alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 266

Requiring the appropriate committees of the House to report legislation to

transfer certain functions of the Government Printing Office, and for

other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 30, 1993

Mr. KLUG (for himself, Mr. PENNY, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. BOEHNER, Mr. CAMP,

Mr. COX, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. PORTMAN, Mr.

RAMSTAD, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. UPTON, and Mr. WALKER) submitted the

following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules

RESOLUTION

Requiring the appropriate committees of the House to report

legislation to transfer certain functions of the Government Printing Office, and for other purposes.

1 Resolved,

2 SECTION 1. REQUIREMENT FOR THE REPORTING OF LEGIS3 LATION.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than October 1, 1994,

5 the appropriate committees of the House of Representa6 tives shall report to the House legislation to accomplish

7 the purposes specified in subsection (b).
2

•HRES 266 IH

1 (b) PURPOSES SPECIFIED.—The purposes referred to

2 in subsection (a) are—

3 (1) transfer of executive branch printing from

4 the Government Printing Office to the General Serv5 ices Administration;

6 (2) transfer of the functions now carried out by

7 the Superintendent of Documents to the Librarian

8 of Congress, who shall be responsible for the dis9 semination of all Government information, with the

10 on-line networks of the Library of Congress to be

11 used for Government information not requiring a

12 printed format;

13 (3) abolition of the Joint Committee on Print14 ing and the Joint Committee on the Library and es15 tablishment of a Joint Committee on Information;

16 (4) reduction of the in-house printing capacity

17 of the Government Printing Office to the minimum

18 level necessary;

19 (5) procurement of other congressional printing

20 whenever possible from the private sector through a

21 competitive bid process, with the procurement to be

22 administered by the Public Printer;

23 (6) reduction in the work force at the Govern24 ment Printing Office to 500 positions, with the re25 duction to be accomplished gradually, but not later
3

•HRES 266 IH

1 than the end of the second fiscal year after the fiscal

2 year in which this resolution is agreed to;

3 (7) submission to the Congress by the Public

4 Printer of an annual report on the standards appli5 cable to, and the efficiency of, the Government

6 Printing Office; and

7 (8) submission to the Congress of triennial

8 General Accounting Office audits of the functions of

9 the Government Printing Office.

Æ
#### James ADAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 45450.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 2, 1978.

Rehearing Denied April 5, 1978.

*1206Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Kenneth J. Scherer, Chief Asst. Public Defender and Lois J. Frankel and Craig S. Barnard, Asst. Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Michael M. Corin and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in *Gardner v. Florida,*430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), this Court entered its order on May 6, 1977, establishing a procedure whereby the trial judge who imposed the death sentence was directed to file a response stating whether he imposed the sentence on the basis of consideration of any information not known to appellant. This order also provided that any application for relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in *Gardner v. Florida, supra,*should be filed with this Court within thirty (30) days after the trial judge had filed his response pursuant to this Court’s directive.

On May 12, 1977, the trial court filed its response stating that in imposing the death sentence it “did not have any information whatsoever, either as listed herein or otherwise . . . which [the court] used as a basis for consideration in imposing the death sentence which was not known to the appellant and/or his counsel of record.”

In his application for relief, appellant argues that he has had no opportunity to deny or explain certain factual findings relied on by the trial judge in his sentencing order. The order, which set forth specific findings of fact on which the death sentence was imposed, states in part:

> By his own admission the defendant was *previously convicted of crimes on at least five occasions*and the further undisputed evidence shows the defendant has a record involving crimes of violence . . . . [Emphasis supplied.]

Appellant contends that he has not been convicted on five previous occasions and that the evidence before the trial court did not show that he had been convicted of prior crimes involving violence but that he had only one previous conviction for rape in Tennessee in 1962.

The admission of five previous crimes to which the trial court referred in its sentencing order was appellant’s response during cross-examination. In response to the state attorney’s question regarding how many times he had been convicted of a crime, appellant stated: “Maybe five or more, I don’t know, something like that.” (R-926).

The Court finds this application for relief pursuant to *Gardner v. Florida*to be without merit. Appellant complains of nothing more than the use by the trial court of his testimony given at trial in sentencing the appellant. Appellant had ample opportunity to explain or refute his own testimony at trial.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND and KARL, JJ., concur.

HATCHETT, J., dissents.
#### Joseph NORRIS, Jr. v. STATE.

No. 38580.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1969.

Certiorari dismissed without opinion. 220 So.2d 396.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Fischer Imaging Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2002
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Harris S. Ravine, Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



/s/HARRIS RAVINEHarris Ravine Chief Executive Officer and PresidentApril 14, 2004

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Fischer Imaging Corporation and will be retained by Fischer Imaging Corporation and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---

QuickLinks
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. Delores Ann HARSHAW, Relator, v. Hon. Ellen J. MORPHONIOS, as Judge of the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 71-1068.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 11, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Mandamus dismissed.
Exhibit 31.2



Section 302 Certification



I, John W. Burns, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of GlycoGenesys, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;



4. The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;



b) [Paragraph reserved pursuant to SEC Release 33-8238];



c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



d) disclosed in this report any change in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



5. The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of
the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants
internal controls over financial reporting.



Date: August 19, 2003



|By: /s/ John W. Burns                                                                        
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|John W. Burns Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)



23
#### Myron CORAK, Appellant, v. Roslyn B. CORAK, Appellee.

No. 77-2245.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 25, 1978.

Eli Breger, North Miami Beach, for appellant.

Snyder, Young, Stern, Barrett & Tan-nenbaum, William L. Rogers, North Miami Beach, and George E. Gelb, North Miami Beach, on the brief, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, HUBBART and KE-HOE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See: *Herzog*v. *Herzog,*346 So.2d 56 (Fla.1977); *Shaw v. Shaw,*334 So.2d 13 (Fla.1976); *Koeppel v. Koeppel,*351 So.2d 766 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); *Sharpe v. Sharpe,*202 So.2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-7302

WESLEY CARROLL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, U.S. Army Records Management and 

Declassification Agency,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Danville. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior

District Judge. (4:11-cv-00022-JLK)

Submitted: January 4, 2012 Decided: January 12, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Wesley Carroll, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Linn Eckert, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Wesley Carroll appeals the district court’s order 

granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss his civil complaint. 

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district 

court. See Carroll v. Dep’t of the Army, No. 4:11-cv-00022-JLK 

(W.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2011). We deny Carroll’s pending motions. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Allan BERRY, Appellant, v. HAYDEN STONE INCORPORATED, a Delaware corporation, Appellee.

No. 70-962.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 18, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS v. E. J. NOSSER.

No. 53910.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 21, 1973.

In re: E. J. Nosser applying for writs of certiorari (review), prohibition, and mandamus.

Application not considered. There is no final judgment, or sentence, and we will not review a case so postured.
IV

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 577

Returning to the Senate S. 1216, to resolve the 107th meridian boundary

dispute between the Crow Indian Tribe and the United States.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 7, 1994

Mr. GIBBONS submitted the following resolution; which was was considered

and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Returning to the Senate S. 1216, to resolve the 107th meridian boundary dispute between the Crow Indian Tribe

and the United States.

1 Resolved, That the bill of the Senate (S. 1216) enti2 tled the ‘‘Crow Boundary Settlement Act of 1994’’, in the

3 opinion of this House, contravenes the first clause of the

4 seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of

5 the United States and is an infringement of the privileges

6 of this House and that such bill be respectfully returned

7 to the Senate with a message communicating this resolu8 tion.

Æ
# C_2021189EN.01001002.xml

| 17.5.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 189/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.5.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 189/10

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 25 February 2021 — X BV v Classic Coach Company vof, Y, Z

(Case C-112/21)

(2021/C 189/11)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: X BV

Respondents: Classic Coach Company vof, Y, Z

Questions referred

| 1. | For the purposes of determining whether there is an ‘earlier right’ of a third party as referred to in Article 6(2) of the repealed Directive 2008/95/EC (1)







  (a) | is it sufficient that, prior to the filing of the trade mark, that third party had made use in the course of trade of a right which is recognised by the laws of the Member State in question; or |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

For the purposes of determining whether there is an ‘earlier right’ of a third party as referred to in Article 6(2) of the repealed Directive 2008/95/EC (1)

(a)

is it sufficient that, prior to the filing of the trade mark, that third party had made use in the course of trade of a right which is recognised by the laws of the Member State in question; or

| (b) | is there a requirement that that third party, on the basis of that earlier right, under the applicable national legislation, is entitled to prohibit the use of the trade mark by the trade mark holder? |
| --- | --- |

(b)

is there a requirement that that third party, on the basis of that earlier right, under the applicable national legislation, is entitled to prohibit the use of the trade mark by the trade mark holder?

| 2. | In answering Question 1, is it also relevant whether the trade mark holder has an even earlier right (recognised by the laws of the Member State in question) in relation to the sign registered as a trade mark and, if so, is it relevant whether the trade mark holder may, on the basis of that even earlier recognised right, prohibit the use by the third party of the alleged ‘earlier right’? |
| --- | --- |

2.

In answering Question 1, is it also relevant whether the trade mark holder has an even earlier right (recognised by the laws of the Member State in question) in relation to the sign registered as a trade mark and, if so, is it relevant whether the trade mark holder may, on the basis of that even earlier recognised right, prohibit the use by the third party of the alleged ‘earlier right’?

---

(1)  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 2008 L 299, p. 25).

---
#### Troy C. BURROUGHS v. STATE.

No. 38761.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1969.

Habeas Corpus denied without opinion.
<PAGE>   1
EXHIBIT 11 - COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER SHARE

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                  Three months ended           Six months ended
                                                       June 30,                     June 30,
                                               -------------------------   -------------------------
                                                  1997          1996          1997          1996
                                               -----------   -----------   -----------   -----------
<S>                                             <C>           <C>           <C>           <C>       
Weighted average common shares outstanding      12,852,583    12,879,176    12,868,702    12,877,088

Net effect of dilutive stock equivalents
  based on the treasury stock method
  using ending market price in 1997 and
  average market price in 1996                     793,921       997,758       722,752       961,985
                                               -----------   -----------   -----------   -----------

Total weighted shares outstanding               13,646,504    13,876,934    13,591,454    13,839,073
                                               ===========   ===========   ===========   ===========

Net income                                     $ 1,413,531   $ 2,442,955   $ 2,553,167   $ 4,758,448
                                               ===========   ===========   ===========   ===========

Net income per share                           $      0.10   $      0.18   $      0.19   $      0.34
                                               ===========   ===========   ===========   ===========
</TABLE>



                                       40
EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Golden  Enterprises,  Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the second  quarter ended November 30, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Mark W. McCutcheon, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

Dated:   January 13, 2004



/s/ Mark W. McCutcheon
----------------------
Mark W. McCutcheon
President and Chief Executive Officer

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to Golden Enterprises, Inc. and will be retained by Golden Enterprises,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its staff upon
request.


                                       18
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 19
- 00343
- CV

In re Sean O ’ Malley

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM BLANCO COUNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Relator, Sean O’Malley, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus in this Court. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221 ; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52.1. In his petition, O’Malley asks us to issue a writ of mandamus directed
to the Honorable Randy Brodbeck , Justice of the Peace for Prec inct 1 of Blanco County

.

By statute, this Court has the authority to issue a writ of mandamus against “a judge of a district, statutory county, statutory probate county, or county court in the court of appeals district”) , see Tex. Gov ’t Code § 22.221(b)(1), and other writs as necessary to enforce our appellate jurisdiction, see id. § 22.221(a). A justice of the peace is not a party against whom we may issue a writ of mandamus. Nor has O’Malley demonstrated that the exercise of our wr it power is necessary to enforce our jurisdiction. We have no jurisdiction to grant O’Malley

any relief. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction.2 ____________ ______________________________ Edward Smith , Justice
Before Chief Jus tice Rose, Justices Kelly and Smith
Filed: May 24, 2019
# C_2020279EN.01005501.xml

| 24.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 279/55 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 279/55

---

Action brought on 7 July 2020 — Deutsche Kreditbank v SRB

(Case T-419/20)

(2020/C 279/69)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Deutsche Kreditbank AG (Berlin, Germany) (represented by: H. Berger and K. Helle, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board (SRB)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the decision of the Single Resolution Board of 15 April 2020 on the calculation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund collected in advance for 2020 (SRB/ES/2020/24), including its annexes, in so far as the contested decision, including Annex I and Annex II, concerns the applicant’s contribution; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of the Single Resolution Board of 15 April 2020 on the calculation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund collected in advance for 2020 (SRB/ES/2020/24), including its annexes, in so far as the contested decision, including Annex I and Annex II, concerns the applicant’s contribution;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The action is based on nine pleas which are essentially identical or similar to the first, second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh pleas in law put forward in Case T-405/20 DZ Hyp v SRB.

---
260 La. 695

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Clyde J. WEBER.

No. 52116.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 10, 1972.

In re: Clyde J. Weber applying for writs of certiorari or review, prohibition and mandamus, and stay order.

Application denied. Under the particular circumstances of this case the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction is not warranted.

BARHAM, J., does not concur.