UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4994

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ALONZO DALE JONES, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:10-cr-00035-WO-1)

Submitted: June 24, 2013 Decided: July 2, 2013

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael B. Driver, DRIVER LAW FIRM, PA, Durham, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Clifton Thomas Barrett, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Alonzo Dale Jones, Jr., pled guilty to distribution of 

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) 

(West 1999 & Supp. 2013). The district court sentenced Jones to 

102 months’ imprisonment.* On appeal, Jones’ counsel has filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but 

questioning the substantive reasonableness of Jones’ sentence. 

Although informed of his right to do so, Jones has not filed a 

pro se brief. We affirm. 

We review Jones’ sentence for reasonableness, applying 

a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We begin by reviewing the 

sentence for significant procedural error, including improper 

calculation of the Guidelines range, failure to consider 

sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), sentencing 

 * Jones was initially sentenced to 124 months’ imprisonment. 

On appeal, the parties filed a joint motion to remand this case 

in light of this court’s decision in United States v. Simmons, 

649 F.3d 237, 241-49 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that a 

North Carolina offense may not be classified as a felony based 

on the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed upon a 

repeat offender if the individual defendant was not eligible for 

such a sentence). By order entered on November 28, 2011, we

granted the motion, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case 

for resentencing. See United States v. Jones, No. 11-4466 (4th 

Cir. 2011) (unpublished order). The 102-month sentence was 

imposed at resentencing. 
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based on clearly erroneous facts, or failure to adequately 

explain the sentence imposed. Id. at 51. Once we have 

determined that the sentence is free of significant procedural 

error, we must consider the substantive reasonableness of the 

sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the 

circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is 

within the appropriate Guidelines range, we apply a presumption 

on appeal that the sentence is reasonable. United States v. 

Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). Such a 

presumption is rebutted only when the defendant demonstrates 

“that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 

§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 

375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, our review of the record indicates no procedural 

error in the imposition of Jones’ sentence. Further, the 

district court adequately explained the basis for Jones’ withinGuidelines range sentence based on the goals of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a), and we conclude that Jones has not rebutted the 

presumption of reasonableness. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and find no other meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm Jones’ conviction and sentence. This court 

requires counsel to inform Jones, in writing, of his right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 
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review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed but counsel 

believes such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in 

this Court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Jones. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this Court and argument would not aid in the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED