J. S34037/20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INT. OF: S.M., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: K.P. AND B.M., MOTHER 

AND FATHER

:

:

No. 552 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 20, 2020,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 7 OC 2020

IN THE INT. OF: K.M., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: K.P. AND B.M., MOTHER 

AND FATHER

:

:

No. 553 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 20, 2020,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 8 OC 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.M., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: K.P. AND B.M., MOTHER 

AND FATHER

:

:

No. 554 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 20, 2020,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 9 OC 2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E. AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
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MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2020

In this consolidated appeal, K.P. (“Mother”) and B.M. (“Father”) 

(collectively, “appellants”) appeal from the February 20, 2020 decrees

granting the petitions of the Tioga County Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”) to involuntarily terminate their parental rights to their three minor 

children, S.M. (born June 2015), K.M. (born June 2015),

1 and B.M. (born June 

2016) (collectively, “Children”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), 

(5), and (b). After careful review, we affirm.

The juvenile court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history 

of this case as follows:

[Appellants] in this action are the natural parents of 

[Children]. [DHS] has had legal and physical custody 

of [Children], constantly since June 26[], 2019, 

pursuant to Court Order. [DHS] was initially granted 

care, after [Children] w[ere] found in the custody of 

[appellants], who had been found passed out in a

motor vehicle, aside a road in Westfield Township, 

Tioga County. [Children] w[ere] subsequently

adjudicated dependent after a full Adjudicatory

Hearing. [DHS] was directed to provide services 

intended to support [appellants’] efforts to address 

their substance use disorder, lack of parenting skills, 

and other concerns. This case was reviewed at 

regular intervals by the [juvenile c]ourt in the

companion Dependency action, filed to Number[s 37]

DP of 2019 [and 38 DP of 2019], the proceedings of 

which have been incorporated into the record of this 

proceeding.

[Children were adjudicated dependent on July 9, 

2019.]

 

1 S.M. and K.M. are twins.
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During the course of the Dependency Proceeding, 

[Father] made no progress towards alleviating the 

circumstances, leading to the placement of [Children]

and was found to be in minimal compliance with the 

Family Service Plan. [Mother] initially made efforts to 

address her substance use disorder, through her 

attendance at an in-patient rehabilitation facility, but 

after her departure from post-placement housing, 

[Mother] took no further steps to address her 

substance use disorder and immediately relapsed. 

Throughout the dependency of the Dependency 

Action, [DHD] offered services, specifically visitation, 

Effective Safe Parenting, and Intensive Case 

Management. The Effective Safe Parenting Program 

is a program offered by [DHS], which is intended to 

support the participants in dealing with substance use 

disorder, in an effort to allow them to become 

effective and safe parents. The program requires 

regular substance use testing, as well as regular 

meetings with service providers. The purpose of the 

meetings with the service provider are not simply to 

conduct substance use testing, but rather are 

intended to allow the participant to build a safe, stable 

recovery network, as well as permitting them to 

address parenting issues and other known concerns. 

The record in this case indicates that while 

[appellants] have periodically submitted to requested 

substance use tests, they have refused numerous 

efforts and requests by the Human Service Provider 

to address underlying concerns related to parenting 

and treatment. The record further reveals that both 

[Mother and Father] have failed to obtain 

recommended Substance Use Assessments, despite 

numerous requests to do so.

The testimony presented in this proceeding indicates 

that between early January to early February, the 

Service Provider, Clara Holley, attempted on 

17 occasions, either by phone or in person to meet 

with [appellants], with success being limited to 

1 occasion, during a review of the Family Service Plan.

Regarding visitation, [DHS] has, pursuant to Court 

Order, afforded both [Mother and Father] numerous 
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opportunities to participate in visitation and has 

supported efforts to permit visitation on the Court 

Order scheduled by providing, at least on one 

occasion, gas cards, and on multiple occasions,

throughout the life of this case, [DHS-]funded taxi 

service, to and from visitation. The record produced 

at the hearing established that [appellants] have 

participated in approximately one-half of the 

scheduled visitations. Regarding other services, 

[appellants] have failed to regularly meet with or 

communicate with the cas[ew]orker in this case. 

[Children] are currently placed with foster parents in 

Bradford County, Pennsylvania. [Children] have 

remained together, in this home, since approximately 

July of 2019. In the current placement, [Children’s]

medical needs are attended to by the foster parents. 

The Court notes that despite [Children’s] medical care 

remaining in the Westfield area, within miles of 

[appellants’] residence, [appellants] have failed to 

attend any medical or dental appointments after July 

of 2019.

Juvenile court opinion (No. 552 MDA 2020; No. 7 OC 2020), 2/20/20 at 2-4; 

see also juvenile court opinion (No. 553 MDA 2020; No. 8 OC 2020), 2/20/20 

at 2-4, and juvenile court opinion (No. 554 MDA 2020; No. 9 OC 2020), 

2/20/20 at 2-4.

On January 24, 2020, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

appellants’ parental rights to Children. The juvenile court conducted a 

termination hearing on February 18, 2020; appellants were not present for 

this hearing but participated via telephone. Following the hearing, the juvenile 

court entered separate decrees for each appellant at each docket number,

involuntarily terminating their respective parental rights to Children pursuant 

to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b). On March 12, 2020, appellants 
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jointly filed a timely notice of appeal at each docket number, in compliance 

with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), and its progeny. 

Thereafter, appellants jointly filed concise statements of errors complained of 

on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), at each docket 

number. On April 17, 2020, the juvenile court entered orders indicating that 

it was relying on its findings of fact and opinions it authored in support of its 

decrees terminating appellants’ parental rights. This court sua sponte

consolidated appellants’ appeals by per curiam order on April 20, 2020.

That same day, this court issued a rule to show cause order directing 

appellants to explain why their notice of appeal from two separate decrees at 

each docket number should not be quashed, pursuant to, inter alia, General 

Electric Credit Corporation v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 263 

A.2d 448 (Pa. 1970) (establishing a three-part test to decide whether quashal 

was warranted where a single notice of appeal was filed in response to multiple 

final orders); 20 Pa.P.R.A.C. § 512 (stating that one appeal from several 

orders is discouraged). Thereafter, on May 8, 2020, this court issued an order 

discharging its rule to show cause order and referring this issue to the merits 

panel. In the interest of judicial economy, and in light of the fact that neither 

DHS nor Children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”)2 has objected, we decline to 

quash this matter on this basis and will proceed to address appellants’ issues 

 

2 We note that DHS’s brief to this court was joined by Children’s GAL, 

Lenore Urbani, Esq., who was appointed by the juvenile court on March 16, 

2020.
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on the merits. See, e.g., In the Interest of P.S., 158 A.3d 643, 648 

(Pa.Super 2017) (declining to quash a juvenile’s appeal taken from both an 

order adjudicating him delinquent and a dispositional order entered following 

the revocation of his probation on the basis that the issues raised in each were 

closely related, the appellee did not object, and the appeal period had already 

expired), appeal denied, 174 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2017); K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 

863, 870 (Pa. 2003) (stating, “appellate courts have not generally quashed 

appeals, provided that the issues involved are nearly identical, no objection to 

the appeal has been raised, and the period for appeal has expired.”).

Appellants raise the following issues for our review: 

1. Did the [juvenile] court err and abuse its 

discretion in finding that [DHS] provided by 

clear and convincing evidence that the 

conditions which led to the removal and 

placement of [Children] continue to exist and 

that [Parents] cannot or will not remedy those 

conditions within a reasonable period of time?

2. Did the [juvenile] court err and abuse its 

discretion in finding that the [DHS] allowed 

sufficient time for [Parents] to respond to 

services by allowing termination parental rights 

after only eight months of services[?]

Appellants’ brief at 8 (extraneous capitalization omitted). 

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. If the 
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factual findings are supported, appellate courts review 

to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion. [A] decision may be reversed 

for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, 

or ill-will. The trial court’s decision, however, should 

not be reversed merely because the record would 

support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis 

of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, 

the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to 

terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on 

the conduct of the parent. The party seeking 

termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in 

Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the 

parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her 

parental rights does the court engage in the second 

part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child 

under the standard of best interests of the child. One 

major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child, with close attention paid to 

the effect on the child of permanently severing any 

such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have 

defined “clear and convincing evidence” as that which is so “clear, direct, 
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weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the juvenile court terminated appellants’ parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition 

filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing 

for a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental 

duties.

(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not 

be remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(5) The child has been removed from 

the care of the parent by the court 

or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at 
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least six months, the conditions 

which led to the removal or 

placement of the child continue to 

exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a 

reasonable period of time, the 

services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely 

to remedy the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the 

child within a reasonable period of 

time and termination of the parental 

rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental 

factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect 

to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first 

initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of 

the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b). 

Appellants’ first claim challenges the juvenile court’s decision to 

terminate their parental rights to Children pursuant to Subsection 2511(a)(5). 

(Appellants’ brief at 8, 22-24.) However, we need only agree with the juvenile 

court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to 

Section 2511(b), to affirm a decree terminating parental rights. See 
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In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 117 (Pa.Super. 2014). Instantly, we analyze the 

juvenile court’s decision to terminate appellants’ parental rights to Children

under Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three 

elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

“The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be 

remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” Id. “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the 

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s 

vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the 

necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Upon review, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence to 

support the juvenile court’s termination of appellants’ parental rights to 

Children, pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). The record establishes that 
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“incapacity” under Section 2511(a)(2) exists given that appellants have

demonstrated a repeated and continual inability to address their substance 

abuse problems and parenting issues that led to the placement of Children. 

As noted, DHS became involved in this matter in June 2019 following a call to 

the Tioga County 911 Center that appellants were sleeping or had overdosed 

in a car parked on the side of the roadway, and that Children were found all 

running around outside the vehicle and were filthy. (Notes of testimony, 

2/18/20 at 34-36.) Heather Patterson, the DHS caseworker assigned to 

Children, testified that at the time of the February 18, 2020 termination 

hearing, Father had yet to make any effort to address his substance abuse 

problems. (Id. at 129.) Mother, in turn, initially took steps to address her 

substance abuse issues by attending an inpatient rehabilitation program, but 

relapsed soon after her release from the program and took no further steps

to address her substance abuse issues. (Id. at 128-32.) At the time of the 

termination hearing, both appellants had also failed multiple drug screenings. 

(Id. at 98-103.)

The record further reflects that appellants have demonstrated an 

unwillingness to actively engage or cooperate with DHS; take advantage of 

the visitation offered to them by DHS; or keep in regular contact with their 

caseworker or service providers. Although DHS funded taxi service for 

appellants to and from visitation, the record reflects that appellants have 

participated in only approximately one-half of the scheduled visits with 
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Children and only sporadically attended the medical, dental, and/or 

therapeutic appointments of Children. (Id. at 135-144). Additionally, 

Clara Holley, the Effective Safe Parenting (“ESP”) caseworker assigned to 

work with appellants to achieve the goals of reunification, testified that she 

made 17 attempts to make contact with appellants in the two months 

preceding the termination hearing, and was successful only one time. (Id. at 

97, 103-104.) Patterson also testified as to the difficulty she had in contacting 

appellants or getting them to engage in any services. (Id. at 146, 167.) We 

further agree with the juvenile court that “[n]o credible evidence indicates a 

likelihood that either [appellant] will take steps to address substance use and 

other concerns in the foreseeable future.” (Juvenile court opinion (No. 552 

MDA 2020; No. 7 OC 2020), 2/20/20 at 2, § 11.)

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the juvenile court that there 

exists clear and convincing evidence of record to terminate appellants’ 

parental rights to Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). See 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1216.

Next, we address whether the termination of appellants’ parental rights

was in Children’s best interests, pursuant to Section 2511(b). With regard to 

Section 2511(b), our supreme court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been 

properly interpreted to include [i]ntangibles such as 
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love, comfort, security, and stability. . . . [T]his Court 

held that the determination of the child’s “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on 

the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s 

bonds is not always an easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (internal case citations omitted). 

“[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. Accordingly, the extent of 

the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the 

particular case.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 

2010) (citations omitted). When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not 

required to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer 

evaluations as well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal 

bonding evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) 

(citations omitted). This court has long recognized that,

[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to 

be considered by the court when determining what is 

in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the 

trial court can equally emphasize the 

safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child 

might have with the foster parent. . . .
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In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Here, the juvenile court made the following findings with respect to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of each Child:

S.M.

The Court begins by acknowledging that there is a 

bond between each [appellant] and [S.M.] [S.M.] 

recognizes [appellants] as parents and interacts with 

them during periods of visitation, in that context. The 

Court, however notes, that this bond and connection 

between [S.M.] has not been in all ways positive. The 

Court notes that [S.M.] has been diagnosed with Post 

Traumatic Stress Disorder. The Court further notes 

that the child, following an evaluation by 

[John] Higham, has been diagnosed with a person 

history of physical abuse, psychological abuse, and 

neglect in childhood.

The Court is also cognizant of and notes the position 

of the Legal Interest Attorney, appointed on behalf of 

[S.M.], Attorney Megan Wells, after consultation with 

[S.M.], has indicated [S.M.’s] stated preference to no 

longer have contact with either [appellant], and a 

desire for permanency in the home of the current 

foster parents. As discussed above, [S.M.] has, since 

removal from the custody of [appellants], been 

attended to entirely by the foster parents, under the

supervision of [DHS]. The current foster resource 

provides transportation and access to medical

services in [S.M.’s] home community of Westfield. 

[S.M.] has also been provided with the appropriate 

and necessary dental care. [DHS] has taken steps to 

engage [S.M.] in recommended mental health 

therapy. The Court also notes that the testimony of 

the foster parent, Amber Swartley, indicating that she 

and her husband are prepared to provide permanency 

for [S.M.] and her siblings in the form of adoption, 

should the Court terminate the parental rights. Based 

upon the entirety of the record presented, the Court 
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determines that it is clearly in [S.M.’s] long-term best

interest that [appellants’] parental rights be 

terminated. [S.M.] is entitled to, pursuant to law,

permanency, and while the Court is conscious of the 

fact that [S.M.] has been in placement for less than 

1 year, the Court, as discussed above, has no 

confidence that [appellants] will take the necessary 

steps to reassume their parental responsibilities in the 

near future. A denial of termination at this point in 

time would result in a continued languishing of [S.M.], 

in a state between the foster parents and [appellants]. 

While the Court acknowledges that there are likely to 

be consequences in permanently severing the bond 

between [appellants] and [S.M.], the long-term best 

interest of [S.M.] clearly outweighs the temporary 

discomfort or inconvenience occasioned by 

termination.

Juvenile court opinion (No. 552 MDA 2020; No. 7 OC 2020), 2/20/20 at 7-8.

K.M.

The Court begins by acknowledging that there is a 

bond between each [appellant] and [K.M.]. [K.M.] 

recognizes [appellants] as parents and interacts with 

them during periods of visitation, in that context. The 

Court, however notes, that this bond and connection 

between [K.M.] has not been in all ways positive, with 

a person [sic] history of physical abuse, psychological 

abuse, and neglect in childhood.

As discussed above, [K.M.] has, since removal from 

the custody of [appellants], been attended to entirely 

by the foster parents, under the supervision of [DHS]. 

The current foster resource provides transportation 

and access to medical services in [K.M.’s] home 

community of Westfield. The Court also notes that the 

testimony of the foster parent, Amber Swartley, 

indicating that she and her husband are prepared to 

provide permanency for [K.M.] and his siblings in the 

form of adoption, should the Court terminate the 

parental rights. Based upon the entirety of the record

presented, the Court determines that it is clearly in 

the [K.M.’s] long-term best interest that [appellants’] 
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parental rights be terminated. [K.M.] is entitled to, 

pursuant to law, permanency, and while the Court is 

conscious of the fact that [K.M.] has been in 

placement for less than 1 year, the Court, as 

discussed above, has no confidence that [appellants] 

will take the necessary steps to reassume their 

parental responsibilities in the near future. A denial 

of termination at this point in time would result in a 

continued languishing of [K.M], in a state between the 

foster parents and [appellants]. While the Court 

acknowledges that there are likely to be consequences 

in permanently severing the bond between 

[appellants] and [K.M.], the long-term best interest of 

[K.M.] clearly outweighs the temporary discomfort or 

inconvenience occasioned by termination.

Juvenile court opinion (No. 553 MDA 2020; No. 8 OC 2020), 2/20/20 at 7-8.

B.M.

The Court begins by acknowledging that there is a 

bond between each [appellant] and [B.M.]. [B.M.] 

recognizes [appellants] as parents and interacts with 

them during periods of visitation, in that context. The 

Court, however notes, that this bond and connection 

between [B.M.] has not been in all ways positive, with 

a person [sic] history of physical abuse, psychological 

abuse, and neglect in childhood.

As discussed above, [B.M.] has, since removal from 

the custody of [appellants], been attended to entirely 

by the foster parents, under the supervision of [DHS]. 

The current foster resource provides transportation 

and access to medical services in [B.M.’s] home 

community of Westfield. The Court also notes that the 

testimony of the foster parent, Amber Swartley, 

indicating that she and her husband are prepared to 

provide permanency for [B.M.] and his siblings in the 

form of adoption, should the Court terminate the 

parental rights. Based upon the entirety of the record

presented, the Court determines that it is clearly in 

the [B.M.’s] long-term best interest that [appellants’] 

parental rights be terminated. [B.M.] is entitled to, 

pursuant to law, permanency, and while the Court is 
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conscious of the fact that [B.M.] has been in 

placement for less than 1 year, the Court, as 

discussed above, has no confidence that [appellants] 

will take the necessary steps to reassume their 

parental responsibilities in the near future. A denial 

of termination at this point in time would result in a 

continued languishing of [B.M], in a state between the 

foster parents and [appellants]. While the Court 

acknowledges that there are likely to be consequences 

in permanently severing the bond between 

[appellants] and [B.M.], the long-term best interest of 

[B.M.] clearly outweighs the temporary discomfort or 

inconvenience occasioned by termination.

Juvenile court opinion (No. 554 MDA 2020; No. 9 OC 2020), 2/20/20 at 7-8.

Our standard of review requires us to accept the juvenile court’s findings 

of fact and credibility determinations where, as here, they are supported by 

the record. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Accordingly, we agree with 

the juvenile court that the termination of appellants’ parental rights to 

Children was proper under Section 2511(b).

In their final claim, appellants contend the juvenile court erred “in 

finding that the [DHS] allowed sufficient time for [appellants] to respond to 

services by allowing termination [of] parental rights after only eight months

of services.” (Appellants’ brief at 8). Here, appellants failed to specifically 

raise or develop this issue in a separate section in the “Argument” portion of 

their appellate brief, opting instead to meld this argument into their discussion 

of Section 2511(a)(5). (See appellants’ brief at 19-24.) Having already found 

that termination of appellants’ parental rights was proper under Section 

2511(a)(2), and cognizant of the fact that we need only agree with the 
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juvenile court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) to affirm a 

termination decree, see In re M.M., 106 A.3d at 117, we need not address 

this issue.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court did not 

abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating appellants’ parental rights to 

Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). Accordingly, we affirm the 

juvenile court’s February 20, 2020 decrees.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 09/16/2020