FIFTH DIVISION	

                                               September 27, 2002

No. 1-01-3409						

Village OF RIVERDALE, a Municipal          ) Appeal from the 

Corporation,                               ) Circuit Court of  

                                           ) Cook County 

		Plaintiff-Appellee,              )

                                           )

	v.                                    )

                                           )

ALLIED WASTE TRANSPORTATION INC.,          ) 

a Delaware Corporation; and SUBURBAN       ) 

WAREHOUSE, INC., an Illinois Corporation,  )

and FRANK M. WARD, SR., as Trustee of the  )

Frank M. Ward Sr., Revocable Trust,        ) Honorable 

                                           ) Stephen A. Schiller

		Defendants-Appellants.           ) Judge Presiding  

	JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:

	Plaintiff, the Village of Riverdale, filed a complaint for

injunctive relief against defendants, Allied Waste

Transportation, Inc., Suburban Warehouse, Inc., and Frank M.

Ward, Sr., seeking to enjoin defendants from continuing to

operate their waste disposal, storage and recycling facility. The

complaint alleged defendants were operating the facility without

obtaining the requisite permits and license pursuant to

applicable statutes and ordinances. A temporary restraining order

was entered on January 26, 2001.  Following an evidentiary

hearing, a preliminary injunction was entered on August 27, 2001. 

Defendants now appeal that order.

	On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court improperly 

granted a preliminary injunction where plaintiff has an adequate

remedy at law.  

	For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.  BACKGROUND

	Defendants, Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., Suburban

Warehouse, Inc., and Frank M. Ward, Sr. are the lessors/operates

of a waste disposal, storage and recycling facility at 13050

South State Street, Riverdale, Illinois.  Defendants' activities

at the facility included the acceptance, separation, shredding,

storage and processing of large quantities of wood, paper, metal,

demolition and general debris.

	On January 26, 2001, plaintiff, the Village of Riverdale

(Village), filed a complaint for injunctive relief and abatement

of nuisance, along with an emergency motion for a temporary

restraining order.  The Village alleged that defendants have

engaged in the above-mentioned activities since at least October

1998.  The complaint alleged that two fires, one on August 25,

2000, and one on October 21, 2000, commenced on defendants'

property in piles of waste.  Defendants agreed to cease the

receipt of waste and all operations at the facility on October

23, 2000.  However, on January 22, 2001, defendants advised

plaintiff by letter that they intended to begin accepting loads

of "wood waste and other recyclable materials for processing and storage."  

	The Village's complaint alleged that defendants had not

obtained a permit from the Illinois Environmental Protection

Agency to operate a waste disposal and storage facility on the

property as required by statute.  Defendants also allegedly

failed to obtain local siting approval from the Village for

operating a pollution control facility or a conditional use

permit for operating a wood recycling, solid waste disposal or

solid waste storage operation as required by statute.  Both the

complaint and the emergency motion alleged that defendants'

operations represent a continuing fire hazard.  The Village's

brief on appeal alleged that the wood A-frame structure on

defendants' property contains no sprinkler or fire suppression

system. 

	The trial court granted the Village's motion for a temporary

restraining order on January 26, 2001.  On July 24, 2001, a

hearing was held on the Village's motion seeking a preliminary

injunction.  James Stock, director of building and zoning in the

Village, testified that in early 2000 he toured defendants'

property.  Stock testified that defendants' activities on the

property constituted the operation of a recycling and waste

transfer facility.  These activities are considered conditional

uses under the Village's zoning code.  Stock also testified as to

the conditions on the property, including piles of separated and

mixed materials, fuel containers not protected, questionable electric wiring and dilapidated buildings.  Stock also testified

that fires occurred on defendants' property in July 2000, in

August 2000 and on October 21, 2000.

	Tyrone Jarrett, fire chief for the Village, testified to the

general safety and public health concerns present on defendants'

property. Jarret testified that upon viewing defendants' property

he had a major concern with the capabilities to suppress fires in

the area because the entrances and exits to the area are limited

and the water resources are limited.  Jarret testified that the

October 21, 2000, fire on defendants' property lasted between

four and six days.

	Rudolph Rinas, assistant fire chief for the Village, also

testified that the limited water, the limited means of egress,

the tremendous exposures to the A-frame building, the propane

tanks, the aboveground storage tanks, the large wood chip pile

and the past fires all represented serious fire safety concerns. 

Jeffrey Diver, special environmental counsel to the Village, also

testified to the fire hazards and general health and safety

issues present on defendants' property.

	Zenovia Evans, mayor of the Village, testified that the

Village had not issued defendants a business license for the year

2001 because defendants were not in compliance with the Village

code, safety requirements, or statutory requirements for the

State of Illinois.  Evans testified that if a business tried to

operate without a business license, police and building inspectors would be sent to shut it down and tag the building.  

	Paul Howe, district manager of Allied Waste, testified that

following the October fire, defendants "agreed to certain

restrictions on inbound material and how we would conduct our

business activities during the cleanup of the fire that occurred

in October."  Howe testified that he memorialized this agreement

to voluntarily cut back operations in a letter to the Village's

attorney.  Howe also testified that defendants were not issued a

business license for the year 2001.

	Following the hearing, on August 27, 2001, the trial judge

ordered that the temporary restraining order continue as a

preliminary injunction.  Specifically, the court held:

	"I think that a preliminary injunction is appropriate. 

I think a preliminary injunction couched in the terms

'until such time as the court is satisfied that the

activity enjoined has been licensed and/or the

respondent Allied, Suburban, in whatever persona they

intend to proceed, exhausts its remedy in challenging

the licensing decision made by the Village of

Riverdale.'"

Defendants now appeal that order.       

II.  ANALYSIS

	Defendants argue that the trial court erred in granting a

preliminary injunction in this case.  The bulk of defendants' argument is centered upon the allegation that the injunction was

improper where the Village had an adequate remedy at law. 

Namely, defendants maintain that because they were not granted a

business license for the year 2001, they were unable to operate

their facility and an injunction was unnecessary. 

	A reviewing court will reverse a trial court's order

granting a preliminary injunction only when it constitutes an

abuse of discretion.  Franz v. Calaco Development Corp., 322 Ill. App. 3d 941, 946 (2001).  As a general rule, a preliminary

injunction will only be granted where the plaintiff shows it: (1)

has a clearly ascertainable right that needs protection; (2) will

suffer irreparable harm without the protection; (3) has no

adequate remedy at law; and (4) is likely to succeed on the

merits.  Prairie Eye Center, Ltd. v. Butler, 305 Ill. App. 3d 442, 445 (1999).  Where, however, an injunction is sought by a

public official or body pursuant to express authorization of a

statute, the requirements of the statute control rather than

those traditional matters to which we have referred.  People ex rel. Hartigan v. Stianos, 131 Ill. App. 3d 575, 580 (1985); People ex rel. Edgar v. Miller, 110 Ill. App. 3d 264, 269 (1982); People ex rel. Carpentier v. Goers, 20 Ill. 2d 272, 276 (1960); People v. Keeven, 68 Ill. App. 3d 91, 96-97 (1979); City of Highland Park v. County of Cook, 37 Ill. App. 3d 15, 20 (1975).  

	When seeking injunctive relief that is expressly provided

for by statute, a plaintiff is not required to plead or prove irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law.  City of Chicago v. Piotrowski, 215 Ill. App. 3d 829, 834-35 (1991).  The State or agency need only show that the statute was violated and

that the statute relied upon specifically allows injunctive

relief.  Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104 Ill. 2d 105, 110-12 (1984).  The principle underlying the willingness of the courts

to issue statutory injunctions to public bodies to restrain

violations of a statute is that harm to the public at large can

be presumed from the statutory violation alone. People v. Keeven, 68 Ill. App. 3d 91, 96.

	Section 11-13-15 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS

5/11-13-15 (West 2000)) provides:

		"In case any building or structure, including

fixtures, is constructed, reconstructed, altered,

repaired, converted, or maintained, or any building,

including fixtures, or land, is used in violation of an

ordinance or ordinances adopted under Division 13, 31

or 31.1 of the Illinois Municipal Code, or of any

ordinance or other regulation made under the authority

conferred thereby, the proper local authorities of the

municipality *** may institute any appropriate action

or proceeding (1) to prevent the unlawful construction,

reconstruction, alteration, repair, conversion,

maintenance, or use, (2) to prevent the occupancy of

the building, structure, or land, (3) to prevent any illegal act, conduct, business, or use in or about the

premises, or (4) to restrain, correct, or abate the

violation.*** 

		In any action or proceeding for a purpose

mentioned in this section, the court with jurisdiction

of such action or proceeding has the power and in its

discretion may issue a restraining order, or a

preliminary injunction, as well as a permanent

injunction, upon such terms and under such conditions

as will do justice and enforce the purposes set forth

above."  65 ILCS 5/11-13-15 (West 2000).

The Village sought to enjoin defendants from the operation of

their facility pursuant to the statutory authorization in section

11-13-15 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-15 (West

2000)). The Village need only show that the statute was violated

and that the statute relied upon specifically allows injunctive

relief. Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104 Ill. 2d at 110-12. 

	In the present case, the record clearly established that

defendants' activities on the property in question constituted

the operation of a wood recycling, waste storage, or waste

disposal facility.  James Stock testified that defendants'

activities on the property constituted the operation of a

recycling and waste transfer facility.  These activities are

considered conditional uses under the Village's zoning code. 

Defendants never obtained a conditional use permit for such activity.  Zenovia Evans, the mayor of the Village of Riverdale,

testified that defendants were not issued a business license for

the year 2001 because defendants were not in compliance with

Village codes, fire safety regulations and safety regulations. 

Evans testified that defendants cannot operate their facility

without a business license.

	Defendants' reliance on Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104 Ill. 2d 105, is unavailing. In Sadat, the sole question presented was whether a complaint for a mandatory injunction that does not

allege the traditional prerequisites for equitable relief may

nevertheless state a cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss

Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Act) (15

U.S.C. §2301 et seq. (1976)).  Section 110(d)(1) provides:

	"[A] consumer who is damaged by the failure of a

supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply

with any obligation under this chapter title, or under

a written warranty, implied warranty, or service

contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal

and equitable relief[.]"  15 U.S.C. §2310(d)(1) (1976).

Plaintiff argued that the Act's reference to "equitable relief"

authorizes the court to grant a mandatory injunction.  This court

disagreed.  The appellate court held that the Act's authorization

for the grant of equitable relief in private actions does not

mean that the plaintiff need not establish the requirements for

granting of equitable relief.  Sadat, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 381.

	The supreme court agreed.  The supreme court began by noting that cases in which plaintiffs were not required to plead and

prove the traditional elements to obtain an injunction involved

plaintiffs seeking equitable relief created by statute.  The

court cited several cases where injunctive relief was expressly

authorized as a means of enforcing compliance with the respective

statutes.  The court than distinguished the instant case. 

"Rather than an express statutory grant of authority to issue

injunctions, section 110(d)(1) of the Act (15 U.S.C. sec.

2310(d)(1) (1976)) is a generalized provision for civil actions

afforded to consumers damaged by the failure of a warrantor to

meet Magnuson-Moss warranty obligations."  Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 113.  The court pointed to the sharp contrast with section

110(c)(1) of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 2310(c)(1) (1976)), which

specifically provides:

	"[T]he district courts of the United States shall have

jurisdiction of any action brought by the Attorney

General (in his capacity as such), or by the Commission

by any of its attorneys designated by it for such

purpose, to restrain (A) any warrantor from making a

deceptive warranty with respect to a consumer product,

or (B) any person from failing to comply with any

requirement imposed on such person by or pursuant to

this chapter or from violating any prohibition

contained in this chapter.  Upon proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission's

or Attorney General's likelihood of ultimate success,

such action would be in the public interest and after

notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining order

or preliminary injunction may be granted without bond." 

15 U.S.C. §2310(c)(1976).

	The supreme court also pointed out that "statutes expressly

authorizing injunctive relief do so on behalf of either a public

official in his capacity as enforcer of a regulatory scheme or,

alternatively, provide for the private actions which may be

necessary to restrain public officials from acting in a manner

inconsistent with that which is prescribed by statute."  Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 113. The statutory violation implies injury to the

general public. "Such injury necessitates the statutory

authorization for equitable relief and supplants the traditional

equitable pleading requirements."  Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 113.  The court held that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act's general

grant of equitable relief did not evince congressional intent to

dispense with the traditional equitable pleading requirements. 

Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 115.

	In applying Sadat to the case at bar, it is clear that the Village need not plead and prove an inadequate remedy at law.  Our case is directly the type of case contemplated by Sadat where dispensing of the traditional requirements would be appropriate. 

First, the language of section 11-13-15 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-15 (West 2000)) specifically provides authority for the court with jurisdiction "to issue a restraining

order, or a preliminary injunction, as well as a permanent

injunctions."  Second, this action does not involve private

parties seeking to enforce solely private rights.  The Village of

Riverdale, as a governing public body, sought the injunction as a

tool to prevent defendants from operating the facility.  This is

a case where a public body brought an action, alleging violations

of its ordinances and statutes, with resulting damage to its

residents, and therefore, plaintiff need not plead and prove an 

inadequate remedy at law.  See City of Highland Park v. County of Cook, 37 Ill. App. 3d 15, 20 (1975).  

	Defendants' claim in their reply brief that the cases where

an injunction has been issued absent a showing of inadequate

remedy at law are inapplicable because "all of the cases

represent a continuing problem that cannot be stopped" is

unpersuasive.  First, defendants are utilizing circular

reasoning.  They are basically arguing that this case is

different because the complained-of behavior has been stopped,

which is essentially reiterating their adequate-remedy-at-law

argument that an injunction is unnecessary.  Also, the record

does not support defendants' claim.  The record established that

following the fires on the property, defendants agreed to cease

operations on October 23, 2000.  Although Paul Howe's testimony

attempted to qualify the agreement as voluntarily "restricting" activity, the letter that memorialized the agreement specifically

stated defendants agreed to "cease further receipts of wood

waste, recyclable materials or other materials to be processed or

stored for processing at [their] leasehold property."  On January

22, defendants, through their attorneys, sent a letter to

plaintiff memorializing their intent to resume accepting loads of

wood waste and other recyclable materials for processing and

storage at defendants' facility.  In addition, Howe acknowledged

in a separate letter sent to the Village's attorney that:

	"At this time, we have an inventory of mulched material

that was untouched by the fire.  It is our intention to

color and bag the chipped material as soon as possible,

as orders allow.  As previously agreed, prior to

commencing any chipping activity or receipt of any new

inbound product, we would provide 5 days' notice to the

Village."  

Evidence indicates, however, that defendants had, in fact,

received waste for recycling at the facility in contravention to

that agreement and without acquiring the necessary permit and

license.  Jim Camalick, Suburban's site manager, testified during

his deposition that defendants had imported approximately 400

tons of new waste onto the property in November and December 2000

and January 2001.    

	We agree with the Village that defendants' brief cites

numerous cases which stand merely for general propositions of the laws governing injunctions, and do not involve statutorily

authorized injunctions as tools of enforcement. Defendants'

repeated assertions in their reply brief that plaintiff's cited

cases holding that plaintiff need not show an inadequate remedy

at law exists predate their general cases is of no assistance to

them either.  Defendants have not, and cannot, establish that

Sadat or its predecessors are not good law and directly applicable to the facts at hand.

	Since it is clear from the record that defendants continued

to operate their facility without the appropriate license and

permit in violation of the statute, the trial court properly

enjoined defendants from operating their waste facility. See City of Chicago v. Piotrowski, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 835.  We conclude that the Village was not required to show an inadequate remedy at

law, as would be required if a private party sought equitable

relief to protect private rights.

	However, even if we were to assume arguendo that the Village

was required to plead and prove that no adequate remedy at law

existed, it has satisfied that burden.  The Village asserted

claims under the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/47-

5(8) (West 2000)) and for common law nuisance in its complaint. 

Again, defendants' entire argument in response hinges on the

assertion that an injunction is unnecessary where defendants have

not been issued a business license for 2001 and are, therefore,

unable to operate their facility.  However, when the trial court reversed defendants' reasoning and posited to counsel that if it

was his position that his client would not operate until

receiving the license, "what does the injunction cost you at this

point?" Counsel had no response.  More importantly, defendants'

argument bears little weight where, as previously noted, the

record has demonstrated that defendants have expressed their

intention to resume operations and have, in fact, already

continued to operate the waste facility in absence of the

required business license.

	Defendants make much ado regarding Mayor Evans' testimony

that she would direct the police to shut down defendants'

facility if they attempted to operate without a business license. 

However, as the Village aptly points out, the mayor does not

possess the authority to carry out such conduct.  The Village's

brief sets forth in detail the governing municipal codes and the

remedies provided therein.  For example, section 1.20.010 of the

Village of Riverdale Code of Ordinances provides:

	"A.  Any person violating any of the provisions or

failing to comply with any of the mandatory

requirements of the ordinances of the Village of

Riverdale, shall be guilty of an offense.  Except in

cases where different punishment is prescribed by any

ordinances of the Village, any person convicted of an

offense under the ordinances of Riverdale shall be

punished by a fine of not less than thirty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars." Riverdale Code of

Ordinances § 1.20.010 eff. Octobver 24, 2000.

In addition, sections 8.04.200 (garbage and refuse), 8.60.090

(failing to abate a fire hazard) and 17.03.14 (penalty for

violation of zoning ordinances) of the Village of Riverdale Code

of Ordinances also provide fines as penalties for an offense.

Riverdale Code of Ordinances §§ 8.04.200, 8.60.090, 17.03.14

(eff. ______October 24, 2000).

	For a legal remedy to be deemed adequate, it must be clear,

complete, and as practical and efficient to the ends of justice

in its prompt administration as the equitable remedy. Wilson v. Illinois Benedictine College, 112 Ill. App. 3d 932, 938 (1983); City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 91 Ill. 2d 295, 314 (1982).  "This court has consistently recognized that the

criminal law is not such a remedy where it is shown ineffective

to prevent the continuance of the nuisance."  City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 91 Ill. 2d at 314.    

	For example, the supreme court held that the imposition of even the maximum fine of $200 a day is not be enough to dissuade

defendants from an enterprise offering sexual massages.  City of Chicago v. Cecola, 75 Ill. 2d 423, 429 (1079); see also Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt, 21 Ill. 2d 228 (1961) (defendant, having been arrested twice, claimed before Village board he would

continue strip-mining despite imposition of fines under

ordinance); People ex rel. Kerner v. Huls, 355 Ill. 412 (1934) (criminal prosecution inadequate remedy where defendant's

statements showed he would pay statutory penalties but still not

submit his cattle for tuberculin tests); People ex rel. Dyer v. Clark, 268 Ill. 156 (1915) (numerous criminal convictions of keeper of brothel did not deter defendant from continuing the

activity); City of Chicago v. Geraci, 30 Ill. App. 3d 699 (1975) (where the criminal code did not effectively prevent the nuisance

of masturbatory practices, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in issuing an injunction to close defendant's massage

and bath enterprise); County of Lake v. Spare Things, 27 Ill. App. 3d 179 (1975) (argument that monetary penalty constituted

adequate legal remedy for failure to obtain use permit under

zoning codes was rejected);  City of Chicago v. Larson, 31 Ill. App. 2d 450 (1961) (injunction barring defendants from

interfering with the inspection of a building alleged to have

been in violation of health and safety codes was upheld where the

act complained of constituted a menace to the public health,

safety or welfare, and where the enforcement of the criminal law

was merely incidental to the relief sought).

	In applying these cases to the case at bar, it is clear that

the minimal monetary fines provided in the Village's municipal

ordinances would not lend a remedy "as clear, complete,

practical, and effective as the equitable remedy." City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 91 Ill. 2d at 314.  In City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., the supreme court held that an injunction which barred live obscene stage shows as common law

nuisances must be reversed where it was not shown that criminal

prosecution was an inadequate remedy for the harm caused.  The

allegations that the defendants presented an allegedly obscene

performance despite two previous arrests for similar performances

within 60 days were insufficient factors to persuade the court to

conclude that the legal remedy was inadequate.  City of Chicago, 91 Ill. 2d at 314.  The court found that the injunction issued within a few months of the first arrest and before criminal

actions were completed was premature.  City of Chicago, 91 Ill. 2d at 315.  The court ruled that although a common law nuisance

action may hereafter be maintained against the defendants, at

that time, the evidence did not disclose that criminal

prosecution would be an inadequate remedy.  City of Chicago, 91 Ill. 2d at 315.  In addition, the court noted that it was not

claimed that this is a case where a risk to public health would

require expedited action by a court action through its equity

powers.

	The case at bar is directly distinguishable.  The issuance

of an injunction at this point could not be considered premature. 

As previously demonstrated, defendants intend to, and have, in

fact, continued operations at the facility.  In addition, the

Village has alleged that this is the type of case where an

extreme risk to the public health and safety, as well as to

property and the environment, exists if defendants' operations continue.  Therefore, we hold that action in equity was required,

and the trial court properly granted the Village's request for a

preliminary injunction.  

	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

	Affirmed.

	GREIMAN and REID, JJ., concur.