alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### REGENCY BAPTIST TEMPLE, etc., Appellant, v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Appellee.

No. DD-277.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Dec. 8, 1977.

*1243Frederick B. Tygart, Jacksonville, for appellant.

S.William Fuller, Jr., Jacksonville, for appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

Regency appeals from a judgment entered on a directed verdict entered at the close of Regency’s case against its insurer for the difference between benefits paid for partial collápse of Regency’s roof and a greater amount which Regency asserts was its insured loss. Part of the roof collapsed under standing water because the entire roof was installed with trusses upside down. A settlement was made on the basis of replacing the collapsed portion, whereupon, pursuant to municipal ordinance, the city declined to issue a building permit for repair unless the entire roof was replaced.

The trial court properly concluded that, under the policy, the amount payable was “the replacement cost of the property damaged or destroyed at the time of loss without deduction for depreciation,” which amount was paid, and that insurance did not extend to expenditures necessary under the ordinance to rebuild the improperly constructed portion of the roof that did not collapse. The policy explicitly excluded coverage for loss

> *1244“Occasioned directly or indirectly by enforcement of any local or state ordinance or law regulating the construction, repair or demolition of buildings or structures.”

The policy exclusion does not conflict with any statute to which our attention has been called. Similar provisions have been upheld in the case of partial loss. 15 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 54:166, p. 419 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1966). The rule is otherwise when, in the case of loss by fire or lightning, such a provision conflicts with Florida’s valued policy law, Section 627.702, Florida Statutes (1975). *Netherlands Ins. Co.*v. Fowler, 181 So.2d 692 (Fla.2d DCA 1966). The present case should also be distinguished from cases in which an ordinance or regulation prevents repair of a damaged building. In those cases courts have declared the building a “constructive total loss” and held the insurer liable for the building’s entire value. *E. g., Feinbloom v. Camden Fire Ins. Co.,*54 N.J.Super. 541,149 A.2d 616 (1959). Compare *Hewins v. London Assur. Corp.,*184 Mass. 177, 68 N.E. 62 (1903) in which, as here, an ordinance merely increased the cost of repair.

Regency proceeded to trial on a pleaded theory that seems to have assumed Regency was foreclosed by its acceptance of the benefits tendered but for a mistake of fact for which the law could give a remedy. That theory is .unavailing because Regency’s remedy would be no greater had it never accepted the tendered settlement for replacement of the collapsed portion of the roof. No other error appears.

AFFIRMED.

RAWLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur.
#### The HASTA AT CORAL GABLES, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Lillian COREY and Joseph Corey, her husband, Appellees.

No. 71-427.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 11, 1972.

Wicker, Smith, Pyszka, Blomqvist & Davant, Miami, for appellant.

*242Welsh & Carroll, Horton, Schwartz & Perse, Miami, for appellees.

Before SWANN, C. J., and PEARSON and BARKDULL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Turpak, Fla.App.1969, 225 So.2d 340; Food Fair Stores, North Dade, Inc. v. Winkelmann, Fla.App.1961, 135 So.2d 6; City of Hialeah v. Revels, Fla.App. 1960, 123 So.2d 400; and Delany v. Breeding’s Homestead Drug Co., Fla.1957, 93 So.2d 116.
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-13-00735- CV

D & S Residential Service s, LP, A ppellan t

v. Melissa Hughes, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 200 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 3-0 0090 9, H ONO RAB LE TIM SULAK , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N App ell ant has failed to prosec ute this appea l. Appellant’s brief was due on J anuar y 2, 2014. On J anuar

y 10, 2014, this Court’s cler k sent appellant a not i ce ad v i s i ng that its brief was overdue and cautioned that the appea l c ould be dismiss ed for want of prosec ution unless appellant filed a response rea sonably explaining its failure to file a brief. The response was due by J anuar y 21, 2014. Appellant has neither responde d to the notice nor filed a brief. Acc ording ly , we dismiss the appe al for w ant of prose cution. See Tex. R. App. P . 42.3 (b), ( c).

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pemberton a nd Rose Dismissed for Want of Prosecution Filed: F ebrua

ry 13, 2014
### SAT Report PMN Number: P-13-0797 SAT Date: 8/16/2013 Print Date: 9/30/2013
Related cases : Health related cases : Ecotox related cases: Analogs:

Concern levels : Type of Concern: Health Eco Comments Level of Concern: 1 3

Persistence Bioaccum Toxicity Comments 2 11

Exposure Based Review : Health: Ecotox: N o Routes of exposure : Health: N o exposures needed Ecotox: Fate: ; Keywords : Keywords: AQUATOX Summary of Assessment : Fate : Fate Summary: P-13-0797 FATE:

log Koc = 2.46 (E) log Fish BCF = 1.92 (E) log Fish BAF = 1.36 (E)POTW removal (%) = 19 via sorption Time for complete ultimate aerobic biodeg = wk-mo Sorption to soils/sediments = moderate - strong PBT Potential: P2B1 *CEB FATE: Migration to ground water = negl - slow
Health : Health Summary: N ot absorbed through the skin as the neat material; p oo r absorption through the skin if in solution; moderate absorption from the lung and GI tract ( p che m ). N o significant health concerns.
Ecotox : Test Organism Test Type Test End Point Predicted Measured Comments
fish 96-h LC50 * daphnid 48-h LC50 * green algal 96-h EC50 0.46 oer * fish

_ chronic value 0.037 daphnid

_ chronic value * algal

_ chronic value * Sewage Sludge 3-h EC50

_ Sewage Sludge

_ Chronic Value _

Ecotox Values Comments: Predictions are based on SARs for ; SAR chemical class = ; MW (P); ; effective concentrations based on 100% active ingredients and mean measured concentrations; hardness <150.0 mg/L as CaCO3; and TOC <2.0 mg/L;
Factors Values Comments Assessment Factor 10 Concentration of Concern ( p pb) 4

SARs SAR Class Ecotox Category N one Ecotox Factors Comments: SAT Chair: L Keifer 564-8916
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of ViroPharma Incorporated (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned officers of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                                         
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/    MICHEL DE
ROSEN                                                   
|Michel de Rosen                                                          
|President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors
|August 5, 2004                                                           
|                                                                         
|/s/    VINCENT J.
MILANO                                                 
|Vincent J. Milano                                                        
|Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer                    
|August 5, 2004
#### Sammy L. CROMER et al., Appellants, v. W. J. WEBB, Appellee.

No. 71-1350.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 14, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Pamela Ruth SELLS, Ruth N. Sells, and Employer’s Commercial Union Insurance Company, a foreign corporation authorized to do business In the State of Florida, Geraldine Donaldson Creveling and The Travelers Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Barbara RUBERTAS, Appellee.

No. 70-140.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 30, 1970.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Palm Beach County; James R. Knott, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### NATCHITOCHES COLLECTIONS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H. B. GORUM, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4086.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

March *12,*1973.

Gahagan & Kelly, by Russell E. Gaha-gan, Natchitoches, for plaintiff-appellant.

Whithead & McCoy by C. R. Whitehead, Jr., Gerard F. Thomas, Jr., Natchi-toches, for defendant-appellee.

Before SAVOY, HOOD and CULPEP-PER, JJ.

SAVOY, Judge.

On February 20, 1970, defendant obtained a loan from plaintiff. As security for said loan defendant executed a note in favor of plaintiff secured by a mortgage on certain property owned by defendant.

Defendant defaulted on the indebtedness, and on September 22, 1970, plaintiff obtained a money judgment against defendant.

Plaintiff then filed garnishment proceedings against defendant. Interrogatories were propounded to defendant’s employer, Natchitoches School Board, which answered setting forth defendant’s salary.

The district judge, on the hearing of the garnishment proceedings, held that the exemption of the wages of defendant would be governed by LSA-R.S. 13:3881(1), Act No. 242 of 1970 (effective July 2, 1970), rather than by LSA-R.S. 13:3881 (Act 119 of 1960).

The 1970 Act allows a much larger exemption from seizure of a debtor’s wages than does the 1960 Act.

The salary of defendant was determined by the court to be $254.00 per month. If the 1970 Act is applied, then no portion of defendant’s salary would be subject to garnishment; whereas, if the 1960 Act is applicable, 20% of his salary would be subj ect to garnishment.

Appellant contends that the trial judge was in error in allowing the exemption under the 1970 Act rather than the 1960 Act, *450citing the case of American Finance Corporation of Coushatta, Inc. v. Small, 250 So.2d 768 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1971) and cases cited therein.

In the case of Hooter v. Wilson, 256 So.2d 808 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1972), the Court of Appeal followed the American Finance Corporation case cited above and held that Act 242 of 1970 was a substantive act, and therefore, was not retroactive. The Supreme Court granted a writ of review from the decision of the Fourth Circuit. On February 19, 1973, under docket number 52,251 in a case entitled Ory J. Hooter, d/b/a O. J. Hooter Furniture v. Wilson, La., 273 So.2d 516, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Fourth Circuit and held that Act 242 of 1970 was remedial and retroactive.

In view of the recent Supreme Court decision reversing the Court of Appeal, and, in effect, reversing American Finance Corporation of Coushatta, Inc. v. Small, supra, the judgment of the district court is affirmed at appellant’s costs.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This  Schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from  the
unaudited  Statement  of  Financial  Condition  at May 26,  2000  and  unaudited
Statement  of  Operations  for the  six-months  ended  May 26,  2000,  which are
contained  in the body of the  accompanying  Form 10-Q and is  qualified  in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<MULTIPLIER>                                         1

<S>                                                 <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        6-Mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    Nov-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                         May-26-2000
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        31,647
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       610,565
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                579,141
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1,000
<OTHER-SE>                                           30,424
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         610,565
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     6,800
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     (6,800)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        (2,942)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 (3,858)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        (3,858)
<EPS-BASIC>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Preferred Voice, Inc. (the “Company”) on
Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Mary G. Merritt,
Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


/s/
      Mary G. Merritt


Mary G.
Merritt


Principal
Executive Officer


Principal
Financial Officer


August 3,
2009
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF CT HOLDINGS, INC. FOR THE YEAR ENDED
FEBRUARY 29, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-29-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               FEB-29-2000
<CASH>                                         707,412
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,155,241
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,100,000
<INVENTORY>                                     80,617
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,130,739
<PP&E>                                         967,341
<DEPRECIATION>                                 739,239
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,832,037
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,363,088
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          1
<COMMON>                                       501,364
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,967,584
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,832,037
<SALES>                                      1,292,250
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,292,250
<CGS>                                           61,564
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   61,564
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              53,340
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (23,656,939)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (23,656,939)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (23,656,939)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.56
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.56


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6258

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

CEARFUL SPEIGHT, a/k/a June,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge.

(CR-93-90-N)

Submitted: June 9, 1998 Decided: June 18, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Cearful Speight, Appellant Pro Se. Fernando Groene, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a modification of sentence under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(2)

(West Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinion and find no reversible error. We note that

Amendment 487 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines became

effective on November 1, 1993, and the Presentence Investigation

Report relied on the November 1, 1993, version of the Guidelines in

calculating Appellant’s sentence. Thus, Appellant’s claim that he

is entitled to resentencing based on Amendment 487 is meritless.

Accordingly, we affirm substantially on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Speight, No. CR-93-90-N (E.D. Va.

Jan. 12, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Alex BRANCH.

No. 53062.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 8, 1973.

John R. Sheppard, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., LeRoy A. Hartley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Alex Branch was tried by a jury and found guilty of aggravated rape without capital punishment, La.R.S. 14:42, and was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor.

The defendant was granted an out-of-term appeal, and a lawyer was appointed to represent the defendant on appeal. In brief before us, defense counsel contended that a “Witherspoon” situation existed in the case. However, no objections were made and no bills of exceptions were reserved to the voir dire examination.

None of the bills of exceptions reserved during the trial were perfected. Nevertheless, because of the seriousness of the offense, and because of the exceptional circumstances existing in this case (the death of trial counsel before the appeal was taken), we have reviewed the record and have considered the bills reserved, even though they were not perfected.

There is no merit in the bills reserved, nor do we find any discoverable error on the face of the pleadings and proceedings.

The conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### Herbert WILLARD et al., Petitioners, v. Jess YARBOROUGH et al., Respondents.

No. 42464.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 31, 1973.

Felix A. Johnston, Jr., of Woods & Johnston, Tallahassee, for petitioners.

Richard B. Burk, of Scott, Burk & Royce, Palm Beach, E. Harper Field, of Keen, O’Kelley & Spitz, Tallahassee and Prentice P. Pruitt and Jerry Johns, Florida Public Service Comm., Tallahassee, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

By petition for writ of certiorari, we have for review Order No. 9935 of the Public Service Commission dated March 9, *4791972, granting the joint application of B. T. Construction Company of West Palm Beach and Big Four Construction of West Palm Beach, Inc. to transfer Certificate of Public Convenience No. 760 from the former to the latter, and Order No. 10067 of the Commission, dated May 10, 1972, denying a petition for reconsideration of Order No. 9935. Certificate No. 760 authorizes transportation as a limited common carrier of road building and construction aggregates between all points and places in all Florida counties lying south of and including Brevard, Orange, Polk and Manatee Counties.

Our consideration of the petition, the record and briefs, and oral argument of counsel sustains the view that the findings of the Public Service Commission are supported by competent substantial evidence and that in entering its order respondent Commission met the essential requirements of law.

It is ordered that the petition for writ of certiorari be and is hereby denied.

ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
Argued January 22,

affirmed February 19, 1970

#### STATE OF OREGON, *Respondent, v.*MARK DANIEL CHILTON, *Appellant.*

465 P. 2d 495

*594
      *James A. Pearson,*Eugene, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

*Michael E. Murphy,*Deputy District Attorney, Eugene, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John B. Leahy, District Attorney, Eugene.

Before Schwab, Chief Judge, and Langtry and Foley, Judges.

FOLEY, J.

Defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of illegal possession of narcotics and was given a sentence not to exceed two years’ imprisonment. The sole assignment of error is that the sentence constituted excessive, cruel and unusual punishment.

The thrust of defendant’s argument is that he, a college student with no previous- criminal record, should have been placed on probation or given a more lenient sentence by the trial judge for this nonviolent offense. He also urges that the trial judge was unduly influenced by information volunteered by defendant to the presentence investigator and included in the investigator’s report to the court that he had sold hashish to a 16-year-old boy.

The maximum permissible sentence set by the legislature for the crime charged is 10 years’ imprisonment. OBS 474.990.

The two-year sentence imposed is a maximum sentence. The defendant after his delivery to the Corrections Division may be considered for earlier release by the Board of Parole and Probation under their rules and regulations. OBS'144.050;

*595Presentence-reports are useful-tool's for-sentencing courts. They assist the court in tailoring the sentence to fit the offender as well as the offense. *State v. Scott,*237 Or 390, 399, 390 P2d 328 (1964). It is proper for the court to consider a confession or admission of another crime in imposing sentence. See Annot., 96 ALR2d768 (1964).

There is nothing in the record in this case to suggest any improper motive on the part of the sentencing court.

> “We have often said that where no improper motives can be attached to the action of the trial court we should not modify the sentence unless it was so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience of fair-minded men. *State v. Shannon,*242 Or 404, 409 P2d 911; *State v. Harp,*239 Or 481, 398 P2d 182 (1965); *State v. Clark,*237 Or 596, 392 P2d 643 (1964); *State v. Montgomery,*237 Or 593, 392 P2d 642 (1964).” *State v. Thornton,*244 Or 104, 106-07, 416 P2d 1 (1966).

We find nothing to justify this court substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. *State v. Gabie,*1 Or App 576, 463 P2d 595 (1970); *State v. Walley,*1 Or App 189, 460 P2d 370 (1969).

Affirmed.