alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-1222

MUHAMMED WALLIYULLAH KARIM ABDUL QADIR, a/k/a Muhammad W.K. Abdul Qadir, Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CHARLES H. MCBRIDE, individually and as ExMayor and Head of Cheraw Town Council; BILL TAYLOR, Sergeant, individually and as the Cheraw Town Administrator; GEORGE HARTZELL, individually and as the Magistrate for the Town of Cheraw; JAMES TILLEY, individually andas the Magistrate of the County of Chesterfield; HARRY DRAKEFORD, individually and as Ex-Chief for the Town of Cheraw; J. A. GRAVES,individually and Chief of the Cheraw City Police Department; JOHN SPEARS, individually andas officer of the Cheraw City Police Department; RANDY MALLOY, individually and as officer of the Cheraw City Police Department; OFFICER MCCLAIN, individually and as officer of the Cheraw City Police Department; UNKNOWN NAMES OF INSURANCE COMPANIES OR AGENTS FOR DEFENDANTS, individually and as agents for each insurance company; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS OF THE CITY OF CHERAW; COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD, SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS OF CHESTERFIELD GENERAL HOSPITAL, individually and in their official capacity, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. Dennis W. Shedd, District Judge. (CA-94-780-4-19BC)23 Submitted: July 23, 1996 Decided: July 30, 1996 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Muhammed Walliyullah Karim, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Foster McLeod, GRIGGS, SPRUILL & HARRIS, Cheraw, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the magistrate judge's recommendation and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Karim Abdul Qadir v. McBride , No. CA-94-780-4-19BC (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED4
#### Hubbard vs. Gray.

Bill for tlie specific performance of a contract: tlio defendant proposed, by letter, to buy of the plaintiff' a house and lot, naming the price — complainant replied that he could have the property — defendant wont into possession; afterwards, the parties differed as to the price, the complainant claiming a larger sum — the negotiation was broken off, and the defendant abandoned the possession; *Held,*That the Circuit Court properly dismissed the bill.

*Appeal from, Hempstead Circuit Court in Chancery.*

Hon. Len B. Green, Circuit Judge.

Hempstead, for the appellant.

Watkins & Gallagher, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Fairchild

delivered the opinion of the court.

Hubbard being the owner of the Burton place, in Spring Hill, received a letter from Gray, proposing to buy it for three hundred dollars.

Hubbard replied that he could have the property, that he had been waiting on another person, to whom he had offered it for *502four hundred dollars — other letters passed, and conversations were had between the parties upon the subject, but none in which any further agreement of the price to be paid was made; and in the meantime Gray had taken possession of the place.

When the agreement came to be perfected by deed and payment, Hubbard understood that he was to have four hundred dollars, and Gray that he was to give three hundred dollars for the property. The negotiation was broken oiT. Gray abandoned his possession of the property, and Hubbard brought his bill for a specific performance of Gray’s contract of purchase at four hundred dollars.

As we construe the evidence, Gray never promised to pay four hundred dollars for the property. He wrote to Hubbard offering three hundred for it, Hubbard wrote back that he could have it, and that could only mean, that he could have it for what he proposed to give; and if Hubbard had offered to let another man have it for four hundred dollars, that is no reason why Gray should give one hundred dollars more than he agreed to give.

The Circuit Court, sitting in chancery, properly dismissed the bill, and its decree is affirmed.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00018-CV

Steve McDaniel and Ginger 

McDaniel

v.

Larry Miller, as judge of the 

Municipal Court; Sherrill Johnson, as 

Court Administrator; and Matthew 

C.G. Boyle, as Town Attorney for the

Municipal Court of the Town of 

Argyle, Texas

§

§

§

§

§

§

From the 16th District Court

of Denton County (2012-10603-16)

March 21, 2013

Per Curiam

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

the appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed for 

want of jurisdiction.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

PER CURIAM
2

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00018-CV

STEVE MCDANIEL AND GINGER 

MCDANIEL

APPELLANTS

V.

LARRY MILLER, AS JUDGE OF 

THE MUNICIPAL COURT;

SHERRILL JOHNSON, AS COURT 

ADMINISTRATOR; AND MATTHEW 

C.G. BOYLE, AS TOWN 

ATTORNEY FOR THE MUNICIPAL 

COURT OF THE TOWN OF

ARGYLE, TEXAS

APPELLEES

----------

FROM THE 16TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellants Steve McDaniel and Ginger McDaniel attempt to appeal from 

an order granting a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court granted the plea on 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

September 27, 2012, and Appellants filed a motion to reinstate on October 30, 

2012; Appellants’ notice of appeal was therefore due December 26, 2012, but 

was not filed until January 11, 2013.2 See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(3). We 

notified Appellants of our concern that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal 

because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, and we informed them that the 

appeal would be dismissed unless they, or any party desiring to continue the 

appeal, filed with the court, on or before February 8, 2013, a response showing 

grounds for continuing the appeal. We have not received a response. 

Therefore, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 

42.3(a), 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MEIER, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and GABRIEL, J.

DELIVERED: March 21, 2013

 

2Appellants appear to have complied with rule of civil procedure 5 in filing 

their motion to reinstate. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 5.
H. Res. 727 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

September 18, 2014. 

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall 

be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 2) to remove Federal Government obstacles to the production of 

more domestic energy; to ensure transport of that energy reliably to businesses, consumers, and other end users; to lower 

the cost of energy to consumers; to enable manufacturers and 

other businesses to access domestically produced energy 

affordably and reliably in order to create and sustain more 

secure and well-paying American jobs; and for other purposes. All points of order against consideration of the bill are 

waived. The bill shall be considered as read. All points of 

order against provisions in the bill are waived. The previous 

question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and on any 

amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) two hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the 

Committee on Natural Resources or their respective designees; and (2) one motion to recommit. 
2 

•HRES 727 EH 

SEC. 2. Upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in 

order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 4) to make revisions to Federal law to improve the conditions necessary for 

economic growth and job creation, and for other purposes. All 

points of order against consideration of the bill are waived. 

The bill shall be considered as read. All points of order 

against provisions in the bill are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and on any 

amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) two hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the 

Committee on Ways and Means or their respective designees; 

and (2) one motion to recommit. 

SEC. 3. On any legislative day during the period from 

September 22, 2014, through November 11, 2014,— 

(a) the Journal of the proceedings of the previous day 

shall be considered as approved; and 

(b) the Chair may at any time declare the House adjourned to meet at a date and time, within the limits of 

clause 4, section 5, article I of the Constitution, to be announced by the Chair in declaring the adjournment. 

SEC. 4. The Speaker may appoint Members to perform 

the duties of the Chair for the duration of the period addressed by section 3 of this resolution as though under clause 

8(a) of rule I. 
3 

•HRES 727 EH 

SEC. 5. Each day during the period addressed by section 

3 of this resolution shall not constitute a calendar day for 

purposes of section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 

U.S.C. 1546). 

SEC. 6. Each day during the period addressed by section 

3 of this resolution shall not constitute a legislative day for 

purposes of clause 7 of rule XIII. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
1 John T. Boyd, Chief Ju stice (Re t.), Seven th Court of Appeal s, sittin g by assi gnment.

Tex. Gov ’t Code A nn. §75.0 02(a)(1) (Vernon S upp. 200 4-2005). NO. 07-03-0383-CR NO. 07-03-0384-CR NO. 07-03-0385-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL E FEBRUARY 24, 2005

______________________________ DAVID MATTHEW LAYTON, APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLE E

_________________________________ FROM THE 251 ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; NO. 34,43 5-C, 34,4 36-C, 34, 437-C; HO NORABLE PATRICK PIRTLE, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ., and BOYD, S.J. 1
In these companion cases, appellant David Matthew L ayton w as convicted of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault of a child. We affirm ed the tri al court conviction in each case. See Layton v. State , No. 07-96- 0234-CR, 199 7 Lexis 5257 (Te x. App.–Amarillo Oct. 3, 19 97, pet. ref’d); Layton v. State , No. O7-96-O235-CR, 1997 Lexis2

5258 (Tex. Ap p.–Amaril lo Oct. 3, 1997, pet. ref’d); and Layton v State , No. 07-96-0236-CR, 1997 Lexis 5259 (Tex. App.–Ama rillo Oct . 3, 1997 , pet. ref’d). Appellant now asserts that the trial court reversibly erred in denying his motions for post-conviction forensic DNA testing. For the reasons set out below, we disagree the trial court erred, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of those motions.
Texas Code of Crimi nal Procedure article 64.03(a)( 2)(A) prov ides tha t a trial court may only order forensic DNA testing i f the convicted person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence t hat the person would not have been convicted if exculpa tory

results had been obtained through DNA testing. Tex. Code Crim Proc. Ann. art64.03(a)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). In advancing his contention that his motions should have been granted, appellant, for the most part, again challenges in some detail the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidenc e to support his conviction. In addition, he specificallyargues that the victims never made a firm identification of him as the culprit and emphasizes that the State’s evidence shows he arrived at the scene of the crimes just after the commi ssion of the crime s. However, the evidence in these cases was reviewe d in somewhat exhaustive detail in our opinions affirming the convictions, and appellant has not presented any contentions here that wer e not within the bounds of our prior discussio n of the sufficiency of the trial evidence. Because

of the na ture of th e ev idence sustaining appellant’s conviction, appellant

has not borne his burden to show by apreponde ran ce of the evidence that he would not havebeen pro secuted o r convicted if exculpator y resultshad bee n obtained through DNA testing.3

Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of appellant’s amended motions for D NA testing of evidence must be, and are hereby, affirmed in each case.
John T. Boyd Senior Justice Do not publish.
# C_2022011EN.01002001.xml

| 10.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 11/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 11/20

---

Appeal brought on 9 November 2021 by KN against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 1 September 2021 in Case T-377/20, KN v EESC

(Case C-673/21 P)

(2022/C 11/27)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: KN (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld and M. Aboudi, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Economic and Social Committee

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court of 1 September 2021, KN v EESC (T-377/20); |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 1 September 2021, KN v EESC (T-377/20);

| — | grant the forms of order sought at first instance; |
| --- | --- |

—

grant the forms of order sought at first instance;

| — | order the EESC to pay all the costs, including those incurred before the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the EESC to pay all the costs, including those incurred before the General Court.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In the context of the appeal, the appellant contests in particular paragraphs 102 to 106, 167 to 169, 171 to 177 and 197 of the judgment under appeal.

In support of the appeal, the appellant puts forward a single ground of appeal, alleging a distortion of the facts by the judgment under appeal and manifest errors of assessment resulting in inaccurate legal reasoning.

---
# C_2022207EN.01004102.xml

| 23.5.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 207/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.5.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 207/41

---

Order of the General Court of 18 March 2022 — Saure v Commission

(Case T-232/21) (1)

(Action for annulment - Access to documents - Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - Correspondence of the Commission concerning the quantities and delivery times of AstraZeneca’s COVID-19 vaccines - Implied refusal of access - Express decision adopted after the action was brought - No need to adjudicate - Requests to amend the form of order sought - Lis pendens - Manifest inadmissibility)

(2022/C 207/55)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Hans-Wilhelm Saure (Berlin, Germany) (represented by: C. Partsch, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: G. Gattinara, K. Herrmann and A. Spina, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment of the implied decision of 30 April 2021, and, after amendment of the forms of order sought, of the express decision of 13 July 2021, by which the Commission rejected his confirmatory request for access to certain documents.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to rule on the form of order seeking annulment of the implied decision of the European Commission of 30 April 2021 rejecting the confirmatory request for access to certain documents. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to rule on the form of order seeking annulment of the implied decision of the European Commission of 30 April 2021 rejecting the confirmatory request for access to certain documents.

| 2. | The action as to the remainder is dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The action as to the remainder is dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible.

| 3. | The Commission shall bear its own costs and pay those of Mr Hans-Wilhelm Saure pertaining to the application and for the application for a declaration that there is no need to adjudicate. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Commission shall bear its own costs and pay those of Mr Hans-Wilhelm Saure pertaining to the application and for the application for a declaration that there is no need to adjudicate.

| 4. | Mr Saure shall bear his own costs and pay those of the Commission pertaining to the request to amend the application. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Mr Saure shall bear his own costs and pay those of the Commission pertaining to the request to amend the application.

---

(1)  OJ C 242, 21.6.2021.

---
#### Succession of Voladia JONES.

No. 62049.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 5, 1978.

In re: Margaret Jones Ellison, applying for certiorari, or writ of review,, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Iberville. 356 So.2d 80.

Writ denied.
EXHIBIT 10.6
 CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED: Certain portions of this
document have been omitted pursuant to a request for confidential
treatment and, where applicable, have been marked with an asterisk ("[****]")
to denote where omissions have been made. The confidential material has been filed separately with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
 EVERGREEN SOLAR, INC.
     
    
    [****]: [****]
    
    [****]: [****]
    
    [****]: [****]
    
    [****]: [****]
    
    [****]: [****]
    
    [****]: [****]
 Evergreen Solar, Inc.
    
    Wagner & Co Solartechnik GmbH
#### UNITED STATES v. TRIANDAPLOUS.

No. 8100.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

March 15, 1937.

*958E. P. Carville, U. S. Atty., of Reno, Nev., Julius C. Martin, Director, Bureau of War Risk Litigation, of Washington, D. C., Wilbur C. Pickett, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., and Young M. Smith, Atty., Dept, of Justice, of Washington, D. C., for the United States.

Alvin Gerlack, U. S. Atty., of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

Before WILBUR and GARRECHT, Circuit Judges, and NETERER, District Judge.

NETERER, District Judge.

To reverse a judgment on war risk insurance policy for total and permanent disability, this appeal is prosecuted.

Errors relied upon are: (a) Trial court erred in denying motion for a directed verdict; (b) error in admitting opinion evidence of doctors as to total and permanent disability.

This case is on all fours with the suit of U. S. v. Eide, etc. (C.C.A.) 88 F.(2d) 682, decided February 23, 1937. Appellee was wounded in the Battle of the Argonne, France, October 10, 1918. He received a gunshot wound six or more inches long on the interior surface of the left thigh with a comminuted fracture of the femur. The thigh bohe was shattered, exposing the soft and hard parts of the bone. Osteomyelitis developed which it is 'claimed rendered him •totally and permanently disabled.

Upon the trial the doctors testifying for appellee gave their' opinion upon hypothetical questions based on the evidence in the case, and the departmental definition •of total and permanent disability, that the .appellee was at the time of his discharge totally and permanently disabled.

It is conceded that it was error to admit the testimony.

While this is assigned as error, no objection was made in the trial court, and the objection comes too late' in this court. Wood v. Weimar, 104 U.S. 786, 26 L.Ed. 779; U. S. v. Eide, etc., supra; U. S. v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498, 55 S.Ct. 273, 79 L.Ed. 617.

Appellant insists that this court should reverse the judgment for plain error although improperly assigned.. On the authority of U. S. v. Eide, etc., supra, and cases cited therein, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded for a retrial.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON M OTION FOR R EHEARING

Appellate case name: Antonio Ruiz Perez V. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01

- 12

- 01001

- CR

Trial court case number: 1309538

Trial court: 339th Dist rict Court of Harris County

Date motion filed: March 31, 2015

Party filing motion: The State of Texas

It is ordered that the motion for rehearing is DENIED

.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Evelyn V. Keyes

Acting for the Court

Panel consists of: Justices Keyes, Higley, and Massengale

Date: April 1 4 , 2015
#### ESTATE of Earl KITE v. FIRST BANK AND TRUST CO. OF JACKSONVILLE, et al.

No. 38736.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 224 So.2d 332.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-19-00627-CV

In re Fraudulent Hospital Lien Litigation

On Appeal from the

444th District Court of Cameron County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. MDL-15-0360-H

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal 

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against 

appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

March 5, 2020
# C_2022037EN.01000602.xml

| 24.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 37/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 37/6

---

Appeal brought on 10 August 2021 by Davide Groppi Srl against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 16 June 2021 in Case T-187/20 Davide Groppi v EUIPO — Viabizzuno (Table lamp)

(Case C-490/21 P)

(2022/C 37/09)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Davide Groppi Srl (represented by: F. Boscariol de Roberto, D. Capra and V. Malerba, avvocati)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 26 November 2021, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals are allowed to proceed) declared that the appeal is inadmissible and ordered Davide Groppi Srl to bear its own costs.

---
#### Sherry Lynn GREENBERG, formerly known as Sherry Lynn Estok, Appellant, v. Stephen M. ESTOK, Appellee.

No. 71-495.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 17, 1972.

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Virginia V. SERGENT, Petitioner, v. ADAMS PACKING ASSOCIATION et al., Respondents.

No. 39917.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 19, 1970.

Certiorari denied.

ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, DREW, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
# C_2021382EN.01002701.xml

| 20.9.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 382/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.9.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 382/27

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 12 July 2021 — Jalkh v Parliament

(Case T-230/21 R)

(Interim measures - Law governing the institutions - Member of the European Parliament - Privileges and immunities - Waiver of parliamentary immunity - Application for suspension of operation of a measure - No urgency)

(2021/C 382/38)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Jean-François Jalkh (Gretz-Armainvilliers, France) (represented by: F. Wagner, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: N. Lorenz and A.-M. Dumbrăvan, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 278 TFEU for suspension of operation of European Parliament decision P9_TA(2021)0092 of 25 March 2021 on the request for waiver of the immunity of the applicant (2020/2110(IMM)).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The application for interim measures is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

| 2. | The costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The costs are reserved.

---