1Rule 10 (Court of Appeals). Memorandum Opinion. -- (b) The Court, with the concurrence of all

judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by mem orandum

opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum

opinion it shall be designated "MEMORANDUM OPINION," shall not be published, and shall not be cited or

relied upon for any reason in a subsequent unrelated case.

FILED

August 26, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON

JAMES L. JONES, et al, ) From the Chancery Court of

) Lauderdale County at Ripley, TN

Plaintiffs/Appellants, )

) The Honorable Walton West, Judge

vs. )

) Lauderdale Chancery No. 9445

RANDALL J. HARRIS, MAYOR, ) Appeal No. 02A01-9701-CH-00010

et al, )

)

Defendants/Appellees. ) AFFIRMED

)

) J. Thomas Caldwell

) Ripley, Tennessee

) Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants

)

) Charles T. Dyer

) Wilkes & Dyer

) Dyersburg, Tennessee

) Attorney for Defendants/Appellees

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

 

HIGHERS, J.

The Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s final judgment which upheld the action of the

Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the Town of Halls in entering into a two-year contract with

a private contractor for the collection of solid waste. For the reasons stated hereinafter,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The parties stipulated to the following facts:

1. Plaintiffs comprise a citizens group formed to

contest the validity of a contract entered into by the [Board of

Mayor and Aldermen] of the Town of Halls with BrowningFerris Industries [BFI], a private firm, for the collecting and

disposal of solid waste within the corporate limits of the

municipality. Plaintiffs, James L. Jones, Noel Sherrod, Oneal

White, Jerry Stanley, Tommy Hansbrough, Gaylon Smith,

Eddie Bishop, Nelda Bishop, David Hurt, Jr., John Eskridge,

Tommy Nix, and others, are resident citizens of the Town of

Halls, taxpayers, and, in varying capacities, users of residential

and commercial waste disposal facilities afforded by the

municipality.

2. Defendants comprise the duly elected Board of

Mayor and [Aldermen] of the Town of Halls (the Board).
2

3. On June 6, 1994, a proposal was presented to

the Board to “contract out” solid waste disposal to a private

firm to be paid for from fees charged the users.

4. On July 11, 1994 the Board voted to advertise for

bids for private waste collection.

5. A Specifications Document was prepared for the

Board by MTAS and advertised in local newspapers.

6. Bids were received from three (3) firms.

7. On August 1, 1995 the Board set August 15,

1995 to open bids for garbage collection.

8. On August 15, 1995 bids were opened and the

meeting adjourned to August 29th.

9. On August 29, 1995 the Board voted to accept

the BFI bid for solid waste collection.

10. Plaintiffs’ suit was filed September 30, 1994

insisting that the Board had no ordinance authority to disband

the Town’s sanitation department and contract for waste

disposal with a private company. Plaintiffs insist the Board’s

action is a nullity because the present, operable ordinances of

the Town do not authorize private waste collection. Plaintiffs

say they have a due process right to be heard through the

statutory ordinance adoption procedure.

11. The Board answered, denying the material

allegations of the Complaint, and affirmatively insisting that the

Plaintiffs have no standing to bring this suit, and further that

Title 8, Chapter 2, of the Town of Halls Code as amended by

Ordinance of September 5, 1967 are sufficient for the

awarding of a contract for collection of refuse.

12. A temporary restraining order was issued

September 30, 1994 and an order for temporary injunction

issued November 1, 1994.

13. Both parties have moved for summary judgment

based on this Stipulation of Fact and the Stipulation of

Documents filed with the Court. 

The stipulated documents filed by the parties included the Town charter, Town

ordinances, and other documents. The Town charter grants the Town the “full power

and authority” to “enact and pass such laws and ordinances necessary and proper to

preserve the health of said town.” The Town ordinances provide, inter alia, that:

Collection. All refuse accumulated within the

corporate limits shall be collected, conveyed, and disposed

of under the supervision of such officer as the board of

mayor and aldermen shall designate. . . . 
3

As amended, the ordinances provide the following definition of collector:

Collector – The term “collector,” shall mean any

person, firm, corporation, or political subdivision, that

collects, transports, or disposes of any refuse within the

corporate limits of Halls, Tennessee. 

The Town’s ordinances also require collectors to obtain collection permits:

Permits. No person, firm, or corporation shall

engage in the business of collecting refuse or removing the

contents of any refuse container (other than the owner of

such containers) for any purpose whatsoever, who does

not possess a permit to do so from appropriate authority of

the [Town] of Halls. . . . 

On appeal, the Plaintiffs raise the following issue for this court’s review:

Can the Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the Town

of Halls do away with the City sanitation-garbage disposal

system and contract solid waste disposal through a

privately owned independent contractor without the

authority of an enabling ordinance? 

A municipality’s powers “are to be carried into effect and discharged through

provisions of ordinances enacted by the [municipality’s] council or other governing

authority.” Brooks v. Garner, 566 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tenn. 1978). Citing this principle,

the Plaintiffs contend that the Board’s action of entering into a contract with BFI was a

nullity because such action was not authorized by any existing Town ordinance.

We disagree because we conclude that, under existing Town ordinances, the

Board has the authority to enter into a contract with a private contractor for the

collection of solid waste within the municipality. The ordinances give the Board the

authority to designate an officer who will supervise the collection, conveyance, and

disposal of refuse within the Town’s corporate limits. The ordinances broadly define

eligible entities which may collect waste within the Town’s corporate limits to “any

person, firm, corporation, or political subdivision,” and require such entities to obtain a

permit from the Town. By their express terms, therefore, the ordinances authorize the

Board to designate a firm or corporation, such as BFI, to oversee the collection of waste

within the Town’s corporate limits. Accordingly, we reject the Plaintiffs’ argument that
2

In light of our affirm ance of the trial court’s judgment, we need not address the Board’s contention

on cross-appeal that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this action.

4

the Town’s ordinances do not authorize the Board to contract for waste disposal with

a private company.2

The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed

to the Plaintiffs, for which execution may issue if necessary.

 

HIGHERS, J.

CONCUR:

 

CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S.

 

TOMLIN, Sr. J.