Nos. 94-097 and 94-107

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1994

FRANKLIN T. CURTIS,

Petitioner,

-vsDISTRICT COURT OF THE TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL

DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, IN AND FOR

THE COUNTY OF RAVALLI! and THE HONOPABLE

JEFFREY LANGTON, Presiding Judge,

Respondents.

IVAN VILENSKY,

Petitioner,

-vsDISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY

OF MISSOULA and THE HONORABLE JOHN S. HENSON

Presiding Judge,

Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Petitioners:

Donald Spadone, Attorney at Law, Hamilton, Montana

Larry Mansch, Public Defender Office, Missoula,

Montana
COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Respondents:

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, John

Paulson, Assistant Attorney General, Helena,

Montana

George Corn, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton,

Montana

Robert Deschamps, III, Missoula County Attorney,

Missoula, Montana

For Amicus Curiae:

Lonnie J. Olson, Mental Disabilities Board of

Visitors, Warm Springs, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: August23, 1994

Decided: August 30, 1994

Filed:
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We accepted original jurisdiction of these consolidated cases

to address the following issue of first impression presented in

Applications for Writ of Supervisory Control: Whether a defendant

awaiting trial on criminal charges, who has been determined to lack

the fitness to proceed, may be involuntarily medicated or treated

for his underlying mental condition during the go-day commitment

period prescribed in 5 46-14-221, MCA. We reverse orders of the

Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, and the

Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, authorizing such

involuntary medication and treatment and remand for further

proceedings.

These consolidated cases are factually similar to the extent

necessary for our resolution of the legal issue before us. Thus,

abbreviated factual summaries are sufficient to provide a

foundation for our analysis.

State v. Franklin T. Curtis

In response to being charged by information with two counts of

deliberate homicide and three counts of felony assault in the

Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, Franklin T.

Curtis (Curtis) moved for a psychiatric examination and filed

notice of intent to rely on the defense of mental disease or

defect. The District Court appointed Dr. William Stratford to

conduct a psychiatric examination of Curtis.

Following the examination and upon motion of the State of

Montana (State), the District Court determined that a doubt existed

about Curtis' fitness to proceed, and ordered that he be examined

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at the Montana State Hospital at Warm Springs (State Hospital)

pursuant to 5 46-14-202, MCA. Subsequent to that examination, the

court determined that Curtis was "not now fit to proceed" and

ordered him committed to the custody of the Director of the

Department of Corrections and Human Services (Department Director)

for placement, as recommended by the court, at the State Hospital

pursuant to § 46-14-221, MCA. The court's order suspended further

criminal proceedings during Curtis' commitment and authorized

involuntary medication for Curtis' mental illness as deemed

necessary by the Department Director. The District Court stayed

the involuntary medication pending Curtis' application to this

Court for a writ of supervisory control.

State v. Ivan Vilensky

Ivan Vilensky (Vilensky) was charged via information with two

counts of felony assault and one count of misdemeanor assault in

the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County. Following a

joint request by Vilensky and the State, the District Court ordered

that Vilensky be examined to determine his fitness to proceed

pursuant to 5 46-14-202, PICA.

Subsequent to that examination and further proceedings, the

District Court found Vilensky unfit to proceed and committed him to

the custody of the Department Director pursuant to § 46-14-221(2),

MCA. The court authorized involuntary antipsychotic medication and

treatment of Vilensky, but stayed the involuntary medication and

treatment pending Vilensky's application to this Court for a writ.

Vilensky's counsel stipulated to preserving the State's "right" to

a full go-day evaluation period.

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May a defendant who is awaiting trial on criminal

charges, and who has been determined to lack the fitness

to proceed, be involuntarily medicated or treated for his

underlying mental condition during the go-day commitment

period prescribed in 5 46-14-221(2), MCA?

The issue before us is limited to whether the State may

involuntarily treat and medicate the underlying mental condition of

a defendant committed pursuant to 5 46-14-221(2), MCA, and, in so

doing, attempt to render the defendant fit to proceed to trial.

Not before us are the questions of medication and treatment for

medical conditions other than the underlying mental condition or

whether, how, and to what extent, the State may involuntarily

medicate a defendant committed pursuant to $j 46-14-221(2), MCA, in

order to constrain behavioral manifestations of the defendant's

underlying mental condition which demonstrably render the defendant

a danger to himself or others.

All parties, including the State on behalf of Respondent

District Courts and amicus curiae Mental Disabilities Board of

Visitors, address the issue before us via both statutory

interpretation and extensive constitutional analysis. The State

argues that both 3 46-14-221, MCA, and the United States

Constitution permit involuntary medication and treatment of Curtis

and Vilensky for their mental illnesses during this period of

commitment for the purpose of rendering them fit to proceed to

trial on the charges against them. Curtis, Vilensky and amicus

curiae contend to the contrary. Because we hold that $j 46-14-

221(2), MCA, does not authorize the involuntary medication or

treatment of a defendant's underlying mental condition, we do not

address the significant constitutional issues which would arise in

5
the event of a different statutory interpretation.

Montana provides by statute that a person who, as a result of

a mental disease or defect, is unable to understand the proceedings

or assist in his or her defense, may not be tried, convicted or

sentenced for the commission of a criminal offense. Section 46-14-

103, MCA. The issue of a defendant's fitness to proceed is raised

and determined in a criminal proceeding pursuant to Title 46,

Chapter 14, Part 2 of the Montana Code Annotated, which is entitled

"Procedure When Mental Disease or Defect an Issue."

A defendant's fitness to proceed often arises first under

$i 46-14-202, MCA, and the court may order an examination of whether

a defendant is fit to proceed pursuant to that statute: for

purposes of such an examination, the defendant may be committed to

any suitable facility for a period not exceeding 60 days unless the

court determines that a longer period is required for the

examination. Section 46-14-202(2), MCA. A report of the

examination must address the criteria set forth in 5 46-14-206,

MCA.

Section 46-14-221, MCA, provides for further proceedings in

the event a report is filed pursuant to 5 46-14-206, MCA. The

court makes the determination of the defendant's fitness to proceed

pursuant to 5 46-14-221(l), MCA, and if the court determines the

defendant is not fit to proceed, 5 46-14-221(2), MCA, governs

subsequent proceedings. The interpretation of 5 46-14-221(2), MCA,

is before us in this case.

Our role in construing statutes is clear. We must "ascertain

and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein . .

6
. ;'I we may not insert what has been omitted or omit what has been

inserted. Section l-2-101, MCA. The intention of the legislature

is to be pursued. Section l-2-102, MCA. If that intention can be

determined from the plain meaning of the words used, a court may

not go further and apply other means of interpretation. State v.

Hubbard (1982), 200 Mont. 106, 111, 649 P.2d 1331, 1333 (citation

omitted). Where the statutory language is "plain, unambiguous,

direct and certain, the statute speaks for itself and there is

nothing left for the court to construe." Hubbard, 649 P.2d at

1333.

In the event of a court determination that the defendant is

not fit to proceed, § 46-14-221(2), MCA, provides as follows:

[T]he proceeding against the defendant must be

suspended, . . . and the court shall commit the defendant

to the custody of the director of the department of

corrections and human services to be placed in an

appropriate institution . . . for so long as the

unfitness endures. The committing court shall, within 90

days of commitment, review the defendant's fitness to

proceed. If the court finds that the defendant is still

unfit to proceed and that it does not appear that the

defendant will become fit to proceed within the

reasonably foreseeable future, the proceeding against the

defendant must be dismissed, . . . and the prosecutor

shall petition the court in the manner provided in

chapter 20 or 21 of Title 53, whichever is appropriate,

to determine the disposition of the defendant pursuant to

those provisions.

It is clear that § 46-14-221(2), MCA, contains no reference to

involuntary treatment and medication of the defendant's mental

condition during the prescribed period.

The State's power to treat mentally ill persons is separately

and specifically addressed in Chapter 21 of Title 53, MCA. The

stated purpose of that chapter is to secure for each person who may

be mentally ill the care and treatment suited to the person's
needs. Section 53-21-101, MCA. Under this chapter, the State is

authorized to provide needed care and treatment involuntarily,

where appropriate, but only pursuant to the procedural requisites

and restrictions specifically provided by the Montana legislature.

See, e.q., § 53-21-121, MCA.

The legislative intent of 5 46-14-221(2), MCA, is clearly

stated by the plain and unambiguous language used. The statute

provides for the suspension of criminal proceedings and commitment

of a defendant who is not fit to proceed to an appropriate

institution for the period of unfitness. Section 46-14-221(2),

MCA.

This latter provision is significantly limited, however. The

defendant's fitness to proceed must be reviewed by the court within

90 days of the commitment: if, at that time, the court determines

that the defendant remains unfit to proceed and it appears that the

defendant will not become fit to proceed "within the reasonably

foreseeable future, the proceeding against the defendant must be

dismissed . . . .I' Section 46-14-221(2), MCA. No language in the

statute supports the position that the legislature intended the

defendant's underlying mental condition to be involuntarily

medicated or treated during the g 46-14-221(2), MCA, commitment

period.

Moreover, the final portion of § 46-14-221(2), MCA, directly

contradicts any such asserted legislative intent. There, the

legislature specifically provided that, if the criminal proceedings

are dismissed due to the defendant's unfitness, "the prosecutor

shall petition the court in the manner provided in chapter 20 or 21

8
of Title 53, . . . to determine the disposition of the defendant

pursuant to those provisions." Section 46-14-221(Z), MCA (emphasis

added). As discussed above, such a petition would result--assuming

the requisite showings were made--in a civil commitment which would

include appropriate treatment for the person's mental condition.

The language of 5 46-14-221(2), MCA, is clear and the statute

speaks for itself. It provides a means of committing a criminal

defendant who is not fit to proceed for a limited period of time to

determine whether the defendant will become fit to proceed to

trial. If it appears that fitness to proceed will not occur within

the reasonably foreseeable future, the criminal proceedings must be

dismissed, and the State must proceed under statutes authorizing

appropriate treatment for the underlying mental condition. W e

conclude that § 46-14-221(2), MCA, does not authorize the

involuntary medication and treatment of a committed defendant's

underlying mental condition.

While the State concedes our conclusion, at least to the

extent of agreeing that no specific authority for such involuntary

medication and treatment of a defendant's underlying mental

condition is contained in § 46-14-221(2), MCA, it contends that the

legislature's intent vis-a-vis this statute can be determined only

through examination of legislative history. It urges us to apply

rules of statutory construction whereby statutes are to be

interpreted so as not to defeat their purpose, and with a view to

effecting their objects and promoting justice. Section l-2-103,

MCA; Maney v. State (1992), 255 Mont. 270, 842 P.2d 704; State v.

Sunday (1980), 187 Mont. 292, 609 P.2d 1188.

9
our conclusion that the legislature's language, intent and

purpose in enacting § 46-14-221(2), MCA, are clear comports with

these rules. It advances the purpose and objects of the statute

ascertained from a plain reading of the legislature's language. It

"promotes justice" by simultaneously effectuating the legislature's

will and requiring the State to pursue involuntary treatment of

mentally ill persons under the civil statutes specifically

authorizing such treatment. Nor does anything in any of the rules

of statutory construction advanced by the State permit this Court

to deviate from the "plain meaning" rule absent ambiguous or

uncertain language which does not exist in § 46-14-221(2), MCA, or

t o insert language authorizing involuntary treatment for a

defendant's underlying mental condition which was not included by

the legislature.

We hold that a defendant who is awaiting trial, and who has

been determined to lack the fitness to proceed, may not be

involuntarily medicated or treated for his underlying mental

condition during the go-day commitment period prescribed in 5 46-

14-221(2), MCA. Having so held, it remains necessary to return to

the individual cases of petitioners Curtis and Vilensky.

State v. Curtis

The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County,

authorized the involuntary medication of Curtis' underlying mental

illness: that provision was stayed. The District Court also

ordered a report within 90 days of the date of its order of

February 17, 1994, and it appears from the record before us that

the report has been prepared and forwarded to the District Court.

10
The District Court's order authorizing involuntary medication

of Curtis' underlying mental illness is reversed. Curtis now

having been committed to the State Hospital for a period in excess

of twice that permitted without further court review under 5 46-14-

221(2), MCA, the District Court is directed to proceed with its

statutorily-mandated review of his fitness to proceed as

immediately as such proceedings can be scheduled on a priority

basis.

State v. Vilenskv

The Fourth Judicial District Court authorized the involuntary

administration of antipsychotic drugs to treat Vilensky: it stayed

that action. Vilensky's counsel stipulated that "the prosecution%

right to a full ninety (90) day evaluation period will be

preserved."

The District Court also determined that the administration of

medication during the § 46-14-221(2), MCA, commitment was necessary

for the health and safety of Vilensky and others. Our resolution

of the issue in this case of involuntary treatment of a defendant's

underlying mental condition addresses the court's "health of

Vilensky" determination. The "safety of Vilensky and others"

determination relates to the issues not before us regarding when

and how the State may involuntarily medicate behavioral

manifestations of a defendant's underlying mental condition which

demonstrably render the defendant a danger to himself or others.

Suffice it to say that our close review of the record reveals no

basis for the court's determination that the "safety" of Vilensky

and others necessitated medication of any kind, much less the

11
antipsychotic drugs recommended to treat the underlying mental

illness.

The District Court's order authorizing the involuntary

administration of antipsychotic drugs to treat Vilensky is

reversed. Any "right" the State has to the go-day period prior to

court review of Vilensky's fitness to proceed has been fully met,

in that some six months have elapsed since the stipulation.

Vilensky having been committed to the State Hospital for a period

longer than 5 46-14-221(2), MCA, allows without further court

review, the District Court is directed to proceed with its

statutorily-mandated review of Vilensky's fitness to proceed as

immediately as such proceedings can be scheduled on a priority

basis.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH

THIS OPINION.

Justices

12
Justice James C. Nelson specially concurs.

I concur in the Court's opinion. The examination - evaluation

statutes (Title 46, Ch. 14, part 2, MCA) clearly do not provide

authority for the involuntary medication or treatment of a pretrial

detainee for purposes of rendering him mentally or emotionally fit

to proceed to trial or to assist in his own defense.

While we clearly state that we are, here, addressing only that

issue, nevertheless, speaking for myself, and out of concern that

our opinion has been drafted with greater care than that with which

it might be read, I emphasize that, absent some future statutory

change or a decision of this Court addressing the precise issue, I

do not interpret our opinion in the instant cases as precluding the

State from involuntarily medicating or treating a seriously

mentally ill detainee under the provisions and procedures

prescribed by 5 53-21-129, MCA. Under our statutory scheme, that

latter treatment is, however, only for the purpose of dealing with

the immediate, emergency situation: it is not for the purpose of

rendering the detainee fit to proceed to trial or to assist in his

own defense.

In neither of the instant cases, is there anything in the

record that implicates involuntary medication or treatment under

the emergency situation required by § 53-21-129, MCA.

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Allen Smith, Jr.

Chief Legal Counsel

Mental Disabilities Board of Visi

P.O. Box 177

Warm Springs, MT 59756

E C) SMITH

CL

STATE

ERK OF THE SUPREME COURT

OF MONTA!

BY:-

Deputy

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