alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Orlan W. ROCKMAN et al., Appellants, v. W. H. CARTER et al., Appellees.

No. P-128.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 3, 1972.

Rehearing Denied March 14, 1972.

Moore & Crump, Niceville, for appellants.

James W. Middleton, Fort Walton Beach, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This cause having been orally argued before the Court, the briefs and record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and the appellants having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court appealed from herein is affirmed.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and RAWLS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
#### Lee BROOK, Appellant, v. Margott BROOK, Appellee.

No. 69-942.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 28, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 23



INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No.
333-12313 on Form S-8 and Registration Statement No. 333-62959 on Form S-8 of
Brooktrout Technology, Inc. of our reports dated February 10, 1999, appearing in
and incorporated by reference in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Brooktrout
Technology, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 1998.

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP

Deloitte & Touche LLP
Boston, Massachusetts
March 29, 1999
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION

SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION OF OUR CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

I, Perry Law, certify that:



1.    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Smart-tek Solutions, Inc.;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of

material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements

made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made,

not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial

information included in this report, fairly present in all material

respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of

the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.    The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for

establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as

defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant

and have:



(a)   Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such

disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our

supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the

registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known

to us by others within those entities, particularly during the

period in which this report is being prepared;



(b)   Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls

and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about

the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of

the end of the period covered by this report based on such

evaluation; and



(c)   Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal

control over financial reporting that occurred during the

registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth

quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially

affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the

registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and



5.    The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on

our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,

to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's

board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a)   All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design

or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are

reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to

record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b)   Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or

other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's

internal control over financial reporting.



/s/ Perry Law

------------------------------

Perry Law

Chief Financial Officer



May 18, 2007
#### The State vs. Harrison.

To refuse to conform to the mandate of this Court, when a ease is reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court, is a gross error.

*Appeal from Washington Circuit Court.*

Hon. John M. Wilson, Circuit Judge.

Mr. Attorney General Hollowell, for the State.

Mr. Justice Compton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case was before this Court at January term, 1858, when it was decided that the court below erred in sustaining the motion to quash the indictment. See 19 *Ark.*565.

The judgment was reversed and the cause remanded; and it appears, from the transcript now before us, that the court refused to overrule the motion to quash, notwithstanding the decision and mandate of this court. This was a 'gross error, for which the judgment must be reversed.
II 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1060 

To amend the Public Health Service Act to facilitate emergency medical 

services personnel training and certification curriculums for military veterans. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 23, 2013 

Ms. KLOBUCHAR (for herself and Mr. ENZI) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To amend the Public Health Service Act to facilitate emergency medical services personnel training and certification curriculums for military veterans. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Veterans to Para5 medics Transition Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. GRANTS FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES PER7 SONNEL TRAINING FOR VETERANS. 

8 Section 330J(c) of the Public Health Service Act (42 

9 U.S.C. 254c–15(c)) is amended— 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1060 IS

1 (1) in paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

2 end; 

3 (2) in paragraph (8), by striking the period and 

4 inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

5 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(9) provide to military veterans required 

7 coursework and training that take into account, and 

8 are not duplicative of, previous medical coursework 

9 and training received when such veterans were active 

10 members of the Armed Forces, to enable such vet11 erans to satisfy emergency medical services per12 sonnel certification requirements, as determined by 

13 the appropriate State regulatory entity.’’. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
cc: Hon. Jerome Polaha, District Judge 

Vernon L. Hollis 

Reno City Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACCTED
FROM THE ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          14,718
<SECURITIES>                                   159,710
<RECEIVABLES>                                   29,022
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 203,450
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           15,768
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     187,682
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   203,450
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                17,669
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,532
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 15,137
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             15,137
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    15,137
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Benjamin F. GILFORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-969.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 18, 1974.

Appeal dismissed.
# C_2023104EN.01004404.xml

| 20.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 104/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 104/44

---

Order of the General Court of 31 January 2023 — EAA v Commission

(Case T-782/21) (1)

(2023/C 104/68)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Fourth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 73, 14.2.2022.

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TODD ERROL VASSELL, a/k/a Eric  No. 00-7815 Scott, a/k/a Corey Ryan, a/k/a

Andre Nunes, a/k/a Michael

Derwitt, a/k/a Chris Daley, a/k/a

Tadd Vassell,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge.

(CR-93-81, CA-00-42)

Submitted: September 28, 2001

Decided: November 26, 2001

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Marcia Gail Shein, LAW OFFICE OF MARCIA G. SHEIN, P.C.,

Decatur Georgia; Charles Haden, Hampton, Virginia, for Appellant.

Laura P. Tayman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Todd Vassell appeals a district court’s order denying his motion for

reconsideration of a previous order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2255 (West Supp. 2001) motion. 

The standard of review of the denial of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)

motions on appeal is abuse of discretion. United States v. Holland,

214 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 2000). In order to be entitled to relief

under Rule 60(b), it is incumbent upon the movant to show: (1) mistake; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) that the judgment

is void; (5) that the judgment has been discharged; or (6) any other

reason justifying relief. When the motion raises no new arguments,

but merely requests the district court to reconsider a legal issue or to

change its mind, relief is not authorized. United States v. Williams,

674 F.2d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 1982). 

Because we are limited to review of only the denial of the motion

for reconsideration, and Vassell does nothing more than disagree with

the court’s resolution of his § 2255 motion, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED

2 UNITED STATES v. VASSELL
#### DIXIE AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellant, v. Robert Eugene MORSE, as father and next friend of Jimmie Lee Morse, a minor, et al., Appellees.

No. 73-512.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 5, 1974.

Bradford, Williams, McKay, Kimbrell, Hamann & Jennings, Miami, and Thomas E. Scott, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Nichols & Nichols and Michael P. Ma-guire; Wicker, Smith, Pyszka, Blomqvist & Davant, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Boston Insurance Company v. Smith, Fla.App.1963, 149 So.2d 68.
#### Freddie Lee SILLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-462.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 24, 1971.

Appeal dismissed.
Exhibit 23.1

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (Form S-3
Nos. 333-110460, 333-115724, 333-15933, 333-24187 and 333-28415) of Magnetek, Inc. and in the related Prospectuses, and in the
Registration Statements (Form S-8 Nos. 33-58929, 333-04021, 333-17889, 333-45935, 333-45939,
333-90645, 333-90647, 333-75418, 333-129362 and 333-146898) pertaining to the Amended and Restated 1989 Incentive Stock Compensation Plan of
Magnetek, Inc., Magnetek, Inc. Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan, Magnetek, Inc. Deferral Investment Plan, Magnetek, Inc. 1997 Non-Employee
Director Stock Option Plan, Magnetek, Inc. Amended and Restated Director Compensation and Deferral Investment Plan, 1999 Stock Incentive Plan of Magnetek, Inc., 2000 Employee Stock Plan
of Magnetek, Inc., Magnetek, Inc. Employee Stock Purchase Plan and 1999 Stock Incentive Plan of Magnetek, Inc., 2004 Stock Incentive Plan of Magnetek, Inc. and Executive
Employment Agreement for Thomas G. Boren, and the Amended and Restated Director and Officer Compensation and Deferral Investment Plan, of our reports dated August 25, 2008, with respect to the
consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of Magnetek, Inc. listed in Item 15(a), Magnetek, Inc. management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal
control over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Magnetek, Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the
year ended June 29, 2008.

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP


Milwaukee,
Wisconsin
August 25, 2008

---



QuickLinks
#### William ROEMELMEYER, as Trustee for Tamarac Golf Club, Inc., and Oak Hills Country Club, Inc., an Ohio corporation, Appellants, v. ARVIDA CORPORATION, etc., Appellee.

No. 1648.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Sept. 29. 1967.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Palm Beach County is hereby dismissed as to Roemel-meyer only; Hugh MacMillan, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Billie Schaefer DeYOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Raymond DeYOUNG, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10834.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 30, 1967.

Rehearing Denied July 27, 1967.

Bodenheimer & Jones, Shreveport, for appellant.

Coen & Pliner, Shreveport, for appellee.

Before HARDY, GLADNEY, and AYRES, JJ.

AYRES, Judge.

Plaintiff, by this action, sought a judgment of separation “a mensa et thoro” from her husband, custody of her two minor children, and an award for support of herself and the children. From a judgment rejecting her demands, plaintiff appealed.

The issue presented is purely factual in character. Appellant asserts that the record supports a conclusion that defendant, on numerous occasions, Had not only been guilty of using violent and abusive language but had actually committed physical assault upon her. Therefore, it is contended that the court erred in holding that: first, plaintiff had not established her case by a clear preponderance of evidence; second, unsupported accusations of infidelity did not constitute cruelty sufficient to justify a separation; and, third, defendant’s act of striking plaintiff did not constitute sufficient cruelty to warrant a judgment in her favor.

From a brief statement of the trial court, dictated into the record, it appears plaintiff’s demands were rejected because they had not been established by a clear preponderance of the evidence. From our review of the evidence, and in consideration of its irreconcilable character, there does not appear to be any basis for a conclusion of error on the part of the trial court. While there was evidence that a minor physical assault had occurred a few years prior to their separation, the evidence shows that defendant apologized, expressed his regret, and promised not to repeat his wrongful acts. The parties continued to live together thereafter until the separation upon which this action is based.

No good purpose would be served by reviewing the testimony in detail. It suffices, we think, to state that the conclusion reached by the trial court, that plaintiff had not established her case by a clear preponderance of the evidence, is correct.

Accordingly, for these reasons, the judgment appealed is affirmed at plaintiff-appellant’s costs.

Affirmed.
#### Robert E. GALLOWAY, Appellant, v. CENTRAL FLORIDA LINCOLN-MERCURY, LEASING DIVISION, a Florida corporation, Oscar P. Reedy and Donald K. Hanson, and Reedy-Hanson Carpets, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.

No. 70-674.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 17, 1971.

Rehearing Denied April 5, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>



                                                                      Exhibit 32


                   CERTIFICATION ACCOMPANYING PERIODIC REPORT
           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                              (18 U.S.C. SS. 1350)

The undersigned, Eric Claus, President and Chief Executive Officer of The Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. ("Company"), and Brenda M. Galgano, Senior
Vice President, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies
that (1) the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended
December 2, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (2) the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
the results of operations of the Company.




Dated:  January 9, 2007                        /s/ Eric Claus
                                               --------------
                                               Eric Claus
                                               President and
                                               Chief Executive Officer




Dated:  January 9, 2007                        /s/ Brenda M. Galgano
                                               ---------------------
                                               Brenda M. Galgano
                                               Senior Vice President,
                                               Chief Financial Officer















                                       71
#### Eugene JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-842.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 15, 1972.

Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, and D. Turner Matthews, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and David Luther Woodward, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PIERCE, Chief Judge.

In this case appellant Eugene Jones was, on December 17, 1968, informed against in the Manatee County Court of Record for the offense of armed robbery. On December 19, 1968, he pleaded guilty to said charge, was adjudged guilty, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On December 16, 1970, he filed in the trial Court his motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and sentence under the post-conviction rule and on October 18, 1971, this 2nd District Court granted him an evidentiary hearing upon such motion. On November 15, 1971, the evidentiary hearing was held before the local Court of Record, resulting in an order being entered in said Court on November 24, 1971, dismissing the motion to vacate. Notice of appeal brings the order of denial to this Court.

In the meantime appellant Jones has filed herein a motion to have his Court-appointed counsel representing him on this appeal discharged and has advised this Court that he will “submit his own brief in lieu of one on behalf of him by his Court-appointed attorney”. We thereupon entered order allowing Jones 30 days therefrom within which to file any additional brief he desired “calling the Court’s attention to any matters that he feels should be considered in connection with the appeal in this cause”. Thereupon appellant’s said counsel has retyped verbatim appellant’s handwritten copy of brief submitted to his counsel on *420this appeal and has filed the same here. This Court has now given due consideration thereto, as well as all other records in the appeal file here.

It appears that appellant Jones has presented nothing of substance to this Court that would warrant or justify this Court disturbing the order of the trial Court appealed from. So said order is thereupon—

Affirmed.

HOBSON and McNULTY, JJ., concur.
#### STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Petitioner, v. James T. CARRICO, Jr., and Mayme Carrico, Respondents.

No. 36711.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 29, 1968.

*15Carey, Dwyer, Austin, Cole & Sel wood, Miami, for petitioner.

Saunders, Curtis, Ginestra & Gore, Ft. Lauderdale, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks review of a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, because of an alleged conflict with the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District in Tuggle v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 185 So.2d 487 (D.C.A.3d, Fla.1966). Since the filing of the petition for certiorari in the instant case, we have quashed the order of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Tuggle. See Tuggle v. Government Employees Insurance Company, Fla., 207 So.2d 674, opinion filed January 31, 1968. Therefore, on the authority of our opinion in Tuggle, supra, the petition for certiorari herein is hereby denied.

The respondents have moved for an award of a reasonable fee for the services of their attorneys in this Court. The petition for certiorari has been denied for lack of jurisdiction without the necessity of a brief on the merits or oral argument. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 627.-0127, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. (Section 1, Chapter 67-400, Laws of Florida) the respondents are awarded the sum of $250.00 as a reasonable fee for their attorneys to be paid by the petitioner.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, DREW, THORNAL and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

CALDWELL, C. J., and THOMAS and ERVIN, JJ., dissent as to attorneys’ fees.