T h e H on or abl e Joh n R. Adams , U n i t ed S t at es D i s t r i ct J u dg e f or t h e N or t h er n D i s t r i ct of O h i o, s i t t i n g by * d esi gnat i o n. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0505n.06 No. 09-5683 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
L ORD VI NCENT SCOTT, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. G & J PEPS I -COL A B OTTL ERS, I NC., Defendan t-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T FO R TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY O P I N I O N

BEFORE: BOGG S and NORRIS, Circuit Judges; ADAM S, District Judge. * ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff, L ord Vincent Scott, a ppeals the di strict court’s g rant of summary judgme nt in favor of defe ndant, G & J Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, I nc. (“ the Company ”), on Mr . Scott’s claims for ra cial and disa bility discrimination under Ke ntucky state law. We a ff ir m. I. Mr . Scott is an A fri can- Am eri can w ho wor kedfor th e C om pan y

fo r a pp ro xima te ly tw e nty -s ix ye ar s b e f o r e h i s e mp l o ym e n tw a s t e r m i n a t e d o nJ u l y 2 9 , 2 0 0 7
. D u r i n g h i s t e nu r e a tt h e C o mp an y, he wa s directly

subjected to two ra cial comments by co-w orker s, and he w itnessed three rac ial comments direc ted at o t h er s . He a lso became awa re of an incident at another of the Company ’s fa c ili tie s in

Winc he ste r, Ke ntu c ky , whe re an unk no wn pe rs on pla c e d a han g man’ s noo se on the de sk- 2 -

of an Afri can- Am e ri c an e mpl oy e e . A c c or din g to M r. Sc ott , th e Com pa ny kn e w a bo ut t he se instances of

rac ial hara ssment but took no dis ciplinary action, ther eby

cre ating a ra cially

hostile work environment. Also while workingfor the Company , Mr. Scott sustaine d a wrist injury resulting in a work dis a bil ity ratin g of fi ve pe rc e nt. Hi s phy sic ian pla c e d him on lif tin g re str ic tio ns of te n p ound s w ith h i s ri gh t h and and twe nty pounds bilaterally . Be cause of these liftingrestric tions, Mr. Scott was unable to re sume the duties of the pos ition he held befor e he injured his wrist. Mr. Scott alleg ed that he wa s capa

ble of pe rfor

ming the duties of

many other positions at t h e C o m p an y ’s plant, but that when he asked the Company to a ccommodate his limitations, it re fused, ther eby denying him wor

k
on the ba s is o f

h is w r is t i mp a ir

me n t. A c c o r d in g to M r . Sc o tt , h e w a s f o r c e d to r e ma in

o nle ave despite his repe ated r equests to re turn to work. He rema ined on leave for twenty -four months. At the e nd of that pe ri od , th e Com

pa ny te rm inate d h is e mpl oy

me nt. Th e re a ft e r, Mr . Sc ott

fi le d s uit, a lle g ingstate statut or y c la ims fo r r a c ia l and

dis a bil ity discrimination in vi o l at i o n o f the Ke ntucky Civil Rights Act, Ky . Rev. Stat. § 344.040(1). Afte r discovery , the Company

moved for summary judgme nt on both claims, assertingthat Mr. Scott had fa ile d to e sta

bli sha pr ima fa c ie c a se fo r e ith e r c la im. The district cour

t gr anted summary

judgme nt on the rac ial discrimination c laim based upon its determinations that Mr. Scott had failed to point to evidenc e showingthat the conduc t in question
wa s se ve re or

pe rv a siv e e no ug h to c re a te an e nv ir on me nt t hat a re a so na ble pe rs on

wo uld fi nd ho sti le or abusive, a

nd that Mr. Scott had fa iled to point to evidence that the Company tolerate d or condone d

ra c ia lly ha ra ssi ngc on du c t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d s umm ary jud g me nt on Mr . Sc ott ’s dis a

bil ity discrimination claim based upon its deter mi n ati on that Mr. Scott had fa iled to present suff icient- 3 -

evidenc e that his wrist injury was a d i s ab i l i ty

under the Americ ans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ AD A” ), 42 U. S.C. § 1 21 02 a s a pp lie d b y Ky . Re v. Stat. § 34 4. 04 0. On a pp e a l, M r. Sc ott
c ha lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g s o n b oth c la ims

. II. A. Standard of Review We r e vie w a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo

. Ther ma -Sca n , In c. v. Thermoscan, Inc

. , 295 F.3d 623, 629 ( 6th Cir. 2002). Summ ary judgme nt is pro p er wh er e there exis ts no ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct and the moving party is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law. F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ). I n c on sid e ri nga mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt mus t
c o n s t r u e t h e e v i d e n c e , an d

m ak e a l l r e a s o n a

b l e i n f e r e n c e s , i nf

av o r o f t h e n o n m o v i n g p art y. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U. S. 574 , 587 (1 98 6)

. Th e c e ntr a l is su e is “whe ther the e vidence prese nts a sufficie nt disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one par ty must prevail as a

matter of la

w.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). B. TheRa c ial

Di sc rim ina tio n Cl

aim Racial discr imination claims filed pursuant to Ky . Rev. Stat. § 344.040(1) are a naly zed under the sta nd ard s a pp lie d to fe de ra l ra c ia l dis c ri min a tio n c la ims br ou g ht p ur su ant t o T itl e VI Iof the Civ il Rights Act of

1964. Smith v. Leggett W ire Co. , 2 2 0 F. 3 d

7 5 2 , 7 5 8 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Kentucky Com m’n o n H

um an Ri gh ts v . Co mm on we alt

h , 5 86 S.W. 2d 27 0, 27 1 (K y . Ct. Ap p. 19 79 )) ; se e als o Clark v. United Parcel Se rv., Inc

. , 400 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2005) (c onstruing se x discrimination cl ai m ) ( ci t i n g Am me rm an v . Bd

. ofEd uc . of N ic ho las Cou nty , 30 S.W .3d 793, 797-98 (Ky . 2000)).- 4 -

Ra c ia l di sc ri min atio n w hic h c re a te s a ho sti le or a bu siv e wo rk e nv ir on me nt i s a c tio na ble un de r T itl e VI I
. See Meritor Sav. Bank , FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986). A plaintiff esta

blishes a prima fa cie c ase of

rac ial discrimination based upon a hostile work environment by

showing that (1) the pla intiff was a member of

a prote cted c lass; (2) the plaintiff w as subjected to unwe lcome har assment; (3) t h e h ar assm ent was r ace -base d; (4) the ha rassment
unrea sonably

interfe red w ith the plaintiff’s work pe rfor mance by cre ating an envir onment that was intimi dating , hostile, or offe nsive; and (5) the employ er was l iable for the har assing conduct. Clay v. United Parc el Serv ., Inc. , 5 0 1 F. 3 d 6 9 5 , 7 0 6 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Hafford v. Seidner , 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th C i r. 1 9 9 9)). To satisfy the fourth e lement, “unr easona ble interfe renc e,” a plaintiff “must prese nt evidence showing that under the ‘totality of t he cir cumstance s’ the har assment was ‘suffic iently

sever e or pe rvas i v e to alter the conditions of the victim’s employ ment and cr eate an abusive working environment.’ ” Id. at 7 0 7 (q u o t i n g W illiams v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 187 F.3d 553, 5 6 0 , 5 6 2 (6 t hC i r. 1 9 9 9 ) ( i ntu rn qu o t i n g Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc ., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n mark s omi tte d) ))

. To satis fy the fi ft h e le me nt, “ e mpl oy e r liab ility ,” a pla intiff must demonstrate “that [t he plainti ff’ s] employ er ‘ tolerate d or condone d the [alleg ed conduc t] ’ or ‘th a t t h e e mp lo y e r

kn e w o r s h o u ld h av e kn o w no f

th e a ll e g e d

c o n d u c t a n d f a il e d to ta k e p r o mpt
reme dial action.’ ” Jack

son v. Quane

x Corp. , 1 9 1 F. 3 d

6 4 7 , 6 5 9 (6 t hC i r. 1 9 9 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co. , 858 F.2d 345, 349 ( 6th Cir. 1988)). I n assess i n g M r. S co t t ’s h o s t i l e w o rken v i ro n m en tcl ai m , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt co n cl u d edt h at Mr. Scott failed to satisfy the “unreasona ble i nterfe renc e” a

nd the “e mploy er liability ” ele ments require d to establish a prima fa cie c ase. W ith respe ct t o the “unreasona ble i nterfe renc e” element, the dist rict court re jected Mr. Scott’s contention that the infre quent, sporadic comments by low-leve l employ ees- 5 -

over a twenty -six -y ear period wer e suff iciently sever e or pe rvasive to inter fer e with his work. As to the “employ er l i ability ” ele ment, the district court c oncluded that e ven if the inc idents that Mr. Scott identified did crea

te a r acia lly hostile work environment, the C ompany ’s knowledge of three incidents over a

twenty -six -y ear

period c annot esta b l i s h t h at t he Company knew or should have kn ow n a bo ut an on g oin g ho sti le wo rk e nv ir on me nt but did no thi ng to c or re c t it or o th erw ise tol e rate d o r c on do ne d it

. Upon d e n o vo re v i ew , we agre e with the district cour t that Mr. Scott failed to establish a prima fa cie c ase of rac ial discrimination. He complains of a total of f ive incidents occ urringover a span of twenty -six y ear s which we re dire cted at h i m or that he witnesse d. He c omplains of an

a dd iti on a l in c ide nt a

bo ut wh ic h he wa s aw are , but did no t per so na lly wi tne ss, wh ic h oc c ur re d at a fac ility other than the one whe re he worke d. Under no objective st andard ca n these fe w, isolated
occur renc es over

twenty -six y ear s be consider ed per vasive or se vere enoug h to cre ate a hostile work environment that affe cted his work. See, e .g. , Sm ith , 220 F.3d at 760-61 (over twenty -y ear

period, single use of a

rac ial slur direc ted a t plaintiff, ra cially offe nsive and g raphic car toon circulated by p l ai n t iff’s supervisor, joke told by supervisor using rac ial slur, and ref ere nce by a co-w orker to a bla c k e mpl oy e e a s a “ g or ill a ” de e me d ins uf fi c ie ntl y se ve re or pe rv a siv e to c on sti tu te o bj ect ive ly ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir on me nt) ; Bowman v. ShawneeState Univ. , 22 0 F .3 d 45 6, 46 4 (6 th Cir

. 20 00 ) ( in
se xua l ha ra ssm e nt c on te xt, fi ve inc ide nts of ha ra ssi ngc on du c t oc c ur

ri ngov e r f

ive -ye ar p e ri od

did
no t c on sti tut e se ve re or

pe rv a siv e c on du c t) ; Burnett v. Tyco Corp. , 203 F.3d 980, 984- 85 (6th Cir. 20 00 ) ( in s e xua l ha

ra ssm e nt c on te xt, thre e of fe ns ive inc i d e nt s i nv o l v i n g pla int if f’ s su pe rv iso r w ith in six -month period not so sever e as to c reate a hostile work e nvironment). While the incidents Mr. Scott describes a

re of fensive, the y

are too isolate d t o establish a per vasive c ourse of

conduct, a

ndI nde e d , M r . Sc o tt a dmi tt e d in h is d e p o s it io n te s ti mo n y th a t h is jo b p e r f o r ma n c e was not 1 a ff e c te d b y any sin g le inc ide nt o r t

he c umu lativ e e ff

e c t of a ll i nc ide nts
. - 6 - the y are no t se ve re enoug h to c re a te an intim idatin g , h os til e e nv ir on me nt t hat in te rf e re d w ithhis work. 1 More o v er , Mr. Scott’s prima fa cie c ase f ails beca use he ha s not established employ er lia bil ity . H e ha s pr e se nte d no e vid e nc e that the Com pa ny kn e w o f a

nd tol e ra te d a n o ng oin g ho sti le work e nvironment. To the contra ry , the evidenc e in the rec ord establishes that, with the exception of one e vent some twenty -odd y ear s ag o which resulted in no disciplinary action, the Company acte d promptly and dec isively

to end the conduc t when the Company beca me awa re of discrete instances of har assment
. Be cause Mr. Scott ha s failed to e stablish the “unre asonable interfe renc e” a nd the “e mploy er liability ” ele ments of hi s prima fa cie hostile work e nvironment ca se, we aff irm the district court’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt o n th a t c la im. C. TheDi

sa bil ity Di sc rim ina tio n Cl

aim To make a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Mr. S cott must establish that he (1) is “disabled”; ( 2) is “other wise qualified” to perfo rm t h e requirements of the job with or without
re a so na ble a c c omm od a tion; and (3 ) s uf fe re d a n a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt d e c isi on

be c a us e of his disability

. Hallahan v. Courier-Journal , 138 S.W .3d 699, 706-07 (Ky . Ct. App. 2004) (citing H e n d e r s o n v. Ardco, I

nc. , 247 F.3d 645, 649 ( 6th Cir. 2001)). The K entucky Civil Rights Act define s “disability ” as “ (a) [a] phy sical or menta l imp ai rm en t t h at substantially limit s one . . . or more of the major life a ctivities of the individual; (b) [a] record of such an impairme nt; or (c ) beingTh e dis tr ic t c ourt qu ote d th e de fi nit ion

of “ dis a bil ity” fro m the AD A, wh ic h is a lmo st 2 identical to the def

inition us ed in the state statute. A s written at the time of Mr. Scott’s termination, the ADA de fined “ disability ” as “ (A) a phy sical or mental impairment that substantially limit s one or mor e of the ma jor lif e a c tiv iti e s o f s uc h in divi du al; (B) a reco rd of su c h a n im pa ir me nt; or (C ) beingreg arde d as havingsuch an impairme nt.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2007)

. Al t h o u ghC o n gre s s en ac t ed l egi s l at i o n o n S ep t em b er 2 5 , 2 0 0 8 , “r ep u d i at i n g Toyota’s strict 3 standard f or finding a disability under the ADA a nd expressing its intent that the ADA be construed in favor of

broad c overa g e, ef

fec tive J anuar

y 9, 2009[,] ” J

e nk ins v . Na t’ l B d. of M

e d. Ex am ’r

s , No. 08-5371, 2009 WL331638, at *1 (6th Cir. Fe b. 11, 2009), Mr. Scott’s termination occ urre d befor e the 2008 amendme nts became effec tive. Thus, we consider his disability discrimination claim under the law as it exi sted befor e the amendments. See Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ. , 569 F.3d 562, 567 (6th Cir. 2009) (no retr oactive a pplication of ADAAmendments Ac t to preamendment c onduct). Ac cording ly , the Toy ota standard a pplies. - 7 - r e g ar d e d a s h av in g s u c hanim

p a ir me n t. ” K y . Re v . St a t. § 3 4 4
. 0 1 0 ( 4 ). A “ ma jor lif e a c tiv ity” is 2 one that is “of c entra l importance to da ily life.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v . W illiams , 5 34 U. S. 184, 197 (2002). 3 I n g rantingsummary

judgme nt in the Company ’s favor, the district cour t observed that the only evidenc e Mr. Scott pr esente d conce rning the disability element of

his discrimination claim was
e vid e nc e that he ha d a tw e nty -p ound bil a te ra l li ft ingre str ic tio n, a te n- po un d li ft ingre str ic tio n w ith his right ha

nd, and a f

ive-pe rce nt disability

rating . The district cour

t held that the evidenc e provide d by Mr. S cott was insuffic ient to make a pr ima fac ie ca se of disability discrimination beca

use he ha d failed to show that his lifting r estrictions rende red him unable to perfor m–or subs t antially

limit ed his a bil ity to p e rf or m–c e ntr a lly

imp or tant d a ily lif e fu nc tio ns . Mr. Sco t t co n t ends that his fac tual alleg ations conce rning the extent of his wrist injury
c re a te d a n is su e fo r t

he jur y to d e te rm ine wh e the r h is l if tin g re str ic tio ns su

bs tanti a lly

lim ite d d a ily lif e a c tiv iti e s. I n his vie w, the Com pa ny wa s re qu ir e d to mak e an indi vid ua lize d ass e ssm e nt o f h is
wr ist inj ur

y and to re a so na

bly a c c omm od a te the lim itatio ns imp os e d by that inj ur y . Mr. Sc ottTo the extent that, on appea l, Mr. S cott alleg es that the Company perc eived him as disabled, 4 we note that he fa iled to raise that argument below. Acc ording ly , it is not proper ly befor e us and w e do not consider it. See B &H Me d., L.L.C . v. ABP Adm in., Inc. , 526 F.3d 257, 268 (6th Cir. 2008) (abse nt exceptional circumstanc es, this cou rt “c an n ot consider a n issue not passed on below” ) ( q u o t i n g St. Marys Foundry, I nc. v. E mployers I

ns. of W ausau , 332 F.3d 989, 995- 96 (6th Cir. 2003)). - 8 - conclude s that beca

use the Company

failed to c onsider him for a position t h at h e could per form within his l imitations , it discriminated ag ainst him on the basis of his impairment. Mr. Scott’s arguments lack mer it. He has not di re ct ed u s to any portion of the re cord showing that his wrist injury substantially

limit s a major life function, and evidenc e of Mr. Scott’s lif tin g re str ic tio ns , s tand inga lon e , is ins uf fi c ie nt t o q

ua lif y a s a “ dis a bi li ty ” for purp os e s o f t

his claim. See Toy ota , 534 U.S. at 195 (“[m] ere ly having an impairment doe s not make one disable d for pur poses of the A DA”)

. Simi larly , Mr. Scott has failed to pr esent a n y ev i d en ce of the 4 Company ’s fa ilure to ac commodate his impairment. The evidenc e shows that the only position on which Mr. Scott bid afte r sus taining his wrist injury went to a fellow union employ ee w ith gr eate r seniority , a dec ision that Mr. Scott concede s was prope r in light of the go v er n ing c ollective barg aini n g agre ement. Given the se fa ilures, Mr. Scott failed to e stablish a prima fa cie c ase of disability discrimination. Accor dingly , we c onclude t h a t t h e district cour

t properly g rante d summary jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f t he Com pa ny on Mr . Sc ott ’s dis a

bil ity dis c ri min a tio n c la im. III . Th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

is aff irm ed
.