alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1996.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                              10
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,048
<ALLOWANCES>                                        27
<INVENTORY>                                      1,423
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,642
<PP&E>                                          13,779
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,188
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  12,873
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,578
<BONDS>                                          4,274
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            73
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,479
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    12,873
<SALES>                                          9,814
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 9,814
<CGS>                                            7,418
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    7,418
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   707
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 331
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    290
<INCOME-TAX>                                       131
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                159
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      5
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       154
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.69
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.69
        

</TABLE>
# G-Invoicing

G-Invoicing is a solution to address accounting and reporting challenges around buy and sell transactions by providing a common platform for inter-governmental transactions, or IGT. This governmentwide initiative is managed by the U.S. Department of Treasury.

The adoption of government invoicing, otherwise known as G-Invoicing, is required by all federal agencies by Oct. 1, 2022.

G-Invoicing will:
                        - Create and store interagency agreements.
                        - Create orders.
                        - Track performance against orders.
                        - Transfer funds.

G-Invoicing is a means to improve the quality of IGT buy/sell data supporting more accurate financial management by federal trading partners, although it’s not an accounting system.

Managed by the Bureau of the Fiscal Service, the solution is in keeping with regulations 31 U.S.C. 3512(b) and 3513 of the U.S. Code which outline federal financial management responsibilities, including effective accounting and reporting.

Federal Intragovernmental Data Standards and defined data elements helped build the G-Invoicing system which, in turn, may help agencies build software interfaces.

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-  Shared services-  Overview 
-  GSA’s Role in the Sharing Quality Services CAP Goal 
-  G-Invoicing    -  Contact Trading Partners 
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UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before

KERN, ALDYKIEWICZ, and MARTIN

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v.

Private First Class JOSHUA C. HUDSONCURRIER

United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20110737

Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division

Tara A. Osborn, Military Judge

Colonel Lorianne M. Campanella, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Potter, JA; Captain A. Jason Nef, JA; 

Captain James S. Trieschmann, Jr., JA (on brief).

For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA; Lieutenant Colonel James L Varley, JA; 

Major Catherine L. Brantley, JA; Captain Samuel Gabremariam, JA (on brief). 

27 February 2014

---------------------------------

SUMMARY DISPOSITION

---------------------------------

Per Curiam:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of resisting apprehension and assault upon a person in the 

execution of law enforcement duties in violation of Articles 95 and 128, Uniform 

Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 895, 928 (2006) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The 

military judge convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of conspiracy and 

aggravated assault in violation of Articles 81 and 128, UCMJ. The military judge 

sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, reduction to the grade of E-1, and 

four years confinement. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence

and credited appellant with 159 days of confinement credit. 

Among appellant’s assignments of error for our review under Article 66, 

UCMJ, is an allegation that the staff judge advocate failed to comply with Rule for 

Courts-Martial [hereinafter R.C.M.] 1106(d)(4) by failing to provide an opinion on 

whether corrective action should be taken on an allegation of legal error raised in 

appellant’s R.C.M. 1105 post-trial matters regarding dilatory post-trial processing in 

violation of United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006) and United States 
HUDSONCURRIER —ARMY 20110737

2

v. Colazzo, 53 M.J. 721 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2000). As relief, appellant requests 

this court order a new review and action. Consistent with our decision in United 

States v. Arias, 72 M.J. 501 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2013), we agree. Consequently, 

we need not reach appellant’s personally raised issues and other briefed allegations 

of error. 

The convening authority’s initial action, dated 7 July 2012, is set aside. The 

record of trial will be returned to The Judge Advocate General for a new staff judge 

advocate recommendation and a new action by the same or different convening 

authority in accordance with Article 60(c)–(e), UCMJ.

FOR THE COURT:

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court

FOR THE COURT:
#### Abraham LEIBISKI and Naomi Leibiski, Appellants, v. The CONCORD FLORIDA, INC., etc., et al., Appellees.

No. 77-1457.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 23, 1978.

Jay Dermer, Miami Beach, Joe N. Unger, Miami, for appellants.

Wicker, Smith, Blomqvist, Davant, McMath, Tutan & O’Hara and Richard A. Sherman, Miami, for appellees.

Before HENDRY and BARKDULL, JJ., and PARKER, J. GWYNN (Ret.), Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *Stark v. Vazquez,*168 So.2d 140 (Fla.1964); *Metropolitan Dade County v. Espinosa,*344 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); *Taylor v. Craig,*354 So.2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
#### Leroy A. HIPKINS, Appellant, v. CITY OF MIAMI, etc., Appellee.

No. 77-1522.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 23, 1978.

*1176J. E. Ludiek, North Miami, for appellant.

George F. Knox, Jr., City Atty. and Clinton J. Pitts, Asst. City Atty., Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, HENDRY and KE-HOE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See, e. g., *Sapp v. City of Tallahassee,*348 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), and *Henderson v. City of St. Petersburg,*247 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971). See generally *Florida First National Bank v. City of Jacksonville,*310 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), and Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1972).
#### CLEMONS *v.*STATE

[No. 253,

September Term, 1961.]

*Decided April 5, 1962.*

Submitted on brief to Henderson, Hammond, Prescott, Hornby and Sybert, JJ.

Submitted on brief by *Harry A. Cole,*for appellant.

Submitted on brief by *Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, Louis E. Schmidt, Special Assistant Attorney General, Saul A. Harris*and *Julius Romano, State’s Attorney*and *Assistant State’s Attorney,*respectively, for Baltimore City, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

Convicted of burglary and sentenced to five years, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, in a trial before the court without a jury, to establish the requisite intent to steal.

*238After Mr. and Mrs. Sherman had locked their house and retired for the night, she heard a noise downstairs at about 1 A. M., and he went to investigate. He leaned over the banister, and almost collided with a man coming up the stairs, who turned and fled when Mr. Sherman yelled at him. A police officer who saw the appellant running out of the screen door and across the porch pursued and captured him. Mr. Sherman identified him as the person who had been in his home. The appellant had in his hip pocket an implement resembling a painter’s scraper with a razor blade attachment. Entry had evidently been made by removing a window screen and opening a kitchen window.

Counsel for the appellant concedes that there was sufficient evidence of a breaking and entering, but contends that where nothing is taken, there must be proof of some fact or circumstance or act or declaration of the prisoner, in addition to the proof of the mere breaking and entering, from which the trier of the facts can find the intent to take and carry away the goods and chattels of the owner. See *Felkner v. State,*218 Md. 300, 307. But we think an inference of intent can be drawn from the circumstances of the instant case. It is not without significance that no other motive was shown. Cf. *Robinson v. State,*53 Md. 151. Again, the facts that the house contained articles of value, and that the accused was accosted while ascending to the second floor and thus deprived of the opportunity of taking anything, are relevant. See *Steadman v. State,*8 S. E. 420 (Ca.), and Clark & Marshall, *Crimes*(6th ed.), § 13.08. Cf. *State v. Wiley,*173 Md. 119, 123 and *Williams v. State,*205 Md. 470, 480. We find no force in the suggestion that because he had been previously convicted of being a “peeping Tom”, he had a similar motive in breaking and entering at the time and under the circumstances described. Obviously, the trial court was not obliged to believe the appellant’s testimony that he never entered the house at all. We think the circumstances support the inference of a larcenous intent which the trial court drew.

*Judgment affirmed.*
**Exhibit 32.2**
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
In connection with the Quarterly Report of Ambassadors International, Inc. (the“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), theundersigned, Brian R. Schaefgen, Chief Financial Officer of the Companycertifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company.
/s/ Brian R. Schaefgen
**Exhibit
      32.1**


**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Xcorporeal, Inc. (“Company”) Annual Report on Form 10-KSB
      for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
      Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Terren S. Peizer, Executive
      Chairman, and I, Robert Weinstein, Chief Financial Officer, of the Company,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
      906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of our
      knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and





(2)
      The
      information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-KSB fairly presents
      in
      all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of
      the
      Company.


By:
            /s/ TERREN
                S. PEIZERTerren
                S. PeizerExecutive
                ChairmanBy:
            /s/ ROBERT
                WEINSTEINRobert
                WeinsteinChief
                Financial Officer




Date:
      August 1, 2008





This
      certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-KSB pursuant to Section 906
      of
      the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required
      by
      such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, another document
      authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to Xcorporeal, Inc. and will be retained
      and
      furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 12.1

                CALIFORNIA STEEL INDUSTRIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY

               Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges

                       (All dollar amounts in thousands)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                             Year ended December 31,
                                        --------------------------------------
                                         1999    1998    1997    1996    1995
                                        ------  ------  ------  ------  ------
<S>                                     <C>     <C>     <C>     <C>     <C>
Income before income taxes............. 77,027  26,816  44,316  67,725  46,988
Fixed charges.......................... 17,861  19,645  16,642  12,578  17,018
Amortization of capitalized interest...    686     609     409     198     198
Capitalized interest...................   (588) (1,940) (1,952) (1,667)    --
                                        ------  ------  ------  ------  ------
  Earnings............................. 94,986  45,130  59,415  78,834  64,204
                                        ======  ======  ======  ======  ======
Imputed interest relating to rental
 expense...............................    470     169      83      58      52
Interest expense....................... 17,391  19,476  16,559  12,520  16,966
                                        ------  ------  ------  ------  ------
  Fixed charges........................ 17,861  19,645  16,642  12,578  17,018
                                        ======  ======  ======  ======  ======
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges.....    5.3     2.3     3.6     6.3     3.8
</TABLE>
#### Frank Potter et al., Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Frank D. Potter and Another, Infants, Respondents, v National Grange Mutual Insurance Company, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 3.)

[656 NYS2d 981]

Judgment unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in concluding that, by breaching its duty to defend, defendant, National Grange Mutual Insurance Company (National Grange), was collaterally estopped from contesting whether the loss is within the policy coverage *(see, Servidone Constr. Corp. v Security Ins. Co.,*64 NY2d 419, 423). The court, however, also addressed on the merits the issue whether coverage exists under the policy. We agree with the court’s conclusion that National Grange failed to show that the pollution exclusion clause "is stated in clear and unmistakable language, *890is subject to no other reasonable interpretation, and applies in [this] particular case” *(Continental Cas. Co. v Rapid-American Corp.,*80 NY2d 640, 652; *see also, Miano v Hehn,*206 AD2d 957). Finally, National Grange failed to establish that the settlement of plaintiffs’ action against Kalamazoo of New York, Inc., the insured, was collusive, in bad faith, or unreasonable. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Herkimer County, Kirk, J.—Summary Judgment.) Present—Green J. P., Pine, Doerr, Boehm and Fallon, JJ.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO**

**18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of LOUD Technologies Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, James T. Engen andTimothy P. O’Neil, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer,respectively, of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, asadopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Dated:  August 15,  2005 | By:    |   | /s/ James T. Engen                                                                                                   |
|------------------------------------|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                               |   |   | James T. Engen                                                                                                       |
|                               |   |   | *President  and Chief Executive Officer*                                                                             |
|                               |   |   |                                                                                                                 |
|                               |   |   |                                                                                                                 |
|                               |   |   | /s/ Timothy P. O’Neil                                                                                           |   |
|                               |   |   | Timothy P. O’Neil                                                                                               |
|                               |   |   | *Chief  Financial Officer, Vice  President, Secretary and  Treasurer (Principal Financial  and  Accounting Officer)* |

 

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to LOUDTechnologies Inc. and will be retained by the Company and furnished to theSecurities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

1

----
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

LADARIUS ADAM LEWIS, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-4688 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed October 11, 2019. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Samantha L. Ward, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Frederick W. Vollrath, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.. Carolyn Snurkowski, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cynthia Richards, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KELLY, SALARIO, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
# C_2023015EN.01003602.xml

| 16.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 15/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 15/36

---

Judgment of the General Court of 9 November 2022 — Minority SafePack — one million signatures for diversity in Europe v Commission

(Case T-158/21) (1)

(Law governing the institutions - European citizens’ initiative - ‘Minority SafePack — one million signatures for diversity in Europe’ - Commission communication setting out the reasons for not adopting the proposals for legal acts contained in the European citizens’ initiative - Obligation to state reasons - Equal treatment - Principle of sound administration - Manifest error of assessment)

(2023/C 15/47)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Citizens’ Committee of the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack — one million signatures for diversity in Europe’ (represented by T. Hieber, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by I. Martínez del Peral, I. Rubene, E. Stamate and D. Drambozova, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the applicant: Hungary (represented by M. Fehér and K. Szíjjártó, acting as Agents)

Interveners in support of the defendant: Hellenic Republic (represented by T. Papadopoulou, acting as Agent), Slovak Republic (represented by E. Drugda, acting as Agent)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of Commission Communication C(2021) 171 final of 14 January 2021 on the European Citizens’ Initiative entitled ‘Minority SafePack — one million signatures for diversity in Europe’.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders the Citizens’ Committee of the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack — one million signatures for diversity in Europe’ to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Citizens’ Committee of the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack — one million signatures for diversity in Europe’ to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

| 3. | Orders the Hellenic Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic to each bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Hellenic Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic to each bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 217, 7.6.2021.

---
# Dallas County

Public Defender’s Office

 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., 9 th Floor, LB 2  Dallas Texas 75207- 4313  Phone: (214) 653- 3550  Fax: (214) 653- 3539  

## September 16, 2015

Ms. Lisa Matz, Clerk Dallas Court of Appeals George L. Allen, Sr. Courts Building 600 Commerce Street, Suite 200 Dallas, Tex as 75202 -4653

RE: Troy Hooper v. State of Texas
Trial Court No .: F12 -71997 -R Appellate Court No .: 05 -13 -01286

- CR



## Certification of Compliance with Rule 48.4

Dear Ms

. Matz :

Pursuant to Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, I certify that on July 30, 2015, I sent to Mr

. Hooper a copy of this Court’s opinion and judgment , along with notification of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review under Rule 68. This notification was sent certified mail, return receipt requested, to Mr

. Hooper at his last known addres s.

I have enclosed a copy of the return receipt, received by our office on August 10, 2015. The date of delivery is reflected as August 6, 2015. Please include this letter in the official papers in this cause.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

/s/ Julie Woods

Julie Woods Assistant Public Defender

En closure

cc: Dallas County Criminal District Attorney’s Office, Appellate Section ACCEPTED 05-13-01286-CR FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS, TEXAS 9/17/2015 9:42:37 AM

LISA MATZ CLERK111 Complete items**1~** 2, and 3. Also complete item 4 jf Restricted Delivery is**desired~** !II Print your**nam~** and address on-th,e revefSe

so that we can return t.he card to you

. • Attach this card to the back ofthe mailpiece J

or on the front if space permits.
1. Article Addressed to: D. Is delivery address i

If YES. enter delivery address below: D No

3. Service Type



## hi Certifjed Mail® 

## fI Registered 

## o Insured 

## o Priority Mail Express""" 

## o Return Receipt for Merchandise 

## o I

2. Article Number**~** (Transfer from Service label) 

### 7013 2250 0002 2038 9084

PS Form 

### 381 1, July 201**~** Domestic Return Receipt