alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment.

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). 

NO. 07-03-0383-CR

NO. 07-03-0384-CR

NO. 07-03-0385-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

FEBRUARY 24, 2005

______________________________

DAVID MATTHEW LAYTON, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

NO. 34,435-C, 34,436-C, 34,437-C; HONORABLE PATRICK PIRTLE, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ., and BOYD, S.J.1

In these companion cases, appellant David Matthew Layton was convicted of

aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault of a child. We affirmed the trial court

conviction in each case. See Layton v. State, No. 07-96-0234-CR, 1997 Lexis 5257 (Tex.

App.–Amarillo Oct. 3, 1997, pet. ref’d); Layton v. State, No. O7-96-O235-CR, 1997 Lexis
2

5258 (Tex. App.–Amarillo Oct. 3, 1997, pet. ref’d); and Layton v State, No. 07-96-0236-CR,

1997 Lexis 5259 (Tex. App.–Amarillo Oct. 3, 1997, pet. ref’d). Appellant now asserts that

the trial court reversibly erred in denying his motions for post-conviction forensic DNA

testing. For the reasons set out below, we disagree the trial court erred, and we affirm the

trial court’s denial of those motions.

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 64.03(a)(2)(A) provides that a trial court

may only order forensic DNA testing if the convicted person establishes by a

preponderance of the evidence that the person would not have been convicted if

exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing. Tex. Code Crim Proc. Ann.

art 64.03(a)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). In advancing his contention that his motions

should have been granted, appellant, for the most part, again challenges in some detail the

legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. In addition, he

specifically argues that the victims never made a firm identification of him as the culprit and

emphasizes that the State’s evidence shows he arrived at the scene of the crimes just after

the commission of the crimes. 

However, the evidence in these cases was reviewed in somewhat exhaustive detail

in our opinions affirming the convictions, and appellant has not presented any contentions

here that were not within the bounds of our prior discussion of the sufficiency of the trial

evidence. Because of the nature of the evidence sustaining appellant’s conviction,

appellant has not borne his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he

would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained

through DNA testing.
3

Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of appellant’s amended motions for DNA testing

of evidence must be, and are hereby, affirmed in each case.

John T. Boyd

Senior Justice

Do not publish.
EXHIBIT 31.2



CERTIFICATIONS



I, Lori A. Jones, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of Analytical Surveys, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and the registrants have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under
our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being
prepared;



b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the
registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this annual report based on such
evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this annual report any change
in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or
is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.



|                       
|-----------------------
|Date: May 17, 2004     
|                       
|/s/ Lori A. Jones      
|Lori A. Jones          
|Chief Financial Officer
#### Jules J. Maurice, Appellant, *v.*William M. Fowler, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

December, 1912.)

Negotiable instruments — where maker writes word “renewed” on notes — Statute of Limitations.

In an action on two promissory notes given as security for a preexisting debt, it is no defense that the notes were made only for accommodation of the original payee.

Where, upon one of the notes, the defendant maker writes the word “ renewed ” together with his signature, there is an unequivocal renewal of his promise to pay sufficient to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations; and the fact that the new promise was asked by the original payee and not by the actual holder of the note is immaterial.

Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, borough of Manhattan, first district, rendered in favor of the defendant.

William M. Kileullen, for appellant.

Frank Trenholm, for respondent.

Lehman, J.

The plaintiff sues upon two notes which the defendant admits making. The answer attempts to set up a defense to the first cause of action that the defendant made the note only for the accommodation of the original payee; and as a defense to the second cause of action he sets up the Statute of Limitations.

*358At the trial evidence was received upon both these issues, and the trial justice rendered judgment in favor of the defendant on both causes of action. The record is somewhat confused, but I think it sufficiently appears that the plaintiff received these notes as security for a pre-existing debt, and, therefore, the defense to the first cause of action was not sustained.

“A pre-existing debt, without extension or forbearance, is sufficient consideration upon which to hold the accommodation maker of a promissory note where there has been no restriction placed on its use.” Lehrenkrauss v. Bonnell, 199 N. Y. 240, citing Grocers’ Bank v. Penfield, 69 id. 502.

It further, I think, sufficiently appears that the defendant wrote on the note in suit in the second cause of action the word *“*renewed ” together with his signature, and that this was an unequivocal renewal of the promise sufficient to take the case out of the statute. It is in my opinion immaterial that the note was presented to the defendant and a new promise asked by the original payee of the note, and not the holder to whom the note had been assigned. By indorsing the new promise upon the note itself, the defendant must be regarded as having made the new promise to the actual holder.

Judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered with costs to appellant to abide the event.

Page, J., concurs; Hotchkiss, J., concurs in result.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.
#### BRUCE BUILDERS, INC., Petitioner, v. HARDRIVES COMPANY, INC., a Florida corporation, Respondent.

No. 72-695.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 6, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari denied.
#### Charles W. Shaffer, Appellant, *v.*Vandewater & Company, Limited, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

November, 1912.)

Municipal Courts — entry of judgment — Municipal Court Act, § 230 — appeal.

Where, on the last day for rendition of judgment under the statute, and stipulation of the parties, a justice of the Municipal Court of the city of New York signed a judgment dated two days ahead, the delivery thereof by him in the clerk’s office on the day he signed it, at an hour when the office was closed for public business, was not within the time prescribed by section 230 of the Municipal Court Act, and said judgment will he reversed for lack of jurisdiction.

Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, borough of Manhattan, seventh district, rendered in favor of the defendant by the court sitting without a jury.

Edgar H. Dollin (George B. Keeler, of counsel), for appellant.

Henry Kuntz (Abraham P. Wilkes, of counsel), for respondent.

Searury, J.

This judgment must be reversed, because it was not rendered in accordance with the terms of the statute. The last day under the statute and stipulation of the parties upon which the court below was authorized in this case to render judgment was February 27, 1912. At five forty-five p. m. on that day, the justice before whom this cause was pending signed the judgment and left it in the clerk’s office. The judgment was.dated as having been signed by the justice on February 29, 1912. At the time the justice left the judgment in the clerk’s office on February twenty-seventh, the clerks had left the office for the day, and the office itself was *134closed to the public. Whether we assume that the delivery in the office was equivalent to the delivery to the clerk to be filed the next day (Hathaway v. Howell, 54 N. Y. 97), or that, in view of the date upon the judgment, the justice intended it to be filed on February twenty-ninth, it is clear that in either case the decision was not filed within the time prescribed by section 230 of the Municipal • Court Act. In neither alternative can the decision properly be said to have been delivered to the clerk within the statutory time. It is well settled that, where,the decision of a justice is not delivered to the clerk within the time prescribed by statute, the justice, loses jurisdiction of the cause. Van Valis v. Charcona, 40 Misc. Rep. 226.

Guy and Bijur, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed, without costs, and complaint dismissed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-7075

In Re: RICHARD ALLEN SMITH, JR., Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus (No. 2:00-cr-00007-FPS; 2:04-cv-00050-FPS) Submitted: September 26, 2006 Decided: October 3, 2006 Before WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Richard Allen Smith, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Richard Allen Smith, Jr., petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging the district court has unduly delayed acting on two motions for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. Although we find that mandamus relief is not warranted because the delay is not unreasonable, we deny the mandamus petition without prejudice to the filing of another mandamus petition if the district court does not act expeditiously. We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential.



# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

IN RE DOCTORS MAKING HOUSECALLS, LLC

______________________

2013

- 1553

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

, in Serial No.

85324528.

______________________

JUDGMENT

______________________

E RIC P. S TEVENS , Poyner Spruill, LLP, of Raleigh, North Carolina, argued for appellant. With him on the
brief was J OHN W. O’H ALE

.

B ENJAMIN T. H ICKMAN

, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With him on
the brief were N ATHAN K. K ELLEY , Solicitor, and
C HRISTINA J. H IEBER , Associate Solicitor.

______________________

T HIS C AUSE having been heard and considered, it is

O RDERED and A DJUDGED :P ER C URIAM (L OURIE

, B RYSON

, and H UGHES

, Circuit Judges ).

AFFIRMED

. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

E NTERED BY O RDER OF THE C OURT

March 10, 2014 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole

Date Daniel E. O’Toole
Clerk of Court
EXHIBIT 23.1

               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 File No. 33-65189, No. 333-03291, No. 333-15665, No. 333-53151 and No.
333-63051) pertaining to the various employee and director stock option plans
and agreements of CT Holdings, Inc. of our report dated April 2, 2004, with
respect to the financial statements of CT Holdings, Inc. included in the Annual
Report (Form 10-KSB) for the year ended December 31, 2003.



/s/ KBA Group LLP
Dallas, Texas
April 14, 2004




<PAGE>
#### Charles DRISCOLL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-265.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 2, 1972.

Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, and D. Turner Matthews, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corees, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on authority of Steinhauser v. State, Fla.App.2d 1969, 228 So.2d 446.

LILES, A. C. J., and MANN and McNULTY, JJ., concur.
# C_2021278EN.01007102.xml

| 12.7.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 278/71 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 278/71

---

Order of the General Court of 28 May 2021 — Corman v Commission

(Case T-25/21) (1)

(2021/C 278/96)

Language of the case: French

The President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 72, 1.3.2021.

---
Exhibit 32.2  CFO Certification

CERTIFICATION

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
(18 U.S.C. 1350)

In connection with the Annual Report of Electronic Systems Technology Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10K for the year ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jon Correio, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ JON CORREIO

Jon Correio                                                                        
Chief Financial Officer                                                               
Date: March 22, 2011



This certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Annual Report and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of § 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.; and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.



A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant to be furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### BARRANGER, BARRANGER & JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Saxon FARMER and Henry Ellen DANIEL, wife of Saxon Farmer, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 9422.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

June 29, 1973.

John Gallaspy, Bogalusa, for defendant-appellant.

Garic K. Barranger, Covington, for defendant-appellee.

Before SARTAIN, BLANCHE and WATSON, JJ.

SARTAIN, Judge.

The law partnership of Barranger, Bar-ranger & Jones instituted this action against Saxon Farmer and Henry Ellen Daniel, wife of Saxon Farmer, alleging that they are jointly and solidarily obligated to the plaintiff in the sum of $366.55, for legal services rendered to Mrs. Farmer in connection with a suit for separation filed by Mr. Farmer against Mrs. Farmer.

*561Mr. and Mrs. Farmer were represented by counsel and filed an answer in the nature of a general denial.

Mr. Farmer, individually, filed a per emptory exception of prescription.

The main demand and the exception were heard on the merits on February 28, 1972, and judgment was rendered and signed in open court on the 3rd day of March, 1972.

The said judgment provides as follows:

> “This matter came on for hearing this 28th day of February, 1972, pursuant to previous assignment, present for plaintiff was Garic Kenneth Barranger, for the defendant, John N. Gallaspy. And when after hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the Court being of the opinion the judgment should be granted for plaintiff and *against the defendant*for the reasons this day orally assigned:

> “IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that there be judgment herein in favor of Barranger, Barranger & Jones, plaintiff in the full and true sum of FIVE HUNDRED AND ELEVEN AND 56/100 DOLLARS ($511.56), together with all costs of these proceedings, including a fee for expert testimony to Mr. France Watts, III, in the full and true sum of -, together with legal interest from date of judicial demand upon the principal sum above stated until paid in full.” (emphasis ours)

Within the proper delays, Mr. Farmer appealed suspensively.

We are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from is defective for it does not name the defendants. We are unable to determine from the record whether it was the intention of the trial judge to cast both Mr. and Mrs. Farmer in judgment or Mr. Farmer alone.

While clerical errors or miscalculations in a final judgment may be corrected by us, we do not feel disposed to assume that judgment in the instant matter was rendered in solido against the defendants or against Mr. Farmer individually. It is for this reason that we deem it proper to remand this matter to the trial court for the purpose of having a proper judgment entered, which judgment will specify the defendant and/or defendants who were intended to be cast.

The cost of this appeal is to be borne by the appellant, Saxon Farmer. All other costs are to await a final determination by us on appeal.

Remanded.
EXHIBIT 99.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

This certification is provided pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 and accompanies the annual report on Form 10-K (the "Form 10-K") for the
year ended December 31, 2002 of American Insured Mortgage Investors - Series 85,
L.P. (the "Issuer").

I,  Cynthia O.  Azzara,  Senior  Vice  President,  Chief  Financial  Officer and
Treasurer, certify that to the best of my knowledge:

(i)  the Form 10-K fully  complies  with the  requirements  of section  13(a) or
     section 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.  78m(a) or
     78o(d)); and

(ii) the  information  contained  in the Form  10-K  fairly  represents,  in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Issuer.


                                  AMERICAN INSURED MORTGAGE
                                  INVESTORS - SERIES 85, L.P.
                                  (Registrant)

                                  By: CRIIMI, Inc.
                                      General Partner



March 25, 2002                    /s/Cynthia O. Azzara
--------------                    ----------------------------------------------
Date                              Cynthia O. Azzara
                                  Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
                                  and Treasurer
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