RENDERED: OCTOBER 14, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-1270-MR

CAMERON MERRITT APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE JERRY D. CROSBY, II, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-CI-00183

SARAH FERGUSON, WARDEN, 

ROEDERER CORRECTIONAL

COMPLEX; AND CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT,

ADJUSTMENT OFFICER APPELLEES

OPINION

REVERSING AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND K. THOMPSON, 

JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Cameron Merritt (“Merritt”), an inmate at the Roederer 

Correctional Complex (“Roederer”),

1

appeals, pro se, from an order of the Oldham 

1 As of the filing of this appeal, Merritt was an inmate at Little Sandy Correctional Complex.
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Circuit Court dismissing his petition for declaratory judgment pursuant to KRS2

418.040.3 After careful review, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

In September 2020, Merritt – in an attempt to prank fellow inmates –

sprayed baby oil on the floor of a doorway of Unit 2, E Wing of Roederer. Merritt 

admits this action, and his movements are shown on video surveillance. While 

conducting a security round, Kentucky Department of Corrections (“DOC”)

Officer Calhoun (“Officer Calhoun”) slipped on the baby oil. The briefs do not 

state that Officer Calhoun fell to the ground when she slipped, but she was later 

“sent for outside medical treatment.” Following the incident, Officer Calhoun 

finished her rounds and advised the inmates that someone should clean up the oil;

Merritt did so. 

Merritt received a disciplinary write-up charging him with a violation 

of Corrections Policy and Procedure (“CPP”) 15.2 Category VII Item 04. A 

disciplinary hearing was held by an Adjustment Officer, and Merritt was assessed 

with 30 days in disciplinary segregation and the loss of 1,460 days (four years) of 

2 Kentucky Revised Statute.

3

“In any action in a court of record of this Commonwealth having general jurisdiction wherein it 

is made to appear that an actual controversy exists, the plaintiff may ask for a declaration of 

rights, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of rights, 

whether or not consequential relief is or could be asked.” KRS 418.040.
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non-restorable good time, 730 days (two years) of which were suspended for 180 

days. Merritt appealed to the Warden, who denied the appeal. Merritt then sought 

judicial review and filed a petition for declaratory judgment in Oldham Circuit 

Court. Thereafter, the circuit court granted Roederer’s4 motion to dismiss Merritt’s 

petition for failure to state a claim pursuant to CR5 12.02(f). This appeal followed. 

PROCEDURE

“A petition for declaratory judgment pursuant to KRS 418.040 has

become the vehicle, whenever Habeas Corpus proceedings are inappropriate,

whereby inmates may seek review of their disputes with the Corrections

Department.” Smith v. O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Ky. App. 1997). Although 

Roederer filed a motion to dismiss in response to Merritt’s petition, rather than a 

motion for summary judgment, this Court has held that summary judgment 

standards and procedures are most appropriate in these cases.6 However, the 

typical summary judgment standard is insufficient to address the administrative 

discretion involved in the Department of Corrections’ disciplinary procedures. 

4 We will refer to the Appellees as “Roederer” because the named appellees, the Warden and 

Adjustment Officer, are named in their official capacity. 

5 Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.

6

“CR 12 motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and CR 56 motions for summary 

judgment are typical Corrections Department responses to inmate declaratory judgment petitions. 

. . . [W]e believe that a motion for summary judgment provides, in most cases, the most 

appropriate procedure and standards for addressing these petitions.” Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 355 

n.1.
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This Court has described the applicable standard for addressing prison disciplinary 

actions as follows:

Where, as here, principles of administrative law and 

appellate procedure bear upon the court’s decision, the 

usual summary judgment analysis must be qualified. The 

problem is to reconcile the requirement under the general 

summary judgment standard to view as favorably to the 

non-moving party as is reasonably possible the facts and 

any inferences drawn therefrom, with a reviewing court’s 

duty to acknowledge an agency’s discretionary authority, 

its expertise, and its superior access to evidence. In these 

circumstances we believe summary judgment for the 

Corrections Department is proper if and only if the 

inmate’s petition and any supporting materials, construed 

in light of the entire agency record (including, if 

submitted, administrators’ affidavits describing the 

context of their acts or decisions), does not raise specific, 

genuine issues of material fact sufficient to overcome the 

presumption of agency propriety, and the Department is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Id. at 356.

“These petitions thus present circumstances in which the need for

independent judicial fact[-]finding is greatly reduced. The circuit court’s factfinding capacity is required only if the administrative record does not permit

meaningful review.” Id. Accordingly, the circuit court presumed that Roederer

acted appropriately in denying Merritt’s petition, and that order may only be 

reversed if Merritt can raise specific, genuine issues of material fact that overcome 

that presumption.
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ANALYSIS

On appeal, Merritt argues that he should have been charged with 

violating CPP 15.2 Category VII Item 001 – physical action against an employee 

or non-inmate – not Item 004 – physical action resulting in the death or injury of 

an employee or non-inmate. Merritt admits his action but argues that there was no

evidence of a resulting injury to a DOC employee; he argues that sending Officer 

Calhoun for a medical assessment was proof of a policy, not an injury. To the 

contrary, Roederer claims that “seeking of medical treatment is sufficient evidence 

for the adjustment officer to infer that the officer who slipped on the baby oil 

sustained some injury.” The circuit court agreed with Roederer and found “some 

evidence” to be supported by 1) camera footage showing Merritt spraying the baby 

oil, and 2) the note that Officer Calhoun had to seek outside medical treatment.

First, we must acknowledge that “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings 

are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a 

defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

556, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974) (citation omitted). This

principle is reflected in the “some evidence” standard adopted in Smith: if any 

evidence in the record supports the conclusion made by the disciplinary board, we 

must affirm. Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 358. “Even ‘meager’ evidence will suffice.” 

Ramirez v. Nietzel, 424 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Ky. 2014) (citing Superintendent, Mass.
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Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 2775, 86 L. Ed. 2d 

356 (1985)). More specifically, because Merritt was sanctioned as a result of

“injuring” Officer Calhoun, there must be “some evidence,” any evidence, of an 

injury. Id. “Admittedly, our review of prison disciplinary cases is materially 

limited. But a review so limited as to be meaningless cannot satisfy the 

requirements of due process.” Id. at 916. Despite these “meager” requirements, 

we cannot find any evidence that an injury occurred.

In 1997, this Court found an inference to be sufficient to satisfy the

“some evidence” standard. Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 357. In Smith, an inmate’s 

family member was found to have marijuana during a pre-admission search. Id. at 

355. At a disciplinary hearing, the Adjustment Officer determined that although 

the inmate disavowed any knowledge of the contraband, the inmate likely knew of 

or requested the marijuana. Id. Upon appeal, this Court determined that 

“[a]lthough the evidence of [the inmate’s] involvement in the attempted smuggling 

is not compelling, the inference is reasonable that he, at some time, communicated 

to his daughters a willingness to receive such contraband.” Id. at 357.

Here, however, there is no such reasonable inference. If the 

surveillance video had shown Officer Calhoun fall to the ground, grab her back, 

walk with a limp, or cry out – after the slip – then we could infer that she was 

injured. However, the video shows no fall to the ground, no outward gesture of 
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pain, nor was there testimony that she cried out or complained. Further, there were 

no medical records presented nor testimony of what “the injury” was. There was

no evidence presented to explain if Roederer had a policy of sending employees for 

precautionary medical examinations or if only an actual injury warranted such 

action.

Additionally, the Smith Court accepted an inference as “some 

evidence,” in part, because it understood the importance in a prison’s ability to 

maintain authority.

Prisons are a vital part of the government’s effort to 

preserve social order and domestic tranquility. They 

provide this fundamental benefit, however, only at the 

cost of becoming places where the risk of disorder and 

violence is greatly heightened.

. . . .

In a prison, where a state of emergency and high alert is 

unrelieved, any defect in the administration’s authority 

poses a risk of disruption.

Id. at 357-58. 

We wholeheartedly agree; however, we note two very dramatic 

factual distinctions. First, the Smith Court appropriately determined that a prison 

administration has a compelling interest in order and in authority, especially when 

weighed against an inmate’s loss of “relatively minor interests (in slightly reduced 

sentences, for example, or marginally mitigated conditions of confinement).” Id.
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at 358. In contrast, Merritt’s losses were not “minor”; he lost four years of good

time credit. Second, illegal drugs and/or contraband – as in Smith – pose a serious 

risk to the “social order and domestic tranquility” of a prison system. Baby oil 

lacks that same gravitas.

In 2003, this Court again addressed an inmate appeal of disciplinary 

action in Yates v. Fletcher, 120 S.W.3d 728 (Ky. App. 2003). In Yates, 

correctional officers found a four-pound can of tuna that was stolen from the 

kitchen and loose sugar in a creamer container in an inmate’s bed area. Id. at 729. 

The inmate received disciplinary write-ups for possession of stolen state property 

and for obtaining goods under false pretenses. Id. A hearing by the Adjustment 

Committee found the inmate guilty of both charges and assessed forfeiture or the 

loss of 60 days good time on each charge. Id. This Court determined that although 

he was not present at the time of the tuna discovery, he had constructive possession 

over it because it was found in his laundry bag. Id. at 730. As it related to the 

creamer, the inmate admitted it was there and that he knew it was sugar in the 

creamer container. Id. at 731. 

We agree with the holding in Yates; that the institution had presented

“some evidence” that was sufficient to affirm the disciplinary action of 60 days

good time for each theft. However, here we lack any evidence of injury. That void

becomes especially glaring when compared to the relatively major loss of inmate
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interest, compared to other Kentucky precedent. For example, in Million v.

Raymer, 139 S.W.3d 914 (Ky. 2004), an inmate pled guilty to an inappropriate 

relationship with a correctional officer and was found guilty of a contraband 

charge, and the institution penalized him with the loss of 180 days of accumulated 

good time, 180 days of telephone restriction, and 90 days in disciplinary 

segregation. Id. at 916. After a successful appeal to the Warden, a second hearing 

found the inmate “guilty of the contraband charge but his penalty was reduced to 

54 days in segregation, which he had already served.” Id. 

Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists – whether any injury 

resulted from Merritt’s actions – and consequently, Roederer is not entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Consequently, we must conclude the court erred by 

granting Roederer’s motion to dismiss. We simply remand for the circuit court to 

address that issue.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, we REVERSE the 

judgment of the Oldham Circuit Court and REMAND for further proceedings 

consistent with this Opinion. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Cameron Merritt, pro se

Sandy Hook, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Edward A. Baylous II

Frankfort, Kentucky