COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Annunziata, Kelsey and Senior Judge Overton 

Argued by teleconference 

FELIX COBBS, III 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 2683-03-3 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 SEPTEMBER 14, 2004 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

William N. Alexander, II, Judge 

 Glenn L. Berger (Berger & Thornhill, on brief), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 A jury convicted appellant of possession of a firearm by a felon, felony elude and reckless 

driving. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior failure to 

appear for trial, admitting evidence of unrelated incidents of flight, and admitting statements he 

made on those occasions. Appellant argues the evidence was irrelevant and immaterial. We 

disagree and affirm. 

BACKGROUND

 On September 23, 2000, Trooper Jackson pursued a vehicle driven by appellant at speeds up 

to 100 miles per hour. Jackson activated his siren and blue lights, but appellant did not stop until he 

lost control and went into a ditch. Jackson searched appellant’s car and found a firearm. Appellant 

was arrested, released on bond, and his trial was set for February 13, 2001. However, appellant 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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failed to appear for his trial and the trial court issued a capias. The court subsequently convicted 

appellant of failing to appear for his February 13, 2001 trial. 

 On September 28, 2001, Officer Lovell of the Martinsville Police Department stopped 

appellant’s vehicle. Lovell asked to see appellant’s license and registration, but appellant “spun 

off.” Lovell pursued appellant, but lost sight of him. Lovell next saw appellant on January 16, 

2002, at the Danville City Jail. Appellant told Lovell he fled from him in September 2001 “because 

of charges he had out of Chatham.” 

 On January 14, 2002, acting on a tip concerning appellant’s location, several officers from 

the Danville Police Department approached a residence. Appellant fled the residence, but Officer 

Pickeral intercepted appellant and told him that he was under arrest. Pickeral testified appellant 

replied, “Fuck you police” and continued to run. Pickeral followed, tackled appellant and took him 

into custody. Appellant had a false identification card in the name of “Tony X. Outlaw” when 

arrested by Pickeral. Officer Pace fingerprinted appellant at the Danville City Jail and testified 

appellant asked if Pace was going to take him upstairs where fingerprints were taken by a 

computerized system. Pace testified he told appellant “it took entirely too long to catch him and I 

wasn’t going to lose him again by taking him out of the jail.” Pace testified appellant laughed and 

said, “Yeah, if I get out of here, I’m gonna go to Japan . . . .” 

 Over appellant’s objection, the trial court admitted into evidence appellant’s conviction for 

failing to appear at trial for the charges, appellant’s statement to Lovell that he fled “because of 

charges he had out of Chatham,” and appellant’s statement to Pace that he would “go to Japan” if he 

had a chance to get out of jail. The trial court also admitted evidence of appellant’s failure to stop 

for Lovell, his attempt to elude Pickeral, his statement to Pickeral, and his possession of a false 

identification card. 
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ANALYSIS

Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency to prove an issue 

in a case. Relevant evidence may be excluded only if the 

prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value. 

The question whether the prejudicial effect of evidence exceeds its 

probative value lies within the trial court’s discretion. 

Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 461-62, 470 S.E.2d 114, 127 (1996). 

 “As a general rule, only under limited circumstances may evidence of other offenses by 

an accused be admitted to prove the offense at bar.” Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 

97, 101, 409 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1991). “Although flight to avoid prosecution is evidence of 

another crime, it is nevertheless admissible to show a consciousness of guilt.” Id. at 102, 409 

S.E.2d at 479. “Evidence of flight from authorities that occurred days, or even months, after a 

crime is admissible, as ‘any flight at a time when it may be to avoid arrest, prosecution, or 

confinement tends to show a consciousness of guilt.’” Ricks v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 

330, 335, 573 S.E.2d 266, 268 (2002) (citation omitted). “The remoteness in time of the flight 

goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.” Langhorne, 13 Va. App. at 103, 

409 S.E.2d at 480. 

 Here, as in Langhorne, appellant knew of the charges pending against him and knew, at 

the time of his flights from the authorities, that he was being sought in connection with those 

charges. Appellant’s failure to appear at his trial was relevant to prove a consciousness of guilt, 

and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence of appellant’s conviction. 

Appellant fled from Lovell in September 2001, which was only seven months after he failed to 

appear for trial; the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence of appellant’s 

flight from Lovell. Although the evidence of appellant’s flight from Pickeral was approximately 

eighteen months after the incident, the charges were still pending and the remoteness in time of 

the flight went to its weight and not to its admissibility. When told he was under arrest by 
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Pickeral, appellant cursed him and continued to run. Appellant later admitted to Lovell he fled 

because of the outstanding charges, and appellant told Pace he would go to Japan if he could 

escape from jail. Appellant’s statements and his possession of a false identification card were 

also relevant to prove appellant’s consciousness of guilt, and the trial judge did not abuse his 

discretion in determining the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. 

 Appellant concedes this Court has allowed evidence of flight as probative of guilt, but 

argues the remoteness of the evidence of his flight and its prejudicial value outweighed any 

probative value of the evidence. Appellant requests that this Court reconsider the holding in 

Langhorne and overrule it. “Under the rule of stare decisis, a decision by a panel of this court is 

an established precedent.” Robinson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 540, 543, 413 S.E.2d 661, 

662 (1992). We find nothing in the circumstances of this case leading us to believe that a 

departure from Langhorne is justified. Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s convictions for 

possession of a firearm by a felon, felony elude and reckless driving. 

Affirmed.