IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-11366

LEROY DONNIE GRANT,

Plaintiff – Appellant

v.

CPC LOGISTICS, INCORPORATED; CPC BUILDING & 

MANUFACTURING PRODUCTS,

Defendants – Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:12-CV-200

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Leroy Donnie Grant, proceeding pro se, timely 

appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit alleging claims of race-based 

discrimination and unlawful retaliation. In his lawsuit, Grant alleges that he 

was subject to unlawful discrimination and retaliation that eventually led to 

his termination.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 17, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 13-11366

On Defendant-Appellees CPC Logistics, Incorporated’s and CPC 

Building & Manufacturing Products’ motion for summary judgment, the 

district court dismissed all of Grant’s claims. Proceeding through the 

McDonnell-Douglas1 circumstantial evidence framework for race 

discrimination claims,2 the district court first concluded that Grant failed to 

establish all four elements of the prima facie case. Specifically, the district 

court concluded that one of Grant’s two comparators had a different and noncomparable violation history, and that the second of Grant’s comparators was 

not treated more favorably than Grant, because he too was fired after the same 

number of logbook violations. Second, the district court concluded that even if 

Grant had established the prima facie case, the Defendant-Appellees had 

articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons3 for terminating Grant—

namely, failure to comply with company logbook and speed limit policies—and 

that Grant failed to establish that these legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reasons were mere pretext for race discrimination. The district court next 

addressed Grant’s claims of retaliation, again proceeding through the 

McDonnell-Douglas framework.4 The district court held that Grant failed to 

1 McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

2 “Under that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination, which requires a showing that the plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected 

group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse 

employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside his protected 

group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the 

protected group.” McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing 

Wheeler v. BL Dev. Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2005)).

3 Once “the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the 

employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for its 

employment action. The employer’s burden is only one of production . . . . If the employer 

meets its burden of production, the plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of proving that 

the employer’s proffered reason is not true but instead is a pretext for the real discriminatory 

or retaliatory purpose.” Id. at 557.

4 “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) 

he participated in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) his employer took an adverse 

employment action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected 

2

 

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No. 13-11366

make the prima facie case, because there was no evidence that he had engaged 

in any protected activity.

Grant timely appeals the grant of summary judgment, arguing that the 

district court erred in dismissing his claims. On de novo review of the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellees, we AFFIRM for 

essentially the same reasons given by the district court.5

activity and the adverse employment action.” Id. at 556–57 (citing Banks v. E. Baton Rouge 

Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003)).

5 Because we affirm the district court, we need not reach Defendant-Appellees’ motion 

to strike Appellant’s brief, and accordingly, we deny the motion as moot.

3

 

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