NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:

CRYSTAL CATHEDRAL MINISTRIES,

Debtor.

BAP No. CC-20-1103-FLT

Bk. No. 2:12-bk-15665-RK

MEMORANDUM*

DOUGLAS L. MAHAFFEY,

Appellant,

v.

CAROL MILNER,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Robert N. Kwan, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: FARIS, LAFFERTY, and TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

This appeal arises out of a dispute between chapter 111 debtor Crystal 

Cathedral Ministries (“CCM”) and appellee Carol Milner about the 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for 

whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential 

value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the 

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules 

of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

FILED

MAY 28 2021

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
2

contents of seven storage containers. Neither CCM nor Ms. Milner knows 

what is in those containers; there is no inventory of their contents, and no 

one has opened them for many years. But even though the parties literally 

do not know what they are fighting over, they have spent about a decade 

and hundreds of thousands of dollars warring over the unknown contents 

of the containers.

Specifically, this is an appeal from an order in which the bankruptcy 

court employed its inherent powers to impose approximately $70,000 of 

attorneys’ fees as a sanction against CCM’s attorney, appellant Douglas L. 

Mahaffey. We conclude that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its 

discretion in sanctioning Mr. Mahaffey for causing CCM to make reckless 

and frivolous arguments for the improper purpose of pressuring 

Ms. Milner to sign a release of claims. We AFFIRM. 

FACTS

A. Prepetition events

CCM is a Christian ministry founded in the 1970s by Dr. Robert 

Schuller and Arvella Schuller. It operated a church on a large campus in 

Orange County, California. Ms. Milner is Dr. Schuller’s daughter and was 

involved in church operations.

In the 1990s, Ms. Milner wrote a play entitled “Glory of Creation” 

(the “Play”). She reached an agreement with CCM to stage the play on the 

CCM campus in summer 2005. The production was elaborate: it included 

video presentations on IMAX-sized screens, aerialists, and twenty-foot-tall 
3

puppets. CCM allegedly spent millions of dollars to stage the Play and 

reportedly lost $13 million on the production. CCM thereafter decided to 

cease staging the Play, but Ms. Milner argued that this breached her 

agreement with CCM.

In July 2006, the parties entered into a settlement agreement 

(“Settlement Agreement”) that divided the physical assets related to the 

Play between Ms. Milner and CCM. The Settlement Agreement included a 

nonexclusive list of the assets allocated to Ms. Milner (the “Play Property”)

and a preface that said that “CCM will keep all goods in [the] same 

condition as they were in at the end of the ’05 season. CCM will not use 

[the] goods without prior, written approval of [Ms. Milner].” Ms. Milner 

claims that this provision obligates CCM to store her property in 

perpetuity at CCM’s expense.

The Settlement Agreement also provided that Ms. Milner would hold 

all intellectual property rights in the Play, that CCM would defend and 

indemnify Ms. Milner against potential copyright infringement claims, and 

that CCM would pay Ms. Milner about $900,000 over a four-year period.

Both parties agreed not to disparage each other.

At some point, CCM stored the Play Property in seven large trailers 

and parked them on leased property; the trailers have remained there for 

over a decade.

B. CCM’s chapter 11 bankruptcy case

On October 18, 2010, CCM filed a chapter 11 petition. It did not 
4

schedule the Settlement Agreement as an executory contract. Nor did it 

mention the Settlement Agreement in its motion for an order authorizing 

rejection of executory contracts.

Ms. Milner filed four proofs of claim relating to a housing allowance, 

copyright infringement, and breach of an oral employment contract. None 

of her proofs of claim related to the storage of the Play Property pursuant 

to the Settlement Agreement. After an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy 

court allowed part of her housing allowance claim, Ms. Milner withdrew 

some of her claims, and the bankruptcy court disallowed the rest. The 

bankruptcy court also awarded CCM its attorneys’ fees for litigating claims 

by Ms. Milner and other members of the Schuller family.

Meanwhile, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors 

(“Committee”) filed a proposed plan that authorized liquidation of 

substantially all of CCM’s real property assets. It also provided that “[a]ny 

contracts not designated for assumption or rejection at or before the 

Confirmation Hearing, shall be deemed rejected as of the Effective Date.” It

stated that, “upon the Effective Date, Debtor shall be discharged of liability 

for payment of debts incurred before confirmation of the Plan, to the extent 

specified in 11 U.S.C. § 1141.”

After a plan confirmation hearing, the bankruptcy court issued its 

confirmation order that attached a list of executory contracts that were 

assumed and a list of executory contracts that were rejected. Neither list 

included the Settlement Agreement.
5

While the bankruptcy case was pending, CCM and Ms. Milner made 

some efforts to resolve the issues concerning the Play Property. It appears 

that Ms. Milner took possession of some but not all of the Play Property, 

the rest of the Play Property remained (or was placed) in the containers, 

and the discussions sputtered out.

On May 20, 2016, the bankruptcy court entered a final decree closing 

the case.

C. CCM’s state court action against Ms. Milner

CCM grew weary of paying to store the Play Property in a storage 

yard. In 2017, CCM demanded that Ms. Milner take possession of the items 

and threatened to dispose of them. It represented that it cost thousands of 

dollars to lease the storage yard and would cost thousands of dollars more 

to remove and dispose of the property. Ms. Milner did not accede to this 

demand.

In November 2017, CCM, represented by Mr. Mahaffey, filed a 

complaint against Ms. Milner in California state court for declaratory and 

injunctive relief (the “State Court Action”). The complaint asserted that the 

Settlement Agreement was an executory contract that was rejected in the 

bankruptcy case, so CCM’s relationship with Ms. Milner became one of 

gratuitous bailment that CCM could terminate at will. It stated that CCM 

chose to end that relationship, which “terminated CCM’s duty to comply 

with the agreement and relieved it of any and all obligations to any future 

performance on the 2006 agreement to store” the Play Property. It also 
6

sought injunctive relief compelling Ms. Milner to remove the Play Property 

from CCM’s premises or allowing CCM to dispose of those items at 

Ms. Milner’s expense.

Ms. Milner, who was represented by Harold J. Light, filed an answer 

and asserted twenty-one affirmative defenses. Among those defenses, she 

asserted that CCM’s obligations under the Settlement Agreement were not 

extinguished at confirmation, CCM had an obligation to store and maintain 

the Play Property, CCM had failed to allow her reasonable access to the 

Play Property, and CCM had failed to redeliver the Play Property to her.

D. CCM’s motion for contempt against Ms. Milner and her counsel

After some unsuccessful efforts to resolve the matter, Mr. Mahaffey

sent Mr. Light an e-mail asserting that Ms. Milner violated the discharge 

injunction by asserting affirmative defenses that claimed she had rights 

under the Settlement Agreement. Mr. Mahaffey’s e-mail pressed 

Ms. Milner to sign a release of claims under the Settlement Agreement and 

“she can then come and retrieve the property.” The e-mail concluded, “The 

permanent injunction terminated her ownership. Is she ready to sign a 

release? If not, I look forward to your opposition.”

Mr. Light responded that the Settlement Agreement was not 

“rejected” during the bankruptcy case because it was not an executory 

contract; Ms. Milner had completed all of her obligations long before the 

bankruptcy proceedings. As such, she retained ownership rights to the 

Play Property and could defend herself in the State Court Action.
7

In June 2018, while the State Court Action was still pending, CCM, 

through Mr. Mahaffey, filed a motion for contempt (“Contempt Motion”) 

in the bankruptcy court. CCM requested that the bankruptcy court issue an 

order to show cause why it should not hold Ms. Milner and Mr. Light in 

contempt for violation of the discharge injunction. It contended that 

Ms. Milner violated the discharge injunction by asserting affirmative 

defenses arising out of the allegedly rejected Settlement Agreement.

CCM took the position that the plan confirmation order “resulted in a 

discharge of the subject agreement between CCM and Milner which 

terminated CCM’s duty, if any, to comply with the agreement.” At that 

point, the discharge “relieved CCM of any and all obligations including,

inter alia, any liability to further store any of Milner’s play equipment, any 

liability related to that play equipment, and any duties to further protect it 

for the benefit of Milner.”

CCM also argued that Ms. Milner waived any claims she had when 

she failed to file a proof of claim based on the storage of the Play Property.

Ms. Milner and Mr. Light opposed the Contempt Motion. They

argued that the Settlement Agreement was not an executory contract 

because Ms. Milner had no material unperformed obligations under that 

agreement. They also argued that she did not need to file a proof of claim 

to assert ownership of the Play Property. They contended that they had a 

good faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their actions. 

Further, they asserted that once CCM “returned to the fray” by filing the 
8

State Court Action, Ms. Milner was entitled to defend herself.

Additionally, Ms. Milner and Mr. Light requested sanctions against

Mr. Mahaffey under Rule 9011 for filing the Contempt Motion.

In its reply, CCM argued that Ms. Milner had waived her right to

pursue personal property claims related to the Play Property because she 

had litigated other rights under the Settlement Agreement. It claimed that 

Ms. Milner knew that CCM disputed her ownership rights in the Play 

Property and that any duty it had to store the Play Property was 

discharged when Ms. Milner did not object or file a proof of claim. It 

argued that she knowingly waived her personal property claims. It also 

disputed her claim that she had a subjective good faith belief that the 

discharge injunction did not apply to her. 

Finally, CCM argued that the Settlement Agreement was an 

executory contract because both parties had unperformed obligations.

Ms. Milner sent Mr. Mahaffey a letter requesting that CCM withdraw 

the Contempt Motion and its frivolous claims or she would seek Rule 9011 

sanctions. But Ms. Milner did not contemporaneously serve an unfiled 

motion under Rule 9011. CCM did not withdraw the Contempt Motion.

At a status conference, CCM, represented by Mr. Mahaffey, raised a 

new set of arguments: that, under nonbankruptcy law, it had never 

effectively transferred the Play Property to Ms. Milner, and the Settlement 

Agreement was unenforceable. 

The bankruptcy court set an evidentiary hearing as to whether the 
9

Play Property had been transferred and whether the Settlement Agreement 

was an executory contract.

In its trial brief, CCM added more nonbankruptcy reasons why the 

Settlement Agreement was unenforceable: lack of consideration and 

unconscionability. It also advanced new reasons why the Settlement 

Agreement was an executory contract: Ms. Milner had not performed her 

obligation to resolve ownership of some of the Play Property, and CCM 

had an unperformed obligation to fund a trust to cover its payment 

obligations to Ms. Milner.

After an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court issued its 

memorandum decision and order (“Contempt Order”) denying the 

Contempt Motion because CCM had failed to prove that Ms. Milner had 

knowingly and willfully violated the discharge injunction. It held that the 

Settlement Agreement was not an executory contract because Ms. Milner 

did not have any material unperformed obligations. The court also held 

that the plan confirmation order had no claim preclusive effect on 

Ms. Milner’s right to enforce the Settlement Agreement because the 

litigated proofs of claim had nothing to do with CCM’s obligation to store 

the Play Property. Finally, it rejected CCM’s arguments that the Settlement 

Agreement was unenforceable under nonbankruptcy law.

CCM appealed the Contempt Order to this Bankruptcy Appellate 

Panel but voluntarily dismissed the appeal. The Contempt Order is now 

final and no longer appealable. 
10

E. Ms. Milner’s motion for sanctions against CCM and its counsel

Ms. Milner filed a motion for sanctions (“Sanctions Motion”) against 

CCM and Mr. Mahaffey pursuant to Rule 9011 and the bankruptcy court’s 

inherent authority. She sought over $113,000 in attorneys’ fees for CCM’s 

prosecution of the Contempt Motion. 

Ms. Milner requested sanctions under Rule 9011 because 

Mr. Mahaffey had failed to undertake a reasonable prefiling inquiry and 

made patently incorrect arguments regarding executory contracts, the 

effect of the plan discharge, ownership of the Play Property, and her duties 

under the Settlement Agreement. She asserted that the Contempt Motion 

was meant to harass her and force her to release CCM from damage claims 

relating to the Play Property. She also argued that the court could exercise 

its inherent authority to award her attorneys’ fees.

CCM and Mr. Mahaffey separately opposed the Sanctions Motion. 

CCM argued that the motion was untimely because Ms. Milner did not 

serve it until it was too late for CCM to withdraw the Contempt Motion

and until after the court had already denied the Contempt Motion. It 

further argued that Ms. Milner did not identify any conduct or improper 

purpose attributable to CCM.

Mr. Mahaffey argued that the Sanctions Motion was deficient 

because Ms. Milner did not serve an unfiled copy of the motion twenty-one 

days prior to filing it. He also argued that sanctions are unavailable under 

the court’s inherent authority where there is another basis for granting 
11

sanctions (such as Rule 9011). Finally, Mr. Mahaffey argued that he 

conducted himself and made arguments in good faith. He said that he did 

not intend to harass Ms. Milner and that other counsel for CCM shared the 

same legal opinion that the Settlement Agreement was an executory 

contract.

The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the Sanctions Motion. The 

court was concerned that Ms. Milner’s papers did not sufficiently identify 

each statement that was allegedly false or made in bad faith. Over 

Mr. Mahaffey’s and CCM’s objection, the court directed Ms. Milner to file a 

brief “identifying citations to the record that you’re saying is offending, 

why it’s offending, so that they know, they can respond.” The court 

permitted Mr. Mahaffey and CCM to file responses.

In her supplemental brief, Ms. Milner argued that the court could 

sanction CCM and Mr. Mahaffey for their bad faith pursuant to its inherent 

powers. She pointed to particular instances of Mr. Mahaffey’s bad faith:

• Asserting that the Settlement Agreement was an executory contract 

that was rejected during the bankruptcy case, even though CCM had 

considered whether to reject it but took no action;

• Filing the Contempt Motion to pressure Ms. Milner to sign a release, 

as evidenced by Mr. Mahaffey’s e-mails;

• Misrepresenting a California state court case in the reply brief to the 

Contempt Motion;

• Submitting a false declaration as to the availability of CCM board 
12

members to offer testimony; 

• Failing to subpoena its trial witness or bring her to the hearing so that 

she could not be questioned as to her allegedly false declaration;

• Failing to turn over documents prior to the hearing; and 

• Presenting false and misleading legal arguments at the hearing.

In response, Mr. Mahaffey argued that Ms. Milner conceded that 

Rule 9011 sanctions were unavailable. He contended that, because the 

alleged conduct was covered by Rule 9011, the court could not exercise its 

inherent authority. He also said that none of his arguments were made in 

bad faith because he conducted independent research, relied on the legal 

opinions of other attorneys, and had a sound basis for making those

arguments. Finally, he argued that there was no improper purpose in filing 

the Contempt Motion.

The bankruptcy court issued its 126-page memorandum decision 

granting in part and denying in part the Sanctions Motion. It denied the 

Sanctions Motion as to CCM but granted it as to Mr. Mahaffey pursuant to 

its inherent authority. 

The bankruptcy court held that sanctions were inappropriate under 

Rule 9011 because Ms. Milner did not serve Mr. Mahaffey with a copy of 

the Sanctions Motion at least twenty-one days prior to filing it and did not

file the Sanctions Motion before the court decided the Contempt Motion, 

which necessarily meant that Mr. Mahaffey could not withdraw the 

Contempt Motion.
13

Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court held that it could exercise its 

inherent authority to sanction Mr. Mahaffey’s bad faith conduct. It held 

that his misstatements of law and fact were both frivolous and reckless. 

First, the bankruptcy court sanctioned Mr. Mahaffey for arguing that 

Ms. Milner’s affirmative defenses in the State Court Action violated the 

discharge injunction. He did not cite any legal authority in the Contempt 

Motion in support of his contention that Ms. Milner could be held liable for 

defending herself. The court noted that he ignored Boeing North American, 

Inc. v. Ybarra (In re Ybarra), 424 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2005), which stands for 

the proposition that a party who defends itself after a debtor “returns to 

the fray” post-discharge does not violate the discharge injunction.

Second, the court held that the Settlement Agreement was not an 

executory contract and that Mr. Mahaffey’s arguments to the contrary were

baseless. It was not swayed by his argument that he relied on other 

attorneys and faulted him for failing to conduct an independent factual or 

legal inquiry.

Third, the court held that Mr. Mahaffey’s misrepresentation of legal 

authority was reckless and indicative of bad faith, not an honest mistake.

Fourth, the bankruptcy court held that the nonbankruptcy challenges 

to the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement were also frivolous and 

reckless and that his statements lacked a reasonable factual basis.

Fifth, the bankruptcy court ruled that Mr. Mahaffey’s prefiling 

inquiry into the law and facts of the case was reckless and not reasonable.
14

The court held that Mr. Mahaffey failed to undertake a reasonable inquiry, 

including “basic legal research.” It ruled that Mr. Mahaffey had crossed the 

line between zealous advocacy and “frivolous, reckless advocacy.”

The bankruptcy court held that Mr. Mahaffey made these frivolous, 

reckless, and baseless arguments with an improper purpose: to increase 

litigation and expand the issues to force Ms. Milner to release her claims 

against CCM. Rather than bringing CCM’s claims in the existing State 

Court Action, “he multiplied the litigation proceedings” with the “purpose 

of browbeating Milner into releasing her claims by forum shopping and 

bringing additional litigation in another court because he was not making 

the progress that he wanted in the pending state court litigation.”

The bankruptcy court next considered the reasonableness of the 

requested attorneys’ fees and allowed $69,400 in fees and $729.26 in costs.

The court issued its order (“Sanctions Order”) granting in part and 

denying in part the Sanctions Motion. Mr. Mahaffey timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 

157(b)(1) and (b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUE

Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in sanctioning 

Mr. Mahaffey. 

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review for an abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s decision 
15

to award sanctions. See Miller v. Cardinale (In re DeVille), 361 F.3d 539, 547 

(9th Cir. 2004). We similarly review for an abuse of discretion the 

bankruptcy court’s decision on the amount of sanctions. See Marsch v. 

Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 1994).

To determine whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion, we 

conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) we review de novo whether the bankruptcy 

court “identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief requested” and 

(2) if it did, we consider whether the bankruptcy court’s application of the 

legal standard was illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences 

that may be drawn from the facts in the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 

F.3d 1247, 1262-63 & n.21 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

“Whether an appellant’s due process rights were violated is a 

question of law we review de novo.” DeLuca v. Seare (In re Seare), 515 B.R. 

599, 615 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) (citing Miller v. Cardinale (In re DeVille), 280 

B.R. 483, 492 (9th Cir. BAP 2002), aff’d, 361 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 2004)). “De 

novo review requires that we consider a matter anew, as if no decision had 

been made previously.” Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis), 505 B.R. 914, 917 

(9th Cir. BAP 2014) (citations omitted).

We review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error.

Honkanen v. Hopper (In re Honkanen), 446 B.R. 373, 378 (9th Cir. BAP 2011). 

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is illogical, implausible, or 

without support in the record. Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 

1196 (9th Cir. 2010). The bankruptcy court’s choice among multiple 
16

plausible views of the evidence cannot be clear error. United States v. Elliott, 

322 F.3d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

A. The bankruptcy court properly exercised its inherent authority to 

sanction Mr. Mahaffey.

Mr. Mahaffey argues that the bankruptcy court could not exercise its 

inherent authority to sanction him once it determined that Rule 9011 

sanctions were unavailable. We disagree.

It is well settled that the bankruptcy court may sanction a party or an 

attorney under its inherent authority. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 994 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (holding that “an attorney’s reckless misstatements of law and 

fact, when coupled with an improper purpose, such as an attempt to 

influence or manipulate proceedings in one case in order to gain tactical 

advantage in another case, are sanctionable under a court’s inherent 

power.”). Mr. Mahaffey argues that the court cannot use its inherent 

authority to impose sanctions when other mechanisms are available.

The Supreme Court in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), 

rejected Mr. Mahaffy’s position. It held that the unavailability of sanctions 

under a rule or statute did not displace the court’s inherent sanction 

authority:

There is, therefore, nothing in the other sanctioning 

mechanisms or prior cases interpreting them that warrants a 

conclusion that a federal court may not, as a matter of law, 

resort to its inherent power to impose attorney’s fees as a 
17

sanction for bad-faith conduct. This is plainly the case where 

the conduct at issue is not covered by one of the other 

sanctioning provisions. But neither is a federal court 

forbidden to sanction bad-faith conduct by means of the 

inherent power simply because that conduct could also be 

sanctioned under the statute or the Rules. A court must, of 

course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it 

must comply with the mandates of due process, both in 

determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing 

fees. Furthermore, when there is bad-faith conduct in the 

course of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under 

the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather 

than the inherent power. But if in the informed discretion of 

the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, 

the court may safely rely on its inherent power.

Id. at 50 (internal citation omitted) (emphases added).

The Ninth Circuit has stated that Chambers:

emphatically rejected the notion that . . . the sanctioning 

provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure displaced the 

inherent power to impose sanctions for bad faith conduct. . . . 

[G]iven the inadequacy of rules and statutes to sanction 

[appellants’] misconduct, the bankruptcy court correctly relied 

upon its inherent power as a sanctioning tool.

In re DeVille, 361 F.3d at 551.

Under controlling precedent in Chambers and DeVille, it was not error 

for the bankruptcy court to utilize its inherent authority to sanction 

Mr. Mahaffey. The unavailability of sanctions under Rule 9011 – due to 

Ms. Milner’s failure to follow Rule 9011’s procedures – did not deprive the 

court of its inherent power to impose sanctions.
18

B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning 

Mr. Mahaffey.

Mr. Mahaffey argues that the court should not have imposed 

inherent power sanctions. We disagree and defer to the court’s findings 

that Mr. Mahaffey acted frivolously and recklessly.

Federal courts, including bankruptcy courts, have inherent power to 

impose sanctions for a broad range of willful or improper litigation 

conduct. See Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1196 (9th Cir. 

2003). “Before awarding sanctions under its inherent powers, however, the 

court must make an explicit finding that counsel’s conduct ‘constituted or 

was tantamount to bad faith.’” Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 

F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see also Fink, 239 F.3d at 992

(“In reviewing sanctions under the court’s inherent power, our cases have 

consistently focused on bad faith. . . . [A] specific finding of bad faith . . . 

must precede any sanction under the court’s inherent powers.” (citations 

and quotation marks omitted)).

The Ninth Circuit has stated that a court may impose sanctions 

pursuant to its inherent authority when it finds:

willful actions, including recklessness when combined with an 

additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an 

improper purpose. . . . [A]n attorney’s reckless misstatements of 

law and fact, when coupled with an improper purpose, such as 

an attempt to influence or manipulate proceedings in one case 

in order to gain tactical advantage in another case, are 

sanctionable under a court’s inherent power.
19

Fink, 239 F.3d at 994.

In the Civil Rule 11 context, the Ninth Circuit has stated that 

frivolousness means “both baseless and made without a reasonable and 

competent inquiry.” Moore v. Keegan Mgmt. Co. (In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. 

Litig.), 78 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Townsend v. Holman 

Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc)). 

While there does not appear to be a single definition of recklessness, 

the Ninth Circuit has stated in the context of sanctions that “recklessness 

might be defined as a departure from ordinary standards of care that 

disregards a known or obvious risk of material misrepresentation.” Thomas 

v. Girardi (In re Girardi), 611 F.3d 1027, 1038 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010).

The Ninth Circuit has urged restraint: “forceful and effective 

representation often will call for innovative arguments. For this reason, 

sanctions should be reserved for the rare and exceptional case where the 

action is clearly frivolous, legally unreasonable or without legal 

foundation, or brought for an improper purpose.” Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., 

Inc., 115 F.3d at 649 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

1. Mr. Mahaffey’s disregard of the “return to the fray” doctrine 

was frivolous and reckless.

Mr. Mahaffey argued in the bankruptcy court that Ms. Milner 

violated the discharge injunction by asserting affirmative defenses in the 

State Court Action. However, Ms. Milner only raised those defenses 

because Mr. Mahaffey caused CCM to “return to the fray” post-discharge. 
20

In the bankruptcy court, Mr. Mahaffey ignored binding authority and 

pressed ahead with the Contempt Motion. He also ignores this point on 

appeal. This is an independently sufficient basis to affirm the Sanctions 

Order.2

In Ybarra, the chapter 11 debtor received a discharge but then 

returned to the state court to resume prepetition litigation against her 

employer. She was ultimately unsuccessful, and her employer recovered 

attorneys’ fees. The Ninth Circuit considered whether the fee award was 

barred by the discharge injunction. In determining that it was not, it stated

that “we have held that post-petition attorney fee awards are not 

discharged where post-petition, the debtor voluntarily ‘pursue[d] a whole 

new course of litigation,’ commenced litigation, or ‘return[ed] to the fray’

voluntarily.” 424 F.3d at 1024 (citation omitted). It further explained that, 

“[e]ven if a cause of action arose pre-petition, the discharge shield cannot 

be used as a sword that enables a debtor to undertake risk-free litigation at 

others’ expense. Personal liability for fees incurred through the voluntary 

pursuit of litigation initiated post-petition is more consistent with the 

purpose of discharge.” Id. at 1026 (citation omitted).

Ybarra is squarely on point, and Mr. Mahaffey has never even 

addressed it, let alone attempted to distinguish it.3 When CCM filed the 

2 Because we agree with the bankruptcy court on this point, we need not address 

the other bases of its findings of recklessness and frivolousness. 

3 When the Panel directly questioned Mr. Mahaffey’s counsel at oral argument as 
21

State Court Action, it initiated new post-discharge litigation, so Ms. Milner 

was entitled to defend herself.

The bankruptcy court correctly held that “Milner defending herself in 

post-confirmation litigation initiated by CCM was not a violation of the 

discharge injunction since the reorganized debtor ‘returned to the fray’ by 

initiating litigation.” The bankruptcy court also correctly held that 

Mr. Mahaffey’s argument was incorrect and without any legal basis. It is 

inexcusable that an attorney should blatantly ignore binding precedent or 

fail to educate himself as to the law.

The bankruptcy court thus concluded that Mr. Mahaffey behaved 

frivolously and recklessly. It said that he completely ignored binding 

authority rejecting his position, and “[i]n proceeding with CCM’s 

Contempt Motion, Debtor’s Counsel failed to rebut these substantial legal 

arguments put forth by Milner, which he did at his peril.”

We agree with the bankruptcy court’s analysis. At bottom, 

Mr. Mahaffey is contending that the bankruptcy court’s orders not only 

extinguished Ms. Milner’s rights but barred her from arguing otherwise. 

Put simply, when CCM sued Ms. Milner, CCM said, “The bankruptcy 

court’s orders mean this,” which gave Ms. Milner the right to say, “No, 

they don’t.”

to why his choice to ignore Ybarra was not reckless, counsel deflected and discussed 

instead the objective contempt standard in Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019), 

rather than answering the Panel’s question.
22

Mr. Mahaffey did not just make an incorrect legal argument, but he 

completely ignored binding authority to the contrary. He failed – both in 

the bankruptcy court and before this Panel – to provide any authority 

supporting his position or even to address Ms. Milner’s arguments. It was 

not error for the court to conclude that Mr. Mahaffey’s arguments and 

conduct were frivolous and reckless.

2. The bankruptcy court’s finding of improper purpose was not 

clearly erroneous.

Mr. Mahaffey challenges the bankruptcy court’s finding that he filed 

the Contempt Motion for the improper purpose of pressuring Ms. Milner 

to release her claims. He argues that he only sought to take advantage of 

the bankruptcy court’s expertise. We find no error. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that an “improper purpose, such as an 

attempt to influence or manipulate proceedings in one case in order to gain 

tactical advantage in another case,” can support sanctions under a court’s 

inherent authority. Fink, 239 F.3d at 994.

The bankruptcy court found, as a matter of fact, that CCM filed the 

Contempt Motion to forum shop, multiply the litigation, and “browbeat”

Ms. Milner to release all of her claims against CCM. It specifically 

referenced the correspondence from Mr. Mahaffey in which he pressed 

Ms. Milner to sign the release and threatened to otherwise go forward with 

the Contempt Motion. This finding is not clearly erroneous. 

C. The bankruptcy court did not deny Mr. Mahaffey due process.
23

Mr. Mahaffey argues that the bankruptcy court denied him due 

process because he was not fully and timely apprised of his improper

conduct. He is wrong. 

Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be 

heard. See Tennant v. Rojas (In re Tennant), 318 B.R. 860, 870 (9th Cir. BAP

2004). According to the United States Supreme Court:

An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in 

any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice 

reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 

interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford 

them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice 

must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required 

information, . . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those 

interested to make their appearance[.]

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations 

omitted).

In considering due process required for a sanctions award, the Ninth 

Circuit has stated that:

whether the bankruptcy court’s inherent power can support the 

attorney’s fees and costs portion of the sanction imposed . . .

depends on whether [debtor and counsel] were . . . “provided 

with sufficient, advance notice of exactly which conduct was 

alleged to be sanctionable and, furthermore . . . [were] aware 

that [they] stood accused of having acted in bad faith.”

In re DeVille, 361 F.3d at 549 (quoting Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. v. 

Charter Techs., Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1225 (3d Cir. 1995)). Here, Mr. Mahaffey 

received notice of his sanctionable conduct, multiple warnings that 
24

Ms. Milner would seek sanctions against him, and an opportunity to 

defend himself.

Mr. Mahaffey argues that the notice was insufficient under Rule 9011 

and the court cannot disregard the procedural safeguards of Rule 9011. He

fails to cite any authority for the novel proposition that the court cannot 

impose sanctions pursuant to its inherent authority until the movant 

complies with the procedures of Rule 9011. These are two different sources 

of sanction power with different procedures, standards, and purposes. 

There is ample binding authority for the proposition that a court may 

impose inherent power sanctions even if the party seeking sanctions 

botches the Rule 9011 procedures. See In re DeVille, 361 F.3d at 551 (holding 

that, although Rule 9011 sanctions were inappropriate given movant’s 

failure to serve the motion, sanctions pursuant to the court’s inherent 

authority were appropriate).

Mr. Mahaffey suggests that he was entitled to receive “repeated 

objections,” before facing sanctions. There is no authority for this 

proposition. 

He also argues that he was not given enough warning or sufficient 

notice of the specific conduct until after Ms. Milner filed her supplemental 

brief and that the bankruptcy court should not have permitted 

supplemental briefing. He complains that he “was denied his right to a 

proper hearing, one in which he was apprised of the specific conduct being 

alleged against him, prior to that hearing.”
25

Unsurprisingly, Mr. Mahaffey offers no authority for the startling 

proposition that due process prohibits a court from requesting posthearing briefing unless it holds another hearing. The bankruptcy court 

gave Mr. Mahaffey a month to respond to Ms. Milner’s supplemental 

filing, and he took advantage of that opportunity. He does not describe 

anything concrete that he would have done at a second hearing that he 

could not have done in his supplemental filing; at oral argument, his 

counsel conceded that it cannot be known what evidence or argument he 

would have offered.

Finally, he contends that he was ambushed by the arguments in the 

supplemental briefing, because both the bankruptcy court and the parties 

had no idea as to the factual bases for the Sanctions Motion, which 

necessitated new arguments in the supplemental briefing. But the 

Sanctions Motion adequately put Mr. Mahaffey on notice of the offending 

conduct; the court merely directed Ms. Milner to list the exact dates, filings, 

statements, correspondence, and actions that supported her arguments. 

The basis of the Sanctions Order should not have been a surprise to 

Mr. Mahaffey.

The bankruptcy court did not deprive Mr. Mahaffey of due process. 

D. The bankruptcy court did not err in calculating the award.

Finally, Mr. Mahaffey argues that the bankruptcy court erred in 

awarding Ms. Milner fees incurred in prosecuting the Sanctions Motion. He 

argues that the Sanctions Motion was insufficient on its face and required 
26

supplemental briefing, so he should not be required to pay for her 

counsel’s “deficient litigation.”

The bankruptcy court reduced fees for counsel’s time spent on the 

supplemental briefing, recognizing that the itemization of specific conduct 

should have been included in the motion. We discern no abuse of 

discretion. 

CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning 

Mr. Mahaffey pursuant to its inherent authority. We AFFIRM.