[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10230

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RONDELL HALL, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00286-KD-C-1

____________________

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 1 of 18
2 Opinion of the Court 22-10230

Before BRANCH, BRASHER, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

BRASHER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents a question of first impression about supervised release and home confinement. The relevant statutes provide that a district court may impose home confinement with electronic monitoring in two circumstances. First, a district court may 

impose home confinement as a special condition of probation or 

supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(19). Second, a court 

may impose home confinement to punish a supervised release violation under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(4). In both instances, Congress 

specified that district courts may order home confinement with 

electronic monitoring “only as an alternative to incarceration.” Id. 

§§ 3563(b)(19), 3583(e)(4). Considering this limitation, the question 

for us is whether a district court may sentence a defendant to home 

confinement for violating the terms of his supervised release even 

if the district court has sentenced the defendant to the statutory 

maximum period of imprisonment for that violation. We join the 

Fifth Circuit in answering this question “no.” See United States v. 

Ferguson, 369 F.3d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 2004).

Rondell Hall, a class C felon, violated the conditions of his 

supervised release. After revoking his supervised release, the district court sentenced Hall to the statutory maximum of two years’ 

imprisonment and added one year of home confinement with location monitoring. We conclude that Hall’s sentence is inconsistent with the limitation that a district court may impose home 

confinement “only as an alternative to incarceration.” Because the 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 2 of 18
22-10230 Opinion of the Court 3

district court sentenced Hall to the statutory maximum term of 

two years’ imprisonment, it lacked authority to impose an additional year of home confinement with electronic monitoring “as an 

alternative to incarceration.” We therefore vacate Hall’s sentence 

to the extent it imposed a term of home confinement and remand 

for resentencing. 

I. 

The story of how Hall received the sentence at issue in this 

appeal begins in 2016, when he pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, a class C felony. 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1). After Hall served fifty-seven months in prison, he began 

a three-year term of supervised release. Hall’s supervised release 

included the conditions that he: (1) refrain from committing another crime, (2) keep his probation officer apprised of his current 

residence, (3) avoid places where people sell or use controlled substances, and (4) avoid associating with anyone involved in criminal 

activity or convicted of a felony. Hall’s supervised release began in 

September 2020. 

Roughly one year into his term, the district court revoked 

Hall’s supervised release because he violated multiple conditions.

Specifically, at the revocation hearing, Hall admitted to changing 

his residence without telling his probation officer and frequenting 

a place known for illegal drug activity. The district court additionally found by a preponderance of the evidence that Hall violated 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 3 of 18
4 Opinion of the Court 22-10230

his conditions by engaging in domestic violence and possessing a 

firearm. 

In response to these violations, the district court revoked 

Hall’s term of supervised release and imposed a modified sentence

under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The court noted that the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for a class C felony upon revocation 

of supervised release is two years. The court sentenced Hall to two 

years’ imprisonment—the statutory maximum—followed by a 

one-year term of home confinement. The district court made clear 

that home confinement would mean that Hall must submit to location monitoring and be “restricted to [his] residence at all times,” 

except for preapproved activities, like employment, church, or 

court appearances. 

Hall objected only to the home confinement order, which 

the district court noted and overruled. Hall then moved to vacate 

the home confinement order. The district court denied Hall’s motion. Hall timely appealed. 

II. 

We review de novo the legality of a sentence, including a 

sentence imposed pursuant to the revocation of a term of supervised release. United States v. Mazarky, 499 F.3d 1246, 1248 (11th 

Cir. 2007). We also review issues of statutory interpretation de 

novo. Id.

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 4 of 18
22-10230 Opinion of the Court 5

III. 

Sections 3563(b)(19) and 3583(e)(4) both provide that a district court may order a defendant to “remain at his place of residence during nonworking hours” and “be monitored by telephonic 

or electronic signaling devices, except that [a condition or order] 

under this paragraph may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(19), 3583(e)(4). In light of this 

statutory language, the sole question in this appeal is whether the 

district court lawfully sentenced Hall to home confinement in addition to the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for his supervised release violation. Hall argues the court did not, and we 

agree. 

Our discussion proceeds in three parts. First, we set out the

statutory framework for sentencing upon revocation of a defendant’s supervised release. Second, we determine the ordinary meaning of “as an alternative to incarceration” in Sections 3563(b)(19) 

and 3583(e)(4). Third, we address (and dispose of) the government’s arguments for why home confinement may be imposed on 

top of a statutory maximum sentence of incarceration.

A.

We start with some basics. A district court may impose a 

sentence only if a statute authorizes that sentence. See generally 18 

U.S.C. § 3551. Accordingly, a sentence cannot exceed the maximum term authorized by statute. See id. §§ 3581, 3583. And a 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 5 of 18
6 Opinion of the Court 22-10230

district court cannot impose a sentence in circumstances that a statute forbids.

Federal law authorizes a category of sentences called “supervised release,” “a form of postconfinement monitoring” provided 

“to facilitate a transition to community life.” Mont v. United States, 

139 S. Ct. 1826, 1833 (2019) (cleaned up). When a district court sentences a defendant to a term of imprisonment, it may include “as a 

part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on 

a term of supervised release after imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(a). The district court should include conditions during this 

term of supervised release to encourage the defendant to avoid future criminal activity. For example, a district court must order as a 

condition of supervised release that the defendant “not commit another . . . crime.” Id. § 3583(d). It has the discretion to impose other 

conditions, such as “any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b).” Id. Section 3563(b) lists 

about twenty potential discretionary conditions, such as working 

in community service or refraining from excessive use of alcohol. 

See id. § 3563(b).

If a defendant violates a condition of his supervised release, 

the district court may revoke the supervised release and impose a 

revised sentence. Id. § 3583(e)(3). The revised sentence may include imprisonment for a term “authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release,” i.e., the original offense. Id. For a defendant convicted of a class C felony, like 

Hall, the revised sentence’s term of imprisonment may not exceed 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 6 of 18
22-10230 Opinion of the Court 7

two years. Id. A district court may also impose a new term of supervised release after the revised term of imprisonment. Id. § 

3583(h). That term cannot exceed the original maximum term for 

supervised release (here, three years) less the time the defendant is 

sentenced to prison upon revocation. Id. § 3583(b)(3), (h). So, if 

someone like Hall is sentenced to two years imprisonment, they 

can be sentenced to a maximum of one year of supervised release 

to follow.

For its part, a sentence of home confinement requires a defendant to “remain at his place of residence during nonworking 

hours and, if the court so directs, to have compliance monitored by 

telephone or electronic signaling devices.” Id. § 3583(e)(4); see also 

id. § 3563(b)(19). Two relevant provisions authorize district courts 

to sentence defendants to home confinement. First, as explained 

above, when a court sentences a defendant to probation or supervised release, it may impose any of the discretionary conditions 

listed in Section 3563(b). See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Home confinement is one such discretionary condition. Id. § 3563(b)(19). Second, 

Section 3583(e) separately authorizes courts to impose a term of 

home confinement as punishment when a defendant violates the 

conditions of his supervised release. Id. § 3583(e)(4). Importantly, 

in both instances, the statute provides that an order for home confinement “may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration.” 

Id. §§ 3583(e)(4), 3563(b)(19).

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 7 of 18
8 Opinion of the Court 22-10230

B.

We now turn to Hall’s arguments. Everyone agrees that,

upon revoking his original term of supervised release, the district 

court could sentence Hall to two years of imprisonment (the maximum) and one year of supervised release (three years minus the 

term of imprisonment). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(3), (e)(3), (h). But Hall 

argues that, because the district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum term of incarceration for his violation, the court 

erred by imposing one year of home confinement as an additional

punishment for that offense. The government argues that this sentence—the statutory maximum term of imprisonment followed by 

one year of home confinement—was not an abuse of the district 

court’s discretion.

There are two ways to understand the home confinement 

portion of Hall’s sentence. The district court may have imposed a 

year of home confinement as punishment for Hall violating the 

conditions of his previous supervised release. See id. § 3583(e)(4). 

Or the district court may have imposed one year of supervised release to follow Hall’s two years of incarceration, see id. § 3583(h), 

and added home confinement as a special condition to that oneyear term of supervised release, see id. § 3563(b)(19). The district 

court cited both statutes in explaining its sentence. Either way, the 

statutes that authorize a sentence of home confinement provide 

that it is authorized “only as an alternative to incarceration.” Id. §§ 

3563(b)(19), 3583(e)(4). Accordingly, to resolve Hall’s argument we 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 8 of 18
22-10230 Opinion of the Court 9

must determine the ordinary meaning of “except [home confinement] may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration.” 

In the government’s view, the phrase is merely hortatory or 

suggestive. Specifically, the government asks us to read “only as an 

alternative to incarceration” as a directive to sentencing courts to 

treat home confinement and incarceration as different things. The 

government contends that Congress wanted sentencing courts to 

appreciate that home confinement “is not imprisonment itself.” 

We cannot agree with this interpretation.

For starters, the government’s reading would give this 

phrase no operative effect. Home confinement is the only enumerated condition of probation or supervised release that includes the 

caveat “except that a condition under this paragraph may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration.” 18 U.S.C. §

3563(b)(19). It appears in both places where the statute authorizes 

home confinement. See id.; id § 3583(e)(4). But it is not the only

supervised release condition with an express limitation on a district 

court’s authority to impose it. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(10) (capping 

nights and weekends in custody at “the lesser of one year or the 

term of imprisonment authorized for the offense”). Nothing about 

the placement of these provisions or the text suggests they are hortatory. And we cannot adopt an interpretation of this phrase that 

simply “render[s] it superfluous.” In re Shek, 947 F.3d 770, 776 (11th

Cir. 2020); see also Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278,

1285 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[A]statute should be construed so that effect

is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 9 of 18
10 Opinion of the Court 22-10230

superfluous, void or insignificant.”) (quoting Corley v. United

States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)).

The government’s reading also makes very little sense in 

light of the statute’s text. The statute does not say that “courts shall 

not consider home confinement to be imprisonment.” Instead, the 

operative phrase expressly conditions a district court’s authority to 

impose a sentence of home confinement. The statute provides that

a district court may impose home confinement “except . . . only as 

an alternative to incarceration.” The word “except” means “other 

than” or “but.” See Except, Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d. 

ed. 1988). The phrase that follows “except” is an exception: courts 

may impose home confinement “except . . . only as an alternative 

to incarceration.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(19), 3583(e)(4) (emphasis added). See Except, Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d. ed. 

1988). The government’s interpretation would read out “except”

altogether. We are confident that, if Congress had wanted to say 

only that home confinement does not count as incarceration, it 

would have done so with different language.

Finally, we note that there was no reason for Congress to 

tell courts to treat imprisonment and home confinement differently. The Code already makes clear that the twenty-three discretionary conditions that courts may impose during probation or supervised release do not count as incarceration. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3563(b); see also id. § 3583(d). Like home confinement, these conditions are allowed as part of probation or supervised release, 

which the sentencing statutes treat separately from incarceration. 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 10 of 18
22-10230 Opinion of the Court 11

See id. § 3563(b); see also United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 

1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that “residence in a halfway house is 

not tantamount to imprisonment” because it “is a lawful and reasonable part of [a] probationary sentence”). But, unlike home confinement, there are no phrases suggesting that these conditions are 

“not imprisonment.” The reason: such statements are unnecessary.

Because we disagree with the government, we conclude that

the phrase—“except that a condition under this paragraph may be 

imposed only as an alternative to incarceration”—must limit a district court’s sentencing authority. To determine what that limitation is, we begin, as always, with the words of the statute. Harris v. 

Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Lacking applicable statutory definitions, “we look to the common usage of 

words for their meaning” and may turn to “dictionary definitions 

for guidance.” CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 

1217, 1222−23 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). The 

word “alternative” is defined as “providing or being a choice between two or among more than two things,” see Alternative, Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d ed. 1988), or “a choice limited to 

one of two or more possibilities, as of things, propositions, or 

courses of action, the selection of which precludes any other possibility.” See Alternative, Random House Dictionary (2d ed. 1987).

For example, “[t]he alternative to riding is walking” because “the 

selection of [one] precludes” the other. Id. Employing this definition buttresses our common sense understanding of the term “alternative”: an alternative is a choice between at least two things. 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 11 of 18
12 Opinion of the Court 22-10230

In light of this definition, we see two possible ways to understand home confinement as an “alternative to incarceration.” This 

language could preclude a district court from ordering home confinement and incarceration in the same sentence i.e., the selection 

of one entirely precludes the other. Or the phrase “alternative to 

incarceration” could mean that a district court may impose home 

confinement only if it could have imposed incarceration i.e., that 

choosing one is an “alternative” to choosing the other. 

We can quickly dispose of the first reading. Faced with the 

same argument, the First Circuit has concluded that home confinement as an “alternative to incarceration” does not mean the two 

cannot be combined in the same sentence. United States v. Marcano, 525 F.3d 72, 73 (1st Cir. 2008). We agree. Because the statute 

expressly allows courts to combine incarceration and supervised

release in the same sentence, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), and expressly allows home confinement as a condition of supervised release, id. § 3563(b)(19), courts must be able to combine incarceration and home confinement in the same sentence. The statute’s use 

of the phrase “alternative to incarceration” thus cannot be read to 

mean “that the imposition of any period of incarceration pursuant 

to § 3583(e)(3) necessarily precludes any home confinement during 

the ensuing period of supervised release.” Marcano, 525 F.3d at 73.

Instead, we believe the second reading is the correct one. 

That is, a district court imposes home confinement “as an alternative to incarceration” when the district court has the authority to 

impose a term of imprisonment but chooses to impose home 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 12 of 18
22-10230 Opinion of the Court 13

confinement instead. The upshot is that a district court may consider home confinement as an option only when a term of incarceration is also on the table. Conversely, a district court without 

the authority to impose imprisonment cannot impose home confinement. If a district court lacks authority to impose a term of imprisonment, then a term of home confinement would not be “as an 

alternative to incarceration.”

Here, the district court sentenced Hall to the maximum 

term of incarceration and an additional year of home confinement.

Based on our understanding of the statute, we agree with Hall that 

this sentence is illegal. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, a court 

cannot “impose the maximum term of incarceration under subsection (e)(3) and also impose a period of home confinement under 

(e)(4).” Ferguson, 369 F.3d at 851. The reason is that incarceration

beyond the statutory maximum term is not an option available to

a district court. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3581, 3583(e)(3). Because the district court did not have the option to impose imprisonment, it 

lacked authority to impose home confinement.

Whether we view Hall’sterm of home confinement as a special condition of supervised release under Section 3563(b)(19) or as 

a stand-alone punishment under Section 3583(e)(4), a court may 

impose it “only as an alternative to incarceration.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 

3563(b)(19), 3583(e)(4). The ordinary meaning of these provisions 

is that the district court erred by imposing a term of home confinement when it could not have imposed the same term of imprisonment. 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 13 of 18
14 Opinion of the Court 22-10230

C.

The government makes three final arguments against this 

common sense reading of the statutory text: (1) our holding, it argues, is inconsistent with our prior precedent; (2) our decision 

would split with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v.

Hager, 288 F.3d 136, 137 (4th Cir. 2002); and (3) the difficulties of 

differentiating special conditions of supervised release from home 

confinement make our holding impracticable. We explain why 

each argument fails in turn. 

1.

First, the government argues our plain text reading conflicts 

with our prior precedent in United States v. Mangaroo, 504 F.3d 

1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2007). We are not persuaded.

The facts in United States v. Mangaroo bear little resemblance to those here. In Mangaroo, the defendants were convicted 

of firearm offenses that, by statute, required a minimum term of 

incarceration and prohibited probation. Id. at 1353−54. We thus 

held that the district court erred in sentencing the defendants to 

home confinement—a “condition[] of probation”—because “home 

confinement is not incarceration.” Id. at 1354. Unlike the statute in 

Mangaroo, Section 3583(e) provides courts with a range of options 

for resentencing upon revocation of supervised release, including 

incarceration, home confinement, or a combination of the two. 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (4). And, of course, we did not address the 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 14 of 18
22-10230 Opinion of the Court 15

meaning of “alternative” in either Section 3583(e)(4) or Section 

3563(b)(19) in Mangaroo.

In any event, our reasoning in Mangaroo aligns with our reasoning here. The government emphasizes our conclusion in Mangaroo that “home confinement is not incarceration.” See Mangaroo, 504 F.3d 1354. But we agree that “home confinement is not 

incarceration.” The whole point is that, under Section 3583(e)(4) or 

Section 3563(b)(19), they must be treated as “alternatives” that are 

not the same. That is, they are mutually exclusive options where 

the selection of imprisonment precludes, in some respects, the selection of home confinement.

2.

Second, the government argues that we are creating a split 

with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hager, 288 

F.3d 136, 137 (4th Cir. 2002). Again, we disagree. In Hager, the 

Fourth Circuit considered whether a defendant should receive

credit against the statutory maximum sentence for a new revocation for time he served on home confinement when his supervised 

release was previously revoked. Id. at 136. The court in Hager

noted that “the word ‘alternative’ does not indicate that home confinement and incarceration are equivalents under the statute.” Id.

at 137. And the court held that a previous period of home confinement from a prior revocation does not count as imprisonment for 

calculating the statutory maximum sentence that could be imposed 

for a new violation of a supervised release. Id. at 139.

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 15 of 18
16 Opinion of the Court 22-10230

Hager is inapposite for at least two reasons. 

First, the court in Hager was answering the inverse of our 

question. The language we are interpreting restricts the district 

court’s power to impose home confinement, not its authority to 

impose incarceration. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(3), 3563(b)(19). But 

the court in Hager was considering whether the district court could 

impose a new term of imprisonment, not a new term of home confinement. Hager, 288 F.3d at 139. Hager has nothing to say about a 

district court’s ability to impose home confinement. And, conversely, our opinion says nothing about when a district court can 

impose a term of imprisonment.

Second, Hager is based on a reading of the statute that has 

been superseded by an amendment and that we have already disavowed. The court in Hager began by “assum[ing] without deciding 

[] that § 3583(e)(3)’s maximum prison term”—here, two years—

“limits the total prison time that may be imposed for multiple violations of supervised release.” Id. at 137 (emphasis added). Then it 

addressed whether a previous sentence to home confinement 

should count toward that aggregate limit. Id. at 137−39. Congress 

has since amended Section 3583 to clarify that the maximum prison 

term a defendant may serve on revocation of supervised release 

does not aggregate over revocations; instead, it applies “on any 

such revocation.” See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to 

End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-

21, Title I, § 101, Apr. 30, 2003, 117 Stat. 651 (codified as amended 

at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)). As we have explained, this statutory

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 16 of 18
22-10230 Opinion of the Court 17

change clarified that “upon each revocation of supervised release a 

defendant may be sentenced to the felony class limits contained

within § 3583(e)(3) without regard to imprisonment previously 

served for revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Cunningham, 800 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015). Thus, the question

presented in Hager can no longer arise— because the full statutory 

maximum applies to each new revocation, there is no need to decide whether to count previous sentences for home confinement 

(or imprisonment) as credit against sentences for future revocations.

3.

Finally, the government argues that our holding will be difficult to apply in practice because it is hard to determine whether a 

special condition of supervised release amounts to home confinement. We disagree. 

We are not convinced that it will be difficult in practice to 

distinguish home confinement from other conditions of supervised 

release. Consider this case as an example. The district court expressly ordered Hall to complete “home detention with location 

monitoring.” Thus, the district court’s home detention order is 

plainly one that, under Sections 3563(b)(19) and 3583(e)(4), “may 

be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration.”

Moreover, the relevant statutes expressly distinguish home 

confinement from other kinds of conditions that may be imposed 

during probation or supervised release. Both Section 3563(b)(19) 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 17 of 18
18 Opinion of the Court 22-10230

and Section 3583(e)(4) provide a definition for home confinement: 

an “order [that] the defendant [must] remain at his place of residence during nonworking hours and, if the court so directs, to have 

compliance monitored by telephone or electronic signaling devices.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(4); accord id. § 3563(b)(19). Accordingly, 

if courts have any difficulty in distinguishing home confinement 

from other conditions of supervised release, that difficulty arises

from the text of the statute, not our holding.

IV. 

For these reasons, we VACATE Hall’s revised sentence with 

the home confinement condition and REMAND for resentencing. 

USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 18 of 18