alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The Union Bank of Brooklyn, Plaintiff, *v.*Reuben Rubenstein et al., Defendants. Action No. 3.

(Supreme Court, New York Special Term,

December 1912.)

Mortgages — foreclosure — receiver of rents — mortgagee in possession.

Where, at the time of the conveyance of mortgaged premises, the mortgagee was in actual possession and collecting the rents under a provision of the mortgage, the purchaser is charged with notice of the mortgagee’s rights although an assignment of the rents was not recorded until after the purchaser received his deed.

In an action to foreclose the mortgage, such purchaser is not entitled to an accounting of the rents collected by plaintiff, though no receiver thereof had been appointed; and the amount of the rent collected is properly applied on the mortgage debt.

Action to foreclose a mortgage upon certain real property.

Louis Goldstein (Bufus 0. Gatlin, of counsel), for plaintiff.

House, Grossman and Yorhaus (Edward Kaufman, of counsel), for defendants Bubenstien and Bude.

Shaw, Fisk and Shaw (James'M. Fisk, of counsel), for defendant Suchy.

Giegerich, J.

In addition to the questions considered in the memorandum handed down herewith in action Bo. 1, this case presents the further question of the right of the defendant Suchy, as owner of the mortgaged premises, to require from the plaintiff an accounting of the rents collected by the plaintiff. The defendant Suchy bases her claim to such right upon the fact that the plaintiff never procured the appointment of a receiver and did not record its assignment of the rents made to it by the defendants Stern, who were at the time the owners of the property, until after the defendant Suchy had purchased the premises from the Sterns. Under the facts shown in this case the *466appointment of a receiver was not necessary to give the plaintiff a right to the rents as against the 'defendant Suchy. The mortgage provided that upon default in the payment of either principal or interest the mortgagee should have the right forthwith to take, possession of the premises and receive the rents. At the time the defendant Suchy received the deed of the property the plaintiff was in possession of the premises and was collecting the rents under this provision of the mortgage. Although the assignment of the rents was not recorded until.after the making of the deed to the defendant Suchy, the plaintiff’s possession of the premises, in connection with the provisions of the mortgage, was nevertheless notice to her of its rights. Raynor v. Timerson, 54 N. Y. 639, 640; Kennedy v. National Union Bank, 23 Hun, 494, 496; Frear v. Sweet, 118 N. Y. 454, 462. Such being the case, I think the defendant Suchy is not entitled to the rents, but that they should be, as they have been, applied toward the payment of the principal and interest of the mortgage. There must, therefore, be a judgment of foreclosure and sale as indicated-in action Ho. 1. Requests for findings should be submitted, with proof of service, within five days after the publication of this memorandum.

Judgment accordingly.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                             222
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,090
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      2,341
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 5,703
<PP&E>                                           4,138
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,555
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   8,706
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,407
<BONDS>                                          1,487
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      1,250
<COMMON>                                         2,134
<OTHER-SE>                                         428
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     8,706
<SALES>                                          2,251
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                14,994
<CGS>                                              433
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   10,453
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,353
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 180
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      8
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  8
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         8
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-19-00113-CR

JOEY ABRAHAM MOOSO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

§

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from Criminal District 

Court No. 2

of Tarrant County (1561923R)

October 24, 2019

Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By _/s/ Bonnie Sudderth_________________

 Chief Justice Bonnie Sudderth
#### COOK v. UNITED STATES.

No. 10778.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 19, 1937.

Herbert H. Cook, pro se.

Russell C. Rosenquest, Asst. U. S. Atty., of St. Paul, Minn. (George F. Sullivan, U. S. Atty., of St. Paul, Minn., on the brief), for appellee.

Before SANBORN and THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and MUNGER, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a judgment for the United States in an action at law brought by the appellant to recover up*682on a policy of war risk insurance issued to him and which he alleged in his complaint had matured by reason of his becoming totally and permanently disabled while his policy was in force. The case was, by stipulation of the parties, tried to the court without a jury: The trial court found “that plaintiff did not become totally and permanently disabléd on or prior to November 1, 1920, or at any time while said- insurance contract was in force and effect.”

The record on appeal contains no bill of exceptions. Therefore, this court has nothing before it but the primary record, consisting of the pleadings, the-process, the findings, and the judgment. McCuing v. Bovay (C.C.A.8) 60 F.(2d) 375, 377; Clune v. United States, 159 U.S. 590, 593, 16 S.Ct. 125, 40 L.Ed. 269; Metropolitan Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322, 332, 25 S.Ct. 28, 49 L.Ed. 219.

There is in this case no valid assignment of ■. error which - raises .any ' question which can be determined from the primary record. Hence the judgment must be.and is affirmed.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JULY 31, 2024

NO. 03-24-00248-CV

K. M. S., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 340TH DISTRICT COURT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES BAKER, TRIANA AND KELLY

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE TRIANA

This is an appeal from the order signed by the trial court on April 1, 2024. Having reviewed the 

record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the trial 

court’s order. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s order. Because appellant is indigent 

and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed August 21, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-1185

Lower Tribunal No. 20-3764

________________

Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty Insurance 

Company, Inc.,

Appellant,

vs.

Dina Loo, et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Valerie R. 

Manno Schurr, Judge.

Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Mark D. Tinker and Brandon J. Tyler

(Tampa), for appellant.

The Nation Law Firm, Mark A. Nation and Paul W. Pritchard

(Longwood), for appellees.

Before EMAS, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.
2

Affirmed. See People’s Tr. Ins. Co. v. Armenteros, 49 Fla. L. Weekly 

D932 (Fla. 3d DCA May 1, 2024); Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Rodriguez, 49 

Fla. L. Weekly D593 (Fla. 3d DCA March 13, 2024); Tower Hill Prime Ins. 

Co. v. Bermudez, 388 So. 3d 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023).

.
#### Lester TERRY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-13.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 5, 1970.

Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, and Edwin T. Mulock, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

*668Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Morton J. Hanlon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on authority of Champlin v. State, Fla.App. 1960, 122 So.2d 412; Sutton v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 202 So.2d 589; Bryan v. State, 1899, 41 Fla. 643, 26 So. 1022; Sawyer v. State, 1927, 94 Fla. 60, 113 So. 736, and Kaminski et al. v. State, Fla. 1954, 72 So.2d 400.

LILES, A. C. J., and PIERCE and Mc-NULTY, JJ., concur.
#### Michael G. NORRIS v. Brian KING.

No. 61924.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 5, 1978.

In re: Brian King, applying for certiora-ri, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Rapides.

Writ denied.

SANDERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., would grant.
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements of Unitil Corporation and subsidiaries on FormS-3 (File No. 333-152823 effective December 5, 2008), Form S-8 (File No. 333-114978 effective April 29, 2004), Form S-3 (File No. 333-42264 effective July 26, 2000) and on Form S-8 (File No. 333-42266 effectiveJuly 26, 2000) of our report dated February 13, 2009, relating to the consolidated financial statements of Unitil Corporation and subsidiaries (the Company) as of December 31, 2008 and 2007 and the three years endingDecember 31, 2008 and the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2008, appearing in the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008.

 

Vitale, Caturano & Company, P.C. 

 

Boston, Massachusetts 

February 17, 2009
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STEPHEN DANIEL LEMIEUX,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WHITE 

HOUSE,

Defendant.

Case No. 24-cv-1056 (JMC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On April 12, 2024, pro se Plaintiff Stephen Daniel Lemieux filed a civil complaint against 

Defendant United States of America White House. ECF 1. On April 16, 2024, this Court dismissed 

his complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). 

ECF 2; ECF 3. Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his complaint by May 16, 2024, and this Court 

warned Plaintiff that the action could be dismissed “if he d[id] not file an amended complaint 

within that timeframe.” ECF 2 at 2 (citing Brown v. WMATA, 164 F. Supp. 3d 33, 35 (D.D.C. 

2016)). Plaintiff’s deadline to file an amended complaint has come and gone, but Plaintiff has not 

filed an amended complaint, so the Court will now DISMISS this action and order that the case 

be terminated. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

SO ORDERED. 

 __________________________

JIA M. COBB

United States District Judge

Date: May 23, 2024
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 96-3363

___________

Jack E. McCoy, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Southern

v. * District of Iowa.

*

American Federation of Labor and * [Unpublished]

Congress of Industrial Organizations, *

and AFL-CIO Retirement Plan, *

Employer Identification Number *

52-6044583, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: May 21, 1997

Filed: July 23, 1997

___________

Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit

Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Jack E. McCoy asserted a number of causes of action against the defendant

union in his complaint, but appeals only from the trial court's order entering judgment

against him on his claim that the union discriminated against him on account of his age

in refusing to transfer him to another job, in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 and
-2-

Iowa Code Ann. §§ 216.1-216.20. The trial court, after a full bench trial, found that

Mr. McCoy had not made out a prima facie case because he had not proved that he was

qualified for the position to which he requested a transfer. See Clements v. General

Accident Ins. Co., 821 F.2d 489, 491 (8th Cir. 1987). After a review of the record, we

cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in reaching this factual conclusion. 

Mr. McCoy contends that we ought to review this record de novo, rather than

for clear error, because the trial judge who rendered judgment did not preside during

the first part of the trial and did not, therefore, have an opportunity to judge the

demeanor of the witnesses. We reject this contention. First of all, Mr. McCoy does

not direct our attention to any decided case that supports his novel argument, and we

know of none. Second, Mr. McCoy consented to the procedure that was employed in

this case. Most importantly, perhaps, the rule that Mr. McCoy urges us to adopt might

well undermine the utility of agreements between parties to a lawsuit allowing a trial

court to decide a case on the basis of a written record, including depositions and

affidavits, a result to which we would not like to contribute.

We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
tdnt_ex104.htm

EXHIBIT 10.4
  
  
 	 
	1
	

	 

  
  
 	 
	2
	

	 

  
  
 	 
	3
	

	 

  
  
 	 
	4
# C_2022064EN.01000703.xml

| 7.2.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 64/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.2.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 64/7

---

Appeal brought on 2 August 2021 by Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 2 June 2021 in Case T-855/19, Franz Schröder v EUIPO

(Case C-474/21 P)

(2022/C 64/11)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG (represented by: L. Pechan, N. Fangmann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, RDS Design ApS

By order of 8 December 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Franz Schröder GmbH & Co. KG should bear its own costs.

---
[No. 662-1.

Division One—Panel 2.

June 14, 1971.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Edward Everett Sovereign, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 51723, F. A. Walterskirchen, J., entered June 3, 1970. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
# C_2022284EN.01003402.xml

| 25.7.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 284/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.7.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 284/34

---

Order of the General Court of 6 May 2022 — documentus Deutschland v EUIPO — Reisswolf (REISSWOLF)

(Case T-374/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - Withdrawal of the application for a declaration of invalidity - No need to adjudicate)

(2022/C 284/45)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: documentus Deutschland GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: D. Weller, V. Wolf, A. Wulff and K. Schmidt-Hern, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: T. Klee and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Reisswolf Akten- und Datenvernichtung GmbH & Co. KG (Hamburg) (represented by: A. Ebert-Weidenfeller and H. Förster, lawyers)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 March 2021 (Case R 2354/2019-1), concerning invalidity proceedings between documentus Deutschland and Reisswolf Akten- und Datenvernichtung.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

| 2. | documentus Deutschland GmbH and Reisswolf Akten- und Datenvernichtung GmbH & Co. KG shall bear their own costs and shall each pay half of the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). |
| --- | --- |

2.

documentus Deutschland GmbH and Reisswolf Akten- und Datenvernichtung GmbH & Co. KG shall bear their own costs and shall each pay half of the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

---

(1)  OJ C 329, 16.8.2021

---
EXHIBIT 31.3



PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION



I, Louis DiNardo, certify that:



| | 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Exar Corporation;
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





Date: July 30 , 2015



|/s/    Louis DiNardo                 
|-------------------------------------
|Louis DiNardo                        
|President and Chief Executive Officer
|(Principal Executive Officer)
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Susan Byrne, Appellant.

[656 NYS2d 902]

Appeal by the defendant from an amended judgment of the County Court, Rock-land County (Nelson, J.), rendered January 16, 1996, revoking a sentence of probation previously imposed by the same court, upon a finding that she had violated a condition thereof, after a hearing, and imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon her previous conviction of driving while intoxicated.

Ordered that the amended judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was afforded meaningful representation of counsel *(see, People v Rivera,*71 NY2d 705, 708; *People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 146-147). Furthermore, the defendant’s sentence is neither unduly harsh nor excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Miller, J. P., Thompson, Joy and Luciano, JJ., concur.
# C_2021502EN.01003002.xml

| 13.12.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 502/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 502/30

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 20 October 2021 — Girardi v EUIPO

(Case T-497/21 R)

(Interim relief - EU trade mark - Professional representation - Application for suspension of operation of a measure - No urgency)

(2021/C 502/47)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Giovanna Paola Girardi (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: G. Macías Bonilla, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Söder and G. Predonzani, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU seeking suspension of operation, first, of the decision of EUIPO of 14 June 2021 concerning the applicant’s capacity to act as a representative before EUIPO and, secondly, of the part of EUIPO’s Guidelines for examination of European Union trade marks relating to professional representation by Spanish lawyers (Part A, Section 5, Annex 1).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The application for interim measures is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

| 2. | The costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The costs are reserved.

---
No. 10666.

#### The Dollar Savings & Trust Co. et al *v.*Hoffstot et al.

Decided January 26, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court of Mahoning county.

*Messrs. Hine, Kennedy & Robinson*and *Mr. D. J. Hartwell,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Mr. Horace F. Smith; Mr. W. W. Zimmerman; Mr. R. B. Murray*and *Mr. S. M. Thompson,*for defendants in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Spear, Davis and Price, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 214 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 214

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                         July 14, 1993.
    Resolved, That all points of order against consideration of the bill (H.R. 
2520) making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related 
agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1994, and for other purposes, 
are waived. During consideration of the bill, all points of order against the 
following provisions in the bill for failure to comply with clause 2 or 6 of 
rule XXI are waived: beginning on page 4, line 22, through page 5, line 13; 
beginning on page 14, line 1, through ``construction'' on line 11; beginning on 
page 54, line 1, through line 4; beginning on page 58, line 14, through line 22; 
beginning on page 78, line 8, through page 80, line 10; beginning on page 85, 
line 15, through page 86, line 15; beginning on page 86, line 20, through page 
87, line 3; and beginning on page 89, line 18, through line 21. Where points of 
order are waived against only part of a paragraph, a point of order against 
matter in the balance of the paragraph may be applied only within the balance of 
the paragraph and not against the entire paragraph.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Ruiz, Appellant.

[655 NYS2d 382]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lipp, J.), rendered April 21, 1995, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Ritter, Copertino and Krausman, JJ., concur.
#### Thomas William CARROLL et al., Petitioners, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 41195.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 28, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 13, 1971.

Vera Winter Lee, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioners.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A. S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Withdrawal of court-appointed counsel after the filing of a brief under Anders v. California is within the sound discretion of the appellate court. State v. Wooden, 246 So.2d 755 (Fla.1971); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., concur.