alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### SAMUEL STEVENS *vs.*JOHN A. MONGES.

Assumpsit will lie for a fee due to counsel.

Assumpsit for a counsel fee. Plea, non-assumpsit; issue.

The question was raised in this case whether an action would lie for a fee due to counsel.

*Bayard*for plff. *Bead, Jr.,*for deft.

*The Court*

said they had no doubt that counsel could in this state sue for and recover their fees. It has been the invariable practice to treat them as legal demands, though no case has occurred in which the question has been expressly decided. We recognize the payment of such fees by executors, administrators and guardians, whenever they come up incidentally: and the Chancellor frequently makes a direct allowance of them. In England physicians stand on the same ground with counsel, their fees being treated as honoraria, yet physicians’ bills have always been sued on here even before the passage of our act of assembly which recognizes them as legal demands.

The counsel mentioned a case lately decided by Judge Hall in the District Court of this district, where Mr. Wirt sued for a fee and recovered.

Verdict for plff.
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 127

To amend title VII of the Public Health Service Act to make certain graduate

programs in clinical psychology eligible to participate in various health

professions loan programs, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 21 (legislative day, JANUARY 5), 1993

Mr. INOUYE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources

A BILL

To amend title VII of the Public Health Service Act to

make certain graduate programs in clinical psychology

eligible to participate in various health professions loan

programs, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. PARTICIPATION IN VARIOUS HEALTH PROFES4 SIONS LOAN PROGRAMS.

5 (a) LOAN AGREEMENTS.—Section 721 of the Public

6 Health Service Act (as amended by the Health Professions

7 Education Extension Amendments of 1992) amended—
2

•S 127 IS

1 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ‘‘, or any

2 public or nonprofit schools that offer graduate pro3 grams in clinical psychology’’ after ‘‘veterinary medi4 cine’’;

5 (2) in subsection (b)(4), by striking out ‘‘or

6 doctor of veterinary medicine or an equivalent de7 gree’’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘doctor of veteri8 nary medicine or an equivalent degree, or a graduate

9 degree in clinical psychology’’; and

10 (3) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ‘‘, or

11 schools that offer graduate programs in clinical psy12 chology’’ after ‘‘veterinary medicine’’.

13 (b) LOAN PROVISIONS.—Section 722 of such Act (42

14 U.S.C. 294n) is amended—

15 (1) in subsection (b)(1), by striking out ‘‘or

16 doctor of veterinary medicine or an equivalent de17 gree’’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘doctor of veteri18 nary medicine or an equivalent degree, or a graduate

19 degree in clinical psychology’’; and

20 (2) in subsection (l)—

21 (A) by striking out ‘‘or podiatry’’ and in22 serting in lieu thereof ‘‘podiatry, or clinical psy23 chology’’ in the matter preceding paragraph

24 (1); and
3

•S 127 IS

1 (B) by striking out ‘‘or podiatric medicine’’

2 in paragraph (4), and inserting in lieu thereof

3 ‘‘podiatric medicine, or clinical psychology’’.

Æ
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-3071

JERRY L. GENT,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

CENTRAL VIRGINIA LEGAL AID SOCIETY,

INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge.

(CA-95-764)

No. 95-7857

JERRY L. GENT,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

CLIENT CENTERED LEGAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellee.
2

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, District Judge.

(CA-95-1188-R)

Submitted: January 18, 1996 Decided: January 31, 1996

Before HAMILTON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jerry L. Gent, Appellant Pro Se. John William Boland, Martha Saine

Condyles, Andrew Eric Kauders, Jr., MCGUIRE, WOODS, BATTLE &

BOOTHE, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
3

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district courts' orders denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint and dismissing a

civil complaint for failure to state a claim. We have reviewed the

records and the district courts' opinions and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

courts. Gent v. Central VA Legal Aid, No. CA-95-764 (E.D. Va. Nov.

15, 1995); Gent v. Client Centered Legal Servs., No. CA-95-118-R

(W.D. Va. Nov. 6, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET FOR MARCH 31, 1999 AND THE STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE THREE MONTH
PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                      15,496,787
<SECURITIES>                                 1,014,115
<RECEIVABLES>                               21,228,892
<ALLOWANCES>                                 6,583,234
<INVENTORY>                                    663,133
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            36,031,107
<PP&E>                                      17,868,843
<DEPRECIATION>                               7,013,547
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              53,307,997
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,460,256
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       104,987
<OTHER-SE>                                  49,697,938
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                53,307,997
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            12,277,104
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,314,149
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,861,505
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               831,592
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,303
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,526,387
<INCOME-TAX>                                   580,979
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            945,408
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   945,408
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .09
        

</TABLE>
:i**~**

# I

;j 

## l I 

# 1 I 1 J 

# I I Faulk, Scott (OST) From: 

### Sent: To: 

### Subject: haliniakpOOl@hawaii.rr.com Wednesday, November 20, 2013 5:57 PM EAS (OST) Mokulele Airlines -.·•-., .•·-·.'

.. -..**~.** :

. -. . . !**~** \-

_.] .·--·.
Dear Department ofTransportation (DOT), I am writing to support Mokulele Airline's 4-year bid to link Kalaupapa to Kahului, Honolulu, Kapalua and Hoolehua. Mokulele is the best candidate as they have lowerfares, experienced friendly agents, frequent flights, multiple islands and ease of booking via Global Distribution System (Expedia, Travelocity, Orbitz, Priceline, etc.). It is importantwe have safe, stable 

### & affordable service to Kalaupapa. Please select Mokulele to serve Kalaupapa for4 years. Paulette Haliniak

1
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, November 18, 2015. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, November 18, 2015 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A16D0109. IN THE INTEREST OF: J. N. W., A CHILD (MOTHER) .
Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this order. The Clerk of Juvenile Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
LC NUMBERS: 1500208
#### Mrs. Hattie Mae Hoyt YOUNG v. STATE of Mississippi ex rel. DISTRICT ATTORNEY.

No. 47313.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 14, 1973.

Rehearing Denied June 5, 1973.

Daniel P. Self, Jr., Robert W. Bailey, Meridian, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by T. E. Childs, Jr., Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Neshoba County; Robert Prisock, Chancellor.

Before GILLESPIE, C. J., and INZER, ROBERTSON, WALKER and BROOM, JJ.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         1,026,412
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  27,270
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (12,473)
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0
<PP&E>                                         35,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1,814,794
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          0
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,716,708
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1,814,794
<SALES>                                        5,652,500
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               6,434,156
<CGS>                                          3,775,825
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               479,735
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               5,705
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             416,599
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                1,756,292
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 1,756,292
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   1,756,292
<EPS-BASIC>                                    205.32
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  205.32


<FN>
         NOTE: TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS AND TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES ARE NOT
         APPLICABLE BECAUSE REGISTRANT DOES NOT PRESENT A CLASSIFIED BALANCE
         SHEET.
</FN>


</TABLE>
50 % difference

Wickman, Trent R -FS to: Randall Robinson

Cc: Steven Rosenthal

From: "Wickman, Trent R -FS" <twickman@fs.fed.us>

To: Randall Robinson/R5/USEPA/US@EPA, 

Cc: Steven Rosenthal/R5/USEPA/US@EPA

Randy - I copied the following out of the “UTac” tab of the “modeled limits” spreadsheet steve has on 

your network in the “Trent” folder. You’ll see at the bottom how I came up with a combined 50% less 

NOx and SO2 reductions modeled by cliffs than what the FIP called for

LINE 1 - Emission reductions modeled by Cliffs 

(2012)

base* FIP

NOx SO2 NOx SO2

43.6 37.2 23.1 2.3 g/s

346 295 183 18 lb/hr

1519 1296 805 80 tpy @ 8760

714 1216 difference

LINE 1 - FIP numbers

1643 1293 493 129 70% and 90% CE

1150 1164 difference

LINE 2 - Emission reductions modeled by Cliffs 

(2012)

base* FIP

NOx SO2 NOx SO2

25.11 31.91 25.44 2.38 g/s - SV48

21.4 27.18 21.67 2.03 g/s - SV49
199 253 202 19 lb/hr - SV48

170 216 172 16 lb/hr - SV49

369 469 374 35 lb/hr - total

1621 2059 1641 154 tpy - total

-21 1905 difference

LINE 2 - FIP numbers

3687 2750 1106 248 70% and 90% CE

2581 2475 difference

Facility Total

3140 3355 base Cliffs 2012 Modeling

693 3121 difs

5330 4043 base FIP

3731 3639 difs

0.185844 0.857729 0.517593

total

Trent Wickman, P.E.

Air Resource Management

Great Lakes National Forests - Eastern Region

USDA Forest Service

stationed on the - Superior National Forest

8901 Grand Avenue Place

Duluth, MN 55808

ph# 218-626-4372

cell# 218-341-8646

fx# 218-626-4398

twickman@fs.fed.us
#### Prentiss Mercantile Co. *et al. v.*Thurman *et al.*

(Division A.

June 10, 1935.)

[161 So. 746.

No. 31783.]

*7Livingston & Milloy, of Prentiss, for appellants.

*8C. E. Thompson and O. O. Luper, both of Prentiss, for appellees.

*9Smith, O'. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellant by an original bill alleges that the appellees executed to it a deed of trust to secure a debt due it by them. The deed of trust, after describing certain property conveyed thereby, proceeds: “Also, any increase of all property, real or personal, that may be hereafter acquired by the parties of the first part (the appellees) by purchase or otherwise, the legal title of which under said trustee, his successors and assigns we warrant and agree forever to defend.” The bill, filed about three years after the execution of the deed of trust alleges that there is a balance-of four hundred sixty-eight dollars and sixty-eight cents due on the indebtedness, secured by the deed of trust; that the appellees have acquired and have in their possession six bales of cotton; that they are insolvent and have no other property out of which the appellant can collect the debt due it; and that they are about to dispose of the cotton.

The prayer of the bill is for a decree for the amount of the debt due the appellant, the subjection of the cotton to the lien of the deed of trust, and that the cotton be im*10pounded (we presume by a writ of sequestration) for subjection to the payment of any amount found to be due the appellant.

A demurrer to this bill was sustained.

The appellant says that its bill presents (1) a case for the enforcement of a lien, and, if not, then (2) a case for equitable relief independent of the claimed lien. We are not here concerned with the validity vel non of this deed of trust in an action at law, for the suit is in equity, and it is settled that an “after-acquired” property clause in a mortgage or deed of trust is valid and enforceable in equity, and that the description of such property here is sufficient. Bacot v. Varnado, 91 Miss. 825, 47 So. 113; Central Trust Co. v. Kneeland, 138 U. S. 414, 11 S. Ct. 357, 34 L. Ed. 1014; 1 Jones on Mortgages (8 Ed.), secs. 208 and 209.

If the court below, as intimated in the appellant’s brief, sustained the demurrer on the theory that such mortgages are limited by section 2130, Code 1930', to property acquired within a stated period not to exceed twelve months, an erroneous construction was thereby put on the statute. That statute does not grant the right to execute mortgages on after-acquired property, but provides only (1) when such mortgages shall be valid as to creditors, and (2) that the mortgagors may pay the secured debts before the maturity thereof.

The first of the appellant’s claimed grounds for relief being valid, the demurrer should have been overruled, and we have no occasion to decide the second.

Reversed and remanded.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-13-00690-CV

IN RE ESTATE OF Alvilda M. AGUILAR, Deceased

From the Probate Court No. 2, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012-PC-2802

Honorable Tom Rickhoff, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE STONE, JUSTICE BARNARD, AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED FOR 

WANT OF JURISDICTION. 

It is ORDERED that appellees Margaret Morales and Jesus Morales recover their costs of 

this appeal from appellants Anthony C. Aguilar and Michael A. Aguilar. 

SIGNED June 4, 2014.

_____________________________

Marialyn Barnard, Justice
#### Alfred RODRIGUE, Sr. v. Harry POST and S. J. McClendon.

No. 2800.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Fourth Circuit.

Dec. 4, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1968.

Rene R. Nicaud, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant'.

Leon C. Vial, III, Hahnville, for defendants-appellees.

Before SAMUEL, HALL and BAR-NETTE, JJ.

SAMUEL, Judge.

This is a summary action for possession of leased premises by which plaintiff, the sublessor, seeks to evict the defendants-sub-lessees on the ground that the sublease was null and void because it contained a po-testative condition. The suit was converted from a summary eviction action to one of ordinary process to annul the sublease; and in accordance with a court order obtained by them, the defendants-sublessees deposited in the registry of the court the full amount of the monthly rental for the premises as such rent accrued during this litigation.

A suit for an injunction prohibiting the plaintiff in the present suit from disturbing the sublessees in their peaceful possession of the same leased premises and for damages allegedly resulting from acts of trespass by the sublessor upon those premises previously had been filed by the sublessees. The two suits involve the same litigants, the same leased property (a portion of Providence Plantation in the Parish of St. Charles) and the same written sublease. A discussion and consideration of both cases is to be found in the injunction-damage suit filed by the sublessees. (See Post v. Rodrigue, No. 2,799 of our docket and handed down this day, 205 So.2d 67).

For the reasons assigned in Post v. Rodrigue, No. 2,799 of our docket and handed down this day, 205 So.2d 67, that part of the judgment appealed from which orders the clerk of court to return to defendants-appellees all rental payments made by them and on deposit in the registry of the court is reversed and the judgment is amended to order, and it is now so ordered, that the Clerk of the 29th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Charles pay all of said rental payments to Alfred Rodrigue, Sr., plaintiff-appellant. As thus amended and in all other respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are to be paid by the defendants-ap-pellees.

Reversed m part; amended and affirmed in part.
*

The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-2915

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

v. * of South Dakota.

*

Howard Spoonhunter, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 11, 2002

Filed: February 20, 2002

___________

Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Howard Spoonhunter, an Oglala Sioux Tribe Department of Public Safety

officer, was convicted of conversion after he sold his department-issued gun, police

radio, vest, flashlight, and police belt to a pawn shop. In an 18 U.S.C. § 1163

conversion case like this, the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor if the stolen

items’ total value is less than $1000, or a felony if the total value is greater than

$1000. Spoonhunter contends the district court*

 committed clear error when it found
-2-

the items’ total value was $1250. See United States v. Hetherington, 256 F.3d 788,

796 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 122 S.Ct. 636 (2001), (standard of review). Having

reviewed the parties’ briefs, we conclude the trial court employed a reasonable

method in determining the monetary value of the converted items in this unusual

situation, see United States v. Stegora, 849 F.2d 291, 292 (8th Cir. 1988), and thus

it did not commit clear error. We affirm the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47(B). 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1997
<CASH>                                          87,405
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  363,830
<ALLOWANCES>                                   101,039
<INVENTORY>                                     34,514
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               576,395
<PP&E>                                         448,730
<DEPRECIATION>                                 386,838
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,751,040
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          479,665
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  2,216,668
<COMMON>                                         2,990
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,481,801)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,751,040
<SALES>                                        748,148
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,164,330
<CGS>                                          675,685
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,967,689
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,004,821
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,493
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                191,820
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (136,100)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            327,920
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   327,920
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .11
        


</TABLE>