alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Lucien EYRAUD et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMMISSION ON ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL for the State of Louisiana and Virgil D. Joffrion, Commissioner of the Commission on Alcoholic Beverage Control, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 9658.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Sept. 5, 1973.

Michael Silvers and Ronald Tanet, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert L. Roshto, Baton Rouge, for defendants-appellees.

Before LOTTINGER, ELLIS and BLANCHE, JJ.

LOTTINGER, Judge.

This matter is before us at this time as the result of an Ex proprio motu show *579cause order issued by this Court questioning the jurisdiction of this Court on this appeal.

The instant appeal was taken from the Trial Court’s refusal to grant the plaintiffs-appellants a preliminary injunction which would have enjoined the Commission on Alcoholic Beverage Control from enforcing ABC Regulation No. XIII.

The appellants filed their petition requesting the preliminary injunction on March 16, 1973, and a rule nisi was fixed for March 22. After hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, the Trial Court submitted written reasons for judgment on March 29. A written judgment denying the preliminary injunction was signed on April 12, and it is from that judgment that the appellants have taken their appeal.

The order of appeal was signed on April 23, 1973 in which order the Trial Court set the amount of the bond at $500.00. However, the bond was not filed until June 15, 1973.

The time limitation for perfecting an appeal in this case is determined by C.C.P. Art. 3612, which provides that “an appeal from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary injunction must be taken and a bond furnished within fifteen days from the date of the order or judgment.” It is clear that both the order of appeal and the filing of the appeal bond must be accomplished within the fifteen day period. Morris v. Transtates Petroleum, Inc., 234 So.2d 243 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1970), aff., 258 La. 311, 246 So.2d 183; La. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Keetmann, 221 So.2d 263 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1969).

The timely filing of the appeal bond is absolutely essential since the jurisdiction of the appellate court is dependent upon that act. C.C.P. Art. 2088 provides that “the jurisdiction of the trial court over all matters in the case reviewable under the appeal is divested, and that of the appellate court attaches, on the timely filing of the appeal bond. . . .’’In similar cases, this Court has ruled that when the appeal bond was not filed timely it was without jurisdiction, and therefore, the appeal must be dismissed. Phillips v. Bergeron, 263 So.2d 72 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1972); Mathews v. Travelers Insurance Company, 234 So.2d 468 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1970).

It is evident from the above i that the bond was not timely filed.

For the reasons assigned, the appeal is accordingly dismissed at appellants’ cost.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Robert CAIVANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-505.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 14, 1973.

Rehearing Denied May 10, 1973.

Kenneth R. Mikos, of Friedrich, Kersten & Blackwell, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corees, Jr., and Richard C. Booth, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PIERCE, Judge (Ret.).

Appellant Caivano was charged in a two-count information with (1) possession of cocaine and (2) sale of cocaine on April 20, 1971. He was convicted of both charges and sentences of three years for each conviction were imposed by the trial judge to be served concurrently. The cocaine he was charged with possessing was the cocaine he was charged with selling. Caiva-no was therefore charged and convicted of two facets or phases of the same transaction. Only one sentence should have been imposed, and that for the highest offense charged. Yost v. State, Fla.App.1971, 243 So.2d 469; Martin v. State, Fla.App.1971, 251 So.2d 283; Brown v. State, Fla.App.1972, 264 So.2d 28; Jones v. State, Fla.App.1972, 265 So.2d 514.

We have examined the other points raised on appeal and find them to be without merit.

*246The judgment is affirmed, but the sentences are vacated and the cause is remanded with directions that appellant be presented to the trial court and properly sentenced in accordance herewith.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.

MANN, C. J., and LILES, J., concur.
# C_2022472EN.01003801.xml

| 12.12.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 472/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.12.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 472/38

---

Judgment of the General Court of 19 October 2022 — Baumberger v EUIPO — Nube (Lío)

(Case T-466/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - European Union figurative mark Lío - Absolute ground for invalidity - Bad faith - Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2022/C 472/43)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Dino Baumberger (Wesel, Germany) (represented by: J. Fusbahn and D. Dawirs, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: N. Lamsters and E. Markakis, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Nube, SL (Ibiza, Spain) (represented by: J. Gracia Albero and R. Ahijón Lana, lawyers)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 2 June 2021 (Case R 1221/2020-5).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Dino Baumberger to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Dino Baumberger to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 382, 20.9.2021.

---
#### Ella RANDOLPH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-1112.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 2, 1974.

*375Pollack, Yocom, Tunkey & Robbins, Ull-man, Kimler & Entin, Miami, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and William L. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-appellant, Ella Randolph, seeks review of the trial court’s order of revocation of probation and sentence to two years in the state penitentiary.

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in finding that the evidence of her possession of marijuana was sufficient to revoke the defendant’s probation. We disagree.

A revocation of probation hearing is informal and does not take the course of a regular trial, nor does the evidence have the same objective as that taken at a regular trial. Its purpose is to satisfy the conscience of the court as to whether the conditions of the suspended sentence have been violated and to give the accused an opportunity to be heard. Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So.2d 607 (1947). A search of the record reveals that there was sufficient evidence contained therein to support the belief of the trial judge that the probationer had violated the terms of his probation. Cf. McNeely v. State, Fla. App.1966, 186 So.2d 520; Singletary v. State, Fla.App.1974, 290 So.2d 116.

Defendant also argues that the trial judge erred in (1) admitting hearsay testimony concerning the chemical analysis of the property seized, and (2) allowing the police officer to testify as to the sale of marijuana which allegedly occurred between the defendant and the confidential informant.

This report and testimony would have been inadmissable at a trial but properly were considered in the instant cause by the trial judge. See Bernhardt v. State, Fla. 1974, 288 So.2d 490; State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 631; Singletary, *supra.*Thus, these contentions of appellant must fail.

We also considered appellant’s remaining point on appeal and found that to be without merit.

Accordingly, the order revoking probation is affirmed.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1997
<CASH>                                             722
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   25,610
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (100)
<INVENTORY>                                     43,644
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                72,688
<PP&E>                                          79,666
<DEPRECIATION>                                (42,188)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 118,020
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           27,545
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            59
<OTHER-SE>                                      63,906
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   118,020
<SALES>                                        236,277
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               236,277
<CGS>                                          166,293
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  166,293
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                54,930
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   202
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,507
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 15,054
<INCOME-TAX>                                     5,728
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              9,326
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     9,326
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.55
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
# C_2022148EN.01002402.xml

| 4.4.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.4.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/24

---

Order of the General Court of 4 February 2022 — ultra air v EUIPO — Donaldson Filtration Deutschland (ultrafilter international)

(Case T-67/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Proceedings for invalidity and revocation - European Union word mark ultrafilter international - Request for conversion to a national trade mark application - Revocation proceedings devoid of purpose - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

(2022/C 148/33)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: ultra air GmbH (Hilden, Germany) (represented by: C. König, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: E. Markakis, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO intervening before the General Court: Donaldson Filtration Deutschland GmbH (Haan, Germany) (represented by: N. Siebertz, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 November 2020 (Case R 271/2020-2), concerning revocation proceedings between ultra air and Donaldson Filtration Deutschland.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | ultra air GmbH shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ultra air GmbH shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 88, 15.3.2021.

---
#### Benj. E. COOK, Executor of Last WILL and Testament of Elmer E. DRAKE, deceased, v. UNITED STATES of America.

No. 1374.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Sept. 23, 1936.

Benj. E. Cook, of Ponca City, Okl., for appellant.

Daniel Dillon, Atty., Bureau of War Risk Litigation, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for the United States.

Before LEWIS, PHILLIPS, and BRATTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded pursuant to stipulation of the parties.
#### Clark County vs. Scott.

Under the statute it is the duty of the clerk of the Circuit Court to provide blank executions) etc, for the use of his office, and it is the duty of. the County Court to allow the account therefor, and provide for its payment.

Upon the reversal of a judgment of the County Court, the Circuit Court ought to proceed to try the case.

*Appeal from Clark Circuit Court.*

Hon. L. B. Green, Circuit Judge.

Hempstead, Solicitor General, for the County.

Flanagin, contra.

Mr. Justice Fairchild

delivered the opinion of the court.

Scott produced his account to the Cark County Court for two quires of blank executions, at $1 25 per quire, which was shown by the evidence to have been furnished on application of the clerk of the Circuit Court, for the use of his office. The amount claimed, $2 50, is proved to be a reasonable charge.

The history of the case, from the County Court up to this Court, is the same as that of *Clark County vs. Spence.*

The *8th section of chapter*30, *of English's Dig.,*requires the clerk to provide suitable books, stationery, furniture, and other things necessary for his office.

These the clerk is to provide, but what the law exacts of him to provide, is not for his own benefit, but what is necessary for his office; books, furniture and stationery that are suitable for the preservation of the county i'ecords, in which every citizen *468of the comity is interested, furniture for their proper keeping, stationery with which the business of the office is to be done, and whatever else is necessary for the office, for all which the ■ county ought to pay.

And that the county would pay for the things provided, under the authority of the section cited, we think is the meaning of the statute.

The County Court should have allowed Scott’s account. The law authorized and required it to be done.

True economy, the despatch and accuracy of public business are greatly promoted by the use of such blanks as were charged for in the account.

The Circuit Court did right in reversing the judgment of the County Court, but should not have remanded the case to the County Court.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, with instructions to reverse the judgment of the County Court, and set the case for trial anew in the Circuit Court.
Capital-Plus Partners, LLC.







A Financial Services Company



7620 Olentangy River Road

Columbus, Ohio 43235

(614) 848-7620 / 841-3856 Fax

EXHIBIT B

TO FACTORING AGREEMENT



SCHEDULE OF COMMISSION AND OTHER CHARGES



Scheduled Item

Description

|Advance Limit
Advance %
Factoring Commission | $700,000
80      % on current, verified receivables.
The factoring Commission on each Account purchased is   0    % of the Purchase Price for such Account.  At Purchaser's election the Commission may be paid from any Advance when made or charged to Seller's account with Purchaser.
|-------------------------------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Discount for Accounts
with Advances          | For each Account against which an Advance is made a factoring Discount shall be paid at the rate of     1        % of the Purchase Price for the first15days and 1 % for each15day period or part thereof elapsed from the date the Advance is made until the Account is paid in full.   
|Service Charges for
Accounts Purchased       | For servicing purchased Accounts,Seller shall pay Purchaser a Service Charge equal to0% of the Purchase Price for each30day period (the "service period") or fraction thereof that the Account remains unpaid.  The Service Charge is payable on the first day of each service period.   
|Interest on other Obligations                | Any amounts, other than Advances, which are not paid when due shall bear interest at the rate of 1.5% per month.                                                                                                                                                                         



If not otherwise paid pursuant to the provisions of the Factoring Agreement between Purchaser and Seller, all outstanding Commissions, Discounts, Service Charges, Fees and accrued Interest may be deducted from any amounts due Seller from Purchaser.  Seller's acceptance and agreement to this Schedule of Commissions and Other Charges is evidenced by Seller's signature below and the Purchaser's acceptance is evidenced by the signature of its authorized representative.  Seller agrees that an Account will be considered to be paid in full only when good funds equaling the Gross Invoice Amount are received by Capital-Plus Partners, LLC. at the bank lock box assigned to Seller.



Assigned Lockbox is:

P.O. Box 714807

Columbus, OH  43271-4807



The above schedule of Commissions and charges is for purchased accounts.



ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO:

ACCEPTED BY:



LBO Capital Corp.

("SELLER")

Capital-Plus Partners, LLC.   ("PURCHASER")

Print Name:Mario DiNello

Print Name:

Robert D. Setzer

By:

/s/ Mario DiNello

By:



( Signature )

( Signature )

Its:

COO

Its:

President

ExhibitB Revised 5/17/95

#
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 12.1

                CALIFORNIA STEEL INDUSTRIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY

                Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges

                        (All dollar amounts in thousands)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                           Year Ended December 31,
                                                 ------------------------------------------
                                                  2001     2000     1999     1998     1997
                                                 ------   ------   ------   ------   ------
<S>                                              <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>
Income (loss) before income taxes ............   (7,317)  56,138   77,027   26,816   44,316
Fixed charges ................................   17,147   19,837   17,861   19,645   16,642
Amortization of capitalized interest .........      552      534      686      609      409
Capitalized interest .........................      118     (300)    (588)  (1,940)  (1,952)
                                                 ------   ------   ------   ------   ------
Earnings .....................................   10,500   76,209   94,986   45,130   59,415
                                                 ------   ------   ------   ------   ------
Imputed interest relating to rental expense...      468      460      470      169       83
Interest expense .............................   16,679   19,377   17,391   19,476   16,559
                                                 ------   ------   ------   ------   ------
  Fixed charges ..............................   17,147   19,837   17,861   19,645   16,642
                                                 ------   ------   ------   ------   ------
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges ...........      0.6      3.8      5.3      2.3      3.6
</TABLE>

                                       1
#### BUDZEN *v.*MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.

Master and Servant — Federal Employers’ Liability Act — Negligence — Evidence—Sufficiency.

In action under Federal employers’ liability act, for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendant’s negligence, judgment for defendant, on court’s finding that it was not guilty of negligence, *held,*supported by preponderance of evidence.

Appeal from Wayne; Dingeman (Harry J.), J.

Submitted October 22, 1931.

(Docket No. 182, Calendar No. 36,024.)

Decided January 4, 1932.

*455Case under the Federal employers’ liability act by Frank Budzen against Michigan Central Railroad Company, a Michigan corporation, for personal injuries alleged to be due to defendant’s negligence. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

*Harry C. Milligan (Leo J. Carrigan,*of counsel), for plaintiff.

*John J. Danhof (Harold H. McLean,*of counsel), for defendant.

Fead, J.

Plaintiff, a trucksmith employed by defendant, while going from the engine house toward the blacksmith shop at night, came to a tire rack at which locomotive tires, weighing from 700 to 1,000 pounds each, were stacked on edge and inclining at an angle. Three of the tires fell on his foot. He claims the accident occurred by his stumbling over a two-by-four block of wood six inches long, which was stuck under the tires, and so releasing them. Defendant denied that such block of wood was, or could be, used in stacking the tires or that it was there when the tire men left the job at the end of the day, and that immediately after the accident plaintiff stated to the men who removed the tires from his foot that the accident had occurred because he was straightening the tires. He had no duty to perform in connection with them.

The action is under the Federal employers’ liability act (45 USCA, §§ 51-59). The trial was before the court without a jury, and defendant had judgment. The court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law and answers to special questions.

The court held that the accident did not occur as claimed by plaintiff, and defendant was not guilty *456of negligence. The finding is amply supported by a preponderance of the testimony, and renders it unnecessary to discuss other questions.

Judgment affirmed, with costs..

Clark, C. J., and McDonald, Potter, Sharpe, North, Wiest, and Butzel, JJ., concurred.
**Exhibit 32.2**

**Certification of Principal AccountingOfficer****Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002 (18 U.S.C §1350)**

I, Lori A. Jones, of Analytical Surveys, Inc.,certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the yearended September 30, 2006 (the “Report”) which this statement accompanies fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of Analytical Surveys, Inc.
| Dated: December 22, 2006     |
|------------------------------|
|                         |
| /s/ Lori A. Jones            |   |
| Lori A. Jones                |
| Principal Accounting Officer |

 

----