alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### MID-STATES INSURANCE COMPANY et al. v. POTOMAC INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 7091.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

June 30, 1967.

Monte J. Ducote, of Schoemann, Gomes & Ducote, New Orleans, for appellants.

J. Louis Watkins, Jr., Watkins & Watkins, Houma, for appellees.

Before LOTTINGER, REID and SAR-TAIN, JJ.

REID, Judge.

This case is a companion case with the case of Thibodaux et al. v. Potomac Insurance Company, La.App., 201 So.2d 159, No. 7089. This case and the appeal in No. 7090 and the Thibodaux No. 7089 were consolidated for trial, separate judgments to be rendered in each and were argued as one case in this Court, separate decision to be reached in each case.

For the reasons set out in our Opinion in Appeal No. 7089 the judgment of the Lower Court in this case is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1164 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1164

  To amend section 2119 of title 18, United States Code, to authorize 
imposition of the death penalty if death results from a carjacking, and 
                          for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                June 25 (legislative day, June 22), 1993

   Mr. Mack introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend section 2119 of title 18, United States Code, to authorize 
imposition of the death penalty if death results from a carjacking, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FEDERAL PENALTIES FOR AUTOMOBILE ROBBERY.

    Section 2119 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as 
follows:
    ``(a) Definition.--In this section, `covered motor vehicle' means a 
motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in 
interstate or foreign commerce.
    ``(b) Offenses.--A person who, while in possession of a firearm (as 
defined in section 921) or other weapon or dangerous device--
            ``(1) intentionally strikes or otherwise makes physical 
        contact with a covered motor vehicle with a motor vehicle 
        operated by the person, with any other thing, or with any part 
        of the person's body, in one of the circumstances described in 
        subsection (c); or
            ``(2) takes a covered motor vehicle from the person or 
        presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, 
        or attempts to do so,
shall be punished under subsection (d).
    ``(c) Circumstances In Which Offense Occurs.--The circumstances 
referred to in subsection (b)(1) are that--
            ``(1) the person makes the contact with the intent to 
        injure an occupant of the motor vehicle or to take or cause 
        damage to the motor vehicle or anything in the motor vehicle; 
        or
            ``(2) in the course of events immediately following the 
        contact, an occupant of the motor vehicle is injured or the 
        motor vehicle or anything in it is taken or damaged.
    ``(d) Penalties.--A person who violates subsection (b) shall--
            ``(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
        15 years, or both;
            ``(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365) 
        results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
        25 years, or both; and
            ``(3) if death results, be fined under this title or 
        imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both, or 
        sentenced to death.''.

                                 <all>
```
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-12-00117-CR

JERRY DON WHATLEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 294th District Court

Van Zandt County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR05-00442

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
2

O RDER

Richard A. Schmidt, Assistant Criminal District Attorney for Van Zandt County, has 

filed a motion to extend time to file the State’s brief in this matter. The brief was due March 22, 

2013.

In his motion, counsel does not provide the Court with a reasonable explanation of the 

need for an extension of time, stating only that he was assigned to complete the appellate brief in 

this case in addition to his normal prosecutorial duties and that he has “been unable to complete 

the . . . brief in the time allotted.” This Court interprets Rule 10.5(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure as requiring counsel to provide the Court with specific information to 

justify a requested extension of time, including the cause numbers of other briefs filed, the dates 

they were filed, the dates of trials, how long those trials are expected to last, etc. Broad, general 

statements do not provide the required facts and are not adequate to meet the requirements of the 

rule. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.5(b)(2).

All future motions to extend time filed with this Court must contain case-specific 

information adequate to justify the request, or they will be denied.

In this instance, we grant the motion for an extension, for a period of thirty days, making 

appellant’s brief now due on or before April 22, 2013. Further requests for extensions will not 

be looked upon with favor.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT

Date: April 2, 2013
256 La. 618

#### A. P. CUNNINGHAM, Ind., etc. et al. v. HARDWARE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY et al.

No. 50687.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 29, 1970.

In re: A. P. Cunningham and Mary M. Cunningham applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 234 So.2d 802.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.
mdla-exhibit109ecpromoti






    Date:  December 21, 2020    Dear Elizabeth Carducci,          It is our great pleasure to congratulate you on your promotion to EVP, Chief Revenue Officer.    As a result of your promotion, the following terms and conditions of your employment will be  modified as follows:    1. Job Title & Manager.  Effective December 14, 2020 your job title will be Chief  Revenue Officer.  You will continue to report to Leslie Stretch, Chief Executive Officer.     2. Compensation.  Effective December 14, 2020  a. Base Salary.  Your annual base salary will be $350,000 USD.  Your annual salary,  less payroll deductions and all required withholdings, will be paid twice monthly  according to Medallia’s normal payroll cycle.  b. Variable Compensation.  You will be eligible for commission under the Company's  sales compensation plan (the "Sales Compensation Plan") in effect at the time a  sale is completed.  Your total annual on-target compensation (including  commission and salary) shall be $ 700,000 USD, assuming 100% achievement to  sales quota during the year.  Any payments, rights or entitlements under the  Sales Compensation Plan will be governed by the terms of the formal plan  documents or policies. The Sales Compensation Plan is subject to change on an  annual basis. Your rights on termination of employment with respect to  commissions will be governed by the termination provisions of the Sales  Compensation Plan. The granting of a payment in any given year or during  several years will not create a precedent for any subsequent years. All  remuneration paid to you will be less any applicable deductions and/or  withholdings, as required by law.     3. Equity.  As a result of your promotion, Medallia recommended to its Board of Directors,  or applicable subcommittee, that you be awarded a target value of $3,000,000 USD in  Medallia, Inc. restricted stock units (RSUs) under Medallia, Inc.'s current Equity  Incentive Plan (“the Plan”). The grant was approved and subject to your continued  employment, the award will vest over three years.  Any approved award of RSUs shall  be issued and governed pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Plan, the grant  notices and the award agreements. Applicable grant agreements and plan documents  will be provided to you accordingly.      





 






With the exception of the foregoing, the terms and conditions of your employment remain  unchanged.      If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.  Congratulations again and  thank you for your contributions to Medallia!     Sincerely,     _________________________________  Mary Ainsworth  EVP, Chief People Officer      _________________________________  Elizabeth Carducci    _________________________________  Date                        12/28/2020
# C_2022303EN.01004401.xml

| 8.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 303/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 303/44

---

Judgment of the General Court of 22 June 2022 — Tequila Revolución v EUIPO — Horizons Group (London) (Revolution Vodka)

(Case T-628/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark Revolution Vodka - Earlier EU word mark TEQUILA REVOLUCIÓN - Relative grounds for refusal - Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Absence of genuine use - Article 47(2) of Regulation 2017/1001)

(2022/C 303/55)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Tequila Revolución S.A.P.I. De C.V. (Mexico City, Mexico) (represented by: M. Pomares Caballero, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Pétrequin and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Horizons Group (London) Ltd (Reading, United Kingdom)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 22 July 2021 (Case R 2266/2020-5).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Tequila Revolución S.A.P.I. De C.V. to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Tequila Revolución S.A.P.I. De C.V. to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 490, 6.12.2021.

---
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

Board of Directors andShareholders of****

**Suffolk Bancorp**

We have issued our reports dated March 15, 2011 (except for Note 1(A) and the related effects thereof as to which the date is December 20, 2011) with respect to the consolidated financial statements anddated March 15, 2011 (except for the matters discussed in paragraphs five through nine of Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting as to which the date is December 20, 2011) with respect to internal control overfinancial reporting included in the Annual Report of Suffolk Bancorp and subsidiaries on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2010. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said reports in the Registration Statement of SuffolkBancorp on Form S-3 (File No. 333-160829, effective July 27, 2009). 

 

/s/GRANT THORNTON LLP 

New York, New York 

****December 20, 2011
#### Marcos Perez JIMENEZ and Wamoco, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellants, v. JOHN B. REID & ASSOCIATES, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 67-167.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Feb. 6, 1968.

Rehearing Denied March 5, 1968.

Walters, Moore & Costanzo and Richard R. Booth, Miami, for appellants.

Hylan H. Kout, Miami Beach, for appel-lee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Retzky v. J. A. Cantor Associates, Inc., Fla.App.1966, 192 So.2d 24; John B. Reid & Associates, Inc. v. Jimenez, Fla.App.1965, 181 So.2d 575; Franklin v. Brown, Fla.App.1964, 159 So.2d 893.

CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., dissents.
# C_2022284EN.01003202.xml

| 25.7.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 284/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.7.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 284/32

---

Order of the General Court of 19 May 2022 — Groschopp v EUIPO (Sustainability through Quality)

(Case T-212/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Revocation of the contested decision - Action which has become devoid of purpose - No need to adjudicate)

(2022/C 284/41)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Groschopp AG Drives & More (Viersen, Germany) (represented by: R. Schiffer, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 February 2021 (Case R 1076/2020-1), concerning an application for registration of the word sign Sustainability through Quality as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

| 2. | The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 217, 7.6.2021.

---
#### J. B. DELMAS v. John S. DELMAS, Jr., Admr. of Estate of John S. Delmas, Deceased.

No. 45372.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 26, 1969.

Ward, Mestayer & Knight, Pascagoula, for appellant.

Dossett, Magruder & Montgomery, Charles L. Brocato, Jackson, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
BALANCE SHEET FOR SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 AND THE STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR
THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                      11,400,566
<SECURITIES>                                 6,064,109
<RECEIVABLES>                               22,456,643
<ALLOWANCES>                                 8,103,226
<INVENTORY>                                    335,658
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            38,189,233
<PP&E>                                      14,969,005
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,714,933
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              52,318,274
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,963,755
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       104,302
<OTHER-SE>                                  47,217,846
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                52,318,274
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            33,680,084
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               13,023,472
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            20,765,773
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             6,866,304
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              65,639
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (6,070,289)
<INCOME-TAX>                               (2,301,264)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,769,025)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,769,025)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.36)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.34)
        

</TABLE>
Section 1350 Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer  Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Medizone International, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:  The Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010 (the Form 10-K) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  Date: February 10, 2011  /s/ Edwin G. MarshallEdwin G. Marshall
Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer
(principal executive officer)
  /s/ Tommy E. AugerTommy E. Auger
Chief Financial Officer
(principal financial and accounting officer)
   A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
# C_2022463EN.01003901.xml

| 5.12.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 463/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.12.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 463/39

---

Judgment of the General Court of 12 October 2022 — H/2 Credit Manager v EUIPO — Hcapital Partners SCR (H/2 CAPITAL PARTNERS)

(Case T-656/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU word mark H/2 CAPITAL PARTNERS - Earlier EU figurative mark HCapital - Relative ground for refusal - Relevant public - Likelihood of confusion - Similarity of the signs - Similarity of the services - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 463/54)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: H/2 Credit Manager LP (Stamford, Connecticut, United States) (represented by: S. Malynicz, Barrister-at-Law, and N. Schmitz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Hcapital Partners SCR, SA (Lisbon, Portugal) (represented by: V. Stilwell de Andrade, lawyer)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 16 July 2021 (Case R 1954/2019-5).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders H/2 Credit Manager LP to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders H/2 Credit Manager LP to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 502, 13.12.2021.

---
**Exhibit
      23.2**




Consent
      of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm










The
      Board
      of Directors


Habersham
      Bancorp:




We
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (Nos.
      33-64149, 33-61587, 33-61589, and 333-48507 ) on Form S-8 and Registration
      Statement No. 333-18023 on Form S-3 of Habersham Bancorp of our report dated
      January 23, 2004, with respect to the consolidated statements of earnings,
      comprehensive income, changes in stockholders’ equity, and cash flows of
      Habersham Bancorp and subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 2003, which
      report appears in the December 31, 2005 annual report on Form 10-K of Habersham
      Bancorp.




KPMG
      LLP




Atlanta,
      Georgia


March
      27,
      2006
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Fennell, Appellant.

[655 NYS2d 972]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Mastro, J.), rendered August 11, 1995, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying his application to permit testimony of an expert in the field of eyewitness identification *(see, People v Mooney,*76 NY2d 827; *People v Kelley,*220 AD2d 456, 457; *People v Wright,*161 AD2d 743; *People v Gibbs,*157 AD2d 799; *People v Foulks,*143 AD2d 1038, 1039). Furthermore, the deficiencies alleged by the defen*460dant with respect to the accuracy of the identification made by the complainant were conveyed to the jury through cross-examination, counsel’s summation, and the court’s charge *(see, People v Wright, supra,*at 744; *People v Gibbs, supra; People v Foulks, supra).*

Moreover, the sentence imposed was not excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Thompson, J. P., Sullivan, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.
#### Delia McNamara, as Administratrix of the Goods, Chattels and Credits of Charles H. McNamara, Deceased, Appellant, *v.*Theodore Rings, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department,

April, 1913.)

Landlord and tenant—lease of building as a private garage—what constitutes an eviction.

Where municipal regulations, after a wooden building has been leased as a private garage, prohibited the issuing of garage permits for buildings not fireproof for storing gasoline, in addition to that contained in the tanks of vehicles, or the storing of motor vehicles except in buildings having a garage permit, the use of a building for a garage is not necessarily prevented so as to constitute an eviction; for while it might be convenient to store gasoline in a public or private garage it cannot be considered necessary in a private garage.

*240Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Brooklyn, fourth district.

Fromme Brothers, for appellant.

Lewis A. Rosen, for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

This was an action for rent. The defense was an eviction caused by a regulation of the municipal explosives commission, passed after the leasing, which it was claimed prohibited the use of the premises for garage purposes.

The only evidence was the lease, testimony that the rent in question had not been paid, that the building was of wood and, therefore, not fire proof, and sections 366 to 370 inclusive of article XI of the regulations of the municipal explosives commission, adopted after the lease was made. There is nothing in the regulations introduced in evidence which necessarily prevents the use of the premises as a garage. It is true that a motor vehicle containing volatile inflammable oil cannot be stored except in a building for which a garage permit shall have been issued. But in the sections of the regulations offered in evidence there appears nothing to prevent a garage permit for these premises, except one allowing the storage of volatile inflammable oil. While it may be convenient to store gasoline in a public or private garage, we cannot say that it is necessary, certainly not in a private garage. The regulations apparently make a difference between keeping motor vehicles containing volatile inflammable oils and storing such oil. It is only where the permit allows storing such oil in addition to that contained in the tanks of the *241vehicles that section 370 prohibits issuing permits for buildings not fire proof. If it should appear on a new trial either that the storage of volatile inflammable oil is necessary to the maintenance of such a garage as the parties contemplated, or that the fire commissioner refuses a garage permit which does not allow the storage of such oils, then the tenant might justly claim an eviction. Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.

Present: Garretson, Blaokmar and Kapper, JJ.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to abide event.