Joshua Maddox v. State of Maryland , No. 990 and 996 , September Term, 201 9 . Opinion

by Zarnoch, J

. S TATUTES

– STATUTORY INTERPRETATIO N

– CONSEQUENCES
In c on struing a statute, t he court may “ cons i der the consequences resulting from one meaning rather tha n anoth er, and adopt that con struction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsisten t with common sense.” G o mez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc. , 42 7 Md. 128, 15 8

- 59 (2012) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. , 308 Md. 69, 7 5 ( 1 986) )

.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

– STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

– EXTENSION OF PROBATION FOR RESTITUTION A court has the authority to impose a period of probatio n, set conditio ns and determine whether the probation is supervised or unsupervised. State v. Alexan d er , 467 Md. 600, 605

- 06 (2020 ). A period of probation typically ma y not exceed five years. Id

. M aryland Code, § 6

- 222(b) of the C riminal Procedure Article permits the cou rt to extend probation beyond five years for the purpose of making restitution. U nder this statute , the court does not have the authority to impose additional conditions on a proba tioner other than to make restitution payments and to engage in the requirem ents for supervised probation. S i milarly , the court does not have the authority unde r this sta tute to revoke probation or sanction a probationer for violating a condition other than making restitution payment s or engaging in restitution

- related misbehavio r in a supervised pr obation.Circuit Court for Wicomico County

Case No s . 22

- K

- 0 9

- 0 0 0928 and 22

- K

- 0 9

- 0 00925 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND
No. 990 & 996 September Term, 201 9

______________________________________

JOSHUA MADD OX

v. STATE OF MARYLAND

___________________________ ___________ Fader, C.J. , Kehoe , Zarnoch , R obert A. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Zarnoch , J.

_____________________________________ _ Filed: February 24, 2021This case bega n in April 2010, when Joshua Maddox ( “ Maddox ” ) entered A lford

pleas t o sec ond degree arson in the Circuit Court for Wicomic o C ounty. At sentencing, the court imposed 24 months of probation subject to the condition that Maddox pay almost $100,000 in restitu tion. Maddox consented to additional extension s of his
p robation aft er the initial 24 months in order to make restitution. In ordering this extension, the court advised that Maddox must also comply with numerous condit ions set by the court. Maddox filed a motion to cor rect an illegal sentence arguing that the c ourt lacked the a u thority to impose additional conditions of probation other than the order to pay restitution . The court denied this motion. Maddox presents one quest ion for our review : When a cour t extends prob ation “ for the purpose of making restituti o n ” under Cri m. Pro c. Art. § 6

- 22 2(b) , may the court impose conditions of probation in addition to the restitution obligation ?

BACKGRO UN D & PROCED UR AL HISTOR Y
I. Probation
I mposition of Probation Whe n a court sent ences a defendant following a conviction, “ it generally has t he option of including a period of probation with respect to one or more counts.” State v. Alexander , 467 Md. 600, 605 (2020), Md. Code, C rim. Proc. § 6

- 225. “Probation is a
creature of sta tute, and as s uch, the terms of probation are de r ived from st atutor y authority.” Bailey v. State , 355 Md. 287, 293 (1999). The court has the authority to set conditions and determine whether probation is supervised or u nsupervised. Alexander , 4 6 7 Md

. at 606

. A defendant ’s probation is sub ject to standar d c onditions of pro bation

–- 2

-

for example , “obey all laws, report as directed to probation officer, appear in court when notified to do so, make restitution.” Id

. The court may also impose special condit ions

– for example, a court can require a probationer t o “ participat e in a n alcohol or substance abuse program, complete a specified number of hours of community service, refrain from contact with certain persons.” Id

. Typical ly, “a period of probation imp osed by a circuit

cou rt may not exceed five years.” Id

. (citing C rim . Proc

. § 6

- 22 2(a)(3)(i) ). However, in cases such as the present one, “in which restitution is a condition of probation, ” a circuit

cour t may extend the period of pro bation for an additional five years “ for the purpose of the defendant making restitut i on.” Id

. at 606

- 07 (citing C rim . Proc. § 6

- 222(b)

- (c)). A district court may extend the period of probation for an additional three years for the purpose of making restitution

. Crim. Proc. § 6

- 222 (b)(1)(ii). Pertinent to this case, the
st atute sta tes: ( b)(1) For the purpose of making restitution, the court may extend th e probation beyond the time al lowed under sub section (a)(3)(i) of this section for: ( i) an additi onal 5 years if the pr obation is ordered by a circuit court; or (ii) an ad ditional 3 years if the probation is ordered by the District Court. (2) An extension of probation under this subse ction may be un supervised or supervised by the Division of Parole an d Pr ob ation. C ri m. Proc. § 6

- 222(b). In addition, the court is further restricted in its authority to impose an extension of probation beyond the limit in s ubsection (b), as follows: (c ) The Court may extend the probation beyond the time al l owed under s ubsect ion (b ) of this s ection if: (1) the defendant consents in writing; and (2) t he extension is only for making restitution.- 3

-

C rim. Proc. § 6

- 222(c). “The power to impose conditions of probation, however, is not unl im i ted, and thus, the tr i al court doe s not have unlimited discretion to ord er conditions of probation.” Bailey , 355 Md. at 294

. Violations of Probation If it is alleged that a defendant has viol ated a co ndition of probati on, the court m ay determine whether to m odify or revoke th e probation. See Cr im. Proc. §§ 6

- 223, 6

- 224. The General Assembly has established presumptive l imits on sanctions for certain types of probation violations. Justice Rein vestment Act Amend ments The G eneral Assembly enact ed the Justice Reinvestment Act ( “ t he Act ” ) in 2016. 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 515. The primary goal of the A ct was to reduce the prison population and invest the savings in “strategies to increase public safety and reduce recidiv ism. ” Revise d Fisc al and P olicy N ote for Senate Bill 1005 (June 2, 2 016). The Ju stice Reinvestment Coordinating Council ( “ the Council ” ) found that “ [a]lmost 60% of all prison admission represent failures of probation, ” man y of which “ stem from technical vi olations, su ch as missing an appo intment or failin g a drug test. ” I d

. To achieve this purpose, the Council studied the causes of mass incarceration and identified extended sentences for technical violations of probation as one driving fac tor. J ustice Reinv estment Coor dina ti ng Council, Fin al Report, S.B. 602, 2015 Leg. at 8 , 9 (Md. 201 5).
Pr ior to the Act’s amendments, if a court found that a probationer violated any condition of probation, the court had the authority to “impose any sentenc e that might have originally b een im posed for the c rime of which the probationer or d e fendant was- 4

-

convic ted. ” Md. Code , Crim. Proc. § 6

- 223(d)(2) ( 2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.)

. The amendments enacted by the Act placed limits on the sanctions for tech nical violat io ns of probation

. State v. Alexander , 467 Md. 600, 609 (2020). A “techn i cal violatio n” is d efined as “a violation of a condition of probation ... that does not involve: (1) an arrest or a summons issued by a commissioner on a statement of c harg es filed by a law enforcement officer; (2) a violation of a criminal prohibition othe r than a mino r traf f ic offense; (3) a violation of a no

- contact or stay

- away order; or (4) absco nding.” C rim. Proc. § 1

- 101(q) (incorporating the definition of technical v iola tion from Md. Co de , § 6

- 10 1(m) of the Correctional Services Article). Because the failure to p ay res titution does not involve any of the aforementioned conditions, it is clear t hat it is considered a technical violation. If a probationer commits a tec hnic al violation of th eir prob ation, the court may revoke the probation and impose a p eriod of inc arcera tion between 15 to 45 days depending on how many technical violations the pro batio ner has committed at that time

. Crim. Proc. § 6

- 223(d)(2)(i).
II. Facts and Proceedi ngs On April 7, 2 010 Maddox ente red Alford pleas to second degree arson i n two
separa te cas es 1 in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. In addition to a prison
sentenc e, the court imposed 24 mo nths of probation subject to the condition that M addox pay $9 5,000 in restituti on in Case No. 925 and $3,500 in restitution in Case No

. 928.

1 Th e case numbers are 22

- K

- 09

- 000925 (“Case No. 925”) and 22

- K

- 09

- 00 092 8 ( “Ca se No. 928”).- 5

-

Maddo x was released from prison in March 2013 and began his probation. The Division of P arole and Probation filed a statement of charges against Maddox on February 27, 2015, a lleging that he fa iled to make re stitution in both cases. 2 In May 2015,
t h e State agre ed to withdraw the pending violation of probation petitions in exchange for Maddox’ s consent to extend his p robation for an additional three years to March 20 18, to provi de additional time to make restit ution. The court also reduced the amount of restituti on to $4,899 in Case No. 925 and $1,101.67 in Case No. 928. In March 2018, the Sta te again filed a statemen t of charges in each case against Maddox alleging he failed to pay restitution. 3 The court held a hearing on May 10, 2018 where Maddox b rought money o rder s to indicate his ability to continue to make restitution payments. Maddox co nsented to a second three

- year extension of his probation to March 2021. In ordering th e extension, the c ourt explain ed that “[t]he State at this point is reall y just trying t o co llect money ... when you are also on probation, all the same conditions of prob ation apply... If you should violate the laws during this interim extended pe riod of time , you’re exposing yourself to a p otential violation of probation.” The co u rt advised t ha t Ma ddox would be required to pay court costs, complete mental health and drug an d alcohol treatment, take any prescribed medication, make restitution
payme nts, have no contact with the victim, and “ha ve no affiliation with places that
respo n d to fires o r any membership with same.”

2 The State also alleged that Maddox failed to pro vide verification that he participated in mental he alth treatment and he tested p ositive for marijuana use . 3 The St ate also alleged that Maddox failed to complete drug and alcohol tre a tm ent

.- 6

-

Later that year, Maddox was charged with violating h is probation. The Division of Parole and Probation alleged that he failed t o complete d rug and alcohol tr eatment and

was charged with new offenses. The Division of Parole an d Prob ation filed a modified statement of charges in June 2019, alleging Maddox was convicted of second degree assault and malicious destruction of property i n separate c ases. Maddox file d a motion t o c orrect an illegal sentence on June 25, 2 0 19, arguing th at t he court lacked authority to impose conditions of probation other than that h e pay restitution in his amended sentence in 2018. Following a hearing on J une 26, 2019 , the court denied the motion. Th e court reasoned that “[Legislators have ] made a dist in ctio n that, if you’re on probation and you have restitution ... there would also be an accompanying need for supervision in order to make sure that everything stays in pl ace so that restit ution can be co llected.” The court explained that if a d efendant suf fe red from an addiction and fails to participate in and complete addiction treatmen t, the likelihood of collecting restitution is “very limited.” This reasoni ng, the cour t proffered, provi des the

cour t t he discretion to offer supervision and a l l standard c on diti ons of probation for an additional five years. Madd ox was sentenced to four y ears with all but 18 months suspended in Case No. 925, and a suspended, con secutive sen tence of three yea rs and six
mont h s in Case No. 928. This timely appeal followed.- 7

- D IS CUSS IO N Standard of Review The crux of this case is the construction of C rim . P roc. § 6

- 222

– in particular, whether the phrase “for the purpose of making restitution” limits the court ’s autho rity to impose con ditions of probation in addit i on to the pa yment of r estitution. This Court reviews de novo the interpretation of a statute an d “provides judicial deference to the policy decisions enacted into law by the General Assembly .” Johnson v. Stat e , 467 Md. 362, 37 1 (2020) (Internal citation o m itted). “We assume tha t the legislature’s intent is expressed in the statutory language and thu s our statutory interpretation focuses primarily on the language of the sta tute to determine th e purpose and inte nt of the Gener al Assembly.” Id

. “The statutor y constructio n anal ysis begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular und erstanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminolo gy.” Id . at 372 (Int ernal cita tions an d quotations om itted). The statute is read as

a whole and “m ust be vie wed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, co nsi dering the purpose, aim or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statut e.” Id . (Internal ci tation omi tted). “ When the words of a statute are ambiguous and s u bject to

mor e than one reasonable interpretation

... a court must resolve the ambiguity by

sea rch ing for legislative intent in other indicia.” Id . (Internal citations and q uotations omitted). Maddox’s position is that the pl ain meaning of Crim. Proc. § 6

- 2 2 2(b) limits a

cour t’s authorit y to impose additional conditions on probation when the purpos e o f- 8

-

extending probation is to make restitution payments

. The State’s position , on the other hand, is that t he only limitati on on the court ’s discretion in Crim. P r oc. § 6

- 222 is the duration of the pro bation pe riod. The State contends that the plain langu age of the statute does not limit the court’s authority to apply conditions of probation “as a means of

ensu ring t hat the purpose is actually fulfi lled.” “For the P urpose of Ma king R estitution” Statutor y Text The statute itself does not provide a specific def inition for the phrase “for the purpose of making restitution,” thus we mus t begin our analysis with comm on dic tionary definition s. Black’s Law Dictionary defin e s “purpose” as “ [a ]n objective, goal, or end.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). It is cl ear that the parties are contemplating different definitions, or interpreta tions , of the word, “purpose.” Maddo x contends that th e use of “purpo se” in this cont e xt limits th e co ur t’s authority to imp ose any conditions other than to make restitution beca use no other purpose has been provided in the statute and there is no indicati on that the Legislature intend ed ano ther purpose. Furt her, Maddox
arg ues that on the b asis of the doct ri ne “ expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), ” the plain language limits the court’s authority. G riffin v. Lindsey , 444 Md. 278 , 28 8 (2015) (Interna l citations and quotations omitted )

. The State empha sizes that the st atute does not contain any language limiting the court’s aut hority to apply standard conditions of probation during the extended period of probation. The circuit cou rt also determined th at the phrase “ for the purpose of m aking restit ution” did n ot limit th e court’s authority to impose additional conditions to he lp- 9

-

achieve the ultimate purpose of restitution. For example, the court reasone d, if a defendant suffers from an addiction and fai ls to seek nece ssary treatment, it is unlikely that t he def

endant will pay restitution, thus necessitating mandated addiction t rea tment to achieve the purpose of restitution. Maddox contends that these con ditions are prohibited, especi all y given many condi tions are not l ogically connected t o the purpos e of r estituti on, such as receiving permission to move, take a trip, or possess a f irearm, as well as special probation conditions , including his condition to have “no affiliation with pla ces that respond to f

ires.” To the exten t these contra r y views crea te am biguity, we consi der the phrase in light of the remainder of the statute. S t atutory Co ntext
W i thin C rim. Proc. § 6

- 222, there are multiple subsections t hat discuss the extension of probation f

or the purpose of restitution. Crim. Proc § 6

- 222 (c) perm its th e court to extend probation beyond the five years permitted in subsection ( b) , but under this subsection, the de fendant must now consent to the extensio n . Crim. Proc. § 6

- 222 (c)
perm its the extension “ only ” to make restitution payments. The circuit court differentiated subsection (b) and sub section (c) by exp laining that if the e xtension of probation is “only” for making restit ution, then the L egislatur e would have used that precise language in subsection (b). The court determined that o nly subsecti on (c) would prohibit the court from imposin g any conditions o f probation exc ept th e payment of restitution due to the use of limiti ng language.- 10

-

Both parties argue that the language of C r im. Proc. § 6

- 222 is unambiguous, however, they both ad o pt conflicti ng int erpretations of the statut e. Thes e contradicto ry interpretations seem to su gg es t that the statute is in fact ambiguous and subject to more than one rea s onable interpretation. “Even w here the language of a statute is plain and

u nambiguous , we may look elsew here to divine l egislative intent; the plain m ea ning rule is not rigid and do es not re q u ire us to read legislative provisions in rote fashion and in iso lation. ” Blaine v. Bl aine , 336 Md. 49, 64 (1994). Thus, we proceed to review the legi s lative histo ry o f the statute.
L egislative History Prior to 19 80 , Maryland court s did not h av e the authority to extend the term of probation beyond fi ve years for any r eason. Kupfer v. State , 287 Md . 540, 543

- 44 (1980). In response to the decision in Ku p fer , the Leg islatu re amended the law “to allow
extens ion of the pr obationary perio d beyond fi ve y ears with the consent of the defendant, but only for pu rposes of restitut ion.” Elias v. State , 62 Md. A pp. 569, 573 (1985). The amended statute read, in relev a nt part, “[i ]f the defendant consents in writing, the court
may gr ant probation in excess of 5 ye ars, but only for purposes of making restitution.” Md. Code, Art

. 27 § 64 1A(a) (195 7 , 1982 Repl. Vol.). The bill was introduced with the
purpose o f providing d efendants gr anted probation sufficient time to make res titution. S ee Summary of Comm i ttee Rep or t of House Bill 642 (1984). In 2001, the Legislature adopt ed Crim. Proc. § 6

- 222 without substantive cha nge from § 641A(a)(3) and (4)

. The new statute read , in relevant par t, “[t ]he court may extend the probation b eyond the time allow ed under subsectio n ( a) of this s ection if: (1) The- 11

-

defendant consents in writing; and ( 2) The e xtension is only for making re stitution.” Crim. Proc. § 6

- 222(b) (2001). In 2003, th e Legislature amend ed the statute to in clude a new subsecti on and provide add itional authori ty t o the courts to extend probation for an additional five years in circuit co urt “for the purpose of making restitution. ” Fiscal and Policy No te, 2003 Session, H

. B

. 233. After amend ment, the statute read , in relevant part: ( b)(1) Only for t he purpose of m ak ing restitution, the court may extend the probation b eyond the time allowed under subsection (a) of this section for: (i) An additional 5 yea rs if the probatio n is ordered by a c ircuit court ; or (ii) An additional 3 year s if the probation is ordered by th e District Court. (2) An extension of probation unde r this subsection may be unsupervised or supervised by the division of parole and probati on. (c) The court may extend t he pro bation beyond the time allowed under subse ct ion (b) of this section if: (1) T he defendant consents in writing; and (2) the extens ion is only for making restitution. C rim. Proc. § 6

- 222 (2003). This amendment permitted circui t courts t o extend prob ation for five years without the defe ndant’s consent, bu t “only for the pu rpose o f making restitution.” The amendment also permitted circuit cou rts to extend probation beyond those five ye ars , but the defendant must consent to the extension , a n d it was per mitted “only for making restitution.” The amendment was intro du ced by Delegate L ui z Simmons due to a large amount of restitution that remained unpaid after a probationer complet ed probation. Delegate Si mmons wrote to Governor Ehrlich, seeking his support fo r the legisla tion a nd expressing dissati sfaction with the present system of c om pe nsating vict ims , specifical ly- 12

-

noting “the system rewards the big crook” because “t he more you steal the more likely
you are to leave probation, before paying back a fraction o f the money t hat wa s stolen.” Letter fro m Delegate Luiz Simmons to Governor E hr li ch (Feb. 9, 200 3) (included in the Committee files on H

. B

. 233)

. The bill would permit the courts to extend probation “f or so lo ng as it takes to repay restitution to the vict i ms.” Id

. Des pite C rim. Proc. § 6

- 222 alr eady permitting the court to extend pr ob atio n for fiv e years, the Maryland Cr ime Victims’ Resource Center (“the Center”) advocated to remove the requirement tha t a defendant co nsent to the first extension of probati o n . 4 The Cente r expl ained “if a defendant fails to pay the full amount of resti tu tion be fore hi s probati onary period is complete, the remaind er of the amount due and owing to the victim cannot be enforc ed as a violatio n of probation unless a defendant conse n ts.” Letter from M aryland Crime Victims’ Resource Center to Chairman Joseph F

. Valla ri o, Jr. (F eb. 10, 2003). Further , the Center argued th at “[f]ew defendants, if any, w ould agree to be subject to in carceration for a longer period of time.” Id

. By removi n g the requir ement that the defendant consent to the initial extension of prob at ion, it would “r eturn[] the power to t he judicial system to ensure that previous court

- orde red restitution is paid in ful l.” Id

. It is cl ear that the purpose of amending C rim. P roc. § 6

- 222 and a dding subsection (c) was to ensure repayment of restitution b y removing th e r equire ment that a defendant mu st

4 We do not rely upon statements made by an advocacy group as evidence of the intent of the L egislature, but point out these remarks merely to “ map the rough co ntours of [the] legislation . Jack Schwartz & Amanda Stakem Conn, T he Court of Appeal s at t he Cocktail Party: The Use and Misuse of Legislative History, 54 Md. Law Rev 432, 463 (1995). In any event, as we conclude later, we do not find the legislative history of the statute as particularly helpful.- 13

-

consent to the firs t five year extension , and giving the courts authorit y to continue extending probation after those five year s to allow th e prob ationer to conti nue making restitution payments

. I n 2005, t he Legislatur e r emoved the limi ting language “ only ” in C rim. Proc. § 6

- 222(b)

. The purpose for the amend ment of § 6

- 222 w as to “authoriz[e] a court to order probation for a def

e ndant convic ted of certain sexual abuse or sexual offense crimes involving a mi nor...” Titl e to C hapter 45 8, Law s of 2005 . T here were no substantive changes to subsection ( b) , solely grammatical clarify ing change s necessitated by the new language being adde d to subsec ti on ( a) . It is clear from the purpose of this amendment that the r em oval of the lang uage “only” in subsection ( b) wa s not intended to express a subst antive cha nge in the interpretation of t he subsection. T he circuit court was incorrect to thin k that the pre sent a bsence of the word “ only ” in § 6

- 222(b) and its re tention i n § 6

- 22 2 (c) w eake ns the force and singularit y of the former

. For purposes of the sometimes f ictional world o f legislative intent, the “ only ” from the original enactment is still t here

. 5
In s um, th e legisla tive history is not especially informative on whet he r the phrase “fo r the
purpose of making rest itu tion” impliedly authorizes a court to impose conditions of probation.

5 It is no teworthy that the title mentio ns n ot hing about resti tution, because under Article III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution, the title of the legislation m ust conf i ne its o peration or the measure must be invalidated to the extent of a confl ict wi th the title. States Atty. f

or Charles Cnty

. v . T

riplett , 255 Md. 270, 282

- 83 (1969).- 14

-

Imp act of Supervise d Probation C rim. Proc. § 6

- 222(b)(2) p r ovides that an ext ension of probation for purposes of restitution “ may be u ns up ervised or super vised ” by the Division of Parole an d Pr obation. Does this mean that when a court o rders “ supervised ” prob ation, it is free under the statute to set the standard conditions, such a s those imposed on M addox? We think not. The supervision o f probation is an administrative act. The imposition of a condition of probation is a judicia l one. A parole and probation agent cannot impose cond itions of probation . R ather , th a t employee ’ s duty i s to “ u se casework techniques to counsel, e ncourage and as si st parole and pr obation clients in adopting socially acc eptable behavior patterns for reinte gration into the commun ity. ” D epartment of Budget and Management (DBM ), Job Specifi c a tion s for Paro le and Probation Agent II (Feb. 2, 2018). Thus, supervision i s no t intended as a backdoor way of authorizing judicially i mposed conditions that are not encomp assed within t he “ purpose of ma king restitution. ” This does not mean that a probat i oner whose peri od of probation is extended for the purpose of restitution i s fr ee not to cooper ate with his or her agent , to ignore a d uty to check

- in , or to fail to report on progress made toward makin g restitution. For such restitution

- related misconduc t , the agent ca n reco mmend graduated sanctions , Md. Code, Corr. Servs. § 6

- 1 21 (b ), which could i nclude incarceration , involuntary d etention for br ief period s , noncustodial s anctions , § 6

- 121(c)(3) , or eve n probatio n revocation , § 6

- 121(d).- 15

-

Consequences of Alternative Cons tructi on Although the legislative history provides no c on clus iv e guidance, we f ind helpful the rule of statutory co nstruct ion that when “ s e eking to ascertai n legislative intent, [a court] may consider the consequences resulting from one me a ning rather than anoth er, and adopt that con struction which avoids an ill ogic al or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsisten t with common sense.” G o mez v. Jackson He witt, Inc. , 427 Md. 128, 15 8

- 59 (2012) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. , 3 08 Md. 69, 7 5 (1 986) )

. Applying this test, w e first examine the conseque nces o f the State’s in terpretation of C rim. Proc. § 6

- 222(b). The State fi rst contends th a t the sta tute does not limit the court’s authority to impose standard conditions of probatio n . The State expl ains t hat the condition to obey all laws “could hardly be mor e imperative to ac hieving the underlying purpose of ensuring t hat a pr obationer actua l ly satisf y his or her restitution obligat ion.” Similarly, the State asserts that most of the standard probati on co n ditions

– “work regularly as dire c ted and provide v erif ic ation; get permi ssion before changing address, jobs, or leav ing the State of Maryla n d; do not illegally use any narcotic drug s or controlled substances; appear in court when no t ified to do so”

– are “conducive to achieving the legisl ature’s intent.” Whe n the court impose s probation on a defendan t, it has the discr etion to impose both sta ndard and special conditio ns that the def endant must follow, or risk penalties or fu rth er in c arceration. C rim . Proc

. § 6

- 222 was enacted because the General Assembly

reco gn ized that probat ioners may be incapable of compl e ting restitution pa yments b y the end of the i r init ial term of probation and this statute would provide judicial oversight to- 16

-

en s ure repayment

. W hile w e understand the State ’ s argument that imposing the se

c on ditions might be conducive to achieving the purpose of the repayment of restituti on, on the o ther hand, these conditions might not be conducive. T he statute simply does not
pro v ide t he court un br idled authority to impose any conditio n t hat might be c ondu ci ve to achieving the purpose of restitution

. The State makes much of Ma ddox’s su bsequent incar c eration for unrelated crimes that ultimately caused the revocation of his probatio n in this case. Tho ugh Ma ddox was charged with numerous crimes, these char ges we re entirely unre lated to the present case and to the reason for his ex tended proba tion

— to con t inue making restitution payments. The State contends that these “entanglements” we r e “counterprodu cti ve to t he purpose for which his probation in this case was ex tended

. ” Maddox presents a hypothetical scenario where a probationer i s charged wi th a new cr i me , but is not imprisoned and

con tinues to make restitution pay men ts. In response t o this hypothetica l, t he State argues that revoking probation is fact

- an d ca se - specific, and t he supervising court has the authority to determine th e appropriat e sanction f or violating probati on . This argu ment misses the point. There are many conditions that can b e impose d on a p robationer t hat could further the purpose of ma king r estitutio n, howe ver, as with Maddox ’s hypothetical, there are also end less scenarios w here it is possible that a probationer vi o lates that condition , but continues to make rest i tution payments. I t is i llogic al and contrary to the text of the
statute to r ev oke proba tion or sanction a probationer for violating a condition othe r than making restitut i o n p ayments ( or engaging in restitution

- related misbehavior in a- 17

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supervised probati o n , s ee p. 14 supra ) because the probatione r is continuing to achieve the purp os e of the extende d probation

– t o make resti tution payments. Further, it would be contrary to the text to rely on the court ’s discretion as to w he ther to sanction a d efen d ant fo r the violation of a condi tion of probation other than failing to make or hind er ing the supervis ion of restitution payments. The State ’ s int erpret ation als o creates the absurd possibility of a n indetermin ate term of probation. By imposing additional condi t ions on a probationer , creating

n umerous opportunities for a proba tioner to v io late probation , the probationer could be
tra pped in a p ermane nt prob ation pe riod and facing a minefield of conditions

. The interpretation advanced by Maddox produces no such a b surd resul ts. Mad dox contends that “ a court may only impose restituti o n a s a co ndition of an ex tended ter m o f probation. ” Otherwise, M a ddox explains , “ a co urt could revoke probation for a reas on unrelated to restitution even when the defendant is able to m ake restit ution p ayments and

e ven when imprison ing him or her would inter fere w ith that ability

. ” F u rther , Maddox
argues “ it makes sens e that there be fewe r po tential o b stacles to his or her a bility to [make restitution payments]. ” We agree. It would be i llog ical t o argue that there were any other rea sons to extend Maddox ’ s pr obat io n, just as it wo uld be unreasonable to argue that his pr oba tion should be re voke d for any other reason than the faili ng to pay or hind ering the supervision of restitution. If M a ddox were capable of payi ng the entirety of his restitu tion by the end of h is i nitial probation , he would not have been on probation at the time he was charged in th ese separate crimes. The only rea son he was stil l on probation was to continue paying- 18

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r est i tution. F u rther, under th e Just ice Reinvestme nt Act, a court does not hav e th e auth ority to rev oke probation for the technica l violation of fail ure to pay restitution

. In the cont ext in which the Legislature inten ded that Crim. Proc. § 6

- 222(b) be applied , the court does not have the au t hority to impose any conditions of probat ion ot her than to make restitution payments and not to hinder superv isi on of th ose payments . This
const ruction is both reasonable and logi cal and furthers the pur pose of Crim. Proc. § 6

- 22 2(b) to all ow t he court to extend probation to ensure restitution is pai d. For these reas ons, we reverse the denial of the Motion to Corre ct an Illegal Sentence. Because resentencing or a correction of the record of disp osition may be in order and b e cause th e parties should be heard on what happens next, we remand for fur the r p roc eedings. J U DGME N T O F THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR W ICOMICO COUN TY REVE RSED . CASE REMA NDED FOR FURTH ER P ROCEED INGS CONS ISTEN T WITH THIS OPINION . COSTS TO BE PAID BY WICOMIC O C O U NT Y .