alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 6 Agreed to House (ATH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 6

      Providing for the designation of certain minority employees.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 5, 1993

Mr. Michel submitted the following resolution; which was considered and 
                               agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
      Providing for the designation of certain minority employees.

    Resolved, That pursuant to the Legislative Pay Act of 1929, as amended, the 
six minority employees authorized therein shall be the following named persons, 
effective January 3, 1993, until otherwise ordered by the House, to-wit: William 
R. Pitts, Jr., Walter P. Kennedy, Ronald W. Lasch, Jay Pierson, William Gavin 
and B. Robert Okun, each to receive gross compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of House Resolution 119, Ninety-fifth Congress, as enacted into 
permanent law by section 115 of Public Law 95-94.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM COMPANY'S
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS AND CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-2000
<CASH>                                           1,072
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   27,584
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (200)
<INVENTORY>                                     57,058
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                89,926
<PP&E>                                         136,315
<DEPRECIATION>                                (48,378)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 190,863
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           38,503
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           110
<OTHER-SE>                                      93,724
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   190,863
<SALES>                                        266,641
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               266,641
<CGS>                                          175,247
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   71,922
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   206
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   188
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,385
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 16,693
<INCOME-TAX>                                     6,527
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,166
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    10,166
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .97
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .96


</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MELODIE DePIERRO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE 

ASSOCIATION METRO, INC.; LAS 

VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-16541 

D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01481-GMN-VCF 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 17, 2022**

Before: S.R. THOMAS, PAEZ, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Melodie DePierro appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing her 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a First Amendment claim arising out of union 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). DePierro’s request for oral 

argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied. 

FILED

AUG 24 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 21-16541 

membership dues paid to Las Vegas Police Protective Association Metro, Inc. 

(“union”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291. We review de novo a 

district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 

1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed DePierro’s First Amendment claim for 

retrospective relief because the deduction of union membership dues arose from a 

private membership agreement between union and employee, and “private dues 

agreements do not trigger state action and independent constitutional scrutiny.” 

Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 946-49 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied 141 S. Ct. 

2795 (2021) (discussing state action); see id. at 950-52 (concluding that the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County &

Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), did not extend a First 

Amendment right to avoid supporting the union and paying union dues that were 

agreed upon under voluntarily entered membership agreements); Knutson v. Sirius 

XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing mutual assent).

DePierro’s claim for prospective relief is moot. DePierro is no longer a 

member of the union and defendants stopped deducting union membership dues. 

See Bain v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 891 F.3d 1206, 1211-14 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(explaining that plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief were moot when they 

resigned their union membership and presented no reasonable likelihood that they 
 3 21-16541 

would rejoin the union in the future).

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 23.3Consent of Cawley, Gillespie & Associates, Inc.     As independent petroleum engineers, we hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in theregistration statements (No. 33-57348, No. 333-34617, No. 333-66938 and No. 333-117533) on FormsS-8, and the registration statements (No. 33-90296, No. 333-112518 and No. 333-119725) on Forms S-3of Parallel Petroleum Corporation of information from our reserves report dated January 31, 2004and all references to our firm included in or made a part of the annual report on Form 10-K/A,amendment no. 1, of Parallel Petroleum Corporation for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004.     /s/ CAWLEY, GILLESPIE & ASSOCIATES, INC.   Ft. Worth, Texas  August 18, 2005
SCWC-18-0000534

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I

STATE OF HAWAI I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. PAMELA JOY NAILE, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-18-0000534; CASE NO. 1DCW-17-0003051) ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Pollack, and Wilson, JJ.) Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Pamela Joy Naile’s application for writ of certiorari filed on August 30, 2019, is hereby rejected.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai i, October 16, 2019. /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Paula A. Nakayama /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Richard W. Pollack /s/ Michael D. Wilson Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-18-0000534 16-OCT-2019 08:07 AM
#### James WARREN, Jack Warren, Jerry Warren, Robert Warren, and Freida Warren, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF the INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 82-4642.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

July 1, 1983.

Robert J. Peyton, Houston & Peyton, Reno, Nev., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Shirley Smith, Asst. U.S. Atty., Reno, Nev., for defendants-appellees.

Before BROWNING, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT, CHOY, GOODWIN, WALLACE, SNEED, KENNEDY, ANDERSON, HUG, TANG, SKOPIL, SCHROEDER, FLETCHER, FARRIS, PREGERSON, ALARCON, POOLE, FERGUSON, NELSON, CANBY, BOOCHEVER, NORRIS and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

ORDER FOR PUBLICATION

Upon a vote of a majority of the regular active judges of this court, it is ordered that this case shall be heard by an en banc panel of the court pursuant to Rule 25 of the *507Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The previous three-judge panel assignment is hereby withdrawn.
Exhibit 99.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of Avery  Communications,  Inc. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the period  ending June 30, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Patrick
J. Haynes, III, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted  pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that:

            (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

            (2) The information  contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.



/s/ Patrick J. Haynes, III
----------------------------------
Patrick J. Haynes, III
Chief Executive Officer
August 14, 2002




<PAGE>
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Joseph S. Forgione, Deceased. Christie Forgione, Appellant; Linda F. Forgione, Respondent.

[655 NYS2d 552]

In a proceeding pursuant to SCPA article 10 to obtain letters of administration for the estate of Joseph S. Forgione, the petitioner Christie Forgione appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Queens County (Nahman, S.), dated January 18, 1996, as granted the motion of the objectant Linda Ferrara Forgione for summary judgment sustaining her first objection to the petition, decreed that the objectant was the decedent’s surviving spouse, and appointed the objectant administrator of the decedent’s estate.

Ordered that the decree is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs payable by the appellant personally.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Surrogate correctly determined that the decedent died prior to the entry of a final judgment of divorce, and that the objectant Linda Ferrara Forgione is thus the decedent’s surviving spouse *(see,*EPTL 5-1.2). Where, as here, a decedent dies during the pendency of a divorce action, the action abates because the marital relationship between the parties no longer exists *(see, e.g., Forgione v Forgione,*231 AD2d 603; *see also, Matter of Alfieri,*203 AD2d 562; *Sperber v Schwartz,*139 AD2d 640). Although an exception to this rule exists where the court has made a final adjudication of divorce but has not performed "the mere ministerial act of entering the final judgment” *(Cornell v Cornell,*7 NY2d 164, 170; *see also, Brown v Brown,*208 AD2d 485; *Van Pelt v Van Pelt, 172*AD2d 659), the record does not support the petitioner’s claim that this exception is applicable in this matter. To the contrary, the Judicial Hearing Officer who presided over the decedent’s matrimonial action expressly advised the parties that no judgment of divorce would be signed until all of the issues referred to him had been resolved. Since the decedent died before the matrimonial hearing could be completed and all issues resolved, entry of a judgment of divorce cannot be considered a mere ministerial act *(see,*Turano, 1996 Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 17B, EPTL 5-1.2, 1997 Pocket Part, at 34; *cf., Brown v Brown, supra; Van Pelt v Van Pelt, supra).*Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
# C_2021310EN.01001102.xml

| 2.8.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 310/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.8.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 310/11

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte d’appello di Venezia (Italy) lodged on 21 May 2021 — Agecontrol SpA v ZR, Lidl Italia Srl

(Case C-319/21)

(2021/C 310/15)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte d’appello di Venezia

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Agecontrol SpA

Respondents: ZR, Lidl Italia Srl

Question referred

Must Article 5(4) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, (1) read in conjunction with Article 5(1) and Article 8 of that regulation and with Articles 113 and 113a of Council Regulation (EU) No 1234/2007 (2) of 22 October 2007, be interpreted as meaning that an accompanying document must be issued indicating the name and the country of origin of fresh fruit and vegetables shipped pre-packed or in the original packaging provided by the producer, during transport from a seller company’s distribution platform to a point of sale of the same company, irrespective of the fact that one side of the packaging features the information particulars required by Chapter I [of Title II] of Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 (including the name and country of origin of the goods) indelibly printed directly onto the package or on a label which is an integral part of the package or affixed to it, and irrespective of the fact that this information is also shown on the invoices issued by the supplier from which the goods were purchased by the seller company kept in that company’s accounting offices and on a notice placed in an obvious position inside the means of transport in which the goods are being conveyed?

---

(1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 of 7 June 2011 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors (OJ 2011 L 157, p. 1).

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (OJ 2007 L 299, p. 1).

---
NUMBER 13-14-00274-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

MARI REGALADO, Appellant,

v.

SERGIO MUNOZ JR., Appellee.

On appeal from the 139th District Court

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

ORDER

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Perkes and Longoria

Order Per Curiam

This cause is before the Court regarding the briefing schedule for this accelerated 

appeal under the Texas Election Code. The Honorable Robert M. Blackmon ordered that 

appellant’s brief was to be filed with this Court by June 6, 2014. See TEX. ELEC. CODE

ANN. § 232.014(d) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). The election code also 

provides that this Court may review these deadlines on motion of a party. See id. 
2

Appellant’s counsel states in his motion that he has not “been furnished” with a copy of 

the clerk’s record, which was filed in this Court on May 22, 2014. This Court attempted 

to email a copy of the record to appellant’s counsel; however, we were unable to do so 

due to technical difficulties with the filing system. On June 3, 2014, we finally submitted 

a copy of the clerk’s record and reporter’s record to appellant’s counsel. Appellee has 

filed a response to the motion opposing any extension to file the brief.

The Court, having considered appellant’s motion for extension of time to file the 

brief, appellee’s response, and the nature of the case, is of the opinion that the motion for 

extension of time to file the brief should be granted in part with order. The Court GRANTS 

IN PART appellant’s motion for extension of time and ORDERS appellant’s brief to be 

filed in this cause on or before June 10, 2014. The Court further ORDERS appellee’s 

brief to be filed in this cause ten days thereafter, or on or before, June 20, 2014. The 

Court will not favorably entertain further motions for extension of time in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the

4th day of June, 2014.
#### William M. BARNETT et al., Members of the Civil Service Commission of the City of New Orleans v. Robert E. DEVELLE et al.

No. 53654.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 21, 1973.

In re: William M. Barnett, Norman C. Francis and Marcel Garsaud, Jr., Members of the Civil Service Commission of the City of New Orleans applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans,

It is ordered that the writ of review issue ; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.

MARCUS, J., recused.
#### Mary McElhaney, Administratrix of the Estate of Willard McElhaney, Appellant, *v.*Fort Pitt Bridge Works, Appellee.

Submitted on briefs May 8, 1975,

to Judges CRUMlish, Jr., Wilkinson, Jr., and Blatt, sitting as a panel of three.

*267*Alexander J. Pentecost,*for appellant.

*Lawrence R. Zewe,*with him *James N. Diefenderfer,*for appellee.

May 27, 1975:

Opinion by

Judge Wilkinson,

The narrow issue before us is whether the lower court1 was correct in affirming the Workmen’s Compensation Board’s finding that the appellant’s decedent2 had not sustained his burden of proof that he had suffered the permanent loss of use of his left foot for all practical intents and purposes. A careful review of the record, being only the testimony of the claimant and his doctor, compels us to conclude that the lower court was correct and we affirm.

The parties agree that, as interpreted by the courts, Section 306(c) of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Com*268pensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, *as amended,*77 P. S. §513 (Supp. 1974-1975), requires the loss of use to be “for all practical intents and purposes.” Judge Wright, later President Judge, of the Superior Court reviewed the law in this area in a case strikingly similar to the instant one, making it unnecessary for us to repeat it here. *See Verna v. Stabler,*204 Pa. Superior Ct. 87, 203 A.2d 578 (1964). Here, at best, perhaps the record could support a finding that the claimant had suffered the “industrial loss of use of a foot.” We say only perhaps, for that was the opinion of the claimant’s doctor. Nevertheless, the record shows clearly that at the time of the hearing, claimant continued to work at the same job and at the same pay as he had before the accident, albeit with considerable discomfort.

In *Hartlieb v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board,*12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 314 A.2d 519 (1974), we had occasion to review a record in connection with “complete” loss of hearing in both ears under Section 306(c)(8), the only sub-section to use the word “complete.” There, the Board had used the “for all practical intents and purposes” rule. We held that “complete” required a different test. However, we observed, on a record which might be considered by some to be stronger in support of the claimant than the instant one, that the evidence probably would not support a claim of loss of hearing even for all practical intents and purposes.

Under such circumstances, we cannot find that the lower court was incorrect in affirming the Board’s finding that the claimant had not carried his burden of proving the loss of use of the left foot “for all practical intents and purposes.”

Affirmed.

1

. The accident occurred on February 21, 1966. The hearings were held in 1969 and 1970. The Board’s decision was filed July 22, 1971. A timely appeal was filed to the lower court which affirmed the Board on July 22, 1974.

2

. During the pendency of the appeal from the Board to the lower court, the claimant died and the caption was amended appropriately by petition.
#### Boy Elijah O’STEEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. P-444.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 2, 1972.

Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, Bartley K. Vickers and Steven E. Rohan, Asst. Public Defenders, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A. S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment finding him guilty of violation of probation.

Appellant contends that the trial court’s revocation of probation was erroneously based on conduct engaged in by appellant prior to his having been placed on probation. We agree.

In Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So.2d 607 (Fla.1947), the Supreme Court speaking of conduct that would warrant revocation of probation said that the conduct contemplated by the statute as grounds for revocation was conduct occurring during the period of revocation. In Egantoff v. State, 208 So.2d 843 (Fla.App.1968), the court said:

> “It is now settled law in this State that probation may be revoked solely upon conviction by a jury of a subsequent crime, . . . ”

On December 21, 1970, an information charging appellant with the offenses of receiving stolen property was filed against him in Duval County. He pled guilty to that charge on January 12, 1971, and was placed on probation for five years. On April 2, 1971, he was served with a rule to show cause why his probation should not be revoked because of certain conduct violative of the conditions of his probation order, which conduct was engaged in subsequent to his being placed on probation. On July 2, 1971, a supplemental rule to show cause was served on appellant based on the allegation that he had violated the conditions of his probation in that he was convicted on June 18, 1971, of committing the offense of breaking and entering with the intent to commit a felony. While the June 18, 1971, conviction occurred during his term of probation, the conduct giving rise to that conviction occurred on November 16, 1970, prior to the date on which appellant was placed on probation. At the probation revocation hearing, no evidence was received or considered regarding the infractions alleged in the April 2, 1971, rule to show cause. Rather, the only conduct of appellant’s which was considered was that relating to the charges on which the supple*209mental rule to show cause of July 2, 1971, was based. As noted above, since the latter charge was based on conduct occurring pior to the probation order, it cannot legally form the basis of revocation of probation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment reviewed herein and remand this cause to the trial court for a further hearing on the charges of probation violation set out in the April 2, 1971, rule to show cause, any one of which allegations of violation, if shown to be true, would be sufficient ground to revoke appellant’s probation since that alleged conduct did occur subsequent to probation order.

Reversed and remanded.

SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Preferred Voice, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending December 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mary G.
Merritt, Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ Mary G. Merritt
-------------------
Mary G. Merritt
Principal Executive Officer
Principal Financial Officer
February 14, 2006