IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0549

Filed December 10, 2014

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TAMMY JENE WRIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano, 

Judge.

Tammy Wright appeals following the district court’s sentencing on her plea 

of guilty to one count of second-degree robbery. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney 

General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Nan M. Horvat and Olu Salami, 

Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
2

POTTERFIELD, J.

Tammy Wright appeals following the district court’s sentencing on her plea 

of guilty to one count of second-degree robbery.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 17, 2013, Wright drove her adult son to a local pharmacy for the 

purpose of obtaining pain medication by placing the pharmacy employees in fear.

She dropped her son off in front of the pharmacy. He entered the store wearing 

a hooded sweatshirt and latex gloves and gave the clerk a note which read, 

“Oxycodone 15s 30s quickly & quietly no one gets hurt.” The clerk complied, and 

the son left the store. Wright was waiting to pick him up after the robbery was 

completed.

On September 23, 2013, Wright again drove her son to the same 

pharmacy for the same purpose. The son entered the pharmacy wearing a 

hooded sweatshirt, gloves, and a mask. He announced, “I told you I’d be back.” 

He handed the clerk another note which read, “Oxycodone 30 and 15. Rush.” 

The clerk again complied, and the son left the store. Again, Wright was waiting 

to pick him up.

On November 11, 2013, the State charged Wright by trial information with

two counts of aiding and abetting second-degree robbery,

1

one count for each 

 

1

“A person commits a robbery when, having the intent to commit a theft, the 

person . . . to assist or further the commission of the intended theft or the person’s 

escape from the scene thereof . . . [t]hreatens another with or purposely puts another in 

fear of immediate serious injury.” Iowa Code § 711.1 (2013). “All persons concerned in 

the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the 

offense or aid and abet its commission, shall be charged, tried and punished as 

principals.” Id. § 703.1. “Robbery in the second degree is a class ‘C’ felony.” Id.

§ 711.3.
3

incident in July and September. Pursuant to a plea negotiation, Wright agreed to 

plead guilty to the second count in exchange for the dismissal of the first.

On February 11, 2014, the district court conducted a colloquy and 

accepted Wright’s guilty plea. The court explicitly informed Wright of the 

elements of the offense and the mandatory sentence of incarceration. On March 

26, 2014, the district court sentenced Wright to the mandatory indeterminate tenyear sentence under Iowa Code sections 902.9(1)(d), 702.11, and 907.3.

2

 

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 902.12(5), the court imposed the mandatory 

minimum sentence of seven years, during which Wright is not eligible for parole 

or work release.3

Wright appeals. She claims she suffered ineffective assistance of counsel 

during the negotiations and entry of her guilty plea. She also claims her 

sentence is an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment.

II. Standard and Scope of Review

We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v. 

Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Iowa 2013). We review claims of cruel and unusual 

punishment, in violation of the United States Constitution and the Iowa 

Constitution, de novo. State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009).

 

2

“A class ‘C’ felon, not an habitual offender, shall be confined for no more than ten 

years . . . .” Iowa Code § 902.9(d). “A ‘forcible felony’ is any felonious . . . robbery . . . .” 

Id. § 702.11. A trial court’s discretion to defer judgment or defer or suspend a sentence 

“does not apply to a forcible felony.” Id. § 907.3.

3

“A person serving a sentence for conviction of [second-degree robbery] . . . shall be 

denied parole or work release unless the person has served at least seven-tenths of the 

maximum term of the person’s sentence . . . .” Iowa Code § 902.12. 
4

III. Discussion

A. Guilty Plea

“Although we normally preserve ineffective-assistance claims for 

postconviction-relief actions, we will address such claims on direct appeal when 

the record is sufficient to permit a ruling.” Finney, 834 N.W.2d at 49. We find 

this record is sufficient to address the issue on direct appeal.

Wright must show that (1) counsel breached an essential duty and 

(2) prejudice resulted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

We begin by presuming counsel rendered competent representation, and the 

challenging defendant bears the burden of overcoming that presumption. See 

Millam v. State, 745 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Iowa 2008).

Even if Wright overcomes our presumption that counsel did not breach an 

essential duty, she must then satisfy the prejudice requirement by demonstrating

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694; see State v. Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d 837, 845 (Iowa 2008). If either prong is 

not satisfied, we will reject the ineffective-assistance claim. Anfinson v. State, 

758 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2008).

Wright claims her counsel was required either to prevent her from 

pleading guilty or to move in arrest of judgment prior to sentencing. She believes 

these steps were required of her counsel for two reasons: first, there was not a 
5

factual basis to support her plea of guilty; second, the plea was not voluntarily 

made.4

“The law requires that the factual basis for [a guilty] plea be disclosed in 

the record.” State v. Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Iowa 2011). Each 

element of the offense must be supported. State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 768 

(Iowa 2010). However, “[o]ur cases do not require . . . evidence that the crime 

was committed beyond a reasonable doubt, but only that there be a factual basis 

to support the charge.” Finney, 834 N.W.2d at 62.

Wright argues one essential element of the crime is not supported by the 

record: her son’s appearance and threatening note placed the employees of the 

pharmacy in fear of immediate serious injury.5 We disagree. The record shows 

during the first robbery, Wright’s son gave the victims a note which read, 

“Oxycodone 15s 30s quickly & quietly no one gets hurt.” When they returned 

and perpetrated the second robbery, the son—wearing a hooded sweatshirt, 

gloves, and a mask—told the victims, “I told you I’d be back.” The implication 

clearly intended by Wright’s son in addressing the victims during both incidences 

is that he would seriously injure the victims if they failed to comply.6

 

4

“The court . . . shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is 

made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(b).

5 The relevant statute reads: “A person commits a robbery when, having the intent to 

commit a theft, the person . . . to assist or further the commission of the intended 

theft . . . [t]hreatens another with or purposely puts another in fear of immediate serious 

injury.” Iowa Code § 711.1(b).

6 An inference may stand as a sufficient factual basis. See State v. Heard, 636 N.W.2d 

227, 232 (Iowa 2001) (holding a fact finder may infer the necessary elements of robbery 

by placing another in fear of injury from both verbal and nonverbal actions). We are not 

persuaded by Wright’s argument that Heard’s use of inference does not apply here. As 

in Heard, a robber in disguise entered a place of business and demanded an employee 

hand over money or drugs. The Heard court contemplates the evidentiary value of 

inferences derived from a robber’s demand of compliance from the victim. Id. at 231–32. 
6

There is a sufficient factual basis for Wright’s guilty plea. Her counsel 

therefore was under no duty to prevent her from pleading guilty or to move in 

arrest of judgment.

Wright argues her plea was involuntary because the trial information was 

deficient. The trial information cited to Iowa Code section 711.1, alleged the 

victims were placed in fear, but failed to include the phrase “immediate serious 

injury” from the statute. Based on her perceived deficiency in the State’s charge, 

Wright asserts she did not realize “her conduct did not actually fall within the 

crime charge[d]” and she did not have “an understanding of the law in relation to 

the facts.”

However, the trial information was sufficient to charge Wright with the 

crime. “Iowa courts consider both the . . . information and the minutes filed when 

determining the adequacy of the allegations to apprise the accused of the crime 

charged.”7 State v. Grice, 515 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Iowa 1994). The minutes of 

testimony contain statements by Eric and Libby VanHeukelom, the owners of the 

pharmacy, and Kelly Gunderson, one of their employees. The VanHeukeloms 

were present for both robberies and would testify “that they were in fear of their 

physical safety and felt they had no choice but to turn over the narcotics.” 

 

Heard does not limit the inferential value of the act of demanding compliance to assault. 

See id.

7 We recognize our supreme court has held, “Reference to the minutes of testimony is 

irrelevant for the purposes of the voluntariness inquiry if the record does not show that 

the minutes were reviewed and accepted as true on the record by the defendant.” 

Finney, 834 N.W.2d at 55. However, in our analysis, we do not use the minutes to 

establish the voluntary nature of Wright’s plea. We refer to the minutes to establish the 

crime was properly charged, the charge matched Wright’s conduct, and the State 

provided adequate notice to Wright of both the law and the facts.
7

Gunderson, who was present during the July robbery, would testify “that she was 

in fear of immediate serious injury to herself or her colleagues.”

Taken together, the two charges included in the trial information and the 

minutes of testimony properly “apprise the accused of the crime charged.” Id. 

Wright’s conduct did fall within the crime charged, so she may not rely on an 

alleged deficiency in the charging documents to claim she was unaware the 

crime included the element that the victims were placed in fear of serious injury.

Her claim that she did not voluntarily plead guilty is further belied by the 

record: there is a factual basis for the victims’ fear of “immediate serious injury,” 

and such injury was expressly discussed prior to the district court’s acceptance of 

the plea. Wright’s counsel included the statutory language at the outset of his

statements to the court,8and Wright herself admitted that her son’s actions would 

have put the victims “in fear of serious injury.”9 Based on the sufficient factual 

basis for the charge in this case, the district court properly found Wright 

“possesse[d] an understanding of the law in relation to facts.” See Finney, 834 

N.W.2d at 61. Based on the record of the plea colloquy, Wright’s subjective state 

of mind renders her guilty plea knowing and voluntary. See id. at 55.

 

8 Wright’s counsel stated to the court:

[Wright] would acknowledge that on or about September 23, 2013, while 

in Polk County, Iowa, she did aid and abet her son, her co-defendant, in 

the commission of second degree robbery, that she did drive her son to a 

Medicap pharmacy . . . knowing that her son would go into the pharmacy 

while having the specific intent to commit a theft and that during the 

commission of this theft, he did don guise and place the employees at the 

Medicap pharmacy in fear of immediate serious injury.

9 The plea colloquy included the following exchange between the court and Wright:

Q: Would you agree that by going in, trying to disguise himself 

and demanding prescription medication, not paying for it from the 

Medicap employees would have placed them in fear of serious injury? 

A: Yes.
8

Because Wright’s guilty plea is supported by a factual basis and because

she pleaded voluntarily, her counsel was under no duty to prevent her from doing 

so or to move in arrest of judgment. “[C]ounsel has no duty to raise an issue that 

has no merit.” State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 620 (Iowa 2009). Wright has 

not met her burden to show a breach of an essential duty by her counsel and is 

therefore not entitled to the corresponding relief.

B. Sentence

Both the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution prohibit the 

infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Iowa 

Const. art. 1, § 17. Wright contends her ten-year sentence coupled with a 

seventy-percent mandatory minimum is cruel and unusual as applied to her 

unique circumstances.10

For a sentence of years to be considered cruel and unusual, it must be 

grossly disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed.11 Bruegger, 773 

N.W.2d at 873 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980)). “[A] 

sentence for a term of years within the bounds authorized by statute is not likely 

to be ‘grossly disproportionate’ . . . .” Id. (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 

(2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227 

 

10 “Under an as-applied attack, a criminal statute imposing a certain sentence is not 

facially invalid in all circumstances, but only as applied under the facts and 

circumstances in a particular case.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 880.

11 If the reviewing court makes a preliminary determination that a sentence casts an 

impression of gross disproportionality, it will then go on to evaluate whether that 

impression is borne out by comparison to other sentences within the same state—an 

intrajurisdictional analysis—and to sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions—

an interjurisdictional analysis. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873. If the sentence does not 

pass the threshold of potentially grossly disproportionate, we need not undertake these 

additional analyses. See id.
9

(1983)). “[L]egislative determinations of punishment are entitled to great 

deference.” Id. at 872–73.

Wright claims her seven-year mandatory minimum sentence is grossly 

disproportionate to her crime. In support of her claim, she notes the statutory 

provisions applicable to her case are extremely broad, which has caused her 

offense to be statutorily equated to more egregious offenses. The robbery 

provision of Iowa Code section 711.1, she claims, could apply to a shoplifter 

hurriedly pushing past a clerk or a team of bank robbers causing major physical 

injuries to tellers. The mandatory minimum provision of section 902.12, she 

notes, applies to severe offenses like second-degree murder, attempted murder, 

and vehicular homicide. The forcible felony provisions of sections 702.11 and 

907.3, which make a term of imprisonment for Wright mandatory, put seconddegree robbery in the same category as child endangerment, murder, and sexual 

abuse.

However, the breadth of these provisions does not render their application 

to Wright’s case grossly disproportionate to her crime. To the contrary, the 

interplay of these provisions demonstrates our legislature’s policy determination 

that perpetrators of second-degree robbery—and their aiders and abettors—are 

subject to harsh penalties to deter those who would consider engaging in such

societally harmful behaviors. Further, our supreme court has acknowledged that 

mandatory minimums do not create grossly disproportionate sentences even for 

second-degree robbery. State v. Phillips, 610 N.W.2d 840, 843–44 (Iowa 2000).

Wright’s lack of criminal history and her motivation for assisting her son in 

the crime—i.e. drug addiction—are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to 
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overcome the deference we give our legislature in crafting proper sentencing 

provisions. Wright has not persuaded us that her sentence should satisfy the 

threshold determination of gross disproportionality to warrant further analysis. 

See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873. We therefore affirm her sentence.

IV. Conclusion

Our record is sufficient to determine whether Wright’s counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance. It shows Wright’s guilty plea was supported by a factual 

basis and was voluntarily made after Wright was given explicit notice of the 

elements of the crime. Her counsel did not breach an essential duty, and she is 

not entitled to relief under her ineffective-counsel claim.

Wright’s ten-year sentence coupled with a seventy percent mandatory 

minimum is not grossly disproportionate to the crime of aiding and abetting 

second-degree robbery. The sentence is therefore not cruel and unusual 

punishment. We affirm the sentence.

AFFIRMED.