# C_2021357EN.01000902.xml

| 6.9.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 357/9 |
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6.9.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 357/9

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Appeal brought on 9 June 2021 by Maxime Picard against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 24 March 2021 in Case T-769/16, Picard v Commission

(Case C-366/21 P)

(2021/C 357/12)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Maxime Picard (represented by: S. Orlandi, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 24 March 2021 in Case T-769/16, Picard v Commission; |
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set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 24 March 2021 in Case T-769/16, Picard v Commission;

| — | annul the decision setting, in advance, certain elements of the appellant’s pension rights or the failure to adopt such a decision required by the Staff Regulations as a result of the message, which was sent to him on 4 January 2016 by the case handler in Section ‘Pensions’, informing him, in response to his query of the same date, that the calculation of his pension rights had been modified following his re-employment in Function Group II at 1 June 2014, that his pensionable age had become 66 years old, and that the accrual rate of his pension rights would be 1,8 % from 1 June 2014; |
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annul the decision setting, in advance, certain elements of the appellant’s pension rights or the failure to adopt such a decision required by the Staff Regulations as a result of the message, which was sent to him on 4 January 2016 by the case handler in Section ‘Pensions’, informing him, in response to his query of the same date, that the calculation of his pension rights had been modified following his re-employment in Function Group II at 1 June 2014, that his pensionable age had become 66 years old, and that the accrual rate of his pension rights would be 1,8 % from 1 June 2014;

| — | in so far as necessary, annul the decision of 25 July 2016 of the Director of Directorate E of the Human Resources Directorate-General of the Commission, inasmuch as it rejects the appellant’s claim of 1 April 2016 against the decision or lack of decision resulting from the response of 4 January 2016 as inadmissible in the absence of a measure adversely affecting him and, in the alternative, as unfounded; |
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in so far as necessary, annul the decision of 25 July 2016 of the Director of Directorate E of the Human Resources Directorate-General of the Commission, inasmuch as it rejects the appellant’s claim of 1 April 2016 against the decision or lack of decision resulting from the response of 4 January 2016 as inadmissible in the absence of a measure adversely affecting him and, in the alternative, as unfounded;

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs of both sets of proceedings. |
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order the Commission to pay the costs of both sets of proceedings.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of his appeal, the appellant maintains that the contested judgment is vitiated by an error of law, since the General Court had limited the scope of the transitional provisions referred to in Article 21, Article 22, with the exception of paragraph 4, Article 23, Article 24a and Article 31(6) and (7) of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, which apply ‘by analogy to other servants employed on 31 December 2013’ in accordance with Article 1(1) of the annex to the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’).

According to the appellant, the General Court erred in holding that the conclusion of a new contract as a member of the contract staff, after the entry into force of the Reform of the Staff Regulations 2014, in order to access a higher function group was comparable, for the purposes of the application by analogy of the transitional provisions, in the case of members of the contract staff, to the ‘termination of service’ of an official, which brings to the application of those transitional provisions to an end.

In doing so, the General Court, inter alia, misinterpreted the objectives pursued by the legislature, the characteristics of the pension scheme of officials and other servants of the Union, and the terminology used in Article 1(1) of the annex to the CEOS by incorrectly equating the conclusion of a new contract immediately following a previous contract to a ‘termination of service’ or ‘end of employment’, despite the continuity of the appellant’s membership of the same pension scheme and of his service within the same institution as a member of the contract staff.

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