alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 15-01331 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(December 29, 2015)

Having carefully considered pro se Plaintiffs’ [21] Motion for Reconsideration under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have provided no 

basis for the Court to alter or amend the judgment issued in this case on December 4, 2015.

Motions under Rule 59(e) are “disfavored” and the moving party bears the burden of 

establishing “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief from a final judgment. Niedermeier 

v. Office of Baucus, 153 F.Supp.2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001). Rule 59(e) motions are “discretionary

and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of 

controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent 

manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Rule 59(e) does not provide a vehicle “to relitigate old matters, or to 

raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” 

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed.1995)).

Rule 60(b) allows the Court, on motion or on just terms, to relieve a party from a final 

judgment for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 

newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in 

time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or 

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) 

the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that 

has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other 

reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears 

the burden of proof to show that he or she is entitled to the relief. Norris v. Salazar, 277 F.R.D. 

22, 25 (D.D.C. 2011). “[T]he decision to grant or deny a rule 60(b) motion is committed to the 

discretion of the District Court.” United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 984 

F.2d 469, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In exercising this discretion, the Court “must balance the interest 

in justice with the interest in protecting the finality of judgments.” Summers v. Howard Univ., 

374 F.3d 1188, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

EDDIE WISE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES, et al.,

Defendants
2

Here, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing any of the circumstances that would 

warrant relief from a final judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Accordingly, for the 

reasons stated in the Court’s [20] Memorandum Opinion dated December 4, 2015—which the 

Court fully incorporates and makes part of this Order—the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ [21] 

Motion for Reconsideration.

 /s/

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge
# C_2022119EN.01004802.xml

| 14.3.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 119/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.3.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 119/48

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 22 December 2021 — Civitta Eesti v Commission

(Case T-665/21 R)

(Interim relief - Public supply contracts - Legal, socio-economic and technical assistance in the fields of energy and mobility and transport - Application for interim measures - No urgency)

(2022/C 119/68)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Civitta Eesti AS (Tartu, Estonia) (represented by: C. Ginter, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: L. André and S. Romoli, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Articles 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU to suspend the operation of the decision of the Commission of 12 October 2021 rejecting the applicant’s tender for Lot 5 of tendering procedure MOVE/2020/OP/0008, suspend the signature of the contracts to be concluded between the Commission and the other tenderers for Lot 5 of that procedure and, where appropriate, suspend the operation of those contracts.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The application for interim measures is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

| 2. | The order of 22 October 2021, Civitta Eesti v Commission (T-665/21 R), is revoked. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The order of 22 October 2021, Civitta Eesti v Commission (T-665/21 R), is revoked.

| 3. | The costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The costs are reserved.

---
**Exhibit 13.1**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of AB Volvo (publ) (the "Company") on Form 20-F for the period ending December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned hereby certify that to the best of our knowledge:

(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)      the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

Date: June 10, 2005                                              /s/ Leif Johansson                                                

Name:   Leif Johansson

Title:     President and Chief Executive Officer

 

Date: June 10, 2005                                              /s/ Stefan Johnsson
## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S

S E C O N D D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

CHIEF JUSTICE

TERRIE LIVINGSTON

JUSTICES

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

ANNE GARDNER

SUE WALKER

BILL MEIER

LEE GABRIEL

BONNIE SUDDERTH TIM CURRY CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER

401 W. BELKNAP, SUITE 9000

FORT WORTH, TEXAS 76196-0211

TEL: (817) 884-1900

FAX: (817) 884-1932

www.txcourts.gov/2ndcoa CLERK

DEBRA SPISAK

CHIEF STAFF ATTORNEY

LISA M. WEST

GENERAL COUNSEL

CLARISSA HODGES

May 12, 2016

Hon. David L. Evans

Regional Presiding Judge

Tom Vandergriff Civil Courts Bldg.

100 N. Calhoun St., 2nd Floor

Fort Worth, TX 76196

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Civil District Clerk, Denton County

P.O. Box 2146

Denton, TX 76202-2146

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Cheryl D. Smith

6001 Bridge Street, Suite 102

6001 Bridge Street, Suite 102

Fort Worth, TX 76112

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL * Hon. Tiffany Haertling

Judge, 442nd District Court

Denton County Courts Bldg.

1450 E. McKinney St., 2nd Floor

Denton, TX 76209-4524

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Paul F. Wieneskie

Bailey & Galyen

1300 Summit Ave., Ste. 650

Fort Worth, TX 76102

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 02-15-00249-CV

Trial Court Case Number: 14-01284-158

Style: Christopher Hoskins

v.

Ricco Family Partners, Ltd.

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 02-15-00253-CV

Trial Court Case Number: 14-01284-158

Style: Dennis Eckel

v.

Ricco Family Partners, Ltd.02-15-00249-CV

May 12, 2016

Page 2

Today the Second Court of Appeals issued an opinion and judgment in the

above-referenced causes.

Copies of the opinion and judgment are attached and can also be viewed on our

Court’s webpage at: http://www.txcourts.gov/2ndcoa

.

Respectfully yours,

DEBRA SPISAK, CLERK
No. 11119.

#### Oakman *v.*Rose Furniture Co.

Decided February 2, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court of Cuyahoga county.

*Mr. J. A. Fenner; Messrs. Carpenter, Young & Carpenter*and *Mr. Abraham Kolinsky,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Max P. Goodman*and *Mr. M. M. Black,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Crew, C. J., Summers, Spear, Shauck and Price, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4280

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus TARIQ BELT, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge. (1:05-cr-00549-WDQ) Submitted: October 27, 2006 Decided: November 14, 2006 Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Howard L. Cardin, CARDIN & GITOMER, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Christopher J. Romano, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Tariq Belt appeals his conviction and sentence to one year in prison and one year of supervised release after pleading guilty to possession of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2000) and 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (2000). We affirm. Belt contends the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his prosecution because there was no verified complaint, the district court is not a “common law court,” prosecutions may not be brought in the name of the government, and he is a sovereign who unwittingly relinquished his freedom to the United States. These claims are utterly devoid of merit. Subject matter jurisdiction over a federal prosecution is conferred on the district court by 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2000). United States v. Hartwell , 448 F.3d 707, 716 (4th Cir. 2006). Moreover, “there can be no doubt that Article III permits Congress to assign federal criminal prosecutions to federal courts.” Hugi v. United States , 164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1999). Belt also contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction because he was operating as a “government agent” at the time of the offense. During Belt’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing before the district court, Belt agreed with the Government’s account of the underlying events, admitting that he was guilty of the crime of possession of cocaine. Belt was arrested following a controlled drug sale with a government informant, and there is no- 3 - evidence that Belt was operating as a “government agent” during the narcotics transaction that gave rise to the charge. This claim lacks a factual or legal basis. Accordingly, we affirm Belt’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit
23.1





INDEPENDENT REGISTERED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM’S CONSENT





We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement of
Clacendix, Inc. (a Development Stage Company commencing January 1, 2008. on Form
S-8 [File No. 333-139072] of our report dated March 26, 2009, with respect to
our audits of the consolidated financial statements of Clacendix, Inc. as of
December 31, 2008 and December 31, 2007 for the years then ended, which report
is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Clacendix, Inc. for the year
ended December 31, 2008.





/s/
Marcum & Kliegman LLP





New York,
New York


March 26,
2009
EXHIBIT 23.1

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

      We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements
No. 33-33013, No. 33-33063, No. 33-65157, No. 33-68860, No. 333-49837 and No.
333-44436 on Form S-8 and Registration Statement No. 33-45815 on Form S-3 of
Network Equipment Technologies, Inc. of our report dated June 25, 2001,
appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Network Equipment Technologies,
Inc. for the year ended March 30, 2001.


/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

San Jose, California
June 28, 2001
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Interior

###### Bureau of Land Management

          - [18XL1109AF LLUTG02000 L13100000.DO0000]

# AGENCY:

Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

# ACTION:

Notice of termination.

# SUMMARY:

                        The preparation of an Environmental Assessment associated with the San Rafael Swell Master Leasing Plan Amendment is no longer required, and the process is hereby terminated. Pursuant to Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as implemented by the Council on Environmental Quality regulations, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) announced its intent to prepare an EA. The Notice of Intent (NOI) was published in the                         **Federal Register**                         on May 18, 2016. The Plan Amendment would have considered modifying oil and gas leasing decisions on approximately 525,000 acres in portion of the Price and Richfield Field Offices in Emery and Wayne Counties, Utah.                    

# DATES:

Termination of the planning process for Rafael Swell Master Leasing Plan Amendment takes effect immediately.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Chris Conrad, Price Field Manager, 125 South 600 West, Price, Utah 84501, telephone (435) 636-3600, email                         *cconrad@blm.gov.*                         Persons who use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) may call the Federal Relay Service (FRS) at 1-800-877-8339 to contact the above individual during normal business hours. FRS is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to leave a message or question with the above individual. You will receive a reply during normal business hours.                    

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Since the publication of the NOI, the BLM issued Washington Office Instruction Memo 2018-034, which terminates the Master Leasing Process. 

Authority:40 CFR 1506.6, 40 CFR 1506.10.

Edwin L. Roberson,

State Director.

[FR Doc. 2018-15016 Filed 7-12-18; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 4310-DQ-P
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

           (Not filed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)

         Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned, Patricia R. Elledge, the
Controller/Treasurer (chief financial officer) of TMBR/Sharp Drilling, Inc.
("TMBR"), hereby certifies that the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of TMBR for the
year ended March 31, 2003 fully complies with the periodic reporting
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the
information contained in that Form 10-K/A Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of TMBR.

Dated: December 30, 2003

                                   /s/ Patricia R. Elledge
                                  ------------------------------------------
                                  Patricia R. Elledge, Controller/Treasurer
                                  (chief financial officer)

         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to TMBR/Sharp Drilling, Inc. and will be retained by TMBR/Sharp
Drilling, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1

                             WEBLINK WIRELESS, INC.
                    COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS (LOSS)

<Table>
<Caption>
                                                        THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2002
                                                  ------------------------------------------
                                                    NUMBER           PERCENT     EQUIVALENT
                                                   OF SHARES       OUTSTANDING     SHARES
                                                  ----------       -----------  ------------
<S>                                               <C>              <C>          <C>
COMMON STOCK
   From Founders' Stock                            2,300,000          100.00%      2,300,000
   Stock Options Exercised                         2,508,997          100.00%      2,508,997
   Preferred Stock Converted to Common Stock      15,310,943          100.00%     15,310,943
   1994 Common Stock Offerings                    11,242,857          100.00%     11,242,857
   1995 Common Stock Offerings                     4,323,874          100.00%      4,323,874
   1996 Common Stock Offering                      6,000,000          100.00%      6,000,000
   1999 Treasury Stock Transaction                    (6,588)         100.00%         (6,588)
   March 2000 Debt Swap                            3,789,715          100.00%      3,789,715
   Canadian Transaction                              714,286          100.00%        714,286
   Surrender/Cancelation of Stock                   (291,723)         100.00%       (291,723)
   Employee Stock Purchase Plan Shares Issued        190,651          100.00%        190,651
   Warrants Exercised                                134,737          100.00%        134,737
                                                  ----------                    ------------
                                                  46,217,749                      46,217,749

WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING                                               46,217,749

NET LOSS                                                                        $ (7,533,180)

NET LOSS PER SHARE                                                              $      (0.16)
                                                                                ============
</Table>
## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 13

- 00110

- CR

MICHAEL EARITT WHITE, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law Lamar County, Texas Trial Court No. 60286

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.2 

### O RDER
Michael Earitt White has filed an appeal with this Court. As no record was filed, and in ligh t of his repeated claims of indigence and the lack of the provision of information from any other source despite our repeated efforts, we abated the appeal to the trial court for a hearing to attempt to determine the nature of the case. The trial court co nducted a hearing, and we have been provided with the following information : (1) White was convicted on June 6, 2013 , of misdemeanor driving while license suspended and (2) o n June 27, 2013, the trial court conducted an indigency hearing and found him not indigent. White continues to claim to be indigent. We therefore abated the case to the trial court for a hearing on indigency. The court conducted a cursory hearing, asking White if there were changes in his circumstances since the previous June hear ing . White said there were not, and the trial court , relying on the information provided at that time, again concluded that he was not indigent. Following the directives of this Court, a clerk’s record has been filed containing the trial court’s findin gs on indigency (adopting and providing a copy of the findings that it had previously made on June 27, 2013), and we have now also received transcripts of both the
June 27, 2013 , and the January 2, 2014 , indigency hearing s pursuant to our abatement order. Because White was found not indigent, he has no right to a free transcript of the proceeding at which he was convicted or to the preparation of a free clerk’s record. He does, however, have the right to a free copy of the record of the indigency hearing that was filed with th is C ourt. White should be afforded review of the trial court’s finding on indigency prior to3 proceeding with the appeal on the merits of his criminal trial. Such review is mandated by Griffin v. I llinois , 351 U.S. 12 (1956) , and Snoke v. State , 717 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). We now have a sufficient record to allow appellate review of that matter, and a record is available at the Office of the County Court at Law of Lamar County for White to review in preparing his brief. As this matter must necessarily be decided before we reach the main appeal, we direct White to file a brief restricted to the question of whether the trial court erred by finding that he was not indigent . White is ins tructed that his brief should contain supporting references to the record and citations to any controlling authority. The brief must be filed within thirty days of the date of this order and to be received by this Court on or before February 2 4, 2014.
IT IS SO ORDERED

.

BY THE COURT

Date: January 23 , 2014
#### Clyde MEACHAM et al., Appellants, v. NOONAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a corporation, and Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., a corporation, Appellees.

No. O-488.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 23, 1972.

Rehearing Denied April 25, 1972.

Wilmer H. Mitchell, of Holsberry, Emmanuel, Sheppard & Mitchell, Pensacola, for appellants.

Joe J. Harrell, of Harrell, Wiltshire, Bozeman, Clark & Stone, and Robert P. Gaines, of Beggs, Lane, Daniel, Gaines & Davis, Pensacola, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal challenges the correctness of a final summary judgment rendered in favor of appellees.

A careful examination of the record on appeal conclusively establishes the absence of any genuine triable issue of a material fact with respect to appellees’ liability for the damages suffered by appellants, and that appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The judgment appealed is accordingly affirmed. 23 Fla.Jur. 281, Negligence, § 37; DeLuca v. Manchester Laundry & Dry Cleaning Company (1955) 380 Pa. 484, 112 A.2d 372; Kite v. Jones (1957) 389 Pa. 339, 132 A.2d 683; Cotter v. Bell (1965) 417 Pa. 560, 208 A.2d 216; Tuz v. Burmeister (Fla.App.1971) 254 So.2d 569; General Telephone Company of Florida, Inc. v. Mahr (Fla.App.1963) 153 So.2d 13.

SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.