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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

RICKY NORTHERN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE, STEPHEN DOTSON,

WARDEN

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hardeman County

No. 05-02-0073 Joe H. Walker, III, Judge

No. W2005-02165-CCA-R3-HC - Filed March 23, 2006 

The Petitioner, Ricky Northern, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus

relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule

20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that

would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed Pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the

Court of Criminal Appeals

DAVID G. HAYES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS AND

ALAN E. GLENN, JJ. joined.

Ricky Northern, pro se.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Rachel Willis, Assistant Attorney General, for the

appellee, the State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Petitioner, Ricky Northern, entered a guilty plea, on November 13, 2003, to one count

of murder in the second degree. For this conviction, he was ordered to serve twenty years

confinement in the Department of Correction. Petitioner is currently confined at the Whiteville

Correctional Facility in Hardeman County. 
The Petitioner has elected not to seek this Court’s review of his claims that trial counsel was ineffective

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and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Notwithstanding, we note that such claims would

not have entitled Petitioner to habeas corpus relief as such claims would merely render his conviction voidable, not

void.

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On August 16, 2005, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief. As grounds for

relief, Petitioner alleged that the judgment against him was void and his sentence was illegal. 

Specifically, the Petitioner complained that trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was

involuntarily entered. Additionally, he asserted that his sentence was illegal as the trial court

imposed a sentence of twenty years at one hundred percent release eligibility for a Class A felony

in violation of the mandates of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).

Petitioner contends that the maximum sentence that could have been imposed was a fifteen year

sentence at one hundred percent. The trial court denied relief on August 23, 2005. In summarily

denying relief, the trial court noted that the petition failed to state a claim for habeas corpus relief

in that the holding in Blakely v. Washington was not to be applied retroactively to cases on

collateral appeal and, even if it did, such a claim would merely render the conviction voidable, not

void. Finally, the trial court recognized that the Tennessee Supreme Court found the Blakely holding

inapplicable to the 1989 Sentencing Act. (citing State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005)).

A timely notice of appeal was filed by the Petitioner. 

In this state, the grounds upon which habeas corpus petitions are granted are narrow. Habeas

corpus relief only addresses detentions that result from void judgments or expired sentences. See

Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 164. A judgment is void “only when ‘[i]t appears upon the face of the

judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered’ that a convicting

court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence

of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004)

(quoting State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted)). The petitioner bears

the burden of establishing either a void judgment or an illegal confinement by a preponderance of

the evidence. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). If the petitioner

carries this burden, he is entitled to immediate relief. However, where the allegations in a petition

for writ of habeas corpus do not demonstrate that the judgment is void, a trial court may correctly

dismiss the petition without a hearing. McLaney v. Bell, 59 S.W.3d 90, 93 (Tenn. 2001) (citing

T.C.A. § 29-21-109 (2000); see, e.g., Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 164 (parenthetical omitted)). The

Petitioner does not contend that his sentence has expired, thus, he is only entitled to relief if the

judgment of conviction against him is void.

The crux of the Petitioner’s claim is that the decision in Blakely v. Washington has rendered

his sentence void and that the sentence imposed by the trial court was illegal as it exceeded the

statutory maximum sentence permitted for the offense. Such a claim does not entitle the Petitioner 1

to habeas corpus relief. Any claim that his sentence was enhanced in violation of his right to a jury

trial would render the judgment voidable, not void. See, e.g., Wayford Demonbruen, Jr. v. State,

No. M2004-03037-CCA-R3-HC, 2005 WL 1541873, *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jun. 30,

2005); Stanley Harvell v. Glen Turner, No. W2004-02643-CCA-R3-HC, 2005 WL 839891, *1
We further acknowledge that, even if such a violation rendered a sentence void, the decision in Blakely is 2

not to be given retroactive application, see State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn.), reh’g denied, (2005); Isaac

Herron v. State, No. W2004-02533-CCA-R28-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 22, 2004) (order), and the

decision in Blakely is not applicable to the 1989 Sentencing Act. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d at 632.

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(Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 12, 2005); Earl David Crawford v. Ricky Bell, No. M 2004-

02440-CCA-R3-HC, 2005 WL 354106, *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 15. 2005). Thus,

the Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. Moreover, the Petitioner’s 2

claim that the minimum sentence was not imposed is in error. The trial court imposed a twenty year

sentence for a class A felony. The presumptive minimum sentence for a class A felony is the

midpoint within the range. See T.C.A. § 40-35-210(c). For a range I standard offender, the

minimum presumptive sentence is twenty years, i.e., the sentence imposed by the trial court.

The trial court determined that the Petitioner was not entitled to habeas corpus relief and

properly dismissed the petition without appointment of counsel or a hearing. The State’s motion is

granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court

of Criminal Appeals.

___________________________________ 

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE