J-S29040-18

2018 PA Super 180

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JERARD STEVENS DAVIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3180 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 21, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-39-CR-0001247-2014, 

CP-39-CR-0001254-2014, CP-39-CR-0004149-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 22, 2018

Appellant Jerard Stevens Davis appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County after Appellant pled 

guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver (PWID)

and Resisting Arrest. Appellant contends the lower court abused its discretion 

in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Finding Appellant 

endeavors to manipulate the criminal justice system in attempting to withdraw 

his guilty pleas, we affirm.

On February 9, 2015, Appellant pled guilty to two counts of PWID and 

one count of Resisting Arrest on three separate dockets. In exchange for 

these pleas, the Commonwealth agreed that Appellant’s minimum sentence in 

the PWID cases would not exceed thirty-eight (38) months, all sentences 

would run concurrently, and the Commonwealth would not pursue any of the 

remaining charges. On the day of Appellant’s pleas, the Commonwealth was 
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ready to proceed to trial as jurors were present and were waiting for the jury 

selection process.

Appellant was scheduled to be sentenced on March 6, 2015, but after 

he failed to appear in court, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. It was 

later discovered that Appellant had been arrested in North Carolina for drug 

charges on March 5, 2015 and was incarcerated at the time of the sentencing 

hearing in this case. Pennsylvania authorities placed a detainer on Appellant 

in North Carolina. When Appellant posted bail in the North Carolina case, he 

was transported to the Lehigh County Jail on February 18, 2017. 

Appellant was promptly brought before the trial court on February 21, 

2017; however, the matter was continued multiple times due to (1) the 

retirement of the Honorable William E. Ford, the judge who accepted 

Appellant’s plea and (2) the trial court’s decision to grant Appellant’s counsel, 

Robert Goldman, Esq. permission to withdraw. On June 9, 2017, the Lehigh 

County Public Defender’s Office filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas in 

which Appellant asserted his innocence, alleged that his plea agreement was 

predicated on an erroneous prior record score, and contended his pleas were

unlawfully induced by the withdrawal of his prior counsel. 

On July 20, 2017, the Honorable Maria L. Dantos held an evidentiary 

hearing on Appellant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas. Appellant testified on 

his own behalf and the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective 

Jason Krasley, a member of the Vice and Intelligence Unity of the Allentown 
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Police Department. After reviewing the record and the testimony elicited at 

the evidentiary hearing, this trial court made the following findings of fact:

On February 9, 2015, with a jury ready to be selected, 

[Appellant] indicated that he wished to accept a guilty plea in the 

within matters.[FN1] The plea entailed, inter alia, capping the 

minimum sentence at thirty-eight (38) months. Attorney 

Goldman and the prosecutor believed [Appellant] to have a prior 

record score of 5...; [FN2] [Appellant], however, thought that his 

prior record score was only a 4. Nevertheless, [Appellant] made 

the decision to enter in to a plea deal on all of his three (3) cases. 

Trial counsel was ready to proceed to trial in Case No. 1247/2014 

on February 9, 2015. [FN3] However, [Appellant’s] decision to enter 

into a guilty plea obviated the need for a trial. [FN4]

[FN1: Prior to jury selection, Appellant asked if he 

could speak with the prosecutor and Detective Krasley 

to negotiate a guilty plea in the within matters. It was 

he who approached the Commonwealth to attempt to 

dispose of these cases via a non-trial disposition. 

Detective Krasley recalls Appellant indicating that he 

wanted to get this “over with,” and that Appellant 

apologized to him.]

[FN2: Appellant is thirty-nine years old, and has an 

extensive criminal history which includes, inter alia, 

eleven (11) adult arrests with six (6) adult 

convictions. Appellant’s prior convictions include 

numerous PWID offenses.]

[FN3: Attorney Goldman, via correspondence dated 

January 27, 2015, indicated to Appellant that he 

would proceed to trial on the first case, but intended 

to withdraw his appearance from the other two cases... 

should they not be resolved by way of a guilty plea.]

[FN4: Appellant had waived his Preliminary Hearing 

in Case No. 1247/2014.]

On that date, Judge Ford conducted an extensive guilty plea 

colloquy[, during which Appellant] acknowledged the terms of his 

plea agreement; indicated that he read and understood the 
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written plea colloquy; stated that he understood that he did not 

have to give up his rights but could proceed to trial; affirmed that 

it was his desire to enter the guilty plea; denied having any drugs, 

alcohol or other medication that would affect his ability to know 

what he was doing; posed no questions to the judge or made any 

indication of his desire not to go through with the guilty plea [FN5]; 

articulated that no one was forcing or threatening him to plead 

guilty; testified that no promises were made to him other than the 

plea agreement; expressed satisfaction with his attorney; and 

acknowledged the facts as recited by the prosecutor.

[FN5: During the guilty plea colloquy, Judge Ford 

repeatedly gave Appellant an opportunity to stop with 

the hearing and to proceed to trial. In addition, after 

Appellant entered his guilty pleas and prior to 

releasing the jurors from service, Judge Ford stated 

the following to Appellant:

THE COURT: Between now and the date of 

sentencing – how do I say this? If, in case 

number 1247, which is the one that was called 

for trial today, if you decide that you want to 

withdraw the plea in that case, that’s one of the 

possession with intent to deliver cases. ... If you 

indicate that I didn’t do this, I’m not guilty, the 

Commonwealth should prove the case, that’s 

not going to be a sufficient reason... to withdraw

the plea. We’re ready for trial today. We have 

jurors here, and in a moment I’m going to 

release all of these jurors. The point is, 

everybody’s ready to go. So that will not be a 

sufficient reason to withdraw the pleas. I want 

to make that clear. Do you understand that, 

sir?

APPELLANT: Yes.

N.T. 2/9/15, pp. 17-18.

In his Petition to Withdraw Guilty Plea[s], [Appellant] claims 

that he is not guilty of the charges filed against him and to which 

he ple[d] guilty. He further alleges that the plea agreement was 

predicated on an erroneous prior record score, and that 
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[Appellant’s] guilty plea was unlawfully induced by prior counsel. 

[The trial court found] these claims to be without merit.

At the time of the hearing on [Appellant’s] Motion to 

Withdraw Guilty Plea, [Appellant] claimed his innocence. Indeed, 

[Appellant] indicated that while he possessed the cocaine, he did 

not possess it with an intent to deliver it in Case No. 1247/2014. 

Specifically, [Appellant] indicated that he was merely a passenger 

in a vehicle driven by Felicita Adorno. Ms. Adorno previously had 

made arrangements with a Confidential Informant (unbeknownst 

to her) for the purchase of a specified amount of crack cocaine. 

***

As a result of this controlled drug purchase, [Appellant] and Ms. 

Adorno were arrested by Detective Krasley of the Allentown Police 

Department. A search of [Appellant’s] person at the Allentown 

Police Department yielded crack cocaine in [Appellant’s] buttocks. 

Appellant makes a similar statement with regard to Case No. 

1254/2014. In that case, [Appellant] was arrested after he was 

stopped for a traffic violation. Again, a search of [Appellant’s] 

person at the Allentown Police Department yielded cocaine in 

[Appellant’s] buttocks. [Appellant] admitted possession of the 

controlled substance, but denied having an intent to deliver it. 

Finally, in Case No. 4149/2014, [Appellant] claims that he did not 

resist arrest, but rather that he was abused and assaulted by the 

police officers. [Appellant] stated that Attorney Goldman had 

acquired the audio and video of the incident which supports his 

innocence. [FN6] [Appellant] also testified that between the date of 

his guilty plea and the scheduled date of his sentencing, he told 

Attorney Goldman that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. In 

fact, [Appellant] indicated that he thought that a Motion to 

Withdraw Guilty Pleas had been filed [by] Attorney Goldman. 

Interestingly, [Appellant] failed to mention that to [the trial court] 

when he first came before this Court on February 21, 2017 and 

March 15, 2017.

[FN6: Appellant knew about the existence and the 

content of this audio and video recording at the time 

that he entered his guilty plea before Judge Ford.]

Contrary to [Appellant’s] assertions, Detective Krasley 

testified that in Case No. 1247/2014, pre-recorded buy money 

was located on [Appellant]. In fact, [Appellant] had half (1/2) of 

the money on his person, [FN7] and Ms. Adorno, the driver of the 

vehicle, had the other half (1/2) of the pre-recorded money on 
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her at the time of their arrests. Furthermore, the cocaine located 

in [Appellant’s] buttocks was packaged in separate multiple

baggies, consistent with selling or delivering.[FN8] No drug use 

paraphernalia was located on [Appellant’s] person. In addition, 

surveillance observed Ms. Adorno approach the Confidential 

Informant, then return to [Appellant] and hand him money, who 

in turn provided her with something that she then gave to the 

Confidential Informant. Detective Krasley also noted that Ms. 

Adorno is the mother of [Appellant’s] child. Ms. Adorno, the CoDefendant in Case No. 1247/2014, entered a guilty plea and was 

sentenced during [Appellant’s] two (2) year absence. As a result 

of pleading guilty and already being sentenced, Ms. Adorno has

no motivation now to cooperate with the Commonwealth in the 

prosecution of [Appellant’s] case.

[FN7: Appellant had approximately $1,650.00 on his 

person, yet he was unemployed at the time of his 

arrest. Ms. Adorno similarly had approximately 

$1,650.00 on her person when taken into custody.]

[FN8: The crack cocaine in Case No. 1247/2014 and 

Case No. 1254/2014 has since been destroyed, and is 

no longer in the possession of the Allentown Police 

Department. Indeed, the log records establish that 

the crack cocaine was destroyed in both cases on April 

5, 2017.]

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 8/14/17, at 1-8 (internal citations omitted).

Based on these findings, the trial court denied Appellant’s Motion to 

Withdraw Guilty Pleas on August 14, 2017. Thereafter, on August 21, 2017, 

the lower court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of three (3) to eight 

(8) years’ imprisonment. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which was 

subsequently denied. Appellant filed a timely appeal and complied with the 

trial court’s direction to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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Appellant’s sole claim on appeal is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 

Specifically, Appellant argues that he established fair and just reasons for 

withdrawing his plea by (1) alleging that he was coerced into accepting a plea 

by his plea counsel’s indication that he would withdraw from representation if 

Appellant did not enter a plea agreement and (2) presenting a colorable claim 

of innocence.1

With respect to the withdrawal of a guilty plea or a nolo contendere plea, 

our courts have held the following:

[W]e recognize that at “any time before the imposition of 

sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of 

the defendant, or direct sua sponte, the withdrawal of a plea of 

guilty or nolo contendere and the substitution of a plea of not 

guilty.” Pa.R.Crim.P 591(A). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 

recently clarified the standard of review for considering a trial 

court's decision regarding a defendant's pre-sentence motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea:

Trial courts have discretion in determining whether a 

withdrawal request will be granted; such discretion is 

to be administered liberally in favor of the accused; 

and any demonstration by a defendant of a fair-andjust reason will suffice to support a grant, unless 

withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the 

Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 631 Pa. 692, 115 A.3d 1284, 

1285, 1291–92 (2015) (holding there is no per se rule 

regarding pre-sentence request to withdraw a plea, and bare 

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1 Although Appellant had originally claimed that his plea was predicated on an 

incorrect prior record score for the purpose of sentencing, Appellant concedes 

on appeal that the lower court correctly calculated his prior record score to be 

a five (5). See Appellant’s Brief, at 20, n.1.
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assertion of innocence is not a sufficient reason to require a court 

to grant such request). We will disturb a trial court's decision on 

a request to withdraw a guilty plea only if we conclude that the 

trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Gordy, 73 

A.3d 620, 624 (Pa.Super. 2013).

Commonwealth v. Blango, 150 A.3d 45, 47 (Pa.Super. 2016).

First, Appellant claims that he should have been allowed to withdraw his 

pleas that he was allegedly coerced into entering by counsel’s indication that 

he would withdraw his representation if Appellant did not plead guilty in all 

three cases. In reviewing Appellant’s suggestion that his pleas were not 

knowing or voluntary, we are guided by the following standard:

In order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, the guilty 

plea colloquy must affirmatively show that the defendant 

understood what the plea connoted and its consequences. This 

determination is to be made by examining the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea. Thus, even 

though there is an omission or defect in the guilty plea colloquy, 

a plea of guilty will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances 

surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that the defendant had 

a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea 

and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 631 Pa. 138, 155–56, 108 A.3d 821, 832 

(2014) (citations omitted).

Our review of the record belies Appellant’s claim that he was coerced 

into pleading guilty by his plea counsel. The trial court found that while Atty. 

Goldman advised Appellant that he intended to seek to withdraw in Case No. 

1254/2014 and 4149/2014 if Appellant did not plead guilty, Atty. Goldman 

was ready and willing to represent Appellant at trial in Case No. 1247/2014, 

had Appellant not approached the prosecution to ask for a plea agreement.
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Further, the trial court’s extensive guilty plea colloquy demonstrated 

that Appellant entered a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea. Appellant 

indicated that he understood the nature of charges against him, the factual 

bases for his pleas, and the rights he was relinquishing in entering the pleas. 

Appellant averred that no threats or promises were made to him to plead 

guilty and he expressed satisfaction with Atty. Goldman’s representation. 

Appellant posed no questions to the trial judge or gave any indication that he 

did not want to enter the guilty pleas. Therefore, the trial court properly 

exercised its discretion in determining that this argument did not provide 

sufficient reason to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Second, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his request to 

withdraw his pleas as Appellant has presented a colorable claim of innocence. 

As noted above, our Supreme Court has emphasized that a defendant’s mere 

assertion of innocence is not, in and of itself, a sufficient reason to grant a 

pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See Carrasquillo, supra. 

Rather, the Supreme Court clarified that:

a defendant's innocence claim must be at least plausible to 

demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for 

presentence withdrawal of a plea. More broadly, the proper 

inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal motion is whether 

the accused has made some colorable demonstration, under the 

circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would 

promote fairness and justice.

Carrasquillo, 631 Pa. at 705–706, 115 A.3d at 1292 (citation omitted). 
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In Carrasquillo, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court acted 

within its discretion to refuse to allow the appellant to withdraw his guilty plea 

given (1) the appellant failed to offer a plausible innocence claim given his 

bizarre claim that he was compelled by the Antichrist to rape the child victim

and (2) the prosecution presented strong evidence of Appellant’s guilt at the 

plea hearing. In Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 632 Pa. 3, 116 A.3d 1103 

(2015), the companion case to Carrasquillo, the Supreme Court upheld the 

trial court’s decision to refuse to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty 

plea, finding the defendant’s assertion of innocence was implausible and 

rebutted by the prosecution’s presentation of taped conversations in which the

defendant admitted in prison that he had murdered his wife. In 

Commonwealth v. Baez, 169 A.3d 35, 40 (Pa.Super. 2017), this Court 

similarly found that the appellant’s bald assertion of innocence was not 

plausible and did not constitute a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea 

when Appellant failed to raise any defenses to the charges besides an 

unsupported claim that he was coerced to plead guilty by the trial court’s 

alleged threats to impose a sentence of sixty-five years’ imprisonment if 

Appellant was convicted. Similarly, in Blango, this Court found the 

appellant’s attempt to withdraw his plea based on his assertion of innocence 

was “an attempt to manipulate the system” when he had previously testified 

against his co-conspirators and admitted that he was the first to pull the 

trigger of his firearm in a fight between two groups of high school students. 

Blango, 150 A.3d at 48.
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Likewise, in the instant case, the trial court found that Appellant’s 

“assertion of innocence is not plausible, but is rather an ‘attempt to manipulate 

the system.’” T.C.O. at 8, quoting Blango, supra. The trial court observed 

that Appellant entered his guilty plea on the day his trial was scheduled to 

begin and then waited to raise his desire to withdraw his plea long after the 

threat of trial had passed; Appellant chose not to assert his claim of innocence 

until two years after he had entered his guilty plea and had subsequently 

appeared before the trial court three times. Further, the trial court explained:

The record and evidentiary proffer made by the Commonwealth in 

this case belies [Appellant’s] assertion of innocence. In Case No. 

1247/2014, Ms. Adorno was observed by members of the 

Allentown Police Department approach the Confidential Informant, 

return to [Appellant] and hand him money, who in turn provided 

her with something that she then gave to the Confidential 

Informant. Of note, Ms. Adorno is the mother of [Appellant’s] 

child. Also, half (1/2) of the pre-recorded buy money was found 

on [Appellant] and the other half (1/2) was found on Ms. Adorno 

at the time of their arrests on August 12, 2013. [Appellant] was 

unemployed at the time, yet he had over $1,600.00 on his person. 

Also, in both Case No. 1247/2014 and Case No. 1254/2014, a 

search of [Appellant’s] person at the Headquarters of the 

Allentown Police Department yielded crack cocaine in [Appellant’s] 

buttocks. The drugs were packaged in separate multiple baggies, 

consistent with selling or delivering. 

***

Moreover, in Case No. 4149/2014, it is nonsensical to 

believe that [Appellant] entered into a guilty plea on February 9, 

2015, if the video and audio recording that memorialized the 

events surrounding the charge of Resisting Arrest had shown that 

he was abused and assaulted by officers. These facts indicate that 

[Appellant’s] assertion of innocence in these cases is bare, noncolorable, and implausible.
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T.C.O. at 9-10. We agree with the trial court’s assertion that Appellant’s claim 

of innocence was implausible as it was unsupported and rebutted by the 

evidence presented by the Commonwealth.

Moreover, we also agree with the trial court’s finding that Appellant’s 

guilty plea could not be withdrawn because the Commonwealth would suffer 

substantial prejudice from the withdrawal. As noted above, Appellant did not 

assert his alleged innocence until over two years after he entered his guilty 

plea; in that time, his co-defendant, Felicita Adorno, had already entered a 

guilty plea and had been sentenced. The trial court found that Adorno’s lack 

of motivation to cooperate with the prosecution would severely prejudice the 

Commonwealth if it sought to try Appellant. T.C.O. at 8 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Ross, 498 Pa. 512, 447 A.2d 943 (1982) (finding that 

the “request to withdraw the plea, which had been made after the dismissal 

of numerous key Commonwealth witnesses in reliance on the plea, was 

properly denied”). Further, the trial court also noted that after Appellant had 

entered his guilty pleas in this case, the Commonwealth had destroyed the 

cocaine seized from Appellant’s person in both Case No. 1247/2014 and Case 

No. 1254/2014. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion in finding that the prosecution would be substantially prejudiced if 

Appellant were allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/22/18