J-S30045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RANSFORD L. LEWIS 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 467 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 19, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001691-2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2024

Ransford L. Lewis (“Lewis”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his conviction for strangulation.

1

 We affirm.

The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history as follows:

On June 29, 2022, Lewis entered an open plea of guilty to 

one charge: strangulation. The remaining charges were nolle 

prossed. Sentencing was deferred pending a presentence 

investigation report (hereinafter “PSI”) and victim impact 

statement. As the factual basis for Lewis’s open guilty plea, he 

admitted that on January 17, 2022 in East Norriton, Montgomery 

County, he got into a physical and verbal altercation with his 

fiancé, P.H. . . ., during which he put his hands around her throat 

and squeezed to the point where P.H. could not breathe and 

blacked out.

At the guilty plea hearing, Lewis was colloquied on the 

record. The sentencing guidelines and the maximum exposure 

were placed on the record. Lewis testified that he understood the 

sentencing guidelines and wished to move forward with his guilty 

plea. Lewis executed a written guilty plea colloquy, initialed the 

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(a)(1).
J-S30045-23

- 2 -

bottom of each page and signed the last page. The court 

determined Lewis entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary 

plea to the charge of strangulation.

On September 19, 2022, th[e trial] court held a sentencing 

hearing. The sentencing guidelines were placed on the record. 

[Lewis] had a prior record score of zero (0) and the crime of 

strangulation carries an offense gravity score of nine (9), which 

put the standard range sentence in this case at twelve (12) to

twenty-four (24) months[,] plus or minus twelve (12) months. 

The court sentenced Lewis to a term of imprisonment for not less 

than two (2) years nor more than eight (8) years in a state 

correctional institution. . . ..

* * * *

The [trial] court had the benefit of a PSI in this case. The 

PSI contained information about [Lewis’s] background, education, 

family history[,] and criminal history. . . ..

The court considered the victim impact statement submitted 

by P.H. . . . as part of the PSI[,] and entered into evidence at the

sentencing hearing. The court found the victim impact statement 

to be credible. P.H. detailed the pattern of abuse she endured at 

Lewis’s hands throughout their relationship. The abuse included 

physical assaults, threats to kill her and attempts to silence her. 

The victim shared that her relationship with Lewis was abusive 

and frightening. The instant event was the culmination of a larger

pattern of abuse, which escalated to a strangulation, resulting in 

P.H. blacking out, losing consciousness and sustaining injuries.

Prior to imposing the sentence, the court considered all of 

the information presented at the sentencing hearing, including the 

PSI, the arguments of counsel, the victim impact statement[,] and 

the restitution request information. The court carefully considered 

the sentencing guidelines. . . .

* * * *

This sentence was at the upper end of the standard range 

of the guidelines. The court also sentenced Lewis to pay 

restitution in the amount of $15,052.20 within eight (8) years. 

This amount includes unreimbursed medical expenses in the 
J-S30045-23

- 3 -

amount of $14,902.20[,] and $150 for the lamp that Lewis used 

to strike [P.H.], which ultimately broke.

On September 27, 2022, Lewis filed a timely post[-

]sentence motion to reconsider and amend sentence. [He did not 

assert therein that the trial court abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law by considering P.H.’s victim impact 

statement.] While the post[-]sentence motion was pending, Lewis 

filed a pro se correspondence to withdraw his guilty plea, which 

th[e] court treated as a supplemental post sentence motion to 

withdraw guilty plea. On January 23, 2023, th[e] court denied 

Lewis’s post[-]sentence motion and his supplemental post[-

]sentence motion.

On February 17, 2023, Lewis filed a timely [n]otice of 

[a]ppeal . . ..

Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 1-3, 7, (paragraphs re-ordered; footnotes 

and citations to the record omitted). Both Lewis and the trial court complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Lewis raises the following issue for our review:

Was the lower court’s sentence rendered illegal when it used

uncharged conduct that had not been proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt – namely prior incidents of alleged abuse of the complainant 

– as a factor in imposing a lengthy state sentence in violation of 

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)?

Lewis’s Brief at 3.

Our standard of review for challenges to the legality of sentencing is as 

follows: “[I]ssues pertaining to Alleyne go directly to the legality of the 

sentence. . . . Issues relating to the legality of a sentence are questions of 

law. . . . Our standard of review over such questions is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Fennell, 105 A.3d 13, 15 (Pa. 
J-S30045-23

- 4 -

Super. 2014) (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted; some 

ellipses in original).

In his sole appellate issue, Lewis argues the trial court imposed an illegal 

sentence by considering uncharged conduct at sentencing. This Court has 

noted that, “[i]n Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that facts that increase 

mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury and must be 

found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fennell, 105 A.3d at 16; accord 

Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 819 (Pa. 2016) (noting that, 

“per Alleyne, it is no longer permissible for state legislatures to direct judges 

to apply specified minimum sentences based on preponderance-based judicial 

findings of fact”). Notwithstanding Alleyne, “[i]t remains lawful and, indeed, 

routine for judges to increase sentences, in the discretionary sentencing

regime, based on facts that they find by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

Washington, 142 A.3d at 819 (emphasis added). Indeed, this Court has 

“previously held that, where a trial court imposes sentence in accordance with 

the guidelines and does not sentence in accordance with a mandatory 

minimum sentencing scheme, an appellant is not entitled to relief under 

Alleyne.” Commonwealth v. Russell, 209 A.3d 419, 424 (Pa. Super. 

2019).

Lewis argues the trial court “impermissibly based its sentence in part on 

uncharged conduct th[at] had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,”

namely, the pattern of abuse P.H. asserted he had subjected her to. Lewis’s 
J-S30045-23

- 5 -

Brief at 10. He argues that if these abuse allegations contributed to the 

increase in his sentence, Alleyne requires it be submitted to a jury. See id. 

at 13. Lewis maintains that the trial court’s acceptance of P.H.’s allegations 

constituted impermissible judicial fact-finding beyond what he admitted to in 

his guilty plea. See id. at 17-18.

The trial court considered this issue and concluded it merits no relief:

In this case, the court did not make a factual finding that 

increased the mandatory minimum sentence in violation of 

Alleyne. Therefore, this case does not implicate the 

considerations of Alleyne. It remains lawful and, indeed, routine 

for judges to increase sentences, in the discretionary sentencing 

regime, based on facts that they find by a preponderance of the 

evidence.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/23, at 4.

Following our review, we conclude the trial court did not impose an 

illegal sentence. It is uncontested that the trial court imposed a standardrange sentence. See, e.g., N.T., 9/19/22, at 17-19. Because the trial court 

did not impose a mandatory minimum sentence, Alleyne is inapplicable and, 

consequently, it does not render Lewis’s sentence illegal. See Washington, 

142 A.3d at 819; see also Russell, 209 A.3d at 424.

2

 Accordingly, we affirm 

the judgment of sentence.

____________________________________________

2 We note that Lewis also presents his issue as a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. See, e.g., Lewis’s Brief at 10 (setting forth Lewis’s 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement of reasons for why this Court should review his

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence). However, Lewis’s 

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence is predicated on the trial 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S30045-23

- 6 -

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 1/24/2024

____________________________________________

court’s consideration of an allegedly improper factor, i.e., the contents of

P.H.’s victim impact statement in which she stated that Lewis subjected her 

to a pattern of abuse. See id. at 10. Lewis did not preserve this issue in his 

post-sentence motion; instead he focused on his mitigating information and 

rehabilitative needs. See generally Post-Sentence Motion, 9/27/22. 

Accordingly, Lewis failed to preserve this challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence, and we therefore decline to review it. See 

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 224 A.3d 40, 47–48 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(finding waiver of a discretionary aspect of sentencing issue where it was not 

raised below in a post-sentence motion or at a sentencing hearing); see also 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 9 (arguing Lewis has waived his challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing by failing to include it in his post-sentence 

motion).