alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
The DoD inTransition program is a free, voluntary, and confidential 

program that can assist ANY service member or veteran in getting 

connected with behavioral health care. An inTransition coach can help 

bridge potential gaps during a service member or veteran’s transition to 

a new provider or for someone seeking care for the first time.

inTransition Key Components:

• Available to ALL service members and veterans regardless of

discharge status, time in service, time since separation

• Available globally via phone 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 

days a year

• No limit on the number of times inTransition can be used

• A designated inTransition Coach, trained in military culture, works 

with you every step of the way to help get you connected to care

• We help connect you to resources in your local area, too

“Wonderful program 

to assist in “closing 

the loop” for our 

mental health 

patients” 

–Referring provider
Access is Easy

• Just call inTransition anytime, from anywhere in the world, to get 

started

• Service members and veterans can call inTransition by themselves or 

with their current provider

• Providers can call on behalf of a service member or veteran, with 

their approval

• We work with the service member or veteran until they have the care 

that works best for them

“I highly recommend this program to anyone 

transitioning from the military that needs assistance. 

My inTransition coach was able to answer any 

questions I had but more importantly she listened 

to me and was a calming, very knowledgeable, well 

informed coach.”

–Service member

For more information about the program, visit 

health.mil/inTransition or call:

800-424-7877 Inside the U.S.

800 424-4685 Outside of the U.S. toll-free

314-387-4700 Outside the U.S. collect

Released April 2021 by the Psychological 

Health Center of Excellence
#### William R. MANCHESTER and Norma H. Manchester, husband and wife, Appellants, v. NEW COLLEGE, INC., a Florida corporation, and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Hartford, Connecticut, Appellees.

No. 72-1053.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 10, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Felipe CABRERA, Petitioner, v. SANS SOUCI HOTEL et al., Respondents.

No. 39962.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 5, 1970.

Certiorari denied.

ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-6679 

DILLARD J. MURRAY, II,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GENE M. JOHNSON, Director,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District

Judge. (CA-04-640-7-SGW)

Submitted: July 27, 2005 Decided: August 5, 2005

Before KING, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dillard J. Murray, II, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Eldridge Jeffrey,

III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond,

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Dillard J. Murray, II, a state prisoner, seeks to appeal

the district court’s order dismissing his petition filed under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (2000), as procedurally defaulted, and denying his

motion for default judgment. The order is not appealable unless a

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will

not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner

satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists

would find that the district court’s assessment of his

constitutional claims is debatable or wrong and that any

dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also

debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v.

Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently

reviewed the record and conclude that Murray has not made the

requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
256 La. 867

#### Hermein MURPHY, wife of/and John T. Murphy v. Michael PODGURSKI and His Insurer, Allstate Insurance Company.

No. 50787.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 30, 1970.

In re: Hermein Murphy, wife of/and John T. Murphy applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Jefferson. 236 So.2d 508.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in the judgment.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM A. GRAVEN, named as Will 

Graven, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

STATE OF ARIZONA, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20-15110 

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-04586-SPL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 2, 2020**

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. 

William A. Graven appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his action alleging federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 16 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 20-15110

Cir. 2004). We affirm. 

The district court properly dismissed Graven’s action against the State of 

Arizona as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. 

v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to 

states and their agencies or departments “regardless of the nature of the relief 

sought”).

All pending motions are denied. 

AFFIRMED.
259 La. 634

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lincoln LEWIS.

No. 51657.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 5, 1971.

In re: Lincoln Lewis applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Writ denied. The showing made does not warrant the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1147 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1147

To prohibit Presidential nominees from performing certain governmental 
                   functions, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                June 23 (legislative day, June 22), 1993

  Mr. Kempthorne (for himself, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Brown, Mr. Coats, Mr. 
   Cohen, Mr. Coverdell, Mr. Craig, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Faircloth, Mr. 
Grassley, Mr. Gregg, Mr. Helms, Mrs. Kassebaum, Mr. Lott, Mr. Nickles, 
  Mr. Mack, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Smith, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. 
 Wallop, Mr. Hatfield, and Mr. McCain) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental 
                                Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To prohibit Presidential nominees from performing certain governmental 
                   functions, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION OF PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES PERFORMING CERTAIN 
              GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS.

    (a) In General.--(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c), 
no person nominated by the President to serve in an office which 
requires the advice and consent of the Senate for appointment may 
perform any function described under paragraph (2) before such 
appointment is approved by the Senate.
    (2) The functions referred to under paragraph (1) shall include any 
function which is authorized or required by law to be performed by an 
officer of the United States, regardless of whether such function may 
be delegated by law.
    (b) Nominees Compensated for Services.--The provisions of 
subsection (a) shall apply to any such person, regardless of whether 
such person is compensated for temporary or intermittent services under 
section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, or any other provision of 
law.
    (c) Application.--(1) The provisions of this Act shall not apply to 
any officer of the United States with respect to the functions of the 
office held by such officer at the time of nomination by the President 
for appointment to another office.
    (2) The provisions of this Act shall not affect the application of 
subchapter III of chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code.
    (3) The provisions of this Act shall not be construed to affect the 
power of the President to fill a vacancy during the recess of the 
Senate.

                                 <all>
```
M otion GRANTED and Order filed April 23 , 2014
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14
- 14
- 00296
- CV

____________ IN RE PLATINUM ENERG Y SOLUTIONS, INC. , Relator

O RIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 234th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2012
- 30972



### ORDER On April 21, 2014, relator Platinum Energy Solutions, Inc. filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this court. Relator asks this court to order the Honorable Wesley Ward, Judge of the 234th District Court , in Harris County, Texas, to set aside his order , dated March 31, 2014 , granting real parties in interest ’ s motion for clarification of order , entered in trial court number 2012

- 30972 , styled StarstreamCapital, LLC, et al. v. L. Charles Moncla, Jr., et al.

. Relator claims respondent abused his discretion by ordering relator to produce forty

- three categories of requested documents.
Relator als o has filed a n unopposed motion for temporary stay of proceedings below. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(b), 52.10. On April 21, 2014, relator ask ed this court to stay proceedings in the trial court pending a decision on the petition for writ of mandamus. It ap pears from the facts stated in the petition and motion that relator’s request for relief requires further consideration and that relator will be prejudiced unless immediate temporary relief is granted. We therefore GRANT relator’s motion and issue the fol lowing order:
We ORDER the trial court’s March 31, 2014 order granting real parties in interest’s motion for clarification of order in trial court cause number 2012

- 30972 , Starstream Capital, LLC, et al. v. L. Charles Moncla, Jr., et al. , STAYED until a final decision by this court on relator’s petition for writ of mandamus, or until further order of this court. In addition, the court requests real part ies in interest to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus on or before May 7 , 201 4 . See Tex. R. App. P. 52.4.
PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Jamison.
<TABLE>

                                             EXHIBIT 12
                             THE GILLETTE COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES
                                  RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
<CAPTION>


                                        Six Months   Six Months
                                          Ended        Ended                 Year Ended December 31,
(Millions)                               June 30,     June 30,      ----------------------------------------
                                           2002         2001        2001     2000     1999     1998     1997
                                        ----------   ----------     ----     ----     ----     ----     ----
<S>                                     <C>         <C>             <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>

Earnings:
  Income from continuing operations
    before income taxes                   $  748         600       1,342    1,288    1,912    1,656    2,065
  Interest expense                            44          85         145      223      136       94       78
  Interest portion of rental expense          20          14          31       25       20       17       16
  Amortization or capitalized interest         5           5           9        6        5        4        3
                                          ------      ------       -----    -----    -----    -----    -----
  Earnings available for fixed charges    $  817         704       1,527    1,542    2,073    1,771    2,162
                                          ======      ======       =====    =====    =====    =====    =====

Fixed Charges:
  Interest expense                        $   44          85         145      223      136       94       78
  Interest capitalized                         2           7          11       23       13       18       10
  Interest portion of rental expense          20          14          31       25       20       17       16
                                          ------      ------       -----    -----    -----    -----    -----
  Total fixed charges                     $   66         106         187      271      169      129      104
                                          ======      ======       =====    =====    =====    =====    =====


Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges          12.4         6.6         8.2      5.7     12.3     13.7     20.8
                                          ======      ======       =====    =====    =====    =====    =====
</TABLE>
#### Eileen CHAFETZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of Phillip Chafetz, Deceased, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, County of Dade, City of Miami Beach, Respondent.

No. 72-522.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 13, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 93 Agreed to House (ATH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 93

 Electing Representative Sanders to the Committee on Banking, Finance 
   and Urban Affairs; and to the Committee on Government Operations.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 18, 1993

Mr. Hoyer submitted the following resolution; which was considered and 
                               agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Electing Representative Sanders to the Committee on Banking, Finance 
   and Urban Affairs; and to the Committee on Government Operations.

    Resolved, That the following named Member be, and is hereby, 
elected to the following standing committees:
    Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs: Bernie Sanders, 
Vermont.
    Committee on Government Operations: Bernie Sanders, Vermont.

                                 <all>
```
#### Charles C. ROGERS v. CIRCUIT COURT FOR LEVY COUNTY, Florida.

No. 38369.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 1969.

Mandamus denied without opinion.
Mr. John S. Hovenga Opinion No. C-512 

Executive Director 

Board of Regents of State Re: Whether or not the reTeachers Colleges quirements of Article 

Sam Houston State Office Bldg. 266313-2, Vernon's Civil 

Austin, TeXaS Statutes, are met by 

stud.ents who take and 

pass an advanced standing examination in American History and Texas 

Dear Mr. Hovenga: History? 

We are in receipt of your letter requesting an 

opinion from this office on the above captioned question. 

Senate Bill 254, Acts 54th Legislature, Regular Session, 1955, Is codified as Article 2663b-2, Vernon's Civil 

Statutea. Section 1, Article 2663b-2, Vernon's Civil Statutes, 

is quoted as follows: 

'Section 1. No person after July 1, 195& 

shall be granted an undergraduate degree of any 

kind from any Institution of higher learning supported or maintained by the State of TeXaB, or 

from any junior college receiving state aid, except that he or Bhe has taken and pasaed six 

semester hours in American History provided 

that any student shall have the option, at his 

or her request, to substitute three semester 

hours,of Texas History for three of the six 

semester hours in American HlBtory required 

by the terms of this Act." 

The answer to your pestion requires 2 determination 

of the meaning of the phrase taken and passed, as such phrase 

appears in the context of Section 1, Article 2663b-2, Vernon's 

Civil Statutes< 

-2413- 
Mr. John S. Hovenga, page 2 (C-512) 

It is our opinion that the plain and unambiguous 

language of Section 1, supra, requires the taking and. passing 

of courseB of instruction consisting of six semester hours in 

American History or the sum of three semester hours in American 

History and three semester hours in Texas History. This requirement may not be met by taking and passing advanced standing examinations in American or Texas History by those who have not 

taken and passed the courses required in Section 1. 

In Volume 53, Tex.Jur.2d, Statutes, I\ 164, p. 2&O241, It is stated,: 

"If the language of a statute is unambiguous, 

and its meaning IB clear, the statute will be 

construed and given effect according to its terms. 

In such a case, the court is not concerned with 

the policy or wisdom of the act, nor with the 

probability that its operation fill entail disaBtroUS or miSchieVOUB results. 

SUMMARY 

Under the provisions of Section 1, Article 

2663b-2, Vernon's Civil Statutes, a student who 

takes and passes an advanced standing examination 

in the field of American History or Texas History 

does not fulfill the requirements of such statute 

by merely passing such examination. 

Very truly yours, 

WAGGONER CARR 

Attorney General 

1RWjr:mkh 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

w. 0. Shultz, Chairman 

John Reeves 

Harold Kennedy 

Sam Kelley 

" Ivan R. Williams, Jr. 1 

Assistant 

APPROVED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY: T. B. Wright 

-2414-
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Annual Report of Global Clean Energy, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on  (the "Report"), the undersigned, in the
capacity and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:




1. The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.




Date:
      April 14, 2010
              /s/ Earl
      AzimovEARL
      AZIMOVPresident
#### Hugh H. POLK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-999.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 12, 1974.

Hugh H. Polk, in pro. per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before PEARSON, CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This court, proceeding in the manner outlined and recommended by the Supreme Court of the United States in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 having deferred ruling on a motion of the public defender to withdraw as counsel for the indigent defendant-appellant, and having furnished appellant with a copy of the public defender’s memorandum brief, and having allowed the appellant a reasonable specified time within which to raise any points that he chose in support of his appeal, and the appellant having failed to respond thereto, on consideration thereof upon full examination of the proceedings, we conclude that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Whereupon, the public defender’s said motion to withdraw is granted, and the order or judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.
# C_2021035EN.01005702.xml

| 1.2.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 35/57 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.2.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 35/57

---

Action brought on 4 December 2020 — Degode v EUIPO — Leo Pharma (Skinovea)

(Case T-715/20)

(2021/C 35/76)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: DEGODE — Dermago Development GmbH (Petershagen, Germany) (represented by: O. Spieker, A. Schönfleisch and N. Willich, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Leo Pharma A/S (Ballerup, Denmark)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark Skinovea — Application for registration No 17 898 565

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 September 2020 in Case R 337/2020-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order the defendant to bear the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to bear the costs of the proceedings.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---