alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1070 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1070

To provide that certain politically appointed Federal officers may not 
receive cash awards for a certain period during a Presidential election 
 year, to prohibit cash awards to Executive Schedule officers, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                May 28 (legislative day, April 19), 1993

Mr. Levin (for himself and Mr. Stevens) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental 
                                Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide that certain politically appointed Federal officers may not 
receive cash awards for a certain period during a Presidential election 
 year, to prohibit cash awards to Executive Schedule officers, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON CASH AWARDS TO CERTAIN FEDERAL OFFICERS.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 45 of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after section 4507 the following new sections:
``Sec. 4508. Limitation of awards during a Presidential election year
    ``(a) For purposes of this section, the term--
            ``(1) `Presidential election period' means any period 
        beginning on June 1 in a calendar year in which the popular 
        election of the President occurs, and ending on January 20 
        following the date of such election; and
            ``(2) `senior politically appointed officer' means any 
        officer who during a Presidential election period serves--
                    ``(A) in a Senior Executive Service position and is 
                not a career appointee as defined under section 
                3132(a)(4); or
                    ``(B) in a position of a confidential or policy-
                determining character under schedule C of subpart C of 
                part 213 of title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
    ``(b) No senior politically appointed officer may receive an award 
under the provisions of this subchapter during a Presidential election 
period.
``Sec. 4509. Prohibition of cash award to Executive Schedule officers
    ``No officer may receive a cash award under the provisions of this 
subchapter, if such officer serves in an Executive Schedule position 
under subchapter II of chapter 53.''.
    (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections for 
chapter 45 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 4507 the following:

``4508. Limitation of awards during a Presidential election year.
``4509. Prohibition of cash award to Executive Schedule officers.''.

                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Kevin Bauer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge, the Annual Report of Exar Corporation on Form 10-K/A for the period ended March 27, 2011 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K/A fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Exar Corporation.

Date: July 13, 2011



|                                                 
|-------------------------------------------------
|/s/    KEVIN
BAUER                               
|Kevin Bauer                                      
|Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ralph L. Homan, Appellant.

[654 NYS2d 925]

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant’s contention that the prosecutor improperly led the nine-year-old complainant during her Grand Jury testimony "is not reviewable upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction based upon legally sufficient trial evidence” (CPL 210.30 [6]). Contrary to defendant’s further contention, County Court did not abuse its discretion in partially excluding the public from the courtroom during the trial testimony of complainant, who the prosecutor said was nervous and embarrassed to testify about sexual acts committed upon her by defendant, her grandfather. The People advanced an overriding interest that was likely to be prejudiced; the closure was no broader than *988necessary to protect that interest; the court considered reasonable alternatives to closure; and the court made findings adequate to support its decision partially to close the courtroom to the public *(see, Waller v Georgia,*467 US 39, 48; *People v Kin Kan,*78 NY2d 54, 57-58, *rearg denied*78 NY2d 1008).

We further conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing complainant to testify under oath. Complainant demonstrated that she had " 'sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of an oath and to give a reasonably accurate account of what [s]he has seen and heard vis-a-vis the subject about which [s]he is interrogated’ ” *(People v Parks,*41 NY2d 36, 45; *see,*CPL 60.20 [2]). Even assuming, arguendo, that the court erred in permitting complainant to testify under oath, her testimony was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence at trial *(see, People v Groff,*71 NY2d 101, 109-111; *People v Green,*181 AD2d 1060, *lv denied*80 NY2d 831).

The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People *(see, People v Williams,*84 NY2d 925, 926), is legally sufficient to support defendant’s conviction *(see, People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495). Upon weighing the relative probative force of the conflicting testimony, we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence *(see, People v Bleakley, supra,*at 495). Finally, upon our review of the record, we conclude that the sentence is neither unduly harsh nor severe. (Appeal from Judgment of Wayne County Court, Sirkin, J.— Rape, 1st Degree.) Present—Pine, J. P., Lawton, Callahan, Do-err and Fallon, JJ.
#### Margaret B. Everett, wife of/and Gary EVERETT v. Daniel W. GOLDMAN, M. D., et al.

No. 60959.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 11, 1977.

In re: Daniel W. Goldman, M. D., applying for writ of review or certiorari.

Granted. The petition of the relator in the above entitled and numbered case having been duly considered,

It is ordered that a Writ of Certiorari issue herein, directing the Honorable Sol Gothard, Judge of the 24th Judicial District, Court for the Parish of Jefferson, to transmit to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, on or before the 25th day of November, 1977, the record in duplicate, or a certified copy of the record in duplicate, of the proceedings complained of by the relator herein, to the end that the validity of said proceedings may be ascertained.

It is further ordered that the aforesaid Judge of said Court and the respondent through counsel shall show cause, in this court, on a date to be fixed by this Court, why the relief prayed for in the petition of the relator should not be granted.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6147

VIRGINIA C. HIGH,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JACK MURRAY; CYNTHIA SHIELDS; HARLEY LAPPIN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District

Judge. (CA-96-1044-5-H)

Submitted: June 12, 1997 Decided: June 17, 1997

Before WIDENER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Virginia C. High, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971).

2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on

her Bivens * complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. High v. Murray, No.

CA-96-1044-5-H (E.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 1997). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT



In connection with the Annual Report of Highwoods Realty Limited Partnership (the Operating Partnership) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), I, Terry L. Stevens, Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Highwoods Properties Inc., general partner of the Operating Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Operating Partnership.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                     
|-----------------------------------------------------
|/s/ TERRY L. STEVENS                                 
|Terry L. Stevens                                     
|Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
|March 30, 2004
Exhibit 31.1 

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION**

**302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Mary G. Merritt,certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB ofPreferred Voice, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report doesnot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered bythis quarterly report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, andother financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report.

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or cause such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared; 

 

b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report on such evaluation; and 

 

c. disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the registrant’s internal controls over financial reporting that occurred duringthe registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controls over financial reporting; 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): 

 

a. all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant’s abilityto record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant’s auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and 

 

b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls. 

 

/s/  Mary G. Merritt

 

Mary G. Merritt 

Vice President Finance 

(Principal Executive Officer) 

August 14, 2003
#### Bobby Allen BRYANT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-929.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 12, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### HENRY COLESBERRY (defendant below) *vs.*AARON STOOPS (plff. below.)

On judgment by default tbe justice ought to state that it was after hearing the proofs and allegations of me plaintiff.

But if it appears from the record that he did so, it will be sufficient.

Covenant will lie before a justice in some cases.

Certiorari to John Wiley, Esq. a justice of the peace.

Record. Summons issued July 14th, 1834, returnable on Monday July 31st, 1834, before John Wiley, at his office in Newcastle. Demand @3 71, on the following account:

Doctor Henry Colesberry

to Aaron Stoops Dr.

1834, March 34.—To forty-one peach trees furnished according to your lease to me by J. Reeve, through Capt. James

McCullough at six cents, *$2*46

To cash paid Capt. J. McCullough *for*trouble, 35

As per the annexed bill and receipt,” *$2*71

Then followed a bill of the trees from S. Reece to James McCullough, and a receipt from McCullough to Stoops for *$2*71.

The summons was returned, “served personally, July 30th, 1834.” “July 31, 1834. The deft, appeared and craves further time until Saturday, July 36, 1834, which is granted. Saturday July 36, 1834. The plff. appears and the deft, not appearing, I enter judgment for the plff. for two dollars and seventy-one cents, with costs of suit, &c.”

Exceptions. First. Because it appears that the action is founded on a covenant in a lease; and being an action sounding in damages is *excludedfrom the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace.*Second. *449Because the deft, below failing to appear pursuant to the adjournment of the cause, the justice gave judgment against the deft, in his absence *ivilhout hearing the allegations and proofs*of the plff.

*Booth,*for defendant.

*By the Court.*

The act of assembly requires that before giving a judgment by default, the justice shall “hear the proofs and allegations of the plff.” *{Dig.*334, *sec.*5;) and he ought so to state on the docket; but when it appears from the record that he did examine the case on the proofs and allegations, the court will sustain his judgment though he omit to state the facts on the record. He has sent up the cause of action in this case which itself exhibits proof of the payment by Stoops for peach trees for deft.’s farm. The statement indeed shows that the contract under which these trees were furnished, grew out of a lease, but it does not therefore necessarily follow that the justice had no jurisdiction. If the lease was not under seal, assumpsit might lie for money paid by Stoops to the use of Colesberry; and we think that even an action of covenant would lie in some cases before a justice of the peace under the first section of the act providing for the recovery of small debts; *Dig.*330.

Judgment aifirmed.
<PAGE>   1



EXHIBIT 11 - STATEMENTS RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS


                         COMMUNITY BANCSHARES, INC.
                 COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE

The following tabulation presents the calculation of primary and fully diluted
earnings per common share for the years ended December 31, 2000, 1999 and 1998.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                  2000             1999            1998
                                                              -------------    ------------    ------------
<S>                                                           <C>              <C>             <C>
Reported net income/(loss) ...............................    $ (2,214,931)    $  1,658,110    $  3,579,493
                                                              ============     ============    ============

Earnings/(loss) on common shares .........................    $ (2,214,931)    $  1,658,110    $  3,579,493
                                                              ============     ============    ============

Weighted average common shares outstanding - basic .......       4,460,295        4,429,303       3,994,798
                                                              ============     ============    ============

Earnings/(loss) per common share- basic
  Income from continuing operations ......................    $      (0.50)    $        .37    $        .90
                                                              ============     ============    ============

  Net income/(loss) ......................................    $      (0.50)    $        .37    $        .90
                                                              ============     ============    ============

Weighted average common shares outstanding - diluted .....       4,671,430        4,595,072       4,052,259
                                                              ============     ============    ============

Earnings/(loss) per common share- diluted
  Income from continuing operations ......................    $      (0.47)    $        .36    $        .88
                                                              ============     ============    ============

  Net income/(loss) ......................................    $      (0.47)    $        .36    $        .88
                                                              ============     ============    ============
</TABLE>



           [The remainder of this page intentionally left blank]
#### G. & G. CONSULTANTS, INC., Appellant, v. GUARANTY FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF FORT LAUDERDALE et al., Appellees.

No. 73-781.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 14, 1973.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; Wm. Clayton Johnson, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
# C_2022051EN.01001602.xml

| 31.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 51/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 51/16

---

Appeal brought on 19 July 2021 by Electrodomésticos Taurus, S.L. against the order of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 17 May 2021 in Case T-328/20, Electrodomésticos Taurus, S.L. v EUIPO — Shenzen Aukey E-Business Co. Ltd

(Case C-468/21 P)

(2022/C 51/21)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Electrodomésticos Taurus, S.L. (represented by: E. Manresa Medina, lawyer)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and Shenzen Aukey E-Business Co. Ltd

By order of 6 October 2021, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal as inadmissible and ordered Electrodomésticos Taurus, S.L. to bear its own costs.

---
<Page>


                                                                     EXHIBIT 8.1

                                  SUBSIDIARIES



<Table>


<S>                            <C>                        <C>

                          SAND TECHNOLOGY INC.
                                Canada
                                  |
                                  |
                                  |
-----------------------------------------------------------------
       |                          |                       |
 100%  |                   100%   |                100%   |
       |                          |                       |
       |                          |                       |
SAND TECHNOLOGY          STSI LICENSING, LLC.      SAND TECHNOLOGY
  CORPORATION                 New Jersey            IRELAND LIMIED
   Delaware                                            Ireland
                                                          |
                                                          |
                                                          |
                                                   ----------------
                                                   |              |
                                              100% |              | 100%
                                                   |              |
                                                 SAND             SAND
                                              TECHNOLOGY       TECHNOLOGY
                                              DEUTSCHLAND        LIMITED
                                                 GmbH           (England)
                                                Germany

</Table>
# C_2021391EN.01000501.xml

| 27.9.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 391/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.9.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 391/5

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla m. st. Warszawy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 7 June 2021 — J.K. v TP S.A.

(Case C-356/21)

(2021/C 391/08)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla m. st. Warszawy w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: J.K.

Defendant: TP S.A.

Question referred

Must Article 3(1)(a) and (c) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (1) be construed as permitting the exclusion from the scope of Council Directive 2000/78/EC, and consequently also as permitting the exclusion from the application of the sanctions laid down in national law pursuant to Article 17 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC, of the freedom of choice of parties to a contract so long as that choice is not based on sex, race, ethnic origin or nationality, in a situation where the alleged discrimination consists in a refusal to enter into a civil-law contract under which work is to be carried out by a self-employed natural person when that refusal is based on the sexual orientation of the prospective counterparty?

---

(1)  OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16.

---
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

217 

CA 11-01367 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, AND LINDLEY, JJ.

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE 

ESTATE OF MICHAEL PANAGGIO, DECEASED, 

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT, 

 

AND ORDER

GRANDE’ VIE, LLC, GRANDE’ VIE REALTY, LLC,

ANTHONY J. MARASCO AND ANTHONY M. DIMARZO, 

RESPONDENTS-PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS.

(APPEAL NO. 2.) 

GATES & ADAMS, P.C., ROCHESTER (ANTHONY J. ADAMS, JR., OF COUNSEL),

FOR RESPONDENTS-PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS.

PHILLIPS LYTLE LLP, BUFFALO (ALAN J. BOZER OF COUNSEL), FOR

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Ann

Marie Taddeo, J.), entered April 13, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to

CPLR article 75. The judgment confirmed in part the award of the

arbitrator. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Entered: March 23, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court