******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALAIN LECONTE

(SC 19258)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald,

Espinosa and Robinson, Js.

Argued November 9, 2015—officially released February 23, 2016

Daniel J. Foster, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Richard J. Colangelo, Jr.,

state’s attorney, James Bernardi, supervisory assistant

state’s attorney, and David I. Cohen, former state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

ZARELLA, J. The defendant, Alain Leconte, appeals

from the judgments of the trial court convicting him of

crimes committed during a string of armed robberies

in the cities of Stamford and Norwalk, and the town of

Greenwich, between October and December, 2009.1 The

defendant claims that his convictions resulting from

the Stamford robbery should be reversed on the ground

that his constitutional right to counsel was violated

when the trial court admitted incriminating statements

he made to an informant regarding the Norwalk and

Greenwich robberies while he was incarcerated and

represented by counsel. The defendant also claims that

his convictions resulting from the Norwalk and Greenwich robberies should be reversed on the ground that

the trial court violated his sixth amendment right to

confrontation or, in the alternative, abused its discretion by restricting defense counsel’s cross-examination

of a key prosecution witness. The state responds that

the trial court’s admission of the incriminating statements and its restrictions on counsel’s cross-examination of the witness did not violate the defendant’s sixth

amendment rights or constitute an abuse of the trial

court’s discretion and that, even if they did, any error

was harmless. We affirm the judgments of the trial

court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Between October

and December, 2009, the defendant participated in three

armed robberies, each of which resulted in criminal

charges against him.

The first robbery took place on October 10, 2009.

The defendant, together with an accomplice, entered a

Shell gas station and convenience store in Norwalk and

demanded that the store clerk hand over the money in

the cash register, which contained approximately

$1300. He then shot the clerk in the head before fleeing

with his accomplice. The clerk later died from the gunshot wound.

The second robbery took place on November 21,

2009. The defendant and three accomplices drove to

a Mobil gas station in Greenwich. While two of the

accomplices waited in the car and the third, Teran Nelson, stood outside as a lookout, the defendant entered

the convenience store and ordered the clerk at gunpoint

to give him the money in the cash registers. After the

clerk handed over approximately $638 and several

boxes of cigarettes, the defendant shot him in the head

and drove off with Nelson. The clerk ultimately recovered from the gunshot wound.

The third robbery occurred on December 12, 2009.

The defendant called and asked a friend, who also was

a police informant, to give him a ride in her car. During

the ride, the defendant told her to stop at a certain
location, where he picked up a gun, smoked marijuana,

and met an accomplice, David Hackney, with whom he

decided to commit a robbery. The informant then drove

the defendant and Hackney to a Walgreens store in

Greenwich. While the two men waited in the car, the

informant purchased a pair of stockings that the defendant said he wanted for his mother and contacted the

police by cell phone to warn of a possible robbery in

Stamford. When the informant returned to the car, she

drove the defendant and Hackney back to Stamford

and dropped them off on Vista Street. The men then

walked a short distance to Adams Grocery Store. After

the defendant and Hackney pulled the stockings over

their heads, they entered the store and the defendant

ordered everyone at gunpoint to get down on the floor.

When the defendant encountered difficulty trying to

open the cash register, the store clerk offered to help.

The defendant then grabbed approximately $203 in cash

and fled from the store with Hackney. A short time

later, the police caught the defendant as he was running

down the street.

The defendant was detained and arrested, and various individuals who had been in Adams Grocery Store

during the robbery identified the defendant and Hackney as the men who had just robbed the store. Police

officers who had observed the men in immediate flight

also identified the defendant, who was wearing the

same clothing he had worn during the robbery. The

defendant then was brought to the police station, where

he provided a written statement in which he confessed

to his involvement in the Stamford robbery and provided details regarding the incident. The defendant subsequently was charged with two counts of robbery in

the first degree in connection with this robbery.

During the defendant’s incarceration forthe Stamford

robbery, he told Anthony Simmons, a cellmate who had

agreed to be a cooperating witness for the state, that

he had been involved in the Norwalk and Greenwich

robberies. On the basis of this information and the evidence obtained from several other persons who also

were cooperating witnesses, the defendant was charged

with murder, felony murder and robbery in the first

degree for his participation in the Norwalk robbery and

with attempt to commit murder and robbery in the first

degree for his participation in the Greenwich robbery.

The three cases were joined for trial on August 21,

2012, and a jury found the defendant guilty as charged,

except with respect to the two first degree robbery

charges in the case involving the Stamford robbery.

With respect to those charges, the jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of the lesser included offense

of robbery in the second degree because evidence had

been admitted that the gun he had used in the Stamford

robbery was inoperable. On February 13, 2013, the court

rendered judgments of conviction and imposed a total
effective sentence of ninety years incarceration.

I

The defendant first claims that he was deprived of

his sixth amendment right to counsel2 when the trial

court admitted the incriminating statements he made

to Simmons regarding his participation in the Norwalk

and Greenwich robberies at a time when he was represented by counsel in the case involving the Stamford

robbery. The defendant acknowledges that, because the

statements concerned offenses for which he was not

yet represented by counsel, they were admissible with

respect to the charges stemming from the Norwalk and

Greenwich robberies at the time of his trial on those

charges. He claims, however, that, because the trial

court granted the state’s motion for joinder and tried

the charges in all three cases in a single proceeding,

the incriminating statements could have invited the jury

to infer that, if the defendant had committed the Norwalk and Greenwich robberies, he was likely to have

committed the Stamford robbery. The defendant further

claims that the trial court’s error was not harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.

The state responds that the admission at trial of the

defendant’s incriminating statements to Simmons was

not improper because the Norwalk and Greenwich robberies were separate offenses from the Stamford robbery and the defendant’s right to counsel, which is

offense specific, had not yet attached to the Norwalk

and Greenwich robbery charges when he mentioned

his involvement in those robberies to Simmons. See,

e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167, 121 S. Ct. 1335,

149 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2001) (sixth amendment right to

counsel is ‘‘ ‘offense specific,’ ’’ meaning it does not

attach until prosecution has commenced). The state

adds that, to the extent the admission of this evidence

was improper, it constituted harmless error. We agree

with the state that the evidence of the defendant’s guilt,

even without the testimony of Simmons regarding the

Norwalk and Greenwich robberies, is so overwhelming

and compelling that any error, even if it did exist, was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

With respect to harmless error analysis, we have

observed that, ‘‘[i]f the claim is of constitutional magnitude, the state has the burden of proving the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . Whether a constitutional violation is harmless in

a particular case depends upon the totality of the evidence presented at trial. . . . If the evidence may have

had a tendency to influence the judgment of the jury,

it cannot be considered harmless. . . . Whether such

error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a

number of factors, such as the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the

testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of

evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony
of the witness on material points, the extent of crossexamination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the

overall strength of the prosecution’s case. . . . Most

importantly, we must examine the impact of the evidence on the trier of fact and the result of the trial.

. . . In order to assess the harmfulness of the impropriety, we review the record to determine whether there

is a reasonable possibility that the evidence . . . complained of might have contributed to the conviction

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Santos, 318 Conn. 412, 425, 121 A.3d

697 (2015). We apply a de novo standard of review to

the defendant’s sixth amendment claim.

Applying this standard in the present case, we conclude that any presumed error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. The defendant notes in his brief that

‘‘the identity of the perpetrator(s) in each incident,

including the Stamford robbery, was the principal issue

in this case.’’ The defendant also concedes that a confession ‘‘is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against [a defendant]

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Artis, 314 Conn. 131, 154, 101 A.3d

915 (2014). Thus, it is extremely probative in this case

that the defendant voluntarily gave a detailed statement

to the police one day after the Stamford robbery confessing to his role in that incident and that another

fellow inmate, Cheikh Seye, testified that the defendant

had told him in July, 2010, that he had committed the

Stamford robbery. Four eyewitnesses also gave testimony regarding the Stamford robbery that corroborated

the defendant’s description of events inside the store,

and two of the eyewitnesses who had chased him down

the street following the robbery not only corroborated

the defendant’s account of many of his actions after

running out of the store but saw him apprehended by

the police when he was still wearing the stocking to

conceal his face. Accordingly, we conclude that the

defendant’s convictions resulting from his participation

in the Stamford robbery should not be reversed because

any presumed error by the trial court in admitting the

incriminating statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court violated

his sixth amendment right to confrontation,4 or, in the

alternative, abused its discretion when it restricted

defense counsel’s cross-examination of Teran Nelson,

one of the defendant’s coconspirators in the Greenwich

robbery, who testified regarding the defendant’s participation in the Norwalk and Greenwich robberies. The

state responds that the defendant’s sixth amendment

right to confrontation was not violated and that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion because the trial

court’s rulings did not prevent the defense from
embarking on a farranging cross-examination of Nelson

that exposed all of the information the defendant sought

to enter into evidence and adequately addressed Nelson’s credibility. We agree with the state.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. At trial, Nelson repeatedly

acknowledged on direct examination that he had

entered into a cooperation agreement with the state in

exchange for his promise to testify truthfully at trial

and for immunity from several pending charges that

could subject him to significant prison time. Nelson

then testified regarding his involvement in the Greenwich robbery and how the defendant had entered the

store and robbed and shot the clerk. He also testified

that, in the aftermath of the Greenwich robbery, the

defendant implied that he had committed the robbery

and murder in Norwalk. Nelson admitted, however, that

he had lied to the police during an interview in the

summer of 2010, when he denied being involved in the

Greenwich robbery, and during an interview in September, 2010, when he again denied participating in that

robbery but stated that he had driven the defendant to

Bridgeport following its commission. Nelson ended by

testifying that, in December, 2010, upon learning that

the defendant had spoken to the police regarding the

robberies, he finally told the truth, confessed to participating in the Greenwich robbery and entered into a

cooperation agreement with the state.

On cross-examination, defense counsel repeatedly

queried Nelson about his obligation to tell the truth

under the cooperation agreement, his repeated lies to

the police before December, 2010, concerning the

Greenwich robbery, the multiple attempts by the Greenwich police to persuade him to tell the truth, his reasons

for entering into the cooperation agreement with the

state and, finally, the substance of the cooperation

agreement, including the elimination of prison time for

various pending charges in exchange for his truthful

disclosure of any and all information he might possess

in connection with the Norwalk and Greenwich robberies. Defense counsel also questioned Nelson regarding

certain details relating to the police interrogations,

including being ‘‘threatened’’ on several occasions to

tell the truth or ‘‘they would make this about you,’’

because the police already had evidence from other

sources regarding the robberies and would know if

Nelson was lying. In connection with this point, Nelson

testified that Detective Pasquale Iorfino had told him

during the summer interview about certain details relating to the case that he wanted Nelson to confirm so he

‘‘would get a free walk,’’ even though Nelson resisted

and did not tell the truth until December, 2010. In addition, defense counsel elicited testimony from Nelson

that, if he did not testify truthfully at trial, he would

risk losing the benefits provided under the cooperation agreement.
On redirect examination, Nelson again testified that

he had lied to the police until he learned in December,

2010, that they had obtained information concerning

the Greenwich robbery from other sources and ‘‘had

everything on tape . . . .’’ Nelson also explained that

he had heard parts of an audio recording in which

Detective Iorfino was talking about the crime and that

he had been told that the police also had an audio

recording of the defendant talking about the crime, at

which point Nelson decided to tell the truth in order

to ‘‘[s]ave [him]self.’’

Turning to the governing legal principles and the standard of review, we note that ‘‘[t]he sixth amendment

to the [United States] constitution guarantees the right

of an accused in a criminal prosecution to confront the

witnesses against him. . . . The primary interest

secured by confrontation is the right to cross-examination . . . . As an appropriate and potentially vital function of cross-examination, exposure of a witness’

motive, interest, bias or prejudice may not be unduly

restricted. . . . Compliance with the constitutionally

guaranteed right to cross-examination requires that the

defendant be allowed to present the jury with facts from

which it could appropriately draw inferences relating to

the witness’ reliability. . . . [P]reclusion of sufficient

inquiry into a particular matter tending to show motive,

bias and interest may resultin a violation ofthe constitutional requirements of the sixth amendment. . . . Further, the exclusion of defense evidence may deprive

the defendant of his constitutional right to present a

defense. . . .

‘‘However, [t]he [c]onfrontation [c]lause guarantees

only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not

cross-examination that is effective in whatever way,

and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. . . .

Thus, [t]he confrontation clause does not . . . suspend

the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right

to engage in unrestricted cross-examination. . . . Only

relevant evidence may be elicited through cross-examination. . . . The court determines whether the evidence sought on cross-examination is relevant by

determining whether that evidence renders the existence of [other facts] either certain or more probable.

. . . [Furthermore, the] trial court has wide discretion

to determine the relevancy of evidence and the scope

of cross-examination. Every reasonable presumption

should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s

ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse

of discretion. . . . [Finally, the] proffering party bears

the burden of establishing the relevance of the offered

testimony. . . .

‘‘Although [t]he general rule is that restrictions on

the scope of cross-examination are within the sound

discretion of the trial [court] . . . this discretion

comes into play only after the defendant has been per-
mitted cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the sixth

amendment. . . . The constitutional standard is met

when defense counsel is permitted to expose to the

jury the facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers

of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. . . .

Indeed, if testimony of a witness is to remain in the

case as a basis for conviction, the defendant must be

afforded a reasonable opportunity to reveal any infirmities that cast doubt on the reliability of that testimony.

. . . The defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness,

however, is not absolute. . . . Therefore, a claim that

the trial court unduly restricted cross-examination generally involves a two-pronged analysis: whether the

aforementioned constitutional standard has been met,

and, if so, whether the court nonetheless abused its

discretion . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 273

Conn. 330, 338–40, 869 A.2d 1224 (2005).

Mindful of these principles, we first consider whether

the restrictions that the trial court placed on defense

counsel’s cross-examination of Nelson complied with

the minimum constitutional standards required by the

sixth amendment. ‘‘The defendant’s constitutional right

to cross-examination is satisfied [w]hen defense counsel is permitted to expose to the jury the facts from

which it appropriately can draw inferences relating to

the reliability of the witness . . . . [W]e consider the

nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of

inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that

were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated

at trial.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 340. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the defendant was not deprived of a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Nelson because Nelson testified extensively regarding the circumstances

leading up to and surrounding his cooperation

agreement with the state, including his repeated lies to

the police. The defense thus was ‘‘permitted to expose

to the jury the facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole

triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw

inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The defendant nonetheless claims that the trial court

prevented defense counsel from asking Nelson five

questions on cross-examination that would have

afforded the defense a reasonable opportunity to reveal

weaknesses that might cast doubt on the reliability of

Nelson’s testimony. These questions included: (1)

whether certain Greenwich police officers, including

Detective Iorfino, told Nelson what they wanted him

to say in order to obtain the cooperation agreement;5

(2) whether Nelson had confessed or intended to ‘‘take

the rap’’ for the Greenwich robbery and the attempted

homicide;6

(3) whether Nelson made changes to his
written statement to the police after entering into the

cooperation agreement;7

(4) whether the supervisory

assistant state’s attorney (prosecutor) was the person

who would decide whether Nelson was telling the truth;

and (5) whether Nelson was compelled, in order to

secure the benefit of the cooperation agreement, to

stand by the statements he had made to the police in

exchange for the cooperation agreement.8

Following a carefulreview of the record, we conclude

that the defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation was not violated when the trial court restricted

defense counsel’s cross-examination by preventing him

from asking Nelson the foregoing questions. With

respect to the first question concerning whether Detective Iorfino told Nelson what the police wanted him to

say in exchange for the cooperation agreement, which

the trial court precluded in part on the ground that it

was based on a document not in evidence, Nelson

already had testified that Detective Iorfino told him

during the September, 2010 interview about certain

details relating to the robbery that he wanted Nelson

to confirm in exchange for the agreement.9 Similarly,

with respect to the second question concerning whether

Nelson had confessed to the police or intended to ‘‘take

the rap’’ for the Greenwich robbery and the attempted

homicide, which the trial court also precluded because

it was based on a document not in evidence, even if

Nelson had responded in the affirmative, he already

had testified that he lied repeatedly to the police regarding the extent of his participation in the Greenwich

robbery. Thus, the trial court’s preclusion of potential

testimony that Nelson was willing to ‘‘take the rap’’ for

the Greenwich robbery would not have raised a new

ground on which to challenge his credibility. It merely

would have added another inconsistent statement in a

long line ofinconsistent statements regarding the extent

of his participation in the Greenwich robbery and the

attempted homicide.

With respect to the third question of whether Nelson

made changes to his written statement after entering

into the cooperation agreement, the defendant misunderstands the question defense counsel wanted to ask.

Counsel did not ask Nelson that question but, rather,

asked whether the police wanted him to change certain

statements he made prior to December, 2010, in which

he had lied under oath during his interviews with the

police despite the promise of a cooperation agreement.

Accordingly, the trial court did not preclude defense

counsel from asking the question alleged to have been

asked in this appeal.

As for defense counsel’s query regarding whether the

prosecutor himself would determine whether Nelson

was telling the truth, this question was not relevant to

Nelson’s credibility or reliability as a witness because

it had nothing to do with his testimony regarding either
his or the defendant’s participation in the Norwalk and

Greenwich robberies.

Finally, the question regarding whether Nelson was

compelled to stand by his past truthful testimony or

risk losing the benefit of the cooperation agreement

was similar to many other questions by the defense

intended to challenge Nelson regarding his obligation

to tell the truth in exchange for the cooperation

agreement. We thus conclude that the trial court did

not improperly preclude defense counsel from asking

this question because Nelson had given extensive prior

testimony on direct examination and cross-examination, and subsequently gave additional testimony on

redirect examination, describing his initial lies to the

police and his eventual decision to tell the truth in

exchange for the cooperation agreement.

In sum, we conclude that the trial court’s rulings did

not violate the defendant’s sixth amendment right to

confrontation because the defense was given ample

opportunity throughout cross-examination to challenge

Nelson’s credibility. The issue of his credibility also was

raised on direct and redirect examination, when he

stated in response to repeated questioning that he initially had lied to the police over a period of several

months regarding his participation in the Greenwich

robbery and that he finally had decided to tell the truth

in order to ‘‘save [him]self’’ from having to serve significant prison time for multiple pending charges. In addition, the defense was able to establish that Detective

Iorfino had presented Nelson with certain details relating to the Greenwich robbery that he hoped Nelson

would confirm by telling the truth in exchange for the

cooperation agreement. Accordingly, we next consider

the defendant’s claim that the restrictions on defense

counsel’s cross-examination of Nelson constituted an

abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

The defendant argues that the trial court abused its

discretion forthe same reasons its restrictions on crossexamination violated his sixth amendment right of confrontation. We disagree. Some of the questions that the

trial court precluded would have elicited testimony on

facts already established, such as the questions concerning whether Detective Iorfino told Nelson what the

police wanted him to say in exchange for the cooperation agreement, whether Nelson intended to ‘‘take the

rap’’ for the Greenwich robbery and the attempted murder, and whether Nelson was compelled, in order to

secure the benefit of the cooperation agreement, to

stand by the statements he had made to the police in

exchange for the cooperation agreement. See Motzer

v. Haberli, 300 Conn. 733, 742, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011)

(‘‘[o]urrules of evidence vest trial courts with discretion

to exclude relevant evidence when its probative value

is outweighed . . . by considerations of undue delay,

waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also

Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3. Of the two remaining questions

the trial court allegedly precluded, one question was

never asked and the other question regarding whether

the prosecutor was the person who would decide if

Nelson was telling the truth was not relevant to the

issues of Nelson’s credibility or to his testimony regarding the Norwalk and Greenwich robberies. Accordingly,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting

defense counsel’s cross-examination of Nelson.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 The defendant was convicted of one count of murder in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), one count of felony murder in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-54c, one count of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a) and 53a-49 (a) (2), two counts of

robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4),

and two counts of robbery in the second degree in violation of General

Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-135 (a) (2).

2 The sixth amendment right to counsel is made applicable to the states

through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United

States constitution. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44,

83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963).

3 The defendant argues that counsel made a strategic decision at trial not

to deny that the defendant had committed the Stamford robbery and not

to attack the reliability of the Stamford confession because the trial court’s

joinder of the three cases had necessitated that counsel distinguish the

modus operandi of the Stamford robbery from that of the Norwalk and

Greenwich robberies in order to establish that the defendant was not guilty

of the Norwalk and Greenwich robberies. Defense counsel’s trial strategy,

however, has nothing to do with the issue that the defendant raises on

appeal, namely, whether he was deprived of his sixth amendment right to

counsel when the trial court admitted evidence of the incriminating statements he made to Simmons. Accordingly, this argument has no merit.

4 The sixth amendment right to confrontation is made applicable to the

states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See,

e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 406, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d

923 (1965).

5 Regarding this issue, the defendant cites the following testimony:

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Mr. Nelson, Detective Iorfino kept telling you things

that he wanted you to say, right?

‘‘[The Supervisory Assistant State’s Attorney (Prosecutor)]: Your Honor,

at this point, what I am going to ask for if the question is not going to be

about what Detective Iorfino—if the questions are going to be about what

Detective Iorfino had to say during this interview as opposed to what his

responses were, I think it’s already out that he denied knowing anything

about the case. I am just going to ask that it be read to the jury,the September,

the August 10—

‘‘The Court: The questions are being asked about a document that is not

in evidence, and nobody has asked to put it in. So, the witness had indicated

what he had indicated. I think we’ve been over this repeatedly, so let’s wrap

up the cross-examination, counsel.’’

Thereafter, the following exchange occurred:

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And later on, some of the other details that you were

given were that you were at a barber shop with [the defendant], right?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: He told you to say that?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

* * *

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: If we could just put this in, please.

‘‘The Court: I am going to sustain the objection. I am going to sustain

the objection.

* * *

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: At that time, you told them the details that they

wanted you to tell them, correct?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Objection. How does he know what they want? He

gave details.

‘‘The Court: Sustained.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: They told you the details that they wanted, correct?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Objection, Your Honor. They did not tell him and I—

‘‘The Court: Sustained, sustained.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: You knew at that time, after they had spoken to you,

that they have certain evidence, correct?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Your Honor—

‘‘The Court: I am going to sustain the objection. At the appropriate time,

[defense counsel], you will have a chance to make any argument you want.

This is not the time to make arguments.’’

6 With respect to this issue, the defendant refers to the following exchange:

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: . . . Didn’t you tell the officers that you were going

to take the rap for [the Greenwich robbery] yourself?

‘‘[The Supervisory Assistant State’s Attorney (Prosecutor)]: If we may,

Your Honor. I have no objection to this coming in—

‘‘The Court: Is there an objection?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes, there is an objection.

‘‘The Court: He is the one that stood up.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Oh, I am sorry.

‘‘The Court: Are you objecting to that question?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor, cross-examination off a document

not in evidence.

‘‘The Court: Sustained.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I am asking him what he said.

‘‘The Court: I heard what you asked. There was an objection. I sustained

the objection. Move on.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Mr. Nelson, it wasn’t until the police told you that

there were more people involved that you decided to change your story

and not take the rap for yourself, correct?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: If I may object, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Sustained.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: It’s [a] mischaracterization of what he just testified to

this morning.’’

7 The defendant relies on the following exchange:

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Isn’t it true that the Greenwich Police Department

got you because they found out that you had told some lies to them in the

previous interview and statement that you had given?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And they wanted you to straighten it out, correct?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: They wanted you to change your statement?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And this was after you had already sworn it under

oath, correct?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And this was after you had already been promised

your cooperation agreement?

‘‘[The Supervisory Assistant State’s Attorney (Prosecutor)]: Objection.

It’s the same day, December 10. I think the document in evidence says

December 10.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: The actual cooperation agreement that is—

‘‘The Court: Are you asking a question or are you making a comment now?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I was responding to the objection if there was an

objection.

‘‘The Court: I sustained the objection. Let’s move on.’’

8 The defendant maintains that Nelson repeatedly testified that the only

thing he had to do to satisfy his end of the bargain was to tell the truth.

When defense counsel asked Nelson, however, if the prosecutor would be

the one to decide whether he had told the truth, the prosecutor objected,

claiming that the jury would make that decision. The court sustained that

objection. Defense counsel later asked: ‘‘[W]hatever you tell them as the

details of this case as you’ve told them in the past that they’ve said that

they would accept as the truth, okay, you’ve got to stick with that [or],

otherwise, you are going to lose the benefit of your agreement, right?’’ The

court sustained the prosecutor’s objection to that question.

9 This issue was addressed in the following exchange regarding Nelson’s

September, 2010 interview with Detective Iorfino:

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Now, during that interview, Detective Iorfino tried

to get you to talk about the Greenwich [robbery], didn’t he?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And you didn’t want to talk about it?

‘‘[Nelson]: No.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: In fact, you denied involvement many times during

that interview, correct?
‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And, in response to your denials in that interview,

Detective Iorfino told you some details about this case, correct?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: He told you that they already had [a coconspirator], right?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

* * *

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And, despite what Detective Iorfino told you, you

continued to deny being involved in any way with the Greenwich [robbery], correct?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And one of the ways that Detective Iorfino tried to

get you to acknowledge the details was to tell you that you would get a

free walk, correct?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And that didn’t persuade you either at that point, all

the efforts he made in that regard, correct?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And [Detective] Iorfino also told you . . . some of

the things that he wanted you to say, correct?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.

* * *

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And he told you repeatedly that he knows the facts.

He just wants you to say them, right?

‘‘[Nelson]: Yes.’’