alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
House Calendar No. 96

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 268

[Report No. 103–274]

RESOLUTION

Waiving points of order against the conference reother purposes. cal year ending September 30, 1994, and for commissions, corporations, and offices for the fis- and for sundry independent agencies, boards, Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, appropriations for the Departments of Veterans port to accompany the bill (H.R. 2491) making

OCTOBER 5, 1993

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be

printed
IV

House Calendar No. 96

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 268

[Report No. 103–274]

Waiving points of order against the conference report to accompany the

bill (H.R. 2491) making appropriations for the Departments of Veterans

Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and for sundry independent agencies, boards, commissions, corporations, and offices for the fiscal

year ending September 30, 1994, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 5, 1993

Ms. SLAUGHTER, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following resolution; which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

RESOLUTION

Waiving points of order against the conference report to

accompany the bill (H.R. 2491) making appropriations

for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing

and Urban Development, and for sundry independent

agencies, boards, commissions, corporations, and offices

for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1994, and for

other purposes.

1 Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it

2 shall be in order to consider the conference report and

3 amendments reported from conference in disagreement on
2

HRES 268 RH

1 the bill (H.R. 2491) making appropriations for the De2 partments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban

3 Development, and for sundry independent agencies,

4 boards, commissions, corporations, and offices for the fis5 cal year ending September 30, 1994, and for other pur6 poses. All points of order against the conference report

7 and against its consideration are waived. The conference

8 report, amendments in disagreement, and motions printed

9 in the joint explanatory statement of the committee of con10 ference to dispose of amendments in disagreement shall

11 be considered as read.
Casey	O’Connell

9072	N	6060E	Rd Manteno	IL,	60950 708
- 793
- 2017 Casey2k3@gmail.com 10/29/2015 **Petition	for	Section	333	Exemption** I	hereby	formally	request	FAA	authorization	for Casey	O’Connell (hereafter	“PETITIONER”)	to operate	a	UAS	for	civil	(non
- governmental)	purposes	other	than	for	recreation	or	hobby. PETITIONER	requests	to	be	exempted	from		14	CFR	§§	61.23(a)	and	(c),	61.101(e)(4)	and	(5), 61.113(a),	61.315(a),	91.7(a),	91.119(c),	91.12 1,	91.151(a)(1),	91.405(a),	91.407(a)(1), 91.409(a)(1)	and	(2),	and	91.417(a)	and	(b),	to	the	extent	necessary	to	allow	PETITIONER	to operate	a	UAS	to	perform	aerial	data	collection,	including	but	not	limited	to	aerial	imaging. PETITIONER	requests	this exemption	for	its	use	of	UAS	both	within	and	without	the	United	States. PETITIONER	frequently	travels	abroad	for	photographic	endeavors	and	seeks	to	use	UAS	in accordance	with	all	laws	of	foreign	and	domestic	governmental	authorities. PETITIONER	requests this	permission	to	pursue	its	use	of	UAS	models	including	DJI	Phantom	1,	DJI Phantom	2,	DJI	Phantom	3,	DJI	Inspire	,	3D	Robotics	IRIS+,	3D	Robotics	Solo,	3D	Robotics	X8+,	and 3D	Robotics	X8
- M,	or	other	similar	commercially
- available	and	widely
- available UAS	models. PETITIONER	will	conduct	its	use	of	UAS	in	a	manner	which	will	minimize	risk	to	the	NAS,	other persons,	and	property.		The	following	procedures	will	be	followed:	(1)	UAS	will	be	given	a	pre
- flight inspection	before	each	flight	to	examine	air
- wo rthiness,	(2)	UAS	will	not	be	materially	altered	from commercial	specifications	except	for	battery,	prop,	and	battery	alterations,	(3)	UAS	will	not	be flown	over	people,	(4)	UAS	will	always	be	flown	within	line	of	sight	to	operator(s)	pursuant	to Section	3 33(b)(1),	(5)	UAS	will	never	reach	altitudes	over	exceeding	those	allowed,	(6)	UAS	will never	reach	speeds	exceeding	50	mph,	(7)	operator	will	perform	a	pre
- flight	visual	inspection	of	the NAS	to	determine	nearby	dangers	such	as	low
- flying	manned	or	unmann ed	aerial	vehicles,	power lines,	and	buildings,	(8)	UAS	will	be	checked	for	flight	stability,	proper	connection	to	remote control,	and	proper	performance	at	a	very	low	altitude	before	reaching	the	NAS,	and	(9)	non
participating	spectators	will	be	asked	to stay	a	safe	distance	away	from	the	flight	path	of	the	UAS and	its	landing	location.		PETITIONER	is	an	experienced	UAS	operator	with	more	than	one	year	of experience. This	petition	wil l	benefit	the	public	interest. PETITIONER	will	provide	imagery	which	is not otherwise	possible	to	be	captured	without	the	use	of	a	UAV,	which	will	assist	companies	to	which the	images	may	be	sold,	will	enhance	the	public	understanding	of	nature	photographed	by	the	UAS,and	PETITIONER	will	be	able	to	provide	UAS	safety	information	to	those	with	whom	he	or	she

comes	in	contact. Please	grant	the	requested	exemption	under	Section	333.
Casey	O’Connell
H. Res. 514

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

August 10, 1994.

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this

resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule

XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the

Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of

the bill (H.R. 4822) to make certain laws applicable to the

legislative branch of the Federal Government. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. General debate shall

be confined to the bill and the amendments made in order by

this resolution and shall not exceed one hour, with thirty minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and

ranking minority member of the Committee on Rules and

thirty minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman

and ranking minority member of the Committee on House

Administration. After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. In lieu of the

committee amendments now printed in the bill, it shall be in

order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule an amendment in the nature
2

HRES 514 EH

of a substitute consisting of the text of H.R. 4892 modified

by the amendments printed in part 1 of the report of the

Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution. That

amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered

as read. No amendment to the amendment in the nature of

a substitute shall be in order except those printed in part 2

of the report of the Committee on Rules. Each amendment

may be offered only in the order printed in the report, may

be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall

be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment

except as specified in the report, and shall not be subject to

a demand for division of the question in the House or in the

Committee of the Whole. All points of order against amendments printed in part 2 of the report are waived. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such

amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may

demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment

adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the

amendment in the nature of a substitute made in order as

original text. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage
3

HRES 514 EH

without intervening motion except one motion to recommit

with or without instructions.

Attest:

Clerk.
[No. 919-1.

Division One—Panel 1.

December 20, 1971.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Gerald L. Wolfe, *Appellant.*
#### BURTON W. WAPLES, et. al. *vs.*DAVID H. WAPLES.

A *view*ordered in *the*action of waste, application having been made for it at the firsi term after issue joined.

Summons in waste.

*Ridgely,*for plaintiff,

moved for a view and for a continuance of the cause to give time.

*Cullen*

objected. The motion for a view is not a motion of course, but in the discretion of the court. The practice in England is under the statute of *Ann,*which has not been held to *extend*to this state. *2 Tidd*846. Our own act of assembly *(Digest*117,) does not affect the granting of a view, but only regulates the mode of conducting it when granted. So of the rule of court. The principle, therefore, of granting a view, is that it must be apparent to the court, that justice cannot be done without it. This must be shown the court, and a party cannot have the order as a matter of course. If a view should be granted, I would consent to send a jury to-morrow, or any day this term, so that no delay shall take plaee.

*Ridgely*.

I have regarded a view as essential in the action of waste, and have, therefore, prepared my cause accordingly; and so is the authority of *Tidd,*which states that a view shall be granted in waste, and without affidavit. 5 *Bacon Waste, K.*In waste a view is incident to the action. With this opinion of the necessity of a view, I could not be prepared for trial at this term. As plaintiff, I can have no desire to delay the cause. In *Wilson’s Red Book,*it is stated, in a note, that a view in waste and also in ejectment, is a motion of course; though the chief justice added, he did not see the necessity of it.

*Per curiam.*

The action of waste is rarely brought in this state, having been nearly superceded by the action of ejectment. But the action may yet be brought. The view could not be asked for in this action until issue joined; this is, therefore, the first term when such a motion could have been made. Without deciding that a view is incident to the action of waste, we can say that it would often be proper, and frequently necessary, for the jury to see the place wasted, as it is attended with the highly penal consequence of a forfeiture of the place wasted.

*The Court,*therefore, order a view, and continue the cause for that purpose; and we direct that the first twelve jurors on the panel re~ turned to the next term, shall be the viewers, six of whom shall sit *160on the trial, allowing each of the parties to challenge three at the trial if he choose.

*Ridgely,*for plaintiff.

*Cullen,*for defendant.
# C_2023083EN.01002001.xml

| 6.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 83/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 83/20

---

Judgment of the General Court of 21 December 2022 — EWC Academy v Commission

(Case T-330/21) (1)

(Social policy - Grants for actions to promote corporate governance initiatives - Call for proposals VP/2020/008 - Exclusion of European works councils not having legal personality - Article 197(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1046)

(2023/C 83/23)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: EWC Academy GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: H. Däubler-Gmelin, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: R. Pethke and B.-R. Killmann, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the European Commission of 14 April 2021 by which the Commission rejected the application for a grant which it had submitted, as coordinator of a consortium, in the context of call for proposals VP/2020/008 relating to employee participation in corporate governance.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the European Commission of 14 April 2021 rejecting an application for a grant submitted by EWC Academy GmbH under call for proposals VP/2020/008; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the European Commission of 14 April 2021 rejecting an application for a grant submitted by EWC Academy GmbH under call for proposals VP/2020/008;

| 2. | Orders the Commission to bear, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by EWC Academy. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Commission to bear, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by EWC Academy.

---

(1)  OJ C 320, 9.8.2021.

---
[No. 199-2.

Division Two.

November 30, 1971.]

#### Bennett Veneer Factors, Inc., *Appellant,*v. John Brewer *et al., Respondents.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 165084, William L. Brown, Jr., J., entered January 12, 1970. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-13-00025-CV

Jerry Scarbrough, Denise Steele, and Melissa Victoria Deaton, Appellants

v.

Helen Purser, Sue E. Purser a/k/a Sue E. Van Zanten, Gary W. Purser, Jr., 

Joann M. Purser, and Elizabeth H. Tipton, Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 146TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 236,117-B, HONORABLE ALAN MAYFIELD, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

Appellants Jerry Scarbrough, Denise Steele, and Melissa Victoria Deaton filed a

motion on February 19, 2013, challenging the trial court’s orders sustaining contests to their

indigency. See Tex. R. App. P. 20.1(j)(1). Appellees Helen Purser, Sue E. Purser a/k/a Sue E.

Van Zanten, Gary W. Purser, Jr., Joann M. Purser, and Elizabeth H. Tipton filed a response

in opposition.

Having reviewed the motion, the response, and the record, we conclude that the

trial court’s orders did not constitute an abuse of its discretion. See Kastner v. Texas Bd. of Law

Exam’rs, No. 03-08-00515-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6381, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 12,

2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to review trial court’s order

sustaining indigency contest). As such, we deny appellants’ motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 20.1(j)(4).
It is ordered on February 27, 2013.

Before Justices Puryear, Rose and Goodwin

2
#### BRUNDAGE MOTORS, INC. v. NORTH DADE IMPORTED MOTORS, INC.

No. 38622.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 221 So.2d 170.
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF CELERIS CORPORATION DATED MARCH 31, 2000
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
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<RECEIVABLES>                                2,521,404
<ALLOWANCES>                                   385,000
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,223,153
<SALES>                                      2,789,063
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,789,063
<CGS>                                        1,957,618
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,776,938
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (846,057)
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</TABLE>
#### THOMAS BABB’S Ex’rs. *vs*JOHN ELLIOTT.

A wife’s interest in a recognizance in the Orphans’ Court on the acceptance of real estate may be *attached*for the debt of her husband.

Fi. fa., attachment. Sheriff returns “ laid in the hands of Eli B. Talley, January 15, 1847, at *12*o’clock (noon,) and summoned him as garnishee.”

Motion to dissolve the attachment on an agreed statement of facts. The real estate of Matilda Babb was valued in the Orphans’ Court under the intestate laws, and assigned to Eli B. Talley, who entered into recognizance to pay to the parties entitled their respective shares of the valuation money. Sarah Ann Elliott, wife of John Elliott, the defendant, was one of the heirs at law of Matilda Babb, and entitled *467to $70, as her share of said recognizance. Mrs. Elliott was yet living.

Mr. Whitely moved to dissolve the attachment, and had a rule to show cause.

*Gilpin,*for plaintiff.

*Whitely,*for defendant.

Whitely.

—The indebtedness of Talley arises on a recognizance in the Orphans’ Court to pay to the heirs at law of Matilda Babb, of whom Mrs. Elliott is one, their several shares of the valuation of her real estate. Elliott alone, without joining his wife, could not bring any suit on this recognizance to recover the sum due his wife. It is, therefore, not the subject of an attachment.

If the garnishee was compelled to answer and the husband should die after judgment and before execution, he would have to pay it to the wife, and also to the attaching creditor.

The principle is very important; being nothing less than to subject the wife’s real estate converted into personalty, by proceedings in the Orphans’ Court, to which she is no party, to attachment process bv the husband’s creditors.

An assignment by act of the husband is equivalent to a reduction to possession; but an attachment is the act of a third person, and does not reduce the wife’s property into possession. In England, the husband is not allowed to reduce this kind of property into his possession without making a provision for the wife.

*Gilpin,*contra.

—The question is no longer an opon one in Delaware, whether a wife’s chose in action can be attached for the debt of the husband. There is no difference in this respect between this and any other chose in action. (1 *Harr. Rep.*442.)

The proceedings and recognizance taken in the Orphans’ Court changed the character of this property. It was no longer real estate, but personal; subject to all the law relating to the personal property of the wife. It is the wife’s chose in action; like any other money debt due the wife. The husband has the right to discharge it, or collect it, even against the consent of the wife.

The object of the attachment law is to place the attaching creditor in the place of the husband as to this matter, and the attachment binds all his right from the moment of the process laid in the garnishee’s hands. Whatever may be the effect of a death between the attachment and answer, or between the answer and judgment, it is enough to say that the attachment secures to the creditor all the rights of the husband. *The Court*discharged the rule.
#### Matter of the Judicial Settlement of the Account of the Long Island Loan and Trust Company as Trustee Under a Trust for the Benefit of Lillie G. Sloan Created by the Last Will and Testament of Stephen Garretson, Deceased.

(Surrogate’s Court, Kings County,

January, 1913.)

Executors and administrators — costs and expenses of annual accounting — annual accounting of trustee.

The costs and expenses of an annual accounting by a testamentary trustee should be borne by the income unless they have been incurred in the administration, preservation or increase of the principal.

Proceeding upon the judicial settlement of the account of a trustee.

George S. Ingraham, for accounting trustee.

Charles D. Ridgway, special guardian for infant remaindermen.

Ketcham, S.

In an annual accounting of a trustee the costs and expenses should be borne by the income unless they have been incurred in the administration, preservation or increase of the principal.

The cases of Chisholm v. Hammersley, 113 App. Div. 565; Robertson v. De Brulatour, 188 N. Y. 301, wontain nothing to the contrary.

The first case arose under a deed of trust. There was, therefore, no need of an annual accounting and no danger that the principal might be seriously impaired by the costs of many successive accountings. The action was brought for the final adjustment of the trust both as to income and principal and the only question litigated was whether, the entire fund was large enough to justify full commissions to each *177trustee. The burden of the inquiry almost wholly concerned the principal fund.

In the other case, the conflict was between the life tenant and the remainderman under a testamentary trust, as to whether certain accretions of stock left by the testator belonged to the life tenant or the remainderman, .and each party to the controversy prevailed in part. Both appealed and it was apparently only the costs of such appeal which the. court considered. The direction that each party to the appeal should have costs thereof and that the same should be assessed upon the capital “ in order that the burden might be equitably borne ” affords no guide.for the present purpose.

Let the expenses of making the account and the costs to be awarded be paid from the income.

Decreed accordingly.