alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED THEATRES OF FLORIDA, INC., d/b/a United Mini-Adult Theatre, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Florida ex rel. Richard E. GERSTEIN, as State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-1000.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 29, 1972.

Rehearing Denied March 15, 1972.

*216Joel Hirschhorn, Miami, for appellants.

Richard E. Gerstein, State Atty., and Milton Robbins and Norman K. Schwarz, Asst. State Attys., for appellee.

Before SWANN, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendants have appealed from a final judgment enjoining the showing of certain moving picture films found by the trial court to be obscene. Assigned as error also was a separate contempt order. Upon consideration of the contentions of the appellants in the light of the record, briefs and argument we conclude no basis in law has been shown for reversal on the final judgment, and the same is hereby affirmed, but is modified to limit the injunction contained therein, against the showing of moving picture films, to the area within the territorial limits of the circuit court of Dade County.

The order adjudging individuals in contempt is reversed. Error was conceded by appellant as to the order holding officials of the defendant corporation in contempt. The order holding the employee (theatre cashier) Celia Winesette in contempt is reversed. The order of the court that was charged to have been violated by her, and which was the basis for the contempt order, was void because entered during a period when the court did not have jurisdiction of the cause, while it was pending in the United States District Court on proceedings for removal from the state court, and prior to its remand therefrom to the Dade County circuit court. Celia Winesette, an employee at the theatre, was the person upon whom was served the subpoena or order to produce which had been issued against the defendant corporation. The order did not specify or require that Winesette personally appear before the court, and the officer who served it by delivering it to her, advised her it did not require her appearance.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

SWANN, Chief Judge

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion and decision which holds that a Circuit Court may not enjoin the showing of obscene films at any public place in the State of Florida. My reasons are set forth in United Theaters of Florida, Inc. v. State of Florida ex rel. Gerstein, Fla.App., 259 So.2d 210, released on the 15th day of February, 1972.
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1094

To amend section 1710 of title 38, United States Code, to extend the

period of eligibility of certain veterans for medical care for exposure

to dioxin or ionizing radiation.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 10, 1993

Mr. DASCHLE (for himself, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. DECONCINI, and

Mr. KERREY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and

referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs

A BILL

To amend section 1710 of title 38, United States Code,

to extend the period of eligibility of certain veterans

for medical care for exposure to dioxin or ionizing

radiation.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF PERIOD OF ELIGIBILITY FOR

4 CARE.

5 Section 1710(e)(3) of title 38, United States Code,

6 is amended by striking out ‘‘December 31, 1993’’ and in7 serting in lieu thereof ‘‘December 31, 2003’’.

Æ
Consent of Independent Auditors

The Board of Directors
Analytical Surveys, Inc.:

We  consent  to  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  registration  statements
(No. 33-24142,  No. 33-33948,  No. 33-53950, and No. 33-59940) on Form 10-KSB of
Analytical  Surveys,  Inc. of our report dated November 1, 1996, relating to the
balance  sheets of Analytical  Surveys,  Inc. and subsidiary as of September 30,
1996  and  1995,  and  the  related   consolidated   statements  of  operations,
stockholders'  equity,  and cash  flows for the years then  ended  which  report
appears in the  September  30, 1996 Annual  Report on Form 10-KSB of  Analytical
Surveys, Inc.

/s/ KPMG Peat Marwick LLP
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

Denver, Colorado
December 11, 1996
#### Ben SILVER, Appellant, v. Joan SILVER, Appellee.

No. 67-772.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Sept. 22, 1967.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed
#### LEVIN LANK vs. KINDER & HORSEY, executors of Horsey.

One of several executors may enter into an amicable action and submit to arbitration so as to bind the estate.

Rule to show cause why an award should not be set aside.

Nathaniel Horsey, together with Owens Kinder, were administrators of Josiah C. Horsey, deceased; and Kinder entered into an amicable action with Levin Lank, at the suit of said Lank vs. Kinder and Horsey, as administrators of Josiah Horsey, and the arbitrators reported a sum due to plaintiff of $63.

On which *Wootten,*for the administrator, Horsey,

who was also a *458creditor, obtained a rule to show cause why the award should not be set aside, as the submission was without his authority.

*McFee,*for plaintiff.

*Wootten,*for defendant.

*McFee*

showed cause and cited (Wms. *Ex’rs.*620-1.) Co-executors are regarded as one, and the act of one binds all, &c. (2 *Leigh's N. P.*981.)

Rule discharged.
Exhibit 31.1 SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION  I, Edwin G. Marshall, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this annual report of Medizone International, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2006;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The small business issuers other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have: (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and (c) disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuers most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuers fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The small business issuers other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuers auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuers board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer=s internal control over financial reporting.  Date: May 29, 2008  /s/Edwin G. Marshall Edwin G. Marshall, Principal Executive Officer
#### STATE ex rel. Gerald Joseph CARUSIELLO v. WAINWRIGHT.

No. 38655.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 1969.

Habeas corpus denied without opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

DAVID KURT SPEARS, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-2720 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed February 7, 2018. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Pat Siracusa, Judge. David Kurt Spears, pro se.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
LaROSE, C.J., and SILBERMAN and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Brooktrout, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Eric R. Giler, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|Dated: March 9, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/ ERIC R. GILEREric R. Giler President
(Principal Executive Officer)
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------

---

QuickLinks
#### Max Wadler, Respondent, *v.*David Karpel, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

December, 1912.)

Appeal—order opening default — dismissal of.

No appeal lies in the first instance from an order opening a default.

Where defendant was not in court on the day to which the case had been peremptorily adjourned, and presented no legal excuse for having the case held, an appeal from an order opening his default on conditions which he considers too pnerous will be dismissed, and a day set for the trial of the case, provided he previously complies with the conditions of said order.

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, borough of Manhattan, second district, granting a motion to vacate and set aside a judgment taken by default in favor of the plaintiff upon certain terms.

Hathan D. Shapiro, for appellant.

Joseph Cans, for respondent.

Lehman, J.

The plaintiff has recovered a judgment against the defendant by default. The defendant then moved to vacate the judgment, and for leave to open his default. The trial judge granted the motion to open his default-upon conditions which the defendant considers too onerous. These conditions were entirely within the discretion of the court. The defendant was not in court when the case was called, although it had been adjourned “ peremptorily ” for trial on that day; nor did he present any legal excuse, either under the rules prevailing in courts of record or in the Municipal Court, entitling him to have the case held to await his engagements. In such a case, we have no right to interfere with the terms imposed by the court below. However, in any case, the defendant has no right to appeal from these terms, for no appeal lies in the first instance from an order *377opening a default. Benvenuta, v. Candeloro, 43 Misc. Rep. 684.

It is true that we have held that, where an order opens a default upon conditions with which the defendant fails to comply after the time has expired in which these conditions may be complied with, it becomes self-operative as an order denying the motion to open the default, and an appeal lies from the order. Goldstein v. Frumkes, 74 Misc. Rep. 450.

In this case, however, the defendant still regards the order as one opening his default upon conditions, for he urges that we should not consider the merits of the defense, for this has already been passed upon in his favor when his default was opened, and he further alleges that, if we feel that the order should be affirmed, we should set a day for trial and preserve his.rights to comply with the conditions of the order.

The appeal should, therefore, be dismissed, with ten dollars costs, and a day set for trial, provided the defendant previously complies with the conditions of the order.

Page and Hotchkiss, JJ., concur.

Appeal dismissed, with ten dollars costs.
#### Elza BARKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. O-275.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 23, 1971.

*685Elza Barks, in pro. per., for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

The briefs and the record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court hereby appealed is affirmed.

WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., and RAWLS, JJ., concur.
Deny and Opinion Filed March 19, 2015 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00276-CV 

IN RE PETER BEASLEY, Relator 

Original Proceeding from the 192nd Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-13-13433 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Stoddart, and Whitehill 

Opinion by Justice Whitehill 

Relator filed this petition for writ of mandamus contending that the trial court abused its 

discretion in allowing real party in interest to withdraw deemed admissions and in continuing a 

hearing on a motion for summary judgment to allow real party in interest to conduct discovery. 

Ordinarily, to obtain mandamus relief, a relator must show both that the trial court has clearly 

abused its discretion and that relator has no adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. 

Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). Relator has not met those 

requirements. We deny the petition. 

150276F.P05 /Bill Whitehill/ 

BILL WHITEHILL 

JUSTICE
# C_2023063EN.01004101.xml

| 20.2.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 63/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.2.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 63/41

---

Judgment of the General Court of 14 December 2022 — Vanhoudt v EIB

(Case T-490/21) (1)

(Civil service - EIB staff - Recruitment - Vacancy notice - Rejection of application - Appointment of another candidate - Obligation to state reasons - Irregularity in the recruitment procedure - Manifest error of assessment - Liability)

(2023/C 63/51)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Patrick Vanhoudt (Gonderange, Luxembourg) (represented by: L. Levi and A. Champetier, lawyers)

Defendant: European Investment Bank (represented by: T. Gilliams, G. Faedo and K. Carr, acting as Agents, and A. Dal Ferro, lawyer)

Re:

By his action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the applicant seeks, first, annulment of the decision of the European Investment Bank (EIB) of 16 December 2020, by which it rejected his application for a position at level 6/5-D/E, and of the decision by which the EIB appointed the successful candidate to that position, and, second, compensation for the harm which he claims to have suffered as a result of those decisions.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mr Patrick Vanhoudt to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr Patrick Vanhoudt to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 422, 18.10.2021.

---
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Evergreen Solar, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended April 2, 2005 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard M. Feldt,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Richard M. Feldt
-----------------------------
Richard M. Feldt
Chief Executive Officer
November 15, 2005
II 

Calendar No. 77 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1004 

To permit voluntary economic activity. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 21, 2013 

Mr. PAUL introduced the following bill; which was read the first time 

MAY 22, 2013 

Read the second time and placed on the calendar 

A BILL 

To permit voluntary economic activity. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Anti-Trust Freedom 

5 Act of 2013’’. 

6 SEC. 2. VOLUNTARY ECONOMIC COORDINATION BY INDI7 VIDUALS. 

8 The Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), the Clayton 

9 Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.), and section 5 of the Federal 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1004 PCS

1 Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) shall not be con2 strued to prohibit, ban, or otherwise extend to any vol3 untary economic coordination, cooperation, agreement, or 

4 other association, compact, contract, or covenant entered 

5 into by or between any individual or group of individuals. 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS

rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 77 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1004 

A BILL 

To permit voluntary economic activity. 

MAY 22, 2013 

Read the second time and placed on the calendar 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1184

To limit the amount of indirect costs that may be incurred in conducting

federally sponsored university research and development to 50 percent

of the modified total direct costs related to such research and development.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 30, 1993

Mr. BROWN (for himself, Mr. GRASSLEY, and Mr. NICKLES) introduced the

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

Governmental Affairs

A BILL

To limit the amount of indirect costs that may be incurred

in conducting federally sponsored university research and

development to 50 percent of the modified total direct

costs related to such research and development.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON INDIRECT COSTS INCURRED IN

4 FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH.

5 (a) LIMITATION.—Notwithstanding any other provi6 sion of law, on and after the date of the enactment of

7 this Act, each head of a Federal agency making a grant
2

•S 1184 IS

1 to, or entering into a contract with, an institution of high2 er education for research and development, shall condition

3 such grant or contract on a requirement that the institu4 tion not use such grant or contract funds to pay for those

5 indirect costs related to such research and development

6 which exceed the amount equal to 50 percent of the modi7 fied total direct costs that are incurred by such institution

8 for such research and development.

9 (b) DEFINITIONS.—For the purpose of this section—

10 (1) the term ‘‘indirect costs’’ means administra11 tive costs and the costs of library and student serv12 ices, building and equipment, and operations and

13 maintenance;

14 (2) the term ‘‘institution of higher education’’

15 has the same meaning given to such term by section

16 1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965;

17 (3) the term ‘‘Federal agency’’ means each de18 partment, agency or instrumentality of the Federal

19 Government, including an executive agency as de20 fined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code;

21 and

22 (4) the term ‘‘modified total direct costs’’

23 means the costs of—

24 (A) salaries and wages;

25 (B) fringe benefits;
3

•S 1184 IS

1 (C) materials, supplies, services and travel;

2 and

3 (D) awarding a subgrant to, or entering

4 into a subcontract for, not more than $25,000.

Æ
#### Jeffrey H. VAN POYCK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-1129.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 29, 1974.

Jeffrey Van Poyck, in pro per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and CARROLL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This court, proceeding in the manner outlined and recommended by the Supreme *531Court of the United States in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, having deferred ruling on a motion of the public defender to withdraw as counsel for the indigent defendant-appellant, and having furnished appellant with a copy of the public defender’s memorandum brief, and having allowed the appellant a reasonable specified time within which to raise any points that he chose in support of this appeal, and the appellant having filed his response thereto, on consideration thereof upon full examination of the proceedings we conclude that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Whereupon, the public defender’s said motion -to withdraw is granted, and the order or judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.
C2DEC14fl7STATEOFDELAWAREDEPARTMENTOFNATURALRESOURCESANDENVIRONMENTALCONTROLOFFICEOFTHE89KINGSHIGHWAYPHONE:(302)739-9000SECRETARYDOVER,DELAWARE19901FAX:(302)739-6242December13,2007RECEIVEDMr.DonaldS.Welsh(3RAOO)RegionalAdministratorU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgencyRegionIII.1650ArchStreetnliftniiL’(iJ1JJ)Philadelphia,PA19103-2029DearMr.Welsh:IampleasedtosubmittheenclosedrevisiontotheStateofDelawareStateImplementationPlan(SIP)fortheAttainmentandMaintenanceoftheNationalAmbientAirQualityStandardsforOzone,FineParticulateMatter(“PM2.5”),andVisibility.ThepurposeoftheSIPrevisionistodetailhowDelawaremeetsallofthenecessaryimplementation,maintenance,andenforcementmeasuresrequiredbyCleanAirAct(“CAA”)§110(a)(2).TheeffectivedateofthisrevisionisDecember13,2007.InthisSIPrevisionDelawareaddressesthoserequirementsofSection110(a)(2)(A)-(M)oftheCAAwhichhavenotbeenspecificallyaddressedinotherSIPrevisions.ItisacompilationofcertainelementsthatdescribehowDelawaredemonstrateshowtheeight-hourozoneandinsomecasesthefineparticulate(PM25)NAAQSarebeingimplemented,maintainedandenforced.TheelementsofthisSIPrevision,onceapprovedbyEPA,willprovideafederallyenforceablewrittenconfirmationofhowDelawarewillcontinuetocomplywiththeSection110(a)(2)requirementsoftheCAA.TherequirementsoftheCAASection110(a)(2)(’A)havebeenmetthroughthenormalpublichearingprocessestablishedbytheStateofDelawarewithpropernotification(30days)priortotheconveningofthepublichearing.ApublichearingwasheldonDecember12,2007.AttachmentsAandBarecopiesofaffidavitsasproofofpropernotification.ItisthepositionoftheStateofDelawarethatallminimumrequirementssetforthinthe1990CleanAirActAmendmentshavebeenmet.De€awvietaztzedefte’td4otMr.DonaldWelshDecember13,2007Page#2CWelookforwardtocontinuingthecooperativeeffortbetweenDelawareandEPAinthisimportantwork.Asalways,feelfreetocontactmeorAuMirzakhalili,ProgramAdministrator,(302)739-9402,ifyouhaveanyquestionsconcerningtheencloseddocuments.cc:JudyKatz,EPAw/encl.DaveArnold,EPAw/encl.AuMirzakhaliliJohnA.HughesSecretary