alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2023164EN.01002201.xml

| 8.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/22

---

Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 16 January 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny — Poland) — W. Sp. z o. o. v Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Łodzi

(Case C-729/21, (1) Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Łodzi)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court - Directive 2006/112/EC - Value added tax (VAT) - Article 19 - Concept of ‘transfer of a totality of assets or part thereof’ - Contract of sale relating to a shopping centre - Transfer of an undertaking - Partial transfer of the tangible and intangible assets of the undertaking)

(2023/C 164/27)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in the appeal on a point of law: W. Sp. z o. o.

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Łodzi

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The first paragraph of Article 19 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax
  must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a provision of national law which provides that the ‘transfer of a totality of assets or part thereof’ is not subject to value added tax, without making its applicability subject to a condition that the person to whom the goods are transferred is to be treated as the successor to the transferor. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The first paragraph of Article 19 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax

must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a provision of national law which provides that the ‘transfer of a totality of assets or part thereof’ is not subject to value added tax, without making its applicability subject to a condition that the person to whom the goods are transferred is to be treated as the successor to the transferor.

| 2. | The first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112
  must be interpreted as meaning that the transfer of part of an undertaking, even though not all the tangible and intangible assets constituting it have been transferred to the acquirer, is covered by the concept of ‘transfer of a totality of assets or part thereof’, provided that the totality of the assets transferred is sufficient to enable that undertaking to continue an independent economic activity. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 2006/112

must be interpreted as meaning that the transfer of part of an undertaking, even though not all the tangible and intangible assets constituting it have been transferred to the acquirer, is covered by the concept of ‘transfer of a totality of assets or part thereof’, provided that the totality of the assets transferred is sufficient to enable that undertaking to continue an independent economic activity.

---

(1)  OJ C 128, 21.3.2022.

---
Exhibit 23.1
 CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
  (1)
    
    Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-65096) pertaining to the Virco Mfg. Corporation 1993 Stock Incentive Plan,(2)
    
    Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-32539) pertaining to the Virco Mfg. Corporation 1997 Stock Incentive Plan,(3)
    
    Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-51717) pertaining to the Virco Mfg. Corporation Employee Stock Ownership Plan,(4)
    
    Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-74832) pertaining to the Virco Mfg. Corporation 401(K) Savings Plan, and(5)
    
    Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-143874) pertaining to the Virco Mfg. Corporation 2007 Stock Incentive Plan;
  /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
# C_2023071EN.01003001.xml

| 27.2.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 71/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.2.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 71/30

---

Order of the General Court of 22 December 2022 — AL v Commission

(Case T-692/21) (1)

(Civil service - OLAF investigation - Acts adopted by OLAF - Identification of the defendant - No act adversely affecting the applicant - Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure - Inadmissibility)

(2023/C 71/40)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: AL (represented by: R. Rata, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: T. Bohr, J. Baquero Cruz and A.-C. Simon, acting as Agents)

Re:

By his action based on Article 270 TFEU, the applicant seeks, first, the annulment of (i) various acts adopted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in the context of an investigation concerning him and by which OLAF rejected, inter alia, two complaints lodged by him against the final report and recommendations made in that investigation, (ii) the European Commission’s note of 3 March 2021 by which the Commission had informed him of its intention to recover certain allowances that had been paid to him, (iii) the Commission decision of 22 March 2021 by which it decided to recover those allowances, (iv) the Council of the European Union’s internal note of 22 January 2021 recommending the opening of disciplinary proceedings against him and, secondly, compensation for the material and non-material damage that he claims to have suffered as a consequence of the recovery of various sums from his salary during 2021 and of the alleged illegal conduct of the OLAF investigation concerning him and its ensuing consequences.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | There is no need to rule on the application for leave to intervene lodged by the Council of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

2.

There is no need to rule on the application for leave to intervene lodged by the Council of the European Union.

| 3. | AL shall bear his own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

3.

AL shall bear his own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Commission.

| 4. | The Council shall bear its own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Council shall bear its own costs relating to the application for leave to intervene.

---

(1)  OJ C 37, 24.1.2022.

---
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Brooktrout, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert C. Leahy, Vice President of Finance and Operations of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|Dated: March 9, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/ ROBERT C. LEAHYRobert C. Leahy Vice President of Finance and Operations
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---

QuickLinks
Exhibit 32.1

** **

** **

 

 

 

In connection with theAnnual Report on Form 10-K of Housing Programs Ltd. (the "Partnership"), for thefiscal year ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the "Report"), John McGrath, as the equivalent ofthe chief executive officer of the Partnership, and Stephen B. Waters, as theequivalent of the chief financial officer of the Partnership, each herebycertifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of hisknowledge:

 

(1)   The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)   Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.

 

 

This certification isfurnished with this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Partnership for purposes of Section 18of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2





                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS




To Board of Directors and Shareholders
American Architectural Products Corporation


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-4/A No. 333-44275 and Form S-8 No. 333-61051 pertaining to the 1996
Stock Option Plan) of our report dated June 6, 2001, which contains an
explanatory paragraph with respect to a going concern uncertainty, with respect
to the consolidated balance sheet at December 31, 2000; the related consolidated
statements of operations, stockholders' equity (deficit), and cash flows for the
year ended December 31, 2000, and the financial statement schedule for the year
ended December 31, 2000 of American Architectural Products Corporation included
in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2000.




Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
October 4, 2001
# C_2021182EN.01004701.xml

| 10.5.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 182/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.5.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/47

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 8 March 2021 — Comité interprofessionnel des huiles essentielles françaises (CIHEF), Florame, Hyteck Aroma-Zone, Laboratoires Gilbert, Laboratoire Léa Nature, Laboratoires Oméga Pharma France, Pierre Fabre Médicament, Pranarom France, Puressentiel France v Ministre de la Transition écologique, Premier ministre

(Case C-147/21)

(2021/C 182/62)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Comité interprofessionnel des huiles essentielles françaises (CIHEF), Florame, Hyteck Aroma-Zone, Laboratoires Gilbert, Laboratoire Léa Nature, Laboratoires Oméga Pharma France, Pierre Fabre Médicament, Pranarom France, Puressentiel France

Defendants: Ministre de la Transition écologique, Premier ministre

Question referred

Does the regulation of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products (1) preclude a Member State from adopting, in the interests of public health and the environment, restrictive rules relating to commercial practices and advertising such as those laid down in Articles L. 522-18 and L. 522-5-3 of the Environmental Code? If not, under what conditions may a Member State adopt such measures?

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products (OJ 2012 L 167, p. 1).

---
# C_2021242EN.01000302.xml

| 21.6.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.6.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/3

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy — Śródmieścia w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 9 February 2021 — B.S., W.S. v M.

(Case C-81/21)

(2021/C 242/05)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla Warszawy — Śródmieścia w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: B.S., W.S.

Defendant: M.

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of provisions of national legislation under which a court, where it finds that a contractual term is unfair, without that rendering the agreement invalid, may supplement the content of the agreement with a supplementary provision of national law? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (1) of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of provisions of national legislation under which a court, where it finds that a contractual term is unfair, without that rendering the agreement invalid, may supplement the content of the agreement with a supplementary provision of national law?

| 2. | Must Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national legislation under which a court, where it finds that a contractual term is unfair, with the result that the agreement is invalid, may supplement the content of the agreement with a supplementary provision of national law, in order to prevent the agreement from being invalid, even though the consumer consents to its being invalid? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Must Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national legislation under which a court, where it finds that a contractual term is unfair, with the result that the agreement is invalid, may supplement the content of the agreement with a supplementary provision of national law, in order to prevent the agreement from being invalid, even though the consumer consents to its being invalid?

---

(1)  OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                       7,643,681
<SECURITIES>                                   250,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                  537,018
<ALLOWANCES>                                   119,000
<INVENTORY>                                    640,023
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            11,311,771
<PP&E>                                      78,794,133
<DEPRECIATION>                              31,059,712
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              61,052,861
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       23,940,104
<BONDS>                                      4,658,474
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       344,936
<OTHER-SE>                                  32,109,347
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                61,052,861
<SALES>                                      7,910,110
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            57,635,149
<CGS>                                        6,566,859
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               34,270,575
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            23,364,574
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,926,378
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,260,740)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (498,928)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (761,812)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (761,812)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.17)
        

</TABLE>
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 26, 2020

No. 04

- 19

- 00890

- CR

In re Benjamin Escobedo

Original Mandamus Proceeding 1

ORDER

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa , Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez , Justice

Relator filed a n “Amended and Sup p lement [sic] Notice of Appeal Against W rit of Error,

Illegal Sente nce, and Illegal Indictment or Information to Reinstate Appeal

, ” in which he appears

to assert t his court err ed by denying his petition for writ of mandamus. Ordinarily, an appeal is

not filed in an original proceeding ; 2 therefore, we const rue relator ’s m otion as a motion for

rehearing. After considering relator ’ s arguments, we deny relator ’ s “Amended and Sup p lement

[sic] Notice of Appeal Against W rit of Error, Illegal Sentence, and Illegal Indictment or

Information to Reinstate Appeal

. ”

I t i s s o ORDERED on February 26, 2020

.

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2016CR4634 , styled The State of Texas v. Benjamin Escobedo , pe ndi ng in

the 227th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas, th e Honorable Kevin M. O'Connell presiding.

2 The Texas Rules of A ppellate Procedure set forth the procedures under which relator may file a motion for leave

to file a petition for writ of man damus along with a petition for writ of mandamus

, or a postconviction application

for writ of habeas corpus wi th the Texas Court of Crim i nal Appeal s

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52; 72.1 ; 73

.P E R C U R I A M

A T T E S T E D T O :

_ ____ __________________ ______

M i c h a e l A

. C r u z

, C l e r k o f C o u r t
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 134 (Thursday, July 12, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 32313]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-14874]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Center for Complementary & Integrative Health; Notice of 
Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the ZAT1 PJ (02) 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Center for Complementary and 
Integrative Health Special Emphasis Panel; Mechanisms of Mind and 
Body Interventions (MMB).
    Date: August 1, 2018.
    Time: 11:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, Two Democracy Plaza, 6707 
Democracy Boulevard, Bethesda, MD 20892 (Virtual Meeting).
    Contact Person: Pamela Eugenia Jeter, Ph.D., Scientific Review 
Officer, Office of Scientific Review, Division of Extramural 
Activities, NCCIH, NIH, 6707 Democracy Boulevard, Suite 401, 
Bethesda, MD 20892, 301-435-2591, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2f5f4e424a434e01454a5b4a5d6f41464701484059"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="9eeefff3fbf2ffb0f4fbeafbecdef0f7f6b0f9f1e8">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.213, 
Research and Training in Complementary and Integrative Health, 
National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: July 6, 2018.
Michelle D. Trout,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2018-14874 Filed 7-11-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 23, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 05-40805

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SAUL HERNANDEZ-AGUIRRE,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:04-CR-934-ALL

--------------------

Before GARZA, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Saul Hernandez-Aguirre appeals his sentence for being an

alien unlawfully found in the United States following deportation

after having been convicted of an aggravated felony, in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). On appeal, he challenges the

constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and

aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than

elements of the offense that must be found by a jury in light of

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Hernandez-Aguirre’s

constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v.
No. 05-40805

-2-

United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although HernandezAguirre contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided

and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule

Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi, we have repeatedly

rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres

remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268,

276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). 

Hernandez-Aguirre properly concedes that his argument is

foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent,

but he raises it here to preserve it for further review. 

Hernandez-Aguirre next raises a Fourth Amendment challenge

to the collection of a DNA sample as a condition of his

supervised release. As he concedes, such a claim is not ripe for

review, and we lack jurisdiction to consider it. United States

v. Riascos-Cuenu, 428 F.3d 1100, 1101-02 (5th Cir. 2005),

petition for cert. filed (Jan 9, 2006) (No. 05-8662). 

Accordingly, that portion of the appeal must be dismissed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.
#### Omey vs. The State.

In an indictment for selling ardent spirits to a slave, without permission, it is necessary to state the name of the master, and allege the sale to have been without the permission of the mistress, overseer or person having charge of him, as well as of the master.

*Appeal from, Franklin Circuit Court.*

Hon. J. J. Green, Circuit Judge.

Stillwell & Woodruff and Thomason, for appellant.

Ifollowell for the State.

Mr. Chief Justice English

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Omey was indicted for selling ardent spirits to a slave.

There were three counts in the indictment. The *first*and *third*charged the defendant with selling ardent spirits to *Charles,*a slave, without permission of the master, mistress, overseer, or person having charge of said negro, but did not allege the name of the owner of the slave, etc.

The second count alleged that the negro belonged to Thomas Aldridge, and that the defendant sold ardent spirits to the negro without permission of his master, but does not negative the permission of the mistress, overseer, etc.

The defendant moved to quash the indictment, the motion was overruled, the plea of not guilty was entered for him fey the court, and he was tried and convicted.

The first and third counts in the indictment were defective in *282not alleging the name of the owner of the slave. *State vs. Cadle,*19 *Ark.*613.

The statute provides that no person shall sell, or cause to be sold, to any negro or mulatto slave, ardent spirits in any quantity, without permission of the master, mistress, overseer, or person having charge of said negro or mulatto slave; and any white person offending against the provision of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,” etc.

It does not make out the offence under the statute to charge that the ardent spirits were sold to the slave without permission of the master, for the permission may be given by the mistress, overseer, or person having charge of the negro; and it is more consistent with the rules of criminal pleading for the indictment to negative the permission of all of the persons who are designated in the statute as authorized to give it. See *Bone vs. State,*18 *Ark.*109.

The judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded) with instructions to sustain the motion to quash the indictment.