## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 6, 2006
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UTAH ENVIRONMENTAL CONGRESS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 05-4102 DALE BOSWORTH, in his official capacity as Chief of the United States Forest Service; UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE; MARY ERICKSON, in her official capacity as Supervisor of the Fishlake National Forest; and D. FRED HOUSTON, in his official capacity as Richfield District Ranger of the Fishlake National Forest,

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH (D.C. NO. 2:04-CV-643-DAK)

Joel Ban, WildLaw, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaint iff-Appellant. Mark R. Hagg, Attorney, Environment & Natural Resou rces Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Kelly A. Johnson, Act ing Assistant Attorney General, and Todd S. Aagaard, Attorney, Environment& Natural Resources Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., and Elise Foster, Of Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture, Ogden, Uta h, with him on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.-2-

Before HENRY , EBEL , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.

TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judge.
In 2004, the United States Forest Service approved a 123-acre timberthinning project to treat beetle-infested trees in Utah’s Fishlake National Forest. Its approval was made pursuant to a categorical exc lusion, a streamlined process allowing minor projects to be quickly implemented s o long as they have no significant effect on the environment. As a resultof this decision, Utah Environmental Congress (“UEC”) appealed to the dist rict court arguing that the project violated a number of environmental and regu latory provisions. We agree with the district court that the Forest Service pro perly implemented this project under a categorical exclusion. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 129 1, we AFFIRM. I. Background A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework 1. National Environmental Policy Act The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requ ires federal agencies such as the Forest Service to analyze environmental consequences before1 The Council on Environmental Quality is responsibl e for implementing

NEPA’s planning requirements by promulgating bindin g regulations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344(3); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501–08. Age ncies, such as the Forest Service, comply with the Council’s regulations by a dopting supplemental procedures. -3- initiating actions that potentially affect the envi ronment. 1 In conducting this analysis, the Forest Service must prepare one of th e following: (1) an environmental impact statement, (2) an environmenta l assessment, or (3) a categorical exclusion. An environmental impact statement involves the most rigorous analysis, and is required if a proposed ac tion will “significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4. If an agency is uncertain whether the proposed acti on will significantly affect the environment, it may prepare a considerab ly less detailed environmental assessment. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9. An environmental assessment provides “sufficient evidence and analysis” to determine whe ther a proposed project will create a significant effect on the environment. Id. If so, the agency must then develop an environmental impact statement; if not, the environmental assessment results in a “Finding of No Significant Impact,” an d no further agency action is required. Id. In certain narrow instances, however, an agency is not required to prepare either an environmental assessment or an environmen tal impact statement. This2 This number excludes seven categories created by t he Secretary of

Agriculture which do not involve physical projects within the National Forest system but instead involve activities such as budge t proposals, educational programs, and legal counseling. See Forest Service Handbook, Ch. 30, § 31.11. -4- occurs when the proposed action falls within a cate gorical exclusion, i.e. , those actions predetermined not to “individually or cumul atively have a significant effect on the human environment.” Id. § 1508.4. The Forest Service has created a list of 24 such categories. 2 See Forest Service Handbook 1909.15 (Environmental Policy and Procedures Handbook), Ch. 30, §§ 31.12, 31.2, http://www.fs.fed.us/cgi-bin/Directives/get_dirs/fs h?1909.15 (last visited March 24, 2006) [hereinafter Forest Service Handbook]. E xamples include small acreage timber-thinning and harvesting, as well as the construction of trails, utility lines, and meteorological sampling sites. See id. Federal law limits categorical exclusions in one cr itical respect: a proposed action is precluded from categorical exclusion if “ extraordinary circumstances” exist such that “a normally excluded action may hav e a significant environmental effect.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. Extraordinary circum stances may exist, for example, where a proposed action—albeit small in scope—signi ficantly affects inventoried roadless areas, archaeological sites, flood plains, or federally listed threatened or endangered species habitat. Forest Service Handboo k, Ch. 30, § 30.3. 2. National Forest Management Act-5-

Under the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (“ NFMA”), the Forest Service must develop a land and resource managementplan, commonly known as a forest plan, for each unit of the National ForestSystem. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a), (e), (g)(3)(B). The Forest Service manages each fo rest unit at two different levels: (1) programmatic and (2) project. Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1167–68 (10th Cir. 1999). At the programmatic level, the Forest Service creat es general, forest-wide planning goals memorialized in a forest plan. Beca use the Forest Service must account for a variety of different interests, each forest plan envisions the forest will be used for multiple purposes, including “outd oor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and wilderness.” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1). At the same time, the forest plan provides for “diversity of plant and animal communities based on the suitability and capability of the specific land area.” Id. § 1604(g)(3)(B). At the project or site-specific level, the Forest S ervice implements the forest plan by approving or disapproving particularprojects using an environmental impact statement, an environmental as sessment, or a categorical exclusion. Projects must comply with the applicabl e forest plan. Silverton Snowmobile Club v. U.S. Forest Serv ., 433 F.3d 772, 785 (10th Cir. 2006); see 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i).3 A transition period for the 2000 regulations was c reated in order that the

individual units of the Forest Service would have a mple time “to incorporate regional guide direction into agency procedures or plan decisions,” thereby “ensur[ing] consistency among national forests and grasslands.” 65 Fed. Reg. (continued...) -6- 3. Implementing Regulations Before a forest plan may be created, NFMA “explicit ly requires the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations that set out the process for the development and revision of land management plans f or units of the National Forest System, and regulations that establish manag ement planning standards and guidelines . . . .” 47 Fed. Reg. 43,026, 43,037 (S ept. 30, 1982). Of particular concern in this case are planning rules the Forest Service adopted in 1979 and revised in 1982, codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219 (1982) , which govern Forest Service management at both the programmatic and project lev els. See generally id. In November 2000, the Forest Service substantially ame nded these regulations, known as the 1982 planning rules, replacing them wi th the 2000 planning rules, codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219 (2001). 65 Fed. Reg. 6 7,568 (Nov. 9, 2000). The 2000 planning rules were not immediately promul gated. Instead, the new regulations contained transition provisions whi ch provided that, beginning on November 9, 2000, until the promulgation of the new , final rule, the Forest Service should consider “the best available science in implementing a forest plan.” 3 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a), (d) (2001). These transit ion provisions remained3 (...continued)

67,514, 67,527 (Nov. 9, 2000). -7- on the books until January 2005 when the new rules were finally implemented. 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.1 to .16 (2005); 70 Fed. Reg. 1,023 ( Jan. 5, 2005). The 2005 rules retained the best available science standard, requi ring the “Responsible Official [to] take into account the best available science” by “document[ing] how t he best available science was taken into account in the pla nning process,” and evaluating and disclosing substantial uncertainties and risks in that science. 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a) (2005) (emphasis added). B. The Seven Mile Project The Seven Mile Spruce Beetle Management Project (“S even Mile Project” or “Project”) sitting within the 1,424,479 acres of the Fishlake National Forest in south-central Utah, is located approximately 22 mil es east of Richfield, Utah. Because it sits within the Fishlake National Forest , the Seven Mile Project is governed by the Fishlake Forest Plan (“the Forest P lan” or “Plan”). See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Forest Service Region 4, Land and Resource Management Plan for the Fishlake National Forest, http://www.fs.fed.us/r4/dixie/projects/FParea/LiveD ocs/Fishlake.pdf (last visited March 24, 2006) [hereinafter Forest Plan]. The Pro ject involves a selective harvest of beetle-infested mature, dead, diseased, or dying Englemann spruce-8-

timber stands covering approximately 123 acres. By implementing the Project, the Forest Service plans to prevent an epidemic inf estation of spruce beetle from spreading into adjacent stands and killing the spru ce. In so doing, the Forest Service hopes to protect mature stands, preserve wi ldlife habitat, and reduce the risk of wildfire. The Forest Service ultimately approved the Seven Mi le Project under categorical exclusion 14 (“Category 14”) in 2004. However, consideration of this particular project had begun over five years earlie r. Beginning in June 1999, the Seven Mile Project was approved under another timbe r harvest categorical exclusion known as Category 4. When a federal dist rict court in Illinois invalidated Category 4 later that year, Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 73 F. Supp. 2d 962 (S.D. Ill. 1999), the Forest Service o pted to prepare an environmental assessment for the Seven Mile Project , which was completed in June 2000. The Regional Forester deemed this envir onmental assessment inadequate; consequently, another draft environment al assessment for the Project was prepared in September 2003. At the same time the Forest Service was completing this revised environmental assessment, anew set of categorical exclusions was adopted by the Department of Agricul ture, which included Category 14. Category 14 applies to small acreage timber-thinni ng projects.4 The district ranger wrote, “This decision superced es, and is essentially the

same as my former decision with the exception that the 0.75 mile of road reconstruction will not be implemented as part of t his decision.” J.A. 549. -9- Specifically, it excludes from NEPA review “commerc ial and noncommercial sanitation harvest of trees to control insects or d isease not to exceed 250 acres, requiring no more than 1/2 mile of temporary road c onstruction, including removal of infested/infected trees and adjacent liv e uninfested/uninfected trees as determined necessary to control the spread of insec ts or disease.” Forest Service Handbook, Ch. 30, § 31.2(14). Finding Category 14 would apply to the Seven Mile P roject, the Fishlake National Forest district ranger issued a Decision M emorandum in May 2004. He concluded that “[Category 14] is appropriate in thi s situation because there are no extraordinary circumstances related to the proposed action.” J.A. 535. The district ranger replaced the original Decision Memo randum in October 2004 with a new Memorandum, but left the project largely unmo dified. 4 In sum, the local forest officials found “that the spruce beetle infestation in the Seven Mile Project area has escalated substanti ally during the past 8 years . . . [and] at least 80 percent mortality will occur in n on-infested spruce in the absence of thinning.” Id. at 551. The district manager assured that (1) “thr ee snags per acre will be retained . . . [as well as] snags cont aining nest cavities or offering potential nesting opportunities . . . to provide fo r [foraging and nesting] for three--10-

toed woodpeckers;” (2) although “no sensitive speci es are known to occur in the project area, and suitable habitat has not been fou nd,” local forest rangers “will continue to survey the project area for all sensiti ve species during pre- and posttreatment activities;” and (3) if any goshawk are d iscovered during the “ongoing surveys [] being conducted for the northern goshawk ,” the Forest Service will act appropriately “to conserve this species.” Id. at 550. C. Decision Below Following the Forest Service’s authorization of the Seven Mile Project,
UEC filed suit in district court, alleging the Forest S ervice’s authorization of the Seven Mile Project violated NEPA, NFMA , and the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). In April 2005, the district court fou nd in favor of the Forest Service on all claims. The district court conclude d that the Forest Service did not act arbitrarily in applying Category 14. Furthermo re, the court found that the Forest Service adequately monitored the management indicator species in accordance with the Fishlake Forest Plan. In reach ing these conclusions, the court held that the 1982 planning rules were not ap plicable to the Seven Mile Project and instead applied the 2000 planning rules

. II. Standard of Review Because neither NEPA nor NFMA provide a private rig ht of action, this court reviews the Forest Service’s approval of the Seven Mile Project as a final-11-

agency action under the APA. Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth , 372 F.3d 1219, 1223 n.3 (10th Cir. 2004) (“ UEC I ”); Colo. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. Forest
Serv. , 220 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000). We conside r the district court’s decision de novo. Am. Wildlands v. Browner , 260 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2001). However, we will not overturn the agency’s decision unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). While administrative agencies generally are afforde d a presumption of regularity, an agency’s decision will nonetheless b e arbitrary and capricious “if the agency . . . entirely failed to consider an imp ortant aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs c ounter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be a scribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. , 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Furthermore, we must det ermine whether the disputed decision was based on consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Id. Deference to the agency is especially strong where the challenged decisions in volve technical or scientific matters within the agency’s area of expertise. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council , 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989). In reviewing conflicting interpretations of an agen cy’s statutes and-12-

regulations, this court grants “substantial deference” to the agency’s interpretat ion of its own regulations. Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp. , 42 F.3d 1560, 1576 (10th Cir. 1994). We may reject the agency’s interpretation only when it is “unreasonable, plainly erroneous, or inconsistent w ith the regulation’s plain meaning.” Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter , 994 F.2d 735, 738 (10th Cir. 1993). III. Analysis UEC appeals the district court’s approval of the Se ven Mile Project raising three primary allegations of error: (1) the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to consider the cumulative impact of the Seven Mile Project on fish and wildlife; (2) the district court improperly used the Forest Service’s 2000 transition provisions, as opposed to the 1982 planning rules, to evaluate the Seven Mile Project; and (3) the ForestService failed to collect adequate data for management indicator species in v iolation of the Fishlake National Forest Plan and NEPA. We discuss, and rej ect, each of UEC’s contentions in the following sections. A. Categorical Exclusion of the Seven Mile Project We first address UEC’s argument that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously by authorizing the Seven Mile Proj ect pursuant to Category 14’s exclusion. UEC raises two separate claims: (1) the Seven Mile Project should not have been categorically excluded because use of an exclusion is appropriate only5 UEC also argues that the environmental assessment completed in 2003

violated NEPA because the Forest Service never pres ented the draft environmental assessment to the public for comment nor properly finalized it through issuance of a “Finding of No Significant Impact.” Aple.’s Br. 25–36. Both contentions are without merit since the ForestService ultimately authorized the Seven Mile Project pursuant to Category 14. By its terms, environmental assessments are not required for categorically excl uded projects unless extraordinary circumstances are found. The draft e nvironmental assessment about which UEC complains was prepared priorto the Project’s authorization under Category 14 and has no relevance here.

6 “‘Cumulative impact’ is the impact on the environm ent which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other action s. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively sig nificant actions taking place over a period of time.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2005). Cumulative impact is synonymous with cumulative effects. Id. § 1508.8(b). -13- when the Forest Service first conducts a preliminary analysis determining that the proposed project will have no significant or cumulative effects on the environment, and (2) the existence of extraordinary circumstances here precludes categorical exclusion of the Seven Mile Project. 5 1. Cumulative Impact **6** UEC’s first claim is that “in order for an agency t o determine whether a project may be categorically excluded, the agency m ust [definitively] determine, based on cumulative effects, whether categorical ex clusion is appropriate.” Aplt.’s Br. 27–28. Specifically, UEC asserts the S even Mile Project should not have been categorically excluded because the ForestService conducted an inadequate analysis of the Project’s cumulative eff ects on the forest. UEC points7 Management indicator species “are a ‘bellwether’ f or other species that have the same special habitat needs or population c haracteristics . . . .” Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth , 439 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal ci tation and quotations omitted). They “serve as a proxy fo r determining the effects of management activities on other species.” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).

-14- to three specific omissions by the Forest Service, which it contends, demonstrate the failure to conduct an adequate cumulative impac t analysis. The Forest Service failed to (1) analyze the Project’s effect on manag ement indicator species; 7 (2) create an appropriate cumulative effects boundary e ncompassing the entire Project area and areas adjacent to the Project where the Pr oject’s effects could be perceived; and (3) analyze the Project’s effect on sensitive species located outside the Project area but nonetheless still within the c umulative effects boundary as well as analyze the impact of other projects occurr ing within the cumulative effects boundary. In addressing this argument, the Forest Service counters that UEC’s argument would effectively render useless the purpose of categorical exclusions generally. We agree. Federal regulations define the term “categorical ex clusion” as: [A] category of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment and which have been found to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency in implementation of these regulations . . . . Any p rocedures under this section shall provide for extraordinary circumstanc es in which a normally excluded action may have a significant env ironmental effect. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2003) (emphasis added). By de finition, then, a categorical-15-

exclusion does not create a significant environment al effect; consequently, the cumulative effects analysis required by an environm ental assessment need not be performed. That assessment has already been conduc ted as a part of the creation of the exclusion, which UEC does not challenge in t his action. Because the Seven Mile Project fell within the gene ral confines of Category 14, a point that UEC also does not dispute, the Pro ject was predetermined to have no significant effect. Under the regulation, only if extraordinary circumstances were present would the Forest Service need to perfo rm further analysis in the form of an environmental assessment. See Nat’l Trust for Historic Preservation v. Dole , 828 F.2d 776, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that “ [b]y definition, [categorical exclusions] are categories of actions that have been predetermined not to involve significant environmental impacts, a nd therefore require no further agency analysis absent extraordinary circumstances” ). We agree that it may be conceptually possible for alarge number of small projects to collectively create conditions that cou ld significantly effect the environment. But the regulation itself contains a provision to address that concern, namely the extraordinary circumstances exc eption. And the extraordinary circumstances safety-valve is more th an capable of addressing specific harms allegedly created by specific projec ts, which we turn to next. Accordingly, the Forest Service did not act arbitra rily in failing to conduct8 The district court reviewed this issue, finding th at the Forest Service had

performed extensive studies of both the Project its elf and Category 14 generally. To the extent the district court’s analysis address es cumulative effects unrelated to the potential for extraordinary circumstances, t his analysis was unnecessary. Because the Seven Mile Project met the general requ irements for Category 14, no further agency action was required absent extraordi nary circumstances. -16- any cumulative effects analysis unrelated to the ex istence of extraordinary circumstances. 8 2. Extraordinary Circumstances UEC next claims that even if the Forest Service was not required to do a preliminary cumulative effects analysis, the ForestService nonetheless exhibited a clear error in judgment in failing to find extrao rdinary circumstances. To determine whether extraordinary circumstances exist , the Forest Service must consider if the proposed action may have a potentia lly significant impact on certain “resource conditions.” Forest Service Handbook, Ch. 30, § 30.3, ¶ 2. The resource conditions are defined in the Forest Servi ce Handbook as follows: (a) Federally listed threatened or endangered speci es or designated critical habitat, species proposed for federal listing or pr oposed critical habitat, or proposed critical habitat, or Forest Service sensit ive species. (b) Floodplains, wetlands, or municipal watersheds. (c) Congressionally designated areas such as wilder ness, wilderness study areas, or national recreation areas. (d) Inventoried roadless areas. (e) Research natural areas.-17-

(f) American Indians’ and Alaska Natives’ religious or cultural sites. (g) Archaeological sites, or historic properties orareas. Id. Here, UEC claims subpart (a) is triggered because t he Seven Mile Project will have “guaranteed effects” on the three-toed wo odpecker and the northern goshawk. Aplt.’s Br. 38. Therefore, UEC argues, t he Forest Service was required to perform an environmental assessment. In particu lar, UEC claims the Forest Service, while finding “no impact” on the northern goshawk, conceded in its Decision Memorandum that the Project “may affect” t he three-toed woodpecker. In light of the Forest Service’s uncertainty, UEC a rgues, it should invoke the extraordinary circumstances exception. The Forest Service, on the other hand, interprets the applicable regulations to require a significant environmental effect, not just any effect as asserted by UEC. The regulatory language guides our analysis. In ge neral, environmental regulations do not place a heavy burden on federal agencies to detail actions which will have only insignificant effects on the h ealth of the environment. For example, “a detailed statement by the responsible o fficial on the environmental impact of [a] proposed action” is required only for“Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment . . . .” 42 U .S.C. § 4332(C) (emphasis added); see 68 Fed. Reg. 44,598, 44,600 (July 29, 2003) (noting that-18-

the Forest Service’s “scarce resources” should be c oncentrated on “major Federal actions and not expend[ed] . . . analyzing agency a ctions where experience has demonstrated the insignificance of effects”) (emphasis added). The analysis is no different with regard to the For est Service’s use of categorical exclusions. As we already discussed, t he presence of an extraordinary circumstance precludes the application of a categor ical exclusion. And such a circumstance exists only where a proposed action “m ay have a significant environmental effect.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (emphasi s added); Forest Service Handbook, Ch. Zero Code, § 05; see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (defining categorical exclusion as a category of actions that do not “ind ividually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment”) (emphasis added). This language plainly requires that an action firstmay produce a significant effect before a federal agency engage in further an alysis. This is only logical given the substantial analytical and evidentiary bu rdens triggered when a project is ineligible for categorical exclusion. By relyin g on categorical exclusions, the Forest Service promotes efficiency in its NEPA revi ew process while avoiding unnecessary analysis. See Fund for Animals v. Babbitt , 89 F.3d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that “[t]he [Counsel on Environmental Quality] has authorized the use of categorical exclusions to promote efficiency in the NEPA review process”). UEC contends that despite this provision, an effectneed not be significant,-19-

but merely predicted by the Forest Service, to trig ger extraordinary circumstances. Thus, even a de minimis effect on a threatened spec ies would bar application of the exclusion. In support of this proposition, it cites two statements from the Forest Service Handbook. First, the Handbook notes that “[t]he mere presence of one or more [] resource conditions does not preclud e use of a categorical exclusion; instead, [i]t is the degree of the potential effect of a proposed action on these resource conditions that determines whether e xtraordinary circumstances exist.” Forest Service Handbook, Ch. 30, § 30.3, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). Second, the Handbookrequires the Forest Service to prepare an environmental assessment if, based on its evaluation, “it is
uncertain whether the proposed action may have a significanteffect on the environment.” Id. ¶ 3 (emphasis added); see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (noting that the term “significantly” as used in NEPA requires consi deration of both context and intensity; one intensity factor considered is “the degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncerta in or involve unique or unknown risks.”). While it is true that the Handbook refers to the “d egree of the potential effect of a proposed action on a resource condition ,” the regulation itself requires the potential for a “significant environmental effe ct.” We must interpret the language found in the Handbook in light of the enti re regulation and its-20-

accompanying policy. See United States v. Shewmaker , 936 F.2d 1124, 1127 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB , 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956)) (“In expounding a statute, we must not be g uided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”). We must also be careful not to disrupt the plain language of the regulation itself. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Plant ers Bank,
N.A. , 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (“[W]hen the statute’s langu age is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the dispositi on required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”) ( internal quotation marks omitted). Considering the purpose of categorical e xclusions in light of these factors and affording the agency’s interpretation s ubstantial deference, we conclude that an extraordinary circumstance is foun d only when there exists a potential for a significanteffect on a resource condition. See Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 297 F.3d 1012, 1023 (10th Cir. 2002) (“When reviewing an agency’s interpretation and app lication of its categorical exclusions under the arbitrary and capricious stand ard, courts are deferential.”). In this light, we review UEC’s contention that the Forest Service erred in evaluating whether the Seven Mile Project would sig nificantly affect the threetoed woodpecker and the northern goshawk. The Fore st Service found that although the Seven Mile Project will have “no impac t” on the northern goshawk,-21-

it “may affect, but is not likely to result in a tr end toward federal listing or loss of viability for the three-toed woodpecker.” J.A. 535

. Although UEC argues the Forest Service expressed “u ncertainty” with regard to the two species, the Forest Service decision can hardly be construed to express such doubt. In evaluating the Seven Mile P roject’s effect on the northern goshawk, the Forest Service relied on helicopter an d ground surveys documenting and confirming the lack of goshawk habitat in the p roposed area. Id. at 511, 516

. Explaining the lack of effect on the three-toed woo dpecker, the Forest Service stated that while “it may impact individuals, indiv idual territories, and cause displacement within the project area,” the Project “would not contribute to a trend towards federal listing or a loss of population via bility,” id. at 516, since adequate woodpecker habitat would be preserved throughout th e forest, and the Project would provide some long-term habitat improvements w here intermediate harvesting or under-burning occurred. Id. at 512, 516. These conclusions were based on a review of the spe cies and habitat conducted as a part of the analysis leading to the agency’s Decision Memorandum, including a biological evaluation of bo th species. Id. at 509–16. Additionally, the species monitoring performed by t he Forest Service, although not consistently conducted on an annual basis, was more than ample to determine whether extraordinary circumstances existed. See id. at 298–300 (helicopter9 We note that additional evidence may have been ava ilable to the district

court regarding effects to these species. UEC, how ever, provided us with a joint appendix that excerpted only portions of the admini strative record. Because many of UEC’s cites in its brief were to other portions of the administrative record, we could not verify them and were limited to the recor d before us. See 10th Cir. R. 10(b)(2) (2006) (“If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that afinding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is con trary to the evidence, the appellant must include in the record a transcript o f all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.”). -22- surveys of goshawk nests for years 1998–2000); id. at 289–97 (surveys for goshawk for years 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2003); id. at 301–05 (surveys for threetoed woodpeckers for years 1998, 2000, 2002); id. at 386–452 (survey for threetoed woodpeckers for year 2000). 9 In sum, although the Forest Service found some poss ible effects, none were potentially significant. As the Handbook clearly s tates, “[t]he mere presence of one or more of these resource conditions does not p reclude use of a categorical exclusion.” Because we afford the Forest Service s ubstantial deference in interpreting its own regulations and because the ag ency exhibited no clear error of judgment in its factual determinations, we find that the Forest Service has not acted arbitrarily in concluding the Seven Mile Proj ect did not trigger a finding of extraordinary circumstances. Accordingly, the Forest Service did not violate the APA when it categorically excluded the Seven Mile Project. B. 1982 and 2000 NFMA Regulations-23-

We next address UEC’s contention that the district court should have applied the 1982 planning rules, instead of the 200 0 transition provisions, when reviewing the Forest Service’s compliance with the regulations’ species monitoring requirements. UEC argues two points: (1 ) the 2000 transition provisions were not effective at the time of the Pr oject’s implementation; and (2) even if the transition provisions were in effect, t he Fishlake Forest Plan incorporates the 1982 regulations for purposes of p rojects considered in the Fishlake National Forest. The Forest Service dispu tes both arguments, contending the 2000 transition provisions were effe ctive for purposes of the Project and that the Forest Plan’s species monitori ng program is independent of the 1982 rules. Deciding whether the 1982 regulations apply to the Project, either of their own accord or by virtue of the Forest Plan, is impo rtant because the 1982 regulations and the 2000 transition provisions cont ain key differences governing species monitoring. The 1982 rules, for example, r equire the Forest Service to monitor the “[p]opulation trends of the management indicator species” and determine “relationships to habitat changes.” 36 C .F.R. § 219.19(a)(6). And we have held that these obligations apply to “project level as well as plan level management actions.” UEC I, 372 F.3d at 1225. Conversely, the 2000 transitio n provisions contain no such explicit language govern ing monitoring but merely-24-

require “the responsible official [to] consider the best available science in implementing” a forest plan. 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a) , (d) (2001); 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514, 67,579 (Nov. 9, 2000). See generally Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth , 439 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006) (“ UEC II ”) (quoting Forest Watch v. U.S.
Forest Serv. , 410 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2005), for the proposi tion that “the standards of the 1982 Rules and the 2000 Transition al Rule are–at least–distinct . . . .”). 1. Implementation of the 2000 Transition Provision s We begin with UEC’s first argument: the 2000 transi tion provisions, although implemented in November 2000, are nonethel ess inapplicable to the Seven Mile Project. To be sure, courts have expressed considerable conf usion in applying the 2000 transition provisions. See 69 Fed. Reg. 58,055, 58,055 (Sept. 29, 2004). They have reached varying conclusions regarding the applicability of the provisions to projects approved during the transiti on period. See, e.g. , UEC II, 439 F.3d at 1189–90, 1195 (applying the 1982 rules because the Forest Service conceded their applicability; the court noted it di d not resolve the question of the 2000 transition provisions’ applicability); Forest Watch , 410 F.3d at 118 (holding that the “plain language of the 2000 Transitional Rule” requires that “projects ‘implemented’ during the transition period must comply with the best available-25-

science standard”); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 421 F.3d 797, 800 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the applicabl e NFMA planning regulations are those in effect at the time “the plan revisions challenged in this lawsuit were prepared”) ; Defenders of Wildlife v. Johanns , No. 04-4512, 2005 WL 2620564, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (applying Natural Resources to conclude that the “2004 Interpretative Rule may continue to be applied in cases where the challenged action was taken during the 20 04 Interpretative Rule’s effective period”); Clinch Coal. v. Damon , 316 F. Supp. 2d 364, 381 (W.D. Va. 2004) (suggesting the 1982 planning rule would appl y to a 2001 decision); Shawnee Trail Conservancy v. Nicholas , 343 F. Supp. 2d 687, 707 (S.D. Ill. 2004) (noting that “[o]n November 9, 2000, the Departmentof Agriculture made wholesale changes to the relevant regulations, maki ng prior citations obsolete”). In an attempt to address this confusion, the Forest Service issued an interpretative rule on September 29, 2004. Introdu cing the rule, the Forest Service explained: [I]t is clear that site-specific decisions entered into during the transition period are not to comply with the substantive provi sions of the 2000 planning rule. This interpretative rule clarifies that until a new final rule is promulgated, the transition provisions of t he 2000 planning rule, as amended by the May 2002 interim final rule remai n in effect . . . . 69 Fed. Reg. 58,055, 58,056 (Sept. 29, 2004). The interpretative provision emphasized that “responsible officials consider the best available science in10 The relevant language governing the transition is found in 36 C.F.R.

§ 219.35(a)–(d) (2001): (a) The transition period begins on November 9, 200 0 and ends upon the completion of the revision process (§ 219.9) for ea ch unit of the National Forest System. During the transition period, the responsi ble official must consider the best available science in implementing and, if appr opriate, amending the current plan. (b) If, as of November 9, 2000, a plan revision or amendment has been initiated under the 1982 planning regulations in effect priorto November 9, 2000 (See 36 CFR part 219, revised as of July 1, 2000.) and if anotice of availability of a draft environmental impact statement or an environmental assessment is published by May 9, 2001 in the Federal Register, the responsibl e official may complete the amendment or revision process under the 1982 regulations or adjust the process to conform to the provisions of this subpart. (c) If a review of lands not suited for timber prod uction is required before the completion of the revision process, the review musttake place as described by the provisions of § 219.28, except as provided in parag raph (b) of this section. (d) Site-specific decisions made by the responsible official 3 years from November 9, 2000 and afterward must be in conforman ce with the provisions of this subpart. -26- implementing national forest land management plans and, as appropriate, plan amendments.” Id. As to the continuing vitality of the 1982 provision s: [T]he 1982 planning rule may continue to be used on ly for plan amendments and revisions upon election of the respo nsible official. Appropriate plan amendments and projects proposed d uring the transition period should be developed considering t he best available science in accordance with § 219.35 paragraph (a). 10
Id. As we explained in UEC II, “the 2000 regulations rendered the 1982 rule inoperative for project-specific decisions made aft er November 9, 2000. The11 In its brief, UEC directed us to our opinion in UEC II for the proposition

that the 1982 rules are applicable. However, the UEC II panel recently granted a limited rehearing to modify the original opinion. This modified opinion removed nearly all reference to its earlier rationale for f inding the 1982 rules’ applicability. Significantly, the UEC II court continued to find the 1982 rules applicable, but solely due to the Forest Service’s concession that it elected to apply the 1982 rules. See UEC II, 439 F.3d at 1189 (stating that “[s]ignificantly, and thankfully, the Forest Service now concedes on appeal that it has waived any argument that the 2000 regulations apply”). The pa nel concluded its opinion, stating “[w]e do not address whether the agency sho uld apply the 1982 rule or the 2005 rule’s transition provision during further pro ceedings.” Id. at 1195. -27- interpretative rule stated that, during the transit ion period between November 2000 and promulgation of a final rule, the Forest S ervice should use the ‘best available science’ under § 219.35(a) for project de cisions.” UEC II, 439 F.3d at
1189. We afford an agency’s interpretation of its own reg ulations “substantial deference,” Olenhouse , 42 F.3d at 1576, except in those instances where such interpretation is “unreasonable, plainly erroneous, or inconsistent with the regulation’s plain meaning.” Bar MK Ranches , 994 F.2d at 738. We recognize, of course, that although interpretative rules can i nform our decision, they do not have the force and effect of law in the adjudicatory process. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp. , 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995). In conducting our analysis, then, we are guided pri marily by the plain meaning of the 2000 transition provisions as well a s the Forest Service’s interpretative rule. 11 However, before looking at this language, it is i mportant to-28-

distinguish the terms used to define a forest plan generally from those used to define specific projects implemented under a forestplan. This distinction is crucial because the 2000 transition provisions endo rse different standards for forest plans generally and individual projects in p articular. Thus, when the Forest Service employs the term “plan,” as in “plan amendm ents and revisions,” “plan” refers to forest plans generally. On the other han d, when the Forest Service uses the term “project” or “implementing the plan,” the term refers to individual projects. With this distinction in mind, we turn to the text. The transition provisions mandate that “[d]uring the transition period, the r esponsible official mustconsider the best available science in implementing. . . the current plan.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a) (emphasis added); cf. § 219.35(b) (“If, as of November 9, 2000, a plan revision or amendment has been initiated underthe 1982 planning regulations . . . the responsible official may complete the amendment or revision process under the 1982 regulations”) (emphasis adde d). This language is the sole direction to the Forest Service regarding project-l evel actions. Nonetheless, it leaves little doubt that the Forest Service is limi ted to consideration of the best available science when approving a project during t he transition period. The interpretative rule confirms this interpretation, s tating in no uncertain terms that “projects proposed

during the transition period should be developed c onsidering-29-

the best available science.” 69 Fed. Reg. 58,055, 58,056 (Sept. 29, 2004) (emphasis added). While it is true that interpretative rules are not legally binding on this court, an agency’s interpretation should be given substantial deference unless the interpretation is plainly erroneous. He re, the interpretative rule clearly concludes the 1982 rules are no longer applicable f or projects proposed during the transition period. Thus, any projects proposed dur ing the transition period must conform with the best available science standard se t forth in the 2000 transition provisions. While there may be many different interpretations f or the term “proposed,” under any definition we would conclude that the Sev en Mile Project was proposed during the transition period. The district ranger gave his final approval to the Project in October 2004, well within the transition period. But even if we looked to the time the Forest Service issued its first Dec ision Memorandum, that takes us back only to May 2004. To be sure, initial evaluat ion of the Project began in 1999. But this initial evaluation is irrelevant to the ultimate discretion exercised by the Forest Service. The Forest Service’s previo us two attempts to create the Seven Mile Project, first by categorical exclusion and later by environmental assessment, both unequivocally rejected by the Regi onal Forester, do not bear on the 2004 decision. Category 14 was not created unt il 2003. The Forest Service did not begin a proposal under Category 14 until Ap ril 2004. Because the agency-30-

action arose from a categorical exclusion not devel oped until 2003 and because the transition provisions were clearly in place at that time, the 1982 rules are not applicable. As a final matter, the interpretative rule would ha ve constrained the Forest Service’s conduct in this instance. The interpretative rule was issued on September 29, 2004. The final authorization of the Seven Mile Project occurred in October 2004. As the interpretative rule clarif ies, “[T]he provisions of the 1982 planning rule may continue to be used onlyfor plan amendments and
revisions upon election of the responsible official. Appropr iate plan amendments and projects proposed during the transition period should be developed considering the best available science . . . .” 69 Fed. Reg. 58,055, 58,056 (Sept. 29, 2004) (emphasis added); see 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1024 (Jan. 5, 2005) (noting that the 2002 interim rule allowed “Forest Service managers to elect to continue preparing plan amendments and revisions under the 1982 planning rule”) (emphasis added). While our court may not be bound by the interpretative rule, certainly the agency itself is. In this respect, t hen, beginning on September 29, 2004, the date the interpretative rule was issued, the Forest Service was obligated to consider the best available science, and not the 1982 rules, in its implementation of the Seven Mile Project. In otherwords, the section of the 1982 rules which imposed an obligation on the Forest Service to monitor management-31-

indicator species over the life of a project, see UEC I, 372 F.3d at 1225, simply could not have any effect as to those project-level actions taken after the interpretative rule was issued. 2. Effect of the Fishlake Forest Plan Finally, UEC argues that the Fishlake Forest Plan i ncorporated the 1982 regulations as its governing provision, as evidence d by the Forest Plan’s detailed species monitoring requirements. The 1982 regulati ons, UEC argues, must therefore be followed even if they have been subseq uently repealed or modified. We disagree. No party disputes that the Forest Plan envisions a species monitoring program for the Fishlake National Forest. It ident ifies, for example, several management indicator species and states in its “Imp lementation” chapter that the Forest Service will use “Population Trends” for man agement indicator species monitoring. However, the Forest Plan does not expl icitly require that the Forest Service comply with the monitoring requirements of the 1982 rules. Nor can such an obligation be reasonably implied. According to the Fishlake Forest Plan, it was “developed under implementing regulations of . . . Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 219 . . . .” Record of Decision for Fishlake National Forest Plan, at 1. Yet, an extensive search of the ForestPlan reveals that it does not explicitly reference or adopt § 219.19 of the 1982 rules, concerning the selection12 The Fishlake Forest Plan also recognizes that Fore st Service regulations

may change. While the Plan generally remains const ant, the regulations are fluid. “During implementation of this Forest Plan, the Fishlake will be guided b y existing and future laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines. The Forest Plan is designed to supplement, not replace, direction from these sources.” Forest Plan, at V-1 (emphasis added). -32- and monitoring of management indicator species. 12 Therefore, we cannot read the Forest Plan to adopt the 1982 rules. That is not to say, however, that the Forest Plan d oes not include some requirements related to monitoring. It does. And the Forest Service must comply with the Fishlake Forest Plan during the transition period. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (“Resource plans and permits, contracts, and other instruments for the use and occupancy of National Forest System lands s hall be consistent with the land management plans.”); Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club , 523 U.S. 726, 730 (1998) (opining that before the Forest Service can begin a project, it must “ensure that the project is consistent with the [applicable ] Plan”); see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(f) (2005) (“For units with plans . . . in effect prior to November 9, 2000, the Responsible Official may comply with any obligations relating to management indicator species by considering data and analysis relating to habitat unless the plan specifically requires population monitoring orpopulation surveys for the species.”); 69 Fed. Reg. 58,055, 58,056 (Sept. 29, 2004) (requiring “[p]rojects implementing land management plans [to] be consiste nt with the provisions of the governing plan”). But, it is only those requiremen ts that arise solely from the13 Although UEC points to UEC II for the proposition that the 1982 rules

apply, there is a principled distinction between th e two cases: the instant appellees never conceded, either in its briefs or d uring oral argument, that the 1982 rules apply. See UEC II, 439 F.3d at 1189. Nor may UEC I offer support since the question of the 1982 rules’ applicability was never raised before that court. See UEC I, 372 F.3d at 1221 n.1 (finding the 1982 regulation s applied since they were “[t]he regulations in effect at the time of the disputed Forest Service decisions in this case”). -33- Forest Plan, not from the 1982 rules, to which the Forest Service must adhere. In sum, the 1982 planning rules are not applicable to the Seven Mile Project. Instead, the Project is subject to the tr ansition provisions of the 2000 planning rules as interpreted by the Forest Service

. Accordingly, in implementing a project under the Forest Plan, the Forest Service “must consider the best available science.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a) (2001). 13 Since UEC does not argue that the Forest Service failed to consider the bestavailable science when it implemented the Seven Mile Project, we find no erro r in the district court’s order affirming the agency’s decision. C. The Fishlake Forest Plan Monitoring Program Finally, we address UEC’s challenge alleging the Fo rest Service failed to comply with the Fishlake Forest Plan because it nei ther conducted annual population trend surveys nor collected adequate pop ulation trend data for multiple management indicator species. In essence, UEC argu es that the Forest Plan requires the collection of annual population trend data as a condition precedent to the approval of the Seven Mile Project.-34-

Although conceding that individual projects must be consistent with the applicable forest plan, the Forest Service contends it was not required to monitor management indicator species as a condition precede nt to approval of the Project. It justifies this assertion with two separate argum ents: (1) a court may only review a claim of inadequate species monitoring under a fo rest plan if some relationship exists between the required monitoring and the chal lenged project; and (2) the Fishlake Forest Plan does not require data collecti on at the project-level. In any event, the Forest Service argues, the compiled popu lation trend data satisfied the monitoring obligations under the Plan. We agree with the Forest Service that monitoring of management indicator species was not a condition precedent to approval o f the Seven Mile Project. In so holding, we conclude that the Fishlake Forest Pl an does not require the application of its monitoring requirements to a cat egorically excluded project, and in any case, the Forest Service conducted MIS monit oring as set forth in the Plan. 1. Application of a Forest Plan’s Monitoring Requirements to a Categorically Excluded Project As we have already noted, our jurisdiction in this case arises under the APA, since neither NEPA nor NFMA provide UEC a priv ate cause of action. Under the APA, a case may only be ripe for review i f the federal conduct at question constitutes a final agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 704; Colo. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 220 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000).-35-

Ordinarily, a forest plan’s forest-wide monitoring program is not subject to judicial review because it does not constitute fina l agency action. Ecology Ctr.,
Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 192 F.3d 922, 925–26 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance , 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (holding that Bureau of La nd Management’s failure to implement an off-road vehic le monitoring program was not a final agency action). In limited circumstanc es, however, we may review a monitoring program to the extent it bears on the ap proval of a particular project. See Ecology Ctr. , 192 F.3d at 926 n.6 (concluding that plaintiff may “raise claims pertaining to inadequate monitoring by bringing an APA challenge to a final decision”); Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander , 303 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Of course, not all forest-wide practic es may be challenged on the coattails of a site-specific action; there must be a relationship between the lawfulness of the site-specific action and the prac tice challenged.”). In other words, if a project’s approval is conditioned upon the fulfillment of certain monitoring obligations, a plaintiff may bring a cla im of deficient monitoring. Without such a relationship, a claim of deficient m onitoring simply is not cognizable. UEC has not shown a connection between the monitori ng program and the Seven Mile Project. More fundamentally, no showing has been made that the applicable Forest Service regulations and directive s conditioned approval of the-36-

Seven Mile Project, a project proposed pursuant to a categorical exclusion, on the successful monitoring of management indicator speci es at either a forest-wide or project level. A categorical exclusion, by definition, only covers projects that will have no significant or cumulative effect on the environm ent. As such, relatively little analysis is required of the Forest Service once it determines that a project fits within the four corners of a categorical exclusion. This is because the Forest Service previously did the heavy lifting when it cr eated the categorical exclusion—it conducted an extensive environmental a nalysis and determined that any project approved under a categorical exclusion would not produce a significant or cumulative effect on the environmentin the absence of extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g. , Colo. Wild v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 435 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the Fo rest Service performed “onsite, post-implementation assessments of [the sampl e] projects’ environmental effects” in order to determine whether the proposed categorical exclusion would create a significant effect on the environment). Thus, to require monitoring, documentation, and review of population trend data for species which do not trigger an extraordinary circumstance would defeat the very purpose of the categorical exclusion. To be sure, the Fishlake Forest Plan in describing the monitoring-37-

requirements for management indicator species does not explicitly exempt categorically excluded projects from such monitorin g. However, monitoring is required only where such data is relevant. And pre -implementation monitoring of management indicator species is relevant only where population trend data is necessary to evaluate a proposed project’s actual e ffect on the environment—such as where (1) a proposed project will create a signi ficant impact on the environment, thus requiring an environmental impactstatement, or (2) a proposed project’s impact is uncertain, thus requiring an en vironmental assessment. See Forest Plan, at V-2 (noting that the monitoring pro gram assists in determining “whether the effects of implementation are as predi cted”). In contrast, monitoring is merely cumulative in the case of a categorical exclusion because the Forest Service has already pe rformed an extensive environmental analysis of representative projects t hat fall within the exclusion.
See Colo. Wild, 435 F.3d at 1210–11 (describing the Forest Servic e’s development of Category 14). The only exceptions a re those projects where extraordinary circumstances may be present. Thus, small projects amenable to a categorical exclusion—small construction projects a nd low acreage forest treatment— require monitoring of those species whic h may trigger an extraordinary circumstance. It finally should be noted the Fishlake Forest Plan itself provides that it is14 We are careful to distinguish analysis of those sp ecies which trigger

application of extraordinary circumstances under a categorical exclusion—an issue we squarely addressed and resolved in supra Part III.A.2. -38- designed to “supplement, not replace, direction” fr om “existing and future laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines.” Id. at V-1. Such is the case here: the Seven Mile Project was pre-determined to produce no significant effects on the environment and otherwise determined not to involve any extraordinary circumstances, therefore being approved pursuant to a categorical exclusion. In sum, approval of a project under a categorical e xclusion is not only meant to be analytically simple, but easy to implem ent. Consequently, neither Forest Service regulations nor the Forest Plan requ ires monitoring of management indicator species as a condition precedent to the approval of a categorically excluded project. 14 Accordingly, the Forest Service had no obligation to conform with the monitoring program set forth in the Fishla ke Forest Plan before it approved the Seven Mile Project. 2. Population Trend Data In any event, we hold that the Forest Service colle cted adequate population trend data to conclude that the Seven Mile Project could be approved pursuant to a categorical exclusion. The Forest Plan requires annual population trend monitoring of management indicator species includin g, “Bonneville Cutthroat Trout, threatened plant species, nongame species, a nd macroinvertebrates.”-39-

Forest Plan, at Table V-1. UEC alleges that the Fo rest Service has not complied with this provision in several respects, resulting in inadequate data by which to measure the Project’s effect on fish and bird speci es.

a) Aquatic Management Indicator Species First, UEC argues the Forest Service failed to coll ect population trend data for Bonneville Cutthroat Trout, macroinvertebrates, and resident trout (including brown, brook, cutthroat, rainbow, and lake trout). We disagree. Forest-wide trends for these species have been docu mented. See J.A 504 (Bonneville Cutthroat Trout); id. at 505 (resident trout); id. at 506 (macroinvertebrates); see also Fishlake National Forest Plan Monitoring and Evaluation Report (Dec. 2003) (population trend dat a covering 1977–2002). Project-level data, however, were not collected bec ause no fish-bearing streams and lakes exist within the cumulative effects area. See J.A. 510 (“No streams, lakes, or ponds present within the proposed projectarea.”).

b) Avian Management Indicator Species UEC also asserts that the Forest Service failed to collect annual population trend data for various avian species, in particularthe hairy woodpecker, western bluebird, Lincoln’s sparrow, song sparrow, Brewer’s sparrow, yellow warbler, and vesper sparrow. Again, we disagree. Population trend data for each of these management indicator species,-40-

sufficient to satisfy the Forest Service’s monitori ng obligations under the Plan, have been detailed in the Life History and Analysis of Endangered, Threatened , Candidate, Sensitive, and Management Indicator Spec ies of the Fishlake National
Forest (2004) (“Life History Report ”) as well as other documentation related to the Project. While we recognize that the Forest Se rvice did not collect annual population trend data in every instance, its data w as nonetheless ample to support the district ranger’s decision to approve the Seven Mile Project pursuant to a categorical exclusion. Hairy Woodpecker . Forest-wide population trend data is available f or the hairy woodpecker from 1968 to 1998, 2001, and 2002, showing a stable population which is “likely viable” across the Fore st. See J.A. 157–61 (Life History Report); id. at 203–08 (Cavity Nesting Study); id. at 528–29 (Environmental Assessment). Project-level data fro m 2001 is available. See id. at 205–07 (Cavity Nesting Study). Western Bluebird . Forest-wide data shows an upward trend in the we stern bluebird population, based on data collected from 1 968 to 1998, 2001, and 2002. See id. at 161–66 (Life History Report); id. at 203–08 (Cavity Nesting Study); id. at 528–29 (Environmental Assessment). Project-leve l data from 2001 is available. See id . at 205–07 (Cavity Nesting Study). Lincoln’s Sparrow . Forest-wide data shows an upward trend in the-41-

Lincoln’s sparrow population, based on data collect ed from 1968 to 1998, 2001, and 2002. See id. at 161–66 (Life History Report ); id. at 531 (Environmental Assessment); id. at 250–87 (Riparian Bird Survey). Additionally, di strict-level data from 2002 is available. See id. at 251–54, 260, 267–69, 275 (Riparian Bird Survey). However, project-level data for this spec ies has not been collected because, although the Lincoln’s sparrow may use the Seven Mile Valley area for breeding or nesting habitat during the spring and s ummer, it would not use the Project area itself. Id. at 531. Song Sparrow . Forest-wide data shows a slightly upward trend i n the song sparrow population based on data collected from 196 8 to 1998, and 2002. See id. at 177–81 (Life History Report ); id. at 531 (Environmental Assessment); id. at 250–87 (Riparian Bird Survey). Additionally, distr ict-level data from 2002 is available. See id. at 251–54, 260, 267–69, 275 (Riparian Bird Survey) . However, like the Lincoln’s sparrow, project-level data is n ot available because the song sparrow would not use the Project area for breeding and nesting. Id. at 531. Yellow Warbler . Forest-wide data shows a stable, to slightly upw ard trend in the yellow warbler population, based on data col lected from 1968 to 1998, and
2002. See id. at 182–86 (Life History Report); id. at 531 (Environmental Assessment); id. at 250-87 (Riparian Bird Survey). District-level d ata from 2002 is also available. See id. at 251–54, 260, 267–69, 275 (Riparian Bird Survey)

.-42-

However, like both the Lincoln’s sparrow and the so ng sparrow, no project-level data is available because the yellow warbler does n ot use the Project area for breeding and nesting. Id. at 531. Brewer’s Sparrow . Forest-wide data shows an upward trend in the Brewer’s sparrow population, based on data collecte d from 1968 to 1998, and
2002. See id. at 187–92 (Life History Report). However, no suitable nesting or breeding habitat is found within the Project area, and consequently no projectlevel data is available. Id. at 530 (Environmental Assessment). Vesper Sparrow . Finally, forest-wide data shows a stable or slig htly upward trend in the vesper sparrow population, base d on data collected from 1968 to 1998, and 2002. See id. at 193–97 (Life History Report). However, no suitable nesting or breeding habitat is found within the Pro ject area, and consequently no project-level data is available. Id. at 530 (Environmental Assessment). * * * Accordingly, since the Forest Plan’s monitoring obl igations are inapplicable to projects subject to categorical exc lusions such as the Seven Mile Project, and because, even if applicable, the Fores t Service collected adequate population trend data for approval of a categorical ly excluded project, UEC has failed to demonstrate the Forest Service’s approval of the Seven Mile Project is arbitrary and capricious.-43- IV. Conclusion We AFFIRM the district court’s order finding the Se ven Mile Spruce Beetle Management Project in compliance with the Administr ative Procedures Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the National Forest Management Act.