PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 19-3150

________________

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 177,

Appellant

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE

________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-19-cv-00726)

District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty

________________

Argued April 14, 2020

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed July 16, 2020)

Edward H. O’Hare (Argued)

Raymond M. Baldino
2

Zazzali Fagella Nowak Kleinbaum & Friedman

570 Broad Street, Suite 1402

Newark, NJ 07102

Counsel for Appellant

Michael T. Bissinger

Michael H. Dell (Argued)

Day Pitney

One Jefferson Road

Parsippany, NJ 07054

Counsel for Appellee

________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

________________

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

We address how Article III standing principles apply in

proceedings to confirm arbitration awards under § 9 of the 

Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). 9 U.S.C. § 9. Teamsters 

Local Union No. 177 (“Local 177” or the “Union”) sought 

confirmation of an arbitration award in its favor (the “Award”) 

per § 9, which provides that a district court “must grant” a 

confirmation order for an award upon application where the 

award has not been “vacated, modified, or corrected” under 

applicable provisions of the FAA. § 9. United Parcel Service, 

Inc. (“UPS”), the loser in arbitration, opposed confirmation 

and filed a cross-motion to dismiss, arguing that the District 

Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because there 

was no case or controversy as required by Article III of the 

Constitution, given that UPS agreed to abide by the Award and 
3

corrected any subsequent violations of it. The District Court 

denied the Union’s motion to confirm and granted UPS’s 

motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction. It acknowledged a circuit split on whether a court 

may confirm an award absent an active dispute. 

We reverse and hold that the District Court had subjectmatter jurisdiction to confirm the Award even in the absence 

of a new dispute about it. We agree with the Second Circuit 

that “the confirmation of an arbitration award is a summary 

proceeding that merely makes what is already a final 

arbitration award a judgment of the court.” Florasynth, Inc. v. 

Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 1984). Confirmation is 

the process through which a party to arbitration completes the 

award process under the FAA, as the award becomes a final 

and enforceable judgment. See 9 U.S.C. § 13. The FAA not 

only authorizes, but mandates, that district courts confirm

arbitration awards by converting them into enforceable 

judgments through a summary proceeding. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

UPS and the Union are parties to a collective bargaining 

agreement (the “Agreement”). It was in effect from August 1, 

2013 through July 31, 2018, and it governed the terms and 

conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees, 

including package car drivers who operate the ubiquitous 

brown UPS trucks and provide delivery and pick-up services. 

Local 177 represents more than 9,000 workers 

employed at various UPS facilities in northern and central New 

Jersey, and New York City and Orange County in New York. 

Article 46, Section 3 of the Agreement groups areas of 

principal responsibility. Drivers are assigned to particular UPS 

buildings, called “home centers,” but may be assigned to other 
4

buildings in other areas, subject to the restrictions of Section 2 

of Article 46. That Article provides in relevant part: 

SECTION 2

It is understood that employees may be assigned 

in classification to work in their home center or 

at places other than their home center, as follows:

(a.) Employees will be required to accept 

assignments, within classification, when 

ordered, anywhere within their area.

(b.) Any employee who refuses an assignment 

out of his/her classification under the above 

conditions will forfeit their rights to report pay.

SECTION 3

For the purposes of other assignments, the 

following areas are applicable:

(1) Lakewood, Tinton Falls, Trenton

(2) Edison, Staten Island, Gould Avenue, 

Meadowlands

(3) Parsippany, Bound Brook, Mt. Olive

(4) Chester, New Windsor

(5) Saddle Brook, Spring Valley. 

J.A. 24. Section 3 is known as the “sister building” provision. 

When drivers are assigned to work at a place outside their 

home center, as permitted in Section 2, then Section 3 governs 

where those drivers may be sent. The locations grouped in 
5

subsections (1) through (5) represent those groupings, known 

as “sisters.” For example, a Lakewood domiciled driver may

be assigned to work in the sister building in Tinton Falls or 

Trenton. Forbidden, however, would be the assignment of a 

Lakewood driver to Staten Island. These restrictions are the 

product of negotiations spanning several decades. 

Article 44 of the Agreement contains mandatory 

grievance and arbitration procedures. It provides that if a 

matter is brought to arbitration, the arbitrator has the authority 

to decide the grievance, and that decision “shall be final and 

binding on the parties and employees involved.” J.A. 17–18.

The Union filed two grievances, one in July 2014 and 

the other in February 2015, respectively, alleging that UPS 

violated Article 46. The July 2014 grievance alleged that New 

Windsor drivers were improperly assigned to Spring Valley. 

The February 2015 grievance alleged a Chester driver was also 

improperly assigned to Spring Valley. 

UPS denied the grievances, and the Union filed a 

demand for arbitration. During the arbitration hearing, both 

parties were represented by counsel and had the opportunity to 

present testimony along with documentary evidence and to 

make arguments. The Arbitrator sustained the grievances and 

ordered UPS to “cease and desist assigning package car drivers 

to work in buildings outside the areas designated in Article 46, 

Section 3 of the parties’ . . . Agreement.” J.A. 47. UPS 

“accept[ed] the Award,” and has never sought to challenge or 

vacate it. J.A. 49.

The Union alleges, and UPS does not deny, that the 

latter has subsequently violated the Award. In April 2018 it 

did so by assigning a driver outside his contractually

designated area. Local 177 Secretary-Treasurer Chris 

Eltzholtz informed UPS District Labor Manager Steve Radigan 
6

of the violation. Eltzholtz later became aware of two more 

violations. Radigan acknowledged them and assured Eltzholtz 

that the situation was corrected and would not occur again. In 

June 2018, Eltzholtz learned that UPS had nonetheless violated 

the Award by assigning a driver to work outside a designated 

area. He informed Radigan of the new violation. Eltzholtz 

then traveled to a UPS facility in New Windsor, New York, 

and personally witnessed UPS about to violate the Award yet 

again by assigning a driver outside his assigned area. Eltzholtz 

brought this to the attention of management, and it stopped the 

violation from occurring. The Union ultimately obtained a 

monetary settlement for these violations. 

Thereafter, the Union moved for confirmation of the 

Award under § 9 of the FAA, which provides in relevant part 

that,

[i]f the parties in their agreement have agreed 

that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon 

the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and 

shall specify the court, then at any time within 

one year after the award is made any party to the 

arbitration may apply to the court so specified for 

an order confirming the award, and thereupon 

the court must grant such an order unless the 

award is vacated, modified, or corrected as 

prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. 

9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added). The Union argues that it

petitioned for confirmation in light of UPS’s repeated 

violations and to preserve its rights in case of future violations. 

UPS opposed the Union’s motion and filed a cross-motion to 

dismiss, arguing that the District Court did not have 

jurisdiction because confirmation requires a pending case or 

controversy about the arbitration award, and no case or 

controversy existed, as there were no ongoing violations. 
7

In its decision, Teamsters Local Union No. 177 v. 

United Parcel Servs., 409 F. Supp. 3d 285 (D.N.J. 2019), the 

District Court acknowledged a circuit divide on whether a 

court may confirm an award in a labor arbitration absent a thenexisting dispute about the arbitration award. Id. at 290. It 

noted that the First Circuit has held that confirmation is not 

proper without an active controversy, see Derwin v. Gen. 

Dynamics Corp., 719 F.2d 484, 492–93 (1st Cir. 1983), while 

the Second Circuit has held that a district court must confirm 

an arbitration award if the statutory requirements are met even 

absent a new dispute, see Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157 (2d 

Cir. 2007); see also Ottley v. Schwartzberg, 819 F.2d 373 (2d 

Cir. 1987); Florasynth, 750 F.2d 171. When the District Court 

followed Derwin, the Union appealed to us.

II. JURISDICTION

The District Court had statutory subject-matter 

jurisdiction under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations 

Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, along with the usual federal 

question jurisdiction accorded by 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

1

 

1 Section 9 of the FAA does not provide an independent 

basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, see Moses H. Cone Mem’l 

Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25, n.32 (1983); 

Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 834 F.3d 242, 255 (3d 

Cir. 2016), but § 301 of the LMRA does, see Citgo Asphalt Ref. 

Co. v. Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l 

Union Local No. 2-991, 385 F.3d 809, 815 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004). 

Even where a complaint does not expressly plead LMRA 

claims, courts usually consider it to state a claim under § 301 

if it pertains to violations of contracts between an employer and 

a labor organization. See Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 
8

That there is federal statutory and federal question 

jurisdiction is clear. The harder question—the one before us 

here—is whether there was a sufficient “case or controversy” 

under Article III so as to confer jurisdiction on the District 

Court. 

We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review de novo the District Court’s order granting 

a motion to dismiss. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d 

Cir. 2010). 

III. DISCUSSION

To repeat, UPS argues that the District Court lacked 

subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award 

under FAA § 9 because, post-Award, there was no longer a

“case or controversy,” which the Constitution’s Article III 

requires. 

A. Confirmation –– the Final Step and Remedy in 

Arbitration 

To establish that a “case or controversy” exists, a party 

seeking relief must have, among other things, standing. In 

legal jargon this requires that a plaintiff show “(1) an ‘injury in 

fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and 

the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a ‘likel[ihood]’ that the 

injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Susan B. 

Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157–58 (2014) 

(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61

(1992)). Think of standing as a stake in the outcome, and what 

a court does can help a party claiming to be hurt. For example, 

a plaintiff whose injuries have been fully remedied before 

U.S. 202, 220 (1985); Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 21 n.1 

(3d Cir. 1989). 
9

seeking judicial relief cannot show a sufficient risk of 

imminent injury, and thus lacks standing. Cf. Holmes v. 

Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 136–37 

(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that putative class representatives who 

settled their claims through administrative means prior to filing 

their complaint lacked standing). And Congress cannot by 

statute grant courts jurisdiction where there is no case or 

controversy. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362–

63 (1911) (holding that Congress could not confer on federal 

courts the ability to hear a matter if it lacked a “case or 

controversy”).

The parties do not dispute that the causation and 

redressability prongs of the standing analysis are satisfied; only 

at issue is whether Local 177 was injured. UPS argues that,

because it has agreed to abide by the arbitration award and has 

remedied any violations of it thus far, the case-or-controversy 

requirement is not satisfied, as the Union has not suffered and 

will not imminently suffer an injury. 

We disagree. Under the FAA a party’s injuries are only 

fully remedied by the entry of a confirmation order. The statute

“creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and 

regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate . . . .” 

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32. Congress 

enacted the FAA to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility 

to arbitration agreements . . . , and to place arbitration 

agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” EEOC 

v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Once parties contract to 

settle their disputes by arbitration, federal courts become 

involved only in limited circumstances for limited purposes. 

The FAA “authorizes district court involvement in the 

arbitration process primarily in two ways.” John Hancock 

Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1998). 
10

The first is “when a party resists arbitration under an existing 

arbitration clause.” Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4). Second, 

“when enforcement of an arbitration award is sought[,] . . . the 

statute authorizes the district court to confirm, vacate, or 

modify the award under a narrow scope of judicial review.” Id.

(citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11); see also Isidor Paiewonsky Assoc., 

Inc. v. Sharp Prop. Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 154 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1993). 

Specifically, the FAA provides in relevant part that a court, 

save exceptions not before us, “must grant” a timely request 

for an arbitration award. § 9.2 Once confirmed, an arbitration 

award becomes a judgment of the court, entitled to “the same 

force and effect, in all respects, as, and . . . subject to all the 

provisions of law relating to, a judgment in [any other] action.” 

§ 13. 

Thus, barring any dispute whether the arbitration award 

shall be vacated, modified, or corrected, it is confirmation 

under § 9 that converts the award into a judgment of the court 

and completes the arbitration process under the FAA 

framework. This puts an award on the “same footing” as other 

legally enforceable documents. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289. 

Put another way, the dispute the parties went to arbitration to 

resolve is “live” until the arbitration award is confirmed and 

the parties have an enforceable judgment in hand. See, e.g., 

Ameriprise Bank, FSB v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 12-cv-1113, 

2012 WL 5906400, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2012) (holding 

that “a federal court constrained by Article III may confirm an 

award even in the absence of a new dispute involving the 

award’s application or enforcement” because the “controversy 

between the parties remains live until the arbitral award is 

confirmed”); National Football League Players Assoc. v. 

National Football League Mgmt. Council, No. 08-cv-3658, 

2 The parties do not dispute that the Agreement includes 

a provision for confirmation of the Award in court. 
11

2009 WL 855946, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2009) (holding 

the district court had jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration 

award absent a new dispute about the award and stating that 

“[t]he real question is whether . . . the Court should impose a 

new requirement that, in addition to the dispute which clearly 

exists between the parties on [the underlying issue being 

arbitrated], one of the parties must raise a new dispute in order 

to have the arbitral award confirmed”).

The FAA explicitly requires that arbitration awards be 

confirmed. What could be stronger than language that, upon 

application, a district court “must grant [a confirmation] order” 

unless the arbitration award is “vacated, modified, or 

corrected.” § 9. The Supreme Court tells us that § 9 “carries 

no hint of flexibility.” Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, 

Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587 (2008). “There is nothing malleable 

about ‘must grant,’ which unequivocally tells courts to grant 

confirmation in all cases, except when one of the ‘prescribed’ 

exceptions applies.” Id. (quoting § 9). The Court further noted 

that § 9 “suggests that, so long as the parties contemplated 

judicial enforcement, the court must undertake such 

enforcement under the statutory criteria.” Id. at n.6.

We agree with the Second Circuit that “the confirmation 

of an arbitration award is a summary proceeding that merely 

makes what is already a final arbitration award a judgment of 

the court.” Florasynth, 750 F.2d at 176 (citation omitted). 

That Circuit has long held that district courts have jurisdiction 

to confirm arbitration awards even in the absence of a new 

dispute about them. In Florasynth, it reasoned that an “[a]n 

examination of the underlying purposes of the arbitration 

mechanism” supported this conclusion, as confirmation arms 

the winning party of an arbitration “with a court order . . . [and] 

a variety of remedies available to enforce the judgment.” 750 

F.2d at 176; see also Zeiler, 500 F.3d at 169 (“Confirmation 

. . . is a summary proceeding . . . , which is not intended to 
12

involve complex factual determinations, other than a 

determination of the limited statutory conditions for 

confirmation or grounds for refusal to confirm. . . . At the 

confirmation stage, the court is not required to consider the 

subsequent question of compliance.”); Ottley, 819 F.2d at 377 

(“[A]ctions to confirm arbitration awards . . . are 

straightforward proceedings in which no other claims are to be 

adjudicated. . . . [I]n a confirmation proceeding, the court 

properly may consider only the statutory bases for modifying 

or vacating an award and challenges to the award’s clarity.”).

Confirming an arbitration award under § 9 is not to be 

confused with litigating a dispute over the validity or accuracy

of that award under § 10 or § 11, or seeking later to enforce 

that arbitration award where there is noncompliance. Section 

9 expressly provides for confirmation in the absence of such 

disputes. Once a court confirms an arbitration award and 

makes it a judgment of the court, noncompliance with that 

order is separately analyzed. See Am. Nursing Home v. Local 

144, No. 89-cv-1704, 1992 WL 47553, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

4, 1992) (“The issues of compliance and confirmation are 

distinct . . . . [C]onfirmation of an arbitration award . . . is not 

a novel inquest into the merits of the award or compliance with 

it . . . .” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 

Without a confirmation order, the parties would essentially 

have to relitigate the case via a suit to enforce the arbitration 

award. But where there is such an order, and one of parties 

violates it, the court applies the analysis as when one of its 

orders is defied—it can penalize the non-complying party 

through contempt proceedings or the issuance of injunctive 

relief. Contempt proceedings and a trial over the underlying 

dispute are clearly very different than the summary proceeding 

provided for by § 9.

Thus, like the Second Circuit, we view the confirmation 

of an arbitration award as the final step in arbitration 
13

proceedings under the FAA where there is no dispute about the 

validity or accuracy of that award under § 10 or § 11. As a 

result, a party seeking to confirm an arbitration award 

continues to have a live stake in the proceeding, and thus it has 

standing to seek confirmation.3

3 We limit our holding to an award for equitable relief

and express no opinion as to whether a party that receives an 

arbitration award for money damages has standing to confirm 

the award in federal court after those damages are paid in full. 

Additionally, we note that an alternative way of 

understanding why confirmation of an arbitration award 

satisfies the jurisdictional existing or imminent injury-in-fact 

prong is to view confirmation as a statutory right created by the 

FAA. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545–49 

(2016) (stating that the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 

created a statutory right to fair and accurate credit reporting, 

and remanding for further assessment of whether the injury 

was sufficiently particularized and concrete). Parties to 

arbitration forgo litigation with the expectation that under the 

FAA they will be able to obtain a judgment at the end of the 

process under § 9. A party to arbitration suffers an injury when 

he is denied the right to obtain confirmation, for it is the 

judgment that makes the party whole and concludes the 

arbitration process. Our case exemplifies this point. UPS has 

recently and repeatedly violated the Award. And although it 

states that it will comply and refrain from violating the Award 

further, that promise does not have the force of a judgement. 

If UPS violates the Award again, the Union may be forced to 

relitigate the case. We need not engage in this separate 

jurisdictional analysis, however, because the principle is well 

established that district courts can preside over summary 
14

B. Summary Proceedings and the District 

Court’s Imprimatur 

In the interest of further explaining the path forward, we 

analogize the confirmation of arbitration awards to other 

summary proceedings in which a district court enters orders

without the parties filing complaints and appearing before it to 

litigate a matter in full. For example, courts enter investigatory 

subpoenas ex parte without the filing of a formal complaint and 

hold summary proceedings to enforce Securities and Exchange 

Commission orders. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 

650, 657 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that Section 21(e) of the 

Exchange Act of 1934 permits the use of summary proceedings 

in district courts to enforce Commission orders); S.E.C. v. 

Sprecher, 594 F.2d 317, 319–20 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that 

the Securities Act of 1933 authorizes district courts to order 

enforcement of investigatory subpoenas on application by the 

S.E.C. in a summary proceeding without the filing of 

complaints by the Commission (citations omitted)). 

The Supreme Court has held summary proceedings 

permissible where expressly authorized by statute. See New 

Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 362 U.S. 404, 406–07 

(1960). Confirmation of arbitration awards is also a summary 

proceeding. And it is authorized by § 9 of the FAA. In 

Scanlon, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he very purpose 

of summary . . . trials is to escape some or most of these trial 

procedures.” Id. at 406. They may be “conducted without 

formal pleadings, on short notice, without summons and 

complaints, generally on affidavits, and sometimes even ex 

parte.” Id; see also Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. 

of Chicago v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 

294 U.S. 648, 682 (1935) (holding that district court could 

proceedings (such as entering consent decrees or confirming 

arbitration awards) where there is statutory authorization.
15

preside over summary proceedings “without the formality in 

respect of pleadings which is required in actions at law or suits 

in equity”).

The summary proceeding perhaps most analogous to the 

confirmation of arbitration awards is the entry of consent 

decrees. They are orders or judgments that reflect the 

settlement terms agreed by the parties and contain an 

injunction. See United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 

U.S. 223, 236 n.10 (1975) (stating that consent decrees “have 

attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees” and a “dual 

character”); FTC v. Enforma Natural Prods., Inc., 362 F.3d 

1204, 1218 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] consent decree is ‘no more 

than a settlement that contains an injunction.’” (quoting In re 

Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP Litig., 957 F.2d 

1020, 1025 (2d Cir. 1992))). District courts have the power to 

enter consent decrees without first determining that a statutory 

or constitutional violation has occurred. See Swift & Co. v. 

United States, 276 U.S. 311, 327 (1928). Cf. Rufo v. Inmates 

of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992). They “must 

spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s 

subject-matter jurisdiction . . . . and must further the objectives 

of the law upon which the complaint was based.” Local No. 

93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of 

Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (citations omitted); see 

also Sansom Committee by Cook v. Lynn, 735 F.2d 1535, 1538 

(3d Cir. 1984) (stating that a district court has authority to enter 

a consent decree “as long as [its] terms . . . come within the 

general scope of the case made by the pleadings . . . [and] if the 

pleadings state a claim over which a federal court has 

jurisdiction.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

Here the FAA provides for confirmation proceedings to 

be summary proceedings akin to the entry of consent decrees 

by requiring that the parties “apply” for confirmation rather 

than file a complaint. 9 U.S.C. § 9. “An ‘application’ is merely 
16

a ‘motion,’” or a request for the court to make a particular 

ruling or enter a particular order, and not a formal lawsuit or 

“action.” McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 657 (citations omitted). This 

distinction applies to the FAA with equal force, as the statute

specifically provides for an “application” for confirmation. 

Moreover, courts do not resolve these applications for 

relief using procedures for ordinary civil actions because the 

FAA provides for applications to be made and heard as 

motions rather than the filing of a complaint. 9 U.S.C. § 6 

(“Any application to the court hereunder shall be made and 

heard in the manner provided by law for the making and 

hearing of motions, except as otherwise . . . expressly provided 

[in the FAA].” (emphasis added)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(6)(B) 

(providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply only 

to the extent procedures are not provided for under the FAA); 

Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 275–76 (7th 

Cir. 1995) (stating that Rule 81 provides that the Federal Rules 

apply only to the extent that matters of procedure are not 

provided for under the FAA); Booth v. Hume Pub., Inc., 902 

F.2d 925, 931 (11th Cir. 1990) (same). As the FAA expressly 

provides for an “application” for confirmation, does not 

instruct parties to file a complaint, and does not instruct the 

district court to carry on a formal judicial proceeding, § 9 

indeed calls for a summary proceeding.4

4 Whether a proceeding is “summary” in nature, of 

course, does not address how Article III’s standing limitations 

apply to that proceeding. Its summary nature defines only the 

procedures employed for motion practice, discovery, and so 

forth; it does not address whether the proceeding requires a live 

case or controversy in order to proceed. Nevertheless, for the 

reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that Local 177 

demonstrated a live controversy here.
17

Accordingly, we hold that the District Court had 

jurisdiction to confirm the Award under § 9 of the FAA even 

in the absence of a new dispute about its terms because the 

underlying dispute between the parties remains live until entry 

of that order. Confirmation is the final step of the FAA’s 

arbitration process. By a truncated summary proceeding, the 

FAA directs district courts to give their imprimatur to 

arbitration awards by converting them into enforceable 

judgments of the court.

C. The Illogical Consequences of Requiring a 

New Dispute Before Confirmation 

We also note the practical absurdity and harmful 

consequences of holding that district courts cannot confirm 

arbitration awards in the absence of a new dispute. First, if we 

allow UPS to challenge confirmation of the arbitration award 

at this stage, we would be allowing it to upend and undermine 

the statutory scheme of the FAA. That scheme expressly gives 

more time to the parties to move for confirmation than to 

dispute the award. While the statute of limitations for 

confirmation of arbitration awards under the FAA is one year, 

9 U.S.C. § 9, the time for moving to vacate or modify the award 

is three months, see § 12. If the party seeking confirmation 

makes its application after that three-month period elapses, 

then the opposing party cannot, as a matter of law, assert a § 

10 or § 11 ground for vacating, modifying or correcting an 

award, even as affirmative defenses to the application to 

confirm. See Florasynth, 750 F.2d at 175. UPS is effectively 

challenging the arbitration award well outside the three-month 

statute of limitations. 

Second, requiring a new dispute about the arbitration 

award would allow, or even incentivize, the party that lost at 

arbitration to defeat confirmation simply by claiming it agrees 

to abide by the Award. In the worst-case scenario, the losing
18

party could wait until after the statute of limitations to confirm 

an award has run to start violating it, and the winning party 

would be left to relitigate the case. That UPS says it will stop 

moving employees outside of their home centers does not mean

there was no injury to the Union’s members who were moved 

when the Award was violated previously, and it does not mean 

that the Union does not have a right to seek compliance with 

the Award in the future. UPS cannot “defeat or frustrate 

confirmation simply by claiming acquiescence with the 

[A]ward[,]” and Local 177 is “entitled to obtain judicial 

confirmation in order to protect its rights under the award . . . 

.” National Football League Players Assoc., 2009 WL 

855946, at *3. 

D. Parting With First Circuit Precedent 

In light of these considerations, we are not persuaded by 

the approach taken by the First Circuit in Derwin, 719 F.2d 

484, and adopted by the District Court. In Derwin, 

representatives of a union sought confirmation of an arbitration 

award issued under a collective bargaining agreement between 

the union and a corporate employer. The former did not allege 

any instances where the employer refused to abide by the 

award. Rather, it relied on the language of the applicable state 

statute, which, like the FAA, provided for a right to 

confirmation when no party had challenged the award within 

30 days after issuance of it. Id. at 486. Derwin held that 

confirmation was “unwarranted,” and noted that

[t]he union’s application for confirmation—

unlike the usual complaint seeking confirmation 

of an arbitrator’s award—does not seek 

resolution of a concrete dispute between the 

parties. The union does not allege that the 

company has repudiated or violated the award in 

some particular calling for judicial resolution. 
19

No relief involving specific enforcement of the 

. . . award is requested. 

Id. The Court declined to “put its imprimatur upon an arbitral 

award in a vacuum” and dismissed the action to confirm it. Id. 

at 491–93. It reasoned that judicial economy counseled against 

the entry of a confirmatory award, and that a more economical 

approach was to require that confirmation petitions allege an 

actual violation or other dispute entitling the party to some 

relief. Id. at 492. 

However, the First Circuit did not consider the 

mandatory language of the FAA, it did not consider whether 

an arbitration dispute was ongoing until confirmation of the 

arbitration award, and, puzzlingly, it considered instead how 

the limitations period in the state statute affected its 

jurisdiction. It reasoned that because in the case before it the 

time to sue was either six or twenty years, the union would 

have plenty of time to seek to enforce the award if a dispute 

arose. Recognizing the need for confirmation under certain 

circumstances, the Court nonetheless allowed that there would 

be a “most compelling basis” for confirmation even without a 

pending dispute in some instances:

If there were a strict limitations period for actions 

to confirm, one could reasonably argue that, even 

in the absence of any current dispute over an

award’s effort, a party should be entitled to 

obtain judicial confirmation in order to protect its 

rights under the award from lapse due to the 

passage of time. 

Id. The Court did not explain why the statute of limitations 

would affect whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case. 
20

The District Court here followed the First Circuit and 

specifically relied on the latter’s statute-of-limitations 

reasoning. In its analysis the District Court held that “two 

potentially dispositive factors” emerged from the case law: 

“(1) whether there is an ongoing dispute over the terms or 

enforcement of the award; and (2) whether there is a realistic 

probability that the employer can wait out the limitations 

period and violate the arbitration award when it is too late for 

the union to obtain judicial relief.” United Parcel Servs., 409 

F. Supp. 3d at 293. It acknowledged that if a one-year statute 

of limitations applied, like in the FAA, there would “surely be 

a realistic possibility that UPS could violate the order after it 

was too late for the Union to seek judicial confirmation.” Id.

at 294. Yet the Court, relying on Derwin, applied the longer 

six-year statute of limitation under New Jersey law, and 

determined that such a period would give the Union “plenty of 

time to bring an action to confirm the award should a problem 

arise.” Id.

Neither the First Circuit nor the District Court here 

explained, however, how the ability of the winning party in an 

arbitration to file suit later has any bearing on the existence of 

a “case or controversy.” Both ignored that statutes of 

limitations and a court’s power to hear a case are separate 

questions. Accordingly, we decline to follow the First 

Circuit’s holding that a new dispute is required before an 

arbitration award can be confirmed, and we reverse the 

judgment of the District Court. 

We remand with instruction for the Court to confirm the 

Award unless the statutory grounds for rejecting it are satisfied.