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*********************************************** 
STEPHEN J. R.* v.

COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 39251)

Keller, Mullins and Lavery, Js.**

Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes in connection

with his alleged sexual abuse of the child victim, sought a writ of habeas

corpus, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

by failing to consult with and present the testimony of an expert on

false memory syndrome in child sexual assault cases. The habeas court

rendered judgment denying the petition and, thereafter, denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court.

Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance was deficient: it was clear from

the record that trial counsel’s decision to focus on the victim’s lack of

credibility and the inconsistency in her story was a matter of trial strategy, and there was no requirement that counsel call an expert when

counsel, after conducting his own research, specifically considered the

false memory defense and made the strategic decision to attack the

victim’s credibility rather than present expert testimony, which was

a reasonable strategic approach; accordingly, the petitioner failed to

demonstrate that the issue raised was debatable among jurists of reason,

that a court could resolve the issue differently, or that the question

raised deserved encouragement to proceed further.

Argued September 13—officially released November 7, 2017

Procedural History

Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Tolland, where the court, Fuger, J., rendered judgment

denying the petition; thereafter, the court denied the

petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner

appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.

Robert O’Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on the

brief, was William A. Adsit, for the appellant (petitioner).

Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state’s

attorney, and Grayson Colt Holmes, former special deputy assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee

(respondent).
Opinion

MULLINS, J. The petitioner, Stephen J. R., appeals

following the habeas court’s denial of his petition for

certification to appeal from the judgment denying his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the

petitioner claims that the court improperly denied his

petition for certification to appeal after erroneously

concluding that his criminal trial counsel, Christopher

Eddy, had provided effective assistance despite his

decision not to consult with and present the testimony

of an expert on false memory syndrome in child sexual

assault cases. We conclude that the court did not abuse

its discretion in denying the petition for certification

to appeal, and, accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

On direct appeal from the petitioner’s underlying conviction, our Supreme Court set forth the following relevant facts that the jury reasonably could have found.

‘‘During all relevant periods of time, the [petitioner]

was a long haul truck driver from Georgia, whose job

took him through Connecticut at various times throughout the year. In the spring of 2002, the [petitioner] and

[the victim’s] mother, A, met and later began a dating

relationship. This relationship lasted from approximately April, 2002 to April, 2003, when [the victim] was

approximately seven years old. During that period of

time, the [petitioner] stayed with A and [the victim] in

their one bedroom apartment . . . four or five times,

in stays ranging from overnight to three or four days,

in addition to a multiweek stay on one occasion while

A recuperated from an accident. When the [petitioner]

stayed overnight, he routinely would drive A to work

at 8:30 a.m. and pick her up at approximately 5:30 p.m.

At approximately 3 p.m., the [petitioner] would pick

[the victim] up from school. As a result, the [petitioner]

and [the victim] were alone in the apartment each afternoon for approximately one and one-half hours.

‘‘One day between April and June, 2002, when [the

victim] was at home after school, she went from the

living room into the bedroom that she shared with her

mother to play with her dollhouse. When [the victim]

entered the bedroom, she found the [petitioner]

undressed on the bed. The [petitioner] told her to put

his penis in her mouth, and she did. The [petitioner]

then pulled down her clothing from the waist down and

put his tongue on her vagina. Afterward, the [petitioner]

instructed [the victim] not to tell her mother about what

had happened.

‘‘Several months into A’s relationship with the [petitioner], she noticed a change in [the victim’s] attitude

toward the [petitioner]. [The victim] seemed afraid of

the [petitioner] and uncomfortable around him. On one

occasion, when the [petitioner] asked [the victim] to

go somewhere with him, she ran to her mother and

said, ‘Mommy, I don’t want to go with him anymore.’
In April, 2003, A broke off her relationship with the [petitioner].

‘‘In January or February, 2006, the [petitioner’s] sister

called A and asked her if the [petitioner] had done

anything sexually to [the victim]. A then posed that

question to [the victim]. [The victim] denied the abuse

to her mother because she thought that if she ‘broke

that secret that something bad would happen.’ Several

more times during the next two years [the victim]

denied to her mother that the [petitioner] had sexually

assaulted her. In November or December, 2007, however, [the victim] admitted to a friend that the [petitioner] had ‘raped’ her. In February, 2008, [the victim]

finally admitted to her mother that the [petitioner] had

sexually assaulted her. Soon after, A contacted the

police, which led to the [petitioner’s] arrest.

‘‘With respect to the three additional incidents,1

the

state offered the following evidence. [The victim] testified that the incident she had described occurred

‘[three] or four times’ before her mother broke off her

relationship with the [petitioner] in April, 2003. [The

victim] stated that ‘[i]t was always the same thing’ and

in ‘the same place.’ When the [petitioner] was engaging

in these acts, he would entice [the victim] with promises

of taking her out for ice cream or to play miniature

golf. He fulfilled those promises . . . . Further, the

[petitioner] told her to keep the sexual acts a secret

from her mother ‘every other time it would happen.’

‘‘The state also presented the DVD of [the victim’s]

April 11, 2008 diagnostic interview with Lisa MurphyCipolla, a clinical child interview supervisor at the

Aetna Foundation Children’s Center at Saint Francis

Hospital and Medical Center. During the interview, [the

victim] told Murphy-Cipolla that the [petitioner] would

put his mouth on her vagina and he would make her

put her mouth on his penis. [The victim] also identified

on diagrams of male and female anatomy where she

had touched the [petitioner] and where he had touched

her, consistent with her statements. When asked how

many times this conduct occurred, [the victim]

answered ‘five to six times.’ Murphy-Cipolla testified

that delayed disclosure is common in cases of reported

child abuse.

‘‘At the end of the state’s case, the [petitioner] moved

for a judgment of acquittal on all charges. The court

denied the [petitioner’s] oral motion, and the jury thereafter returned a verdict of guilty on all sixteen counts.

The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with

the jury’s verdict . . . .’’ (Footnotes altered.) State v.

Stephen J. R., 309 Conn. 586, 589–92, 72 A.3d 379 (2013).

Our Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction

on direct appeal. Id., 607.

On July 24, 2015, the petitioner filed a second

amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which
he alleged in relevant part that his criminal trial counsel

had provided ineffective assistance by failing to ‘‘investigate alternative theories to explain why the [victim]

would fabricate, lie, or provide inaccurate, mistaken,

or incorrect information alleging sexual abuse’’ and by

failing to present expert testimony. In a May 4, 2016

memorandum of decision, the habeas court denied the

petition after finding that criminal trial counsel’s ‘‘assistance was completely reasonable considering all the

circumstances: he investigated the case, prepared for

trial, and employed reasonable trial strategies.’’ The

habeas court further found that, even if it assumed,

arguendo, that criminal trial counsel had performed

deficiently in a manner alleged by the petitioner, the

petitioner had not established that he was prejudiced

by that performance. The habeas court, accordingly,

denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The

court, thereafter, also denied the petition for certification to appeal. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the petitioner contends that the court

abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal from the denial of his petition for a writ

of habeas corpus. Specifically, he argues that the habeas

court erred because the record established that his

criminal trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing ‘‘to utilize an expert to support a false

memory2 defense.’’3

(Footnote added.) We disagree.

Initially, we set forth our standard of review. ‘‘Faced

with the habeas court’s denial of certification to appeal,

a petitioner’s first burden is to demonstrate that the

habeas court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion.

. . . A petitioner may establish an abuse of discretion

by demonstrating that the issues are debatable among

jurists of reason . . . [the] court could resolve the

issues [in a different manner] . . . or . . . the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . . The required determination may be

made on the basis of the record before the habeas court

and the applicable legal principles. . . .

‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused

its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for

certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of

the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether

the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review

the petitioner’s substantive claims for the purpose of

ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more

of the three criteria . . . adopted by this court for

determining the propriety of the habeas court’s denial

of the petition for certification. Absent such a showing

by the petitioner, the judgment of the habeas court must

be affirmed. . . .

‘‘[As it relates to the petitioner’s substantive claims,

our] standard of review of a habeas court’s judgment

on ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well set-
tled. In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the

underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they

are clearly erroneous, but our review of whether the

facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right to effective

assistance of counsel is plenary. . . .

‘‘In Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], the United States

Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he

must show that counsel’s assistance was so defective

as to require reversal of [the underlying] conviction

. . . . That requires the petitioner to show (1) that

counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. . . .

Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot

be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result

unreliable.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Mourning v. Commissioner of Correction,

169 Conn. App. 444, 448–49, 150 A.3d 1166 (2016), cert.

denied, 324 Conn. 908, 152 A.3d 1246 (2017).

‘‘To satisfy the performance prong . . . the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably competent or within the range

of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law. . . . To satisfy the

prejudice prong, a claimant must demonstrate that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. . . . A court can find

against a petitioner, with respect to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, on either the performance

prong or the prejudice prong . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Brian S. v. Commissioner of Correction, 172 Conn. App. 535, 538–39, 160 A.3d 1110, cert.

denied, 326 Conn. 904, 163 A.3d 1204 (2017).

‘‘We also are mindful that [a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;

that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . [C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Hilton v. Commissioner of

Correction, 161 Conn. App. 58, 66–67, 127 A.3d 1011

(2015), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 921, 132 A.3d 1095
(2016); see also Michael T. v. Commissioner of Correction, 319 Conn. 623, 632, 126 A.3d 558 (2015).

‘‘[T]he United States Supreme Court has emphasized

that a reviewing court is required not simply to give

[the trial attorney] the benefit of the doubt . . . but to

affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons

. . . counsel may have had for proceeding as [he] did

. . . . [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options

are virtually unchallengeable; [but] strategic choices

made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional

judgments support the limitations on investigation.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brian S. v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 172 Conn. App. 539–40.

We now turn to the merits of the petitioner’s claim.

The petitioner claims that his criminal trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing ‘‘to

utilize an expert to [present and] support a false memory defense.’’ He contends that the result of the criminal

trial likely would have been different had counsel consulted and presented such an expert. The respondent,

the Commissioner of Correction, asserts that the habeas

court properly found that the assistance provided by

counsel was ‘‘completely reasonable’’ in this case and

that, even if counsel had performed deficiently in the

manner alleged, such deficiency was not prejudicial to

the petitioner. We conclude that trial counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable and, therefore, that

the petitioner failed to prove his ineffective assistance claim.

During the habeas trial, the petitioner presented the

testimony of David Mantell, a licensed clinical psychologist, who has a Ph.D in clinical psychology, among other

degrees. Mantell testified about proper protocol for

interviewing suspected child abuse victims. He opined

that yes and no questions lead to less reliable information because they present a ‘‘forced choice closed

option’’ situation. He also opined that questions that

cause children to guess at the answer or that provide

multiple optional responses are unreliable. Mantell

explained that in his opinion answers to open-ended

questions are the most reliable. Mantell stated that he

had reviewed the child forensic interview aspects of

this case, and that, in his opinion, the interview that

had been conducted was thorough in some respects

and not thorough in other respects.

Mantell discussed some of the things that he believed

were not thoroughly covered in Murphy-Cipolla’s questions to the victim. He also criticized Murphy-Cipolla

for not formulating an alternative hypothesis to bring

‘‘to the attention of the child . . . other possibilities

through which the child might have acquired the suspicion or belief that abuse had occurred, when perhaps

it had not occurred.’’ Mantell then opined that he
thought it was possible that the victim ‘‘may have developed a false memory of abuse based on the fact that

she had been asked about abuse multiple times . . . .’’

Mantell testified that he came to this conclusion for

several reasons. He thought it was significant that the

victim did not report the abuse prior to being questioned

by her mother several years after it had happened. He

also found it significant that the petitioner had not been

involved in the victim’s life for many years prior to her

disclosure, and that she failed to provide a level of

detail of the abuse. He found it persuasive that the

victim also was inconsistent about her age and her

grade level at the time of the abuse, and that she used

a different developmental level of language or words

when describing these events, some being much more

adult and others being more childlike. He stated that

this combination of facts led him to conclude that the

victim may have experienced false memories of the

alleged abuse.

Criminal trial counsel, Eddy, also was called to testify

at the habeas trial. He testified that, through discovery,

he received the forensic interview file and the DVD of

the actual interview conducted by Murphy-Cipolla. He

also received the victim’s records from the Wheeler

Clinic. Eddy was asked by the petitioner’s habeas attorney to describe the theory of defense that he had chosen

for the petitioner’s criminal trial. Eddy responded: ‘‘I

think my theory of the case was one of reasonable

doubt, that the [victim] made inconsistent and incomplete reports; her testimony was inconsistent and

incomplete. That the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that abuse occurred. That there were

. . . denials and that . . . the disclosure lacked sensory details, and that, ultimately, the jury should determine that [the victim] lacks credibility because you have

to assess whether the child used her own vocabulary.

Did the child reenact trauma? Was the child’s affect

consistent with the accusations? Did the child have a

good recall of those details? And the answers to all

of those questions is no. There was no threat and no

pressure or coercion—just, frankly, the story doesn’t

make sense. It’s not plausible. There is a lack of progression from a less to more intimate physical contact

. . . .’’

Eddy further explained that, since there was no medical evidence to substantiate the abuse allegations, the

case ‘‘obviously [came] down to credibility,’’ and he

acknowledged that his job was to attack the victim’s

credibility and to make her seem unbelievable. He

stated that he defended the case in a manner that would

give the jury a reasonable doubt about the crimes

charged. He also testified that he had sought successfully to exclude information of prior sexual misconduct

committed by the petitioner against other children, for

which the petitioner had served time in Florida.
Additionally, Eddy testified that he conducted

research in anticipation of cross-examining MurphyCipolla, as well as other witnesses, by going to the Yale

Law Library and reading several publications, including:

‘‘ ‘Child Sexual Abuse: Disclosure, Delay, and Denial,’

[by] Pipe, Lamb, Orbach and Cederborg, 2007; ‘Tell Me

What Happened: Structured Investigated Interviews of

Child Victims and Witnesses’ by [Lamb, Hershkowitz,

Orbach and Esplin], 2008; ‘Investigative Interviews of

Children: [A Guide for Helping Professionals]’ by Poole

and Lamb; ‘Jeopardy in the Courtroom: [A] Scientific

Analysis of Children’s Testimony’ by Bruck and Ceci;

[and] ‘Expert Witnesses in Child Abuse Cases: [What

Can and Should Be Said in Court]’ by Ceci and Hembrooke, among others.’’ He also familiarized himself

with the RATAC4 protocols used by forensic interviewers, and he reviewed the victim’s mental health records.

When asked whether it was a strategic decision not

to call an expert, Eddy explained: ‘‘Yes. The reason I

didn’t call an expert was because we didn’t have a

situation where there was custody or explanation for

the child lying. The state was not attempting to introduce lots of child behavioral issues. Having watched

the video [of the forensic interview], there was not a

strong claim that could be made that it was overly

suggest[ive]. There w[ere] no dolls being used or play

therapy, the things that are found to be not appropriate.

There were no medical findings that I needed to dispute.

This is not a situation where we had a Jarzbek situation5

or anything like that, so that was my rationale for not

calling an expert.’’ (Footnote added.) He also stated that

he had considered false memory, but did not argue it.

Following closing argument at the habeas trial, the

court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus

on the ground that Eddy’s performance was not deficient and that the petitioner had not demonstrated prejudice. Specifically, the court concluded that Eddy’s

‘‘assistance was completely reasonable considering all

the circumstances: he investigated the case, prepared

for trial, and employed reasonable trial strategies.’’ The

court further concluded that even assuming, arguendo,

that Eddy’s performance was deficient, the petitioner

had failed to demonstrate that such deficiency caused

him prejudice. We agree with the habeas court and

conclude that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate

that criminal trial counsel’s performance was deficient.

It is clear from the record as set forth previously in

this opinion that trial counsel’s decision to focus on

the victim’s lack of credibility and the inconsistency in

her story was a matter of trial strategy. Although the

petitioner argues that trial counsel should have called

an expert to discuss false memory syndrome, there is

no requirement that counsel call an expert when he has

developed a different trial strategy. ‘‘[T]here is no per

se rule that requires a trial attorney to seek out an expert
witness. . . . Furthermore, trial counsel is entitled to

make strategic choices in preparation for trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brian S. v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 172 Conn. App. 542.

Indeed, our Supreme Court expressly has declined

to adopt a bright line rule that an expert witness for

the defense is necessary in every sexual assault case.

Michael T. v. Commissioner of Correction, 307 Conn.

84, 100–101, 52 A.3d 655 (2012). We recognize, however,

as the petitioner points out, that our Supreme Court also

has stated that ‘‘in certain instances, the employment

of an expert for the defense may be constitutionally

mandated by the facts and surrounding circumstances

of the case . . . .’’ Id., 101. The petitioner, however,

has not demonstrated that the present case is such a

matter. In this case, which boiled down to a credibility

contest, trial counsel, after conducting his own

research, specifically considering the false memory

defense, and reviewing the facts of the case, made the

strategic decision to attack the victim’s credibility

rather than present expert testimony. ‘‘[S]trategic

choices made after thorough investigation of law and

facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, 325 Conn. 426,

444, 159 A.3d 109 (2016).

Here, trial counsel told the habeas court that he, in

fact, had considered false memory but did not argue

that theory to the jury, instead focusing on the victim’s

lack of credibility. Trial counsel explained that he

wanted the jury to find the victim not credible and to

conclude that there was a reasonable doubt as to the

petitioner’s guilt, and that he proceeded with that trial

strategy. He also conducted independent research to

assist with the petitioner’s defense. A review of trial

counsel’s closing argument at the petitioner’s criminal

trial reveals that counsel pointed out to the jury that

there were many inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony and that her details were incomplete. He argued

that there were inconsistencies in her statements as to

her age and her grade level at the time the abuse was

alleged to have occurred. He also pointed out the victim’s delay in reporting and her repeated denials that

abuse had occurred, despite the fact that the petitioner

was no longer present in the home or involved with

her or A. He discussed the lack of emotion from the

victim and her varied vocabulary and descriptions of

the abuse, which, at times, sounded ‘‘almost clinical.’’

On the basis of this record, we agree with the habeas

court that this was a reasonable strategic approach.

‘‘It is all too tempting for a [petitioner] to secondguess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse

sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining

counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to

conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel
was unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of attorney

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct

the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and

to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at

the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making

the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . [C]ounsel is strongly

presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Clinton S. v. Commissioner of Correction,

174 Conn. App. 821, 831–32, 167 A.3d 389 (2017).

We conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the petition for certification to

appeal. The petitioner has not demonstrated that the

issue he raised on appeal is debatable among jurists of

reason, that the court could resolve the issue in a different manner, or that the question raised deserves encouragement to proceed further.

The appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of

victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others through

whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 Our Supreme Court noted that, although the long form information did

not indicate that the sixteen counts with which the petitioner had been

charged occurred in the course of four incidents, the defendant and the

state agreed that the state’s theory at trial was predicated on the sixteen

counts occurring during the course of four incidents. State v. Stephen J. R.,

309 Conn. 586, 589 n.3, 72 A.3d 379 (2013).

2 The petitioner’s expert, David Mantell, a forensic psychologist, testified

that ‘‘repeated questioning of children and adults can lead some adults to

form false memories about events that didn’t occur, or [that] didn’t occur

in the way that they are being recalled. . . . [The repeated questioning]

. . . can . . . lead to the development of an entirely false memory . . . .’’

3 Although this precise allegation of ineffectiveness does not appear in

the petition for a writ of habeas corpus or in the petitioner’s pretrial brief

to the habeas court, and, in fact, the words ‘‘false memory’’ do not appear

in those documents at all, the petitioner’s habeas counsel presented expert

testimony from Dr. Mantell on this theory and included it in his closing

argument at the habeas trial. The habeas court construed the petition to

have included such a claim or a close variation thereof, and stated, in its

memorandum of decision, that the petitioner in part had alleged that criminal

trial counsel failed to ‘‘adequately present testimony that contradicts, refutes,

offers alternative explanations for and otherwise challenges the [victim’s]

allegations.’’ The respondent has not objected to the claim set forth by the

petitioner on appeal or to our consideration of the claim as presented.

4 Mantell explained that the CornerHouse RATAC Protocol ‘‘was one of

many available protocols to guide forensic interviews . . . [a]nd it was the

one that was selected here in Connecticut, and also in many other states

across the country . . . . And it describe[s] a series of phases or steps that

interviewers [are] expected to pass through in order to conduct a protocol

compliant best practice interview.’’ Mantell also explained what the RATAC

initials stand for: ‘‘R, is for rapport building, A, is for anatomical body-part

review, T is for touch-contact review, A, is for abuse inquiry, and, C is
for closure.’’

5

‘‘In cases involving the alleged sexual abuse of children, the practice of

videotaping the testimony of a minor victim outside the physical presence

of the defendant is, in appropriate circumstances, constitutionally permissible. To that end, in such cases, the state files a motion pursuant to State

v. Jarzbek, [204 Conn. 683, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061,

108 S. Ct. 1017, 98 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1988)], and a hearing is held to determine

whether it is necessary to exclude a defendant from the room during the

videotaping of a child victim’s testimony in order to preserve the accuracy

and reliability of that testimony.’’ Ruiz v. Commissioner of Correction, 156

Conn. App. 321, 324 n.2, 113 A.3d 485, cert. granted, 319 Conn. 923, 125 A.3d

199 (2015) (appeal withdrawn, January 28, 2016).