THE ATrORNEY GENEWAL 

OF TEXAS 

Honorable H. C. Plttman, Jr., 

Chairman, Ipdustrlal Accident 

Board, 

Walton Building, 

Austin, Texas Opinion No. WW- 333. 

Re: Effect of Section 2 of 

House Bill No, 433, Acts 

55th Legislature, Regular 

Session 1957 (Chapter 397, 

page 1186) on authority of 

Industrlal Accident Board 

to approve compromise setDear Mr. Plttman: tlement agreements. 

In your letter of November 8, 1957, you ask: 

"Will you give us your opinion as to whether 

or not this Board has authorlty to approve a Compromise Settlement Agreement which closes the llablllty 

of an Insurance carrier for euture medical and hospital expense under the Workmen's Compensation Act 

as amended, I.e. does the word\awardl and the wording 

used In the amendment to Section 5 apply to compromise 

settlements and take precedence over Section 12, Article a307v 

You further point out that Section 12 of Article 8307, 

Revised Civil Statutes, gives the Board authority to approve 

compromise settlement agreements under certain conditions, and 

that House Blll No. 433, amending Section 5 of Article 8307, 

changes the llablllty of Insurance carriers as to medical and 

hospital expenses. 

Section 2 of House Bill No. 433 reads as follows: 

'Sec. 2. Section 5 of Article 8307, Revised 

Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended, Is hereby 

amended by adding a new paragraph at the end of said 

Section to read as follows: 

"lNotwlthstandlng any other provision of thls 

law, as amended, no award of the Board, and no judgment 
Honorable H. C. Pittman, Jr., Page 2 (W-333). 

of the court, havlng jurisdiction of a claim against 

the association for the oost or expense of Items of 

medical aid, hospital services, nursing, chlropraotlc 

,servlces, medicines or prosthetic appliances furnished 

to an employee under circumstances creating a llablllty therefor on the part of the association under the 

provisions of thle law, shall Include In such award or 

judgment any cost or expense of any such Itemsactually furnished to and received by the employee 

prior to the date of said award or judgment. The 

first such final award or ment rendered on such 

claim shall be remlcata of the llablllty of the 

association forall such cost or expense which could 

have been claimed up to the date of said award or 

judgment and of the Issue that the Injury-aid 

employee Is subject to the provlslons of this law with 

respect to such Items, but shall not be res Judlcata 

of the obligation of the association to furnish or pay 

for any such Item8 after the date of said award or 

judgment, . . .' (Emphasis ours) 

The remainder of the paragraph provides for continuing 

jurisdiction of the Board over the claim for additional medical 

expenses and for appeals to the courts from each successive award 

of such medical benefits. 

The added paragraph relates only to awards (or denials) 

of medical aid and, In our opinion, does not have any.bearlng on 

the function of the Board In approving compromise settlement 

agreements under Sec~tlon 12. The making of awards and th$g;proval 

of settlements are two distinct functions of the Board. 

Board's approval of a compromise settlement agreement Is not an 

award of compensation . . . Neither Is It an order denying compensation." Commercial Casualty Co. v. Hilton, 187 S.W. 2d 1081 

(Comm. Am., opinion approved by S. Ct.). The Board Is prohibited 

from awarding the workman any money for future medical aid, but 

there Is nothlng In the Act which would bar or dlmlnlsh the right 

of the parties to enter Into a contract settling their rights and 

llabllltles with respect to future medical expenses of the kind 

referred to In the amendment. There being no amendment to Section 12, and there being no mention elsewhere in the Act of the 

role the Board Is to play In the approval or disapproval of compromise settlement agreements with respect to future medical aid, 

the conclusion seems Inescapable that the Legislature Intended 

no change with respect thereto. 

The purpose of the amendment to Section 5 was to enable 

the workman to obtain unlimited medical treatment. Although his 

claim or cause of action Is broken down Into separate periods of 

six months each, there Is nothing In the Act to Indicate that 

his claim for future medical aid may not be settled by a 
Honorable H. C. Plttman, Jr., Page 3 (ww-333). 

compromise settlement agreement once and for all. It Is to be 

assumed that the Legislature was cognizant of the rules of the 

Board which require a showing that maximum recovery has been 

reached before It wlll approve compromise settlements, and that 

the Legislature contemplated that the Board would discharge Its 

responslblllty to protect the +&red workman In this type of 

settlement agreement, as It had done under the pre-existing law 

where settlement agreements have embraced liability for future ' 

medical treatment. 

Therefore, It Is our opinion that the amendment to 

Sec. 5 of Art. 8307 does not alter the authorlty of the Industrial Accident Board under Sec. 12, and the Board has authorl3.y 

to approve compromise settlements which close the llabllltv of 

an Insurance carrier for future medical and hospital expenses. 

SUMMARY 

Section 2 of House Bill No. 433, Acts of 

Session, 1957 

-_. 

the 55th Legislature, Regular 

(Chapter 397, page 1186 at 1192) amending 

Section 5 of Article 8307, Revised Civil 

Statutes, does not alter the authority tid 

duty of the Industrial Accident Board under 

Section 12 with respect to the approval of 

compromise settlement agreements, and this 

authority extends to agreements which termlnate the llablllty of the carrier for future 

medical and hospital expenses. 

Yours very truly, 

WILL WILSON 

Attorney General of Texas 

RRR:mg:pf 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Geo. P. Blackburn, Chairman 

J. C. Davis, Jr. 

W. V. Geppert 

Leonard Passmore 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

By: James N. Ludlum. 

Mac0 Stewart 

Assistant