UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. BRENDA SEYBELS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 12-4130 (D.C. No. 2:11-CR-00208-TC-2) (D. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , Circuit Judge, PORFILIO , Senior Circuit Judge, and HOLMES , Circuit Judge.
Defendant Brenda Seybels appeals the di strict court’s deni al of a motion to suppress evidence relating to a large quantity of methamphetamine found in her car after a police dog alerted to the presence of drugs during a traffic stop. Her challenge to this ruling was preserved in a conditional guilty plea of possessing with intent to distribute the methamphetamine. We affirm for the reasons explained below.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this pane l has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 7, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK The basic constitutional analysis of traffic stops is well-established: For Fourth Amendment purposes, th e legality of a traffic stop is assessed pursuant to the framework established in Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) . Accordingly, we proceed in two steps. First, we question whether the traffic stop was justified at its inception. Second, if the stop was justified, we determine whether the resulting detention was re asonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. United States v. Polly , 630 F.3d 991, 997 (10th Cir. 201 1) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and additional cita tions omitted). The second step of the inquiry, which will be our focus here, is dr iven primarily by the purpo se of the initial stop: [T]he investigative detention usua lly must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlyi ng justification. In accordance with these principles, . . . a law enforcement officer conducting a traffic stop may genera lly request a driver’s license, registration, and other required papers, run requi site computer checks, and issue citations or warnings as a ppropriate. In addition, an officer may ask questions, whether or not related to the purpose of the traffic stop, if they do not excessively pr olong the stop. However, once an officer returns the drive r’s license and registrati on, the traffic stop has ended and questioning must cease; at that point, th e driver must be free to leave. United States v. Kitchell , 653 F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Ci r.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied , 132 S. Ct. 435 (2011). Bu t “a traffic stop may be expanded beyond its original purpose if during the initial stop the detaining officer acquires reasonable suspicion of [other] criminal activity[.]” Id. In that regard, [t]o determine whether an officer has reasonabl e suspicion to detain beyond the scope of the traffic stop, we must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a- 3 - particularized and objective basi s for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Although the government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of an officer’s susp icion, reasonable suspicion is not, and is not meant to be, an onerous standard. While reasonable suspicion cannot be based upon a mere hunch, it also need not ri se to the level required for probable cause. . . . I ndeed, a factor may raise objectively reasonable suspicions even if it is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consiste nt with innocent travel. Id. at 1218-19 (internal quotation marks, al terations, and citati ons omitted). In applying these principles in a particul ar case, this court “accepts the factual findings of the district court, and its determinations of w itness credibility, unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 1215. We also view th e evidence in a light most favorable to the government. Id. at 1216 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately, however, this c ourt must review de novo the reasonableness of the government’s action under th e Fourth Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). II. THE TRAFFIC STOP On the afternoon of March 8, 2011, Ms. Seybels and Cole ne Hageman were traveling eastbound through Utah on Intersta te 70 in a Chevrolet Impala driven by Ms. Hageman. Sergeant Stev e Salas of the Utah Highway Patrol stopped the car for speeding and for having an illegal window tin t. Ms. Seybels doe s not challenge the grounds for this stop; she challe nges only its duration and scope. Sergeant Salas requested Ms. Hageman’s driver’s license and asked where the two women were coming from. Ms. Hageman gave him her license and said they had been to California to visit her passenger’s family. Sergeant Salas also requested the- 4 - vehicle registration and proof of insurance. Ms. Seybels, th e owner, said she had just purchased the car the precedi ng Friday (March 4) and had not yet registered it, explaining that she had wanted to visit he r father in Californi a. But she gave Sergeant Salas the title and an insurance card, as well as her own driver’s license for identification. The title a nd insurance card both matched the vehicle, but the title listed Crystal Gallegos as owner. Althou gh Ms. Gallegos had signed the back of the title as required for a sale, purchase info rmation including the price and buyer was not filled in. Nor did Ms. Se ybels have a bill of sale. Sergeant Salas asked her to accompany him to his patrol car, since she would be res ponsible for the window-tint violation and because he was suspicious about the title and registration. Sergeant Salas read through the two doc uments and asked Ms. Seybels about her trip and her travelling companion. Sh e replied that the driver was a friend she had known for six months, but she only knew her first name. Turn ing to her purchase of the car, she said she wa s currently unemployed but had bought the car with a tax refund so she could visit her father, leaving for California the very next day. A sheriff’s deputy arrived at the scene with a police dog, and Ms. Seybels allowed him to walk the dog around the car while Serg eant Salas began writing a warning ticket for the illegal window tint. 1 As the deputy and his dog made their way up the

1 Ms. Seybels’ permission wa s not required, as “[i]t is well-settled that a drug dog’s sniff of the outside of a car is not itself a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.” United States v. Ludwig , 641 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005)). The recent decision in Florida v. (continued)- 5 - passenger side of the car, a Chihuahua jumped out of the passenger window and approached them barking. The deputy pick ed up the Chihuahua and returned it to the car and put his own dog away. Sergeant Sa las, a narcotics can ine instructor and handler himself (with his own police dog at the scene), observed that the encounter had distracted the deputy’s dog. Sergeant Salas returned to completing the warning citation for Ms. Seybels regarding the window tinting. During this time, Ms. Seybels told him she had bought the car on Friday to travel to California, because her fa ther was having a birthday. But she also said the birthda y was not until the following week, and had no answer as to why she needed to rush to California (and return af ter such a short visit) a week beforehand—which was significant in that sh e had cited that rush to explain why she had not registered the vehicl e. Sergeant Salas also he ard from dispatch, confirming that the car was not reporte d stolen but was registered to Crystal Gallegos. We pause to note that Sergeant Salas’s actions up to this point were clearly consistent with Fourth Amendment standards. First of all, Ms. Seybels was rightfully detained while Sergeant Salas “was in th e process of writing the warning ticket” for the window-tint violation, and it was entirel y proper to question her about her travel plans during this interval. United States v. Villa , 589 F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir. 2009). Second, the lack of a vehicle regist ration and the incompleteness of the title
Jardines , 2013 WL 1196577 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2013) , that entry onto a home’s curtilage to conduct a dog sniff is a se arch, was based on property rights not implicated in the traffic stop context and, hence, did not undermine Caballes , see id. at *6.- 6 - provided objective grounds for inquiring fu rther about ownership of the car—which Sergeant Salas did both by engaging Ms. Se ybels in conversation and by asking dispatch to run a stolen-vehicle check. We have repeatedly noted a “‘recurring factor supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion . . . is th e inability of a defendant to provide proof that he is entitled to ope rate the vehicle he is driving.’” United States v. Villa-Chaparro , 115 F.3d 797, 802 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma , 14 F.3d 1479, 1484 (10th Cir. 1994)); see also United States v. Ludwig , 641 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 2011). But Ms. Seybels contends that thereaf ter, once Sergeant Sa las completed the warning ticket, there was no legitimate basis for detain ing and questioning her any longer in light of the negative dog sniff a nd the response from dispatch indicating the car was not stolen, yet (while he claimed to be having trouble pr inting the warning) he continued to ask her questions about the purchase of the car. In particular, he asked whether someone else had bought the car for her or helped her to buy it, which she denied in a voice he described as very , very low or quiet. After printing the warning and giving it to Ms. Seybels along w ith her license, title, and insurance card, he asked her to remain in the patrol car while he spoke with Ms . Hageman, whom he had said would get a verbal warning for sp eeding. Like Ms. Se ybels, Ms. Hageman did not appear to know the la st name of her traveling co mpanion—at l east she said she could not pronounce or spel l it. In addition, some of her answers did not match what Ms. Seybels had told Sergeant Salas, including how long the women had known- 7 - each other. Sergeant Salas re turned to the patrol car a nd, after a brief exchange, asked Ms. Seybels for permission to search her vehicle, wh ich she refused. He then brought out his own dog to conduct a second drug sniff of the car. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, providing probable cause for a search that u ltimately led to the hidden cache of methamphetamine suppor ting Ms. Seybels’ conviction. III. REASONABLE SUSPICIO N FOR PROLONGED DETENTION Ms. Seybels argues that the stop becam e illegal when, having completed the warning ticket, Sergeant Salas needed but lacked reasonable suspicion to detain her any longer. We direct our reasonable-suspic ion analysis accordi ngly, and thus do not consider information gleaned by Sergeant Salas only after his fu rther questioning of the two suspects. Two major premises of Ms. Seybels’ argument are that th e first dog sniff dissipated any reasonable suspic ion of drugs being in the car and the response from dispatch dissipated any reasona ble suspicion that the car was stolen. The district court noted, however, that the probative eff ect of the first dog sniff was negated by the circumstances surroundi ng it, while the response fr om dispatch, though it may have reduced suspicions of car theft, did not dissipate susp icions that the vehicle was conveying contraband: Neither of these events was determ inative [of a lack of reasonable suspicion]. First, Sergeant Salas testified that from his training and experience as a dog handl er, he could tell that the first dog had been distracted by the Chihuahua. This le d him to believe th at the sniff was not reliable [and hence did not dissipa te reasonable suspicion about the presence of drugs]. Second, the res ponse from dispatch did not indicate- 8 - that Ms. Seybels owned the car, only that it was registered to Crystal Gallegos and not reported stolen. Se rgeant Salas testif ied that, in his experience, people hauling contraband are usually hired to do so and are usually given a car that is not registered in th eir names. R. Vol. 1 at 222. These are matters of fact and credibility, a nd we see no basis for rejecting them as clearly erroneous. W ith this understanding of the relevance and effect of the first dog sniff a nd dispatch’s response regardi ng the status of the car, we now consider de novo the overarching que stion whether “the totality of the circumstances” show that Sergeant Salas ha d “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing” when he con tinued to detain Ms. Seybels and her companion for questioning and to conduct th e second dog sniff of the car for drugs. Kitchell , 653 F.3d at 1218-19 (interna l quotation marks omitted). The district court cited a number of fa ctors supporting reasonable suspicion. We deem the following facts particularly probative. Fi rst, Ms. Seybels lacked registration and proper title to the car, which as explained by Sergeant Salas is indicative not only of potentia l theft but of persons hi red to transport drugs. See also Ludwig , 641 F.3d at 1249 (“[D]riving a vehicle re gistered to a third party who wasn’t present . . . is a factor we have often held may indicate a stolen vehicle or drug trafficking .” (emphasis added, internal quotati on marks and alterations omitted)). Second, Ms. Seybels did not even know th e last name of her purported friend and travelling companion, “a circumstance that quite reasonably rais ed . . . a suspicion that the two [traveling companions] had not taken a vacation . . . but had come together for a brief, illegal bus iness [i.e., drug] transaction,” United States v. Hardy ,- 9 - 855 F.2d 753, 758 (11th Cir. 1988). See also United States v. Sanchez , 417 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting “fact that [defendant] did not know [her driving companion’s] last name ev en though she claimed to ha ve known him for almost a year” as factor supporting re asonable suspicion to support de tention for drug sniff of vehicle). Third, Ms. Seybe ls’ explanation of her trav el itinerary was facially implausible. See United States v. Davis , 636 F.3d 1281, 1291 (10th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases holding that implausible tr avel plans, or implausible explanations for such plans, can contribut e to reasonable suspicion). While it is true that take n individually such facts coul d well be consistent with innocent activity, we have repeatedly recogni zed that, considered in the totality of relevant circumstances, “‘[a ] factor may raise objectively reasonable suspicions even if it is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is qu ite consistent with innocent travel.’” Kitchell , 653 F.3d at 1219 (quoting United States v. White , 584 F.3d 935, 950 (10th Cir. 2009) (further quot ations omitted)). “[P]ol ice need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct, ” as “[r]easonable suspici on may exist even where it might be more likely than not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.” United States v. Guardado , 699 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Ci r. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). And “[w]hen making our assessment [of reas onable suspicion], deference is to be accorded a law enfo rcement’s ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.” United States v. Jones , 701 F.3d 1300, 1316 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Th e circumstances cited above,- 10 - which collectively converge on a reasona ble suspicion that Ms. Seybels was transporting drugs, justified Sergeant Salas in further detaining her for the short time it took to briefly question her companion and conduct the second, uninterrupted, dog sniff around the vehicle which resulted in th e discovery of drugs. Accordingly, we conclude that her motion to suppress was properly denied. The judgment of the dist rict court is affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Jerome A. Holmes Circuit Judge