### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 10-70016

JOHN REYES MATAMOROS, Petitioner - Appellant,
v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, T exas D epartment o f Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent - Appellee.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:07-CV-2613

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * In 1992, a Texas jury found John Reyes Matamoros guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) a ffirmed Matamoros’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. A federal district court d enied habeas r elief and sua sponte denied

a certificate of appealability (COA). Matamoros n o w u r ges us to grant a COA on two claims: (1) that he is mentally r etarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 3 0 4 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , and (2) that the jury U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Septem ber 3, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5, the court has determ ined that this op inion s hould not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 10-70016 Document: 00512360151 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/03/2013No. 10-70016

i n s t ructions at the sentencing phase of his t rial were unconstitutional u n d e r Penry v. Johnson , 532 U .S. 7 8 2 ( 2 0 0 1). Matamoros also moves to r emand his Atkins claim to the district c ourt. For the reasons e xplained b elow, we GRANT Matamoros’s request for a COA on his Atkins claim, but DENY b oth his request for a COA on the Penry claim and his motion for remand. I. The district court’s comprehensive opinion recounts the f a c tual background and procedural development of this case. See Matamoros v. Thaler , No. H-07-2613, 2010 WL 1404368, at *1–3 (S.D. T ex. Mar. 31, 2010). We recite only the factual and procedural history necessary to our analysis. In November 1992, Matamoros stood trial for the c a p i t a l murder 1 of his neighbor, Eddie Goebel, in the 180th Judicial District for Harris County, Texas. The jury found Matamoros guilty and answered affirmatively t o the punishment issues submitted under Article 37.071 of the Texas C ode o f Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the t rial court sentenced M atamoros to death. T he TCCA affirmed Matamoros’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See Matamoros v. State , 901 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Matamoros filed his initial state application for a writ of habeas corpus on April 2 3, 1 997, c hallen g i n g t h e validity of his conviction a nd sentence. The TCCA denied the application. Ex Parte Matamoros , No. 50,791-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2001). Matamoros filed his initial federal habeas petition on July

1 At the tim e of G oebel’s d eath, a p ers on com mitted cap ital murd er in T exas w hen he “intentionally com m it[ ted ] the m urd er in the cours e of c o m m itting or attem p ting to com m it k id nap ping, burglary, robbery, aggravated s exual as s ault, or ars on. ” Tex. Pen a l C od e Ann. § 19. 03( a) ( 2 ) (Wes t 1974)

. What w as cap ital m urd er then is cap ital m urd er now
. See Tex. Penal Cod e Ann. § 19. 03( a) ( 2) ( Wes t 2011)

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5, 2 0 02. Matamoros then moved to stay those proceedings so that he could return t o state court and exhaust a c l a i m t h at he is ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins because h e is mentally retarded. The district court granted the motion. T h e TCCA r eceived Matamoros’s successive state habeas application o n O c t o ber 27, 2003, and remanded the action for the trial court to address t h e

m e r i t s o f the Atkins claim. Ex Parte Matamoros , No. 50,791-02, 2007 WL 1707193, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 13, 2007). A fter an evidentiary h earing in 2006, t h e t r ial court e ntered written f indings o f fact and conclusions of law recommending that the T CCA deny relief. Id. The TCCA r e j ected the finding that Matamoros had not shown by a preponderance of t he evidence that he f ails to meet the first criterion for mental retardation—i.e., significant sub-average
g e n e r a l intellectual functioning. Id. Nevertheless, the T CCA denie d Matamoros’s p etition because i t determined that he had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence t hat he satisfies the other t w o c r i t eria for mental retardation—i.e., sufficient deficiencies in adaptive f unctioning and the onset of mental retardation before th e a g e of e ighteen. Id. A ccordingly, the TCCA denied Matamoros’s petition. Matamoros then returned to federal district court and, on July 10, 2007, filed the habeas petition that gives rise t o t h e pending request for a COA. Matamoros asserted that he is ineligible for the death p enalty b ecause (1) he is mentally retarded, (2) the j ury instructions used during the sentencing phase of his trial were u nconstitutional, (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel,

a n d ( 4 ) t h e T e x a s c apital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional. See Matam o r o s , 2010 WL 1404368, at *4. The district court granted summary judgment to the

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state and dismissed the petition. Id. at *23. The district court also sua sponte denied a COA as to all issues. Id. at *22–23. On J uly 22, 2010, Matamoros filed i n t h i s c ourt a request for a COA on only the issues of m e n t a l r e tardation and the jury instructions. The state opposed the motion. While the COA motion was p e nding, Matamoros moved to stay the proceeding so t hat he c o u l d r e t u rn to state c ourt to present newly available and unexhausted evidence i n support of his Atkins claim. Specifically, Matamoros sough t t o present evidence regarding Dr. George Denkowski, the psychologist who testified a s an expert for the s t a t e at the 2006 hearing on Matamoros’s Atkins claim. See Matamoros , 2010 WL 1404368, at *9–10, 14–15. In April 2011, Denkowski entered into a Settlement Agreement with the Texas State Board o f Examiners of Psychologists, in which h i s l icense was

“ reprimanded.” Pursuant t o the Settlement Agreement, Denkowski agre e d t o “not accept any engagement to p e r f o r m forensic psychological s ervices in the evaluation of subjects for mental retardation or in t e l l e c t u a l d i s a b i l ity in c riminal proceedings.” We granted Matamoros’s motion to stay the proceedings. Following the s t a y i n this court, the TCCA exercised its authority to reconsider the initial disposition of Matamoros’s writ. E x Parte Matamoros , No. 50,791-02, 2011 W L 6241295, at *1 (Tex. C rim. App. Dec. 14, 2011). T he TCCA first r e m anded the cause to the trial c ourt “to allow it the opportunity to reevaluate its initial findings, c o n c l u s ions, and recommendation in light of the Denkowski Settlement Agreement.” Id. T he TCCA stated t ha t t he trial court could “order affidavits or h o l d a live hearing if warranted.” Id. Matamoros tendered ne w a f

f i d a vits to t he trial court, including an a ffidavit from Dr. Thomas Oakland, a nd requested a hearing. O n March 30, 2 0 1 2 , w ithout ruling on or

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discussing M atamoros’s affidavits or request, the t rial court signed an o r d er adopting the state’s A mended Proposed Findings o f Fact and Conclusions of Law, which recommended that relief b e denied. The trial court announced that i t h a d totally d iscounted “ anything in the records provided by Dr. Georg e Denkowski in this matter.” E x Parte Matamoros , Nos. 50,791-02 & 50,791-03, 2012 WL 4 7 1 3 5 6 3 , a t *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2012) (Price, J., dissenting). Yet , i n t he order, the trial court continued to partially r e ly on records and evidence provided by Denkowski. 2 Nevertheless, c onsisten t w i t h the trial court’s findings and conclusions, the TCCA again denied Matamoros’s writ application. Id. at *1. Two TCCA judges dissented. I d. at * 2–5 (Price, J., joined by Johnson, J.). The dissent c ontended that Matamoros “has made a fairly compelling showing of mental retardation.” Id. at *3. The dissent further observed: Given D enkowski’s s ettlement agreement, and t h e substantial criticisms of his diagnostic meth o d o logy, as evidenced b y t h e affidavits [Matamoros] has lately tendered, questions abound. For example, even t aking Denkowski’s testimony out o f the mix, is it appropriate for this Court—the u ltimate arbiter of [Matamoros’s] mental retardation—to rely on the TYC records as evidence that t h e applicant suffers no adaptive deficits outside the realm of functional academics, considering (as the convicting court apparently did not) Dr. Oakland’s criticisms? Id. at *5. Matamoros has returned to this court with a motion to lift the stay and to remand to the district court for it “ t o r e c o nsider [his] Atkins claim de novo without taking into a c c o u n t o r in any respect relying on Dr. Denkowski’s

2 For exam p le, a m end ed f ind ing nos
. 88 and 90 ap p ear to have been d raw n f rom tes tim ony p rovid ed by D enk ow s k i at the 2006 hearing. M ore generally, am end ed f ind ing nos
. 75 –90, regard ing ad ap tive f unctioning, continued to rely heavily on record s from the Texas Y outh Com m is s ion (TY C )— record s on which Denk ow sk i relied at the 2006 hearing. The trial court d id not ad d res s D r. O ak land ’s criticis m of D enk ow s k i’s reliance on the TY C record s
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analysis.” This court granted the motion to lift the stay and entered a n order carrying the motion for remand with the request for a COA. I I. The Antiterrorism and Effective D ea t h Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, governs our consideration of Matamoros’s motion and request f or a COA. Under AEDPA, a state habeas petitioner must obtain a COA before he can appeal the federal district c o u rt’s denial of habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); see M

iller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (describing a COA as a “jurisdictional prerequisite” w ithout which “federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the appeals from habeas petitioners”). A COA is warranted upon a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). A petitioner satisfies this sta n dard if “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims d ebatable

or wrong.” Slack v. M cDaniel , 529 U.S. 4 73, 484 ( 2000). 3 T h e i s s u e i s “the debatability of the underlying constitutional claim, not t he resolution of the debate.” Miller-El , 5 37 U

. S

. a t 342; see id. at 338 (“[A] claim can be d ebatable

even though every jurist of reason m ight agree, after the COA has been granted and the case has received full c onsideration, that p etitioner w ill not prevail.”). “This threshold inquiry does not require full c onsideration of the factual or legal bases addu c e d i n support of the claims. In fact, the statute f orbids it.” Id. at 336. In cases involving the d eath penalty, “ a n y d oubts as to whether a COA should issue must be resolved in [the petitioner’s] f avor.” Hernandez v. Johnson , 213 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2000). W e e v a luate the debatability of Matamor o s ’ s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m s t h r o u g h

3 To obtain a CO A w hen the d is trict court has d enied relief on p roced ural ground s , a p etit i o n e r m us t s how both that the claim is d ebatable on the m erits a nd that the d is trict court’s p roced ural ruling is d ebatable. S ee Sl ack , 529 U

. S. at 484–85. 6 Case: 10-70016 Document: 00512360151 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/03/2013No. 10-70016

t he lens o f AEDPA’s h i ghly deferential s t andard, which “demands th a t state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. L ett , 1 30 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (internal q uotation marks omitted). We defer to the state trial

c o urt’s factual findings, Moody v. Quarterman , 476 F.3d 2 60, 2 67–68 (5th Ci r
. 2007), and c o n s i d e r only t he record that was before the state court, Cullen v. Pin h o l s t e r , 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). We review “ only the ultimate legal determination b y the state court—not e v ery link in its r easoning.” Neal v. Puckett , 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Under A EDPA, a federal court may not g rant habeas relief u nless the petitioner has first exhausted state remedies with respect t o t he claim at issue. § 2254(b). To prevail, the h abeas petiti oner must prove that the state court’s constitutional adjudication “ resulted in a decision that w as c o n t r a ry to, or involved an unreasonable a p p l i cation o f, clearly established Federal law, as determined by t he Supreme Court o f the United S tates” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an u nreasonabl e d e t e r m i n a t i on of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court p r o ceeding.” § 2254(d)(1)–(2). Clearly established federal law is comprised of “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the rel e v ant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A s tate-court decision is contrary to c learly established federal law w hen it “arrives at a c o nclusion

o p p o s i t e to that r eached by [the Supreme] Court on a q uestion of law or i f t h e state court decides a case differently t h an [the Supreme] Court has o n a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” I d

. at 4 13. A s tate-court decision fails the “unreasonable application” prong if i t “ c o r r ectly identifies the governing legal rule [from the Supreme Court’s cases] but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” Id . at 407–08.

7 Case: 10-70016 Document: 00512360151 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/03/2013No. 10-70016 III. M a t a m o ros seeks either a COA on whether he is a mentally retard e d offender whose execution is unconstitutional under Atkins o r a r e m and to the district court for a hearing o n this Atkins claim. Matamoros also seeks a COA

as t o whet h e r t he jury instructions violated Penry by precluding the jury from giving full effect to his mitigating evidence. W e a d d r e ss each issue in turn, ultimately granting a COA on the Atkins cla i m , b u t d enying Matamoros’s motion for remand and denying a COA on the Penry claim. A. With respect to his Atkins claim, Matamoros filed both a request for a COA and a motion f

or remand to the district court. We add r e s s t h e s e filings separately, beginning with his request for a COA. 1

. Matamoros advances a two-part argument regarding his A tkins c l a i m
. First, he contends t hat the state court’s finding t hat he is not m entally retarded

was unreasonable b ecause it i s b a s e d on the 1992 American Association for Mental Retardation (AAMR) definition of m ental retardation, not the updated 2002 definition. The district court rejected this argument. Reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s decision regarding the AAM R d efinitions. Atkins does not mandate that a state a dopt any particular clinical definition of mental r etardation. S ee Atkins , 536 U.S. at 317 (leaving “to the State[s] the task of developing ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences” (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright , 477 U.S. 3 99, 416–17 ( 1986))); see Clark

v. Quarterman , 457 F.3d 441, 445 (5th C ir. 2006) (“Although t he [ Atkins ] Court did refer to t he clinical defi n i t i o n s of mental retardation promulgated by the AAMR and the [American Psychological Association], i t did not dictate that the

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approach and analysis of the State must track the A AMR o r the A PA exactly.”). Moreover, this court recently held that, for purposes of Atkins , Texas need not follow AAMR procedures when determining whether a prisoner is m e n t a l l y retarded

. Chester v
. Thaler , 666 F.3d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied , 133 S. Ct. 5 25 (2012). Therefore, reasonable j urists would not d e bate the district court’s conclusion regarding the state court’s use of the 1 992 AAMR d e finition for mental retardation. To the extent that Matamoros’s r equest for a COA relies

on t his specific argument, he has not cast a ny doubt that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an u n reasonable a pplication of, clearly established federal law. See § 2254(d)(1). Matamoros advances a second argument in his request for a COA on the Atkins claim. Matamoros challenges the state court’s “m i s t a k en reliance” on Denkowski’s testimony and methodology. This is n ot the first time Denkowski’s methodology and credibility have come under scrutiny. In Ex Parte Plata , No. AP-75820, 2008 WL 151296, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. J a n
. 1 6 , 2 0 08), the TCCA

ac c e p ted the state h abeas trial court’s recommendation that Denkowski’s testimony not b e c redit e d , d u e to what the trial court found were pervasive

errors in Denkowski’s a dministration and scori n g of the p risoner’s IQ and adaptive deficit tests. See id. ; Ex P arte Plata , No. 693143-B (Tex. 351st Dist. Ct., Harris County, Sept. 28, 2007). Furthermore, our court h as a t least twice before granted COAs on Atkins claims involving Denk o wski’s testimony and methodology. See M

al d o n a d o v. Thaler , 389 F. App’x 399, 403–04 (5th Cir. 2010); Pierce v. Thaler , 355 F. App’x 784, 794–95 (5th Cir. 2009). When we granted C OAs in Maldonado and Pierce , the T exas State Board of Examiner s o f Psychologists’ complaint against D enkowski was unresolved. W h i le M atamoros’s COA request was pending, D enkowski entered i nto t h e Settlement Agreement, which formally “reprimanded” his license and prohibits

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h i m from “accept[ing] any e ngagement to perform forensic psychological s e r v i c e s in the e valuation o f subjects f or mental retardation or i ntellectual disability in criminal proceedings.” We granted M atamoros’s motion to stay the proceeding in this court while he p r e sented evidence of t h e Settlement Agreement to the state c o urts. A s n o t e d above, a majority of the T C C A agreed with the trial court’s recommended findings and conclusions and denied the application. See Ex Parte Matamoros , 2012 WL 4713563, at *1. But Judges Price and Johnson dissented. In his dissenting opinion, J u d g e P rice, joined by Judge Johnson, referred to affidavits that Matamoros filed with the state trial court, including the affidavit of Dr. Oakland, a psychologist and co-autho r o f t h e Adaptive Behavior Assessment System (ABAS). 4 I d. at *3–5. The dissent noted that the trial court’s amended findings and conclusions failed to address Dr. Oakland’s

c r i t i cisms of r elying on certain types of information to assess Matamor o s ’ s adaptive functioning, such a s records f r o m t he T YC. Id. a t *4–5. The dissent further o p ined that “even taking Denkowski’s t estimony out of the m ix,” the Settlement Agreement and Dr. Oakland’ s affidavit raise important questions about whether it is a ppropriate for the state courts “to rely o n the TYC records

as e vidence that [Matamoros] suf f ers no adaptive deficits outside t he realm of functional academics.” Id. at *5. Moreover, the trial court’s amended findings continued to include references to D enkowski’s testimony, albeit w i t h out explicitly invoking his name. It is against this backdrop that we must d ecide whether reasonable jurists

c o u l d d e bate the d istrict c ourt’s conclusion that the state court’s rejection o f Matamoros’s Atkins claim was reasonable. See Blue v. Thaler , 665 F.3d 647, 661

4 The d is s ent als o ref

erred to a s igned but uns w orn af f id avit f rom D r. Jack M

. Fletcher,
a p s ychology p rof

es s or, w hich M atam oros p rof f ered to the s tate court. Ex Pa rte M ata m oros , 2012 WL 4713563, at *4. 10 Case: 10-70016 Document: 00512360151 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/03/2013No. 10-70016

(5th Cir. 2011). We conclude that Matamoros has met this “threshold” showing. See Miller-El , 537 U.S. at 336, 338. It is consistent with prior cas e s i n v o lving Denkowski’s methodology to grant a COA in this case so that we may g ive “full consideration [ to] the factual [and] l egal bases adduced in support of [Matamoros’s] claim.” 5 See Miller-El , 5 37 U .S. a t 336; see also Maldonado , 389 F. A pp’x at 403–04; Pier c e , 3 5 5 F

. App’x at 794–95. Accordingly, w e grant Matamoros’s request for a COA with respect to his Atkins claim. 2

. The thrust o f Matamoros’s motion for r e m a nd is that the district court should have an opportunity t o reach a different conclusion on the Atkins claim in light of the s u b s e q u ent state court proceedings regarding Denkowski. But whether the district court would r each a different conclusion in l ight of the nowsupplemented state court r ecord is irrelevant. Under AEDPA, it is the state trial court’s f actual findings to which we must defer if reasonable, not th e d i s t r i c t court’s. See Pinholster , 131 S. C t

. a t 1 398 (explaining that u nder AEDPA we consider only the r e c o r d t hat was before t he state court); Moody , 476 F.3d at 2 67–68 (recognizing that A EDPA requires us to defer to t he state trial court’s

5 The s tate as s erts that D enk ow sk i’s m ethod ology is bes id e the p oint becaus e the d is trict court conclud ed that “[ e] ven if D enk ow s k i’s op inion is d is regard ed , . . . the s tate court’s conclus ion w as reas onable. ” 2 010 WL 1404368, at *15. T he s tate further as s erts that the
s tate court’s am end ed f ind ings of f

act d eterm ined that “an y c riticis m or d is cus s ion of D enk ow s k i’s m ethod ology concerning ad ap tive behavior tes ting in [ M atam oros ’s ] cas e” is “irrelevant. ” For tw o r e as ons thes e s tatem ents d o not convince us that w e s hould d eny M atam oros ’s reques t f or a CO A on his A tki ns claim

. Firs t, M atam oros correctly p oints out that even though the s tate court os tens ibly f ound any d is cus s ion of D enk ow s k i’s m ethod ology

“ i r r e l e v a n t , ” so me o f t h e c o u r t’s am end ed f ind ings regard ing M atam oros ’s ad ap tive f unct i o n i n g conti n u e t o includ e citations to D enk ow s k i’s tes tim ony. Second , w e are m ind f ul that “the
s tatute forbid s” us f

rom f ully cons id ering the f

actual and legal bas es in s up p ort of M atam oros ’s A tki ns claim as p art of the “thres hold inquiry” regard ing his reques t f or a CO A. M

i l l er- El , 537 U

. S. at 336; see a l so i d. at 338 ( “[ A] claim can be d ebatable even though every j uris t of reas on m ight agree, af

ter the CO A has been granted and the cas e has received f ull cons id eration, that p etitioner w ill not p revail. ”)

. 11 Case: 10-70016 Document: 00512360151 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/03/2013No. 10-70016

factual findings). Therefore, reman d i n g t h is case to the district court to allow it to m ake ne w f

i n d i ngs would s erve no m eaningful purpose. We deny Matamoros’s motion for remand. B. M a ta m o ro s a lso co n te n d s t h a t t h e ju ry in stru ctio n s a t th e se n te n cin g p h a s e o f h i s tria l w e re u n co n stitu t io n a l. S ee P en ry v
. J

o h n so n , 5 3 2 U .S

. 7 8 2 (2 0 0 1 ) (“ P

en ry II ”); P e n ry v
. L y n a u g h , 4 9 2 U .S . 3 0 2 (1 9 8 9 ) (“ P en ry I ”); see a l so S m i th v
. T

ex a s , 5 5 0 U

. S

. 2 9 7 ( 2 0 0 7 ); B rew er v
. Q u a rterm a n , 5 5 0 U .S

. 2 8 6 (2 0 0 7 ). A l th o u g h t h e d i strict co u rt fo u n d th a t th e ju ry in s tru ctio n s “p la in ly

v io l a t[e d ]” P

en ry II , it d e n ie d M a ta m o ro s’s cla im fo r h a b e a s re lie f o n p ro ce d u ra l
g ro u n d s, c o n clu d in g th a t M a ta m o ro s h a d n o t e x h a u ste d th is cla im in sta t e

co u r t. S ee M

a ta m o ro s , 2 0 1 0 W L 1 4 0 4 3 6 8 , a t * 1 7

– 1 8

. B e ca u se th e d istrict co u rt d e n i e d re lie f o n p r o ce d u ra l g ro u n d s, M a ta m o ro s m u st sh o w th a t th e d istrict

co u r t’s p ro ce d u ra l ru lin g is d e b a ta b le

. S ee S l a c k , 5 2 9 U .S . a t 4 8 4

– 8 5

. AEDPA prohibits a federal court f r o m g r anting a writ of habeas corpus unless: “(A) the applicant has exhausted the r emedies available in t he courts of the State; or (B)(I) there is an abse n c e o f a v ailable S tate c orrective process; or (ii) circumstances e xist that r ender such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Here, Matamoros raised his claim based on P

enry II for the first time i n his federal habeas petition. A lth o u g h M a ta m o ro s in clu d e d e v id e n ce re g a rd i ng pot ent i al mi t i gat in g fa cto rs in h is sta te

co u r t h a b e a s a p p lica t io n , h e a rg u e d o n ly th a t th e ju ry in stru c tio n s v i o la te d h is rig h ts u n d e r P

e n ry I

. 6 S ee M

a ta m o r o s , 2 0 1 0 W L 1 4 0 4 3 6 8 , a t * 1 7

. B e ca u se M a ta m o ro s fa ile d t o ra ise h i s P en ry II cla im b e f

o re th e T e x a s co u rts, r e a so n a b l e

6 M oreover, M atam oros d oes not argue that there is an abs ence of a corrective p roces s in Texas or that any s uch proces s is inef f ective.
12 Case: 10-70016 Document: 00512360151 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/03/2013No. 10-70016

ju rists w o u ld n o t d e b a te t h e d istrict co u rt’s d e cisio n to d ism iss th e cla im o n p ro ce d u ra l g ro u n d s. F u rth e r m o re , a s th e d istrict c o u rt e x p la in e d , M a ta m o r o s ’ s fa ilu re to

e x h a u st re q u ire s a d ism iss a l w i th p re ju d ice b e c a u se T e x a s la w w o u ld b a r M a ta m o ro s’s u n e x h a u ste d P en ry II c l a im a s a n a b u s e o f w rit. A p ro ce d u ra l b a r fo r h a b e a s re v ie w o c cu rs w h e n th e co u rt to w h ich a p e t i tio n e r m u st p re se n t h is cla im s to sa tisfy t h e e x h aus t i on r equi r ement w oul d f i nd th e u n e x h a u ste d cla im s p ro ce d u ra lly b a rre d

. Id

. a t * 1 8 (citin g C o lem a n v
. T h o m p so n , 5 0 1 U .S

. 7 2 2 , 7 3 5

n
. 1 ( 1 9 9 1 )). T e x a s p ro h ib i t s su cce ssiv e w rits ch a lle n g in g th e sa m e c o n v ictio n

e x c e p t w h e r e : (1 ) th e cu rre n t cla im s a n d issu e s h a v e n o t b e e n a n d co u ld n o t h a v e b e e n p re s e n te d p re v io u sly in a tim e ly in itia l a p p lica tio n o r i n a p re v io u sly co n sid e re d a p p lica tio n file d u n d e r th is a rticle o r A r ticle 1 1 .0 7 b e ca u s e t h e fa ctu a l o r le g a l b a s is fo r t h e cla im w a s u n a v a i la b l e on t he da te th e a p p lica n t file d th e p re v io u s a p p lica tio n ; (2 ) b y a p r e p o n d e r a n ce o f th e e v id e n ce , b u t f o r a v i o l a tio n o f th e U n ite d S ta te s C o n stitu tio n n o ra tio n a l ju ro r co u ld h a v e fo u n d th e a p p lica n t g u ilty b e y o n d a re a so n a b le d o u b t; o r (3 ) b y c le a r a n d co n v in cin g e v id e n ce , b u t fo r a v io l a tio n o f th e U n ite d S t a te s C o n stitu tio n n o ra tio n a l ju ro r w o u l d h a v e a n sw e re d in th e s ta te ’s fa v o r o n e o r m o re o f th e sp e c i a l issu e s t h a t w e re su b m itte d to th e ju ry in th e a p p lica n t’s tria l u n d e r 3 7 .0 7 1 , 3 7 .0 7 1 1 , o r 3 7 .0 7 2

. T e x
. C o d e
. C rim

. P ro c. a rt. 1 1 .0 7 1

. B e ca u s e M a ta m o ro s’s P en ry I I c l a i m w a s

a v a ila b le w h e n h e o rig in a lly file d h is w r i t , h e ca n n o t sh o w th a t r e a so n a b l e ju rists w o u ld d e b a te th e d istrict co u rt’s p r o ce d u ra l co n clu s io n
. S ee F ea ra n ce v
. S c o t t , 5 6 F .3 d 6 3 3 , 6 4 2 (5 th C ir. 1 9 9 5 ) (sta tin g th a t “th e h ig h e s t c o u r t o f t h e S ta te o f T e x a s a n n o u n ce d t h a t i t w o u ld a s a ru l e d ism iss a s a b u se o f th e w rit

a n a p p lica n t fo r a su b se q u e n t w rit o f h a b e a s co rp u s ra is[in g ] issu e s th a t e x iste d

13 Case: 10-70016 Document: 00512360151 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/03/2013No. 10-70016

a t th e tim e o f h is first w rit” (a lte r a t i o n in o rig in a l) (in te rn a l q u o ta tio n m a r k s

o m itte d )). IV. For the reasons above, we GRANT Matamoros’s application for a COA on whether he i s ineligible for the death penalty because h e mentally retarded. We DENY M atamoros’s m otion for remand to the district c o u r t a n d D ENY his request for a COA based on the jury instructions.

14 Case: 10-70016 Document: 00512360151 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/03/2013