alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT NASHVILLE
DAVID PETERS, ) ) C.C.A. NO. 01C

01-9706-CR-00217 Appellant, ) ) DAVIDSON COUNTY VS. ) (No. 2557 Belo w) ) RICKY BELL, WARDEN, ) The Hon. J. Randall Wyatt ) Appellee. ) (Dismissal of Habeas Corpus Petition) ) AFFIRMED PU RSUANT TO R ULE 20

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion reques ting that the judgmentin the above-styled cause be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rules. Although not forthe reaso ns set fo rth in the state’s m otion, we find that this is an appropria te case for affirmance pursuant to Rul e 20.
According t o the t rial court’s order denying relief, the petitioner is currently serving a 40-year sentence for agg ravated kidnapping, w hich began to run on May 12, 1986, and a 2-year

sentence for felony escape. In his petition for habeas cor pus relief and in this appeal, the p eti tioner challenges his 1 993 conviction for felony es cape, asserting that the indictment failed to specify the underlying conv

iction or classificati on thereofand that the indictment failed to state the necessary mens rea element for the o ffen se. In dismissing the petition,the trial court stated:

Habeas corpus relief is available in Tennessee only if “it appears upon th e face of th e judgment or the record of the pr oceedings upon which the judgmentis rendered that a convi cting court was wi thout jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a def enda nt’s sentence of imprisonment

or other restraint has expired.” Archer v. State , 851 S .W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). This languag e, however, does not prov ide a vehicle forhabeas relief on an indivi du al sente nce while a prisoner continues to serve other sentences. Arendall v. S tate , C.C.A. No. 01C01-9510-CR00341, filed December 30, 1996. The law in this State i s clear that habeas corpus relief is available on ly to persons eligible for immediate release from custody

. Arendall , supra , citing Taylor v. Morgan , 909 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1995) (emphasis added)

. See T.C.A. §29-21-122(b)(2).-2- In the case sub judice , petitioner only chall enges his conviction and sentence for felony escape, and no t his co nvicti on and se ntence fo r aggravated kidnapping. Irrespective of th e validity of petit ioner’s challen ge to the escape conviction, th en, in light of petitioner’s current fort y (40) year sentence on the latter

charge, such a challeng e is premature at this time an d is not app ropriate for review.
Finding tha t the trial court properly dismissed the petitioner’ s petition for habeas corpus relief as prematur e, we grant the state’s

motion to affirm the judgment.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the judgment of the trial court is her eby affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tenne ssee Court of Criminal Appeal Rules.

ENTER this the ____ day of September , 1997.

___________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, JUD GE
CONCUR:

___________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, JUDG E

___________________________ THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
#### Comer SELLARS, Appellant, v. General G. COSBY and Erna P. Cosby, his wife, d/b/a the Hideaway, Appellees.

No. 72-500.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 6, 1974.

John A. Williamson, Tampa, for appellant.

John T. Blakely, of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tampa, for appellees.

HOBSON, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered after the trial court directed a verdict for the defendants-appellees at the close of the plaintiff-appellant’s case.

The final judgment states that it was granted upon the grounds set forth in the record. The record discloses that the final judgment was entered on two grounds, to wit, lack of proof of a breach of duty by the appellees, and proof of contributory negligence of the appellant.

Upon a careful review of the record, we hold that the trial judge was eminently correct in directing a verdict for the appel-lees.

One other contention is raised by the appellees in further support of the final judgment. Appellees argue that the appellant did not prove that they owned or controlled the property upon which he tripped and fell over the garbage can.

The pretrial order stated:

> “1. This cause arises out of a fall on the part of Plaintiff on the outside premises of THE HIDEAWAY, a beer tavern, on March 7, 1970, in the City of Tampa, in the Port Tampa area, and involves the question of lighting of the premises, propriety of guard posts and safety of premises. *The issues are negligence, contributory negligence and damages.”*(emphasis added)

Our pretrial procedure pertaining to pretrial conferences is covered by “R.C.P.” Rule 1.200, 30 F.S.A. The principal purpose of a pretrial conference is to simplify *444the issues to be tried at trial. Subsection (c) states in part:

> “ * * * limiting the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of the parties.”

The pretrial order having limited the issues to negligence, contributory negligence and damages, it was not necessary for the appellant to prove at trial the appellees’ ownership or control of the property upon which the accident occurred.

The appellant having failed to show reversible error, the final judgment is

Affirmed.

MANN, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMAITON EXTRACTED FROM BONTEX,
INC.'S UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENT FOR THE QUARTER
ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1997, AS SET FORTH IN THE COMPANY'S QUARTERLY REPORT ON
FORM 10-Q, AND IS QUALIFIEID IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,743
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<INVENTORY>                                      6,370
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                20,642
<PP&E>                                          23,183
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,877
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  32,491
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,574
<BONDS>                                          2,839
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              157
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      11,462
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    32,491
<SALES>                                         10,533
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                10,565
<CGS>                                            7,321
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    9,971
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    56
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    15
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 256
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    282
<INCOME-TAX>                                       125
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                157
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       157
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       .1
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       .1
        

</TABLE>
Consent of Independent Auditors



The Board of Directors
Smithway Motor Xpress Corp:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the Registration  Statements  (No.'s
333-10249,  333-10251,  333-21253,  333-81855,  and  333-97195)  on Form  S-8 of
Smithway  Motor Xpress Corp. of our report dated  February 6, 2004,  relating to
the consolidated  balance sheets of Smithway Motor Xpress Corp. and subsidiaries
as of December 31, 2003 and 2002,  and the related  consolidated  statements  of
earnings,  stockholders'  equity,  and cash  flows  for each of the years in the
three-year  period ended December 31, 2003, which report appears in the December
31, 2003 annual report on Form 10-K of Smithway Motor Xpress Corp.


                                  /s/ KPMG LLP



Des Moines, Iowa
March 30, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                               5
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      149
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   312
<PP&E>                                              81
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   3,485
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,757
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        600
<COMMON>                                            51
<OTHER-SE>                                     (1,783)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     3,485
<SALES>                                            837
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   837
<CGS>                                              911
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    3,379
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 218
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,760)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,760)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,760)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.56)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.56)


</TABLE>
#### Milton THOMAS, Petitioner, v. Louis L. WAINWRIGHT, Respondent.

No. R-41.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 6, 1972.

Milton Thomas, in pro. per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

*235PER CURIAM.

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
#### Richard Lionel SEGUIN and Eleanor Seguin, husband and wife, Appellants, v. HAUSER MOTOR COMPANY, Hauser Dodge Leasing Corporation, Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, Donald Page and Brooks H. Berrie, Appellees.

No. 76-1928.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 27, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 9, 1977.

Edgar G. Hamilton, of Hamilton, James, Merkle and Young, West Palm Beach, and William C. Sprott, Palm Beach, for appellants.

Edna L. Caruso, of Montgomery, Lytal, Reiter, Denney & Searcy, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

*1090PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs appeal from a final judgment based upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, and from the denial of their motion for new trial in a personal injury action. We hold that the trial court erred first in failing to give plaintiffs’ additional requested jury instructions, and second by allowing defense counsel to inject into the case his own personal credibility.

On the first issue, it is axiomatic that each party is entitled to have the jury instructed upon his theory of the case. *Sea Ledge Properties, Inc. v. Dodge,*283 So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Without the requested instructions defining the rights of a lien claimant, the plaintiffs’ theory of the case was left partially unexpressed. The requested instruction on vicarious liability should also have been given because it was only on this basis that the defendant Hau-ser Motor Co. could have been found liable.

On the second issue, it is also axiomatic that the expression by a lawyer of his personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness is not a proper subject for argument to the trier of fact. Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, E.C. 7-24, D.R.7-106. Defense counsel as part of his closing argument to the jury said:

> . I am an officer of the Court. If I lie to you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, they would take my license away, and the practice of law and justice means too much to me and I tell you this; yes, Mr. Berrie was telling the truth. He told me that. He said, “That fellow, I knew him, he was limping long before this accident occurred. I can’t remember which leg it was. He had a limp and they called him, ‘the Penguin.’ I don’t know why. I always assumed it was by reason of the limp he had,” and that was what the man told me.

This was an expression by defense counsel of his personal opinion as to the credibility of the witness, and was improper. As stated by the Supreme Court in *Tampa Transit Lines, Inc. v. Corbin,*62 So.2d 10 (Fla.1952):

> Verdicts rendered by a jury, after having heard such incompetent testimony from an attorney and such highly prejudicial remarks, under the circumstances as shown by this case, cannot be permitted to stand.

We have considered the other two points raised by appellants and find them to be without merit. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

ALDERMAN, C. J., and DAUKSCH and MOORE, JJ., concur.
#### Joseph Roosevelt WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-523.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 15, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 99.0**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANTTO****18 U.S.C SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Harrodsburg First Financial Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission onthe date hereof (the “Report”), we, Arthur L. Freeman, Chief Executive Officer, and Jack Hood, Chief Financial and Accounting Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, ad adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Exley Act of2002, that:

1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.

Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

|   |                                             |   |   |                                                                   |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | /s/ ARTHUR L. FREEMAN                            |   |   | /s/ JACK HOOD                                                          |
|   |                                                  |   |   |                                                                        |
|   | **Arthur L. Freeman****Chief Executive Officer** |   |   | **Jack Hood****Treasurer****(Chief Financial and Accounting Officer)** |

 

21
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 135 (Friday, July 13, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 32672-32673]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-15044]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Cancer Institute Amended; Notice of Meeting

    Notice is hereby given of a change in the meeting of the National 
Cancer Institute Special Emphasis Panel, August 6, 2018, 10:00 a.m. to 
August 6, 2018, 05:00 p.m., National Cancer Institute Shady Grove, 9609 
Medical Center Drive, 7W102, Rockville, MD 20850 which was published in 
the Federal Register on June 08, 2018, 83 FR 26703.

[[Page 32673]]

    This meeting notice is amended to change the contact person from 
Dr. Shakeel Ahmad to Dr. Jun Fang. The meeting date has changed from 
August 6, 2018 to August 16, 2018. The meeting room has changed from 
7W102 to 7W246. The meeting times are the same. The meeting is closed 
to the public.

    Dated: July 10, 2018.
Melanie J. Pantoja,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2018-15044 Filed 7-12-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
Exhibit 32.2CERTIFICATION(Not filed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)     Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, the undersigned, Steven D. Foster, the Chief Financial Officer of Parallel PetroleumCorporation (“Parallel”), hereby certifies that the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Parallel for theyear ended December 31, 2007 fully complies with the periodic reporting requirements of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information contained in that Form 10-K Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofParallel.Dated:February 20, 2008              /s/ Steven D. Foster   Steven D. Foster,   Chief Financial Officer        A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided toParallel Petroleum Corporation and will be retained by Parallel Petroleum Corporation and furnishedto the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
AUBURN NATIONAL BANCORPORATION, INC AND SUBSIDIARIES

EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Auburn National Bancorporation, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as of the date hereof (the Report), I, E.L. Spencer, Jr., President, Chief Executive Officer and
Chairman of the Board of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: March 31, 2009



|                                                            
|------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ E.L. Spencer, Jr.                                       
|                                                            
|E.L. Spencer, Jr.                                           
|President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the
Board
IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 272

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to create the Committee

on the Investigation of Corrupt Practices.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 7, 1993

Mr. WALKER submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Rules

RESOLUTION

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to

create the Committee on the Investigation of Corrupt

Practices.

1 Resolved, That clause 1 of rule X of the Rules of the

2 House of Representatives is amended by redesignating

3 paragraphs (l) through (v) as paragraphs (m) through

4 (w), respectively, and by inserting after paragraph (k) the

5 following new paragraph:

6 ‘‘(l)(1) COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF COR7 RUPT PRACTICES, consisting of the following Members:

8 ‘‘(A) 6 Members who are not members of the

9 same political party as the President, to be ap10 pointed by the majority leader or minority leader, as
2

HRES 272 IH

1 the case may be, and 1 of whom he shall designate

2 as chairman; and

3 ‘‘(B) 5 Members who are members of the same

4 political party as the President, to be appointed by

5 the majority leader or minority leader, as the case

6 may be.

7 ‘‘(2) The committee shall have the duty—

8 ‘‘(A) to investigate, at the instigation of its

9 chairman or upon receipt of a written request made

10 by at least 50 Members of the House and transmit11 ted to the committee by 1 such Member, corrupt

12 practices in the executive branch of the Government;

13 and

14 ‘‘(B) to report to the House the results of its

15 investigations; and

16 ‘‘(C) to recommend to the House such legisla17 tive or administrative actions as it deems appro18 priate.’’.

Æ
TS-EMLA50/60/70/80 Attachment #6 Pt. 2, Sec. A, 3 EnvironmentalRelease andDisposal Information on the New Chemical Substance at Industrial Sites Controlled by the Submitter-Manufacture and Processing
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

KARI FAMBRO, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D18-1855

)

DEBORAH FAMBRO and JOHN )

DICKSON, )

)

Appellees. )

)

Opinion filed February 22, 2019.

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 

9.130 from the Circuit Court for Pinellas

County; James Pierce, Judge.

Lawrence P. Cartelli of Lawrence P. 

Cartelli, P.A., Tavares, for Appellant.

Jane H. Grossman, St. Petersburg, for

Appellee Deborah Fambro. 

No appearance for remaining Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

SILBERMAN, SALARIO, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
# C_2022284EN.01003002.xml

| 25.7.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 284/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.7.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 284/30

---

Judgment of the General Court of 1 June 2022 — Worldwide Machinery v EUIPO — Scaip (SUPERIOR MANUFACTURING)

(Case T-316/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Revocation proceedings - EU figurative mark SUPERIOR MANUFACTURING - Genuine use of the mark - Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 284/38)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Worldwide Machinery Ltd (Channelview, Texas, United States) (represented by: B. Woltering, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: T. Frydendahl and D. Gája, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Scaip SpA (Parma, Italy) (represented by: B. Saguatti and A. Guareschi, lawyers)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 March 2021 (Case R 873/2020-5), relating to revocation proceedings between Worldwide Machinery and Scaip.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Worldwide Machinery Ltd to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Worldwide Machinery Ltd to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 289, 19.7.2021.

---