alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Raleigh W. RICE et ux., Appellants, v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF LAKE COUNTY, Appellee.

No. 67-231.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

Feb. 16, 1968.

Walter Warren, of Warren, Warren & Austin, Leesburg, for appellants.

Charles B. P. Sellar, Leesburg, for appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants are appealing a judgment foreclosing a mortgage on a building which they owned. Appellants borrowed $12,000 from appellee and delivered to appellee their promissory note for that amount. As security, they gave appellee a mortgage on the building which was to be constructed partly with the loan proceeds. Appellee *23deducted from the loan proceeds, as a fee for “inspection and supervision,” an amount equal to one per cent thereof. An agent of appellee, in fact, made inspections of the construction site. Soon after the completion of the building, because of certain defects in the construction, its wall began to crack extensively, causing considerable damage.

Appellants defaulted on the payments on their note and appellee sued for foreclosure of the mortgage on the building. Appellants counterclaimed for damages on the theory that appellee had inspected the construction site in a negligent manner so as to breach its contractual duty to appellants to inspect the site for their benefit. They conceded they were in default under the terms of the note and mortgage, and the cause was tried on the sole issue of whether appellee was liable to appellants under the counterclaim. The court below ruled that no contractual duty existed as alleged and ordered foreclosure. The sole question before this court is whether appellee, by undertaking the inspection of the construction site and requiring appellants to pay a fee therefor, impliedly contracted with appellants to make such inspection for their benefit.

The effect to be given to an alleged implied contract is that effect which the parties as fair and reasonable men presumably would have agreed upon if, having in mind the possibility of the situation which has arisen, they had expressly contracted in reference thereto. Bromer v. Florida Power and Light Co., Fla.1950, 45 So.2d 658, 660, 13 A.L.R.2d 1227. It would be unreasonable to infer merely from ap-pellee’s deduction of an inspection fee a contractual duty to appellants to perform such inspection on their behalf. As the court below aptly stated:

> “A lender of construction money has an interest in the progress and quality of the construction of its security proportional to the amount of money invested and would reasonably be expected to inspect the construction and be entitled to additional compensation for its additional costs in making such inspection.”

Affirmed.

LILES, C. J., and PIERCE and HOB-SON, JJ., concur.
263 La. 106

#### Joseph Enos THERIOT v. TRANSIT CASUALTY COMPANY and Jim S. Hebert.

No. 52872.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 19, 1972.

In re: Transit Casualty Company and Jim S. Hebert applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Cameron, 265 So. 2d 845.

Writ denied. The result is correct.

BARHAM and TATE, Justices,

concurring in the writ denial: While the result is correct, we are of the opinion that liability for the damage here should be founded upon the theory of strict liability under Civil Code Articles 2315 and 2317. In Cartwright v. Firemen’s Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 254 La. 330, 223 So.2d 822, this court said that although Article 2317 made one responsible for damage occasioned by “the things which we have in our control”, that article was modified by Articles 2315 and 2316. That case then stated that “fault” under those articles was a prerequisite to recovery in cases such as this, but the court construed “fault” at that time to mean only “negligence”. In Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133, this court expanded the “fault” concept and categorically held that “fault” as defined in Articles 2315 and 2316 included acts and omissions other than those defined as negligent. The Cartwright rationale is therefore inapplicable now, and the application of res ipsa loquitur by the appellate court to> establish negligence in the case at hand was unnecessary. The owner of the vehicle from which the tire was thrown is responsible for the damage occasioned to the innocent third party under the theory of strict liability. See concurrence in Cartwright v. Firemen’s Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 213 So.2d 154 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1968).
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements of Golden Triangle Industries, Inc. for the period
ended SEPTEMBER 30, 1997, and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000042284
<NAME> GOLDEN TRIANGLE INDUSTRIES, INC.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                          252057
<SECURITIES>                                     75138
<RECEIVABLES>                                   780976
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     197251
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1305422
<PP&E>                                         6541621
<DEPRECIATION>                               (1552078)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 7133476
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           365537
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                       5719
<COMMON>                                           578
<OTHER-SE>                                     6596328
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   7133476
<SALES>                                        1943759
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               1972032
<CGS>                                           413111
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   413111
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                944830
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 518
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 674620
<INCOME-TAX>                                    272663
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             401957
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    401957
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .74
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .74

        

</TABLE>
#### Soloman HAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. Q-115.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 16, 1972.

Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and William C. Owen, Special Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

*191Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Prospect, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The briefs and the record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and the appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. See McCutchen v. State, 96 So.2d 152 (Fla.1957).

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and RAWLS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
No. 00-1026.

#### Vinson *v.*Collums et al.

C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.
#### Johnnie Lee MILLER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 70-504.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 8, 1970.

Habeas corpus denied.
#### Janette Holmes NOTO v. Tony L. NOTO.

No. 9659.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Sept. 11, 1973.

John D. Kopfler & Associates, Hammond, for appellant.

Roy L. Wood, Amite, for appellee.

JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

The Joint Motion of Janette Holmes Noto, Plaintiff-Appellee, through her attorney, Roy L. Wood, Post Office Box 307, Amite, Louisiana, and Tony L. Noto, Defendant-Appellant, through his attorney, *378John D. Kopfler of the firm of John D. Kopfler and Associates, Post Office Box 1209, Hammond, Louisiana, respectfully shows that:

1.

The Defendant-Appellant has voluntarily agreed to dismiss the appeal now pending in the above matter and has requested his attorney to file a Motion to Dismiss said appeal, and under the rules of this Honorable Court, it is necessary that a joint motion by both parties be presented to this Honorable Court for the dismissal of said appeal.

2.

No answer to the appeal has been filed on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellee, but the Plaintiff-Appellee, through her attorney joins in this joint motion to dismiss.

Wherefore, the movers pray that this Honorable Court dismiss the appeal filed herein in this proceedings on behalf of the Defendant-Appellant, Tony L. Noto, and further, for all such additional relief as the law, equity and the nature of the case may permit.

> Respectfully submitted, John D. Kopler and associates

> By: (s) John D. Kopfler

> Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, Tony L. Noto

> (s) Roy L. Wood

> Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee, Janette Holmes Noto

ORDER

SARTAIN, Judge.

Considering the foregoimg Motion to Dismiss:

It is ordered by the Court that the appeal filed in this matter on behalf of the Defendant-Appellant, Tony L. Noto, is hereby dismissed.
H. Res. 532

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

September 26, 1994.

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule

XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the

Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of

the bill (H.R. 4448) to amend the Act establishing Lowell

National Historical Park, and for other purposes. The first

reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. General debate

shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour

equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking

minority member of the Committee on Natural Resources.

After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under

the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Natural Resources

now printed in the bill. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read. Points of

order against the committee amendment in the nature of a
2

HRES 532 EH

substitute for failure to comply with clause 5(a) of rule XXI

are waived. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for

amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to

the House with such amendments as may have been adopted.

Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on

any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to

the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a

substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage

without intervening motion except one motion to recommit

with or without instructions.

Attest:

Clerk.
# C_2022148EN.01001002.xml

| 4.4.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.4.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/10

---

Appeal brought on 10 November 2021 by Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 1 September 2021 in Case T-561/20, Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe v EUIPO

(Case C-679/21 P)

(2022/C 148/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Ltd (represented by: S. Malynicz, BL)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 22 February 2022, the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Ltd shall bear its own costs.

---
No. 00-988.

#### Haney *v.*United States.

C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied.
#### Roberto RAMOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-647.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 23, 1971.

Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, and Edwin T. Mulock, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and P. A. Pacyna, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lake-land, for appellee.

PIERCE, Chief Judge.

Appellant Roberto Ramos appeals to this Court from an order denying his post-conviction motion for relief filed under CrPR 1.850, 33 F.S.A.

On March 11, 1969, Ramos was informed against for the offense of possession of a narcotic drug, to-wit, marijuana. Upon plea of not guilty he was tried on July 28, 1969, and was found guilty by the jury and sentenced to a term of imprisonment accordingly. Thereafter, on May 22, 1970, he filed motion in the trial Court asking that said judgment and sentence be vacated, which motion was denied.

With the aid of the local Public Defender, Ramos has appealed from the order denying his post-conviction motion. The Public Defender has filed in this Court an Anders-type brief setting forth that he “has been unable to come up with any legal argument which could justifiably be made for the contentions raised by the Appellant”, although he had “searched the record in an attempt to find something which could arguably support” such contentions. The Public Defender thereupon suggests that “this is a frivflous appeal”, and asks “leave of the Court to withdraw as attorney of record for the Appellant herein”.

This Court withheld ruling on the said motion to withdraw and ordered a copy of the Public Defender’s brief served upon appellant Ramos, which was done. Ramos was allowed thirty days by this Court within which to file any additional brief calling this Court’s attention to any matters that he felt should be considered in connection with his appeal. On April 7, 1971, within the thirty day period allowed by this Court, Ramos filed his said additional brief wherein he affirmatively abandoned and waived all grounds of his original motion filed under CrPR 1.850 except the insufficiency of the evidence to convict.

We have read the transcript of evidence at the trial, which has been certified to us as a part of this appeal, and find that it is amply sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment. Also, it is academic that a criminal case cannot be factually retried upon a post-conviction motion under CrPR 1.850 and the legal sufficiency of the evidence to convict again weighed, first by the trial Court, and then by the appellate Court.

*729The post-conviction motion was therefore properly denied and the order of the trial Court appealed here is accordingly—

Affirmed.

HOBSON and MANN, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.2

Certification

I, Howard
E. Ehler, certify that:

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of GeoResources, Inc. (the
Company) for the period ended June 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Howard E. Ehler, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Howard E. EhlerHoward E. EhlerPrincipal Financial OfficerAugust 6, 2010
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         59,512 
<SECURITIES>                                   101,990
<RECEIVABLES>                                  75,640 
<ALLOWANCES>                                   3,926  
<INVENTORY>                                    19,713 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               270,019
<PP&E>                                         124,916
<DEPRECIATION>                                 82,259 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 334,557
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          70,129 
<BONDS>                                        0      
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0      
<PREFERRED>                                    0      
<COMMON>                                       215    
<OTHER-SE>                                     236,438
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   334,557
<SALES>                                        200,199
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               308,721
<CGS>                                          78,468 
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  145,785
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               145,794
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0      
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,968  
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                21,103 
<INCOME-TAX>                                   6,753  
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            14,350 
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0      
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0      
<CHANGES>                                      0      
<NET-INCOME>                                   14,350 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .68    
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .65    
         


</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1


                            ACT MANUFACTURING, INC.

                   COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE
                      (IN THOUSANDS EXCEPT PER SHARE DATA)
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>


                                                      YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
                                                    -------------------------
                                                                 PRO FORMA
                                                       1996     1995    1994
                                                      -------  ------  ------
<S>                                                   <C>      <C>     <C>
Net income......................................      $10,157  $4,466  $4,353
Weighted average number of common                     =======  ======  ======
 and common equivalent shares
 outstanding:
      Common Stock..............................        8,762   7,894   5,600
      Stock Options.............................          336       0       0
      Common Shares used to fund
        S Corporation distribution..............            0       0     650
                                                      -------  ------  ------
          Subtotal..............................        9,098   7,894   6,250
      Effects of SAB 83.........................            0     277     498
                                                      -------  ------  ------
      Total.....................................        9,098   8,171   6,748
                                                      =======  ======  ======
Net income per common share.....................      $  1.12  $  .55  $  .65
                                                      =======  ======  ======
</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 200218 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Goldfield Corporation (the"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2004 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the"Report"), I, John H. Sottile, Chairman of the Board of Directors,President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002, that:

(1)   The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and result of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906 has been provided to The Goldfield Corporation and will beretained by The Goldfield Corporation and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.

```

Date: November 11, 2004
```

```
 
```

```
/s/ John H. SottileJohn H. Sottile Chairman of the Board of Directors,        President and Chief Executive Officer
```

```
 
```

```
 
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 20
- 0 5 8 9 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. RYAN PATRICK SULLIVAN,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**O RDER**  Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including December 15 , 2021 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

November 9 2021

11/09/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0589
# C_2022303EN.01000701.xml

| 8.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 303/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 303/7

---

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 16 June 2022 — SGL Carbon SE (C-65/21 P), Química del Nalón SA, formerly Industrial Química del Nalón SA (C-73/21 P), Deza a.s. (C-74/21 P), Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA (C-75/21 P) v European Commission, Kingdom of Spain, European Chemicals Agency (ECHA)

(Joined Cases C-65/21 P and C-73/21 P to C-75/21 P) (1)

(Appeals - Environment - Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 - Classification, labelling and packaging of certain substances and mixtures - Regulation (EU) No 944/2013 - Classification of pitch, coal tar, high-temp as an Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) toxic substance and as an Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) toxic substance - Annulment - Actions for damages)

(2022/C 303/08)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: SGL Carbon SE (C-65/21 P), Química del Nalón SA, formerly Industrial Química del Nalón SA (C-73/21 P), Deza a.s. (C-74/21 P), Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA (C-75/21 P) (represented by: M. Grunchard, P. Sellar and K. Van Maldegem, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: A. Dawes, R. Lindenthal and K. Talabér-Ritz, acting as Agents), Kingdom of Spain (represented by: L. Aguilera Ruiz and M.J. Ruiz Sánchez, acting as Agents), European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) (represented by: W. Broere, M. Heikkilä and S. Mahoney, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeals; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeals;

| 2. | Orders SGL Carbon SE, Química del Nalón SA, Deza a.s. and Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders SGL Carbon SE, Química del Nalón SA, Deza a.s. and Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

| 3. | Orders the Kingdom of Spain and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Kingdom of Spain and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

---