alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ex_234747.htm


Exhibit 10.3


 


 


SECOND AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


 


This SECOND AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”), dated as of March 15, 2021 (the “Effective Date”), by and among NorthWest Indiana Bancorp (the “Company”), the wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company, Peoples Bank (“Peoples Bank,” and collectively with the Company, the “Bank” unless otherwise noted), and Benjamin J. Bochnowski (the “Executive”).


 


WHEREAS, the Company, Peoples Bank, and the Executive entered into an Employment Agreement, dated as of August 1, 2017, as amended by that certain First Amendment to Employment Agreement, dated as of July 27, 2018 (as amended, the “Employment Agreement”);


 


WHEREAS, the Executive has served as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Bank pursuant to the Employment Agreement; and


 


WHEREAS, the parties now desire to make certain modifications to the Employment Agreement as set forth in this Amendment;


 


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and mutual covenants herein and for other good and valuable consideration, the parties hereby agree that the Employment Agreement shall be, and it hereby is, amended as follows:


 


	 	
			1.

				
			Obligations of the Bank Upon Termination. Clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 9 (b) of the Employment Agreement are hereby amended and restated in their entirety to read as follows:

			



 


“(i)  Payment in a lump sum of an amount equal to two (2) times the Executive’s then-current base salary as in effect prior to the termination;


 


(ii)  Payment in a lump sum of an amount equal to two (2) times the most recent annual bonus received by the Executive;”


 


	 	
			2.

				
			Defined Terms. All capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Amendment shall have the meanings given to them in the Employment Agreement.

			



 


	 	
			3.

				
			Counterparts. This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, each such counterpart being deemed to be an original instrument, and all such counterparts shall together constitute the same instrument.

			



 


	 	
			4.

				
			Miscellaneous. Except as specifically amended by the terms of this Amendment, all other terms and conditions of the Employment Agreement are and shall remain in full force and effect for all purposes.

			



 



 




 




 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as of the date first above written.


 


 


	 	
			NORTHWEST INDIANA BANCORP

			
	 	 
	 	
			/s/ Donald P. Fesko

			
	 	
			Name:  Donald P. Fesko

			
	 	
			Title: Chair, Compensation and Benefits Committee  

			
	 	 
	 	 
	 	
			PEOPLES BANK

			
	 	 
	 	
			/s/ Donald P. Fesko

			
	 	
			By: Donald P. Fesko

			
	 	
			Title: Chair, Compensation and Benefits Committee

			
	 	 
	 	 
	 	
			/s/ Benjamin Bochnowski

			
	 	
			By: Benjamin J. Bochnowski

			



 





2
-  Civil Rights for Individuals and Advocates      -  Race, Color, National Origin 
  -  Disability        -  Section 504 
  -  Age Discrimination 
  -  Sex Discrimination & Harassment 
  -  Title IX 
  -  Section 1557 
  -  Hill-Burton 
  -  Section 1553 
  -  Special Topics        -  Reproductive Health Care 
    -  Civil Rights and Opioids 
    -  Child Welfare 
    -  Community Living and Olmstead 
    -  Effective Communication in Hospitals 
    -  Emergency Preparedness and Response 
    -  Health Disparities 
    -  HIV/AIDS 
    -  Limited English Proficiency (LEP) 
    -  National Origin Discrimination 
    -  Shared Ancestry or Ethnic Characteristics Discrimination 
    -  Environmental Justice 
    -  Sex-Based Harassment 
    -  Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
  -  Civil Rights FAQs 
  -  Fact Sheets 
  -  HHS Nondiscrimination Notice 

                      -   
                      -   
                      -   
                      -   
                      -   

# Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)

TANF helps needy families support themselves financially. States, territories, and tribes receiving HHS block grants for TANF cannot discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, disability, age, or sex.

## Laws & Regulations

                          - TANF Final Rule
                          - Your Rights Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act Factsheet
                          - Your Rights Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act Factsheet
                          - Your Rights Under the Age Discrimination Act Factsheet
                          - Your Rights Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Factsheet

## Resources for TANF Agencies

                          - FAQs : In partnership with ACF, OCR has developed a TA tool so that State TANF Agencies can comply with Federal civil rights laws and more effectively serve TANF applicants and beneficiaries with LEP and/or disabilities.
                          - Joint Letter  from OCR and ACF sent to State TANF Agencies regarding FAQs: Meeting the needs of TANF applicants and beneficiaries under Federal civil rights laws.
                          - Urban Partnerships Initiative Online Toolkit , funded by ACF, highlights promising practices of TANF agencies around the country.
                          - OCR Guidance on TANF and Disability
                          - Policy Guidance  Regarding Inquiries into Citizenship, Immigration Status and SSN in State Applications for Medicaid, SCHIP, TANF and Food Stamp Benefits.
                          - Civil Rights Laws and Welfare Reform -  An Overview
                          - OCR TANF Related Training: “ Ignorance of Disability is No Excuse: Screening TANF Customers for Hidden Disabilities to Ensure Equal Opportunity, " presented at the 2007 National Equal Opportunity Professional Development Forum (DOL)

Enforcement Success Stories Involving TANF Programs

Content last reviewed October 29, 2015
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT



In connection with the Annual Report of Highwoods Realty Limited Partnership (the Operating Partnership) on Form 10-K for the period ended
December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Terry L. Stevens, Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Highwoods Properties Inc., general partner of the
Operating Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Operating Partnership.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                            
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/    TERRY L. STEVENS                                                     
|Terry L. Stevens                                                            
|Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the General Partner
|January 19,
2005
#### Maxim Bramble CZELLAR, Appellant, v. FRANCIS I. duPONT & CO., Appellee.

No. 69-163.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Nov. 12, 1969.

Alexander S. Gordon, Miami Beach, for appellant.

*883Smathers & Thompson and Earl D. Waldin, Jr., Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendant. In that judgment the court set out certain material facts. On this appeal appellant agrees that the facts set out are correct and undisputed but urges that the summary judgment was erroneously granted as a matter of law.

We hold otherwise. On review of the record and briefs, we conclude that on the facts disclosed the trial court was eminently correct in holding that the defendant was entitled to a summary judgment. Moreover we think it should be pointed out that the damages urged in argument before this court were not recoverable. Cf. Barrow v. Curtis, Fla.App.1968, 209 So.2d 699; Courtney v. American Oil Company, Fla. App.1969, 220 So.2d 675.

Affirmed.
#### CONLEY v. HILDEBRANT.

No. 6153.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Feb. 4, 1937.

Oliver C. Riethmiller, of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

T. Henry Walnut, of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.

*301Before BUFFINGTON, DAVIS, and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.

In the court below plaintiff recovered a verdict against defendant for damages in an automobile accident caused by the alleged negligence of defendant. After verdict in plaintiff’s favor, the court refused to grant a new trial and entered judgment for plaintiff; whereupon defendant appealed and contends the verdict should have been set aside as excessive.

Refusal of a new trial is a matter of discretion, and no appeal lies unless the judge abused the discretion intrusted to him.

The case before us depends on its own facts, and as no precedent or principle is involved, we refrain from discussing the facts and limit ourselves to saying that in view of all the proofs and circumstances and of all questions involved, which we have duly considered, we are of opinion the court did not abuse the discretionary power vested in it. So holding, the appeal is dismissed.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-3370

_____________________________

EARL JAMES RAY, JR.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Mark Borello, Judge.

October 16, 2018

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and KELSEY and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Earl James Ray, Jr., pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
#### Morrison vs. Alphin.

After the bond prescribed by the attachment law is given, there is no levy to be quashed.

When the clerk takes the bond to release property attached, the presumption is that the writ was returned.

*Error to Union Circuit Court.*

Hon. Lem B. Green, Circuit Judge.

Carleton, for the plaintiff in error.

On the sufficiency of the motion, we refer the court to 1 *Kent*411; *United States vs. Mart,*1 *Pet. C. R.*390; *United States vs. Barney,*3 *Hall’s Law Jour.*128.

The record does not show that the writ was returned, therefore the clerk could not take the bond and release the levy. But if the defendant had given bond, he did not waive his right to have an illegal levy quashed.

Mr. Justice Fairchild

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Alphin brought assumpsit against Morrison, sued out a writ of attachment, had it served upon four horses belonging to the defendant. Seven days after the service of the writ, the defendant executed his bond for the release of the attachment. At the return term of the court, the defendant plead the general issue, and then moved that the levy of attachment be quashed, because the horses attached were in the *United*States mail service. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendant's motion from the files; the court overruled it; the plaintiff then demurred to the’ defendant’s motion; this the court sustained.

*137On trial judgment was given for the plaintiff, and the defendant sued out a writ of error against it, and assigns as error of the court below, that it did not quash the levy; that it sustained a demurrer to his motion to quash. After the bond was given? releasing the attached property, the levy was out of consideration. The suit was not an attachment suit, it was to proceed as other suits at law. *Gould’s Big., ch.*17, *sec.*19. *Section*13 of the same chapter permits the bond to release the attachment to be entered into before the clerk, when the sheriff has returned the writ. The bond in this case was taken by the clerk: we presume that the writ had been returned to his office, though the return day of the writ had not come. The bond answered the purpose of the defendant in giving him the use of his mail horses, and he ough not to questtion it.

Judgment affirmed'.
EXHIBIT
32.1
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
  18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
  AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
  SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  In connection with the Quarterly Report
on Form 10-Q of Massey Energy Company (the “Company”) for the quarter ending
March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the “Report”), I, Don L. Blankenship, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1)           the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  (2)           the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 /s/ Don L.
      BlankenshipDon
      L. BlankenshipChairman,
      Chief Executive Officer andPresidentMay
      9, 2008
##### 



Exhibit 21.1 Subsidiaries of Merchants and Manufacturers Bancorporation, Inc. The following bank subsidiaries are state banks and are organized under the laws of the State of
Wisconsin. Lincoln State Bank
Grafton State Bank
Franklin State Bank
Community Bank Financial
The Reedsburg Bank
Fortress Bank of Westby
Wisconsin State Bank The following bank subsidiary is a state bank and is organized under the laws of the State of Iowa: Fortress Bank of Cresco The following bank subsidiary is a state bank and is organized under the laws of the State of
Minnesota: Fortress Bank Minnesota The following non-bank subsidiaries are organized under the laws of the State of Wisconsin: CFG Financial Services, Inc.
Community Financial Services, LLC.
Keith C. Winters & Associates, LTD.
CFG Mortgage, Inc.
Lincoln Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation
Merchants Merger Corp.
Merchants New Merger Corp. The following non-bank subsidiaries are organized under the laws of the State of Nevada: M&M Lincoln Investment
Corporation
Westby Investment Company, Inc.
Reedsburg Investment Corp.
GSB Investments, Inc.
CBOC Investments, Inc.
Random Lake Investments, Inc. All such subsidiaries are wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by Merchants and Manufacturers
Bancorporation, Inc.
#### LaVerne BOECK and Valda Boeck, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Walter DIEM, Appellee. Della SMITH, Appellant, v. Walter DIEM, Appellee.

Nos. 70-286, 70-287.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 10, 1971.

*688Herb Blessing, Bradenton, for appellants.

W. Robert Mann, of Mann, Fay & Price, Bradenton, for appellee.

MANN, Judge.

Our Supreme Court has made it clear in Short v. Grossman, Fla. 1971, 245 So.2d 217, opinion filed January 13, 1971, that Griffis v. Hill, Fla. 1969, 230 So.2d 143, was not intended to make a new trial necessary in every zero damages case. Though the holding in *Short*seems to reaffirm a restrictive view of Supreme Court jurisdiction under Fla.Const. Art. V, § 4, F.S.A., the opinion clearly rehabilitates Shaw v. Puleo, Fla.1964, 159 So.2d 641.

This is an appropriate case for the af-firmance of zero damages. Plaintiffs were passengers in a car struck lightly by a following car. The car in which they were riding suffered a slight dent in the chrome ring surrounding the tail light lens, leaving the lens intact. Neither passenger suffered any injury requiring immediate medical attention, and they proceeded to their bingo game. They testified to headaches and pains attributed to the accident, but the jury chose to believe either that the pain did not exist or was attributable to other causes. A reasonable man could have believed that they were not injured in the accident.

Affirmed.

PIERCE, C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
EXHIBIT 23.1



                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS




         We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements of Ion Networks, Inc. and subsidiaries (the "Company") on Forms S-3
(File Nos. 333-09507, 333-85693 and 333-50246) and Forms S-8 (File Nos.
333-61837, 333-14681 and 333-76809) of our report dated June 28, 2001 relating
to the consolidated financial statements, which appears in the Company's Annual
Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended March 31, 2001.

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
---------------------------------
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Florham Park, New Jersey
June 28, 2001
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1227 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1227

   To make technical corrections to emergency unemployment benefits 
                              provisions.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                July 14 (legislative day, June 30), 1993

  Mr. Wofford introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To make technical corrections to emergency unemployment benefits 
                              provisions.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
    (a) In General.--Subclauses (II) and (III) of section 
102(b)(2)(A)(v) of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 
are amended to read as follows:
                                    ``(II) The requirements of this 
                                subclause are met for any week if the 
                                national rate of total unemployment 
                                (seasonally adjusted) for each of the 2 
                                most recent calendar months (not 
                                averaged) for which data are published 
                                before the close of such week is less 
                                than 7 percent, and if the requirements 
                                of subclause (III) are not met for such 
                                week.
                                    ``(III) The requirements of this 
                                subclause are met for any week if the 
                                national rate of total unemployment 
                                (seasonally adjusted) for each of the 2 
                                most recent calendar months (not 
                                averaged) for which data are published 
                                before the close of such week is less 
                                than 6.8 percent.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply as if included in the amendments made by section 101(b) of the 
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992.

                                 <all>
```
#### KENDALL MALL, INC., Appellant, v. CHURCHILL’S HAIR DESIGNER TO MEN AND WOMEN, INC., Appellee.

No. 77-1889.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 30, 1978.

Risken & Dishowitz, Hollywood, Savitt, Kotzen & France, North Miami Beach, for appellant.

Steven M. Siegfried, of Schoninger & Siegfried, Miami, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, NATHAN and HUBBART, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The only point raised in this appeal by the defendant-lessor from an adverse final money judgment in an action for breach of lease, is that the plaintiff-lessee failed to properly prove its damages. Having considered the contentions raised in the parties’ briefs in the light of the record on appeal and the transcript of the non-jury trial, we are of the opinion that no reversible error has been demonstrated because the award of damages is supported by unrefuted competent substantial evidence.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>   1
                                EXHIBIT (23)-1-

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


     We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statement
(Post-effective amendment No. 2 on Form S-3 to Form S-14 (No. 2-93037)) of
Unimar Company of our report dated February 26, 1997, relating to the
consolidated balance sheets of Unimar Company and subsidiaries as of December
31, 1996 and 1995 and the related consolidated statements of earnings, cash
flows and changes in partners' capital for each of the years in the two year
period ended December 31, 1996 and 1995, which report appears in the December
31, 1996 annual report on Form 10-K of Unimar Company.


                                                           KPMG Peat Marwick LLP




Houston, Texas
March 21, 1997
260 La. 695

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Alfred Charles LEE v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 52129.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 10, 1972.

In re: Alfred Charles Lee applying for writs of mandamus, certiorari and habeas corpus.

Application denied. Since a hearing has been fixed in the trial court for February 24, 1972, the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction is not warranted.

BARHAM, J.,

does not concur. This arises in the same jurisdiction as State ex rel. Lynn v. Henderson, 260 La. 294, 255 So.2d 774. See my dissent there.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 70 Agreed to House (ATH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 70

   Electing Representative Pelosi of California to the Committee on 
                     Standards of Official Conduct.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 4, 1993

Mr. Hoyer submitted the following resolution; which was considered and 
                               agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   Electing Representative Pelosi of California to the Committee on 
                     Standards of Official Conduct.

    Resolved, That the following named Member be elected to the 
following standing Committee of the House of Representatives:
    Standards of Official Conduct: Nancy Pelosi, California, to rank 
after Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland.

                                 <all>
```
#### DESIGNS IN CONCRETE, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. PRECISION CONCRETE CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, and Sam Serkin, individually, Appellees. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Appellant, v. DESIGNS IN CONCRETE, INC., Appellees.

Nos. 71-649, 71-651.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 24, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 30, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 6, 1972 in No. 71-649.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.