Filed 1/14/14 P. v. Perez CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANTONIO PEREZ et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B238303

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TA112332)

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Affirmed.

Melanie K. Korian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant Antonio Perez.

Alan Stern, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant Jacori Armon Williams.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson and Robert M. 

Snider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Defendants and appellants, Antonio Perez and Jacori Armon Williams, appeal 

their convictions for premeditated attempted murder, assault with a firearm, shooting at 

an occupied vehicle, and possession of a firearm by a felon, with firearm, criminal street 

gang enhancements, and prior serious felony conviction enhancements (Pen. Code,

§§ 664, 187, 245, subd. (a)(2), 246, former 12021, 186.22, subd. (b), 667, subds. (b)-(i)).1 

Perez was sentenced to state prison for a term of 231 years to life. Williams was 

sentenced to state prison for a term of 195 years to life. 

The judgments are affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Viewed in accordance with the usual rule of appellate review (People v. Ochoa

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206), the evidence established the following. 

1. Prosecution evidence.

The Front Hood Crips gang frequented West 137th Street in Compton. Front 

Hood’s rivals included the B-13s, a Latino gang whose members had been moving into 

some of the apartments on 137th Street. In addition, the Front Hood Crips were engaged 

in an ongoing gang war with several other African American gangs. Defendants Perez 

and Williams were Front Hood members.

a. The April 4, 2010, shooting.

On April 4, 2010 2, L.T. was living with his grandmother on the 800 block of West 

137th Street. That morning, as L.T. and his uncle walked to the market, L.T. noticed the 

defendants standing next to Perez’s minivan. On his way back home, L.T. saw 

defendants talking with five or six people. Williams walked over to L.T., approached 

to within a few inches of him, said “I am Ice from Front Hood,” and asked what 

gang L.T. was from. L.T. answered “Nowhere,” turned away and continued 

 

1 All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 

2 All further date references are to the year 2010 unless otherwise specified. 
3

walking home with his uncle. Although L.T. had tattoos all over his body, he testified 

they were not gang-related. 

Later that same day, L.T. was in front of the house washing his grandmother’s car 

when Perez drove up in the minivan and blocked the driveway. Williams emerged from 

the van’s passenger side, walked over to the sidewalk, extended his arm straight out and 

pointed a semiautomatic handgun at L.T.. Without saying a word, Williams pulled the 

trigger rapidly three or four times. L.T. ducked behind his grandmother’s car. L.T.’s 

uncle came out of the garage, walked up to Williams and said, “Naw, this ain’t about to 

happen.” Williams returned to the van and the defendants drove off. L.T. later found an 

unfired bullet on the ground where Williams had been standing when he pulled the 

trigger.

By the time of trial, L.T. was afraid for himself and his family because people 

were saying he would be killed if he testified. A few weeks before trial, two men 

confronted him near the courthouse and asked if he was testifying against their homeboy. 

When L.T. said it was none of their business, they threatened him. L.T. recognized one 

of them as a member of the Front Hood Crips.

b. The April 18 shooting.

On April 17, while he was with Perez, Williams was shot in the leg.

The following afternoon, a gold sedan carrying four men drove down the 

800 block of West 137th Street. Perez shot at the car from one side of the street and 

then from the other side. W.S., who was acquainted with Perez, witnessed the shooting. 

Afterward, W.S. saw Perez go into Williams’s apartment. The police recovered six .45-

caliber shell casings and one expended round from the scene. 

W.S. believed the defendants were gang members and he was afraid for his family 

if he testified.

c. The April 19 shooting.

On the afternoon of April 19, W.S. witnessed a second shooting. He saw a man 

entering a parked truck. Then he saw Williams come down the stairs of an apartment 

complex and shoot at the truck. 
4

The victim of this shooting, F.S., testified he had been dropping off two 

employees at their homes on the 800 block of 137th Street when someone started 

shooting at his truck. F.S. thought he heard someone in a nearby group of people say, 

just before the shooting, “That’s him,” or “That’s them.” The truck was hit numerous 

times, but F.S. kept on driving. 

The police recovered nine expended .45-caliber shell casings from around the 

stairs and bullet fragments from the street. The forensic evidence showed the same gun 

had been used in both the April 18 and the April 19 shootings.

The prosecution gang expert, Brian Richardson, testified gang members often 

share a handgun communally: “Gang members usually pass their gun from gang member 

to gang member. Often, a gang member, if he needs to go put in some work, you go get a 

gang gun or a hood gun. A hood gun is a gun that is passed throughout the hood. When I 

say hood, I am talking about that particular gang. And it is used numerous times.” 

Richardson also testified that, during the L.T. incident, Perez had probably been “acting 

as a recorder or observer” who would “go back and tell other gang members that 

[Williams] is willing to put in . . . work.” 

2. Defense evidence.

Neither defendant testified.

According to one of the officers who responded to the scene, L.T. did not say 

Williams had introduced himself as Ice from Front Hood. L.T. said that when he was 

washing the car outside his grandmother’s house he was by himself, not with his uncle, 

and that Williams pulled the trigger once, not four times. 

In March 2010, Williams began living part-time with his aunt at her West 137th 

Street apartment. Around 1:00 p.m. on April 4, Williams and his girlfriend arrived at the 

aunt’s apartment for dinner. When his girlfriend left around 4:00 p.m., Williams was still 

there. After she returned at 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., she and Williams stayed at his aunt’s 

apartment almost until midnight.
5

For a month after he was shot in the leg on April 17, Williams could not walk 

without limping slightly and he was unable to run. W.S. had told a detective that on 

April 19 he saw the gunman running.

CONTENTIONS

1. There was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions arising out of the 

L.T. shooting on April 4.

2. There was insufficient evidence to sustain the premeditation and deliberation 

findings related to the April 18 and 19 shootings.

3. The trial court erred by consolidating the L.T. case to the other two shooting 

incidents.

4. There was insufficient evidence to sustain Williams’s Three Strikes 

enhancement.

DISCUSSION

1. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions arising out of the L.T. 

incident on April 4.

Defendants contend their convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault 

arising out of the April 4 incident, when Williams confronted L.T. with a handgun, must 

be reversed. They argue the required intent for those offenses was missing because there 

was insufficient evidence the gun had been loaded and, even if it had been loaded, the 

evidence showed the gun was inoperable. This claim is meritless. 

a. Legal principles.

“In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court’s task is to 

review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether 

it discloses substantial evidence – that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of 

solid value – such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The federal standard of review is to the same effect: Under 

principles of federal due process, review for sufficiency of evidence entails not the 

determination whether the reviewing court itself believes the evidence at trial establishes 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but, instead, whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
6

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The standard of 

review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial 

evidence. [Citation.] ‘ “Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds 

that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests 

guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court[,] which 

must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘ “If the 

circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing 

court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding 

does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.)

“ ‘An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [finder of fact] might 

have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Before the judgment of the 

trial court can be set aside for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear 

that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the 

verdict of the [finder of fact].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 

1567, 1573.) As our Supreme Court said in People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th 1, 

while reversing an insufficient evidence finding because the reviewing court had rejected 

contrary, but equally logical, inferences the jury might have drawn: “The [Court of 

Appeal] majority’s reasoning . . . amounted to nothing more than a different weighing of 

the evidence, one the jury might well have considered and rejected. The Attorney 

General’s inferences from the evidence were no more inherently speculative than the 

majority’s; consequently, the majority erred in substituting its own assessment of the 

evidence for that of the jury.” (Id. at p. 12, italics added.)

“A long line of California decisions holds that an assault is not committed by 

a person’s merely pointing an (unloaded) gun in a threatening manner at another person. 

. . . [In this case], we address the required quantum of circumstantial evidence necessary 

to demonstrate present ability to inflict injury and thus to sustain a conviction of 

assault with a firearm.” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 11, fn. 3.) 
7

“California courts have often held that a defendant’s statements and behavior while 

making an armed threat against a victim may warrant a jury’s finding the weapon was 

loaded.” (Id. at p. 12.) 

b. Discussion.

The encounter with L.T. began when Williams detached himself from a group of 

people and confronted L.T. with the standard gang challenge, “Where are you from?” 

L.T. responded by saying he was not affiliated with any gang. The prosecution gang 

expert testified L.T. would have been seen as having insulted Williams in front of his 

peers. Just a few hours later, now armed with a semiautomatic pistol, Williams got out of 

Perez’s car, walked over to L.T., aimed the gun at him and pulled the trigger three or four 

times. After Williams left, an unfired bullet was found at the spot where he had been 

standing.

This amounted to sufficient circumstantial evidence that Williams’s gun was 

loaded. (See People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 14 [evidence showing 

defendant had “armed himself and gone hunting for” the victim would suggest 

defendant’s weapon was loaded]; People v. Lochtefeld (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 533, 542, 

italics added [“Lochtefeld’s acts in threatening persons on the street and in pointing the 

gun at officers demonstrated his implied assertion the [pellet] gun was sufficiently 

charged [with CO2] to inflict injury”].)

Defendants’ additional claim, that even if the gun had been loaded, Williams 

lacked the “present ability” to commit an assault because it was inoperable, is meritless. 

Our Supreme Court has recognized that a gun’s jammed magazine does not necessarily 

negate a present ability to commit an armed assault. In People v. Chance (2008) 

44 Cal.4th 1164, our Supreme Court approved the following analysis by People v. 

Ranson (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 317: “Ranson aimed a rifle at a police car. After the 

police shot and disarmed him, it was discovered that there was no round in the chamber 

because a cartridge was jammed in the magazine. [Citation.] The Ranson court noted 

that while an unloaded gun does not confer ‘present ability,’ the element is satisfied if the 

defendant wields an automatic rifle with cartridges in the magazine, even if the firing 
8

chamber is empty. [Citation.]” (People v. Chance, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1172, 

fn. omitted.) “The Ranson court held the evidence of present ability sufficient, even 

though Ranson had to do much more than turn around to use his weapon against the 

police. He had to remove the clip, dislodge a jammed cartridge, reinsert the clip, 

chamber a round, point the weapon, and pull the trigger. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1173, 

fn. omitted.)

Here, the prosecution firearms expert explained how a jam could have occurred if 

the magazine had not been properly seated in the weapon, and how such a jam could have 

been cleared. Perez argues the jury could not have rationally concluded Williams had 

sufficient time to shoot after clearing the jam because “immediately after he heard the 

clicking sound, [L.T.] ducked and his uncle charged up to Williams, who then jumped in 

the car and fled the scene.” (Italics added.) But L.T.’s testimony did not necessarily lead 

to that conclusion. L.T. testified he ducked behind the car after hearing Williams pull the 

trigger, and then “[a]fter that, my uncle had come out and told them like, ‘Naw, this ain’t 

about to happen.’ ” (Italics added.) L.T. also testified, “[M]y uncle, he was in the garage 

when it happened. So he came out of the garage and told them, ‘No. This is not about to 

happen.’ ” (Italics added.) The jury could have reasonably inferred Williams had 

sufficient time to clear a jam.

There was sufficient evidence to sustain defendants’ convictions arising out of the 

L.T. incident.

2. Sufficient evidence to sustain the premeditation and deliberation findings 

related to the April 18 and 19 shootings.

Defendants claim there was insufficient evidence to sustain the premeditation and 

deliberation findings made by the jury in connection with the attempted murder 

convictions against Perez for the April 18 shooting, and against Williams for the April 19 

shooting. These claims are meritless.
9

a. Legal principles.

People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27, a murder case, discussed the 

following types of premeditation and deliberation evidence:3 “The type of evidence 

which this court has found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and 

deliberation falls into three basic categories: (1) facts about how and what defendant did 

prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed 

toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing – what may be characterized as 

‘planning’ activity; (2) facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with 

the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a ‘motive’ to kill the victim, which 

inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an 

inference that the killing was the result of ‘a pre-existing reflection’ and ‘careful thought 

and weighing of considerations’ rather than ‘mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily 

executed’ [Citation.]; (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could 

infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must 

have intentionally killed according to a ‘preconceived design’ to take his victim’s life in 

a particular way for a ‘reason’ which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type 

(1) or (2). [¶] Analysis of the cases will show that this court sustains verdicts of first 

degree murder typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires 

at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with 

either (1) or (3).” 

The Anderson factors do not establish normative rules, but instead provide 

guidelines for a reviewing court’s analysis. (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 32, 

disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) 

Thus, the Anderson factors are not a sine qua non to finding deliberation and 

 

3

“We do not distinguish between attempted murder and completed first degree 

murder for purposes of determining whether there is sufficient evidence of premeditation 

and deliberation. [Citation.]” (People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1462, 

fn. 8, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191.)
10

premeditation, nor are they exclusive. (People v. Sanchez, supra, at pp. 32-33; People v. 

Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 511 [Anderson factors are descriptive, not normative].) 

b. Discussion.

(1) April 18.

On April 18, Perez fired multiple shots at a car driving down the 800 block of 

West 137th Street. There were four African Americans in the car. Perez then crossed the 

street and continued to shoot at the car. Perez argues the evidence showed no more than 

an impulsive, unpremeditated act on his part. We disagree.

The prosecution gang expert Brian Richardson testified that, precisely at the time 

of this shooting, there had been a major street war going on between the Front Hood 

Crips and three other African American gangs. Richardson testified about “the gang right 

across the street, Fruit Town Piru, which at the time there was a major street war, a gang 

war going on between the two gangs, as well as other gangs that I mentioned earlier . . .

Corner Pocket and Anzac Grape Street Crips.” Richardson testified there had been 

shootings going on “with Fruit Town in particular during that week or two period.” 

Gang rivalry, even if the victim is merely suspected of belonging to a rival gang, 

can provide evidence of motive and may prove premeditation and deliberation. For 

example, People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 194, held the trial court did not err 

by denying a motion to exclude gang evidence, reasoning in part as follows: “Defendant 

argues the issue of gang hostility as a motive was not reasonably raised because the 

prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that the victim, Dunn, was a gang member. 

The contention fails for the obvious reason that defendant’s alleged motive to kill Crips 

was just as arguable on facts suggesting (as they did) that the victim was dressed like a 

Crip when he was shot, as it would have been on facts suggesting he actually was a Crip. 

Similarly, contrary to defendant’s characterization, the prosecution did not stake the 

relevance of its gang evidence on Dunn’s having been shot in recognized Blood 

‘territory.’ The prosecution argued only that the area where Dunn died was frequented 

by Bloods as well as Crips, such that the area would occasionally be the scene of conflict 

between the two groups.” 
11

Given the context of an ongoing violent gang war, evidence that Perez might have 

believed the gold sedan carried rival gang members would have explained this otherwise 

completely inexplicable shooting. Richardson testified it would raise Perez’s status 

within the gang to shoot at people he suspected of belonging to the Fruit Town Pirus or 

either of the other two gangs with which the Front Hood Crips were at war.

Perez points out he “is not challenging the attempted murder conviction itself; he 

is arguing that the attempted murders were not premeditated or deliberate.” Perez’s 

theory, that the evidence only showed a shooting “consistent with what courts have 

described as ‘rash impulse,’ and an ‘unpremeditated impulsive explosion of violence,’ 

rather than a carefully thought-out and planned shooting, even if the motive was gangrelated,” is implausible. 

Much more likely is the scenario that Perez suspected the car contained rival gang 

members and, in the context of an ongoing gang war, when presented with an opportunity 

to shoot at rival gang members, Perez needed little time to decide what to do. 

“ ‘The process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period 

of time. “The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the

reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated 

judgment may be arrived at quickly. . . . ” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Koontz (2002) 

27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080.) “Premeditation can be established in the context of a gang

shooting even though the time between the sighting of the victim and the actual shooting 

is very brief. [Citation.]” (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 849.) In addition, 

there were about 10 shots fired, which also tends to show premeditation and deliberation. 

(See People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 369 [“The manner of killing – multiple 

shotgun wounds inflicted on an unarmed and defenseless victim who posed no threat to 

defendant – is entirely consistent with a premeditated and deliberate murder.”]; 

People v. Herrera, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1464, disapproved on other grounds in 

People v. Mesa, supra, 54 Cal.4th 191 [dozen shots fired during drive-by shooting was 

evidence of premeditation and deliberation].)
12

There was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s premeditation and deliberation 

findings in connection with Perez’s attempted murder convictions for the April 18 

shooting. 

(2) April 19.

Williams makes practically the same argument as Perez, but in his situation the 

argument is much weaker. The evidence, that just before Williams fired a flurry of shots 

someone said, “there he is” or “there they are,” tended to show these victims had been 

purposely targeted. As the Attorney General points out, “[O]f Williams’ three victims,

[one] was a member of the B-13s and [F.S.] was an associate of that gang.” The evidence 

showed 12 or 13 shots had been fired, again indicating the shooting had been deliberate 

and premeditated. (See People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 369; People v. Herrera, 

supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1464.)

Like Perez, Williams argues “[t]he simple truth is [he] had no idea who was in the 

car he impulsively and rashly and without reflection fired upon and no gang motive for 

doing so.” Williams asserts he “simply came down the stairs and immediately 

impulsively and without thought or reflection started firing his gun at a passing truck.” 

But this is just jury argument, and highly implausible at that.

We conclude there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s premeditation and 

deliberation findings in connection with the attempted murder convictions against 

Williams for the April 19 shooting. 

3. Joinder was proper.

Perez contends the trial court erred by joining for trial the L.T. incident with the 

two car shootings. He argues that “not only was the evidence not cross-admissible in 

separate trials, but the consolidation allowed the prosecution to bolster its attempted 

murder case involving [L.T.], which was otherwise weak.” This claim is meritless. 
13

a. Legal principles. 

“Section 954 governs the issue of joinder of counts and it provides in pertinent 

part: ‘An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected 

together in their commission, . . . or two or more different offenses of the same class of 

crimes or offenses, under separate counts, . . . provided, that the court in which a case is 

triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order 

that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried 

separately or divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately.’ 

(Italics added.) . . . [¶] [If t]he statutory requirements for joinder [are] satisfied, 

defendant ‘ “can predicate error in denying the motion only on a clear showing of 

potential prejudice. [Citation.] We review the trial court’s ruling on the severance 

motion for abuse of discretion.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (2013) 

57 Cal.4th 899, 924-925.)

“The determination of prejudice is necessarily dependent on the particular 

circumstances of each individual case, but certain criteria have emerged to provide 

guidance in ruling upon and reviewing a motion to sever trial. Thus, refusal to sever may 

be an abuse of discretion where ‘(1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not 

be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to 

inflame the jury against defendant; (3) a “weak” case has been joined with a “strong” 

case, or with another “weak” case, so that the “spillover” effect of aggregate evidence on 

several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all; and (4) any one of the 

charges carries the death penalty.’ [Citation.]” (Frank v. Superior Court (1989) 

48 Cal.3d 632, 639.) Section 954.1 specifically provides that cross-admissibility is not 

required: “[E]vidence concerning one offense or offenses need not be admissible as to 

the other offense or offenses before the jointly charged offenses may be tried together

before the same trier of fact.” On the other hand, “[i]f the evidence underlying the 

charges in question would be cross-admissible, that factor alone is normally sufficient to 

dispel any suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial court’s refusal to sever properly 

joined charges.” (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 774-775; see also People v. 
14

Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 985 [“complete cross-admissibility is not necessary 

to justify the joinder of counts”].)

b. Discussion.

The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to consolidate these cases, ruling: 

“I do find that there’s sufficient similarity of class of crimes[,] of . . . similar intent. 

There’s cross-admissibility of [Evidence Code section] 1101(b) evidence, and while there 

is prejudice to the defendants to consolidate these cases, I don’t find that it rises to the 

level of substantial prejudice to outweigh the factors that . . . would permit the granting of 

the motion.” 

Perez concedes all three cases involved the same class of offense and, therefore, 

that consolidation was proper under section 954, but he argues the evidence was not 

cross-admissible and “the consolidation resulted in a conviction for attempted murder, 

which was not supported by substantial evidence.” He asserts “there were virtually no 

factual similarities between the first case and the subsequent shootings,” and that the L.T. 

incident “involved a personal vendetta [while] the other two pertained to controlling 

one’s neighborhood.” 

But the “differences” Perez points to amount to no more than minor factual details, 

e.g., that L.T. was not “driving in his car with multiple occupants on 137th Street,” and 

there was no evidence either defendant “believed [L.T.] to be a rival gang member.” 

All three incidents occurred on the same city block within a 16-day period. All three 

incidents apparently involved a gang motivation. All three incidents involved the same 

two perpetrators, and the evidence showed they shared the same gun that had been used 

in two of the incidents. Moreover, the gang-related motive and intent evidence, 

generated by all three incidents, was crucial to understanding these otherwise 

inexplicable crimes. And contrary to Perez’s assertion, there was nothing weak about the 

L.T. case. 

The trial court did not err by ordering consolidation of these cases.
15

4. There was sufficient evidence of Williams’s Three Strikes prior.

Williams contends there was insufficient evidence to support imposition of a 

Three Strikes sentence based on his federal bank robbery conviction. This claim is 

meritless. 

a. Background.

At trial, the prosecution put into evidence two exhibits for the purpose of 

establishing that Williams’s conviction for federal bank robbery, in violation of title 18 

United States Code section 2113, constituted a Three Strikes-qualifying prior.

One exhibit consisted of a judgment and commitment order showing that in 2005 

codefendant Perez pled guilty to armed bank robbery in violation of title 18 United States 

Code section 2113(a)(d), and brandishing a weapon during the commission of a violent 

crime in violation of title 18 United States Code section 924(c). Attached to this 

judgment and commitment order was a copy of a First Superseding Indictment charging 

that in February 2000, Perez, Williams and a third person had robbed the Star Harbor 

Federal Credit Union in Rancho Dominguez, California. According to this indictment, 

Williams personally used a firearm during the robbery. 

The second exhibit consisted of a certified CLETS (California Law Enforcement 

Telecommunications System) computer printout showing that, following his arrest in 

October 2000, Williams was convicted of violating title 18 United States Code section 

2113(a)(d), sentenced to 130 months in prison, and eventually began a term of supervised 

release in March 2010. 

At trial, defense counsel made hearsay and lack of foundation objections to these 

exhibits, but did not argue the evidence was otherwise insufficient to prove the existence 

of this prior conviction. The trial court concluded the prior strike had been proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt.
16

b. Legal principles.

“The People must prove all elements of an alleged sentence enhancement beyond 

a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Where, as here, the mere fact of conviction under a 

particular statute does not prove the offense was a serious felony, otherwise admissible 

evidence from the entire record of the conviction may be examined to resolve the issue. 

[Citations.] This rule applies equally to California convictions and to those from foreign 

jurisdictions. [Citations.]” (People v. Miles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1074, 1082.)

“However, if the prior conviction was for an offense that can be committed in 

multiple ways, and the record of the conviction does not disclose how the offense was 

committed, a court must presume the conviction was for the least serious form of the 

offense. [Citations.] In such a case, if the serious felony nature of the prior conviction 

depends upon the particular conduct that gave rise to the conviction, the record is 

insufficient to establish that a serious felony conviction occurred. [¶] On the other hand, 

the trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from the record presented. Absent 

rebuttal evidence, the trier of fact may presume that an official government document, 

prepared contemporaneously as part of the judgment record and describing the prior 

conviction, is truthful and accurate. Unless rebutted, such a document, standing alone, is 

sufficient evidence of the facts it recites about the nature and circumstances of the prior 

conviction. [Citations.] [¶] On review, we examine the record in the light most 

favorable to the judgment to ascertain whether it is supported by substantial evidence.” 

(Id. at p. 1083.) 

Title 18 United States Code section 2113(a) provides: “Whoever, by force and 

violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of 

another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other 

thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession 

of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association; or [¶] Whoever enters or 

attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, or any 

building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan 

association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in such savings and loan 
17

association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony affecting such bank[, credit 

union,] or such savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the United 

States, or any larceny – [¶] Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 

twenty years, or both.”

Section 2113(d) provides: “Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, 

any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts 

in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be 

fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.” 

“The California serious felony of bank robbery substantially coincides with the 

offense described in the first paragraph of section 2113(a) . . . . However, there is no 

California serious felony that corresponds to the crime described in the second paragraph 

of section 2113(a). Thus, evidence that the defendant suffered a previous conviction 

under section 2113(a), standing alone, cannot establish that the conviction was for a 

serious felony under California law.” (People v. Miles, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1081-

1082, fns. omitted.) 

c. Discussion.

Citing People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616, Williams argues there was 

insufficient evidence his violation of section 2113 constituted a prior serious felony 

conviction for Three Strikes purposes. But the problem in Jones was that, although the 

defendant had originally been charged by indictment with violating title 18 United States 

Code sections 2113(a) and 2113(d), he was ultimately convicted only for violating the 

“lesser included offense” of section 2113(a). In this situation, Jones held: “The evidence 

presented by the People did not suffice to disclose the facts of the prior offense actually 

committed, and therefore the trial court should have presumed that the prior conviction 

was for the least offense punishable under the federal law, which did not constitute a 

serious felony strike. [Citations.]” (People v. Jones, supra, at p. 635.) But that problem 

did not exist here because the evidence shows Williams had been convicted for the 

aggravated form of the offense defined by the first paragraph of section 2113(a).
18

Certified rap sheets are admissible to prove the fact of prior convictions. 

(People v. Morris (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 363, 367-368.) Here, the CLETS rap sheet not 

only reflects Williams’s conviction for violating “2113(a)(d),” but an additional notation 

reads: “armed bank robbery.” This notation tended to show Williams had committed the 

aggravated form of federal bank robbery. (See People v. Miles, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 

1085 [“Where . . . the statutory provision includes more than one form of offense, one 

may reasonably infer, absent contrary indicia, that the additional prose notation is not 

mere surplusage, but an attempt to delineate which form was violated.”].) That 

Williams’s CLETS rap sheet may have contained a minor clerical error, describing him 

as 5 feet tall and weighing 90 pounds, does not materially impair the value of this 

evidence. In any event, there was more evidence showing the nature of Williams’s prior 

conviction.

A charging document is part of the record for purposes of determining the 

substance of a foreign conviction. (See People v. Towers (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1273, 

1285, fn. 11 [Tennessee indictment]; People v. McMahan (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 740, 745-

746 [Missouri indictment].) Here, the federal indictment describes an armed robbery 

during which Williams personally used a firearm, which constitutes more evidence about 

the nature of his prior. (See People v. Miles, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1088, fns. Omitted 

[“It is highly unlikely that one charged and convicted under section 2113(a) only for 

entering a bank with felonious or larcenous intent, without an attempted or actual taking 

of property by force and violence or intimidation, would also be found, in the course of 

the offense, to have placed a victim’s life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon and 

to have taken a hostage. In the absence of any rebuttal evidence as to the nature of the 

prior conviction, the trial court was entitled, prima facie, to draw the more reasonable 

inference that it was for committing the California serious felony of bank robbery.”].)

Hence, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding that Williams suffered 

a prior felony conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law.
19

DISPOSITION

The judgments are affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KLEIN, P. J.

We concur:

KITCHING, J.

ALDRICH, J.