alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
-  Presidential Advisory Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria (PACCARB)      -  About Us 
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# Designated Representative: Padmini Srikantiah, MD, MPH

**Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Seattle, WA; **Designated Representative:**Padmini Srikantiah, MD, MPH**

Guided by the belief t hat every life has equal value, the Bill & Melinda Gates foundation works to help all people lead healthy, productive lives. In developing countries, it focuses on improving people’s health and giving them the chance to lift themselves out of hunger and extreme poverty. In the United States, it seeks to ensure that all people—especially those with the fewest resources—have access to the opportunities they need to succeed in school and life.

Padmini Srikantiah is a Deputy Director in Global Health at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Dr. Srikantiah serves as the lead for the foundation’s cross-cutting Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) strategy, which is focused on preventing mortality due to high AMR risk pathogens in low and middle-income country populations. During her time at the foundation, her work has included surveillance to support global burden of disease estimates for AMR associated and attributable mortality (the GRAM study), as well as key surveillance efforts in multiple low-and-middle-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia that have significantly deepened global understanding of drug resistant pathogens as leading etiologies of neonatal sepsis and related deaths in these geographies. Her current work including efforts to prevent neonatal sepsis by developing a maternal vaccine against Klebsiella pneumoniae as well as investments and partnerships with the Combatting Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria Accelerator (CARB-X) supporting preventive interventions (vaccines, prophylactic monoclonal antibodies, and microbiome-based approaches) to address AMR. She has led the foundation’s initiative on vaccines to address AMR, which includes work to quantify the impact of vaccines to reduce resistant pathogens and antibiotic use through modelling analyses as well as engagement with WHO to establish their framework on vaccines and AMR. Dr. Srikantiah was with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as a Senior Medical Epidemiologist, and led CDC’s AMR platform in India, encompassing efforts to strengthen AMR surveillance and reduce key healthcare associated infections, and served as the CDC-India lead for infectious disease surveillance.

Content last reviewed December 4, 2023
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of ViroPharma Incorporated (the Company) on Form
10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned officers of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                         
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Michel de Rosen                                                      
|Michel de Rosen                                                          
|President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors
|May 1, 2007                                                              



|                                                                              
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Vincent J. Milano                                                         
|Vincent J. Milano                                                             
|Vice President, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
|May 1, 2007
1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-13-00562-CV

____________________

MARCELINO RODRIGUEZ, DONNA JEAN FORGAS AND LINDA 

MARIE WILTZ GILMORE, Appellants

V.

BEAUMONT INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, WOODROW REECE, 

TERRY D. WILLIAMS, JANICE BRASSARD, GWEN AMBRES AND 

ZENOBIA RANDALL BUSH IN THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY AS TRUSTEES OF DEFENDANT BEAUMONT 

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellees

_______________________________________________________ ______________

On Appeal from the 172nd District Court 

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. E-194,295 

________________________________________________________ _____________

ORDER 

On December 9, 2013, the trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction and 

special exceptions of Marcelino Rodriguez, Donna Jean Forgas and Linda Marie 

Wiltz Gilmore to the counterclaim filed by Beaumont Independent School District, 

Woodrow Reece, Terry D. Williams, Janice Brassard, Gwen Ambres and Zenobia 
2

Randall Bush in their Respective Official Capacity as Trustees of Defendant 

Beaumont Independent School District. The trial court granted permission to 

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 28.3. The parties dispute whether the trial court has 

ruled on a controlling issue of law in the case that an immediate appeal of the order 

would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See Tex. Civ. 

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (d) (West Supp. 2013).

After reviewing the petition requesting permission to appeal and the 

response to the petition, we deny the petition for permission to appeal. The appeal 

will be dismissed on January 23, 2014. 

ORDER ENTERED January 9, 2014.

PER CURIAM

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
#### Michael KASTAN v. Martin KASTAN.

No. 38774.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 222 So.2d 55.
#### BARNES *v.*FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ST. IGNACE.

1. Witnesses — Depositions—Matters Equally Within Knowledge op Deceased.

In action against bank, nse of deposition of plaintiff, taken after suit was commenced and used after her death, rendered competent testimony of defendant’s assistant cashier (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14219).

2. Banks and Banking — Authority to Pay Money to Another— Question por Jury.

Whether plaintiff gave written order for bank to pay money to her son, *held,*under evidence, question for 'jury.

3. Appeal and Error — Verdict op Jury Conclusive.

Jury’s verdict on question properly submitted to it is conclusive.

Appeal from Mackinac; Sprague (Victor D.), J.

Submitted October 8, 1931.

(Docket No. 60, Calendar No. 35,804.)

Decided January 4, 1932.

Assumpsit by Gustava Ericks against First National Bank of St. Ignace for sums alleged to have been illegally paid from savings" account. Upon *601death of plaintiff, Leo B. Barnes, executor of her estate, was substituted as plaintiff. Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

*J. M. Harris,*for plaintiff.

*Prentiss M. Brown,*for defendant.

Potter, J.

November 18, 1929, Gustava Ericks sued defendant to recover damages alleged to have been caused by defendant wrongfully paying out to plaintiff’s son .money deposited in the savings department of defendant belonging to plaintiff and deposited in her name. Gustava Ericks died during the pendency of the suit. Plaintiff is her executor. Plaintiff appeals from verdict and judgment'for defendant. The deposition of Gustava Ericks was taken after suit commenced. It was used on the trial. This rendered competent the testimony of defendant’s assistant cashier under 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14219.

The important question is whether there was testimony to carry the case to the jury. Plaintiff claimed defendant paid out the money in violation of law and its own rules. Defendant claimed it rightfully paid out the money to Oscar Ericks, son of Gustava Ericks, on her written order. Gustava Ericks testified she trusted her son, to whom the money was paid, and when she wanted money she was willing the bank should pay it to him. She signed and gave to her son a paper directing the bank to pay money to her son. When she subsequently wanted her son to get money for her from the bank and suggested she sign a slip,, note, or ■ something to the bank, Oscar, her son, told her it was not necessary, because the slip she had given the first time was there. *602Defendant’s assistant cashier testified he was positive he had an order signed by Gustava Ericks, authorizing Oscar to draw her money. He thought such order was still around the bank; he had searched for it, but could not find it. This was sufficient to carry the case to the jury. Its verdict is conclusive unless there was error in submitting the question in issue to it. We find none. Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Clark, C. J., and McDonald, Sharpe, North, Fead, Wiest, and Butzel, JJ., concurred.
EXHIBIT 31.2

I, R. Llee Chapman, certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this amended annual report on Form 10-K/A of Apollo
Gold Corporation;

     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

     4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

          a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

          b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

          c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;

     5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

          a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

          b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting.



Date:  July 25, 2004             /s/ R. LLEE CHAPMAN
                                 ----------------------
                                 R. Llee Chapman, Chief Financial Officer
#### JONES *v.*STATE

[No. 23,

September Term, 1962.]

*473
      *Decided October 16, 1962.*

The cause was argued before Bruñe, C. J., and Henderson, Hammond, Horney and Sybert, JJ.

*Stanley J. Schápiro,*with whom was *Michael P. Preedman*on the brief, for appellant.

*Boring B. Hawes, Assistant Attorney General,*with whom were *Thomas B. Binan, Attorney General, Saul A. Harris*and *Dene B. Busby, State’s Attorney*and *Assistant State’s Attorney for Baltimore City,*respectively, on the brief, for appellee.

PER Curiam.

Eonnie B. Jones was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore of violating the narcotics law, and, after sentence, he appealed. He complains here that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction, and that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to the weight to be given to the testimony of the apprehending officer.

There was evidence to show a sale of heroin by the appel*474lant to a police officer. The contention as to the sufficiency of the evidence must fail. The record shows, and the appellant concedes, that no motion for a directed verdict (now a judgment of acquittal) was made at any stage of the trial. Thus the question is not before us for determination. Code (1957), Art. 27, Sec. 593; *Humphreys v. State,*227 Md. 115.

The appellant’s second contention is also not properly before us, because no objection was made to the court’s advisory instruction to the jury. Maryland Rule 756 g. However, while appellant denies making the sale of heroin, his version of the episode was that the police officer was attempting to entrap him into making a sale, and he therefore claims the court should specially have instructed the jury as to the weight to be given to the officer’s testimony. He relies upon a statement made in *Callahan v. State,*163 Md. 298, at 302, that while [under circumstances comparable to those here] it is not objectionable for an officer to lay a trap to detect an offender, “The only effect would be to justify a more careful scrutiny of the evidence”. Even though appellant did not request a special instruction and made no objection to the court’s charge as given, he asks us to invoke the discretion vested in us by Rule 756 g to “take cognizance of and correct any plain error in the instructions, material to the rights of the accused even though such error was not objected to” as otherwise provided by the Rule. However, we have read the instructions given by the trial judge to the jury and find them adequate under the circumstances of the case, and we find in the record no plain error material to the rights of the appellant. Hence this case does not present a situation calling for invocation of the Rule.

*Judgment affirmed.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Krupp Realty
Fund 7 Financial Statements for the twelve months ended December 31, 1999 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         120,525
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  244,193<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               518,462
<PP&E>                                      23,391,023<F2>
<DEPRECIATION>                            (14,436,906)<F3>
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,837,297
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          625,590
<BONDS>                                     10,220,052<F4>
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,008,345)<F5>
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,837,297
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,997,617<F6>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,667,374<F7>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             879,470
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (549,227)<F8>
<EPS-BASIC>                                        0<F8>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F8>
<FN>
<F1>Includes all receivables  included in "prepaid expenses and other assets" on
the Balance Sheet.
<F2>Multi-family complexes of $23,075,371 and deferred expenses of $315,652.
<F3>Accumulated  depreciation  of $14,265,488  and  accumulated  amortization of
$171,418.
<F4>Represents mortgage notes payable.
<F5>Total  deficit of the  General  Partners  of  ($309,945)  and of the Limited
Partners of ($698,400).
<F6>Includes all revenue of the Partnership.
<F7>Includes operating expenses of $1,686,434, real estate taxes of $428,806 and
depreciation and amortization of $1,552,134.
<F8>Net loss allocated ($5,492) to the General  Partners  and  ($543,735) to the
Limited  Partners.  Average net loss per  Unit of  Limited  Partner  interest is
($20.00) on 27,184 Units outstanding.
</FN>


</TABLE>
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ GORDON C. REID, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 17-6100 (D.C. No. 5:12- CV-01416-M) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , BALDOCK , and EBEL , Circuit Judges. **

________________ _________________ Gordon C. Reid appeals the distri ct court’s dismissal of his su it under the Federal Tort Claims Act for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . The United States has filed a Motion for Voluntary Remand explaining that it recen tly discovered that the record it provided to the distric t court was incomplete. The go vernment states that it will withdraw the motion to dismi ss it filed below and proceed with a new motion on

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata , and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 1 0th Cir. R. 32.1.
** On October 15, 2018 th e court issued an order vacating the ora l argument hearing originally set for Novemb er 13, 2018. After examining t he Motion for Voluntary Remand and response this panel has det ermined unanimously that oral argument would not materially ass ist in the determination of th is appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Ci r. R. 34.1(G). The case is th erefore ordered submitted without oral argument. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 26, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 the full record or with discove ry. Further, the government will ask the district court to appoint counsel for Mr. Reid. Mr. Reid has filed a response to the motion agreeing that the c ase must be remanded given the government’s d iscovery as to the record and joining the government’s suggesti on that counsel be appointed in the distri ct court. Given the circumstances of the government’s motion, Mr. Reid also asks th is court to consider waiving the filing fee for this appeal. The filing fee is prescribed by statute, and we have no authori ty to waive it.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (providi ng that a prisoner appealing a civil case “shall be required to pay the full amount o f a filing fee”). Consequently , we deny Mr. Reid’s request to be relieved of his obl igation to make partial paymen ts towards that fee. Id

. The government’s Motion for Voluntary Remand is granted. This matter is fully remanded to the district court with instructions to vacat e its judgment dated March 28, 2017 and to conduct a ny and all proceedings necessary for a full review of all of Mr. Reid’s claims in light of the government’s represent ation that it will withdraw its motion to dismiss. In addition, given the governme nt’s statement that it will ask the district court to a ppoint counsel for Mr. Reid, th e district court is strongly encouraged to consid er the appointment of counsel. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

Per Curiam
# C_2022244EN.01003001.xml

| 27.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 244/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 244/30

---

Judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 — Kazembe Musonda v Council

(Case T-106/21) (1)

(Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territories of the Member States - Retention of the applicant’s name on the lists of persons covered - Right to be heard - Proof that inclusion and retention on the lists is well founded - Manifest error of assessment - Continuation of the factual and legal circumstances which led to the adoption of the restrictive measures)

(2022/C 244/39)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda (Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of the Congo) (represented by: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme and T. Payan, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: S. Lejeune, acting as Agent)

Re:

By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2033 of 10 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 30) and, second, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2021 of 10 December 2020 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2020 L 419, p. 5), in so far as those acts concern him.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mr Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

---