alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6478

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TIMOTHY JAMES THORNE,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, 

at Parkersburg. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., District Judge. (6:13-cr-00148-1; 2:15-cv16027)

Submitted: October 18, 2018 Decided: October 23, 2018

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KEENAN, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Timothy James Thorne, Appellant Pro Se. Joshua Clarke Hanks, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Timothy James Thorne seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

(2012) motion. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2012). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied 

and advised Thorne that the failure to file timely objections to this recommendation 

might waive appellate review of a district court order based on the recommendation. 

Despite this warning, and two extensions to address the delinquency, Thorne failed to file 

objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is 

necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of the recommendation when the 

parties have been warned that failure to object will waive appellate review. Wright v. 

Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985). Thorne has waived appellate review by failing to timely file specific objections 

after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and 

dismiss the appeal.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 11.1



UNITIL CORPORATION



COMPUTATION IN SUPPORT OF EARNINGS PER SHARE



|                                                      |  |                         |       |      |   |       |  |   |      
|----------------------------------------------------- |  | ----------------------- | ----- | ---- | - | ----- |  | - | -----
|                                                      |  | Year Ended December 31,
|                                                      |  | 2008                    |       | 2007 |   | 2006 
|EARNINGS PER SHARE (000s, except per share data)     |  |                         |       |      |   |       |  |   |      
|                                                      |  |                         |      
|Net Income                                            |  | $                       | 9,735 |      | $ | 8,746 |  | $ | 8,033
|                                                      |  |                         |      
|Less: Dividend Requirements on Preferred Stock        |  |                         | 135   |      |   | 136   |  |   | 133  
|                                                      |  |                         |      
|                                                      |  |                         |       |      |   |       |  |   |      
|                                                      |  |                         |      
|Net Income Applicable to Common Stock                 |  | $                       | 9,600 |      | $ | 8,610 |  | $ | 7,900
|                                                      |  |                         |      
|                                                      |  |                         |       |      |   |       |  |   |      
|                                                      |  |                         |      
|Average Number of Common Shares OutstandingBasic     |  |                         | 5,830 |      |   | 5,659 |  |   | 5,597
|                                                      |  |                         |      
|Dilutive Effect of Stock Options and Restricted Stock |  |                         |      |      |   | 13    |  |   | 15   
|                                                      |  |                         |      
|Average Number of Common Shares OutstandingDiluted   |  |                         | 5,830 |      |   | 5,672 |  |   | 5,612
|                                                      |  |                         |      
|Earnings Per ShareBasic                              |  | $                       | 1.65  |      | $ | 1.52  |  | $ | 1.41 
|                                                      |  |                         |      
|Earnings Per ShareDiluted                            |  | $                       | 1.65  |      | $ | 1.52  |  | $ | 1.41
#### William CROTTS, Petitioner, v. MONTGOMERY WARD & COMPANY and the Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.

No. 36787.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 13, 1968.

Hamilton & James and John R. Young, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Harry A. Johnston, II, of Johnston, Lilienthal & Johnston, West Palm Beach, Patrick H. Mears, Tallahassee, and J. Franklin Garner, Lakelánd, for respondents.

DREW, Justice.

Petitioner in this case was awarded permanent total disability compensation for a back injury based on findings (1) that his pre-existing Parkinson’s disease was not accelerated or aggravated by the injury, and (2) that the back disability which on the basis of his education and experience makes him unemployable “is solely caused by the industrial injuries.”

The Commission has reversed and remanded for apportionment of disability from disease to the extent it had progressed at the time of the award, on authority of Evans v. Florida Industrial Commission, Fla. 1967, 196 So.2d 748. That decision, however, does not alter the provision of the statute, F.S. Sec. 440.02(19), F.S.A., limiting apportionment thereunder to the situation “where a pre-existing disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by accident * *

The record evidence in this case clearly sustains the finding that claimant’s preexisting disease was not accelerated or aggravated by his accidental injury, and that the back disability which makes him unemployable is caused by the industrial injury and not by the disease. This conclusion in the present case is not, in our opinion, affected by evidence that claimant’s diseased condition prevents rehabilitation and corrective surgery. The statute does not provide for apportionment when a com-pensable injury is aggravated by disease, but attempts only to define the measure of apportionment when a compensable disability is attributable in part to aggravation or acceleration of pre-existing disease. The Evans decision in no way impinges that statutory condition by holding that when pre-existing disease is in fact aggravated by accident so that the resulting loss of earning capacity is attributable to or caused in part by the disease, then that apportiona-ble part shall be measured by and limited to disability caused by disease independent of aggravation and existing at the time of the accident or through normal progress *98“at the time permanent disability is determined and an award is made.”

The order of the Commission is therefore quashed and the cause remanded with directions for reinstatement of the award.

CALDWELL, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
259 La. 885

#### George BELL et al. v. The AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY et al.

No. 51769.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 18, 1971.

In re: George Bell and Jeanetta S. Bell applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 251 So.2d 521.

Application denied; on facts found by court of appeal, there is no error of law.
-  Blood and Tissue Safety and Availability      -  About 
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# Donación de sangre y plasma

Cada dos segundos, una persona en los Estados Unidos necesita sangre o productos derivados de la sangre para ayudar a pacientes con cáncer, víctimas de accidentes y quemaduras, receptores de trasplantes y personas que sufren de afecciones raras y crónicas. El plasma, una parte de nuestra sangre que está hecha de agua, sales y proteínas, se usa para el tratamiento de muchas condiciones de salud graves, incluidas las terapias para enfermedades crónicas, trastornos hemorrágicos y otras afecciones, como tratamientos para el COVID-19.

A diferencia de otros tratamientos médicos, los productos derivados de la sangre no se pueden hacer en un laboratorio. Estos productos solo se pueden hacer cuando donantes generosos, como usted y otros familiares, dan sangre o plasma. Cuando dona sangre o dona plasma, usted juega un papel vital en el apoyo al sistema de atención médica y garantiza que todos los pacientes reciban los tratamientos que necesitan.

La sangre y el plasma se donan por medio de diferentes procesos y en diferentes lugares.

## Datos breves sobre la sangre y el plasma

## Recursos útiles

**Aprenda cómo puede donar sangre y plasma:**
                          - Cómo donar sangre
                          - Cómo donar plasma

Content last reviewed March 10, 2022
#### Leotha McGILL, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 47391.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 29, 1973.

Karl W. Kepper, Hattiesburg, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by- Karen Gilfoy, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

ROBERTSON, Justice:

Leotha McGill, Jr., was indicted and tried in the Circuit Court of Lamar Coun*404ty for the murder of S. T. Williams. He was found guilty of manslaughter, and the court sentenced him to IS years in the State Penitentiary.

We have carefully reviewed the record, and the briefs of counsel, and are of the opinion that the verdict of the jury is fully supported by the record.

From the evidence adduced, the jury could have justifiably found that, after the initial encounter, McGill pursued Williams into Williams’ home and shot him two times in the back, one of which was a fatal shot as it entered and exited from Williams’ heart, and Williams would have lived at most 10 minutes after the firing of the fatal shot.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

RODGERS, P. J., and PATTERSON, INZER and SMITH, JJ., concur.
# C_2022213EN.01003902.xml

| 30.5.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 213/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.5.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/39

---

Order of the General Court of 24 March 2022 — Di Taranto v EPPO

(Case T-368/21) (1)

(Action for annulment - Law governing the institutions - Enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office - Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 - Appointment of the European Delegated Prosecutors of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office - Derived unlawfulness - Candidates nominated by the Italian Republic - Nomination disputed before the national court - Inadmissability)

(2022/C 213/54)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Alessandro Di Taranto (Rome, Italy) (represented by: G. Pellegrino, lawyer)

Defendant: European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) (represented by: L. De Matteis and T. Gut, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Decision No 34/2021 of the College of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office of 3 May 2021 on the appointment of fifteen European Delegated Prosecutors of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in the Italian Republic.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

| 2. | Mr Alessandro Di Taranto shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mr Alessandro Di Taranto shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 368, 13.9.2021.

---
#### In the Matter of Rockbottom Stores, Inc., Appellant, v Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Clarkstown, Respondent.

[655 NYS2d 1001]

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Clarkstown, dated December 23, 1994, which, after a hearing, denied the petitioner’s application for a sign permit, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Rudolph, J.), dated September 7, 1995, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

To annul an administrative determination made after a hearing, a court must conclude that the determination is not supported by substantial evidence on the record when read as a whole *(see, Matter of Lahey v Kelly,*71 NY2d 135; *Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.,*34 NY2d 222, 231; *Matter of Lawrence v Weinstein,*181 AD2d 888; *Matter of County of Suffolk v Newman,*173 AD2d 618). A determination is supported by substantial evidence when the record contains evidence consisting of " 'such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion of ultimate fact’ ” *(People ex rel. Vega v Smith,*66 NY2d 130, 139, quoting *300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights,*45 NY2d 176, 180). Here, the determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals to deny the petitioner’s application for a sign permit because the proposed sign was dissimilar in color to other signs in the immediate area of the shopping center was based upon substantial evidence *(see, Matter of Party City v Board of Appeals,*212 AD2d 618).

Moreover, the interpretation of and reliance upon Town of Clarkstown Local Law No. 7-1991 and Clarkstown Town Code § 290-31-B (1) by the Zoning Board of Appeals were neither arbitrary, capricious, nor contrary to law.

*612The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Pizzuto, J. P., Altman, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.
# C_2022359EN.01007301.xml

| 19.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 359/73 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 359/73

---

Order of the General Court of 15 July 2022 — El Corte Inglés v EUIPO — Brito & Pereira (TINTAS BRICOR)

(Case T-317/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Revocation of the contested decision - Action which has become devoid of purpose - No need to adjudicate)

(2022/C 359/90)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: El Corte Inglés, SA (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: J. Rivas Zurdo, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carillo, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Brito & Pereira (Vizela, Portugal)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 26 March 2021 (Case R 882/2020-1).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

| 2. | The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by El Corte Inglés, SA. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by El Corte Inglés, SA.

---

(1)  OJ C 289, 19.7.2021.

---
ex_235361.htm


Exhibit 10.1


 


FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 


 


GENASYS INC. 


 


AMENDED AND RESTATED 2015 EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN


 


This First Amendment (this “Amendment”) to the Genasys Inc. Amended and Restated 2015 Equity Incentive Plan (the “Plan”) is made and adopted by Genasys Inc. (the “Company”), a corporation organized under the laws of State of Delaware. Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Plan.


 


	 	
			1.

				
			Section 3(a) of the Plan is hereby amended to read as follows:

			



 


“(a) Subject to Paragraph 15, the number of Shares which may be issued from time to time pursuant to this Plan shall be 10,000,000 shares of Common Stock.”


 


	 	
			2.

				
			This Amendment is effective as of December 8, 2020.

			



 


	 	
			3.

				
			This Amendment shall be and is hereby incorporated in and forms a part of the Plan. All other terms and provisions of the Plan shall remain unchanged except as specifically modified herein. The Plan, as amended by this Amendment, is hereby ratified and confirmed.

			



 


* * * * * * * *


 


I hereby certify that the foregoing Amendment was duly adopted by the Board of Directors of the Company on December 8, 2020.


 


	 	
			GENASYS INC.

			
	 	 	 
	 	
			By:

				 	
			/s/ Richard S. Danforth

			
	 	 	 	 
	 	
			Name:

				 	
			Richard S. Danforth

			
	 	 	 	 
	 	
			Its:

				 	
			Chief Executive Officer
#### MONDE INVESTMENTS, INC., Appellant, v. John A. DEPOLE, Appellee.

No. 73-538.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 13, 1973.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; J. Cail Lee, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
<PAGE>   1
                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS



     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements
of PictureTel Corporation on Form S-8 (File Nos. 33-7477, 33-19024, 33-31161,
33-36315, 33-44719, 33-49814, 33-66502, 33-69292, 33-81848, 33-99272, 333-10163,
333-31917) of our reports dated February 25, 1998, on our audits of the
consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of PictureTel
Corporation as of December 31, 1997 and 1996 and for each of the three years in
the period ended December 31, 1997, which reports are included in this Annual
Report on Form 10-K.




                                             COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.

Boston, Massachusetts
March 30, 1998
#### Terry R. LAWSON v. William J. LAWSON.

No. 50030.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 14, 1977.

Patricia C. Champagne, Gulfport, for appellant.

Ladner & Emil, Osear B. Ladner, Gulf-port, for appellee.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Harrison County; John S. Morris, Chancellor.

Before PATTERSON, C. J., and SUGG and WALKER, JJ.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

INZER, and SMITH, P. JJ., ROBERTSON, BROOM, LEE and BOWLING, JJ.
#### UNITED RENT ALL, INC., a Nebraska corporation, Appellant, v. STEPHENSON’S RENTAL MART, INC., a Florida corporation, et al., Appellees.

No. 73-6.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 12, 1973.

Appeal dismissed.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-19-00305-CV

Vanessa Zuniga

v.

Mark Anthony Zuniga

On appeal from the

94th District Court of Nueces County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 2014-FAM-2105-C

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal 

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion. No costs of the appeal are taxed against 

appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

July 18, 2019
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________ 

Case No. 5D23-1099 

LT Case No. 2019-CF-004956-A 

_____________________________ 

JAVON L. MAXWELL, 

Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

_____________________________ 

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County. 

Robert W. Hodges, Judge. 

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Steven N. Gosney, 

Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. 

Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for 

Appellee. 

February 13, 2024

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. 

EDWARDS, C.J., HARRIS, and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur. 
2

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
# C_2021320EN.01003802.xml

| 9.8.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 320/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.8.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 320/38

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 22 June 2021 — Polynt v ECHA

(Case T-207/21 R)

(Application for interim measures - REACH - Hexahydro-4-methylphthalic anhydride substance - Obligation to register - Evaluation of dossiers - Examination of testing proposals - Obligation to provide certain information requiring animal testing - Application for interim measures - No urgency)

(2021/C 320/44)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Polynt SpA (Scanzorosciate, Italy) (represented by: C. Mereu, P. Sellar and S. Abdel-Qader, lawyers)

Defendant: European Chemicals Agency (represented by: M. Heikkilä, W. Broere and N. Knight, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU for the suspension of the operation of Decision A 015 2019 of the Board of Appeal of ECHA of 9 February 2021, which requests the applicant to carry out an Extended One-Generation Reproductive Toxicity Study (EOGRTS) of the substance hexahydro-4-methylphthalic anhydride or for the grant of any other interim measures deemed appropriate.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The application for interim measures is dismissed; |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed;

| 2. | The costs shall be reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The costs shall be reserved.

---