alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

165 

KA 12-01601 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DARYL D. WILLIAMS, SR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

REBECCA CURRIER, AUBURN, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

JON E. BUDELMANN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUBURN (CHRISTOPHER T. VALDINA OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Cayuga County Court (Thomas G.

Leone, J.), rendered July 5, 2012. The judgment revoked the probation

component of defendant’s split sentence of incarceration and probation

and imposed a lengthier indeterminate term of incarceration. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment revoking the

probation component of the split sentence of incarceration and

probation previously imposed upon his conviction of robbery in the

third degree (Penal Law § 160.05) and sentencing him to a lengthier

indeterminate term of incarceration. County Court did not abuse its

discretion in denying defendant’s request for an adjournment of the

violation of probation hearing to enable him to obtain a copy of the

plea and sentencing transcripts from the underlying conviction (see

People v Strauts, 67 AD3d 1381, 1381, lv denied 14 NY3d 773; see also

People v Darryl P., 105 AD3d 1439, 1440, lv denied 21 NY3d 1041). 

Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the People established by

a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the condition of his

probation that he abstain from the use of intoxicating beverages (see

People v Flinn, 92 AD3d 1217, 1217-1218, lv denied 18 NY3d 994; People

v Jones, 50 AD3d 1058, 1059, lv denied 10 NY3d 936). The State

Trooper who arrested defendant for driving while intoxicated after he

crashed his vehicle testified at the hearing that defendant tested

positive for alcohol on the preliminary screening device, failed three

sobriety tests, and admitted that he purchased beer. Also contrary to

defendant’s contention, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. 

We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions and conclude that

they are without merit.

Entered: February 14, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
**EXHIBIT 23**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 33-57648, 333-15679, 333-33885, 333-47536, 333-47538 and 333-88387 onForm S-8 of our report dated May 14, 2010, relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of Material Sciences Corporation appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Material Sciences Corporation for theyear ended February 28, 2010. 

DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP 

Chicago, IL 

May 14, 2010 

 

1
251 La. 74

#### Edgar Frank BLANCHARD and The Heme Indemnity Company v. Sam OGIMA, Vincent Russo d/b/a Russo Motors.

No. 48875.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 20, 1967.

In re: Edgar Frank Blanchard and the Home Indemnity Company applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 200 So.2d 374.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.

McCALEB, J., recused.
#### FLORIDA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION v. RATNER.

No. 38466.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 219 So.2d 62.
#### HANNAH RINGGOLD *vs.*JACOB R. GRIFFIN.

If a trial be”granted after judgment entered on a *judgment*note it *vacates*that judgment, unless there has been *a levy.*

And in such case there is no *appeal*from a subsequent judgment under five dollars and thirty-three cents.

Appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace.

A judgment had been entered by the justice at the suit of *Sing-gold*vs. *Griffin*on a judgment note. The deft, made affidavit as required by the act of assembly *(Big.*337, *sec. 12)*and the justice appointed referees to try the cause, who reported; and the justice afterwards set 'aside and vacated their report and gave judgment against the defendant for four dollars and sixteen cents, costs; from which an appeal was taken.

*Frame,*

of counsel .for Griffin, moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the judgment was for a sum under five dollars and thirty-three cents, and that no appeal lay from the original judgment.

*Per curiam.*

In this case there being no execution, no lien, and a trial ordered by the justice, it is as if an original action had been brought on the note without entering judgment under the power attorney, the opening of the judgment in such case doing no harm •to any one. But if there had been an execution levied the vacating the judgment would necessarily have destroyed the execution and with it the lien of the party; therefore the act provides in such case that the judgment and execution shall stand unless the deft, gives security.

By ordering a trial in this case the judgment entered on the warrant of attorney was vacated; and the proceedings were to be had as if an action had been regularly commenced on the obligation; consequently the only judgment now remaining of record on the record of the justice is the judgment for four dollars and sixteen cents, the amount of the costs which being under five dollars and thirty-three .cents is final and no appeal lies therefrom. *(Dig.*342, *sec. 22.)*

Appeal dismissed.
### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs April 3, 2017 **IN RE DAMIEN G. M. Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Bradley County**  **No. J -**  **12 -** **219 Kurt Andrew Benson,**  **Substitute Judge**

**___________________________________ No.**  **E2016 -**  **02063 -**  **COA -** **R3 -** **PT**

**___________________________________** C HARLES D. SUSANO , JR., J., dissenting. The first referral in this matter occurred on October 31, 2014. It involved “drug exposure of [Damien and his older sibling]
. ” On December 15, 2014, there was a second referral to DCS, again for “drug exposure.” M ethadone and methamphetamine were involved in the children’s care, or, more aptly, their non
- care. On April 17, 2015, Damien’s hair follicle drug screen was “positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.” Damien’s “drug life” continued. When DCS was considering the placement of Damien with his father, the father tested “positive for methamphetamine.” After attending the required five chemical dependency support group meetings, father “continued to fail random drug tests.” Mr. Peters testified that he last requested a drug screen around March 2016. The saga goes on. As recited by the majority, [o]n June 17, 2015, Mr. Peters met with Father to discuss his lack of progress and positive drug screens. Father stated that his positive screens were due to Mother breaking into his residence and contaminating his tea with methamphetamine. He also opine d that his positive screens could be the result of his consumption of energy drinks. On or about June 25, 2015, the trial court allegedly adjudicated Damien to be dependent and neglected due to Father’s illegal drug use. Also on June 25, 2015, the trial court ratified the April 20, 2015 permanency plan, finding the goals and responsibilities to be appropriate and reasonably related to the reasons the child came into DCS custody. 05/03/2017- 2
-

(Footnote omitted.) The excuses given by father with respect to his failed drug tests strain credulity. His explanations are preposterous. The fact that he would use them tells me that we are dealing with a practicing drug addict. I would hold that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that father failed to substantially comply with his permanency plan. Ialso find that there is clear and convincing evidence that termination of father’s parental rights is in Damien’s best interest. I respectfully dissent.

_______________________________ CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
_____________

No. 96-3316EM

_____________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern

v. * District of Missouri.

*

Michael Watson, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

_____________

 Submitted: February 5, 1997

 Filed: February 26, 1997

_____________

Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

On appeal from his cocaine-related sentence, Michael Watson contends

he should have received an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. We

disagree. Having reviewed the record, we conclude Watson's state arrest

for possessing cocaine while on bond awaiting sentencing in this case--

after removing an electrical monitoring device he was required to wear as

a condition of his release--provides ample justification for the district

court's decision to deny the reduction. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 3E1.1 cmt. note 1(b); United States v. Nguyen, 52 F.3d 192, 194

(8th Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of § 3E1.1 reduction when defendant

committed similar type of offense while on bond). We affirm Watson's

sentence.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON M OTION

November 7, 2008 Revision Cause number: 01

- 1 7

- 0 0160

- CR

Style: The State of Texas v. Carl Rankin Frazier, Jr.

Date motion filed * : October 25 , 2017

Type of motion: Third Motion to Extend Time

Party filing motion: Appell ee Carl Rankin Frazier, Jr. ’s counsel, Zachary S. Maloney

Document to be filed: Appell ee ’s Brief

Is appeal accelerated? No

.

If motion to extend time:

Original due date: Ju ly 6 , 201 7

Number of extensions granted: 2 Current Due D ate: September 25 , 2017

Date Requested: N/A (60 days or 1 40 days from original due date )

Ordered that motion is:

 Granted

If document i s to be filed, document due: November 2 7 , 2017

.  No further extensions of time will be granted

.  Denied

 Dismissed ( e.g. , want of jurisdiction, moot)

 Other: _____________________________________

Because appell ee ’s counsel’s third extension request states that Hurricane Harvey has

displaced him from his home and office, the Court gra nt s the motion

, but counsel is

warned that no further extensions are to be granted

. See E xtension of E mergency

Order Authorizing Modification and Suspension of Court Procedures in Proceedings

Affected by Disaster

, Misc. Docket No. 17

- 0 1 3 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 2 6 , 201 7 ) ; T EX

.

R. A PP

. P. 2

, 38.6(d)

. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 2

, 38.6(d)

. Accordingly, if appell ee ’s brief is

not filed by Novem ber 2 7 , 2017

, the Court ma y se t this case for submission without

appellee’s brief. See id. 4.1(a), 38. 9 ( a ) , 39.8.

Judge’ s signature: /s/ Evelyn V. Keyes

 Acting for the Court

Date: October 31 , 2017
#### Irvin SCOTT v. R. J. SHAW CONSTRUCTION CO.

No. 62032.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 5, 1978.

In re: Irvin Scott, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Parish of Terrebonne.

Denied.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 4594** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. BOBBY EUGENE CREWS , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh
. Terrence W. Boyle , District Judge. ( 5:13

- cr - 00019

- BO

- 1 )

Submitted : April 28, 2014 Decided: May 7, 2014

Before KEENAN and WYNN , Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May

- Parker, Yvonne V. Watford

- McKinney, As sistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Bobby Eugene Crews was confined at the Federal Prison Camp at Butner, North Carolina. O n October 11, 20 12 while Crews was part of an afternoon landscaping crew , he walked away from the camp and into the nearby woods. He was discovered missing and placed on escape status . On October 19, 2012, Crews was apprehended near Greensboro, North Carolina. Crews pl ed guilty to escape from federal custody and was sentenced to a term of twelve months’ imprisonment, to run consecutive to the sentence he was serving at the time of his escape. Crews appeals, arguing that the district court erred by not reducing his offe nse level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2P1.1(b)(3) , which pro vides for a four

- level reduction for escape from a non

- secure community corrections center or simil ar facility. We affirm. We review the appli cation of the S entencing G uidelines de novo . United States v. Sarno , 24 F.3d 618, 62 3 (4th Cir. 1994) ; United States v. Daughtrey , 874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 1989)
. Under the two

- pronged test adopted in Sarno , the § 2P1.1(b)(3) reduction applies if: ( 1) the escape is from a

non - secure facility; and (2) the non

- secure facility is “ similar
to a c ommunity corrections center, community treatment cen ter or half

- way house. ” 24 F.3d at 623.3 Crews does not qualify for a reduction under § 2P1.1(b)(3) because a prison camp is not “ similar to a

c ommunity corrections center, community treatment cen ter or half

- way house. ” I d. at 623 & n.4 (citing cases). Accordingly, the district court properly denied the reduction
. For these reasons , w e affirm Cre ws’ twelve

- month
sent ence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this C ourt and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED
#### Sherwood L. STOKES, as Executor of the Estate of Eleanor L. Frattini (Walker), deceased, Appellant, v. Gordon C. HUIE, as Executor of the Estate of Cebelle Norton, deceased, Appellee.

No. 70-719.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 5, 1971.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Wilson C. KREBS et al. v. TOWN OF PATTERSON.

No. 9097.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Sept. 14, 1972.

Wilson G. Krebs, in pro per.

Michael J. McNulty, Jr., Bauer, Darnall, McNulty & Boudreaux, Franklin, and Robert M. Mahoney, Davidson, Meaux, One-bane & Donohoe, Lafayette, for appellee.

Before LANDRY, SARTAIN and TUCKER, JJ.

PER CURIAM:

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

From an examination of this record it appeared that the appeal bond had not been filed timely by the appellants. Consequently, this court, on its own motion, under date of August 1, 1972, issued a rule ordering the parties to show cause, by briefs, on or before August 21, 1972, why the appeal should not be dismissed. The appellee responded by memorandum, urging that the appeal be dismissed, but there has been no response or reply to the rule by the appellants.

The record reflects that the trial court signed a judgment in the case on March 6, 1972, rejecting plaintiffs’ demands. An order of appeal to this court was signed on March 14, 1972. The appeal bond was filed on July 29, *1972.*

Under the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2087, more than ninety days having elapsed between the date that the judgment of the trial court became final and the date appellants filed their appeal bond, the appeal was not perfected timely, and this court did not acquire jurisdiction of the appeal. In plain parlance the jurisdiction of the trial court has not been divested nor has our jurisdiction been effectuated. See Orrell v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, 248 La. 576, 180 So.2d 710 (1965).

The rule is made absolute and plaintiffs’ appeal is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Robert HOLLOMAN and Jettie Holloman v. Metro HOWELL.

No. 44786.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 4, 1968.

W. S. Murphy, Lucedale, for appellants.

Darrl A. Hurt, Lucedale, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
# C_2022237EN.01005001.xml

| 20.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 237/50 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 237/50

---

Judgment of the General Court of 6 April 2022 — Agora Invest v EUIPO — Transportes Maquinaria y Obras (TRAMOSA)

(Case T-219/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark TRAMOSA - Earlier EU figurative mark TRAMO, SA TRANSPORTE MAQUINARIA Y OBRAS, S.A. - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Genuine use of the earlier mark - Article 15(1)(a) and Article 42(2) and (3) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 18(1)(a) and Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation 2017/1001) - Form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character)

(2022/C 237/63)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Agora Invest, SA (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: A. Alejos Cutuli, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Transportes Maquinaria y Obras, SA (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: N. Fernández Fernández-Pacheco, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 February 2021 (Case R 566/2020-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Transportes Maquinaria y Obras and Agora Invest.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Agora Invest, SA to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Agora Invest, SA to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 228, 14.6.2021.

---
# C_2021349EN.01002201.xml

| 30.8.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 349/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.8.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 349/22

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht München (Germany) lodged on 15 June 2021 — DOMUS-SOFTWARE-AG v Marc Braschoß Immobilien GmbH

(Case C-370/21)

(2021/C 349/27)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht München

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: DOMUS-SOFTWARE-AG

Respondent: Marc Braschoß Immobilien GmbH

Question referred

Is Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 2011/7/EU, (1) read in conjunction with Article 3 of Directive 2011/7/EU, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of periodic claims for payment arising from a single contractual relationship, there is an entitlement to payment of a fixed sum of at least EUR 40 for each individual claim for payment?

---

(1)  Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions (recast) (OJ 2011 L 48, p. 1).

---
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 139 (Thursday, July 19, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 34165]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-15383]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES


Arts and Artifacts Indemnity Panel Advisory Committee

AGENCY: Federal Council on the Arts and the Humanities.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, notice is 
hereby given that the Federal Council on the Arts and the Humanities 
will hold a meeting of the Arts and Artifacts Domestic Indemnity Panel.

DATES: The meeting will be held on Wednesday, August 8, 2018, from 
12:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held by teleconference originating at 
the National Endowment for the Arts, Washington, DC 20506.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elizabeth Voyatzis, Committee 
Management Officer, 400 7th Street SW, Room 4060, Washington, DC 20506, 
(202) 606-8322; <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#660310091f07121c0f152608030e48010910"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="dcb9aab3a5bda8a6b5af9cb2b9b4f2bbb3aa">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The purpose of the meeting is for panel 
review, discussion, evaluation, and recommendation on applications for 
Certificates of Indemnity submitted to the Federal Council on the Arts 
and the Humanities, for exhibitions beginning on or after October 1, 
2018. Because the meeting will consider proprietary financial and 
commercial data provided in confidence by indemnity applicants, and 
material that is likely to disclose trade secrets or other privileged 
or confidential information, and because it is important to keep the 
values of objects to be indemnified, and the methods of transportation 
and security measures confidential, I have determined that the meeting 
will be closed to the public pursuant to subsection (c)(4) of section 
552b of Title 5, United States Code. I have made this determination 
under the authority granted me by the Chairman's Delegation of 
Authority to Close Advisory Committee Meetings, dated April 15, 2016.

    Dated: July 13, 2018.
Elizabeth Voyatzis,
Committee Management Officer, National Endowment for the Humanities.
[FR Doc. 2018-15383 Filed 7-18-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7536-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM PICTURETEL'S
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT FOR THE PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH 10-K FILING.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> US$

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          23,115
<SECURITIES>                                    37,787
<RECEIVABLES>                                   82,762
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (5,642)
<INVENTORY>                                     32,930
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               183,514
<PP&E>                                         214,132
<DEPRECIATION>                               (127,913)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 294,870
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          100,520
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         45
<COMMON>                                           406
<OTHER-SE>                                     139,315
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   294,870
<SALES>                                        323,279
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               323,279
<CGS>                                          221,143
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  221,143
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               192,420
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,636
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (80,142)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,384
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (84,526)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (84,526)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (2.23)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.23)


</TABLE>