1

Filed 6/8/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MANOHAR RAJU et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE 

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

A164736

(Contra Costa County 

Super. Ct. No. MSRA21-0005)

Manohar Raju, Donna Doyle, John Dunbar, and Rose Marie Sims 

appeal a judgment dismissing their taxpayer action against the Superior 

Court of the City and County of San Francisco (defendant court), AnneChristine Massullo, and Mark Culkins, the latter in their official capacities 

as defendant court’s presiding judge and interim chief executive officer 

(CEO).1 At issue in this appeal is plaintiffs’ taxpayer-standing cause of action 

for declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy alleged violations of Penal Code 

provisions that impose a duty on the courts (and others) to expedite criminal 

proceedings, including by prioritizing them over civil cases, and to follow 

1 Plaintiffs initially named as defendants then Presiding Judge 

Samuel K. Feng and then CEO T. Michael Yuen in their official capacities. 

While this appeal was pending, this court granted a motion to substitute 

current Presiding Judge Massullo and current Interim CEO Culkins, in their 

official capacities, as nominal defendants. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.36.) 
2

specific procedural steps before a criminal trial may be continued beyond 

statutory time limits.2

The trial court sustained the demurrer pursuant to Ford v. Superior 

Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 737 (Ford), which held that one department of a 

superior court may not restrain the implementation of a judgment entered by 

another department in a prior action. As we explain, Ford is not relevant to

the taxpayer cause of action. Nor do defendants’ alternative legal challenges 

permit us to affirm the judgment. Accordingly, we reverse.

Factual and Procedural History3

The complaint, filed in September 2021, alleged that “San Francisco’s 

criminal legal system is in a state of crisis,” as over 400 criminal defendants 

had cases pending past their statutory deadline for trial. Of the defendants, 

178 were in jail, typically locked in cells for 23 hours a day; most had been 

there for months and some, for over a year. 

Pre-pandemic, defendant court held most criminal jury trials in 12 

departments in its Hall of Justice. The 37 departments in its Civic Center 

courthouse (Civic Center) were devoted almost wholly to noncriminal cases.

In March 2020, COVID-19 shelter-in-place orders led defendant court to shut 

down and continue all jury trials by 90 days.

When trials resumed in June 2020, at least 11 courtrooms in the Hall of 

Justice were large enough for socially distanced jury trials, and defendant 

2 Although Raju is not listed as a plaintiff only on the taxpayer-standing

cause of action, he asserts that he would have standing to join the taxpayer 

action and will seek leave to do so on remand. As the other appellants plainly 

have standing to appeal, we need not address the issue. 

3 As the judgment of dismissal followed an order sustaining a demurrer

without leave to amend, we accept as true all facts properly alleged in the 

complaint. (Minton v. Dignity Health (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1161.)
3

court had the technical capacity to stream video of its trials on the internet.

However, it reopened only four courtrooms for felony trials, and used four 

more as “satellites,” staffed by bailiffs, to which it broadcast live video of 

trials underway in other courtrooms. The satellite courtrooms often sat 

empty. Shortages of staff, not COVID safety measures, prevented the 

reopening of more courtrooms for criminal trials.

By July 2020, 135 criminal cases were pending past their original 

statutory trial deadline; for 31 of those cases, the defendants were in custody 

(in-custody cases). 

In January 2021, the Judicial Council allocated funds to courts around 

the state, including defendant court, to address pandemic-driven backlogs.

Defendants did not use the funds to open more courtrooms for criminal trials. 

Around this time, then Presiding Judge Samuel K. Feng addressed the civil 

bar at a webinar, admonishing that litigants had “better get ready” for their 

(jury and bench) trials because all of defendant court’s civil courtrooms were 

“available” and “equipped” and the court was “ready to go.” At that time, 

defendant court had assigned 12 courtrooms to conduct civil trials and only 

four to criminal trials.4 The next month, the backlog had increased to 183 

felony cases beyond their statutory deadlines, of which 68 were in-custody 

cases.

In April 2021, defendant court began sending “nonviolent 

misdemeanor” cases (a term not defined by California law) to be tried at Civic 

Center. It did not send felony, in-custody, or “violent misdemeanor” cases to 

Civic Center, claiming the courthouse lacked sufficient security. 

4 Defendant court continued to designate an additional four courtrooms 

as “satellites” for remote viewing of criminal trials. 
4

In June 2021, public health officials removed all social-distancing 

requirements. On June 28, 2021, defendant court opened nine departments in 

the Hall of Justice, or 14 percent of its 65 total departments, for criminal 

trials—three for in-custody felony trials, four for out-of-custody felony trials, 

and two for misdemeanors. It continued to send a few “nonviolent 

misdemeanor” trials to Civic Center. 

By June 29, 2021, the backlog had ballooned to 416 cases, roughly 

125 in custody. As of July 2022, only 5 of defendant court’s 65 departments

(or roughly seven percent) actually were conducting criminal trials. At no 

time in July or August 2021 were more than seven of its 65 departments (or

11 percent) actually engaged in hearing criminal trials. 

Between June 29 and August 30, 2021, defendant court sent out two 

in-custody cases for trial, while the backlog of in-custody cases grew by 31, to 

156 cases. The total backlog rose to 388. Numerous courtrooms were empty

and unused, with their doors locked and no indication that any proceedings 

were being held.

Plaintiffs acknowledge the pandemic’s role in precipitating the backlog, 

but allege that defendants unnecessarily exacerbated the backlog and 

prolonged its effects by failing to, inter alia: utilize available courtrooms (both 

civil and criminal), seek out additional resources to help mitigate the backlog,

prioritize criminal trials, or take meaningful steps to address security issues 

that purportedly prevented them from assigning criminal trials to Civic Center

courtrooms. Plaintiffs claim defendants improperly failed to utilize Civic 

Center courtrooms to try any felony, in-custody, or “violent misdemeanor” 

cases, due to purported security concerns, despite Civic Center’s multiple 

holding cells, airport-style entrance security, and regular staffing by over 20

sheriff’s deputies. Moreover, before the pandemic, between 2006–2017, 
5

defendant court had safely tried without issue 56 felony cases (24 in-custody)

at Civic Center; and from 2018 through March 2020, it tried 166 misdemeanor 

cases there, including 50 “violent misdemeanors.” And in 2021, a 15-day trial 

in a juvenile murder case deemed “too risky” for the juvenile justice center was 

tried at Civic Center.

Defendants also exacerbated the backlog by failing to make meaningful 

efforts to access additional resources, for example, to ask the sheriff to provide 

additional security to facilitate more trials at Civic Center, seek alternative 

venues in which to hold trials, request visiting judges to help reduce the 

backlog, or endeavor to hire temporary employees or retrain existing ones to 

remedy its clerk and court reporter shortages. 

Plaintiffs allege that these failures violate duties imposed upon 

defendants by Penal Code section 1050, subdivision (a),5 specifically: to 

expedite criminal cases “to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends 

of justice” (ibid.); and to give criminal trials “precedence over . . . any civil 

matters or proceedings” (ibid.), including by organizing its civil and criminal 

departments and workload so as not to “shortchange the court’s criminal 

caseload” (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1156 (Engram)).

In addition, defendant court allegedly facilitated routine violations of 

procedural statutes (§§ 1049.5, 1050, subds. (b), (i)) enacted to promote the 

timely disposition of criminal cases. These statutes permit the continuance of

felony trials beyond the statutory trial deadline only upon an evidentiary 

showing of the necessity of a continuance, and only for the period proven 

necessary. However, instead of conducting genuine evidentiary hearings and 

making case-specific factual findings demonstrating good cause for a 

5 All undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code. For 

brevity, we refer to subdivision (a) of section 1050 as section 1050(a).
6

continuance beyond the statutory trial deadline, as these provisions require, 

judges routinely continued felony trials months beyond the statutory deadline

based upon the court’s recitation of a generic, unsworn “good cause” script, by 

an anonymous author that defendants could not cross examine, enumerating

“facts” that the parties could not challenge. 

Plaintiffs’ taxpayer cause of action, based upon both Code of Civil 

Procedure section 526a and the common law doctrine of taxpayer standing 

identified in Silver v. Los Angeles (1961) 57 Cal.2d 39 (Silver), alleges

defendants are “illegally expending, wasting and injuring public funds by 

performing their duties in violation of . . . sections 686(1), 1049.5 and 1050

[and the speedy trial clauses of the state and federal constitutions].” The 

failure to prioritize criminal cases caused the public to incur “increased 

security, staff and facility costs for multiple pretrial court appearances,” 

increased pretrial-incarceration costs, and “increased costs for the public 

defender, district attorney, and witnesses employed by [public] agencies.”6

In addition to seeking the (now abandoned) writ of mandate, plaintiffs

demand a permanent injunction requiring all defendants to, inter alia, give 

criminal trials priority over non-specialized civil matters,7 to set them 

without regard to the pendency of such civil matters, to make all nonspecialized civil courtrooms in Civic Center available for criminal trials, and 

6 On demurrer, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ remaining causes of 

action for a writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a)) to compel 

defendants to comply with assertedly ministerial duties to devote more 

resources to holding criminal trials, as well as a civil cause of action 

purportedly arising directly under the speedy trial clause (Cal. Const., art. I, 

§ 15). Plaintiffs do not appeal from this aspect of the order.

7 We assume that by “specialized” civil matters plaintiffs mean probate, 

juvenile justice, juvenile dependency, and family law proceedings.
7

to implement a plan to remediate the backlog.8 They also seek a declaration 

that defendants’ conduct violates the cited statutes and constitutional 

provisions, which “require [defendants] to act as set forth above.” Plaintiffs, 

however, “do not challenge or seek to remedy any order in any particular 

criminal case. Nor do they seek dismissal of any case.” 

Defendants demurred, contending, among other things, that plaintiffs 

lack taxpayer standing because they are not criminal defendants, who can 

assert their own speedy trial rights in their own cases. Defendants also 

purported to demur to plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive and declaratory 

relief. Finally, they argued that plaintiffs’ decision to forgo a remedy in any

pending (criminal) case divests this case of any “present controversy” and,

thus, any basis for declaratory relief. 

The trial court9 sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Citing 

precedents holding that one superior court cannot direct a writ of mandamus 

to another such court (or itself),10 the trial court ruled that plaintiffs could 

seek mandamus relief only in the court of appeal.11 Then, it extended those 

8 However, plaintiffs’ counsel clarified at oral argument that with 

respect to the taxpayer cause of action, plaintiffs primarily seek declaratory 

relief and will seek injunctive relief only “if necessary.” (See fn. 29, post.)

9 All judges of defendant court disqualified themselves and this case 

was assigned to a judge of Contra Costa County Superior Court.

10 See Ford, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at page 742; Haldane v. Superior 

Court of Los Angeles County (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 483, 485–486; People v. 

Davis (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1371; Alvarez v. Superior Court (2010) 

183 Cal.App.4th 969, 983.

11 Plaintiffs later filed such a petition invoking this court’s original 

jurisdiction, which we summarily denied. Defendants seek judicial notice of 

this petition and this court’s order, but do not argue that such a denial can 

have any preclusive effect. Nor can they. (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 
8

same precedents to the remaining claims, reasoning that they “do not merely 

apply in the context of a petition for writ of mandate . . . but hold that as a 

general matter, one superior court lacks the power to compel or restrain the 

actions of another superior court.” On that basis alone, the court concluded

that its “lack of authority to issue any relief directed at another superior 

court judge is fatal to all of [plaintiffs’] claims, and cannot be remedied by 

any amendment.” (Italics added.) The court sustained the demurrer without 

leave to amend and, after entry of judgment, plaintiffs timely appealed.

Standard of Review

“We review de novo an order sustaining a demurrer, assessing whether 

the complaint states a cause of action. (Minton v. Dignity Health, supra, 

39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1161.) We accept all properly pleaded material facts, but 

not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.) ‘We affirm if 

any ground offered in support of the demurrer was well taken but find error if 

the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. 

[Citation.] We are not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons . . . ; we 

review the ruling, not its rationale.’ ” (Amy’s Kitchen, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund 

Ins. Co. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067 (Amy’s Kitchen).)

We also assume the truth of judicially noticeable facts. (Code Civ. Proc. 

§ 430.30, subd. (a).) Defendants request judicial notice of documents from 

plaintiffs’ mandamus proceeding in this court (see fn. 11, ante), and of various

documents related to motions to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds filed by 

specific detainees mentioned in this case. Defendants assert that the 

documents “refute allegations made in [the] complaint” but they do not

request judicial notice of any specific fact appearing in a judicially noticeable 

888, 899; Franchise Tax Bd. Limited Liability Corp. Tax Refund Cases (2018) 

25 Cal.App.5th 369, 387, fn. 7.)
9

court document; nor do they identify the purportedly “refuted” allegations.12

Defendants also assert that the proffered documents support their arguments 

about “available and adequate remedies to the individual criminal 

defendants” but no examples are needed to prove the existence of remedies 

the Penal Code expressly provides (§ 1382) and, as we explain (see p. 35, 

post), the underlying legal premise is unavailing. We therefore deny the 

request.

Analysis

Plaintiffs’ taxpayer cause of action is based upon asserted violations of 

section 1050(a) (imposing a duty to expedite criminal proceedings, including 

by giving them priority over civil proceedings, to the greatest degree that is 

consistent with the ends of justice); and sections 1050, subdivisions (b) 

through (i), and 1049.5 (together, requiring felony trials to commence within 

60 days of arraignment, absent a finding, after a hearing, of good cause based 

upon admissible evidence); as well as constitutional provisions conferring a 

right to speedy trial. As we conclude that plaintiffs have stated a cause of 

action premised upon alleged violations of section 1050(a), we focus on that 

theory.

1. Ford Does Not Bar Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action

Defendants contend the trial court correctly relied upon Ford, supra,

188 Cal.App.3d 737, to sustain their demurrer to the taxpayer cause of 

action.13 They concede, contrary to the trial court’s apparent reasoning, that

12 Defendants have also failed to provide legal authority, and we are 

aware of none, authorizing us to take judicial notice of the truth of facts 

recited in otherwise judicially noticeable documents. (Johnson & Johnson v. 

Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768.)

13 While the court referred to four mandamus cases (see fn. 10, ante) in 

asserting that the taxpayer-standing cause of action was likewise barred, 
10

Ford does not hold that a superior court judge can never “issue any relief 

directed at another superior court judge” or “lacks the power to compel or 

restrain the actions of another superior court.” Nonetheless, they assert that, 

read more narrowly, Ford still bars plaintiffs’ taxpayer-standing claim. We 

disagree. 

In Ford, plaintiffs filed an action seeking “an order restraining [the 

court and its clerk] from carrying out and executing the judgment which had 

been entered by” a different department of the same superior court in a 

separate action. (Ford, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 741.) The Ford action was 

dismissed pursuant to demurrer. (Ibid.) In affirming the dismissal, the 

Second Appellate District reasoned, “The complaint states no cause of action. 

In reality, it seeks to have one department of the superior court review and 

restrain the judicial act of another department of the superior court. That 

cannot be done.” (Ibid.) 

Defendants simply stop here, contending this general principle bars 

challenges to any conduct fairly characterized as “judicial,” such as a 

presiding or supervising judge’s decision to designate particular departments 

for criminal or civil trials, or to distribute and sanction the use of a 

standardized “script” to facilitate routine continuances beyond the statutory 

last date. This argument, however, ignores the procedural posture in Ford, in 

which the plaintiff filed suit to challenge a judicial decision in an individual 

case, after it had been “ ‘assigned for hearing and determination to one 

department,’ ” leading the court to hold: “One department of the superior 

court cannot enjoin, restrain, or otherwise interfere with the judicial act of 

another department . . . .” (Id. at pp. 741–742.) Rather, “[a]ppellate 

defendants on appeal rely solely on Ford, implicitly conceding that the other 

three are inapposite. We agree.
11

jurisdiction to review, revise, or reverse decisions of the superior courts is 

vested by our Constitution only in the Supreme Court and the Courts of 

Appeal.” (Id. at p. 742.) 

Here, as the trial court acknowledged, plaintiffs do not seek to review, 

revise, or reverse any decision in an individual criminal case. Rather, they 

challenge courtwide decisions regarding allocation of judges, courtrooms, and 

other resources, as well as the creation and circulation to criminal 

departments of a “script” to be utilized in resolving speedy trial motions in 

lieu of compliance with statutorily-mandated procedural requirements. 

Ford further observed that the plaintiffs’ proper remedy was “by way of 

intervention in the main case, and, in the event of an adverse decision there, 

an appeal to this court.” (Ford, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 742.) As we have 

explained, however, plaintiffs have neither the desire nor the ability to 

intervene in the underlying criminal proceedings and have disavowed any 

intent to modify any order or judgment entered in a criminal case. And 

contrary to defendants’ assertions, the sought-after relief does not threaten to 

upset individual, fact-specific, discretionary decisions on speedy trial motions 

(to continue a trial beyond its statutory “last day” or to dismiss a case for 

failure show good cause for such continuance) in individual criminal cases, or 

to alter the well-established procedural and substantive rules governing such 

motions. As such, neither the rule nor the underlying rationales of Ford apply 

to bar plaintiffs’ taxpayer cause of action.

2. Defendants’ Alternative Arguments 

Despite the trial court’s erroneous application of Ford, the judgment will 

not be reversed if we find the demurrer should have been sustained based 

upon any of defendants’ alternative “ground[s] offered in support of the 

demurrer” and reiterated on appeal. (Amy’s Kitchen, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at 
12

p. 1067.) To evaluate these theories, we first examine the two forms of 

taxpayer standing and the various Penal Code provisions upon which the 

taxpayer claim is premised.

a. Taxpayer Standing Claims Against Courts and Judges

 “[A] taxpayer can bring suit against governmental bodies in California 

under either of two theories, one statutory, the other based upon the common 

law. Section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that ‘An 

action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal 

expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a 

county, town, city or city and county of the state,[14]

 may be maintained 

against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, 

either by a citizen resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for 

and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the 

action, has paid, a tax therein.’ (Italics added.) This provision is to be 

compared to and contrasted with the common law authority for taxpayer 

suits, as stated in Silver[, supra,] 57 Cal.2d [at pages] 40–41 that a ‘taxpayer 

in his representative capacity can sue a municipality only in cases involving 

fraud, collusion, ultra vires, or a failure on the part of the governmental body 

to perform a duty specifically enjoined.’ (Italics added.)” (Los Altos Property 

Owners Assn. v. Hutcheon (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 22, 26.)

 Defendants mainly challenge the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ Code of Civil 

Procedure section 526a claim (statutory taxpayer claim). First, they assert 

14 The Legislature amended the statute in 2018, replacing the original 

list of local entities with the phrase “local agency,” and defining that term to 

mean “a city, town, county, or city and county, or a district, public authority, 

or any other political subdivision in the state.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 319, § 1.) 

Defendants do not contend that the 2018 amendment narrowed the statute’s 

scope as determined by prior caselaw.
13

that they are not subject to a statutory claim because they are not identified 

in the statute as a covered entity. This argument is, frankly, specious. 

Although the statute “on its face, only applies to towns, cities, counties, and 

cities and counties of the state,” our courts have “consistently held that the 

statute is to be liberally construed” to also apply to state officials and 

agencies. (Los Altos Property Owners Assn. v. Hutcheon, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d 

at pp. 27–28 & p. 27, fn. 5, citing Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206, 222–

223; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 618, fn. 38; Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 

5 Cal.3d 258, 267–268 (Blair); California State Employees’ Assn. v. Williams

(1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 390, 395.) That proposition, settled decades ago, remains 

true today. (See, e.g., Grosz v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee Admin. (2023) 

87 Cal.App.5th 428, 439 [applying statute to state agencies and officials].) For 

this reason, defendants’ related contention that a superior court is “part of 

the state judicial branch,” not a subagency of a county (Jones v. County of Los 

Angeles (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045), is immaterial. 

 Defendants also argue that there is no authority specifically providing 

for the assertion of statutory taxpayer claims against a court or judge. 

However, they have not pointed to any policy of Code of Civil Procedure 

section 526a, or precedent construing it, that would warrant a judicially 

created exception to the well-established rule, simply because the case 

involves allegations of unlawful activity by a court or judicial officer.15 (See, 

15 The parties debate whether dicta in Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 

27 Cal.3d 424 (Van Atta) (plur. opn.), undercut by subsequent change in 

Cal. Const. as stated in In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1143, fn. 7, 

implicitly permits statutory taxpayer claims against courts. Van Atta 

addressed a statutory taxpayer claim against San Francisco’s police chief and 

sheriff (but no court or judge) challenging a pretrial release program. (Id. at 

p. 433.) The defendants cited two opinions rejecting taxpayer-standing 
14

e.g., R.S. v. PacifiCare Life & Health Ins. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 192, 207 

[affirming judgment following demurrer because, “[a]t bottom, appellants 

seek a public policy exception to the [relevant law], but they cite no authority 

. . . for such an exception”].) 

b. The Courts’ Duties to Ensure Speedy Criminal Trials

1. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

The federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant a 

speedy trial. (U.S. Const., amend. 6; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) California law

implements and protects that right through, inter alia, sections 686, 

subdivision (1) (restating the right) and 1382 (requiring dismissal, absent 

actions against judges, Di Suvero v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 

73 Cal.App.3d 718 (Di Suvero) and Gould v. People (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 909 

(Gould), for the proposition that the existence of directly affected persons who 

may challenge an allegedly illegal act bars taxpayer standing. (Van Atta, at 

p. 448.) The Van Atta court disapproved Di Suvero and Gould insofar as they

supported that proposition. (Id. at p. 449.) Under a part of Gould’s holding

approved in Van Atta, dismissal is proper if a litigant “ ‘[files] a collateral 

action against a judge under the guise of a taxpayer’s suit contesting the 

outcome of any civil or criminal action in which he [believes] the trial court 

ruled erroneously.’ ” (Van Atta, at p. 448.) 

Plaintiffs argue that if a statutory taxpayer action against a court or 

judge does not amount to such a disguised collateral attack on a ruling in an 

individual case, Van Atta “strongly signals the viability” of such an action, in 

dicta that should be heeded. Were we to consider dicta, we might also note 

that Division Two of this court cited with approval a lower court’s conclusion 

that, “defendant judges and sheriff are proper candidates for an injunction 

under . . . [Code Civ. Proc., § 526a], since these officers are the 

instrumentalities bringing about the allegedly illegal expenditure of funds 

through the enforcement of [certain] allegedly unconstitutional provisions of 

the Penal Code.” (Kawaichi v. Madigan (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 461, 464, fn. 2, 

disapproved on other grounds by Van Atta, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 446, fn. 19.) 

However, given defendants’ failure to identify authority barring such actions 

as a matter of law, or a compelling reason to create a new rule to that effect, 

we need not decide how much weight, if any, we should give to dicta in these 

cases.
15

good cause, of felony cases not tried within 60 days of arraignment, and of 

misdemeanor cases not tried within 30 or 45 days of arraignment or plea, 

depending on custody status). When a defendant moves to dismiss pursuant 

to section 1382, the court must determine whether the People have 

demonstrated “good cause” for a continuance of trial beyond the statutory last 

day. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1162–1163.) The court must consider

all relevant circumstances of the particular case, including the nature and 

strength of the justification for delay, the duration of the delay, and the

prejudice to defendant or the People that is likely to result from the delay.

(Ibid.)

Two other statutory provisions featuring prominently in plaintiffs’ 

taxpayer claim implement and enforce the state’s policy in favor of speedy 

criminal trials more broadly, to further the rights and interests of all 

participants in criminal cases and of society as a whole. The first is 

section 1049.5, which requires the court to set felony criminal trials within 

60 days of arraignment unless, after a hearing as set forth in section 1050, 

the court finds good cause for a later date. (§ 1049.5.)16 This provision was 

enacted by the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, a 1990 initiative measure

intended “to restore balance to our criminal justice system, to create a system 

in which justice is swift and fair, and to create a system in which violent 

16 Subdivisions (b) to (i) of section 1050 set forth rules governing

motions to continue criminal hearings, including trials. Such motions (§ 1050, 

subds. (b)–(d)) “shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause,” and, at 

the end of a hearing on such a motion, a court “shall make a finding whether 

good cause has been shown” and, if so, “shall state on the record the facts 

proved that justify its finding” (id., subds. (e) & (f)). Continuances are limited 

to a duration “shown to be necessary by the evidence considered at the 

hearing,” and, when granted, “the court shall state on the record the facts 

proved that justify the length of the continuance . . . .” (Id., subd. (i).)
16

criminals receive just punishment, . . . crime victims and witnesses are 

treated with care and respect, and . . . society as a whole can be free from the 

fear of crime . . . .” (Prop. 115, § 1(c), approved by voters on June 5, 1990; see 

id., § 21 [enacting § 1049.5].) Rather than emphasize defendants’ rights, the 

initiative focuses on swiftly punishing “violent criminals,” protecting public 

safety, and fostering the welfare of victims and witnesses.

The second provision is section 1050(a), which imposes a “duty [on] all 

courts and judicial officers [and counsel] . . . to expedite [criminal] 

proceedings to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice.” 

(§ 1050(a).) To that end, the provision further commands that criminal cases 

“shall be given precedence over, and set for trial and heard without regard to 

the pendency of, any civil matters or proceedings.” (Ibid.) As we discuss 

below, while this provision has been construed to permit superior courts some 

latitude in managing their workload, including by designating specific 

courtrooms to preside over particular case types, it imposes the concomitant 

duty to do so in a manner that acknowledges the state interest in expeditious 

criminal proceedings and does not “shortchange the court’s criminal caseload 

by creating or maintaining a disproportionately large number of civil as 

compared to criminal departments.” (See pp. 17–21, post.)

Unlike section 1382, which was enacted to protect defendants’ speedy 

trial rights, section 1050(a) acknowledges that the right to “expeditious 

disposition” of criminal cases inures broadly to “the people, the defendant, 

and the victims and other witnesses.” It also “finds” that excessive 

continuances in criminal courts have “adverse consequences” not just to 

defendants, but “to the welfare of the people,” cause “substantial hardship to 

victims and other witnesses,” and can lead to “overcrowding and increased 

expenses of local jails.” 
17

Finally, a correlating California Rule of Court imposes on the presiding 

master calendar judge and on the court certain duties designed to reduce 

delays and minimize section 1382 dismissals. (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 4.115(a) [“To ensure that the court’s policy on continuances is firm and 

uniformly applied . . . and that cases are tried on a date certain,” a court not 

operating on direct calendar system must implement a master calendar 

system, in which the presiding judge of a master calendar department must 

conduct or supervise all arraignments and pretrial hearings and “assign to a 

trial department any case requiring a trial . . .”]; id., rule 4.115(b) [“Active 

management of trial calendars is necessary to minimize the number of 

statutory dismissals. . . . Courts must implement calendar management 

procedures, in accordance with local conditions and needs, to ensure that 

criminal cases are assigned to trial departments before the last day permitted 

for trial under section 1382.”].)

2. Engram and the Duty of a Court Under Section 1050(a) 

In Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th 1131, the Supreme Court analyzed the

duties imposed by section 1050(a), and considered how those duties interact 

with a court’s case-specific obligations, under section 1382, to dismiss a 

criminal case if not timely brought to trial.

Engram concerned a trial court’s decision to dismiss an individual

criminal case in Riverside County Superior Court, which was then 

experiencing a massive, chronic backlog due to years of inadequate funding 

vis-à-vis the county’s growth. A task force had been assembled to assess and 

assist with the backlog, and the court had devoted virtually all of its judges 

and courtrooms (including every civil department but family law, juvenile, 
18

and probate17) to criminal trials. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1136–

1137.) On the statutory deadline to try Engram’s case, a Riverside County 

judge found no courtroom available (for Engram or for the defendants in 17 

other “last day” cases in which defense counsel had declared “ready”) and 

concluded that the lack of courtrooms did not constitute “good cause” to 

extend the date to commence trial any further. (Id. at pp. 1140–1143.) To 

avert dismissal, the district attorney argued that section 1050(a) obliged the 

court, before dismissing the case, to consider sending the trial to a probate, 

juvenile or family law department, and argued in the alternative that if no 

department was available, that fact was good cause for a continuance. (Id. at 

p. 1141.) The court rejected both arguments and, upon motion, dismissed the 

action pursuant to section 1382. (Id. at pp. 1141–1144.) 

The Supreme Court affirmed, observing that court and counsel are 

obligated to expedite criminal proceedings only “to the greatest degree that is 

consistent with the ends of justice.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1153–

1156, 1150, quoting § 1050(a), italics added.) It held section 1050(a) could not 

be read to create “an absolute or inflexible rule mandating such precedence 

[for criminal cases] under all circumstances.” (Id. at p. 1151.) In so doing, the 

court rejected the prosecution’s contention that the Riverside court could not 

categorically exempt its specialized civil departments (family, probate and 

juvenile) from trying last-day criminal cases, and was obligated to compare,

on a case-by-case basis, the relative urgency of each criminal trial with the 

matter(s) pending in those departments. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 

pp. 1153–1154.) The court reasoned that section 1050(a) “does not preclude a 

17 Other civil matters were tried by out-of-county judges temporarily 

assigned to a facility at an elementary school, which lacked adequate security 

for criminal trials, and by one judge whom the district attorney had blanketchallenged in criminal cases. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1144, 1158.) 
19

trial court . . . from designating separate departments to handle criminal and 

civil matters and, within reasonable limitations, assigning cases for trial only 

within the appropriate department.” (Id. at p. 1154, italics added.) Those 

“reasonable limitations,” under applicable precedents, “require a trial court to 

organize its civil and criminal departments and workload in a manner that 

(1) acknowledges the important state interest in the expeditious resolution of 

criminal proceedings as reflected in section 1050, and (2) does not 

shortchange the court’s criminal caseload by creating or maintaining a 

disproportionately large number of civil as compared to criminal 

departments.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1156–1157 [citing 

authorities].) 

In one of those precedents, this court suggested 70 years ago that 

defendant court had violated section 1050(a) despite devoting a somewhat 

higher percentage of its departments to criminal trials than it allegedly did in 

2021. (People v. Echols (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 810 (Echols), disapproved on 

another ground in People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 152.)18 There, “the 

trial court found good cause to continue [a] trial beyond the statutory period 

on numerous occasions, based solely upon the circumstance that in the 

particular criminal trial department to which the defendants’ case initially 

had been assigned there were older cases that were then in trial or [scheduled 

for trial].” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1156.) The Echols court noted the 

absence of any showing why the case “could not have been tried in one of the 

other criminal departments” and added that, even assuming they all were 

18 In Echols, defendant court had devoted 17 percent of its departments 

to criminal matters (Echols, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d at pp. 815-816); by 

comparison, in 2021, it nominally devoted only 14 percent of its courtrooms 

to, and actually used only 8 to 11 percent of its courtrooms for conducting 

such trials.
20

busy, defendant court then had 23 departments, of which only four (or 

17 percent) were devoted to criminal trials, and “more departments could be 

assigned criminal cases.” (Echols, supra, at pp. 815–817.) “ ‘To comply with 

the provision contained in section 1050 . . . that criminal matters should be 

given precedence over civil matters and to enable defendants in criminal 

actions to have the speedy trials . . . guaranteed by the Constitution, a 

greater number of judges should have been assigned to departments handling 

criminal matters.’ ” (Id. at p. 816.) In a mandamus proceeding resolved a 

week before Echols, this court issued a writ compelling defendant court to 

dismiss a case pursuant to section 1382, while paraphrasing an opinion to 

similar effect by the Second District: “To comply with the provision contained 

in section 1050 . . . that criminal matters should be given precedence over 

civil matters and to enable defendants . . . to have the speedy trials . . . 

guaranteed by the Constitution, a greater number of judges should have been 

assigned to departments handling criminal matters. There are 22 judges in 

[defendant court], and the showing that a large number of civil cases were 

pending does not excuse the failure to assign a sufficient number of judges to 

handle criminal matters.” (Sigle v. Superior Court (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 747, 

748–749, citing Dearth v. Superior Court (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 56, 59.) 

 The Engram court found that, unlike the trial courts in Echols, Dearth, 

Sigle, and another similar case,19 the Riverside court had not “shortchanged 

19 Along with Echols and Dearth, Engram discussed another opinion of 

similar vintage, noting that all of those precedents “demonstrate that a 

superior court may run afoul of section 1050 if it shortchanges criminal 

matters and does not devote a reasonable proportion of its resources to the 

trial of criminal cases.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1137–1138; see also

id. at p. 1157, discussing Stewart v. Superior Court (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 536 

[court violated section 1050(a) by assigning only 8 of 59 judges to criminal 
21

criminal cases by reserving an unreasonably high number or proportion of 

judges or courtrooms exclusively for the trial of civil matters”; rather, it had 

“continually granted substantial precedence to criminal cases over civil cases, 

utilizing virtually all of the court’s ordinary civil department judges and 

courtrooms for the trial of criminal cases.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 

p. 1157.)

The Engram court also criticized other decisions for their “fail[ure] to 

recognize that the question whether a trial court’s policies and practices with 

regard to the processing of criminal and civil matters violate the provisions of 

section 1050 is separate and distinct from the question whether good cause 

exists to delay a criminal defendant’s trial for purposes of the statutory 

speedy-trial provisions of section 1382.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 

p. 1160, italics added.) “[E]ven . . . when there is adequate justification for the 

trial court’s decision not to preempt the trial of a civil matter in favor of a 

last-day criminal proceeding,” that is, no violation of section 1050, “it still 

may be the case that the lack of a number of judges or courtrooms sufficient 

to try the criminal case within the presumptive statutory period will not 

constitute good cause for purposes of section 1382 and thus will not be an 

appropriate basis for refusing to dismiss the criminal proceeding under

section 1382.” (Ibid.) As discussed below (see pp. 32–35, post), defendants

similarly conflate these inquiries.

The Engram court then rejected the district attorney’s argument that 

the lack of an available courtroom constituted good cause under section 1382 

to delay the trial. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1162–1165.) While the 

Riverside court’s organizational and workload policies had not violated 

trials and sending 29 civil cases to trial on the dates it continued defendant’s 

criminal trial] and Dearth v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.App.2d at p. 59.)
22

section 1050(a), the inability to commence trial was nonetheless attributable 

to the state’s failure to supply sufficient judges and courtrooms to timely try 

criminal cases. (Id. at pp. 1164–1165.) While this “might constitute good 

cause to justify the delay of trial under section 1382 in ‘exceptional

circumstances,’ ” (which it described as “unique, nonrecurring events” that 

produce “an inordinate number of cases”), the Supreme Court concluded that

“delay arising out of chronic congestion of a court’s trial docket cannot be 

excused.” (Id. at pp. 1163–1164 & fn.12, citing People v. Johnson (1980) 

26 Cal.3d 557, 571–572, italics added.)20

3. Recent Decisions Assessing Case-Specific Section 1382 

Rulings in Light of Engram

Defendants cite two recent decisions denying mandamus petitions filed 

by criminal defendants seeking dismissal of their individual cases under 

section 1382. In Hernandez-Valenzuela v. Superior Court (2022) 

75 Cal.App.5th 1108 (Hernandez-Valenzuela), our colleagues in Division 

Three considered defendants’ response to the pandemic and efforts to reduce 

the backlog in the same period of time at issue in this case. (Id. at pp. 1117–

1120.) Hernandez-Valenzuela differed from this appeal, however, in two 

fundamental ways. First, Division Three had before it an evidentiary record

enabling it to resolve factual disputes going to the question of good cause for 

20 In Johnson, the court also distinguished between predictable, chronic 

causes for delay, on one hand, versus “unforeseen events,” such as sudden 

illness, on the other; and held that “exceptional circumstances” which could 

justify a delay of trial do not include routine overassignment of cases to 

public defenders, which would “foreseeably . . . result in the delays of trials.”

(Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 570–572.) Similarly, the Supreme Court

has observed that a trial court’s failure to prepare for and address predictable 

obstacles cannot support a good cause finding for continuance, rather than 

dismissal. (People v. Hajjaj (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1184, 1201–1202.) Rather, court 

administrators must plan for these contingencies. (Id. at p. 1201.)
23

delay. Here, our only inquiry is the sufficiency of the pleadings. Second, in 

Hernandez-Valenzuela, the dispositive question was not simply whether 

defendant court had discharged its duty under section 1050(a) to avoid 

“shortchang[ing] the court’s criminal caseload by creating or maintaining a 

disproportionately large number of civil as compared to criminal 

departments.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1156.) Rather, the inquiry 

was whether the trial court, in continuing defendants’ trials beyond their 

statutory last dates, abused its discretion, an analysis which turned on a 

consideration of all relevant circumstances in the specific cases at issue, 

including not only the nature and strength of the reason for the delay, but 

also the extent of the delay beyond each defendant’s statutory last date, and 

the prejudice a party would likely suffer by virtue of the delay. (HernandezValenzuela, at p. 1124; see also Engram, supra, at p. 1160 [observing that 

these two questions are “separate and distinct”].)

Having considered the evidence, a divided panel held that although 

defendant court’s failure to utilize courtrooms was “startling and troubling,” 

it was not unreasonable that, by the fall of 2021, the backlog persisted

despite defendants’ efforts; and that the length of the delay of each 

defendant’s trial was short, relative to the delays in Engram. Thus, there was 

no abuse of discretion in finding good cause to continue petitioners’ trials.

(Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1127, 1131–1132.)

A vigorous dissent concluded that the good-cause findings did

constitute an abuse of discretion. (Hernandez-Valenzuela, supra, 

75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1136 (dis. opn. of Tucher, P. J.).) The People had not 

borne their burden of proving good cause to delay trial beyond the statutory 

last day. (Id. at p. 1142.) While the existence of a backlog when trials 

resumed in June 2021 had been inevitable, the court had not “react[ed] with 
24

urgency” or implemented obvious, common-sense measures to address the 

backlog, instead “allow[ing] the trial departments at the Hall of Justice to 

limp along at half strength,” so “that the backlog of felony cases actually 

grew.” (Id. at p. 1138, 1141–42.) Further, the decision to delay petitioners’ 

trials plainly inflicted “significant” prejudice on petitioners, in part due to 

their prolonged pretrial incarceration under additional restrictions 

necessitated by the pandemic. (Id. at p. 1140 & fn. 4.)21

Recently, Division One denied two more mandamus petitions alleging 

that judges of defendant court abused their discretion in finding good cause to 

continue petitioners’ trials beyond their statutory last day and declining to 

grant petitioners’ section 1382 motions to dismiss. (Estrada v. Superior Court

(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1101 (Estrada).) After summarizing HernandezValenzuela’s majority opinion (id. at pp. 1101–1103, 1106–1112), Division 

One found—again based on an evidentiary record—that in 2022 defendants 

had made some progress in reducing the backlog, increased the percentage of 

Hall of Justice courtrooms actually in use from roughly 30 percent to

73 percent, and implemented many of the remedial measures proposed in 

Hernandez-Valenzuela.22 (Id. at pp. 1112–1115, 1122–1123.) After 

“considering the totality of the circumstances,” it found that petitioners’ cases 

were delayed due to “the continuing sequelae of the COVD-19 pandemic” and, 

21 Unlike the dissent, the majority opinion did not address the prejudice 

occasioned by the trial court’s decisions to continue petitioners’ trials beyond 

their statutory last dates or explain how that factor weighed in the analysis. 

22 Not only was Estrada decided based upon markedly improved 

courtroom-utilization rates since the timeframe addressed in HernandezValenzuela, the Estrada petitioners did not (unlike plaintiffs here) attribute 

the backlog to defendants’ failure to try criminal cases at Civic Center.

(Estrada, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1115.) Rather, they blamed judicial 

vacations and a “remarkably inefficient trial assignment system.” (Id. at 

p. 1112.)
25

as such, there was no abuse of discretion in finding good cause to continue 

petitioners’ trials or in declining to dismiss the cases. (Id. at pp. 1117–1118, 

1121, 1124.) 

Defendants do not contend that either of these cases has preclusive 

effect or establishes some legal principle that would bar plaintiffs’ claims as a 

matter of law. Nor do they suggest we could take judicial notice of the truth 

of any factual findings in those cases in a way that would somehow render 

plaintiffs’ claims insufficiently pleaded. As such these opinions are relevant, 

at best, as background.

c. The Complaint Sufficiently Alleges a Common Law 

Taxpayer Claim

While conceding that they are subject to common law taxpayerstanding actions, defendants contend that plaintiffs have not pleaded the

necessary facts to establish such a claim—that is, facts showing “fraud, 

collusion, ultra vires, or a failure on the part of the governmental body to 

perform a duty specifically enjoined.” (Silver, supra, 57 Cal.2d at pp. 40–41.) 

In our view, however, plaintiffs’ factual allegations, if proven, could lead a 

trier of fact to conclude that one or more defendants failed “to perform a duty 

specifically enjoined” (ibid.)—that is, the duty to ensure that criminal cases 

are given precedence over, and set for trial regardless of the pendency of, civil 

matters “to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice”

(§ 1050(a)). As discussed below, while this duty is not absolute or inflexible, it 

requires all courts to “organize [their] civil and criminal departments and 

workload in a manner that (1) acknowledges the important state interest in 

the expeditious resolution of criminal proceedings as reflected in section 

1050, and (2) does not shortchange the court’s criminal caseload by creating 

or maintaining a disproportionately large number of civil as compared to 

criminal departments.” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1156; see pp. 17–22, 
26

ante.) The facts alleged, if proven, could lead a trier of fact to find that, many 

months into the pandemic, defendants failed to take feasible, common-sense 

measures to devote adequate resources to criminal trials, and thus failed to 

adequately prioritize criminal cases over civil matters, in ways that

exacerbated the backlog and “shortchanged” defendant court’s criminal 

caseload. Thus, plaintiffs “state[] a cause of action under [a] possible legal 

theory.” (Amy’s Kitchen, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067.)

Citing subdivision (l) of section 1050, defendants contend that the duty 

imposed by section 1050(a) cannot serve as a basis for common law taxpayer 

relief because the duty is “directory” only, not mandatory, and thus there is

no “duty specifically enjoined” upon them. (See § 1050, subd. (l) [“This section 

is directory only and does not mandate dismissal of an action by its terms”].)

This very argument was refuted, however, in Engram, in which the court 

explained that the term “directory” as used in subdivision (l) does not mean—

as it can in other legal contexts—that “the sentence in section 1050 granting 

precedence to criminal cases over civil cases is . . . merely directive rather 

than compulsory,” but simply that the statute does not mandate dismissal of 

a case as a remedy for a violation. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1151 & 

fn. 8, citing § 1050, subd. (l).) Indeed, section 1050 observes that the remedy 

of dismissal is provided for in section 1382. (§ 1050, subd. (j).) The duty

imposed by section 1050(a) is in fact mandatory.23

23 In People v. Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th 530, the Supreme Court 

analyzed subdivision (e) of section 1050, one of the provisions governing 

requests for continuances in specific cases (§ 1050, subds. (b)–(i)), which 

states that “[c]ontinuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good 

cause.” The question was whether, when “good cause” for a continuance is not 

shown, the court must deny a continuance even when that will foreseeably 

result in dismissal of the action. (14 Cal.5th at pp. 533–534, 537.) Consistent 
27

Plaintiffs allege that defendants maintained a disproportionately large 

number of civil departments in the face of a mounting backlog of criminal 

trials and failed to devote sufficient resources to staff and operate the small 

fraction of departments they did devote to criminal trials, causing a 

significant number of criminal cases to be continued months past their 

statutory “last date” for trial. They have therefore pleaded a prima facie case

that defendants shortchanged the court’s criminal caseload in violation of “a 

duty specifically enjoined” on them by section 1050(a).

d. The Complaint Sufficiently Alleges a Statutory Taxpayer

Claim

Defendants also challenge the adequacy of plaintiffs’ statutory

taxpayer-standing cause of action. While not dispositive of this appeal, given 

our holding that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a common law claim, we 

exercise our discretion to provide guidance on remand.

1. Plaintiffs Have Pleaded “Waste” or “Illegal Expenditure” 

of Public Funds

Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, subdivision (a) permits actions to 

restrain “any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, 

or other property” of a covered public agency. Defendants deny that plaintiffs 

with Engram, the court cited subdivision (l), describing section 1050 as 

“directory,” and reasoned that subdivision (e) does not require denial where it

would result in dismissal, since subdivision (l) specifies that section 1050 

does not mandate dismissal as a remedy for a violation. (Id. at p. 538.) The 

court quoted with approval the passage in Engram distinguishing the two 

senses of the term “directory” (ibid., fn. 3, quoting Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th 

at p. 1148, fn. 7), and did not call into question Engram’s holding that the 

duty set forth in subdivision (a) to give criminal cases calendar priority over 

civil cases “to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice” 

is mandatory in the sense of compulsory, and directory in the sense that 

section 1050 does not mandate dismissal as a remedy for a violation.

(Engram, at p. 1151.) 
28

have pleaded “waste.” Initially, they argue plaintiffs allege only expenditures 

by other entities occasioned by defendant court’s backlog and resultant 

continuances. However, plaintiffs allege that defendants’ failure to prioritize 

criminal cases has caused, inter alia, “increased security, staff and facility 

costs for multiple pretrial court appearances.” In any event, Code of Civil 

Procedure section 526a permits challenges to “illegal expenditure” of public 

funds, regardless of their amount or whether “the illegal procedures actually 

permit a saving of tax funds.” (Wirin v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890, 894, 

italics added.)

Indeed, ample precedent permits the use of Code of Civil Procedure 

section 526a to challenge an agency’s expenditure of funds for activity carried 

out in a manner violative of constitutional or statutory provisions, even if the 

expenditure also produces some public benefit. (See, e.g., Blair, supra,

5 Cal.3d at pp. 267–269 [authorizing statutory taxpayer challenge to 

constitutionality of “claim and delivery law” permitting pre-adjudication 

seizure of property; if law were unconstitutional, “then county officials may 

be enjoined from spending their time carrying out its provisions”]; Wirin v. 

Parker, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pp. 891, 894 [authorizing statutory taxpayer 

challenge to police chief’s operation of hidden-microphone surveillance 

program for “injunction against the expenditure of public funds in violation of 

. . . constitutional guarantees”]; People for Ethical Operation of Prosecutors 

and Law Enforcement v. Spitzer (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 391, 395–396, 401–

402 (Spitzer) [authorizing statutory taxpayer suit “to enforce constitutional 

duties” by restraining district attorney and sheriff’s operation of confidential 

informant program, which allegedly elicited confessions by violating 

detainees’ constitutional rights, as expenditures on unlawful program could 

amount to waste]; California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. California Department of 
29

Motor Vehicles (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1247, 1251 [taxpayers could challenge 

operation of license-revocation hearing program conducted in a manner that 

allegedly violated due process].) In other words, no depletion of funds is 

required where the complained-of activity is itself unlawful. “[T]he mere 

expenditure of the time of [public employees] is a sufficient expenditure of 

public funds to be subject to injunction under [Code of Civil Procedure] 

section 526a.” (Blair, supra, 5 Cal.3d 258, 285, fn. 21, italics added.) Having

alleged that defendants have organized the court’s workload in a manner 

which violates section 1050(a), plaintiffs have stated a statutory taxpayer 

claim for “waste.”

2. Plaintiffs Do Not Impermissibly Challenge a 

Discretionary Act 

Defendants also contend statutory taxpayer claims may not be based on 

“alleged mistake[s] by public officials in matters involving the exercise of 

judgment or wide discretion.” (Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 

1101, 1138 (Sundance).) Sundance involved a challenge to the enforcement of 

a public intoxication statute as a waste of public funds, given proof that an 

alternative, treatment-based civil approach would more efficiently remedy 

the societal harms at issue. (Id. at pp. 1108–1116.) The Supreme Court held

that Code of Civil Procedure section 526a may not be utilized to enjoin 

expenditures merely because they are unwise, reflect poor policy, or do not 

produce sufficient benefit. (Id. at pp. 1138–1139.) Enforcement of the 

criminal statute at issue could not be considered “waste” because the 

allegations and findings “do not indicate that criminal enforcement of [the 

statute] provides no public benefit,” but “only that the civil detoxification 

alternative would be a more prudent allocation of funds.” (Id. at p. 1139.)

“Therefore, the County’s decision to continue arresting and detaining chronic 

alcoholics does not constitute waste, but merely an ‘alleged mistake by public 
30

officials in matters involving the exercise of judgment or wide discretion.’ 

[Citation.] This court should not interfere with the County’s legislative 

judgment on the ground that the County’s funds could be spent more 

efficiently.” (Ibid.)

Defendants, however, fail to address the separation-of-powers rationale 

for the holding of Sundance, which prohibits the use of Code of Civil 

Procedure section 526a “to invade, supersede, or even intrude upon the 

discretion invested in the legislative and executive branches.” (Humane 

Society of the United States v. State Bd. of Equalization (2007) 

152 Cal.App.4th 349, 356–358, italics added; accord, Daily Journal Corp. v. 

County of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1558 [“the limitations 

inherent in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 526a actions are founded in the 

separation of powers principle of our tripartite system of government”].) This

omission is surprising, given their acknowledgment that Sundance precludes

statutory taxpayer claims challenging “ ‘the exercise of the discretion of 

either the legislative or executive branches of government,’ ” (quoting Schmid 

v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470, 495–496

(Schmid)).24

Defendants also cite authorities holding that a public entity’s “exercise 

of discretion . . . cannot provide the foundation for taxpayer claims.” (See 

Chodosh v. Commission on Judicial Performance (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 248, 

267–269 (Chodosh); Schmid, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 495–496; San 

Bernadino County v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 679 (San 

Bernadino).) In applying this principle to plaintiffs’ claims, however, 

defendants mischaracterize the type of “discretion” that removes 

24 None of defendants’ precedents extend the Sundance rule, grounded 

in separation of powers, to a taxpayer action challenging judicial acts. 
31

governmental conduct from the ambit of Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. 

The rule is that “ ‘[t]axpayer suits are authorized only if the government body 

has a duty to act and has refused to do so. If it has discretion and chooses not 

to act, the courts may not interfere with that decision.’ ” (San Bernadino, at 

p. 686; accord, e.g., California Assn. for Safety Education v. Brown (1994)

30 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1281.) Where the government has a duty to act, 

Sundance does not preclude a statutory taxpayer claim merely because 

fulfilling the duty involves some exercise of discretion.

Chodosh, Schmid, and San Bernardino are inapposite, here, as each 

barred a taxpayer challenge to an official’s policy decision whether or not to 

perform a discretionary act, not a failure to discharge a mandatory duty that 

involved some discretion in the manner of performance. In San Bernadino, 

the “discretionary act” that the court held to be beyond the reach of a 

taxpayer-standing action was “ ‘a government entity’s decision whether to 

pursue a legal claim.’ ” (San Bernadino, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 686.) In 

so holding, San Bernadino cited, as an exception that proved the rule, cases 

in which plaintiffs properly premised taxpayer actions upon a public body or 

official’s failure to pursue a legal claim in circumstances in which the 

defendant had a mandatory duty to pursue the claim. (San Bernadino, at 

p. 687, quoting Schaefer v. Berinstein (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 278, 292–293

[action may proceed against city officials for failure to declare certain 

transactions void where city charter provision required city council to declare 

such transactions void]; Miller v. McKinnon (1942) 20 Cal.2d 83, 86–87, 95 

[taxpayer action may be premised upon failure of county district attorney to 

comply with statute that “ ‘made his imperative duty, to institute suit, in the 
32

name of the county’ ”].)25 Here, defendants do not enjoy discretion to decide

whether to devote sufficient resources to criminal departments to ensure 

speedy trials in criminal cases. Section 1050(a)—like the city charter in 

Schaefer v. Berinstein, supra, and the statute in Miller v. McKinnon, supra—

requires them to do so. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1151.) While 

carrying out this duty may require the exercise of judgment on issues such as

resource allocation, rendering it an inappropriate subject of mandamus 

relief,26 that does not confer on defendants any discretion to choose whether

or not to satisfy this duty.

3. Plaintiffs’ Taxpayer Claim Is Distinct from Individual 

Defendants’ Motions under Sections 1049.5 and 1382

Defendants also assert that if the cause of action is permitted to 

proceed, the relief sought here threatens to “intersect with” rulings on speedy 

trial motions in specific cases. They predict that judges will “either be 

25 In the other cases defendants cite, courts denied taxpayers standing 

to challenge a commission’s exercise of discretion “in deciding whether to 

report information concerning possible criminal conduct by judges to 

prosecutors” (Chodosh, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 268) and an arts 

commissioner’s exercise of “discretion to remove works of art [from city land] 

that did not fit the Commission’s vision” (Schmid, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 496). In those cases, too, the official enjoyed discretion to choose, on policy 

grounds, whether or not to perform the act at issue, and that choice (not the 

manner in which it was carried out) was held immune to taxpayer challenge.

26 That exercise of judgment, which was recognized in Engram, supra,

50 Cal.4th at page 1146, is why the trial court, in this case, relied on Engram 

to hold that a trial court’s duty to allocate courtrooms “is a matter of 

discretion” that is “anything but ‘ministerial’ ” in the sense required for 

mandamus relief. (See County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 

164 Cal.App.4th 580, 593 [ministerial duty is one that must be “performed in 

a prescribed manner under the mandate of legal authority without the 

exercise of discretion or judgment”].) The fact that the duty is not ministerial, 

as would support a writ of mandate, does not mean it is not mandatory. 
33

precluded from making a ‘good cause’ finding under circumstances presented 

in their individual actions or violate an order in [this] action that . . . a 

criminal defendant’s speedy trial rights already have been abrogated.”

However, plaintiffs’ complaint disclaims any request for relief affecting 

particular cases and, as the Supreme Court held in Engram, the case-specific, 

discretionary, “good cause for delay” determination under section 1382 is 

distinct from the general question of whether defendants have complied with 

a mandatory duty imposed by section 1050(a). (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 

p. 1160.) Defendants evidently do not accept that aspect of Engram, but we 

are not at liberty to treat the questions as interchangeable. 

Nor have defendants shown how a judgment declaring courtwide policy 

decisions to be in violation of duties imposed on the court by section 1050(a)

would interfere with or predetermine rulings on speedy trial motions in 

individual criminal cases. Such a finding would be, at most, one of several 

considerations in resolving such a motion. The prosecution still could show 

good cause for delay in a given defendant’s case, based on the specific facts 

and history specific to that case (other factors contributing to the delay, the 

length of the delay, and prejudice, or lack thereof, caused by any continuance) 

which would not be the same facts considered in connection with the section 

1050(a) taxpayer claim in this case.

Defendants also take the position that enforcement of the speedy trial 

provisions can occur only in defendants’ individual criminal cases. At oral 

argument, they went so far as to argue that even a clear violation of the duty 

to prioritize criminal matters—for example, a decision to conduct criminal 

trials only every other year—could not be challenged by taxpayers, but only 

by directly impacted criminal defendants in their individual cases. 

Defendants cited no authority for this extreme ipse dixit, which contravenes 
34

the express purpose of section 1050(a) to protect not only the rights of 

criminal defendants, but the right of “the people, the defendant, and the 

victims and other witnesses . . . to an expeditious disposition” of criminal 

cases. (§ 1050(a).) This argument also flies in the face of the evident intent of 

section 1050(a) to mitigate an array of “adverse consequences” caused by trial 

delays, including not just hardships experienced by the participants in

individual criminal cases, but also broader social ills, including undesirable 

impacts on the public health and fisc. (Ibid. [observing that “excessive 

continuances” contribute to “overcrowding and increased expenses on local 

jails”].) It would therefore undermine the legislative intent behind 

section 1050(a) to bar taxpayers from enforcing the duties “enjoined upon” 

defendants by that provision for the benefit of all segments of society.27

27 Defendants also seem to suggest that the mere existence of many 

cases that have passed their “last date” for trial, itself, cannot prove that

defendants shortchanged the criminal caseload in violation of section 1050(a)

without an inquiry into the individualized circumstances of every such case, 

to determine whether there was no good cause for delay. There is some irony 

in this argument, given plaintiffs’ allegation (which we must credit) that 

defendants systematically bypassed this very same inquiry by developing and 

circulating a “good cause” script to utilize as the sole basis for numerous 

continuances. More importantly, as we have noted, defendants conflate two 

analyses which are conceptually and legally distinct (Engram, supra, 

50 Cal.4th at p. 1160) (see p. 21, ante), and section 1050(a) protects rights 

and interests of the public, in addition to those of individual criminal 

defendants (see pp. 15–16, ante). Finally, we also consider that once a case 

has reached its statutory “last date,” the time to commence trial can be 

extended (or a motion to dismiss denied) only upon an affirmative showing of 

good cause. (§§ 1049.5, 1382.) In other words, even in an individual case, the 

court presumes there is a speedy trial violation unless the People can 

demonstrate otherwise. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.113 [motion to 

continue trial of criminal case will be denied unless moving party “presents 
35

Finally, like the trial court, we reject defendants’ related argument that 

plaintiffs lack taxpayer standing because criminal defendants may assert 

their own speedy trial rights. It is plainly without merit. (See Spitzer, supra, 

53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 406–407 [“ ‘taxpayers may maintain an action under 

[Code of Civil Procedure] section 526a to challenge an illegal expenditure of 

funds even though persons directly affected by the expenditure also have

standing to sue’ ”]; accord, Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424, 447–448 & 

fn. 21 [citing seven precedents, “Numerous decisions have affirmed a 

taxpayer’s standing to sue despite the existence of potential plaintiffs who 

might also have had standing to challenge the subject actions or statutes”].)28

e. Defendants’ Challenges to the Sought-After Relief Lack Merit

Defendants also contend that the trial court erred in declining to 

consider their challenge to certain types of relief because a demurrer does not

lie to a form of relief, only a cause of action. Defendants assert that because 

they demonstrated that every form of relief sought in the complaint seeks is 

affirmative proof in open court that the ends of justice require a 

continuance”].) In some instances, then, a speedy trial violation could be 

found without any inquiry into case-specific circumstances.

28 As they did below, defendants cite Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 

53 Cal.3d 442 (Dix), for the proposition that nonparties lack standing to 

challenge rulings in individual criminal cases. Dix held that a crime victim

lacked standing to seek a writ of mandate to stop a court from resentencing 

the defendant. (Id. at pp. 447–450.) Dix is plainly irrelevant, as the trial court 

explained, “because it involved an effort . . . to compel a particular outcome in 

a [specific] criminal case, which [plaintiffs] specifically foreswear.” (See id. at 

p. 454, fn. 7 [“nothing we say here affects independent citizen-taxpayer 

actions raising criminal justice issues”].)
36

barred by law, the demurrer should be sustained. As we explain, defendants 

have made no such showing.29

First, defendants contend declaratory relief is not available because

this case presents “no actual controversy upon which declaratory relief can be 

granted” as required by Code of Civil Procedure section1060. They do not, 

however, clearly develop this argument, which we surmise rests upon the 

plaintiffs’ disclaimer of any intent to challenge specific speedy-trial rulings in 

individual criminal cases; or upon plaintiffs’ lack of a direct, personal interest 

in those rulings (as opposed to their general interest, as taxpayers, in 

ensuring the lawful and complete performance of the court’s duties). 

Such an argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the 

taxpayer standing doctrine, which exists to enable citizens who have not 

suffered particularized injury to nonetheless enforce legal duties protecting 

the general public: “ ‘As a general principle, standing to invoke the judicial 

process’ ” requires that a plaintiff have “ ‘suffered or is about to suffer an 

injury,’ ” but “the concept of standing . . . has been considerably relaxed by 

[Code of Civil Procedure] section 526a,” under which “ ‘ “no showing of 

special damage to the particular taxpayer [is] necessary” ’ for the taxpayer to 

prevent injury to the public.” (Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco

(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 480–482.) It is thus well recognized that so long 

as a plaintiff alleges a statutory taxpayer claim, the action “presents a true 

case or controversy.” (Blair, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 269 [in case involving 

29 While injunctive relief features prominently in the complaint and 

defendants’ responding brief on appeal, at oral argument plaintiffs’ counsel 

explained that plaintiffs primarily seek declaratory relief and will seek 

injunctive relief only “if necessary” (presumably, if defendants were to fail to 

comply with any resulting declaratory judgment). Thus, we focus primarily 

on the demand for declaratory judgment.
37

demand for injunctive relief, observing “[i]f we were to hold that [statutory 

taxpayer actions] did not present a true case or controversy unless the 

plaintiff and the defendant each had a special, personal interest in the 

outcome, we would drastically curtail their usefulness as a check on illegal 

government activity”]; Kawaichi, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 463, fn. 2 

[applying same principle to declaratory relief].) 

Defendants also contend declaratory relief is not available to settle the 

“rights of third parties,” citing Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 

146 Cal.App.4th 739 (Connerly). In Connerly, plaintiff sought to preclude 

enforcement of a provision which barred private parties from filing suit to 

challenge certain anti-discrimination measures. (Id. at p. 742.) The court held 

declaratory relief was unavailable against the Governor and Attorney 

General because they had no control over private persons’ ability to file suit. 

(Id. at pp. 742–743.) Here, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment as to 

whether defendants’ own resource-allocation decisions satisfied duties 

expressly imposed upon them under, inter alia, section 1050(a) or, as we 

discuss below (see pp. 39–40, post), whether the distribution of a “generic 

script” to facilitate “good cause” findings without a bona fide hearing violated 

the requirements of section 1049.5 and 1050(b)–(i).

Having concluded that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a right to 

declaratory relief, we need not address defendants’ challenges to injunctive 

relief, but observe as follows: First, defendants erroneously contend that 

plaintiffs must demonstrate particularized, individual injury to themselves to 

obtain injunctive relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. As was 

stated unequivocally in Blair, “ [I]t has never been the rule in this state that 

the parties in suits under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 526a must have a 

personal interest in the litigation. We specifically stated in Crowe v. Boyle
38

[(1920)] 184 Cal. 117, 152 that ‘no showing of special damage to the 

particular taxpayer has been held necessary.’ ” (Blair, supra, 5 Cal.3d at 

pp. 269–270.)

Second, defendants claim that Connerly held that “[w]ithout a threat of 

present or future injury, no injunction can lie.” (Connerly, supra,

146 Cal.App.4th at p. 751) This selective quotation, however, is outright 

misleading. In fact, the Third Appellate District held that the general rule 

(requiring a party to show particularized injury to obtain an injunction) does 

not apply in a statutory taxpayer action, “which allows a taxpayer the right to 

bring an action to restrain an illegal expenditure of public money without a 

showing of special injury.” (Id. at p. 749, italics added.)30

Defendants similarly mischaracterize the holding of White v. Davis

(2003) 30 Cal.4th 528. In that case, the Supreme Court held that “a 

taxpayer’s general interest in not having public funds spent unlawfully . . . , 

while sufficient to afford standing to bring a taxpayer action under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 526a and to obtain a permanent injunction after a full 

adjudication on the merits, ordinarily does not in itself constitute the type of 

irreparable harm that warrants the granting of preliminary injunctive relief.” 

30 The plaintiff in Connerly sought a declaration that a statute was 

unconstitutional and an injunction to bar state officers from enforcing it. 

(Connerly, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 742.) While the case was pending, a 

final decision in another case held the statute unconstitutional, making it “for 

all purposes, invalid and unenforceable.” (Ibid.) Connerly held that, at that 

point, the plaintiff ceased to have taxpayer standing and could no longer

pursue an injunction—not for lack of particularized injury to himself, but 

because he could not allege that defendants planned to waste public funds 

trying to enforce a statute that had already been declared void. (Id. at 

pp. 749–751.) Thus, he could no longer allege a threat of injury “ ‘to the public 

fisc.’ ” (Id. at p. 749, italics omitted.) 
39

(Id. at pp. 556–557, italics added.) Neither of these cases preclude injunctive 

relief on the facts pleaded in plaintiffs’ complaint.

Finally, defendants assert that injunctive relief is unavailable “because 

courtroom utilization implicates security concerns for which the San 

Francisco Sheriff has responsibility.” Even if this might ultimately limit the 

scope of available relief, defendants do not show that, as a matter of law, the 

court will be unable to fashion effective relief in the sheriff’s absence.

f. Claims Based on Sections 1049.5, 1050(b)–(i) and the 

Constitution

Although the viability of the section 1050(a) theory compels reversal of 

the judgment, to provide guidance on remand, we briefly assess plaintiffs’ 

other theories of recovery, namely, that defendants violated duties enjoined by 

section 1049.5 and constitutional speedy-trial provisions.

Section 1049.5 requires a court in a felony case to set a trial date within 

60 days of the defendant’s arraignment “unless, upon a showing of good cause 

as prescribed in section 1050, the court lengthens the time,” and in such a 

case requires the court to “state on the record the facts proved that justify its 

finding.” (§ 1049.5.) Section 1050, subdivisions (b) to (i), which govern 

continuance motions, require specific evidentiary support, both in the 

movant’s request (§ 1050, subd. (b)) and, if the request is granted, in the 

court’s order on the record (§ 1050, subd. (f)). 

Plaintiffs allege that, “instead of convening the hearings” required by 

sections 1049.5 and 1050 and “resting its good cause determination on 

affidavits and declarations,” defendant court “routinely continues felony 

trials for months at a time, relying only on a generic ‘good cause’ script.” This 

would appear to state a second, substantive basis for a taxpayer claim. 

Although individual judges rule on speedy trial motions pursuant to sections 

1049.5 and 1050 in individual criminal cases, plaintiffs’ claim focuses on the 
40

role of defendant court and the defendant presiding judge in structuring and 

supervising that process. (Cf. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.115.) If plaintiffs can 

prove defendants disseminated to defendant court’s judges a generic 

continuance “script” for use in lieu of (not merely in aid of) compliance with 

the procedural requirements of sections 1382, 1049.5 and 1050(b) to (i), they 

may prove defendants violated independent duties to enact policies and 

practices designed to avoid delays and statutory dismissals, and instead 

actively facilitated and sanctioned the violation, en masse, of underlying

statutory procedural requirements governing speedy trial motions.31

Unlike plaintiffs’ section 1050(a) theory of liability, this theory 

implicitly challenges, if not the merits of trial judges’ rulings in various 

individual criminal cases, then the procedural foundation for those 

determinations. Further, although plaintiffs disclaim any request for relief in 

any individual criminal case, criminal defendants in pending cases (i.e., those 

in which the trial court relied solely upon its recitation of the generic script in 

denying a motion to dismiss under section 1382) could conceivably seek to 

rely on findings or orders in this action to obtain new or different rulings in 

their criminal cases. It is well-established, however, that neither of these 

circumstances preclude a taxpayer standing claim. In Wirin v. Parker, supra, 

31 We are aware of the recent observation by our colleagues in Division 

One that, “[g]iven the hundreds of cases in which defendants had not waived 

time, a boilerplate order setting forth the background of the COVID-19 

pandemic and [defendant] court’s response was not only within the trial 

court’s discretion, but a time-efficient way of addressing motions to dismiss.” 

(Estrada, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1118.) We agree that it is permissible to 

utilize, in orders resolving motions to dismiss, boilerplate language reflecting 

general, judicially noticeable facts regarding the pandemic and the court’s 

response. However, we do not read Estrada to endorse a trial court’s use of a 

generic script to avoid fulfilling its statutory duties to receive, consider, and 

base its ruling on case-specific facts and evidence (§ 1050, subds. (b)–(i)).
41

48 Cal.2d 890 (surveillance program alleged to violate Fourth Amendment), 

Spitzer, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 391 (confidential informant program alleged to 

elicit confessions in violation of constitutional rights), and Van Atta, supra, 

27 Cal.3d 424 (pretrial-release program alleged to deny due process of law),

courts affirmed taxpayers’ ability to challenge the constitutionality of an 

alleged policy or pattern of official conduct, even though the challenges might 

implicitly undermine the propriety of past rulings or provide a basis to seek 

future relief in specific cases. 

In Spitzer, the defendants challenged a taxpayer suit to enjoin a 

confidential-informant (CI) program that allegedly elicited confessions by 

unconstitutional means “because it will interfere with other pending criminal 

cases and thus fall afoul of the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.” 

(Spitzer, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 405.) Rejecting that claim, the Fourth 

Appellate District noted that the court in the taxpayer action “will not be 

required to make a ruling [regarding any specific confession or criminal case]

in a way that poses a risk of inconsistent directives.” (Ibid.) But even if “two 

departments . . . may form different legal opinions about the legality of the CI 

program . . . [,] that sort of risk is inherent in judicial systems, like ours, that 

do not adhere to horizontal stare decisis. That is not a sufficient basis to deny 

plaintiffs standing . . . .” (Spitzer, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 406–407, 

citing Van Atta, supra, 27 Cal.3d 424 [permitting taxpayer suit challenging 

pretrial release system].) We agree.32

32 Plaintiffs have not shown how they can prove violations of the 

constitutional provisions guaranteeing criminal defendants’ rights to a 

speedy trial in a way that is distinct from their theories grounded in sections 

1050(a) and 1049.5 and will not entail challenging the rulings in individual 

criminal cases. However, because their complaint states a cause of action 

under other legal theories, we must reverse the judgment dismissing that 

cause of action. (Amy’s Kitchen, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067.)
42

In any event, as we have noted throughout, the complaint expressly 

disclaims any intent to “challenge or seek to remedy any order in any 

particular criminal case” or to “seek dismissal of any case.” On remand, we 

trust the trial court will manage the proceedings accordingly.

Disposition

The judgment of dismissal is reversed and the matter is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiffs shall recover their 

costs on appeal. 

WHITMAN, J.*

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, Acting P. J.

GOLDMAN, J.

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
Raju et al. v. The Superior Court of California for the City and County of San Francisco et al. – A164736

Trial Court: Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa

Trial Judge: Hon. Edward G. Weil

Counsel: Olivier & Schreiber, Monique Olivier, Christian Schreiber; 

Miller Shah, James E. Miller and Casey T. Yamasaki for

Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Clyde & Co, Alison K. Beanum, Douglas J. Collodel, and 

Kevin R. Sutherland for Defendants and Respondents.