This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. No. 35,326 4 ARMANDO ARAGON, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Michael E. Martinez, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 12 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 172 {1} Defendant Armando Aragon appeals from the revocation of his probation. We 1 issued a notice of proposed summary dispos ition, proposing to affirm. Defendant has 2 filed a memorandum in opposition. After due consideration, we remain unpersuaded 3 by Defendant’s assertions of error. We therefore affirm. 4
{2} In our notice of proposed summary disposition, we suggested that the State 5 presented evidence, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that Defendant violated his 6 probation by damaging the property of another and by using alcohol; therefore, we 7 proposed to affirm. [ See generally CN] In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant 8 renews his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the revocation of his 9 probation. [MIO 1] More specifically, Defe ndant challenges the sufficiency of the 10 evidence to establish that he willfully damaged property or consumed alcohol. [Id. at 11 1, 4] See In re Bruno R. , 2003-NMCA-057, ¶ 11, 133 N.M. 566, 66 P.3d 339 (“To 12 establish a violation of a probation agreemen t, the obligation is on the State to prove 13 willful conduct on the part of the probationer so as to satisfy the applicable burden of 14 proof.”). 15
{3} We acknowledge that willf ul conduct is a requisite . However, as we have 16 previously stated, “[o]nce the [S]tate offers proof of a breach of a material condition 17 of probation, [D]efendant must come forward with evidence [to show that his 18 non-compliance] was not willful.” State v. Parsons , 1986-NMCA-027, ¶ 25, 104 N.M. 193 123, 717 P.2d 99; see also State v. Martinez , 1989-NMCA-036, ¶ 8, 108 N.M. 604, 1 775 P.2d 1321 (explaining that probation shoul d not be revoked where the violation 2 is not willful, in that it resulted fro m factors beyond a probationer’s control)

. “ [I]f 3 [D]efendant fails to carry hi s burden, then the trial court is within its discretion in 4 revoking [Defendant’s probation].” Martinez , 1989-NMCA-036, ¶ 8

. 5
{4} In this case, the State presented eviden ce, discussed in greater detail in the 6 notice of proposed disposition, that Deputy DeLa Cruz was dispatched to investigate 7 a domestic disturbance at a tr ailer park; at the entrance of the trailer park, he made 8 contact with Defendant who wa s wearing clothing that matc hed the description he had 9 received from dispatch; the deputy spoke w ith Defendant; Defendant told the deputy 10 that he knew he was in trouble; Defendant admitted that he had broken a window; the 11 deputy testified that Defendant smelled like alcohol; Defe ndant was stumbling as he 12 walked; Defendant swayed as he stood; and during a pat down for weapons, the 13 deputy had to hold Defendant upright to keep him from falling. [DS 3-4; MIO 2] The 14 deputy and Defendant went to the trailer where Defendant’s girlfriend was living, and 15 the deputy observed a broken window in the liv ing room with most of the glass inside 16 the trailer. [DS 4; MIO 2] Defendant admitted that when he saw his girlfriend look out 17 the window, he ran toward it, hit it with his closed fist, and it broke; however, he 18 maintains that he did not intend to break the window. [DS 4; MIO 2-3] Additionally, 194 the State presented evidence that Defendant’s probation officer had discussed the 1 probation orders and standardconditions of probation with Defendant. [DS 5; MIO 2 3] This was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant was aware 3 that, as part of his probation agreement, he was prohibited from violating the laws of 4 the State of New Mexico and he was not permitted to possess, consume or use alcohol 5 while he was on probation. [ See MIO 1-2] See generally State v. Romero , 6 1968-NMCA-078, ¶ 17, 79 N.M. 522, 445 P.2d 587 (“An inference is merely a logical 7 deduction from facts and evidence.” (quoting State v. Jones , 1935-NMSC-062, ¶ 21, 8 39 N.M. 395, 48 P.2d 403)). 9
{5} Defendant has not demonstrated that heoffered any evidence to excuse his non10 compliance with the terms of his probation. Instead, he contends that “the evidence 11 clearly shows that [he] accidentally brokea window and smelled of alcohol.” [MIO 12 1; see also id. at 6] 13
{6} As we discussed in our notice of proposeddisposition, to the extent there was 14 conflicting testimony, contrary tes timony is not a basis for reversal. See State v. Rojo , 15 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P. 2d 829 (“Contrary evidence supporting 16 acquittal does not provide a basis for reversal because the jury is free to reject [the 17 d]efendant’s version of the facts.”). Rather it was for the district court to weigh the 18 evidence and assess credibility, and we w ill not engage in a reweighing of the 195 evidence on appeal. See State v. Apodaca , 1994-NMSC-121, ¶ 3, 118 N.M. 762, 887 1 P.2d 756 (stating that the appellate court views the evidence in the light most 2 favorable to the verdict, resolving all c onflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences 3 in favor of the verdict); State v. Griffin , 1993-NMSC-071, ¶ 17, 116 N.M. 689, 866 4 P.2d 1156 (“This court does not weigh th e evidence and may not substitute its 5 judgment for that of the fact finder so l ong as there is suffici ent evidence to support 6 the verdict.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). To the extent that 7 Defendant claims that, absent a chemicaltest, there was insufficient evidence to 8 establish that he had consumed alcohol[MIO 5-6], we are not persuaded. See State v. 9 Baldwin , 2001-NMCA-063, ¶ 16, 130 N.M. 705, 30 P. 3d 394 (pointing out that a fact10 finder can rely on “human experience” in deciding whether a defendant was under the 11 influence); Sanchez v. Wiley , 1997-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 2, 19, 124 N.M. 47, 946 P.2d 650 12 (holding that a witness could rely on his knowledge in testifying that the defendant 13 was “drunk”). 14
{7} For the reasons stated in this opini on and in our notice of proposed summary 15 disposition, we affirm. 16
{8} IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 18

_______________________________________ 19 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 206 WE CONCUR: 1

2 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge 3

4 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 5