alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-13-00682- CV

Ge rald Willi s and Kim ly West, Appellants

v. Gar y Huebn er; Carolyn Huebn er; Ron Collier; Sharon Collier; Mem ory Lane Event Cente r, LLC; Thalia R. Morgan; John M. Morgan and Jan et S. Mor gan, App ellees

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F H AY S CO UNTY, 274 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 10- 2037 , H ONO RAB LE WI LLIAM R. H ENRY, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
On Dec ember 5, 2013, we abate d the appea l so that the parties could neg otiate settling their dispute. The parties have now filed an agree d motion to dismiss the appea l, explaining that they have signe d a settlement ag ree ment. We there fore g rant the motion and dismiss the appea l. See Tex. R. App. P . 42.1(a)
.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Rose and Goodwin Dismissed on Ag ree d Motion Filed: F ebrua

ry 7, 2014
#### Ben ARNETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. M-330.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 28, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>   1


                                                                      EXHIBIT 23


                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report (Form 10-K)
of Virco Mfg. Corporation of our report dated March 19, 2001, included in the
2000 Annual Report to Stockholders of Virco Mfg. Corporation.

Our audits also include the financial statement schedule of Virco Mfg.
Corporation listed in Item 14(a). This schedule is the responsibility of the
Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion based on our
audits. In our opinion, the financial statement schedule referred to above, when
considered in relation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole,
presents fairly in all material respects the information set forth therein.

We also consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 No. 33-65096, Form S-8 No. 333-32539 and Form S-8 No. 333-51717)
pertaining to the Virco Mfg. Corporation 1993 Stock Incentive Plan, the Virco
Mfg. Corporation 1997 Stock Incentive Plan, and the Virco Mfg. Corporation
Employee Stock Ownership Plan, respectively, of our report dated March 19, 2001,
with respect to the consolidated financial statements incorporated herein by
reference, and our report included in the preceding paragraph with respect to
the financial statement schedule included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) of
Virco Mfg. Corporation for the year ended January 31, 2001.


                                            /s/ Ernst & Young LLP



Long Beach, California
April 26, 2001
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00016-CR

DAVID WILLIAM APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant David William pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain to burglary 

of a habitation. The trial court placed him on four years’ deferred adjudication 

community supervision. Almost seven months later, the State filed a petition to 

adjudicate, alleging several violations, including the commission of a new 

offense. Appellant pled “not true” to all allegations. After an adjudication 

hearing, the trial court found many of the allegations, including that regarding the 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

commission of a new offense, true. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to eight years’ confinement.

Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to 

withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel 

avers that, in his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief 

and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California2by presenting a 

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable 

grounds for relief.3 This court afforded Appellant the opportunity to file a brief on 

his own behalf, but he did not.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we 

are obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if 

there is any arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf.4 Only then may 

we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.5

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with 

counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in 

 

2Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).

3See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510–11 & n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1991).

4See id. at 511.

5See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
3

the record that might arguably support the appeal.6 Consequently, we grant the 

motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MCCOY, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 16, 2010

 

6See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
# C_2022207EN.01004202.xml

| 23.5.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 207/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.5.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 207/42

---

Order of the General Court of 21 March 2022 — Kalypso Media Group v EUIPO (COMMANDOS)

(Case T-550/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Revocation of the contested decision - Action which has become devoid of purpose - No need to adjudicate)

(2022/C 207/57)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Kalypso Media Group GmbH (Worms, Germany) (represented by: T. Boddien, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 July 2021 (Case R 1864/2020-2) relating to an application for registration of the word sign COMMANDOS as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

| 2. | The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by Kalypso Media Group GmbH. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by Kalypso Media Group GmbH.

---

(1)  OJ C 431, 25.10.2021.

---
# C_2022368EN.01000501.xml

| 26.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 368/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 368/5

---

Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 2 May 2022 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Obvodní soud pro Prahu 1 — Czech Republic) — Správa železnic, státní organizace v České dráhy a.s., PKP Cargo International a.s., PDV Railway a.s., KŽC Doprava, s.r.o. (C-221/21), and České dráhy a.s. v Univerzita Pardubice and Others (C-222/21)

(Joined Cases C-221/21 and C-222/21) (1)

(References for a preliminary ruling - Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Rail transport - Directive 2012/34/EU - Decisions of the regulatory body - Article 56(10) - Judicial review - National law providing for the jurisdiction of the civil courts - Rules governing the action - Compatibility with Directive 2012/34 - Manifest inadmissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling)

(2022/C 368/06)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Obvodní soud pro Prahu 1

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Správa železnic, státní organizasse (C-221/21), České dráhy a.s. (C-222/21)

Defendants: České dráhy a.s., PKP Cargo International a.s., PDV Railway a.s., KŽC Doprava s.r.o. (C-221/21), Univerzita Pardubice and Others (C-222/21)

Operative part of the order

The requests for a preliminary ruling made by the Obvodní soud pro Prahu 1 (District Court, Prague 1, Czech Republic), by decisions of 22 September 2020 and 1 October 2020, are manifestly inadmissible.

---

(1)  OJ C 242, 21.6.2021.

---
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-11394

Conference Calendar

 

ROQUE T. ARANDA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JEANNE MILLSAPS, Clerk, 

San Joaquin Superior Court;

MICHAEL PLATT, Judge, 

San Joaquin Superior Court; 

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:99-CV-333

- - - - - - - - - -

August 29, 2000

Before KING, Chief Judge, and POLITZ and WIENER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Roque T. Aranda, Texas prisoner #805045, appeals from the

dismissal, without prejudice, of his suit invoking 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The district court concluded that “all of [Aranda’s]

claims in the instant civil rights action arose out of or relate

to his conviction and should properly be raised in a habeas

action.” Aranda’s failure to identify any error in the district

court’s legal analysis or its application to his lawsuit “is the 
No. 99-11394

- 2 -

same as if he had not appealed that judgment.” Brinkmann v.

Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.

1987).

Aranda’s appeal is without merit and therefore frivolous. 

See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). 

Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R.

42.2. Our dismissal of this appeal counts as a strike against

Aranda for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We caution Aranda

that once he accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed in

forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal filed while he is

incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g). 

APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.42

AG ASSOCIATES                                          1998 Bonus Plan

                                 1998 Bonus Plan


                     November 5, 1997 Compensation Committee

                           AG Associates Confidential

                                                                        10/30/97



<PAGE>   2

AG ASSOCIATES                                                  1998 Bonus Plan


Bonus to pay in two parts with three factors

- Revenue factor

- Operating profit factor

- Personal goal factor

                           AG Associates Confidential

                                                                        10/30/97



<PAGE>   3



AG ASSOCIATES                                                   1998 Bonus Plan



- President and Vice Presidents have a 30% plan

- Directors have a 15% plan

- Plans are calculated exactly the same way



                           AG Associates Confidential

                                                                        10/30/97



<PAGE>   4



AG ASSOCIATES                                                    1998 Bonus Plan


    -  REVENUE FACTOR

       - Paid out each quarter

       - Paid out on cumulative revenue

       - Min revenue factor 85%; Max revenue factor 140% of plan revenue

       - Revenue achievement % is multiplied by the personal goal achievement %
           for that quarter, then multiplied by one half of the total plan
           percentage*, then multiplied by the participants quarterly salary

         - *30% x 1/2 = 15% for President and Vice Presidents

         - *15% x 1/2 = 7.5% for Directors

                           AG Associates Confidential

                                                                        10/30/97



<PAGE>   5



AG ASSOCIATES                                                   1998 Bonus Plan

     - OPERATING PROFIT FACTOR

        - Paid out at year end, after annual audit

        - Paid out on year end results (excluding Amat legal Costs)

        - Min ops profit factor 3% of revenue (40%); Max revenue factor 10% of
          revenue (200%)

        - Ops profit achievement % is multiplied by the personal goal
          achievement ave % for the year, then multiplied by one half of the
          total plan percentage*, then multiplied by the participants yearly
          salary

          - *30% x 1/2 = 15% for President and Vice Presidents

          - *15 % x 1/2 = 7.5 % for Directors

                           AG Associates Confidential

                                                                        10/30/97
# C_2022303EN.01004301.xml

| 8.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 303/43 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 303/43

---

Judgment of the General Court of 22 June 2022 — Kubara v EUIPO (good calories)

(Case T-602/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark good calories - Absolute grounds for refusal - No distinctive character - Descriptiveness - Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Legal certainty - Legitimate expectations)

(2022/C 303/54)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: Kubara sp. z o.o. (Częstochowa, Poland) (represented by: A. Suskiewicz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 14 July 2021 (Case R 2167/2020-1).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Kubara sp. z o.o. to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Kubara sp. z o.o. to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 462, 15.11.2021.

---
EXHIBIT 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Golden  Enterprises,  Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the first quarter ended  September 1, 2006, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Patty Townsend, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

Dated:   October 11, 2006



/s/ Patty Townsend
------------------
Patty Townsend
Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to Golden Enterprises, Inc. and will be retained by Golden Enterprises,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission, or its staff, upon
request.


                                       24
# C_2023071EN.01002301.xml

| 27.2.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 71/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.2.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 71/23

---

Judgment of the General Court of 21 December 2022 — European Lotto and Betting v EUIPO — Tipp24 Services (Cash4Life)

(Case T-554/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU word mark Cash4Life - Absolute ground for invalidity - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2023/C 71/29)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Lotto and Betting Ltd (Ocean Village, Gibraltar) (represented by: D. Egan, Solicitor)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Schäfer and M. Eberl, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Tipp24 Services Ltd (London, United Kingdom)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 8 July 2021 (Case R 264/2020-1).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders European Lotto and Betting Ltd to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders European Lotto and Betting Ltd to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 502, 13.12.2021.

---
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. Louis James WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. Honorable H. Paul BAKER, as one of the Judges of the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 40274.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 3, 1971.

*651Tobias Simon and Beverly Gurevitz, Miami, for petitioner.

H. Paul Baker, in pro. per.

Jerry Mosca and Shalle Stephen Fine, Miami, for intervenor.

PER CURIAM.

In this original proceeding in prohibition, we determined that a rule absolute in prohibition should issue, but the issuance of a formal writ was withheld in full confidence that the trial court would discharge the petitioner in accordance with the law as set forth in the opinion. The trial court refused to discharge the defendant and to dismiss the prosecution, purportedly basing its ruling on State of Florida ex rel. Soodhalter v. Baker (1971), Fla.App., 242 So.2d 814. The latter case merely involved the question of whether this Court could transfer a petition for writ of prohibition to the District Court of Appeal where this Court lacked jurisdiction. It was pointed out that we have jurisdiction .in prohibition proceedings when questions are involved upon which a direct appeal to this Court is allowed as a matter of right. Fla.Const., art. V, § 4(2), F.S.A. A constitutional question was raised in the case *sub judice*at the trial level and we had jurisdiction.

Petitioner has now filed a motion for the issuance of a formal writ of prohibition. Ordinarily, the Court is reluctant to issue a formal writ where the respondent is a member of the judiciary. However, in view of the evident disagreement of the trial court with both the correctness and wisdom of the opinion of this Court in this case and the trial court’s refusal to carry out the mandate as expressed in our opinion, we feel it necessary to issue a formal writ of prohibition, and it is hereby ordered that same be issued.

The petitioner should not be the victim of an intellectual struggle between this Court and the trial court. In an effort to avoid any further misunderstanding or controversy, we have concluded to exercise our power under Fla.Stat. § 59.34, F.S.A., and enter the judgment which the lower court should have entered. Accordingly, it is further

Ordered and adjudged that petitioner, Louis James Williams, insofar as the charge of robbery alleged in the information filed November 19, 1969, is concerned, be discharged from custody.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C. J., and CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
[No. 361-2.

Division Two.

February 7, 1972.]

#### J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc., *Appellant,*v. The City of Lacey, *Respondent.*

*Anthony T. Ressa,*for appellant.

*Argal D. Oberquell,*for respondent.

Armstrong, J.

This comes before us on a petition for rehearing of our decision reported in 6 Wn. App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (1971). The respondent, City of Lacey, contends that even if the ordinance in question was unconstitutional, the appellant, J.S.K. Enterprises, could not recover damages for loss of business because legislative actions of the city cannot be characterized as tortious, however unwise or mistaken they may be. We agree.

We have previously determined that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the city did not engage in any harassment of the appellant, but did conduct an investigation to ascertain whether employees of the appellant sauna parlor engaged in lewd acts. We held that the ordinance in question was unconstitutional.

We now hold that liability for damages in favor of appellant must be predicated upon tortious conduct by the city. The enactment of the ordinance was a legislative act and legislative acts of the city cannot be characterized as tortious, however mistaken or unwise they may have been. We find that the ordinance was enacted in good faith by the city in an attempt to eliminate a social evil — the lewd acts of certain sauna employees. Public policy and good government require that a legislative body be free to enact *434good faith legislation without incurring tort liability, even though that legislation be subsequently held to be unconstitutional. *Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State,*67 Wn.2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).

The dismissal of the claim for damages will be affirmed. In all other respects we adhere to our former opinion.

Petrie, C.J., and Pearson, J., concur.

Review denied by Supreme Court March 21, 1972.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


The Board of Directors
Smithway Motor Xpress Corp.:

We consent to incorporation  by reference in the  Registration  Statements (Nos.
333-10249,  333-10251,  333-21253,  and 333-81855) on Form S-8 of Smithway Motor
Xpress Corp.  of our report  dated  February 3, 2000,  relating to  consolidated
balance sheets of Smithway Motor Xpress Corp.  and  subsidiaries  as of December
31,  1999  and  1998,  and the  related  consolidated  statements  of  earnings,
stockholders'  equity,  and cash  flows for each of the years in the  three-year
period ended  December 31, 1999,  which report  appears in the December 31, 1999
Annual Report on Form 10-K of Smithway Motor Xpress Corp.

                                  /s/ KPMG LLP
#### Willie Roy THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. U-102.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Jan. 24, 1974.

Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We have fully and carefully considered the record on appeal and the briefs filed *540by the parties. It appearing- therefrom that appellant has failed to demonstrate that the judgment appealed is erroneous, the said judgment is therefore affirmed.

SPECTOR, Acting C. J., and JOHNSON and BOYER, JJ., concur.