alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CHESTER C. KILBURN v. NATIONAL SURETY COMPANY.1

April 20, 1916.

Nos. 19,589—(227)2.

Impeachment oí witness.

Evidence of a specific act of immorality and indecency committed on the part of employees who made certain reports concerning plaintiff some time after the time of such reports, is not admissible for the purpose of impeaching the veracity of such persons. [Reporter.]

Action in the district court for Waseca county against the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Company and the National Surety Company to recover $25,000 for defamation. The separate answer of defendant surety company alleged, among other matters, that the matters set out in the reports mentioned in the complaint were true and were made to the defendant railroad company in the due course of business, in good faith, in the belief that they were true, and were privileged communications between the two companies. The case was tried before ¡Childress, X, and a jury which returned a verdict for $2,000 against defendant surety company and a verdict in favor of defendant railroad company. From an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant surety company appealed.

Reversed.

*Bufler, Mitchell & EoJce,*for appellant.

*F. E. Glinite*and *Moonan & Moonan,*for respondent.

1

 Reported in 157 N. W. 498.

2

 October, 1915, term calendar.

Per Curiam.

This case is similar to the case of Tierney against the same defendants, 134 Minn. , 157 N. W. 497, and grows out of the same transaction. Tierney was employed as conductor and plaintiff as ¡brakeman upon the same pas. senger train; and the reports referred to and considered in the Tierney case implicated plaintiff as a party to the irregularities charged against Tierney, and resulted in the discharge of both plaintiff and Tierney. Most of the questions presented are the same in both cases, but the present case presents one question not presented in the Tierney case. In the present case it appears that, against the strenuous objection of defendant, plaintiff was permitted to prove a specific act of immorality and indecency on the part of *473defendant’s employees committed some time after making the reports in question, for the purpose of discrediting and impeaching such employees. Such testimony was not admissible for the purpose of impeaching the veracity of these employees. Rudsdill v. Slingerland, 18 Minn. 342 (380); State v. Barrett, 40 Minn. 65, 41 N. W. 459; State v. King, 88 Minn. 175; 92 N. W. 965; Matthews v. Hershey Lumber *Co.*65 Minn. 372, 67 N. W. *1008;*Moreland v. Lawrence, 23 Minn. 84; Warner v. Lockerby, 31 Minn. 421, 18 N. W. 145, 821; Swanson v. Andrus, 84 Minn. 186, 87 N. W. 363, 88 N. W. 252; also cases cited in note in 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) at page 698, et seq; 3 Enc. Ev. 36.

Order reversed.
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Amended and Restated Quarterly Report of Hemispherx
Biopharma, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q/A for the fiscal quarter ended June
30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the “Report”), I, William A. Carter, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)  
 The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  
 The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.





Date:February 11,
2011





/s/ William A. CarterWilliam
      A. Carter, M.D.Chief
      Executive Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 588 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 588

   Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to provide for 
      transition salary continuation for certain committee staff.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 29, 1994

   Mr. Mineta submitted the following resolution; which was referred 
      jointly to the Committees on Rules and House Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to provide for 
      transition salary continuation for certain committee staff.

    Resolved, That clause 6 of rule XI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is amended by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph:
    ``(j)(1) For purposes of this paragraph:
            ``(A) The term `committee' means a standing, select, or 
        special committee, or commission of the House, or a joint 
        committee of the Congress whose funds are disbursed by the 
        Clerk of the House.
            ``(B) The term `eligible staff member' means an individual 
        employed by a committee or subcommittee thereof for at least 
        183 days (whether or not service was continuous) prior to the 
        termination of employment as described in subdivision (C) and 
        whose pay is disbursed by the Clerk of the House.
            ``(C) The term `displaced staff member' means an eligible 
        staff member whose service as an employee of the House is 
        terminated solely and directly as a result of a change in the 
        political party of the individual occupying the position of 
        chairman or ranking minority member of a committee and who is 
        certified as a displaced staff member by the chairman and 
        ranking minority member of the committee to the Clerk of the 
        House. Such certification shall be made no later than 60 days 
        after the date of such change.
    ``(2) The Clerk of the House shall notify the Committee on House 
Administration of the name of each displaced staff member.
    ``(3)(A) Each displaced staff member shall, upon application to the 
Clerk of the House and approval by the Committee on House 
Administration, continue to be paid at his respective salary for a 
period not to exceed 60 days following the staff member's date of 
termination or until the staff member becomes otherwise gainfully 
employed, whichever is earlier.
    ``(B) A statement in writing by any such employee that he was not 
gainfully employed during such period or the portion thereof for which 
payment is claimed shall be accepted as prima facie evidence that he 
was not so employed.
    ``(4) Funds necessary to carry out this paragraph shall be 
available from the contingent fund of the House.''.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 302**

**OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Burt Sugarman, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the second quarterly period ended June 30, 2003 (“Quarterly Report”) of GIANT GROUP, LTD. (“Company” or “Registrant”);

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this Quarterly Report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Quarterly Report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financialinformation included in this Quarterly Report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for the periods presented in this Quarterly Report; 

 

4. The Registrant’s other certifying officer and I am responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e) for the Company and have: 

 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the Company is made known to us during the period in which this Quarterly Report is being prepared; 

 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Company’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this Quarterly Report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the period ended of June 30, 2003 covered by this Quarterly Report based on such evaluation; and 

 

(c) Disclosed in this Quarterly Report any change in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theCompany’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Company’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. The Registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the Company’s independent auditor and the Audit committee of the Board of Directors: 

 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the Company’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Company’s internal controlover financial reporting. 

 

Date: August 14, 2003 

 

/s/    BURT SUGARMAN

----
#### James K. GAUDET v. DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF the CITY OF GRETNA, and its Individual Members et al.

No. 53593.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 25, 1973.

In re: James K. Gaudet applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Jefferson. 278 So.2d 556.

Application denied. The showing made does not warrant the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-30516

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KIM ANDREA WEBB,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 96-CR-50086

- - - - - - - - - -

December 18, 1997

Before WISDOM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:*

Kim Andrea Webb pleaded guilty to count 5 of an indictment

charging him with wire fraud and has appealed the district

court’s restitution order. Webb contends that the restitution

order was imposed in violation of the Victim and Witness

Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663. Because Webb failed to object

to the restitution order in the district court, we review this

issue under the plain error standard. See United States v.
No. 97-30516

-2-

Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730-35 (1993)). 

Webb concedes that the victims of his “employment testing”

scheme are entitled to restitution. He argues, however, that

certain other victims were who were enticed to extend credit to

him for airline tickets and hotel rooms were victims of an

entirely different scheme and were not entitled to restitution

under § 3663(a)(1). 

Webb has not shown that the error is plain and has affected

his substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-35. 

Moreover, the issue presented involves a question of fact. 

“[Q]uestions of fact capable of resolution by the district court

upon proper objection at sentencing can never constitute plain

error.” United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir.

1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The judgment is 

AFFIRMED.
259 La. 691

#### STATE ex rel. Robert LEWIS and Donald Ray Buffett v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden.

No. 51550.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 17, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Writ denied.

At the evidentiary hearing below, the proof shows that counsel was present with the defendants at their sentencing, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in accepting the testimony of counsel that he was present, and the testimony of the general practice of the court in requiring counsel to be present, as disproving the allegations of the petition to the contrary.

With regard to the averment that the indictment was fatally defective because not endorsed by the foreman of the grand jury, see State v. Stoma, 199 La. 529, 6 So.2d 650, former La.R.S. 15:3 (1950), cf. La.C.Crim.P. art. 383, we find, based on the evidence at the evidentiary hearing, that the grand jury indictments were signed by the foreman of the grand jury at the time the indictments were returned. This satisfies the requirement of La.C. Crim.P. Art. 383 that the indictment must “[be] endorsed ‘a true bill,’ and the endorsement must be signed by the foreman”. The endorsement “A True Bill” may be printed, as here, or typed — it need not be handwritten by the foreman — before it is signed by the foreman of the grand jury.
`[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1205 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.1205
                       One Hundred Third Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America


                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
  the fifth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-three


                                 An Act

  
 
  To amend the Fluid Milk Promotion Act of 1990 to define fluid milk 
processors

        to exclude de minimis processors, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Fluid Milk Promotion Amendments Act 
of 1993''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF FLUID MILK PROCESSOR.

    (a) Fluid Milk Processor.--Paragraph (4) of section 1999C of the 
Fluid Milk Promotion Act of 1990 (7 U.S.C. 6402(4)) is amended to read 
as follows:
        ``(4) Fluid milk processor.--The term `fluid milk processor' 
    means any person who processes and markets commercially more than 
    500,000 pounds of fluid milk products in consumer-type packages per 
    month.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1999J(e) of such Act (7 U.S.C. 
6409(e)) is amended by inserting after ``4504(g))'' the following: ``, 
and that are fluid milk processors,''.







                                Speaker of the House of Representatives.







                             Vice President of the United States and    
                                                President of the Senate.`
#### Elizabeth L. BASKETT, Appellant, v. John S. BASKETT et al., Appellees.

No. 73-354.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 14, 1973.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; John G. Ferris, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Victor H. HUTCHINS, Jr. v. Mary C. HUTCHINS.

No. 38568.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 220 So.2d 438.
#### Leroy PEARSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-223.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 1, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
# C_2022002EN.01002402.xml

| 3.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 2/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 2/24

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France) lodged on 19 October 2021 — PB v Geos SAS, Geos International Consulting Limited

(Case C-639/21)

(2022/C 2/30)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: PB

Respondents: Geos SAS, Geos International Consulting Limited

Questions referred

| — | Are Article 4(1) and Article 20(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, where it is claimed that a company domiciled in a Member State, and being sued by an employee before the courts of that State, is the joint employer of that employee, who was engaged by another company, that court is not required to assess at the outset whether the employee is jointly employed by those two companies in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction to rule on the claims made against them? |
| --- | --- |

—

Are Article 4(1) and Article 20(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, where it is claimed that a company domiciled in a Member State, and being sued by an employee before the courts of that State, is the joint employer of that employee, who was engaged by another company, that court is not required to assess at the outset whether the employee is jointly employed by those two companies in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction to rule on the claims made against them?

| — | Are those articles to be interpreted as meaning that, in such a case, the autonomy of the special rules of jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment does not preclude the application of the general rule that jurisdiction lies with the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled, set out in Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012? |
| --- | --- |

—

Are those articles to be interpreted as meaning that, in such a case, the autonomy of the special rules of jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment does not preclude the application of the general rule that jurisdiction lies with the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled, set out in Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012?

---

(1)  OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEETS AND STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS OF THE COMPANY'S 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1999, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000754591
<NAME> RAY ELLISON MORTGAGE ACCEPTANCE CORP.
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                           1,202
<SECURITIES>                                62,661,553
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               365,106
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              68,859,399
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          392,030
<BONDS>                                     66,816,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        10,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,641,369
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                68,859,399
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,523,472
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                7,460,238
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           5,340,957
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 63,234
<INCOME-TAX>                                    14,287
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             48,947
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    48,947
<EPS-BASIC>                                     4.89
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     4.89


</TABLE>
Ryder Scott Company
Petroleum Consultants

1100 Louisiana                                              Fax (713) 651-0849
Suite 3800
Houston, TX  77002-5218                               Telephone (713) 651-9191






                      CONSENT OF PETROLEUM CONSULTING FIRM




      We consent to the  reference to our name included in this Annual Report on
Form 10-K for  the  year  ended December  31, 2001 for  Dyco Oil and Gas Program
1985-1 Limited Partnership.


                              //s// Ryder Scott Company, L.P.

                              RYDER SCOTT COMPANY, L.P.




Houston, Texas
March 8, 2002
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 July 8, 2016

t0705

Order 

Clerk

July 8, 2016

153884

In re SMART, Minors SC: 153884

COA: 329413

Wayne CC Family Div: 

97-360976-NA

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 10, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.