alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
259 La. 764

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Wilton JORDON v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 51759.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 28, 1971.

In re: Wilton Jordon applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus.

Application denied. Applicant makes a showing that the co-defendants whose confessions were used took the stand and he was afforded the right of confrontation.
# C_2022171EN.01003501.xml

| 25.4.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 171/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.4.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 171/35

---

Judgment of the General Court of 23 February 2022 — Ignacio Carrasco v EUIPO (La Hoja del Carrasco)

(Case T-209/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark La Hoja del Carrasco - Earlier national figurative mark CARRASCO, Guijuelo - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Dominant and distinctive elements of the marks at issue)

(2022/C 171/46)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Ignacio Carrasco SL (Guijuelo, Spain) (represented by: J. Donoso Romero, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: R. Santana Davies and D. Gája, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Santos Carrasco Manzano SA (Guijuelo) (represented by: F. Marín Riaño, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 10 February 2021 (Case R 175/2020-1), relating to invalidity proceedings between Santos Carrasco Manzano and Ignacio Carrasco.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Ignacio Carrasco SL to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Ignacio Carrasco SL to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 217, 7.6.2021.

---
257 La. 859

#### Homer ROBERTS v. PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 51157.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 24, 1971.

In re: Homer Roberts applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Rapides. 242 So.2d 11.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, we find no error of law in its judgment.
#### Hector Bonilla, Appellant, v Petrillo Realty Development Corp., Respondent.

[655 NYS2d 340]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paula Omansky, J.), entered September 23, 1996, which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In an action alleging violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) and common-law negligence arising from plaintiff’s alleged backward fall from a ladder, the court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, taken in light of other submissions on the motion, raises credibility questions precluding summary judgment. Nor was it conclusively established that lack of safety devices constituted a failure to provide "proper protection” in violation of section 240 (1) or that said violation was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries *(Saaverda v East Fordham Rd. Real Estate Corp.,*233 AD2d 125). Concur—Milonas, J. P., Nardelli, Williams and Andrias, JJ.
#### Helen Milbauer SONDHEIM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-520.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 9, 1973.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Orange County; Peter de Manió, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1131

AN ACT

To extend the method of computing the average

employee health benefits programs.title 5, United States Code, relating to Federalsubscription charges under section 8906(a) of
103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1131

AN ACT

To extend the method of computing the average subscription

charges under section 8906(a) of title 5, United States

Code, relating to Federal employee health benefits programs.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 1131 ES

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF METHOD OF COMPUTING AVER2 AGE SUBSCRIPTION CHARGES FOR FEDERAL

3 EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAMS.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Act entitled ‘‘An Act relating

5 to the method by which Government contributions to the

6 Federal employees health benefits program shall be com7 puted for 1990 or 1991 if no Government-wide indemnity

8 benefit plan participates in that year’’, approved August

9 11, 1989 (5 U.S.C. 8906 note; Public Law 101–76; 103

10 Stat. 556) is amended in subsection (a)(1) by striking out

11 ‘‘contract years 1990 through 1993’’ and inserting in lieu

12 thereof ‘‘contract years 1990 through 1996’’.

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the

14 Congress that nothing in this section should be considered

15 to reflect any view on the appropriateness, merits, or tim16 ing, or any other aspect of any comprehensive health care

17 reform legislation.

Passed the Senate July 28 (legislative day, June

30), 1993.

Attest:

Secretary.
#### ABEL JEANS *vs.*E. I. DU PONT de NEMOURS & CO., and W. B. BROBSON, attorney.

The entry that referees are summoned *for*a particular day, is a sufficient entry of the *adjournment*of the cause to that day; it appearing that the defendant had notice.

Certiorari to Justice McCauiley.

Record. Debt, demand $47 50. Summons issued March 1st to 11th, 1837, Saturday. Returned “ served by copy left at defendant’s dwelling house.” March, 11,1837, parties appear, defendant pleads nil debt; plaintiff appeals to referees, whereupon appointed and summoned Ziba Ferris, Thomas McDowell, and Stephen Bonsall, for Saturday next, 18th inst., at 2 o’clock, P. M. March, 18th, 1837, referees appear and are qualified, plaintiff present; same day referees report in favor of plaintiff $47 50; whereupon judgment in favor of plaintiff on report of referees for $47 50 debt, and $1 56 costs.

Exceptions, 1st, That it does not appear that there was any adjournment of the cause from the 11th to the 18th of March. 2d, That the defendant below had no notice of any adjournment. 3d, Because it does not appear that the defendant below was present before the referees when they heard the cause, or was notified of their meeting. 4th, Because the referees decided the cause below without notice to defendant and in his absence.

*Gray,*for plaintiff in error.

*Per Curiam.*

The entry of the adjournment is very informal, and only indirect at most; but it answered the purpose of notice to the defendant, who was present when the referees were appointed and summoned. The justice says they were appointed and summoned *far*Saturday next, the 18th inst. This appears to be the mode which this justice uses in stating the day at which the cause is to be taken up. His summons is issued, “March 1st to 11th.” The essential object of requiring stated adjournments is notice. Here the defendant had notice; and it will not do for us to hold these justices to too strict a rule, or we shall not be able to sustain any of their judgments. On the whole, we incline to sustain this record as a substantial, though very informal, compliance with the law.

Judgment affirmed.
#### Donna SCIPIO, wife of/and Lester Nicholas v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE INC. and John B. Owen. Johnnie JOHNSON v. John P. OWEN, NOPSI et al.

No. 62553.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 15, 1978.

In re: Donna Scipio, wife of /and Lester Nicholas applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 359 So.2d 272.

Granted.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.
#### Morris B. ALLEN, Appellant, v. Dorothy Silas ALLEN, Appellee.

No. 71-886.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 24, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    Exhibit 21.1

                              LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                           State or Jurisdiction       Type of      Percent
  Subsidiary or Partnership                  of Incorporation         Interest*      Owned       Owned by
  -------------------------                ---------------------      ---------     -------      --------
<S>                                        <C>                        <C>           <C>          <C>
Chicago Miniature Lamp (Canada) Inc.            Ontario                    C         100%        SLI
IDI International S.A.                          Costa Rica                 C         100%        SLI
Chicago Miniature Lamp -
    Sylvania Lighting
      International, Inc.
    ("CML/SLI")                                 Delaware                   C         100%        SLI
Sylvania Lighting
    International, B.V.                         Netherlands                C         100%        CML/SLI
Alba Speciallampen Holding
    GmbH ("Alba Holding")                       Germany                  LLC         100%        SLI
Gustav Bruckner GmbE                            Germany                    C         100%        Alba Holdings
SLI Miniature Lighting SARL ("SARL")            France                     C         100%        Alba Holdings
Socop S.A.                                      France                     C         100%        SARL
Badalex Limited                                 England                    C         100%        CML/SLI
Chicago Miniature Lamp Europe
    Limited                                     England                    C         100%        Badalex
CML Ballast, Inc. ("CML Ballast")               Oklahoma                   C         100%        SLI
Power Lighting Products, Inc.                   Delaware                   C         100%        CML Ballast
CML Fiberoptics, Inc.                           Massachusetts              C         100%        SLI
CML Air, Inc.                                   New Hampshire              C         100%        SLI
SLI Lighting Solutions, Inc.                    North Carolina             C         100%        SLI
Supreme  Corporation                            South Carolina             C         100%        SLI
Newmar Inc. ("Newmar")                          Delaware                   C         100%        SLI
Marvel Lighting Corporation                     Delaware                   C         100%        Newmar
</TABLE>

* C=Corporation, LLC=Limited Liability Company, LP LP=Limited Partnership
  Interest, GP=General Partnership Interest
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1256

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to examine the status of

the human rights of people with disabilities worldwide.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 16 (legislative day, JUNE 30), 1993

Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. HELMS, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. LEAHY,

Mr. SIMON, Mr. D’AMATO, Mr. DURENBERGER, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr.

INOUYE, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. HATFIELD,

Mrs. KASSEBAUM, Mr. MOYNIHAN, and Mr. HATCH) introduced the

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

Foreign Relations

A BILL

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to examine

the status of the human rights of people with disabilities

worldwide.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Disability Rights in

5 American Foreign Policy Act of 1993’’.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

7 (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—
2

•S 1256 IS

1 (1) at least 500 million people throughout the

2 world have a disability, most of whom live in devel3 oping countries;

4 (2) legal and other forms of discrimination

5 against people with disabilities are pervasive world6 wide;

7 (3) such discrimination involves not only active

8 exclusion, but a lack of accommodations and acces9 sibility that would allow participation by people with

10 disabilities;

11 (4) discrimination against people with disabil12 ities is a violation of their human rights; and

13 (5) discrimination against people with disabil14 ities has not historically been addressed by existing

15 standards of human rights employed in American

16 foreign policy.

17 (b) PURPOSE.—It is the purpose of this Act to pro18 mote recognition of the human rights of people with dis19 abilities and to promote the elimination of discrimination

20 against such people.

21 SEC. 3. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABIL22 ITIES INCLUDED IN ANNUAL REPORT ON

23 HUMAN RIGHTS.

24 (a) Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of

25 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(d)) is amended—
3

•S 1256 IS

1 (1) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of paragraph

2 (2);

3 (2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as para4 graph (4); and

5 (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the follow6 ing:

7 ‘‘(3) an examination of discrimination toward

8 people with disabilities; and’’.

9 (b) Section 502B(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act

10 of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304) is amended by inserting ‘‘dis11 ability,’’ after ‘‘language,’’.

Æ
#### Fred O. DICKINSON, Jr., Comptroller of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. The FIRST NATIONAL BANK AT ORLANDO et al., Appellees.

Nos. 72-166, 72-268.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 14, 1973.

Rehearing Denied April 11, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### David PRESTON, Appellant, v. Deanna PRESTON, Appellee.

No. 66-923.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

July 11, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 16, 1967.

Fred A. Jones, Jr., and Robert M. Suss-man, Miami, for appellant.

Morris Berick, Miami Beach, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The order under review in this cause is an outgrowth of domestic litigation. The appellee filed a complaint for divorce. The appellant employed several different counsel, attempted a reconciliation, and objected strenuously to certain temporary awards. The chancellor lent his efforts towards reconciliation, without success. No responsive pleadings being filed in accordance with an interlocutory order, he duly entered a decree pro confesso against the husband and, thereafter, proceeded to a final decree of divorce ex parte. Subsequently, the appellant moved to vacate the decree pro con-fesso and the final decree of divorce. The chancellor entered an order vacating the decree pro confesso and vacating those portions of the final decree relating to a division of property, allowances for alimony and support, but refused to disturb that portion of the final decree granting a divorce, adjudicating custody of the minor children of the parties, and awarding attorney’s fees. This order is here for review.

Once the chancellor exercised his discretion to set aside the decree pro confesso,1 he should not piecemeal have vacated portions of the final decree but should have set it aside in its entirety. See: Adelhelm v. Dougherty, 129 Fla. 680, 176 So. 775; 19 Fla.Jur., Judgments and Decrees, § 499; Los Angeles County v. Lewis, 179 Cal. 398, 177 P. 154; Lohmann v. Lohmann, St. Louis, Mo.App.1952, 246 S.W.2d 368.

The order here under review is reversed with directions to vacate the remaining portions of the final decree, permit the appel--*88lant to further plead [if he so desires] within a time certain, and proceed to a final hearing upon due notice upon the issues as made by the pleading.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

1

. Florida Investment Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co., Fla.App.1964, 160 So.2d 783; Evans v. Hydeman, Fla.App.1964, 168 So.2d 183; Gordon v. Vaughan, Fla. App.1967, 193 So.2d 474.
#### ITT CONSUMER SERVICES CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Petitioner, v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, subrogee for Sky Lake Country Club, division of Two Seasons Incorporated, Respondent.

No. 42054.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 8, 1972.

Rehearing Denied June 27, 1972.

Certiorari denied. 256 So.2d 74.

ERVIN, Acting C. J., and CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
snx-ex101_34.htm



Exhibit 10.1

January 25, 2021

Dennis Polk

 

 


	
 
	
Re:
	
Amendment to Promotion Offer Letter




Dear Mr. Polk:

Reference is made to that certain promotion offer letter, dated January 4, 2018 (the “Offer Letter”), by and between you and SYNNEX Corporation (“Company”).

Pursuant to Section 14(b) of the Offer Letter, as of the date first written herein, the Company and you wish to amend the Offer Letter by this letter amendment (“Amendment”).  Capitalized terms used in this Amendment which are not otherwise defined herein, shall have the meanings given such terms in the Offer Letter.  Therefore, the parties agree that a new Section 7(c) shall be added as follows:


	
Section 1
	
Amendment to the Agreement




Section 7(c) Retirement:  if you terminate your employment with the Company for a reason other than Cause, Disability or death and you sign a standard release of claims, then, subject to Section 8, eighty percent (80%) of your then unvested equity grant awards, except any unvested long-term performance-based RSU awards and any unvested equity grant awards with an effective date less than three (3) months prior to your termination, will be accelerated upon your date of termination.


	
Section 2
	
Reference to and Effect on the Agreement




2.1Upon the effectiveness of this Amendment, on and after the date hereof, each reference to the Agreement shall mean and be a reference to the Agreement as amended hereby.

2.2Except as specifically set forth above, the Agreement, and all other documents, instruments and agreements executed and/or delivered in connection therewith, shall remain in full force and effect, and are hereby ratified and confirmed.

2.3The execution, delivery and effectiveness of this Amendment shall not, except as expressly provided herein, operate as a waiver of any right, power or remedy of a party, nor constitute a waiver of any provision of the Agreement, or any other documents, instruments and agreements executed and/or delivered in connection therewith.






Page 2

 

 

If the above changes to the Agreement are acceptable, please acknowledge your acceptance below and return the executed portion of this Amendment on or before January 25, 2021.

Very truly yours,

SYNNEX Corporation

/s/ Kevin M. Murai

Kevin M. Murai

Chairman of the Board of Directors

AGREED AND ACCEPTED:

 

/s/ Dennis Polk____________

Dennis Polk
Richmond

#### Marchant & Another *v.*Healy & Others.

June 17, 1897.

1. *Appeais*— Amount *in controversy*— Dismissal.—The amount in controversy in this case is the difference between the amount claimed by the appellants and the amount recovered, and this sum being less than $500, the appeal will be dismissed, although appellees raised no objection to the jurisdiction of the court.

Argued at Bichmond. Decided at Wytheville.

Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Middlesex county, pronounced November 28, 1894, in a suit in chancery wherein John JR. Marchant was the complainant, and the appellees, and the appellant W. W. Woodward, trustee, were the defendants.

*Appeal dismissed.*

John JR. Marchant had a second deed of trust on a tract of 383^ acres of land. The first deed was on a tract of land described as containing six hundred acres, more or less, and embraced the land conveyed in the second deed of trust. The first deed was given to secure money belonging to an infant, which was loaned under an order of the court. After both deeds had been given, the grantor applied to the court under whose order the money was loaned to release a part of the land conveyed by the first deed, as the lands conveyed by that deed were more than ample security for the amount borrowed. The court ordered a release of a part of the land conveyed by the first deed, but the release deed does not appear ever to *615have been executed. The grantor, however, sold and conveyed this land to sundry different purchasers who paid the purchase money therefor. The beneficiary in the second deed was no party to the suit, and knew nothing of the order for the release of a part of the land.

The appellant Marchant instituted this suit, to which all of the alienees of any part of the land were made parties, in order to marshall the assets, and have a sale of the land conveyed by both deeds, and if this was not sufficient to pay both debts, then to sell so much of the land conveyed by the first deed only as was necessary to make up the deficiency. The tract conveyed by both deeds was sold, and the purchase price was sufficient to pay the whole of the first lien and all of the second except about $320. The court below refused to subject the other lands in the hands of the alienees for value to the payment of this balance, and from that decree this appeal was taken.

*Pollard (&*Sands, for the appellants.

*T. G. Jones*and *Bo.*MoGandlish, for the appellees.

Buchanan, «L,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The amount involved in this appeal is the difference between the debt asserted by the appellant in the lower court, and the amount paid upon it by sales of land made in that court. That difference being less than $500, this court has no jurisdiction, and, although no objection was made by the appellees upon the hearing to the jurisdiction of the court, the appeal must be dismissed as improvidently awarded.

*Appeal dismissed.*
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