UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

BRENDA SEYBELS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 12-4130 

(D.C. No. 2:11-CR-00208-TC-2) 

(D. Utah)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and HOLMES, 

Circuit Judge. 

 

 

 Defendant Brenda Seybels appeals the district court’s denial of a motion to 

suppress evidence relating to a large quantity of methamphetamine found in her car 

after a police dog alerted to the presence of drugs during a traffic stop. Her challenge 

to this ruling was preserved in a conditional guilty plea of possessing with intent to 

distribute the methamphetamine. We affirm for the reasons explained below. 

 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 7, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
- 2 - 

I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

The basic constitutional analysis of traffic stops is well-established: 

 For Fourth Amendment purposes, the legality of a traffic stop is 

assessed pursuant to the framework established in Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Accordingly, we 

proceed in two steps. First, we question whether the traffic stop was 

justified at its inception. Second, if the stop was justified, we determine 

whether the resulting detention was reasonably related in scope to the 

circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. 

United States v. Polly, 630 F.3d 991, 997 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks, 

alterations, and additional citations omitted). The second step of the inquiry, which 

will be our focus here, is driven primarily by the purpose of the initial stop: 

[T]he investigative detention usually must last no longer than is 

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the 

detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. In 

accordance with these principles, . . . a law enforcement officer 

conducting a traffic stop may generally request a driver’s license, 

registration, and other required papers, run requisite computer checks, 

and issue citations or warnings as appropriate. In addition, an officer 

may ask questions, whether or not related to the purpose of the traffic 

stop, if they do not excessively prolong the stop. However, once an 

officer returns the driver’s license and registration, the traffic stop has 

ended and questioning must cease; at that point, the driver must be free 

to leave. 

United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Cir.) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 435 (2011). But “a traffic stop may be 

expanded beyond its original purpose if during the initial stop the detaining officer 

acquires reasonable suspicion of [other] criminal activity[.]” Id. In that regard, 

[t]o determine whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain 

beyond the scope of the traffic stop, we must look at the totality of the 

circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 
- 3 - 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. 

Although the government bears the burden of proving the 

reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion, reasonable suspicion is not, 

and is not meant to be, an onerous standard. While reasonable suspicion 

cannot be based upon a mere hunch, it also need not rise to the level 

required for probable cause. . . . Indeed, a factor may raise objectively 

reasonable suspicions even if it is not by itself proof of any illegal 

conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. 

Id. at 1218-19 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). 

In applying these principles in a particular case, this court “accepts the factual 

findings of the district court, and its determinations of witness credibility, unless they 

are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 1215. We also view the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the government. Id. at 1216 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Ultimately, however, this court must review de novo the reasonableness of the 

government’s action under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

II. THE TRAFFIC STOP 

On the afternoon of March 8, 2011, Ms. Seybels and Colene Hageman were 

traveling eastbound through Utah on Interstate 70 in a Chevrolet Impala driven by 

Ms. Hageman. Sergeant Steve Salas of the Utah Highway Patrol stopped the car for 

speeding and for having an illegal window tint. Ms. Seybels does not challenge the 

grounds for this stop; she challenges only its duration and scope. 

Sergeant Salas requested Ms. Hageman’s driver’s license and asked where the 

two women were coming from. Ms. Hageman gave him her license and said they had 

been to California to visit her passenger’s family. Sergeant Salas also requested the 
- 4 - 

vehicle registration and proof of insurance. Ms. Seybels, the owner, said she had just 

purchased the car the preceding Friday (March 4) and had not yet registered it, 

explaining that she had wanted to visit her father in California. But she gave 

Sergeant Salas the title and an insurance card, as well as her own driver’s license for 

identification. The title and insurance card both matched the vehicle, but the title 

listed Crystal Gallegos as owner. Although Ms. Gallegos had signed the back of the 

title as required for a sale, purchase information including the price and buyer was 

not filled in. Nor did Ms. Seybels have a bill of sale. Sergeant Salas asked her to 

accompany him to his patrol car, since she would be responsible for the window-tint 

violation and because he was suspicious about the title and registration. 

Sergeant Salas read through the two documents and asked Ms. Seybels about 

her trip and her travelling companion. She replied that the driver was a friend she 

had known for six months, but she only knew her first name. Turning to her purchase 

of the car, she said she was currently unemployed but had bought the car with a tax 

refund so she could visit her father, leaving for California the very next day. A 

sheriff’s deputy arrived at the scene with a police dog, and Ms. Seybels allowed him 

to walk the dog around the car while Sergeant Salas began writing a warning ticket 

for the illegal window tint.1

 As the deputy and his dog made their way up the 

 

1

 Ms. Seybels’ permission was not required, as “[i]t is well-settled that a drug 

dog’s sniff of the outside of a car is not itself a search for Fourth Amendment 

purposes.” United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005)). The recent decision in Florida v. 

(continued) 
- 5 - 

passenger side of the car, a Chihuahua jumped out of the passenger window and 

approached them barking. The deputy picked up the Chihuahua and returned it to the 

car and put his own dog away. Sergeant Salas, a narcotics canine instructor and 

handler himself (with his own police dog at the scene), observed that the encounter 

had distracted the deputy’s dog. 

Sergeant Salas returned to completing the warning citation for Ms. Seybels 

regarding the window tinting. During this time, Ms. Seybels told him she had bought 

the car on Friday to travel to California, because her father was having a birthday. 

But she also said the birthday was not until the following week, and had no answer as 

to why she needed to rush to California (and return after such a short visit) a week 

beforehand—which was significant in that she had cited that rush to explain why she 

had not registered the vehicle. Sergeant Salas also heard from dispatch, confirming 

that the car was not reported stolen but was registered to Crystal Gallegos. 

We pause to note that Sergeant Salas’s actions up to this point were clearly 

consistent with Fourth Amendment standards. First of all, Ms. Seybels was rightfully 

detained while Sergeant Salas “was in the process of writing the warning ticket” for 

the window-tint violation, and it was entirely proper to question her about her travel 

plans during this interval. United States v. Villa, 589 F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir. 

2009). Second, the lack of a vehicle registration and the incompleteness of the title 

 

Jardines, 2013 WL 1196577 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2013), that entry onto a home’s curtilage 

to conduct a dog sniff is a search, was based on property rights not implicated in the 

traffic stop context and, hence, did not undermine Caballes, see id. at *6. 
- 6 - 

provided objective grounds for inquiring further about ownership of the car—which 

Sergeant Salas did both by engaging Ms. Seybels in conversation and by asking 

dispatch to run a stolen-vehicle check. We have repeatedly noted a “‘recurring factor 

supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion . . . is the inability of a defendant to 

provide proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle he is driving.’” United States 

v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 802 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. 

Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1484 (10th Cir. 1994)); see also United States v. 

Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 2011). 

But Ms. Seybels contends that thereafter, once Sergeant Salas completed the 

warning ticket, there was no legitimate basis for detaining and questioning her any 

longer in light of the negative dog sniff and the response from dispatch indicating the 

car was not stolen, yet (while he claimed to be having trouble printing the warning) 

he continued to ask her questions about the purchase of the car. In particular, he 

asked whether someone else had bought the car for her or helped her to buy it, which 

she denied in a voice he described as very, very low or quiet. After printing the 

warning and giving it to Ms. Seybels along with her license, title, and insurance card, 

he asked her to remain in the patrol car while he spoke with Ms. Hageman, whom he 

had said would get a verbal warning for speeding. Like Ms. Seybels, Ms. Hageman 

did not appear to know the last name of her traveling companion—at least she said 

she could not pronounce or spell it. In addition, some of her answers did not match 

what Ms. Seybels had told Sergeant Salas, including how long the women had known 
- 7 - 

each other. Sergeant Salas returned to the patrol car and, after a brief exchange, 

asked Ms. Seybels for permission to search her vehicle, which she refused. He then 

brought out his own dog to conduct a second drug sniff of the car. The dog alerted to 

the presence of drugs, providing probable cause for a search that ultimately led to the 

hidden cache of methamphetamine supporting Ms. Seybels’ conviction. 

III. REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR PROLONGED DETENTION 

Ms. Seybels argues that the stop became illegal when, having completed the 

warning ticket, Sergeant Salas needed but lacked reasonable suspicion to detain her 

any longer. We direct our reasonable-suspicion analysis accordingly, and thus do not 

consider information gleaned by Sergeant Salas only after his further questioning of 

the two suspects. 

Two major premises of Ms. Seybels’ argument are that the first dog sniff 

dissipated any reasonable suspicion of drugs being in the car and the response from 

dispatch dissipated any reasonable suspicion that the car was stolen. The district 

court noted, however, that the probative effect of the first dog sniff was negated by 

the circumstances surrounding it, while the response from dispatch, though it may 

have reduced suspicions of car theft, did not dissipate suspicions that the vehicle was 

conveying contraband: 

Neither of these events was determinative [of a lack of reasonable 

suspicion]. First, Sergeant Salas testified that from his training and 

experience as a dog handler, he could tell that the first dog had been 

distracted by the Chihuahua. This led him to believe that the sniff was 

not reliable [and hence did not dissipate reasonable suspicion about the 

presence of drugs]. Second, the response from dispatch did not indicate 
- 8 - 

that Ms. Seybels owned the car, only that it was registered to Crystal 

Gallegos and not reported stolen. Sergeant Salas testified that, in his 

experience, people hauling contraband are usually hired to do so and are 

usually given a car that is not registered in their names. 

R. Vol. 1 at 222. These are matters of fact and credibility, and we see no basis for 

rejecting them as clearly erroneous. With this understanding of the relevance and 

effect of the first dog sniff and dispatch’s response regarding the status of the car, we 

now consider de novo the overarching question whether “the totality of the 

circumstances” show that Sergeant Salas had “a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting legal wrongdoing” when he continued to detain Ms. Seybels and her 

companion for questioning and to conduct the second dog sniff of the car for drugs. 

Kitchell, 653 F.3d at 1218-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The district court cited a number of factors supporting reasonable suspicion. 

We deem the following facts particularly probative. First, Ms. Seybels lacked 

registration and proper title to the car, which as explained by Sergeant Salas is 

indicative not only of potential theft but of persons hired to transport drugs. See also 

Ludwig, 641 F.3d at 1249 (“[D]riving a vehicle registered to a third party who wasn’t 

present . . . is a factor we have often held may indicate a stolen vehicle or drug 

trafficking.” (emphasis added, internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 

Second, Ms. Seybels did not even know the last name of her purported friend and 

travelling companion, “a circumstance that quite reasonably raised . . . a suspicion 

that the two [traveling companions] had not taken a vacation . . . but had come 

together for a brief, illegal business [i.e., drug] transaction,” United States v. Hardy, 
- 9 - 

855 F.2d 753, 758 (11th Cir. 1988). See also United States v. Sanchez, 417 F.3d 971, 

976 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting “fact that [defendant] did not know [her driving 

companion’s] last name even though she claimed to have known him for almost a 

year” as factor supporting reasonable suspicion to support detention for drug sniff of 

vehicle). Third, Ms. Seybels’ explanation of her travel itinerary was facially 

implausible. See United States v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1281, 1291 (10th Cir. 2011) 

(collecting cases holding that implausible travel plans, or implausible explanations 

for such plans, can contribute to reasonable suspicion). 

While it is true that taken individually such facts could well be consistent with 

innocent activity, we have repeatedly recognized that, considered in the totality of 

relevant circumstances, “‘[a] factor may raise objectively reasonable suspicions even 

if it is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent 

travel.’” Kitchell, 653 F.3d at 1219 (quoting United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 

950 (10th Cir. 2009) (further quotations omitted)). “[P]olice need not rule out the 

possibility of innocent conduct,” as “[r]easonable suspicion may exist even where it 

might be more likely than not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.” 

United States v. Guardado, 699 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). And “[w]hen making our assessment [of reasonable suspicion], 

deference is to be accorded a law enforcement’s ability to distinguish between 

innocent and suspicious actions.” United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1316 

(10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The circumstances cited above, 
- 10 - 

which collectively converge on a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Seybels was 

transporting drugs, justified Sergeant Salas in further detaining her for the short time 

it took to briefly question her companion and conduct the second, uninterrupted, dog 

sniff around the vehicle which resulted in the discovery of drugs. Accordingly, we 

conclude that her motion to suppress was properly denied. 

 The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Jerome A. Holmes 

 Circuit Judge