alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION





PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(18 U.S.C. 1350)





Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of (18 U.S.C. 1350), the undersigned officer of Earth Search Sciences, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify, to the best of such officer's knowledge and belief, that:





(1) The Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended March 31, 2011 (the "Form 10-K") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all materials respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: July 14, 2011/s/Tami StoryTami Story, Secretary Treasurer





This certification shall not be deemed "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section. Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act or the Securities Exchange Act.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

NO. CAAP-22-0000693

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I

STATE OF HAWAI I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

SHANNON KAINOA RYSER KEALA, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT

KONA DIVISION

(CASE NO. 3DTC-22-061452)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL FOR LACK OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION

(By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Wadsworth and Chan, JJ.)

Upon review of the record, it appears that DefendantAppellant Shannon Ryser, a.k.a., Shannon Kainoa Ryser Keala

(Ryser) appeals from the District Court of the Third Circuit's

(district court) October 20, 2022 Judgment and Notice of Entry of

Judgment, which dismissed one of three charges in this case,

October 20, 2022 Order and Notice of Entry of Order, which

ordered Ryser to return to court for a pre-trial conference, or

from the purported "final judgment" of the district court's

"claim of personal jurisdiction" over Ryser. We conclude that

the court lacks appellate jurisdiction because the district court

has not entered a final decision or a final judgment. Hawaii

Revised Statutes § 641-12 (2016); State v. Nicol, 140 Hawai i

482, 490, 403 P.3d 259, 267(2017). 

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-22-0000693

11-JAN-2023

07:49 AM

Dkt. 22 ODSLJ
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is

dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai i, January 11, 2023.

/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza

Chief Judge

/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth

Associate Judge

/s/ Derrick H.M. Chan

Associate Judge

2
# C_2021368EN.01001202.xml

| 13.9.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 368/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.9.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 368/12

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 14 July 2021 — European arrest warrant issued against HM; other party to the proceedings: Openbaar Ministerie

(Case C-428/21)

(2021/C 368/12)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

European arrest warrant issued against: HM

Other party to the proceedings: Openbaar Ministerie

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Article 27(3)(g) and (4) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (1) read in the light of the right to effective judicial protection, be interpreted as meaning that:






  — | a surrendered person must be able to exercise his or her right to be heard in relation to a request for an extension of the offences in the issuing Member State when a judicial authority of that Member State grants him or her a hearing relating to the possible renunciation of the entitlement to the speciality rule as referred to in Article 27(3)(f) of the Framework Decision, or |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Must Article 27(3)(g) and (4) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (1) read in the light of the right to effective judicial protection, be interpreted as meaning that:

—

a surrendered person must be able to exercise his or her right to be heard in relation to a request for an extension of the offences in the issuing Member State when a judicial authority of that Member State grants him or her a hearing relating to the possible renunciation of the entitlement to the speciality rule as referred to in Article 27(3)(f) of the Framework Decision, or

| — | must that person be able to exercise his or her right to be heard in the Member State which previously surrendered him or her to the executing judicial authority in the proceedings relating to the request for consent to extend the offences? |
| --- | --- |

—

must that person be able to exercise his or her right to be heard in the Member State which previously surrendered him or her to the executing judicial authority in the proceedings relating to the request for consent to extend the offences?

| 2. | If a surrendered person must be able to exercise his or her right to be heard in relation to the decision on a request for consent to extend the offences, as referred to in Article 27(4) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, in the Member State which previously surrendered him or her, in what way must that Member State enable him or her to do so? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If a surrendered person must be able to exercise his or her right to be heard in relation to the decision on a request for consent to extend the offences, as referred to in Article 27(4) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, in the Member State which previously surrendered him or her, in what way must that Member State enable him or her to do so?

---

(1)  Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).

---
#### CITY NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI, Miami, Florida, and John O. McNamara, Petitioners, v. The Honorable Joe EASTHOPE, County Judge, County Judges’ Court in and for Broward County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 70-327.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 27, 1970.

Mandamus denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Carl R. CRAIG.

No. 61298.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 19, 1978.

Alton T. Moran, Director, Allen J. Ber-geron, Jr., App. Counsel, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Marilyn C. Castle, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was charged by bill of information with the crime of simple burglary, La.R.S. 14:62. After waiving trial by jury defendant was found guilty as charged and sentenced as a multiple offender to serve nine years at hard labor. On appeal he relies on six assignments of error for reversal of his conviction and sentence, five of which were not briefed or argued.

We have reviewed the record and find no merit in defendant’s assignment of error which was briefed and argued. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of ViroPharma Incorporated (the Company) on Form
10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned officers of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as
adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ Vincent J. Milano                
|Vincent J. Milano                    
|President and Chief Executive Officer
|October 27, 2008                     
|                                     
|/s/ Charles A. Rowland, Jr.          
|Charles A. Rowland, Jr.              
|Chief Financial Officer              
|October 27, 2008
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-51181 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MIGUEL VALENZUELA-GONZALEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. EP-00-CR-1165-ALL-H

- - - - - - - - - - June 15, 2001 Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Miguel Valenzuela-Gonzalez appeals his sentence following his guilty plea conviction for illegal re-entry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Valenzuela argues that his sentence should not have exceeded the two-year maximum sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Valenzuela acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue for SupremeNo. 00-51181 - 2 - Court review in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres

. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 1214 (2001). Valenzuela’s argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres , 523 U.S. at 235. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that the judgment of the district court be affirmed and that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is granted. AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                             487
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                           5,446
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (2,585)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   3,348
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           45,333
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            80
<OTHER-SE>                                    (42,065)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     3,348
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 4,517
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  113,550
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,069
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (117,102)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (117,102)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (117,102)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.01)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         51
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  3833
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               23913
<PP&E>                                         2382
<DEPRECIATION>                                 1191
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 85104
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          2074823
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       1380357
<OTHER-SE>                                     (3390634)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   85104
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               618584
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             51873
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (670457)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (670457)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (670457)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.01)



</TABLE>
#### Kenneth Charles BROCHU, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 0-205.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 29, 1972.

Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

RAWLS, Judge.

By this appeal, appellant Brochu challenges judgments of conviction for three counts of robbery, the unauthorized use of a vehicle, and escape. Pursuant to the judgments of conviction. Brochu was sentenced to three concurrent 30-year sentences for the three counts of robbery, six months for the unauthorized use of a vehicle, and two years for the escape.

The sole error in this appeal lies with the insufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment of conviction of escape as the State failed to prove that the defendant was a prisoner in custody serving a sentence.

Florida Statute § 944.40 (1969), F.S.A. was the controlling statute in force at the time Brochu was put to trial on the charge of escape. The subject statute provided as follows:

> “Escapes; *penalty.*— Any *prisoner*
>       *1*
>       *confined in any prison, jail, road camp, or other penal institution,*state, county or municipal, working upon the public roads, or being transported to or from a place of confinement who escapes or attempts to escape from such confinement shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than 10 years. The punishment of imprisonment imposed under this section shall run consecutive to any former sentence imposed upon any prisoner.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The cited statutes 2 establish without contradiction that an essential element of the crime of escape was proof that the person charged had been convicted and sentenced to a state prison, prison farn^ or penitentiary, or to the custody of the division, *287as provided by law. In the instant case such proof was wholly lacking on the part of the State and thus the conviction must be set aside. It is uncontroverted that Brochu escaped from the Volusia County Convict Camp, but it is likewise uncontro-verted that the State never established that he was a prisoner “convicted and sentenced” in accordance with the law of this sovereign at the time he departed from the confines of the camp.

The judgments of conviction and sentences of three counts of robbery, and the unauthorized use of a vehicle are affirmed. The judgment of conviction and sentence of two years for the crime of escape is set aside.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

SPECTOR, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concur.

. The term “prisoner” as used in F.S. § 944.40 (1969), F.S.A. was defined by the provisions of F.S. § 944.02(!5) (1909), F.S.A., viz.:

> “(5) ‘Prisoner’ means any person convicted and sentenced by the courts and committed to the state prison, prison farm, or penitentiary, or to the custody of the division, ns provided by law.”

. We note that F.S. §§ 944.40 and 944.02 (5) were amended in 1971, but as amended are not applicable to the instant cause.
#### BUCKRESS LAND CO., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., and City of Opa Locka, a municipal corporation of Florida et al., Appellees.

No. 68-158.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 4, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### ROYLE, Labor Commissioner of Nevada, v. WARD et al.

No. 8201.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Feb. 8, 1937.

The settlement agreement mentioned in the opinion provided that Royle would accept the sum of $5,000 pro rata out of payments made to the trustee in bankruptcy on the condition quoted in the opinion, as and when payments were made by the party who made the offer of $13,500 mentioned in the opinion.

Walter Rowson, of Reno, Nev., for appellant.

Wayne T. Wilson, of Reno, Nev., for appellees.

Before WILBUR and GARRECHT, Circuit Judges, and NETERER, District Judge.

WILBUR, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of a court in bankruptcy reversing a decision of the referee on review of an order for the payment of a dividend upon the claim of the appellant William Royle. The question involved on'the appeal is an interpretation of an agreement entered into between William Royle, the owner of a judgment foreclosing certain labor liens, and Grace V. Ward, the owner of a decree foreclosing a mortgage on the same property, and Wayne T. Wilson, who joined in the agreement by reason of certain costs and expenses of litigation due him.

A difficulty arises in the case because of the fact that when the stipulation was entered into an arrangement had been made to sell the encumbered property of the bankrupt for $13,500. The proposed sale was not effected, and the property was subsequently sold for $12,000. This fund was insufficient to pay the full amount agreed upon in the settlement. The appellant claims that he is entitled to preferential payment of his $5,000 because of a parenthetical condition with reference thereto contained in the contract of settlement, reading as follows:

> “Conditioned that there should be no deduction from said amount for any reason whatsoever.”

The trial court in a carefully prepared opinion stated the facts and circumstances which impelled him to the conclusion that this condition did not give the petitioner *305priority. We are satisfied with the reasonings and conclusions of the trial judge and refer to that decision for a further amplification of our reasons for our conclusion.

We find no merit in the contention of appellant that by previous orders which had become final the question of priority had been determined. The trial court ruled to the contrary, and we agree with that conclusion. No question of general importance is involved in the case, and for that reason we deem it unnecessary to extend this opinion by a restatement here of the facts and circumstances which justify the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.
```

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 183 (Wednesday, September 21, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Page 64977]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-22721]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) Program; Draft FAA Order 5500.1B

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice and request for comments, extension of comment period.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FAA is extending the comment period on the draft FAA Order 
5500.1B, Passenger Facility Charge published on August 5, 2016. This 
draft Order clarifies and updates statutory and regulatory 
requirements, including those affected by changes to the PFC statute 
from multiple FAA reauthorizations.

DATES: The comment period for the draft FAA Order 5500.1B published on 
August 5, 2016 is extended from September 30, 2016 to October 31, 2016.

ADDRESSES: An electronic copy of draft FAA Order 5500.1B is available 
through the Internet at the FAA Airports Web site at http://www.faa.gov/airports/. You may submit comments using the Draft PFC 
Order 5500.1B Comment Form available at the same web address, using any 
of the following methods:
     Email: 9-faa-arp-pfc-order-55001b@faa.gov.
     Facsimile: (202) 267-5302.
     Mail: FAA Office of Airports, Office of Airport Planning 
and Programming, Financial Analysis and PFC Branch (APP-510), Room 
619E, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591.
    For more information on the notice and comment process, see the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe Hebert, Manager, Financial 
Analysis and Passenger Facility Charge Branch, APP-510, Federal 
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 
20591, telephone (202) 267-8375; facsimile (202) 267-5302.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 5, 2016, the FAA published a 
notice titled ``Notice and Request for Comments'' (81 FR 51963). In 
that Notice, the FAA announced a request for comments on the draft FAA 
Order 5500.1B. The notice requested that interested parties submit 
written comments by September 30, 2016.
    On August 19, 2016, three industry associations (Airlines for 
America, Airports Council International--North America, and the 
American Association of Airport Executives) submitted a joint request 
to extend the comment period by 30 days for several reasons. After 
careful consideration, the FAA has decided to extend the comment period 
for 31 days until October 31, 2016.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 13, 2016.
Elliott Black,
Director, Office of Airport Planning and Programming.
[FR Doc. 2016-22721 Filed 9-20-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
```