alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF PROSOURCE, INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-28-1998             DEC-27-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-28-1998             DEC-27-1997
<CASH>                                      12,137,000              12,501,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                              220,864,000             226,332,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 3,330,000               4,085,000
<INVENTORY>                                152,488,000             160,621,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           397,658,000             410,993,000
<PP&E>                                      98,275,000              89,368,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              31,769,000              29,407,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             541,938,000             548,101,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      288,543,000             304,965,000
<BONDS>                                    185,300,000             174,200,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                        94,000                  93,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  62,908,000              64,322,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               541,938,000             548,101,000
<SALES>                                    989,764,000           3,901,165,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           989,764,000           3,901,165,000
<CGS>                                      911,564,000           3,591,368,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              911,564,000           3,591,368,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            77,978,000             302,080,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               453,000               2,275,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,377,000               9,193,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,155,000)             (1,476,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,519,000                 485,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,636,000)               (991,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0             (6,262,000)
<CHANGES>                                            0             (6,426,000)
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,636,000)            (13,679,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.18)                  (1.47)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.18)                  (1.47)
        

</TABLE>
#### James Robert NICHOLS, Debtor, Appellant, v. S. V. KEMP, Attorney, and six other cases.

Nos. 4019, 4023, 4036, 4051, 4069, 4081, 4156.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

April 10, 1937.

S. S. Lambeth, Jr., of Bedford, Va.. Ted Dalton, of East Radford, Va., William Lernke, of Fargo, N. D., Philip Williams, of Winchester, Va., Gilbert E. Pence, of Woodstock, Va., William J. Carter, of Johnson City, Tenn., S. Bruce Jones, of Bristol, Va., and Legh R. Page, of Richmond, Va., for appellants.

S. V. Kemp, Samuel FI. Williams, and B. B. Campbell, all of Lynchburg, Va., William D. Staples, T. X. Parsons and W. J. Henson, all of Roanoke, Va., John S. Draper, of Pulaski, Va., FI. C. Tyler, of East *1016Radford, Va., F. S. Tavenner, of Woodstock, Va., Wade B. Hampton, of Washington, D. C., Hunter J. Phlegar, of Christiansburg, Va., and H. G. Lavinder, of Bristol, Va., for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

In these cases, the orders and decrees entered below will be reversed and the cases will be remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Robert Page Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, Virginia et al., 57 S.Ct. 556, 81 L.Ed. — .

Reversed.
#### W. G. C., INC., and Guardian Insurance Company, Appellants, v. The MAN CO., etc., et al., Appellees. The MAN CO., etc., et al., Appellants, v. W. G. C., INC., et al., Appellees.

Nos. 77-2221, 77-2249.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 25, 1978.

*1153Daniel P. Tunick, Miami, for W. G. C. and Guardian.

Donald F. Frost, Miami, for The Man Co.

Before PEARSON, NATHAN and KE-HOE, JJ.

NATHAN, Judge.

By these consolidated appeals, both plaintiff/counter-defendants, and defendant/counter-plaintiffs, urge reversal of an order of the trial court which dismissed with prejudice, actions arising from a real estate transaction between the parties. We find that dismissal with prejudice was too harsh a remedy and therefore, we reverse.

The record reveals that both sides failed to comply with an order of the trial court which required that pre-trial catalogues be filed at least ten days prior to trial date. However, such non-compliance is not shown to have been willful nor, more importantly, does either side claim prejudice as a result. Indeed, both sides seek reversal of the order of dismissal.

While it is within the discretion of the trial court to impose sanctions for noncompliance with court orders, the court abused its discretion in dismissing these causes with prejudice where no prejudice was asserted by either side. It was error to condemn the litigants to the loss of their right to access to the courts because of their attorneys’ non-willful' failure to comply with a court order. *Travelers Insurance Company v. Rodriguez,*357 So.2d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The other point raised on appeal is deemed to be without merit and will not be discussed.

Reversed and remanded.
Exhibit
32.1
 
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002
 
 In
connection with the Annual Report of Xcorporeal, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form
10-K for the period ending December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Kelly J. McCrann,
as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:
 
 (1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
 
 (2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.
 
 
 /s/
Kelly J.
McCrann
 Kelly J.
McCrann
 Chief
Executive Officer
 
 Date:
March 31, 2009
 
 This
certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-K pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by
such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
 
 A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, another document
authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
 
 72
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection  with the Annual Report of Smithway  Motor Xpress Corp.  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-K for the period ended  December 31, 2003,  as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, G.
Larry Owens,  Chief Executive  Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


                                   /s/ G. Larry Owens
                                 ------------------------------
                                 G. Larry Owens
                                 Chief Executive Officer
                                 March 30, 2004

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to Smithway  Motor Xpress Corp.  and will be retained by Smithway Motor
Xpress Corp.  and  furnished to the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its
staff upon request.
# C_2021452EN.01000501.xml

| 8.11.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 452/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.11.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 452/5

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 14 July 2021 — LD v ALB FILS KLINIKEN GmbH

(Case C-427/21)

(2021/C 452/04)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesarbeitsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: LD

Defendant: ALB FILS KLINIKEN GmbH

Questions referred

| 1. | Does Article 1(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/104/EC (1) apply if — as specified in Paragraph 4(3) of the Tarifvertrag für den Öffentlichen Dienst (collective agreement for the public service, ‘the TVöD’) — an employee’s duties are assigned to a third party and this employee must, at the request of his or her current employer while the existing employment relationship with the latter continues, perform his or her contractually agreed work for said third party on a permanent basis and accept technical and organisational instructions from the third party? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does Article 1(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/104/EC (1) apply if — as specified in Paragraph 4(3) of the Tarifvertrag für den Öffentlichen Dienst (collective agreement for the public service, ‘the TVöD’) — an employee’s duties are assigned to a third party and this employee must, at the request of his or her current employer while the existing employment relationship with the latter continues, perform his or her contractually agreed work for said third party on a permanent basis and accept technical and organisational instructions from the third party?

| 2. | If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:
  Is it consistent with the protective purpose of Directive 2008/104 to exclude ‘supply of staff’ within the meaning of Paragraph 4(3) of the TVöD from the scope of the national protective provisions for personnel leasing, as point 2b of Paragraph 1(3) of the Gesetz zur Regelung der Arbeitnehmerüberlassung (Law on personnel leasing, ‘the AÜG’) does, meaning that these protective provisions are not applicable to cases involving supply of staff? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:

Is it consistent with the protective purpose of Directive 2008/104 to exclude ‘supply of staff’ within the meaning of Paragraph 4(3) of the TVöD from the scope of the national protective provisions for personnel leasing, as point 2b of Paragraph 1(3) of the Gesetz zur Regelung der Arbeitnehmerüberlassung (Law on personnel leasing, ‘the AÜG’) does, meaning that these protective provisions are not applicable to cases involving supply of staff?

---

(1)  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work (OJ 2008 L 327, p. 9).

---
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 345 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 345

Providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House for expenses of 
 investigations and studies by the Committee on Education and Labor in 
         the second session of the One Hundred Third Congress.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 3, 1994

   Mr. Ford of Michigan (for himself and Mr. Williams) submitted the 
  following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on House 
                             Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House for expenses of 
 investigations and studies by the Committee on Education and Labor in 
         the second session of the One Hundred Third Congress.

    Resolved, That (a) for expenses of investigations and studies by 
the Committee on Education and Labor (hereinafter in this resolution 
referred to as the ``Committee''), including expenses for--
            (1) procurement of consultant services under section 202(i) 
        of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946; and
            (2) provision of assistance for members of professional 
        staff in obtaining specialized training under section 202(j) of 
        such Act;
there shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the House not more 
than $4,238,064.
    (b) Not more than $100,000 of the amount specified in subsection 
(a) may be used for consultant services referred to in paragraph (1) of 
such subsection and not more than $10,000 of such amount may be used 
for specialized training referred to in paragraph (2) of such 
subsection.
    Sec. 2. Payments under this resolution shall be made on vouchers 
authorized by the Committee, signed by the chairman of the Committee, 
and approved by the Committee on House Administration.
    Sec. 3. Amounts shall be available under this resolution for 
investigations and studies carried out during the period beginning at 
noon on January 3, 1994, and ending immediately before noon on January 
3, 1995.
    Sec. 4. Amounts made available under this resolution shall be 
expended in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Committee on 
House Administration.

                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1998
<CASH>                                         258,217
<SECURITIES>                                 1,103,767
<RECEIVABLES>                               11,293,345
<ALLOWANCES>                                    93,000
<INVENTORY>                                  5,785,671
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            21,328,958
<PP&E>                                      82,912,996
<DEPRECIATION>                              60,669,572
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              46,439,064
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,438,201
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     9,219,195
<OTHER-SE>                                  24,361,844
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                46,439,064
<SALES>                                     62,362,865
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            62,594,430
<CGS>                                       29,217,148
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               61,544,323
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                18,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,050,107
<INCOME-TAX>                                   359,297
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            690,810
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   690,810
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .06
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .06
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of the Objections to the Independent Certificate Filed Purporting to Nominate Andrew Archibald, Jr., for Assessor of the City of Cohoes.

(Supreme Court, Albany Special Term,

October, 1912.)

Election Law — certificate of independent nomination — certificate, when declared void.

Where a certificate of independent nomination contains 549 names on 70 separate sheets, of which names 27 are of persons not registered and 9 are duplications, the duplicated names appearing on 10 separate sheets containing 88 others of which five per cent of the names are fraudulent, leaving but 416 on the certificate to be counted, • it must be declared void.

Objections to a certificate of independent nomination.

Charles B. Templeton, for objectors.

Walter E. Wertime, for respondents.

*87Chester, J.

The certificate contains 549 names on 70 separate sheets. Of these, 27 are names of persons not registered and 9 are duplications. The duplicated names appear on ten separate sheets containing 88 other names on each of which five per centum of the names are fraudulent.

Applying the principles stated in the Matter of William Baillee, candidate for mayor, decided herewith *(ante*page 84), there must he deducted 27 names of persons not registered, 18 for duplicated names and 88 under the five per centum rule, a total of 133, leaving but 416 upon the certificate to he counted.

The certificate must he declared void.

Ordered accordingly.
M A N D A T E

TO THE 389TH DISTRICT COURT of HIDALGO COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas, on the 29th day of

August, 2014, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between

TALAL NIMER EL HAJ, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

CAUSE NO. 13-13-00326-CR (Tr.Ct.No. CR-3117-12-H)

was determined; and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be VACATED IN PART

and AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED by this Court. The Court orders the judgment of the trial

court VACATED IN PART and AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

      

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals

for the Thirteenth District of Texas, in this behalf, and in all things have it duly

recognized, obeyed and executed.

WITNESS, the Hon. Rogelio Valdez, Chief Justice of our Court of Appeals, with the seal

thereof affixed, at the City of Edinburg, Texas this 23rd day of January, 2015.

Dorian E. Ramirez, CLERK

FILE COPY
#### JOHNSON & PANICO, P. A., a/k/a Johnson, Panico, Hunkapiller, Baum & Simmermon, P. A., and James P. Panico, Individually, Appellants, v. Billy Joe COUCH, Appellee.

No. 76-2545.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 13, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 9, 1977.

William A. Kledzik of James P. Pánico & Associates, P. A., Maitland, for appellants.

Jerry S. Luxenberg, Orlando, for appel-lee.

DAUKSCH, Judge.

Appellants seek to have the Judgment of the trial court reversed after a non-jury trial. No transcript of the testimony was provided for our review. We have no alternative but to affirm. *Pierson v. Sharp,*283 So.2d 880 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). *Rosenstein v. Raticoff,*265 So.2d 387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).

The Judgment finds that “Count 8 [is] a contingency fee contract [and] said contingency has not occurred . . . ” In the judgment the court properly denies the Appellant any relief under Count 8 and includes the words “shall go hence without day.” These words should not be included since the Appellant would not be barred from bringing action should Appellee fail to pay a lawful indebtedness if the contingency does occur. The Judgment is hereby modified to delete the words “and shall go hence without day.”

AFFIRMED as modified.

ALDERMAN, C. J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur.
#### George STECHER, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

No. 8246.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 11, 1937.

P. Robert G. Sjostrom, of Miami, Fla., for petitioner.

Robert H. Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewall Key, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., and Herman Oliphant, Gen. Counsel, Department of Treasury, and Chester A. Gwinn, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Before FOSTER, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to the joint stipulation executed September 4, 1936, for the consolidation of this case with the case entitled David Gross, Petitioner, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent (C.C.A.) 88 F.(2d) 567, and the motion filed by petitioner to enter the same judgment in the above-entitled and numbered cause as was entered by this court in the case entitled David Gross, Petitioner, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on March 2, 1937, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court that the judgment of the said United States Board of Tax Appeals in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed with direction to correct the tax assessed in accordance with the opinion of this court. rendered on March 2, 1937, in the case of David Gross, Petitioner, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.
#### Lawrence H. SAWYER et ux., Appellants, v. CITY OF BILOXI, Appellee.

No. 46464.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Dec. 13, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1972.

Thomas J. Wiltz, Biloxi, for appellants.

Ronald G. Peresich, Lyle M. Page, Biloxi, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Charles K. TRACE, d/b/a Trace Electric, Appellant, v. Elvira NICOSIA et al., Appellees.

No. 71-852.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 2, 1972.

Thomas W. Stewart, Bradenton, for appellant.

Larry K. Coleman, of Knowles & Bla-lock, Bradenton, for appellee, Nicosia.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Stancil v. Gardner, Fla.App.1966, 192 So.2d 340; Crane Co. v. Fine, Fla.1969, 221 So.2d 145; and Trowbridge, Inc. v. Hathaway, Fla.1970, 233 So.2d 129.

PIERCE, C. J., and LILES and MANN, JJ,, concur.