IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 18–1623

Submitted November 17, 2020—Filed January 29, 2021

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

ANTHONY ERNST,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Michael J. 

Shubatt, Judge.

State seeks further review from court of appeals’ reversal of the 

defendant’s conviction for attempted burglary. DECISION OF COURT OF 

APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AFFIRMED.

Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices 

joined. Appel, J., filed a special concurrence.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender

(argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven (argued), 

Assistant Attorney General, C.J. May III, County Attorney, and Brigit M. 

Barnes and Ry Allen Meyer, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
2

OXLEY, Justice.

We have long recognized that specific intent crimes are seldom 

proved by direct evidence of the defendant’s intent, leaving the State to 

rely on inferences to be drawn from the surrounding circumstances to 

convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a 

sufficiently culpable mental state to support a conviction. In this case, the 

defendant convinced the court of appeals that his conviction could not be 

supported on the theory that the jury improperly stacked inferences on 

top of other inferences to find he attempted to burglarize a garage with the 

intent to commit a theft. We disagree and conclude the State’s evidence—

and all reasonable inferences from that evidence—was sufficient to 

support the defendant’s conviction. 

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

Anthony Ernst’s parole officer lives on a dead-end gravel road in 

rural Cascade with her husband. The parole officer’s husband discovered 

the service door to their garage had been pried open while they were at

work on August 21, 2017. The door was closed and locked when they left, 

but the door was ajar with the knob still locked when he returned home. 

The weather stripping around the door was damaged with what looked like 

pry marks near the handle and near the bottom of the door. Nothing was 

missing from the garage, and there was no indication anyone had entered 

the house through the locked interior door. The parole officer contacted 

police about the break-in, and an investigation followed. 

Video footage from a business at the top of the dead end road showed 

only one vehicle drove down the road toward the parole officer’s house that 

day that was unaccounted for by local traffic, which passed the business 

at 10:31 a.m. and returned approximately thirteen minutes later. Further 

investigation led to Ernst based on his ownership of a white police model 
3

Crown Victoria, the same type of car observed in the footage. The parole 

officer identified the vehicle from the video footage as belonging to Ernst 

based on the distinct pattern of chipped paint on the car. 

Ernst was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary in the 

third degree with intent to commit assault and intent to commit theft. At 

the close of the State’s evidence at trial, Ernst moved for a judgment of 

acquittal. The district court granted the motion in part, concluding the 

State failed to present sufficient evidence for a jury to find he intended to 

commit an assault, but it did present sufficient evidence for the jury to 

find he intended to commit a theft. Ernst proceeded to trial on the theft 

version of burglary.

The jury returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included attempted 

burglary charge. The district court entered judgment against Ernst and 

sentenced him to the maximum two-year sentence. Ernst appealed, 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals reversed 

Ernst’s conviction, concluding the State’s only direct evidence showed 

Ernst in the area but the remaining circumstantial evidence was too 

speculative to support his conviction because it “require[d] a stacking of 

inferences: first the inference [Ernst] forced entry to the garage, then the 

inference he did so with intent to commit theft.” The State applied for, and 

we granted, further review to address the court of appeals’ conclusion that 

stacked inferences could not support Ernst’s conviction. 

II. Analysis.

To prove Ernst was guilty of attempted burglary, the jury 

instructions required the State to prove he (1) attempted to enter the 

garage, (2) which was an occupied structure, (3) without permission or 

authority (4) with the specific intent to commit theft. On appeal, Ernst 

contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the 
4

first and fourth elements. Alternatively, he argues he is entitled to a new 

trial because the weight of the evidence preponderates against his 

conviction. Finally, Ernst claims his trial counsel was ineffective for not 

challenging the admission of cell phone records and related testimony at 

trial. We address each contention in turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence. “We review the sufficiency of the 

evidence for correction of errors at law.” State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 

663, 666 (Iowa 2018). We consider all evidence, not just the evidence 

supporting the conviction, and view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, “including legitimate inferences and presumptions 

that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” 

State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v. 

Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa 2005)). 

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether 

“the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 

Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d at 666 (quoting State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 

132, 138 (Iowa 2011)). Substantial evidence “means a person may not be 

convicted based upon mere suspicion or conjecture.” Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 

at 692. “Substantial evidence exists when the evidence ‘would convince a 

rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” 

Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d at 666 (quoting Meyers, 799 N.W.2d at 138).

Ernst contends the State failed to prove: (1) anyone attempted to 

enter the garage, (2) if someone attempted to enter the garage, that person 

was Ernst, and (3) if Ernst did enter the garage, he did so with the specific 

intent to commit theft. We conclude the State presented sufficient 

evidence to support Ernst’s conviction.

With respect to establishing Ernst as the perpetrator of the 

attempted burglary, the State presented evidence that Ernst was off work 
5

on August 21 to attend a child support hearing in the afternoon. Footage 

from a traffic camera located one block from Ernst’s Dubuque home 

showed Ernst left home around 8:45 a.m. and returned around 12:28 p.m. 

Other city traffic cameras showed Ernst coming into Dubuque at 12:20 

p.m. on Highway 151. A vehicle matching Ernst’s vehicle, including its 

distinctive chipped paint pattern, was seen on video surveillance of a 

business near the crime scene driving down the dead-end road toward the 

parole officer’s house at 10:31 a.m. and driving back thirteen minutes 

later. It was the only unaccounted vehicle on the dead-end road that day. 

Ernst’s probation officer identified the car from the video surveillance as 

belonging to Ernst. The video also revealed a driver wearing a brightly 

colored sleeveless shirt, similar to the shirt Ernst was seen wearing later 

that day at his child support hearing. 

“While opportunity to commit a crime or mere presence at the scene 

ordinarily is not a sufficient corroborative circumstance from which to 

infer guilt,” substantial evidence of guilt can exist when presence is 

considered with other evidence. State v. Schrier, 300 N.W.2d 305, 309 

(Iowa 1981). Significant evidence in addition to Ernst’s presence in the 

area supports his conviction. The State presented evidence that someone 

had pried open the service door, contrary to Ernst’s argument that the 

wind or an animal caused the door to be opened. That evidence included 

testimony from both homeowners that the door was closed and locked 

when they left that morning, evidence of pry marks they testified were not 

previously on the weather stripping and doorframe, and evidence that the 

door handle was still locked although the door was ajar when the husband 

arrived home. Investigator Grant testified at trial, unchallenged, there had 

been a forced entry. 
6

From the direct evidence that Ernst was driving the only 

unaccounted-for vehicle on the road that day, coupled with the 

circumstantial evidence that someone had pried open the service door, the 

jury could have reasonably inferred that Ernst was the one who pried open 

the door. This evidence provides substantial evidence to support the first 

three elements of the burglary charge—that Ernst entered the garage1

without authorization.

The State was also required to prove Ernst entered the garage with 

the specific intent to commit theft. “Specific intent is seldom capable of 

direct proof.” State v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Iowa 1998). 

Therefore, specific intent will often “be shown by circumstantial evidence 

and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.” Id. 

We first note that intent to commit theft can “reasonably be inferred 

from the evidence of surreptitious entry and other circumstances.” State 

v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980); see also State v. Oetken, 

613 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (“An intent to commit theft 

may be inferred from an actual breaking and entering of a building which 

contains things of value.”); State v. Erving, 346 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Iowa 

1984) (“[E]xperience teaches that, in the great majority of cases of unlawful 

breaking and entering, the act [done is] with intent to steal.” (quoting State 

v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897, 906, 156 N.W.2d 266, 271 (1968), overruled on 

other grounds by State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973) (en banc))); 

State v. Woodruff, 208 Iowa 236, 240, 225 N.W. 254, 255 (1929) (“People 

are not accustomed, in the nighttime, to enter the homes of others, when 

asleep, with innocent purposes. The usual object is theft, and this is the 

inference ordinarily to be drawn, in the absence of explanation, from 

 

1Ernst conceded the garage was an “occupied structure,” the second element 

under the jury instructions.
7

breaking and entering at night, accompanied by flight upon discovery, 

even though nothing has been taken.”). In State v. Erving, we found the 

intent element satisfied from evidence the defendant removed a glass panel 

from a locked and closed pharmacy area and testimony by the pharmacist 

that “removal of the glass panel would greatly facilitate entry into the 

pharmacy and access to the various controlled substances stored there.” 

346 N.W.2d at 835.

The jury’s finding Ernst intended to commit a theft is supported by 

substantial evidence. The State presented evidence that Ernst was in the 

area of the garage between 10:31 a.m. and 10:44 a.m., a time he had 

reason to know both homeowners would not be home. Ernst was aware 

of his parole officer’s work schedule, and Ernst’s boss testified the parole 

officer’s husband worked for a construction company that was often on 

the same worksite as Ernst. Ernst’s sister testified she and Ernst had 

previously located the parole officer’s address from incident reports 

obtained from the City of Dubuque’s website. This additional evidence—

that Ernst knew his parole officer’s address and knew she and her 

husband would likely be away from home in the midmorning hours—

provides sufficient additional circumstances to support the inference that 

Ernst broke into the garage with the intent to take something. See 

Commonwealth v. Madison, 397 A.2d 818, 824 (Pa. Super. 1979) (“Another 

factor [indicating intent to commit theft] may be whether the evidence 

indicates that the defendant thought the building was unoccupied at the 

time of the entry.”). 

Additionally, “[a] false story told by a defendant to explain or deny a 

material fact against him is by itself an indication of guilt and . . . is 

relevant to show that the defendant fabricated evidence to aid his defense.” 

State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1993). Ernst denied he was 
8

anywhere near Cascade despite the video footage of a car identified as 

Ernst’s being driven down the dead-end road toward his parole officer’s 

house. Instead, he presented his sister and his mother as alibi witnesses, 

both of whom testified Ernst had visited first his sister in Bernard, Iowa,

and then his mother in Epworth, Iowa, on the morning of August 21. 

However, his sister admitted she failed to tell Investigator Grant this 

information when he interviewed her. Similarly, Ernst’s mother was 

confused about the timing of Ernst’s visit, and her testimony that Ernst 

drove her into Dubuque to run errands and then dropped her off was 

inconsistent with traffic camera footage showing Ernst entered Dubuque 

on Highway 151 at 12:20 p.m. and returned alone to his home in Dubuque 

at 12:28 p.m. The jury was free to disbelieve both witnesses’ testimony, 

leaving them to conclude Ernst offered a false story of his whereabouts the 

morning of August 21.

Although Ernst was convicted of only attempted burglary because 

nothing was taken from the garage, the lack of a completed burglary does 

not negate the intent element of Ernst’s conviction. See State v. Morelock, 

164 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Iowa 1969) (holding failure to complete a breaking 

and entry does not prevent jury from finding an unlawful intent); Allnutt, 

261 Iowa at 905–06, 156 N.W.2d at 271 (noting intent to steal was not 

negated merely because nothing was stolen). As it turned out, the garage 

was immaculate, with no tools or small items for Ernst to take. 

Additionally, the parole officer’s husband’s personal truck was in the 

garage, which could have caused Ernst to believe someone was home and 

to flee when he saw it. Further, the State was not required to refute every 

possible inference from the evidence. See State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 

257, 262–63 (Iowa 2008) (holding the State does not have the “onerous 

burden” of disproving hypotheses favorable to the defendant). 
9

Ernst contends his conviction is not supported by substantial 

evidence because the State’s case relied on circumstantial evidence and

that circumstantial evidence must be “wholly inconsistent with any 

rational hypothesis of his innocence,” citing State v. Schurman, 205 

N.W.2d 732, 734 (Iowa 1973), overruled by State v. O’Connell, 275 N.W.2d 

197 (Iowa 1979) (en banc), and State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 618–

19 (Iowa 2004). He also argues the jury’s verdict relied on an improper 

stacking of inferences from circumstantial evidence, first that Ernst was 

the one who pried open the garage service door and then that Ernst did so 

with the specific intent to commit theft. See State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 

693, 711 (Iowa 2016) (Hecht, J., concurring specially) (“[O]ur cautious 

approach to the doctrine of constructive possession should not recognize 

a stack of speculative inferences piled one on top of another as substantial 

evidence that Reed constructively possessed the drugs beyond a 

reasonable doubt.”). Ernst misconstrues our jurisprudence concerning 

circumstantial evidence. 

We readily reject Ernst’s reliance on Schurman. We eliminated the 

distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence over forty years ago 

in State v. O’Connell, 275 N.W.2d at 204–05, decided after Schurman. 

Previously, a conviction supported solely by circumstantial evidence could 

stand only if the facts proved were not only “consistent with the guilt of 

the accused, but they must [have] also be[en] inconsistent with any 

rational theory of his innocence.” O’Connell, 275 N.W.2d at 204 (quoting 

Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Uniform Instruction 501.13). Recognizing this 

requirement was based on an “outmoded generality,” we joined the growing 

number of federal and state courts that treat direct and circumstantial 

evidence as equally probative. Id. at 204–05 (collecting cases, including 

Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S. Ct. 127, 138 (1954) (“If 
10

the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no 

more.”)). Indeed, that “[d]irect and circumstantial evidence are equally 

probative” is now one of the propositions our appellate rules “deem[] so 

well established that authorities need not be cited” to support it. Iowa R. 

App. P. 6.904(3)(p). Thus, contrary to Ernst’s arguments, the State need 

not discredit every other potential theory to be drawn from circumstantial 

evidence. See Bentley, 757 N.W.2d at 263 (“While the absence of direct 

evidence that Bentley abducted J.G. from her house means the 

prosecution cannot affirmatively disprove the hypothesis that someone 

other than Bentley removed J.G. to the trailer, the State is not tasked with 

such an onerous burden.”). 

The same is true when a jury makes inferences from the evidence 

presented at trial. Proof of specific intent is “seldom susceptible to proof 

by direct evidence.” State v. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Iowa 1994) 

(quoting State v. Olson, 373 N.W.2d 135, 136 (Iowa 1985)). Rather, proof 

of intent usually depends on “circumstantial evidence and inferences 

drawn from such evidence.” Id. “The requirement of proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt is satisfied if it is more likely than not that the inference 

of intent is true.” Id. 

While other conflicting scenarios can be postulated, a court 

“faced with a record of historical facts that supports 

conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not 

affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact

resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and 

must defer to that resolution.”

Bentley, 757 N.W.2d at 263 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

326, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2793 (1979)).

We also reject Ernst’s reliance on Truesdell to argue that evidence 

susceptible to more than one inference is merely speculative and cannot 

support a conviction. Truesdell was convicted of possession of a precursor 
11

with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, methamphetamine,

after he purchased seventy boxes of cold relief medication containing 

pseudoephedrine. See Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d at 614. We held the evidence 

was insufficient to support an inference that the defendant possessed the 

cold medication with the requisite intent to manufacture 

methamphetamine—as opposed to merely providing pseudoephedrine to 

allow someone else to manufacture methamphetamine. Id. at 618–19. In 

reversing Truesdell’s conviction for lack of sufficient evidence to support

the intent-to-manufacture element, we stated that “when two reasonable 

inferences can be drawn from a piece of evidence, we believe such evidence 

only gives rise to a suspicion, and, without additional evidence, is 

insufficient to support guilt.” Id. Ernst argues this means the State must 

disprove all other reasonable inferences before inferences from 

circumstantial evidence may be used to prove an element of an offense. 

Ernst reads too much into this isolated sentence. In Truesdell, the 

State offered a single piece of evidence—possession of a large amount of 

pseudoephedrine—from which a jury could reasonably infer either that the 

defendant intended to manufacture methamphetamine or that he intended 

only to supply the precursor for another to use in manufacturing 

methamphetamine. In State v. Keeton, we distinguished Truesdell as “a 

case where proof of intent depends upon a single piece of evidence from 

which two reasonable inferences could be drawn.” 710 N.W.2d 531, 535 

(Iowa 2006) (explaining Keeton was “not [such] a case”). In Keeton, the 

defendant’s conviction for robbery with intent to commit assault was 

supported by the collective evidence, including surveillance video showing 

the defendant’s actions when a store clerk attempted to block the door and

the clerk’s testimony that she felt there was “no way” she could stop him 

from leaving. Id. at 534–35. While the evidence was also consistent with 
12

defendant’s testimony he never intended to assault the clerk and was 

merely trying to flee the store following the robbery,

[t]he success of [the defendant]’s claim at trial hinged on the 

facts as viewed by the fact-finder, and it is not for us to 

interfere with the finding made when supported by 

substantial evidence, even though the evidence may have also 

supported a finding favorable to the defendant.

Id. at 535. 

Likewise, this is not a case where inferences to establish each of the 

contested elements of Ernst’s conviction are dependent “upon a single 

piece of evidence from which two reasonable inferences could be drawn.” 

Id. Truesdell does not change our analysis.

Finally, we reject Ernst’s argument that his conviction was premised 

on an improper stacking of inferences. The rule “that a conviction cannot 

be sustained if obtained by ‘piling inference on inference[,]’ . . . is oft cited, 

[but] it begs ready definition.” United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 

1294 (10th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting United 

States v. Dunmire, 403 F.3d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 2005)). An example of 

inference stacking was recently addressed by the Colorado Supreme Court 

in People v. Donald, where the defendant was charged with violating bail 

bond conditions that precluded him from leaving the state without 

permission. 461 P.3d 4, 5–6 (Colo. 2020) (en banc). To prove the 

defendant had actual knowledge of the bond conditions, the state 

presented evidence about the “jail’s regular practice of having prisoners 

sign bond paperwork before they are released,” which supported the 

inference that the defendant in that case had in fact signed the bond 

paperwork. Id. at 6. However, the state offered no additional evidence 

that the defendant read the bail conditions, even if he did sign the 

paperwork. Id. Rather, 
13

to find that Donald had actual knowledge of the conditions, 

the jury would have had to make inferences (e.g., that Donald 

was afforded the opportunity to read the bond paperwork and 

did so either when he signed it or thereafter) that rested on 

another inference (i.e., that Donald had signed the bond 

paperwork consistent with the jail’s routine practice).

Id. at 7. 

The Colorado Supreme Court concluded a strict prohibition against 

inference stacking was inconsistent with its previous adoption of the 

substantial evidence test, which treated circumstantial evidence as equally 

probative as direct evidence. Id. at 8–9. The court explained “the 

inference-upon-inference prohibition was premised on now-outdated law 

requiring the prosecution to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other 

than guilt in cases premised solely on circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 9. 

Instead, the court adopted the reasoning of those courts that 

have concluded that although inference stacking is not 

absolutely prohibited, the reliance on stacked inferences is 

pertinent to the analysis of a sufficiency of the evidence claim 

because a chain of inferences can become so attenuated that 

reliance on it to sustain a conviction would be unreasonable 

and would amount to speculation. 

Id. (collecting cases). 

Juries must necessarily make inferences when finding facts based 

on circumstantial evidence. Cf. Southworth v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 

32, 46 (Ky. 2014) (“[T]he modern trend is to abandon rules limiting the use 

of circumstantial evidence, including an inference upon an inference.”) 

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Eyal Zamir et al., Seeing is Believing: The AntiInference Bias, 89 Ind. L.J. 195, 199 (2014)). We agree with the Colorado 

Supreme Court that a strict prohibition against stacking inferences to be 

drawn from circumstantial evidence is inconsistent with our current 

formulation of substantial evidence. See Donald, 461 P.3d at 9; see also 

United States v. Shahane, 517 F.2d 1173, 1178 (8th Cir. 1975) (“It is too 
14

much to say, however, that an inference is necessarily invalid or 

impermissible because it is based on a fact established in whole or in part 

by a preceding inference.”). The relevant inquiry is not whether a fact

finding is based on an inference drawn from another inference. Rather,

the relevant inquiry is whether a fact finding is a legitimate inference “that 

may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” Tipton, 

897 N.W.2d at 692 (quoting Williams, 695 N.W.2d at 27). Allowing a jury 

to rely on stacked inferences becomes problematic only when a jury’s 

ultimate fact finding is based on speculation rather than on evidence in 

the record. See Summers, 414 F.3d at 1295 (“[T]he chance of error or 

speculation increases in proportion to the width of the gap between 

underlying fact and ultimate conclusion where the gap is bridged by a 

succession of inferences, each based upon the preceding one.” (quoting 

Shahane, 517 F.2d at 1178)); see also Walls v. Jacob N. Printing Co., 618 

N.W.2d 282, 286 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (“[I]nferences can assist in 

establishing a basic fact, but they cannot in and of themselves create 

evidence.” (quoting In re Est. of Kerndt, 251 Iowa 963, 968, 103 N.W.2d 

733, 736 (1960))).

Thus, like the Colorado Supreme Court, we do not categorically 

prohibit stacking of inferences but consider whether the inferences are 

supported by such evidence as to “convince a rational fact finder the 

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelso-Christy, 911 

N.W.2d at 666 (quoting Meyers, 799 N.W.2d at 138).

Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

jury’s verdict, including reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, we 

conclude Ernst’s conviction for attempted burglary with intent to commit 

theft is support by substantial evidence.
15

B. Weight of the Evidence. Alternatively, Ernst argues the district 

court should have granted a new trial because the jury verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence. “We generally review rulings on motions for 

new trial asserting a verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence for 

an abuse of discretion.” State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016).

The State claims this argument is inconsistent with Ernst’s 

sufficiency of the evidence claim. “In contrast to a motion for new trial 

brought under the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a motion for new 

trial brought under the weight-of-the-evidence standard essentially 

concedes the evidence adequately supports the jury verdict.” Id. A new 

trial is appropriate under a weight-of-the-evidence challenge “only in the 

extraordinary case in which the evidence preponderates heavily against 

the verdict rendered.” Id.

While the weight-of-the-evidence standard allows the district court 

to make its own credibility determinations, a district court may grant a 

motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence “only if more 

evidence supports the alternative verdict as opposed to the verdict 

rendered.” Id. “The question for the court is . . . whether ‘a greater amount 

of credible evidence’ suggests the verdict rendered was a miscarriage of 

justice.” Id. (quoting State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Iowa 1998)).

We agree with the State that Ernst merely repackaged his 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge into a weight-of-the-evidence 

challenge. Similar to his argument to the district court, Ernst fails to 

identify any specific evidence that preponderates so heavily in favor of 

acquittal that we can say the district court abused its discretion in denying 

his motion for a new trial. Ernst offered the testimony of his sister and his 

mother as alibi witnesses to refute the State’s evidence showing he was in 

the area of the attempted burglary. But that uncorroborated testimony 
16

was not so credible to require the district court to overturn the jury’s 

verdict. Ernst’s sister’s trial testimony that Ernst visited her the morning 

of the attempted burglary was contradicted by her failure to tell the 

investigator Ernst was at her house that day when she was previously 

interviewed. Ernst’s mother’s testimony was contrary to the timing of 

traffic photos showing Ernst returning to Dubuque alone around 

12:20 p.m. Both witnesses’ testimony was contrary to the surveillance 

video showing Ernst’s vehicle—and a person wearing clothing similar to 

what Ernst wore later in the day—drive toward the location of the 

attempted burglary at the time the alibi witnesses claimed Ernst was with 

them. 

On this record, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion 

in denying Ernst’s motion for a new trial on the basis his conviction is 

against the weight of the evidence.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Finally, Ernst objects to the 

State’s introduction of evidence related to his cell phone records. The State 

elicited testimony from Investigator Grant about his use of cell tower 

records to create a map indicating the cell towers Ernst’s phone pinged 

when he received calls from his mother and whether the records and map 

indicated Ernst was near the attempted burglary site outside Cascade, his 

sister’s residence in Bernard, or his mother’s residence in Epworth. The 

State also introduced phone records identifying the two calls Ernst’s 

mother made to him at 11:44 a.m. and 11:48 a.m., during the time she 

testified he was with her. 

Since Ernst did not object to Investigator Grant’s testimony about 

cell tower data, the map he created from that data, or the cell phone 

records admitted at trial, he raises his claims through the ineffective 

assistance of counsel framework. He argues his trial counsel was 
17

ineffective for: (1) failing to object to the admission of testimony and the 

accompanying map relying on historical cell site data from a witness not 

qualified as an expert and (2) failing to object to the admission of cell phone 

records as hearsay not fitting an exception. 

We recently considered a similar challenge to an officer’s testimony 

about the defendant’s general location based on a map created from cell 

tower records, concluding that “the line between lay and expert testimony 

involving historical cell site data [depends] on the underlying information 

supporting the testimony.” State v. Boothby, 951 N.W.2d 859, 876, (Iowa 

2020) (adopting the approach of the growing majority of jurisdictions). 

Here, the State does not argue the testimony did not require an expert 

witness, instead arguing only that Investigator Grant could likely meet the 

expert requirements on a more fully developed record. Given the state of 

the current record and the fact that the parties did not have the benefit of 

our Boothby opinion, we conclude that Ernst’s ineffective assistance 

claims are better left for postconviction-relief proceedings. See State v. 

Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 208–09 (Iowa 2018) (preserving claims for 

postconviction-relief proceedings “so an adequate record of the claim can 

be developed and the attorney charged with providing ineffective 

assistance may have an opportunity to respond to defendant’s claims” 

(quoting State v. Soboroff, 798 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2011))).

III. Conclusion.

Ernst’s conviction for attempted burglary is affirmed. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF 

CONVICTION AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except Appel, J., who concurs specially.
18

#18–1623, State v. Ernst

APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).

The court diligently examines the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the jury’s verdict. I write separately to emphasize that the approach of 

the court applies with equal force in civil contexts such as tort or 

employment cases. For example, the notion that specific intent is rarely 

shown by direct evidence is equally true in both criminal and civil settings. 

The same may be said about the court’s approach to “stacking of 

inferences.” At some point, of course, inferences become so remote or 

attenuated that they simply cannot be sustained. But it is not mere 

stacking but the overall remoteness or attenuation that matters. In other 

words, what might be characterized as the stacking of reasonable 

inferences does not necessarily prevent a jury from reaching a verdict 

based upon them. 

Although I regard this case as a close one, I agree that, as explained 

by the majority, the inferences cumulatively provide sufficient evidence to 

permit the jury to return the verdict it did in this case.