Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

In re P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re P.S. and A.S., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois,

Petitioner-Appellee, v. Charlie S., Respondent-Appellant).

District & No. Fifth District 

Nos. 5-21-0027, 5-21-0028 cons.

Filed July 26, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County, Nos. 19-JA-75, 19-

JA-76; the Hon. Martin J. Mengarelli, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Anthony G.M. Swarringin, of Edwardsville, for appellant.

Thomas A. Haine, State’s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Patrick Delfino 

and Jennifer L. Camden, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s 

Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justice Welch concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Wharton dissented, with opinion.
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OPINION

¶ 1 Respondent, Charlie S. (Father), appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Madison 

County terminating his parental rights to his two minor children, P.S. and A.S. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 2 P.S. and A.S. are the biological children of Father and Amanda H. (Mother), who is not a 

party to this appeal. P.S. was born on October 31, 2014. On February 1, 2019, Mother gave 

birth to A.S., whose meconium tested positive for methamphetamines, amphetamines, and 

marijuana. Mother admitted to using methamphetamine and marijuana while pregnant and 

tested positive for both substances. The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services 

(DCFS) conducted an investigation, during which Mother agreed to DCFS initiating intact 

family services. 

¶ 3 On April 18, 2019, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship of the minors under 

the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)). In the petitions, 

the State alleged that the minors were neglected because their environment was injurious to 

their welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) and A.S. had methamphetamines, 

amphetamines, and marijuana in his system at birth (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(c) (West 2018)). 

The petitions alleged that (1) Mother had a substance abuse addiction that impaired her ability 

to adequately care for the minors; (2) Father had a criminal history including, but not limited 

to, criminal convictions for aggravated battery to a pregnant person and domestic battery; 

(3) Mother had pending charges for battery and domestic battery and an active warrant for her 

arrest; and (4) A.S. was born with methamphetamines, amphetamines, and marijuana in his 

system, and Mother admitted to using said substances during her pregnancy. 

¶ 4 On July 25, 2019, the children were taken into protective custody, and shelter care hearings 

were conducted on July 25, 2019, and July 30, 2019. On the day of the first shelter care hearing, 

Father tested positive for methamphetamine. Following the hearings, the trial court found there 

was probable cause to believe the children were neglected as defined by the Act. The children 

were removed from their parents’ custody, and temporary custody was given to DCFS.

¶ 5 On October 1, 2019, the court adjudicated the minors neglected and made them wards of 

the court. The court found that Mother admitted to using methamphetamine and marijuana 

while pregnant and that A.S. was born with these substances in his system. The court also 

found that Mother’s substance abuse impaired her ability to adequately care for the minors, 

that Father had two criminal convictions for battery, and that Mother had pending criminal 

charges for battery and an active warrant for her arrest. 

¶ 6 On August 4, 2020, the State filed petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights to the 

children. The petitions alleged that Father was unfit based on three statutory grounds: (1) he 

failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare 

of the children (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)); (2) he failed to make reasonable efforts to 

correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the children during any nine-month 

period following the adjudication of neglect, specifically October 1, 2019, through the date of 

the filing of the petitions (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2020)); and (3) he failed to make 

reasonable progress toward the return of the children during any nine-month period following 

the adjudication of neglect, specifically October 1, 2019, through the date of the of the filing 

of the petitions (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)).
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¶ 7 On November 24, 2020, the court called the cause for a fitness hearing. The proceedings 

were conducted in open court, via Zoom, a video conferencing platform. At the start of the 

hearing, Father’s counsel made an oral motion to continue the case until an in-person hearing 

could be conducted at some later date. The State requested that the case proceed over Zoom. 

Mother’s counsel stated that Mother would prefer an in-person hearing but had not expressed 

any concerns about proceeding via Zoom. The court denied Father’s motion to continue. Father 

then made a motion to have an emergency, in-person hearing that day, which the court denied.

¶ 8 At the fitness hearing, Gretchen Truax testified that she was assigned as the family’s 

caseworker in August 2019. Truax testified that after Mother gave birth to A.S., both Mother 

and A.S. tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines. Thereafter, DCFS was 

contacted and conducted an investigation. During the investigation, Mother admitted to using 

controlled substances during her pregnancy, but Father denied any substance abuse. DCFS also 

learned that the family had a history of domestic violence. Mother agreed to DCFS initiating 

intact family services. An intact family service plan was created in April 2019, but conditions 

required the children to be taken into DCFS care in July 2019. 

¶ 9 In August 2019, after the children were taken into care, Truax created a service plan, which 

she reviewed every six months. Father’s initial service plan included the following tasks: 

(1) complete a substance abuse assessment and follow any recommendations, (2) complete a 

mental health assessment and follow any recommendations, (3) complete a domestic violence 

assessment and follow any recommendations, and (4) cooperate with DCFS. Truax testified 

that Father’s most recent service plan was created in June 2020 and included the same tasks. 

Truax testified that, as of her last review, Father had not made any progress on his service plan.

¶ 10 Truax referred Father to Chestnut Health System (Chestnut) early in the case, and Father 

had repeatedly advised Truax that he had made an appointment to complete his assessment. 

Truax stated that when she would follow up with Father, he would always have some excuse 

for having missed the appointment. Father completed his first assessment in January 2020, and 

Chestnut recommended that Father engage in outpatient treatment with group and individual 

sessions. Father did not attend these sessions and was unsuccessfully discharged from the 

program in February 2020. Truax re-referred Father to Chestnut, and he completed a new 

assessment in April 2020. Chestnut again recommended that Father complete outpatient 

services. Father did not attend the sessions, and he was unsuccessfully discharged a second 

time. Truax referred Father to Chestnut a third time, but Father did not complete that 

assessment. Truax testified that Father checked himself into Chestnut’s seven-day crisis unit 

on two occasions. Both times, Father checked himself out, against the advice of the staff, before 

completing the seven-day treatment. 

¶ 11 Truax testified that Father began looking into inpatient substance abuse treatment in July 

2020, and that he was put on a waiting list at Gateway Rehabilitation Center (Gateway). Truax 

did not know if the wait time for Gateway’s inpatient program was impacted by the ongoing 

coronavirus (or COVID-19) pandemic caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome 

coronavirus 2. Father was admitted to Gateway in October 2020 and was successfully released 

from the program in the beginning of November. Gateway recommended that Father complete 

outpatient treatment and referred him to Chestnut. Father completed this assessment at 

Chestnut on November 17, 2020, which again recommended that he complete group and 

individual sessions. Truax testified that Father indicated that he was going to start treatment at 

Chestnut the week of the termination hearing. 
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¶ 12 Truax testified that Father tested positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines on 

September 30, 2019; January 22, 2020; February 19, 2020; February 26, 2020; and March 11, 

2020. Father failed to appear for drug testing on December 23, 2019; January 8, 2020; June 

17, 2020; July 24, 2020; September 18, 2020; and October 7, 2020. Father tested negative for 

substances on May 28, 2020. Truax testified there were two gaps in drug testing for Father, 

one between September 30, 2019, and December 23, 2019, and another between March 11, 

2020, and May 28, 2020. With regard to the first gap, Truax testified she did not request drug 

tests from Father during this period because Father indicated that he was going to engage in 

substance abuse services with Chestnut and Chestnut would have tested Father. When Truax 

realized that Father was not engaged in services, she started referring Father to drug tests again. 

Truax explained that the second gap was due to the regular testing facility temporarily closing 

due to the coronavirus pandemic. 

¶ 13 Father’s service plan also recommended that he complete a mental health assessment and 

follow any recommendations from the assessment. Truax testified that she referred Father to 

Chestnut for a mental health assessment. Father advised Truax that he wanted to focus on his 

substance abuse first, so he did not complete the mental health assessment until April 2020. 

Chestnut recommended that Father complete outpatient services, but Father did not complete 

the services and he was unsuccessfully discharged from the program. Truax stated that Father 

completed a mental health assessment while he was at Gateway in October or November 2020. 

Gateway recommended Father seek medication and services to alleviate his anxiety, and 

referred him to Chestnut. Truax testified that Father was currently “working on getting an 

assessment” at Chestnut but that she was not sure if he had an appointment scheduled. 

¶ 14 Truax also testified there were also concerns about domestic violence in the home. Father 

had a prior conviction for battery against a pregnant woman, and Father did not complete the 

recommended domestic violence classes ordered as a condition of his probation. Truax stated 

there were also numerous instances of domestic violence between Mother and Father while the 

children were in their parents’ care. Truax testified that P.S. described in detail instances of 

domestic violence that she witnessed between the parents. Truax testified that Father indicated 

that he wanted to address his substance abuse before his domestic violence issues. Based on 

the amount of domestic violence present in Mother and Father’s relationship, however, it was 

determined that Father should not wait to begin domestic violence services. 

¶ 15 Truax testified that she referred Father to Group Interventions in order to complete a 

domestic violence assessment. Father contacted the coordinator on several occasions but failed 

to show up for any of the appointments. In February 2020, as a result of the missed 

appointments, Group Interventions indicated that it would no longer make space available for 

Father to participate in the program. In April 2020, Truax referred Father to Alternatives 

Counseling to complete an assessment. Father again failed to appear for the appointment. The 

assessor, however, used the information Father provided over the phone during the initial 

intake call and recommended that Father complete 26 weeks of sessions. Truax advised Father 

of the recommendation, but Father did not attend these sessions and he was unsuccessfully 

discharged from the program. Truax testified that she re-referred Father to Group Intervention 

and that she believes Father has recently taken some initial steps to engage in the program. 

¶ 16 Truax testified that Father has been cooperative with DCFS and respectful to her as the 

caseworker. She stated that she referred Father to services numerous times but that he has not 

taken the service plan seriously, which has been the barrier to Father’s progress. Truax testified 
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that Father always had excuses, throughout the entirety of the case, for his failure to follow 

through with starting recommended services or attending appointments. Truax testified that 

the parents were permitted one hour of supervised visitation per week, which they regularly 

attended. Truax testified the parents interacted appropriately with the children during the visits, 

and that Father was very good at making the children laugh. 

¶ 17 During cross-examination, Truax testified that the coronavirus pandemic caused some 

restrictions to be put into place beginning in the third week of March 2020. Truax stated it took 

approximately two weeks for providers to figure out how to function during the pandemic and 

that providers had made the necessary adjustments by mid-April. Truax explained that the 

pandemic complicated visitation because the visits had to be conducted over the telephone 

instead of in person. With regard to the provision of services, Truax testified the pandemic 

actually reduced barriers to obtaining services and made some services more readily available 

than in the past. Truax stated that, for the first time, service providers conducted assessments 

over the phone and allowed clients to participate in group and individual counseling over the 

phone or through video conferences. Truax stated she communicated with the parents in early 

April 2020, and she was able to refer them to remote services within 7 to 10 days. 

¶ 18 Father did not testify at the fitness hearing. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court 

made a verbal finding that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Father 

was an unfit person for failing to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were 

the basis for removal of the minors during any nine-month period following the adjudication 

of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2020)) and that he failed to make reasonable 

progress toward the return of the minors in any nine-month period following the adjudication 

of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)). The court found that while Father was 

currently engaged in services, he did not engage in services or make any progress on his service 

plan during the relevant time period. 

¶ 19 The court then immediately proceeded to the best interests hearing. Father requested a 

continuance of the best interests hearing so that an in-person hearing could be conducted. The 

court denied Father’s motion and took judicial notice of the evidence presented during the 

fitness hearing. 

¶ 20 At the best interests hearing, Truax testified that the children have been in their current 

placement since March 2020. The foster parents also have a 16-year-old daughter whom they 

adopted at birth. Truax testified the foster parents have completed the DCFS training for foster 

parents and their background checks. One of the foster parents works full time while the other 

stays home to care for the children. Truax testified the children are thriving in their placement, 

as the foster parents have devoted a large amount of attention to the children’s needs. A.S. was 

born premature and previously struggled to gain weight and to advance his gross and fine motor 

skills. Under the foster parents’ care, A.S. has gained weight and he received early intervention 

screening to improve his motor skills. P.S. is doing well in school but suffers from anxiety and 

is in counseling. The foster parents have worked to develop an understanding of her condition 

and have followed the recommendations of P.S.’s counselor in order to support the child’s 

needs. P.S. feels safe in the foster parents’ home and has expressed the desire to stay with, and 

be adopted by, the foster parents. The foster parents want to adopt the minors and have signed 

permanency commitments. Truax testified she believes the foster parents will continue to be 

supportive of the children’s needs in the future and will treat the children as their own.
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¶ 21 Truax testified the children are excited for their visits with Mother and Father, but that P.S. 

has begun experiencing anxiety leading up to, and after, the visits with her parents. Truax 

testified that P.S. began expressing a desire not to attend the visits near the end of June 2020. 

Truax testified that P.S. has stated that she is relieved when a visit is cancelled. P.S. has 

indicated, however, that she would like to continue to have visits with her parents even if she 

is adopted by the foster parents. Truax testified that A.S. fusses whenever he leaves the foster 

parents, which he does not do when he leaves visits with his parents. Truax believed that A.S. 

had an increased level of attachment to the foster parents over his parents. Truax testified that 

she believed it would be in the best interest of the children for the parental rights to be 

terminated. 

¶ 22 During cross-examination, Truax testified that she did not believe that more than one hour 

of visitation per week would have been beneficial because the visits cause P.S. to experience 

increased anxiety. Truax testified that while P.S. and her parents clearly love each other and 

are bonded to each other, P.S.’s comments indicate that she did not always feel safe living with 

her parents. Truax stated she had concerns about the parents’ ability to meet the needs of the 

children due to the parents’ continued use of controlled substances and their failure to 

recognize that their personal choices impacted the children. Truax was also concerned that the 

parents would not keep up with the children’s counseling and therapy appointments because 

the parents frequently did not keep their own appointments. 

¶ 23 Father testified that he was currently working as a forklift driver. Father stated that before 

DCFS removed the children from the home, he had been a stay-at-home father and that he and 

P.S. had a great relationship. Father testified that he had three adult children that he had helped 

raise. Father disagreed with Truax’s testimony that P.S. did not want to participate in visits. 

Father testified that he and P.S. had good conversations and that she spoke with him on the 

phone for an hour. After Father testified, the guardian ad litem (GAL) advised the court that 

she believed it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights. 

¶ 24 The court entered a verbal finding that it was in the children’s best interests that Father’s 

parental rights be terminated. That same day, the court entered a written order terminating 

Father’s parental rights. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father failed 

to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the 

children from the home during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect, 

and that Father failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children to the home 

during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect. The court also found, by 

a preponderance of the evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best 

interests of the minors. The court found the minors were strongly bonded to their foster family 

and that their needs were being met in the foster home. The court found that the foster parents 

wished to adopt the minors and had signed permanency commitments. 

¶ 25 On December 23, 2020, Father filed a posttrial motion to reconsider. In the motion, Father 

argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue the hearings because the court 

“denied Father’s right to an in-person trial.” The court denied Father’s motion, and this appeal 

follows.

¶ 26 ANALYSIS

¶ 27 Prior to discussing respondent’s contentions on appeal, we briefly address the timeliness 

of our decision. This case has been designated as accelerated pursuant to Illinois Supreme 
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Court Rule 311 (eff. July 1, 2018). Rule 311(a)(5) provides, in part, that “[e]xcept for good 

cause shown, the appellate court shall issue its decision within 150 days after the filing of the 

notice of appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). The 150-day deadline expired on 

June 28, 2021. In this case, Father requested three extensions of time to file his opening brief, 

and the case was not docketed until June 8, 2021. Furthermore, because the case involves the 

application of a recently revised Illinois Supreme Court rule and due process issues, we find 

good cause for issuing our decision after the 150-day deadline. See In re B’Yata I., 2013 IL 

App (2d) 130558, ¶ 26.

¶ 28 The Trial Court’s Termination of Father’s Parental Rights

¶ 29 On appeal, Father argues the trial court’s determinations that he was unfit and that the 

termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children were against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. 

¶ 30 Section 2-29(2) of the Act sets forth a two-step process for the involuntary termination of 

parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020). First, the State must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent is an unfit person as defined by the Adoption Act (750 

ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 

337 (2010). If the trial court finds the parent to be unfit, the court must then determine whether 

the State has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is in the child’s best interest 

that parental rights be terminated. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 

347, 367 (2004). During the second stage of the proceedings, the focus of the court’s scrutiny 

shifts from the rights of the parents to the best interests of the child. In re B.B., 386 Ill. App. 

3d 686, 697 (2008). 

¶ 31 The trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights involves factual findings and 

credibility assessments which, on review, are accorded great deference. In re M.J., 314 Ill. 

App. 3d 649, 655 (2000). On appeal, the trial court’s findings of parental unfitness and that 

termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests will not be disturbed unless they 

are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d 985, 998, 1001 

(2004).

¶ 32 Determination of Unfitness

¶ 33 Here, the trial court concluded that the State had successfully proven two grounds of 

unfitness against Father. The court found that Father failed to make reasonable efforts to 

correct the conditions that were the basis for removal of the minors during any nine-month 

period following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2020)) and that 

he failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors in any nine-month period 

following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)). 

¶ 34 “Reasonable effort” is a subjective standard and refers to the amount of effort reasonable 

for the particular parent. In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 998. The court must determine whether 

the parent has made earnest and conscientious strides toward correcting the conditions that led 

to the removal of the minor from the home. In re L.J.S., 2018 IL App (3d) 180218, ¶ 24. In this 

case, the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the children from the home were that 

their parents had issues with substance abuse which impaired their ability to adequately care 

for the minors, and there were concerns about domestic violence in the home. 
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¶ 35 On appeal, Father argues that it was not possible for him to have completed his service plan 

in nine months, given his ongoing addiction during the coronavirus pandemic. Father contends 

the nine-month period for assessment “should have been extended to account for the 

interference of the COVID-19 pandemic.” Father’s contention that the coronavirus pandemic 

interfered with his efforts to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the children is 

unsupported by any evidence in the record. Instead, the evidence was that, absent a two-week 

transition period at the beginning of the pandemic in March 2020, services were more readily 

available than in the past. 

¶ 36 Father was repeatedly referred to substance abuse, domestic violence, and mental health 

services. Although Father made numerous appointments for services, he chronically failed to 

appear for his appointments or to follow through on recommendations. Father made almost no 

effort to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the children until the State sought to 

terminate his parental rights in August 2020. Based on the evidence, the trial court’s 

determination that Father was unfit for failing to make reasonable efforts to correct the 

conditions that were the basis for removal of the minors during any nine-month period 

following the adjudication of neglect was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 37 The trial court also did not err in finding that Father was unfit for failing to make reasonable 

progress toward the return of the minors in any nine-month period following the adjudication 

of neglect. “Reasonable progress” is an objective standard and is based upon the amount of 

progress as measured from the conditions existing at the time of removal. In re Jacorey S., 

2012 IL App (1st) 113427, ¶ 21. Reasonable progress requires a measurable or demonstrable 

movement toward the goal of reunification. In re Jacorey S., 2012 IL App (1st) 113427, ¶ 21. 

A parent has made “reasonable progress” when the trial court can conclude that it will be able 

to return the child to parental custody in the near future. In re Jacorey S., 2012 IL App (1st) 

113427, ¶ 21. If a service plan has been established to correct the conditions that were the basis 

for the removal of the child from the parent, a “failure to make reasonable progress” includes 

a parent’s failure to substantially fulfill his obligations under the service plan. 750 ILCS 

50/1(D)(m) (West 2020). 

¶ 38 Father’s first service plan was created in August 2019, shortly after the children came into 

DCFS care. Father’s service plan was revisited every six months, with the tasks remaining the 

same throughout the case. Father’s last service plan, created in June 2020, included the 

following tasks: (1) complete a substance abuse assessment and follow any recommendations, 

(2) complete a mental health assessment and follow any recommendations, (3) complete a 

domestic violence assessment and follow any recommendations, and (4) cooperate with DCFS. 

While Father cooperated with DCFS, Father failed to make significant progress on any of the 

other tasks in his service plan between October 1, 2019, and August 4, 2020. 

¶ 39 Father tested positive for controlled substances on five occasions and missed six scheduled 

drugs tests between September 2019 and October 2020. Father completed substance abuse 

assessments at Chestnut in January and April 2020 but did not complete the treatment 

recommended. Father did not successfully complete any substance abuse treatment until 

November 2020, well after the relevant nine-month time period had passed. As of the date of 

the termination hearing, Father had not yet followed up with outpatient treatment, as requested. 

¶ 40 Father also failed to follow through on his tasks regarding treatment for his mental health 

and domestic violence issues. Although Father completed mental health assessments in April 

2020 and in October or November 2020, Father failed to complete the recommended treatment. 
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Father repeatedly failed to appear for appointments to complete an assessment regarding his 

issues with domestic violence. In April 2020, one program used the information Father 

provided over the phone as part of its intake procedure to provide Father with a treatment plan, 

but Father failed to complete any of the recommended treatment. The overwhelming evidence 

was that Father failed to make any measurable movement toward reunification between 

October 1, 2019, and August 4, 2020. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court’s finding 

that Father was unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors 

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 41 Determination of the Children’s Best Interests

¶ 42 Once a parent has been found to be unfit, the parent’s rights yield to the child’s best 

interests. In re Tashika F., 333 Ill. App. 3d 165, 170 (2002). Again, this court will not reverse 

the trial court’s determination as to the child’s best interests unless it is contrary to the manifest 

weight of the evidence. In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1001.

¶ 43 The record clearly reveals Father’s lack of effort and progress to complete the objectives 

of his service plan, in particular his failure to seek treatment for his substance abuse, mental 

health issues, and perpetuation of domestic violence. The caseworker’s concerns about 

Father’s ability or willingness to keep up with the children’s appointments were valid in light 

of his failure to follow through with his own service plan tasks. By contrast, the children were 

thriving in their foster home due to the foster parents’ dedication to meeting the needs of the 

children. P.S. feels safe in the foster home, a feeling she did not have while living with her 

parents. The children are strongly bonded to their foster family, and the foster parents wish to 

adopt the children. Based on the circumstances presented, the trial court’s determination that

termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children was not contrary 

to the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 44 Denial of Father’s Motions to Continue or for an In-Person Hearing

¶ 45 On November 24, 2020, the trial court called the case for the fitness and best interests 

hearings. The proceedings were conducted in open court, via the video conferencing platform 

Zoom. The judge, the GAL, the parties, and counsel for the attorneys and DCFS were all 

present on the video call. The record suggests that each of the participants were in separate 

locations, with the exception of the parents, who were together in the same “breakout room.”1

It is unclear from the record when, but at some point, the caseworker was also included in the 

call so that she could testify. 

¶ 46 At the start of the hearing, Father’s counsel stated that Father did not consent to a 

videoconference hearing and made an oral motion to continue the case until an in-person 

1The Zoom videoconferencing platform allows participants to be placed in “breakout rooms.”

Breakout rooms are sessions that are split off from the main Zoom meeting. They allow the participants 

to meet in smaller groups, and are isolated in terms of audio and video from the main session. Breakout 

rooms can be used for collaboration of one or more individuals. Participating in Breakout Rooms, 

Zoom Help Center (Mar. 25, 2021), https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/115005769646-

Participating-in-breakout-rooms [https://perma.cc/3RNE-DXUH]. In the courtroom setting, the 

breakout room can serve as a room where a party can confer with his or her attorney or a witness can 

wait to testify, without having access to the main meeting.
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hearing could be conducted. Father indicated that the cause had originally been set for an inperson hearing but was reset for a Zoom hearing because the Madison County courts were not 

conducting in-person hearings, except in emergency situations, due to the ongoing coronavirus 

pandemic. Counsel indicated that it was counsel’s preference and Father’s “preference” to have 

the hearing in person, “[g]iven the difference in cross examining the witnesses.” Counsel 

argued that an in-person hearing would allow the participants to “see the witness, *** see what 

the witness is doing, [and] who the witness is with.” 

¶ 47 The State requested that the case proceed over the Zoom videoconference platform, given 

the parents’ lack of progress on services, the length of time the case had been pending, and 

Zoom’s capability to allow the parties to confer privately with their counsel in a breakout room. 

Mother’s counsel stated that Mother would prefer an in-person hearing, but that she had not 

expressed any concerns about proceeding via Zoom. 

¶ 48 The trial court denied Father’s motion to continue. The court noted that it was a bench trial 

and found that the parents’ constitutionally protected rights would not be infringed by going 

forward with a hearing held via videoconference. The court stated that, most importantly, it 

did not believe that permanency for the children should be further delayed. Father’s counsel 

then made a motion to have an emergency, in-person hearing that day. The court denied 

Father’s motion. 

¶ 49 During the hearings, counsel requested the opportunity to confer with Father four times: 

(1) during Truax’s testimony at the fitness hearing, (2) before counsel’s cross-examination of 

Truax at the fitness hearing, (3) after the State rested during the fitness hearing and before 

counsel announced that Father would not testify, and (4) after the State rested during the best 

interests hearing and before counsel announced Father would testify. During each conference, 

Father and Mother were placed in a breakout room with their attorneys. The court also advised 

the parties to write down any thoughts or issues they had during the course of the proceedings 

so that they could be addressed with their attorneys during the breaks. 

¶ 50 Early in the fitness hearing, while the State was questioning Truax regarding Mother’s 

service plan, Father’s counsel objected, indicating that Truax appeared to be looking down at 

something while testifying. The court instructed Truax not to refer to any notes or documents 

unless requested to do so. During Father’s testimony at the best interest hearing, the State 

interjected, stating counsel could hear Mother speaking in the background. The court advised 

Mother that she could be in the room while Father testified, but that she was not to provide 

him with any answers to the questions and that she would need to testify separately if she 

wanted to speak. 

¶ 51 On appeal, Father argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to 

continue the termination hearings and, alternatively, in denying Father’s motion for an 

immediate in-person hearing. Father argues the trial court’s actions denied Father his “right to 

an in-person hearing” and violated his “due process right to appear personally at all stages of 

the proceeding.” Father contends he was prejudiced by the trial court’s decision to conduct the 

hearings via videoconference. 

¶ 52 A parent has a fundamental liberty interest, protected by the due process clause of the 

fourteenth amendment, in maintaining a parental relationship with his or her child. In re D.R., 

307 Ill. App. 3d 478, 482 (1999). To protect this interest, parents are entitled to certain due 

process safeguards in actions to terminate their parental rights. In re D.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d at 

482. These safeguards include the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material 
- 11 -

to the proceedings, and to cross-examine witnesses. In re D.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d at 482; 705 

ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2020). 

¶ 53 The respondent does not have an absolute right to a continuance in a proceeding under the 

Act. In re S.W., 2015 IL App (3d) 140981, ¶ 31. Whether to grant or deny a motion to continue 

in a proceeding under the Act is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. In re C.L.T., 302 

Ill. App. 3d 770, 778 (1999). We will not overturn the trial court’s decision absent manifest 

abuse or palpable injustice. In re S.W., 2015 IL App (3d) 140981, ¶ 31.

¶ 54 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 241 (eff. May 22, 2020) provides that “[t]he court may, upon 

request or on its own order, for good cause shown and upon appropriate safeguards, allow a 

case participant to testify or otherwise participate in a civil trial or evidentiary hearing by video 

conferencing from a remote location.” A “case participant includes any individual involved in 

a civil case including the judge presiding over the case, parties, lawyers, guardians ad litem, 

minors in the care of [DFCS], witnesses, experts, interpreters, treatment providers, law 

enforcement officers, DCFS caseworkers, and court reporters.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee 

Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). “Good cause is likely to arise when a witness is unable to 

attend trial for unexpected reasons, such as accident, illness, or limited court operations, but 

also in foreseeable circumstances such as residing out of state.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee 

Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). The rule requires that adequate safeguard be taken to “ensure 

accurate identification of the case participant testifying remotely and to avoid improper 

influences by any individual who may be present with the case participant at the time of the 

testimony.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). 

¶ 55 The trial court should consider and weigh a multitude of factors when assessing whether it 

is appropriate to admit video testimony. The committee comments provide that the court

“should take into consideration and balance any due process concerns, the ability to 

questions witnesses, hardships that would prevent the case participant from appearing 

in person, the type of case, any prejudice to the parties if testimony occurred by video 

conference, and any other issues of fairness. A court must balance these and other 

relevant factors in an individual case.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. 

May 22, 2020).

¶ 56 On appeal, Father indicates his belief that the question of whether a parent has a right to 

demand an in-person hearing during proceedings to terminate parent rights is an issue of first 

impression. Father, however, provides this court with no analysis as to his belief regarding the 

nature of this alleged right to be personally present. Instead, he baldly asserts that he has a 

“right to an in-person hearing” and that the denial of this “right” violates his “due process right 

to appear personally at all stages of the proceeding.” Father does not provide this court with 

any analysis of Rule 241, the interplay between Rule 241 and his alleged due process right to 

an in-person hearing, or how conducting the hearing via a videoconferencing platform 

interfered with his due process right to be present at the proceeding. 

¶ 57 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. May 25, 2018) sets forth requirements for appellate 

briefs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff. May 25, 2018). Rule 341(h)(7) provides that the argument portion 

of the appellant’s brief “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, 

with citations to the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) 

(eff. May 25, 2018). “A reviewing court is entitled to the benefit of clearly defined issues with 

pertinent authority cited and a cohesive legal argument. *** The appellate court is not a 

depository in which an appellant may dump the entire matter of argument and research.” Wing 
- 12 -

v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11. Arguments that are not 

supported by citations to legal authority do not meet the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7) and 

are procedurally defaulted on appeal. Wing, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11; Ill. S. Ct. R. 

341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) (points not argued are forfeited on appeal). Therefore, Father 

has forfeited this claim on appeal.

¶ 58 Father also forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. Bank of New York 

Mellon v. Rogers, 2016 IL App (2d) 150712, ¶ 32 (issues not raised in the trial court are 

forfeited on appeal); Fawcett v. Reinertsen, 131 Ill. 2d 380, 386 (1989) (holding that issues not 

raised in the trial court, even constitutional matters, are generally considered to be forfeited on 

appeal). At the hearing, Father’s only stated reason for the motion to continue was a 

“preference” for an in-person hearing due to the “difference[s] in cross examining the 

witnesses” and the ability to observe the witness and the witness’s surroundings. At no time 

during the hearing did Father assert that he had a due process right to an in-person hearing. 

The first mention of any alleged “right” to an in-person hearing appeared in Father’s posttrial 

motion to reconsider. Father’s entire argument on this issue constituted the single statement 

that, “[i]n denying Father’s motion [to continue], [the court] denied Father’s right to an inperson trial.” As such, Father’s contention that he had “due process” right to an in-person 

hearing, and that the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue violated this right, have been 

forfeited on appeal.

¶ 59 Despite this forfeiture, the record demonstrates that the trial court allowed all of the case 

participants to testify or participate in the hearing remotely via a videoconferencing platform 

because court operations were limited in Madison County due to the public health concerns 

presented by the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. The committee comments to Rule 241 

specifically indicate that “limited court operations” can constitute “good cause” for proceeding 

under the rule. In denying Father’s motions, the court considered Father’s concerns regarding 

examination of the witnesses, the parents’ due process rights, the court’s role in judging the 

credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, and the children’s need for permanence. 

¶ 60 During the proceeding, the court took steps to safeguard the integrity of the proceeding and 

the parties’ rights. The court repeatedly stopped the proceedings so that the parties could 

privately confer with their attorneys. When the circumstances were brought to the court’s 

attention, the trial judge admonished one witness not to refer to documents unless requested 

and admonished Mother not to provide prompts to Father during his testimony. 

¶ 61 Notably, the committee comments anticipated that these specific issues may arise when 

admitting testimony remotely. The committee comments indicate that the attorneys have an 

ethical obligation to instruct the case participants that they represent that (1) he or she may not 

communicate with anyone during their testimony except the examining attorney and the court 

reporter, and (2) he or she may not consult any written, printed, or electronic information 

during the examination other than information provided by the examining attorney. See Ill. S. 

Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). While a trial judge could also offer 

blanket admonishments regarding these issues prior to the taking of any testimony, in this case 

none of the parties requested that the court do so, and the curative measures employed by the 

trial court when those issues arose were appropriate and sufficient safeguards under the 

circumstances.

¶ 62 While videoconferencing in civil proceedings is relatively new, our supreme court has 

spoken on the use of videoconferencing by amending Rule 241. Our trial courts are now 
- 13 -

experimenting with technology that allows for private conferences between a party and his or 

her attorney, private waiting rooms for witnesses so that testimony is not compromised, and 

other methodologies that enhance the taking of testimony remotely. We find the circuit court 

used the Zoom videoconference platform to conduct a hearing that protected the rights of the 

parties, as well as the integrity of the judicial process.

¶ 63 Further, we find that Father has failed to demonstrate that he had a right to demand an inperson hearing during the termination proceedings in this case. Father has failed to demonstrate 

that the trial court’s decision to conduct the proceeding via a videoconferencing platform, 

consistent with Rule 241, violated Father’s right to personally appear at the termination 

proceeding. Even though Father was not able to be in the same physical space as every other 

participant at the hearing, the videoconferencing platform allowed Father to be present, 

virtually. He was able to testify and was able to be heard, to present evidence, and to crossexamine witnesses. Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Father’s request for a continuance and electing to conduct the termination 

proceedings via a videoconferencing platform in conformity with Rule 241. 

¶ 64 Furthermore, Father has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling. 

On appeal, Father argues that conducting the hearing via videoconference interfered with his 

ability to consult with his attorney “at all times,” stripped him of his right to see what Truax 

was looking at during her testimony, and inhibited the court’s ability to observe the witnesses 

and weigh their credibility. Father’s contentions of prejudice are unfounded. The record 

indicates that Father conferred with his counsel in a breakout room four times during the 

hearing and that the court never denied a request from Father or his counsel to be placed in a 

breakout room for a consultation or to exchange notes.2

¶ 65 Father also asserts he was prejudiced because he could not see what Truax was looking at 

during her testimony. The dissent goes so far as to conclude that the video conference created 

a “specific challenge to the judge in that the witness appeared to be using notes while 

testifying.” The record belies such an assumption. Indeed, the report of proceedings indicates 

that Father’s counsel objected early in the fitness hearing because it appeared that Truax was 

looking down at something while testifying. Obviously, this nuance was not lost on Father’s 

counsel as a result of the videoconference. Moreover, no one asked what it was that Truax 

seemed to be looking at. Upon making the objection, however the court instructed Truax not 

to refer to any notes unless requested to do so. This scenario occurs all of the time when a 

witness takes notes to the witness stand in anticipation of testimony, and it is not unusual for 

the trial court to similarly instruct a witness not to use notes. At no time did Father ask what

Truax was allegedly referring to during her testimony, and he may not now claim that he is 

prejudiced by the omission of his own counsel. The fact that the trial court instructed the 

witness lends validity to the application of Rule 241, as the instruction by the court was an 

appropriate safeguard contemplated by the rule. 

¶ 66 Finally, Father argues he was prejudiced because the trial court’s ability to observe the 

witnesses and weigh their testimony was inhibited by the use of videoconferencing. Father’s 

argument is nothing more than conjecture. There is simply no evidence that the 

videoconferencing platform interfered with or inhibited the trial court’s ability to view the 

2Notably, nothing in the record suggests that public health guidelines prevented Father from 

attending the hearings from the same remote location as his counsel.
- 14 -

witnesses, hear their testimony, and weigh the evidence. For the reasons stated, we find the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion to continue the proceedings 

and, alternatively, in denying his motion for an immediate in-person hearing. 

¶ 67 Despite Father’s forfeiture of his due process claim both in the trial court and on appeal, 

the dissent has elected to present a due process analysis and a Rule 241 analysis in Father’s 

stead. Although we believe that we have already sufficiently addressed Father’s properly 

preserved points on appeal, we feel the need to respond to the dissent’s analysis and findings. 

¶ 68 Written between the lines of the dissent is a dissatisfaction with the trial court’s ruling on 

the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. The dissent’s rationale suggests the belief that 

the State moved too fast, that the trial court should have given Father more time to prove 

himself and his sobriety, and that the trial court should have weighed Father’s last-minute 

success more heavily. This court, however, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial 

court, and ultimately, the dissent does not suggest that the trial court’s determinations as to 

unfitness and best interests were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 69 Other than the general tone that Father was “doing better” by the best interest hearing, the 

dissent in this case seems focused on three distinct issues: (1) that a parent has a due process 

right to an in-person hearing at both stages of a termination proceeding, (2) that the trial court 

misapplied Rule 241, and (3) that the remote appearance did not allow the trial court to 

sufficiently observe the demeanor of the parties and witnesses. We will address each in turn. 

¶ 70 First, the dissent’s finding of a due process right to demand an in-person hearing during 

termination proceedings is premised upon its belief that a parent’s right to be “present” 

encompasses the right to be physically present in the courtroom during the hearing. The dissent 

further suggests that this right extends to requiring most, if not all, of the case participants to 

also appear in person. 

¶ 71 The dissent, however, does not provide the basis for its belief that due process requires a 

physical presence at a hearing. Rather, the dissent cites section 1-5(1) of the Act (705 ILCS 

405/1-5(1) (West 2020)), which provides that parents “have the right to be present, to be heard, 

to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine 

pertinent court files and records and also *** the right to be represented by counsel.”3 On its 

face, the statute does not indicate that the parent’s right to be “present” at the hearing 

encompasses the right to demand an in-person hearing or that all case participants must share 

the same physical space. 

¶ 72 The question of whether the statutory right to be present, in the civil context, requires an 

“in person” presence has not yet been decided by our supreme court. In the criminal context, 

however, we have some guidance that remote proceedings can satisfy the constitutional right 

to be present as it relates to due process. In People v. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d 45, 61-63 (2002), the 

Illinois Supreme Court rejected the argument that a defendant had to be physically present in 

the courtroom where certain statutory criminal provisions required that the pretrial proceeding 

take place in “open court.” See 725 ILCS 5/113-1 (West 2020) (statute on arraignment 

procedures provides that a criminal defendant shall “be called into open court, informed of the 

3

By statute, the Act, the Child Care Act of 1969 (225 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 2020)), the Interstate 

Compact on the Placement of Children Act (45 ILCS 150/0.01 et seq. (West 2020)), and the 

Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. § 14901 (2018)) are to be construed with the Adoption 

Act (750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West 2020)).
- 15 -

charge against him, and called upon to plead thereto” before he can be tried for the offense); 

725 ILCS 5/103-6(i) (West 2020) (providing a defendant can waive his right to a jury trial by 

understandingly waiving the right “in open court”). In reaching the conclusion that remote 

appearances satisfied the “in court” requirement, the court relied upon section 106D-1(a) of 

the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which provided that, “ ‘[w]hen a defendant’s personal 

appearance is not required by the Constitution of the United States or Illinois Constitution, the 

court may allow the defendant to personally appear at any pre-trial or post-trial proceeding by 

way of closed circuit television.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 62-63 (quoting 

725 ILCS 5/106D-1 (West 1998)). Construing the statutory provisions in pari materia, the 

court held that appearances via closed circuit television could satisfy the statutory requirement 

that the defendant be called into “open court” for purposes of arraignment and waiver of his 

right to a jury trial. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 63. 

¶ 73 Unlike criminal proceedings, the termination of parental rights is governed by the Adoption 

Act, all matters attendant thereto are civil in nature, and the general rules of civil practice apply. 

In re J.R., 342 Ill. App. 3d 310, 315 (2003); 750 ILCS 50/20 (West 2020).4 Rule 241 allows 

persons to “testify or otherwise participate” in civil trials and evidentiary hearings by 

videoconference from remote locations and is located under Article II of the Illinois Supreme 

Court Rules.5 While Rule 241 does not specifically state that remote participation is the same 

as the statutory right to be “present” at a hearing, such a finding is implicit in the Rule’s 

provision allowing persons to “participate” remotely. 6 Indeed, the comments to the rule 

indicate that allowing the use of video technology “to conduct testimony under oath in civil 

trials increases accessibility to the courts, aids in the efficient administration of justice, avoids 

delays in trials, and more efficiently administers testimony for case participants who face an 

obstacle to appearing personally in court such as illness, disability, or distance from the 

courthouse.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). 

4“The provisions of the Civil Practice Law [(725 ILCS 5/2-101 et seq. (West 2020))] and all 

existing and future amendments of that Law and the Supreme Court Rules now or hereafter adopted in 

relation to that Law shall apply to all adoption proceedings except as otherwise specifically provided 

in this Act.” 750 ILCS 50/20 (West 2020).

5

“The court may, upon request or on its own order, for good cause shown and upon appropriate 

safeguards, allow a case participant to testify or otherwise participate in a civil trial or evidentiary 

hearing by video conferencing from a remote location.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 241 (eff. May 22, 2020).

6 Although not yet adopted, the Illinois Supreme Court’s Rules Committee has proposed 

amendments to several rules on the use of remote appearances in civil proceedings. This includes a 

proposed amendment to Rule 2(b) defining the terms “in person or by attorney,” “in person or through 

any attorney,” “in person or by counsel,” or “in person or by substitute counsel” as including “such 

individual appearing remotely, including by telephone or video conference under Rules 45 and 241 and

any other rules governing remote appearance.” Ill. S. Ct. Comm’n on Access to Justice, Proposal 21-

01, https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/5c2c4fd1-9ca1-4d8d9e70-1d9c037b0f78/Proposal%2021-01%20Amends%20Rules%202,%2021,%2088,%2090,%20

91,%2093,%2099,%20100.6,%20100.7,%20100.8,%20100.10,%20113,%20203,%20206,%20207,%

20209,%20217,%20218,%20237,%20277,%20551,%20901,%20905,%20and%20942%20Offered%2

0by%20Illinois%20Supreme%20Court%20Commission%20on%20Access%20to%20Justice.pdf. 

(last visited July 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/JY3S-9935].
- 16 -

Based on the foregoing, we do not believe that section 1-5(1) of the Act provides a parent a 

statutory right to demand an in-person hearing during termination proceedings.

¶ 74 The dissent seems to suggest, nevertheless, that parents always have a constitutional due 

process right to be present in person, personally, in open court in a termination proceeding. 

Inasmuch as there is no case law that supports such a theory, the dissent likens a parent’s 

procedural due process rights in termination proceedings to the “procedural protections 

accorded to criminal defendants.” In criminal proceedings, however, the right to be physically 

present, even at a critical stage of the proceeding, is not absolute. In Lindsey, the Illinois 

Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention that his appearance via closed circuit 

television for his arraignment and jury waiver violated his federal and state constitutional rights 

to be present at all critical stages of trial. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 54-60. Under the United States 

Constitution, a criminal defendant has a right to be physically present “ ‘at any stage of the 

criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the 

fairness of the procedure.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 57 (quoting Kentucky 

v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)). As stated in Lindsey:

“ ‘[A criminal defendant] has a due process right “to be present in his own person 

whenever his presence has a relationship, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his 

opportunity to defend against the charge.” [Citation.] Although the Court has 

emphasized that this privilege of presence is not guaranteed “when presence would be 

useless, or the benefit but a shadow” [citation], due process clearly requires that a 

defendant be allowed to be present “to the extent a fair and just hearing would be 

thwarted by his absence” [citation].’ ” Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 56-57 (quoting Stincer, 

482 U.S. at 745).

¶ 75 As previously noted, the Lindsey court acknowledged that the use of a closed circuit 

television did not violate the defendant’s right to be present “in open court” under the 

circumstances presented. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 57.

¶ 76 Article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution grants criminal defendants the right “to 

appear and defend in person and by counsel.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8.7 Even this more 

express right, guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution, to be physically present at a hearing, is 

limited. Indeed, our Illinois Supreme Court has stated that “ ‘[the right to be present] is a lesser 

right the observance of which is a means to securing the substantial rights of a defendant. 

Thus[,] a defendant is not denied a constitutional right every time he is not present during his 

trial, but only when his absence results in a denial of an underlying substantial right, in other 

words, a constitutional right,’ ” such as the right to confront witnesses, the right to present a 

defense, and the right to an impartial jury. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 57 (quoting People v. Bean, 

137 Ill. 2d 65, 81 (1990)). As such, a criminal defendant’s absence from a critical stage of the 

proceeding “will violate his constitutional rights only if the record demonstrates that 

defendant’s absence caused the proceeding to be unfair or if his absence resulted in a denial of 

an underlying substantial right.” Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 57. Whether the fairness of the trial was 

affected by the defendant’s absence from a portion of his trial is assessed in light of the entire 

record. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 57-58. Notably, while we again recognize that these are standards 

for criminal proceedings, we do so only to observe that the dissent appears to be providing 

7There is no similar counterpart for civil proceedings or termination proceedings under the 

Adoption Act.
- 17 -

parents in civil termination proceedings greater constitutional procedural due process rights 

than those reserved for defendants in certain types of criminal proceedings. Moreover, as 

explained further herein, nothing in the record indicates Father was denied the right to confront 

witnesses, testify, or otherwise present his evidence. As such, we find that the hearing 

conducted via videoconference did not deny Father his constitutional due process right to be 

“present” at the hearing.

¶ 77 The dissent next concludes that the trial court misapplied Rule 241. On this point, the 

dissent asserts that (1) the express language of Rule 241 does not permit the trial court to hold 

the entire termination hearing remotely without the consent of the parents, (2) there was no 

“good cause” shown that would permit remote participation in this case, and (3) the trial court 

did not balance the competing factors before denying Father’s motion to continue and request 

for an in-person hearing.

¶ 78 The dissent contends that the express language of Rule 241 only permits a court to “allow” 

a case participant to participate remotely, but that it does not grant the trial court the authority 

to “require[ ] case participants—including parents whose fundamental right to a continued 

relationship with their children was at stake—to participate from remote locations despite their 

expressed preference for an in-person hearing and [a] formal objection to holding a remote 

hearing.” (Emphasis in original.) Infra ¶ 122. Thus, the argument contends that the rule is 

permissive and that the trial court’s decision can be preempted where a party objects. 

¶ 79 There is nothing in the language of the rule that requires a party to consent or otherwise 

approve of the trial court’s decision to conduct a hearing remotely. Therefore, we find the 

dissent’s reading of the rule to be strained. Rule 241 specifically permits the court to allow 

remote participation “upon request or on its own order.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 241 

(eff. May 22, 2020). Any argument that Rule 241 requires the consent of a party, or other case 

participant, is simply not supported by the plain reading of the rule, itself. 

¶ 80 The dissent also concludes that “good cause” did not exist in this case where limited court 

operations were in place due to a nationwide pandemic. Again, the plain language of the rule 

grants the court the authority to exercise its judgment that good cause exists and order the cause 

to proceed remotely. The rule also requires that the court adopt “appropriate safeguards” to 

protect the rights of the litigants and witnesses. Ill. S. Ct. R. 241 (eff. May 22, 2020). There is 

a paucity of information in the record regarding when and why the decision was made to hold 

the termination hearings via videoconference. The record does indicate that the attorneys and 

the parties became aware that the termination hearings were going to be conducted via 

videoconference prior to the hearing. The decision to conduct the hearings remotely was made 

because the Madison County courts were not conducting in-person hearings, except in 

emergency situations, due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. Other than these few facts, 

the dissent goes to great lengths to fill in the gaps in the record with assumptions that are 

convenient to its ultimate conclusion. For example, without any further factual information as 

to the conditions which prompted the trial court to reset the hearing, the dissent concludes that 

court operations were not sufficiently limited to constitute “good cause” under the rule because 

(1) the trial court had conducted in-person hearings during the pandemic months earlier and 

(2) the chief judge of the Third Judicial Circuit entered administrative orders permitting 

“essential court proceedings” to be conducted in person. 

¶ 81 The dissent’s finding that the trial court could have provided the parents with an in-person 

hearing with little or no delay is nothing more than unsupported speculation. The reality is that 
- 18 -

court operations in Madison County were limited due to public health concerns caused by the 

ongoing pandemic, and there is simply no evidence in the record suggesting that an opportunity 

for an in-person hearing was readily available under the current conditions in the community, 

the court, or for all of the case participants. As already discussed in the main portion of this 

opinion, the pandemic and the health threat posed by it provided “good cause” for the trial 

court to conduct the hearing via videoconference.

¶ 82 In further support of the dissent’s argument that the court misapplied Rule 241, the dissent 

suggests that the trial court did not “take into consideration and balance any due process 

concerns, *** the type of case, *** and any other issues of fairness” in denying Father’s request 

for a continuance and proceeding with the hearing via videoconference. (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) Infra ¶ 125. Initially, we must reiterate that Father did not raise his alleged 

due process right to an in-person hearing when requesting a continuance before trial. Instead, 

Father only asserted that he did not consent to the videoconference hearing because he had a 

“preference” for an in-person hearing “[g]iven the difference in cross examining the witnesses” 

and the ability to “see the witness, *** see what the witness is doing, [and] who the witness is 

with.” 

¶ 83 The dissent’s suggestion that the trial court did not balance the necessary factors is belied 

by the record. Prior to rendering its decision to proceed remotely, the court heard the arguments 

from the parents and the State regarding concerns about viewing the witnesses, the possibility 

of outside influences upon the witnesses, the type of the proceeding, the competing interests at 

stake, and the parents’ right to counsel. In denying Father’s motion to continue, the court 

specifically indicated that it did not believe the parents’ constitutionally protected rights would 

be infringed by moving forward. Thus, pursuant to Rule 241, the court considered what was 

necessary to protect the due process rights of the litigants and determined that a hearing via 

videoconference could be safely conducted. 

¶ 84 Had Father desired a more robust argument and analysis of his request to continue the 

hearing, he should have filed a written motion objecting to the videoconference hearing and 

requesting a continuance. That motion could have more clearly described his alleged claim of 

a due process right, a violation of that right, and may have clarified when the court could have 

conducted an in-person hearing. The record demonstrates that Father and his counsel knew, 

prior to the hearing, that the court was considering conducting the termination hearings via 

videoconference. Instead of filing a written motion objecting to the procedure, Father elected 

to wait until the start of the hearing and made his objections and motion to continue orally. 

¶ 85 The dissent glosses over the fact that Father knew the hearing may be conducted remotely. 

Instead, the dissent indicates that Father was “caught off-guard by the State’s sudden 

objection” at the hearing because Father had advised the State prior to the hearing that he 

intended to object to the Zoom hearing and believed the State would agree to the continuance. 

Infra ¶ 113. There is a real distinction between what facts are contained in the record at trial 

versus those set out in Father’s posttrial motion. We believe it is important to observe that the 

overwhelming majority of “facts” presented by the dissent on this issue are derived from 

Father’s posttrial motion to reconsider. These “facts” are unsupported by any evidence in the 

record, were not raised as a basis for granting the continuance at the hearing or on appeal, and 

are nothing more than unvetted allegations. The dissent, however, argues that we should take 

as true Father’s allegations in his posttrial motion wherein allegations were made that Father, 

or his counsel, notified the state’s attorney that Father would be seeking a continuance of the 
- 19 -

hearing. This information was certainly not made available to the trial court when it was 

considering Father’s request for a continuance, and the trial court denied Father’s posttrial 

motion before the State could respond. Therefore, the question arises as to why Father 

remained silent about this alleged set of circumstances when asking the trial judge to continue 

the case. Ultimately, the failure to file a written motion setting forth Father’s objections and 

arguments supporting the contention that proceeding with the hearing as scheduled would 

result in a deprivation of Father’s constitutional rights falls squarely on Father’s counsel. 

Simply put, the record belies the dissent’s assertions that the trial court did not balance the 

various pros and cons of proceeding remotely before it denied Father’s motion for a 

continuance.

¶ 86 Finally, the dissent argues that the use of a videoconference platform denied the trial court 

the opportunity to observe Father’s demeanor and somehow interfered with the trial court’s 

ability to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Nothing in the record supports this argument. 

Despite this conclusion by the dissent, Father has made no allegation that conducting the 

hearing via videoconference instead of in person denied him a substantial constitutional right 

to confront witnesses against him. Nowhere in the record has Father asserted that the 

videoconference hearing adversely affected the fairness of the proceeding or affected Father’s 

opportunity to defend against the petition. And we simply cannot fill in the void for Father 

when he has failed to do so.

¶ 87 Even if we were to accept the dissent’s argument, the facts of this case render it meritless. 

For example, the dissent believes that Father’s reaction to Truax’s testimony would have 

provided the trial court with “subtle clues” as to the veracity of the witness’s testimony. The 

dissent believes this was vitally important in this case because only 10 months elapsed between 

the adjudication of neglect and the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights and that 

these clues were necessary in determining whether Father’s efforts and progress during this 

time were “reasonable.” Make no mistake, the uncontested evidence at the unfitness hearing 

was that Father made very little effort, and absolutely no progress, on any of his service plan 

tasks during the nine months at issue, despite persistent efforts to get Father to engage. And 

the dissent provides no insight into how viewing Father, in person, as opposed to over a live 

video monitor, would have given the trial court a better vantage to view Father’s “reaction” to 

Truax’s uncontested testimony. After all, Father did not challenge the testimony of Truax 

indicating that Father failed to engage in services that would have, or should have, altered the 

trial court’s finding of unfitness or transformed Father’s lack of effort and progress into 

something “reasonable.” Father did not testify in response to the evidence offered by Truax 

during the fitness hearing. Thus, it is mere conjecture that Father had any relevant response to 

the testimony given by Truax that was “missed” by the trial court.

¶ 88 The same result is true for the “best interests” determination. Truax and Father agreed as 

to the most salient facts weighing in Father’s favor at the best interests hearing: (1) Father had 

very recently completed in-patient drug treatment, (2) Father and the children were bonded to 

each and loved each other, (3) the children were excited for visits, and the interaction between 

Father and the children was positive, and (4) P.S. wished to continue visits with her parents 

even if she was adopted. The major point of contention in this case was whether Father was 

willing and able to overcome his own issues so that he could meet the many needs of his 

children in the future. Again, the uncontested evidence at the hearing was that, for the 

overwhelming majority of the case, Father was either unwilling or unable to do this, in that he 
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made little or no effort to seek treatment for his persistent substance abuse, mental health, and 

domestic violence issues. 

¶ 89 Furthermore, while the dissent insinuates that the timeline in the case was unfairly 

compressed, the full record demonstrates otherwise. While only relevant to the “best interests” 

determination, the evidence is clear that the conditions that brought the children into care were 

present no later than February 1, 2019, at the time of A.S.’s birth almost two years earlier. At 

that time, DCFS initiated an investigation and intact services. Father did not cooperate with 

those services, notably denying any substance abuse issues. Father’s November 2020 

completion of in-patient drug treatment is admirable, and certainly everyone involved hopes 

that he maintains his sobriety. This success, however, was only achieved in the weeks prior to 

the termination hearing, and its staying power was untested. Father’s ability to maintain 

sobriety was untested because he chose not to fully engage in substance abuse treatment 

services earlier, despite the fact that his children were in State care. 

¶ 90 Based on the foregoing, we do not believe that Father had either a statutory or constitutional 

due process right to an in-person hearing during the termination proceedings. Furthermore, we 

do not believe that the trial court misapplied Rule 241 in conducting the termination 

proceedings via a videoconferencing platform or that the videoconferencing platform limited 

the trial court’s ability to observe the case participants and interfered with its ability to judge 

the credibility of the witnesses.

¶ 91 CONCLUSION

¶ 92 For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Madison 

County. 

¶ 93 Affirmed.

¶ 94 JUSTICE WHARTON, dissenting:

¶ 95 Due to the importance of the rights at stake in this case and the permanence of the order 

severing the parent-child relationship—a State action that represents a parental death 

sentence—I cannot agree with the majority that due process never requires an in-person 

hearing. Furthermore, I cannot agree with the majority that the hearing in this case comported 

with the requirements of due process. I also believe that by holding the entire termination 

hearing remotely without the consent of the parents and without balancing due process 

concerns and “other issues of fairness,” the trial court read Rule 241 more broadly than was 

intended. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 96 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized “the primacy of the parent-child 

relationship” (M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 

645, 651 (1972), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))). Thus, as the majority 

explained, parents enjoy a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining their relationships with 

their children. See D.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d at 482. An order terminating parental rights 

permanently severs that relationship. “Few forms of state action are both so severe and so 

irreversible.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982). 

¶ 97 It is important to note at the outset that, because of these concerns, the Illinois Supreme 

Court has explicitly held that proceedings involving the termination of parental rights must 
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comport with the requirements of due process. In re J.J., 201 Ill. 2d 236, 243 (2002). Thus, the 

fact that proceedings are deemed to be civil in nature does not completely answer the question 

before us. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 128. Parental termination cases are quite distinguishable 

“from mine run civil actions, even from other domestic relations matters such as divorce, 

paternity, and child custody.” Id. at 127. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has likened 

a respondent “endeavoring to defend against the State’s destruction of her family bonds” to a 

criminal defendant because both “seek[ ] to be spared from the State’s devastatingly adverse 

action.” Id. at 125. “[T]ermination decrees ‘wor[k] a unique kind of deprivation.’ ” Id. at 127 

(quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).

¶ 98 As such, parents enjoy many of the procedural protections accorded to criminal defendants. 

See id. at 124. For example, parents in termination proceedings in Illinois have the right to 

appointed counsel, the right to present evidence, the right to cross-examine witnesses against 

them, and—most significantly for purposes of this appeal—the right to be present at hearings. 

705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2018). 

¶ 99 At issue is the State’s authority to permanently sever the intimate relationship between a 

parent and his child through a totally remote Zoom hearing. In determining whether due 

process liberty interests are implicated by the State’s action, we are cautioned to look not only 

at the weight of an individual’s interest but to consider the nature of the interest at stake. See 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)). 

The United States Supreme Court has reiterated that “a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the 

companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children’ is an important interest 

that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, 

protection.’ ” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651). More definitively, 

the United States Supreme Court has concluded that “ ‘the interest of parents in their 

relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of 

liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’ ” M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 119 (quoting 

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and White and 

O’Connor, JJ.)).

¶ 100 Although a parent has a fundamental interest in the relationship with his child and a 

statutory right to be present at hearings, the right to be present is not absolute. See In re J.M., 

2020 IL App (2d) 190806, ¶ 42. However, due to the nature of the rights at stake, I believe that 

terminating a parent’s rights, under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, without 

allowing the parent to be present in person at the hearing, raises due process concerns. See, 

e.g., id. ¶ 37; S.W., 2015 IL App (3d) 140981, ¶¶ 43-44; In re C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d 461, 465-

66 (1995). The Illinois Appellate Court, confronting these due process concerns, has utilized 

the three factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 

U.S. 319 (1976), to determine whether the requirements of due process were satisfied under 

the specific facts and circumstances of the cases before them. See, e.g., J.M., 2020 IL App (2d) 

190806, ¶¶ 41-49; In re M.R., 316 Ill. App. 3d 399, 402-03 (2000); C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 

465-66.8

8

I note that the Fourth District found due process analysis inapplicable in a case involving a request 

for a continuance to allow a parent to attend her termination hearing. In re S.B., 2015 IL App (4th) 

150260, ¶ 21. The court reasoned that, in other civil proceedings, a ruling on a motion for a continuance 

is ordinarily a matter of judicial discretion that does not involve questions of due process. Id. (citing 
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¶ 101 The Mathews factors are (1) the nature of the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of 

erroneous deprivation and the value of additional safeguards; and (3) the State interest 

involved, including the burdens that additional safeguards would impose. Mathews, 424 U.S. 

at 334-35. In applying these factors, we must keep in mind that due process is “a flexible 

concept that affords procedural protections as required by specific situations.” J.M., 2020 IL 

App (2d) 190806, ¶ 40 (citing In re J.S., 2018 IL App (2d) 180001, ¶ 18, citing Mathews, 424 

U.S. at 334). Applying these three factors to the case before us, I believe that due process 

required that Father be permitted to be present at the termination hearing.

¶ 102 The first Mathews factor is the private interest involved. As already emphasized in both 

the majority opinion and my dissent, this case involves the termination of one of the most 

fundamental rights protected under our constitution. This factor weighs heavily in favor of 

Father’s argument. See id. ¶ 43; M.R., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 402; C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 465.

¶ 103 The second Mathews factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the right involved and 

the value of providing additional safeguards. Here, I recognize that Father was represented by 

counsel and that he was permitted to participate in the hearing remotely and to present 

evidence, including his own testimony. These features do mitigate the risk of an erroneous 

deprivation to a great extent. See J.M., 2020 IL App (2d) 190806, ¶ 47; M.R., 316 Ill. App. 3d 

at 402-03. However, as I will explain in more detail, I do not believe they eliminate the risk. 

¶ 104 In crafting Rule 241, our supreme court has explicitly recognized the importance of live 

testimony. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). The ability to 

observe both witnesses and parties in person can be crucial and should not be understated. A 

party’s reaction to a witness’s testimony can give subtle clues as to the veracity of the witness’s 

testimony. The demeanor of a parent during a hearing can also give subtle clues about his 

temperament and his attitude towards his children. Indeed, the trial court’s opportunity to 

observe first-hand the demeanor of the parties is one of the reasons we give such great 

deference to its decisions in matters involving the welfare of children. See In re Jay. H., 395 

Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1070 (2009). 

¶ 105 Although video conferencing platforms like Zoom do not eliminate a judge’s opportunity 

to observe a parent’s demeanor throughout the hearing, they do impose limitations. See People 

v. Stroud, 208 Ill. 2d 398, 407 (2004) (explaining that in a video appearance, “ ‘crucial aspects 

of defendant’s physical presence may be lost or misinterpreted, such as the participant’s 

demeanor, facial expressions, and vocal inflections’ ” (quoting People v. Guttendorf, 309 Ill. 

App. 3d 1044, 1046-47 (2000))). A judge can only see what takes place within the video frame, 

and it is harder to watch parties’ real time reactions to testimony when the parties and the 

Benton v. Marr, 364 Ill. 628, 630 (1936)). However, the Fourth District went on to hold that the trial 

court abused its discretion because its denial of the mother’s motion to continue was unjust under the 

circumstances of the case. Relevant circumstances included the fact that the mother’s parental rights 

were at stake, the fact that she was delayed in reaching the court due to circumstances beyond her 

control, and the fact that she was seeking a short delay. Id. ¶ 23. These are the very factors involved in 

my due process analysis in this case. I also note that in S.W. the Third District similarly applied an 

abuse-of-discretion standard to a court’s decision to deny a mother’s requests for continuances. See 

S.W., 2015 IL App (3d) 140981, ¶¶ 32-38. However, the court also went on to consider the mother’s 

alternative argument that the trial court violated her right to due process by denying her requests for 

continuances and by holding the best interest portion of the termination process in her absence. Id. 

¶¶ 41-44.
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witnesses appear in separate boxes. In this case, the Zoom hearing presented a specific 

challenge to the judge in that a witness appeared to be using notes while testifying and Father’s 

attorney objected, stating that “[e]very time the witness answers she appears to be looking offcamera down at something, so I don’t believe she’s testifying from her memory or, you know, 

from her personal knowledge.” The judge was unable to determine whether the witness was 

testifying from notes due to the visibility constraints resulting from the video frame. The judge 

communicated to the witness: “I don’t know if you’re reading anything, but don’t refer to any 

notes or anything unless specifically requested to, okay?” 

¶ 106 In this case, those subtle clues were particularly important. The question before the trial 

court was whether Father’s efforts and progress were reasonable. Unlike many cases involving 

the termination of parental rights, only 10 months elapsed between the adjudication of neglect 

and the date on which the State filed its motion to terminate. During this period, Father took 

the important step of seeking in-patient treatment for his addiction. At the time the petition to 

terminate was filed, he was on a waiting list for a program. By the time the termination hearing 

was held, he had successfully completed that program. Although Father did not complete the 

program until after the period identified in the petition to terminate, a trial court may consider 

a parent’s efforts during the entire period following the adjudication of neglect. In re E.S., 246 

Ill. App. 3d 330, 338 (1993). 

¶ 107 In reviewing the entire period after the minors were adjudicated neglected, Father also 

secured employment as a forklift operator and attended all scheduled visits with the children. 

Furthermore, the DCFS caseworker testified that Father was cooperative and that he had very 

positive interactions with the children during his visits. Despite the obvious impact of the 

COVID-19 pandemic, Father took several important steps toward correcting the conditions 

that resulted in the removal of the children from the home. 

¶ 108 In determining whether to take the extraordinary step of terminating Father’s parental 

rights, the trial court had to consider whether Father was likely to continue to make progress 

so that the children could be returned to his care. See In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 459 

(1991) (explaining that “reasonable progress requires measurable or demonstrable movement 

toward the goal of reunification” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A better opportunity to 

observe Father’s temperament could have helped inform the court’s decision. For these 

reasons, I believe that the risk of erroneous deprivation weighs at least slightly in favor of 

finding that due process required an in-person hearing.

¶ 109 The final Mathews factor is the State’s interest. As Illinois courts have often recognized, 

the State has an interest in providing permanence to the children involved in these proceedings. 

See, e.g., J.M., 2020 IL App (2d) 190806, ¶ 48; M.R., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 403; see C.J., 272 Ill. 

App. 3d at 466. Pertinent here, the State also has an interest in limiting the spread of COVID19. While both of these State interests are important, I do not believe forcing Father to forgo 

his right to an in-person hearing was necessary to protect either of these State interests.

¶ 110 I first address the State’s interest in providing permanence to the children involved in this 

case. The State has an interest in avoiding undue delay in juvenile cases because “serious delay

*** can cause grave harm to the minors.” (Emphasis added.) S.W., 2015 IL App (3d) 140981, 

¶ 31. Here, however, the State filed a petition to terminate parental rights only 10 months after 

the court entered an adjudicatory order, and the matter came for a termination hearing less than 

4 months later. This case, therefore, does not involve the type of “serious delay” that often 

occurs. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 6, 14, 22-24 (where the petition to terminate was filed when the case 
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involving the older child had been pending for nearly four years and the case involving the 

younger child had been pending for nearly two years, and the termination hearing took place 

one year later due to continuances requested by the mother); M.R., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 400, 403 

(noting that the June 1998 termination hearing “had previously been continued and set for trial 

at least once since 1996”).

¶ 111 Moreover, providing Father with an in-person hearing would not necessarily have required 

any substantial delay. See J.M., 2020 IL App (2d) 190806, ¶ 49 (considering the “lengthy delay 

in the proceedings” that would have been necessary to arrange for the incarcerated father to be 

transported from a Wisconsin prison to Illinois for a hearing); M.R., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 403 

(noting that the mother’s release date from a psychiatric hospital was unknown); C.J., 272 Ill. 

App. 3d at 466 (finding that the State’s interest in permanency for the children “would not have 

been unduly burdened” where “less time-consuming” alternatives to waiting for the 

incarcerated mother’s release date were available). 

¶ 112 It is also worth noting that the court could have provided the parents with an in-person 

hearing with no additional delay. The record in this case reveals that the hearing was originally 

set to take place in person on October 1, 2020. On that date, the State’s attorney, Mother’s 

attorney, and the GAL appeared in person, and the trial court entered its order granting the 

motion to continue that all parties requested. The order reset the termination hearing for 

November 24, 2020, without any indication that the hearing would not be in person. The parties 

were ordered “to appear” on November 24, 2020.9 The court, therefore, could have held the 

hearing in person as scheduled. Alternatively, the court could have addressed the possibility of 

holding a virtual hearing instead at a status conference rather than making that change without 

consulting with the respondent parents. 

¶ 113 I also note that Father and his attorney had always intended to object to the Zoom hearing. 

Father’s attorney communicated this intent to the Madison County State’s Attorney assigned 

to this case. In Father’s motion to reconsider filed on December 23, 2020, his attorney verified 

that he provided advance notice to the state’s attorney that he would be requesting the 

continuance. The state’s attorney did not state any objection to this procedural plan, and 

Father’s attorney believed that the State had no objection to his request. So, on November 24, 

2020, at the beginning of the Zoom hearing, Father’s attorney made his oral motion to continue 

the case, noting that the case had originally been scheduled for an in-person hearing and that 

his client would not consent to the Zoom hearing. The trial court then asked the state’s attorney 

for her response. She stated that “the State is fully prepared to move forward.” Father’s attorney 

was caught off-guard by the State’s sudden objection as he believed the State would agree to 

the continuance. The court immediately denied the motion. Father’s attorney then asked to 

convert the hearing on that date to an in-person hearing, stating: “If it’s such an emergency 

that it needs to happen today, then I think we can all come to court and have it in person today.” 

The court denied the second motion without further comment and directed the State to proceed 

with its case. Although the majority construes the statements made by Father’s attorney in the 

motion to reconsider to be “nothing more than unvetted allegations,” I find that the pleading 

9I also note that although the court made no express statement to this effect, the COVID-19 

pandemic was presumably utilized as the foundation for holding the termination hearing remotely by 

Zoom. However, this court and judge held in-person hearings earlier in this case, including a hearing 

that took place on October 1, 2020, just weeks before hearing at issue.
- 25 -

was signed by the attorney in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 

2018). As Rule 137(a) provides, “[t]he signature of an attorney *** constitutes a certificate by 

him that he has read the *** motion *** [and] that to the best of his knowledge, information, 

and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 

existing law.” Id.

¶ 114 Under these circumstances—where the trial court had held in-person hearings in this case 

throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, including an in-person hearing just weeks before the 

hearing at issue, and where there was a misunderstanding of the State’s intentions with respect 

to Father’s planned request for a continuance to accommodate an in-person hearing—I do not 

believe the State’s interest in providing the children with permanency as early as possible 

outweighed Father’s interest in having an in-person hearing.

¶ 115 I reach a similar conclusion with respect to the State’s interest in preventing the spread of 

COVID-19. As I will explain more fully next, Madison County was holding in-person hearings 

in “essential cases” at the time the termination hearing in this case took place, including 

hearings in this type of case. Considering the totality of the circumstances of this case, I cannot 

find that the State’s legitimate interests required an entirely virtual hearing at all, much less 

that these interests outweighed Father’s interests. Weighing all three Mathews factors, I find 

that holding a fully virtual hearing over Father’s objections violated his right to due process.

¶ 116 Before turning my attention to the question of whether the court complied with the 

requirements of Rule 241, I wish to address the majority’s discussion of Lindsey and its 

suggestion that I “appear[ ] to be providing parents in civil termination proceedings greater 

constitutional procedural due process rights than those reserved for [criminal] defendants.” 

Supra ¶ 76. With all due respect, I believe this statement mischaracterizes both my dissent and 

the holding of Lindsey. 

¶ 117 The majority states that the supreme court’s holding in Lindsey provides us with “some 

guidance that remote proceedings can satisfy the constitutional right to be present as it relates 

to due process.” Supra ¶ 72. Although I believe that the Illinois cases I have discussed, which 

utilized the Mathews factors to address the requirements of due process in the context of 

parental termination hearings, provide the appropriate analytical framework, I agree that 

Lindsey can provide additional guidance.

¶ 118 In Lindsey, a criminal defendant appeared remotely at several pretrial hearings, including 

his arraignment and a hearing at which he waived his right to a jury trial. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d 

at 47-48. At both hearings, the defendant appeared by closed-circuit television from the jail. 

Id. The supreme court found that both hearings were “critical stages” of the proceedings against 

the defendant. Id. The supreme court explained, however, that the constitutional right to be 

present at critical stages of criminal proceedings is not absolute. Id. at 56. The court held that 

a defendant’s remote appearance violates his right to be present at a critical stage only if he 

can show that his “physical absence from the proceedings caused the proceedings to be unfair 

or that his physical absence from the proceedings resulted in the denial of an underlying 

constitutional right.” Id. at 60. 

¶ 119 In finding that the defendant’s remote participation did not violate his rights under the 

circumstances of the case before it, the supreme court highlighted two significant factors. First, 

the court noted that although the “defendant was not physically present in the courtroom for 

his arraignment and jury waiver, neither was he entirely absent from these proceedings.” Id. at 

58. I recognize that the same is true in this case. The supreme court also found it significant, 
- 26 -

however, that the defendant’s “right to confront witnesses was not implicated because there 

were no witnesses to confront at the proceedings.” Id. at 59. Unlike Lindsey, the hearing at 

issue in this case did involve witness testimony.

¶ 120 The most significant difference between this case and Lindsey is the stage of proceedings 

at issue. This case involves a final determination of parental unfitness, not a preliminary matter. 

The Illinois Supreme Court drew precisely that distinction in People v. Stroud. There, a 

criminal defendant participated in his guilty plea hearing by closed-circuit television. Stroud, 

208 Ill. 2d at 400. In finding that his constitutional right to be present at a critical stage was 

violated by this procedure (id.), the court specifically distinguished the case before it from 

Lindsey on the basis that Lindsey involved an arraignment and a waiver of the right to a jury 

trial rather than a plea hearing (id. at 406). The supreme court explained, “The number and 

gravity of rights at stake at a guilty plea hearing is greater than when a defendant intends to 

plead not guilty at arraignment.” Id. In significant part, this is because a guilty plea hearing, 

unlike an arraignment or jury trial waiver, directly results in a judgment of conviction. Id.

(citing Guttendorf, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 

(1969)). Similarly, the hearing at issue in this case resulted in the permanent severance of 

Father’s parental rights. Thus, to the extent we can look to criminal cases for guidance, this 

case is more akin to Stroud than it is to Lindsey. 

¶ 121 The majority asserts that I want to give parents in termination hearings more rights than 

criminal defendants enjoy. Nothing could be further from the truth. Both parents in termination 

cases and criminal defendants are entitled to due process. In both contexts, the requirements of 

due process depend upon the specific facts and circumstances involved. For the reasons I have 

discussed, I find that under the circumstances of this case, the requirements of due process 

were not satisfied.

¶ 122 I also do not believe the express terms of Rule 241 allow courts to hold an entirely virtual 

hearing over the objection of a party under the circumstances of this case. The rule provides 

that a court may “allow a case participant to testify or otherwise participate in a civil trial or 

evidentiary hearing by video conferencing from a remote location.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. 

Ct. R. 241 (eff. May 22, 2020). Here, the court required case participants—including parents 

whose fundamental right to a continued relationship with their children was at stake—to 

participate from remote locations despite their expressed preference for an in-person hearing 

and Father’s formal objection to holding a remote hearing. There is a significant difference 

between allowing something and requiring it. Further, the rule explicitly requires a showing of 

good cause. Id. Although limited court operations can constitute “good cause” (see Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020)), Madison County was holding live 

hearings in “essential cases” at the time of the termination hearing in this case.

¶ 123 Early in the pandemic, on March 20, 2020, the chief judge of the Third Judicial Circuit, 

which includes Madison County, entered Administrative Order 2020-M-9, which stated that 

“only essential court matters and proceedings shall continue to be heard in the Third Judicial 

Circuit in order to protect the health and safety of court patrons, staff, judges[,] and the general 

public.” Third Judicial Cir. Ct. Adm. Order 2020-M-9 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://files1.revize.

com/revize/madisoncounty/document_center/CircuitClerk/Administrative%20Oder%2020M

9.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MRG-FN3T]. The chief judge ordered that all non-essential court 

matters and proceedings would either be continued or conducted remotely. Id. “Essential court 

proceedings” included:
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“1. All matters with individuals in custody, including bond hearings;

2. Criminal trials with speedy trial demands and those in custody;

3. Summary suspension hearings, absent an agreed continuance; 

4. Emergency and Plenary Petitions for Protective Orders (including, but not 

limited to, Orders of Protection, Stalking, No Contact, Civil No Contact and Firearms 

Surrender Order);

5. Detention hearings for detained juveniles;

6. Shelter Care and other essential hearings for juveniles who may have been 

abused or neglected;

7. Mental Health hearings for involuntary commitment or treatment;

8. Emergency hearings in family matters scheduled only with the approval of the 

Court; [and]

9. Any other emergency hearing scheduled and approved by the court.” (Emphasis 

added.) Id.

The chief judge also entered an order effective November 16, 2020—just eight days before the 

termination hearing in this case—restating its intent to hold in-person proceedings in “essential 

court matters.” Third Judicial Circuit Ct. Adm. Order 2020-M-29 (Nov. 13, 2020), https://

files1.revize.com/revize/madisoncounty/document_center/CircuitClerk/Administrative%20O

rder%202020-M-29%20COVID-19%20Resurgence%20Response.pdf) [https://perma.cc/

8JJ2-5UUW]. Again, the order specifically included “Shelter Care and other essential hearings 

for juveniles who may have been abused or neglected.” Id. 

¶ 124 Here, the Third Judicial Circuit entered orders providing express COVID-19 procedures 

and categories for in-person court proceedings. While I recognize that these administrative 

orders did not mandate in-person hearings, the orders also did not prohibit the court from 

holding in-person hearings. Considering the timing and subject matter of these administrative 

orders, Father’s attorney seemingly misspoke in communicating his oral motion for a 

continuance, when he stated that Madison County was only holding in-person hearings in 

emergency situations. A termination hearing assuredly constituted an “essential” court 

proceeding, as detailed in the Madison County orders. Therefore, I believe there was no “good 

cause” shown based on limited court operations to require a remote hearing.

¶ 125 In addition, the committee comments to Rule 241 direct courts to “take into consideration 

and balance any due process concerns, *** the type of case, *** and any other issues of 

fairness.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). Here, no such 

balancing occurred. Instead, the court stated only, “Given the fact that it’s a bench trial, and 

more importantly, I don’t believe permanency for the children should be delayed, I don’t 

believe the parents’ constitutionally protected rights would be infringed by going forward with 

the Zoom hearing.” Of note, the trial court did not reference the COVID-19 pandemic as 

necessitating the change from in person to remote presence. I agree with the majority’s 

statement that the record contains a “paucity of information” about when and why this court 

ordered the hearing to be held remotely. However, the absence of an express statement of the 

court’s rationale for holding this critical hearing remotely should be weighed against finding 

“good cause” shown. I do not believe Rule 241 was intended to allow courts to require litigants 

to appear remotely under the circumstances of this case with no showing that the hearing could 
- 28 -

not have taken place in person and with no indication that the court weighed any of the relevant 

concerns or considered less drastic alternatives, such as observing social distancing.

¶ 126 Finally, I note that although Father argued that the court violated his right to due process 

and emphasized the fact that the court opted to hold the hearing by Zoom due to circumstances 

beyond Father’s control, he did not specifically address the Mathews factors or the interplay 

between those factors and Rule 241. However, even assuming Father forfeited his claim by 

presenting it in this manner, forfeiture is a limitation on the parties, not on this court. People 

v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 21. I find that it is appropriate to give full consideration to 

the due process concerns raised by Father in this case in order to reach a just result. See S.B., 

2015 IL App (4th) 150260, ¶ 23. Addressing the issue would also provide guidance to courts 

in future cases. See People v. Holmes, 2016 IL App (1st) 132357, ¶ 65.

¶ 127 Rule 241 is intended to allow the use of relatively new technology to increase access to the 

courts. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). In many cases, 

allowing a party or witness to participate remotely by video will have this intended effect. For 

instance, a disabled parent or a parent with a limited income who struggles to find 

transportation may benefit from being allowed to participate remotely. In cases where a 

caseworker has moved away, allowing a caseworker who is familiar with the family to testify 

remotely may be more beneficial than relying on the testimony of a different caseworker who 

must base his or her testimony on a review of the case file. There also may be circumstances 

where it truly is impossible to hold an in-person hearing without a substantial delay, such as 

during the early days of the pandemic before courts and health departments had established 

procedures for dealing with COVID-19. 

¶ 128 However, given the importance of in-person testimony (see id.), courts must carefully 

decide on a case-by-case basis whether doing so will instead infringe on a party’s due process 

rights, particularly in cases like this one that involve fundamental rights. Based on the record 

in this case, I do not believe the court weighed all the relevant considerations before holding a 

remote hearing over the objection of Father. Moreover, based on a careful consideration of the 

totality of the relevant facts and circumstances, I do not believe the hearing complied with the 

requirements of due process. Contrary to the majority’s telepathic speculation, in reaching this 

conclusion, I am not commenting on the issue of Father’s fitness as a parent. By virtue of the 

permanency and seriousness of this case, providing Father with a fair hearing necessarily 

precedes the issue of the determination of his fitness. For these reasons, I would reverse and 

remand for a new termination hearing.