alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Thurmon Brooks, Appellant, v Paul Russi et al., Respondents.

[655 NYS2d 65]

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lange, J.), entered October 2,1995, which, upon return of an order to show cause why the petitioner should not be *395restored to parole and released from custody, dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The petitioner commenced this habeas corpus proceeding after the respondent New York State Board of Parole issued a determination revoking his parole. The Supreme Court granted an order to show cause why the petitioner should not be restored to parole in lieu of a writ of habeas corpus. Upon the return of the order to show cause, the court dismissed the proceeding on the ground that because his administrative appeal of the parole revocation determination was still pending, the petitioner had not exhausted his administrative remedies. However, some of the issues raised in the petition were not subject to administrative review *(see,*9 NYCRR 8003.3), and therefore judicial review of those issues was appropriate *(see, e.g., People ex rel. Hacker v New York State Div. of Parole,*228 AD2d 849; *People ex rel. Washington v Irvin,*201 AD2d 907; *People ex rel. Woods v McGreevy,*191 AD2d 938, 941; *People ex rel. Allison v LeFevre,*126 AD2d 928). Because these issues can be resolved on this record, without the need for a hearing, we shall dispose of the proceeding on the merits rather than remit it to the Supreme Court for consideration *(see,*CPLR 409 [b]).

The petitioner contends, somewhat inconsistently, that he was denied his right to a final revocation hearing within 90 days of the probable cause determination *(see,*Executive Law § 259-i [3] [f] [i]), and that the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter the ALJ) wrongfully refused to adjourn the final hearing pending resolution of the underlying criminal charges. We find no merit to either contention. Although the Division of Parole was responsible for 48 days of delay in the commencement of the final revocation hearing, the remainder of the delay was attributable to the unavailability of the petitioner’s attorney *(see, People ex rel. Burton v Russi,*199 AD2d 560; *People ex rel. Sloan v New York State Bd. of Parole,*88 AD2d 666). Moreover, we find no error in the ALJ’s refusal to delay the final hearing until the underlying charges were resolved *(see, People ex rel. Matthews v New York State Div. of Parole,*58 NY2d 196, 201).

Because the police officer who witnessed the incident in question testified at the hearing, the petitioner was not deprived of his right to confrontation when the victim of the petitioner’s assaultive conduct failed to testify *(cf., People ex rel. McGee v Walters,*62 NY2d 317).

*396The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Copertino, J. P., Sullivan, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
#### WILLIAM M. BONWILL *vs.*SAMUEL DICKSON.

The court will not permit a party to demur after issue joined and jury sworn.

Affirmative pleadings do not always give the right to conclude; this depends on the *onus probandi*and is in the discretion of the court.

Trespass, assault and battery. Plea, justification. The plea of non cul. had also been putin; but before trial deft’s, counsel asked and obtained of the court leave to withdraw it. The plff’s. counsel, though in court when the motion was made, were not apprised of the plea being withdrawn until after the jury was sworn. They then wished to demur, but the court would not permit them as they had suffered the jury to be sworn without objection.

*106The defendant offered no evidence of justification but merely in mitigation of damages.

A question then arose as to the order of addressing the jury, the deft, claiming the right to conclude as his only plea was affirmative.

*Clayton*and *Rates,*for plff.

*Ridgely,*for deft.

*Per curiam;*

The question is one upon which the court in their discretion pass, and it depends more upon the state of the proof than of the pleadings. Affirmative pleadings usually impose the onus probandi but not always. In this case the deft, has offered no evidence whatever to sustain his plea of justification; but only in mitigation of damages. It is not the case of a contrariety of testimony on the point; but of no testimony. The plea of justification, therefore, without any effort to support it, does not give the deft, the reply. It is essential to enable the jury to give a verdict that the plff. shall proceed to show his damages. He therefore is entitled to the reply. *Roscoe Ev.*132; 2 *Stark. Rep.*487; 14 *Com. Law Rep.*176; *Stark. Ev. Ch.*3. *p.*384-5; 3 *Campb.*366. Chandler et al. *vs.*Ferris, post

The plaintiff had a verdict.
#### James GERTMAN v. STATE of Florida.

No. 38830.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 223 So.2d 798.
<PAGE>

                             Verizon Northwest Inc.

                                                                      EXHIBIT 12

                COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES

                                                           Three Months Ended
(Dollars in Millions)                                        March 31, 2002
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income before provision for income taxes                               $ 92.8
Equity in income from affiliate                                           (.1)
Interest expense                                                         11.1
Portion of rent expense representing interest                             3.7
Amortization of capitalized interest                                       .2
                                                             -----------------
Earnings, as adjusted                                                  $107.7
                                                             =================
Fixed charges:
Interest expense                                                       $ 11.1
Portion of rent expense representing interest                             3.7
Capitalized interest                                                       .3
                                                             -----------------
Fixed Charges                                                          $ 15.1
                                                             =================
Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges                                       7.13
                                                             =================
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                           5,600
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  738,800
<ALLOWANCES>                                    67,100
<INVENTORY>                                     61,800
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               779,700
<PP&E>                                      10,503,300
<DEPRECIATION>                               6,621,400
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,502,900
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,267,300
<BONDS>                                      1,565,900
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     50,000
<COMMON>                                     1,400,000
<OTHER-SE>                                     364,900
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,502,900
<SALES>                                      2,478,200
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,478,200
<CGS>                                          720,900
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,503,700
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              99,700
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                885,100
<INCOME-TAX>                                   357,600
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            527,500
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   527,500
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
# Official Journal L 21/2018

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 21 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6125 January 2018 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 21

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6125 January 2018

---

| Contents | | I   Legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | Definitive adoption (EU, Euratom) 2018/91 of amending budget No 6 of the European Union for the financial year 2017 | 1 |

Contents

I   Legislative acts

page

Definitive adoption (EU, Euratom) 2018/91 of amending budget No 6 of the European Union for the financial year 2017

1

All amounts in this budget document are expressed in euro unless otherwise indicated.

Any revenue provided for in Article 21(2) and (3) of the Financial Regulation, entered in Titles 5 and 6 of the statement of revenue, may lead to additional appropriations being entered on the headings which bore the initial expenditure giving rise to the corresponding revenue.

Figures for outturn refer to all authorised appropriations, including budget appropriations, additional appropriations and earmarked revenue.

Budgetary remarks are only executable insofar as they do not modify or extend the scope of an existing legal base, impinge on the administrative autonomy of institutions and can be covered by available resources (as indicated in the annex to the executability letter dated 28 October 2015).

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.
Exhibit 32-2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the
Quarterly Report of The Goldfield Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the three months ended March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Stephen R.
Wherry, Senior Vice President, Treasurer, Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to The Goldfield Corporation and will be retained by The Goldfield Corporation
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



/S/ STEPHEN R. WHERRYStephen R. WherrySenior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer), Treasurer and Assistant SecretaryMay 14, 2009




26
#### Bernice LYLES, Appellant, v. Joe WOODWARD, as Administrator of the Estate of Josephine Lucas, Deceased, and Thomas J. Williams, Appellees.

No. 68-461.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District

May 5, 1969.

Appeal dismissed.
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1129

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize the transfer

of $20,000,000 in addition to United States War Reserve Stockpiles

for Allies in Thailand to support the implementation of a bilateral agreement with Thailand.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 17 (legislative day, JUNE 15), 1993

Mr. PELL (by request) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and

referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize

the transfer of $20,000,000 in addition to United States

War Reserve Stockpiles for Allies in Thailand to support

the implementation of a bilateral agreement with

Thailand.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That section 514(b)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of

4 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), as amended by section 569 of

5 the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related

6 Programs Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102–

7 391, October 6, 1992; 106 Stat. 1681), is amended by
2

S 1129 IS

1 striking out ‘‘of which amount not less than $200,000,000

2 shall be available for stockpiles in Israel, and up to

3 $189,000,000 may be made available for stockpiles in the

4 Republic of Korea’’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘of which

5 amount not less than $200,000,000 shall be available for

6 stockpiles in Israel, and up to $169,000,000 and

7 $20,000,000 may be available for stockpiles in the Repub8 lic of Korea and Thailand, respectively’’.

Æ
257 La. 450

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Frank JOHNSON v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 51097.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 13, 1971.

In re: Frank Johnson applying for writ of habeas corpus.

Writ denied. The showing made does not warrant the exercise of our supervisory or original jurisdiction. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 25 L.Ed.2d 785, 90 S.Ct. 1458 (1970).
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-51057

Summary Calendar

JUSTO GONZALEZ, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ARMY; TOGO D. WEST, JR.,

Secretary of the Army,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(EP-96-CV-466-F)

August 13, 1998

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Justo Gonzalez, Jr. (Gonzalez) filed suit in federal court

against appellees, U.S. Department of the Army and Togo D. West,

Jr., Secretary of the Army (the Army), asserting that the Army

refused to promote him to Garrison Manager at Fort Bliss because of

sex and national origin discrimination. Gonzalez also alleged the

Army retaliated against him because he filed an EEO complaint

challenging the Army’s discriminatory failure to promote. Gonzalez
2

moved for partial summary judgment on his discrimination claim on

October 10, 1997. The Army moved for summary judgment on

Gonzalez’s discrimination and retaliation claims on October 14,

1997. The district court denied Gonzalez’s motion for partial

summary judgment and granted the Army’s motion for summary judgment

on both of Gonzalez’s asserted causes of action on November 14,

1997. Gonzalez timely appealed.

We have carefully reviewed the briefs, the reply brief, the

record excerpt and relevant portions of the record itself. For the

reasons stated by the district court in its 31-page Order signed

under date of November 10, 1997 and filed under date of November

14, 1997, we AFFIRM the Final Judgment of the district court signed

under date of November 12, 1997 and filed under date of November

14, 1997.

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 32

                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS

      Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the
undersigned certifies that this periodic report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and that information contained in this periodic report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Smithway
Motor Xpress Corp.

Date: March 28, 2006             /s/ G. Larry Owens
                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                 G. Larry Owens
                                 President,
                                 Chief Executive Officer and Secretary

Date: March 28, 2006             /s/ Douglas C. Sandvig
                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                 Douglas C. Sandvig
                                 Senior Vice President,
                                 Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
#### UNITED STATES v. EIDE.

No. 8178.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Feb. 23, 1937.

H. H. McPike, U. S. Atty., and Thomas C. Lynch, Sp. Asst, to the U. S. Atty., both of San Francisco, Cal. (Julius C. Martin, Director, Bureau of War Risk Litigation, of Washington, D. C., Wilbur C. Rickett, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., and Thomas E. Walsh and W. Clifton Stone, Attys., Department of Justice, both of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for the United States.

Alvin Gerlack, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

Before WILBUR, GARRECHT, and HANEY, Circuit Judges.

HANEY, Circuit Judge.

In an action to recover on a war risk insurance policy, the jury returned a verdict for appellee, and from the judgment entered in accordance therewith, the government appeals.'

The soldier contracted influenza while in the army, and appellee seeks recovery on the ground that the soldier contracted a neuropsychiatric disease as a result of the influenza, which rendered him totally and permanently disabled.

Appellee called Dr. Edwin M. Wilder as a witness, who was given the departmental definition of total and permanent disability, and was then asked: “Bearing in mind that definition, Doctor, have you an opinion as to whether or not Arthur J. Eide was totally and permanently disabled within this definition prior to July first, 1919?”. The witness replied “I think he was, yes.” ' Another doctor testified in answer to a question of appellee that on May 16, 1929, the soldier was totally and permanently disabled. Another doctor, called by appellee, testified in answer to a question by appellee, that at the time the witness was testifying, the soldier was totally and. permanently disabled.

Appellee concedes that this evidence is inadmissible. U. S. v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498, 506, 55 S.Ct. 273, 79 L.Ed. 617; U. S. v. Stephens (C.C.A.9) 73 F.(2d) 695; U. S. v. Sullivan (C.C.A.9) 74 F.(2d) 799; U. S. v. Sampson (C.C.A.9) 79 F.(2d) 131.

No objection was made to the testimony, and the admission thereof was not assigned as error. Under these circumstances, appellee contends that the admission was not reversible error. Rule 11 of *683this court. This court1 has heretofore held to the contrary. U. S. v. White (C.C.A.9) 77 F.(2d) 757, 758; see, also, Du Vall v. U. S. (C.C.A.9) 82 F.(2d) 382, 385. Appellee contends, however, that U. S. v. White, supra, was overruled by U. S. v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555. That case is not in point. Appellee says: “It is our understanding that in argument in the Supreme Court, counsel for the government relied heavily upon the decision of this Court in United States v. White. * * * ” If that statement is true, there is little reason to believe that U. S. v. White, supra, was overruled in U. S. v. Atkinson, supra, because the latter case makes no mention of U. S. v. White. On the authority of U. S. v. White, supra, the judgment is reversed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           4,053
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  308,954
<ALLOWANCES>                                    20,862
<INVENTORY>                                     29,394
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               345,358
<PP&E>                                       4,341,667
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,721,683
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,136,763
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          581,350
<BONDS>                                        578,073
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        412
<COMMON>                                       525,000
<OTHER-SE>                                     159,768
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,136,763
<SALES>                                        394,943
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               394,943
<CGS>                                          133,325
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  256,506
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              14,412
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                124,025
<INCOME-TAX>                                    48,168
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             75,857
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    243
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    75,614
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 99(a)


             Certification of Principal Executive Officer
                      Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350
            (Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)

I, Thomas R. Dickinson, President and Chief Executive Officer (principal
executive officer) of Miltope Group, Inc. (the "Registrant"), certifies
that to the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of the Annual
Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2002 of the
Registrant (the "Report"):

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
          13(a) [15(d)] of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
          amended; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
          in all material respects, the financial condition and results
          of operations of the Registrant.


____________________________

Name: /s/ Thomas R. Dickinson
     ------------------------

Date:March 18, 2003