alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Michael D. BODNE, as Administrator for the Estate of Matthew J. Peppard, Deceased, Appellant, v. Milton M. FERRELL and Phillip Schiff, Appellees.

No. 69-776.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 14, 1970.

Rehearing Denied May 6, 1970.

Sager, Silverman, Bodne & Burns, Miami, for appellant.

Milton M. Ferrell and Phillip Schiff, Miami, for appellees.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant is the administrator of the estate of Matthew J. Peppard. The estate was sued by the appellees, as plaintiffs, for legal services rendered to Matthew J. Peppard, now deceased.

The appeal is from a final judgment rendered in a non-jury case. The final judgment awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to the plaintiffs. On appeal, no argument is presented concerning the liability of the estate for the legal services allegedly rendered or as to the correctness of the amount awarded for costs.

The first question argued is that the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding the amount of fees for the legal services rendered and that the award was so excessive that it should shock the judicial conscience of this court. Defendant claims that the amount is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and is an abuse of discretion.

■ We do not believe that any useful purpose would be served in setting forth the criteria which should be followed in arriving at a reasonable and proper sum for attorneys’ fees in cases of this type. They have been sufficiently and adequately explored before.

The award appears to be substantial but was supported by expert testimony and we are unable to say that the trial judge clearly abused his sound judicial discretion in this award. See Ames v. Ames, Fla.App. 1963, 153 So.2d 737; and Raynes v. Raynes, Fla.App.1961, 128 So.2d 417.

Defendant also argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the petition for rehearing. A review *863of the petition for rehearing and the briefs and record on appeal do not demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition for rehearing.

The judgment herein appealed is, therefore,

Affirmed.
#### Patricia Jarvis von DAMECK et al. v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 62857.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 22, 1978.

In re: St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge. 361 So.2d 283.

Writ denied.
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Patricia GARRETT, Appellee.

No. 77-315.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. 16, 1977.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Mary Jo M. Gallay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant,

Daniel J. Grieco, St. Petersburg, for ap-pellee.

*1267PER CURIAM.

We treat this appeal as a petition for certiorari on the authority of *State v. Wilcox,*351 So.2d 89 (Fla.2d DCA, 1977), and the petition for certiorari is hereby denied.

GRIMES, Acting C. J., and SCHEB and OTT, JJ., concur.
#### Honorable C. P. RUBIERA, Administrative Judge of the Crimes Division of the County Court, in and for Dade County, Florida, et al., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida ex rel. Paul RUVERA, a/k/a Paul Remy, Appellee.

No. 73-449.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 2, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 8, 1973.

Richard E. Gerstein, State Atty., and John P. Durant, Asst. State Atty., for appellant.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Mark King Leban, Asst. Public Defender, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and CHARLES CARROLL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Edwards, Fla.1970, 233 So.2d 393, 395.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5 <LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND STATEMENTS OF CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED
OPERATIONS AND ACCUMULATED DEFICIT ON PAGES 2 AND 3 OF THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q
FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           8,725
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,802<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0<F2>
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                12,636 
<PP&E>                                         277,764
<DEPRECIATION>                                      61
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 292,020
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,531
<BONDS>                                         25,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       198,091
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   292,020
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   184
<CGS>                                              188
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,392
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (30)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,178)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        15
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,193)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,115)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.03)
<FN>
<F1>NOTE RECEIVABLE FROM RELATED PARTY -- 200
<F2>PREPAIDS AND OTHER -- 109
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
# C_2022051EN.01001601.xml

| 31.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 51/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 51/16

---

Appeal brought on 28 July 2021 by Puma SE against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 19 May 2021 in Case T-510/19, Puma v EUIPO — Gemma Group (Representation of a bounding feline)

(Case C-462/21 P)

(2022/C 51/20)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Puma SE (represented by: P. González-Bueno Catalán de Ocón, abogado)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 1 December 2021, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Puma SE should bear its own costs.

---
#### W. Wallace POOLE, Jr. v. Stephanie Ann Arculeer POOLE.

No. 53176.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 1, 1973.

In re: Mrs. Stephanie Ann Arculeer Stanley, divorced wife of Weldon Wallace Poole applying for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Tammany. 270 So.2d 215.

Writ denied. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal the result is correct.

TATE, J.,

entertains doubt that the appellate court was correct in holding the trial court abused its discretion in changing visitation rights.
#### George W. REILAND, Appellant, v. Benjamin FRIEDMAN and Solitron Devices, Inc., Appellees.

No. 72-911.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 30, 1973.

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Fred Larry CARROLL v. Jean L. CARROLL.

No. 47123.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 7, 1973.

Roy Noble Lee, Thomas D. Lee, Forest, for appellant.

L. Douglas Wade, Jackson, for appellee.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Scott County; L. B. Porter, Chancellor.

Before GILLESPIE, C. J., and INZER, ROBERTSON, SUGG and BROOM, JJ.

Affirmed.
```

[Federal Register: January 24, 2011 (Volume 76, Number 15)]
[Notices]               
[Page 4094-4095]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr24ja11-32]                         

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

 
Sunshine Act Meetings

    The following notice of scheduled meetings is published pursuant to 
the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, Public Law 94-
409, 5 U.S.C. 552b.

Agency Holding the Meetings:  Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

Times and Dates: The Commission has scheduled two meetings for the 
following dates:
    February 11, 2011 at 9:30 a.m.
    February 24, 2011 at 9:30 a.m.

Place: Three Lafayette Center, 1155 21st St., NW., Washington, DC, 
Lobby Level Hearing Room (Room 1000).

Status: Open.

Matters To Be Considered: The Commission has scheduled these meetings 
to consider various rulemaking matters, including the issuance of 
proposed rules and the approval of final rules. Agendas for each of the 
scheduled meetings will be made available to the public and posted on 
the Commission's Web site at http://www.cftc.gov at least seven (7) 
days prior to the meeting. In the event that the times or dates of the 
meetings change, an announcement of the change, along with the new time 
and place of the meeting will be posted on the Commission's Web site.

[[Page 4095]]

Contact Person for More Information: David A. Stawick, Secretary of the 
Commission, 202-418-5071.

David A. Stawick,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2011-1519 Filed 1-20-11; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
```
#### Jo Anne POERSCHKE et al., Petitioners, v. Frances FANDREY, Respondent.

No. 44564.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 21, 1974.

Certiorari denied, Fla.App., 290 So.2d 493.

ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 31.3**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 302 OF**

**THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, L. Michael Hone, certify that:

 

1.                                      I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Lucid, Inc.; and

 

2.                                      Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

 
| Date: April 30, 2012 |                        |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                      |                        |
|                      |                        |
|                      | /s/ L.   Michael Hone  |
| ** **                | **L. Michael Hone**         |
| ** **                | **Chief Executive Officer** |

 

----
#### TEXACO INC. v. OWEN.

No. 38575.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 1969.

Certiorari dismissed without opinion. 222 So.2d 289.
# C_2022276EN.01001001.xml

| 18.7.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 276/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.7.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 276/10

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 25 April 2022 — HB v Commission

(Case T-408/21 R)

(Interim relief - Public service contracts - Irregularities in the contract award procedure - Recovery of sums unduly paid - Enforceable decision - Application for interim measures - Urgency - Prima facie case - Weighing up of the interests)

(2022/C 276/15)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: HB (represented by: L. Levi, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: B. Araujo Arce, J. Estrada de Solà and J. Baquero Cruz, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its application based on Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant seeks: (i) the suspension of the operation of Commission Decision C(2021) 3339 final of 5 May 2021 relating to the recovery of a debt in the amount of EUR 4 241 507,00 payable by the applicant under the contract with reference TACIS/2006/101-510, and Commission Decision C(2021) 3340 final of 5 May 2021 relating to the recovery of a debt in the amount of EUR 1 197 055,86 payable by the applicant under the contract with reference CARDS/2008/166-429; (ii) an injunction preventing the European Commission from recovering the amounts in those decisions; and (iii) an order requiring the Commission to pay symbolic damages of EUR 1.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The operation of Decision C(2021) 3339 final, relating to the recovery of a debt in the amount of EUR 4 241 507,00 payable by HB under the contract with reference TACIS/2006/101-510, and Commission Decision C(2021) 3340 final of 5 May 2021 relating to the recovery of a debt in the amount of EUR 1 197 055,86 payable by the applicant under the contract with reference CARDS/2008/166-429, is suspended. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The operation of Decision C(2021) 3339 final, relating to the recovery of a debt in the amount of EUR 4 241 507,00 payable by HB under the contract with reference TACIS/2006/101-510, and Commission Decision C(2021) 3340 final of 5 May 2021 relating to the recovery of a debt in the amount of EUR 1 197 055,86 payable by the applicant under the contract with reference CARDS/2008/166-429, is suspended.

| 2. | Costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Costs are reserved.

---
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk April 18, 2012

h0411 

# Order

April 18, 2012

144316

___________________ ____________________ In re Conservatorship of DEANNA THERESA CISNEROS.

___________________ ____________________ MARK A. FULLMER, Successor Conservator of DEANNA THERESA CISNEROS, a Protected Person, Petitioner-Appellee,

v SC: 144316 COA: 298922 AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, St. Clair PC: 07-110072-CA Respondent-Appellant.

_____________ _______________ ___________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the September 27, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the
cases of Johnson v Recca (Docket No. 143088) and Douglas v Allstate (Docket No. 143503) are pending on appeal before this C ourt and that the decisions in those cases may resolve an issue raised in the present application for le ave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decisions in those cases.
# C_2023094EN.01003501.xml

| 13.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 94/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 94/35

---

Judgment of the General Court of 25 January 2023 — Zielonogórski Klub Żużlowy Sportowa v EUIPO — Falubaz Polska (FALUBAZ)

(Case T-703/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU word mark FALUBAZ - Absolute ground for invalidity - Bad faith - Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2023/C 94/38)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: Zielonogórski Klub Żużlowy Sportowa S.A. (Zielona Góra, Poland) (represented by: T. Grucelski, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Falubaz Polska S.A. spółka komandytowo-akcyjna (Zielona Góra) (represented by: J. Kurzawski, lawyer)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 24 August 2021 (Case R 1681/2020-1).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Zielonogórski Klub Żużlowy Sportowa S.A. to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Zielonogórski Klub Żużlowy Sportowa S.A. to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 11, 10.1.2022.

---
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed August 14, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-2170

Lower Tribunal Nos. HSMV Case No. MS-23-071, DOAH Case No. 23-

1420

________________

Amigos Traffic School, Inc.,

Appellant,

vs.

Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.

Claudio R. Cedrez LLC, and Claudio R. Cedrez Pellegrino, for 

appellant.

David Arthmann, General Counsel, and Linsey Sims-Bohnenstiehl, 

Assistant General Counsel (Tallahassee), for appellee.

Before SCALES, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.
2

Affirmed. See Bagarotti v. Reemployment Assistance Appeals 

Comm’n, 208 So. 3d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“An administrative 

hearing officer’s findings of fact may not be disturbed by a reviewing court if 

those findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence.”); see also

O.H. v. Agency for Persons with Disabilities, 332 So. 3d 27, 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2021) (“It does not matter that there may be competent substantial evidence 

to support alternative findings of fact, only whether the hearing officer’s 

findings of fact are supported by competent and substantial evidence.”).
Exhibit 10.4


 





Supplementary Agreement


 


	Lessor:	Neighborhood Committee of Dongqili Community, Caiyuan Street, Taishan District, Tai’an City (hereinafter referred to as “Party A”)
	 	 
	Lessee:	Tai’an Tony Fun Shopping Mall Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Party B”)


 


Per friendly consultation, in the spirit
of mutual benefit and reciprocity as well as mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, and based on the “Lease”
and “Supplementary Agreement” signed by both parties on June 28, 2013 and July 28, 2017 respectively, both parties
hereby agree unanimously to amend the amount of rent as follows:


 


		1.	Party B has paid RMB 2,105,098 in total to Party A for the rent.



 


		2.	Both parties will not amend the paid rent as mentioned above, however, for the rent through July
31, 2021, both parties agree that:



 


		1)	The amount of rent from August 1, 2016 to July 31, 2017 is RMB 2,105,098.



 


		2)	The amount of rent from August 1, 2017 to July 31, 2018 is RMB 2,105,098.



 


		3)	The amount of rent from August 1, 2018 to July 31, 2019 is RMB 2,455,948.



 


		4)	The amount of rent from August 1, 2019 to July 31, 2020 is RMB 2,455,948.



 


		5)	The amount of rent from August 1, 2020 to July 31, 2021 is RMB 4,093,246.



 


		3.	In case of any discrepancy among different versions, this Supplementary Agreement shall prevail
on the adjusted clauses, the unchanged clauses shall be performed pursuant to the previous agreements.



 


		4.	This Supplementary Agreement shall be performed beginning on July 6, 2018.



 


		5.	This Supplementary Agreement is made in quadruplicate, each party holds two copies respectively,
and it will come into effect after the signature of both parties.



 





		Party
                          A:	Neighborhood
Committee of Dongqili Community, Caiyuan Street, Taishan District, Tai’an City



 


	Authorized representative (Signature) /s/ Yunqing Cao
	 	 
	Date of signature: 	July 6, 2018







 





		Party
                          B:	Tai’an
Tony Fun Shopping Mall Co., Ltd.



 


	Authorized representative (Signature) /s/ Zhiqiang Han
	 
	Date of signature: 	July 6, 2018
#### Yvonne PERRETTE, Wife of and Joseph B. DANIELS v. EMMCO INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 4514.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Aug. 23, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 6, 1971.

*548Morphy & Freeman, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

Alvin E. Hughes, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before SAMUEL, REDMANN and GULOTTA, JJ.

REDMANN, Judge.

Defendant insurer appeals from a judgment holding it liable for $1,475, the value of plaintiffs’ insured car damaged by flood water in Hurricane Betsy.

Defendant’s regional manager’s testimony established the value of the car. The real issue on appeal is whether defendant is liable for total loss of the car.

The car was made operable after hurricane waters subsided, and taken to the insurer. The insurer “authorized directly” Star Chrysler to repair the car and plaintiffs agreed to the repair. Star made some repairs but not all plaintiffs thought necessary. Further discussion by plaintiff wife with the insurer resulted in the insurer instructing Star to do anything necessary to restore the car to perfect condition. She then gave Star a list of items. A week later Star told her the work could not be done because the insurer stopped the work. (This testimony by the wife is not contradicted; Star’s service manager testified they repaired the car well, but his testimony does not discuss the extent of the insurer’s authorization nor the alleged stopping of the work.)

Defendant’s manager testifed he did in a “later discussion” (i. e., not at first) agree to pay full $1,475 value “if they paid the repair bill after they had already had the repairs done”. The manager stated the insurer would have then owned the *repaired*car, of which he said the *salvage value was*$779.50. Star’s first repair bill was over $300 and its last bill was over $700.

From defendant’s testimony that the salvage value of the car, repaired to the extent the insurer would authorize repair, was only $780 although the average retail value was $1,475, the trial judge obviously concluded that a great deal more repair was necessary to bring the car to average retail condition. Salvage value may be lower than retail value by the amount of sale costs, but those would not amount to $695. Since complete repair would thus have cost approximately the value of the car, defendant’s election to refuse further repairs under the circumstances amounted to an election to limit its liability to replacement value; this was not a simple case of dispute over whether more repairs were necessary. Defendant’s then offer of replacement conditioned on plaintiffs’ paying accrued repairs and defendant’s getting the car was an unfair attempt to escape with a net loss of only $695 when it had *549already authorized over $700 of repairs and would have been liable for several hundred dollars more repairs necessary to bring the car to average retail condition.

The trial judge’s conclusion that complete repair would have amounted to replacement cost and therefore the latter was due is reasonably supported by the preponderance of the evidence and will not be disturbed.

The judgment is affirmed.