Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Donald E. C. Leicht

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Robert Parker,

Appellant-Defendant,

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

December 5, 2018

Court of Appeals Cause No.

18A-CR-1582

Appeal from the Howard Superior 

Court

The Honorable William C. Menges, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 34D01-1610-

F3-1071

Riley, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 2 of 12

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Robert Parker (Parker), appeals his sentence following 

his conviction after pleading guilty to dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 3 

felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(d)(2).

[2] We affirm, but we remand with instructions.

ISSUES

[3] Parker presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as the following three 

issues: 

(1) Whether the trial court erred by not awarding Parker credit time for days 

he served in jail prior to his sentencing;

(2) Whether Parker was entitled to receive credit time during the time he 

participated in the drug court program; and 

(3) Whether Parker’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and his character.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On October 12, 2016, Parker was the target of an arrest warrant based on 

allegations that he had previously sold drugs to a confidential informant

working with the Kokomo Police Department drug task force unit. On that 

day, the same confidential informant called Parker on his cellphone and 

arranged to buy “4 grams of heroin and 3.5 grams of cocaine” from Parker. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 3 of 12

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 17). Also, at the request of the confidential 

informant, Parker agreed to bring a scale with him. Parker arranged to meet 

the confidential informant at the parking lot of a restaurant. Parker’s friend,

Christopher Carter (Carter), accompanied Parker to the drug sale.

[5] With no intention of having the confidential informant present at the drug buy, 

the officers arrived at the agreed meeting spot and observed Parker standing at 

the corner of the restaurant smoking a cigarette. The officers instructed the 

confidential informant to call Parker to confirm that Parker was the person 

outside the restaurant. Parker confirmed that he was “standing outside 

smoking a cigarette.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 22). Following that 

confirmation, the officers approached and arrested Parker. In Parker’s left coat 

pocket, the officers found two knotted plastic bags. One held 4 grams of a 

white powered substance which tested positive for cocaine, and the other 

knotted bag held 3.5 grams of a grey powdered substance, which field tested

positive for heroin. The officers also recovered a .38 caliber handgun in 

Parker’s front waistband. Upon running the gun’s serial number, the report 

showed that the gun had previously been reported stolen. The scale which 

Parker had agreed to bring to the drug sale was located inside Parker’s vehicle. 

A whitish residue on the scale field tested positive for cocaine. Carter, who was 

inside the vehicle, was also arrested. 

[6] On October 14, 2016, the State filed an Information, charging Parker with 

Count I, dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 3 felony; Count II, dealing in 

cocaine, a Level 3 felony; Count III, possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 5 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 4 of 12

felony; Count IV, possession of cocaine, a Level 5 felony; and Count V, theft, a 

Level 6 felony. 

[7] On October 4, 2017, pursuant to a plea agreement, Parker agreed to plead guilty 

to Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, and the State agree to dismiss all 

the remaining charges. The agreement called for a deferment of Parker’s 

conviction and sentence if Parker successfully completed the Howard County 

Drug Court Program. The agreement, however, stipulated that non-compliance 

with the terms and conditions of the drug program would result in Parker’s 

conviction and sentencing to the Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug. 

[8] October 5, 2017, Parker was released into the Howard County Drug Court 

Program. During his participation in the drug court program, Parker violated 

the terms and conditions of the program from November 8, 2017, through

November 15, 2017, and also from December 6, 2017, through January 10, 

2018. Whenever Parker violated the conditions of the drug court program, he

was sanctioned with jail time. 

[9] On January 31, 2018, Parker was placed on work release with an electronic 

ankle monitor after he committed perjury while testifying in another cause. 

Sometime thereafter, Parker cut his electronic ankle monitor, failed to 

participate in the drug court program, and absconded from the trial court’s 

jurisdiction. On February 2, 2018, Parker failed to report to drug court, and on 

the same day, the trial court issued an arrest warrant for Parker. Parker 

remained a fugitive until May 3, 2018, when he was arrested. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 5 of 12

[10] On May 9, 2018, the Howard County Drug Court Program filed its notice to 

terminate Parker’s participation in the program. On May 14, 2018, the trial 

court entered a judgment of conviction for Parker’s Level 3 felony dealing in a 

narcotic drug. On June 13, 2018, the trial court conducted a sentencing 

hearing. At the close of the evidence, the trial court sentenced Parker to serve a

sixteen-year term in the Department of Correction. In the sentencing order, the 

trial court held that Parker’s “jail time credit” was “in the sum of 357 actual 

days or 476 credit days.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 60). 

[11] Parker now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Credit Time

[12] Parker asserts that the trial court erred when it calculated his pretrial credit 

time. As our Supreme Court has noted, there are two types of credit that must 

be calculated: “(1) the credit toward the sentence a prisoner receives for time

actually served, and (2) the additional credit a prisoner receives for good 

behavior and educational attainment.” Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220, 222 

(Ind. 1999). Credit time is a matter of statutory right, and trial courts do not 

have discretion in awarding or denying such credit. Harding v. State, 27 N.E.3d 

330, 331-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 

[13] Consistent with the sentencing order, the Abstract of Judgment read that Parker 

was entitled to receive accrued time of 357 days and good time credit of 119 

days, totaling 476 days of credit time. On appeal, Parker contends that his 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 6 of 12

actual time served from the date of his arrest, October 12, 2016, to his release 

date, October 5, 2018, was 358 days instead of 357 days. The record shows that 

Parker was arrested on October 12, 2016, for the instant drug offense. On 

October 4, 2017, the trial court conducted Parker’s guilty plea hearing, but 

Parker was released to the Howard Drug Court Program the following day, 

October 5, 2017. The State agrees that Parker is due one additional day of 

credit. Also, Parker contends that he was entitled to accrued time and good 

time credit when he was detained on May 3, 2018, up until his sentencing 

hearing on June 13, 2018. The State does not dispute that Parker deserves 

accrued time and good time credit during that period. 

[14] Based on the foregoing, and consistent with this opinion, we remand to the trial 

court for the recalculation of Parker’s credit time.

II. Credit Time during the Drug Court Program

[15] Parker additionally argues that he was entitled to receive credit time during his 

participation in the drug court program and for any time he was incarcerated 

for violating the terms of the drug court program. The State contests Parker’s

claim that he enjoyed a statutory entitlement to credit time during his

participation in a drug court program. 

[16] “Because pre-sentence jail time credit is a matter of statutory right, trial courts 

generally do not have discretion in awarding or denying such credit.” Molden v. 

State, 750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “However, those sentencing 

decisions not mandated by statute are within the discretion of the trial court and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 7 of 12

will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion.” Id. An abuse 

of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual 

deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490, 

(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (citation omitted). 

[17] A person who is imprisoned and awaiting trial or sentencing for a crime other 

than a Level 6 felony or misdemeanor is initially assigned to Class B. I.C. § 35-

50-6-4(b)(2). Such a person earns one day of good time credit for every three 

days the person is confined awaiting trial or sentencing. I.C. § 35-50-6-3.1(c). 

We note that Indiana Code chapter 33-23-16, concerning drug court programs, 

is silent as to whether a drug court participant is entitled to credit time. 

[18] In resolving this issue, we find Meadows v. State, 2 N.E.3d 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014), instructive. In that case, Meadows challenged the trial court’s denial of 

his request for credit time for time he spent on electronic monitoring as part of a 

drug court program. Id. at 790. Meadows admitted to violating the conditions 

of his drug court agreement but argued the time he spent on electronic 

monitoring should count against his imposed sentence. Id. at 791. This court 

reasoned that statutes governing electronic monitoring as a condition of 

probation were inapplicable to a person who voluntarily participated in a drug 

court program. Id. at 792. Further, credit time statutes that apply to persons 

convicted or sentenced were inapplicable since Meadows was neither convicted 

of a crime nor sentenced at the time he participated in electronic monitoring.

Id. Ultimately, this court decided it was within the trial court’s discretion to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 8 of 12

award or deny credit time spent on electronic monitoring while participating in 

a deferral program. Id. at 794. 

[19] Parker argues that we should “reconsider [our] reasoning” in Meadows, and he 

contends that “to say that [he] was not [] awaiting sentencing [] is ignoring a 

reality that is used to underpin compliance in [d]rug [c]ourt.” (Appellant’s Br. 

pp. 11-12). We decline Parker’s invitation. 

[20] In exchange for his participation in the drug court program under Indiana Code 

section 33-23-16-14, Parker pleaded guilty to Level 3 felony dealing in a 

narcotic drug. At the time, the trial court did not enter a judgment of 

conviction or sentence. We note that Indiana Code chapter 33-23-16 does not 

provide for the application of credit time. Therefore, with no mandate in place 

with regard to the grant or denial of credit time in this instance, the trial court is 

free to exercise its discretion. See Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 449. 

[21] In Meadows, we found that if we were to award offenders credit for time spent in 

diversion programs prior to sentencing, it would diminish the reward for 

completing the program and ultimately be rewarding offenders for their failure. 

Meadows, 2 N.E.3d at 793. Had Parker successfully completed the drug 

program, his Level 3 felony drug charge would have been dropped. See 

Meadows, 2 N.E.3d at 793 (holding that drug court deferral program provides an 

opportunity for those qualified to avoid conviction and sentence, but only if 

they comply with the conditions of the program.) Thus, Parker was not eligible 

to earn credit time while he was participating in the drug court program; he was 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 9 of 12

only eligible to begin earning credit for time served once his participation in the 

program was terminated. 

[22] Further, Parker argues that he was entitled to earn credit time during the times 

he was sanctioned with jail time after he violated the conditions of the drug 

court program. By virtue of his status as a participant in a deferral program,

Parker was not awaiting trial or sentencing for his drug charge during the time 

that he was in the drug court program. Rather, he was temporarily exempt 

during this time from the consequences of his charge. Therefore, when Parker 

was incarcerated during the times he violated the drug court program, his 

period of incarceration was not a fulfillment of any penal consequences to his 

charge, but it was a fulfillment of the requirements of the drug court program, 

which, if finished successfully, would result in a complete dismissal of the 

charge. Similarly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding credit time during the time Parker was imprisoned for not complying 

with the drug court program.

[23] In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not 

awarding Parker credit time during Parker’s participation in the drug court 

program, or credit time for any time he was incarcerated for violating the terms 

of the drug court program. 

III. Inappropriate Sentence

[24] Parker claims that his sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) empowers 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 10 of 12

us to independently review and revise sentences authorized by statute if, after 

due consideration, we find the trial court’s decision inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 

1114, 1116 (Ind. 2007). The “nature of offense” compares the defendant’s 

actions with the required showing to sustain a conviction under the charged 

offense, while the “character of the offender” permits a broader consideration of 

the defendant’s character. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008); 

Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An appellant bears 

the burden of showing that both prongs of the inquiry favor a revision of his 

sentence. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether we 

regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the 

culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to 

others, and a myriad of other considerations that come to light in a given case. 

Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Our court focuses on “the length of the aggregate 

sentence and how it is to be served.” Id. 

[25] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Abbott v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1016, 

1019 (Ind. 2012). For his Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, Parker

faced a sentencing range of three to sixteen years, with the advisory sentence 

being nine. Parker was ordered to serve the maximum sentence of sixteen

years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5. 

[26] We first examine the nature of Parker’s offense. After previously selling drugs 

to a confidential informant, Parker was willing to do it again. On October 12, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 11 of 12

2016, Parker agreed to sell 4 grams of heroin and 3.5 grams of cocaine to a 

confidential informant. Not only was Parker armed with a .38 caliber handgun 

during the drug transaction, that gun had previously been reported as stolen. 

[27] When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the 

defendant’s criminal history. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2013). The significance of a criminal history varies based on the gravity, 

nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense. Id.

[28] At the time of his sentencing, Parker was twenty-four years old. As a juvenile, 

Parker was arrested, but not adjudicated as a delinquent, for receiving stolen 

property. As an adult, in 2012, Parker was arrested for carrying a false 

identification card. In 2014, Parker was charged with four misdemeanor drug 

offenses in Pennsylvania and was ordered to complete probation. In 2016, 

Parker was arrested for carrying a handgun without a license and false 

informing, however, those charges were later dropped. 

[29] Also, we find that Parker’s substance abuse reflects poorly on his character. In 

the presentencing report, Parker reported that he began consuming alcohol at 

age fourteen. Parker additionally indicated that from age fourteen until age 

twenty-four, he had used the following “illegal substances: hash, marijuana, 

spice, [] ecstasy, methamphetamine, amphetamine, codeine, morphine, heroin,

oxycontin, opium, Xanax, Lortab, Klonopin, Norco, Suboxone and Adderall.” 

(Appellant’s App. Conf. Br. p. 13). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1582 | December 5, 2018 Page 12 of 12

[30] Most significantly, Parker was given an extraordinary chance to have his Level 

3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug charge dismissed had he successfully 

completed the drug court program. Instead of taking part in the program, 

Parker violated the conditions and was sanctioned twice with jail time. 

Sometime in February 2018, Parker fled the state, abandoning his 

responsibilities in the drug court program. Here, Parker has not convinced us 

that his sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense, and his character. 

CONCLUSION

[31] In sum, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not awarding 

Parker credit time during his participation in the drug court program and during 

the time he was incarcerated for violating the terms of the program. Also, we 

find that Parker’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and his character. However, consistent with this opinion, we remand to 

the trial court for the recalculation of Parker’s credit time. 

[32] Affirmed but remanded with instructions. 

[33] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur