Filed 2/27/23 L.V. v. E.C. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

L.V.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

E.C. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 D080046

 (Super. Ct. No. 20FL005185C)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Jinsook Ohta, Judge. Affirmed.

Cage & Miles and John T. Sylvester for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Bickford Blado & Botros and Andrew J. Botros for Defendants and 

Respondents.

Plaintiff and appellant L.V. appeals a family court judgment denying 

her petition to be determined a third parent to her granddaughter, A.C. 

under Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c).1 The court based its ruling 

1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless 

otherwise specified.
2

on its conclusion that L.V. failed to establish presumed parent status of A.C. 

under section 7611, subdivision (d), because L.V. had not demonstrated that 

she openly held A.C. out as her own. L.V. does not bring a substantial 

evidence challenge to the court’s finding. Instead, L.V. contends the court 

committed reversible error when it applied what L.V. calls an “antiquated” 

approach to the requirement that she “openly hold out” A.C. as her natural 

child. According to L.V., rather than requiring her to “pretend [A.C.] was her 

own natural child in her community, modern authority holds the statute 

requires her to treat [A.C.] as her child by committing herself to parental 

responsibilities.” L.V. argues her commitment to parenting A.C. was 

undisputed and the trial court therefore abused its discretion in finding she 

failed to hold out A.C. as her own.

We conclude the court correctly interpreted and applied section 7611, 

subdivision (d)’s holding out requirement. While L.V. argues a party seeking 

presumed status can admit and acknowledge she is not a biological parent 

without losing presumed status, performance of parental responsibilities 

alone does not entitle a person to presumed parent status. The ultimate 

issues are whether the party seeking presumed status demonstrated a 

commitment to the child and established a fully developed parental

relationship.

Contrary to L.V.’s argument on appeal, the trial court did not rely 

solely on whether L.V. publicly declared A.C. as her own. Rather, the court 

concluded L.V. was a caring grandmother who performed many parental 

duties and had a deep and loving grandparent bond with A.C., but failed to 

establish a parental relationship with A.C. The judgment is affirmed.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

L.V. filed a petition to be determined a parent of A.C. under section 

7611, subdivision (d), on the basis that she received A.C. into her home and 

openly held out A.C. as her natural child.

In support of her petition, L.V. alleged that A.C.’s mother E.C. (Mother) 

and father J.C. (Father) did not care for A.C. for the first five years of life.

L.V. declared that as soon as A.C. was born in October 2014, she began caring 

for A.C. four days per week. The evidence showed that when Mother and 

Father began to have problems in April 2016, Mother and A.C. moved in with 

L.V. and her husband. Mother and A.C. moved back in with Father in 

September 2016 until Mother and Father separated in June 2017. During 

this time, L.V. helped care for A.C. approximately two to three days per week 

and one or two overnights. Mother and A.C. moved back in with L.V. from 

June 2017 to December 2018. Mother and A.C. lived on their own in a rental 

from December 2018 to May 2019. They moved back in with L.V. until 

November 2019, at which time Mother remarried and moved herself and A.C. 

in with her new husband, D.S. In January 2020, Mother and Father decided 

to end L.V.’s contact with A.C.

L.V. testified that her bond with A.C. was a “very strong, loving, 

mother-daughter bond, grandmother. I’m both to [A.C.]” She did not tell 

A.C. that she was her mother because A.C. was autistic and telling A.C. that 

she was no longer her grandmother would have “devastated her.” L.V.

introduced herself to A.C.’s teachers as A.C.’s grandmother and never 

introduced herself as A.C.’s parent. She also referred to herself as A.C.’s 

grandmother on her public Facebook posts. However, she testified that she 

would call A.C. “mija,” which means “my daughter” in Spanish. She testified 

A.C. called her “Mama Two, Grandma.” According to L.V., Mother 
4

acknowledged that L.V. was A.C.’s mother in one text, which read “Great 

team work, [A.C.’s] mom.” Mother testified that she never intentionally 

referred to L.V. as A.C.’s mom and the text was a typo where she meant to 

say “Great team work with [A.C.], mom.”

L.V. claimed she co-parented A.C. with Mother and Father. She picked 

up and dropped off A.C. at school and brought A.C. to see doctors, which L.V.

characterized as “parental duties,” but testified that she did these at Mother’s 

behest. Mother also set the schedule for when L.V. would watch A.C. L.V.

testified that she never attended A.C.’s back to school nights, Individualized 

Education Plan (IEP) meetings, or parent-teacher conferences.

L.V.’s husband testified that while Mother and A.C. were living with 

them, L.V. dressed and fed A.C., took her to and picked her up from school, 

woke her up in the morning, and put her to bed at night. He testified L.V.

developed strategies to encourage A.C.’s developmental growth and that they 

had a “really unique, special bond.” He testified that in public, people would 

comment as if A.C. was L.V.’s daughter. However, he had never heard A.C. 

call L.V. “Mama Two.”

Mother’s sister, L.S. testified that she did hear A.C. refer to L.V. as 

“Mama Two.” She never heard L.V. refer to A.C. as her child but she did 

hear L.V. call A.C. “mija,” which L.S. explained is Spanish for “my daughter.” 

She testified A.C. and L.V. had a “deep and beautiful bond” and L.V. “would 

play every aspect of the role of mother because she was a mother to [A.C.]”

Mother testified she never heard A.C. call L.V. “Mommy,” “Mom,” or 

“Mama Two,” or otherwise refer to L.V. as her mother. She had also never 

heard L.V. refer to A.C. as her child or daughter. She acknowledged L.V.

would sometimes call A.C. “mija,” and testified that L.V. would call other 

people “mija,” including younger cousins. Mother testified this is a slang 
5

word used in Hispanic culture that she has never interpreted to mean child. 

No family members referred to L.V. as A.C.’s mother or A.C. as L.V.’s child.

Mother testified that L.V. did not have any influence or involvement in 

schooling decisions for A.C., and L.V. did not attend school events for parents. 

Mother testified she took A.C. to the majority of her medical appointments, 

with occasional help from L.V. or Father. Mother denied that she and L.V.

coparented A.C., but admitted they had a “system-like arrangement.”

Mother acknowledged that L.V. gave her money two to three times a month, 

which she understood to be reimbursements for groceries and money that 

L.V. borrowed from her, not child support.

Father testified he never heard A.C. call L.V. “Mommy,” “Mom,” or 

“Mommy Two,” and had never heard L.V. refer to A.C. as her daughter. 

Other family members including Mother’s second husband D.S., Father’s 

father (A.C.’s paternal grandfather), L.V.’s brother’s wife (L.V.’s sister-inlaw), L.V.’s brother’s daughter (L.V.’s niece), and L.V.’s son (Mother’s brother) 

testified that L.V. did not call A.C. her daughter, nor did A.C. refer to L.V. as 

her mother, and they understood that L.V. was A.C.’s grandmother, not 

Mother.

Mother and Father both testified that A.C. had not asked about L.V.

since they “cut off” contact in January 2020.

The court issued a statement of decision concluding: “The evidence 

establishes that [L.V.] was a doting grandmother and, like many other 

grandmothers, generously assisted in the rearing of her grandchild. Despite 

her deep and loving grandparent bond with [A.C.], the court concludes that 

she did not assume a parental relationship with [A.C.] such that she could be 

deemed to have openly held out [A.C.] as her child.” The court noted the 

requirement that a party seeking presumed parent status prove that she 
6

openly held out the child as her natural child “looks at the extent and nature 

of the claimed parental relationship; it does not require that the person 

seeking parental status to have represented that the child is their biological 

child.” Citing In re Bryan D. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 127, 139-140 (Bryan D.), 

the court stated that “[i]n the context of a grandparent-grandchild biological 

relationship . . . the ‘holding out’ prong requires more than the performance 

of ‘all parental responsibilities.’ ”

Under a subheading titled “[L.V.’s] bond with her grandchild,” the court 

acknowledged credible evidence of the close bond between L.V. and A.C. as 

well as “undisputed testimony” that L.V. shared in the child rearing duties 

during the times that A.C. was living with her. The court stated “[n]o one 

disputes that [L.V.] was a loving and involved grandmother who played a 

significant role in [A.C.’s] life.” However, the evidence “failed to establish by 

a preponderance, that the relationship exceeded a close and special 

grandparent-grandchild bond and became a parental relationship.” Under 

this subheading, the court found the testimony that A.C. called L.V.

“ ‘Momma [Two]’ ” lacked credibility given testimony about A.C.’s verbal 

abilities due to her autism. The court also rejected L.V.’s contention that 

Mother referred to her as “ ‘Aria mom,’ ” and found that the testimony 

applying “mija” as a literal declaration that A.C. was L.V.’s daughter lacked 

credibility.

Under a subheading titled “The extent of [L.V.’s] assumption of 

parental responsibilities,” the court acknowledged that L.V. performed many 

parental duties for A.C., and stated “that alone does not create a parental 

relationship, any more than being a nanny creates a parental relationship.”

The court noted L.V. cared for A.C. at Mother’s request and permission, and 

occasionally obtained medical care for A.C. with the knowledge and at the 
7

direction of Mother. Also, while L.V. did much of the driving to school for 

A.C., Mother “executed parental responsibilities” such as enrolling A.C. in 

school, attending IEP sessions, and attending parent-teacher conferences and 

school events for parents. The court concluded “Mother received significant 

childcare help from [L.V.] but acted as the primary parent for [A.C.] at all 

times.”

Under a subheading titled “Friends, relatives, and school staff 

understood [L.V.] to be [A.C.’s] grandmother rather than de facto parent,” the 

court stated “[n]ot surprisingly, the general perception of the people’s in 

[L.V.’s] and [A.C.’s] community matched the underlying reality of their 

grandparent-grandchild relationship.” The court noted L.V. posted public 

social media communications referring to A.C. as her granddaughter and 

Mother as A.C.’s mother, and L.V. presented no evidence regarding any 

communications in which she discusses her role as A.C.’s parent. 

Additionally, L.V.’s close relatives understood she was a grandparent to A.C. 

rather than a grandmother raising A.C. as her own child, which the court 

weighed more heavily than L.V.’s testimony that she did not correct 

strangers when they assumed A.C. was her daughter. The court also noted 

teachers and staff at A.C.’s schools understood L.V. to be a grandmother 

assisting in pickups rather than a person playing the role of a parent in 

A.C.’s life.

DISCUSSION

As identified by L.V., the sole issue in this appeal is whether the court 

erred in its interpretation of section 7611, subdivision (d)’s “holding out” 

requirement. Review of the trial court’s legal interpretation of the statute is 
8

subject to de novo review.2 (S.Y. v. S.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1031

(S.Y.).)

Section 7611, subdivision (d) provides that a person is presumed to be 

the natural parent of a child if “[t]he presumed parent receives the child into 

their home and openly holds out the child as their natural child.”

According to L.V., there is an “antiquated” approach to the holding out 

standard, which requires a public display of admitted parentage. She 

contends this view wrongly denies presumed parent status to those who 

demonstrate a parent-child bond, despite publicly acknowledging a different 

biological reality. L.V. refers to the “modern” approach to the holding out 

requirement as one that emphasizes “parentage in action, rather than 

words,” focusing on commitment to the child even if the person does not 

publicly claim or pretend to be the child’s biological parent.

L.V. argues the court erred in applying the “antiquated” approach by 

relying solely on her failure to publicly claim A.C. as her own child. She 

further contends she satisfied the modern approach when she undertook 

significant parental responsibilities for A.C. L.V. argues that under the 

modern application of the holding out requirement, the court abused its 

discretion in finding that she did not hold out A.C. as her own because it was 

undisputed that she shared in child-rearing duties and was committed to 

parenting A.C.

2 The court’s factual finding that L.V. did not hold out A.C. as her 

natural child is subject to the substantial evidence standard of review. (S.Y., 

supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1031.) L.V., however, does not contend that 

there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the court’s finding and 

instead challenges only the court’s legal interpretation of the holding out 

requirement.
9

As an initial matter, we disagree that there is an “antiquated” 

approach to the holding out requirement that focuses on a public display of 

admitted parentage. Citing Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043, 

Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, and In re Spencer W. (1996) 

48 Cal.App.4th 1647 (Spencer W.), L.V. argues that the “antiquated” 

approach to the holding out requirement derives from antiquated notions of 

legitimacy and paternity, and focused on unwed biological fathers’ words and 

the community’s perception of those words. According to L.V., by openly and 

publicly admitting paternity, the father could establish their willingness to

assume full responsibility for the child. These cases did involve an unwed 

biological father’s claim to his child, however, Michael H. and Kelsey S. did 

not analyze presumed father status under section 7611, subdivision (d)’s 

holding out requirement. In Michael H., the trial court determined that the 

father was not a presumed father under section 7611 and the father did not 

challenge that conclusion on appeal, instead asserting a constitutional right 

to his child. (Michael H., at p. 1052.) In Kelsey S., it was undisputed that the 

father openly held out the child as being his own, but he was not a presumed 

father because he did not physically receive the child into his home. 

(Kelsey S., at p. 825.)

In Spencer W., the court concluded that the father’s “actions, as a 

whole, were not sufficient to satisfy the requirement that [he] ‘openly and 

publicly admit paternity.’ ” (Spencer W., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1653-

1654, first italics added.) The court noted that the father claimed paternity 

to his family and friends but was unwilling to claim paternity when there 

might have been some cost to him, and the father failed to take steps to place 

his name on the birth certificate or establish paternity by legal action. 

However, in analyzing the “holding out” requirement, the court also 
10

considered facts such as the father’s failure to assume financial obligations 

for child support, and the father’s “indifference toward establishing or 

maintaining a parental relationship” with the child during the years that the 

father was in prison. (Id. at p. 1654.) The court applied the reasoning that 

“presumed father status is earned based on a commitment toward developing 

a ‘substantial familial relationship to the child.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1654-1655.)

Thus, the court looked beyond the father’s words or public acknowledgment of 

paternity, ultimately considering whether the father showed a commitment 

to and established a parental relationship with the child.

We also disagree that the “antiquated” approach has been applied as a 

bar to “prevent willing parental figures from claiming parentage, simply 

because they recognized the biological reality that they were not, in fact, the 

child’s natural parent.” L.V. contends two cases, In re Jose C. (2010) 

188 Cal.App.4th 147 (Jose C.) and Bryan D., were wrongly decided and 

“suggest the presumed parent should not only have acted like a parent, but 

publicly pretended to be one, despite knowing this was not the truth.” She 

further contends that this approach, which shifts the focus away from 

commitment to parental responsibilities, persists in a handful of cases, citing 

R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760 (R.M.) and In re D.A. (2012) 

204 Cal.App.4th 811 (D.A.).3

We agree that Jose C. and Bryan D. appear to weigh heavily evidence 

that the party seeking presumed status did not publicly claim to be the 

child’s parent and that the child and others knew that the party seeking 

presumed status was not the child’s parent. (See Bryan D., supra, 

3 L.V. also cited In re T.G. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1, however, the trial 

court’s presumed parent finding was not an issue on appeal in that case. (Id. 

at pp. 9, 18.)
11

199 Cal.App.4th at pp. 139-140 [“undisputed that grandmother performed all 

parental responsibilities for him. However, there was no evidence that 

grandmother was openly holding Bryan out as her son, rather than as her 

grandson. Both grandmother and Bryan indicated that grandmother was 

like a mother, or acted as his mother. But in all of the interviews of Bryan, 

he referred to grandmother as his grandmother, not his mother. . . . [¶] . . . 

Even if Bryan at some point believed grandmother was his mother, this was 

no longer true, and had not been true for years”]; Jose C., supra, 

188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 162-163 [“grandfather acted as the functional 

equivalent of Jose’s father . . . but that alone does not satisfy the test for 

presumed father status. . . . [¶] . . . Jose (and everyone else) knows he is not 

grandfather’s son, and grandfather has never suggested to anyone that he is 

Jose’s father. Consequently, grandfather cannot qualify as a presumed 

father”].)

We do not agree, however, that Jose C. and Bryan D. suggest that the 

determining factor is whether the party seeking presumed status publicly 

claimed to be the child’s parent in the face of a different biological parentage. 

Rather, this reflects the reality that there is a difference between a 

grandparent performing parental responsibilities as a grandparent versus as 

a parent—i.e., whether the grandparent established a parental relationship. 

(See Jose C., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 162 [“Many people may perform the 

function of a parent at various points in a child’s life, including grandparents, 

stepparents, foster parents, extended family members, and so on. Doing so 

does not make any of them a presumed parent”].) Whether the party seeking 

presumed status publicly claims to be the child’s parent, and whether the 

child and the community perceive the party seeking presumed status to be 

the child’s parent are facts that courts properly consider in assessing the 
12

distinction. This is further demonstrated by the cases that L.V. claims 

perpetuate Jose C.’s and Bryan D.’s approach.

In R.M., the court stated, “[w]hen determining whether the person has 

met the statutory requirements of receiving the child into his or her home 

and openly holding the child out as his or her own, the court may consider a 

wide variety of factors, including the person’s provision of physical and/or 

financial support for the child, efforts to place the person’s name on the birth 

certificate, efforts to seek legal custody, and the breadth and unequivocal 

nature of the person’s acknowledgement of the child as his or her own. 

[Citation.] No single factor is determinative; rather, the court may consider 

all the circumstances when deciding whether the person demonstrated a 

parental relationship by holding out the child as his or her own and assuming 

responsibility for the child by receiving the child into his or her home.” (R.M., 

supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 774, italics added.) In affirming the trial court’s 

finding that R.M. was the child’s presumed father, the court considered the 

fact that R.M. and the mother openly referred to the child as R.M.’s daughter, 

which was corroborated by R.M.’s brother, pastor, and neighbor. (Id. at 

p. 781). The court also considered facts beyond any party’s verbal 

acknowledgment of R.M.’s relationship with the child, such as the fact that 

R.M. was at the hospital assisting the mother when the child was born, R.M., 

the mother, and the child participated in family events and recreational 

outings, and attended church together as a family unit, and R.M. named the 

child as his beneficiary on his life insurance policy. (Id. at pp. 780-781.) The 

court concluded that “all this evidence together” supports a finding that R.M., 

the mother, the child, and the community at large “all perceived the 

relationship between RM and Child as a father-daughter relationship.” (Id. 

at p. 781.)
13

The court in D.A. concluded the record contained no evidence that the 

party seeking presumed father status met the requirements of receiving the 

child into his home and openly holding the child out as his natural child. 

(D.A., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 814.) The court reasoned that the 

appearance of his name on the child’s birth certificate did not constitute 

evidence that he openly and publicly admitted paternity because he did not 

sign the birth certificate. (Id. at p. 827.) That does not mean, however, that 

the court considered a public claim of paternity to be the determining factor. 

Rather, the unsigned birth certificate did not constitute evidence that could 

satisfy the holding out requirement and the record contained no other 

evidence that could satisfy the requirement. Notably, the party seeking 

presumed status moved in with the mother just two weeks before and moved 

out two weeks after the child was born. After he moved out and before the 

child was detained at six months old, he watched the child overnight on some 

unspecified number of occasions while the mother “was out partying.” (Ibid.) 

Thus, it appears there was simply no evidence of a fully developed parental 

relationship.

Just as we disagree that there is an “antiquated” approach to the 

holding out requirement, we disagree that there is a “modern” approach. 

According to L.V., the “modern” approach emphasizes parentage in action, 

rather than words, focusing on commitment to the child even if the person 

does not publicly claim or pretend to be the child’s biological parent. As 

explained above, the cases that L.V. cites as applying an “antiquated” 

approach do not treat public claims of parentage as determinative, but rather 

as a fact to be considered, along with other facts. The cases that L.V. cites as 

applying a “modern” approach still consider public claims of parentage as a 

relevant fact, as well as other facts. (See In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 
14

1202, 1211 [presumed father applicant openly acknowledged T.R. as his 

daughter, provided financial support, and received her in his home; however, 

these positive factors were outweighed by conduct antithetical to a parent’s 

role]; In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56, 61 [in concluding the evidence 

more than satisfied the requirements of section 7611, subdivision (d), the 

Court of Appeal observed the party seeking presumed status provided 

Nicholas with significant financial support over the years, consistently 

referred to and treated Nicholas as his son, was the “ ‘only father Nicholas 

has ever know[n],’ ” and Nicholas had “ ‘a strong emotional bond’ ” with him; 

issue considered by California Supreme Court was whether under section 

7612, subdivision (a), a man loses this status as a presumed father by 

admitting he is not the biological father]; Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 

37 Cal.4th 108, 122 [the party seeking presumed parent status acted as a 

coparent with the biological mother for a substantial period of time, gave the 

children at issue and her biological child the same surname, breast-fed the 

children, claimed the children as her dependents on her tax returns, and 

testified that she considered herself to be the children’s mother]; In re M.R.

(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 899 [the presumed father always viewed the child 

as his son and always held him out as such to others, the child was treated as 

part of the presumed father’s family not only by him but also his wife and 

extended family, and the child viewed him as his father]; S.Y., supra, 

201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1034 [concluding that S.Y. was the presumed parent of 

the children that her former same-sex partner, S.B. adopted, the court 

considered that S.Y. helped care for the children since birth, displayed 

pictures of S.B. and the children at work for everyone to see, brought S.B. 

and the children to work-related functions typically attended by family, 

attended school events, baseball games, and practices, named the children as 
15

beneficiaries on everything she had, went on family vacations with S.B. and 

the children; also S.Y.’s parents considered and treated the children as their 

grandchildren, and S.B. and the children gave S.Y. Mother’s Day cards]; In re 

Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475, 493 [the presumed father acted as the 

child’s live-in father, taking on the various duties and responsibilities 

demanded of an infant’s parent, the presumed father treated the child as his 

own child and the child referred to him as “Daddy,” the child was most 

comfortable in the presumed father’s care, and the presumed father 

reaffirmed his commitment to return to the mother and the minor on a 

permanent basis].)

While L.V. contends that the “modern” approach focuses on 

commitment to the child by performing parental responsibilities, that fact is 

not determinative either. That is, even if the person seeking presumed 

status demonstrates a commitment to the child, that person is not necessarily 

entitled to presumed status if that person does not have a fully developed 

parental relationship with the child. (In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 

544, 555 [“although J.J. may have done everything he could under the 

circumstances to be a father to D.M., he must also demonstrate that he has 

an existing familial bond with the child sufficient to warrant giving him 

rights equal to those afforded a biological mother”; “the court did not find 

that there was an existing father-son relationship between J.J. and D.M., 

without which J.J. cannot be a presumed father”].) Along the same lines, 

while it is true that a person can be a presumed parent of a child while 

acknowledging a different biological reality, performing parental 

responsibilities alone does not entitle a person to presumed parent status.

In sum, there are no distinct antiquated or modern approaches to the 

holding out requirement. Instead, courts consider a wide range of factors as 
16

appropriate to the circumstances including whether the party seeking 

presumed status publicly claimed to be the child’s parent, how the 

community perceived the relationship, assumption of parental 

responsibilities, and the parent-child bond. All these factors are informative 

to the ultimate determination, which is whether the party seeking presumed 

status demonstrated a commitment to the child and established a fully 

developed parental relationship.

On appeal, L.V. argues that she met the holding out requirement, 

focusing only on the facts showing that she undertook significant parental 

responsibilities for A.C. and therefore demonstrated a commitment to A.C.

However, more is required to obtain presumed parent status. Particularly 

lacking here was a fully developed parental relationship, as the trial court 

noted multiple times in its statement of decision.

Contrary to L.V.’s characterization of the court’s ruling, the court did 

not rely solely on L.V.’s failure to publicly claim that A.C. was her child. 

Rather, it was one fact the court considered in weighing L.V.’s request for 

presumed parent status. The court also considered L.V.’s bond with A.C., the 

community’s perception of the relationship, and L.V.’s assumption of parental 

responsibilities. For example, the trial court considered “credible evidence of 

the close bond between [A.C.] and her grandmother,” but found that the 

evidence “failed to establish by a preponderance, that the relationship 

exceeded a close and special grandparent–grandchild bond and became a 

parental relationship.” Whether A.C. or Mother called or referred to L.V. as 

some form of “Mom,” and whether L.V. called A.C. her daughter was

informative, but not determinative in making this distinction. Likewise, the 

community’s “general perception” of A.C.’s and L.V.’s relationship was not 

determinative but rather “matched the underlying reality of their 
17

grandparent-grandchild relationship.” The fact that L.V. referred to A.C. as 

her granddaughter on public social media posts was again indicative of the 

relationship, but not determinative. The court also acknowledged that L.V.

performed many parental duties but correctly noted that “that alone does not 

create a parental relationship, any more than being a nanny creates a 

parental relationship.” We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s 

consideration of all of these factors in concluding that L.V. “did not assume a 

parental relationship with [A.C.] such that she could be deemed to have 

openly held out [A.C.] as her child.”

We also disagree with L.V.’s contention that she would have satisfied 

the holding out requirement if she had simply pretended to be A.C.’s 

biological parent in public. We note an important distinction here, that 

whether the party seeking presumed status pretends to be or claims to be the 

child’s biological parent, or whether the community believes that the party 

seeking presumed status is actually the child’s biological parent are not the 

relevant facts. Rather, it is how the parties and the community perceive the 

relationship that is relevant. (See S.Y., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1028-

1029 [“Although S.Y. referred to herself as the children’s ‘godparent,’ her 

supervisor understood ‘she was in her role as the parent’ ”].) This makes 

sense because where a person is so committed to a child and has developed a 

parental relationship with the child such that people perceive or consider the 

person to be the child’s parent even though they know the person is not 

actually the child’s biological parent, that matters more than a verbal claim 

of being the child’s biological parent. Said another way, whether the party 

seeking presumed parent status makes public claims of being the child’s 

parent, and whether the community perceives the person to be the child’s 
18

parent is indicative (again, not determinative) of a fully developed parental 

relationship.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.