NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SAMPSON K., VICTORIA Y., 

Appellants,

 

v.

 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, F.K.,

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0334

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD28252

The Honorable Alison S. Bachus, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant Father

Law Office of Ed Johnson, PLLC, Peoria

By Edward D. Johnson

Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Cathleen E. Fuller

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
SAMPSON K., VICTORIA Y. v. DCS, F.K.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.

B E E N E, Judge:

¶1 Sampson K. (“Father”) and Victoria Y. (“Mother”) appeal the 

termination of their parental rights to their eldest child, F.K. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm the superior court’s termination of parental rights.

FACTS

¶2 On April 23, 2014, F.K., and his three younger siblings came 

into State care after allegations that Father abused the children by 

employing extreme discipline. Specifically, it was alleged that Father 

slapped the children, beat F.K. with a cord and rubbed a mixture of hot 

peppers in F.K.’s eyes and nose. It was also alleged that Mother failed to 

protect F.K. and his siblings from Father’s abuse and had thus neglected 

them as well. After an adjudication, the superior court found that the 

children were dependent as to Mother and Father. Arizona Department of 

Child Safety (“DCS”) offered the parents reunification services.

¶3 In December 2014, Father pled guilty to felony child abuse

relating to his treatment of F.K. As a result of his plea, Father was placed 

on probation for 10 years and was prohibited from visiting F.K. without 

prior approval from DCS.

¶4 In 2015, Father and Mother reunified with their children, 

except F.K., after the superior court determined that the parents had 

successfully completed all required services. F.K. was not returned to 

Mother and Father because he did not consistently participate in services 

with his parents. F.K. did not participate in visitation and family 

counseling services because he did not feel safe with his parents. Shortly 

before the termination hearing, F.K. indicated that he wanted to be adopted

by another family.

¶5 On a motion by DCS and after a contested termination 

hearing in August 2016, the superior court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights based on abuse, neglect and the child’s out-of-home placement for 15 
SAMPSON K., VICTORIA Y. v. DCS, F.K.

Decision of the Court

3

months or longer, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)1 sections

8-533(B)(2) (2017), (B)(8)(c) (2017), respectively. The superior court 

terminated Father’s parental rights on the same grounds as Mother, along 

with the additional ground of unfitness to parent due to a felony conviction. 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) (2017). Mother and Father timely appealed the superior 

court’s final order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A)

(2017) and 12-2101(A) (2017).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Custody of one’s children is a fundamental, but not absolute, 

right. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t. of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶ 12 (2000).

The superior court may terminate a parent’s rights upon clear and 

convincing evidence of one of the statutory grounds in A.R.S. § 8-533(B),

and upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in 

the best interests of the child. Id. at 248-49, ¶ 12. We review the superior 

court’s termination order for an abuse of discretion; we will affirm the order 

unless its factual findings are clearly erroneous, “that is, unless there is no 

reasonable evidence to support them.” Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).

¶7 Father does not contest the superior court’s findings

regarding the statutory grounds for termination.2 Similarly, Mother does 

not dispute the superior court’s findings against her on the grounds of 

abuse and neglect. The existence of any one of the enumerated grounds in 

§ 8-533 is sufficient to justify termination. Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS6520, 157 Ariz. 238, 242 (App. 1988); see also Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002) (“If clear and convincing evidence 

supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court 

ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other 

grounds.”). Nevertheless, we have reviewed the superior court’s findings 

and hold that it did not err in finding that Mother and Father neglected F.K., 

within the meaning of the severance statutes.

¶8 Parental rights may be terminated when a parent has 

neglected or willfully abused a child. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). Neglect is 

defined in part as “[t]he inability or unwillingness of a parent, guardian, or 

 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current 

version.

2 “Generally, we will consider an issue not raised in an appellant’s opening 

brief as abandoned or conceded.” Robert Schalkenbach Found. v. Lincoln 

Found., Inc., 208 Ariz. 176, 180, ¶ 17 (App. 2004).
SAMPSON K., VICTORIA Y. v. DCS, F.K.

Decision of the Court

4

custodian of a child to provide that child with supervision ... if that inability 

or unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child’s health or 

welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a) (2017).

¶9 The superior court found that Father neglected F.K. by his 

unwillingness to provide F.K. with proper parental supervision. Instead of 

offering appropriate parenting, Father often employed harsh and unduly

painful discipline to F.K. The superior court held that Father’s 

unwillingness to properly supervise F.K. caused an unreasonable risk to the 

child’s welfare. We conclude that reasonable evidence in the record 

supports the superior court’s finding.

¶10 Regarding Mother, the superior court found that she 

neglected F.K. by her failure to protect him from Father’s abusive conduct. 

By failing to remove F.K. from this environment, Mother demonstrated her 

unwillingness to properly supervise F.K. Mother’s inability to protect her 

son caused F.K. to suffer physical harm at the hands of Father. Reasonable

evidence in the record supports the superior court’s finding that Mother 

neglected F.K.

¶11 Now, we turn to the superior court’s findings that termination

was in F.K.’s best interests.

¶12 Whether severance is in a child’s best interest is a question of 

fact, and we view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence in favor of supporting the superior court’s findings. Jesus M., 203 

Ariz. at 282, ¶ 13. A best-interests finding may be supported by evidence 

of an affirmative benefit to the child from severance or a detriment to the 

child if the relationship were to continue. Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 189 Ariz. 533, 557 (App. 1997). Being available for adoption is an 

affirmative benefit that can support a finding that termination is in the 

child’s best interests. See Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 

348, 352 (App. 1994).

¶13 Father challenges the superior court’s finding that 

termination of his parental rights was in F.K.’s best interests. Father claims 

that the superior court erred in its best interests finding because DCS was 

dilatory in providing visitation and family counseling services, arguing that 

if DCS provided more visitation and counseling, F.K. would be more 

willing to return to Father and Mother. The superior court found that 

reunification services were provided to the parents and child in a timely 

manner and we conclude that reasonable evidence in the record supports 

that finding.
SAMPSON K., VICTORIA Y. v. DCS, F.K.

Decision of the Court

5

¶14 Next, Father contends that he made “significant behavioral 

changes” and no longer posed a danger to F.K. The record reflects 

otherwise. The superior court found that Father failed to adequately 

understand or acknowledge why F.K. was removed from the home and 

what parenting skills would be required to effectively care for F.K. if he 

were returned to Father’s care. Once again, we conclude that reasonable

evidence in the record supports the superior court’s finding.

¶15 Lastly, Father argues that the superior court erred in its best 

interest finding because he successfully completed reunification services 

and the only impediment to returning F.K. home was the child’s 

unwillingness to reunify with his parents. Father cites Desiree S. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 235 Ariz. 532 (App. 2014), in support of his argument. Desiree 

S. is readily distinguishable from this case. In Desiree S., the juvenile refused 

to participate in family counseling and did not want to return to his 

mother’s care because he feared that she would not be able to protect him 

from future abuse. 235 Ariz. at 534, ¶ 10. This court held that the juvenile’s 

refusal and subjective belief that his mother would be unable to protect him 

from future abuse, without more, was insufficient evidence to support the 

superior court’s finding that mother could not parent the child in the near 

future. Id. at 534-35, ¶ 11. In the instant case, the superior court determined 

that F.K.’s unwillingness to engage in family counseling was not the sole 

basis for its termination finding. Rather, the superior court properly found 

that in addition to F.K.’s unwillingness to engage in family counseling, the 

parents failed to demonstrate a full understanding as to why F.K. was 

brought into care and what would be necessary to safely parent him in the 

future. Accordingly, reasonable evidence supported the superior court’s 

determination that termination of Father’s parental rights would be in 

F.K.’s best interests.

¶16 Mother also challenges the best interests finding by arguing 

that the superior court erred in finding that F.K. would derive a benefit 

from the termination of her parental rights. This claim fails as well. The 

record reflects that F.K. is adoptable, willing to be adopted, and currently 

in a potential adoptive placement. Also, the superior court found that 

termination of the parent-child relationship would provide F.K. with a safe 

home that is free from abuse or neglect. Additionally, as noted, F.K. has 

expressed his desire to be adopted. Consequently, reasonable evidence 

supports the superior court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental 

rights is in F.K.’s best interests.
SAMPSON K., VICTORIA Y. v. DCS, F.K.

Decision of the Court

6

CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

order terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father.