alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 10.2

                      CEO EMPLOYMENT CONTINUATION AGREEMENT

Network Equipment  Technologies,  Inc. ("the Company") and Joseph J. Francesconi
("Officer"),  in partial consideration for his continuing officer and employment
relationship and to encourage  continued  employment in the event of a potential
Change of Control, agree as follows:

1. In the  event of  Termination  of  Employment  of  Officer  resulting  from a
Corporate  Transaction,  Change of Control or Hostile  Take-Over (as those terms
are  defined in the 1993 Stock  Option  Plan,  collectively  referred to in this
Agreement as "Change of Control") or from  involuntary  termination  for reasons
other than cause, the Company will provide severance benefits as follows:

     a.   two years of Officer's base salary ("salary continuance"),

     b.   two  years of  Officer's  variable  compensation  (computed  using the
          mid-point of the applicable range and the company "meets plan"),

     c.   Officer level medical,  dental,  life and disability  insurance during
          the period of salary continuance, and

     d.   vesting of  outstanding  stock  options and  restricted  stock  awards
          during the period of salary continuance.

2.  "Termination  of  Employment"  of Officer  occurs when one of the  following
occurs:  he is terminated  without  cause,  job location is changed more than 50
miles,  his  compensation  is  materially   reduced  or   responsibilities   are
substantially  altered or reduced  (without  express consent of the employee) by
the Company,  or by any successor to the Company in  conjunction  with or within
one year after the close of a Change of Control.

3. In the event of a Termination Of Employment in  conjunction  with a Change of
Control,  then vesting of outstanding stock options and restricted stock held by
Officer shall  accelerate at the time of such  Termination.  All vested  options
shall be exercisable for the duration of the life of the option.

4. In order to receive the  foregoing,  Officer  agrees to execute the Company's
release and  non-competition  agreement at the time of any such  Termination  of
Employment.

Agreed this 14th day of April, 1998.

NETWORK EQUIPMENT                               --------------------------------
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.                              JOSEPH J. FRANCESCONI


By: Roger A. Barney                               /s/ Joseph J. Francesconi
                                                --------------------------------
                                                          (Signature)
Title: V.P. HR & Corp. Services

April 14, 1998                                               N.E.T. Confidential
#### Ex parte STATE of Alabama.

77-339.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 24, 1978.

SHORES, Justice.

WRIT DENIED.

TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, JONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
# C_2022398EN.01003602.xml

| 17.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 398/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 398/36

---

Order of the General Court of 31 August 2022 — Virbac v Commission

(Case T-138/21) (1)

(2022/C 398/44)

Language of the case: French

The President of the Fifth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 206, 31.5.2021.

---
#### Leon LEVY v. Gene STELLY and Southern Pacific Transportation Company.

No. 53559.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 21, 1973.

In re: Gene Stelly and Southern Pacific Transportation Company applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Jefferson. 277 So.2d 194.

Application denied. The Court of Appeal is correct.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

GUILLERMO HOLGUIN,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 23

- 1625

D.C. No. 3:22

- cr

- 01987

- AJB

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California Anthony J. Battaglia

, District Judge , Presiding

Submitted August 20, 2024 **

Before: S.R. THOMAS, RAWLINSON, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

Guillermo Holguin appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges

the 180

- month sentence imposed following his guilty

- plea conviction for

possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 27 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 23

- 1625

Holguin contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the

district court gave excessive weight to the G uidelines range and insufficient

consideration to the mitigating factors, including his acceptance of responsibility

,

his personal and family circumstances , and the fact that his Guidelines range was

enhanced as a result of his voluntary admission that he possessed more

methamphetamine than was seized by authorities

. The district court did not abuse

its discretion. See Gall v. U nited States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The below

Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U. S .C. § 3553(a)

factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the serious nature and

circumstances of the offense and the need to protect the public. See Gall , 553 U.S.

at 51; see also United States v. Gutierrez

- Sanchez , 587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir.

2009) (“The weight to be given the various factors in a particular case is for the

discretion of the district court.”). Moreover, contrary to Holguin’s contention, the

record reflects that the district court thoroughly considered his mitigating

arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Carty , 520 F.3d 984,

992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

AFFIRMED.
# C_2023321EN.01000601.xml

| 11.9.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 321/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.9.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 321/6

---

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 13 July 2023 — Nichicon Corporation v European Commission

(Case C-757/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Authentication of a judgment by the General Court - Article 118 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court - Copy of the judgment to be served - Signature of the judges - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Article 101 TFEU - Market for tantalum and aluminium electrolytic capacitors - Agreements and concerted practices in respect of several elements of pricing - Concept of infringement ‘by object’ - European Commission’s burden of proof - Statements of undertakings - Reliability - Geographic scope of anticompetitive conduct - Single and continuous infringement - Fine - Calculation of the basic amount - Sales to be taken into account - Mitigating circumstances - Unlimited jurisdiction)

(2023/C 321/06)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Nichicon Corporation (represented by: A. Ablasser-Neuhuber, G. Fussenegger, H. Kühnert and F. Neumayr, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party: European Commission (represented by: B. Ernst, T. Franchoo, C. Sjödin and F. van Schaik, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders Nichicon Corporation to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Nichicon Corporation to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 64, 7.2.2022.

---
**50 % difference Wickman, Trent R**  **- FS**  to: Randall Robinson Cc: Steven Rosenthal

From: "W ickman, Trent R - FS" <twickman@fs.fed.us> To: Randall Robinson/R5/USEPA/US@EPA, Cc: Steven Rosenthal/R5/USEPA/US@EPA

Randy - I copied the following out of the “UTac” tab of the “modeled limits” spreadsheet steve has on your network in the “Trent” folder. You’ll see at the bottom how I came up with a combined 50% less NOx and SO2 reductions modeled by cliffs than what the FIP called for

LINE 1 - Emission reductions modeled by Cliffs (2012) base* FIP NOx SO2 NOx SO2

43.6 37.2 23.1 2.3 g/s 346 295 183 18 lb/hr 1519 1296 805 80 tpy @ 8760 714 1216 difference LINE 1 - FIP numbers

1643 1293 493 129 70% and 90% CE 1150 1164 difference LINE 2 - Emission reductions modeled by Cliffs (2012) base* FIP NOx SO2 NOx SO2

25.11 31.91 25.44 2.38 g/s - SV48 21.4 27.18 21.67 2.03 g/s - SV49199 253 202 19 lb/hr - SV48 170 216 172 16 lb/hr - SV49 369 469 374 35 lb/hr - total 1621 2059 1641 154 tpy - total

-21 1905 difference LINE 2 - FIP numbers

3687 2750 1106 248 70% and 90% CE 2581 2475 difference Facility Total 3140 3355 base Cliffs 2012 Modeling

693 3121 difs 5330 4043 base FIP 3731 3639 difs 0.185844 0.857729 0.517593 total
Trent Wi ckman, P.E. Air Resource Management Great Lakes National Forests - Eastern Region USDA Forest Service stationed on the - Superior National Forest 8901 Grand Avenue Place Duluth, MN 55808 ph# 218-626-4372 cell# 218-341 -8646 fx# 218-626-4398 twickman@fs.fed.us
# C_2022482EN.01001901.xml

| 19.12.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 482/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.12.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 482/19

---

Judgment of the General Court of 19 October 2022 — Kaczorowska v EUIPO — Groupe Marcelle (MAESELLE)

(Case T-716/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU figurative mark MAESELLE - Earlier EU figurative mark MARCELLE - Relative ground for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 482/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Katarzyna Kaczorowska (Warsaw, Poland) (represented by: P. Kurcman, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Chylińska and D. Gája, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Groupe Marcelle Inc. (Lachine, Quebec, Canada)

Re:

By her action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 6 September 2021 (Case R 670/2021-4).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Ms Katarzyna Kaczorowska to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Ms Katarzyna Kaczorowska to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 2, 3.1.2022.

---
#### Terry *v.*State.

(Division B.

April 8, 1935.)

[160 So. 574.

No. 31620.]

W. M. Lofton, of Mendenhall, for appellant.

*304W. D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.

Anderson, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellant was charged and convicted in the court of a justice of the peace of Simpson county of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while drunk and fined one hundred dollars. From that judgment he appealed to the circuit court, where there was a trial de novo, resulting in a verdict and judgment of guilty and a fine of one hundred dollars. From that judgment he appeals to this court.

The statute under which the prosecution and conviction was had is section 5579, Code of 1930, which follows: “No person shall operate or attempt to operate a motor vehicle while such person is in a state of intoxication, or is in other respects incapable of properly and safely *305operating said motor vehicle, on any public highway, street, avenue or alley within this state.”

As everybody knows, an intoxicated driver of a motor vehicle is a menace to the lives, limbs, and property of others. By the adoption of this statute the Legislature sought to reduce this menace.

The evidence for the state showed that appellant owned an automobile; that he was riding in the car while intoxicated, but that he was not driving the car himself; a negro servant was driving it, and appellant and the servant were sitting on the front seat. There was no evidence to show that appellant in his drunken condition was directing and controlling the operation of the car by the negro. For aught that appeared in the evidence to the contrary, the negro was operating the car independently of any direction or control by appellant. If the evidence had shown that, although appellant did not have his hands on the wheel, he was directing and controlling the operation of the car by the negro, there might he a different case, which we are not called on to decide now. Criminal statutes are construed most strongly against the state. The evidence fell short of showing that appellant either operated the car or controlled its operation. The result is that appellant’s request for a directed verdict should have been granted.

Reversed, and judgment here for appellant.
1 Local Rule 47.5 provides: “The publication of opinions that have

no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the

basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on

the public and burdens on the legal profession.” Pursuant to that

Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 95-10549

Summary Calendar

WAYNE MORRIS REEVES, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

STATE OF TEXAS, PARDON AND PAROLE DIVISION;

JAMES A. COLLINS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION; 

JOHN DOE, Commissioner of TDCJ-Board of Pardons

and Paroles Division,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(2:93-CV-255)

(September 27, 1995)

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Appellant, a Texas Department of Criminal Justice inmate,

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the suit under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(d) as frivolous. We affirm, and specifically warn
2

Appellant that the filing of any further frivolous suits will

result in sanctions.

Appellant claims that the Texas practice of requiring inmates

to work violates the Thirteenth Amendment; that since he cannot be

forced to work, he cannot be disciplined for refusing to work; and

that inmates should be compensated for their work and given more

“work time credit”. This Court has long ago decided all these

issues adverse to Appellant’s position. Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d

619, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Murray v. Mississippi Dep’t

of Corrections, 911 F.2d 1167, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 1050 (1991). These same authorities dispose of

his claim regarding revocation of prisoners “work time credits”. 

We do not consider Reeves claims that relinquishment of work

time credit as a condition of parole is unconstitutional because he

did not allege that he either has been, or will be, eligible for

parole so he has not presented a case or controversy for decision.

Cross v. Lucius, 713 F.2d 153, 158 (5th Cir. 1983). This Court is

without jurisdiction to consider the issue.

Appellant raises for the first time on appeal the contentions

that his medical records have been altered and that attendance at

the Windham School deprives inmates of true educational

opportunity. We do not consider issues not raised in the district

court. Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 1991). His

assertion in the district court that other prisoners’ medical

records were altered does not state a claim that Appellant is

competent to litigate.
3

Numerous orders of the district court are complained of on

appeal but no understandable argument is advanced in Appellant’s

papers in relation to them so we are unable to review them.

AFFIRMED.
#### Joseph T. BLUME and Ethel O. Blume, his wife, Appellants, v. Jack H. CONRAD, Appellee.

No. O-378.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 11, 1972.

John London Arnold, Jacksonville, for appellants.

Dan H. Stubbs, Jr., Jacksonville, for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

This cause having been orally argued before the court, the briefs and record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and appellants having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court hereby appealed is affirmed.

SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
Drone/VAS Practice Group 

# ANTONELLI



# -- LAW --

U.S. Department ofTransportation Docket Management System 1200 New Jersey Ave S.E. Washington, D.C. 20590 35 East Wacker Drive Suite 1875 Chicago, IL 60601 Tel. 312.201.8310 Jeffrey({{)Antonelli-Law.com May 15, 2015

Re: Amendment to Bums & McDonnell Engineering Company, Inc. request for relief under Section 333 ofthe FAA Modernization and Reform Act Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-1248-0001 Dear Sir or Madam: Bums & McDonnell Engineering Company, Inc. ("Bums & McDonnell") requests to amend its Petition for Exemption that was posted to the Regulations.gov website on April27, 2015. In its original petition, the weight ofthe Draganflyer X4-ES was listed incorrectly as 5 lbs., 3.2 kg. The correct weight is 5 lbs., 2.3 kg
. We request that this change be made in each place it appears in the petition
. If we can provide any additional information to assist your understanding or review of these documents, please do not hesitate to contact us at 312-201-8310 or via email at Jcffrcv @Ant elliLaw.com
.
Attorney for Bums & McDonnell En OfCounsel Kate D. Fletcher Airline Transport Pilot License Type rated in: CE-500 (Citation Jet) SF-340 (Saab turbo prop) DC-9 (turbo-jet) B-73 7 (Boeing 73 7) B-757 (Boeing 757) B-767 (Boeing 767) First Class Medical Certificate Tel: 312
.285.4359 kate(q!kdfletcherlaw
.com
#### Charlie Will SCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-426.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 20, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Maxine Thelma MITCHELL, as Guardian of Charles Roosevelt Mitchell, incompetent, Appellant, v. BURGESS & COOK, INC., a Florida corporation, and Kenneth Lamar Hunt, Appellees.

No. M-16.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Aug. 20, 1970.

Dunn & Johnson, and Jeanne Heyward, Miami, for appellant.

*461Howell, Kirby, Montgomery & D’Aiuto, Jacksonville, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of an adverse final judgment rendered upon a jury verdict in favor of appellees. The cause of action sued upon is for the recovery of damages suffered by appellant as a result of appellees’ alleged negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The principal question preserved on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment.

In our review of the issues presented for decision we have given due consideration to the applicable principle that a judgment of the trial court reaches the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness. The record reveals that although the testimony is conflicting, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the jury as reflected by its verdict and the conclusion reached by the trial court in denying appellant’s motion for a new trial. These findings and conclusions will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing that they are erroneous and unsupported by the record.1

We have carefully considered appellant’s remaining points charging error by the trial court’s refusal to strike appellees’ defense of contributory negligence and to grant appellant’s requested jury instruction on the doctrine of last clear chance. We find these contentions to be without merit.2

The judgment appealed is accordingly affirmed.

CARROLL, DONALD K„ Acting C. J., WIGGINTON, J., and McLANE, RALPH M., Associate Judge, concur.

1

. Old Equity Life Insurance Company v. Levenson, (Fla.App.1965) 177 So.2d 50; Stoller v. Jaffe, (Fla.App.1961) 125 So.2d 310.

2

. Rodriguez v. Haller, (Fla.App.1965) 177 So.2d 519; Williams v. Scott, (Fla.App.1963) 153 So.2d 18.
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE>                                          5
<CIK>                                     0000756680
<NAME>                     HMG Worldwide Corporation
<MULTIPLIER>                                    1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   Year
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                        DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                             DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         6,950
<SECURITIES>                                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  7,031
<ALLOWANCES>                                     577
<INVENTORY>                                    4,214
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              17,953
<PP&E>                                         4,739
<DEPRECIATION>                                 1,390
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                28,755
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         21,189
<BONDS>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                        0
<COMMON>                                          81
<OTHER-SE>                                     5,110
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  28,755
<SALES>                                       45,552
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              45,552
<CGS>                                         37,589
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 13,003
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               834
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (5,523)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      12
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (5,535)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
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<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (5,535)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (0.73)
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