### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 672 -CV

Ca r r ie K . C am pbe ll , A ppe lla nt

v. Ninette Cam pbell, as Ind ependent Executrix of the Estate of Kar leen Mouton, Dec eased , Appellee

F ROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF COM AL COUNTY NO. 2007 -P C-00 88 , HO NORAB LE CHARLES A. STEP HENS II , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Carrie K. Campbell (“Car rie” ) appea ls f

rom a g rant of summary judgme nt in favor of her mothe r , N in e tt e Ca mp b e ll ( “ N in e tt e ” )
. N in e tt e s u e d a s th e e xe c u tr ix o f

th e e s tate of Ka rl e e n M ou ton , w ho wa s N ine tte ’s mot he r an d Car

ri e ’s g ra ndmot he r. Ni ne tte a lle g e d th a t w hil e Mouton was alive, Carrie had fraudulently place d her own name on the deed to Mouton’s house and ha d a lso defr aud e d M ou ton ou t of tho us and s o f d oll ars . O n b e ha lf of Mo uto n’ s e state , N ine tte
so ug ht m on e tary

dama g e s and

a de c laratio n th a t Ca

rr ie did no t c o- ow n the h ou se. Ni ne tte
succe ssfully

moved for summar

y judgme nt on all her c laims and then soug ht and obtained attorney ’s fee s for prevailing on her de clar atory -re lief cla im. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009 (West 2008) (trial court may awa rd attorne y ’s fe es on dec laratory -re lief cla im). She also soug ht and obtained sanctions ag ainst Carrie for failing to prope rly serve cer tain documents, see Tex. R. C iv. P. 21b, for filing a fr ivolous pleading , see Te x. R. Civ
. P. 13 , and fo r fi lin g a ba d- fa itha ff

ida vit in2

opposition to Ninette’s summary -judg ment motion, see Te x. R. Civ. P. 166 a (h ). On a pp e a l, C arr ie argues that the e vidence did not support summ ary judgme nt, that Ninette was not e ntitled to recove r attorney ’s fe es, and that sanctions wer e improper . We will reverse and re mand.

F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND I n ea rl y 2002, Mouton was living in B urleson, Te x as, and Car rie wa s living in the Ne w B ra un fe ls a re a . M ou ton

c on tacted Ca rr ie and

re qu e ste d h e lp p ur c ha sin g a ho us e in Ne w B ra un fe ls. Carr ie c on ta c te d a re a lto r an d fou

nd a ho us e tha

t su ite d h e r g ra

ndmot he r’ s n e e ds
. On Marc h 30, 2002, Carrie ex ec u t ed an earne st money contra ct for the house. On or a round April 18, 2002, Mouton signe d the closi ng documents t o purcha se t he house. Carrie also signe d the closing documents, thoug h it is not clea r exactly when she did so. One of the m ai n p o ints of contention betwe en the pa rties is whether

Mouton knew c ontemporane ously that Carrie signe d the closing documents; Ninette alleg es that Carrie cover tly signe d the documents the da y afte r Mouton signe d them, there by

making herse lf a c o-owne r of the house without Mouton’s knowledg e, whe rea s Carrie alleg es that Mouton instructed her to co-sig n the documents a s a “g ift” for helping Mouton “in her times of need.” I n May of 2002, af

ter moving into her Ne w B raunf els house, Mouton opene d a joint bank ac count with Carrie ’s s ister, J amie S chindler, who also lived in the are a. In J anuar y of 2003, Mo uto n s ig ne d a

do c ume nt t

hat g a ve Carr ie dura

ble po we r o f a tto rn e y ov e r Mo uto n’ s a ff a ir s. Carr ie alleg es that she ne ver “ used” the power .

I n November

of 2004, Mouton moved into an assisted-living fac ility beca use her health wa s declining , and Carrie ag ree d to assist Mouton i n rentingout her house. Ca rrie r ented out the ho us e a t a

rate of $8 50 per month , w hic h s he a lle g e dly a g re e d to c oll e c t and

de po sit int o3

Mouton’s and Schindler’ s joint bank acc ount. Carrie a lleg es that bec ause the house nee ded signific ant re pairs, Mouton instructed he r to use the r ental income to pa y for r epair s as nee ded. Carrie alleg es that betwee n November of 2004 and July

of 2006 she spe nt over $15,700 re pairing the hous e. She also alleg es t hat, wit h Mouton’s permission, she either used t he rental income to pay for the r epair s directly

or used he r own money

and then r eimbursed he rself out of the renta l income. Carrie also alleg es t hat s he used the rental income to pay proper ty taxes and ins uranc e premiums on the house. In the end, ve ry littl e of the rent Car

rie c olle ct ed ac t u al l y

went into Mouton’s and Schindler’s joint bank ac count. In fac t, bank re cords a ppear to show that (1 ) o n l y t wo $850 rent pay ments wer e ever deposited into the account, and (2) shortly afte r t hose pay ments wer e deposited, Schindler withdrew

them and paid them ba ck to Carr ie. Around the time that Mouton moved out of her house and int o t h e a s sisted-living fac ility , she also aske d Carrie to sell her ca r for her. Car rie sold the ca

r for $5,000. She alleg es that sh e g a ve the $5 ,0 00 to M ou ton , b ut N ine tte a lle g e s th a t Mo uto n n e ve r r e c e ive d it
.

Ni net te alle g e s th a t Mo uto n b e c a me awa re of ir re g ula ri tie s in he r f ina nc e s in e arl y 20 05 . M ou ton

a lle g e dly a sk e d h e r g ra

nd da ug hte rs to e xpla in t

he ir re g ula ri tie s, and the y a lle g e dly either r efuse d or we re una ble to do so. Ninett e, wh o had bee n living out of state, move d to the New B raunf els are a in the summer of 2005 a

nd beg an assisting Mouton in her day -to-day aff airs. Af ter Ninet t e h el p ed her mother discover

the full extent of t h e irre g ularities in her f inance s, Mouton filed a cr iminal complaint ag ainst her g randda ugh t ers with the Ne w B raunf els Police Depa

rtment. The Comal County District Attorney

eventua lly

decide d not to prosecute. I n Dec ember

2005, Mouton transfe rre d power

of attorne y

over he r af

fairs f rom Carrie to Ninette.Tex. P rob. Code Ann. §§ 481- 525 (West 2003). 1 The third-pa

rty aff iants included Ninette’ s attorney ; the rec ords custodian of the 2 New B raunf

els Police Depa

rtment; the re co rd s cu stodian of the title company involved in the purcha se of Mouton ’s Ne w Braunfe ls house; and the re cords c ustodian of the re alty company involved in the purcha se of Mouton’s Ne w B raunf els house. Sc hin dle r d id n ot f

ile he r o wn

re sp on se to Nin e tte ’s mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, no r d id 3 she file a n appea l after

summary judgme nt was ente red a g ainst her.

4 Af te r M ou ton

pa sse d a wa y , N ine tte br ou g ht t

his su it on be ha lf of Mo uto n’ s e state to
rec over the money

and prope rty

th a t C a rrie a nd Schindler alleg edly

misappropriate d. Ninette alleg ed
c a us e s o f a c tio n f

or de fa lc a tio n, mis a

pp lic a tio n o f f

idu c iary pr op e rt y , v iol a tio n o f t

he Dura ble P owe r of Attor ne y Ac t, fr a ud by no nd isc los ur e , a

nd c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it f

ra ud . Sh e a lso 1
s o u g h t a d e c la

r a to r y ju d g me n t th a t M o u to n ’ s e s tate w a s th e s o le r ig h tf u l o w n e r of Mouton’s New B raunf

els house. Approxim ately four months a fter filing suit, Ninette moved f or traditional summary judgme nt. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c). I n support of her motion, Ninette filed police re cords, ba nk
re c or ds , re a l- e state re c or ds , an d sev e ra l th ir d- pa rt y a ff ida vit s. She also filed two aff idavits of her 2 own—one that c laimed she ha d persona l knowledg e of th e fa ctual alleg ations contained in the summary -judg ment motion, and one that claimed he r docume ntary exhib i t s were true a

nd corr ect copies of the orig inals. The for mer a ffdavit did not s tate a ba sis for the cla im of persona l knowledg e. Carrie opp o s edNi n et t e’ s s u m m ary -j u d gm en tm o t i on by arg uing tha t the documentar

y evidenc e did not establish Ninette’s r ight to rec overy as a matter of law. In support of this positi on, Carrie submitt ed a personal affidavit and an af fidavit by Schindler. Carrie also filed (1) a motion

3 for c ontinuance that alleg ed she ne eded add i t i o nal time to marshal evide nce to r ebut Ninette’ s summary -judg ment claims, and (2) a motion to strike the persona l a ffidavits Ninette filed in support5

of he r s umm ary -j ud g me nt mot ion . Car ri e a lle g e d th a t N ine tte ’s a ff ida vit s w e re , amon g oth e r t

hin g s, ba se d o n h e ars ay

and no t ba se d o n p e rs on a l kn owl edg e . Sh e a lso a lle g e d th a t th e thi rd -p art y
a ff ida vit s N ine tte su

bmi tte d w e re de fe c tiv e fo r a va ri e ty of re a so ns . Wit hou t e xp r e s s ly

a d dr e s s in g Ca

r r ie ’ s mo ti o n s , th e tr ia l c o u rt g r an te d N in e tt e’s summary -judg ment motion and awar ded Nine t t e damag es and attorney ’s fe es. At the he aringon Ninette’s summary -judg ment motion, Ninette orally reque sted sanctions ag ainst Carrie on sever al g rounds. Fir st, she reque sted sanctions under Texas Rule of C ivil P roce dure 21b be cause Carrie had not served N inet t e wi t h a copy of her motion for continuance or a c opy of the a ffidavit Schindler filed in support of C arr ie’s response t o the summary -judg ment motion. S econd, N inette re quested
sanc tio ns un de r T e xas R ule of Civ il Pr oc e dure 13 becau se Ca rri e a lle g e dly ma de fa lse repr esentations in her response to Ninette’s summary -judg ment motion. Third, Ninette reque sted sanctions under

Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 166a( h) bec ause Carri e al leg edly made f a l s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i nt h e a f f i d a v i t s h e f

i l e d i ns u p p o rto f h e r r e s p o n s e t o N i n e t t e ’ s s u m m aryjudgme nt motion.

The trial c ourt g rante d Ninette’s motion for sanctions. I t a war ded her $2,500 under Rul e 21 b, $5 ,0 00 un de r R ule 13 , a nd $3 ,0 00 un de r R

ule 16 6a (h ). I t a lso awarded he r $ 3, 00 0 in attorney ’s fe es and $1,000 in “ rea sonable e x penses” for the c osts incurred in pur suing sa nctions. Carrie appea ls the sum m ar y j u d g ment, the awa rd of attorney ’s fe es, and the awa rd of sanc tions. Relatedly , she also appe als the denia l of her motion for continuance a nd her motion to s trike.6 STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We r eview the g rant of summary judgme nt de novo. Pr ov ide nt L ife& Ac c ide nt I ns . Co. v . Kn ott , 128 S.W. 3d 21 1, 21 5 (T e x. 20 03 ). A “ tr a dit ion a l” mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt i s proper ly gra n t ed when the movant establishes that there are no g enuine issues of material fa ct
and that sh e is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r of law. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); Lear Siegler, Inc

. v. Pe rez , 8 19 S.W. 2d

47 0, 47 1 ( Te x. 19 91 ); Holmstrom v. Lee , 26 S.W .3d 526, 530 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no p et
. ). I n revie wing a g rant of summar y judgme nt, we take as true
e vid e nc e fa

vo ra ble to t he no nmo va

nt, makin g e ve ry

re a so na ble inf e re nc e and

re so lvi nga ll d ou

bts in the nonmovant’s favor. Centeq Realty, I nc. v. Sie gler , 899 S.W .2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995). We reviewthe awa

rd of attorney ’s fe es under Texas Civi l Practice and Remedie s Code section 37.009 for

abuse of discretion. Mo ntema

yor v. Or tiz , 2 0 8 S. W. 3 d 6 2 7 , 6 6 3 ( T e x. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. d en i ed ). W e may reve rse a n awa rd of attorney ’s fe es if the tria l court a war ded them without ref

ere nce to any g uiding rules and princ iples, such that its ruling wa s arbitra ry or unre asonable
. Id
. We also review

sanctions awa

rds for a buse of discr etion. Low v. He nr y , 221 S.W .3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007). We may reve rse a

sanctions awa

rd if the tria l court i m posed it without ref ere nce to a

ny g uiding r ules and princ iples, such that its r uling was arbitra

ry or unre asonable
. Id
.

DI SCU SSIO N Carrie raises e leven points of err or that reduc e to f ive basic issues: (1) whether the trial court e rre d by

denying he r motion for continuanc e; (2) whether the trial cour t erre d by denying her motion to strike the evidenc e supporting Ninette’s summary -judg ment motion; (3) whether theI ndeed, Ca rrie’ s appell at e b ri ef doe s not specifica lly reque st relief f

rom the trial cour

t’s 4 denial of her motion for continuance and motion to strike; it mer ely reque sts a reve rs al o f t he summary judgme nt. 7 tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y g ra nti ng summa

ry jud g me nt; (4 ) whe the r t he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y awa rd ingNi ne tte attorney ’s fe es; and (5) whether the t ri al co u rt er red by

awa rding Ninette sanc tions. W e will not addre ss the first two of these issues, as the y are obviated by

our consider ation of whe ther the tria l
c ourt e rr e d b y g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt. W e tu r

n , t h e n , t o t h e m e r i t s o f

N i n e t t e ’ s s u m m ar

y- 4 judgme nt motion.
Summ ar y Jud gment As stated above , Ninette broug ht claims for defalc ation, misapplication of fiducia ry prope rt y , v iol a tio n o f t

he Dura ble Pow e r o f A tto rn e y

Ac t, f ra ud by no nd isc los ur e , c on sp ir a c y to commit fraud, a

nd decla ratory relief . Ninette submitted four for ms of evidenc e to s upport her mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt o n th e se c l a i m s : a ff ida vit s, po lic e re c or ds , f

ina nc ia l r e c or ds , a

nd re a le state re c or ds
. Som e of

the a ff ida vit s N ine tte su

bmi tte d w e re e xec ut ed by thi rd pa rt ie s. Th e se aff idavits purported to substantiate Nine tte’s attorne y ’s fe es and to a uthenticate the rec ords attac hed to her summary -judg ment motion. They did not purport to ver ify the fa ctual alleg ations contained in the motion. Ninette also submitted two aff idavits of her own. One was a custodial a ffidavit that purported to a

uthenticate the rec ords attached to the m otion. The other, which is the important one for pr esent purpose s, asserte d that Ninette had persona l knowledg e of the fac tual alleg ations in theTh e te sti mon ia l pa rt of the a ff ida vit state d in fu ll: 5 My name is Ninette Campbel l
. I am at l east 18 y ear s of ag e and of sound mind. I have pe rsonal knowledg e of the fac ts alleg ed in Plaintiff’s M o t i o n for Summary J udg ment. Ihere by

swea r that the statements conta ined in Section I , titled Fac ts and Procedur al H is to r

y , w h ic h ar e in c o r

p o r a te d h e r e in a s if s e t f o rth in th e ir e n ti r e ty [,] and[] which ar e filed herein in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judg me nt[, ] ar e tr

ue and c or re c t. 8 summary -judg ment motion and that those alleg ations wer e true
. Cr iti c a lly , how e ve r, the a ff ida vit 5 d i d n o ts ay how Ninette had pe rsonal knowledg e of the fac ts.

This omission is f

atal. Affidavits must be based on persona l know ledg e. See T e x. R. Civ. P . 166a(c ). All o f Ni n ette’s c auses of action we re ba sed on eve nts in which she did not participate. To illustrate:

• Ni ne tte ’s c a

us e s o f a c tio n f

or de fa lc a tio n a

nd mis a pp lic a tio n o f f

idu c iary pr op e rt y we re ba se d o n Ca

rr ie ’s a lle g e d f

a ilure t o tr ans mit

re nt p ay me nts and

c ar- sa le proce eds to Mouton.

• Ninette’s c ause of action under

the Dura ble Power o f At t o rney

Act wa s based on Carr ie ’s a lle g e d f

a ilure to satis fy Mo uto n’ s re qu e st fo r “ an a c c ounti ngof a ll a c tiv ity initiated by

[C arr ie] invol ving Mr s. Mouton’s financia l acc ounts and proper ty .”

• Ninette’s c auses of action for

decla ratory relief and fr aud by

nond i s closure w ere ba s e d o nC ar r i e ’ s a l l e g e d

f a i l u r e t o i n f

o r m M o u t o nt h a ts h e c o - s i g n e d t h e d e e d to Mouton’s house.

• Ninette’s c ause of action f o r co n spiracy

to commit fraud wa s based on Car rie a nd Schindler’s alleg ed coordinated e ffor ts to remove Mouton’s money from Mouton’s and Sc hin dle r’ s jo int

ba nk a c c ount. Ninette’s a ffidavit cla imed that Ninette had persona l knowledg e of these e vents, but it revea led no basis for that claim. The affidavit was theref ore inc ompetent summary -judg ment evidenc e. Se e id .; Kerlin v. Arias , 274 S.W .3d 666, 668 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (“An affidavit showing no basis for pe rs onal kn owle dg e is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt. ” ); Trostl e v. Combs , 1 0 4 S. W. 3 d 2 0 6 , 2 1 4 ( T e x.As we r ece ntly noted, “ther e ar e Te x as dec isions (including at least one e arlier decision 6 from this Court) holding that a summary -judg ment aff iant’s lack of

persona l knowledg e may be a wa iva ble de fe c t of

fo rm ,” bu t “ in m or e re c e nt ye ars we , li ke ma ny of our s ist e r c ourt s, h av e c o n cl u d edt h atan af fi d av i t ’s fa i l u re t o d em o n s t ra t e ab as i s fo r p er s o n al kn o wl ed ge rende rs i t incompetent sum mary -judg ment evidenc e.” Sp ra y be rry v . S ie sta MH C I nc om e Pa rtn e rs, 9 Ap p . — Au s t i n2 0 0 3 , n o p et
. ) (“ T h e me re re ci t at i o n t h at t h e af fi d av i ti s b as edo np er s o n al kn o wl ed ge is inadequate if the af

fidavit does not positively show a ba sis for such knowle dg e.”)
. Ninette cla ims on appeal that she acquired personal knowledg e of the fac ts alleg ed in h e r s umm ary -j ud g me nt m oti on thr ou g h h e r r ol e as e xec utr ix of Mo uto n’ s e state . T his c la im i s pate ntl y wr on g—N ine tte ’s ro le a s e xec utr ix c ou ld no t have g ive n he r p e rs on a l kn ow le dg e of e ve nts in whic h s he did

no t pa rt ic ipate —b ut i n a

ny e ve nt N ine tte did

no t make the c la im i n h e r a ff ida vit
. I t th e re fo re c ann ot h a ve be e n a ba sis fo r t

he tr ia l c ourt to c re dit

the a ff ida vit ’s a sse rt ion

that N ine tte had per sonal knowledg e.

Ni n et t e a l s o cl ai m s t h at C arri e f ai l edt o p re s erv e e rr o r o nt h e p er s o n al -k n o wl ed ge iss ue be c a

us e sh e did

no t pr op e rl y

ra ise and ob ta in a ruli ng on it in t

he tr ia l c ourt . T hat f

a c t is irrele vant; Carrie raises the issue on appe al. See Dailey v. Albertson’s, Inc. , 83 S.W .3d 222, 226-27 (Tex. A pp.—El Paso 2002, no pet.) (“[A] lac k of persona l know ledg e, ref lect ed i n t h e affiant’s testimony itself and not just as t he lack of a formal recitation, i s a defec t of substance that may be
ra ise d for the fi rs t ti me on a pp e a l.” ); City of W

ilmer v. Laidlaw W

aste Sys., Inc

. , 890 S.W .2d 459, 467 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994), aff’d , 904 S.W .2d 656 (Tex.1995) (“T he fa ilure of a n aff idavit to be made on pe rsonal knowledg e . . . is a de fec t in substance, not form, a nd need not be objected to at tr ia l to be a

g ro un d f or re ve rs a l.” ); se e als o Tr os tle , 104 S.W .3d at 214 (“When the substance of an aff idavi t reve als that it was not made on pe rsonal knowledg e, the a ffidavit is not competent summary -judg ment evidenc e.”)
. 6L.P. , No. 03-08-00649- CV, 2010 Tex. App. L EXI S 2517, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 8, 2010,

no pet. h.).
10

I n s um, be c a

us e Ni ne tte ’s a ff

ida vit did no t sh owa

ba sis fo r p e rs on a l kn ow le dg e , it did n o t s u p p ort the fa ctual alleg ations in Ninette’s summary -judg ment motion. Thus, sum mary judgme nt was improper

unless some other e vidence supported the a lleg ations (or at least supplied the missing basis for

Ninette’s c laim of persona l knowledg e). See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c). The other evidenc e that Ninette submit ted consisted of police rec ords, financ ial
r e c o r d s , an d

r e a l

- e s t a t e r e c o r d s . C ar

r i e ar g u e s t h a t t h e p o l i c e r e c o r d s w e r e i n c o mp e t e n ts u m m aryjudgme nt evidence beca

use they wer e base d on hear say -lade n witness repor ts. See U nited Blood Se rv s. v . Lo ngor ia , 93 8 S.W. 2d 29 , 3 0 ( Te x. 19 97 ) (pe r c ur iam) (s a me e vid e nti ary sta nd ard s a pp ly to s umm ary

jud g me nt p ro c e e din g s a s to re g ula r t ri a l) ; Ke rli n , 2 7 4 S
. W
. 3 d a t 6 6 8 ( h e ar s ay s u m m aryjud g me nt e vid e nc e “ c arr ie s n o pro bativ e we ig ht” if pr op e rl y ob je c te d to)
. Ni ne tte argue s th a t Ca rr ie waived this argument by failing to pr eser ve it in the trial court. Assuming that Nine tte is right, the po lic e re c or ds sti ll d o n ot e sta bli shthat N ine tte wa s e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt; the y

c on ta in statements that support both Ninette’s and Carrie ’s versions of events, and we must take as true the statements t hat s upport Carrie ’s. See Sie gler , 8 99 S.W. 2d

a t 19 7 ( in r e vie wi ngsumma ry jud g me nt, appellate courts take as true e vidence favor able to the nonmovant)
.

Th e fi na nc ia l re c or ds that Nine tte su bmi tte d ar e a lso a mbi g uo us ; the nume ri c a l data they contain ar e consistent with Ninette’ s alleg ations, but they d o n o t s how what wa s said or not said, or what ag ree ments were rea ched or not rea ched, betwee n Carrie and Mout on. Thus, they do
no t e sta bli sha s a matte r o f l aw that Ca rr ie a c te d im

pr op e rl y in f a ili ngto d e po sit

c e rt a in f un ds int o he r g ra ndmot he r’ s bank ac c ount. Simi larl y , th e re c or ds sh owthat Sc hin dle r d re w c he c ks to C arr ieNin et t e ar gu es that at a minimum we should aff irm the summary

judgme nt as to her 7 de c larator y -r e lie f c la im b e c a

us e Carr ie do e s n ot ad dr e ss that cla im in her a pp e llate br ie f. Whil e it is t ru e that Ca

rr ie ’s br ie f d oe s n ot a dd re ss the decl arat or

y -r e lie f c la im b y

name , it e xten siv e ly a dd re sse s th e a lle g e d f

ra ud by no nd is c los ur e on

wh ic h th e c la im i s b a se d. Th a t is su ff ic ie nt t o prese rve e rror . See Tex. R
. App. P. 38.1(f) ( statement of issue will be tre ated a s cover ing e very su bs idi ary qu e sti on fa ir ly inc lud e d) ; P e r r

yv . Co h en , 2 7 2 S .W.3d 585, 587-88 (Tex. 2008) (p e r c ur iam) (“[W]e lib e ra lly c on str ue iss ue s p re se nte d to ob ta in a jus t, f a ir , a nd e qu ita ble adjudication of the rig hts of the litigants.” ) (c itation and punctuation omitted). 11 on Schindler’s a

nd Mouton’s jo i n t account, but they do not show that Schindler did so without Mouton’s permission. Finally , t h e re cords c ontain copies of c hecks to Car rie on whic h Schindler
a lle g e dly fo rg e d M ou ton ’s sig natur e , b ut t he re c or d c on ta ins no e vid e nc e (let a lon e le g a lly conclusive e vidence ) that the sig nature s on the che cks we re in fa ct forg ed.

Th e re a l e state re c or ds that N ine tte su bmi tte d f are no be tte r. Th e y

sh owthat Ca

rr ie sig ne d v ari ou s d oc ume nts inc lud ingthe de e d to Mo uto n’ s h ou se , b ut t he y do no t sh ow that she did so without Mouton’s permission (i.e., fraudule ntly).

I n sum, Ninette’s sum m ar y -judg ment evidenc e fa iled to establish that Ninette’s fac tual alleg ations wer e bey ond dispute. The trial court there fore err ed in g ranting Ni n et te’s summary -judg ment motion. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c). 7
Attorn ey’ s Fees The trial c ourt awa

rded N inette attorne y ’s fe es u nder Te x as Civil P rac tice & Re medies Code sec tion 37.009. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009 (trial cour t may awa rd attorney ’s fe es on dec laratory -re lief cla im). Beca u s e we are reve rsing the summary judgme nt on Ninette’s de clar atory -re lief cla im and rema ndi n g t h e ca use for

further proce eding s, the awa

rd of
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s c ann ot s tand a t this j un c tur e . A c c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e the awa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.Rules 2 1 b an d 1 3 a ll o w a c o u rt to im p o s e an y o f th e s an c ti o n s s e t f o rth in Ru le 215-2b. 8 See Tex. R. C iv. P. 21b, 13. Thus, in considering the propriety of sanctions imposed under Rules 21b and 13, we drawon jurisprudenc e conc erningRule 215-2b. Rul e 16 6a (h ) s tate s th a t “ the c ourt sh a ll .
. . or de r t

he pa rt y [vio latin g the Rul e ] to p ay to 9 the oth e r p art

y the a mou nt o f t he re a so na

ble e xpe ns e s w hic h th e fi lin g of the a ff ida vit s c a us e d h im to incur, including rea sonable attorney ’s fe es.” I n addition, beca

use Ninette or ally

moved for sanctions at a hearingof which w e have no 10 rec ord, we do not know what evide nce ( if any ) Ninette c ited to justi fy

her initial all eg ation that C ar r i e a c t e d s an c t i o n a

b l y. 12 Sanc tio ns As stated above, the t rial court awa rded N inette sanc tions in t he amounts of $2,500 under Te x as Rule of Civil Procedure 21b, $5,000 under Te x as Rule of Civil Procedure 13, and $3,000 under Texas Rule of Civil P roce dure 166a (h). I t also awa rded he r $3,000 in attorney ’s fe es 8 and $1,000 in r easona

ble expenses for the costs incurre d in pursuing the sanctions orde r. We h old 9 that th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

imp os ingthe se sa

nc tio ns . A sanc tio ns awa

rd “ sh ou ld b e no mor e se ve re tha n n e c e ssa ry to s a tis fy its le g iti mate purposes.” Tra ns

Am e ric an Natural G as Cor p. v . P owe ll , 811 S.W .2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991). Her e, the rec ord contains no justification f or the amounts of sanctions imposed. Even if w e assume that Carrie actua lly

committed the sanctionable acts a lleg ed, t h e rec ord conta ins no ex planation or
ana ly sis of

ho w the sanc tio ns imp os e d w e re pr op or tio nate to t

he egre g iou sn e ss o f C arr ie ’s a c ts. Thus, i t is not clear that the sanctions ar e “no mor e seve re tha n nece ssary .” Id . Moreove r, at the hear ing on N inette’s sanc tions mot ion, the only evidenc e intro d u ce d was billing r ecor ds showing Ninette’s attorney ’s fe es. See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v . Holten , 168 S.W .3d 777, 783 (T e x. 20 05 ) ( ho ldi ngthat, u nle ss r e c or d o f e vid e nti ary heari ngde mon str a te s o the rw ise , a pp e llate courts “should presume that
. . . the trial court considere d only the evidenc e filed with the cler k.”). 1013

Thus, we do not know on wha t bases the c ourt found t h at C ar ri e knowingly failed to ser

ve documents on Ninette, know ingly included fa lsehoods in her opposition to Nin et t e’s summ ary judgme nt motion, and knowingly filed a f alse a ffidavit. See Spohn H osp. v. May er , 104 S.W .3d 878, 88 2 ( Te x. 20 03 ) ( sanc tio ns mus t ha ve “ dir e c t ne xus” wi th “ of fe ns ive c on du c t” ). As a

re su lt, we ho ld that these findings, and the sanctions pre dicated on the m, were arbitra ry . See Zarsky

v. Zurich Mgmt., Inc

. , 829 S.W .2d 398, 399 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1992, no writ) (or der imposing sanctions must state with particula rity acts or omissions on which sanctions are ba sed). It follows that Ninette wa s not entitled to recove r attorney ’s fee s and costs for pursuing her sa nctions motion. I n light of this re sult, we d ecline to a ddress Car rie’s a lternative a

rg ument that she
re ce i v edi n ad eq u at e n o t i ce o f t h e s an ct i o n s h ea ri n g.
CO NC LU SION For the re asons stated above, we reve rse the trial court’s summary judgme nt, awar d of attorne y ’s fe es, and a

war d of sanc tions. W e re mand t he cause for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and Pember

ton Reverse d and Remande d Filed: June 18, 2010