1 In

the Ci ty’s m unici pal structur e, “dev el opm ent re view bo ar d” is t he n am e u se d to ref

er to it s board of adj ustmen

t, which hears appea

ls of deci si ons m

ade by the zoni ng adm in is trat or. Although t he state stat ute refers to a board o f adj ustmen t and the ci

ty ordin ance ref ers to t he de velop ment reviewboard, the parties agree the en tities are the sam

e, and the l

a ngua ge o f the st at ut e and ordinan ce are v i rtual l y i den tic al . Compare Te x. Loc. Gov ’t Code An n. § 2 11.011 (We st 1988 ), with Round Rock, Tex., Code o f Ordi nan ces § 11.324. 

### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-01-00400-CV
Richa rd W all

ace P earce an d Jes se Ray Bl ann, App el lan ts v. City of R ound Rock ; Round Rock Devel opment Re

view Board; Fr ank Del Cas tillo, in Hi s Ca pa cit y as Me mbe r of t he R ou nd Roc k Dev elop men t R evi ew B oard ; Te rry Hagood, in His Capacity as Member of the Round Rock Devel opment Review Board; Keith Hickman, in His Capacity as Member of the Round Rock Development Review Board; Brian Lott, in His Capacity as Member of the Ro und Rock

Devel opment Re

view Board; Mark

Sill a, in His Capacity as Member of the Round Rock Development Review Board; Joseph Vining, in His Capacity as Director of Planning and Community Development, Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WILLIAMSON COUNT Y, 277TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 97-314-C277, HO NORABLE JO HN R. CARTER, JUDG E PRESIDING

A pp el l an ts Richard W

al l ace Pearc e and Je sse Ray Blan n appeal the dist rict co urt ’s judg ment affirming the d ecisio ns o f the Ro und Ro ck D evelo pment Rev i ew B oard 1 to deny

appell ants’ pe r mit applic ations f

or seven out doo r adver tising struc tu res locat ed in Round Ro ck’s extraterritor ia l j ur isdict ion. In f

iv e i ssues, appel

la nts contend that the Board erred in uph oldi ng the zo nin g2 Issues con cern i n g tw o of

th e n ine st r uc t ur es be ca me moot upon t ermi nation of appell

ants’ gr ou nd l ea se s f orthe pro pert y on whi

ch the signs were located. Accordingl y, we address only t he Board’s decisions pertaini ng to the seven remai

ni ng struct ures. 3 The off

i ce of di rector o f planning and co mmunity develo pment is also re ferr ed t o by t he parties a s the

off i ce of the “ zoni ng a dm i nistrator.” 4 A non-conf ormi ng u se of l and or bui ldi ngs i s a use that exi sted legally when t he zo ning restri cti on b eca

me ef f ecti ve . University Parks v. B enners , 485 S.W .2d 773 , 777 (Tex. 19 72).

2 admin istrat or ’s deci si ons deny

in g t hei r pe rmits . T he issue for ou r d et er minatio n is whet her t he district cour t abused its discretion in aff irm in g the Boa rd’s decisi

ons. We hold that, as a matte r of la w, four of t he st ru ct ur es a re “signs” w ithin t he meaning o f Rou nd Ro ck’ s cit y or dinance , a nd we reverse an

d re man d to the B oard

f or f urth er proce edi

ng s th at p orti on of

the dist rict co urt ’s judg ment and rende r a determi

nation tha t t he di strict

co ur t er r ed , as a ma t t er o f law , in affi rmin g t he Boar d’s de ci si ons rel ati ng to thos e f

our structure s. B ec au se

wehol d that the other th

ree stru ctu res are not “si gns,” we af

fi rm that part of the dis

trict court ’s j udgme

nt aff irm in g the Board. BACKGROUND A pp el l an ts o bt ain ed pe r mit s fr o m t he T ex as De pa r t me nt of Tr ansp or t at ion fo r t he ere cti on o f ni neou t do or adve rt ising signs wit hin the C ity’s ext ra t er rit or ial jurisdict ion. 2 Af ter con stru cti on began, t he Round R ock City Council adopt ed an o rdinance extending the City’s au th ori ty to reg ul ateoutdoor

adve rt ising into its e xt ra t er rit or ial jurisdict ion. The day aft er ado pt ing t he ne w ord i na nc e, th e C i ty ’s di rector of pl an n i n g a n d c om m un i ty dev el opm en t, 3 Joe Vin in g, directed his st aff t o po st “st o p w o r k” o r de r s o n a ll nine st ru ct ur es, asse rt ing violat ions of the new ordi nan ce. The Ci ty later removed

the stop work ordersfro m tw o s t ru ct ur es, co ncluding t hey wer e “signs” and entitled to non-conf

ormi ng use status under the sign ordinan ce 4 beca use t hey co nt ained a dver t ising5 The dist rict co ur t initially dismissed a ppe llants’ s uit for want o f jur isd ict io n; h o we ve r , t his Court determi ned tha t j urisd i cti on wasproper a

nd r em anded the ca

use f or adeter mi

nation on the merits. See Pearce v

. City of Round R ock, 992 S.W .2d 668 (Tex . App.—A usti n 19 99, pet. deni ed). 6 The Local Gove

rnm ent Code permi

ts a di str i ct c our

t to gran t a wri t of certi ora ri di re cte d to t he Board to rev

i ew i ts dec i sion. See Tex . Loc. Gov ’t Code An n. § 211.011 ( We st Supp . 2002) . Certior ari i s a proced ural m echanism by wh i ch a re vi ew i ng cou rt ca n “ de man d of an i nf eri orcourt orbod y tha t i t send up th e re cor d o f t he pr o ce ed in gs in t he mat t er unde r r eview in o rd er t hat t he l eg al i ty th er eof m i gh t b e te ste d to dete

rm i n e w h eth er th e l owe r c our t or b ody h ad ac ted wi th init s proper jurisdi ction.” Ci ty of San Angelo v . Boehm e Bakery , 190 S.W .2d 67, 7 0 (Tex . 1945) . Because the Board volun

taril y f orwarded its reco rd t o t he district c our t, our review of the Bo ard’s de cis io ns is no t affe ct ed by t he fac t t ha t ap pe llant s d id n o t file a wr it o f ce r t io r ar i. 3 on one side of t he structur es’ surf ace. Appel

la nts subm itted permi

t appli cations f or t he other seven struct ures, but Vin

in g denied the permi

ts. A pp el l an ts app ealed Vining’s de cisions t o t he Bo ar d, co nt ending t hat (i) t he signs were non-conf

ormin g s tru ctu re s, (i i ) the stru ctu

re s w er e s i gns, an

d ( i i i ) they

wereen ti tl ed to “g randf athe r” use unde r t he o rd inance. Afte r a hear ing, t he Bo ar d, act ing on a “ motion to overturn t he dec ision o f the zon

i ng ad m i ni stra tor de ny i ng ” a ppe l l an ts’ pe rm i ts, v oted on a separate per-item ba sis to reverse Vi

ni ng’s deci si ons. The reversal

vote fai le d, however, becaus e the three-to -two v ote in fav or o f rev ersal did n ot me et the supermaj ority (sev enty-fi ve percen t) vot e required. SeeRo und Rock, Te x., Co de o f Ord inances § 11. 324 (1 0) . Ap pellant s ap pea led t he Bo ar d’s d ecisio ns t o t he di str i ct c our t. O n re man d f rom th i s C our t, 5 the dis trict court aff

irm ed the Board. STANDARD OF REVIEW Judi ci al review of the Board’s decisi ons i s governed b y s ection 211.011 of t he Texas Local Governm ent Code. 6 See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Co de Ann. § 211.011 (West Supp. 2002). Revie w under se cti on 211 .01 1 “ dif

f ers f rom t he major ity o f Texa s st at ut es p re scr ibing the pr oc edu re for t he4

revi ew of ordersof adm

in is trat iv e bodi es.” Board of Adjustment v. Stovall, 216 S.W.2d 171, 172 (T ex. 194 9); Ci ty of San Ange lo v. B oehme Bakery , 19 0 S . W. 2d 67 , 69 ( T ex . 19 45 ) . T he o nly que sti on b ef oreth e d i str i ct c our t wa s th e l eg al i ty of the Board ’sorder. Boehme B akery , 190 S.W.2d at 70. Be ca

us e th e l eg al i ty of th e B oard’ s or

der i s a qu esti on of l aw an d th e p ar ti es do n ot dispute t he cent ra l fact s, in r eviewing it s o rd er , t he di strict court does not ask whether there i s subs tantial evi dence t o sup po rt t he Bo ar d’s d ecisio n; ra t her , it ask s whe t her , in making it s de t er minatio n, t he Board abused

i ts di scre tion . See Nu-W

ay Emulsi ons, Inc. v. C

ity of Dalworthington Garde ns , 617 S. W.2d 188 , 18 9 (T ex. 1 981 ); Boehme B akery , 1 90 S .W. 2d a t 70. To find an abus e o f discr et ion, a reviewi ng court must concl

ude that the Board act ed wi thou t ref ere nc e to a ny gui di ng rul esor pr i nci ple s of l aw. Dow ner v. Aquamarine Operators , Inc ., 701 S.W .2d 238 , 241-4 2 (Tex . 1985) . The Boa rd ’s de cisi on i s pre su med to b e l eg al, a n d a pa rty at t ack ing it be ar s t he bur den o f est ablishing that the B oard cl

earl y abuse d i ts di scre tion . See Pi

ck-n-Pul l Auto Dism antlers

v. Zo ning Bd

. of Adjustment , 45 S.W .3d 337 , 340 (Tex. A pp.—F ort Worth 20 01, pet. deni ed). In det er mini ng whe t her t he Bo ar d abu sed its d iscre t ion, t he re viewing cou rt m ay not put i tse l f i n th e p osi ti on of t he Bo ar d and subs t itu t e its wisdo m, judg ment, and di screti on f or th at of t he Board. Boehme B akery , 19 0 S . W. 2d at 70 . “Alt ho ug h t his is an appell ate review of an agency’s act ion, we do not empl oy the sub stantial evi dence st anda rd of r eview in re viewing [ dec isions] by the Board of Adj ustmen

t.” Texans to Save the Capitol v. Board of Adjustment , 647 S.W.2d 773, 777 (T ex. App.—Austin 1983, wri t ref’d n.r.e. ). Ins t ea d, we as k o nly wh et he rt he Bo ar d c o rr ec t ly anal yz ed and appl

ie d the sign ordin

ance. See Wende

v. Board of Adjustment , 27 S.W.3d 162, 167 (T ex. A pp .—S an A n toni o 20 00 , pe

t. granted) . Because a b oard of ad j us tmen t h as n o discre ti on

to det er mine the la

w, a fai lure to correct ly

anal yz e or apply

the la wco nst itu t es a n abus e o f discr et ion.7 A

pp el l an ts assert that den i al

of th ei r p er m i t re qu ests wa s i

m prop er b ec au se

(i ) th ey were n ot required to ob tai n perm i ts un der s tate la w; (ii) the ci

ty ordin ance upon wh

ic h the adm in is trat or reli ed in denying t heir p er mits wa s invalid; and(i i i ) tw o of th e stru ctu

re s d i d n ot re qui reperm i ts because they contained advertisi

ng and were therefore no n-conformi ng struct ures. 8 The City’s main a rgument on appeal isthat, because app el l an ts “ ha ve not c om pl ai ne d of any errors co mm

itted by the d istr ict c ou rt ,” app ellants “have not pres erv ed n or ass i gne d an

y errors on t he pa r t o f t he dis t r ict co ur t fo rt his C o ur t t o r ev iew . ” S o lo ng as ap pe llant s’ br ie f s uff ic i en t ly rais es the al l eg ed err ors of the dis trictco ur t , t hos e issue s ar e pr ese rve d fo r o ur re view. Bec aus e t he dis trictco ur t ’s de t er minat io n c an no t be ex amine d w it ho ut fi rst co nsi dering the Board’s decisions, appe l l an ts have appropriately

preserved rev

ie w of the di strict court ’s determi nat i on and t he City’s con ten ti on i s wi th out m er i t. 5 SeeWalker v. Packe

r , 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (T ex. 1 992 ); Boehme Bakery , 190 S. W.2d at 70 . Thus, in th i s q ua si -a dm i n i strati v e a pp ea l , w e r ev i ew th e le ga lit y of t he Bo ar d’s d ecisio ns t o d et er mine whether the di strict court abused i ts discretion in

aff irm in g the Board. DISCUSSI ON The central i

ssueon appeal is whether an

y of appella nts’ sev en structures quali

fi ed as non- co nfor ming

structure s at the

tim e the Ci ty p ass ed th e si

gn ord i na nc e. A pp el l an ts con ten d th at, because t he Cit y un law fully r eg ula t ed t he ir o ut do o rsig n u sa ge in

its e xt ra t er rit or ial jurisdict ion, t he Board and t he dist rict co ur t er re d by no t rendering a d ec isio n p er mit t ing ap pe llant s t o us e t he ir structur es as they

origi nal ly in tended. 7 The C i

ty responds that, because i

t lawf ull y e nacted the si

gn ordinan ce be f ore a ppe l l an ts c om plete d c ons

tructi on o f t he ir s ign s, all seven

of appel la nts’ structures aresubj ec t t o t he ordin

ance. 8 T he r efo r e, t he Cit y as se rt s, t he zo ning ad minist r at o rwa s w it hin h is di screti on t o d eny app ellants ’ re que st ed p er mits and ne i ther the Board

no rt he dis t r ict co ur t er r ed in upho ldingthose decisions. Before we can proper ly address t hesecontentions, howev er, we must fi

rst ascertain the eff ective date of Round Rock’s si gn ordin ance.6 A pp el l an ts argue t hat, because the sign ordinan ce l evi es a pena lty for non-compl

ia nce, it did n ot becom e eff ective until

April 10, 1997, whe

n i t was rea d f

or a s ec on d ti

me. The C i

ty contends that t he ordin

ance b ecam

e eff ective on Feb

ruary 27, 1997, upon i

ts fi rst reading, b ecause, as the ordinan

ce does not levy

a fi ne, the Ci ty Counsel

could (and di

d) unani mously vote t o dispense wi th th e s ec on d r eadi

n g. R oun d R ock Ci ty Ch ar ter se cti on 3.1 3 p rov

i de s, i n perti n en t pa rt: Any or dinance which levies a fine o r p enalt y and t hos e de aling wit h budg et and/ or t ax, franch ises, publ ic util ities or the sett in

g of thei r rates, shal l b e rea d at two regular me etings follow ed by pu blicatio n in full or by cap t ion in t wo suc ces sive issue s o f the off ic ia l n ewspaper of the Ci

ty be fore the sam

e shal l b ecome ef

fecti ve. All ot her ordin

ance s shal

l n ot be f in al ly passed un

til they have been

read on two se pa ra te da ys not less than

twelve (12) hours apart; provided h owever if an ordin ance hasbe en i ntroduc ed at a r

egul ar m ee ti ng of the Ci ty Cou nc i l , th e re qui

rem en ts f or re ading o n t wo se pa r at e d ays may be di sp en se d w i

th b y an af f i rm ati ve vote of all the Ci ty Cou n ci l mem b er s pre se

n t. Round Roc k, Tex., Charter § 3 .13 (1 996). The sign ord in ance provides: It shall be unlaw ful for any per so n t o e re ct , r eloc at e, re pair , r epa intorma terial ly al ter any Sign, as d efi

ned h er ein, w ithin t he cit y’s lim its o r e xt ra t er rit or ial jurisdict ion, withoutfi rst obt ai ni ng a b uil din g permi t issued b y the Chi ef Bu ilding Offic ial o rhis designee, as di

rected in Sec

tion 3.106 of thi s Code. Ro und Rock, Tex., Code of O rd inance § 3. 140 3( 6) (a ). Sec t ion 3 .1 06( 3) set s for t h a f eesche dul

e f or anyone “ wh

o de si res to . . . erect, or co nstruct a sign of any descri ption.” Id. § 3.106 (3). Fa i l ur e to o bt ain a permi

t prior to begi

nni ng construction doubl

es the f ee sch edul e. Id. § 3. 106 (6 ). Des pit e t he fee do ub ling fea t ur e c o nt ain ed in se ct io n 3 . 10 6( 6) , se ct io n 3 . 14 03 ( 6) ( a) it se lf do es no t lev y a

pen al ty orfine . Ac co r din gly, we r eje ct ap pe llant s’ cla im that, because vio lat ing t he sig n o r din an ce ca n r es ult in an as se ss men t t ha t do ub les t he fee sc he du le u nd er t he ge ne r al o r din an ce , t he sig n or din ance9 In

thei r f i rst i ssue, a

pp ell an ts c l ai m th at thei r con stru cti on of the seven structur es at is sue constitutes a “set of proj ects” and that, under form er Texas Govern

me nt Code chapter 481, th e C i ty was pre cl ude d f rom im posin g the requirem

ents of i ts new sign ordin

ance an d in stead was requi

red to consider

o nly t he o r din an ce s inef

f ec t at the ti

me a ppe l l an ts re ce i ve d thei r ori gi na l pe rm i ts f rom t he Te xas D epa rt ment of Tra ns portation . Because appel la nts’ bi ll board construction was not a “set of projects” as they

contend, forme

r Governm

ent Code chapter

48 1 h as no ap plic at io n in t his a pp ea l. Theref ore, asof its e ffect ivedate, appell

ants were requi

red to compl

y w ith the C ity ’s si

gn ordin ance. 10 Ap pe lla nts’ seco nd issue chall enges t he Boar d’s deci si on under current Go ve rn m en t Cod e sec t ions 216.003(b) and 216.004(a). The crux of appell ants’ argumen

t is that, because “

Round Rock has n ot created a mun

ic ipa l board on si gn

contro l[,] i

ts sign ordinan ce m ust therefore be construed not t o r equ ire t he relocation, reconstruction, or removal of exi stin g signs (as def

in ed by state law) whi ch arein la wful exi stence whe

n the ordin

ance b ecome ef

fecti ve.” Becaus e three of appell ants’ stru ctu res l ac ke d the b ac ki

ng on which t o a pply t ext or symbols, a s o f the eff ective date of the sign ordinan ce, as di scussed infra , they were not si gns , ev en und er the state law defi

ni tion; theref

ore, Go ver nment Code sections 216 .003(b) and 216.0 04(a) a re i na ppl i cab l e an d app el l an ts were required to compl y w ith the C ity ’s si

gn ordin ance as of i ts eff ective date. 11 In two separat e l etter s to appell ants reg ard i ng the two s i gn s n

ot at iss ue in t his a pp ea l, Vin in g advi sed appellants that , because the st ruct ures “met t he City Code’s de f i ni ti on of a s i gn ” on “the date of

the a dopti on of

the [c i ty ordi na nc e],” a ppel l an ts were “e nti tle d to conti

nue to . . . use[] and occup [y

each structure] a s a n

on-con f ormi ng s i gn.” 7 co nt ains a p en

al ty or fine. We ho ld t hat , be cau se se ct ion 1 .4 03( 6) (a ) d oe s no t by its lang uag e levy a f i n e or pen al ty , the B oard’ s u

n an i mous v ote to di sp ense

wi th t he se co nd r ead ingwas valid and t he ordinan ce be ca me eff

ective Feb ruary 27, 19 97 . Acc ordi

n gl y , w e ov er ru l e a pp el l an ts’ f i rs t, 9 second, 10 and third i ssues.

Having de t er mine d t he effect ive dat e o f the or dinance , w e must now det er mine whether appe l l an ts’ s ev en structure s we

re “ si gns ” an d en titl ed to non-c onf

or mi ng use stat us. A pp el l an ts t ake t he po sitio n t hat , be cau se t hey co mplet ed a ll seven st ru ct ur es p rio r t o e nact ment of t he o r din an ce an d w er e a wa it ing o nly t he app licatio n of a dver t ising messag es t o t he st ru ct ur es, t he City lack s au t hor ity t o r egu late t he structur es un der the n ew ordi n an ce . Th e C i ty doe s n ot dispute that signs com

ple ted prior to February 27, 1997 woul d be en titled to non-conf

ormi ng use status and exem pt f rom com pl y i n g w i th th e p er m i t re qui re men t. 11 I nst ea d, it contends t hat none of appellees’12 Under a prior versi

on of the Code of Ordinan ces , the City defi ned si gn as“ [a] ny de vi ceor sur fac e on whi

ch l etter s, il lus trat ions , fi

gures, or sym

bols are pai nted, prin ted, stamped, raise d, projected or in an y m ann er out li ned or att ached and

used for advertising .” Round Rock, Tex., Code of Ordi na nc e § 3.2(1961 ) (em

phasi s ad ded). However, the 1995 edition of the Code of Ordi nan ces re f l ec ts subse que n t re visions t o t his olde r d efinition o f “sign” and omit s any re fere nce t o t he “ ad v er ti si n g” re qui re men t. 8 structur es were, by defi

ni tion, signs. Two structure s con tai ne d wri tin g: one di spl ay ed “ f or le ase ,” one di spl ay ed “ f or sal e,” a nd b oth di spl

ay ed ap pel l an ts’ ph one n um ber. In let t er s de nying

appell ants’ requestedpermi

ts for those two structur es, Vi ni ng statedth at, b ec au se

n ei th er str uc tur e w as

com pl ete or “being us ed a nd o ccu pied a s a ‘s ign’ as def in ed in the Ci ty Code,” nei

ther struct ure was enti

tled to non-c onfo rming st at us. Exp laining this co nclusio n furt her , V ining advised app ellants t hat “the
merefact that you ha

ve pl aced a teleph

one num ber on the struc tur e d oes n ot b ring it wit hin the def i ni tion of a ‘s i gn’ . . . .” “Sign” is defi ned as “[a]ny devi ce or surface on wh

ic h letters, num

bers, il lustrations, designs , f i gures , or other sy

m bol s are paint ed, pr inted , st amped , r aised , p roject ed o r in any ma nne r out li ned or at tached and is used f or t he purposes of adv

ertisem ent, announce

ment, decla

r at ion, demo nst ra t ion, dis

pla y, i dentif ic ation or expressi

on.” Round Rock, Tex ., C ode of Ordin ance § 3.1403 (1 )( m

). 12 Wh en construi

ng statutes, t he pl

ai n m eani ng of words i s to be giv en ef fect when ever practi cab l e. See Tex . Gov’ t Code A nn . § 311.021(2) (We st 1998 ); Quantum Chem. Corp.
v. Toennies , 47 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Tex. 2001) (“A ba sic ru l e of statuto ry cons truct ion i s that we enf orce t he pla in

m ea ni ng of an un amb igu o us st at ut e. ”) . He r e, ne it he rpa r t y ar gu es t he o r din an ce is amb iguous. Thus, we gi ve t he o rd inance it s plain meaning, pr esu ming tha t ever y wor d in t he ordinan ce is used f

or a p urpo se and gi

vi ng ef fect to each sen

tence, claus e, and w or d if rea so nable and possib le . See T

exas Wor ker s’ Co mp. Ins . Fund

v. Del Indus ., Inc. , 3 5 S .W. 3d 5 91, 593 (T ex. 2000) .13 The f o ur st ruc t ur es t ha t we r e s ign s a r e id en t ified in th e sti pul ate d adm

i n i strati ve record a s pla in tif f’ s exh ibits 16/17, 18/19, 22/23, and 24/25. 9 To be a sign

under the Ci

ty’s ordi nan ce, a structur e m

ust be a device or surface “ on whi ch let t er s, nu mbe r s, illus t r at io ns, de sig ns, figu r es , o ro t he rsymbo ls arepai nted, prin ted, stamped, rais ed, pr ojec t ed o r in any manner ou t lined or at t ache d . . . .” In t he co nt ext o f t his a pp ea l, t hen, t he de fin it i on of sign c ont ains no re quir ement t hat app ellants ’ st ru ct ur e must cur re nt ly display any writi ng, o nly t hat , a t t he t ime t he C it y ena ct ed t he o rd inanc e, it hav e a su rfa ce “on whic hletters, num bers, il lustrations . . .” were capable of bei ng dis play ed. We hold that t he Board err ed, as a
matte r of l aw , i n n ot rej ec ti ng Vi ni ng ’s i nte rpreta ti on t ha t , in ord er to be si

gns, the str uctur es must co nt ain thi

rd-par ty a dve rtis i ng. The or dinance simply

co nt ains no such requiremen t. The Board a lso erredin aff irm in g Vin in g’s decisi ons as to each of appel la nts’ structures that were “surface s” f or such ad ve rti semen ts on Feb ruary 27, 199 7. Bec aus e f

our of a ppel l an ts’ structures

contai ne d ba cki ng ( a “surf ace”) cap able o f displaying t ext or symbols, a nd we re in all respe ct s t he same as appel lan ts’ two str uc tur es th at th e C i ty de term i ne d to b e s i gn s—

the onl y di sti nc ti on bei ng that advertis in

g was y et to be affix ed t o t he se fo ur st ruc t ur es —w e h o ld t ha t t he y we r e s ig n s and t her efo re ent itled t o no nco nfor ming

use. 13 W e h

ol d th at th e d i str i ct c our t ab us ed i ts discr et ion i n aff

irmi ng the Bo ard’s decisi on to the cont rary. We sustain appel lan ts’ fourth i ssue. As to the remai ni ng three structures at i ss ue , we hol d that, b ec au se

the y l ac k a ba ck i ng (s urf ac e) on whi ch to att ach text or sym

bols , they ar e n o t cu rr en t ly ca pa ble o f dis pla ying t ex t o rsymbo ls and a re acc or dingly not signs; w e affirm the district cour t’s decision with respect t o t hose str uctur es.

By appella nts’ f if th is sue , th ey

con ten d that, to th

e e xte nt th ey are proh i bi ted f rom using t he st ru ct ur es a s signs, t he sign ordin ance cons titutes an unl

awful taking. The Ci

ty m ay enact10

re as on ab l e r eg

ul ati on s to pr om

ote the he al th, saf ety , an d ge ne ral we l f are of i ts peopl e. See Ellis v. City of W. Univ. Place , 175 S.W.2d 396, 39 7 ( T ex . 19 43 ) . I n o r de rfo ran o r din an ce t o be a v alid exercise of th e Ci ty’ s pol i ce powe r, t he r egu latio n must be ad op t ed t o a cco mplish a leg it imat e g o al, that is, i t must be “substantial

ly related” t o t he heal

th, sa f ety , or general

wel fare of

the people. Waxah achie

v. Watkins , 275 S. W.2d 477 , 48 1 (T ex. 1 955 ); Lombardo v. Dallas , 73 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Tex . 19 34 ). A

pr es um pti on ex i sts that fav ors the reasonableness

and validi

ty of the ordi

nan ce, and an “ ex tra ordi n ar y b ur den ” r ests on one

attacki ng i t. Hunt v. San Antonio , 462 S.W.2d 536, 539 (T ex. 19 71 ) . A br o ad r an ge o f go ve rnme nt al p urpo se s will sat isfy this req uire ment, including pr ot ect ingre sident s fr o m t he il l ef f ects of urb an ization. See Mayhe

w v. Tow n of Sunnyvale , 964 S.W.2d 922, 934 (T ex. 1998) (citi ng Agins v. City of Tiburon , 44 7 U. S. 255 , 26 1 (1 980 )) ; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U .S. 26, 33 (1954 ). As l ong as reasonab le

mi nds m ay dif fer ab out whether a particul ar zonin g ordinan ce be ar s a su bst an t ial r ela t io nsh ip t o t he pu blic he al th, saf ety , m oral s, or general welf are, t hen the ordinance is a val id exercise of the Ci

ty ’s pol i cy

power. See Hunt , 462 S.W.2d at 5 39. A ppe l l an ts do not cont est t he City’s

power t o enact the sign

ordinan ce. Instead, they ar gu e t ha t , t o t he ex t en t t he o r din an ce pr o hibit s t he m fro m us ing t he st ruc t ur es as t he y int en de d, it inter fere s wit h t heir invest ment- back ed e xpec t at ions a nd con sti tutes a ta ki ng . Th i s c onte nti on fails to sa ti sf y appe l l an ts’ b ur den to re b ut th e p re su m pti v e c on sti tuti on al i ty of the ordin

ance. Ac co r di ng ly, we hol d the Ci ty’ s reg ul ati on of bi l l board s i n i ts ex traterri tor ia l jurisdi ction pass es consti

tut iona l
m uster. Our

conc l usi on tha t the ordi na nc e i s con sti

tution al does n ot, however, end our

takings inq ui ry. A c o mpe nsa ble reg ul atory taki ng occurs i f govern men tal res tri cti ons de ny l an dow ne rs of all ec o no mica lly

viable use of

th ei r p rop er ty or un rea son ab l y i nte rf ere wi th th ei r ri gh t to us e a nd en j oy11

t he sam e. Mayhew , 96 4 S .W .2d

at 9 35 . H er e, appe l l an

ts cl ai m on l y th at th e ordi n an ce i n terf er es wi th t he irr ig ht t o us e a nd en

jo y t he irpr o pe r t y. In de ter m i n i n g w h eth er th e C i ty h as un re as on ab l y i n terf er ed wi th a lando wner ’s r ight to use and en

joy its property, we consi

der (i) the econom

ic im pact of the regulation on the la ndowner and (ii) t he ext ent t o w hich the re gulat ion int er fere s wit h t he l an dow ner’s i nve stmen t-backed ex pectati ons. Id. The f

irst f actor co mpa

res the economi

c val ue taken from the propert y w

ith that whi ch rem ai ns , wi thou t con si de rati on of an ti ci pa ted gai ns orpro fi ts. Id. at 9 36. Th e s ec ond f ac tor requires con si de rati on of the exi stin

g and perm

itted uses of t he pr op er t y affect ed by t he r egu latio n, t aking i n to acc ou nt t he lando wner ’s kno wledg e o f existing zoni ng r estri cti ons. Id. Evide nce o f the landowner’s devel

opmen t plans and m arket anal ysi s, inc lud ing pr o

jec t ed pr o fit s, may be r ele va nt in det er mini ng whether

t he r egu latio n inter fere s wit h t he lan downer’s inv

estment-backed expectat ions, even though it i s not relev

ant in determi ni ng the am ount o f com

pensation due. City of Glenn Heights
v. Sheffi eld Dev. Co. , 61 S.W .3d 634 , 651 (Tex. A pp.— Waco 2001, pe t . d enied) . B eca use t he record is void o f any

evidenc e ena bling us t o a sses s t he ec ono mic im pac t of t he Ci

ty’s ordi nan ce, we ho ld that ap pel l an ts ha ve not m et thei r bu rden to support thei

r taki ngs clai m . Acc ordingl

y, we overrule thei

r fi fth issue. CONCLU SION In fail i ng to rev

erse Vi ni ng’ s de ci sions d

en y i ng a ppel l an ts’ pe rm i ts, the B oard accepted Vi ni ng ’s i nte rpreta ti on of the ordi na nc e a nd req ui red the pre senc e of

t hird- par t y adver t ising on a s t ruc t ur e in o r de rfo rit to comply wi th t he City ordinance’s defi ni tion of si gn. We c oncl

ude that t he judg ment o f the dist rict co ur t upho ldingthe Board’s deci si ons on that ground must be rev ersed.12

Because a s ign ne ed o nly

be a “ dev i ce or su rf ace on wh i ch l etters, n um bers, i l l ustrati ons . . .” can be “pri nted, st amp ed , r ais ed . . . ” w e h o ld t ha t ( i) f our of a ppel l an ts’ structures

were si gns and theref

ore entitled to n on-co nf

ormi ng use status under the City ’s ordin ance an d (ii ) the remai

ni ng three structur es were not signs and were correctly deni ed non-conf

ormi ng use status. Accordingl y, we reverse an d r em an d to th e B oard i ts d ec i si on s rel ati n g to those four structur es f or furtherproceedin

gs co nsist ent wi

th this opini on. In all other

re spe ct s, w e affirm the dist rict co ur t ’s judg ment u pho lding the Boar d’s decisi

ons.

Jan P. Patterson, Justice Bef ore Justices B. A . Smi

th, Patt erson and Pury

ear Af f i rmed i n Pa rt; Re versed and Rem anded i n Pa rt File d: April 11, 2002 Publish