J-S65012-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

STEVIE BOYD

Appellant No. 2026 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order June 13, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1102391-1996

BEFORE: OLSON, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 07, 2017

Appellant, Stevie Boyd, appeals pro se from the June 13, 2016 order 

denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We vacate and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this judgment order.

The factual background and procedural history of this case are as 

follows. On October 2, 1996, Appellant shot his ex-wife, Stacey Buxton-Boyd 

(“Buxton-Boyd”) as she stood outside her children’s elementary school. He 

then shot Lealoa Coles (“Coles”), who was waiting with Buxton-Boyd. Both 

Coles and Buxton-Boyd died as a result of their gunshot wounds.

On May 1, 1998, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 

term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after Appellant pled

guilty to two counts of first-degree murder.1 Appellant did not file a direct 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
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appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed multiple PCRA petitions. Those petitions 

were dismissed as untimely. 

On March 25, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se document titled a petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court treated the filing as a PCRA petition. 

On June 13, 2016, the trial court denied the petition. This timely appeal 

followed.2

Appellant presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the [trial court] erred by dismissing Appellant’s [filing 

titled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus] as untimely?

2. Whether the [trial court] improperly used its discretion to 

modify a Pennsylvania statute?

Appellant’s Brief at 1 (certain capitalization omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in treating 

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a PCRA petition and dismissing that 

petition as untimely. He argues that the trial court should have treated the 

filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether a filing is properly 

construed as a PCRA petition or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a 

purely legal question. Therefore, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary.

 

2 The trial court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Nonetheless, the trial court 

issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 26, 2016. 
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Appellant argues that his confinement is illegal because the 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) is unable to produce a 

written sentencing order. Such a claim properly sounds in habeas corpus as 

it is not cognizable under the PCRA. Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 368 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Therefore, the trial court erred in treating 

Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus as a PCRA petition.3

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying 

his habeas corpus petition. We conclude that the trial court erred by denying 

the petition based on the record before it. As this Court stated in Joseph, 

ordinarily the “record of [a] judgment of sentence maintained by the [trial]

court [is sufficient to prove the authority for a petitioner’s confinement.]” 

Joseph, 96 A.3d at 372. In this case, however, the Philadelphia Court of 

Common Pleas’ Office of Judicial Records was unable to locate any portion of 

the record in this case prior to Appellant’s habeas corpus petition. In other 

words, the trial court lost the first 18 years of the record. This includes the 

notes of testimony from the sentencing hearing, the written sentencing order, 

and the notes of testimony from the guilty plea hearing. Thus, the trial court 

had no record to support its decision that the DOC possesses authority to 

confine Appellant. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand this 

case to the trial court for proper reconstruction of the record. See 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1270-1271 (Pa. 2016) 

 

3 The trial court appeared to recognize this error in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 
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(discussing how our Supreme Court vacated a PCRA court’s order under

similar circumstances and gave directions to the PCRA court on how to 

properly reconstruct the record).

Application to Strike granted. Order vacated. Case remanded. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/7/2017