1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WHEATON COLLEGE, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Civil Action No. 12-1169 (ESH) 

 

MEMORANUM OPINION

Wheaton College, a Christian liberal arts college located in Wheaton, Illinois, has sued, 

claiming that regulations defendants issued pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable 

Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (March 23, 2010), violates the First Amendment, 

the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. (Complaint, July 

18, 2012 [Dkt. No. 1] (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1–2, 6–8.) The regulations require covered employers to 

offer group health insurance plans that provide women with certain forms of preventive care, 

including all FDA-approved forms of contraception, without cost sharing. Wheaton argues that 

it cannot offer health plans that cover emergency contraceptives, namely Plan B (levonorgestrel, 

or the “morning-after pill”) and Ella (ulipristal, or the “week-after pill”), consistent with its 

religious beliefs. 

Wheaton moved for a preliminary injunction on August 1, 2012. (Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction, August 1, 2012 [Dkt. No. 4] (“Pl. Mot.”).) On August 10, defendants 

moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing that Wheaton lacks standing and 

that its claims are not ripe. (Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, August 10, 2012 [Dkt. No. 17] 
2 

(“Def. Mot.”).) Wheaton opposed defendants’ motion (August 16, 2012 [Dkt. No. 18] (“Pl. 

Opp’n”)), defendants filed a reply in further support thereof (August 20, 2012 [Dkt. No. 19] 

(“Def. Reply”)), and the Court heard oral argument. (8/23 Tr.) Based on this record, the Court 

concludes that, in light of concrete steps defendants are taking to address Wheaton’s concerns, 

including their commitment not to enforce the challenged regulations against Wheaton while 

accommodations are being negotiated, Wheaton has not alleged a concrete and imminent injury 

and that its claims are not fit for judicial review. For the reasons stated, the Court will grant 

defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

BACKGROUND

This action is one of twenty-six lawsuits challenging the Affordable Care Act’s 

preventive services regulations with regard to their requirements involving contraception.1

 In 

recent decisions granting the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss on standing and ripeness 

grounds in two of these cases, Judges Urbom and Boasberg described the relevant statutory and 

regulatory background in detail. See Nebraska ex rel. Bruning v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 

Servs., --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2012 WL 2913402, at *2–5 (D. Neb. 2012) (Urbom, J.); Belmont 

Abbey College v. Sebelius, --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2012 WL 2914417, at *1–3 (D.D.C. 2012) 

(Boasberg, J.). In summary, the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) “requires group health plans to 

provide women with ‘preventive care and screenings’ at no charge to the patient.” Id. at *1 

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)). While certain health plans are grandfathered,2 the rest 

must, “with respect to women,” cover “such additional preventive care and screenings . . . as 

 

1 See The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty – HHS Mandate Information Central, 

http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited August 24, 2012). 

2

 Wheaton alleges that its plans are not grandfathered (Compl. ¶ 44) and defendants do not 

dispute this assertion. 
3 

provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services 

Administration” (“HRSA”) without imposing any cost sharing requirements. Id. § 300gg13(a)(4). 

The guidelines subsequently adopted by HRSA require insurance plans to cover, inter 

alia, all “contraceptive methods,” including Plan B and Ella, “sterilization procedures, and 

patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity” that are approved by 

the FDA. Women’s Preventive Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, 

http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited August 24, 2012); see Belmont Abbey 

College, 2012 WL 2914417, at *1–2 (citing FDA Birth Control Guide, 

http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/ucm118465.htm (last visited August 

24, 2012)). Defendants promulgated an interim final rule, effective August 1, 2011, “requiring 

‘group health plan[s] and . . . health insurance issuer[s] offering group or individual insurance 

coverage [to] provide benefits for and prohibit the imposition of cost sharing with respect to’ the 

preventive services for women included in HRSA’s guidelines.” Id. at *2 (alterations in the 

original) (quoting Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 

Preventive Services Under the ACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,622–23 (August 3, 2011) (interim 

final rules with request for comments); citing 45 C.F.R. § 147.130). 

Responding to comments received about a prior interim rule, defendants acknowledged 

“the effect on the religious beliefs of certain religious employers if coverage of contraceptive 

services were required,” and granted HRSA the authority “to exempt certain religious employers 

from [its] Guidelines where contraceptive services are concerned.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,623. The 

interim final rule provided a definition for “religious employers” that included houses of worship 
4 

but did not include institutions like Wheaton College.3

 (See Compl. ¶¶ 105–110; Def. Mot. at 7–

8.) 

Defendants requested comments on the interim final rule and specifically on its definition 

of “religious employer.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,623. In response to the more than 200,000 

comments defendants received, defendants published final regulations adopting the definition of 

“religious employer” in the interim final rule and simultaneously establishing a temporary 

enforcement safe harbor for non-profit employers that did not meet that definition’s criteria but 

that professed religious objections to providing coverage for contraceptives. Group Health Plans 

and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 

Fed. Reg. 8,725, 8,725–8,729 (February 15, 2012) (final rules). Defendants stated that “[b]efore 

the end of the temporary enforcement safe harbor,” they would “work with stakeholders to 

develop alternative ways of providing contraceptive coverage without cost sharing with respect 

to non-exempted, non-profit religious organizations with religious objections to such coverage.” 

Id. at 8,728. 

Defendants have announced that, during the temporary enforcement safe harbor, the 

government will not take any enforcement action against any employer, group health plan, or 

group health insurance issuer with respect to a non-grandfathered plan that fails to cover some or 

all recommended contraceptive services and that is sponsored by an organization that meets the 

following criteria: 

1. The organization is organized and operates as a non-profit entity. 

 

3

 The interim final rule defined “a religious employer [as] one that: (1) Has the inculcation of 

religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs persons who share its religious tenets; (3) 

primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization 

under” the Internal Revenue Code.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,623. 
5 

2. From February 10, 2012 onward, contraceptive coverage has not been 

provided at any point by the group health plan established or maintained by the 

organization, consistent with any applicable [s]tate law, because of the religious 

beliefs of the organization. 

3. . . . [T]he group health plan established or maintained by the organization (or 

another entity on behalf of the plan, such as a health insurance issuer or thirdparty administrator) must provide [notice] to participants . . . stat[ing] that 

contraceptive coverage will not be provided under the plan for the first plan year 

beginning on or after August 1, 2012. 

4. The organization self-certifies that it satisfies criteria 1–3 above . . . . 

HHS, Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor, February 10, 2012 (“Feb. 2012 

Guidance”) at 3 (footnote omitted), available at

http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/02102012/20120210-Preventive-Services-Bulletin.pdf. 

In a revised guidance, defendants “clarif[ied] . . . 

(1) that the safe harbor is also available to non-profit organizations with religious 

objections to some but not all contraceptive coverage . . .; (2) that group health 

plans that took some action to try to exclude or limit contraceptive coverage that 

was not successful as of February 10, 2012, are not for that reason precluded from 

eligibility for the safe harbor . . .; and (3) that the safe harbor may be invoked 

without prejudice by non-profit organizations that are uncertain whether they 

qualify for the religious employer exemption . . . . 

HHS, Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor, August 15, 2012 (“Aug. 2012 

Guidance”) at 1 n.1, available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/prev-services-guidance08152012.pdf; see id. at 3–4 (stating revised criteria for the temporary enforcement safe harbor 

in accordance with the above).4

 

4

 Defendants issued the August 2012 Guidance in response to this lawsuit. In its complaint, 

Wheaton alleged that it was not eligible for the temporary enforcement safe harbor as described 

in the February 2012 Guidance because “Wheaton’s employee insurance plans . . . currently 

provide coverage for certain contraceptives and inadvertently provided coverage for a short 

period after February 10, 2012 for other now-excluded contraceptives,” such as Plan B and Ella. 

(Compl. ¶ 120; see also Pl. Mot. at 7–9.) In their motion to dismiss, defendants announced an 

interpretation of the safe harbor criteria encompasses Wheaton, and this interpretation has now 
6 

 The “safe harbor provides an additional year for these group health plans and group 

health insurance issuers (i.e., until the first plan year beginning on or after August 1, 2013)” to 

comply with HRSA guidelines regarding contraceptive coverage. Id. at 3. It also provides time 

for defendants, as they announced in a March 2012 Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(“ANPRM”), “to expeditiously develop and propose changes to the final regulations” regarding 

preventive services “that would meet two goals—accommodating non-exempt, non-profit 

religious organizations’ religious objections to covering contraceptive services and assuring that 

participants and beneficiaries covered under such organizations’ plans receive contraceptive 

coverage without cost sharing.” Certain Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. 

16,501, 16,503 (March 21, 2012). In the ANPRM, defendants thus “formally declar[ed] their 

intention to amend the final regulations” with regard to contraceptive coverage “and solicit[ed] 

input from interested parties and the public.” Belmont Abbey College, 2012 WL 2914417, at *3. 

Defendants represent that, having received comments on the ANPRM, they “will publish a 

notice of proposed rulemaking, which will be subject to further public comment, before [they] 

issue further amendments to the preventive services coverage regulations”; defendants will 

“finalize the amendments . . . such that they are effective before the end of the temporary 

enforcement safe harbor.” (Def. Mot. at 10 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. at 16,501, 16,503, 16,508).) 

Wheaton College brought suit, claiming that the regulations as currently fashioned violate 

the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (Counts I, XIII), the First 

Amendment (Counts II–X, XIII), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.

(Counts XI–XIV). 

 

been formalized in the August 2012 Guidance. (Def. Mot. at 9.) 
7 

ANALYSIS

Defendants have moved to dismiss on standing and ripeness grounds. Because 

defendants’ claims go to the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court must consider them before addressing 

Wheaton’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 

83, 94–95 (1998). Wheaton bears the burden of establishing that this Court has jurisdiction over 

its claims. Id. at 104. 

I. STANDING 

[T]o establish constitutional standing, plaintiffs must satisfy three elements: (1) 

they must have suffered an injury in fact that is “concrete and particularized” and 

“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) the injury must be 

“fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) “it must be 

likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a 

favorable decision.” 

NB ex rel. Peacock v. Dist. of Columbia, 682 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 

At issue here is whether Wheaton College has alleged an injury in fact. In Whitmore v. 

Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990), “the Supreme Court summarized its case law and flatly stated: 

‘[W]e have said many times before and reiterate today: Allegations of possible future injury do 

not satisfy the requirements of Art[icle] III. A threatened injury must be certainly impending to 

constitute injury in fact.’” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 

1279, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (alterations in the original) (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158 

(collecting cases)). 

Wheaton concedes that it does not face an impending government enforcement action. It 

is undisputed, given the August 2012 Guidance, that Wheaton qualifies for the temporary 

enforcement safe harbor. (Def. Mot. at 12 (citing the declaration of HHS official Michael Hash 
8 

¶ 5); Pl. Opp’n at 10.) Furthermore, Wheaton has indicated that it will self-certify its eligibility 

and take advantage of the safe harbor pursuant to the August 2012 Guidance’s requirements.5

 

Accordingly, the government “will not take any enforcement action against [Wheaton College] 

until the first plan year that begins on or after August 1, 2013.” (Def. Mot. at 12 (citing Aug. 

2012 Guidance at 3).) Wheaton College may therefore continue to offer its current health plans, 

which do not cover Plan B and Ella, for the upcoming plan year without fear of government 

interference.6

 

5

 The upcoming plan year for Wheaton’s employee insurance plans will begin on January 1, 

2013. (Compl. ¶ 43.) In opposing defendants’ motion to dismiss, Wheaton stated that “as of that 

date, Wheaton’s health insurance will be in violation of federal law. . . . Wheaton will now be 

relieved from government enforcement of the [preventive services regulations] for an extra year, 

[but] it will still violate federal law” as of January 1. (Pl. Opp’n at 11.) With good reason, the 

Court and defendants (see Def. Reply at 2) read this as a statement by Wheaton that it would 

continue its current plans, which do not cover Plan B and Ella, for the upcoming year. However, 

Wheaton’s lawyer backpedaled at oral argument and asserted that his client has yet to make a 

final decision about whether it would continue its current coverage or begin offering health plans 

that include emergency contraceptives. (8/23 Tr. at 33.) 

6

 At oral argument, counsel for Wheaton claimed that the August 2012 Guidance, which makes 

Wheaton eligible for the temporary enforcement safe harbor, is irrelevant to the standing analysis 

because “the standing inquiry [is] focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the 

requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed,” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) 

(emphasis added), and when Wheaton filed its complaint it alleged that, under the criteria 

announced in the February 2012 Guidance that were operative at the time, it was not eligible. 

(Compl. ¶ 120; see 8/23 Tr. at 3–4.) However, the requirement that a plaintiff establish standing 

“continue[s] throughout the course of the litigation,” Johnson v. Holway, No. 03-cv-2513 (ESH), 

2005 WL 3307296, at *25 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2005), because “‘[i]f the plaintiff loses standing . . . 

during the pendency of the proceedings . . ., the matter becomes moot, and the court loses 

jurisdiction.’” McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 227 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (some 

alterations in the original) (quoting Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 69 (2d Cir. 

2001)). Indeed, the standing “requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial 

proceedings,” and “it is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed” 

because “[t]he parties must continue to have a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the lawsuit.” 

Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (citations and some internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)). In sum, “Standing 

represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all stages of the 

litigation.” Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994). 
9 

Wheaton protests that it still alleges a “‘certainly impending’” injury, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

564 n.2 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158), because it 

may be subject to ERISA lawsuits attempting enforcement of the preventive services regulations. 

(Pl. Opp’n at 11.) However, even crediting Wheaton’s assertion that it is “completely exposed” 

to such actions (id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1185d(a)(1))), it is well-established that the 

theoretical possibility of harm from future litigation does not, without more, confer standing. 

“‘Allegations of injury based on predictions regarding future legal proceedings are . . . too 

speculative to invoke the jurisdiction of an Article III Court.’” City of Orrville v. FERC, 147 

F.3d 979, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (alteration in the original) (quoting Platte River Whooping Crane 

Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Whitmore, 495 

U.S. at 157)); see also Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs of New Jersey, 919 F.2d 183, 

193 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that “the theoretical possibility of a suit against [plaintiff] by a 

program beneficiary” was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction); Belmont Abbey College, 2012 

WL 2914417, at *15 (rejecting an argument identical to that raised by Wheaton College (citing 

Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 193)). 

Furthermore, Wheaton has not demonstrated that there is anything “actual or imminent,” 

Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155, about the specter of a “participant [in] or beneficiary of” one of 

Wheaton’s health plans suing under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), to challenge the fact that the 

 

Furthermore, although the burden lies with the party asserting mootness, Friends of the 

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000), the fact that a case 

becomes moot when plaintiff loses standing, McNair, 672 F.3d at 227 n.17, does not mean that it 

is somehow defendant’s burden to show that plaintiff no longer faces imminent injury. To the 

contrary, “[t]he party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [that it has 

standing] at every stage of the litigation, as it does for ‘any other essential element of the case.’” 

Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cent. Delta Water 

Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
10 

plan does not cover Plan B or Ella. To the contrary, the allegations in Wheaton’s complaint 

support the conclusion that this is a “‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’” possibility. Whitmore, 495 

U.S. at 155 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101–02). (See Compl. ¶¶ 20–29, 37–38.) “Each year, all 

Wheaton College students and full-time employees commit themselves to” the “Christian 

community of living, learning, and serving that Wheaton College aspires to be . . . by signing 

Wheaton College’s Community Covenant.” (Id. ¶¶ 25–26.) That Covenant “recognizes that 

Scripture condemns the taking of innocent life.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Wheaton alleges that it “believes 

and teaches that abortion ends a human life and is a sin” (id. ¶ 29); that its “religious beliefs 

prohibit it from deliberately providing insurance coverage for drugs, procedures, or services 

inconsistent with its faith, in particular abortion-inducing drugs” (id. ¶ 37); and that these 

include, in Wheaton’s view, Plan B and Ella. (Id. ¶ 90.) Therefore, the possibility that Wheaton 

College health plan participants, all of whom have signed the Community Covenant, or 

beneficiaries, who are likely family members of Wheaton employees, would sue Wheaton to 

secure free access to Plan B and Ella is remote at best.7

 It is therefore reasonable to conclude 

that such private suits are not “certainly impending.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158. 

 

7

 Wheaton provides health insurance for its 709 full-time employees. (Compl. ¶ 35; Pl. Opp’n at 

1.) At oral argument, counsel for Wheaton affirmed the complaint’s allegation that all of 

Wheaton’s full-time employees, and therefore all of its health plans’ participants, have signed the 

Community Covenant. (8/23 Tr. at 7.) The Court recognizes that Wheaton also provides health 

insurance for its employees’ family members (Pl. Mot. at 7), who may not necessarily share the 

views described in Wheaton’s complaint. Nonetheless, counsel for Wheaton admitted that he did 

not know if anyone had ever asked Wheaton to cover Plan B or Ella, and that he had no concrete 

evidence to support his claim that a private ERISA suit is a realistic threat. (8/23 Tr. at 9–10; id.

at 32 (“[W]hether the actual lawsuit happens next year is at some level speculative . . . . We 

don’t have a crystal ball and we don’t know . . . .”).) See Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 193 

(“Nothing in the current record indicates that [plaintiff] has been threatened with suit . . . or 

provides any other reason to believe that [plaintiff’s] professed fear of a . . . suit is a realistic 

one.”). 
11 

 In arguing to the contrary, Wheaton relies heavily, if not exclusively, on Chamber of 

Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Wheaton’s reliance is misplaced. In Chamber 

of Commerce, the Circuit’s conclusion that plaintiffs had standing to challenge a Federal Election 

Commission regulation on political speech was premised on its belief that a government 

enforcement action, even if not imminent, was nonetheless likely. While the Chamber of 

Commerce plaintiffs were “not faced with any present danger of an enforcement proceeding” 

because the Commission could not act while it was tenuously “split three-three,” the Circuit held 

that plaintiffs had standing because “[n]othing” would “prevent[] the Commission from 

enforcing its rule at any time with, perhaps, another change of mind of one of the 

Commissioners.” 69 F.3d at 603; see id. at 603–04 (“A party has standing to challenge, preenforcement, even the constitutionality of a statute if First Amendment rights are arguably 

chilled, so long as there is a credible threat of [government] prosecution.” (citing, inter alia, 

Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1988) (finding plaintiffs had standing 

to bring a pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge because “[t]he [s]tate has not suggested 

that the newly enacted law will not be enforced” and “plaintiffs have alleged an actual and wellfounded fear that the law will be enforced against them”))). 

Here, however, the government’s commitment not to act against employers that qualify 

for the temporary enforcement safe harbor was the product of sustained agency and public 

deliberation, see 77 Fed. Reg. at 8,726–27, and it represents a final decision, see 77 Fed. Reg. at 

16,502–03, that has been reiterated twice. See Feb. 2012 Guidance; Aug. 2012 Guidance. 

Wheaton has not even argued that the Court should question the government’s promise not to 

enforce the preventive services regulations against it while defendants work with Wheaton and 

others to revise them. This alone serves to distinguish Chamber of Commerce, where there was 
12 

no formal commitment not to prosecute and an enforcement action was likely enough that even 

counsel for the government “agreed at oral argument—as he really had to—that he would not 

advise [plaintiffs] to ignore the rule” that they were challenging. 69 F.3d at 603. 

 Moreover, the Chamber of Commerce plaintiffs alleged that in the prior election cycle 

they responded to the issuance of the FEC regulation by ceasing the political activity that the 

regulation affected. Id. at 602, 603. They thus substantiated their allegations regarding the 

chilling effect of the challenged regulation on their constitutionally protected speech by putting 

forward a credible “‘claim of specific present objective harm.’” Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 

809, 816–17 (1975) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972)). 

 Therefore, the fact that the Circuit in Chamber of Commerce also cited plaintiffs’ First 

Amendment claims and the potential that plaintiffs would be “subject to [private] litigation 

challenging the legality of their actions,” 69 F.3d at 603–04, provides scant support for 

Wheaton’s arguments. Wheaton is unquestionably exempt from government enforcement 

actions during the safe harbor and it has indicated, in opposing defendants’ motion to dismiss, 

that it will not compromise its beliefs in response to the preventive services regulations during 

that period. (Pl. Opp’n at 10–11.) As noted above (see supra n.5), Wheaton’s counsel retreated 

from this unequivocal statement of its future plans at oral argument, and described the “coercive” 

effect of the government’s preventive services regulations on Wheaton’s decision as the source 

of Wheaton’s present injury. (8/23 Tr. at 12; see id. at 8–13, 18, 32–33, 39.) However, 

“allegations of chilling injury are not sufficient basis for standing to challenge a government 

action, at least when the chill is ‘subjective’ and not substantiated by evidence that the 

government action has a present and concrete effect.” Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 193 
13 

(emphasis added) (quoting Laird, 408 U.S. at 13) (collecting cases)). Indeed, the Supreme Court 

has emphasized that while its precedent 

recognize[s] that governmental action may be subject to constitutional challenge 

even though it has only an indirect effect on the exercise of First Amendment 

Rights, . . . these decisions have in no way eroded the ‘established principle that 

to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the 

validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained, or is 

immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury as the result of that 

action . . . .’ 

Laird, 408 U.S. at 13 (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)). Wheaton has “not 

[met] this test; [its] claim, simply stated, is that [it] disagree[s] with the judgments made by the 

Executive Branch with respect to” what preventive services health insurance plans must cover, 

“and that the very existence” of these regulations (notwithstanding the fact that they are presently 

in flux and that the government will not enforce them against Wheaton while they are being 

amended to address Wheaton’s concerns) “produces a constitutionally impermissible chilling 

effect upon the exercise of [its] First Amendment Rights.” Id. But “[a]llegations of a subjective 

‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of 

specific future harm; ‘the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do 

not render advisory opinions.’” Id. at 13–14 (quoting United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. 

Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947)). 

Wheaton has not demonstrated that it has standing. 

II. RIPENESS 

 In addition, Wheaton’s claims are not ripe.8

 “In assessing the prudential ripeness of a 

case,” courts consider two factors: “the ‘fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and the extent 

 

8

 Judges Urbom and Boasberg concluded the same as to the almost identical claims raised by the 

plaintiffs before them. See Nebraska ex rel. Bruning, 2012 WL 2913402, at *20–24; Belmont 

Abbey College, 2012 WL 2914417, at *10–15. 
14 

to which withholding a decision will cause ‘hardship to the parties.’” Am. Petroleum Inst. v. 

EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 

(1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)). 

Wheaton argues that its claims are fit for judicial decision because the preventive services 

regulations are binding legal rules that constrain Wheaton’s choices with regard to the health 

insurance purchasing decisions. (Pl. Opp’n at 21–22, 26–27.) Having rejected a similar standing 

argument, the Court will reject Wheaton’s ripeness argument as well. The two doctrines are 

closely related. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Belmont Abbey College, 2012 

WL 2914417, at *10. Yet, they are motivated by somewhat different concerns. The standing 

doctrine reflects the constitutional imperative that “federal courts sit ‘solely[] to decide on the 

rights of individuals,’” Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 

(2007) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803)), “and must ‘refrai[n] from 

passing upon the constitutionality of an act . . . unless obliged to do so in the proper performance 

of [the] judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to 

raise it.’” Id. (alterations in the original) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United 

for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982)). By ensuring that plaintiffs have 

standing, courts enforce Article III’s limitations on their own powers. 

Ripeness, on the other hand, is also concerned with the separation of powers, particularly 

where agency review is concerned. In addition to preserving the proper role of courts under 

Article III, the ripeness doctrine “‘prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of premature 

adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, 

and also . . . protect[s] the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has 

been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’” Nat’l Park 
15 

Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807–08 (2003) (quoting Abbott Labs., 

387 U.S. at 148–49). The fitness requirement of the ripeness inquiry thus “protect[s] ‘the 

agency’s interest in crystallizing its policy before that policy is subjected to judicial review and 

the court’s interests in avoiding unnecessary adjudication and in deciding issues in a concrete 

setting.’” Am. Petroleum Inst., 683 F.3d at 387 (quoting Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest 

Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). As such, the “fitness of an issue” depends in large part 

on “‘whether the agency’s action is sufficiently final.’” Id. (quoting Atl. States Legal Found. v. 

EPA, 325 F.3d 281, 284 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 

Courts decline to review “tentative” agency positions because doing so “severely 

compromises the interests” the ripeness doctrine protects: “The agency is denied 

full opportunity to apply its expertise and to correct errors or modify positions in 

the course of a proceeding, the integrity of the administrative process is 

threatened by piecemeal review of the substantive underpinnings of a rule, and 

judicial economy is disserved because judicial review might prove unnecessary if 

persons seeking such review are able to convince the agency to alter a tentative 

position.” 

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 31 (D.C. 

Cir. 1984)). 

Because they are in the process of being amended, see 77 Fed. Reg. at 16,501 (ANPRM), 

the preventive services regulations are by definition a tentative agency position “‘in which the 

agency expressly reserves the possibility that its opinion might change.’” Birdman v. Office of 

the Governor, 677 F.3d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted) (quoting Natural Res. Defense Council v. FAA, 292 F.3d 875, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).9

 

 

9

 Wheaton protests that its “challenge to the [preventive services regulations] raises questions of 

law largely independent of context-specific facts” (Pl. Opp’n at 22), and that “if the issue raises a 

purely legal question . . . [courts] assume its threshold suitability for judicial determination.” 

Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985). However, even were the Court 

to agree that Wheaton’s claims are purely legal, that does not end the inquiry. After deciding 
16 

The ANPRM is “‘clearly not some non-substantive, thinly veiled attempt [by defendants] to 

evade review.’” Belmont Abbey College, 2012 WL 2914417, at *13 (quoting Am. Petroleum 

Inst., 683 F.3d at 388); accord Nebraska ex rel. Bruning, 2012 WL 2913402, at *23 (the fact that 

the preventive services regulation itself “describes the temporary enforcement safe harbor,” and 

that the agencies have undertaken “a new proposed rulemaking[,] dispels the notion that the 

defendants are engaged in review-evading gamesmanship”).10 And the fact that defendants may 

have settled on a definition of the “religious employers” that will be exempted from certain of 

the preventive services requirements11 is irrelevant given that the requirements themselves are 

anything but final. See id. at *22. 

 

that an “issue raises a purely legal question,” courts must still “consider whether the agency or 

the court will benefit from deferring review until the agency’s policies have crystallized and the 

‘question arises in some more concrete and final form.’” Eagle-Picher Indus., 759 F.2d at 915 

(quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149); see Belmont Abbey College, 2012 WL 2914417, at *14 

(“courts should refrain from ‘intervening into matters that may best be reviewed at another time 

or in another setting,’ even if the issue presented is ‘purely legal’” (quoting Full Value Advisors 

v. SEC, 633 F.3d 1101, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 

10 Defendants have taken significant steps toward revising the preventive services regulations: 

They have published their plan to amend the rule to address the exact concerns 

[p]laintiff raises in this action and have stated clearly and repeatedly in the 

Federal Register that they intend to finalize the changes before the enforcement 

safe harbor ends. . . . Not only that, but [d]efendants have already initiated the 

amendment process by issuing an ANPRM. . . . The government, moreover, has 

done nothing to suggest that it might abandon its efforts to modify the rule—

indeed, it has steadily pursued that course—and it is entitled to a presumption that 

it acts in good faith. See . . . Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 526 F.3d 763, 769 n.2 

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We must presume an agency acts in good faith . . . .”). 

Belmont Abbey College, 2012 WL 2914417, at *9 (some internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

11 In addition, counsel for the defendants stated at oral argument that the ANPRM “certainly 

doesn’t foreclose changing the religious employer exemption.” (8/23 Tr. at 27.) 
17 

Moreover, the regulations Wheaton challenges are being amended precisely in order to 

accommodate Wheaton’s concerns. See AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 369 F.3d 554, 563 (D.C. Cir. 

2004) (per curiam) (dismissing challenge as unripe because of “ongoing rulemaking proceedings 

. . . address[ing] the issues raised by [petitioner]”). Wheaton only tilts at windmills when it 

protests that it will not be satisfied with whatever amendments defendants ultimately make. 

Indeed, Wheaton’s argument that various hypothetical accommodations are insufficient (see Pl. 

Opp’n at 16–17, 19, 23–26) only serves to underscore why this Court ought not address the 

merits of Wheaton’s claims until the preventive services regulations “have taken on fixed and 

final shape so that [the Court] can see what legal issues it is deciding.” Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. 

Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 244 (1952). 

Nor has Wheaton demonstrated a hardship from any delay that would override its claims’ 

lack of fitness for judicial review. See Am. Petroleum Inst., 683 F.3d at 389 (“Considerations of 

hardship that might result from delaying review ‘will rarely overcome the finality and fitness 

problems inherent in attempts to review tentative positions.’” (quoting Pub. Citizen Health 

Research Grp., 740 F.2d at 31)). “Costs stemming from [Wheaton’s] desire to prepare for 

contingencies are not sufficient . . . to constitute a hardship for purposes of the ripeness 

inquiry—particularly when [defendants’] promises and actions suggest the situation [Wheaton] 

fears may not occur.” Belmont Abbey College, 2012 WL 2914417, at *14 (collecting cases). 

And “[t]he planning insecurity [Wheaton] advances” with regard to what the preventive services 

regulations may (or may not) require of it does not suffice to show hardship. Tenn. Gas Pipeline 

Co. v. FERC, 736 F.2d 747, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 

CONCLUSION 

“In sum, the application of” the preventive services regulations to Wheaton “remains 
18 

hypothetical.” Id. Wheaton’s arguments do not 

set its case apart from the mine run of situations in which an enterprise confronts 

. . . projected application of regulatory or fiscal legislation. Were [courts] to 

entertain anticipatory challenges pressed by parties facing no imminent threat of 

adverse agency action, no hard choice between compliance certain to be 

disadvantageous and a high probability of strong sanctions, . . . [they] would 

venture away from the domain of judicial review into a realm more accurately 

described as judicial preview. No roving preview function has been assigned to 

courts in the federal system. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds will be granted. A separate 

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

 /s/ 

 ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE 

 United States District Judge 

Date: August 24, 2012