alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements of Golden Triangle Industries, Inc. for the period
ended SEPTEMBER 30, 1997, and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000042284
<NAME> GOLDEN TRIANGLE INDUSTRIES, INC.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          244707
<SECURITIES>                                     58624
<RECEIVABLES>                                  1043139
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     212981
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1575225
<PP&E>                                         6774522
<DEPRECIATION>                               (1771726)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 7113052
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           270402
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                       5727
<COMMON>                                           582
<OTHER-SE>                                     6836341
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   7113052
<SALES>                                         967890
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                995271
<CGS>                                           420445
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   420445
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                337453
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 372
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 285587
<INCOME-TAX>                                     97070
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             188517
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    188517
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .32
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .31
        

</TABLE>
# July 2020
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 327 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 327

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                      January 25, 1994.
    Resolved, That until otherwise ordered, the hour of meeting of the House 
shall be noon on Mondays and Tuesdays; 2 p.m. on Wednesdays; 11 a.m. on all 
other days of the week up to and including May 15, 1994; and that from May 16, 
1994, until the end of the second session, the hour of daily meeting of the 
House shall be noon on Mondays and Tuesdays and 10 a.m. on all other days of the 
week.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<CIK> 0000043512
<NAME> GREAT WESTERN FINANCIAL CORPORATION
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1995
<CASH>                                         849,096
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                             125
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               287,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                  3,759,581
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                       7,827,138
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                         7,984,196
<LOANS>                                     30,011,786
<ALLOWANCE>                                    378,562
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              44,693,014
<DEPOSITS>                                  29,432,176
<SHORT-TERM>                                 9,157,900
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          1,014,540
<LONG-TERM>                                  2,434,099
<COMMON>                                       136,633
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    294,375
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,223,291
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>              44,693,014
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              1,786,025
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              602,987
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                32,729
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             2,421,741
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             903,312
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,452,536
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          969,205
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  137,400
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               4,731
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                766,530
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                268,555
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     162,455
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   162,455
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.05
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.05
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.25
<LOANS-NON>                                    489,986
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                               108,790
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               438,051
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  210,982
<RECOVERIES>                                    14,093
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              378,562
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           378,562
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### Eugene GOLSBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2453.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 20, 1970.

*773Leonard L. Stafford, Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The Broward County Public Defender filed on behalf of the appellant in this appeal nine assignments of error. Nevertheless, instead of filing a brief in this court in support of the appeal, the public defender filed a motion for leave to withdraw supported by a “no-merit” brief totally inadequate to meet even the minimum standards required by Anders v. State of California, 1967, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493. The brief filed in support of the motion to withdraw contained an argument one-half of one page in length (double spaced) without a single reference to the assignments of error* or portions of the record which might arguably support any of the assignments of error.

The motion to withdraw was denied on 1 April 1969 by this court, and the public defender has still not filed a brief in support of this appeal. For this court to now decide the present appeal on the basis of the brief heretofore filed by the public defender in support of his motion to withdraw would be to deny the appellant his right to counsel in connection with his first full appeal.

It is the considered opinion of this court that the Broward County Public Defender should and is hereby directed to file in this cause within twenty days a proper brief discussing the assignments of error and referring this court to anything in the record that might arguably support the assignments; thereafter, the State will file its brief within the time limits prescribed by the Florida Appellate Rules.

It is so ordered.

CROSS, C. J., and McCAIN and REED, JJ-, concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
PARTNERSHIP'S STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS AND BALANCE SHEETS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                       1,162,398
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,162,398
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              14,571,452
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,855
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                 (5,585,370)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                14,571,452
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               893,750
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               694,623
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             917,376
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (718,249)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (718,249)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              2,149,096
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,430,847
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
No. 10510.

#### Pritchard, a Taxpayer, *v.*The Board of Education of Houston Special School District, etc.

Decided November 10, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Shelby county.

*Mr. D. Oldham; Mr. Hugh Doorley*and *Mr. S. L. Wicoff,*for plaintiff in ¿rror.

*Mr. H. W.*Rob*inson*and *Mr. Charles C. Marshall,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Crew, Summers and Spear, JJ., concur.
256 La. 871

#### Harry FONTENOT v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 50818.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 30, 1970.

In re: Harry Fontenot applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Evangeline. 236 So.2d 889.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in its judgment.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HUMBERTO I. MIRANDA,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

RAYMOND MADDEN, Warden, Warden;
et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 22

- 55299

D.C. No.

3:19

- cv

- 01605

- LAB

- RBM

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 6, 2024 * *

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Humberto Miranda appeals pro se the district court ’ s

judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for the reason of defendants’

qualified immunity. Because the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them

only as necessary to explain our decision

. We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 6 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 I.

Miranda allege d that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment when

pieces of a water

- damaged ceiling in the prisoner visiting room fell upon him

,

injuring his shoulder. The district court did not err in concluding that t he

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Miranda’s conditions of

confinement claim because the constitutional right allegedly violated is not clearly

established

. No binding case law informs the defendants that their conduct in this

case would violate the Eighth Amendment. Osolinksi v. Kane , 92 F.3d 934, 937

-

38 (9 th Cir. 1996) (concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity

when they failed to repair an oven door that fell off its hinges in the prison visiting

area) ; see Ballentine v. Tucker , 28 F.4th 54, 61 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that we

may analyze the two prongs of qualified immunity in any order)

.

II.

Miranda requests a remand to the district court because he did not receive a

mailed copy of the magistrate’s report and recommendation until after judgment

was entered

. Miranda , however, timely appealed to this court and fully briefed his

objections

. Accordingly

, we deny Miranda’s request for a remand.

AFFIRMED.
256 La. 869

#### GORDON FINANCE COMPANY, Inc. v. Oliver CHAMBLISS.

No. 50796.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 30, 1970.

In re: Oliver Chambliss applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 236 So.2d 533.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, the result is correct.
#### Robert Ralph MORET, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-511.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 30, 1971.

Milton E. Grusmark, Miami Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Joel D. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

Before PEARSON, CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order of the trial court denying a petition filed pursuant to CrPR 3.850, 33 F.S.A. The order was entered after a full evidentiary hearing. The argument presented on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying the petition upon the basis of the evidence presented upon the petition. We affirm the order appealed upon the rule stated in Plymale v. State, Fla.App.1967, 201 So.2d 85, 86, where it is stated:

> * * * * * *

> “If the evidence in the record on appeal, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports the order he should be affirmed. See: Crum v. State, Fla.App.1965, 172 So.2d 24; Hennessy v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 198 So.2d 37.”

> ******

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                                         <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                       3,979,104
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,038,513
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    205,675
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             7,314,512
<PP&E>                                      21,242,515   
<DEPRECIATION>                              17,183,421
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              13,850,221   
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,154,408  
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    339,407
<COMMON>                                     2,687,211
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                13,850,221
<SALES>                                      3,249,096
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,345,071
<CGS>                                        2,705,913 
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,243,067
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                102,004 
<INCOME-TAX>                                    24,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    78,004
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
[No. 153-2.

Division Two.

May 24, 1971.]

#### *In the Matter of the Estate of*Walter Clive Abel, *Deceased.*

*Ernest M. Ingram*(of *Ingram, Zelasko &*Goodwin), for appellant.

*Stanley A. Taylor*(of *Conniff, Taylor, Moffett & Behr*horst), for respondent.

Per Curiam.

This case involves a disputed grant of an award in lieu of homestead. The deceased, Walter Abel, died testate in September, 1968, and the value of the assets in his estate has been appraised as in excess of $2.6 million. His will provided that this entire amount, which was all the separate property of Mr. Abel, should be equally divided among his surviving spouse and his three children by a prior marriage.

The surviving spouse petitioned the trial court for an award in lieu of homestead. The children resisted this petition. The trial court, stating that its decision was a discre*38tionary one by the terras of RCW 11.52.012 (3) ,1 granted the petition. The trial court stated that despite the fact the surviving spouse had received $18,000 from a joint bank account and $18,000 in family allowances, the petition should be granted. The children were beneficiaries of a $10,000 policy of insurance on their father’s fife. The surviving spouse had aided in caring for the deceased during the last years of his life, while he was disabled by a stroke. Part of the property the surviving spouse wished to set off was household furnishings accumulated during the marriage and much of the balance consisted of a note due from an old family friend. Finally, the amount in controversy is relatively insignificant in relation to the total estate.

We agree with the trial court that under the statute, it was exercising -discretion in determining whether or not to grant this petition. We can find no abuse of this discretion. The amount in question pales to insignificance when compared with the total each of the beneficiaries is to receive under the will. None of the beneficiaries will suffer any real financial harm or hardship because of this award. The trial court heard the evidence and we certainly cannot say that its resolution of the issue constituted an abuse of discretion. It was in no way arbitrary, clearly untenable or manifestly unreasonable, under the facts of this case. *Holm v. Holm,*27 Wn.2d 456, 178 P.2d 725 (1947).

Affirmed.

1

 This section reads: “Such award shall be made by an order or judgment of the court and shall vest the absolute title, and thereafter there shall be no further administration upon such portion of the estate so set off, but the remainder of the estate shall be settled as other estates: . . . *Provided further,*That if it shall appear to the court, either ... or (3) if such surviving spouse or minor children are entitled to receive property including insurance by reason of the death of the deceased spouse in the sum of ten thousand dollars, or more, then the award in lieu of homestead and exemptions shall lie in the discretion of the court, and that whether there shall be an award and the amount thereof shall be determined by the court, who shall enter such decree as shall be just and equitable but not in excess of the award provided herein.”
# C_2020320EN.01002401.xml

| 28.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 320/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 320/24

---

Action brought on 16 August 2020– JT v EUIPO — Carrasco Pirard and Others (QUILAPAYÚN)

(Case T-197/20)

(2020/C 320/54)

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: JT (represented by: A. Mena Valenzuela, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Eduardo Carrasco Pirard and seven others (Santiago de Chile, Chile)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for the EU figurative trade mark QUILAPAYÚN — Application for registration No 9 267 287

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 10 February 2020 in Case R 1518/2019-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

Annul or revoke the contested decision, upholding all claims in favour of that party.

Plea in law

Infringement of Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council in conjunction with Article 6a(1a) of the Paris Convention.

---
#### The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. George N. SUNE and Robert Delgado, Appellees.

No. 77-1118.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 18, 1978.

Janet Reno, State’s Atty., and Paul M. Rashkind, Asst. State’s Atty., for appellant.

John H. Lipinski, Miami, for appellees.

Before HENDRY, NATHAN and KE-HOE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendants, George N. Sune and Robert Delgado, were charged by information with bribery, unlawful compensation and conspiracy, all growing out of a single criminal episode.

The trial court sua sponte entered an order requiring the state to elect between the counts of bribery under Section 838.015, Florida Statutes (1977), and unlawful compensation under Section 838.016, Florida Statutes (1977). From this order the state appeals. We reverse.

A single criminal episode can be violative, of more than one criminal statute, and the defendants may be tried for and convicted of either or both counts. See State v. *Peav*
      *1129
      *ey,*326 So.2d 461 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); *Fayerweather v. State,*332 So.2d 21 (Fla.1976).

Reversed.
|                                            |   |          |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------|
| SUBSIDIARIES                                    |   | JURISDICTION  |
|                                            |   |          |
| SkillSoft Corporation                           |   | Delaware      |
| SkillSoft Ireland Ltd                           |   | Ireland       |
| SkillSoft UK Limited                            |   | England       |
| SkillSoft Asia Pacific Pty Ltd                  |   | Australia     |
| Books24x7.com, Inc.                             |   | Massachusetts |
| SkillSoft Finance Limited                       |   | Grand Cayman  |
| CBT Technology Limited                          |   | Ireland       |
| SkillSoft Canada Limited                        |   | Canada        |
| SmartForce Business Skills Ltd                  |   | Ireland       |
| SkillSoft New Zealand Ltd                       |   | New Zealand   |
| SkillSoft France SARL                           |   | France        |
| SkillSoft Asia Pacific PTE Ltd                  |   | Singapore     |
| Targeted Learning Corporation                   |   | Maine         |
| NETg GmbH                                       |   | Germany       |
| SkillSoft NETg Limited                          |   | England       |
|  SS Software Service India Private Limited |   |  India   |