alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements for the six months ended September 30, 1997 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                          30,853
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,379,679
<ALLOWANCES>                                    17,000
<INVENTORY>                                    944,342
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,907,358
<PP&E>                                       2,342,561
<DEPRECIATION>                                 103,330
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,762,884
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,795,028
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          944,756
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,958
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,898,403
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,762,884
<SALES>                                      2,137,237
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,137,237
<CGS>                                        2,212,851
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,212,851
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               161,860
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              68,077
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,180,674)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    10,355
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,191,029)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,712,227)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.09)
        

</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 139 (Thursday, July 19, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 34164]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-15423]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET


Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board Membership

AGENCY: Office of Management and Budget.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) publishes the names 
of the members selected to serve on its Senior Executive Service (SES) 
Performance Review Board (PRB). This notice supersedes all previous 
notices of the PRB membership.

DATES: Applicable: June 28, 2018.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sarah Whittle Spooner, Assistant 
Director for Management and Operations, Office of Management and 
Budget, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 4314(c) of Title 5, U.S.C. requires 
each agency to establish, in accordance with regulations prescribed by 
the Office of Personnel Management, one or more PRBs. The PRB shall 
review and evaluate the initial appraisal of a senior executive's 
performance by the supervisor, along with any response by the senior 
executive, and make recommendations to the final rating authority 
relative to the performance of the senior executive.
    The persons named below have been selected to serve on OMB's PRB.

Kelly T. Colyar, Chief, Water and Power Branch
Jennifer L. Hanson, Chief, Income Maintenance Branch
Michael J. Hickey, Chief, Environment Branch
Kirsten J. Moncada, Chief, Privacy Branch
Robert J. Nassif, Chief, Force Structure and Investment Branch
Sarah Whittle Spooner, Assistant Director for Management and Operations


Sarah Spooner,
Assistant Director for Management and Operations.
[FR Doc. 2018-15423 Filed 7-18-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 3110-01-P
#### STATE of Louisiana v. William R. FURR.

No. 53162.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 11, 1973.

C. Alvin Tyler, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., LeRoy A. Hartley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Frank J. Gremillion, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

SUMMERS, Justice.

William Furr appeals to reverse his conviction for possession of L.S.D., and to set aside his sentence to one year in parish prison.

The appeal is based upon one bill of exceptions reserved during direct examination by the prosecuting attorney of Trooper Aaron V. Duke, the arresting officer.

The record reflects that Trooper Duke testified that when he arrested the defendant pursuant to an arrest warrant, he allowed him to retrieve his personal belongings from his Volkswagen van parked in the front of his residence, and began to state what he observed in the van at the time. He was interrupted by defense counsel, who objected to his proceeding. The jury was retired from the courtroom.

During the ensuing argument the assistant district attorney indicated that he would introduce as evidence a shirt belonging to the accused and which was found in the van at the time of the arrest. The reason for introducing the shirt would be to show that marijuana gleanings were found to be present in the shirt pocket when it was later inspected in the crime lab.

Defense counsel argued there was insufficient evidence to connect defendant with the shirt; and the time lapse between the date of the offense (January 22) and the date of the arrest (February 27) was too great to permit the shirt to be considered relevant.

The trial judge overruled the defense objection, and this single bill of exceptions was reserved.

The bill of exception lacks merit. Although the prosecuting attorney intended to introduce the shirt to prove intent, the shirt was never actually offered in evidence. In fact, at no point during the testimony of Trooper Duke does he even mention the shirt.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### OSCEOLA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Dennis L. GOODMAN, Appellee.

No. 71-901.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 17, 1973.

John B. Ritch and Murray W. Over-street, Jr., Kissimmee, for appellant.

William H. Davis, of Giles, Hedrick & Robinson, Orlando, for appellee.

WALDEN, Judge.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff-ap-pellee in a suit for declaratory judgment. We reverse because same was prematurely entered in violation of the criteria found in Rule 1.510, F.R.C.P., 31 F.S.A.

Summary judgment is only properly entered where there are no material issues of fact. Holl v. Talcott, Fla.1966, 191 So.2d 40. Where the evidence is un-contradicted, the moving party is still not entitled to summary judgment if the evidence is susceptible of conflicting inferences. Williams v. Davidson, Fla.App.1965, 179 So.2d 387; Beikirch v. City of Jacksonville Beach, Fla.App.1964, 159 So.2d 898; Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Edgerly, Fla.App.1963, 155 So.2d 649; Baskin v. Griffith, Fla.App.1961, 127 So.2d 467; Pollock v. Kelly, Fla.App.1960, 125 So.2d 109; Smith v. City of Daytona Beach, Fla.App.1960, 121 So.2d 440; and Graff Enterprises v. Canal Ins. Co., Fla.App.1968, 213 So.2d 738. Even where counsel stipulate for the use of summary judgment procedure *211(or both move for it as here) the stipulation is not binding on the court where the prerequisites for summary judgment are not met. Van Arsdale v. DiMil Land Co., Fla.App.1972, 264 So.2d 85.

Here plaintiff, on May 14, 1968, applied to the Osceola County Planning Commission for approval of his proposed plan to develop a mobile home park and travel trailer arena on a seventeen acre tract of land which he was then considering purchasing. He had not yet purchased the property. The hearing was held on July 25, 1968, at which time the commission refused to approve plaintiff’s plan. One of the reasons for the commission’s refusal to approve the mobile home development was that plaintiff’s land was within an area which was to be zoned for the highest residential use. Nevertheless, plaintiff completed the purchase of the property at issue on July 26, 1968, in accordance with a contract which he had previously entered into. In October 1968 the Osceola County Commission had enacted interim zoning regulations to become effective on December 1, 1968.

Based upon the foregoing, there is a question and an issue as to whether plaintiff was estopped from asserting a nonconforming use against the County. City of Fort Lauderdale v. Lauderdale Industrial Sites, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 47; Sharrow v. City of Dania, Fla.1955, 83 So.2d 274.

Not in limitation, there is a further issue as to whether the county was responsible for thwarting the plaintiff in its development.

All in all, from a survey of the record, it is our opinion that summary judgment was inappropriate and that the issues deserved development at a regular trial.

Reversed and remanded.

CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 121 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 113

103d CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                 S. 121

                          [Report No. 103-72]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 To authorize a certificate of documentation for the vessel Enterprise.

_______________________________________________________________________

                June 29 (legislative day, June 22), 1993

                       Reported without amendment

                                                       Calendar No. 113
103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 121

                          [Report No. 103-72]

 To authorize a certificate of documentation for the vessel Enterprise.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

             January 21 (legislative day, January 5), 1993

  Mr. Inouye introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
   referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

                June 29 (legislative day, June 22), 1993

              Reported by Mr. Hollings, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To authorize a certificate of documentation for the vessel Enterprise.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DOCUMENTATION.

    Notwithstanding sections 12106, 12107, and 12108 of title 46, 
United States Code, and section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 
App. U.S.C. 883), as applicable on the date of enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Transportation may issue a certificate of 
documentation for the vessel Enterprise, United States official number 
692956.
```
257 La. 445

#### CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. Clark HARRISON.

No. 51082.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 6, 1971.

In re: Clark Harrison applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

Granted with stay order.

The petition of the relator in the above entitled and numbered case having been duly considered,

It is ordered that a writ of certiorari issue herein, directing the Honorable Oliver S. Delery, Judge of the Traffic Court of the City of New Orleans, Division “D”, to transmit to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, on or before the 25th day of January, 1971, the record in duplicate, or a certified copy of the record in duplicate, of the proceedings complained of by the relator herein, to the end that the validity of said proceedings may be ascertained.

It is further ordered that the aforesaid Judge of said Court and the respondent through *the*City Attorney shall show cause, in this court, on the date aforesaid, at 11 o’clock A. M., why the relief prayed for in the petition of the relator should not be granted.

It is further ordered that, in the meantime and until the further orders of this court all proceedings against the relator in said Traffic Court of the City of New Orleans shall be stayed and suspended.
NO. 07-10-00240-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO
PANEL A SEPTEMBER 15, 2010

JAICOURRIE FINLEY, APPELLANT

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; NO. 61,383-A; HONORABLE DAVID GLEASON, JUDGE

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL On June 16, 2010, appellant, Jaicourrie Finley, filed a pro se notice of appeal with this Court indicati ng appellant’s desire to appeal the district co urt’s “denial of an injunction/protective order.” On June 30, 2010, this Court received correspondence from appellant, entitled “A ppellant’s Brief,” that indicates t hat appellant is attempting to appeal the denial of a motion for injunctive relie f in his pending crim inal prosecution. This “brief” expressly indicates that the mo tion for injunctive relief was filed by courtappointed counsel. The clerk’s record in this cause was received on September 9, 2010. The clerk’s record includes a “Motion for Order to Transfer to Another Unit,”2 which was denied by the trial court, and appear s to be the motion that appellant is seeking to appeal. This motion was filed by counsel, and nothing in the clerk’s record indicates that counsel has ever been permi tted to withdraw from representation of appellant in the underlyi ng criminal proceeding.
Because appellants are not allowed to have hybrid re presentation on appeal and because the record does not reflect that a ppellant’s counsel ha s been permitted to withdraw from representation in this matte r, we may not consider the merits of appellant’s appeal. See Ex parte Taylor , 36 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).
Because this correspondence was filed by appellant pro se while appellant is represented by counsel, the Court hereby dismisses the appeal without prejudice to refiling by counsel.

Per Curiam
# C_2023223EN.01002001.xml

| 26.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 223/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 223/20

---

Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2023 — SN v Parliament

(Case T-249/21) (1)

(Law governing the institutions - Rules governing the payment of expenses and allowances to Members of Parliament - Parliamentary assistance allowance - Recovery of sums unduly paid - Obligation to state reasons - Independence of Members - Error of assessment)

(2023/C 223/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: SN (represented by: P. Eleftheriadis, Barrister)

Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: N. Görlitz, T. Lazian and M. Ecker, acting as Agents)

Re:

By her action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament of 21 December 2020 concerning the recovery of a sum of EUR 196 199,84 unduly paid by way of parliamentary assistance allowance, and of the corresponding debit note of 15 January 2021.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament of 21 December 2020 concerning the recovery from SN of a sum of EUR 196 199,84 unduly paid by way of parliamentary assistance and the corresponding debit note of 15 January 2021, in so far as they concern sums paid for May, July and November 2016, June 2017 and March, April and November 2018; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament of 21 December 2020 concerning the recovery from SN of a sum of EUR 196 199,84 unduly paid by way of parliamentary assistance and the corresponding debit note of 15 January 2021, in so far as they concern sums paid for May, July and November 2016, June 2017 and March, April and November 2018;

| 2. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 3. | Orders SN and the Parliament to bear their own costs, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders SN and the Parliament to bear their own costs, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures.

---

(1)  OJ C 278, 12.7.2021.

---
Exhibit 32-1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the
Quarterly Report of The Goldfield Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the six months ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John H. Sottile,
Chairman of the Board of Directors, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to The Goldfield Corporation and will be retained by The Goldfield Corporation
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



/s/ JOHN H. SOTTILEJohn H. SottileChairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)August 11, 2009




28
#### In re ESTATE of Jose C. PEREZ, Deceased. Mary Frances DRESSING, Appellant, v. ESTATE of Jose C. PEREZ, Deceased, Appellee.

No. 67-67.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Jan. 16, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 6, 1968.

*59Duff, Brown & Gramling, Miami, Raymond R. Lord, Key West, for appellant.

Neblett, Sauer & Chappell, Key West, for appellee.

Be .ore CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a final probate order of the County Judge’s Court of Monroe County which denied appellant’s petition for revocation of probate of a will. Two points on appeal are presented. The first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to testamentary capacity. The second urges that the .evidence of fraud, duress or undue influence was so strong as to render erroneous the order sustaining the probate of the will. We affirm.

Each point presented requires a review of the evidence, and we think that in each instance there was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of the county judge. An order of a county judge sitting in probate will not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial competent evidence to sustain his findings, unless he has misinterpreted the legal effect of the evidence. Watts v. Newport, 149 Fla. 181, 6 So.2d 829; Heasley v. Evans, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 854; In Re Estate of Craig, Fla.App.1965, 179 So.2d 116.

Upon the issue of testamentary capacity, there was evidence that the deceased was very ill, that for long periods of time he did not know what was going on around him, but there was testimony that at the particular time of the execution of the will, he was competent. The burden of establishing the lack of testamentary capacity is on the will contestant. Schaefer v. Vogle, 88 Fla. 170, 102 So. 7 (1924); In Re Bailey’s Estate, Fla.App. 1960, 122 So.2d 243. Mere old age, physical frailty or sickness are not necessarily inconsistent with testamentary capacity, particularly where the will appears to have been made under fair circumstances and was not unnatural in the disposition of the property. See Heasley v. Evans, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 854.

 It is true, as urged by the appellant, that the amount of undue influence need not be great where a testator is weak and his intellect clouded. In re Reid’s *60Estate, Fla.App.1962, 138 So. 342; see cases collected at 57 Am.Jur., Wills, § 356. Nevertheless, the burden of establishing undue influence is upon the party who alleges it and it may not be inferred from the existence of testator’s condition. See Gardiner v. Goertner, 110 Fla. 377, 149 So. 186 (1932). We do not feel that the appellant has sustained the burden of proof necessary to overthrow the will on the grounds of testamentary incapacity and undue influence.

Having decided the case upon the principles of law set forth, we do not think that it is necessary or useful to detail the conflicting evidence before the county judge. See In Re Zimmerman’s Estate, Fla. 1956, 84 So.2d 560.

Affirmed.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 1124** 

In R e: BERNARD MIDDLETON, a/k/a Cass , Petitioner
.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
. (1:92

- cr - 00348

- CMH

- 3)

Submitted : May 6, 2014 Decided: May 15, 2014

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD , Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by un published per curiam opinion
.
Bernard Middleton, Petitioner Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Bernard Middleton petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has unduly delayed ruling on two post

- judgment motions. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. We conclude that there has been no undue d elay in the district court. Therefore, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the mandamus petition without prejudice to Middleton’s right to file another petition if the district court does not act expeditiously on the pending post

- judgment motions. We also deny his motion to remove district judge and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETIT ION DENIED
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 

Application Under the Equal Access ) 

to Justice Act of -- ) 

) 

ADT Construction Group, Inc. by ) 

Timothy S. Cory, Chapter 7 Trustee ) 

) 

Under Contract No. DACA09-03-C-0009 ) 

APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: 

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 

ASBCA No. 55307 

John W. Ralls, Esq. 

W. Samuel Niece, Esq. 

Ralls, Gruber & Niece LLP 

San Mateo, CA 

Thomas H. Gourlay, Jr., Esq. 

Engineer Chief Trial Attorney 

John F. Bazan, Esq. 

Gilbert H. Chong, Esq. 

Engineer Trial Attorneys 

U.S. Army Engineer District, Los Angeles 

DISMISSAL BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE SHACKLEFORD 

The parties have resolved the captioned application under the Equal Access to 

Justice Act. Accordingly, the application is dismissed with prejudice. 

Dated: 8 February 2016 

RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 

Administrative Judge 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Order of Dismissal of the 

Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals on an application for fees and other 

expenses incurred in connection with ASBCA No. 55307, Appeal of ADT 

Construction Group, Inc. by Timothy S. Cory, Chapter 7 Trustee, rendered in 

accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 504. 

Dated: 

2 

JEFFREYD. GARDIN 

Recorder, Armed Services 

Board of Contract Appeals
#### JACOBS *v.*WARDEN OF MARYLAND PENITENTIARY

[App. No. 23,

September Term, 1962.]

*Decided October 10, 1962.*

Before' the full Court.

*641PER Curiam.

Eor the reasons stated in the opinion of Judge Allen of the Criminal Court of Baltimore, application is denied.