UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ LUZ DEL CARMEN MORONES-QUINONES, Petitioner,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent. No. 15-9545 (Petition for Review)

__________________ _______________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

__________________ _______________ Before GORSUCH , McKAY , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ Ms. Luz del Carmen Morones-Quinones was ordered removed. She asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen the removal proceedings sua sponte so that she could re quest adjustment of status. 1 The Board

* The parties have not requested oral argument , and we do not believe oral argument would be helpful. As a re sult, we are decidi ng the appeal on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgme nt does not constitute bi nding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be ci ted for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

1 Ms. Morones-Quinones asked for relief sua sponte because she had missed the 90-day deadline for filing a moti on to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C). After the 90-day deadline expired, “the only avenue of FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 declined to reopen the re moval proceedings. Rather than file a petition for review, she moved for reconsideration. This motion was denied, prompting Ms. Morones-Quinones to file a petition for revi ew of the denial of reconsideration and to seek leave to proceed in fo rma pauperis. We dismiss the petition, but grant leave to proceed in fo rma pauperis. Petition for Review. We generally have jurisdiction to consider a motion to reconsider. See Mata v. Lynch , ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2154 (2015). In the moti on, however, Ms. Morones- Quinones relies on an alleged error by the Board in declinin g to sua sponte re open the removal proceedings. 2 We lack jurisdiction to entert ain that argument. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review. Ms. Morones-Quinones acknowledg es that we ha ve held in precedential opinions that we lack jurisd iction to consid er whether the Board erred in declinin g to reopen the pro ceedings sua sponte. See Infanzon v. Ashcroft , 386 F.3d 1359, 1361 (10th Cir. 2004); Belay-Gebru v.
INS , 327 F.3d 998, 1001 (10th Cir. 2003 ). But Ms. Morones-Quinones argues that the Supreme Court overruled these precedents in Kucana v. Holder , 558 U.S. 233 ( 2010). We disagree. relief is for the [Board of Immigration Appeals] to reopen proceedings sua sponte .” Gor v. Holder , 607 F.3d 180 , 198 (6th Cir. 2010); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (stati ng that the Bo ard of Immigrat ion Appeals can reopen a case on its own at any time).

2 In the motion, she also relies on a change in the law after the denial of her motion to reopen. Bu t she does not ra ise this argument in our court.3 Kucana addressed 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (B), which precludes judicial review of discretionary denials of relief. The Kucana Court held that § 1252(a)(2)(B) does not deprive the cour ts of jurisdiction to review the Board’s decisions on mo tions to reopen becaus e those decisions are discretionary by regulatio n, not statute. 558 U. S. at 237, 253. But in
Kucana , the Supreme Court noted that its issue did not i nvolve sua sponte reopening. Id. at 251 n.18. On th at issue, the Cour t stated that it “express[ed] no opinion on whether federal courts may review the Board’s decision not to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte .” Id. ; see also Mata v. Lynch , ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2155 (2015) (n oting that the question was reserved in Kucana and assuming arguendo that the court of appeals had correctly held that it lacked authority to review the Board’s refusal to reop en sua sponte). Because the Kucana Court expressed no op inion on our issue, we are bound by our precedents, whic h hold that we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the Board erred when dec lining to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte. See In re Smith , 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (“ We are bound by th e precedent of prior panels absent en banc recons ideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.”). Under these precedents, we lack jurisdiction to consid er whether the Board should have sua sponte reopened Ms. Morones-Quinon es’ removal proceedings. See Infanzon4 v. Ashcroft , 386 F.3d 1359, 1361 (10th Cir. 2004); Belay-Gebru v.
INS , 327 F.3d 998, 1001 (10th Cir. 2003). Th us, we dismiss the petition for review.
M otion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. Because Ms. Morones-Quinones cannot afford to prepay the filing fee, we grant her motion for leave to proceed in form a pauperis. With this status, Ms. Morones-Quinones is relieve d of her obligation to prepay the filing fee.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). But she remains ob ligated to pay th e filing fee. Brown v. Eppler , 725 F.3d 1221, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2013). Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge