alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ricardo CABEZA, Appellant, v. Lina CABEZA, Appellee.

No. 77-416.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 23, 1978.

Arango & Galarraga, Coral Gables, for appellant.

*1169Lopez & Saldise and Carlos L. DeZayas, Miami, for appellee.

Before HENDRY, NATHAN and KE-HOE, JJ.

KEHOE, Judge.

Appellant, respondent below, brings this appeal from an order on petition for modification of final decree awarding appellee, petitioner below, the exclusive use and possession of the marital home and requiring appellant to pay the mortgage payments on the home.

After a careful review of the entire record, we are of the opinion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order appealed and that, even if it had jurisdiction, appellee was not entitled to possession of the home. See *Nahoom v. Nahoom,*341 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); *Church v. Church,*338 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); *Frumkes v. Frumkes,*328 So.2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); *Collazo*v. *Collazo,*318 So.2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); and *Vandervoort v. Vandervoort,*277 So.2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Accordingly, the order appealed is reversed.

Reversed.
1

From:

Monday, June 29, 2015 12:44 PM

To: RedHill

Subject: Protect our Water from Jet Fuel

Follow Up Flag: Follow up

Flag Status: Flagged

Aloha,

It is alarming to me that my drinking water is unsafe ! We the public have been `mislead & deceived' in thinking that our

water is clean ! This is unacceptable !!!!

I am writing to express my extreme concern for the quality of our drinking water threatened by the jet fuel leaking from

Navy storage tanks in Red Hill.  

Please ensure this jet fuel is completely cleaned up immediately. Twenty‐five years is too long to wait before acting to

save our most precious resource. If the leaks cannot be immediately fixed, then the tanks must be emptied.  

I also ask that the public comment period on the negotiated agreement between the U.S. Navy, Environmental

Protection Agency, and Hawaii Department of Health be extended to allow the public meaningful opportunity to

understand and weigh‐in on this important issue.  

Please continue to keep me informed in this decision‐making process.  

Thank you.
# C_2021310EN.01001101.xml

| 2.8.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 310/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.8.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 310/11

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Kleve (Germany) lodged on 14 May 2021 — AB and Others v Ryanair DAC

(Case C-307/21)

(2021/C 310/14)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Kleve

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: AB and Others

Respondent: Ryanair DAC

Question referred

Are Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the operating air carrier must pay compensation in the event of a flight cancellation of which the passenger was not informed at least two weeks prior to the scheduled time of departure, even though the air carrier sent that information in good time before the expiry of two weeks to the only email address communicated to it in the course of the booking, without, however, being aware that the booking had been made via an agent or its internet platform and that the email address communicated by the booking platform could be used at most to contact the agent, and not the passenger directly?

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).

---
Exhibit 31.2 SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION  I, Steve Hanni, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this annual report of Medizone International, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2006;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The small business issuers other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have: (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and (c) disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuers most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuers fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The small business issuers other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuers auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuers board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer=s internal control over financial reporting.  Date: May 29, 2008  /s/Steve Hanni Steve Hanni, Principal Financial Officer
No. 00-1088.

#### Lemke *v.*International Total Services, Inc., et al.

C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF INTERIM CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Ambassadors International, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the
period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Laura L. Tuthill, Interim Chief Financial Officer of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                                               
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                                               
|/s/ Laura L. Tuthill                                                                           
|Laura L. Tuthill Interim Chief Financial
Officer (Principal Financial Officer) November 9, 2007

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signatures that appear in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
**OFFICE OF**  **THE ATTORNEY**  **GENERAL OF**  **TEXAS AUSTIN** 

iion.'i.

Gilbert hdms County Attorney Jrsper county Jrs.per,

Texas Dear Sir: 

### Opinion MO.+7l+.&3

captionedmatter fro= pour letter as epsrt%nt.
Court have the t to an Indevex-, from .any at he is ree over his re@ar ch road Is under

tractor. The Contractorh+s begun the work and has taken out e bridge **05** the rose for the purpose

### of constructinga new one, and in doing so, did not build a detour bridge for the traffic, and especiallythe School Bus of the Jasper IndevendentSchoolDistrict. There is a road on the other sike of the bridge that leads into a

## , a27
#### In the Interest of A. A., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-1042.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 2, 1974.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Eva Weisner, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Linda C. Hertz, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Craig Hall, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, a juvenile, seeks review of an order by the juvenile court [now Circuit Court] withholding adjudication on a petition charging the appellant with theft of a bicycle.

We have considered the record, the briefs and arguments of counsel in the light of applicable principles of law, and have concluded that no reversible error has been demonstrated. Therefore, the order appealed is affirmed.

Affirmed.
PCCI ceived m

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINALAPPEALS TMMMAl APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

NO. ot-q-00o<*~aa f^ 22 2015

•"«»Acosia, Clerk

JOSE AMILPAS

Appellant,

On Appeal from the

V. 174TM District Court of

Harris County, Texas;

Trial Cause Number 1334791

THE STATE OF TEXAS

PETITIONER'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE FILED IN

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEV^QURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

MAY 2 2 2015

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT:

Abe|Acosta, Clerk

JOSE AMIPLAS, Petitioner in the above cause number, would respectfully

request the Court to grant his motion to extend the time to file his petition for

discretionary review. In support of said motion, Appellant would show unto the

Court the following:

I.

This appeal lies from Appellant's convictions in The State of Texas 'v. Jose

Amilpas, No. 01-14-00053rCR; Cause Number 1334791 in the 174th District Criminal

Court of Harris County, Texas. Mr. Amilpas was charged with felony possession of

more than four grams and less than 200 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. Mr.

Amilpas pleaded not guilty to the offense and after a jury found himguilty as charged
the trial court assessed punishment at thirty (30) years in the Institutional Division of

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice pursuant to an agreed recommendation by

the State. Appellant's Petition for Discretionary Review is due May 25, 2015. This is

Appellant's first request for an extension to file the petition for discretionary review.

II.

Appellant is requesting an extension of time in order to fully evaluate the issues

to be raised in the PDR. An extension of time is necessary so that the petition for

discretionary review can be timely filed. This motion is not made for the purpose of

delay.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays that this

Honorable Court will grant this requested extension of time to file the Appellant's

Petition for Discretionary Review in the above cause for ninety days and extend the

time for filing the petition until July 24, 2015.
Respectfully submitted,

Mr. Jose Amilpa^

TDCJ No. 01908295

French Robertson Unit

12071 FM 3522

Abilene, Texas 79601

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

!4i=-

I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing instrument was this day&2rved

on counsel for the State by mailing same to the following parties on this theffifflay of

Mr. Allen Curry

Harris County District Attorney's Office

Appellate Division

1201 Franklin, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002

State Prosecuting Attorney

P.O. Box 12405

Austin, Texas 78711

c

L6se Amilpas, PRO SE
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

 

CARLOS E. REYES, M.D. and THOMAS )

M. MCNEIL, M.D., )

)

Appellants, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-1771

)

HEATHER K. LYONS, )

)

Appellee. )

) 

Opinion filed February 28, 2018.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for 

Pinellas County; Jack R. St. Arnold, 

Judge.

Erik P. Bartenhagen and Dinah Stein of 

Hicks, Porter, Ebenfeld & Stein, P.A., 

Miami; and Ronald H. Josepher of 

Josepher & Batteese, P.A., Tampa, for 

Appellants. 

Kristin A. Norse and Stuart C. Markman 

of Kynes, Markman & Felman, P.A., 

Tampa; and Armando T. Lauritano of 

Morgan & Morgan, P.A., Tampa, for 

Appellee. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
- 2 -

KELLY, KHOUZAM, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.
a.
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during
the period in which this report is being prepared;b.
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or
caused such internal control over financial reporting to be
designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;c.
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; andd.
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuers internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuers most
recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuers fourth fiscal quarter in the case of
an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting;
  a.
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the small business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; andb.
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the small business issuers internal control over
financial reporting.
  /s/ Kenneth S. AdesskyKenneth S. AdesskyChief Financial Officer
Principal Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7771

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JUAN BAUTISTA ALOMIA-TORRES, a/k/a John, a/k/a Juan BaustistaAlomia, a/k/a Luis Antonio Torres, a/k/a Edward Martinez,

a/k/a Luis Alfredo Martinez, a/k/a John the Jamaican,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees,

District Judge. (3:97-cr-00040-RLV-2)

Submitted: July 31, 2008 Decided: August 4, 2008

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Juan Bautista Alomia-Torres, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Jack Higdon,

Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
*

In accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1) and Houston v.

Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), a prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed

“filed” when it is deposited into the institution’s mail system.

Alomia-Torres’ notice of appeal is dated October 22, 2007, and we

conclude that this was the earliest date it could have been filed.

- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Juan Bautista Alomia-Torres seeks to appeal the district

court’s order construing his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as a

successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion and dismissing it without

prejudice. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because

the notice of appeal was not timely filed. 

When the United States or its officer or agency is a

party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days

after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order,

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the

appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal

period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is

“mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr.,

434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361

U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). 

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on

April 20, 2006. The notice of appeal was filed, at the earliest,

on October 22, 2007.* Because Alomia-Torres failed to file a

timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of

the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
- 3 -

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           7,182
<SECURITIES>                                     8,937
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        538
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                17,588
<PP&E>                                           6,731
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,914
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  18,518
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,343
<BONDS>                                          1,283
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          4
<COMMON>                                           287
<OTHER-SE>                                      14,601
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    18,518
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 140
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (12,271)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (12,271)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                  (12,271)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.98)
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</TABLE>
REGULATORY EVALUATION

Directorate Identifier: 2011-NM-045-AD

Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific 

requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska, where aviation might be the only mode of 

transportation?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)
(March 13, 1997)

#### In the Matter of Joel M., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[654 NYS2d 753]

—Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Sara Schechter, J.), entered on or about January 22, 1996, which adjudicated respondent a juvenile delinquent, following a fact-finding determination that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fifth degrees, and placed him with the Division for Youth for a period of 18 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In an omnibus motion seeking, *inter alia,*a *Mappl Dunaway*hearing, respondent asserted that, while a police officer had stated that he observed respondent repeatedly exchange small objects for United States currency, he was not standing in close proximity to any uniformed or non-uniformed officer at the time. Respondent also asserted that any such exchange, when viewed from any vantage point at any distance, would have appeared to be a handshake, which was innocuous and at worst equivocal behavior, and insufficient to provide probable cause to arrest. The allegations in respondent’s motion papers failed to deny or to controvert the police officer’s observations, and the assertion that his conduct appeared to be a handshake amounted to nothing more than legal argument. As a result, the Family Court correctly denied the motion for a *Mappl Dunaway*hearing (see, Family Ct Act § 330.2 [1]; CPL 710.60 [1], [3] [b]; *People v Mendoza,*82 NY2d 415, 421). While we are aware that the allegations of respondent’s motion papers are similar to the allegations made in *People v Altruz*(198 AD2d 423), we decline to follow the holding of that case.

In any event, at the end of the fact-finding hearing, respondent renewed his motion to suppress and the court and parties treated the fact-finding hearing as encompassing a suppression hearing. In light of the ample evidence of probable cause adduced at the fact-finding hearing, the court properly denied the renewed motion. Respondent was arrested on the basis of observations establishing probable cause *(People v Schlaich,*218 AD2d 398, 400, *lv denied*88 NY2d 994), and upon a sufficiently specific description *(People v Chiari,*220 AD2d 316, *lv denied*87 NY2d 899). Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Rubin and Andrias, JJ.
#### Nathaniel ANDREWS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-757.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 23, 1971.

Appeal dismissed.