alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2022119EN.01004701.xml

| 14.3.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 119/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.3.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 119/47

---

Order of the General Court of 4 January 2022 — Vivostore v EUIPO — Linda (VIVO LIFE)

(Case T-540/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Withdrawal of the opposition - No need to adjudicate)

(2022/C 119/66)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Vivostore Ltd (Winscombe, United Kingdom) (represented by: T. Urek, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Eberl and E. Markakis, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Linda AG (Cologne, Germany) (represented by: I. Jung, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 July 2021 (Case R 1587/2020-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Linda and Vivostore.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

| 2. | Vivostore and Linda AG shall bear their own costs and each pay half of the costs of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Vivostore and Linda AG shall bear their own costs and each pay half of the costs of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

---

(1)  OJ C 431, 25.10.2021.

---
#### Bennie F. GRAHAM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-1071.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 2, 1974.

*374Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Kathleen Gallagher, Asst. Public Defender, and Lorna Kent, Legal Intern, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and J. Robert Olian, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-appellant was informed against, tried by jury, found guilty and sentenced to the state penitentiary for life for rape.

For his second point on appeal, defendant-appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession without an unequivocal and explicit finding of voluntariness. We find merit in this contention.

The record clearly reflects that the trial judge merely stated that the. motion to suppress the confession is denied. The above statement simply does not meet the requirement that the trial judge’s conclusion that the confession is voluntary appear from the record with *unmistakable clarity.*See McDole v. State, Fla. 1973, 283 So.2d 553.

Therefore, for the purpose of disposing of the issue of the court’s making an unequivocal and explicit finding of voluntariness, this court will relinquish jurisdiction and remand the case to the trial judge to consider and then rule explicitly on the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession with or without oral argument thereon as the trial judge shall choose. Promptly after an order is made on the issue of volun-tariness as herein provided for, counsel for the appellant shall file herein a certified copy of such order. Further proceedings taken by this court on this appeal shall be as indicated or required dependent upon the order which shall be made on the issue of an explicit finding of voluntariness of the defendant’s confession.

It is so ordered.
#### Edward E. HODSDON and Mary Q. Hodsdon, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. OSCAR DOOLY ASSOCIATES, INC., etc., and W. W. Garris, Respondents.

No. 39894.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 5, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 19, 1970.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, DREW, THORNAL, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 23.2Consent of Cawley, Gillespie & Associates, Inc.     As independent petroleum engineers, we hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in theRegistration Statements (No. 333-146775) on Form S-3, (No., 333-148465) on Form S-4 and (No.33-57348, No. 333-34617, No. 333-66938, No. 333-117533 and No. 333-145827) on Forms S-8 of ParallelPetroleum Corporation of information from our reserves report datedJanuary 22, 2008 and all references to our firm included in ormade a part of the Annual Report on Form 10-K of ParallelPetroleum Corporation for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007.         /s/ Cawley, Gillespie & Associates, Inc.         Ft. Worth, Texas
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 55 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 55

 Urging the President to call on the President of Syria to permit the 
        extradition of fugitive Nazi war criminal Alois Brunner.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 27, 1993

 Mr. McNulty submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Urging the President to call on the President of Syria to permit the 
        extradition of fugitive Nazi war criminal Alois Brunner.

Whereas Austrian-born Alois Brunner, who joined the Nazi party at the age of 19, 
        was the deputy and personal secretary to Adolf Eichmann, who was 
        personally responsible for sending to their deaths more than 120,000 
        Jews from Austria, Germany, France, Slovakia, and Greece;
Whereas, in 1938, after Kristallnacht, Brunner joined the Nazi Secret Police and 
        subsequently requested a transfer to the Central Office for Jewish 
        Emigration in Vienna, where he began his career in genocide as 
        Eichmann's personal secretary;
Whereas Brunner, often characterized as the personification of Nazi sadism in 
        all its horror, executed Eichmann's plan for the Final Solution;
Whereas Brunner was particularly brutal toward French Jews, sending to their 
        deaths more than 200 children from Jewish-operated orphanages, including 
        34 children from Louviciennes;
Whereas, in 1954, Brunner was sentenced to death in absentia by French courts in 
        Paris and Marseilles for crimes against humanity;
Whereas, since 1955, Brunner has lived in Damascus, Syria, under the protection 
        of the Syrian government and Syrian bodyguards and has assumed the name 
        of Dr. Georg Fischer;
Whereas it is well known that Brunner lives in an apartment at 7 Rue Haddad in 
        Damascus;
Whereas the Syrian government has frequently denied that Brunner lives in Syria; 
        and
Whereas attempts by Austria and Germany to secure Brunner's extradition from 
        Syria have been unsuccessful: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the House of Representatives urges the President to 
call on the President of Syria to permit the extradition of the 
fugitive Nazi war criminal Alois Brunner for trial in Germany.

                                 <all>
```
251 La. 69

#### Cora Lee CARTER et al. v. HIGHWAY INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS et al.

No. 48881.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 20, 1967.

In re: Cora Lee Carter et al. applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Vernon. 200 So.2d 780.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.
# C_2022119EN.01003902.xml

| 14.3.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 119/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.3.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 119/39

---

Judgment of the General Court of 12 January 2022 — Neolith Distribution v EUIPO (Representation of an ornamental pattern)

(Case T-259/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for an EU pattern mark - Representation of an ornamental pattern - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 119/53)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Neolith Distribution, SL (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: N. Fernández Fernández-Pacheco, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 March 2021 (Case R 2155/2020-4), regarding an application for registration of a pattern sign representing an ornamental pattern as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Neolith Distribution, SL, to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Neolith Distribution, SL, to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 252, 28.6.2021.

---
# C_2021471EN.01001802.xml

| 22.11.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 471/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.11.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 471/18

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 2 August 2021 — Monz Handelsgesellschaft lnternational mbH & Co. KG v Büchel GmbH & Co. Fahrzeugtechnik KG

(Case C-472/21)

(2021/C 471/26)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: Monz Handelsgesellschaft lnternational mbH & Co. KG

Respondent on a point of law: Büchel GmbH & Co. Fahrzeugtechnik KG

Questions referred

| 1. | Is a component part incorporating a design a ‘visible’ component within the meaning of Article 3(3) of Directive 98/71/EC (1) if it is objectively possible to recognise the design when the component is mounted, or should visibility be assessed under certain conditions of use or from a certain observer perspective? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is a component part incorporating a design a ‘visible’ component within the meaning of Article 3(3) of Directive 98/71/EC (1) if it is objectively possible to recognise the design when the component is mounted, or should visibility be assessed under certain conditions of use or from a certain observer perspective?

| 2. | If the answer to Question 1 is that visibility under certain conditions of use or from a certain observer perspective is the decisive factor:






  (a) | When assessing the ‘normal use’ of a complex product by the end user within the meaning of Article 3(3) and (4) of Directive 98/71, is it the use intended by the manufacturer of the component part or complex product that is relevant, or the customary use of the complex product by the end user? |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to Question 1 is that visibility under certain conditions of use or from a certain observer perspective is the decisive factor:

(a)

When assessing the ‘normal use’ of a complex product by the end user within the meaning of Article 3(3) and (4) of Directive 98/71, is it the use intended by the manufacturer of the component part or complex product that is relevant, or the customary use of the complex product by the end user?

| (b) | What are the criteria for assessing whether the use of a complex product by the end user constitutes a ‘normal use’ within the meaning of Article 3(3) and (4) of Directive 98/71? |
| --- | --- |

(b)

What are the criteria for assessing whether the use of a complex product by the end user constitutes a ‘normal use’ within the meaning of Article 3(3) and (4) of Directive 98/71?

---

(1)  Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of designs (OJ 1998 L 289, p. 28).

---
#### Alvin DINKINS v. STATE of Florida.

No. 38904.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 1969.

Certiorari dismissed without opinion. 223 So.2d 577.
#### John A. DAVIS v. STATE.

No. 38354.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1969..

Appeal dismissed without opinion. 222 So.2d 772.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. F. O. DIDIER, Jr.

No. 52421.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 13, 1973.

*278William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., LeRoy A. Hartley, Special Counsel to Atty. Gen., New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.

Maxwell J. Bordelon, Marksville, for defendant-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was charged with violation of La.R.S. 42:283-286. The District Attorney made a motion for change of venue, which motion after a contradictory hearing was denied by the court. To this ruling there was reserved and perfected one bill of exceptions which is the basis for this appeal by the "state. La.C.Cr.P. Art. 912(B)(5).

Granting or denial of a change of venue rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. His ruling denying such a motion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the evidence affirmatively shows that the ruling was erroneous and a clear abuse of judicial discretion. State v. Poland, 255 La. 746, 232 So.2d 499 (1970); State v. LeJeune, 248 La. 682, 181 So.2d 392 (1965); State v. Rogers, 241 La. 841, 132 So.2d 819 (1961).

La.C.Cr.P. Art. 622 provides:

> “A change of venue shall be granted when the applicant *proves*that by reason of prejudice existing in the public mind or because of undue influence, or that for any other reason, a fair and impartial trial cannot be obtained in the parish where the prosecution is pending. . . ”

We find that the state has not presented a sufficient basis to warrant a change of venue in this case. The only grounds alleged in the motion for change of venue were that since the defendant is the sheriff and will be the sheriff of the parish in which this case will be tried, and since numerous provisions of the laws of Louisiana vest the Sheriff with certain duties relative to criminal proceedings, therefore it *would be possible*for the defendant to exercise undue influence and control over the fair and impartial administration of his trial. This overlooks the provision of Louisiana Constitution Art. 7, Section 71 (1921) that the coroner of parishes (other than Orleans) “act[s] for and in place of the sheriff, whenever the sheriff [is the] party interested. . . ” The mover did not bear his burden of proving, Article 622, the need for a change of venue.

This bill of exceptions is without merit.

For the reasons assigned, the case is remanded to the Disrtict Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion expressed herein.
Dear FAA Program Analyst, I would like to close this docket number FAA-2015-1903 due to the fact it is a duplicate petition request. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at the number below. John Pope Lewis Communications o: 205-980-0774 c: 205-721-0657
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas M. WOMACK.

No. 52632.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 13, 1973.

*291Emmons & Henry, W. Jackson Emmons, Jonesboro, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hal R. Henderson, Dist. Atty., Bobby L. Culpepper, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Thomas M. Womack, was tried by a jury and found guilty of theft of a 1965 automobile valued at $1100.00 and sentenced to serve nine years in the state penitentiary. On this appeal, the defendant relies on fourteen bills of exceptions to obtain a reversal.

However, we do not consider these bills because there is an error discoverable on the face of the proceedings which merits our attention. La.C.Cr.P. Art. 920. The Minutes show that the sentence was imposed before the expiration of the mandatory statutory delay, and there is no minute entry or showing of a waiver of same — a patent error requiring remand. State v. Douglas, 250 La. 480, 196 So.2d 799 (1967); see also State v. Augustine, 263 La. 977, 270 So.2d 118, decided November 28, 1972.

La.Code of Criminal Procedure Article 873 provides:

> “If a defendant is convicted of a felony, at least three days shall elapse between conviction and sentence. If a motion for a new trial, or in arrest of judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled. If the defendant expressly waives a delay provided for in this article or pleads guilty, sentence may be imposed immediately.”

Where the record does not disclose any waiver of the twenty-four hour delay in sentencing after the denial of the Motion for New Trial heard on September 24, 1971, and it is clear from the minutes that less than the mandatory delay had elapsed at the time of the sentencing, we note *ex proprio motu,*that the sentence is void, since imposed before expiration of the twenty-four hour delay and without waiver of same.

For these reasons, the sentence is annulled and set aside, and the case is remanded to the Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jackson, for re-sentencing in conformity with the law.
# C_2022284EN.01003601.xml

| 25.7.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 284/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.7.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 284/36

---

Order of the General Court of 10 May 2022 — Girardi v EUIPO

(Case T-497/21) (1)

(Action for annulment - EU trade mark - Representation before EUIPO - Notification of a deficiency in the power to act as a representative before EUIPO - Act not open to challenge - Preparatory act - Inadmissibility)

(2022/C 284/47)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Giovanna Paola Girardi (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: A. Pomares Caballero and M. Pomares Caballero, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: G. Predonzani and A. Söder, acting as Agents)

Re:

By her action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks, first, annulment of the act by which the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) notified her, on 14 June 2021, of a deficiency in an application for a declaration of invalidity which she had filed under reference 000050057 C, and of any other file in which the applicant or right holder represented by her has their permanent residence outside the European Union and, secondly, a declaration that Annex 1 to Section 5 of Part A of the Guidelines for examination of European Union trade marks of EUIPO is unlawful in so far as that annex relates to professional representation by Spanish lawyers before the Office.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

| 2. | The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) is to bear its own costs and pay those of Ms Giovanna Paola Girardi, including those relating to the proceedings for interim relief in Case T-497/21 R. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) is to bear its own costs and pay those of Ms Giovanna Paola Girardi, including those relating to the proceedings for interim relief in Case T-497/21 R.

---

(1)  OJ C 412, 11.10.2021.

---
### NUM BER 13-0 8-00 489- CR 

## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS CORPUS CHRI ST I - E DI NBURG GRE GORY SMIKLE, A pp ellan t, v . TH E STA

TE OF T EXAS, A pp ellee

. On A pp eal f rom th e 3 47t h Dist rict C ou rt o f N ue ces Co un ty , T exas .



## ME MOR A N D U M OP I N I ON Be fo re Ju stice s Y an ez, Garza, a nd Ve la M emo rand um Opin ion Pe r Cu riam A p p e l l a n t , G r e g o r

y S mi k l e , a t t e mp t s t o a p p e a l a c o n v i c t i o n fo r as saul t. The tr ial cour t has ce rt ified thatthi s “ is a pl ea- barg ain ca se, and the d e f e n d a nt ha s N O r ig ht of app eal.” See T EX . R. A PP . P. 25 .2(a)(2). On Au gust 14, 200 8, th is Court notif ied ap pellan t’s coun sel of the trial court’s cer ti ficat ion and or der ed counse l to: (1 ) r ev iew the re cord; (2) determi ne w hether appel lan t2

has a rig ht to app eal; a nd (3) forw ard to th is Cou rt , byl etter , c ounse l’ s fin din g s a s t o w hether appel lan t has a r ig ht t o appea l, or , al ter n a ti vely, adv is e thi s C our t as to the ex is tenc e of any

amended cer

ti ficat ion

. On Se pte mb er 6, 20 08, coun sel f iled a le tter brief w ith this Court. Counsel’s re s po ns e do es no t es ta bl i s h: ( 1) th at th e c er ti fi c at i on c ur r en tl y on fi l e w i th this Court is inc or re ct, or

( 2) thatappel lan t ot her w is e has a r ig ht t o appea l. The Tex as Rul es of A ppel lat e Pr ocedu re pr ov ide that an appeal must be di smi ss ed if the trial court’s certif ication doe s not sho w that the d e f e n dan t has th e rig ht of app eal. T EX . R. A PP . P. 25. 2(d); se e T EX . R. A PP . P. 37 .1, 4 4.3 , 44. 4. Acco rdingly , this a p p e al is DI SM ISSE D. An y

pendi ng moti ons ar e deni ed as moot.

PERC UR IAM

Do not p ubl is h. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 47 .2(b). Me moran dum Opi nio n del iv er ed and filed thi s t he 23r d day

of Oct ober , 200 8.
#### Earl FAIRCLOTH, as Attorney General of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Mary J. ORR and Ernest W. Orr, Appellees.

No. L-256.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.

May 20, 1969.

PER CURIAM.

Interlocutory appeal dismissed.
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 19

- 00113

- CR

J OEY A BRAHAM M OOSO

, Appellant

V

.

T HE S TATE OF T EXAS §

§

§

§

§ On Appeal from Criminal District

Court No. 2

of T arrant County (1561923R)

October 24, 2019

Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment o f the trial

court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By _ /s/ B onnie Sudderth

_________________ Chief Justice Bonnie Suddert h
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE
F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

M EMORANDUM O RDER

Appellate case name: In the Matter of J. S.

Appellate case number: 01

- 10

- 00646

- CV

Trial court case number: 1000824J

Trial court: 313th District Court of Harris County

This is an appeal from a proceeding under the Texas Juvenile Justice Act, in which the juvenile, J.S., was adjudicated delinquent. Appellant, J.S.’s mother, filed a pro se notice of appeal under her own signature. On September 20, 2011, this Court issued a n order abating this appeal and directing the trial court to conduct a hearing and make appropriate findings on whether J.S. retained his right to appeal and wishe d to prosecute the appeal. A reporter’s record of the hearing was ordered to be filed within 20 days of our order. A clerk’s record of all documents filed in the trial court, including the findings and recommendations requested in our September 20, 2011 order, was ordered to be filed within 30 days of our order. A lthough a

clerk’s record was filed on October 18, 2011, it did not include the findings and recommendations requested in our order. The reporter’s record has not been filed.

Accordingly

, t he appeal remains abated, treated as a closed case, and removed from this

Court’s active docket. We or der the trial court to conduct a hearing within 15 days of this order to determine (1) whether J.S. retained his right to appeal and (2) whether both appellant and J.S.

wish to prosecute this appeal. I f the trial court finds that J.S. did not waive his right to appeal and

that both appellant and J.S. wish to pursue this appeal, the trial court is ordered to appoint appellate counsel for J.S.

The trial court shall have a court reporter record the hearing . The court reporter is

ordered , at no cost to appellants, to file a reporter’s record of the hearing within 30 days of this

order. We further order the district clerk, at no cost to appellants, to file, within 30 days of this order, a supplemental clerk’s record containing all documents filed in the trial court, including the findings and recommendations ordered herein.

This appeal will be reinstated on this Court’s active docket when the reporter’s record

and the supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s findings and recommendations ordered herein are filed in this Court. The Court will consider an appropriate motion to reinstate the appeal filed by any party.It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Jane Bland

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: April 8, 2014