alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2023321EN.01000701.xml

| 11.9.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 321/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.9.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 321/7

---

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 13 July 2023 — Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation v European Commission

(Case C-759/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Authentication of a judgment by the General Court - Article 118 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court - Copy of the judgment to be served - Signature of the judges - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Article 101 TFEU - Market for tantalum and aluminium electrolytic capacitors - Agreements and concerted practices in respect of several elements of the pricing - Concept of infringement ‘by object’ - European Commission’s burden of proof - Geographic scope of anticompetitive conduct - Single and continuous infringement - Fine - Calculation of the basic amount - Sales to be taken into account - Mitigating circumstances - Unlimited jurisdiction)

(2023/C 321/07)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation (represented by: P. Neideck, H.-J. Niemeyer, M. Röhrig, Rechtsanwälte, and by I.-L. Stoicescu, avocate)

Other party: European Commission (represented by: B. Ernst, T. Franchoo, C. Sjödin and L. Wildpanner, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 64, 7.2.2022.

---
EXHIBIT NO. 31.1



Rule 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) Certification





CERTIFICATION

I, Marc T. Giles, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Gerber Scientific, Inc.;

2.   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.   The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e) for the registrant and we have:

a)   designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)   evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;

c)   disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.   The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)   all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b)   any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.

Date:   September 11, 2003

| | /s/ Marc T. Giles                     | 
| | ------------------------------------- | 
| | Marc T. Giles
Chief Executive Officer |
## IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTR ICT

TYLER, TEXA S
JAM ES D AVID HEL

MU TH , § APP EAL FRO

M T HE 2 41 ST APPELLANT V. § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF TH E ST ATE OFTEX

AS, APP ELL EE § SMI TH CO UN TY

, T EXAS MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION PER CU RIAM J am es Da v i d Helmuth pleade d g uilty to continuing se x ual abuse of a c hild, and the jury assessed punishment at thirty -five year s. He n o w attempts to appea l his conviction. W e have rec eived the trial court’s certific ation showing that Appellant wa ived his rig ht to appeal. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 25 .2 (d ). Th e c e rt if ic a tio n is sig ne d b y

the tr ia l c ourt , App e lla

nt, and Ap pe lla nt’ s c ouns e l. Ac c or din g ly , th e a

pp e a l is dism issed

for wa nt of jurisdiction. Opinion delivere d April 8, 2009. P an el consi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and H oyl e, J.

(DO N OT PUBL I SH)
#### Harvey Bruce ROBERTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. U-195.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 9, 1974.

Harvey B. Roberts, in Pro. Per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Prospect, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The same factual situation which is involved in the case sub judice has been repeatedly considered by this court. See Roberts v. Wainwright, Fla.App. 1st 1971, 251 So.2d 157; Roberts v. State, Fla.App. 1st 1972, 265 So.2d 431; Roberts v. State, Fla.App. 1st 1972, 266 So.2d 421; and Roberts v. State, Fla.App. 1st 1973, 281 So.2d 219.

We have carefully examined the record on appeal and the briefs submitted by both the appellant and the appellee and find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate reversible error.

Therefore, the order appealed from be and it is hereby affirmed.

RAWLS, C. J., and BOYER and Mc-CORD, JJ., concur.
[No. 117-3.

Division Three.

July 9, 1971.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Joseph Daniel Wilson, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 19370, John J. Lally, J., entered November 7, 1969. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
#### Charles PREVATT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. I-129.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.

Sept. 7, 1967.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
[No. 452-1.

Division Three.

September 27, 1971.]

#### Pacific Car and Foundry Company, *Appellant,*v. Walter Coby et *al., Respondents.*

*Helsell, Paul, Fetterman, Todd & Hokanson*and *John E. Ederer,*for appellant.

*Slade Gorton, Attorney General, Tracy B. Madole, Assistant,*and *Walthew, Warner & Keefe,*for respondents.

Munson, C.J.

Pacific Car and Foundry Company appeals from a superior court’s affirmation of a Department of Labor and Industries pension award to Walter Coby for an industrial injury to his right arm.

The primary issue presented is whether the trial court erred in failing to find as a matter of law that Goby’s injury entitled him to only a permanent partial disability award under RCW 51.08.150 and not one for permanent total disability under RCW 51.08.160. We answer in the negative.

The injury definitionally fell within the abstract-functional purview of RCW 51.08.150 in that, under the medical testimony, Coby was entitled to 30 to 50 per cent of the compensable amputation value of the right arm immediately below the shoulder. The injury’s debilitating nature, coupled with claimant’s age, extent of education *548and occupational retraining prognosis, clearly established that Coby was incapable of future gainful employment and, as properly found by the department and the trial court, brought the injury within that portion of RCW 51.08.160 which states:

> “Permanent total disability” means . . . other condition permanently incapacitating the workman from performing any work at any gainful occupation.

*Kuhnle v. Department of Labor & Indus.,*12 Wn.2d 191, 120 P.2d 1003 (1942).1

The trial court’s findings of fact, challenged by Pacific Car and Foundry Company, drawn from contradicting evidence are supported by the record.

Judgment affirmed.

Green and Evans, JJ., concur.

1

The cases relied upon by appellant in support of an affirmative answer are readily distinguishable:

(a) The out-of-state cases involve jurisdictions which base computation of the permanent partial disability award upon prior wages of the disabled individual. *Cf.*11 Schneider’s Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 2254 and 2277 (1957). In Washington the award is based solely on loss of bodily function. *Page v. Department of Labor & Indus.,*52 Wn.2d 706, 328 P.2d 663 (1958); Cayce *v. Department of Labor & Indus.,*2 Wn. App. 315, 467 P.2d 879 (1970).

(b) *Erickson v. Department of Labor & Indus.,*48 Wn.2d 458, 294 P.2d 644 (1956) merely sets forth the rule under which a claimant must show permanent total disability when he has suffered two industrial injuries.

(c) *Sinnes v. Daggett,*80 Wash. 673, 142 P. 5 (1914) involved only the sufficiency of a complaint to show a reviewable error of law was committed by the commissioners in making a permanent partial disability award. The trial court, under former requisites of pleading, found against the plaintiff on that issue and the Supreme Court affirmed. The comments contained therein concerning permanent partial and permanent total disability were clearly dicta and are not controlling.
#### Frank James DENSON, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 70-445.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 10, 1971.

Walter N. Colbath, Jr., Public Defender, and Jeffrey H. Barker, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner secured in this cause, by way of habeas corpus, a delayed review of his conviction in the Broward County Court of Record on the charge of robbery. We have thoroughly reviewed the point presented on appeal and conclude the same to be without merit. The judgment and sentence is, therefore, affirmed and the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed.

REED, C. J., and WALDEN and CROSS, JJ., concur.
#### Patricia SANDERS and Edna Leon v. N.O.P.S.I., Gerald Blackwell, John P. Owen, ABC Ins. Co. and XYZ Ins. Co. Johnnie JOHNSON v. John P. OWEN and N.O.P.S.I. et al.

No. 62555.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 15, 1978.

In re: Patricia Sanders and Edna Leon applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 359 So.2d 272.

Granted.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.
251 La. 66

#### In re: METROPOLITAN CRIME COMMISSION et al.

Ne. 48922.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 11, 1967.

In re: E. C. Upton, Jr., President of the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans, Inc., et al. applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Writs refused. This matter is now moot. See our order of October 11, 1967 (attached) .

ORDER

Considering the letter, dated October 10, 1967, of Honorable Malcolm V. O’Hara, Judge of Section “A” of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, in which he requests an indefinite leave of absence from his duties as Judge, and the conditions and circumstances set forth therein which prompted him to request such leave.

It is ordered that the request be and it is hereby granted and that, meanwhile, the other judges of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans be and they are hereby assigned to perform the duties of Judge O’Hara until further orders of this Court as follows:

Honorable Matthew S. Braniff is specially designated to receive the returns and findings of the Orleans Parish Grand Jury during the absence of Judge O’Hara; and the other judges of the Criminal District Court shall, individually, and in such rotation as they deem expedient, each sit temporarily in Section “A” of the Criminal District Court and handle and dispose of all matters on the docket of said Section “A” until further orders of this Court, in addition to the performance of all the duties and functions they may have to perform as judges of their respective sections of the Criminal District Court.
# Privilegedand Confidential

Applicant submits this Safety Checklist as a confidential document under 14 C.F.R. 11.35 (b) as the entire safety checklist contains confidential and proprietary information that the Applicant has not and will not share with others. The safety checklist contains operating conditions and procedures that are not available to the public and are protected from releaseundertheFreedom ofInformationAct, 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Bontex,
Inc.'s unaudited condensed consolidated financial statements for the nine months
ended March 31, 2000, as set forth in the Company's Quarterly Report on Form
10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         230
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  11,179
<ALLOWANCES>                                   207
<INVENTORY>                                    5,180
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               17,189
<PP&E>                                         24,221
<DEPRECIATION>                                 13,469
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 29,394
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          17,320
<BONDS>                                        2,483
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       157
<OTHER-SE>                                     8,797
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   29,394
<SALES>                                        28,479
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               28,512
<CGS>                                          20,921
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  28,597
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               64
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               135
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             594
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (743)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (112)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (631)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (631)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (.40)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.40)



</TABLE>
# C_2022037EN.01001701.xml

| 24.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 37/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 37/17

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) (Portugal) lodged on 29 October 2021 — IM GESTÃO DE ATIVOS — SOCIEDADE GESTORA DE ORGANISMOS DE INVESTIMENTO COLETIVO, SA and Others v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-656/21)

(2022/C 37/23)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: IM GESTÃO DE ATIVOS — SOCIEDADE GESTORA DE ORGANISMOS DE INVESTIMENTO COLETIVO, SA and Others

Defendant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Questions referred

| 1. | Does Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/7/EC (1) preclude national legislation, such as item 17(3)(4) of the Código do Imposto do Selo (Stamp Duty Code), under which stamp duty is levied on fees which banks charge open-ended securities investment fund management companies for gaining new subscriptions for units, that is, for obtaining new inflows of capital for the investment funds in the form of new subscriptions for units issued by the funds? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/7/EC (1) preclude national legislation, such as item 17(3)(4) of the Código do Imposto do Selo (Stamp Duty Code), under which stamp duty is levied on fees which banks charge open-ended securities investment fund management companies for gaining new subscriptions for units, that is, for obtaining new inflows of capital for the investment funds in the form of new subscriptions for units issued by the funds?

| 2. | Does Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/7/EC preclude national legislation under which stamp duty is levied on the management fees charged to open-ended securities investment funds by management companies, in so far as those management fees include the fees which the banks charge the fund management companies for the aforementioned activity? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Does Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/7/EC preclude national legislation under which stamp duty is levied on the management fees charged to open-ended securities investment funds by management companies, in so far as those management fees include the fees which the banks charge the fund management companies for the aforementioned activity?

---

(1)  Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 February 2008 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital (OJ 2008 L 46, p. 11).

---
III

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 84

Providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House for expenses

of investigations and studies by the Committee on Merchant Marine

and Fisheries in the first session of the One Hundred Third Congress.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 16, 1993

Mr. STUDDS submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on House Administration

RESOLUTION

Providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House

for expenses of investigations and studies by the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in the first session

of the One Hundred Third Congress.

1 Resolved, That for expenses of investigations and

2 studies by the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish3 eries (hereinafter in this resolution referred to as the

4 ‘‘Committee’’), there shall be paid out of the contingent

5 fund of the House not more than $2,500,441.

6 SEC. 2. Payments under this resolution shall be made

7 on vouchers authorized by the Committee, signed by the
2

HRES 84 IH

1 Chairman of the Committee, and approved by the Commit2 tee on House Administration.

3 SEC. 3. Amounts shall be available under this resolu4 tion for investigations and studies carried out during the

5 period beginning at noon on January 3, 1993, and ending

6 immediately before noon on January 3, 1994.

7 SEC. 4. Amounts made available under this resolution

8 shall be expended in accordance with regulations pre9 scribed by the Committee on House Administration.

Æ
#### Howard MOORMAN, Appellant, v. R. EARLEY and Joseph G. Ehrlich, d/b/a Wall Street Co., Appellees.

No. 73-794.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 26, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Arsoreda BYRD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 76-2134.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 4, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1978.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Crais S. Barnard, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Anthony C. Musto, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

*1229DAUKSCH, Judge.

We have no jurisdiction to consider the appeal because Appellant appealed only from the Judgment and not the Order placing the Defendant on probation. *Recht v. State,*344 So.2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Since the error arose as a result of state action, as so many things nowadays seem to do, we shall assume jurisdiction as the First District did in *Jackson v. State,*301 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), and treat this as a *Hollingshead*appeal. *Hollingshead v. Wainwright,*194 So.2d 577 (Fla.1967).

This indigent Appellant was ordered, as a condition of her probation, to pay court costs. This is error. Section 939.15, Florida Statutes (1975), says the county must pay the court costs and two appellate decisions say the sentencing judge cannot require a defendant to pay the costs. *Cox v. State,*334 So.2d 568 (Fla.1976); *Mack v. State,*305 So.2d 264 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974). That portion of the probation Order requiring the Defendant to pay $116 court costs is reversed. The Judgment is otherwise affirmed.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

LETTS and MOORE, JJ., concur.

MOORE, Judge,

specially concurring:

I concur with the holding of the Court that this matter should be treated as a *Hollingshead*appeal and that it is error to require an indigent defendant to pay court costs as a condition of probation. I would, however, reverse and remand with instructions that such a requirement is permissible if it is conditioned upon a showing that the defendant becomes solvent during the term of probation. See, Gryca v. *State,*315 So.2d 221 (1 DCA 1975).
#### William Henry BALDWIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. Q-120.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 16, 1972.

Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and Steven E. Rohan, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

The briefs and the record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and the appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and RAWLS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.