J. S31043/17

NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

– SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.D.D., A.N.S., AND T.S., JR., MINORS :
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

: APPEAL OF: K.D., NATURAL MOTHER : No. 219 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order, December 28, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Orphans’ Court Division at Nos. 2016

- 204 IVT,

2016

- 205 IVT, 2016

- 206 IVT

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DUBOW, J. AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 26, 2017

Appella nt, K.D. (“Mother”), appeals from the order of December 28,

2016, terminating her parental rights to the children, J.D.D., A.N.S., and

T.S., Jr. (“the Children”). After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court, following three evidentiary hearings, mad e the

following findings:

1. On March 9, 2016, Cambria County

Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of [K.D., “Mother”], age 23, [], and [Father], age 32, [], to their respective children. [Mother] is the b iological mother of [J.D.D.], [] age 3, []; [A.N.S.], [] age 2, []; and [T.S., Jr.], [] now 11 months old []. [Father] is the biological father of [A.N.S.] and [T.S., Jr.]. The biological father of [J.D.D.] is unknown. The grounds alleged are 23 Pa.C.S. [A.] Section 2511(a) Subsections (1), (2), (5), and (8).

2. Counsel was appointed for the parents and children, and after continuance requests granted by the Court evidentiary hearings were held on June 22,J. S31043/17

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- 2016; September 20, 2016; and September 29, 20 16. After transcripts of the hearings were prepared and reviewed by counsel, all counsel submitted memoranda of their respective positions.

3. In July 2014, [Mother] and [Father] moved to Johnstown, Cambria County, Pennsylvania from Onondaga County, Ne w York where [Mother] was involved with the New York Department of Social Services as a result of issues resulting in a neglect petition being filed involving [J.D.D.] and then newly born [A.N.S.].

4. Both [Mother] and [Father] were referred to Dennis M . Kashurba, a licensed psychologist. [Mother] was evaluated by Mr. Kashurba who issued a report dated August 20, 2014 (Petitioner Exhibit 11). The purpose of the evaluation was to gather information pertinent to ascertaining what type of services would b e appropriate to ensure the best interests of [Mother]’s two children. [Mother] had a history of anger management and impulse control problems. Mr. Kashurba in his report stated in part:

“Her judgment in the session appeared to be good once she would p ause and think about the answer she had impulsively given to a question. Her level of insight appeared to be at an early adolescent level of development and rather consistent with the obtained estimate of intellectual functioning as noted below.”

In his diagnostic impression, Mr. Kashurba wrote:

“Axis I Impulse Control Disorder,

NOS Relational Problem NOS Anxiety Disorder NOS ADHD, Combined Type Disruptive Behavior Disorder, NOS, by history Mathematics DisorderJ. S31043/17

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- Bipolar Disorder, NOS, by history

Axis I I Borderline Intellectual

Functioning Histrionic Personality Disorder with Paranoid Traits and Obsessive Compulsive Features”

In Mr. Kashurba’s summary of the various tests administered to [Mother], he stated:

“All of her performances fell within

a re latively consistent band between the normal late 10

- year level of development and the normal early 12

- year level of development.”

5. In Mr. Kashurba’s conclusion he stated:

“The total information available at the present time suggests that [Mother] ha s below average overall intellectual ability and academic skills. She also appears to have long

- standing mental health issues which may adversely affect her ability to harness her intellectual skills in terms of learning and independently implementing app ropriate parenting techniques with her children. Thus, it does appear that there will be the ongoing need for comprehensive, multimodal mental health services as well as a variety of social services that can typically be facilitated through CYS. [Mother] claims that she plans to become enrolled in parenting classes at some time in the future whenever an opening exists for a six

- week class. However, her mental health and cognitive issues clearly indicate that her need for services is well beyond the scope of typical parent training classes.J. S31043/17

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- Additionally, the mental health issues of her paramour ([Father]) suggests that there will be an ongoing need for an external agent of control (CYS)...”

6. On September 24, 2014, Mr. Kashurba penned a report based u pon his evaluation of [Father]. The purpose of that evaluation was to gather information pertinent to determining the probability of [Father] developing the ability to parent his children by himself or with the assistance of his paramour, [Mother]. In th e clinical interview portion of his report, Mr. Kashurba states:

“[Father] presented on time for his scheduled appointment. Initially, his affect was calm and composed. However, later when he was informed of ongoing CYS concerns that were inconsistent with his perspective of the home and family situation, he became somewhat irate. He then proceeded to engage in denial and minimize the circumstances documented by the CYS caseworker, CYS social worker, and the IFS [(“Independent Family Services”)] home m anagement person. [Father] actually appeared to possess grossly normal intellectual potential. He admitted that he has been hearing ‘voices’ for the past eight years’ time. These voices were described as ‘Bob’ who supposedly is ‘a mean son of a bitch

an d what I would be like if I was bad.’ The other voice, Tom, was described as ‘my good side.’ Supposedly Tom tells [Father] not to listen to Bob. In addition to hearing these voices, [Father] admitted that he sometimes sees them. Bob was described as be ing ‘tall and built’ and being blond with blue eyes. Tom, on the other hand, was described as having dark hair and hazel eyes and being slim.”J. S31043/17

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- Further, Mr. Kashurba notes:

“[Father] clearly had a preoccupation with the overvalued idea regarding the st atus of the dogs in his life...[.] It was reasonably obvious that [Father] viewed the dogs at least as equals to the children in terms of status within the family and perhaps higher in status.”

In Mr. Kashurba’s summary he notes:

“[Father]’s performan ce on academic testing today found him to meet with frustration in basic reading skills at a beginning 4th grade level of difficulty. This performance placed him within the mildly mentally deficient range and only at the 1st percentile for his chronologic al age group.”

Mr. Kashurba concludes:

“The total information available at the present time suggests that [Father] would have adequate intellectual potential to learn appropriate parenting strategies if his mental health issues could be ameliorated. I n his current ‘off meds’ condition, there is little likelihood that he will be able to ameliorate his mental health difficulties, which are chronic and severe, to a degree that he will be able to harness his low average intellectual potential to learn and independently implement appropriate parenting strategies for the children. His overvalued idea regarding the status of the dogs (supposed service animals) suggests that these animals will continue to be a higher priority to [Father] than the children in t heJ. S31043/17

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- household. Unfortunately, it would be this examiner’s opinion that the supposed service animals have actually adversely affected [Father]’s ability to function in society.”

7. As a result of a permanency review hearing held on April 20, 2015, the Ju venile Court found that the parents had only been minimally compliant with the permanency plan and that there had been minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances necessitating the original placement.

8. Among the Juvenile Judge’s orders, both parents were to enroll, participate, attend, and successfully complete parenting skill classes; comply with the agency social worker in addressing their mental health issues; no pets were permitted in the residence; and all pets were to be removed prior t o any consideration of the children’s return home to either parent’s residence. [Father] was to have a psychiatric evaluation, which the Court notes he successfully completed on January 13, 2016 (Respondent Exhibit 2).

9. Another permanency review hear ing was held on September 21, 201[5]. Again the Juvenile Court found only minimal compliance with the permanency plan and only minimal progress toward eliminating the circumstances necessitating the original placement. Supervised visits were to continue, and both [Mother] and [Father] were ordered to submit to random drug screens.

10. [Father] was again evaluated by Mr. Kashurba resulting in reports of November 5 and November 12, 2015. Mr. Kashurba noted in his report:

“It would be this examiner’s i mpression that the prognosis for significant improvement in the parenting domain would not be substantially improved and in all likelihood would notJ. S31043/17

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- make positive contribution to the children. Thus, this examiner has no choice but to concur with the opini on of the CYS and home management staff that permanency through adoption would be in the children’s best interests.”

11. The results of the January 27, 2016 permanency review hearing are significant in that the parties again had made only minimal compli ance with the permanency plan, but the Court further found that the children had been in placement for 15 of the last 22 months, neither parent was a placement option for the children, and that the parents had refused to allow the agency to inspect and pho tograph any residence since October of that year. In addition, even with attending mental health services both parents continued [to] display significant mental health instability. Both parents have cognitive limitations that are not likely to change in a reasonable period of time. The children need a permanent, consistent environment, and the goal was changed to adoption.

12. This Court further reviewed in detail Petitioner’s Exhibit 13, which were court summaries given to the Juvenile Court in Octob er 2014, April 2015, September 2015, and January 2016.

In the April 13, 2015 court summary it was noted that the home was found to be in a deplorable condition, including but not limited to garbage, food, clothes, dog feces and dog urine on the[] floor a nd furniture. Due to the ongoing nature of the house and the parents’ aggressive conversation with the social worker, all social worker visits were moved to the [CYS] Office.

In the September 21, 2015 report, it was noted that the parents now lived sepa rately from each other. [Mother] still required constant redirection to focus on the skills that she was being taught. The social worker continued to observe positive progress in her ability to control herJ. S31043/17

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- impulses and aggressive outbursts however. The social [worker] noted that neither parent appeared to be able to multitask and supervise and interact with both children at the same time. When the social worker addressed making good decisions, [Father] and [Mother] became very angry and defensive and ve rbalized their belief they are fine because they do not have their children so they are doing nothing wrong. The parents were not open[] to changing their lifestyle to demonstrate stability for their children to return home.

In the final report to the C ourt dated January 22, 2016, the social worker noted:

“This social worker continues to have numerous concerns regarding [Mother]’s ability to provide for her children’s basic needs, safety, and well

- being due to her parenting deficit, cognitive limitatio ns, and mental health. [Mother] has demonstrated that she is unable to adequately parent her children during a two

- hour visitation, as well as maintain a stable lifestyle. It is this social worker’s opinion [that] due to [Mother]’s cognitive limitations, her resistance to participate in parenting instruction, and her mental health it is not likely she can remedy these concerns in a timely manner.

Regarding [Father], he has shown consistency when parenting one child; however, he is resistant to social wo rk services. This social worker has serious concerns regarding his mental health stability and his need for changing his daily functioning. It is this social worker’s opinion that [because of] [Father]’s mental health, cognitive limitations, and unwillin gness to change his daily functioning [] it is also unlikelyJ. S31043/17

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- he could alleviate the concerns in a timely manner.”

13. This Court is well aware that the termination of parental rights is one of the most serious and severe steps a court can take. As to [ Father], this Court admits to struggling between separating the concept of “reasonable doubt” versus a civil case, clear and convincing evidence. This Court has examined the individual circumstances of this case and considered all explanations and accompl ishments as to the [F]ather and the lack of explanations as to the [M]other on the issues before the Court.

14. Addressing the best interests of the children, the Court may rely on the testimony of the caseworkers and/or social workers. In the report ( Petitioner Exhibit 10), the caseworker and caseworker supervisor note that:

“[Father] and [Mother] have the barrier of their mental health and cognitive limitations that prevent them from making the necessary significant changes to provide for their chil dren’s safety and well

- being in a reasonable period of time. In addition, they lie, attempt to manipulate, and refuse to take responsibility for their actions.

[Father] and [Mother] do love the children. There is no bond between both parents and [T.S., Jr.] as they have only seen him three times since his placement from the hospital on January 15, 2016. [Mother] has demonstrated minimal bonding with [A.N.S.] and [J.D.D.] and with that it was not a true parent

- child bond with either due to her mental he alth and cognitive limitations. For the brief period of time [Father] visited with [A.N.S.] alone a parent

- child bond was present. Once the visits resumedJ. S31043/17

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- together again both parents paid less attention and time with [A.N.S.]. The most significant bond was the bond between [J.D.D.] and [Father] though [Father] is not [J.D.D.]’s biological father.

[J.D.D.] and [A.N.S.] have a genuine bond with their foster family and [T.S., Jr.] is bonding with his foster family which demonstrates that they will be able to build a healthy bond with an adoptive family.”

. . . .
16. This Court has found that there does not presently exist a strong bond between [Mother] and her three children. In terminating the parental rights of [Mother], this Court has found that th is will best meet the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the children.

17. In regard to [Father], the Court has found that any bond that exists is minimal. Further, that in terminating the rights of [Father] to his two children , this Court has found that this will best meet the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of those children.

Order, 12/28/16 at 1

- 11.

By order entered December 28, 2016, the trial court terminated the

parental rights of both Mother and Father. The trial court determined that

CYS established a basis for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),

(2), (5), & (8). ( Id. at 11

- 12.) The trial court also found that termination

best met the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of

the Children under Section 2511(b). ( Id. at 10

- 11.) This timely appealJ. S31043/17

- 11

-

followed. In response to Mother’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal, the trial court relied on its Opinion and

Order of December 28, 20 16. (Order, 2/14/17 at 1; docket #18.) 1

Mother has raised the following issue for this court’s review on appeal:

“Whether the Court either abused its discretion or committed an error of law

when it granted the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Par ental Rights,

thereby terminating the parental rights of [Mother] to [the Children][?]”

(Mother’s brief at 2.)

When considering appeals such as the one presently before us, we are guided by the following:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminatin g parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree mus t stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury verdict.

In re: Involuntary Termination of C.W.S.M. and K. A.L.M. , 839 A.2d 410, 414 (Pa.Super. 2003). We are also aware that:

In a proceeding to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination to establish by “clear and

1 Father filed a separate appeal at No. 218 WDA 2017, assigned to this same panel.J. S31043/17

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- convincing” evidence the existence of gro unds for doing so. The standard of “clear and convincing” evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

In re A.L.D. , 797 A.2d 326, 336 (Pa.Super. 2002) (quoting In re Adoption of Atencio , 539 Pa. 161, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1994)).

In re C.L.G. , 956 A.2d 999, 1003

- 1104 (Pa.Super. 2008) ( en banc ).

Moreover, an abuse of discretion occurs “when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. Generally,

[o]ur case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. In re D.W. , 856 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Pa.Super. 2004). Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The part y seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). In re B.L.L. , 787 A.2d 1007, 1013

- 14 (Pa.Super. 2001). Only after determining that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights must the court engage in the second part of the analysis: determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. C.M.S. , supra , [884 A .2d 1284, 1286

- 87 (Pa.Super. 2005)]; A.C.H. , supra , [803 A.2d 224,J. S31043/17

- 13

- 229 (Pa.Super. 2002)]; B.L.L. , supra

. Although a needs and welfare analysis is mandated by the statute, it is distinct from and not relevant to a determination of whether the parent’s cond uct justifies termination of parental rights under the statute. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child.

In re Adoption of R.J.S. , 901 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa.Super. 2006)

.
Id. at 1004 (brackets in original).

We need only agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W. , 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) ( en banc ), appeal denied , 581 P a. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows.

(a) General Rule.

-- The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well

- being and the

co nditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.J. S31043/17

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- * * *

(b) Other considerations.

-- The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physica l and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the fi ling of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

In re Adoption of C.D.R. , 111 A.3d 1212, 1215

- 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) repeate d and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well

- being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P. , 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited t o affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity toJ. S31043/17

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- perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D. , 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations omitted).

Id. at 1216.

The case was first initiated in A ugust 2014 for lack of mental health

treatment, parenting skills, and budgeting skills. (Notes of testimony,

9/20/16 at 128

- 129.) In October 2014, the Children were ordered to be

removed. ( Id. at 133.) CYS received a report that Mother was beating

J.D. D. and that A.N.S. was soiled and extremely dirty. ( Id. at 134; notes of

testimony, 6/22/16 at 79.) A hearing was held on October 20, 2014, and

reunification was the original goal. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 27

- 28.)

The juvenile court ordered Moth er and Father to, inter alia : keep all

appointments with mental health providers and follow through with any

recommendations; complete parenting classes; follow through with the

Independent Family Services (“IFS”) home management program; maintain

a safe, clean, and adequately furnished residence for at least six months;

pay rent, utilities, and other bills on time; permit caseworkers to enter,

inspect, and photograph the home; remove all pets from the residence; and

complete psychiatric evaluations. ( Id. at 28.)

The record indicates that Mother failed to comply with the court’s

directives. For example, Mother and Father refused to get rid of the Pitbull

dogs, which was a condition of having the Children returned. At one time,

there were as many as 10 d ogs in the residence, including 7 puppies.

(Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 37.) The residence was covered in dogJ. S31043/17

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-

feces and smelled of ammonia due to the presence of dog urine. ( Id. at

169.) The Pitbull dogs were aggressive, overly protective, and

malno urished, leading to a fear that they would attack the Children. (Notes

of testimony, 9/20/16 at 131, 152

- 153.) Mr. Lonnie Maldet, a CYS

caseworker, testified that Mother and Father asked for money for dog food

and baby formula. ( Id. at 131.) He was con cerned that a hungry Pitbull

dog could turn on one of the Children. ( Id. ) Sabrina Uebel, another CYS

caseworker, testified that there was one cup of dog food for three large

Pitbulls, including one that was pregnant. ( Id. at 152.) The baby slept on

the floor with the hungry Pitbulls. ( Id. ) Ms. Uebel testified that the dogs

were large and aggressive and had to be put in the room upstairs during

CYS visits. ( Id. at 152

- 153.)

The condition of the family’s residence was described as deplorable

and unsan itary. The house was littered with garbage and dog waste. (Notes

of testimony, 6/22/16 at 169.) There was clutter and dried vomit

throughout the house. ( Id. at 21

- 22, 33.) Ashley Shaffer, a licensed social

worker for CYS, testified that the smell made her physically ill. ( Id. at 169.)

The kitchen was covered in trash, empty beer bottles, and dirty dishes.

(Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 33.) Louann Gustkey

- Patterson, the

parents’ landlord at 482 Rear First Street, testified that the house smelled

l ike dogs. ( Id. at 86, 100.) There was trash in and around the home and

cockroaches. ( Id. ) Sometimes she was afraid to enter the property. ( Id.J. S31043/17

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-

at 99

- 100.) In addition, the residence was not child

- proofed and was

unsafe, with knives lying around withi n reach of the Children. ( Id. at 31,

101, 142.) Mr. Maldet testified that there were pocket knives, hunting

knives, and kitchen knives strewn about, as well as cigarette butts and

lighters. ( Id. at 136, 142.) There was evidence of drug and alcohol abus e
at the home. ( Id. at 87

- 90; notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 194

- 195.)

Mother and Father never complied with the court’s directive to maintain a

consistently safe and clean home. 2

Regarding the deplorable conditions, while they would show some

measurabl e improvement over short periods of time, they would always

return to the status quo. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 16.)

Ms. Kathy Scaife from IFS testified that some months the house looked okay

and then other months it was terrible. ( Id. ) The condi tions were not

consistently acceptable. ( Id. at 17

- 18.) Ms. Scaife described clothing,

papers, empty food containers, and food wrappers spread throughout the

home. ( Id. at 30

- 31.) She testified that the clutter was a tripping hazard

2 Mother and Father li ved at 482 Rear First Street until June 2015, when they moved to 1122 Ridge Avenue. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 31

- 33, 59.) At some point in May 2015, Mother moved her belongings to an apartment at Solomon Homes; however, she continued to reside with Father. ( Id. at 32

- 33.) Barbara Brzana, a caseworker for CYS, characterized it as a ruse so that Mother could get the Children back while Father kept the dogs. ( Id. at 38.) Ms. Brzana never saw the inside of the Solomon Homes apartment since Mother wa s rarely there, and pursuant to Johnstown Police Department policy, CYS cannot enter Solomon Homes without a police escort due to safety concerns. ( Id. at 59

- 60, 62.)J. S31043/17

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-

for the Children. ( Id. ) According to Ms. Shaffer, in April 2015 she had to

move visits off

- site due to poor housekeeping. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16

at 169.) She described dog feces and garbage strewn about the floor, as

well as the odor of urine and marijuana smoke. ( Id. ) This testimony was

corroborated by Ms. Brzana who described a house full of fecal matter, dried

vomit, clutter, and garbage. ( Id. at 33.) On each of three occasions she

visited the home from January 2015 to March 2015, the conditions were the

sam e. ( Id. ; notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 36.)

Ms. Brzana testified that she still has not seen the inside of their

current residence because Mother and Father refused entry, in violation of

the juvenile court order. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 33

- 36. ) Mother

and Father gave numerous excuses for refusing entry. ( Id. ) Mother also

failed to comply with mental health treatment. ( Id. at 36.) She started the

Alternative Community Resource Program (“ACRP”) in February 2015 but

was discharged in Septembe r for missing appointments. ( Id. )

Ms. Brzana testified that Mother’s parenting skills were very limited.

( Id. at 39.) She had difficulty initiating and maintaining play with the

Children. ( Id. ) Mother would complain of being tired and direct either

F ather or J.D.D. to get things for her. ( Id. ) Mother and Father would arrive

late and unprepared for supervised visits. ( Id. at 39

- 40.)

Ms. Brzana testified to safety concerns as well. She testified that

A.N.S. was “kind of forgotten” during supervised visits. ( Id. at 40.) CYSJ. S31043/17

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-

caseworkers would warn Mother and Father of potential injuries to the

Children but they would not react until injuries had already occurred. ( Id. at

40

- 41.) When J.D.D. hit his head and was crying, Mother told him, “Come

over here.” ( Id. at 41.) She would not go to him to pick him up and soothe

him. ( Id. ) According to Ms. Brzana, neither Mother nor Father made

significant progress. ( Id. at 42.)

Ms. Brzana also testified regarding ongoing financial pressures.

Mother and F ather relied on Father’s social security disability and Mother did

not work. ( Id. at 46

- 47.) Mother was employed for one month from

October 2015 until November 2015 but was terminated for failure to perform

her job duties. ( Id. at 47.) Mother did work at the soup kitchen but that

was unpaid; she was required to do community service in order to collect

cash assistance. ( Id. at 60.) The parents’ monthly expenses exceeded their

meager income and they were behind on their bills. ( Id. at 46

- 48.)

Mr. Kash urba characterized Mother’s intelligence as between the

normal late 10

- year level of development and the early 12

- year level of

development. ( Id. at 96

- 97.) Academically, Mother functioned at a

7 th grade level. ( Id. at 97

- 98.) Mr. Kashurba observed Mot her with the

Children on several occasions. ( Id. at 105.) He noted bickering between

Mother and Father during the visitations as well as lack of preparation. ( Id. )

His impression was of two teenagers “playing family” while babysitting

someone else’s ch ildren. ( Id. at 106.) Mr. Kashurba testified that thereJ. S31043/17

- 20

-

were a variety of tripping hazards left on the floor. ( Id. ) Mother spent

much of the visit talking to the social worker who was supervising the visit.

( Id. ) Mr. Kashurba’s opinion was that Mothe r would not be able to

adequately parent the Children within a reasonable amount of time. ( Id. at

106

- 107.) Therefore, Mr. Kashurba supported a goal change to permanency

through adoption. ( Id. at 108.)

Ms. Shaffer testified that she began working with Mother and Father in

August 2014. ( Id. at 166

- 167.) With regard to Mother, she canceled

6 sessions and failed to show up for 11 sessions. ( Id. at 168

- 169.) Mother

did keep 44 sessions, and Ms. Shaffer also supervised 24 visitations with

Mother. ( Id. a t 168.) Ms. Shaffer testified that in April 2015, they had to

move the sessions out of the home because of deplorable housekeeping and

also because Mother had threatened the CYS caseworker. ( Id. at 169.)

According to Ms. Shaffer, Mother becomes easily o verwhelmed during

visitations, has an explosive temper, and poor impulse control. ( Id. at 170.)

Ms. Shaffer testified that Mother lacks motivation to parent the Children and

has to be prompted to get up and play with them. ( Id. ) Mother would

spend most of the time during visitation sitting in a chair either eating or

trying to converse with Ms. Shaffer. ( Id. )

Ms. Shaffer did testify that Mother showed some improvement with

regard to her temper. ( Id. at 171.) In the beginning, she would yell at

J.D.D . and grab him by the arm. ( Id. ) Later, she was utilizing theJ. S31043/17

- 21

-

“time out” method and was able to better control her anger. ( Id. )

However, in other areas, the parents showed limited or no improvement.

( Id. ) For example, CYS attempted to work with them on nutrition and

providing healthy lunches for the Children instead of just potato chips and

juice boxes. ( Id. at 171

- 172.) Mother commented that she was too lazy to

walk to the grocery store to buy fruit. ( Id. at 172.) On one occasion, they

brought wh ole, unpeeled carrots for A.N.S. to eat, who had just turned one

year old. ( Id. ) They did not understand how that could be a choking hazard

for a one

- year
- old baby. ( Id. )

Ms. Shaffer testified that Mother was very defensive and would dismiss

any concer ns or suggestions. ( Id. at 173.) Mother maintained that she

knew how to parent the Children and did not need CYS’s help. ( Id. ) Mother

felt that the parenting classes she received in New York State were

sufficient. ( Id. )

Similarly, Candice Mishler, a social worker for CYS, testified that

Mother took an inactive role during supervised visits. (Notes of testimony,

9/20/16 at 41.) She described Mother’s approach as “aloof.” ( Id. at 42.)

After about 40 minutes, Mother would become overwhelmed and frust rated

and snap at the Children for minor transgressions. ( Id. at 42

- 43.) Mother

struggled with multitasking and had difficulty interacting with both J.D.D.

and A.N.S. simultaneously. ( Id. at 45.) This testimony was corroborated by

Ms. Brzana who testif ied that Mother and Father could not clean up the roomJ. S31043/17

- 22

-

and dress the Children at the same time. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at

73.) Mother and Father were unable to adequately supervise the Children

due to their problems multitasking. ( Id. ) In additio n, Ms. Mishler testified

that neither Mother nor Father had appropriate insight into the needs of the

Children or their own mental health needs. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at

43.) They denied or refused the need for services. ( Id. )

Mother claims that these issues were de minimus and that the

Children were never in any form of danger. (Mother’s brief at 6.) Mother

argues that there were no allegations that the Children were suffering due to

her shortcomings or that the pets posed any legitimate risk. ( Id. at 7.) As

set forth at length supra , the Children were in physical and psychological

danger. They were living in filth. Besides the hungry Pitbulls and hunting

knives lying around, there was testimony of ongoing drug use and domestic

violence. ( Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 44, 194

- 195.) It was readily

apparent to the trial court that despite 15 months of intensive services,

Mother was unable or unwilling to remedy the conditions which led to the

Children’s placement, and they would continue to be at risk if returned to

her care. Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that

Mother is incapable of parenting the Children and that her parental

incapacity has left the Children without essential parental care or control.

Addi tionally, it was reasonable for the court to determine that Mother will

not, or cannot, remedy this incapacity.J. S31043/17

- 23

- Next, we consider whether termination was proper under Section 2511(b). Section 2511(b) “focuses on whether termination of parental rights woul d best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of J.M. , 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010). As this Court has explained, “Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered” as part of our analysis. In re K.K.R.
- S. , 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008). “Wh ile a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best

- interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.” I n re N.A.M. , 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citing K.K.R.
- S. , 958 A.2d at 533

- 36).

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, com fort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent

- child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

Id. (quoting In re A.S. , 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010)); see also In re T.D. , 949 A.2d 910, 920

- 23 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied , 601 Pa. 684, 970 A.2d 1148 (2009) (affirming the termination of parental rights wher e “obvious emotional ties exist between T.D. and Parents, but Parents are either unwilling or unable to satisfy the irreducible minimum requirements of parenthood,” and where preserving the Parents’ rights wouldJ. S31043/17

- 24

- prevent T.D. from being adopted and attainin g permanency).

In re Adoption of C.D.R. , 111 A.3d at 1219.

Ms. Brzana testified that at the time of the last hearing on

September 29, 2016, J.D.D. was 42 months old and had spent 27 of those

months in out

- of

- home placement, including 4 months in New York . (Notes

of testimony, 9/29/16 at 38.) A.N.S. was 27 months old and spent only

2 months at home prior to placement with CYS. ( Id. at 38

- 39.) T.S., Jr.,

was 8 months old and had been in CYS’s care since his birth. ( Id. at 39.)

Ms. Brzana testified tha t any bond between J.D.D. and Mother was not a

parent/child bond. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 43

- 44.) J.D.D. enjoyed

seeing Mother but did not look at her as a mother figure. ( Id. at 44.)

Regarding A.N.S., Ms. Brzana did not see any bond with Mot her. ( Id.

at 44.) Ms. Brzana testified that, “[A.N.S.] is left to her own devices a lot

during the visits.” ( Id. ) T.S., Jr., was placed directly from the hospital and

because his permanency goal was changed immediately, Mother and Father

had only month ly visits. ( Id. ) Ms. Brzana testified that there is no bond

between T.S., Jr., and his parents. ( Id. )

Ms. Brzana testified that in her professional opinion, it is in the

Children’s best interests for the goal to be changed to adoption. ( Id. at 45.)

J .D.D. has had four different placements in 42 months and needs stability.

( Id. ) A.N.S. has thrived in foster care and feels safe and stable. ( Id. )

Ms. Brzana testified that A.N.S. connects with her foster parents as thoughJ. S31043/17

- 25

-

they are her mom and dad. ( I d. ) Regarding T.S., Jr., Ms. Brzana opined

that delaying the adoption process “would be like just holding off the

inevitable.” ( Id. at 45

- 46.) CYS provided both parents with services for

15 months without significant progress. ( Id. at 46.)

Ms. Brzana sees the foster parents once a month in their home and

also follows up with e

- mail or phone calls at least twice a month. ( Id. at

60.) Ms. Brzana has had no issues with the foster parents and has no

concerns about their ability to care for the Children. ( Id. at 60

- 61.) The

trial court found that the Children are successfully bonding with their foster

family, indicating that they will be able to build a healthy bond with an

adoptive family. (Order, 12/28/16 at 10 ¶14.)

The evidence supports the trial court’s determination that it would be

in the Children’s best interests if Mother’s parental rights were terminated.

Clearly, it would not be in the Children’s best interests for their lives to

remain on hold indefinitely in hopes that Mother will one da y fulfill her

obligations and be able to act as their parent. See In re Adoption of

C.D.R. , 111 A.3d at 1220, quoting M.E.P. , 825 A.2d at 1276 (“A child’s life

simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” (citations omitted)).

Mother is not entitled to relief.J. S31043/17

- 26

-

Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to

Section 2511(a)(2 ) and (b), we affirm the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2017