NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BEN PIAZZA; JOEL BINGER; KEVIN 

BELLOTTI; JIMMY VELARDE; WAYNE 

GETCHELL; NANCY PERRY; EDWARD 

NELSON; RON NUGENT; DAVE GOLBA; 

PETER MALLARD; FREDERICK SMITH; 

JULIAN SALAS; ROBERTO BOSIO; 

RICHARD LABGOLD; DENISE STONES; 

LESLIE NOURSE; LINDA RUSS; 

BARBRA CIMO; SHARON O'DANIEL; 

JODY LAWRENCE-MILLER; VICKI 

KAUFMAN; TRACY LAWRENCE; MARC 

BERUTI, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

CBS BROADCASTING, INC.; 

TELEVISION CITY STUDIOS, LLC; 

TELEVISION CITY SERVICES, LLC; 

TELEVISION CITY PRODUCTIONS, 

LLC; MICHAEL HACKMAN AND 

ASSOCIATES; HACKMAN CAPITAL 

PARTNERS, LLC, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-55615 

D.C. No. 

2:20-cv-02920-DSF-AS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

SEP 19 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Submitted September 15, 2023**

Pasadena, California

Before: SCHROEDER, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

A group of former CBS employees (“Plaintiffs”) appeals the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment in favor of their employer, CBS (“Defendant”), on 

claims that Defendant violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act 

(“FEHA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Plaintiffs’ briefing fails to comply with both the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure and our court’s rules. Under our court’s rules, “[e]very 

assertion in the briefs regarding matters in the record, except for undisputed facts 

offered only for general background, shall be supported by a citation to the 

Excerpts of Record, unless the filer is exempt from the excerpts requirement.” 9th

Cir. R. 28-2.8; see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6), (e). Although Plaintiffs’ opening 

brief contains numerous factual assertions, it includes only a handful of citations in 

support—all of which are to the Complaint or the district court’s order, not to 

record evidence. Defendant pointed out these deficiencies in its response brief. In 

reply, Plaintiffs’ brief includes a single citation to a range of over one hundred 

pages from a submission by counsel to the district court (much of which was 

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
3 

reproduced verbatim in the brief without any additional explanation), which itself 

contains citations that have no correspondence to the appellate excerpts of record. 

This is insufficient to remedy the deficient opening brief. See Indep. Towers of 

Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[J]udges are not like 

pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 

F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991))).

Those failures could warrant outright dismissal of this appeal. See N/S 

Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking the 

appellant’s deficient briefs and dismissing the appeal). Nevertheless, we proceed 

to the merits and conclude that the appeal is not meritorious. 

2. Plaintiffs contend that the district court’s order was inappropriately short 

and failed to adequately explain its reasoning. But the district court’s analysis 

easily satisfies Rule 56’s directive that a trial court “should state on the record the 

reasons for granting or denying the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendments (“The form and 

detail of the statement of reasons are left to the court’s discretion.”). 

3. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendant 

on Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim. Plaintiffs challenge two decisions that 

they argue adversely impacted them: (1) the decision to transfer them to a different 

employer as part of an acquisition, and (2) the decision to exclude transferred 
4 

employees from a voluntary buyout. Even assuming those are adverse 

employment actions, Defendant has provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reasons for both decisions. Defendant explained that (1) the transferred employees 

were selected based on their roles, to ensure continuity of operations after the 

transfer, and (2) Defendant was contractually obligated to exclude the transferred 

employees from the voluntary buyout.

To defeat summary judgment, then, Plaintiffs “had the burden to rebut this 

facially dispositive showing by pointing to evidence which nonetheless raises a 

rational inference that intentional discrimination occurred.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l 

Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 357 (2000). They have not done so. Although Plaintiffs 

assert that Defendant’s proffered reasons were pretextual, they offer no evidence in 

support of that assertion apart from their subjective beliefs that Defendant 

discriminated against them due to their age.

4. Summary judgment was also warranted on Plaintiffs’ disparate impact 

claim. Plaintiffs have offered no evidence—statistical or otherwise—in support of 

their claim that a disproportionate number of older employees was transferred. 

They have accordingly not made out a prima facie case of disparate impact. See 

Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. App. 4th 1390, 1405 (2015) (requiring a 

plaintiff to show that the challenged “facially neutral policy has caused a protected 

group to suffer adverse effects” in order to make out a prima facie case of disparate 
5 

impact under FEHA); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1425 (9th Cir. 

1990) (granting summary judgment to the defendant employer where the plaintiff 

failed to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact).

AFFIRMED.