[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2024-Ohio-4503.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO

 Appellee

v.

ZAEVION ARNOLD

 Appellant

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C.A. No. 2024-CA-1

Trial Court Case No. 23-CR-0477

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on September 13, 2024

. . . . . . . . . . . 

LUCAS W. WILDER, Attorney for Appellant

 

ROBERT C. LOGSDON, Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Zaevion Arnold appeals from his convictions following 

his plea of guilty to improper discharge of a firearm at or into a habitation, tampering with 

evidence, and receiving stolen property. He challenges the sentence imposed by the 

trial court. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
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I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On May 30, 2022, officers were dispatched to the residence of A.I., who 

stated that someone had fired shots toward her home. Security camera video showed 

that two individuals had exited a black SUV and walked toward her home. Shots can 

then be heard on the video, and the two men ran back to the SUV and left the scene. 

The video also showed the SUV driving past A.I.’s home earlier that same day. In the 

morning hours of May 31, 2022, the same SUV drove by the house again and more shots 

were fired. 

{¶ 3} Following an investigation, Arnold was identified as one of the shooters. He 

was charged as a juvenile but was subsequently bound over to the general division of the 

common pleas court to be tried as an adult. In July 2023, Arnold was indicted on one 

count each of improper discharge of a firearm at or into a habitation, discharge of a firearm 

on or near prohibited premises, improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, 

tampering with evidence, having weapons under disability, and receiving stolen property. 

The counts of improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation and discharge of a firearm 

on prohibited premises carried attendant firearm specifications. 

{¶ 4} The matter proceeded to a jury trial, but after the trial had commenced, 

Arnold entered into a plea agreement with the State. Arnold pled guilty to improper 

discharge of a firearm at or into a habitation, tampering with evidence, and receiving 

stolen property; in exchange, the State dismissed the remaining counts and the firearm 

specifications. 
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{¶ 5} At sentencing, the trial court imposed an indefinite sentence of 7 to 101⁄2

years for improper discharge of a firearm, a definite sentence of three years for tampering 

with evidence, and a definite sentence of one year for receiving stolen property. The trial 

court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 

11 to 141⁄2 years.

{¶ 6} Arnold appeals.

II. Sentence Proportionality

{¶ 7} Arnold’s sole assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT 

TO SIX MORE YEARS IN PRISON THAN HIS CO-DEFENDANT IN 

VIOLATION OF R.C. 2929.11(B). 

{¶ 8} Arnold claims his sentence should be vacated because it is “grossly 

disproportionate” to that imposed upon the codefendant involved in the shooting. 

{¶ 9} This exact issue was recently addressed in State v. Williamson, 2024-Ohio1599 (10th Dist.), wherein the court stated:

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) generally governs our review of felony 

sentences. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 

¶ 26-42. Under that statute, we are permitted to modify or vacate a sentence 

only if we clearly and convincingly find either: (1) the record does not 

support the sentencing court's findings under certain statutes, none of which 

are implicated here; or (2) the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Id. at 
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¶ 30-39; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

Relevant here, a sentence is contrary to law if the trial court failed to 

consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 

2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. See, 

e.g., State v. Dodson, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-297, 2021-Ohio-2415, ¶ 11, 

quoting State v. Haddad, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-459, 2017-Ohio-1290, ¶ 19. 

However, “[n]othing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to 

independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment 

for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects 

compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones at ¶ 42.

Central to [the defendant’s] assignment of error is his general 

dissatisfaction with receiving a longer prison sentence than his 

codefendant. Specifically, he takes issue with the trial court's application of 

R.C. 2929.11(B), which states:

A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated 

to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth 

in [R.C. 2929.11(A)], commensurate with and not demeaning to the 

seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, 

and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by 

similar offenders.

(Emphasis added.)

Initially, we note that although [the defendant] contends that his 
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sentence is “disproportionate” to his codefendant's, his argument is, in 

reality, one of consistency. “For purposes of R.C. 2929.11(B), ‘consistency’ 

relates to the sentences in the context of sentences given to other 

offenders; ‘proportionality’ relates solely to the punishment in the context of 

the offender's conduct (does the punishment fit the crime).” State v. Moore, 

8th Dist. No. 99788, 2014-Ohio-5135, ¶ 17. See also State v. Murphy, 10th 

Dist. No. 12AP-952, 2013-Ohio-5599, ¶ 13.

. . .

Consistency in sentencing is accomplished by the trial court's 

consideration and application of the controlling statutory sentencing factors 

and guidelines in the Ohio Revised Code. See, e.g., Murphy at ¶ 13, quoting 

State v. McMichael, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1042, 2012-Ohio-3166, ¶ 42, citing 

State v. Hayes, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-233, 2009-Ohio-1100, ¶ 9; State v. 

Holloman, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-875, 2008-Ohio-2650, ¶ 19. There is no 

requirement that codefendants receive equal sentences. State v. Hall, 179 

Ohio App.3d 727, 2008-Ohio-6228, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.), citing State v. 

Templeton, 5th Dist. No. 2006-CA-33, 2007-Ohio-1148, ¶ 103. Rather, 

“consistency has a goal of similar sentences for similar offenses.” Murphy

at ¶ 14, citing State v. Battle, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-863, 2007-Ohio-1845. “As 

a result, consistency includes a range of sentences, taking into 

consideration a trial court's discretion to weigh the relevant statutory 

factors.” Id. Thus, even where offenses are similar, “distinguishing factors 
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may justify dissimilar sentences.” Id., citing Battle at ¶ 24. “A consistent 

sentence is not derived from a case-by-case comparison; rather, the trial 

court's proper application of the statutory sentencing guidelines ensures 

consistency.” Hall at ¶ 10, citing State v. Swiderski, 11th Dist. No. 2004-L112, 2005-Ohio-6705, ¶ 58.

. . .

It is well-established that a trial court has “full discretion to impose a 

prison sentence within the applicable sentencing range.” State v. Foster, 

109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, ¶ 100. And “neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 

2929.12 requires a trial court to make any specific factual findings on the 

record.” Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729 at ¶ 20, citing State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio 

St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, ¶ 31, and State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 

215 (2000). . . . The trial court was not required to make any specific 

findings on the record as to its application of the “consistency” requirement 

in R.C. 2929.11(B) or any of the sentencing factors.

Williamson at ¶ 16-25.

{¶ 10} In Arnold’s case, in explaining its sentencing, the trial court noted that the 

codefendant had entered a guilty plea to one offense while Arnold had entered guilty 

pleas to three offenses. The trial court also found that Arnold had shown no remorse 

and indeed had denied responsibility for the offenses during his presentence investigation

(PSI) interview. Importantly, the trial court noted that Arnold had been previously 

adjudicated delinquent for an offense that would constitute a felony gun offense had he 
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been an adult. 

{¶ 11} The trial court expressly stated that it had considered and applied the R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12 sentencing factors in determining what sentence was appropriate 

to the circumstances surrounding Arnold’s case. Based on our review of the sentencing 

hearing transcript and the trial court's judgment entry, we find no basis for concluding the 

trial court failed to properly consider the relevant sentencing factors. Further, the 

sentences imposed were within the allowable statutory range for each offense. Thus,

we find no merit in Arnold’s argument. 

{¶ 12} Because Arnold’s assignment of error arguably challenges the imposition 

of consecutive sentences by the trial court, we will also examine whether the trial court 

erred in that aspect of sentencing.

{¶ 13} When multiple prison terms are imposed, Ohio law presumes those 

sentences will run concurrently rather than consecutively. R.C. 2929.41(A). However, 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) permits the imposition of consecutive sentences if the trial court 

makes the findings prescribed by the statute. Specifically, the trial court must find that: 

(1) “the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to 

punish the offender”; (2) “consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the 

seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public”; 

and (3) one or more of the following three findings is made:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the 

offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed 

pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or 
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was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or 

more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the 

multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single 

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses 

of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).

{¶ 14} “[W]here a trial court properly makes the findings mandated by R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4), an appellate court may not reverse the trial court's imposition of 

consecutive sentences unless it first clearly and convincingly finds that the record does 

not support the trial court's findings.” State v. Withrow, 2016-Ohio-2884, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.). 

Under R.C. 2953.08(F), the “record” includes, among other things, any presentence or 

other report submitted to the trial court, the trial record in the case, and any oral or written 

statements made by or submitted to the trial court at the sentencing hearing. The clearand-convincing standard requires “a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 

established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, (1954), paragraph three of the 

syllabus.

{¶ 15} There is no dispute the trial court made the requisite findings for the 

imposition of consecutive sentences. Thus, the question before us is simply whether we 
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can clearly and convincingly find that the record does not support the trial court’s findings.

{¶ 16} According to the PSI, Arnold was adjudicated delinquent on May 5, 2022, 

for offenses which would have constituted felony crimes of carrying a concealed weapon 

and receiving stolen property had he been an adult. The charge of receiving stolen 

property was reduced to a misdemeanor. In the June 2022 judgment entry in that case, 

Arnold was placed on intensive probation. As part of that probation, he was ordered to 

have no contact with the man who took part in the offenses at issue in this case. Thus, 

at the time he committed the instant offenses, Arnold had a history of committing a felony 

gun offense and of violating the terms of his probation. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c).

{¶ 17} Based upon our review, we cannot clearly and convincingly conclude that 

the record does not support the trial court’s consecutive sentencing findings. 

{¶ 18} Because we find no error in sentencing, the sole assignment of error 

asserted by Arnold is overruled. 

III. Conclusion

{¶ 19} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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WELBAUM, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.