statute outlining the duties and authority of the Ombudsman does not authorize

the Ombudsman to file a motion seeking information in a case in which it is not a 

party but rather, to obtain such information, the Ombudsman must comply with 

the Colorado Open Records Act, §§ 24-72-200.1 to -206, C.R.S. (2023); and (3) in any

event, the Ombudsman had no right to obtain the full, unredacted Report, most of 

which addressed matters beyond the scope of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the court makes its rule to show cause absolute.
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado

2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

2023 CO 60

Supreme Court Case No. 23SA131

Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21

Washington County District Court Case No. 19JV13

Honorable Charles M. Hobbs, Judge

In Re

Petitioner:

The People of the State of Colorado,

In the Interest of

Child:

C.J.T.,

and Concerning

Respondents:

A.N.J. and F.R.T.,

and Concerning

Intervenors:

J.M.B. and L.A.B.

Rule Made Absolute

en banc

December 4, 2023
2

Attorneys for Washington County Board of County Commissioners and 

Washington County Department of Human Services:

Hoffmann, Parker, Wilson & Carberry, P.C.

Jefferson H. Parker

Kathryn M. Sellars

Daniel P. Harvey

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Colorado Office of the Child Protection Ombudsman:

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General

Janna K. Fischer, Senior Assistant Attorney General

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Washington County District Court:

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General

Grant T. Sullivan, Assistant Solicitor General

Brian A. Keener, Assistant Attorney General Fellow

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae A.N.J.:

A.E. Bochniak Law, LLC

Ainsley E. Bochniak

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae F.R.T.:

Just Law Group, LLC

John F. Poor

Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE

HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.
3

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 In this C.A.R. 21 proceeding arising out of an underlying child welfare case, 

the Washington County Board of County Commissioners (the “BOCC”) and the 

Washington County Department of Human Services (“DHS”), which we will refer

to collectively as the “County,” contend that the district court had no jurisdiction 

to grant a non-party, the Office of the Child Protection Ombudsman, access to an 

unredacted workplace investigative report (the “Report”) commissioned by the 

BOCC. The Report concerned allegations of workplace misconduct by DHS’s

former director and, in small part, referenced the parties involved in the 

underlying child welfare case.

¶2 After rejecting the Ombudsman’s and the district court’s contention that the 

issues raised in this case are moot, we conclude that (1) the district court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction to order the BOCC to release the Report to the 

Ombudsman because the court’s jurisdiction terminated before it issued its orders

and the court did not retain ongoing jurisdiction to issue such orders; (2) the

statute outlining the duties and authority of the Ombudsman does not authorize

the Ombudsman to file a motion seeking information in a case in which it is not a 

party but rather, to obtain such information, the Ombudsman must comply with 

the Colorado Open Records Act, §§ 24-72-200.1 to -206, C.R.S. (2023) (“CORA”); 

and (3) in any event, the Ombudsman had no right to obtain the full, unredacted 
4

Report, most of which addressed matters beyond the scope of the Ombudsman’s 

jurisdiction.

¶3 Accordingly, we make our rule to show cause absolute, and we order the 

Ombudsman to destroy or delete all copies of the unredacted Report in its 

possession, custody, or control, including all paper and electronic copies, and to

provide a certification to the County within fourteen days of the date the mandate

issues in this case verifying that it has done so.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶4 During the pendency of the child welfare matter underlying the present 

proceeding, the BOCC contracted with Heather Coogan, an independent 

investigator, to investigate allegations of workplace misconduct by the

then-director of DHS.

¶5 Coogan issued her Report on November 30, 2022. Although most of the

Report’s findings were unrelated to the underlying child welfare case, the Report 

stated, with respect to that case, that the former director was “very involved in the 

case,” was attached to the child and the foster parents, and expressed animus 

toward the child’s father. In addition, the Report noted that some DHS employees

believed that the former director had promised the child to the foster parents.

¶6 Shortly after Coogan issued the Report, the BOCC, through counsel, wrote 

to counsel for DHS to inform DHS of the Report’s existence and the potential 
5

relevance of certain statements in the Report to the underlying child welfare case. 

That same day, DHS filed the BOCC’s letter with the district court, and the 

respondent parents in the child welfare case filed an emergency joint motion 

asking the court to release the Report. In response to this motion, the district court

shared a redacted version of the Report with the parties, subject to a protective 

order that limited disclosure of the Report to counsel of record and their respective

clients.

¶7 DHS then moved to withdraw from the case, stating that the redacted 

Report raised a legitimate concern regarding the appearance of fairness that could 

negatively impact the parties’ ability to work together for the sake of the child. 

The district court granted that motion and indicated that it would seek to appoint 

another county department of human services to proceed in the case.

¶8 Meanwhile, the Ombudsman received two complaints indicating that the

Report existed and that it detailed the impact on the family in the underlying child 

welfare case. Based on these allegations, the Ombudsman wrote to DHS and 

requested the full and unredacted Report. DHS responded that (1) the Report was 

subject to a protective order that precluded the requested disclosure; (2) most of 

the Report did not involve Washington County child welfare matters and was, 

therefore, outside the scope of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction; and (3) in any event, 

DHS was not in possession of an unredacted version of the Report. DHS thus
6

stated that it did not have the authority or ability to comply with the

Ombudsman’s request.

¶9 During this same time frame, the district court issued an order advising the 

parties that it had been unable to find a successor county agency to substitute for

DHS in the underlying child welfare case. The court thus ordered DHS to contact 

the Logan, Weld, Adams, and Denver County departments of human services to

see whether any of them would be willing to take the assignment.

¶10 Thereafter, on February 21, 2023, the court issued a notice of dismissal for

failure to prosecute, indicating that it would dismiss the case without prejudice

the following month unless DHS showed cause why the case should not be

dismissed. The following day, DHS filed a motion to terminate jurisdiction, noting 

the unusual posture of the case and the difficulty in finding another county to

prosecute it, and the court granted DHS’s motion, stating, “Jurisdiction is hereby

terminated.”

¶11 Several hours after the court entered its order terminating jurisdiction, the 

Attorney General filed a “Limited Entry of Appearance” on behalf of the

Ombudsman and also a motion seeking access to a full and unredacted copy of the

Report. In this motion, the Ombudsman stated that the complainants who had 

advised the Ombudsman of the Report’s existence had alleged that the Report 

found evidence of the mishandling of cases by DHS and detailed several cases that 
7

had been negatively impacted by DHS staff. The Ombudsman further stated that 

it had a duty to understand the individual and systemic impact of these alleged 

actions. The Ombudsman does not appear to have served a copy of its motion for

access on the BOCC, notwithstanding the fact that the BOCC was the custodian of 

the Report that the Ombudsman sought.

¶12 The following day, February 24, 2023, the district court issued an order

granting the Ombudsman’s motion for access to the Report. The court did so

despite the fact that it had terminated its jurisdiction the day before.

¶13 The BOCC subsequently learned of the Ombudsman’s motion and the 

court’s order and, in an effort to resolve the matter, offered to provide the 

Ombudsman with a redacted copy of the Report. The Ombudsman refused this

offer, however, and the BOCC filed what it called a response to the district court’s 

order. In its response, the BOCC asserted that the Report and its disclosure were 

governed by CORA, and not by the statutory authority relating to the

Ombudsman on which the Ombudsman had relied. Upon reviewing the BOCC’s 

response, the district court entered an order vacating and staying its prior order

for fourteen days to allow the Ombudsman to respond to the BOCC’s position.

¶14 After receiving the Ombudsman’s response and a reply from the BOCC, on 

March 27, 2023, the court issued an order stating, “The Court finds the specific 

statute relied upon herien [sic] controls the general, broader requirements of 
8

CORA. The Motion for access to the entire file and the unredacted report is

granted subject to the confidentiality requirements as set forth in the Motion.” The 

order did not state who was responsible for producing the Report. Nor did it

provide a deadline for compliance or make production of the Report subject to the

protective order that the court had previously issued in the case.

¶15 Subsequently, the court itself provided an unredacted copy of the Report to

the Ombudsman. The County then sought relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21, and we 

issued a rule to show cause.

II. Analysis

¶16 We begin by discussing our jurisdiction to hear this matter. We then address 

the Ombudsman’s and the district court’s assertion that the issues raised in the 

County’s petition are moot. Concluding that they are not, we turn to the questions

of the district court’s jurisdiction to enter the orders at issue and the scope of the 

Ombudsman’s investigatory authority.

A. Original Jurisdiction

¶17 The exercise of our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 rests within our sole

discretion. People v. Tafoya, 2019 CO 13, ¶ 13, 434 P.3d 1193, 1195. An original 

proceeding under C.A.R. 21 is an extraordinary remedy that is limited in its

purpose and availability. Id. As pertinent here, we have exercised our jurisdiction 

under C.A.R. 21 to address a district court’s ruling in excess of its jurisdiction when
9

no other adequate appellate remedy exists. People v. Jones, 2015 CO 20, ¶ 6, 

346 P.3d 44, 46. We have also exercised our discretion under C.A.R. 21 to hear

matters that present issues of significant public importance that we have not 

previously considered. Tafoya, ¶ 13, 434 P.3d at 1195.

¶18 Here, for two reasons, we deem it appropriate to exercise our discretion 

under C.A.R. 21. First, the petition raises a substantial question as to whether the

district court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered disclosure of the 

Report, and because the custodian of the Report, the BOCC, was not a party to the 

underlying case, it has no adequate appellate remedy other than the present 

petition. Second, the petition raises an issue of significant public importance that 

we have not previously addressed, namely, the scope of the Ombudsman’s 

investigatory authority and the proper mechanism by which the Ombudsman is

to exercise that authority.

¶19 Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of the issues before us.

B. Mootness

¶20 As an initial matter, we address and reject the Ombudsman’s and the district 

court’s contention that the issues raised in the County’s petition are moot because 

the district court has already provided the unredacted Report to the Ombudsman.

¶21 We review de novo the question of whether a case is moot. People ex rel.

Rein v. Meagher, 2020 CO 56, ¶ 14, 465 P.3d 554, 558. “A case is moot when the 
10

relief sought, if granted, would have no practical legal effect.” Id. (quoting State 

Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs v. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 959, 970 (Colo. 1997)). We have, 

however, recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine, observing that a 

court may adjudicate an otherwise moot case if (1) the matter at issue is capable of 

repetition yet evades review or (2) the case presents an issue of great public 

importance or involves a recurring constitutional violation. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 

at 971.

¶22 In our view, at a minimum, the second exception applies here. Specifically, 

the question of whether the Ombudsman, as a non-party to a case, may obtain an 

unredacted, confidential document from another non-party, the BOCC, simply by

filing a motion in that case is a matter of great public importance, implicating 

issues of courts’ jurisdiction over the parties, due process, and the proper

procedures by which the Ombudsman may pursue its investigatory authority. 

Moreover, on the facts of this case, it is no answer to say—as both the Ombudsman 

and the district court do—that the Ombudsman already has the unredacted 

Report. But for the district court’s decision to release the Report, the propriety of 

which action is now before us, the Ombudsman would not have had access to that

Report. Assuredly, the Ombudsman and the district court cannot immunize their

own arguably erroneous actions from review by relying on the fact that their

actions have already occurred.
11

¶23 Accordingly, we conclude that the issues raised in the petition are not moot,

and we proceed to address them.

C. The District Court’s Jurisdiction

¶24 The County contends that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction when 

it ordered the release of the unredacted Report to the Ombudsman. In the 

County’s view, the district court had already terminated its jurisdiction over this

case, its subject matter, and the parties when it nonetheless chose to address the 

Ombudsman’s motion to release the unredacted Report. We agree that the district 

court lacked jurisdiction at the time it issued its orders granting the Ombudsman 

access to the Report.

¶25 When the facts are undisputed, as they are here, the determination of a 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law that we review de 

novo. Arapahoe Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Velarde, 2022 CO 18, ¶ 14, 507 P.3d 518, 

521.

¶26 Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as “a court’s power to resolve a dispute 

in which it renders judgment.” Associated Gov’ts of Nw. Colo. v. Colo. Pub. Utils.

Comm’n, 2012 CO 28, ¶ 30, 275 P.3d 646, 652. As a general matter, once a case is 

dismissed, neither the action nor the parties remain within the court’s jurisdiction.

Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Dist. Ct., 526 P.2d 661, 664 (Colo. 1974). Even after

dismissal, however, a court retains jurisdiction to enforce its prior orders. In re
12

J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo. 1991); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 

496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990) (“It is well established that a federal court may consider

collateral issues after an action is no longer pending.”). Thus, as we have noted, 

“Once jurisdiction has been granted to a court, it must have the requisite power to

enforce its orders. Indeed, it is the court’s duty to insure that its orders are obeyed 

by invoking the appropriate remedial sanctions . . . .” J.E.S., 817 P.2d at 513

(quoting In re D.L.D., 327 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Wis. 1983)).

¶27 We have applied this principle in a variety of contexts. For example, in

dissolution cases, we have said that a court retains continuing jurisdiction over the

support of minor children after the court has issued a separation or a dissolution

decree. In re Marriage of Chalat, 112 P.3d 47, 53 (Colo. 2005); see also Gonzales v. Dist.

Ct., 629 P.2d 1074, 1075 (Colo. 1981) (“[A] district court which has entered a decree 

of dissolution possesses continuing in personam and subject matter jurisdiction to

enforce its child support orders . . . .”). Similarly, in criminal cases, we have noted 

that courts retain jurisdiction to collect restitution after a defendant completes a 

deferred sentence and until the restitution is fully paid. Pineda-Liberato v. People, 

2017 CO 95, ¶¶ 2, 33, 403 P.3d 160, 161, 165–66. And a division of our court of 

appeals has recognized that sanctions may be imposed against an attorney despite

a lack of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the underlying 
13

action. Consumer Crusade, Inc. v. Clarion Mortg. Cap., Inc., 197 P.3d 285, 289 (Colo. 

App. 2008).

¶28 Here, as noted above, the district court dismissed the underlying child 

welfare case, expressly stating, “Jurisdiction is hereby terminated,” before it, in 

essence, ordered the BOCC to provide the unredacted Report to the Ombudsman. 

As a result, neither the action nor any of the parties remained within the court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction at the time it entered the orders at issue. Columbia 

Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 526 P.2d at 664.

¶29 The question thus becomes whether these orders were of the type of orders 

over which a court retains continuing jurisdiction. For two reasons, we conclude 

that they were not.

¶30 First, the orders did not seek to enforce any order entered before the district 

court’s jurisdiction terminated. Rather, the Ombudsman was seeking—and the 

district court granted—wholly new disclosures.

¶31 Second, the orders were unrelated to the child welfare case previously

before the court. Indeed, procedurally, they did not even involve any of the parties

to that case. In essence, they were orders that one non-party, the BOCC, produce 

the Report to another non-party, the Ombudsman.
14

¶32 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter

its February 24, 2023 and March 27, 2023 orders granting the Ombudsman’s 

motion for access to the unredacted Report.

¶33 In so concluding, we are not persuaded by the district court’s citation to case

law involving collateral issues over which district courts have retained jurisdiction 

after otherwise terminating their jurisdiction. The cases on which the district court

relies involved sanctions imposed on counsel, awards of attorney fees, or the 

modification of pre-existing protective orders. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 395;

United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990); In re

“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Wesley v. Newland, 

2021 COA 142, ¶¶ 16, 18 n.1, 25, 505 P.3d 318, 321–22 & n.1; Consumer Crusade, 

197 P.3d at 289. Those cases thus involved the attorneys’ actions in the cases before 

the courts or protective orders that the courts had issued while exercising 

jurisdiction. Here, in contrast, the orders providing the Ombudsman with access

to the Report did not involve parties to the underlying action but rather involved 

two non-parties, the BOCC and the Ombudsman. Moreover, as noted above, the 

orders at issue did not involve the district court’s enforcing orders that it had 

entered while it had jurisdiction over the case. Instead, the orders reflected new

disclosure obligations imposed by the court after it had terminated its jurisdiction.
15

¶34 The unpublished district court order in United States v. Meyer, 

No. 18-cv-60704-BLOOM/Valle, 2023 WL 2663017 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2023), on 

which the district court also relies, is likewise inapposite. In that case, the United 

States alleged that the defendant had promoted an abusive tax scheme. Id. at *1.

The parties eventually settled the matter, and the court dismissed the case while

retaining jurisdiction to implement and enforce the parties’ stipulated final 

judgment and permanent injunction. Id. Thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service 

(“IRS”) began an administrative investigation into the defendant for civil 

penalties, relying in part on Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 admissions that the defendant had 

provided in the then-settled federal action. Id. The defendant filed a motion for a 

protective order in the federal action, arguing that Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b) precluded 

the IRS from using his prior admissions against him in a new administrative

proceeding. Id. The United States responded that the court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to enter a new protective order after entering final judgment, but the 

court rejected this argument, concluding that the motion presented the type of 

collateral issue that a district court retains jurisdiction to consider after termination 

of an underlying case. Id. at *2, *4. In support of this determination, the court 

observed that the defendant’s motion was not seeking “a ‘new, affirmative’

discovery requirement, but rather compliance with an already-existing 

prohibition set forth in Rule 36(b).” Id. at *3.
16

¶35 Meyer is distinguishable from the present matter because in this case, the 

Ombudsman was seeking precisely what the Meyer court observed was 

impermissible, namely, an affirmative new disclosure requirement—the 

production of the unredacted Report—rather than seeking to enforce an order or

obligation that existed prior to the termination of the district court’s jurisdiction.

¶36 Lastly, we are unpersuaded by the Ombudsman’s reliance on our opinion 

in People v. Sprinkle, 2021 CO 60, 489 P.3d 1242. There, pursuant to section 

24-72-303, C.R.S. (2023), of the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act (“CCJRA”), 

the defendant had served a subpoena duces tecum on the El Paso County Sheriff’s 

Office demanding access to internal investigation files regarding two sheriff’s

deputies who were to testify as witnesses at her trial. Id. at ¶¶ 1–2, 489 P.3d at 

1244. The question before us principally concerned the specificity required in a 

CCJRA demand before disclosure would be ordered. Id. at ¶ 24, 489 P.3d at 1247. 

We concluded that the plain language of the statute at issue in that case “provides

that any member of the public is entitled to inspect the entire file from any

completed internal investigations into specific, identifiable instances of alleged 

officer misconduct while that officer was on-duty or in-uniform and interacting 

with the public.” Id. at ¶ 30, 489 P.3d at 1248. The person requesting the file, 

however, need not know of specific, identifiable instances of misconduct or

include any such designation in the request. Id.
17

¶37 In Sprinkle, the case was still pending when the defendant, a party to the 

case, served a subpoena duces tecum for information relating to her case. 

Moreover, the defendant served her subpoena duces tecum pursuant to the 

CCJRA, which is a procedural mechanism afforded to criminal defendants. Here, 

in contrast, jurisdiction had terminated before the district court issued the orders

at issue, and, as noted above, the orders effectively involved a request by one 

non-party to the case for information from another non-party. Accordingly, 

Sprinkle does not support the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction in the present 

case.

¶38 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not have subject 

matter jurisdiction to consider the Ombudsman’s motion or order production of 

the unredacted Report at the time that it entered the orders at issue. In light of this 

determination, we need not address the County’s alternative argument that the 

district court also lacked personal jurisdiction over the BOCC and the 

Ombudsman at the time it entered those orders.

D. The Ombudsman’s Investigatory Authority

¶39 Finally, because we anticipate that the Ombudsman will continue to seek to

obtain the Report after this opinion is issued, we address the proper mechanism 

by which the Ombudsman may do so.
18

¶40 This issue implicates matters of statutory construction, particularly

regarding the scope of the Ombudsman statute, section 19-3.3-103, C.R.S. (2023). 

We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v.

Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, 2021 CO 43, ¶ 17, 488 P.3d 1065, 1069. When 

interpreting statutes, we seek to discern and give effect to the General Assembly’s 

intent. Id. In doing so, we apply words and phrases in accordance with their plain 

and ordinary meanings, and we look to the entire statutory scheme to give

consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Id. In addition, we

avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous or that 

would lead to illogical or absurd results. Id. And in construing a statute, we must 

respect the General Assembly’s choice of language. UMB Bank, N.A. v. Landmark 

Towers Ass’n, 2017 CO 107, ¶ 22, 408 P.3d 836, 840. As a result, we do not add 

words to a statute or subtract words from it. Id.

¶41 If the statutory language is unambiguous, then we must apply it as written,

and we need not resort to other rules of statutory construction. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, ¶ 17, 488 P.3d at 1069.

¶42 Section 19-3.3-103 provides, in pertinent part:

(1) The ombudsman has the following duties, at a minimum:

(a)(I)(A) To receive complaints concerning child protection services. 

For the purposes of this section, “complaint” means any report or

complaint made by or on behalf of a child relating to any action,

inaction, or decision of any public agency or any provider that 
19

receives public money that may adversely affect the safety,

permanency, or well-being of the child. . . .

. . . .

[(a)](II)(A) In investigating a complaint, the ombudsman has the

authority to request, access, and review any information, records, or

documents, including records of third parties, that the ombudsman 

deems necessary to conduct a thorough and independent review of a 

complaint so long as either the state department or a county

department would be entitled to access or receive such information,

records, or documents.

. . . .

[(a)(II)](D) The ombudsman must have access to all information,

records, or documents described in subsection (1)(a)(II)(A) of this

section created in an investigation of an event or incident described 

in subsection (1)(a)(II)(A), (1)(a)(II)(B), or (1)(a)(II)(C) of this section 

occurring in the state from any entity. . . .

. . . .

[(a)(II)](F) Nothing in the provisions of subsection (1)(a)(II)(A),

(1)(a)(II)(B), or (1)(a)(II)(C) of this section grants subpoena power to

the ombudsman for purposes of investigating a complaint pursuant 

to subsection (1)(a)(II)(A), (1)(a)(II)(B), or (1)(a)(II)(C) of this section.

¶43 The Ombudsman contends that section 19-3.3-103(1)(a)(II)(A) authorized it 

to file a motion in the underlying child welfare case to obtain access to the Report, 

even though it was not a party in that case. Specifically, in the Ombudsman’s 

view, because section 19-3.3-103(1)(a)(II)(A) authorized it to request and access 

“any information, records, or documents” that the Ombudsman deems necessary

to its review of a complaint, it could proceed as it did. We disagree.
20

¶44 As an initial matter, we perceive nothing in the text of section

19-3.3-103(1)(a)(II)(A) that somehow exempts the Ombudsman from the rules of

civil procedure. Nor do we perceive anything in the text of section 19-3.3-103 that 

provides how the Ombudsman is to exercise its investigatory power. Indeed,

section 19-3.3-103(1)(a)(II)(F), which provides that nothing in the provisions of 

subsections (1)(a)(II)(A) through (C) grants subpoena power to the Ombudsman 

for purposes of investigating a complaint under those subsections, appears to

undermine the Ombudsman’s claim to broad discovery rights.

¶45 Absent any express procedures in section 19-3.3-103 governing the exercise

of the Ombudsman’s investigatory authority, we conclude that to access 

documents like the Report, the Ombudsman must proceed in accordance with 

CORA.

¶46 In so concluding, we are not persuaded by the Ombudsman’s and the 

district court’s argument that section 19-3.3-103, as a more specific statute, controls 

over the more general CORA statute. As noted above, nothing in section

19-3.3-103 establishes a mechanism by which the Ombudsman may seek 

documents in the course of investigating a complaint, much less a more specific 

mechanism than CORA. Nor do we perceive a conflict between section 19-3.3-103

and CORA. Section 19-3.3-103 simply does not speak to the means by which the
21

Ombudsman may obtain documents pertinent to an investigation, and we may

not read such means into the statute. See UMB Bank, ¶ 22, 408 P.3d at 840.

¶47 We further note, contrary to the Ombudsman’s apparent view, that section

19-3.3-103 does not provide an unlimited grant of authority to the Ombudsman to

obtain any and all information that it might deem relevant to an investigation.

Rather, section 19-3.3-103(1)(a)(I)(A) authorizes the Ombudsman to receive

complaints concerning “child protection services,” and section

19-3.3-103(1)(a)(II)(A) authorizes the Ombudsman to request only those 

documents held by a county department that the state department of human 

services or a county department would be entitled to access.

¶48 Here, although isolated portions of the Report arguably related to child 

protection services, the great majority of the Report did not, but instead addressed 

allegations of workplace misconduct by a DHS employee. Moreover, it appears 

that much of the matter contained in the Report was information that neither the 

state department of human services nor DHS would have been entitled to access. 

Accordingly, even if the district court had jurisdiction to provide portions of the

report to the Ombudsman, which it did not, the court erred in providing the 

complete unredacted Report to the Ombudsman without making any

determination as to what portions of the Report properly fell within the

Ombudsman’s scope of authority.
22

¶49 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the district court erred in 

producing any of the Report to the Ombudsman, much less the portions of the

Report that did not concern child protection services and that neither the state 

department of human services nor DHS was entitled to access. We cannot ignore, 

however, that the district court has already provided a copy of the unredacted 

report to the Ombudsman. Accordingly, we order the Ombudsman to destroy or

delete all copies of the unredacted Report in its possession, custody, or control,

including all paper and electronic copies, and to provide a certification to the

County within fourteen days of the date the mandate issues in this case verifying 

that it has done so.

¶50 To the extent that the Ombudsman thereafter chooses to pursue access to

the Report under CORA, it may seek access only to matters regarding child 

protection services and matters to which either the state department of human 

services or a county department would be entitled to access.

III. Conclusion

¶51 For these reasons, we conclude that (1) the district court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction to enter the orders compelling production of the unredacted 

Report in this case; (2) the Ombudsman does not have the statutory authority to

access information relating to an investigation by filing motions in cases in which 

it is not a party but rather must proceed in accordance with CORA; and (3) even if 
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the district court had jurisdiction here, the Ombudsman had no right to obtain the 

full, unredacted Report, most of which addressed matters beyond the scope of the

Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.

¶52 Accordingly, we make our rule to show cause absolute, and we order the 

Ombudsman to destroy or delete all copies of the unredacted Report in its

possession, custody, or control, including all paper and electronic copies, and to

provide a certification to the County within fourteen days of the date the mandate

issues in this case verifying that it has done so.