UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, DC WILLIAM ALFRED HICKS, JR. a/k/a BILLY HICKS Complainant,
VS. CITY OF MOUNTAIRY, NORTH CAROLINA; and the COUNTY OF SURRY, NORTH CAROLINA; through the MOUNT AIRY/SURRY COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITYRespondent.

Submitted By: Howard C. Jones II, Attorney At Law 105 West Fourth Street, Suite 400-E Winston-Salem, NC 27101 Phone: 336 750-0860; Cell: 336-816-1716 Fax: (336) 727-1085 Email: howardcjonesii@gmail.com ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) FAA Docket No. 16-15-07

MOTION TO FORLEAVE TO FILE OPINION AND JUDGMENT OF THE UNITIED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA IN HICKS V. AUTHOTIRY ET AL, MDNC CASE NO. 1:15-CV-38 AND REQUEST FOR JUDICAL NOTICE OF THE SAM_E.

Attorney for MountAiry/Surry CountyAirportAuthority
Pursuant to 14 CFR 16.13, 16.19, and 16.23UJ and the inherent power of this tribunal to take judicial notice, respondent Mount Airy/Surry County Airport Authority ("Authority") moves this tribunal for leave to file the order andjudgment ofthe United States District Court for the Middle District ofNorth Carolina in Hicks v. Mount AirySurry County Airport Authority et a!, Case No. 1: 15-cv-38 and that this tribunal take judicial notice ofthe same, and grounds therefore states as follows:l. In their pleadings in this Part 16 proceeding, the complainant and the respondent have both previously referred to the complaint and amended complaint which Mr. Hicks filed against the Authority in a lawsuit pending in the United Sates District Court for the Middle District ofNorth Carolina. Respondent also previously filed copies ofthe complaint and amended complaint as exhibits to respondent's motion to dismiss and for summaryjudgment. Respondent also cited the amended complaint in support of its affirmative defenses ofresjudicataand collateral estopple and lack of jurisdiction. 2. Thereafter, on December 9, 2015, the District Court entered an opinion and ajudgment in I: 15-CV-38, dismissing Mr. Hicks' complaint in its entirety. A true and accurate copy ofthe opinion is attached as Exhibit "1" to this motion; a true and correct copy ofthejudgmentis attached as Exhibit "2" to this motion. 3. This tribunal has the inherent power to take judicial notice of these documents. 4. These documents are relevant to the consideration ofthe matter currently pending beforethis tribunal. 5. Granting this motion and permitting the filing of these documents and taking judicial notice ofthe same would be in the interest ofjustice and promote the mandate ofthis tribunal to fairly adjudicate Part 16 proceedings. Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, respondent Authority respectfully requests that this tribunal permit the filing of the United States District Court's opinion and judgment in MDNC Case NO. I: 15-cv-38 and take the judicial notice ofthe same, and for such further reliefas this tribunal deems appropriate.

2Respectfully submitted, this the 21''day ofDecember 2015.

estFourth Street, Suite 400-E 

### w· stan-Salem,NC 27101 Telephone: (336) 750-0860 Fax: (336) 727-1085 Email: howardcjonesii@gmail.com Attorney for Mount Airy/Surry County Airport Authority

3CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Howard C. Jones II, certifY that on December 21, 2015 I filed and served this Motion for Leave to File (together with all attachments and exhibits thereto) by placing the original thereofand three copies to the FAA, in prepaid first class or better envelopes in the custody of the United States Mail and by mailing a copy to counsel of record addressed as follows: MailedTo: FAA Part 16 Docket Clerk AGC-600 Federal AviationAdministration 800 IndependenceAvenue SW Washington, DC 20591 MailedTo: Randolph M. James Randolph M. James, P.C. P.O. Box 20069 Winston-Salem, NC 27120 Attorney For Complainant Mailed to: Edwin M. Woltz 119 Rawley Avenue MountAiry, NC 27030 Attorney for the County ofSurry, North Carolina Mailed to: Hugh B. Campbell, III 235 E. Independence Blvd. PO Box 1846 Mount Airy, North Carolina 27030 Attorney for the City ofMount Airy, North Carolina

4IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WILLIAMALFRED HICKS, JR., Plaintiff,
v. MOUNTAIRY-SURRY COUNTY AIRPORTAUTHORITY, eta!., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 1:15-CV-38

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Catherine C. Eagles, DistrictJudge. This case arose out ofa dispute over a lease for an airplane hangar at an airport in SurryCounty. Theplaintiff, BillyHicks, was both a tenant and a member ofthe airport's governing body when otherboardmembers votedto terminate his hangar lease because offire code violations. After failing to obtainreliefin state courtproceedings, Mr. Hicks suedthe AirportAuthority, its seven board members, its attorney, and the Surry County fire marshal in this Court, claimingthey violated his constitutional rights. He contends thatthe tire code violations were apretext for the lease tennination and other adverse actions, which were in fact motivated by personal animus towards Mr. Hicks for positions he had taken as a board member on unrelated airport business in the past. For the reasons more fully set forth below, all claims against all defendants will be dismissed. 

### I. FACTS ALLEGED IN COMPLAINT TheMount Airy-Surry CountyAirportAuthority (the "Authority") is a governmental entityjointly fonned by the City ofMountAiry and the County ofSurry 

### EXHIBIT



## j~i> 

# .l

### pursuant to North Carolina law to operate the Mount Airy-Surry County Airport. (Doc. 18**at~** 

### 7.) PlaintiffBilly Hicks was appointed as an Authority board member by the City ofMount Airy in 2010 and served in that position through 2013. (Doc. 18**at~~** 

### 19-20.) He also owns two planes he has kept at the airport since 2008. (Doc. 18**at~** 

### 2.) AfterMr. Hicks voiced opposition to other board members on two separate matters, (see 

### Doc. 18**at~~** 

### 25, 59), he began receiving "pressure"to resign his board position. (Doc. 18 at**~** 

### 62.) The defendants latertook a series ofactions resulting in a "constructive ban" on Mr. Hicks'spersonal use ofthe airport. (Doc. 18 at**~** 

### 109.) Following an incident in which Mr. Hicks used spray paint inside the hangar he rented from the Authority, the defendantboard members voted to terminate Mr. Hicks's lease if it were found he had violated any laws. (Doc. 18**at~~** 

### 65, 67, 71, 103.) The Authority's attorney, defendant Joseph Williams, described the incident to the Surry County Fire Marshal, defendant Roger Jones, who, without further investigation, generated areport listing fire code violations. (Doc. 18**at~~** 

### 73-75.) A number ofother tenants had lease and fire code violations that the board and fire marshal did not investigate. (See 

### Doc. 18**at~~** 

### 42, 88.) Othertenants have been given timeto fix violations discovered during fire marshal inspections. (Doc. 18**at~** 

### 82.) However, after Mr. Hicks's violation, Mr. Williams sent a letter terminating Mr. Hicks's hangar lease and removing his name from the waiting list for an additional hangar, citing ten tire code violations and possible OSHA violations. (Doc. 18**at~** 

### 85; see also 

### Doc. 32-1 at 10.) Mr. Hicks asserts he was treated differently than similarly-situated tenants because ofhis opposition to other board members in matters ofAuthority business. (Doc. 218

**at~** 90.) Aroundthis time, Mr. Hicks also resignedhis position as an Authority board member. 

### (E.g., Doc. 18

**at~** 22.) The actions ofall defendants "forc[ed] his resignation." (Doc. 18

**at~** 130.) 

### II. OVERVIEW OF CLAIMS AND DEFENSES Section 1983 "is not itselfa source ofsubstantiverights, but merelyprovides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). "The first inquiry in any§ 1983 suit, therefore, is whetherthe plaintiffhas been deprived ofa right 'securedbythe Constitution and laws."' Baker

### v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979) (quoting 42 

## u.s.c. § 1983). Mr. Hicks framed his complaint as three claims against all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: violations ofequal protection, violations ofdue process, and conspiracy to violate his equal protection and due process rights. (See Doc. 

### IS at 21, 25, 27.) Underlying these claims are his contentions thatthe defendants retaliated against him for exercising his FirstAmendment rights, (see Doc. 18

**at~~** 101, 137, 141), and that the defendants unconstitutionally deprivedhim ofliberty andproperty rights. (See Doc. 18

**at~~** 108, 136.) Mr. Hicks seeks damages, a renewedhangar lease, and reinstatement on the waiting list for an additional hangar lease in the same wait-list position he held in May2013. (Doc. 18 at pp. 29-30

**~~I,** 5.) All defendants have movedto dismiss under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which reliefcan be granted and, alternatively, because the claims are barred by resjudicataand collateral estoppel. (Docs. 32, 38, 40.) 3All defendants additionally assert that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars the conspiracy claim. (Docs. 33 at 15; 39 at 15; 41 at 12.) The board member defendants additionally maintain the claims are barredbecause ofabsolute and qualified immunity, (Doc. 33 at 20), and defendant Mr. Jones, the fire marshal, asserts qualified immunity. (Doc. 41 at 15.) TheAuthority and Mr. Jones also contend the claims shouldbe dismissed because Mr. Hicks has not adequately alleged that his injuries t1owed from a governmental policy or custom. (Docs. 33 at 24; 41 at 16.) 

### III. ANALYSIS A. Issue and Claim Preclusion This is not the first lawsuitMr. Hicks brought concerningthese factual allegations. In June 2013 Mr. Hicks filed a declaratoryjudgmentaction in state superior court seeking
an order enjoiningtheAuthority from evicting him. (Doc. 32-1 at 2

**~** 12.) Mr. Hicks voluntarily dismissed that suit in September 2014, (Doc. 32-2), withouthaving vacated the hangar. (See Doc. 18

**at~** 86.) Meanwhile, in August 2014 the Authority brought a state court summary ejectment action against Mr. Hicks, alleging his written lease had ended that May. (Doc. 32-3.) In defense, Mr. Hicks asserted thatthe Authority violated his constitutional right to equalprotection underthe FourteenthAmendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Doc. 32-4

**at~** 2), but he did not file any counterclaims, and it does not appearthatthe state courtjudge addressed these constitutional defenses in herdecision. (See Doc. 32-6.) The state court ruled in favor ofthe Authority, holding thatthe lease had expired withoutbeingrenewed. (Doc. 32-6 at ,[6.) Mr. Hicks filed a notice of appeal but later vacated the hangar space, and the appeal was dismissed as moot. (Docs. 432-7; 32-8

**at~** 3(c); 32-9.) 1 The defendants contendthat Mr. Hicks's claims in this lawsuit are barred by issue and claimpreclusion. (Docs. 33 at 17-20; 39 at 20-22; 41 at 16-19.) "Federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to a state courtjudgment as the forum that rendered thejudgmentwould have given it." Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d 284,287 (4th Cir. 2008). Therefore, the Court must apply North Carolina lawto determine the preclusive effect of the ejectmentjudgment. 

### 1. Claim Preclusion Resjudicata, or claim preclusion, bars the relitigation ofclaims and counterclaims that were or couldhave beenraised in a priorproceeding between the same parties. Sartin, 535 F.3d at 287. A litigantwho fails to raise a compulsory counterclaim risks beingprecluded from asserting that claim in a separate action. Fickley v. Greystone Enters., Inc., 140 N.C. App. 258,261,536 S.E.2d 331,334 (2000)). "Generally, a counterclaim is compulsory if'it arises out ofthe transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter ofthe opposingparty's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence ofthirdparties ofwhom the court cannot acquirejurisdiction.'" !d. at 260, 536 S.E.2d at 333 (quoting N.C. R. Civ. P. 13(a)). In contrast, where a plaintiffseeks a remedy for a separate and distinct act leading to a separate and distinct injury, the claim is not barred even ifboth acts arose from a single core ofoperative facts. Tong v. Dunn,

1While the state court action was still pending, Mr. Hicks filed the complaint in this Court. (See Doc. 16-7 at I, 18.)
5752 S.E.2d 669, 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 428 S.E.2d !57(1993)). IfMr. Hicks were making a claim that his First Amendmentrights were violated by the board's actions, such a claim would be barredby resjudicata. Under applicable North Carolina law, retaliatory lease termination claims are compulsory counterclaims in summary ejectment ifthey are based on the same factual claims andinvolve the same determinative questions. Fickley, 140 N.C. App. at 261-62, 536 S.E.2d at 334. Here, however, Mr. Hicks is not basing his § 1983 claims on his FirstAmendment rights; rather, he relies on his equal protection and due process rights.2 The defendants have not cited authority to supporttheir contention that all ofthe claims in this suit were compulsory counterclaims to the summary ejectment action. (Doc. 33 at 18-19.) The Courtwill denythe motion to dismiss based onresjudicata. 

### 2. Issue Preclusion Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation ofspecific issues that
were actually determined in aprior action that resulted in a finaljudgmenton the merits. Sartin, 535 F.3d at 287-88. Itapplies when (I)the issues are the same as those involved in the prior action; (2) the issues were raised and actually litigated in the prior action; (3) the issues were material and relevant to the disposition ofthe prior action; and (4) the determination ofthose issues in the prior action was necessary and essential to the 2 Though Mr. Hicks mentions free speech rights several times, (see, e.g., Doc. 18

**at~~** 96, I0I, I06, I41, 147), he does not appearto assert a § 1983 claim based on violation ofhis First Amendment rights and, rather, explicitlybases his claims only on equal protection and due process. (See Doc. 18 at 21, 27.)

6resultingjudgment. Beckwith v. Llewellyn, 326 N.C. 569, 574,391 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1990). "Avery close examination ofmatters actually litigated must be made in orderto determine ifthe underlying issues are in fact identical. Ifthey are not identical, then the doctrine ofcollateral estoppel does not apply." /d. As discussed 

### supra, the only issues squarelybefore the state court were whether the lease contained a renewal provisionthat allowed Mr. Hicks to renew at his option and whetherthere had previously been an agreement to renew between the parties. (See also Doc. 16-7.) The state court expressly found that no renewal agreement was made and did not address Mr. Hicks's constitutional defense. (Doc. 32-6

**at~** 6.) Accordingly, to the extent that Mr. Hicks claimshe is entitledto renewal ofthe lease, that claim is precludedby the state court decision. All other claims are not precluded and will be considered. 

### B. Absolute Immunity The boardmembers contend they are entitled to absolute immunitybecause they
are equivalentto a legislature. Local legislators are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for legislative activities. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998). This immunity extends to "[o]fficials outside the legislative branch
...when they perform legislative functions" and attaches to "all actions taken in the sphere oflegitimate legislative activity." /d. at 55, 54 (internal quotations omitted). Actions that are administrative rather than legislative in nature are not protected by absolute immunity. See id. at 55. The board actions complained ofhere were not legislative in nature. Even ifthe 7board members perform some legislative functions in their oversight ofthe Authority, termination and non-renewal ofleases "affect specific individuals rather than formulate broad public policy" and do not involve "the adoption ofprospective, legislative-type rules
... that establish a generalpolicy affecting the largerpopulation." EEOC 

### v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm 'n, 631 F.3d 174, 184 (4th Cir. 20II) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Alexander

### v. Holden, 66 F.3d 62, 67 (4th Cir. 1995). Defendant board members have cited no authority to supporttheir conclusory argument that termination ofthe lease was a legislative activity. (See Doc. 33 at 20-21.) They are not entitledto absolute immunity. 

### C. Equal Protection Claims Mr. Hicks alleges an equal protection violation because he was treated differently than otherhangar tenants with tire code violations. (Doc. 18

**at~~** 87-90, 100.) He alleges that this disparate treatment occurred because he voiced opposition to otherboard members on two separate matters. (See Doc. 18

**at~~** 21-25, 59.)3 TheEqual Protection Clause ofthe FourteenthAmendmentprovides that "[n]o State shall
... deny to anyperson within itsjurisdictionthe equal protection ofthe laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I. The equal protection mandate "does not take from the States all power ofclassification,"Pers. Adm 'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,271 (1979), but "keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all

3 As noted supra, to the extentthis claim is based on retaliatory termination, it is barred by resjudicata.

8relevant respects alike." Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. I, 10 (1992). Equal protection claims usually arise whenplaintiffs allege arbitrary classification
as members ofan identifiable group. Engquist v. Or. Dep 't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008). In somecircumstances, equal protection plaintitis mayprevail without invoking membership in a protected class by showingthey were "intentionallytreated differently from others similarly situated andthat there is norational basis for the difference in treatment." Vill. ofWillowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam); see also Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631,633 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Theparadigmatic 'class of one' case, [ ] sensibly conceived, is one in which a public official, with no conceivable basis for his action otherthan spite or some other impropermotive (improperbecause unrelatedto his public duties), comes downhard on a hapless private citizen."). While theparameters ofa "class ofone" cause ofaction in the context of discretionary decisionmaking are in flux,4 "itis not sufficient for a plaintiffsimply to showthat the defendants' actualmotive for their disparate treatment was irrational; rather

4 In Engquist, the Supreme Court limited the availability ofthe "class ofone" theory, concluding it does not apply in the context ofpublic employmentbecause the state action involved "discretionarydecisionmakingbased on avast array ofsubjective, individualized assessments" and "allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out ofaparticularperson would undermine the very discretionthat such state officials are entrustedto exercise." 553 U.S. at 603. Several courts have questioned whether "class ofone" claims in the context of discretionary decisionmaking remain viable after Engquist. See, e.g., Rapp v. Dutcher, 557 F. App'x 444,449 (6th Cir. 2014); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794,799-800 (8th Cir. 2009); UnitedStates v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir. 2008); Uzoukwu v. Prince George's Cmty. Coli., No. DKC 12-3228,2013 WL 4442289, at *9-10 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 2013); Mathis v. McDonough, No. ELH-13-2597, 2014 WL 3894133, at *28 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2014). The Fourth Circuithas not yet addressed thepost-Engquistviability ofclass-of-one equal protection claims. See Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533,542 n.l3 (4th Cir. 2013) (observing that other circuits have discussed the impact ofEngquist on "class ofone" claims, but concluding that "such discussion is not necessary to resolving the claim before us."). 9

### he must negate 'anyreasonably conceivable state offacts that couldprovide arational basis for the classification."' Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 

### 388 F.3d 440,447 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bd. ojTrs. v. Garrett, 

### 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)); see also Herman v. Lackey, 

### 309 F. App'x778 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per curiam) (applying Kirby 

### in the Rule 12(b)(6) context). 

### l. BoardMembers
a. Alleged Constitutional Violation Mr. Hicks alleges thatboard members treated him differently than similarlysituated tenants when they voted to terminate his lease. In June 2011, Mr. Hicks entered into athree-year lease withthe Authority for a hangar. (Doc. 18-1 at 40.) Aroundthattime, in his capacity as a board member, Mr. Hicks argued for a fuel audit thatthe chairman ofthe board, John Springthorpe, opposed. (Doc. 18

**at~~** 

### 21-22.) Thereafter, Mr. Springthorpe "resented" him and "treated [him] differently" in unspecifiedways. (Doc. 18

**at~** 

### 25.) In April2012, Mr. Hicks again disagreedwith Mr. Springthorpe and otherboard members about whether aparticular flight instructor should be allowed to use the airport. (Doc. 18

**at~~** 

### 44, 59.) Mr. Hicks alleges that his support ofthis flight instructor caused board members to retaliate against him. (Doc. 18

**at~~** 

### 59-62.) In March 2013 Mr. Hicks spray-painted his aircraft inside his hangar, and "overspray" resulted "in a mist ofpaint adhering to ... other aircraft." (Doc. 18 at ,[,[65, 67.) Three other tenants contacted the Authority about damage to their aircraft and personal property stored in the hangars. (Doc. 18 at

**~** 

### 68.) Mr. Hicks's insurance 10companypaid for the damage, and he maintains there were no further complaints from the othertenants afterthey were compensated. (Doc. 18

**at~~** 69-70.) On May 17, 2013, Mr. Williams sent Mr. Hicks a letter on behalfoftheAuthorityterminating his lease, citing this incident. (Doc. 18

**at~** 85.) Mr. Hicks contendsthat the defendant board members used the overspray incident
as apretext for terminatinghis lease, not renewinghis lease, and not grantinghim an additional lease for a second hangar. (Doc. 18 at

**~~** 71-87.) He alleges that other hangar tenants had fire code violations "equal to" his own violation, (Doc. 18

**at~~** 88-89), that his own violationwas minor, (see Doc. 18

**at~** 82 ("paint spraying as a fire code violation only lasts as long as the paint spraying does")), and that he was treated differently than similarly situatedtenants because ofhis oppositionto otherboard members in the matter ofthe flight instructor. (Doc. 18

**at~** 90.) Relying on Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995), and JetstreamAero Servs., Inc. v. New Hanover Cty., No. 88-1748, 1989 WL 100644 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1989) (unpublished), Mr. Hicks contends that "[s]electiveprosecution is actionableunder the federal Constitution when the prosecution or enforcement arises from retaliation against the plaintifffor the exercise ofa constitutional right, like free speech." (Doc. 45 at I0.) There are severalproblems with this contention. First, it is highly doubtful that Mr. Hicks has a constitutional right as aboardmember to disagree with other governmental board members. See Nev. Comm 'non Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011) (holding that a legislator's vote is not First Amendment speech); Garcetti v. IICeballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) ("[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendmentpurposes."). Second, the complaint itselfshows arational basis for treating Mr. Hicks differently from othertenants with lease violations: he was the only tenant whose violations caused serious property damage to other tenants' airplanes. (Doc. 18 at**~~** 42, 88.) A plaintiffproceeding on an equal protection claim subject to rational basis review "must negate 'anyreasonably conceivable state offacts that couldprovide arational basis for the classification."' Kirby, 388 F.3d at448 (quoting Garrett, 53! U.S. at 367). "[A] discriminatory purpose is not presumed." Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. I, 8 (1944). Accepting as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, as this Court must do on a motion to dismiss, BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,**555~56** (2007), Mr. Hicks's allegations are likely insufficient to support his claimthatthe defendants' actions here
were irrational. See Lackey, 309 F. App'xat 785 (finding that the complaint failed to negate the hypothetical rational basis); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2008) (same); Ruttenberg v. Jones, 283 F. App'x 121, 131 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (per curiam) (same); McWaters v. Cosby, 54 F. App'x 379, 383 (4th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (per curiam) (same). 

### b. Qualified Immunity Assuming without deciding that Mr. Hicks stated a claim for an equal protection violation, the board member defendants are entitled to qualitled immunity. Public officials perfonning discretionary functions are generally granted qnalitled immunity and 12shielded from civil damages unless their "conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights ofwhich a reasonable person would have known." Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1385 (4th Cir. 1995) (citingHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982)). Analysis ofa qualified immunity defense "requires three distinct steps: (1) identification ofthe specific right allegedly violated; (2) determining whether at the time ofthe alleged violation the rightwas clearly established; and (3) ifso, then determining whether areasonable person in the [official's] position would have known that doing whathe didwould violate that right." Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1385. Mr. Hicks's allegations are insufficientto establishthat board members would have known their actions violated a clearly established right. As noted, FirstAmendment protections are not clearly established for speech by a member ofa governmentalboard about and in connection with decisions made by that board. Moreover, the application of the class-of-one theory ofliability to situations involving discretionary decisionmaking is quite "murky." Jetstream, 1989 WL 100644, at* 1; see supra note 4. Mr. Hicks contends that his constitutional right to equal protection, including the right against selective enforcement, was well established. (Doc. 45 at 23.) Itis not, of course, enough that the general, abstract right to equal protection is well established; the right must be well established "at a high level ofparticularity." Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258,271 (4th Cir. 2007); see alsoAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,639-40 (1987). To this end, Mr. Hicks relies on one unpublished Fourth Circuit case and several
cases from otherjurisdictions to support his selective enforcement argument. (Doc. 45 at 10-13.) None constitute the kind ofauthority that results in a clearly established right, ' 13and all are distinguishable in meaningful ways. InJetstream, the unpublished Fourth Circuit case, the plaintiffwas not a government official, and there was evidence ofareasonable temporal connection between the expressed animosity and the discriminatory conductthat could not otherwise be explained. 1989 WL 100644, at *3. Here, the alleged animosity arose at least a year before the alleged discriminatory act, which was otherwisebased on afirm factual footing: a lease violation about which causedproperty damage and about which other tenants had complained. As noted, "a discriminatory purpose is notpresumed; there must be a showing ofclear and intentional discrimination." Snowden, 321 U.S. at 8 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Esmail case from the Seventh Circuit involved an "orchestrated campaign of official harassment" against the plaintiff, includingpolice harassment, intrusive surveillance, repeated and unjustifiedpolice stops, and false criminal charges. 53 F.3d at 178-79. This ongoingharassment describes conduct ofa differentkind and degree than what Mr. Hicks alleges-namely, that board members initiated a one-offinvestigation into alleged fire code violations that resulted in the termination and non-renewal ofhis lease and his removal from a waiting list for future leases. Moreover, the Seventh Circuithas questioned Esmail's ongoing validity, see Lauth, 424 F.3d at 633, and othercourts have raised serious questions about "class of one" cases like this one. See supra note 4. Indeed, the Fourth Circuithas called the Seventh Circuit's selective enforcement holding in Esmail "anovel theory." Edwards v. City ofGoldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250 (4th Cir. 1999). Novel claims are precisely what 14qualified immunity doctrine evolved to protect against. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (Qualified immunity "provides ample protectionto all but the plainly incompetent orthose whoknowingly violate the law."); Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640 ("[I]n the light ofpre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent."). In any case, for "clearly established"purposes, existingprecedent is limitedto "the decisions ofthe Supreme Court, this [Fourth Circuit] court ofappeals, and the highest court ofthe state in which the case arose." City ofGoldsboro, 178 F.3d at 251 (internal quotations omitted). None ofthe cases Mr. Hicks cites fall into any ofthese categories. The equal protection claims against the board member defendants are dismissed
on qualified immunity grounds. 

### 2. The Airport Authority "Unless a government entity has apolicy or custom ofdiscrimination, a courtwill not attribute an individual's constitutional violations to the government entity." Lefemine
v. Wideman, 758 F.3d 551, 557 (4th Cir. 2014). Because theAuthority is a "unitoflocal government"under North Carolina law, (Doc. 18

**at~** 7(b)), Mr. Hicks must allege that his deprivation was caused by a "constitutionally forbidden rule orprocedure." Polk Cty.
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,326 (1981). Tohold the Authority liable, official policy must be "the moving force ofthe constitutional violation." Monell v. New York CityDep 'tof Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,694 (1978). Here, Mr. Hicks has not alleged any such policy, rule, or procedure and indeed has alleged facts to the contrary. (See Doc. 18

**at~~** 61, 113; see also Doc. 45 at 6 (The 15

### Authority had "an almost automatic renewal policy" for leases that the board members ignored in terminating his lease.)) Elsewhere, Mr. Hicks alleges that the board members' vote to terminate his lease amounted to "approvingnew policy." (Doc. 18

**at~** 

### 107.) "An official policy often refers to 'formal rules orunderstandings
...that are intendedto, and do, establish t1xed plans ofaction to be followed under similar circumstances consistently and overtime,' and must be contrasted with 'episodic exercises ofdiscretion in the operational details ofgovernment."' Semple v. City of Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708,712 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986) and Spellv. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1386 (4th Cir. 1987)). A decision to terminate oneparticular lease is not ordinarily a formulation ofanew policy. Rather, it represents the exercise of"discretionary authority in purely operational aspects ofgovernment." Spell, 824 F.2d at 1386. A conclusory allegation that the termination ofthe lease was "policy" is not sufficient to state a claim. In the absence ofany factual allegations indicating that the board had an unconstitutional officialpolicythat was the moving force behind the termination ofthe lease and other disputed actions, the equal protection claims against the Authority are dismissed. 

### 3. Mr. Williams 

### Mr. Hicks alleges that Mr. Williams, aprivate lawyer who represented the Authority during the relevant time period, violated his right to equal protectionthrough the investigation ofthe alleged tire code violations and later selective enforcement of lease provisions. (Doc. 18

**at~~** 

### 15, 112, 121.) Mr. Williams is entitled to qualified 16immunity for the same reasons as the board members. See Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657 (20 12) (holdingthat aprivate attorney retained to carry outthe work ofthe government is entitledto qualified immunity). The equal protection claims against Mr. Williams are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. 

### 4. Mr.Jones Mr. Hicks alleges that the fire marshal, Mr. Jones, violatedhis right to equal protection by preparing an inspectionreport at the Authority's request without physically inspecting Mr. Hicks's hangar. (Doc. 18

**at~~** 112, 118.) As noted supra, to adequately state a class-of-one equalprotectionclaim, Mr. Hicks must allege facts indicatinghe "has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. Mr. Hicks alleges that the tire marshal had "aduty to inspect all buildings [sic] structures orpremises for the purpose ofascertaining any code violations and ensuring those violations are corrected," (Doc. 18

**at~** 7 4), and that the fire marshal had performed "actualphysical inspections" at unspecified other occasions. (Doc. 18

**at~** 82.) This statement ofan alleged duty, plus a vague reference to otherphysical inspections, is not sufficient to allege that Mr. Jones treated Mr. Hicks differently than similarly situated individuals. Itdoes not allege that Mr. Jones's regularpractice was to inspect premises before issuing a report and that he intentionally treated Mr. Hicks differently. Itdoes not allege that Mr. Jones knew about fire code violations by other tenants and responded differently to them. In the absence ofany allegation that Mr. Jones was aware of violations in otherhangars, the fact that Mr. Jones did not investigate whether other 17

### tenants had engaged in violations similarto Mr. Hicks's spray painting violation, 

### (see Doc. 18

**at~** 

### 78), fails to state a claim that Mr. Jones intentionally treated similarly situated tenants differently. Allegations that the Authority treated othertenants with violations differently does not translate into a claim against the Fire Marshal. Though a court reviewing factual allegations on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) takes the facts in the light most favorable to theplaintiff, it need not accept as true "unwarranted inferences." Wag More Dogs, Ltd. Liab. Corp. v. Cozart, 

### 680 F.3d 359,365 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Nor is it required to accept conclusory and speculative allegations. Painter's Mill Grille, LLCv. Brown, 

### 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). Mr. Hicks's complaintis devoid offacts supporting his equal protection violation claim against Mr. Jones, and this claim is dismissed. D. Due Process Claims Mr. Hicks claims aproperty interest in the use ofthe public airport. (Doc. 18

**at~** 

### I08.) He alleges all defendants violated his propertyrights "in forcing his resignation from the Board ofthe Airport Authority, terminating Plaintiffs lease for the hangar, prohibiting tie-down onthe ramp, removing Plaintiffsname from the waiting list, removing individuals involvedwith Plaintifffrom the waiting list, and denying access to
apublic airport." (Doc. 18

**at~** 

### 130.) He contends these actions deprived him ofproperty interests in the use ofthe airport without adequate due process oflaw. All defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state aclaim. (Docs. 32, 38, 40.) Because Mr. Hicks has not adequately alleged a constitutionally protectedproperty right, this claim will be dismissed as to all defendants. 18

### To the extent the claim is based on the termination ofthe lease and the refusal to
renew the lease, Mr. Hicks has already received due process oflaw via the state court summary ejectmentproceedings. Moreover, the state court previously ruled that Mr. Hicks did not have a contractual right to renewal ofhis lease, (Doc. 32-6

**at~** 

### 6), and Mr. Hicks has not explained how anon-existent contractual right canmorph into aproperty right subjectto constitutionalprotections. His passing references to "tie-down" rights, (Doc. 18

**at~~** 

### 130, 136), do not state aclaim. He has pleaded no facts to support his conclusory allegations that he has a liberty interest in the use ofthe airport, (Doc. 18 at

**~~** 

### 136, 148), or that he has been "constructively banned" from the airport. (Doc. 18

**at~** 

### 136.) Indeed, he has not alleged even one instance when he tried to access the airport and
was prevented from doing so. To the extent he bases his claim on the allegations that he "receivedpressure from the Mount Airy commissioners to resign his appointment as an AirportAuthority Board member," (Doc. 18

**at~** 

### 62), and that all defendants "fore[ed] his resignation," (Doc. 18 at

**~** 

### 130), those allegations are either levied against persons otherthan the defendants to this action or are entirely conclusory. To the extent the claim is based on allegations that his friends have also been removed from the hangarwaiting list because ofassociation with him, (Doc. 18

**at~~** 

### 94, 117, 136, 145), Mr. Hicks does not have standing to assert the claims ofothers. Finally, he alleged no facts that would support his conclusory allegation that he had aproperty orliberty interest in being on the waiting list for a second hangar. (Doc. 18

**at~** 

### 130); see Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 

### 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that to have aproperty interest in a govemment benefit, aperson must "have alegitimate claim 19ofentitlementto it"). 

### E. Conspiracy Claims Mr. Hicks alleges a conspiracy between and among all defendants to deprive him ofhis constitutional rights by actingtogether "to falsify aFireMarshal's Inspection Report, a vote or agreement to terminate Plaintiffs lease and remove his name from the waiting list for future hangar space, remove Plaintiffs friends [sic] name from the waiting list; and deprive Plaintiffoffair and reasonable use ofapublic airport." (Doc. 18

**at~** 126.) The Court construes the amended complaintto assert a conspiracy to deprive Mr. Hicks ofhis constitutional rights to equal protection andto due process. A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is established by evidence that the defendants actedjointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance ofthe conspiracy that resulted in the deprivation ofaplaintiffs constitutional right. Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d416,421 (4th Cir. 1996). Other courts also have emphasizedthe needto prove adeprivation ofa constitutional right orprivilege. See, e.g.,Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953,957 (8th Cir. 1999); Villanueva v. Mcinnis, 723 F.2d414, 418 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[I]tremains necessary to prove an actual deprivation ofa constitutional right; a conspiracy to deprive is insufficient."); accordByrdv. Hopson, 265 F. Supp. 2d 594, 599 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (UnderNorth Carolina state law, "there is no independent
cause ofaction for [common law] civil conspiracy; the claim can arise only where there is an underlying claim for unlawful conduct."), aff'dinpartandrev 'dinparton other grounds, 108 F. App'x 749 (4th Cir. 2004). l. 

### Due Process 20As noted 

### supra, Mr. Hicks's claim for due process violations is being dismissed in absence ofaproperty orliberty interest. 

### See discussion pp. 18-19. A liberty orproperty interest is also required for a claim ofconspiracyto violate due process rights. 

### See Hinkle, 81 F.3d421 (noting that a deprivation ofa constitutional right is required); Millerd, 191 F.3d at 957 (same); Villanueva, 723 F.2d at 418 (same). The claim that there was a conspiracy to violate his due process rights fails in the absence ofany such due process rights.5 

### 2. Equal Protection Mr. Hicks's claimbased on a conspiracyto violate his equalprotection rights also fails. As tothe fire marshal, Mr. Hicks has not madethe required factual showing to support conspiracy claims. He has made only a "bare assertion ofa conspiracy" between Mr. Jones and any ofthe Authority defendants. Hardrick v. Canter, No. DKC 11-3032, 2012 WL 5409739, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2012) (internal quotations omitted). The allegations ofconspiracy between and among the Authority defendants fail because persons acting on behalfofthe same entity generally cannot be in a conspiracy with each other. Accordingly, the conspiracy claims are dismissed against all defendants.


### a. Mr. Jones
5The Fourth Circuit has noted it is possible that aclaim ofcivil conspiracy can survive after an officer was found not liable on arelated but distinct constitutional claim. See Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 421 (noting that the claim ofacivil conspiracy to deny appellants access to the courts "is not mooted by the mere fact OfficerLake was found not liable for using excessive force against Wilson"). That is not the situation here, because Mr. Hicks alleges that the conspiracy constituted the same factual conduct, no less and no more, that he alleges in support ofhis other § 1983 claims. Nor is this acase involving an unsuccessful attempt to violate someone's constitutional rights, which might support a separate claim for conspiracy.

21"Wherethe complaintmakes only conclusory allegations ofa conspiracyunder § 1983 or § 1985 and fails to allege facts suggesting an agreement ormeeting ofthe minds amongthe defendants, the courtmay properly dismiss the complaint." 

### Sales v. Murray, 862 F. Supp. 1511, 1517 (W.D. Va. 1994). "[T]he factual allegations must amount 'to
morethan rank speculation and conjecture' and must 'giverise to an inferencethat each alleged conspirator sharedthe same conspiratorial objective."' 

### Jones v. Clarke, No. 7:14CV00422, 2015 WL 5254938, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2015) (quoting

### Hinkle, 81 F.3d at422). Mr. Hicks alleges no facts indicating that any ofthe boardmembers were in a conspiracy with the fire marshal. No discussions or communications betweenMr. Jones and any boardmemberare set forth. 

### (See Doc. 18

**at~~** 71-85.) Inthe absence ofsome sort ofcommunication, it is difficultto seehow there couldbe a meeting ofthe minds. The facts alleged are insufficientto state a claimthattheboardmembers were in a conspiracy withthe fire marshal to deprive Mr. Hicks ofhis constitutional rights. The complaint alleges moreinteractionbetweenthe fire marshal and Mr. Williams, the attorney for the Authority. Mr. Hicks alleges that Mr. Williams tookpart inthe investigation ofthe over-spray incident, includingcontactingthe fire marshal's office and describing the incident to Mr. Jones, (Doc. 18

**at~~** 72-73); that Mr. Williams "relied on information procuredfrom third parties as opposedto firsthand knowledge of thepaintincident" in speaking with Mr. Jones, (Doc. 18

**at~** 73); andthathe "knowingly helped [Mr. Jones] concoct" a report thatMr. Williams couldthenuse toterminate the plaintiffs lease. (Doc. 18

**at~~** 79, 81.) Mr. Hicks also alleges that Mr. Jones did not 22perform an inspection before issuing a "FirePreventionInspection Report" and that the fire code violations were "tmmpedup" by Mr. Williams and Mr. Jones "to ensure the pretext for the [lease termination]." (Doc. 18

**at~~** 143, 103.) Mr. Williams "acted, alone and in concert with DefendantJones, to produce an [sic

## l Fire PreventionInspection Report
...that would give Board Members apretextto terminate Plaintiffs lease." (Doc. 18 at

**~** 118.) These facts do not "giverise to an inference" that Mr. Jones and Mr. Williams "sharedthe same conspiratorial objective,"Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 422, or otherwise had a meeting ofthe minds to violate Mr. Hicks's equal protectionrights. The allegation that Mr. Williams and Mr. Jones concocted areport, (Doc. 18

**at~** 81), is contradicted elsewhere in the complaintwhen Mr. Hicks acknowledges he violated the fire code. (Doc. 18

**at~** 82.) The allegation that the fire code violations were "trumpedup," (Doc. 18

**at~** 1 03), suffers from the same deficiency. The allegation that thepurpose ofthe report was "to ensure the pretext" for the lease termination, (Doc. 18

**at~** 1 03), concerns a purported agreementbetweenMr. Williams and the board members, not any agreement with Mr. Jones. The mere fact that Mr. Williams and Mr. Jones talked is insufficient to support a conspiracy claim. See Smith v. McCarthy, 349 F. App'x 851, 858 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per curiam) ("The allegations in the Smiths' complaint describe that, at the time ofarrest, these Defendants 'conferred attimes as an entire group and at times in smaller groups out ofearshot ofplaintiffs and appeared at times to be talking on cell phones.' These facts, taken as tme, do not establish a meeting ofthe minds among the 23officers to violate the rights ofthe Smiths."); 

### Sherwin v. Piner, No: 5:03 CV 275 H(3), 2003 WL 24051574, at *3 (E.D.N.C. July 22, 2003) ("The fact that plaintiffreceived an unfavorable determination in his workers compensationproceedings does not raise an inference ofa conspiracy to deprive him ofhis constitutionalrights."), 

### ajf'd, 91 F. App'x 312 (4th Cir. 2004). A "mere speculation" and a "reliance on labels and conclusions" is insufficientto state aconspiracy claim. 

### Clarke, 2015 WL 5254938, at *4 (citing 

### Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557); 

### Davis v. Hudgins, 896 F. Supp. 561,571 (E.D. Va. 1995) (granting a motion to dismiss "[b]ecause Plaintiffhas onlyputforward broad allegations that do not indicate any actual violation ofPlaintiffs civil rights, northe existence ofany 

### [§ 1985] conspiracy"), 

### ajf'd, 87 F.3d 1308 (4th Cir. 1996). The equal protection conspiracy claims against Mr. Jones are dismissed. 

### b. The Authority Defendants and Mr. Williams The Authority and the board member defendants have movedto dismiss the conspiracy claim on the grounds that it is barredby the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. (Doc. 33 at 15.) Mr. Williams makes a similar argument. (Doc. 39 at 14-15.) "Theintracorporate conspiracy doctrine recognizes that acorporation cannot conspire with its agents because the agents' acts are the corporation's own." 

### Painter'sMill Grille, 716 F.3d at 352. The doctrine applies to municipalities and in civil rights cases. 

### See Fox
v. City of Greensboro, 807 

### F. Supp. 2d 476, 499 (M.D.N.C. 2011). Mr. Hicks alleged that all board members and Mr. Williams acted as agents ofthe Authority. (Doc. 18 at

**~,1** 8-15.) On its face, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to protectthe board 24members and Mr. Williams from a conspiracy claim. Mr. Hicks maintains that the board members are not all agents ofthe same corporation, because some are appointed by Surry County and someby the City ofMount Airy. (Doc. 45 at 15-16; see also Doc. 18

**at~~** 8-14.) He also alleges thatthe defendant board membersparticipated in the conspiracy "as authorizedrepresentatives ofSurry County and/orMountAiry." (Doc 18

**at~** 127.) However, the Authority is a "unit of local government" underNorth Carolina law. (See Doc. 18

**at~** 7(b).) Mr. Hicks alleges
no facts indicating thatthe board members acted as agents ofthe respective local governmentsthat appointed them to the board as opposed onbehalfofthe Authority. Likewise, Mr. Hicks alleges that at all relevant times Mr. Williams acted as an agent for the Authority. (Doc. 18

**at~** 15.) Becausethe individual board members andMr. Williams were all agents ofthe Authority, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine precludes them from being in a conspiracy with each other. Mr. Hicks next contends thatthe intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply whenthe alleged co-conspirators had a personal stake in achieving the object ofthe conspiracy, buthe does not say whatthis personal stakemight be. (Doc. 45 at 16.) To the extenthe means that the board members were motivated by a personal bias against him, the "intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is not avoided simply by showing that corporate employees were motivated in part by personal bias." Painter's Mill Grille, 716 F.3d at 353 (internal quotation omitted). The personal interest mustbe "wholly separable" from the interests ofthe corporation for the exception to apply. Mitchell Tracey v. FirstAm. Title Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 826, 846 (D. Md. 2013). 

### 25Mr. Hicks finally asserts thatthe intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply becausethe acts ofthe board members and the attorney were not authorized bythe Authority. (Doc. 45 at 16.) As to the attorney, the allegations ofthe complaint are directly in conflict with this argument, as Mr. Hicks alleges Mr. Williams at all times acted atthe direction oftheboard. (See Doc. 18

**at~~** 15, 71-72.) As to the board memberdefendants, they couldnot as individuals terminate or decline to renew the lease; they could only do so bycausingthe Authorityto so act, which they did by virtue oftheir authorizedrole as board members. (Doc. 18

**at~** 29.) Tothe extentMr. Hicks contends the members were acting outside their authority because their authority wouldnever permitthem to act "maliciously" orin violation ofthe Constitution, (Doc. 45 at 17), the Court does not find the unauthorized acts exception to go so far; ifit did, it would swallowthe rule.6 The conspiracy claims against all defendants are dismissed. 

### IV. CONCLUSION Itmay well be the case that some ofthe defendants disliked Mr. Hicks resented his disagreements overboardpolicyin 20II and 2012 and that this affected their decisions about his lease. This does not rise to the level ofa violation ofconstitutional rights. Mr. Hicks has not nudgedhis claims ofconstitutional violations "across the line from 6The unauthorized acts exceptionto the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is less well recognized than the personal bias exception, Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1253 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985.) Courts typically require more than Mr. Hicks alleged here to show that the acts were unauthorized, such as thatthe agent ignored the corporation's statedpolicies. Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Md. 1978); see also Chavez v. Mclntyre, 424 F. Supp. 2d 858, 861 (W.O. Va. 2006) (following Hodgin); Fox, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 499.
26conceivable to plausible." 

### Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Itis hereby ORDERED that the motions to dismiss by the defendant board members and Mount Airy-Surry County Airport Authority, (Doc. 32), by defendant Joseph Williams, (Doc. 38), and by defendant Roger Jones, (Doc. 40), are GRANTED and the case will be dismissed. Judgment will be entered concomitantly with this Order. This the 9th day ofDecember, 2015.

27IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WILLIAM ALFRED HICKS, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) V. ) ) MOUNT AIRY-SURRY COUNTY ) AIRPORT AUTHORITY, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) JUDGMENT 1: 15-CV-38

For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion and Orderfiled contemporaneously with this Judgment, Itis hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED thatthe defendants' motions to dismiss, (Docs. 32, 38, 40), are GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED. This the 9th day ofDecember, 2015.

UNITED STATES DIS