OWlCE OF THE ATTORNEY GENEML STATE OF TEXAS 

JOHN CORNYN 

December 15,200O 

The Honorable Senfronia Thompson 

Chair, Committee on Judicial Affairs 

Texas House of Representatives 

P.O. Box 2910 

Austin, Texas 78768-2910 

Opinion No. JC-03 17 

Re: Whether the addition ofcertain protest words 

to a traffic citation constitutes a valid promise to 

appear in court (RQ-0270-JC) 

Dear Representative Thompson: 

In 1999, this office opined on certain general principles of contract law with respect to the 

potential effect of certain protest words written under a signature on an Internal Revenue Service 

form. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0153 (1999). The constituent for whom you inquired on that 

occasion now wishes to know the effect ofthe same or similar formulae ofprotest on a traffic ticket.’ 

Your constituent has, in our view, misunderstood the distinction between contract law, which 

governs the relations of particular parties who have come to an agreement, and public law, which 

governs all persons within that law’s jurisdiction. 

While it matters for the purpose of contract law whether or not two parties have agreed to be 

bound to certain conditions in a bargain, it is of no consequence whether any individual agrees to 

be bound by the traffic regulations or penal laws of the State of Texas. So long as such a person is 

in Texas, he or she is bound by those laws. See United States v. Masat, 948 F.2d 923,934 (5th Cir. 

1991) (rejecting argument that court lacks jurisdiction over one who declares himself “non-citizen,” 

“non-resident” and “freeman”). Your constituent’s legal obligation to appear in court does not 

require his agreement. His choices in the matter are simple. When he is stopped, the police officer 

has the discretion to issue him a ticket or take him into custody. Ifthe police officer issues the ticket, 

your constituent can sign it or be arrested. On the indicated court date he can appear in court, or he 

can subject himself to arrest. He cannot, merely by writing “forced to sign under threat, duress and 

coercion”’ on his traffic ticket, avoid the consequences of the traffic laws. 

‘See Letter from Honorable Senfronia Thompson, Chair, Committee on Judicial Affairs, Texas House of 

Representatives, to Honorable John Comyn, Texas Attorney General (Aug. 17,200O) (on file with Opinion Committee). 

‘Letter from Charles Louis Bailey III, to Honorable SenfroniaThompson, Chair, Committee on Judicial Affairs, 

Texas House of Representatives (June 6,200O) (on tile with Opinion Committee) [hereinafter Charles Louis Bailey III 

(continued...) 
The Honorable Senfionia Thompson - Page 2 (JC-0317) 

The statutes in question here are to be found in subchapter A, chapter 543 of the 

Transportation Code. Pursuant to section 543.001, a peace officer may arrest without warrant a 

person found committing any of a variety of traffic violations? See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. 5 

543.001 (Vernon 1999). The police officer then either takes the arrestee “immediately before 

a magistrate,” id. 4 543.002, or issues “a written notice to appear in court,” id. 5 543.003 (Vernon 

Supp. 2000). Such a notice is to be issued if “the offense charged is speeding or a violation of the 

open container law; . and the person makes a written promise to appear in court as provided by 

Section 543.005.” Id. 5 543.004. “To secure release, the person arrested must make a written 

promise to appear in court by signing the written notice prepared by the arresting officer. The 

arresting officer shall retain the paper or electronic original of the notice and deliver the copy ofthe 

notice to the person arrested. The officer shall then promptly release the person from custody.” Id. 

5 543.005. The appearance date on the notice must be at least ten days later “unless the person 

arrested demands an earlier hearing.” Id. 5 543.006 (Vernon 1999). A will%1 violation ofthe written 

promise to appear is a misdemeanor. See id. 5 543.009. 

The import of this statutory scheme is clear. When a policeman stops a driver for a moving 

violation, he writes a ticket. The driver signs the ticket, thereby promising to appear in court. If the 

driver does not sign the ticket, he is not released. If the driver signs the ticket and does not appear 

in court, he is subject to arrest. 

Your constituent, however, appears to believe that he may escape the consequences of 

chapter 543 of the Transportation Code. He has asked you: 

By placing these words after one’s signature, “forced to sign under 

threat, duress and coercion,” when no “meeting of the minds has 

occurred,” and the ticketed party has no intentions of making a 

court appearance, is the signatory relieved of his promise to appear in 

court if no adhesion contract exists?4 

Your constituent has noted the conclusion of Attorney General Opinion JC-0153 that such 

a form ofwords, when appended to a contract, “may indicate that the person signing has not agreed 

to the terms of the document, and consequently that there has been no ‘meeting of the minds’ that 

is necessary to form a binding agreement.” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0153 (1999) at 4. He then 

z(...continued) 

Letter]. 

‘Thequestionofwhetheranarrest foramisdemeanorpunishable only by afineviolatestheFourth Amendment 

of the Constitution is at present before the United States Supreme Court in Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 195 F.3d 242 

(5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Q. 2715 (2000) (No. 99-1408). 

‘Charles Louis Bailey III Letter, supra note 2, at 1. 
The Honorable Senfronia Thompson - Page 3 (X-0317) 

makes the assumption that a traffic ticket is a contract. His implicit argument is that the contract is 

void, because it is adhesive and he has not truly agreed to it. 

We note, as a preliminary matter, that even were we to accept the notion that a traffic stop 

is a bargaining session in which the writing of a ticket is an offer and the signing of the ticket an 

acceptance, the principles ofcontract law would not provide your constituent with the reliefhe seeks, 

It is hombook law that “[a] person will not be permitted to accept the beneficial part of a transaction 

and repudiate the disadvantageous part. In other words, one who retains benefits under a transaction 

cannot avoid its obligations, and is estopped to take a position inconsistent therewith. Similarly, one 

cannot accept and reject the same instrument, or, having availed himself of the benefits conveyed 

by a part of an instrument, reject its other provisions,” 34 TEX. JUR. 3~ Esfoppel 3 13 (1984). 

Transparently, amotorist who signs a ticket and drives away rather than spending the night in police 

custody has availed himself of what a reasonable person would regard as a very substantial benefit. 

He cannot then be heard to say that he has no intention to appear in court. 

The traffic laws of this state are, however, no more a matter of contract than are its penal 

laws. They govern all those within the jurisdiction of Texas; they cannot be evaded at whim by a 

verbal formula. Your correspondent’s apparent notion that his relation to our laws is purely 

contractual, and as such may be unilaterally abrogated by him, has no basis in law. See Coyle v. 

Sfate, 775 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ) (rejecting argument that defendant 

“has cancelled all contracts that would require her, in her view, to recognize any authority other than 

God.“); cf: Barcroft Y. State, 881 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1994, no pet.) (Uniform 

Commercial Code inapplicable in criminal trial for exceeding speed limit). 

Having signed a traffic ticket, one is obliged to appear in court. Wilful failure to so appear 

is a misdemeanor. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 543.009 (Vernon 1999). The law does not 

contemplate that any mental reservations with which one signs, or any form of words one appends 

to that signature, will have the remotest effect on one’s obligation to appear. 
The Honorable Senfronia Thompson - Page 4 (JC-0317) 

SUMMARY 

The addition of protest words to a signature on a traffic ticket 

has no effect whatsoever on the obligation of the ticketed party to 

appear in court. 

Attorney General of Texas 

ANDY TAYLOR 

First Assistant Attorney General 

CLARK KENT ERVIN 

Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel 

SUSAN D. GUSKY 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

James E. Tourtelott 

Assistant Attorney General - Opinion Committee