This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

32807 

Vol. 83, No. 136 

Monday, July 16, 2018 

1The terms ‘‘limit,’’ ‘‘ultimate,’’ and ‘‘factor of 

safety’’ are specified in § 25.301, ‘‘Loads,’’ § 25.303, 

‘‘Factor of safety,’’ and § 25.305, ‘‘Strength and 

deformation.’’ To summarize, design loads are 

typically expressed in terms of limit loads, which 

are then multiplied by a factor of safety, usually 1.5, 

to determine ultimate loads. In this proposal, the 

design loads would be expressed as ultimate loads, 

and no additional safety factor would be applied. 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No.: FAA–2018–0653–; Notice No. 

18–04] 

RIN 2120–AK89 

Yaw Maneuver Conditions—Rudder 

Reversals 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to add a 

new load condition to the design 

standards for transport category 

airplanes. The new load condition 

would require the airplane be designed 

to withstand the loads caused by rapid 

reversals of the rudder pedals and 

would apply to transport category 

airplanes that have a powered rudder 

control surface or surfaces. This rule is 

necessary because accident and incident 

data show that pilots sometimes make 

rudder reversals during flight, even 

though such reversals are unnecessary 

and discouraged by flightcrew training 

programs. The current design standards 

do not require the airplane structure to 

withstand the loads that may result from 

such reversals. If the airplane loads 

exceed those for which it is designed, 

the airplane structure may fail, resulting 

in catastrophic loss of control of the 

airplane. This proposal aims to prevent 

structural failure of the rudder and 

vertical stabilizer that may result from 

these rudder reversals. 

DATES: Send comments on or before 

October 15, 2018. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number [Insert docket number 

from heading] using any of the 

following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30; U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 

553(c), DOT solicits comments from the 

public to better inform its rulemaking 

process. DOT posts these comments, 

without edit, including any personal 

information the commenter provides, to 

www.regulations.gov, as described in 

the system of records notice (DOT/ALL– 

14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at 

www.dot.gov/privacy. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov at any time. 

Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to the Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

action, contact Robert C. Jones, 

Propulsion & Mechanical Systems 

Section, AIR–672, Transport Standards 

Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, 

Aircraft Certification Service, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 2200 South 

216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198; 

telephone and fax (206) 231–3182; email 

Robert.C.Jones@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules on 

aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the 

United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 

106 describes the authority of the FAA 

Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation 

Programs, describes in more detail the 

scope of the agency’s authority. 

This rulemaking is promulgated 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701, ‘‘General Requirements.’’ Under 

that section, the FAA is charged with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

and minimum standards for the design 

and performance of aircraft that the 

Administrator finds necessary for safety 

in air commerce. This regulation is 

within the scope of that authority. It 

prescribes new safety standards for the 

design of transport category airplanes. 

I. Overview of Proposed Rule 

The FAA proposes to add a new load 

condition to the design standards in title 

14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 

CFR) part 25. The new load condition, 

to be located in new proposed § 25.353, 

would require that the airplane be 

designed to withstand the loads caused 

by rapid reversals of the rudder pedals. 

Specifically, applicants would have to 

show that their proposed airplane 

design can withstand an initial full 

rudder pedal input, followed by three 

rudder reversals at the maximum 

sideslip angle, followed by return of the 

rudder to neutral. Due to the rarity of 

such multiple reversals, the proposed 

rule would specify the new load 

condition is an ultimate load condition 

rather than a limit load condition. 

Consequently, the applicant would not 

have to apply an additional factor of 

safety to the calculated load levels.1

The proposed rule would affect 

manufacturers of transport category 

airplanes applying for a new type 

certificate after the effective date of the 

final rule. The proposed rule may also 

affect applicants applying for an 

amended or supplemental type 

certificate as determined under 14 CFR 

21.101 after the effective date of the 

final rule. Proposed § 25.353 would 

apply to transport category airplanes 

that have a powered rudder control 

surface or surfaces, as explained in the 

‘‘Discussion of the Proposal.’’ 

II. Background 

A. Statement of the Problem 

Accident and incident data from the 

events described in section II.B.1 show 

pilots sometimes make multiple and 

unnecessary rudder reversals during 

flight. In addition, FAA-sponsored 


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2Report No. DOT/FAA/AM–10/14, ‘‘An 

International Survey of Transport Airplane Pilots’ 

Experiences and Perspectives of Lateral/Directional 

Control Events and Rudder Issues in Transport 

Airplanes (Rudder Survey),’’ dated October 2010, is 

available in the Docket and on the internet at http:// 

www.faa.gov/data_research/research/med_

humanfacs/oamtechreports/2010s/media/ 

201014.pdf. 

3 VD is the design diving speed: The maximum 

speed at which the airplane is certified to fly. See 

14 CFR 1.2. Advisory Circular 25–7C provides 

additional information related to VD. 

4A rudder reversal is a continuous, pilotcommanded pedal movement starting from pedal 

displacement in one direction followed by pedal 

displacement in the opposite direction. 

5Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–04/04, 

‘‘In-flight Separation of Vertical Stabilizer, 

American Airlines Flight 587, Airbus Industrie 

A300–605R, N14053, Belle Harbor, New York, 

November 12, 2001,’’ dated October 26, 2004, is 

available in the Docket and on the internet at 

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Accident

Reports/Reports/AAR0404.pdf. 

6On February 11, 1991, an Airbus Model A310 

series airplane experienced in-flight loss of control 

over Moscow, Russia. 

7On May 12, 1997, an Airbus Model A300–600 

series airplane experienced in-flight loss of control 

near West Palm Beach, Florida, after the flightcrew 

failed to recognize that the airplane had entered a 

stall. 

8The Interflug and Miami Flight 903 events are 

discussed in NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/ 

AAR–04/04, pp. 103–110. See footnote 5 on p. 6. 

9FCHWG Recommendation Report, ‘‘Rudder 

Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder Reversal,’’ dated 

November 7, 2013, is available in the Docket and 

on the internet at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_

policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/ 

TAEfch-rpsrr-3282011.pdf. See p. 5 of the report. 

10TSB Aviation Investigation Report A08W0007, 

‘‘Encounter with Wake Turbulence,’’ is available in 

the Docket and on the internet at http://tsb.gc.ca/ 

eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2008/a08w0007/ 

a08w0007.pdf. 

11TSB Aviation Investigation Report A05A0059. 

See footnote 10 on p. 7. 

12Report No. DOT/FAA/AM–10/14 (see footnote 

2 on p. 5), OMB Control No. 2120–0712. 

research 2 indicates that pilots use the 

rudder more often than previously 

thought and often in ways not 

recommended by manufacturers. 

Section 25.1583(a)(3)(ii) requires 

manufacturers to provide 

documentation that warns pilots against 

making large and rapid control reversals 

as they may result in structural failures 

at any speed, including below the 

design maneuvering speed (VA). Despite 

the requirement, and though such 

rudder reversals are unnecessary and 

discouraged by flightcrew training 

programs, these events continue to 

occur (see section II.B.1, ‘‘History— 

Accidents and Incidents’’ below). 

Section 25.351, the standard for 

protecting the airplane’s vertical 

stabilizer from pilot-commanded 

maneuver loads, only addresses single, 

full rudder inputs at airspeeds up to the 

design diving speed (VD).3 This design 

standard does not protect the airplane 

from the loads imposed by repeated 

inputs in opposing directions, or rudder 

reversals.4 If the loads on the vertical 

stabilizer exceed those for which it is 

designed, the vertical stabilizer may fail, 

resulting in the catastrophic loss of 

airplane control. 

Incidents and accidents related to 

rudder reversals have occurred in the 

past, and the FAA believes that another 

such event could occur, resulting in 

injuries to occupants or a structural 

failure that jeopardizes continued safe 

flight and landing of the airplane. 

B. History 

1. Accidents and Incidents 

Rudder reversals have caused a 

number of accidents and incidents. On 

November 12, 2001, American Airlines 

Flight 587 (AA587), an Airbus Model 

A300–600 series airplane, crashed at 

Belle Harbor, New York, resulting in 

265 deaths and the loss of the airplane. 

The National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) found that the probable 

cause of this accident was the in-flight 

separation of the vertical stabilizer as a 

result of the loads beyond ultimate 

design that were created by the first 

officer’s unnecessary and excessive 

rudder pedal inputs. The NTSB also 

noted that contributing to these rudder 

pedal inputs were characteristics of the 

Airbus A300–600 rudder system design 

and elements of the American Airlines 

Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering 

Program.5

In two additional events—commonly 

known as the Interflug incident 6 and 

Miami Flight 903 accident (AA903) 7— 

the vertical stabilizer of each airplane 

experienced loads above the ultimate 

load level due to pedal reversals 

commanded by the pilot after the 

airplane stalled.8 While none of the 

passengers and crew were injured in the 

Interflug incident, a passenger was 

seriously injured and a crewmember 

sustained minor injuries in the AA903 

accident. The AA903 airplane also 

sustained sheared fasteners, deformed 

nacelles, and engine component 

damage, but landed safely. A 

catastrophe similar to AA587 was 

averted in each of these events because 

the vertical stabilizer was stronger than 

required by the design standards.9

Other rudder reversal events have 

occurred more recently. On January 10, 

2008, an Airbus Model 319–114 series 

airplane, operated as Air Canada Flight 

190 (AC190), encountered a wake vortex 

while at cruise altitude over Washington 

State.10 The pilot responded with inputs 

that included six rudder reversals. The 

flightcrew eventually stabilized the 

airplane and diverted to an airport 

capable of handling the injured 

passengers. 

The Transportation Safety Board of 

Canada (TSB) investigated this event, 

along with NTSB accredited 

representatives, and classified it as an 

accident. Analysis by the TSB showed 

that the pilot’s actions resulted in a load 

on the vertical stabilizer that exceeded 

its limit load by approximately 29 

percent. The TSB found that the 

flightcrew was startled by wake 

turbulence at that altitude, erroneously 

believed that the airplane had 

malfunctioned, and therefore responded 

with erroneous actions. The pilot had 

received training to avoid rudder 

reversals. 

On May 27, 2005, a Bombardier DHC– 

8–100 series airplane, operated by 

Provincial Airlines Limited for 

passenger service, experienced a stall 

and uncontrolled descent over 

Canada.11 During climb-out, the 

indicated airspeed gradually decreased, 

due to the flightcrew’s inadvertent 

selection of an incorrect autopilot mode. 

The airplane stalled at an unexpectedly 

high airspeed, likely due to the 

formation of ice. The flightcrew’s failure 

to recognize the stall resulted in 

incorrect control inputs and the loss of 

4,200 feet of altitude in approximately 

40 seconds before recovery. There were 

no injuries and the airplane was not 

damaged. During this event, the pilot 

commanded a rudder reversal. 

2. New Transport Airplane Programs 

Since the AA587 accident, the FAA 

has responded to the risk posed by 

rudder reversals, in part, by requesting 

that applicants for new type certificates 

show that their designs are capable of 

continued safe flight and landing after 

experiencing repeated rudder reversals. 

Applicants have been able to show this 

capability through rudder control laws 

in flight control systems. Applicants 

have incorporated these control laws 

through software and, therefore, added 

no weight or maintenance cost to the 

airplanes. 

In 2016, the European Aviation Safety 

Agency (EASA) began applying special 

conditions to new airplane certification 

programs. EASA mandated these special 

conditions to address the exact risk of 

rudder reversals explained in this 

NPRM. The requirements in the EASA 

special conditions are identical to the 

requirements proposed in this NPRM. 

3. FAA Survey of Pilots’ Rudder Use 

In 2006, the FAA sponsored a 

survey 12 to better comprehend transport 

category pilots’ understanding and use 

of the rudder. This survey included 


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13This notice of ARAC tasking was published in 

the Federal Register on March 28, 2011 (76 FR 

17183). 

14FCHWG Recommendation Report, ‘‘Rudder 

Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder Reversal,’’ dated 

November 7, 2013, is available in the Docket and 

on the internet at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_

policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/ 

TAEfch-rpsrr-3282011.pdf. See footnote 9 on p. 7. 

15NTSB Safety Recommendation A–04–056 is 

available in the Docket and on the internet at http:// 

www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/A04_

56_62.pdf. 

16NTSB Safety Recommendation A–04–60 is 

available in the Docket and on the internet at http:// 

www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A04_56_

62.pdf. 

17AD 2012–21–15 was published in the Federal 

Register on November 9, 2012 (77 FR 67526). For 

more information, see Docket No. FAA–2011–0518 

on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov. 

18AD 2015–23–13 was published in the Federal 

Register on December 29, 2015 (77 FR 67526). For 

more information, see Docket No. FAA–2011–0518 

on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov. 

transport pilots from all over the world. 

The FAA’s analysis of the survey data 

found that— 

• Pilots use the rudder more than 

previously thought and often in ways 

not recommended by manufacturers. 

• Pilots make erroneous rudder pedal 

inputs, and some erroneous rudder 

pedal inputs include rudder reversals. 

• Even after specific training, many 

pilots are not aware that they should not 

make rudder reversals, even below VA. 

Over the last several years, training and 

changes to the airplane flight manual 

(AFM) have directed the pilot to avoid 

making cyclic control inputs. The 

rudder reversals that caused the AC190 

incident in 2008, and the Provincial 

Airlines Limited incident in 2005, 

occurred despite this effort. 

• The survey indicated that pilots in 

airplane upset situations (e.g., wake 

vortex encounters) may revert to prior 

training and make sequential rudder 

reversals. 

C. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 

Committee (ARAC) Activity 

In 2011, the FAA tasked ARAC to 

consider the need to add a new flight 

maneuver load condition to part 25, 

subpart C, that would ensure airplane 

structural capability in the presence of 

rudder reversals and increasing sideslip 

angles (yaw angles) at airspeeds up to 

VD. The FAA also tasked ARAC to 

consider if other airworthiness 

standards would more appropriately 

address this concern, such as pedal 

characteristics that would discourage 

pilots from making rudder reversals.13

ARAC delegated this task to the 

Transport Airplane and Engine 

subcommittee, which assigned it to the 

Flight Controls Harmonization Working 

Group (FCHWG). 

The FCHWG was tasked to examine 

several options to protect the airplane 

from pilot-commanded rudder reversals. 

These options included developing new 

standards for— 

• Loads, 

• Maneuverability, 

• System design, 

• Control sensitivity, 

• Alerting, and 

• Pilot training. 

The FCHWG completed its report in 

November 2013.14 ARAC and the FAA 

accepted the report. The report’s 

findings and recommendations guided 

the formation of this proposal. 

While multiple rudder reversals are a 

very low probability event, they have 

occurred in service and cannot be ruled 

out in the future. The FCHWG found 

that a load condition was the optimal 

way to protect the airplane from the 

excessive loads that can result from 

multiple rudder reversals. The FCHWG 

recommended a load condition over the 

other options because it would be a 

performance-based requirement. The 

FCHWG noted that this would provide 

applicants for design approval with the 

flexibility to determine the best way to 

meet a load condition. 

D. NTSB Safety Recommendation 

Following the AA587 accident 

described in section II.B.1 of this NPRM, 

the NTSB provided safety 

recommendations to the FAA. The 

NTSB stated, ‘‘For airplanes with 

variable stop rudder travel limiter 

systems, protection from dangerous 

structural loads resulting from sustained 

alternating large rudder pedal inputs 

can be achieved by reducing the 

sensitivity of the rudder control system 

(for example, by increasing the pedal 

forces), which would make it harder for 

pilots to quickly perform alternating full 

rudder inputs.’’ In Safety 

Recommendation A–04–056,15 the 

NTSB recommended that the FAA 

modify part 25 to include a certification 

standard that will ensure safe handling 

qualities in the yaw axis throughout the 

flight envelope, including limits for 

rudder pedal sensitivity. 

This proposed rule would address 

this recommendation and, if 

incorporated on new airplane designs, 

would reduce the risk of an event 

similar to AA587. The proposed rule 

would also respond to the NTSB’s 

concern about rudder pedal sensitivity. 

E. Other Regulatory Actions 

1. 2010 Revisions to § 25.1583 

During its investigation of the AA587 

accident, the NTSB found that many 

pilots of transport category airplanes 

mistakenly believed that, as long as the 

airplane’s speed is below VA, they can 

make any control input they desire 

without risking structural damage to the 

airplane. AA587 exposed the fact that 

this assumption is incorrect. As a result, 

the NTSB recommended that the FAA 

amend its regulations to clarify that 

operating at or below VA does not 

provide structural protection against 

multiple, full control inputs in one axis, 

or full control inputs in more than one 

axis at the same time.16 After making its 

own assessment, the FAA agreed, and 

revised § 25.1583(a)(3) at Amendment 

25–130, effective October 15, 2010. 

Section 25.1583(a)(3) was revised to 

change the information that applicants 

must furnish in the AFM explaining the 

use of VA to pilots. The amendment 

clarified that, depending on the 

particular airplane design, flying at or 

below VA does not allow a pilot to make 

multiple large control inputs in one 

airplane axis or full control inputs in 

more than one airplane axis at a time 

without endangering the airplane’s 

structure. However, the AC190 accident 

shows that even a properly trained pilot 

might make rudder reversals when 

startled or responding to a perceived 

failure. 

2. Airworthiness Directives 

In 2012, the FAA adopted an 

airworthiness directive (AD) applicable 

to all Airbus Model A300–600 and 

Model A310 series airplanes.17 The AD 

was prompted by the excessive rudder 

pedal inputs and consequent high loads 

on the vertical stabilizer in the events 

described previously, including AA587. 

The AD required operators to either 

incorporate a design change to the 

rudder control system or other systems, 

or install a modification that alerts the 

pilot to stop making rudder inputs. 

In 2015, the FAA adopted an AD 

applicable to all Airbus Model A318, 

A319, A320, and A321 series 

airplanes.18 That AD was prompted by 

a determination that, in specific flight 

conditions, the allowable load limits on 

the vertical stabilizer could be reached 

and possibly exceeded. Exceeding 

allowable load could result in 

detachment of the vertical stabilizer. 

The AD also required a modification 

that alerts the pilot to stop making 

rudder inputs. 

F. Advisory Material 

The FAA has developed proposed 

Advisory Circular (AC) 25.353–X, 

‘‘Design Load Conditions for Rudder 

Control Reversal,’’ to be published 

concurrently with this NPRM. This 

proposed AC would provide guidance 


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19The proposed AC is also available in the 

Docket. To ensure the FAA receives your comments 

on the proposed AC, please submit them via the 

instructions found on the ‘‘Aviation Safety Draft 

Documents Open for Comment’’ web page. 

20The Air Line Pilots Association, International 

(ALPA), EASA, National Civil Aviation Agency— 

Brazil (ANAC), and Transport Canada Civil 

Aviation (TCCA), and FAA representatives. 

21Airbus, Bombardier, Cessna, Dassault Aviation, 

and Embraer. 

material on acceptable means, but not 

the only means, of showing compliance 

with proposed § 25.353. The FAA will 

post the proposed AC on the ‘‘Aviation 

Safety Draft Documents Open for 

Comment’’ web page at http://

www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/.19 The 

FAA requests that you submit 

comments on the proposed AC through 

that web page. 

III. Discussion of the Proposal 

The FAA proposes to revise 14 CFR 

by adding new § 25.353 to add a design 

load condition. It would apply to 

transport category airplanes that have a 

powered rudder control surface or 

surfaces, as explained later in this 

section. The load condition would 

require that the airplane be able to 

withstand three full reversals of the 

rudder pedals at the most critical points 

in the flight envelope. From a neutral 

position, the pedal input would be 

sudden and to one side and held; then, 

as the maximum sideslip angle is 

reached, the pedals would be suddenly 

displaced in the opposite direction and 

held until the opposite angle is reached; 

then again to the first side; then again 

to the second side; then suddenly 

moved back to the neutral position. 

The reason for this proposal is that 

pilots make inadvertent and erroneous 

rudder pedal inputs, and the accident 

and incident data show that the loads 

caused by rudder reversals can surpass 

the airplane’s structural limit load and 

sometimes its ultimate load. 

Compliance with the proposed rule 

would require a showing that the 

airplane’s vertical stabilizer and other 

airplane structure are strong enough to 

withstand the rudder reversals. 

Ten of the eleven members of the 

FCHWG recommended proposing some 

form of a new load condition to protect 

the airplane against rudder reversals. 

During discussions, five members of the 

FCHWG 20 recommended requiring a 

load condition that would protect the 

airplane from three, sequential, full 

rudder reversals. This notice puts forth 

those proposals. 

Five members of the FCHWG 21

recommended a similar load condition, 

which would only protect against a 

single reversal of the rudder pedals. The 

FAA is not proposing this alternative 

because a new rule that only includes a 

single rudder reversal, with a safety 

factor of 1.0, would not materially 

increase the design load level from 

current design loads criteria and would 

not be effective in preventing accidents 

such as the AA587 accident. 

One member, The Boeing Company 

(Boeing), took the position that no new 

rulemaking or design standards are 

required, and that the risk from rudder 

reversals should be addressed by 

flightcrew training. Boeing stated that 

rudder reversals are always 

inappropriate and that pilots should 

never make such commands. Boeing 

argued it is inappropriate to issue an 

airworthiness standard to mitigate a 

situation caused by actions that pilots 

should avoid. The FAA rejects this 

alternative because, while multiple 

rudder reversals are a very low 

probability event, they have been seen 

in service, despite training, and cannot 

be ruled out in the future. 

As indicated previously, yaw 

maneuver loads are currently specified 

in § 25.351, ‘‘Yaw maneuver 

conditions.’’ The FAA used this 

requirement as a template to develop 

the proposed new rudder reversal 

design load condition. Therefore, the 

proposed load condition would be 

similar to the load condition required by 

§ 25.351, except as follows: 

• Section 25.351 specifies a single, 

full-pedal command followed by a 

sudden pedal release after the airplane 

has reached the steady-state sideslip 

angle. Proposed § 25.353 would specify 

a single, full-pedal command followed 

by three rudder reversals, and return to 

neutral. 

• In the proposed rule, the rudder 

reversals must be performed at the 

maximum sideslip angle, which is 

referred to as the ‘‘overswing sideslip 

angle.’’ This term is also used in 

§ 25.351 and would have the same 

meaning. The overswing sideslip angle 

is the maximum sideslip angle that 

occurs following full rudder pedal input 

and includes the additional sideslip that 

may occur beyond the steady-state 

sideslip angle. 

• The § 25.353 load requirement 

would be an ultimate design load 

condition, instead of a limit load 

condition as in § 25.351. This means 

that applicants would apply a safety 

factor of 1.0, rather than 1.5. The 

proposed rudder reversal maneuver 

would cover the worst-case rudder 

maneuver expected to occur in service. 

Because service history has shown that 

three full rudder reversals are unusual, 

the FAA proposes that a safety factor of 

1.0 is appropriate. 

• The proposed § 25.353 condition 

would require only that the applicant 

account for the rudder reversals at 

speeds up to the design cruising speed 

(VC). In contrast, § 25.351 requires 

applicants to account for speeds up to 

VD. The reason for this difference is that 

VC represents the majority of the flight 

envelope, and compliance to VD is not 

necessary due to the infrequency of 

exposure to such speeds and the low 

probability that a rudder reversal will 

occur at speeds above VC. 

• Section 25.351 requires a pilot force 

of up to 300 pounds, depending on the 

airplane’s speed. In contrast, the pilot 

force specified in § 25.353 would be 

limited to 200 pounds because it would 

be difficult, and therefore very unlikely, 

for a pilot to maintain 300 pounds of 

force while performing rapid alternating 

inputs. 

• The proposed § 25.353 condition 

would be evaluated only with the 

landing gear retracted and speed brakes 

(and spoilers when used as speed 

brakes) retracted. This is because flight 

loads would be more severe with the 

gear and speed brakes retracted. 

A. Expected Methods of Compliance 

The proposed rule is performancebased. For example, an applicant could 

choose to comply with the proposed 

standard by using control system 

architecture and control laws to limit 

the airplane response to rudder 

reversals, and thereby reduce structural 

loads on the airplane. An applicant 

could also choose to comply by 

increasing the capability of the airplane 

to withstand the maximum expected 

structural loads that could result from 

the proposed load condition. 

B. Proposed Applicability 

After examining all the data and 

considering stakeholder opinions, the 

FAA has determined that the proposed 

rule should apply to new type 

certification programs of transport 

category airplane designs and to 

amended or supplemental type 

certificate programs as determined 

under § 21.101. The proposed rule 

would affect manufacturers of transport 

category airplanes. In the future, 

applicants who want to certify new 

airplanes under part 25 would have to 

comply with proposed § 25.353. 

As noted previously, this proposed 

rule would apply only to airplanes that 

use powered rudder control surfaces. In 

this proposed rule, a powered rudder 

control surface is one in which the force 

required to deflect the surface against 

the airstream is generated or augmented 

by hydraulic or electric systems. An 

unpowered rudder control surface is 


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22A record of this conversation between the FAA 

and airplane manufacturer is available in the 

Docket. 

one for which the force required to 

deflect the surface against the airstream 

is transmitted from the pilot’s rudder 

pedal directly through mechanical 

means, without any augmentation from 

hydraulic or electrical systems. Powered 

rudder control systems include fly-bywire (FBW) and hydro-mechanical 

systems. Unpowered rudder control 

systems are also referred to as 

mechanical systems. Incorporation of a 

powered yaw damper into an otherwise 

unpowered rudder control system does 

not constitute a powered rudder control 

surface, for the purpose of this proposed 

rule. The reasons that the FAA proposes 

to exclude airplanes with unpowered 

(mechanical) rudder control surfaces are 

as follows, and the FAA seeks comment 

on these reasons: 

1. The only U.S. transport category 

airplane models, currently in 

production, that use unpowered rudder 

control surfaces are small business jets. 

Small airplanes typically have a 

minimal delay between pilot yaw 

control inputs and airplane response. 

The pilots of these airplanes receive 

more immediate feedback of airplane 

response to their yaw control inputs 

and, therefore, are less likely to execute 

inappropriate pedal movements 

resulting in rudder reversals. 

2. The only U.S. transport category 

airplane models, currently in 

production, that use an unpowered 

rudder control surface are also equipped 

with a yaw damper. The FAA has 

assessed the design of this yaw damper 

and determined its normal operation 

would be adequate to reduce yaw 

overshoot loads resulting from rudder 

reversals to acceptable levels. However, 

the yaw damper system on these 

airplanes is not required to be 

operational on any given flight. The yaw 

damper is included in these airplanes 

primarily to improve ride quality for 

passenger comfort (as opposed to 

providing adequate stability about the 

yaw axis to ensure airplane safety). 

Since the yaw damper may not be 

available on a given flight, the 

manufacturer of these airplanes has 

stated it might need to add structure or 

an improved yaw damper to any new 

type certificated airplanes to comply 

with the proposed rule.22 This would 

significantly increase design, 

production, and operation costs. The 

FAA considers that, for these airplanes, 

the cost to comply with the proposed, 

new load condition through structural 

modification is not justified by the 

relatively low risk these airplanes face 

from rudder reversals. Further, the FAA 

considers it unlikely that many of these 

airplanes would fly for extended 

periods without an operable yaw 

damper that provides acceptable ride 

quality. Therefore, most of these 

airplanes have protection against yaw 

overshoot loads, even if they are not 

required to demonstrate this protection 

during certification. 

3. The use of unpowered rudder 

control surfaces is diminishing in the 

transport category airplane fleet. The 

FAA expects that most, if not all, new 

type certificate applications to which 

this proposed rule would apply will 

employ powered rudder control 

surfaces. 

4. The FAA has reviewed the accident 

and incident records and has found no 

events in which pilots commanded 

inappropriate rudder reversals on 

airplanes with unpowered rudder 

control surfaces. This alone does not 

mean such systems cannot be affected 

by pilot-commanded inappropriate 

rudder reversals. However, the absence 

of any previous incidents indicates that 

excluding these designs would not 

appreciably increase the future risk of 

such events above acceptable levels. 

C. Summary 

The proposed design criteria would 

provide a practical, relatively low-cost 

solution that would be achievable on 

future designs without the requirement 

to significantly strengthen the vertical 

stabilizer, or make significant changes to 

system design. In fact, some current 

airplanes would be able to meet the 

proposed criteria with no changes 

whatsoever. This proposal should 

require a minimal increment of 

applicant resources to show 

compliance. While an applicant might 

choose to comply with this 

performance-based standard by 

strengthening the airplane structure, the 

FAA believes that most applicants 

would use control laws to comply with 

this proposed rule. These control laws 

are a part of the flight control computer, 

and they adjust control surface 

deflections based on pilot input and 

other factors like airspeed. Since control 

laws are typically implemented through 

systems and software, there would be 

little to no incremental cost in the form 

of weight, equipment, maintenance, or 

training. 

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 

direct that each Federal agency shall 

propose or adopt a regulation only upon 

a reasoned determination that the 

benefits of the intended regulation 

justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354), 

as codified in 5 U.S.C. 603 et seq., 

requires agencies to analyze the 

economic impact of regulatory changes 

on small entities. Third, the Trade 

Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96–39), 

19 U.S.C. Chapter 13, prohibits agencies 

from setting standards that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. In 

developing U.S. standards, the Trade 

Agreements Act requires agencies to 

consider international standards and, 

where appropriate, that they be the basis 

of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–4), as codified in 2 U.S.C. Chapter 

25, requires agencies to prepare a 

written assessment of the costs, benefits, 

and other effects of proposed or final 

rules that include a Federal mandate 

likely to result in the expenditure by 

State, local, or tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector, of 

$100 million or more annually (adjusted 

for inflation with base year of 1995). 

This portion of the preamble 

summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the 

economic impacts of this proposed rule. 

In conducting these analyses, FAA 

has determined that this proposed rule 

has benefits that justify its costs and is 

not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as 

defined in section 3(f) of Executive 

Order 12866. The rule is also not 

‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures. The 

proposed rule will not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities, will not create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States, and will 

not impose an unfunded mandate on 

State, local, or tribal governments, or on 

the private sector by exceeding the 

threshold identified previously. 

A. Regulatory Evaluation 

Department of Transportation Order 

2100.5 prescribes policies and 

procedures for simplification, analysis, 

and review of regulations. If the 

expected cost impact is so minimal that 

a proposed or final rule does not 

warrant a full evaluation, this order 

permits a statement to that effect and 

the basis for it to be included in the 

preamble if a full regulatory evaluation 

of the costs and benefits is not prepared. 

Such a determination has been made for 

this proposed rule. The reasoning for 

this determination follows. 

1. Background 

The genesis of this proposed rule is 

the crash of American Airlines Flight 

587 (AA587), near Queens, New York, 


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32812 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 136 / Monday, July 16, 2018 / Proposed Rules 

23NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR– 

04/04, p. 160. See footnote 5 on p. 6. 

24NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR– 

04/04, p. 31, n. 53. 

25NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR– 

04/04, p. 104. 

26FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 

Committee. Flight Controls Harmonization Working 

Group. Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder Reversal 

Recommendation Report, Nov. 7, 2013. (ARAC 

Rudder Reversal Report). This Report identifies four 

notable rudder events to which we add the Interflug 

incident discussed in the NTSB AA587 Report. 

27NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR– 

04/04, pp. 106–109. 

28NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR– 

04/04, pp. 104. 

29NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR– 

04/04, pp. 38–39. 

30An aileron is a hinged control service on the 

trailing edge of the wing of a fixed-wing aircraft, 

one aileron per wing. 

31The yaw axis is defined to be perpendicular to 

the wings and to the normal line of flight. A yaw 

movement is a change in the direction of the aircraft 

to the left or right around the yaw axis. 

32NTSB Safety Recommendation A–04–56, Nov. 

10, 2004. 

on November 12, 2001, resulting in the 

death of all 260 passengers and crew 

aboard, and the death of five persons on 

the ground. The airplane was destroyed 

by impact forces and a post-crash fire. 

The National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) found that the probable 

cause of the accident was ‘‘the in-flight 

separation of the vertical stabilizer 

[airplane fin] as a result of loads above 

ultimate design created by the first 

officer’s unnecessary and excessive 

rudder pedal inputs.’’ 23 Ultimate loads 

on the airplane structure are the limit 

loads (1.0) multiplied by a safety factor, 

usually 1.5 (as for the vertical 

stabilizer). An airplane is expected to 

experience a limit load once in its 

lifetime and is never expected to 

experience an ultimate load.24 For the 

AA587 accident, loads exceeding 

ultimate loads ranged from 1.83 to 2.14 

times the limit load on the vertical 

stabilizer,25 as a result of four, full, 

alternating rudder inputs known as 

‘‘rudder reversals.’’ 

Significant rudder reversals events are 

unusual in the history of commercial 

airplane flight, having occurred during 

just five notable accidents and 

incidents, with AA587 being the only 

catastrophic accident resulting from 

rudder reversals.26 Ultimate loads were 

exceeded in two of the other notable 

rudder reversal accidents, the Interflug 

incident (Moscow, February 11, 1991) 

and American Airlines Flight 903 

(AA903) (near West Palm Beach, 

Florida, May 12, 1997).27 For the 

Interflug incident, with multiple rudder 

reversals, loads of 1.55 and 1.35 times 

the limit load were recorded; and for 

AA903 (eight rudder reversals), a load of 

1.53 times the limit load was 

recorded.28 A catastrophe similar to 

AA587 was averted in these two events 

only because the vertical stabilizer was 

stronger than required by design 

standards.29 In a fourth event—Air 

Canada Flight 190 (AC190) (over the 

state of Washington, January 10, 2008)— 

with four rudder reversals, the limit 

load was exceed by 29 percent. 

In transport category airplanes, rudder 

inputs are generally limited to aligning 

the airplane with the runway during 

crosswind landings and controlling 

engine-out situations, which occur 

predominately at low speeds. At high 

speeds, the pilot normally directly rolls 

the airplane using the ailerons.30 If the 

pilot does use the rudder to control the 

airplane at high speeds, there will be a 

significant phase lag between the rudder 

input and the roll response because the 

roll response is a secondary effect of the 

yawing moment generated by the 

rudder.31 The roll does not result from 

the rudder input directly. Even if the 

rudder is subsequently deflected in the 

opposite direction (rudder reversal), the 

airplane can continue to roll and yaw in 

one direction before reversing because 

of the phase lag. The relationship 

between rudder inputs and the roll and 

yaw response of the airplane can 

become confusing to pilots, particularly 

with the large yaw and roll rates that 

would result from large rudder inputs, 

causing the pilots to input multiple 

rudder reversals. 

Following the AA587 accident, in 

November 2004 the NTSB released 

Safety Recommendation A–04–56 

recommending that the FAA modify 

part 25 ‘‘to include a certification 

standard that will ensure safe handling 

qualities in the yaw axis throughout the 

flight envelope. . . .’’ 32 In 2011, the 

FAA tasked the Aviation Rulemaking 

Advisory Committee (ARAC) to 

consider the need for rulemaking to 

address the rudder reversal issue. ARAC 

delegated this task to the Transport 

Airplane and Engine subcommittee, 

which assigned it to the Flight Controls 

Harmonization Working Group 

(FCHWG). One of the recommendations 

of the ARAC Rudder Reversal Report, 

issued on November 7, 2013, was to 

require transport category airplanes to 

be able to safely withstand the loads 

imposed by three rudder reversals. This 

proposed rule adopts that 

recommendation. The ARAC report 

indicates that requiring transport 

category airplanes to safely operate with 

the vertical stabilizer loads imposed by 

three full-stroke rudder reversals 

accounts for most of the attainable 

safety benefits. With more than three 

rudder reversals, the FCHWG found 

little increase in vertical stabilizer loads. 

2. Costs and Benefits of This Proposed 

Rule 

Since the catastrophic AA587 

accident, the FAA has responded to the 

risk posed by rudder reversals by 

requesting, through the issue paper 

process, that applicants for new type 

certificates show that their designs are 

capable of continued safe flight and 

landing after experiencing repeated 

rudder reversals. For airplanes with 

FBW systems, manufacturers have been 

able to show capability by means of 

control laws, incorporated through 

software changes and, therefore, adding 

no weight and imposing no additional 

maintenance cost to the airplanes. Many 

if not all of these designs have 

demonstrated tolerance to three or more 

rudder reversals. Aside from converting 

to an FBW system, alternatives available 

to manufacturers specializing in 

airplane designs with mechanical or 

hydro-mechanical rudders include 

increasing the reliability of the yaw 

damper and strengthening the airplane 

vertical stabilizer. 

To estimate the cost of the proposed 

rule, the FAA solicited unit cost 

estimates from U.S. industry and 

incorporated these estimates into an 

airplane life cycle model. The FAA 

received one estimate for large part 25 

airplanes and two estimates for small 

part 25 airplanes (business jets). 

One of the business jet estimates was 

provided by a manufacturer specializing 

in mechanical rather than FBW rudder 

systems; therefore, that estimate reflects 

significantly higher compliance costs. 

This manufacturer’s most cost-efficient 

approach to addressing the proposed 

requirement—although high in 

comparison to manufacturers who use 

FBW systems exclusively—is to comply 

with a strengthened vertical stabilizer. 

The cost of complying with a more 

reliable yaw damper was higher than 

strengthening the vertical stabilizer, and 

higher yet if complying by converting to 

a FBW rudder system for new models. 

As a result of these high costs and 

other reasons set forth in the preamble, 

the FAA has decided that the proposed 

rule would not apply to airplanes with 

‘‘unpowered’’ (mechanical) rudder 

control surfaces. An ‘‘unpowered’’ 

rudder control surface is one whose 

movement is affected through 

mechanical means, without any 

augmentation from hydraulic or 

electrical systems. Accordingly, the 

proposed rule would not apply to 

models with mechanical rudder control 

systems, but would apply only to 

models with FBW or hydro-mechanical 


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rudder systems. The FAA solicits 

comments on the exclusion of airplanes 

with unpowered rudder control surfaces 

from the proposed rule and the 

corresponding inclusion of FBW and 

hydro-mechanical models. 

The FAA estimates the costs of the 

proposed rule using unit cost per model 

estimates from industry for FBW models 

and our estimates of the number of new 

large airplane and business jet 

certifications with FBW rudder systems 

in the ten years after the effective date 

of the proposed rule. These estimates 

are shown in table 1. The FAA solicits 

comments, with detailed cost estimates, 

on our estimates. 

TABLE 1—COST ESTIMATED FOR PROPOSED RULE

[$ 2016] 

Cost per 

model 

Number of 

new FBW 

models 

(10 yrs) 

Costs 

Large Airplanes ............................................................................................................................ $300,000 2 $600,000 

Business Jets ............................................................................................................................... 235,000 2 470,000 

Total Costs ........................................................................................................................... ........................ ........................ 1,070,000 

With these cost estimates, the FAA 

finds the proposed rule to be minimal 

cost, with expected net safety benefits 

from the reduced risk of rudder reversal 

accidents. 

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a 

principle of regulatory issuance that 

agencies shall endeavor, consistent with 

the objectives of the rule and of 

applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and 

informational requirements to the scale 

of the businesses, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation. To achieve this principle, 

agencies are required to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions to assure that such proposals are 

given serious consideration.’’ The RFA 

covers a wide range of small entities, 

including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small 

governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a rule will have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. If 

the agency determines that it will, the 

agency must prepare a regulatory 

flexibility analysis as described in the 

RFA. However, if an agency determines 

that a rule is not expected to have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities, 

section 605(b) of the RFA provides that 

the head of the agency may so certify 

and a regulatory flexibility analysis is 

not required. The certification must 

include a statement providing the 

factual basis for this determination, and 

the reasoning should be clear. As noted 

above, because manufacturers with FBW 

rudder systems have been able to show 

compliance by means of low-cost 

changes to control laws incorporated 

through software changes, the FAA 

estimates the costs of this proposed rule 

to be minimal. Therefore, as provided in 

section 605(b), the head of the FAA 

certifies that this proposed rule will not 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of small entities. 

C. International Trade Impact 

Assessment 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

(Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits Federal 

agencies from establishing standards or 

engaging in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Pursuant to this Act, the establishment 

of standards is not considered an 

unnecessary obstacle to the foreign 

commerce of the United States, so long 

as the standard has a legitimate 

domestic objective, such as the 

protection of safety, and does not 

operate in a manner that excludes 

imports that meet this objective. The 

statute also requires consideration of 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis for 

U.S. standards. 

The FAA has assessed the effect of 

this proposed rule and determined that 

its purpose is to protect the safety of 

U.S. civil aviation. Therefore, the 

proposed rule is in compliance with the 

Trade Agreements Act. 

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or 

final agency rule that may result in an 

expenditure of $100 million or more (in 

1995 dollars) in any one year by State, 

local, and tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector; such 

a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently 

uses an inflation-adjusted value of 

$155.0 million in lieu of $100 million. 

This proposed rule does not contain 

such a mandate. Therefore, the 

requirements of Title II of the Act do not 

apply. 

E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the 

FAA consider the impact of paperwork 

and other information collection 

burdens imposed on the public. The 

FAA has determined that there would 

be no new requirement for information 

collection associated with this proposed 

rule. 

F. International Compatibility and 

Cooperation 

(1) In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

conform to International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) Standards and 

Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. The FAA 

has determined that there are no ICAO 

Standards and Recommended Practices 

that correspond to these proposed 

regulations. 

(2) Executive Order 13609, 

‘‘Promoting International Regulatory 

Cooperation,’’ promotes international 

regulatory cooperation to meet shared 

challenges involving health, safety, 

labor, security, environmental, and 

other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or 

prevent unnecessary differences in 

regulatory requirements. The FAA has 

analyzed this action under the policies 

and agency responsibilities of Executive 

Order 13609, and has determined that 

this action would have no effect on 

international regulatory cooperation. 

G. Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA 

actions that are categorically excluded 


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32814 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 136 / Monday, July 16, 2018 / Proposed Rules 

from preparation of an environmental 

assessment or environmental impact 

statement under the National 

Environmental Policy Act in the 

absence of extraordinary circumstances. 

The FAA has determined this 

rulemaking action qualifies for the 

categorical exclusion identified in 

paragraph 312f of Order 1050.1E and 

involves no extraordinary 

circumstances. 

V. Executive Order Determinations 

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this proposed 

rule under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, ‘‘Federalism.’’ 

The agency has determined that this 

action would not have a substantial 

direct effect on the States, or the 

relationship between the Federal 

Government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government, and, therefore, 

would not have Federalism 

implications. 

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations 

That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use 

The FAA analyzed this proposed rule 

under Executive Order 13211, ‘‘Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use’’ (May 18, 2001). 

The agency has determined that it 

would not be a ‘‘significant energy 

action’’ under the executive order and 

would not be likely to have a significant 

adverse effect on the supply, 

distribution, or use of energy. 

C. Executive Order 13771, Reducing 

Regulation and Controlling Regulatory 

Costs 

This proposed rule is not expected to 

be an E.O. 13771 regulatory action 

because this proposed rule is not 

significant under E.O. 12866. 

VI. Additional Information 

A. Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. The agency also invites 

comments relating to the economic, 

environmental, energy, or federalism 

impacts that might result from adopting 

the proposals in this document. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the proposal, explain 

the reason for any recommended 

change, and include supporting data. To 

ensure the docket does not contain 

duplicate comments, commenters 

should send only one copy of written 

comments, or if comments are filed 

electronically, commenters should 

submit only one time. 

The FAA will file in the docket all 

comments it receives, as well as a report 

summarizing each substantive public 

contact with FAA personnel concerning 

this proposed rulemaking. Before acting 

on this proposal, the FAA will consider 

all comments it receives on or before the 

closing date for comments. The FAA 

will consider comments filed after the 

comment period has closed if it is 

possible to do so without incurring 

expense or delay. The agency may 

change this proposal in light of the 

comments it receives. 

Proprietary or Confidential Business 

Information: Commenters should not 

file proprietary or confidential business 

information in the docket. Such 

information must be sent or delivered 

directly to the person identified in the 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

section of this document, and marked as 

proprietary or confidential. If submitting 

information on a disk or CD–ROM, mark 

the outside of the disk or CD–ROM, and 

identify electronically within the disk or 

CD–ROM the specific information that 

is proprietary or confidential. 

Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), if the FAA is 

aware of proprietary information filed 

with a comment, the agency does not 

place it in the docket. It is held in a 

separate file to which the public does 

not have access, and the FAA places a 

note in the docket that it has received 

it. If the FAA receives a request to 

examine or copy this information, it 

treats it as any other request under the 

Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 

552). The FAA processes such a request 

under Department of Transportation 

procedures found in 49 CFR part 7. 

B. Availability of Rulemaking 

Documents 

An electronic copy of rulemaking 

documents may be obtained from the 

internet by— 

1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking 

Portal (http://www.regulations.gov); 

2. Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies web page at http://

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or 

3. Accessing the Government Printing 

Office’s web page at http://

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/. 

Copies may also be obtained by 

sending a request to the Federal 

Aviation Administration, Office of 

Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or 

by calling (202) 267–9680. Commenters 

must identify the docket or notice 

number of this rulemaking. 

All documents the FAA considered in 

developing this proposed rule, 

including economic analyses and 

technical reports, may be accessed from 

the internet through the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal referenced in item 

(1) above. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The Proposed Amendment 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations as follows: 

PART 25—AIRWORTHINESS 

STANDARDS: TRANSPORT 

CATEGORY AIRPLANES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 25 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 

44701, 44702 and 44704. 

■ 2. Add § 25.353 to read as follows: 

§ 25.353 Rudder control reversal 

conditions. 

For airplanes with a powered rudder 

control surface or surfaces, the airplane 

must be designed to withstand the 

ultimate loads that result from the yaw 

maneuver conditions specified in 

paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section 

at speeds from VMC or the highest 

airspeed for which it is possible to 

achieve maximum rudder deflection at 

zero sideslip, whichever is greater, up to 

VC/MC. The applicant must evaluate 

these conditions with the landing gear 

retracted and speed brakes (and spoilers 

when used as speed brakes) retracted. In 

computing the loads on the airplane, the 

applicant may assume yawing velocity 

to be zero. The applicant must assume 

a pilot force of 200 pounds when 

evaluating each of these conditions: 

(a) With the airplane in unaccelerated 

flight at zero yaw, the flight deck rudder 

control is displaced as specified in 

§ 25.351(a) and (b). 

(b) With the airplane yawed to the 

overswing sideslip angle, the flight deck 

rudder control is suddenly displaced in 

the opposite direction. 

(c) With the airplane yawed to the 

opposite overswing sideslip angle, the 

flight deck rudder control is suddenly 

displaced in the opposite direction. 

(d) With the airplane yawed to the 

subsequent overswing sideslip angle, 

the flight deck rudder control is 

suddenly displaced in the opposite 

direction. 

(e) With the airplane yawed to the 

opposite overswing sideslip angle, the 

flight deck rudder control is suddenly 

returned to neutral. 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 136 / Monday, July 16, 2018 / Proposed Rules 32815 

Issued under authority provided by 49 

U.S.C. 106(f) and 44701(a) in Washington, 

DC, on July 2, 2018. 

Dorenda D. Baker, 

Executive Director, Aircraft Certification 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 2018–15154 Filed 7–13–18; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY 

CORPORATION 

29 CFR Parts 4041A, 4245, and 4281 

RIN 1212–AB38 

Terminated and Insolvent 

Multiemployer Plans and Duties of 

Plan Sponsors 

AGENCY: Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Corporation. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Corporation proposes to amend its 

multiemployer reporting, disclosure, 

and valuation regulations to reduce the 

number of actuarial valuations required 

for smaller plans terminated by mass 

withdrawal, add a valuation filing 

requirement and a withdrawal liability 

reporting requirement for certain 

terminated plans and insolvent plans, 

remove certain insolvency notice and 

update requirements, and reflect the 

repeal of the multiemployer plan 

reorganization rules. 

DATES: Comments must be submitted on 

or before September 14, 2018 to be 

assured of consideration. 

ADDRESSES: Comments may be 

submitted by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. (Follow the online 

instructions for submitting comments.) 

• Email: reg.comments@pbgc.gov. 

Refer to RIN 1212–AB38 in the subject 

line. 

• Mail or Hand Delivery: Regulatory 

Affairs Division, Office of the General 

Counsel, Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Corporation, 1200 K Street NW, 

Washington, DC 20005–4026. 

All submissions must include the 

agency’s name (Pension Benefit 

Guaranty Corporation, or PBGC) and the 

RIN for this rulemaking (RIN 1212– 

AB38). All comments received will be 

posted without change to PBGC’s 

website, www.pbgc.gov, including any 

personal information provided. Copies 

of comments may also be obtained by 

writing to Disclosure Division, Office of 

the General Counsel, Pension Benefit 

Guaranty Corporation, 1200 K Street 

NW, Washington, DC 20005–4026, or 

calling 202–326–4040 during normal 

business hours. (TTY users may call the 

Federal relay service toll-free at 800– 

877–8339 and ask to be connected to 

202–326–4040.) 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Hilary Duke (duke.hilary@pbgc.gov), 

Assistant General Counsel for 

Regulatory Affairs, Office of the General 

Counsel, Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Corporation, 1200 K Street NW, 

Washington, DC 20005–4026; 202–326– 

4400, extension 3839. (TTY users may 

call the Federal relay service toll-free at 

800–877–8339 and ask to be connected 

to 202–326–4400, extension 3839.) 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Executive Summary—Purpose of the 

Regulatory Action 

This proposed rule would make 

certain reporting and disclosure of 

multiemployer information to PBGC and 

interested parties more efficient and 

reflect the repeal of the multiemployer 

plan reorganization rules. The proposal 

would reduce costs by allowing smaller 

plans terminated by mass withdrawal to 

perform actuarial valuations less 

frequently and by removing certain 

notice requirements for insolvent plans. 

This would reduce plan administrative 

costs and, in turn, may reduce financial 

assistance provided by PBGC. 

PBGC’s legal authority for this action 

is based on section 4002(b)(3) of the 

Employee Retirement Income Security 

Act of 1974 (ERISA), which authorizes 

PBGC to issue regulations to carry out 

the purposes of title IV of ERISA; 

section 4041A(f)(2) of ERISA, which 

gives PBGC authority to prescribe 

reporting requirements for terminated 

plans; section 4245(e) of ERISA, which 

directs PBGC to prescribe requirements 

for notices regarding multiemployer 

plan insolvency; section 4261 of ERISA, 

which authorizes PBGC to provide 

financial assistance to insolvent plans, 

and section 4281(d)(3) of ERISA, which 

directs PBGC to prescribe requirements 

for notices to plan participants and 

beneficiaries in the event of a benefit 

suspension by an insolvent plan. 

Executive Summary—Major Provisions 

of the Regulatory Action 

Plan Sponsor Duties—Annual Valuation 

and Withdrawal Liability 

The plan sponsor of a multiemployer 

plan terminated by mass withdrawal is 

responsible for specific duties, 

including an annual actuarial valuation 

of the plan’s assets and benefits. This 

proposed rule would reduce 

administrative burden by allowing the 

plan sponsor to perform an actuarial 

valuation only every 5 years if the 

present value of the plan’s 

nonforfeitable benefits is $50 million or 

less. The proposed rule would add a 

new requirement for plan sponsors of 

certain terminated or insolvent plans to 

file actuarial valuations with PBGC. 

Where the present value of the plan’s 

nonforfeitable benefits is $50 million or 

less, a plan receiving financial 

assistance from PBGC would be able to 

file alternative valuation information. 

The plan sponsor of a multiemployer 

plan also is responsible for determining, 

giving notice of, and collecting 

withdrawal liability. The proposal 

would require plan sponsors of certain 

terminated or insolvent plans to file 

with PBGC information about 

withdrawal liability payments and 

whether any employers have withdrawn 

but have not yet been assessed 

withdrawal liability. 

Insolvency Notices and Updates 

A multiemployer plan terminated by 

mass withdrawal that is insolvent or is 

expected to be insolvent for a plan year 

must provide certain notices to PBGC 

and participants and beneficiaries. 

Similarly, a multiemployer plan that is 

certified by the plan’s actuary to be in 

critical status and that is expected to 

become insolvent under section 4245 of 

ERISA must provide certain notices to 

PBGC and interested parties. Notices 

include a notice of insolvency and a 

notice of insolvency benefit level. The 

proposed rule would eliminate outdated 

information included in the notices. The 

proposal would require a plan to 

provide notices of insolvency if the plan 

sponsor determines the plan is insolvent 

in the current plan year or is expected 

to be insolvent in the next plan year. 

The proposal also would eliminate the 

requirement to provide most annual 

updates to the notices of insolvency 

benefit level. 

Background 

The Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Corporation (PBGC) administers two 

insurance programs for private-sector 

defined benefit pension plans under 

title IV of the Employee Retirement 

Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA): A 

single-employer plan termination 

insurance program and a multiemployer 

plan insolvency insurance program. In 

general, a multiemployer pension plan 

is a collectively bargained plan 

involving two or more unrelated 

employers. This proposed rule deals 

with multiemployer plans. 

Under section 4041A of ERISA, a 

mass withdrawal termination of a plan 

occurs when all employers withdraw or 

cease to be obligated to contribute to the 

plan. A plan terminated by mass 


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