### RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0984- 21 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.HENRY A. DELEONMAURICIO, a/k/a HENRY DELONMAURICIO, HENRY DELEON, HENRY A. DELEON, HENRY MAURICIO, HENRY A. MAURICIO, and HENRY ALBERTO DELEON MAURICIO, Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted May 8, 2024

– Decided May 16, 202 4 Before Judges Firko and Susswein. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 15

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- 1387. Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Suzannah Brown, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 0984

- 21 Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney f or respondent (Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Henry A. Deleon-Mauricio appeals from a May 18, 2021 Law Division order denying his petition for post -conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. He alleged his plea counsel c oerced him into pleading guilty to a single count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and did not properly advise him of the need to consult with imm igration counsel about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Defen dant also claims his motion counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that h is guilty plea was involuntary due to mental and physical exhaustion. We affirm the denial of his PCR petition.
I. Defendant was arrested for grabbing his then fourt een-year- old stepdaughter by the neck, holding a knife to her throat , dragging her out of her room into the back of his van, and sexually molesting he r. Defendant forced the victim to nasally ingest cocaine. In October 2015, defendant was indicted for two co unts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a) (cou nts one and two); two counts of third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact, N.J .S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (counts3 A- 0984

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three and four); first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b) (count five); fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1( b)(3) (count six); fourthdegree unlawful possession of a knife, N.J.S.A. 2C: 39-5(d) (count seven); thirddegree possession of a knife for an unlawful purpos e, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count eight); second-degree possession of a knife while engaged in drugdistribution activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(b) (count nine); six counts of seconddegree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 (counts ten, eleven, fourteen, sixteen, nineteen, and twenty); four coun ts of fourth-degree child abuse, N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 and -3 (counts twelve, fiftee n, seventeen, and twenty-one); third-degree distribution of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:3 5-5(a)(1) and (b)(3) (count thirteen); and first-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24- 4(b)(3) (count eighteen). On May 20, 2016, pursuant to a negotiated plea agr eement, defendant pled guilty to a single count of aggravated sexual assau lt. The State recommended a fifteen-year term of imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA) , N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and agreed to dismiss the remai ning other twenty counts of the indictment. At the plea allocution hearing, with the aid of a Spanish interpreter, defendant testified he read the plea forms , plea counsel reviewed the plea forms4 A- 0984

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with him in Spanish, defendant reviewed the questio ns in Spanish, and plea counsel circled the responses after defendant provi ded an answer to each question. Defendant testified he is "fluent in bot h English and Spanish." Defendant was thirty-four years old at the time of the plea hearing and had completed two years of high school. Defendant test ified he was satisfied with plea counsel's advice and representation, and was n ot forced or pressured to plead guilty by anyone or forced to sign the plea f orms. He also confirmed that he reviewed certain reports in his file with plea c ounsel, who had consulted a
DNA expert, and that plea counsel and defendant also m et with his family members about the plea and DNA results. Relevant here, defendant acknowledged he is not a United States citizen, but a permanent resident, and that his guilty plea "may result in [his] removal from the United State[s] and/or stop [him] from bei ng able to legally enter or reenter the United States." When the judge 1 inquired whether defendant exercised his right to consult with an immigration attorney a bout the effect his guilty plea will have on his immigration status, defendant resp onded, "yes." The judge questioned defendant, "whose decision was it to ple ad guilty today?" and he responded, "[m]ine."

1 The same judge presided over all of the matters add ressed in this opinion.5 A- 0984

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Defendant testified that the initials and signatur es on the forms were his. The judge explained to defendant that he did not ha ve to plead guilty, had a right to a jury trial, and is presumed innocent until pro ven guilty. The judge further stated the State would have to prove its case again st defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant acknowledged the judge 's statements. The judge also told defendant that at a trial, counsel would represent him, cross-examine the State's witnesses, call witnesses on his behalf , and present evidence, which defendant acknowledged. The judge also advised defendant he had a right to testify or not testify at trial, file motions, and h ad a right to remain silent, but by pleading guilty, defendant would give up th ose rights because he had to establish a factual basis for the plea. Finally, when the judge asked defendant if he still wanted to plead guilty in light of possible immigration consequences, he a nswered "yes." The judge found defendant was advised by "very competent coun sel," the guilty plea was entered into "freely and voluntarily," and defendan t has been "alert and comprehending throughout the proceedings." The jud ge determined that defendant was "not under the influence of any drugs , alcohol, [or] medication," and "waived his [c]onstitutionally guaranteed right s after signing the plea forms." Defendant acknowledged the offense, and th e judge accepted his plea.6 A- 0984

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Approximately six months later on July 1, 2016, pr ior to sentencing, defendant's new attorney moved to withdraw his guilty plea on several grounds, including plea counsel's alleged failure to show hi m any documents, insisting "everything was al l right, that there were no problems, and that was th e reason why [defendant] had an attorney." On December 21, 2016, t he judge conducted a testimonial hearing on defendant's motion to with draw his guilty plea. Defendant, Carmen Mauricio, his mother, Aylene Dele on and Jeisa Mauricio , defendant's sisters, testified in support of his mo tion. The State called plea counsel as a witness. Defendant testified that he only met with plea cou nsel "one, two, or three times the most" between his arrest and indictment, and "not more than four times" between his indictment and guilty plea. Def endant stated that he "was never pleased with his visits. It was something th at [plea counsel] always did in a rush." Defendant also testified that plea cou nsel "never showed [him] any documents." According to defendant's testimony, plea counsel k ept insisting that if the case went to trial and defendant got convicted, he would get "[forty-five] years, [fifty] years, [and] [he] was going to lose [ his ] life." When asked if plea counsel ever discussed working out a plea deal with him, de fendant responded, "[n]o.7 A- 0984

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[Plea counsel] always was asking me to sign some pa pers and if I were to do that right away, that all I was going to do was ten months in jail." Defendant stated that plea counsel told him that if he chose not to plead guilty and go to trial, he would not represent him any longer. Defe ndant claimed he "couldn't take it anymore," and he "was tired and depressed," when he entered the guilty plea. Defendant also testified that he did not read the plea forms before he signed and initialed them because plea counsel "rea d them himself, [counsel] marked the circles on it, " and that plea counsel pressured him to sign them

. Defendant's new counsel then questioned him about t he inconsistencies between his present testimony and his responses at the plea allocution:

COUNSEL : And did [the judge] ask you if you had spoken with an immigration lawyer about the immigration consequences of your plea?
DEFENDANT : Yes. COUNSEL : And what did you tell [the judge] ? DEFENDANT: I told him that I understood everything , even though I didn't know it, but I said yes, becau se [plea counsel] was telling me to say yes that I was understanding everything.
COUNSEL : Did [the judge] ask you if you were satisfied with the services that your lawyer gave y ou?8 A- 0984

- 21 DEFENDANT: I said yes, but at the same time I wanted to remove him as my attorney but I couldn't do it. Defendant added that "any person with all the lies that [plea counsel] told [him] that day would have . . . done the same thing ." Defendant's family members, who had interacted with plea counsel durin g the representation, all corroborated defendant's assertions when they testi fied. The State then called plea counsel as a witness. Plea counsel confirmed that he gave defendant copies of the discovery and reviewed the documents and information with him. Plea counsel testified that he consulted with a "DNA scientist" and discussed the consultation and the DNA results with defendant. Plea counsel recalled that he discussed the charges with defendant and his family members, and spoke to them regarding the immigration consequences of a guilty ple a. During his course of representation of defendant, ple a counsel testified he met with him "around ten times" or more and discuss ed the case with defendant's family members at his office "a majority of the tim e." Plea counsel recalled having the plea hearing carried a few times in orde r to meet with defendant. Plea counsel testified as follows:9 A- 0984

- 21 THE STATE: Did you talk to him about the immigration consequences of a plea

— or him pleading guilty or him being found guilty after trial?
PLEA COUNSEL : Yes. THE STATE : How many times did you discuss that with him? PLEA COUNSEL: Probably maybe three or four times. THE STATE: And what did you tell him in regards to that?
PLEA COUNSEL : I told him that if he were to plead, or be convicted, he would be suffering what is call ed an aggravated felony charge in Immigration Court, and in all likelihood would be removed from this country.
THE STATE : Did you have that discussion about the immigration consequences of him pleading or being found guilty with anyone else?
PLEA COUNSEL : Yes. THE STATE : Who?
PLEA COUNSEL : With his family, namely his mother . . . [and] I believe his sister was also present a t one of . . . the meetings. Plea counsel denied advising defendant he would on ly have to serve ten months in jail if he pled guilty and testified he t old him what the plea agreement was: if defendant pled guilty to a first-degree ch arge, the State would ask for a fifteen-year sentence and plea counsel had the right to ask for a lower amount

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ten years. Plea counsel denied tell ing defendant or his family that he would withdraw if the case went to trial. Plea counsel f urther asserted that he read defendant every single question on the plea forms, and defendant's guilty plea was voluntary. Plea counsel testified he did not "force" defendan t to plead guilty and that he "would be facing at least more than twenty years " based on the first and second-degree charges. On cross-examination, plea counsel testified that he told defendant "in all likelihood prior to being released [from] his term, immigration or the Department of Homeland Security would probab ly file a detainer against him and then there would be a removal proceeding." Plea counsel stated this information was shared with defendant's family. On March 30, 2017, the judge rendered a thorough w ritten decision denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty p lea after applying the four Slater factors. See State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157- 58 (2000). As to the first factor

— whether defendant asserted a colorable claim of inn ocence

— the judge found no "specific, potentially plausible facts" we re presented to support his assertion that he was not guilty. As to the second factor

— consideration of the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for with drawal

— the judge did "not find [d]efendant's and his family's testimony credi ble" because "[i]t is simply11 A- 0984

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unsupported by the record." The judge emphasized that defendant's testimony was consistently at odds with the plea hearing test imony, and it appeared the motion to withdraw his guilty plea was nothing more than a "change of heart." For the third factor

— the existence of a plea bargain

— the ju dge noted that defendant's plea was the result of a plea agreement. Fin ally, the fourth factor

— whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or an unfair advantage to the accused

— the judge found the passage of seven months from the plea hearing to the motion to withdraw hearing w as not a significant amount of time and therefore did not unfairly prejudice th e State. The judge highlighted that "permitting the case to go to trial would forc e the victim to re -open a traumatic incident in her life, one which she thoug ht was closed after [d]efendant pled guilty." On July 27, 2017, the judge sentenced defendant to a thirteen-year term of imprisonment subject to NERA

— two years less than the prison term the State had agreed to recommend as part of the plea bargain . The judge also sentenced defendant to parole supervision for life (PSL), N.J .S.A. 2C:43-6.4; mandated his compliance with Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23 ; entered a sex-offender restraining order (SORO) pursuant to Nicole's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-12 and 2C:44-8; imposed applicable fines and penalties; an d dismissed the remaining12 A- 0984

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twenty counts of the indictment. On August 8, 2017 , a judgment of conviction was entered and was later amended to reflect defend ant was sentenced to PSL and that the SORO had been entered. Defendant filed a notice of appeal of his convicti on and sentence, which he subsequently withdrew. 2 Defendant filed this pro se PCR petition seven months later on September 20, 2018, alleging his pl ea counsel was ineffective "throughout the criminal proceeding, including duri ng the plea agreement, [and] discovery process, resulting in fundamental injusti ce." Defendant was assigned PCR counsel, who filed a le tter brief and a certification from defendant in support of PCR. Defe ndant alleged plea counsel was ineffective: because he misinformed defendant a bout the immigration consequences of pleading guilty; fail ed to fully inform defendant of his sentencing exposure; and fail ed to provide discovery, especially the DNA evidence, to enable defendant to make an informed d ecision before pleading guilty . Defendant also alleged motion counsel was ineffe ctive because he failed to provide any evidence or discovery and fail ed to argue defendant's guilty plea

2 An order dismissing appeal was entered. State v. D eLeon-Mauricio , No. A0904 -17 (App. Div. Feb. 22, 2018).13 A- 0984

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was involuntary due to his physical and mental exha ustion at the time of the plea allocution. On February 14, 2019, the judge heard oral argumen t on defendant's PCR petition and reserved decision. On August 13, 2019 , the petition was denied. In a thirteen-page written decision, the judge found t hat defendant was not misinformed about his removal risk and sentencing c onsequences, which the same judge considered during defendant's Slater hea ring. The judge found defendant failed to present any new evidence to sup port his claim and his "PCR rehashes the same argument as in his motion for ple a withdrawal." The judge credited plea counsel's testimony at the Slater hearing tha t he had already consulted a DNA expert and reviewed the findings with defendant prior to the plea. "Without more," the judge found defendant's claim "amounts to nothing 'more than . . . [a] bald assertion[.]' " (alterations in original). The judge also rejected defendant's claim that motion c ounsel was ineffective for failing to raise his purported mental and physical exhaustion argument because the record demonstrated that defendant "knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his guilty plea." A memorial izing order was entered. On September 27, 2019, defendant filed an appeal o f the order denying PCR. While the appeal was pending, defendant filed a motion seeking a limited14 A- 0984

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remand for the PCR judge to address all PCR claims raised, including his claim that plea counsel did not review discovery with him . We granted the motion and remanded to the PCR judge "to address all of the is sues in the PCR petition[,] including defendant's claim that plea counsel faile d to review discovery with him, including DNA evidence critical to the State's case." State v. DeLeonMauricio, No. A- 0406 -19 (App. Div. May 14, 2020). On remand, defendant and the State filed briefs in support of their positions regarding the motion for a limited remand of the PCR petition. On May 18, 2021, the judge conducted oral argument on the remand issue

— whether plea counsel's performance was ineffective for faili ng to provide DNA evidence and discovery to defendant prior to his guilty plea . The judge determined that defendant "provide[d] no supporting affidavit, evid ence, or other proof to support his claim that DNA evidence was not provide d to him other than merely his word." In addition, the judge found "[t]he rec ord contradicts this unsupported claim ," and defendant's "trustworthiness," including his own statements under oath that plea counsel did not pro vide the DNA evidence to him or the expert's findings. The judge reiterated that at his plea allocution, defendant acknowledged his plea counsel cons ul ted with an expert, and at the Slater hearing, the judge15 A- 0984

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found defendant and his family members were not cre dible in claiming plea counsel deprived defendant of the DNA evidence before his plea. The judge found defendant was "not credible," and plea counse l was "credible." The judge determined that defendant failed to establish ineff ective assistance of counsel under either Strickland 3 prong and rejected his claim that he was put into an "impossible situation" as to whether he should plea d guilty or proceed to trial without knowing whether DNA evidence would be used against him. In addition to DNA evidence, the judge reasoned th e State had medical evaluations, statements from the victim and the cus todial parent, video footage, and cell phones to prove the charges. The judge fo und the twenty- one -count indictment against defendant exposed him to over fift y years of imprisonment if he went to trial and was found guilty. A memorializ ing order was entered. This appeal followed. On appeal, defendant raises the following points f or our consideration:
POINT I
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING [DEFENDANT'S] CLAIM THAT PLEA COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE PROVIDED INCORRECT ADVICE REGARDING THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA.

3 Stickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).16 A- 0984

- 21 POINT II THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE CLAIM THAT MOTION COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ARGUE THAT [DEFENDANT'S] GUILTY PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY DUE TO MENTAL AND PHYSICAL EXHAUSTION WITHOUT HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
II. The standard for determining whether counsel's per formance was ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment was formulated in Strickland , and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of co unsel claim, defendant must meet a two-prong test by establishing that: (1) co unsel's performance was deficient and the errors made were so egregious tha t counsel was not functioning effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2) the defect in performance pre judiced defendant's rights to a fair trial such that there exists "a reasonable p robability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differe nt. " Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. In the plea bargain context, "a defendant must pro ve 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's erro rs, . . . [he] would not have pled17 A- 0984

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guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012) (quoting State v. Nuñ ez -Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009)). He must also show that "a decision to reject the plea barga in would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
A. Defendant alleges his plea counsel misinformed him about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty because he did not inform him that in all likelihood removal was mandatory. 4 Because defendant's plea was entered on May 20, 2016, the standards set forth in Padilla applied. 559 U.S. at 356. Under Padilla "to satisfy a defendant's Sixth Amen dment right to effective assistance of counsel, counsel has an affirmative o bligation to inform a clientdefendant when a plea places the client at risk of deportati on." Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 356 (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374). Our Supr eme Court explained that following Padilla , "counsel is duty-bound to provide a client 'with av ailable advice about an issue like deportation' and declare d that 'the failure to do so'

4 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), a non-citizen "is deportable" if he or she commits an "aggravated felony." Here, defendant pl ead guilty to one count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C :14-2(a), which is an aggravated offense. See State v. Francisco, 471 N. J. Super. 386, 414 (App. Div. 2022). "Removal" is the current statutory term for what wa s previously referred to as "deportation." Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339 n.1.18 A- 0984

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satisfies the attorney-deficiency prong in Strickla nd's analysis." Ibid. (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371). However, "immigration law is often complex, and the consequences of a conviction are often far from clear." State v. Bla ke, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 295 (App. Div. 2016) (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369). "[T]he specificity and definiteness of counsel's required advice varies wi th the clarity of the immigration law itself." Ibid. Counsel's failure "to point out to a noncitizen that he or she is pleading to a mandatorily removab le offense," constitutes "deficient performance of counsel." Blake, 444 N.J . Super. at 296 (quoting Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 380). We are convinced that defendant failed to sustain h is burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his plea co unsel's performance was deficient under the first prong of the Strickland/F ritz standard. The credible evidence in the record supports the judge's finding that plea counsel did not provide misleading advice to defendant regarding th e immigration consequences of his plea. Nuñez-Valdez, 200 N.J. at 139- 40. Moreover, the credible evidence supports the judge 's conclusion that plea counsel provided constitutionally effective assista nce by advising defendant he may be deported and that he had the opportunity to confer with immigration19 A- 0984

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counsel. And , defendant confirmed that he reviewed and answered the plea forms with plea counsel, which contained questions regarding citizenship and the understanding a "guilty plea may result in . . . removal from the United States." The judge engaged in an extensive colloqu y with defendant about the effect his guilty plea will have on his immigration status. Defendant testified he conferred with plea counsel prior to the entry o f his plea and provided affirmative responses to the questions on the plea forms confirming that he had been advised he may be deported and had the opportu nity to confer with immigration counsel if he chose to do so. We are also satisfied that defendant did not susta in his burden of establishing the second Strickland prong because he failed to present "sufficient evidence to show 'a reasonable probability that, fo r counsel's errors, [he or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insiste d on going to trial.'" State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 376 (App. Div. 2 014) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Defendant was r equired to demonstrate that "had he been properly advised, it would have been r ational for him to decline the plea offer and insist on going to trial and, in fact, that he probably would have done so." State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 47 5, 486 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372).20 A- 0984

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Defendant did not offer any evidence beyond his ba re conclusory assertion that he would not have pled guilty had he known of the immigration consequences. Standing alone, this does not demons trate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged deficie ncy, defendant would not have accepted the plea bargain. See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999 ) (holding "a petitioner must do more than make bald asserti ons that he was denied the effective assistance of coun sel"). Defendant's failure to prove both prongs of the Strickland standard by a p reponderance of the evidence required the denial of his PCR petition. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 618, 542 (2013).
B. Finally, defendant contends his motion counsel was ineffective because he failed to argue his guilty plea was involuntary due to mental and physical exhaustion. In particular, defendant asserts his m otion counsel failed to utilize information that was available to argue his guilty plea was involuntary and should have been vacated. We are unpersuaded. As the judge noted when recounting the facts of th e matter, the record shows defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli gently entered his guilty plea. At the plea allocution, the judge found defe ndant confirmed he had the opportunity to review the plea forms with counsel, understood the legal rights21 A- 0984

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he was waiving by pleading guilty, and understood t he consequences of his guilty plea on his immigration status. Defendant's testimony at the plea allocution did not support his claim that his plea was involuntary due to mental and physical exhaustion. Accordingly, defendant is unable to demonstrate plea counsel's performance was so deficient as to consti tute ineffective assistance of counsel under the first Strickland prong. Defendant also failed to satisfy the second Strickl and prong because he did not present evidence that demonstrates motion c ounsel's failure to raise his mental and physical exhaustion claim prejudiced his defense. See State v. Taccetta, 200 N.J. 183, 193 (2009). At the Slater hearing, defendant testified that when he pled guilty "he couldn't take it anymo re . . . [and] was tired and depressed." The judge rejected defendant's testimo ny because the record showed defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intell igently entered his guilty plea. On this record, we conclude that defendant h as presented no facts to satisfy the ex ac ting standard required by Strickland 's second prong. Defendant claims the judge erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing because "the resolution of the claim may require th e examination of the discussion that took place between motion counsel a nd [defendant] off the22 A- 0984

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record." Defendant asserts that he should be given the opportunity to provide testimony concerning his ineffective representation by motion counsel. However, a defendant is only entitled to an evident iary hearing if "a prima facie case in support of [PCR]" is demonstrated and "there are material issues of fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record, and a determination that an evidentiary hearing is necess ary to resolve the claims for relief." State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting
R. 3:22 -10(b)). Here, the judge found there were no mater ial facts in dispute that could not be resolved by reference to the exis ting record. We agree with the judge that motion counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue defendant's plea was involuntary due to me ntal and physical exhaustion. In sum, the judge properly denied PCR. To the extent not addressed, defendant's remaining contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11

- 3(e)(2). Affirmed.