1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 15a0211p.06 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

T HEODORE J ACKSON , Petitioner-Appellant ,

v.

B RIGHAM S LOAN , Warden, Respondent-Appellee

. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ Nos. 15-3775/3776

Appeal from the United St ates District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland. No. 1:15-cv-00870—James S. Gwin, District Judge. Decided and Filed: August 26, 2015 Before: BOGGS, SUHRHEINRICH, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

_________________ ORDER

_________________ SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Theodore Jackson, an Ohio state inmate, racked up a lengthy prison sentence by continually viol ating the terms of his parole. Facing up to 26 years behind bars, he filed a habeas petition in federal court to challenge his detentio n in 2013. It gained no
traction. See Jackson v. Sloan , No. 14-3955 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (unpublished order). Jackson tried again by filing two more habeas petitions in April and May 2015, but the district court thought they counted as second or succe ssive and transferred them to our court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1631, 2244(b)(3)(A); In re Sims , 111 F.3d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1997). Jackson did not like that. He filed “motion[s] for relief from” th e judgments in each case asking the district court
to reconsider the transfer orde rs. No. 15-3775, R. 6 at 1; No. 15-3776, R. 5 at 1. The district court denied both motions. Jackson appeals. 

### >Nos. 15-3775/3776 Jackson v. Sloan Page 2

Howard v. United States , 533 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2008), la ys out our court’s general procedure for reviewing second-or-successive transf er orders. We “treat the transfer order as non-appealable” and “consider in the transferred case whether [the] transfer was necessary or appropriate.” Id. at 474; see, e.g. , In re West , 402 F. App’x 77, 78–79 (6th Cir. 2010); McGhee v. Myers , 1999 WL 644374, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 1999) (unpublished table disposition). That approach is a sound one, but it does not help us here. Wh y not? Because Jackson appeals the denial of his motion for relief from the transfer order, not the transfer order itself

. This case thus presents a separate question, one that to our knowledge we have yet to address. See Keith v. Bobby , 618 F.3d 594, 602 (6th Cir. 2010) (Gibbons, J., c oncurring). Do appeals from the denial
of motions to reconsider second-or-successive tr ansfer orders face any jurisdictional barriers?
The answer, we think, is yes. The problem stems not from our lack of jurisdiction, as with direct appeals from transf er orders, but rather from the district court’s lack of jurisdiction.
When a district court transfers a second-or-succe ssive habeas petition, the case travels from one court (here the Northern Dist rict of Ohio) to another (here the Sixth Circuit). See 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Such inter-court transfers, to borrow the Supreme Court’s language from a similar context, are “event[s] of jurisdictional significance.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount
Co. , 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). “Jurisdict ion follows the file,” we have said, meaning that the one court loses jurisdicti on and the other court gains it wh en a case file physically moves
between courts. Miller v. Toyota Motor Corp. , 554 F.3d 653, 654 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp. , 729 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 2013); Jones v. InfoCure Corp. , 310 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2002); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3846 (4th ed. 2014).
This rule, it is true, usually arises with transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. That statute allows “a district court [to] tran sfer any civil action to any othe r district or division where it might have been brought” “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses” and “in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). But we see no reason to adopt a different approach with secondor-successive transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, whic h orders courts to “t ransfer [any] action or appeal” over which they lack jurisdiction “to a ny other [] court in which the action or appeal could have been brought” if doing so “is in the intere st of justice.” Nothing in the text of the twoNos. 15-3775/3776 Jackson v. Sloan Page 3

statutes suggests that transfers under § 1404 shoul d have jurisdictional consequences and those under § 1631 should not. If anything it should be the other way around. Transfers under § 1631 exist after all to “cure [a ] want of jurisdiction.”
Using the same approach under both statutes makes things easier on judges and litigants alike. We already apply the same basic rule to the most common transition between a district court and a court of appeals—an appeal from a final judgment. See Griggs , 459 U.S. at 58; see also Fed. R. App. P. 3, 4. Granted, this case concerns transfers , not appeals , but the contexts are similar. Plus, applying this ru le to second-or-successive transfer orders promotes efficiency.
It saves district courts the tr ouble of reconsidering wh ether a habeas petition counts as second or successive while a panel of our court consid ers the same question at the same time. See Howard , 533 F.3d at 474.
The district court, as we see it, lost juri sdiction over Jackson’s ha beas petitions when each petition was physically transferred to the Sixth Circuit. When exactly did the physical transfer occur? A simple rule of thumb provides the answer. A case is physically transferred as soon as the transferee court (t hat’s us) dockets the case. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc. , 928 F.2d 1509, 1516–17 (10th Cir. 1991); Lou v. Belzberg , 834 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1987). We docketed Jackson’s poten tially second-or-successive habeas petitions on May 19, 2015. Jackson filed his motions for relief from judgment on June 29, 2015. By then the case had left the district court’s hands, meaning it lacked jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s
motions.
That leaves one loose end. In one case (No. 15-3775), Jackson appealed from the district court’s order of “July 6, 2015.” R. 9 at 1. But no such order existed. The district court denied
Jackson’s motion on July 8 . “[F]unctional rather than formalistic compliance” with Appellate Rule 3 “is all that is required,” Isert v. Ford Motor Co. , 461 F.3d 756, 759 (6th Cir. 2006), and
we have no reason to believe th at the incorrect date “misle[d] or prejudice[d]” the defendant.
Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962); cf. Flieger v. Delo , 16 F.3d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 1994); Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados , 917 F.2d 620, 630 (1st Cir. 1990).Nos. 15-3775/3776 Jackson v. Sloan Page 4

For these reasons, we vacate the district court’s orders from July 8, 2015, and remand
with instructions to dismiss Jackson’s motions fo r relief from the transfer orders for lack of jurisdiction.