alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### MOSES MURPHY *vs.*PETER COUNTISS.

A false imprisonment does not necessarily include an assault and battery.

If an officer illegally imprisons a person he is liable not only for the time he is in the officer’s custody, but for all the time of his imprisonment.

Trespass, assault and battery, and false imprisonment. Pleas, Not guilty and justification.

The plff. was claimed as a servant by one Stephen Townsend, and the deft, being a constable, arrested and put him in prison as such servant. Upon investigation, it turned out that Townsend had no valid claim to the plff. Whereupon he brought this suit.

His counsel contended that every imprisonment necessarily included an assault and battery; which was denied, and the deft, insisted that, if liable at all, he was only liable while plff. was in his custody, and not for the whole period of his imprisonment.

*The Court*

said the older authorities sustained the position of the plff’s, attorney. In the time of Lord Kenyon and since, however, *144the decisions have been that a false imprisonment does not necessarily include a battery.. But it makes no difference here; the false imprisonment, if proved, will entitle the plff. to recover; and not merely for the time the constable was bringing him to jail, but for the whole period of his imprisonment.

Gilpin, for plaintiff.

Latimer, for defendant.

The plaintiff had a verdict.
#### Judie Madsen PELLEY, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a corporation, and Marjorie Pelley, Appellees.

No. 70-195.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 2, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1205

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 13, 1993

Referred to the Committee on Agriculture

AN ACT

To amend the Fluid Milk Promotion Act of 1990 to define

fluid milk processors to exclude de minimis processors,

and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fluid Milk Promotion

5 Amendments Act of 1993’’.
2

•S 1205 RFH

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF FLUID MILK PROCESSOR.

2 (a) FLUID MILK PROCESSOR.—Paragraph (4) of sec3 tion 1999C of the Fluid Milk Promotion Act of 1990 (7

4 U.S.C. 6402(4)) is amended to read as follows:

5 ‘‘(4) FLUID MILK PROCESSOR.—The term ‘fluid

6 milk processor’ means any person who processes and

7 markets commercially more than 500,000 pounds of

8 fluid milk products in consumer-type packages per

9 month.’’.

10 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 1999J(e)

11 of such Act (7 U.S.C. 6409(e)) is amended by inserting

12 after ‘‘4504(g))’’ the following: ‘‘, and that are fluid milk

13 processors,’’.

Passed the Senate July 1 (legislative day, June 30),

1993.

Attest: WALTER J. STEWART,

Secretary.
#### Dale Patric BOWLIN, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DADE et al., Appellees.

No. 73-1431.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 6, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Mary HAWKINS v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 44559.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 30, 1967.

R. Jess Brown, Jackson, for appellant.

Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., by G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. Murray Akers, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Ambassadors International, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2006 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Brian R. Schaefgen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Brian R. Schaefgen 
|Brian R. Schaefgen     
|Chief Financial Officer
|May 10, 2006           

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany this Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350
and in accordance with SEC Release No. 33-8238, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made
before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We hereby
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-147154 and 333-147153), Form S-4 (Nos. 333-143243 and 333-157724) and Form S-8 (Nos. 333-145741, 333-138839, 333-96967, 333-55082, 333-48226,
333-31120, 333-69381, 333-37371, 333-37369 and 33-58991) of Exar Corporation of our report dated June 10, 2011 relating to the financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in this Form
10-K.



|                                 
|---------------------------------
|/s/    PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP
|PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP       
|San Jose, California             
|June 10, 2011
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000751256
<NAME> DYCO OIL & GAS PROGRAM 1985-2 LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          86,273
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   46,545
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               132,818
<PP&E>                                      22,443,455
<DEPRECIATION>                              22,371,239
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 244,561
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,198
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     225,464
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   244,561
<SALES>                                        230,192
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               232,494
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  141,199
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 91,295
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             91,295
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    91,295
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       21
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
INDEX TO EXHIBITS


   10.1   Letter Employment Agreement dated May 6, 1999, among
          the Company, Global Marine Corporate Services Inc.,
          and C. Russell Luigs.

   10.2   Second Amendment and Appointment of Successor Trustee
          Under the Global Marine Executive Deferred Compensation
          Trust dated as of June 1, 1999, by and between Global
          Marine Corporate Services Inc. and SEI Trust Company.

   10.3   First Amendment and Appointment of Successor Trustee
          Under the Global Marine Benefit Equalization Retirement
          Trust dated as of June 1, 1999, by and between Global
          Marine Corporate Services Inc. and SEI Trust Company.

   10.4   First Amendment and Appointment of Successor Trustee
          Under the Global Marine Outside Director Deferred
          Compensation Trust dated as of June 1, 1999, by and
          between Global Marine Corporate Services Inc. and SEI
          Trust Company.

   10.5   Second Amendment to Credit Agreement and Loan Documents,
          dated as of April 23, 1999, among Global Marine Inc.,
          Various Lending Institutions, Bankers Trust Company, as
          administrative agent, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken
          AB(publ) and Den Norske Bank ASA, New York Branch, as
          co-agents, and Societe Generale, Southwest Agency, as
          documentation agent.

   10.6   Second Amendment to Credit Agreement and Loan Documents,
          dated as of April 23, 1999, among Global Marine Inc.,
          Various Lending Institutions, Bankers Trust Company, as
          administrative agent, ABN Amro Bank, N.V., Houston Agency,
          as syndication agent, and Societe Generale, Southwest
          Agency, as documentation agent.

   10.7   Letter Agreement dated as of June 4, 1999, between Global
          Marine Inc. and Societe Generale.

   10.8   Loan Agreement dated as of June 4, 1999, between Global
          Marine Inc. and Altair Funding Corporation.

   15.1   Letter of Independent Accountants regarding Awareness of
          Incorporation by Reference.

   27.1   Financial Data Schedule.  (Exhibit 27.1 is being submitted
          as an exhibit only in the electronic format of this
          Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q being submitted to the
          Securities and Exchange Commission.  Exhibit 27.1 shall not
          be deemed filed for purposes of Section 11 of the Securities
          Act of 1933, Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of
          1934 or Section 323 of the Trust Indenture Act, or otherwise
          be subject to the liabilities of such sections, nor shall
          it be deemed a part of any registration statement to which
          it relates.)
#### James SANDERS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-787.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 30, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
# C_2022095EN.01000603.xml

| 28.2.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 95/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.2.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 95/6

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 30 September 2021 — Gmina O. v Dyrektor Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej

(Case C-612/21)

(2022/C 95/10)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Gmina O.

Defendant: Dyrektor Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej

Questions referred

| 1. | Must the provisions of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, (1) in particular Articles 2(1), 9(1) and 13(1) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that a municipality (a public authority) acts as a taxable person for VAT purposes in carrying out a project whose objective is to increase the proportion of renewable energy sources by means of entering into a civil-law contract with property owners, under which the municipality undertakes to install renewable energy source systems on their property and — after a certain period of time has elapsed — to transfer the ownership of those systems to the property owners? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must the provisions of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, (1) in particular Articles 2(1), 9(1) and 13(1) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that a municipality (a public authority) acts as a taxable person for VAT purposes in carrying out a project whose objective is to increase the proportion of renewable energy sources by means of entering into a civil-law contract with property owners, under which the municipality undertakes to install renewable energy source systems on their property and — after a certain period of time has elapsed — to transfer the ownership of those systems to the property owners?

| 2. | If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must European co-financing received by a municipality (a public authority) for the implementation of projects involving renewable energy sources be included in the taxable amount within the meaning of Article 73 of that directive? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must European co-financing received by a municipality (a public authority) for the implementation of projects involving renewable energy sources be included in the taxable amount within the meaning of Article 73 of that directive?

---

(1)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

---
#### Richard Floyd DeVOE v. T. E. DUNCAN, State Attorney, Eighth Judicial Circuit, State of Florida.

No. 38570.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 1969.

Prohibition denied without opinion.
#### Mrs. Ruth Richards VAUGHAN v. Fred King VAUGHAN, M.D.

No. 5743.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Nov. 30, 1973.

*417Tucker & Schonekas, Gibson Tucker, Jr., New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.

Racivitch & Wegmann, William J. Weg-mann, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

Before GULOTTA, J., and GAUDIN and ZACCARIA, JJ. Pro Tern.

GULOTTA, Judge.

This is an appeal by a defendant husband from an alimony pendente lite award in favor of plaintiff wife in the amount of $800 per month. No issue as to child support is presented since no children were born of the marriage. It is the husband’s contention that illness has reduced his income to $1,000 per month. While acknowledging an estate with a net value of $105,700, defendant claims the assets comprising his estate are not liquid.

The husband in this case is a medical doctor who suffered a stroke on July 31, 1971. As a result of the illness, Vaughan became totally incapacitated for a period of five months, during which time he was hospitalized for eleven weeks.

If Doctor Vaughan’s financial condition were accurately reflected by the income from his medical partnership alone, there would clearly have been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in awarding Mrs. Vaughan $800 per month in alimony pen-dente lite. However, limiting the inquiry to Doctor Vaughan’s medical income does not reveal the entire picture. It is uncon-tradicted that Dr. Vaughan has gross total assets in the amount of $435,000. Included in his estate are real estate located in Lul-ing, Louisiana, valued at $65,000; a home and lot in Audubon Place, New Orleans, for which Dr. Vaughan has received an offer to purchase for the sum of $170,000 not including furnishings valued at $50,000; two other pieces of real estate, both valued at $28,000; and finally a 15 percent interest in real estate in Mississippi, valued at $21,000. It is also not controverted that Dr. Vaughan’s interests in real property are heavily encumbered. He has total outstanding liabilities in the amount of $329,300. Nevertheless, his net worth is valued at $105,700.

The jurisprudence of this state has consistently, held that, in assessing the amount of alimony pendente lite, the entire financial condition of the husband must be examined. The inquiry is not complete by merely looking at the income of the husband. King v. King, 255 So.2d 225 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971); Browsky v. Silverman, 184 La. 977, 168 So. 121; Viser v. Viser, 179 So.2d 672 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1965).

When we consider Vaughan’s total finances, both income and assets, and the admittedly lavish standard of living to which the Vaughans were accustomed prior to the separation, we cannot conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion. Finally, we find no merit in Vaughan’s contention that his assets are not liquid and, therefore, cannot be considered in determining the amount of the alimony award. Clearly, there is no showing that *418his assets are not liquid. We find, therefore, no necessity of considering the legal aspect of this contention.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

May 10, 2018

No. 04

- 18

- 00182

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF D.L.A., D.L.A.R., B.B.R., B.L.A.R., AND J.R.,

From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016PA01942

Honorable Ri chard Price, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

This is an accelerated appeal of an order terminating Appellant D.R.’s parental rights, which must be disposed of by this Court within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal is filed.

See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2. Appellant D.R. has filed a motion for extension of time to file her brief. We GRANT the motion and ORDER Appellant D.R. to file her brief on or before June 8,

2018. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS WILL BE GRANTED.

_________________________________ Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 10th day of May, 2018

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
#### CITY OF WINTER GARDEN, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. Raymond Emanuel RICHARDSON and Jerry B. Hadley, Appellees.

No. 69-527.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 18, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
259 La. 867

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Kirksey McCord NIX, Jr., et al.

No. 51753.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 21, 1971.

On Reconsideration Sept. 30, 1971.

Dissenting Opinion Oct. 11, 1971.

Dissenting Opinion Oct. 19, 1971.

In re: Kirksey McCord Nix, Jr., John C. Fulford, James R. Knight and Peter F. Mule applying for writs of certiorari.

Granted. See order.

The petition of relators in the above numbered and entitled cause having been duly considered,

It is ordered that the order denying a contradictory hearing to determine “ * ** **if the proof is evident or the presumption great that he is (relators are) guilty of the capital offense” issued by the Honorable Oliver P. Schulingkamp, Judge of Section F of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans on September 13, 1971, be and the same is hereby set aside.

It is further ordered that the Judge of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans conduct a hearing on relators’ application for bail in compliance with Code of Criminal Procedure Article 313 and after evidence has been adduced by the relators and the State the Court shall determine relators’ entitlement to bail in the premises.

On Reconsideration.

On reconsideration of this matter in the light of the return of the trial judge who had not been served originally with a copy of relator’s application as required by our rules, we reinstate our order of Sept. 21, 1971, relative to the holding of a hearing for bail. However, that hearing is to be restricted to the introduction of affirmative evidence by relators tending to show that the proof of guilt is not evident nor the presumption great, and to the introduction of rebuttal evidence of the state. Discovery evidence shall not be received.

BARHAM, J., concurs adhering to original order citing C.Cr.P. Art. 313.

HAMLIN, J., dissents. The return of the trial judge convinces me that his ruling is correct.

SANDERS, J., dissents with written reasons.

SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

SANDERS, Justice

(dissenting).

The Grand Jury of Orleans Parish indicted the applicants for murder. Pursuant to Article 313 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial judge ordered a bail hearing. During the hearing, the applicants began to call the State’s witnesses and propound questions directed to the discovery of the details of the State’s evidence. After the State objected to the use of the hearing for pre-trial discovery, the trial judge ruled that he would only receive evidence of extraordinary circumstances (such as alibi) tending to show that the proof of guilt was not evident or presumption great. The applicants did not perfect a bill of exceptions to this ruling, but applied to this Court for supervisory relief without serving the trial judge.

In my opinion, the ruling of the trial judge was correct.

I am also of the opinion that the showing made does not warrant the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.

SUMMERS, Justice

(dissenting from the order directing the trial judge to hold another hearing).

I agree with the dissenting opinion of SANDERS, J.
<PAGE>   1
                                  EXHIBIT 21.0


                              LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES


The following list contains the names and jurisdictions of organization of
Habersham Bancorp's direct and indirect subsidiaries. Habersham Bancorp owns
100% of the outstanding stock of each listed entity, except for BancMortgage
Financial Corp., Appalachian Travel Service and Advantage Insurers, Inc., which
are wholly owned subsidiaries of Habersham Bank.

Name and Jurisdiction

Habersham Bank, a Georgia state bank.
Security State Bank, a Georgia state bank.
The Advantage Group, Inc. a Georgia corporation.
BancMortgage Financial Corp., a Georgia corporation.
Appalachian Travel Service, Inc., a Georgia corporation.
Advantage Insurers, Inc., a Georgia corporation.
Exhibit 32.2
 
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
 (2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ Mark T. Detillion

Mark T. Detillion 
Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
August 14, 2009
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signatures that appear in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided
to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

In connection with the Annual Report of Sierra Health Services, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K/A for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Paul H. Palmer, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

/s/ Paul H. Palmer			

Paul H. Palmer				

Chief Financial Officer

August 15, 2003