alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Day International Group, Inc
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Dennis R. Wolters, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial position and results of operations of the
Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.

|                                           |  | 
|------------------------------------------ |  | 
|/s/ Dennis R.
Wolters                     
|Dennis R. Wolters 
Chief Executive Officer | 
|August 6, 2004                             | 
|
#### Napoleon HOWARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-148.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 24, 1970.

Appeal from Court of Record, Broward County; Neals R. Pearson, Judge.

Appeal quashed.
#### Wassell et al. vs. Trapnall, as ad.

Mr. Justice Compton

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellee recovered judgment against the appellants on a writing obligatory for $500, dated 31st May, 1853; and the appellants have prosecuted their appeal to this court.

*274The only question involved, relates to a demand for rents, pleaded by way of set-off, which is the identical demand relied on in the case of *Trapnall vs. Wassell,*decided at the present term, where it was held, upon the authority of *Watkins et al. vs. Wassell,*20 *Ark.*410, that the demand was unfounded.

The judgment must be affirmed with costs.
#### BENNETT *v.*JOHNSON.

Vendor and Purchaser — Insurance—Application op Insurance Monet.

Where fire insurance policy, taken out by assignees of vendees in pursuance of provision therefor in contract, provided that in case of loss payment should be made to vendor and vendees as their respective interests should appear, decree directing payment of amount due on contract, on vendor’s furnishing proper deed and abstract, and balance to be paid to assignees, ■was correct.

Appeal from Grenesee; Gradóla (Paul V.), J.

Submitted December 2, 1931.

(Docket No. 201, Calendar No. 36,028.)

Decided January 4, 1932.

Bill by Stephen Bennett and another, as assignees of the vendee’s interest in a land contract, against Arthur C. Johnson for an accounting of money collected for a loss by fire. Decree for defendant. Plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

*Cline & George,*for plaintiffs.

*Neithercut & Neithercut,*for defendant.

Butzel, J.

Defendant Arthur C. Johnson is the vendor, and plaintiffs Stephen S. Bennett and wife are the assignees of the vendee’s interest, in an executory contract for sale of property in Vienna township, Grenesee county. The contract required the vendees to insure the buildings against loss by fire, in company and amount to be approved by vendor, and with policies properly indorsed, to protect the interest of both parties to the contract. A *558policy of insurance taken out accordingly provided for payment of loss to plaintiffs and defendant as their respective interests should appear. After adjustment of a fire loss, a draft for $2,505.20 payable to plaintiffs and defendant was received from' the insurer. Subsequent to the fire, plaintiffs sold the property on executory land contract to a third party who constructed a new building thereon at a cost in excess of the amount paid by the insurance company. Plaintiffs ask that the insurance money be turned over to them or that it be placed in the hands of a trustee to insure the payments on the contract. Defendant asks that the insurance be applied to the payment of the balance still due on the land contract, and the surplus be paid to plaintiffs. There is no material dispute on the facts. ■

On the hearing, it was shown that there was $2,278.76 still due on the contract, and that part of it was past due. The circuit judge decreed that the amount due defendant be paid to him upon his furnishing a proper deed, with abstract showing good title, and that the balance be paid to plaintiffs.

As there are no other agreements in reference to the insurance moneys than those in the contract and insurance policy as hereinbefore set forth, the court was absolutely correct in its decree. The case is ruled by *Kudner*v. *Miller,*244 Mich. 49, and *Shaw*v. *Cramton, ante,*293.

The decree is affirmed, with costs to defendant.

Clark, C. J., and McDonald, Potter, Sharpe, North, Fead, and Wiest, JJ., concurred.
R-404 

June 10, 1947 

Hon. C. H. Carnese Opinion Ho. V-241 

State Aad.itor 

Austin, Texas Re: Payment~to psmokm 

dfsohrr64d or parohd 

rrom oortafn Strte 

correotiotial lnstitutfons ;, Arttfole 514Sb) 

section 1; V.C.Sd 

Dear Sir: 

We refer to your letter of recent date acknowl- 

&ged by the Attorney General on May 16, 1947, which9 in 

rabatance, reads as follows: 

seOtiOn 1 Or &Ots 1445 s 49th hub, k$. 9 

Ch, 106, H. BU 105, recorded as Article 5143b, 

Sec. 1, VsC.SO, prorfdes: 

“Seation 1, Upon the discharge or parole of any persoa committed to the Oatesville 

State School for Boys or the @afnesrflle State 

School for Girls, the Superintendent of ,the 

Instftutfon from whfeh such person fs dfscharged or paroled shall prosfde them with a 

complete suit of suftab.le cloth-, and Five 

Dollars (I)s) fn ra04e~~' and prooure trenapox%+ 

tfon for them to their hbmes, if residen% al? 

this State, cir: to the oounty in which they III&$ 

have been collvfotcd o~;to~auch other plaou fn 

tlw State. at which twfd dfschsrged’or paroled 

person may have procured employment or to a 

place where a suitable home has been found for 

such personA" 

The question has arfs.@n (at the Gatesvflle 

State School for Boys) :gs to whether the )5,00 

in money and transportation cost oap, be pai‘& 

.more than owe to or for.the same boy who 

has been paroled and tfldn subsequently readmitted as a parole Violator, or possfbl,y 

taken fn again under a new eohrfe%?&qO 
Hon. Co El. Cavness, Page 2 

The provisions of Seetfon 1 of Article 5143b 

are clear and unambiguous. Said statute requires that 

the superintendent at the institutions named therein 

shall provide any person upon his or her discharge or 

parole therefrom with a complete suit of suitable clothing and $5,OQ, and shall secure transportation for said 

'person to some place,wPthfn the State as generally deslgnated in the,Act, 

Where a statute, civil or criminal, is expressed in plain and.unambiguous language, and its meanfq is 

clear and abvious, there is no room for construction. 

Gaddg v. First Watfonal Bank of Beaumont, 283 S,W, 472; 

,Spa.rks v0 State, 174 SoWo‘~51, 

We think that the' provisions of this Aot are 

susceptible of but.one fnterpretation;,that whenever and 

as often as any person is discharged or paroled from one 

of these Institutions, 'he or she is entitled to the benefits afforded by the specific provisions of this law. 

StiRY 

Persons discharged'or paroled from the 

State borrectional institutions designated in 

Article 5143b, Section 1, V,C.S., are entitled 

to the benefits afforded in said Act whenever 

and as often as they are discharged or paroled 

the'refrom, 

Very trul$ yours 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

,By UTChester E, Ollfson 

Bssistant 

'APPROVED JUNE 10, 1947 

z.L ah?& 

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

CEO!djm*
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1280 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1280

To amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for a biennial report 
  on nutrition and health by the Surgeon General of the Public Health 
                    Service, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                July 22 (legislative day, June 30), 1993

 Mr. Harkin (for himself and Mr. Leahy) introduced the following bill; 
 which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Labor and Human 
                               Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for a biennial report 
  on nutrition and health by the Surgeon General of the Public Health 
                    Service, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nutrition and Health Information 
Act''.

SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF REQUIREMENT OF BIENNIAL REPORT ON NUTRITION 
              AND HEALTH.

    Title XVII of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300u et 
seq.), as amended by section 302 of Public Law 102-531 (106 Stat. 
3483), is amended by adding at the end the following section:

            ``biennial report regarding nutrition and health

    ``Sec. 1709. (a) Biennial Report.--The Secretary shall require the 
Surgeon General of the Public Health Service to prepare biennial 
reports on the relationship between nutrition and health. Such reports 
may, with respect to such relationship, include any recommendations of 
the Secretary and the Surgeon General regarding the public health.
    ``(b) Submission to Congress.--The Secretary shall ensure that, not 
later than February 1 of 1995 and of every second year thereafter, a 
report under subsection (a) is submitted to the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources of the Senate.
    ``(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--For the purpose of carrying 
out this section, there are authorized to be appropriated such sums as 
may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 1994 through 1998.''.

                                 <all>
```
IB

House Calendar No. 175

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 458

[Report No. 103–554]

Waiving certain points of order against the bill (H.R. 4602) making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for

the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 21, 1994

Mr. GORDON, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following resolution;

which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

RESOLUTION

Waiving certain points of order against the bill (H.R. 4602)

making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for other purposes.

1 Resolved, That during consideration of the bill (H.R.

2 4602) making appropriations for the Department of the

3 Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending

4 September 30, 1995, and for other purposes, all points

5 of order against provisions in the bill for failure to comply
2

HRES 458 RH

1 with clause 2 or 6 of rule XXI are waived except as fol2 lows: beginning on page 80, line 10, through line 19.

House Calendar No. 175

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 458

[Report No. 103–554]

RESOLUTION

Waiving certain points of order against the bill

for other purposes.the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, andpartment of the Interior and related agencies for(H.R. 4602) making appropriations for the DeJUNE 21, 1994

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be

printed
#### Maurice BALLARD, Appellant, v. James COWART, Ralph Smith, Luke Waldron, Tom Cooper, and Conard Moye, constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Hardee County, Florida, Appellees.

No. 70-621.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 14, 1970.

*485John W. Burton, Wauchula, for appellant.

R. Earl Collins, of Patarini & Collins, Wauchula, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant appeals a final declaratory judgment whereby the learned trial judge determined that appellant was not qualified to become a candidate for County Commissioner of Hardee County, Florida, by reason of the provisions of Chapter 70-80, Laws of Florida, 1970.

 The trial court found that the appellant is a duly appointed member of the Hospital District Board of Hardee County, whose term of office has not expired and who had not tendered his resignation from said office in accordance with Chapter 70-80, Laws of Florida, 1970.

In the final judgment the trial court also found:

> “2. Plaintiff is the holder of an ‘elective or appointive office’ within the purview of Chapter 70-80, Laws of Florida, 1970.

> “3. The term ‘elective or appointive office’ exhausts the enumeration of the series, and the following term, viz., ‘whether state, county, or municipal’ does not in any way limit the exhaustive term, so that the doctrine of ejusdem generis has no application. [Citation omitted.]”

We adopt the above finding and interpretation of Chapter 70-80, Laws of Florida, 1970, as the opinion of this court.

Therefore, the final declaratory judgment appealed is affirmed.

HOBSON, C. J., and LILES and Mc-NULTY, JJ., concur.
#### David COOPER and Celia Cooper, his wife, Appellants, v. FENTON BRACE & LIMB COMPANY, INC., a Florida Corporation and, National Indemnity Company, a Foreign Corporation, Appellees.

No. 76-890.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 4, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1977.

*1107Pettigrew, Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson & Greer, Miami, for appellants.

Virgin, Whittle & Popper and Gary E. Garbis, Miami, for appellees.

Before HAVERFIELD and HUBBART, JJ. and CHARLES A. CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiffs [David Cooper] and his wife [Celia Cooper] appeal from a final judgment entered in a negligence action in favor of the defendant [Fenton Brace & Limb Company] and its insurer [National Indemnity Company]. The plaintiffs contend that it was error for the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendants at the close of all the evidence in the case. We agree and reverse.

The law is clear that a directed verdict should not be entered for a defendant in a negligence action unless the plaintiff cannot recover under any reasonable view of the evidence; even where the evidence is not in dispute, when conflicting reasonable inferences may be drawn from the admitted facts, questions of negligence and negligence causation are peculiarly questions of fact which should be permitted to go to the jury. *Rio Seco v. Alfred Meyers Trucking, Inc.,*208 So.2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). Our review of the evidence in this case leads us to the conclusion that there were conflicting reasonable inferences on the question of negligence and negligence causation based on all the evidence which precluded the entry of a directed verdict in favor of the defendants.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
# C_2022073EN.01001402.xml

| 14.2.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 73/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.2.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 73/14

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte costituzionale (Italy) lodged on 22 November 2021 — O.G.

(Case C-700/21)

(2022/C 73/19)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte costituzionale

Party to the main proceedings

O.G.

Questions referred

| (a) | Does Article 4(6) of Council [Framework Decision] 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, (1) interpreted in the light of Article 1(3) of that decision and Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preclude legislation, such as the Italian legislation, that — in the context of a European arrest warrant procedure for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence or detention order — absolutely and automatically precludes the executing judicial authorities from refusing to surrender third-country nationals staying or residing in Italian territory, irrespective of the links those individuals have with that territory? |
| --- | --- |

(a)

Does Article 4(6) of Council [Framework Decision] 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, (1) interpreted in the light of Article 1(3) of that decision and Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preclude legislation, such as the Italian legislation, that — in the context of a European arrest warrant procedure for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence or detention order — absolutely and automatically precludes the executing judicial authorities from refusing to surrender third-country nationals staying or residing in Italian territory, irrespective of the links those individuals have with that territory?

| (b) | If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, what criteria and assumptions are used to establish that such links are to be regarded as so significant as to require the executing judicial authority to refuse surrender? |
| --- | --- |

(b)

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, what criteria and assumptions are used to establish that such links are to be regarded as so significant as to require the executing judicial authority to refuse surrender?

---

(1)  OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>       THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
               FROM THE ACCOMPANYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN
               ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>   1,000
       
<S>                                         <C>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           Dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                              Jan-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                Dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-TYPE>                               12-MOS
<CASH>                                          3,359
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  86,999
<ALLOWANCES>                                   13,189
<INVENTORY>                                    24,707
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              124,210
<PP&E>                                         17,195
<DEPRECIATION>                                  6,744
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                207,783
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          41,410
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                          181
<OTHER-SE>                                    161,849
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  207,783
<SALES>                                       239,551
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              239,551
<CGS>                                         143,156
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 143,156
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              118,253
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                602
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (47,504)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (18,054)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (29,450)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (29,450)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  ($1.63)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  ($1.63)
        

</TABLE>
# C_2022064EN.01002301.xml

| 7.2.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 64/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.2.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 64/23

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Županijski sud u Puli-Pola (Croatia) lodged on 30 November 2021 — Criminal proceedings against GR, HS, IT, INTER CONSULTING d.o.o., in liquidation

(Case C-726/21)

(2022/C 64/35)

Language of the case: Croatian

Referring court

Županijski sud u Puli-Pola

Parties to the main proceedings

GR, HS, IT, INTER CONSULTING d.o.o., in liquidation

Question referred

In assessing whether there has been an infringement of the ne bis in idem principle, is it possible to compare only the facts cited in the enacting terms of the indictment of the Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Puli-Pola (Pula Public Prosecutor’s Office, Croatia) of 28 September 2015 with the key facts cited in the enacting terms of the indictment of the Staatsanwaltschaft Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt Public Prosecutor’s Office, Austria) of 9 January 2015, and in the operative part of the judgment of the Landesgericht Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt Regional Court) of 3 November 2016, upheld by judgment of the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court of the Republic of Austria) of 4 March 2019, or is it possible to compare the facts cited in the enacting terms of the indictment of the Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Puli-Pola (Pula Public Prosecutor’s Office) with the facts cited in the grounds of the judgment of the Landesgericht Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt Regional Court) of 3 November 2016, upheld by judgment of the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court of the Republic of Austria), and which were the subject of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Staatsanwaltschaft Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt Public Prosecutor’s Office) against several persons, in particular against GR and HS, and which were subsequently omitted from the indictment by the Staatsanwaltschaft Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt Public Prosecutor’s Office) of 9 January 2015 (and were not cited in those enacting terms)?

---
#### James M. HUTCHINSON, Appellant, v. George FLEMING, as Administrator of the Estate of Jeffrey A. Fleming, Deceased, Appellee.

No. 73-801.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 16, 1973.

Certiorari denied.