### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-01-00093-CV Joseph D . Longton, Appel lant
v. Pamel a Lyn Longton, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. FM0-01907, HONORAB LE JOHN K. DIETZ, JUDGE PRESIDING Joseph and Pam el a Longton agreed

in op en co ur t t o e nt er into binding alt er nat ive di spute re sol uti on to dis solv

e thei r marriage. The pri

ma ry i ssuepr ese nt ed is w het her t his agr eement constituted a “

wri t ten a greem en t” enf orceab l e un

der s ection 6.60 1 of

the F am i l y Code. See Te x. Fam . Code A nn . § 6.601 (b) (W

est 199 8). In

f i ve i ss ue s, J ose ph Lon gton appeal s, contendi

ng that t he dis trict court erred in

enterin g the div orce decree ba se d u po n t he ar bit r at io n a wa r d. We o ve rrule th e iss ue s pre se n ted an d a f f i rm th e d i str i ct c our t’s j udgm en t. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On Septembe

r 19, 2000, whil

e thei r div orce action was pen

ding, t he Lo ngt ons appeared i n c ourt b ef

ore th e H onor ab l e W . Je an

ne Me ure r f ora hea ring on mo t ions fo r t he app oint ment of

a re ce i ve r of the i r j oi nt real es tatebu si

ne ss , Lon gton Par tne rs Re al Esta te, a nd f oran order com

pel l i ng th e sa l e of thei r resi den ce. At the

conc l usi on of the h eari ng, a dis cussi on ensued
co ncer ningt he po ss ibilit y o f en ga gin g in a binding ADR proceedi ng regardi ng thei r div orce dispute.1 The facts of this case are known to the part ie s, and we do no t r ec it e t he m he r e in gr ea t er de t ail t ha n is n ec es sa ry t o r es o lve t his a pp ea l. 2 Judge Meu re r o ffered t o d ecide issues upo n which t he Lo ngt ons co uld no t agree. The parties acknowl edged

tha t an i m pe di men t to proc ee di

ng i n th at m an ne r wa s P am

el a’ s th i rd- pa rty ac ti on agains t another real e state broker in the Longtons’ real estate busi

ness with wh om Joseph was engaged i n an in tim ate relations

hi p. 1 The broker had al

so fi le d counterclai

ms agai nst Pam el a. At the heari

ng, the parties a

greed to forego a trial

and to resolve thei

r dispute through
a bi ndi ng A DR pr oceed i ng i n accorda nc e wi th the Fam i l y Code. See Tex. Fam . Code Ann . § 6.601. On the record, Judge Meurer expl ai ned t he consequenc es of thei

r decis ion. W

ith the pa rties un der
oa t h, and in

response to questioni

ng by their attorneys, b ot h Joseph and Pam el a agreed to pro ceed. They ex pr es sl y wai v ed th ei r ri gh ts to a j ur y trial , w ai v ed a r ec ord of th e p roc ee di

n g, a n d agr ee d to t ime l i m i ts a n d a f orm at f or th e a l ter n ati v e d i spute re sol uti on pr oce ed i n g. P am el a a gr ee d to release her cl ai ms agai nst the broker, thereby

le avi ng an is sue of com

mi ssions owedto be resol

ved b etween t he br ok er and J os eph.

Under oath, Joseph expressl

y wai ved “ val uabl e righ ts” to whi

ch h e was o t he r wis e entitled and agreed to be bound b y Ju dg e M eu r er ’s de t er minat io n, wh ich he ac kn o wle dg ed wo uld “r es ult in the entry of

a fi nal an d n on -app ealable or der. ” He furt her agr eed t o pa y the brok er’s
co mmi ssio ns and attor ney ’s f

ees sh e i ncurred in connecti on with the Longto ns’ div orce pro ceedings. Having made th

ese agree men ts an d af ter ack nowl edgi ng th ei r ri ghts , theLongt ons al lowed Judge Me ure r to ar bi trate the i r di vor ce. A t the con cl us i on of the ADR proc ee di ng on Septembe r22, 2000, Judge Meurer ann ounced her rul

in g. The parti es thereaf

ter attem pted, b ut were unab le , t o a gr ee u po n t he fo rm o f a final decr ee. Afte r e xpr essing h er f ru strati on to the parties ab out3

t he ir i na bi li ty to agree upon an order, at a heari ng on Fri day , Octo ber 20th, the trial court deni

ed Joseph’s motion f or co ntin uance an d ordered t he parties

“to appear at t he 9:00 docket on Monday
m orni ng [ Octobe

r 23rd].” On Octo ber 23rd, t he casew as a ssigned t o t he Ho nor able Jo hn K. D ietz . At proceedin gs b ef oreJudg e D i etz

on Oc t o be r23 r d a nd 24 t h, t he pa r t ies pr es en t ed ar gu men t s. Pa mela fi le d a mot ion t o r edu ce t he ar b i tra ti on aw ard to j ud

gm en t. Sh e a l so s ub m i tted to Jud ge M eur er and Judge Diet z a p ro po sed judg ment a nd confi rmation of rulin

g, seeki ng ve rif ic ation that

the propo sed judg ment repr es en

ted th e c our t’s ru l i n g i n th e ADR pr oce ed

i n g. J ose ph ’s cou n se l argu ed th at, because the proceedin

g em braced ch ara cte ri sti csof both medi ati on a nd arbi trati on, hi s c l i en t ha d n ot consented to t he h

yb rid resol ution proceedin

g. Having reviewed the parties’ various moti on s, Judg e D i etz ex pre ss ed hi s i nc l i na ti on to grant Pamel

a’s m ot ion to reduce t he award to judgm ent. Pamel

a off ered to adduce additional evi dence t o su pp o r t t he jud gme nt ; J o se ph did notof f er a ny addi ti ona l ev i de nc e or prof

f er a bi l l of exceptions. Instead

of g ran tin g Pam ela’s order, Judge

Dietz rem an de d the c as e to J

udg e M eu rer f or confi rmation of her origi

nal ruli ngs. At a heari

ng on October 27th, Judge Meurer conf irm ed her Septem

ber 22 nd
ar bitr at ion aw ar d. The award was presen ted to Judge Di etz who sign ed the fi nal decree of di

vorce on Novem ber 7th. Nei

ther par t y pro ffered add itio nal evidenc e; no further he arin gs were requested. Fi ndi ngsof f act and concl

usi ons of l aw fi le d on Decem

ber 21, 2000 i

ncl uded fi ndi ngs that (i) the partie s agreed to submi t all dis puted issue s i

n the case to Judge Meurer f

or fi nal , bi ndi ng, no n- ap pe ala ble re so lut ion and (ii) t he pa rt ies’ ag re ement was co mmemora t ed in wr iting by t he off ic ia l
cour t rep ort er. Jo seph has n ot challen ged these, o r any, of the court ’s fi ndi ngs or co ncl

usions.4 Joseph appeals a judgm ent in fav or o f Pam el a on the grounds that t he trial court erred in signing t heir d ivor ce d ecr ee ba sed on an arb i trationawa rd t hat was (i) e nt er ed w itho ut hear ing evi dence to support the award, (ii ) not in com

pli ance wit h t he Fa mily

Code, ( i i i ) i

nv al i d f or lac k of a condi tion preceden

t, and (iv ) in compl ete. DISCUSSI ON Joseph f i rst com pl ai ns on ap peal that the tria l court erred

by en teri ng th e dec re e of div orce wi thou t con duc ting a h

earin g to recei ve ev ide nce. In acc ordance wi

th the parties’ a

greed procedure, testim

ony was gi

ven and ev ide nceconsidered

in a heari ng conducted by

Judge Meurer beginning on

Septembe

r 18, 2000, and concl

udin g on Septembe

r 22nd. In that heari

ng, Judge Meurer ruled o n a ll iss ue s no t ag r ee d u po n by t he pa r t ies
. Sh e t he n r en de r ed he rde cis io n regard ing t he part ies’ pr op er t y and

ch i l d c us tody

i ss ue s. W he n J ose ph oppos ed the m oti on to ren de r j udg men t on t he arbi trat ion a ward, Judge Meurer pl aced the c ase on t he trial docket and assigned i

t t o Judge Die tz. Afte r he ar ing ar gument fro m the parties an d recei vi ng Judge M eurer’s orderco nfirming the arbi trat ion a ward, Judge Di etz sign

ed the decree of di

vorce. Because Jud ge D ietz first indicat ed he would he ar evi dence an d then deci

ded i t was un ne ce ss ar y, Joseph

co nt ends t hat t he de cr ee is u nsup po rt ed by any evide nce. We disag re e. Absent
a sta tutor y or c om mon l aw gr oun d to v ac ate or mod ify

an ar bitr at ion aw ar d, a r eviewing court la cks j urisd i cti on to review other compla

in ts, incl udin g the s uff ic i ency o f the evidenc e su ppo rt ing t he award. Jamison &

Harris v. National

Loan Inv estors , 93 9 S. W .2d 735 , 73 7 (T ex . A

pp. —H ous ton [1 4th Dis t.] 1997, writ denied) ; J.J. Gr egor y Gou rme t Ser

vs., Inc. v. Antone’s Imp. Co. , 927 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. App. —Houst on [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). Jo se ph doe s not chal

le nge the ev

ide nce sup po rt ingt he aw ar d. Inst ead , he co mplains tha t J udg e Diet z did no t co nduc t a hea ring o n t he5

m oti on to ren der j udgm

en t on th e a rb i tra ti on award. But the tr ia l c ourt did n

ot refuse to hear Josep h’s ev ide nc e a t t he he ar ing
. Ap ar t fr o m t he ev ide nc e r ec eiv ed du r in g the p roce edi ng s f rom Septembe r 18th through 22nd, Joseph f ai le d to off

er any evi dence. Secti on 6.60 1(b ) of th

e Fa m i l y Code pr ovi desthat “ [i ]f

th e p ar ti es ag re e to binding
ar bitr at ion, the co urt shall render an or der r eflect ing the arbitrat or ’s awar d.” Te x. Fa m. Co de Ann. § 6.601(b). This

provisi on does not re quir e a he ar ing t o e nt er t he awa rd . R at her , in a su it affec t ing t he pa r en t - ch ild

re latio nship, t he Fa

m i l y Cod e s i m pl y re qui re s th e en try of th e order c on siste

n t wi th t he awa rd “unless t he court determ i ne s at a n on-j ury hearin g that the award is not in the best interest of the chi ld.” Id. § 153.0071 (We st 1996 ). Jose ph d i d not con tend that the arb i tration awar d i s n ot in the best i nterest of hi s chi

ldren . We concl

ude the court was not required to recei v e a dd i ti onal evi dence to su ppor t the aw ard . F urth

er, be ca us e Jose ph f ai l ed to raise thi s c onte nti on in the trial courtor i n h i s m oti on f or n ew trial, the c om

pl ai n t pr es en ts n othin g for our r ev iew
. We o ve rrule Joseph’s fi rst issue. Joseph next co nt ends t hat t he agr eement t o s ubmit t o bind ingar bitr at ion vio late d t he Fa mily Code b eca

use i t was n ot in wri tin g. See i d. §§ 6.601(a) (West 1998), 15 3.0071( a) (West. 1996)
. Sec t ion 6 .6 01( a) of t he Family Code is ident ic al to sec ti on 1 53. 007 1, exc ep t tha t se cti on 153 .0 071 re fers t o a suit affect ingthe p aren t-chi l d rel ati onsh i p. Compare id. § 153.00 71(a) ( West 1996) , with id. § 6.601 (a) (W est 199 8). The rationale for the wri

ting req uir eme n

t i s a ti me- h on ore d on

e: oral ag re em en ts co ncer ningsui

ts “are very

li abl e to be mi sconstrued or forgo tt en and t o be get misunder st andings and controv ersy.” Birdw

ell v. Cox , 18 Tex. 535, 537 (1 857 ). The re quir ement is mi nimal and th e b en ef i ts2 The parties di sagree about the app rop ri ate n om en cl atu reto de scri

b e th e a l ter n ati v e d i spute mechanism emplo yed by

Judge Meurer. The record refl ects that eac h par t y made re fere nces t o t he pr oc eed ingas

b oth arbi trati on and m edi ation; i t is apparen

t from a caref

ul rev ie w of the record that b oth wer e co nt emplat ed by t he pa rt ies. I n fact , w hen as ked by Jo sep h t o d esc ribe t he nat ur e o f the pro ceedings, Judge Meurer adm onis hed him that , “I t is im

po rt ant t hat t he pa r t ies un de r st an d t ha t in tr yi ng to assess . . . t his case [and come] t o closu re, you have a quo te ‘mediation/a rbitrat ion.’” 6 are great. The Fam

il y C ode doe s n

ot sp ec ify ho w t he wr it ing r eq uir eme nt may be sa t isfie d. Bu t it is cl ear that a writin

g is required. Here, the agreem

ent to be bound by

the ADR proceedi

ng wasma

de i n open co ur t and
rec or ded by t he co ur t re po rt er wit h t he pa rt ies und er oa t h, a fte r e xaminatio n by cou nsel and t he
cou rt; it was r educedto writi ng by the court report er bef

ore t he en

try of j udgme

nt. The parties agree d on the re cord

t ha t t he pr o ce ed ing wo uld be bind ing an d r es ult in a fina l an d n o n- ap pe ala ble order wi th the c ou rt d ecidi

ng i ssues not agr eed upo n by the part ies. 2 Wh

il e the statut e m

ay con tem pl ate an agreem

ent drafted

and e xecu t ed by t he pa rt ies and th ei r c ounse l , w e c an

n ot s ay th at, under the ci rcu m sta nc esof t his case, an agreem

ent ma de under oath and on the record and reduced to wr iting be for e t he co nclusio n of t he proceedin gs i s i nsuf fi ci ent to sat is fy

the Fam il y C ode wr iting
re qui re men t. Joseph

do es no t claim that he di d not ag ree to arb i trate al l matters in

dis pute, o r that he di d n ot know the agre em

en t woul d b e b i nd i ng , i rrevoc ab l e, a

nd non-appeal abl

e. His atto rney sp ec ifica lly

ask ed him whet her he und er st oo d t he ADR proceedi ng to be bi

ndi ng, resul ting i n a f in al and non-appe alab l e order. Jo se ph r ep lied t ha t he did
. T he pa r t ies we r e fu lly advise d o f the ir right to t rial wit h its a t t enda nt pr oc edu ra l safegu ar ds. The re cord m akes cl ea r that, to resolve thei

r dispute, the pa rti esrel i nq ui sh ed the i r ri gh t to a j ury tri al an d tradi ti ona l l i ti ga ti on in favor of a bindingADR7

procedure. If

part ies are f

ree to repudiate t hei

r agreements, dispu t es w ill sur ely pro long litigat ion and reduce t he eff

ectiveness of

ADR m echani sms. Parties ca nno t be fo r ce d t o se t t le t he ir c o nflic t s o ut sid e o f co ur t ; bu t if they en ter i n to an agr eement t hat com

pl i es wi th se cti on 6.6 01 , they

sh oul d b e r eq ui re d to h on or th at a gr eemen t. Because t he ag re ement t o a rbit ra t e wa s re duc ed t o w rit ing du ring the cou rs e of the proceedin

gs, we hold that the statute’swri

tin g requ i rem en t is sati sf i ed. See Cooper v. Bushong , 10 S.W.3d 20, 24 (T ex. App.—A

usti n 19 99, pet. d enied) (u pho lding an ar bitr at ion aw ar d whe re “a t ra nscr ipt co nt aining t he arbi trat or’s award was i

ntroduced into ev ide nc e b ef ore the d i stri ct court, an

d the record in dic ate[d] t hat t he co ur t ha d a co py o f t he aw ar d w he n he r en de r ed his de cis io n” )
. Ac co r di ng ly, we overrule Joseph ’s second i ssue. By his third issue, Jo sep h co nt ends t hat t he t rial co ur t er re d by ent er ing t he div

orce decree be ca

us e the a rb i trati on a gre em en t wa s v i ti ate d f or lac k of a co ndit ion precedent. Wi thout ci tation to authority, Joseph

argues that, b eca

use the a greem en t ann ounc ed i n open c ourt contain

ed a condi tion preceden

t t hat was not met, the agreem ent was not bi

ndi ng. A n ob stacl e to the i ni ti al agree men t to arb i trate wa s P am el a’ s th i rd- pa rty cl ai m s f or fraud agains t Jo seph’s broker-girlf

riend an d her count erclai

ms agai nst Pamela for slander and agai nst t he pa rtn ers hi p f or com m i ss i on paym ents and a t t or ney’s fees . At t he hea ring o n Sep t ember 1 9t h, Joseph an d P am el a a gr ee d th at th ey wou l d sub m i t th ei r e n ti redi v orc e c as e to bi

n di n g a rb i tra ti o n. Joseph also agreed t o p ay the bro ker ’s co mmi ssio ns and at t or ney’s fees ou t of his sha re of t he
com m un i ty est at e; P amela ag re ed t hat she w ou ld no t pur sue her claims against t he br ok er if the brokeragreed to r el ease he r clai ms for slander

agains t Pa mel a. Jos ep h ’s

cou n se l ad v i se d th e c our t:8

“M r. Long ton woul d li ke to make a

cond i tion of the agre em

en t to medi ate tha t those issues a

re resolved and—an

d not considered.” The f

oll owing c oll

oquy then occurred: [Jose ph] : Your Honor, ca n t he pa r t icip an t s— t he ac t ua lly [sic ] partici

pants say one thin g? * * * [The Court]: Sure. I f you w an t to. [Jose ph] : T he —in say i ng we go ah

ead w i th b i ndi ng a rbi tration, one o f the—I guess the fi

nal bone of content ion i s, wh at d o we do wi th t he cla ims regar di ng [ the b roker]. And wh at I see happ ening her e in the fut ur e is t hat I’m go ing t o br ing a bu nc h of wi tne ss es . . . . P am

i s g oi ng to br i ng som e p eop let o dis parage her

ch arac ter. . . . We’re goin g to end up n

eutrali zi ng each other i n th i s court ca se . . . . And I ’m wo nder ingif

we can’t just say, I ’m will ing t o g o a head and pay the—t he comm

issi on s that a

re due to her. We owe her about $6 0, 00 0 r igh t no w— o rwill be com i ng d ue ov er the

next y ear. And they b ot h dropped the charge agai nst each other. [The broker], her sl ander char ges aga inst P am, a nd

vice ver sa; a nd we ’re do ne wi th th at. We l et that—we let that anim

al die
. * * * [Coun sel f or Joseph]: And

i s i t your a gre em en t tha t i n c on n ec ti on wi tht his me diati

on ag re em en t, that you have agreed to pay the comm is si ons that aredue [the broker] in the f

uture as they com

e due? [Jose ph] : Ye s, I

do. [Coun sel ]: And

tha t you ’ ve also agreed to pay the atto rney ’s f

ees that her atto rney hasinc ur r ed as a r es ult o f [ t he br o ke r ’s ] invo lve men t in t his case? [Jose ph] : Yes. [Coun sel ]: And

is it also y our u nd ers tan di ng tha t, as a c ond i ti on of thi s m edi ati on ag re em en t, that Pam

Lon gton is relea sing all of her claims against [t he broker], and agai

nst Longton Partners Real Estate?9

[Jose ph] : Yes. [Coun sel ]: And

f ur th er , i s i t y our un ders tan di n g th at th i s a gr eemen t to enter i n to bindingme dia

tion i s co ntin

gen t upo n [the broker and her l awyer’s] agr eement t ha t t he y will a cc ep t t he t er ms o f t his med i ati on ag re em en t, an d t ha t t he y willrelease al l cl aim s that [ the broker ] has against Pam Longton or Lo ngton Partners Real Estate? [Jose ph] : Yes. [Coun sel ]: And

based on those represen tations, are you wi

ll in g to le t Judge Meurer act as t he mediat or in thi s case t o en ter f i n al ord er s wi

th respectto the

di vi si on of your prope

rti es , an d w i th reg ard to you r childre n? [Jose ph] : Ye s, I am. At th e c on cl

us i on of th e a rb i tr ation, Jud ge M eur er anno unce d her dec ision. The part ies, how ever , w er e una ble to agr ee o n t he fo rm o f a judg ment inco rp or at ing t he agreem en t to rel ea se the thi rd- pa rty cl ai m s a nd cou nte rcl ai m s. A t the Oc tobe r 20 th h ea ri ng on P am el a’ s m oti on to enter judgm

ent, Judge Meurer express ed her f rustrat ion that

the parties h

ad been unab le to agree on a judgm ent incorpor ating the releaseof the clai ms and threatened to void the arb itration. Instead of voidi ng i t, however, Judge Meurer severed the thi

rd-party cl ai

ms and ordered the parties to appear the fol lowi ng Monday

at the tr ia

l s etting of the cas e. In su bse qu en t pr o ce ed ing s a ga inst t he br o ke rt o o bt ain t he en t ry o f t he de cr ee , Pa mela
n on -s ui ted h er th i rd -p ar ty cl ai m s wi th pr ej udi ce . W

i th th i s te n der, P am

el a a l so wai v ed h er ri gh t to de man d t ha t t he cla ims against her—o ther than t he clai ms f or commi ssions and att or ney’s fees that Joseph agr eed t o p ay—be d ismi ssed , a nd t hat she w ou ld be re spo nsible for her ow n defens e and any l i ab i l i ty resul ting f rom the clai

ms . Because the conti

ngen cy requiri ng the b roker t o release h

er co un t er cla ims to Pamela’s thi rd-par ty a cti on onl y bene f i tted Pam ela, an d not Jos eph , Pa

me la contends10

that th e c on

ti n gen cy i s n ot a con di ti on pr ec eden t an d c an n ot b e u rg ed to prevent the en

try of the f

in al decree of di

vorce. We agree. Condi tions preceden

t are not fav

ored in the l

aw. Crisw

ell v. European Crossroads Shopping Ctr., Ltd. , 79 2 S. W.2d 945 , 94 8 (T ex. 1 990 ); Reilly v. Ranger Mgmt., Inc. , 727 S.W.2d 527, 530 (T ex. 1 987 ); HohenbergBros. Co. v. George E. Gibbons & Co. , 5 37 S .W. 2d 1 , 3 (T ex. 1976)
. To det ermi

ne wh ether an antecedent agr eemen

t is a condition precedent, as Jo seph contends,
ora co venant , a s Pa mela ur ges , w e must disce rn t he pa rt ies’ inte nt by loo king at t he pu rp os e o f the
en tire agree men t. Crisw ell , 792S.W .2d

at 9 48. W

he n th e i nte nt of the parties is uncl

ear or when
co nst ru inga

pro vi sion as a condi

tion would im

pose an ab su r d o rimpo ss ible r es ult , t he ag r ee men t will be i nte rprete d a s crea

ti ng a c ove na nt i ns tea d of a co ndit ion. Id. ; Hohenberg Bros. Co. , 537 S.W.2d at 3. The Lon

gtons a gr ee d to ar bit r at e t he ir

div o r ce an d, in so do ing , ex pr es sly w aiv ed t he ir ri gh ts t o a jury t rial and all the c onc omit ant procee di ngs and protections. They

both acknowl edged that the ADR proceedi

ng would res

ul t in a fi nal , bi ndi ng, non-appeal

abl e order; their i

ntent was cle ar ly to avoid the

tim e an d ex pen se of protracted l

i tig ati on. It

is u nlik ely

t hat Pamela w ou ld have engaged in a four-day arbi trat ion proceedi

ng knowi ng he rhusba nd’s g irlfriend co uld lat er re ject t he fi nal judgm ent. To co ncl

ude ot herwi se would i

gnore the fact that, prior to the arbi trat ion procedure, Joseph as su r ed Pa mela in

open court t hat he could convi ncethe broker to release her cl aim s against Pa mela an d t ha t he wo uld ind emn ify Pa mela f ro m the br ok er ’s claims re lating t o c ommission a nd att orney’s f

ees. Ad di t io na lly, acceptin g Joseph’s

contention that hi s broker-girl fri end’s relea se of h

er co un t er cla ims wa s a

con dit ion p rece den

t to t he bi ndi ng A DR pr ocedure would l ead to the

ab surd3 Joseph also chal le nges ref erences m ade by P ame la’ s c o un se l, bo t h in h er br ief a nd in he r m oti on to su pp l em en t th e r ec ord , to docu

men ts not c onta

i ne d i n th e C l erk ’s Re cord . Be ca

us e h er m oti on was overruled an

d we do n ot rel y on a ny doc um en ts n ot con tai ne d i n th e C l erk ’s Re cord , we

do n ot address thi s i ssue. 11 r es ult that, because Joseph was un happy with the c onsequence s of his de cision t o e ngag e in binding
ar bitr at ion, a third party al ign ed wi th hi m c ould f

rustrat e the c ou rt ’s au t ho rity to enf orce an agr eement vo lun t ar ily and kn o win gly en tered i n to b y th e p ar ti es . B ec au se

th e c on ti n gen cy wa s to Pamela’s bene f i t, Joseph can not ass erta c laim o f co nd it io n p r ec ed en t t o his benef it for the purp ose of def eatin g entry of the fi nal div orce decree. Joseph’s thi rd iss ue i s overruled. In his f ourth i ssue, Jos eph

conten ds that the d

i stri ct courtentered a di

vorce decree that
was in complete and f

ail ed to dispose of all

part ies’ clai

ms. 3 See T ex . R. Civ. P. 30 1. Jo se ph cla ims that the div

orce decree om

i tted a d i sp osi ti on of pa rtner sh i p c l ai m s a n d tw o atta

ch men ts ident ify ing par t icular liensren

de red i n P am el a’ s f av or. Pa mel a re sp onds b

y arg ui ng tha t a j udg men t ne ed not co nt ain all d o cu men t s t o wh ich it re f er s; ra th er , i t m ay si m pl y make r ef er en ce to doc um en ts contain ed in the record. A j udgme

nt must be suf

fi ci ently defi ni te and certain

to defi ne an d prot ect the

righ ts of all parti es. Stew

art v. USA Custom Paint & Body Shop, Inc. , 870 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1994). T hat is, it sh ould provide an

ident ifi able means o f asce rt aining the p arti es’ ri ghts

so that m i nisteri al off i cers can ex ecute th

e j udgm en t wi thout i nqu i ri ng i nto f acts n ot contai ne d therei n. Id. The documen

ts about which

Joseph com

pla in s, although n

ot attach e d to th

e j udgm en t, arepa rt of th e r ec ord

an d a recl ea rl y i den ti f i ab l e. The f

i rs t doc um en t, “Exh ibit A,” l is ts Pamel a’s l ie n on pa rtners hi p real estate c ontracts . The sec ond do cument , “E xhibit H- 1, ” ident ifi es a judg ment in Pamela’s fav o rfo r$1 , 08 0, 00 0. 00 . E xhib it A i s a ttac he d to the c ourt’ s s i gned con f i rm ati on of rulin g; E xhib it H- 1 is at t ache d t o t he cou rt’ s f i nd i ng s of f ac t an d c onc l us i ons of la w. Because we can

not say12

t he decree faile d t o dis po se o f t he pa r t ies ’ c laims o rpr o vid e a de finit e me an s o f as ce r t ain ing t he ir righ ts, we overrule Joseph’ s f ourt h i ssue. Fin ally, Joseph contends that Judge Me urerer r ed in

de ny i ng the pa rti es ’ m oti ons f or continua nce. We rev

ie w a trial court ’s den

ia l of a m oti on f or con ti nu an cef or an ab us e of discr et ion. Villegasv. Carter , 711 S.W .2d 624 , 626 (Tex. 19 86). A tri al cou rt doe s n ot ab us e i ts d i screti on mer ely because a reviewi

ng court wo ul d r eac h a dif f eren t concl usi on. Dow ner v. Aquamarine Operations , 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 198 5). So long asthe tri al cou rt’ s acti on wasnot withoutre fere nce t o g uiding pri nc i pl es a nd r ul es of l aw, i t shoul d be upheld. Id
. Theref

ore, reversal is a pp r o pr iat e o nly

wh en t he t r ial ju dg e’ s d ec isio n w as so cle ar ly wr o ng as t o lie ou t side t hat zo ne wit hin whi ch reasonable pers ons m

i ght di sag ree. Bocquet v. Herring , 9 72 S .W. 2d 1 9, 21 ( Te x. 1998)
. A s evi

de nc e that J

udg e M eu

rer ab us ed he r discreti on i n d en y i ng hi s or al moti on f or continua nce, Jo sep h ar gue s t hat disco ve ry h ad not been com

ple ted, t hat none of the requi red docum en ts in the fam il y l aw case had be en filed, a nd t hat t he pa rt ies ag re ed t o t he co nt inuance . N one of t hese asse rt ions w ou ld ent itle t he pa rt ies t o a co nt in uance as a matter of r

i ght a nd n one a re supported wi

th a uthori ty orreco rd ci

tes. W i thout such i

nf orma tion , we ca

nn ot say the tri al court abused i ts discretion. Joseph’s f

if th is sue i s overruled. Because Texas l

aw favo rs AD R pr oc edu re s, e ver y reas ona ble pr esu mpt ion will be indulged t o u pho ld t he arb i tration procee di ng. Brazoria County v. Knutson , 176 S.W.2d 740, 743 (T ex. 194 3); Daniew

icz v. Thermo Inst. Sys., Inc. , 992 S.W.2d713, 716 (Tex. App.—Austi n 1999, pe t . de nie d)
. On ce t he pa r t ies su bmit t he ir dis pute to arbi

trat ion a nd an award has b een m

ade, t he parties are bound by

the award i f n

o fraud, mi

stake, or mi

sconductwasi

nv olv ed. L.H. Lacy Co. v.13

City of Lubbock , 559 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1977). Here, t he parties knowin gly and wi ll in gly agreed to re sol v e th ei r d i v orc e d i spute usi ng a b in din g ADR procedure. The

y were adm oni shed b y the c ourt and their res

pect ive co un se l ab o ut t he na t ur e o f t he pr o ce ed ing an d t he co nse qu en ce s o f t he ir dec ision. There hav

e been no al le gations of

fraud, m is take, o r misconduct. No showing h as been
ma de th at th e tr i al cou rt a b us ed i ts dis cr et io n. Abs en t t he se alle ga t io ns, it wou l d i n de ed b e u n j us t to set asi de the d

i vorce decre e tha

t the pa rtie s ex pres sl y i nten ded to b e f

i na l and non -appe alab l e. To
sea rc h for a t echnica lity by wh i ch to void t he de cr ee w ou ld do har m to t he pa rt ies’ inte ndment and
wo uld con

trav en e Texas’ sta

ted pol i cy f av ori ng en f orce men t of arbi trati on aw ar ds
. T he Fa mily

Code speci fi cally contempl ates a b roa d p roc ed

ur al f ra mew ork to enco ur age t he cr eat ive and c oo per at ive
res ol ution of d isput es by

the judge , the parties, an

d their couns el . In the spi

rit of that fram

ework, we uphold the d i stri ct court’s

order. CONCLU SION Having o ver ru led Jo se ph L o ngt o n’s issu es , w e a ffi rm the tri al cou rt’ s dec ree

of div orce.

Jan P. Patterson, Justice Be f ore J us ti ce s K i dd, Ye akel

an d Pa tters on Af fi rmed File d: Novem

ber 15, 200114

Do No t Publis

h