J-A15016-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SHEKIANA CHAMBERS

Appellant No. 1739 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 15, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010468-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2015

Appellant, Shekiana Chambers, appeals from the May 15, 2014 

aggregate judgment of sentence of three years’ probation, imposed after 

pleading guilty to hindering apprehension or prosecution and false 

identification to law enforcement authorities.1 After careful review, we 

affirm.

The trial court has set forth the relevant factual and procedural 

history, as follows.

On July 23, 2013, Philadelphia police officers 

arrested [Appellant] for hindering apprehension and 

related offenses stemming from an incident wherein 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5105(a)(1) and 4914(a), respectively. 
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[Appellant] enabled another person to evade arrest 

by posing as the other person and permitting officers 

to arrest her under that person’s name. After 

arraignment, court administrators scheduled the 

matter for a waiver trial on December 6, 2013[,] 

before the Honorable Rayford A. Means. On that 

date, the [Appellant] requested a continuance. 

Honoring this request, Judge Means rescheduled the 

waiver trial for March 17, 2014[,] and transferred 

the matter to th[e instant trial court].

On March 17[, 2014] [Appellant] recanted her 

desire to proceed to a waiver trial and asserted her 

right to a jury trial. Upon hearing [Appellant]’s new 

demand for a jury trial and her corresponding 

continuance request, th[e trial court] conducted a 

colloquy with [Appellant] and scheduled a jury trial 

on May 5, 2014. [Appellant] appeared on that date, 

but th[e trial court] was in the midst of another trial, 

so it could not proceed with [Appellant]’s jury trial. 

[The trial c]ourt conducted another colloquy with 

[Appellant] and rescheduled [Appellant]’s jury trial to 

May 6, 2014.

On May 6[,2014] [Appellant] failed to appear, 

and th[e trial c]ourt issued a bench warrant for her 

arrest. Court administrators again rescheduled 

[Appellant]’s jury trial to May 13, 2014. On that 

date, [Appellant]’s attorney failed to appear. Yet 

again, court administrators rescheduled [Appellant]’s 

jury trial to May 15, 2014. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/14, at 1-2.

Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the aforementioned charges 

on May 15, 2014. Appellant read, reviewed, and signed a written guilty plea 

colloquy, wherein the trial court specifically guaranteed her a term of 

probation. Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 5/15/14, at 1. At her hearing, 

Appellant stated that no one threatened her to plead guilty, she was 
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pleading guilty of her own free will, and she was pleading guilty because she 

was guilty of the offenses charged. N.T., 5/15/14, at 5-7. That same day, 

the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of three years’ probation.2 No 

post-sentence motions were filed. On June 10, 2014, Appellant filed a 

timely notice of appeal.3

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review.

Was it reversible error for the trial judge to 

repeatedly pressure ... Appellant to enter into a guilty 

plea when Appellant had indicated, numerous times, 

that she wished to be tried by a jury, resulting in a 

plea under duress?

Appellant’s Brief at 1. 

In assessing challenges to the validity of a guilty plea, we are guided 

by the following standard of review. “Settled Pennsylvania law makes clear 

that by entering a guilty plea, the defendant waives his right to challenge on 

direct appeal all nonjurisdictional defects except the legality of the sentence 

and the validity of the plea.” Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 

609 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 319 (Pa. 

2014). “Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was 

aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving otherwise.” 

____________________________________________

2 Specifically, Appellant was sentenced to two years’ probation for hindering 

apprehension or prosecution, and a consecutive one year term of probation 

for false identification to law enforcement authority.

3 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925.
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Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citation omitted). “[A] defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty 

plea; rather, the decision to grant such a motion lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 

378, 382 (Pa. Super. 2002).

A defendant wishing to challenge the 

voluntariness of a guilty plea on direct appeal must 

either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion 

to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Failure to 

employ either measure results in waiver. 

Historically, Pennsylvania courts adhere to this 

waiver principle because [i]t is for the court which 

accepted the plea to consider and correct, in the first 

instance, any error which may have been committed.

Lincoln, supra at 609-610 (Internal quotation marks and some citations 

omitted). 

Instantly, our review of the record reveals that Appellant did not 

object to her plea prior to or during the May 15, 2014 guilty plea and 

sentencing hearing. Further, Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion 

to withdraw her plea, despite being informed of her right to do so at said 

hearing. N.T., 5/15/14, at 12-13. As noted above, in order to preserve an 

issue related to the validity of a guilty plea, an appellant must either object 

during the colloquy or otherwise raise the issue at the guilty plea hearing, 

the sentencing hearing, or through a post-sentence motion. Lincoln, supra

; accord Commonwealth v. Tareila, 895 A.2d 1266, 1270 n.3 (Pa. Super. 

2006); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating, “[i]ssues not raised in the lower 
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court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[]”). 

Accordingly, Appellant has waived any challenge to the validity of her guilty 

plea.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s sole issue on appeal 

is waived for lack of preservation. Accordingly, the trial court’s May 15, 

2014 judgment of sentence is affirmed.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/23/2015