Motions for Rehearing Denied, Motion for Reconsideration En Banc 

Dismissed as Moot, and Supplemental Opinion filed December 6, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-16-00116-CV

OSAMA ABDULLATIF AND ALI MOKARAM, Appellants 

V.

ALI CHOUDHRI AND MOKARAM LATIF WEST LOOP, LTD., Appellees 

On Appeal from the 190th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2012-27197 

S U P P L E M E N T A L M A J O R I T Y O P I N I O N 

 We issue this supplemental opinion to address cases cited in appellee Ali 

Choudhri’s motion for rehearing. Finding no merit in that motion or in the motion 

for rehearing filed by appellants Osama Abdullatif and Ali Mokaram (collectively 

the “Latif Parties”), we deny these motions. These rulings render moot the Latif 

Parties’ motion for reconsideration en banc. 
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Choudhri’s Newly Cited Authority 

 In his motion for rehearing, Choudhri cites The Atrium v. Kenwin Shops of 

Crockett, Inc., a case from this court, for a holding that parties to a lease could 

ratify by their conduct a lease even after the lease had become “null and void” 

under a lease provision. See 666 S.W.2d 315, 317–18 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In its brief analysis, the Atrium court cited no case in 

support of its conclusion. See id. We presume for argument’s sake that the Atrium

court held that parties to a lease can ratify by their conduct a lease even after the 

lease has become “null and void” under a lease provision using the plain, ordinary, 

and generally accepted meaning of the phrase “null and void.” See id. 

Even under this presumption, the Atrium court’s holding does not bind this 

panel because the holding conflicts with Supreme Court of Texas precedent under 

which the plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning of the term “void” is 

“entirely null, not binding on any party, and not susceptible of ratification or 

confirmation.” See Brazzel v. Murray, 481 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. 1972) (relying 

on precedent in Murchison v. White, 54 Tex. 78, 81 (Tex. 1880) for the proposition 

that a void act is entirely null, not binding on either party, and not susceptible of 

ratification or confirmation); Rue v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 8 S.W. 533, 535 (Tex. 

1888) (stating that “[n]o acts of ratification can validate or make effective that 

which is void” in a case involving a void lease or contract); Murchison v. White, 54 

Tex. 78, 81 (Tex. 1880) (stating that “[a] void act is one entirely null within itself, 

not binding on either party, and which is not susceptible of ratification or 

confirmation. Its nullity cannot be waived.”); Cummings v. Powell, 8 Tex. 80, 85 

(Tex. 1852) (stating that “[a] void act . . . is one which is entirely null, not binding 

on either party, and not susceptible of ratification; and a voidable act is one which 

is obligatory upon others until disaffirmed by the party with whom it originated 
3

and which may be subsequently ratified or confirmed”). No panel of this court is 

bound by a prior holding of another panel if, as with Atrium, the prior holding 

conflicts with an on-point precedent from the supreme court. See Glassman v. 

Goodfriend, 347 S.W.3d 772, 781 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. 

denied) (en banc). To the extent the statements in the cited cases were not 

necessary to the supreme court’s disposition of the case, the high court made the 

statements deliberately and for future guidance in the conduct of litigation, so these 

statements constitute judicial dicta binding on this court. See Allstate County 

Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wootton, 494 S.W.3d 825, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Thus, even if the Atrium court held that the contracting 

parties can ratify by their conduct a lease after the lease had become “null and 

void” under a lease provision using the plain, ordinary, and generally accepted 

meaning of that phrase, any such holding does not bind this court. See Brazzel, 481 

S.W.2d at 803; Rue, 8 S.W. at 535; Murchison, 54 Tex. at 81; Cummings, 8 Tex. 

at 85; Glassman, 347 S.W.3d at 781; The Atrium, 666 S.W.2d at 317–18. Dutybound to follow the supreme court’s precedent, we conclude the Atrium case 

provides no basis for rehearing relief. 

In his motion for rehearing, Choudhri also cites Humble Oil & Refining 

Company v. Clark for the proposition that a void instrument can be made valid by 

adoption, ratification, or confirmation. See 87 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tex. 1935). The 

Clark case does not support this proposition. See id. In Clark, the supreme court 

presumed that a 1928 oil and gas lease was void. See id. at 472. The Clark court 

then examined whether a 1930 oil and gas lease was valid. See id. Except for a 

few changes, the language of the 1930 lease mirrored the language of the 1928 

lease, including a statement that the lease was made in 1928. See id. The lessors 

signed the second lease in 1930. See id. The supreme court determined that the 
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terms of the 1930 lease were valid, even though one part of the lease incorrectly 

recited that it was made in 1928. See id. at 473–74. The high court concluded that 

the 1930 lease’s use of the terms from the void 1928 lease did not make the 1930 

lease void. See id. at 474. The Clark court discussed a fact pattern in which one 

instrument is void and a second instrument is then validly executed to effect the 

transfer that the void instrument failed to accomplish. See id. The Clark court 

indicated that, if the part of the first instrument that made the instrument void was 

not present in the later instrument, then the latter’s use of the terms of the void 

instrument does not make the second instrument void or invalid. See id. The 

Clark court did not state that a void instrument can be made valid by adoption, 

ratification, or confirmation. See id. 

We stated on original submission that if, after October 2010, Latif and 

Mokaram both approved an assignment of all of Mokaram’s membership interest 

in Mokaram-Latif General, LLC to Choudhri, the proper course under the company 

agreement would have been to document this approval and have Mokaram execute 

another assignment document that would not be null and void ab initio. See 

Abdullatif v. Choudhri, No. 14-16-00116-CV, 2018 WL 1559995, at *14 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 30, 2018, no pet. h.). This statement is consistent 

with the Clark court’s analysis. See Clark, 87 S.W.2d at 472–74. The Clark case 

provides no reason to depart from the analysis in our original opinion or to grant 

any relief on rehearing. 

Conclusion 

In sum, we conclude that the arguments in Choudhri’s motion for rehearing 

and the arguments in the Latif Parties’ motion for rehearing lack merit. 

Accordingly, we deny these motions. And, we dismiss as moot the Latif Parties’ 
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motion for reconsideration en banc. 

 /s/ Kem Thompson Frost

 Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Busby and Wise.

(Justice Wise respectfully dissents to the Supplemental Majority Opinion for the 

reasons expressed in the Dissenting Opinion he filed in this case on March 30, 

2018. Justice Wise would grant appellants’ motion for rehearing).