Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A01-1506-GU-658 | February 15, 2016 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Bobby Ray Long

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Dan L. Strahl

Steven M. Elsbury

Greenfield, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Guardianship of 

Sue Ann Scott, Adult,

Bobby Ray Long,

Appellant-Non-Party,

v.

Dan L. Strahl, Steven M. 

Elsbury, and Gary McDonald,

Appellees-Petitioners.

February 15, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

30A01-1506-GU-658

Appeal from the 

Hancock Circuit Court

The Honorable 

Richard D. Culver, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

30C01-1403-GU-17

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] Bobby Ray Long (“Long”) appeals the trial court’s order overruling his 

objection to the guardianship of Sue Ann Scott (“Scott”), contending that the 
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trial court abused its discretion when it did so. Finding that Long lacks 

standing to bring this appeal, we dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 13, 2014, Gary McDonald (“McDonald”) was appointed as 

guardian of his mother, Scott. Scott consented to the appointment of 

McDonald as her guardian, as did her four children, McDonald, Phillip 

McDonald, David McDonald, and Sherrie Sauer (“Sauer”). On June 23, 2014, 

Long filed with the trial court a motion to remove guardian. On July 10, 2014, 

Sauer, who is Scott’s adult daughter, filed with the trial court a motion to 

remove guardian and a request for consolidation of cases to have her motion 

consolidated with Long’s motion. The trial court set a hearing on the two 

motions, but before the hearing, Long and Sauer moved to withdraw their 

motions. On April 10, 2015, the trial court received a letter from Long in which 

he requested that McDonald be removed as guardian of Scott. After receiving 

the letter, the trial court set a hearing for May 18, 2015 on Long’s objections to 

guardianship. After the hearing, the trial court issued an order finding “that . . . 

Long is the former boyfriend of . . . Sauer, who apparently is no longer 

considered a part of the family.” Appellees’ App. at 9. The trial court ordered 

that “the objections to the guardianship filed by . . . Long be, and the same 

hereby are, overruled.” Id. Long now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

[3] Initially, we note that our Supreme Court has defined standing as “‘having 

sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial 

resolution of that controversy.’” Old Nat’l Bancorp v. Hanover Coll., 15 N.E.3d 

574, 575-76 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n v. Indianapolis 

Newspapers, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 943, 945 (Ind. 1999)). The point of the standing 

requirement is to ensure that the party before the court has a substantive right to 

enforce the claim that is being made in the litigation. Simon v. Simon, 957 

N.E.2d 980, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Standing focuses generally upon the 

question of whether the complaining party is the proper person to invoke the 

court’s power. Id. “‘However, more fundamentally, standing is a restraint 

upon this Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction in that we cannot proceed where there

is no demonstrable injury to the complainant before us.’” Id. (quoting Pence v. State,

652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995)) (emphasis in original). 

[4] Appeals may be taken by either party from all final judgments in circuit courts 

and superior courts. Ind. Code § 34-56-1-1. In order to prosecute an appeal, 

“the person considering [him]self aggrieved must have first been a party before 

the trial court.” Simon, 957 N.E.2d at 988-89. Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A) 

provides in pertinent part that a party of record in the trial court shall be a party 

on appeal. It has been held by this court that the “converse is also true: a 

person who is not a party of record in the trial court cannot become a party for 

the first time on appeal.” Simon, 957 N.E.2d at 989 (citing Treacy v. State, 953 
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N.E.2d 634, 635-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied). Thus, Appellate Rule 

17 limits the class of parties on appeal to parties of record in the trial court. Id. 

[5] In the present case, Long was not a party of record in the trial court during the 

guardianship proceedings. Long is not related by blood or marriage to Scott, 

the protected person who is the subject of the guardianship. The trial court 

originally set a hearing in response to Long’s June 23, 2014 motion for removal 

of the guardian because a motion had also been filed by Sauer, a child of Scott. 

However, no other family member joined Long in his letter sent in April 2015 

that again requested the removal of the guardian. At no time did Long ever 

petition the trial court to intervene in the guardianship action. Further, Long is 

not an aggrieved party in this case. “For a person to be ‘aggrieved’ under the 

statute, the probate court’s judgment must be adverse to the person’s legal 

interests.” In re Estate of Eguia, 917 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). A 

person’s subjective belief that he or she is aggrieved does not control, because

such interpretation would “provide no discernable limit to who could challenge 

a probate court’s decision.” Id. Here, while Long may well have a personal 

interest, he has no legal interest in Scott, and therefore, the trial court’s order 

overruling his objection to the guardianship did not cause any adversity to him. 

We, therefore, conclude that Long lacks standing to pursue an appeal of the 

trial court’s judgment, and we dismiss his appeal.

[6] Dismissed.

[7] Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.