alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### SCOTT FENCE & INSULATION CO., Inc. v. Mrs. Shirley BOUDRO.

No. 4566.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Sept. 10, 1971.

Garrett, Carl & Roussel, James H. Leveque, III, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.

McBride & Tonry, T. M. McBride, III, Chalmette, for defendant-appellee.

Before REDMANN, GULOTTA and BOUT ALL, JJ.

REDMANN, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal on the merits of its suit for the contract price of a fence.

The trial judge’s narrative of the facts (in lieu of transcript, C.C.P. art. 2131) is that, as photographs show, one whole side of the fence was located on public property over two feet from defendant’s property line; the fence did not inclose her air conditioner ; and the tops of its vertical boards were not picket-shaped as specified in the contract. Defendant’s uncontradicted testimony was that her agreement with plaintiff’s salesman was that the fence was to *459be installed on the same lines as a hurricane-destroyed one. Because of hurricane damage her home was unoccupied and she was not there when construction occurred.

While plaintiff argues the contract’s stipulation that it is the owner’s responsibility to locate the fence line, defendant’s testimony of her agreement with the salesman indicates she discharged that responsibility. The trial court noted that the salesman was not called as a witness although plaintiff’s manager admitted notice of mislocation of the fence and the salesman had been listed on pre-trial documents as a possible witness for plaintiff. We conclude the circumstances justified the trial judge’s , conclusion that the mis-location was not attributable to defendant.

Plaintiff relies on the principle derived from C.C. art. 2769 that a contractor who has substantially performed is entitled to recover the contract price less whatever damages the owner may prove attributable to incomplete performance; Airco Refr. Serv. v. Fink, 242 La. 73, 134 So.2d 880 (1961). However, as Fink noted at 134 So.2d 882, “Substantial performance of the contract is essential to warrant the application of this rule of law.” Where substantial performance is absent, the contractor “is not entitled to recover under the contract itself”; Town & Country Contr’s v. Henderson, 231 La. 131, 90 So.2d 863 (1956).

We concur with the trial court that plaintiff did not substantially perform its contract. We view plaintiff’s performance as if it had merely constructed the fence on one side line and the rear. Even without the two other deficiencies, this performance could not be considered substantial completion of the fence contracted for.

Presumably the fence as erected may have some value to defendant, but the trial judge correctly refused to attempt a quantum meruit judgment (not alternatively sought by the petition in any case) for lack of evidence from which the amount defendant may owe plaintiff could have been decided.

The judgment is affirmed.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1

                             WEBLINK WIRELESS, INC.
                    COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS (LOSS)

<Table>
<Caption>
                                                                        SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 2001
                                                            ------------------------------------------------------
                                                                NUMBER               PERCENT          EQUIVALENT
                                                               OF SHARES           OUTSTANDING          SHARES
                                                            --------------        ------------      --------------
<S>                                                         <C>                   <C>              <C>
COMMON STOCK
   From Founders' Stock                                          2,300,000              100.00%          2,300,000
   Stock Options Exercised                                       2,508,997              100.00%          2,508,997
   Preferred Stock Converted to Common Stock                    15,310,943              100.00%         15,310,943
   1994 Common Stock Offerings                                  11,242,857              100.00%         11,242,857
   1995 Common Stock Offerings                                   4,323,874              100.00%          4,323,874
   1996 Common Stock Offering                                    6,000,000              100.00%          6,000,000
   1999 Treasury Stock Transaction                                  (6,588)             100.00%             (6,588)
   March 2000 Debt Swap                                          3,789,715              100.00%          3,789,715
   Canadian Transaction                                            714,286              100.00%            714,286
   Employee Stock Purchase Plan Shares Issued                      190,651              100.00%            190,651
   Warrants Exercised                                              134,737              100.00%            134,737
                                                            --------------                          --------------
                                                                46,509,472                              46,509,472

WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING                                                                     46,509,472

NET LOSS                                                                                               (72,897,000)

NET LOSS PER SHARE                                                                                  $        (1.57)
                                                                                                    ==============
</Table>
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-09-091-CV

F & R AUTO, INC.	APPELLANT

	V.

ARLINGTON INDEPENDENT 

SCHOOL DISTRICT, CITY OF 

ARLINGTON, TARRANT COUNTY, 

TARRANT COUNTY COLLEGE 

DISTRICT, AND TARRANT 

COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT	APPELLEES

	------------

	FROM THE 236TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	Appellant F & R Auto, Inc. attempts to appeal from the trial court’s final judgment in favor of Appellees Arlington Independent School District, City of Arlington, Tarrant County, Tarrant County College District, and Tarrant County Hospital District.  The trial court’s judgment was signed on December 18, 2008.  F & R Auto did not file a motion for new trial.  The notice of appeal was therefore due on January 19, 2009, but it was not filed until March 16, 2009.  See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1.

	On March 24, 2009, we notified F & R Auto of our concern that this court may not have jurisdiction over the appeal and informed it that unless it or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed with the court a response showing a reasonable explanation for the late filing of the notice of appeal, this appeal would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.2  See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3(b), 42.3(a).  F & R Auto filed a response, but it does not state grounds for exercising jurisdiction over the appeal.  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.  See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

							PER CURIAM

PANEL:  MEIER, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and LIVINGSTON, J.

DELIVERED:	April 23, 2009
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEETS AND STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE COMPANY'S 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1995, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000754591
<NAME> RAY ELLISON MORTGAGE ACCEPTANCE CORP.
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                           3,956
<SECURITIES>                               438,914,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,621,207
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             459,002,488
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,604,421
<BONDS>                                    429,652,000
<COMMON>                                        10,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  19,687,087
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               459,002,488
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            41,827,300
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               40,009,996
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          34,756,988
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,817,304
<INCOME-TAX>                                   349,792
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,467,512
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,467,512
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   146.75
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   146.75
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 21

                        Subsidiaries of the Registrant

                                                          State or
                                                       Jurisdiction of
  Name of Subsidiary                                    Incorporation
  ------------------                                    -------------

MSC Pre Finish Metals Inc.                                Illinois

MSC Pre Finish Metals (EGV) Inc.                          Delaware

MSC Pre Finish Metals (MV) Inc.                           Delaware

MSC Pre Finish Metals (MT) Inc.                           Delaware

MSC Walbridge Coatings Inc.                               Delaware

MSC Specialty Films, Inc.                                 California

MSC Laminates and Composites Inc.                         Delaware

MSC Laminates and Composites (EGV) Inc.                   Delaware

Material Sciences Foreign Sales Corporation               U. S. Virgin Islands

Solar-Gard International, Inc.                            Florida

MSC Specialty Films (UK) Limited                          United Kingdom

MSC Specialty Films (Canada) Inc.                         Canada

MSC Specialty Films (Australasia) Pty. Limited            Australia

Solar-Gard (SEA) Pte., Ltd.                               Singapore

Pro Marketing, Inc.                                       Nebraska

MSC Specialty Films de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.               Mexico

Specialty Films Services Company, S.A. de C.V.            Mexico

MSC Pinole Point Steel Inc.                               Delaware

MSC Pre Finish Metals (PP) Inc.                           Delaware

                                      36
IV 

House Calendar No. 6 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 99 

[Report No. 113–12] 

Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 933) making appropriations 

for the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, 

and other departments and agencies for the fiscal year ending September 

30, 2013, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 5, 2013 

Mr. COLE of Oklahoma, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following 

resolution; which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed 

RESOLUTION 

Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 933) making 

appropriations for the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and other departments 

and agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 

2013, and for other purposes. 

1 Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution 

2 it shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 

3 933) making appropriations for the Department of De4 fense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and other demstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS

2 

•HRES 99 RH 

1 partments and agencies for the fiscal year ending Sep2 tember 30, 2013, and for other purposes. All points of 

3 order against consideration of the bill are waived. The 

4 amendment printed in the report of the Committee on 

5 Rules accompanying this resolution shall be considered as 

6 adopted. The bill, as amended, shall be considered as read. 

7 All points of order against provisions in the bill, as amend8 ed, are waived. The previous question shall be considered 

9 as ordered on the bill, as amended, and on any amendment 

10 thereto to final passage without intervening motion except: 

11 (1) one hour of debate equally divided and controlled by 

12 the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee 

13 on Appropriations; and (2) one motion to recommit with 

14 or without instructions. 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS

House Calendar No. 6 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 99 

[Report No. 113–12] 

RESOLUTION 

Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 933) 

purposes. year ending September 30, 2013, and for other and other departments and agencies for the fiscal Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, making appropriations for the Department of 

MARCH 5, 2013 

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Vincent J. WATERHOUSE, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 42249.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 24, 1972.

Upon consideration of the Motion to Dismiss filed by attorney for respondent, it is ordered that said motion is granted and this cause be and the same is hereby dismissed. See Rule 4.5c (6) Florida Appellate Rules.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
1 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont 

__________________ 

NO. 09-21-00318-CR 

__________________ 

KYLE GENE CHISM, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

__________________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the 356th District Court 

Hardin County, Texas 

Trial Cause No. 25532 

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 In an open plea, appellant Kyle Gene Chism pleaded guilty to evading arrest 

or detention with a motor vehicle. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial 

court found the two prior felonies included in the enhancement paragraphs in the 

State’s Notice of Intent to Enhance to be true and assessed Chism’s punishment at 

thirty-two years of confinement. 

 Chism’s appellate counsel filed an Anders brief that presents counsel’s 

professional evaluation of the record and concludes that the appeal is frivolous. See 
2 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1978). On January 5, 2002, we granted an extension of time for Chism 

to file a pro se brief. Chism filed a pro se letter in response. The Court of Criminal 

Appeals has held that we need not address the merits of issues raised in Anders briefs 

or pro se responses. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005). Rather, an appellate court may determine either: (1) “that the appeal is wholly 

frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it has reviewed the record and finds 

no reversible error[;]” or (2) “that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand the 

cause to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the issues.” Id. 

 We have determined the appeal is wholly frivolous. We have independently 

reviewed the appellate record, and we agree with counsel’s conclusion that no 

arguable issues support the appeal. See id. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order 

appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 

503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

 AFFIRMED. 

_________________________

 W. SCOTT GOLEMON 

 Chief Justice 

Submitted on April 19, 2022 

Opinion Delivered May 18, 2022 

Do Not Publish 

Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ. 

1

Chism may challenge our decision in this case by filing a petition for 

discretionary review. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.
Exhibit 32

Certifications of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer Section 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of Material
Sciences Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 29, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Clifford D. Nastas, Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

Dated: May 29, 2008



By:

/s/    CLIFFORD D. NASTASClifford D. NastasChief Executive Officer


In connection with the Report, I, James M. Froisland, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer,
Chief Information Officer and Corporate Secretary of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

Dated: May 29, 2008



By:

/s/    JAMES M. FROISLANDJames M. FroislandSenior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer
and Corporate Secretary




1
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Tyronne BURRELL.

No. 53213.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Mar. 1, 1973.

In re: Tyronne Burrell applying for remedial writs.

Writ granted. Subpoena duces tecum ordered issued, with full rights of state reserved.

SANDERS, J., is of the opinion that the ruling of the trial judge is correct.

SUMMERS, J., objects to this ex parte order for production of the State’s evidence.
# C_2022266EN.01000701.xml

| 11.7.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 266/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 266/7

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 19 May 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione — Italy) — Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL), Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) v Ryanair DAC

(Case C-33/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Migrant workers - Social security - Legislation applicable - Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 - Article 14(2)(a)(i) and (ii) - Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 - Article 11(5) - Article 13(1)(a) and (b) - Concept of ‘operating base’ - Flight and cabin crew - Workers employed in the territory of two or more Member States - Connecting factors)

(2022/C 266/08)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL), Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS)

Defendant: Ryanair DAC

Operative part of the judgment

Article 14(2)(a)(i) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, in the version amended and updated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 1996, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 631/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004, Article 13(1)(a) and Article 87(8) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 988/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009, and subsequently by Regulation (EU) No 465/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012, and Article 11(5) of Regulation No 883/2004, as amended by Regulation No 465/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that the social security legislation applicable to the flight and cabin crew of an airline, established in a Member State, which crew is not covered by E101 certificates and which work for 45 minutes per day in premises intended to be used by staff, known as the ‘crew room’, which that airline has in the territory of another Member State in which that flight and cabin crew reside and, which for the remaining working time, are on board that airline’s aircraft is the legislation of the latter Member State.

---

(1)  OJ C 110, 29.3.2021.

---
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1236

To reauthorize the National Women’s Business Council, and for other

purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 15 (legislative day, JUNE 30), 1993

Mr. MITCHELL (for himself and Mr. BUMPERS) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Small Business

A BILL

To reauthorize the National Women’s Business Council, and

for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘National Women’s

5 Business Council Reauthorization Act of 1993’’.

6 SEC. 2. MEMBERSHIP.

7 (a) NEW MEMBERS.—Section 403 of the Women’s

8 Business Ownership Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 631 note) is

9 amended—

10 (1) in subsection (a)—
2

•S 1236 IS

1 (A) by striking ‘‘nine’’ and inserting ‘‘elev2 en’’;

3 (B) in paragraph (1), by inserting ‘‘, the

4 Secretary of Labor (or such Secretary’s dep5 uty),’’ after ‘‘(or such Secretary’s deputy)’’;

6 (C) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ at

7 the end of the paragraph;

8 (D) in paragraph (3), by striking the pe9 riod at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and

10 (E) by adding at the end the following new

11 paragraph:

12 ‘‘(4) one member shall be appointed by the

13 President.’’.

14 (b) TERMS OF CURRENT MEMBERS.—Any member

15 appointed under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 403(a)

16 of the Women’s Business Ownership Act of 1988 (15

17 U.S.C. 631 note) and serving prior to the date of enact18 ment of this Act shall continue to serve until the expira19 tion of the term for which the member was appointed.

20 SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION.

21 Section 407 of the Women’s Business Ownership Act

22 of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 631 note) is amended to read as fol23 lows:
3

•S 1236 IS

1 ‘‘SEC. 407. AUTHORIZATION.

2 ‘‘(a) There are authorized to be appropriated

3 $500,000 for each of the fiscal years 1994 and 1995.

4 ‘‘(b) New spending authority or authority to enter

5 into contracts as authorized in this Act shall be effective

6 only to such extent and in such amounts as are provided

7 in advance in appropriation Acts.

8 ‘‘(c) This title shall cease to be effective 2 years after

9 the date of enactment of the National Women’s Business

10 Council Reauthorization Act of 1993.’’.

Æ
#### Edward CHARLES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-408.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 22, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.