alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JOHNNY JARAMILLO, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-10249 

D.C. No. 

1:18-cr-00014-LJO-SKO-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 26, 2020**

Before: McKEOWN, RAWLINSON, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Johnny Jaramillo appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges 

the 120-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for transfer 

of a firearm to a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1); possession of an 

unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); and possession of 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 30 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-10249 

firearms after suffering a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 

affirm.

Jaramillo argues that the district court deprived him of constitutionally 

effective counsel when it improperly denied his second motion for substitution of 

counsel. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Jaramillo’s motion. See United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 942 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and three-factor test). The record 

reflects that the district court adequately questioned Jaramillo and appointed 

counsel, and had a sufficient basis for reaching an informed decision. See id. at 

942-43. The record further reflects “some level of conflict” between Jaramillo and 

his counsel, but not an “extensive, irreconcilable conflict” that substantially 

interfered with the relationship. See id. at 943 (internal quotations omitted); see 

also United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 844 (9th Cir. 2003) (it is “wellsettled” that disagreements over strategic decisions are insufficient to warrant 

substitution of counsel). 

AFFIRMED.
#### Mrs. Victoria Moussa LANDRY, Etc. v. William B. LANDRY.

No. 4545.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Aug. 24, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 6, 1971.

David H. Seelig, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.

Thomas J. Kliebert, Becnel & Kliebert, Gramercy, for defendant-appellee.

Before REDMANN, GULOTTA and STOULIG, JJ.

REDMANN, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal on exceptions of her action for child support.

The exception grounded on improper venue was properly maintained.

Defendant resides in St. Charles Parish. The general rule of C.C.P. art. 42(1) requires suit against an individual to be brought at his domicile. This independent action (not part of a separation or divorce or custody case) was brought in Orleans Parish. None of the statutory exceptions to C.C.P. art. 42 is claimed to be applicable.

Plaintiff’s theory relies on Lucas v. Lucas, 195 So.2d 771 (La.App.1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 539, 197 So.2d 81, for a view that pleading other matters than objection to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction constitutes a general appearance and waives that objection to jurisdiction. Regardless of the ultimate import of Lucas (see Tate, Work of Louisiana Appellate Courts, Procedure, 1968, 28 La.L.Rev. 386), we are here concerned not with jurisdiction (not even over the person) but with venue. Nor do we have here a peremptory exception co-pleaded, as plaintiff argues.

*550The objection to venue is a declina-tory exception which “shall be filed at the same time” as the dilatory (if both are to be filed), C.C.P. art. 928. Expressly complying with art. 928, defendant also filed the dilatory exception, C.C.P. art. 926, alleging unauthorized use of summary proceeding. The only other ground stated, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (based on the St. Charles court having continuing jurisdiction since its earlier support decree), was an objection required to be pleaded in the declinatory exception or else waived, C.C.P. art. 925.

Plaintiff argues that the last objection is in substance a peremptory exception of no right or cause of action, and argues (rightly or wrongly) from Lucas, supra, that filing a peremptory exception waives the declinatory exception of venue. Plaintiff’s characterization of the last objection is erroneous; its whole thrust is that the St. Charles court retains (exclusive?) jurisdiction and that the cause of action should be there asserted.

We rule only on the exception on ground of improper venue, which was correctly maintained.

The judgment is affirmed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

IN RE: UPSET SALE, TAX CLAIM BUREAU OF TIOGA COUNTY, CONTROL NO. 012488 (MARTIN J. OSTAPOWICZ)

PETITION OF: MARTIN J. OSTAPOWICZ :

:

:

:

:

: No. 62 MAL 2024

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Commonwealth

Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 1 st day of July, 2024, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

GRANTED . The issue, as stated by petitioner, is:

(1) Did the courts below err in affirming a county tax sale of real estate where the successful bid at the sale of [p]etitioner’s home was approximately 18 percent of its appraised fair market value?

The parties are requested to discuss First Federal Savings and Loan Association

of Lanc aster v. Swift , 321 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1974), in their briefing to this Court.
#### NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO. OF PITTSBURG, PA., Appellant, v. Roxie Irene SMITH, Appellee.

No. 1282.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Sept. 29, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1967.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Pedro De La Rosa and * From the 441st District Court

Angelina De La Rosa, of Midland County,

Trial Court No. CV52579

.

Vs. No. 11

- 19

- 00 1 23

- C V * April 8 , 20 2 1

Basic Energy Services, L.P., * Memorandum Op inion by Trotter, J.

by and through its General (P anel consists of: Bailey, C. J.

, Partner, Basic Energy Services Trotter , J., and Williams, J.)

GP, LLC,

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that t here is

error in the order below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, we

reverse the trial court’s order and remand th e cause to the trial court for further

proceedings. The costs incurred by reason of this appeal are taxed against Basic

Energy Services, L.P., by and through its General Partner, Basic Energy Services

GP, LLC.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RE: REAPPOINTMENT TO COURT OF

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

 

:

:

:

No. 645

SUPREME COURT RULES DOCKET

 O R D E R

PER CURIAM:

AND NOW, this 15th day of August, 2014, The Honorable Charles A. 

Clement, Jr., Cumberland County, is hereby reappointed as a member of the Court of 

Judicial Discipline for a term expiring April 8, 2015.
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. ENCORE, INC., a Florida corporation, et al., Relators, v. Honorable Thomas E. LEE, Jr., Judge of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit In and for Dade County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 72-502.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 25, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Prohibition dismissed.
IV 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 733 

Expressing support for designation of the month of September as ‘‘Clinical 

Research Innovation Month’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 17, 2014 

Mr. PETERS of California (for himself, Mr. VARGAS, Ms. MATSUI, and Ms. 

BASS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing support for designation of the month of 

September as ‘‘Clinical Research Innovation Month’’. 

Whereas Clinical Research Organizations (CROs) provide 

specially designed services which are fundamental to the 

development of drugs, biologics, and medical devices that 

improve the general health and well-being of the people 

of the United States; 

Whereas CROs have more than doubled in size over the past 

decade; 

Whereas the number of studies conducted by CROs has increased by over 500 percent over the past 8 years; 

Whereas CROs conduct 80 percent of the experimental research for innovative new drugs; 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HRES 733 IH 

Whereas CROs contribute more than 100,000 professional research jobs to the global innovation economy; 

Whereas these cutting-edge research organizations undertake 

approximately two-thirds of business activity for biopharmaceutical development, demonstrating their critical 

involvement in the pharmaceutical, biotech, and medical 

device industries; 

Whereas of the 88 new drugs to receive Food and Drug Administration and Emergency Medical Associates approval 

last year, 85 of them were manufactured by CROs; 

Whereas CROs research medical solutions to combat diseases 

such as breast cancer, Alzheimer’s Disease, hepatitis, diabetes, asthma, and hypertension; 

Whereas CROs have conducted thousands of clinical trials involving over 1,000,000 patients as they strive to tackle 

the world’s most pressing medical issues through innovative clinical research; and 

Whereas the month of September would be an appropriate 

time to designate as ‘‘Clinical Research Innovation 

Month’’: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 

2 (1) supports the designation of ‘‘Clinical Re3 search Innovation Month’’; 

4 (2) recognizes the considerable contributions of 

5 Clinical Research Organizations to the United 

6 States; and 

7 (3) honors these organizations, which will con8 tinue to inspire innovation in future generations. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
# C_2022432EN.01000501.xml

| 14.11.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 432/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.11.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 432/5

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 29 September 2022 — ABLV Bank AS, in liquidation v Single Resolution Board (SRB), European Commission

(Case C-202/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Economic and monetary policy - Banking union - Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 - Single resolution mechanism for credit institutions and certain investment firms - Single Resolution Fund - Annual contributions - Liquidation of a credit institution - Reimbursement of contributions paid - Pro rata temporis)

(2022/C 432/05)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: ABLV Bank AS, in liquidation (represented by: O. Behrends, Rechtsanwalt)

Other parties to the proceedings: Single Resolution Board (SRB) (represented by: C.J. Flynn and J. Kerlin, acting as Agents, and by S. Ianc, T. Klupsch, B. Meyring and S. Schelo, Rechtsanwälte), European Commission (represented by: A. Nijenhuis, A. Steiblytė and D. Triantafyllou, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders ABLV Bank AS, in liquidation, to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders ABLV Bank AS, in liquidation, to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the European Commission.

---

(1)  OJ C 217, 7.6.2021.

---
#### Hidden Ponds of Ontario, Inc., Appellant-Respondent, v Estate of Gregory Hresent, Deceased, Respondent-Appellant.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[654 NYS2d 532]

Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs in accordance with the following Memorandum: Supreme Court properly rejected defendant’s counterclaim for unpaid rent and counsel fees. The court’s determination that defendant breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment is supported by the record *(see, Hidden Ponds v Hresent*[appeal No. 2], 209 AD2d 1025). Because plaintiff was justified in abandoning the premises, defendant is not entitled to unpaid rent for the remainder of the lease term *(see generally,*74 NY Jur 2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 369) or counsel fees.

Further, the court properly determined that plaintiff was entitled only to nominal damages of $1 *(see, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v 9 Ave. 31-St. Corp.,*274 NY 388, 403, *mot to amend remittitur granted*274 NY 636; *see generally,*74 NY Jur 2d, *op. cit.,*§ 270). A tenant may recover special, or consequential, damages for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment "provided they are proximate in effect, and are not speculative or uncertain in character and were fairly within the contemplation of the parties when the lease was made, or might have been foreseen as a consequence of a breach of its covenants” *(Friedland v Myers,*139 NY 432, 436; *see generally,*74 NY Jur 2d, *op. cit.,*§ 271). Thus, where a landlord breaches the covenant by *879failing to deliver possession, the tenant may recover the start-up costs for alteration or repair of the premises or for moving into the premises *(Friedland v Myers,*supra;*see generally,*74 NY Jur 2d, *op. cit,*§ 271). Defendant delivered possession, and more than one year elapsed before plaintiff abandoned the premises because of the breach. Under the circumstances, plaintiff did not sustain damages related to start-up costs, and, in any event, plaintiff failed to establish that it suffered damages for any expenditure it made for start-up costs. Further, plaintiff failed to establish that it sustained damages proximately caused by the breach at the time it abandoned the premises. It submitted no proof of the depreciated value of equipment or supplies removed from the premises at the time of abandonment and failed to establish that it suffered a loss of profit.

The court erred, however, in awarding costs to plaintiff. The action, but for the amount of damages claimed, could have been commenced in Wayne County Court. Plaintiff did not recover damages in excess of $500 and, thus, CPLR 8102 (2) precludes an award of costs. Nevertheless, the court may award disbursements even though plaintiff is not entitled to costs *(see,*CPLR 8301 [c]). Thus, we modify the judgment by vacating the award of costs in the sum of $700. (Appeals from Judgment of Supreme Court, Wayne County, Strobridge, J.—Damages.) Present—Denman, P. J., Green, Pine, Balio and Boehm, JJ.
# C_2022128EN.01000601.xml

| 21.3.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 128/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.3.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 128/6

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 1 December 2021 — W. Sp. z o. o. v Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Łodzi

(Case C-729/21)

(2022/C 128/08)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in the appeal on a point of law: W. Sp. z o. o.

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Łodzi

Questions referred

| 1. | Must the provisions of EU law concerning VAT be interpreted as allowing the application of a provision of national law — such as Article 6(1) of the ustawa o podatku od towarów i usług (Law on the tax on goods and services) of 11 March 2004 (Dz. U. of 2021, item 685; ‘the Law on VAT’) — which excludes taxation of a supply of an organised part of an undertaking without making the application of that exclusion subject to the condition referred to in Article 19 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax ..., (1) that is to say, legal succession between the seller and the purchaser? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must the provisions of EU law concerning VAT be interpreted as allowing the application of a provision of national law — such as Article 6(1) of the ustawa o podatku od towarów i usług (Law on the tax on goods and services) of 11 March 2004 (Dz. U. of 2021, item 685; ‘the Law on VAT’) — which excludes taxation of a supply of an organised part of an undertaking without making the application of that exclusion subject to the condition referred to in Article 19 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax ..., (1) that is to say, legal succession between the seller and the purchaser?

| 2. | If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, do all the assets of that organised part of the seller’s property have to be transferred for the exclusion referred to in Article 6(1) of the Law on VAT to apply and does a change in this respect (in particular the non-conclusion of agreements concerning the insurance and management of the property being transferred) mean that there has been a taxable supply of goods? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, do all the assets of that organised part of the seller’s property have to be transferred for the exclusion referred to in Article 6(1) of the Law on VAT to apply and does a change in this respect (in particular the non-conclusion of agreements concerning the insurance and management of the property being transferred) mean that there has been a taxable supply of goods?

---

(1)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

---
<PAGE>   1



EXHIBIT 11 - STATEMENTS RE:  COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS


                           COMMUNITY BANCSHARES, INC.
                   COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE

The following tabulation presents the calculation of primary and fully diluted
earnings per common share for the years ended December 31, 1998, 1997 and 1996.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                               1998          1997          1996
                                                                          -------------  ------------ -------------

<S>                                                                       <C>            <C>          <C>
Reported net income....................................................   $   3,579,493  $  3,512,278 $   3,458,986
                                                                          =============  ============ =============

Earnings on common shares..............................................   $   3,579,493  $  3,512,278 $   3,458,986
                                                                          =============  ============ =============

Weighted average common shares outstanding - basic.....................       3,994,798     3,807,232     3,727,506
                                                                          =============  ============ =============

Earnings per common share- basic
  Income from continuing operations....................................   $         .90  $        .92 $         .93
                                                                          =============  ============ =============

  Net income............................................................  $         .90  $        .92 $         .93
                                                                          =============  ============ =============

Weighted average common shares outstanding - diluted....................      4,052,259     3,830,231     3,727,506
                                                                          =============  ============ =============

Earnings per common share- diluted
  Income from continuing operations.....................................  $         .88  $        .92 $         .93
                                                                          =============  ============ =============

  Net income............................................................  $         .88  $        .92 $         .93
                                                                          =============  ============ =============
</TABLE>






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                                       162
# C_2022244EN.01002902.xml

| 27.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 244/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 244/29

---

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Kanyama v Council

(Case T-105/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/38)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Célestin Kanyama (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M.-C. Cadilhac and H. Marcos Fraile, acting as Agents)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mr Célestin Kanyama to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr Célestin Kanyama to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

---
#### Brooklyn Bailey HAYDEN and Mrs. Mayme Belle Sanders Hayden v. Peter TORRENCE and Cumis Insurance Society, Inc.

No. 61978.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 5, 1978.

In re: Cumis Insurance Society Inc. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Tangipahoa. 355 So.2d 1362.

Denied.