[Cite as State v. Cooks, 2019-Ohio-2254.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 SANDUSKY COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. S-18-046 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. 18CR792 

v. 

Nathan T. Cooks DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: June 7, 2019 

* * * * * 

 Timothy Braun, Sandusky County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Joseph H. Gerber, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Brett A. Klimkowsky, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

MAYLE, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant Nathan T. Cooks appeals the November 6, 2018 judgment of the 

Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to 18 months in prison 

following his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and 

(C)(4)(b). Because Cooks’s sentence is not contrary to law, we affirm. 
2.

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} The Sandusky County Drug Task Force, acting on a tip, conducted a search 

of Cooks’s Fremont, Ohio home on March 8, 2018, pursuant to a search warrant. Cooks 

was found in a bathroom, attempting to flush drugs down a toilet. A law enforcement 

officer was able to retrieve the drugs before they were flushed, and they were later 

identified as .95 grams of cocaine. A bag of marijuana was found next to the toilet, and a 

second bag was located in a kitchen drawer. The police confiscated the drugs, as well as 

video recording equipment, six cell phones, $187 in cash, and two guns that were alleged 

to have been used in the commission of the offense(s). According to the record, Cooks’s 

two young children were seen “wandering” in the home at the time of the search. 

{¶ 3} No charges were brought against Cooks until July 30, 2018, when he was 

indicted for tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a felony of the 

third degree (Count 1); possession of cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and 

(C)(4)(a), a felony of the fifth degree (Count 2); and trafficking in cocaine, in violation of 

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(4)(b), a felony of the fourth degree (Count 3). The 

indictment included specifications for committing the crimes within the vicinity of 

children and a nearby school. At his August 1, 2017 arraignment, Cooks pled not guilty, 

was appointed counsel, and was released on his own recognizance. 

{¶ 4} At the change-of-plea hearing on September 5, 2018, the parties agreed that 

Cooks would plead guilty to the drug trafficking offense (Count 3), and the state would 

nolle prosequi Counts 1 and 2. Before accepting the plea, the court advised Cooks of his 
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rights, as set forth in Crim.R. 11. Of particular relevance to this case, the court advised 

Cooks that he faced up to 18 months in prison, a $5,000 fine, forfeiture of the property 

confiscated from his home, a five-year driver’s license suspension, and postrelease 

control. The trial court accepted Cooks’s plea, found him guilty, and referred the matter 

for a presentence investigation (“PSI”). 

{¶ 5} By decision dated November 6, 2018, following a hearing, the trial court 

sentenced Cooks to 18 months in prison, the costs of prosecution and confinement, three 

years of discretionary postrelease control, forfeiture of the items previously described, 

and a 24-month driver’s license suspension. Cooks was assigned appellate counsel and 

raises a single assignment of error for our review. 

 STATEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1: The Trial 

Court’s sentence of Nathan T. Cooks (“Appellant”) is excessive and 

violates the law insofar as the Trial Court penalized Appellant in part due to 

being indigent. 

{¶ 6} We review sentencing challenges under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). The statute 

allows an appellate court to increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence or vacate 

the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing only if it clearly and convincingly 

finds either of the following: 

 (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings 

under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of 
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section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, 

whichever, if any, is relevant; 

 (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). 

{¶ 7} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial 

court considered the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the 

seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, properly applied postrelease 

control, and imposed a sentence within the statutory range. State v. Tammerine, 6th Dist. 

Lucas No. L-13-1081, 2014-Ohio-425, ¶ 16, citing State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 

2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 18. 

{¶ 8} If the appellate court finds that a sentence is not clearly and convincingly 

contrary to law, it may vacate or modify the sentence “only if the appellate court finds by 

clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the sentence.” State v. 

Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 23. 

{¶ 9} Here, Cooks does not challenge the trial court’s compliance with the 

sentencing statutes identified in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a). Likewise, Cooks does not claim 

that the trial court failed to consider R.C. 2929.12, improperly applied postrelease 

control, or sentenced him beyond the statutory range for a fourth-degree felony 

conviction. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(4) (“For a felony of the fourth degree, the prison term 

shall be a definite term of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, 

fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen months.”). 
5.

{¶ 10} Instead, Cooks argues that his sentence is contrary to law because (1) it is 

“unduly harsh” and therefore unlawful under R.C. 2929.11, and (2) it was purportedly 

based upon his “indigency status” and/or his “class.” We will consider both arguments 

in turn. 

{¶ 11} First, Cooks maintains that his sentence fails to comport with the purposes 

and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 because the trial court should have 

“considered alternatives to incarceration.” Cooks argues that he was amenable to house 

arrest or substance abuse treatment because he is “otherwise law-abiding”―as 

demonstrated by the fact that he voluntarily turned himself in―and because he was 

employed and taking care of his children. 

{¶ 12} R.C. 2929.11 provides, in part, 

 (A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided 

by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes 

of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective 

rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court 

determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary 

burden on state or local government resources. To achieve those purposes, 

the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, 

deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the 
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offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or 

both. (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 13} At sentencing, the trial court acknowledged that its “job” is “to protect the 

public from future crime and attempt [to] impose an appropriate punishment for your 

conduct.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the court determined that prison was warranted 

under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(x). (Trial court “has discretion to impose a prison term 

upon an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth or fifth 

degree that is not an offense of violence * * * if any of the following apply: * * * [t]he 

offender * * * previously had served [] a prison term.”). As the court noted at 

sentencing, Cooks served a year in prison for violating the terms of his probation that had 

been imposed following a 2011 conviction for possession of crack cocaine. As further 

noted by the court, Cooks’s extensive criminal history includes “about 28 [criminal] 

entries” and three other probation violations. The court lamented that, “we’ve got a drug 

crisis going on” and, “[i]t’s not as though you don’t know better.” It concluded that 

Cooks “took the risk [and] got caught” and that while it doesn’t “enjoy sending people to 

prison, * * * sometimes - - if people violate the law with impunity, at some point we say 

enough is [enough], and that’s where we are.” 

{¶ 14} We find that the trial court properly considered the purposes and principles 

of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 before it sentenced Cooks to 18 months in prison, and 

Cooks has failed to set forth clear and convincing evidence to establish otherwise. The 

mere fact that the trial court did not agree with Cooks’s recommended sentence does not 
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render his sentence contrary to law. Accord, State v. Filious, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

104287, 2016-Ohio-8312, ¶ 10 (Rejecting argument that the court failed to consider R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12 “simply because it did not agree with the victim’s [and defendant’s] 

recommended sentence.”). We, therefore, may not vacate or modify the sentence. 

Marcum at ¶ 23. 

{¶ 15} Cooks also argues that his sentence was improperly based upon his 

“indigency status” and/or his “class.” Cooks claims that he is “obviously indigent – as 

evidenced by [his] needing appointed attorneys” and that he was punished for his 

inability to pay criminal fines imposed in previous cases. Cooks’s allegation is based 

solely upon the trial court’s observation that he owed “substantial fines and costs” to the 

Fremont Municipal Court and “about 1,200 bucks” to the Sandusky County Court of 

Common Pleas. Cooks argues that he could only be incarcerated for failing to pay those 

fines if his decision not to pay was “willful.” In support, Cooks relies upon Bearden v. 

Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983) where the court held, 

“that in revocation [of probation] proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a 

sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay.” 

{¶ 16} The record, however, does not support Cooks’s position that he was 

sentenced to prison due to unpaid court fees. The record clearly indicates that the trial 

court sentenced Cooks to prison because he trafficked in cocaine. A few passing 

comments from the trial court regarding unpaid court fines―which were made while 

discussing Cooks’s lengthy criminal record that includes many drug-related 
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convictions―are insufficient to prove otherwise. We therefore find that his sentence is 

therefore not contrary to law. Accord, State v. Shankland, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 

18CA11, 18CA12, 2019-Ohio-404, ¶ 25 (Rejecting claim that trial court punished 

defendant for his “illness of being a drug addict” and finding instead that it punished him 

for committing the criminal act of trafficking in heroin.). 

Conclusion 

{¶ 17} We find that the trial court’s decision to impose the maximum prison term 

was appropriate to protect the public and to punish Cooks for his offense. Cooks has a 

lengthy criminal history and continues to pose a serious danger to the public. We find 

that the trial court complied with all applicable sentencing requirements when it 

sentenced him to prison and that Cooks’s sentence is not clearly and convincingly 

contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Accordingly, his assignment of error is not 

well-taken. 

{¶ 18} Based on the foregoing, the November 6, 2018 judgment of the Sandusky 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Cooks is ordered to pay the costs of this 

appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 
9.

 State v. Cooks 

 C.A. No. S-18-046 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Christine E. Mayle, P.J. 

 _______________________________ 

Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.