alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Mrs. Leona HOWARD et al. v. HARDWARE MUTUAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 8537.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

June 30, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 2, 1971.

Writ Granted Oct. 1, 1971.

Robert J. Mack of Sims and Mack, Hammond, for plaintiffs.

Daniel Atkinson of Dale, Owen, Richardson, Taylor and Mathews, David Robinson of Watson, Blanche, Wilson, Posner & Thibaut, Emile Weber and Richard Lang-ford, Baton Rouge, for defendants.

Before LANDRY, ELLIS, and BLANCHE, JJ.

ELLIS, Judge.

On March 11, 1971, plaintiff was granted a devolutive appeal to this court, returnable on May 10, 1971. The judgment appealed from was signed on December 10, 1970, and new trial was denied on January 4, 1971.

Because Hardware Mutual Casualty Company and Southern Truck Service, Inc. had earlier taken a suspensive appeal, the record was completed and lodged with this court on April 23, 1971.

This motion alleges that plaintiffs never paid the $25.00 filing fee required by R.S. 13:352(1) and Rule 1, Section 10 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, and that their appeal must be dismissed. The certificate of the Clerk of the 19th Judicial District Court, attached to the motion, shows that plaintiffs did not pay the $25.00 filing fee, and nothing appears in the record to the contrary.

The failure to pay the filing fee timely is grounds for dismissal, even if the other costs are paid and the record timely lodged. Cobb v. Bergeron, 223 So.2d 483 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1969).

Plaintiffs’ appeal is therefore dismissed, at their cost.

Appeal dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 92 Agreed to House (ATH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 92

  Electing Representatives Wheat, McDermott, Norton, Levin, Lewis of 
 Georgia, and Jefferson to the Committee on the District of Columbia; 
and Representative Spratt to the Committee on Government Operations to 
                  rank following Representative Towns.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 18, 1993

Mr. Hoyer submitted the following resolution; which was considered and 
                               agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  Electing Representatives Wheat, McDermott, Norton, Levin, Lewis of 
 Georgia, and Jefferson to the Committee on the District of Columbia; 
and Representative Spratt to the Committee on Government Operations to 
                  rank following Representative Towns.

    Resolved, That the following named Members be, and are hereby, 
elected to the following standing committees:
    Committee on the District of Columbia: Alan Wheat, Missouri; Jim 
McDermott, Washington; Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia; 
Sander M. Levin, Michigan; John Lewis, Georgia; and William J. 
Jefferson, Louisiana.
    Committee on Government Operations: John M. Spratt, Jr., South 
Carolina, to rank following Edolphus Towns, New York.

                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Ambassadors International, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), the undersigned, Brian R. Schaefgen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|                       
|/s/ Brian R. Schaefgen 
|Brian R. Schaefgen     
|Chief Financial Officer
|August 3, 2005         



The foregoing certification is
being furnished solely to accompany this Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the
Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
#### Ernest VARNADOE, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. DeSOTO CANNING COMPANY, Inc., Defendant/Appellee, and DAN B. VINCENT COMPANY, Inc., Third-Party Defendant/Appellee.

No. 71-435.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 7, 1972.

*227Benjamin C. Sidwell, of Sidwell, Cheat-wood & Smith, P. A., Tampa, for plaintiff-appellant.

Calvin A. Pope, of Pope & Burton, Tampa, for defendant-appellee, De Soto Canning Co., Inc.

David J. Kadyk, of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for third-party defendant-appellee, Dan B. Vincent Co., Inc.

DAYTON, O. L. (Ret.), Associate Judge.

Appellant Varnadoe, who was employed by appellee Dan B. Vincent Company, Inc., was performing work for appellee DeSoto Canning Co., Inc., under the latter’s contract with his employer aforesaid. He was severely injured while on the job and brings this suit alleging negligence against DeSoto Canning Co., Inc. DeSoto Canning Co., Inc., joined Dan B. Vincent Co., Inc., a third party action for indemnification of any damages for which it may be liable to Varnadoe and bases such third party action on unworkmanlike performance of the contract. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee DeSoto Canning Co., Inc., on two grounds, i. e., no negligence on the part of DeSoto Canning Co., Inc., and contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff-appellant. The third party defendant Dan B. Vincent Co., Inc., also moved for summary judgment but the trial judge, having ruled in favor of DeSoto Canning Co., Inc., considered the third party defendant’s motion for summary judgment as moot rather than ruling thereon on its merits.

A careful review of the record reveals that there are triable issues of material fact which cannot properly be resolved by summary judgment. The summary judgment entered herein is therefore error and the cause must be reversed for trial on such issues. See, e. g., Tynan v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company (Fla.1971), 254 So.2d 209, and Torrence v. Sacred Heart Hospital (Fla.App.1971), 251 So.2d 899.

Since the trial judge considered the third party defendant’s motion for summary judgment as moot, as we have noted, there is nothing upon which we can rule with regard thereto. Upon remand we are certain that the able trial judge will fully consider the matter and enter an appropriate order as he may be advised.

HOBSON, A. C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C Section 1350 (adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), I, the undersigned Executive Vice President, Finance and Administration of California Steel Industries, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify that the Annual Report on Form
10-K of the Company for the year ending December 31, 2010 (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; as amended, and that information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.

A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



| |  |                |  |  |  |     |  |                                                     
| |  | -------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------
| |  |                |  | 
| |  | March 23, 2011 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ BRETT GUGE                                      
| |  |                |  |  |  |     |  | Brett Guge                                          
| |  |                |  |  |  |     |  | Executive Vice President, Finance and Administration
April 30 , 2014



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

BETTY GE TERS , Appellant

NO. 14

- 13

- 00045

- CV V.

THE BAYTOWN HOUSING AUTHORITY , Appellee

________________________________ This cause, an appeal from the judgment in favor of appellee, The Baytown Housing Authority, signed October 26, 2012, was heard on the transcript of the record. We have inspected the record and find the trial court erred in its judgment

. We therefore order the judgment of the court below REVERSED and RENDER a take

- nothing judgment against The Baytown Housing Authority and in favor of Betty Geters , dissolving any writ of possession that may have issued.

We further order that all costs incurred by reason of this appeal be paid by appellee, The Baytown Housing Authority.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

April 29, 2014

N o. 04

- 13

- 00571

- CR

Fernando LOPEZ

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. 12

- 1791

- CR William Old, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The State’s brief was originally due March 2 7 , 2014; however, the court granted an extension of time until April 28, 2014 to file the brief. The State has filed a motion requesting an

additional extension of time.

We grant the motion and we order the State to file the brief by May 27, 2014 (60 days after the original due date). Counsel is advised that no further extensions of time will be granted absent a motion that (1) demonstrates extraordinary circumstances justifyin g further delay, (2) advises the court of the efforts counsel has expended in preparing the brief, and (3) provides the court reasonable assurance that the brief will be completed and filed by the requested extended deadline. If the brief or a conforming motion is not filed by the date ordered, the court may

order the case submitted without a State’s brief.

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 29th day of April, 2014

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### LAKEVIEW NURSERY, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Robert W. HOUSTON et al., Appellees.

No. 71-619.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 21, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 22, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### John R. DOWLING, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-416.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 8, 1972.

Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, and Edwin T. Mulock, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corees, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant appeals a judgment and sentence entered upon a verdict of guilty of possession of narcotic paraphernalia and central nervous system stimulant.

The only point on appeal is whether or not it was reversible error to preclude the appellant from offering testimony as to the reputation for truth and veracity in the community of the state’s witness (Deputy DeAngelis) who was the arresting officer.

> The record discloses the following:

> “Q Do you know Deputy DeAngelis?

> A I have heard of him.

> Q Do you know his reputation in the Community ?

> A Yes sir.

> MR. SEYMOUR: Objection, Your Honor. This is surely immaterial.

> MR. HUSSEY: It is one of the proper ways of impeachment, Your Honor. The reputation of someone in the community for truth and veracity of other witnesses.

> THE COURT: I will sustain the objection. You haven’t laid a foundation for that.

> MR. HUSSEY: May I ask the question preparatory ?

> THE COURT: I have sustained the objection, Mr. Hussey.

> MR. HUSSEY: I have no other questions, then, Your Honor.”

The appellant through two other defense witnesses attempted to inquire into Deputy DeAngelis’ reputation for truth and varacity which the court also refused to allow.,

The rule in regard to the impeachment of the credibility of a witness was laid down in Nelson v. State, 99 Fla. 1032, 128 So. 1 (1930) where it was stated:

> “When the character of a witness is gone into, the only proper object of inquiry is as to his reputation for truth and veracity. * * * ”

The court below did not permit the appellant to inquire into Deputy DeAngelis’ reputation for truth and veracity on the ground that a proper predicate had not been laid. This error was compounded by the fact that the appellant was also denied the *387right to attempt to satisfy the court’s obj ection to admitting the testimony.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment and sentence is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

LILES, Acting C. J., and HOBSON and McNULTY, TJ., concur.
# C_2022432EN.01002501.xml

| 14.11.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 432/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.11.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 432/25

---

Judgment of the General Court of 14 September 2022 — Gioioso v EUIPO — Maxi Di (MARE GIOIOSO di Sebastiano IMPORT EXPORT)

(Case T-423/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU figurative mark MARE GIOIOSO di Sebastiano IMPORT EXPORT - Earlier national figurative mark GIOIA DI MARE - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 432/29)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Sebastiano Gioioso (Fasano, Italy) (represented by: F. Amati, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: R. Raponi and J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Maxi Di Srl (Belfiore, Italy)

Re:

By his application based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 10 May 2021 (Case R 1650/2020-1).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | dismisses the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

dismisses the action.

| 2. | orders Mr Sebastiano Gioioso to bear the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

orders Mr Sebastiano Gioioso to bear the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 357, 6.9.2021.

---
# 6H

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 22

- 0676 RITA M. BLADES, Temporary Guardian and Conservator for H.A.G.,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. GARRY DOUGLAS SEAMAN,

Defendant and Appellant. ORDE R OF MEDIATOR APPOINTMENT

This appeal being subject to M.R.App.P. 7, and the parties having failed to jointly and timely select a mediator under M.R.App.P., 7(4),(c), IT IS ORDERED THAT **Peter Francis Carroll,** whose name appears next on the list of atto rneys desiring appointment as mediators for Money Judgments appeals which is maintained pursuant to M.R.App.P., 7(4)(e), is hereby appointed to conduct the mediation process required by M.R.App.P., 7(5), and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the time periods s et forth in M.R.App.P., 7(5)(d) shall run from the date of this order of appointment. A true copy of this order is being mailed to counsel of record for the parties, or to the parties individually if not represented by counsel, on the date hereof. DATED this April 18, 2023.

Bowen Greenwood , Clerk of the Supreme Court

c: David Robert Paoli, davidpaoli@paoli

- law.com David Brian Cotner, dcotner@cotnerlaw.com Reid J. Perkins, rperkins@wordenthane.com Brian Geer, bgeer@cotnerlaw.com Emily Jung Bruner, ebruner@wordenthane.c om Peter Francis Carroll , petercarroll@flatheadlaw.com 04/18/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0676
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Robbie Pines, Respondent.

[722 NYS2d 239]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael Corriere, J.), entered on or about April 23, 1999, which granted defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence and statements, unanimously reversed, on the law, the motion denied, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

The testifying police officer stated that while on patrol in the neighborhood of 152nd Street and Broadway with two other officers in an unmarked car, he observed defendant walking down the street with a companion. Defendant was looking around nervously, and when he observed the officers’ vehicle, his eyes bulged out. Although their car was unmarked, the officer testified that “everyone in the neighborhood” recognized it to be a *312police car. As they approached, defendant “bunched up”, his bubble jacket on the right side, at the waist area, with his hand cupped underneath it, as if he were cradling or holding an object, reminding the officer of how he himself, when off-duty, sometimes adjusted his gun in a similar manner. In addition, when the police pulled their car up to the curb, defendant started walking sideways, shielding his right side from view, still holding his jacket on that side in a bunched-up fashion. Defendant then turned around and started to walk in the opposite direction from where he and his companion had previously been headed, leaving his companion behind. When the officers called out to him that they wanted to ask him a few questions, he fled and they pursued him. The officer spotted a silver gun in defendant’s right hand, and as they approached Broadway, defendant threw the gun into some nearby garbage cans. Defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter, and the gun was retrieved from among the garbage cans into which it had been thrown.

While the officer’s initial observations of defendant may not, alone, have risen to the level of grounds for a stop and frisk, they gave rise to more than a mere objective credible reason to make a limited request for information. Rather, they justified a “founded suspicion” that defendant may have been engaged in criminal activity, giving rise to a common law right of inquiry under *People v De Bour*(40 NY2d 210). As a result of defendant’s flight upon the approach of the officers, and the additional suspicion engendered by it, the evidence met the level of reasonable suspicion, justifying pursuit *(see, People v Atkins,*273 AD2d 12, *lv denied*95 NY2d 960). The officers then had the right to detain him, and the related right to pursue him *(see, People v Sierra,*83 NY2d 928), and consequently, the gun he discarded in the process should have been held admissible. Concur — Williams, J. P., Andrias, Lerner, Saxe and Buckley, JJ.
#### Charles Arthur GELIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-753.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 17, 1972.

Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, and D. Turner Matthews, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and David Luther Woodward, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PIERCE, Chief Judge.

Appellant Charles Arthur Gelis was tried and convicted in the Criminal Court of Record for Polk County, Florida, of breaking and entering and grand larceny, and was thereupon sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. His motion for new trial was denied and he has appealed the judgment and sentence to this Court. The Public Defender, appointed to represent Gelis on this appeal, filed a brief in’ this Court on his behalf.

The Public Defender stated in his brief that he had “carefully examined the Record on Appeal, and particularly the testimony of James Wilson Jones, and the particular exhibits which were objected to by trial counsel for the Appellant. Upon examination of this record, Attorney for Appellant can find nothing which would arguable support an appeal, and requests to be relieved as Attorney of Record and would cite as authority the case of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493.”

The Public Defender served a copy of his said brief upon appellant Gelis, and on February 13, 1972, this Court entered its order allowing Gelis thirty days within *419which to file any additional brief he might desire, calling the court’s attention to any matters that he feels should be considered in connection with the appeal in this cause.

Appellant was granted additional time within which to file his brief. On May IS, 1972, he filed his supplemental brief, arguing eight points on appeal. The Attorney General filed an additional brief on behalf of the State in reply to appellant’s brief.

We have carefully examined the entire record on file here on behalf of appellant Gelis, and the brief filed by appellant, and find no merit to the points raised. Neither do we find anything in the record which would warrant or justify this Court in disturbing the judgment of conviction appealed. It is thereupon ordered that said judgment be

Affirmed.

HOBSON and McNULTY, JJ., concur.