[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-13277

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-23081-JAL

ROCHELLE DRIESSEN, 

Mother of Minor Children B.O. D/O/B 1993

and B.O. D/O/B 1994,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BAMBI LOCKMAN, 

Bureau Chief, 

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 

BUREAU OF EXCEPTIONAL EDUCATION

AND STUDENT SERVICES, 

STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS,

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(May 10, 2013)

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Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Rochelle Driessen, plaintiff below and appellant here, appeals the judgment 

the District Court entered pursuant to its order granting the appellee defendants’

motions to dismiss her pro se complaint filed on behalf of herself and her two 

minor daughters, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 

(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 

1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. In her complaint, Driessen alleged that the defendants, 

which also included the U.S. Department of Education, had failed to provide a free 

and appropriate public education to one of her daughters, and that they had denied 

her access to her children’s education records. 

Prior to bringing this action, a Florida circuit court adjudicated Driessen’s 

father the children’s permanent legal guardian, with the express right to make all 

educational decisions for the children. In light of this decision, the District Court 

dismissed Driessen’s complaint on the grounds that she lacked standing to 

prosecute it: (1) as a non-custodial parent without the authority to make 

educational decisions for her children, she could not bring the claims on behalf of 

herself; and (2) she could not bring the claims on behalf of her children. 

In her brief on appeal, Driessen argues, among other things, that the District 

Court failed to entertain on the merits her claim that the defendants failed to 

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comply with the procedural requirements of the IDEA; since the court had 

jurisdiction under the IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act, it should have decided her 

claim. Her brief fails, however, to address the District Court’s dismissal of her 

complaint on the two grounds indicated above. Though we normally would treat 

as abandoned any argument she could make regarding those grounds, see Timson 

v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a pro se plaintiff 

abandons any issues not raised on appeal), given her pro se status, we address 

them. 

We review de novo the dismissal of a case for lack of standing. Stalley ex 

rel. United States v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th 

Cir. 2008). Under the IDEA, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision 

made under subsection (f) or (k) who does not have the right to an appeal under 

subsection (g), and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under 

this subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil action . . . .” 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(i)(2)(A). Subsection (f) requires that “the parents or the local educational 

agency” involved in a due-process complaint have the opportunity for an impartial 

due-process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). Subsection (k) provides that the 

“parent of a child with a disability who disagrees with any decision regarding 

placement, or the manifestation determination under this subsection, . . . may 

request a hearing.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)(A). 

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Regulations promulgated by the DOE define a parent, inter alia, as a 

“guardian generally authorized to act as the child’s parent, or authorized to make 

educational decisions for the child.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(a)(3). Moreover, if a 

judicial decree identifies a specific person to act as the parent of a child “or to 

make educational decisions on behalf of a child, then such person or persons shall 

be determined to be the ‘parent.’” Id. § 300.30(b)(2). Under Florida law, the term 

“parent” does not include “an individual whose parental relationship to the child 

has been legally terminated.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.01(49). Florida law also 

provides that the phrase “[p]ermanent guardianship of a dependent child” indicates 

that the court has transferred the parental rights “with respect to the child relating 

to protection, education, care and control of the person, custody of the person, and 

decisionmaking on behalf of the child.” Id. § 39.01(55).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, parties in federal courts are permitted to 

“plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. 

Nevertheless, a parent may not bring a pro se action in federal court on behalf of a 

child who was denied relief in an administrative hearing held under the IDEA. 

Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 581-82 (11th Cir. 1997), 

overruled in part on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City 

Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535, 127 S.Ct. 1994, 2006-07, 167 L.Ed.2d 904 (2007) 

(holding that parents have separately enforceable rights under the IDEA and, thus, 

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declining to reach the question of whether parents may litigate their children’s 

claims pro se). 

The District Court properly dismissed Driessen’s complaint because, at the 

time she filed it, she was not a “parent” under federal law and thus did not have the 

authority to make educational decisions on behalf of her children under state law. 

In short, she lacked standing to bring this lawsuit.

AFFIRMED.

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