alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-40513 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus REYNALDO CAMACHO-LORENZO, also known as Antonio Ramos, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. B-01-CR-574-1

-------------------- December 12, 2002 Before JOLLY, JONES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Reynaldo Camacho-Lorenzo appeals his guilty plea conviction and sentence for being found in the United States after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Camacho-Lorenzo argues that the sentencing provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are unconstitutional on their face and as applied in his case. He contends that the unconstitutional portions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 should be severed from the statute. He asks us to vacate hisNo. 02-40513 -2- conviction and sentence, reform the judgment to reflect a conviction only under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and remand his case for resentencing under that provision.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. Camacho-Lorenzo acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres , but asserts that the decision has been called into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000). He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Id. at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. The Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
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. April 19, 2018

04/19/2018
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45478

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DAMIAN MAXWELL BARBER,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2018 Unpublished Opinion No. 436

Filed: April 25, 2018

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge. 

Order relinquishing jurisdiction, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Lara E. Anderson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and LORELLO, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM 

Damian Maxwell Barber pled guilty to aggravated battery. I.C. §§ 18-903(c) and 18-

907(b). In exchange for his guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. The district court 

sentenced Barber to a unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of 

three years. The district court retained jurisdiction, and Barber was sent to participate in the rider 

program. After Barber completed his rider, the district court relinquished jurisdiction. Barber

appeals, claiming that the district court erred by refusing to grant probation. 

We note that the decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to 

relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district 
2

court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hood, 102 

Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-

97 (Ct. App. 1990). The record in this case shows that the district court properly considered the 

information before it and determined that probation was not appropriate. We hold that Barber

has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction. The 

order of the district court relinquishing jurisdiction and Barber’s sentence are affirmed.
#### Allan Greene, Appellant, v Nancy Greene, Respondent.

[655 NYS2d 400]

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by a judgment dated August 25, 1981, the plaintiff former husband appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (O’Brien, J.), dated January 26, 1996, which denied, without a hearing, his motion pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (9) (b) and § 248 to terminate his maintenance obligation in the weekly amount of $100.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff’s submissions failed to disclose a genuine question of fact as to whether the continued enforcement of the maintenance provision would create an extreme hardship for him *(see, Grimaldi v Grimaldi,*167 AD2d 443). Accordingly, the court did not err in denying his motion without a hearing. Mangano, P. J., O’Brien, Pizzuto, Goldstein and Luciano, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 10.11


 


BioRestorative
Therapies, Inc.


40
Marcus Drive, Suite One


Melville,
New York 11747


 


January
13, 2020


 


Mr.
Francisco Silva


c/o
BioRestorative Therapies, Inc.


40
Marcus Drive, Suite One


Melville,
New York 11747


 


Dear
Mr. Silva:


 


Reference
is made to the Executive Employment Agreement, dated as of May 10, 2011, between BioRestorative Therapies, Inc. (the “Company”)
and you (the “Executive”), as amended (the “Employment Agreement”). All capitalized terms used and not
defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Employment Agreement.


 


The
Company and the Executive agree that, effective with the salary payment due on January 15, 2020, the Executive’s Per Annum
Salary is $46,800. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for purposes of Section 5(b) of the Employment Agreement, the term “Salary”
shall mean $287,500.


 


Except
as amended hereby, the Employment Agreement shall continue in full force and effect in accordance with its terms.


 


	 	Very
    truly yours,
	 	 
		BioRestorative
    Therapies, Inc.
	 	 
	 	By:	                                    
	 	 	Mark Weinreb, Chief Executive Officer


 


Agreed:


 





 


	Francisco Silva
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 487 Agreed to House (ATH)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 487

Returning to the Senate S. 1030, to amend title 38, United States Code, 
to improve the Department of Veterans Affairs program of sexual trauma 
   services for veterans, to improve certain Department of Veterans 
     Affairs programs for women veterans, to extend the period of 
 entitlement to inpatient care for veterans exposed to Agent Orange or 
   ionizing radiation, to establish a hospice care pilot program, to 
    establish a rural health care clinics program, to authorize the 
    Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide per diem payments and 
construction grants to State homes for adult day health care services, 
           to establish an education debt reduction program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 21, 1994

 Mr. Gibbons submitted the following resolution; which was considered 
                             and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Returning to the Senate S. 1030, to amend title 38, United States Code, 
to improve the Department of Veterans Affairs program of sexual trauma 
   services for veterans, to improve certain Department of Veterans 
     Affairs programs for women veterans, to extend the period of 
 entitlement to inpatient care for veterans exposed to Agent Orange or 
   ionizing radiation, to establish a hospice care pilot program, to 
    establish a rural health care clinics program, to authorize the 
    Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide per diem payments and 
construction grants to State homes for adult day health care services, 
           to establish an education debt reduction program.

    Resolved, That the bill of the Senate (S. 1030) entitled the 
``Veterans Health Programs Improvement Act of 1994'', in the opinion of 
this House, contravenes the first clause of the seventh section of the 
first article of the Constitution of the United States and is an 
infringement of the privileges of this House and that such bill be 
respectfully returned to the Senate with a message communicating this 
resolution.
                                 <all>
```
(March 5, 2001)

#### Peter C. Altner, Appellant, v Louise Altner, Respondent.

[721 NYS2d 279]

—In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated January 29, 1991, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Milano, J.), dated June 5, 2000, which granted the defendant’s motion, in effect, to modify an order of the same court dated January 17, 2000, by awarding her 50% of the interest accrued on a Thrift Savings Plan.

Ordered that the order dated June 5, 2000, is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, and the order dated January 17, 2000, is reinstated.

The parties’ stipulation of settlement provided that the defendant was to receive 50% of the value of the plaintiff’s Thrift Savings Plan as of October 1990, and did not provide that she was to receive 50% of the interest which accumulated in the plan after that date. Thus, the Supreme Court erred in modifying its order to include an award of that interest (see, *McWade v McWade,*253 AD2d 798; *Twiss v Twiss,*245 AD2d 502). Bracken, Acting P. J., S. Miller, McGinity and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.2

The following certification is provided by the undersigned Chief Financial
Officer of Merchants and Manufacturers Bancorporation, Inc. on the basis of such
officer's knowledge and belief for the sole purpose of complying with 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.

CERTIFICATION

I, James C. Mroczkowski, Chief Financial Officer of Merchants and Manufacturers
Bancorporation, Inc., certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.

(1) The Annual Report of Merchants and Manufacturers Bancorporation, Inc. for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, (14 U.S.C. 78m or
78o (d)); and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Merchants and
Manufacturers Bancorporation, Inc.

         /s/ James C. Mroczkowski
         -------------------------------
         Name: James C. Mroczkowski
         Title: Chief Financial Officer
         Date: March 15, 2004

                                       46
#### LAMHOFF *v.*DANIEL.

Specific Performance — Agreement to Lease — Fraud—Equity.

Specific performance of agreement to lease, induced by misrepresentations of plaintiff’s agent, was properly denied.

On effect of mistake of fact by defendant on right to specific performance of a contract induced thereby, see annotation in 15 L. B. A. (N. S.) 81.

Appeal from Jackson; Simpson (John), J.

Submitted October 9, 1931.

(Docket No. 81, Calendar No. 35,680.)

Decided December 8, 1931.

*334Bill by Michael Lamhoff against Thomas I. Daniel and another for specific performance of an agreement to lease real estate. Decree for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

*Rosenburg & Lawrence (Frank C. Painter,*of counsel), for plaintiff.

*Reuben H. Rossman,*for defendants.

Potter, J.

Plaintiff filed, a bill for specific performance of an alleged agreement to lease made with defendants December 13, 1929. Defendants were the owners of real estate in Jackson, Michigan. The premises were leased by defendants to a tenant, Chris Tannis. Plaintiff had been a partner of Tannis, but had sold out his interest to Tannis. Plaintiff desired to get a lease of the premises. Defendants had lost their copy of the Tannis lease. Plaintiff’s agent represented to defendants the Tannis lease expired August 1, 1930. In fact it expired August 1, *1931.*Defendants relied upon the representations made by plaintiff’s agent, in making the agreement sought to be enforced. They were mistaken as to the date of the expiration of the outstanding lease. This mistake was brought about by the misrepresentations of plaintiff’s agent. Defendants were deceived thereby. Plaintiff cannot ask specific performance of a contract entered into by defendants by mistake, which mistake was induced by the false representations of plaintiff’s agent. The.trial court so held. Decree affirmed, with costs.

Butzel, C. J., and Wiest, Clark, McDonald, Sharpe, North, and Fead, JJ., concurred.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7619

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

AMOS JUNIOR SCOTT, a/k/a Crazy,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:00-cr-00069-MR-5)

Submitted: March 29, 2022 Decided: April 1, 2022

Before HARRIS, QUATTLEBAUM, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Amos Junior Scott, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Amos Junior Scott, a federal prisoner serving a life sentence, appeals the district 

court’s orders denying Scott’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for compassionate 

release, and denying reconsideration. We review a district court’s denial of a motion for 

compassionate release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 383 (2021). 

In the appealed-from orders, the district court assumed the arguments advanced by 

Scott satisfied the “extraordinary and compelling” standard under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and 

proceeded to weigh the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The court ultimately found, 

though, that the § 3553(a) factors did not countenance the grant of relief in this case. Upon 

review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s analysis. Id. at 331-32 (holding 

that, even if extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist, courts may deny 

compassionate release if § 3553(a) factors counsel against reduction). We therefore affirm 

the district court’s orders. United States v. Scott, No. 1:00-cr-00069-MR-5 (W.D.N.C. July 

26, 2021 & Oct. 26, 2021). We deny Scott’s motion to appoint counsel. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Gertrude FRITSCH, Appellant, v. Joan ROYCE, d/b/a the Royce Company, not Inc., Appellee.

No. 71-195.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 3, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 9, 1971.

James F. Pollack, Miami, for appellant.

*565David H. Zoberg, Miami, for appellee.

Before SWANN, C. J., and HENDRY and BARKDULL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on the authority of: Wiggins v. Wilson, 55 Fla. 346, 45 So. 1011 (1908); Knowles v. Henderson, 156 Fla. 31, 22 So.2d 384, 169 A.L.R. 600 (1945); MacGregor v. Hosack, Fla. 1952, 58 So.2d 513; Lindquist v. Burklew, Fla.App.1960, 123 So.2d 261; Edelstein v. Wilder, Fla.App.1967, 198 So.2d 665; Abel v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Manatee County, Fla.App.1967, 199 So.2d 295.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16A0068. JUDITH F. HURT v. SPT REAL ESTATE SUB III, LLC.

This case was docketed on September 3, 2015, and appellant’s brief and

enumeration of errors were due on September 23, 2015. On that day, appellant moved

this Court for an extension of time to file her brief, which motion was granted,

extending her time to file until October 20, 2015. Because appellant did not file a

brief and enumeration of errors before the extended deadline, this appeal is hereby

DISMISSED pursuant to Court of Appeals Rules 13 and 23. 

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

03/10/2016

March 10, 2016
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEETS AND STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-KSB FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1998.
</LEGEND>
       
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<CASH>                                          348957
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<ALLOWANCES>                                    230000
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<SALES>                                        6808489
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<CGS>                                          2208172
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  7067800
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (10352)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                365000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               15963
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (649922)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (128130)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (778052)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-7583

RONALD SMITH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus THEODIS BECK; JAMES B. FRENCH; JEANNIE LANCASTER; TED C. SMILEY, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (CA-00-537-5-2BR) Submitted: January 31, 2002 Decided: February 7, 2002 Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Ronald Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Deborrah Lynn Newton, Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Ronald Smith appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny Smith’s motion for appointment of counsel and affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Smith v. Beck , No. CA-00-537-5-2BR (E.D.N.C. July 25, 2001). We dispense withoral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED