alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
H. Res. 422

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

May 17, 1994.

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule

XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the

Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of

the bill (H.R. 518) to designate certain lands in the California Desert as wilderness, to establish the Death Valley and

Joshua Tree National Parks and the Mojave National Monument, and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill

shall be dispensed with. General debate shall be confined to

the bill and the amendments made in order by this resolution

and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled

by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Natural Resources. After general debate the bill

shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute

rule. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for

the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the

amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the

Committee on Natural Resources now printed in the bill. The
2

committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be

considered by title rather than by section. Each title of the

committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be

considered as read. Points of order against the committee

amendment in the nature of a substitute for failure to comply

with clause 5(a) of rule XXI are waived. No amendment to

the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall

be in order unless printed in the portion of the Congressional

Record designated for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII

before the beginning of consideration of the bill. The amendment caused to be printed in the Record by Representative

LaRocco of Idaho (relating to an East Mojave Preserve) may

amend portions of the bill not yet read for amendment. At

the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the

Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with

such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member

may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment

adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the

committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and

amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions. After passage of H.R. 518, it shall be in order to

take from the Speaker’s table the bill S. 21 and to consider

the Senate bill in the House. All points of order against the
3

Senate bill and against its consideration are waived. It shall

be in order to move to strike all after the enacting clause of

the Senate bill and to insert in lieu thereof the provisions of

H.R. 518 as passed by the House. All points of order against

that motion are waived. If the motion is adopted and the

Senate bill, as amended, is passed, then it shall be in order

to move that the House insist on its amendments to S. 21

and request a conference with the Senate thereon.

Attest:

Clerk.
#### Robert E. HALE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 40239.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 19, 1970.

Certiorari denied.

ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, DREW, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
# C_2022037EN.01000502.xml

| 24.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 37/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 37/5

---

Appeal brought on 18 June 2021 by Hasbro Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 21 April 2021 in Case T-663/19, Hasbro v EUIPO

(Case C-373/21 P)

(2022/C 37/06)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Hasbro Inc. (represented by: J. Moss, Barrister)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 1 December 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Hasbro Inc. should bear its own costs.

---
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-41516

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ARTEMIO ANDRADE-REAL

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:06-CR-776-ALL

Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Artemio Andrade-Real (Andrade) appeals his conviction and sentence

following his guilty plea to illegal reentry into this country following deportation,

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Andrade asserts that his 41-month guidelines

sentence violates United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and is

unreasonable. Andrade argues that this court’s post-Booker sentencing

jurisprudence effectively reinstates the mandatory nature of the Guidelines by

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 24, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-41516

2

bestowing a presumption of reasonableness on sentences that fall within the

advisory sentencing guideline range.

The 41-month term of imprisonmentimposed in Andrade’s case fell within

his properly-calculated guidelines range and is entitled to a presumption of

reasonableness. See United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006).

Andrade correctly concedes that his argument that the presumption of

reasonableness used by this court returns the Guidelines to their formerly

unconstitutional, mandatory status is foreclosed. See Rita v. United States, 127

S. Ct. 2456, 2462-68 (2007). Because the district court exercised its discretion

to impose a sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range,the sentence

is presumptively reasonable, and we may infer thatthe district court considered

all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines. See Rita, 127 S. Ct.

at 2462-70; United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006); United

States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2005).

Andrade has not rebutted the presumption that his sentence is

unreasonable. Nothing in the record indicates that the district court failed to

afford appropriate weight to relevant factors, considered any irrelevant factors,

or balanced the factors unreasonably. See United States v. Nikonova, 480 F.3d

371, 376 (5th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (May 21, 2007) (No. 06-11834).

In light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Andrade

challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and

aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the

offense that must be found by a jury. This court has held that this issue is “fully

foreclosed from further debate.” United States v. Pineda-Arrellano, 492 F.3d

624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (Aug. 28, 2007) (No. 07-6202).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### Billy FORD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-488.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 2, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION

SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION OF OUR CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



I, Perry Law, certify that:



1.    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Smart-tek Solutions, Inc.;



2.    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of material fact or omit to

state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which

such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this

report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash

flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.    The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining

disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the

registrant and have:



(a)

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and

procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to

the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those

entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b)

Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in

this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as

of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c)   Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that

occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth quarter in the case

of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,

the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and



5.    The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of

internal control over financial reporting to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the

registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a)

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control

over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability

to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b)

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a

significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.



/s/ Perry Law

------------------------------

Perry Law

Chief Financial Officer



November 12, 2007
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PEDRO JESUS-GONZALEZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 09-72977

Agency No. A070-925-672

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 8, 2011** 

Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Pedro Jesus-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for

FILED

MAR 24 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-72977

withholding of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We

dismiss the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s determination that Jesus-Gonzalez is

ineligible for withholding of removal under the “persecutor’s bar” of 8 U.S.C. §

1231(b)(3)(B)(i) because Jesus-Gonzalez failed to exhaust this issue before the

BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.
J

- S24017

- 17

NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. CHRISTOPHER DICKINSON Appellant No. 959 WDA 2016 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 29 , 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at Nos: CP

- 02

- CR

- 0008066

- 2015, CP

- 02

- CR

- 0010547

- 2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E. * JUDGMENT ORDER BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 8, 2017 Appellant, Christopher Dickinson, appeals from the February 29, 2016 judgment of sentence imposing an aggregate 36 to 72 months of incarceration followed by three years of probation. We vacate and remand for a new sentencing hearing. On December 14, 201 5, Appellant pled guilty to two counts of robbery and one count each of simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, resisting arrest, and flight to avoid apprehension. 1 At the February 29, 2016 sentencing hearing, the trial court neglected to d etermine whether

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701, 2701, 2705, 5104, and 5126, respectively.J

- S24017

- 17

- 2

-

Appellant was eligible for a Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive (“RRRI”) sentence. Statutory law requires the trial court to make that determination. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756(b.1); 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4505(a). “[W]here the trial court fails to m ake a statutorily required determination regarding a defendant’s eligibility for an RRRI minimum sentence as required, the sentence is illegal.” Commonwealth v. Robinson , 7 A.3d 868, 870 (Pa. Super. 2014). The Commonwealth concedes this point. 2 Commonwe alth’s Brief at 6. We therefore vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 6/8/2017

____________________________________________ 2 The trial court did not address this issue because Appellant raises it for the first time on appeal. We will not deem the is sue waived, because it implicates the legality of Appellant’s sentence. Commonwealth v. Tobin , 89 A.3d 663, 669

- 70 (Pa. Super. 2014).
#### Elwood McGUIRE v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

No. 5698.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Dec. 7, 1936.

Robert A. Littleton, of Washington, D. C, for petitioner.

Frank J. Wideman, of Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Before SPARKS, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to stipulation of counsel filed December 9, 1935, and order of this court entered on the same date, providing that proceedings in this cause be stayed until the final determination of cause No. 5699, Charles A. McGuire v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 84 F.(2d) 431, and after such final determination that either party may apply for a judgment in this cause corresponding to the judgment entered in said cause; and on motion of counsel for respondent, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that the decision entered in this cause on August 6, 1935, by the United States Board of Tax Appeals be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1094 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1094

 To amend section 1710 of title 38, United States Code, to extend the 
period of eligibility of certain veterans for medical care for exposure 
                    to dioxin or ionizing radiation.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 10, 1993

 Mr. Daschle (for himself, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Campbell, Mr. DeConcini, and 
  Mr. Kerrey) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend section 1710 of title 38, United States Code, to extend the 
period of eligibility of certain veterans for medical care for exposure 
                    to dioxin or ionizing radiation.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF PERIOD OF ELIGIBILITY FOR CARE.

    Section 1710(e)(3) of title 38, United States Code, is amended by 
striking out ``December 31, 1993'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
``December 31, 2003''.

                                 <all>
```
# C_2022119EN.01002601.xml

| 14.3.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 119/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.3.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 119/26

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 27 December 2021 — Beverage City & Lifestyle GmbH and Others v Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc.

(Case C-832/21)

(2022/C 119/34)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendants and appellants: Beverage City & Lifestyle GmbH, MJ, Beverage City Polska Sp.z.o.o., FE

Applicant and respondent: Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc.

Question referred

The Higher Regional Court, Düsseldorf, refers the following question to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Article 122 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (1) in conjunction with Article 8(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012. (2)

Are claims ‘so closely connected’ that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to prevent irreconcilable judgments, within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, where, in infringement proceedings for infringement of an EU trade mark, the connection consists in the fact that the defendant domiciled in a Member State (here, Poland) supplied the goods which infringe an EU trade mark to a defendant domiciled in another Member State (here, Germany) whose legal representative, against whom infringement proceedings have also been brought, is the anchor defendant, if the parties are connected to each other only through the mere supply relationship beyond which there is no legal or factual connection?

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

(2)  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).

---
COURT OF APPEALS

S E C O N D D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

CHIEF JUSTICE

 TERRIE LIVINGSTON

JUSTICES

 LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

 ANNE GARDNER

 SUE WALKER

 BILL MEIER

 LEE GABRIEL

 BONNIE SUDDERTH

TIM CURRY CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER

401 W. BELKNAP, SUITE 9000

FORT WORTH, TEXAS 76196-0211

TEL: (817) 884-1900

FAX: (817) 884-1932

www.txcourts.gov/2ndcoa

CLERK 

 DEBRA SPISAK

CHIEF STAFF ATTORNEY

 LISA M. WEST

GENERAL COUNSEL

 CLARISSA HODGES

May 12, 2016

Hon. David L. Evans

Regional Presiding Judge

Tom Vandergriff Civil Courts Bldg.

100 N. Calhoun St., 2nd Floor

Fort Worth, TX 76196

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Civil District Clerk, Denton County

P.O. Box 2146

Denton, TX 76202-2146

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Cheryl D. Smith

6001 Bridge Street, Suite 102

6001 Bridge Street, Suite 102

Fort Worth, TX 76112

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Hon. Tiffany Haertling

Judge, 442nd District Court

Denton County Courts Bldg.

1450 E. McKinney St., 2nd Floor

Denton, TX 76209-4524

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Paul F. Wieneskie

Bailey & Galyen

1300 Summit Ave., Ste. 650

Fort Worth, TX 76102

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 02-15-00249-CV

Trial Court Case Number: 14-01284-158

Style: Christopher Hoskins

v.

Ricco Family Partners, Ltd.

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 02-15-00253-CV

Trial Court Case Number: 14-01284-158

Style: Dennis Eckel

v.

Ricco Family Partners, Ltd.

FILE COPY
02-15-00249-CV

May 12, 2016

Page 2

Today the Second Court of Appeals issued an opinion and judgment in the

above-referenced causes. 

Copies of the opinion and judgment are attached and can also be viewed on our

Court’s webpage at: http://www.txcourts.gov/2ndcoa.

Respectfully yours,

DEBRA SPISAK, CLERK

FILE COPY
# C_2021242EN.01004801.xml

| 21.6.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.6.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/48

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 13 April 2021 — PJ v EIT

(Case T-12/21 R)

(Application for interim relief - Civil service - Measures for the organisation of work during the health crisis - Prohibition of teleworking outside the country of employment - Application for an exemption - Refusal decision - Application for suspension of operation of a measure - Application for interim measures - Urgency - Prima facie case - Balancing of interests)

(2021/C 242/68)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: PJ (represented by: N. de Montigny, lawyer)

Defendant: European Institute of Innovation and Technology (represented by: P. Juanes Burgos, acting as Agent, and by A. Duron, lawyer)

Re:

APPLICATION under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU for (i) the suspension of operation of the decision of the EIT of 17 December 2020 to refuse the applicant’s request to telework from her place of origin and (ii) an order that EIT should authorise her to telework from her place of origin until restrictions relating to the health crisis imposed by the German and Hungarian national authorities are lifted.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The operation of the decision of the Director of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) of 17 December 2020, refusing PJ’s request to telework from her place of origin, is suspended. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The operation of the decision of the Director of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) of 17 December 2020, refusing PJ’s request to telework from her place of origin, is suspended.

| 2. | The EIT shall authorise PJ to telework from the place of residence of her children subject to this being justified by the circumstances relating to the COVID-19 pandemic and without prejudice to the requirement that PJ travel to her place of employment on an ad hoc basis for reasons relating to the interests of the service. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The EIT shall authorise PJ to telework from the place of residence of her children subject to this being justified by the circumstances relating to the COVID-19 pandemic and without prejudice to the requirement that PJ travel to her place of employment on an ad hoc basis for reasons relating to the interests of the service.

| 3. | The costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The costs are reserved.

---
#### Columbus PAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-767.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 6, 1972.

Walter N. Colbath, Jr., Public Defender, and Jeffrey H. Barker, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

*236Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Rodney Durrance, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

On the basis of the briefs and the record, we hold that appellant has not made error appear. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed.

Affirmed.

REED, C. J., and WALDEN and OWEN, JJ., concur.