alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                          CONSENT OF KPMG PEAT MARWICK

The Board of Directors
Habersham Bancorp:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos.
33-64149, 33-61587, 33-61589, 333-48507 on Forms S-8 and Registration Statement
No. 333-18023 on Form S-3 of Habersham Bancorp of our report dated January 30,
1998, with respect to the consolidated balance sheet of Habersham Bancorp and
subsidiaries as of December 31, 1997, and the related consolidated statements of
income, shareholders' equity, and cash flows for the year then ended, which
report appears in the December 31, 1997 annual report on Form 10-KSB of
Habersham Bancorp.

                            /s/ KPMG Peat Marwick LLP
                            -------------------------
                            KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

Atlanta, Georgia
March 26, 1998


                                       70
#### G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc., et al., Respondents, v New York State Liquor Authority, Appellant.

[654 NYS2d 773]

Judgment (denominated an order), Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered on or about February 27, 1996, which denied defendant Liquor Authority’s motion to dismiss this declaratory judgment action as to whether Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 101 (1) (a) and § 107-a and defendant’s rule 50 prohibit plaintiffs manufacturer and wholesaler of a malt liquor product from placing a suggested retail price sticker on the bottles of such product, and granted plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment declaring that they are not thereby prohibited from so doing, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, the motion court correctly invoked "settled law that, where no factual issue is raised, a declaratory judgment action may be maintained to challenge the validity or application of a particular statute without exhausting administrative remedies” *(Westwood Pharms. v Chu,*164 AD2d 462, 467, *lv denied*77 NY2d 807). Moreover, in view of defendant’s firm statement of policy, it is evident that resort to administrative remedies, such as a declaratory ruling, would have been futile, and therefore was not required *(Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation,*87 NY2d 136, 140-141). On the merits, the removable suggested retail price sticker, which does not conflict with or augment the information required to be on the approved and registered brand label, does not violate Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 107-a or defendant’s rule 50, since the sticker in and of itself is not deceptive and any deceptive practices by retailers that may occur can be otherwise prohibited *{see,*9 NYCRR 99.6 [a]). Nor does the sticker violate Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 101 (1) (a), the "tied house” provision prohibiting wholesalers and manufacturers of alcoholic beverages from being directly or indirectly interested in retailers, since the retailer is not required to charge the suggested price, keep the removable sticker on the product or even sell the product at all, and is not otherwise tied to plaintiffs by use of the sticker. We have considered defendant’s other arguments and find them to be without merit. Concur— Ellerin, J. P., Nardelli, Rubin and Mazzarelli, JJ.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT CARLOS E. REYES, M.D. and THOMAS ) M. MCNEIL, M.D., ) ) Appellants, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-1771 ) HEATHER K. LYONS, ) ) Appellee. ) 

### ) Opinion filed February 28, 2018. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Jack R. St. Arnold, Judge. Erik P. Bartenhagen and Dinah Stein of Hicks, Porter, Ebenfeld & Stein, P.A., Miami; and Ronald H. Josepher of Josepher & Batteese, P.A., Tampa, for Appellants. Kristin A. Norse and Stuart C. Markman of Kynes, Markman & Felman, P.A., Tampa; and Armando T. Lauritano of Morgan & Morgan, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.- 2 -

KELLY, KHOUZAM, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.
## REG I STRATION N OT TRANSFERABLE UN ITED S T ATES OF AMERICA 

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#### JOHN BURROWS vs. JAMES DUMPHY.

*The*remedy under section 20 of the attachment law, though given in terms to the inhabitants of this government, extends to citizens of other statos.

*Quere.*Whether the order for further security provided by that section is not unconstitutional.

Capias case.

The defendant was arrested on the affidavit of plaintiff, that he •was indebted to him in a sum exceeding forty shillings, the day of payment of which was not then come, and that the deponent verily believed upon good grounds, that the debtor was about to depart this government, and to remove his effects, and hath refused to give better security for the payment of the money when due.

The application was for an order on the defendant to give better security, under section 20 of the attachment law. *Digest,*51.

Rule hearing on the motion for better security; and rule also, on motion of the defendant’s counsel, to show cause why the writ should not be quashed.

Plaintiff exhibited his cause of action, which was two notes of hand, each for $200, dated 5th August, 1837, at ninety days, and six months.

He also testified (being sworn by direction of the court, as to which see section 20 of the act,) that defendant had refused to give better security; and that he had been told by defendant’s partner, that defendant was about to remove to the south, having got a situation there.

*Per Curiam.*

This act gives a great stretch of power to the court, and we must take care that we do not carry it so far as to violate the constitution of the United States by extending the obligation of these contracts. One of these notes is now due, and the plaintiff may sue upon it and hold the defendant to bail; as to the other, the court might perhaps safely go so far as to direct the party to give security to appear here and answer to a suit on it; but as to ordering him to give better security for the *payment of the money,*we have our doubts, though the act is so.

It was suggested that the plaintiff was a resident of Pennsylvania, and this remedy under the act is given only “ to the inhabitants of this government.”

Sed non allocatur. The remedy under this section has always been held to extend to all citizens of the United States; and it is a question whether a contrary construction would not make the act a violation of the constitution of the United States.

*309
      *W. H. Rogers,*for plaintiff.

*Rodney,*for defendant.

James Dumphy, the defendant," was now sworn, and the court finally quashed the writ.

So the plaintiff took nothing by his motion.
#### Dolores CENTRELLA, Appellant, v. Victor CENTRELLA, Appellee.

No. 69-151.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Dec. 16, 1969.

*883Cushman & Cushman, Miami, for appellant.

Frates, Fay, Floyd & Pearson, and Harvey M. Goldstein, Miami, for appellee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, BARK-DULL and HENDRY, JJ.

HENDRY, Judge.

The wife was plaintiff in her action for divorce below. She has appealed from three portions of the final judgment of divorce. The appellant’s first point contends that the amount of alimony awarded to her was insufficient. We have closely reviewed the record on appeal and conclude the appellant has failed to show that the chancellor abused his discretion in this area. See Milander v. Milander, Fla.App.1968, 208 So.2d 876, and cases cited therein.

As her second point on appeal, the appellant contends that the chancellor erred when he ordered as follows:

> “10. * * * Only until such time as [the marital home] can be sold or partitioned is the Plaintiff, Delores CEN-TRELLA, and the children granted the right of occupancy of said home. During such pending period, the Defendant, VICTOR CENTRELLA, is directed and ordered to pay the monthly mortgage payments on said home, the utility bills, and an allowance of $20.00 per month for the gardener to keep said place in proper appearance and maintenance. *The monthly mortgage payments made by the defendant after the date of this divorce shall first be deducted from the equity of the parties when the property is sold, and returned to the Defendant, VICTOR CENTRELLA, prior to- the proceeds being divided on a fifty-fifty basis.”*[Emphasis added.]

The appellant’s position is that the emphasized portion above is inequitable and improper. We must agree. To require the appellant to pay part of the mortgage payments by way of diminishing her share in the property if and when it is sold, in effect relieves the husband of half of his obligation to provide a place for his wife and children to live.

We have examined appellant’s third point on appeal and find it to be without merit.

Therefore, we affirm all the provisions of the final judgment except that which was set forth above which allowed the husband to receive credit for all payments made on the mortgage. We hereby direct that the emphasized portions of the final judgment of divorce, supra, be stricken.

The judgment, as amended, is affirmed.
---

EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Smart-Tek Solutions
Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
the undersigned, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of
      Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
  and                                   
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |     |                                                                                                                                                                 
| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.

Date: May 14, 2010

/s/ Brian Bonar
________________________________________Brian Bonar Chief Executive
Officer and Chief Financial Officer

---
# C_2022002EN.01004001.xml

| 3.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 2/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 2/40

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 3 November 2021 — PBL and WA v Commission

(Case T-538/21 R)

(Interim relief - State aid - Aid granted by France to a professional football club - Application for interim measures - No urgency)

(2022/C 2/55)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Penya Barça Lyon: Plus que des supporters (PBL) (Bron, France), WA (represented by: J. Branco, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: B. Stromsky and G. Braga da Cruz, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU for, first, annulment of the Commission’s letter of 1 September 2021 bearing the reference COMP.C.4/AH/mdr 2021(092342) and responding to a State aid complaint (SA.64489 — State aid to the Paris Saint-Germain football club) and, second, directions to be issued to the Commission.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The application for interim measures is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

| 2. | The costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The costs are reserved.

---
259 La. 763

#### Bertha Mae Hayes DICKERSON v. EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF WISCONSIN.

No. 51621.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 28, 1971.

In re: Bertha Mae Hayes Dickerson applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Winn. 248 So.2d 852.

Writ refused — The judgment is correct.

BARHAM, TATE and DIXON, JJ., are of the opinion that writs should be granted and Humphreys v. Marquette, 235 La. 355, 103 So.2d 895 should be overruled insofar as it denies recovery to woman living with and dependent on deceased, but not married to him.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

MOTLEY CREW, LLC, A LAW FIRM, JOSEPH R. REISINGER ESQUIRE, LLC, AND JOSEPH R. REISINGER ESQUIRE,

Petitioners

v.

BONNER CHEVROLET CO. INC., PAUL R. MANCIA, RICHARD F. CROSSIN, JOHN J. GILL, JR., GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY, THOMAS N. CROSSIN, JOSEPH CROSSIN, AND JAMES E. MILLER, BONITA MANCIA, AND
FRANCES A. MILLER,

Respondents :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 103 MM 2014

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 21 st day of August, 2014, the Application for Extraordi nary Relief

and the Application for Leave to Amend are DENIED

.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1136 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1136

        For the relief of Alfredo Tolentino of Honolulu, Hawaii.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 22, 1993

  Mr. Inouye introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
           referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
        For the relief of Alfredo Tolentino of Honolulu, Hawaii.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding 
the provisions of section 8337(b) of title 5, United States Code, 
Alfredo Tolentino of Honolulu, Hawaii may file an application no later 
than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act with the 
Office of Personnel Management for a claim of disability retirement 
under the provisions of such section.

                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.1






CERTIFICATION OF M. H. MCILVAIN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER,


AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350






The undersigned officer of American Resources Resources, Inc. hereby certifies that (a) American Resource’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (b information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of American Resources.




October 22, 2010
By:
/s/  M. H. MCILVAINM. H. McIlvainExec. Vice President and Chief Financial Officer,American Resource Technologies, Inc.




A signed original of this written statement has been provided to American Resource Technologies, Inc. and will be retained by American Resource Technologies, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
On appellant’s motion to recall appellate judgment and reconsider dismissal filed July 5, and response to motion to recall appellate judgment and reconsider dismissal filed November 15, 2001;

motion to recall appellate judgment and for reconsideration of order of dismissal denied May 8, 2002

#### DOUGLAS POWELL, *Appellant, v.*S. Frank THOMPSON, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, *Respondent.*

98C-12009; A103057

45 P3d 1056

Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General, and Kelly Knivila, Assistant Attorney General, *contra.*

Before Brewer, Presiding Judge, and Deits, Chief Judge, and Wollheim, Judge.

BREWER, P. J.

*447BREWER, P. J.

Plaintiffs trial attorney in this habeas corpus case filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismissed the appeal on that ground. Plaintiff has moved to recall the appellate judgment and reconsider the order of dismissal.

Plaintiff relies on *State ex rel SOSCF v. Hammons,*169 Or App 589,10 P3d 310 (2000), and *State exrelJuv. Dept, v. Balderas,*172 Or App 223, 18 P3d 434 (2001). In those cases, as here, the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was attributable to counsel and not to the appellant personally. In *Hammons,*a termination of parental rights case, and *Balderas,*a juvenile delinquency proceeding, we determined that the failure of counsel to file a timely appeal amounted to inadequate assistance of counsel. We permitted the appeals to proceed pursuant to our authority to fashion a remedy for the inadequate assistance.

By contrast, in *Miller v. Baldwin,*176 Or App 500, 32 P3d 234 (2001), a post-conviction relief case, we held that the plaintiff, whose attorney also failed to file a timely appeal, was not entitled to a delayed appeal. This case is more like *Miller*than *Hammons*and *Balderas,*because here plaintiff is not a party against whom the state is seeking relief but, rather, he initiated the action. We also note that, unlike post-conviction relief actions, for which ORS 138.590 requires the appointment of “suitable” counsel, no statute *expressly requires*the appointment of counsel, suitable or otherwise, in a habeas corpus action.1

Motion to recall appellate judgment and for reconsideration of order of dismissal denied.

1

 ORS 34.355 authorizes compensation for court-appointed counsel in habeas corpus cases. Plaintiff argues that we should infer from that statute an *implied*right to adequate counsel. Because this case is analogous to *Miller,*we do not address whether ORS 34.355 implies a right to court-appointed counsel, and, if it does, whether that right includes a right to adequate counsel. *See State v. Linder,*177 Or App 715, 716, 720, 33 P3d 1023 (2001) (Kistler, J., concurring; Brewer, J., dissenting).
#### Robert R. D. V. COOLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-226.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 8, 1971.

Walter N. Colbath, Jr., Public Defender, and Norman J. Kapner, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Rodney Durrance, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

WALDEN, Judge.

Defendant plead guilty to the crime of assault with intent to commit robbery and was duly sentenced. He thereafter filed a motion for post conviction relief under Rule 1.850, 33 F.S.A., saying that his plea was coerced because his attorney (Public Defender) told him that he would receive the death penalty if he did not plead guilty and that, if the plea was made, he would receive a five year sentence. This motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appeals. We reverse.

Review of the record so far as it travels, as conceded by defendant, reveals no lack of voluntariness on the part of defendant in the entry of his guilty plea. However, the present concrete averments do not appear and are not refuted in the record. If they are true they could very well lead to the conclusion that the plea was involuntary and that defendant should be permitted to withdraw it.

We, therefore, hold that the defendant, appellant here, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to the voluntariness of his guilty plea and specifically with reference *680to his allegation that his attorney threatened him with the death penalty if he did not plead guilty and his advancement of the tacit promise that he would receive a five year sentence, only, if he did plead guilty. We do this on authority of Brumley v. State, Fla.App.1969, 224 So.2d 447, and Bartz v. State, Fla.App.1969, 221 So.2d 7.

Reversed and remanded for an eviden-tiary hearing in accordance with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

REED and MAGER, JJ., concur.