Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1710-CR-2425 | June 19, 2018 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Victoria L. Bailey

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Riggle,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 19, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1710-CR-2425

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G03-1605-F1-20345

Brown, Judge.
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[1] Michael Riggle appeals his convictions for multiple offenses including child 

molesting, sexual misconduct with a minor, child seduction, and activity related 

to an obscene performance. Riggle raises one issue which we revise and restate 

as whether he made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to 

counsel. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 27, 2016, the State charged Riggle with: Count I, child molesting as a 

class A felony; Count II, child molesting as a class A felony; Count III, sexual 

misconduct with a minor as a class B felony; Count IV, child molesting as a 

class C felony; Count V, child seduction as a level 5 felony; Count VI, child 

seduction as a level 5 felony; Count VII, child seduction as a level 5 felony; 

Count VIII, child molesting as a level 1 felony; and Count IX, activity related to 

obscene performance. 

[3] At the beginning of the trial, on August 28, 2017, Riggle fired his attorney and 

requested to move forward pro se. Specifically, the following exchange 

occurred:

[Riggle]: You’re fired. I – I’ll be going pro se. 

THE COURT: Well, sir, you’re represented by counsel this 

morning. We’ve - -

[Riggle]: Yeah, I just fired him. 

THE COURT: Okay. Don’t – don’t interrupt me. Okay?

[Riggle]: F--- it. Do what you’re going to do. Let’s go, man. 

We’re trying to get – this s--- on the road. 
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Transcript Volume 2 at 15.

[4] The trial court informed Riggle that he had not been given permission by the 

court to proceed pro se. Riggle expressed concern about how his attorney had 

not come to visit him, stated he was not aware of what his attorney had done to 

prepare, and indicated that he was “more comfortable doing it on [his] own.” 

Id. at 17. The court then questioned him and his attorney, Kevin McShane, 

about Riggle’s decision to proceed pro se. When questioned, Attorney McShane

stated Riggle had an absolute right to represent himself and that he had no 

reason to believe Riggle was not competent. The court took a recess to allow

Riggle and his attorney to discuss the situation. After the recess, Attorney

McShane stated he thought Riggle’s desire to proceed pro se was sincere and 

asked the court for permission to withdraw as counsel. 

[5] The court placed Riggle under oath and began questioning him about his 

decision to proceed pro se. The court questioned Riggle regarding his education, 

and he testified that he received a GED with honors, completed one year of 

college, and completed trade school for plumbing. 

[6] The court asked Riggle if he was currently under the influence of any alcohol or 

prescription medication, and he answered “no.” The following exchange took 

place:

THE COURT: . . . Have you ever been treated for any mental 

illness of any kind?

[Riggle]: Manic depression and bipolar disorder. 
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THE COURT: And how long ago was that?

[Riggle]: That I was treated?

THE COURT: Yes. 

[Riggle]: It’s been years. I don’t -- over a decade. 

THE COURT: [A]ny treatment for any mental health issues 

since you’ve been charged with this case?

[Riggle]: Yeah . . . I was prescribed Depakote, but I - - I quit 

taking Depakote months ago.

THE COURT: And was that for depression or - -

[Riggle]: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

[Riggle]: It was for bipolar depression.

THE COURT: Okay. And you’re not taking that anymore?

[Riggle]: No.

THE COURT: Does that affect your ability to understand 

anything going on around you?

[Riggle]: No, ma’am. 

Id. at 25-26.

[7] The court informed Riggle that it recommends everyone be represented by 

counsel and again stated the serious nature of the case. Riggle indicated that 

the charges were very serious and that he understood them. He agreed to 

follow the rules of court if he were to proceed pro se. With respect to Count IX, 

the court explained that the State did not specifically name an alleged victim 
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and that the State’s proof at trial had to be that the victim was an individual 

who was or who appeared to be under sixteen years of age. Riggle stated: 

“That part I didn’t understand very well.” Id. at 31. The following exchange 

occurred: 

THE COURT: That’s okay. And by your questions, that causes 

the Court some concern that you don’t understand the 

allegations or the discovery that’s been filed in this case. 

[Riggle]: I haven’t seen the discovery. 

THE COURT: Okay. How are you going to proceed to trial if 

you haven’t reviewed all your discovery?

[Riggle]: I’m going to wing it. 

THE COURT: You’re going to wing it.

[Riggle]: Yes, ma’am. 

Id.

[8] Upon the court’s questioning, Riggle confirmed that he had earned a GED with 

honors and completed his freshman year of college. Riggle indicated that he 

had no legal training and that he understood that his attorney was licensed to 

practice law in Indiana, had been doing so for many years, and had skill and 

expertise. He also indicated that he understood representing himself could be 

hurtful to his defense and that he might lose. Under further questioning by the 

court, Riggle indicated that he fully understood he would be on his own, he was 

expected to abide by the same standards as a licensed attorney, the State would 

be represented by licensed attorneys, his attorney knew how to review and 
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examine documents or testimony, prepare any pre-trial motions, make 

objections, review the court’s instructions, and make favorable opening and 

closing statements on his behalf, and that he would be unable to later claim 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

[9] The following exchange then occurred:

THE COURT: Now, with respect to the way a trial works, I 

know, because we were here together, you have been to trial on 

one other case where you were represented by counsel. So I 

know from the defendant’s chair you observed all that happened 

in that trial; correct?

[Riggle]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. But—

[Riggle]: I think I could do a better job on my own. 

Id. at 36. 

[10] Upon further questioning by the court, Riggle indicated that he understood he 

was expected to follow all the rules of court and the Rules of Evidence, a 

closing argument could not be based on items not in the record, it was his 

responsibility to preserve issues for appeal, the State would have the right to 

cross-examine him if he chose to testify, and he understood the charges against 

him and the possibility that there could be lesser included offenses. The court 

advised him that when defendants proceed pro se, it tries to provide standby 

counsel to sit in the back of the courtroom to discuss rules of evidence. The 

following exchange occurred:
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[Riggle]: Yeah, I – I understand I am – I am completely out of 

my league here, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Okay. And is there – this acknowledgement by 

you of that kind of screams to the Court that you should be 

represented by counsel. Is there – is it – is it that you want more 

time to talk to your counsel?

[Riggle]: I don’t – I don’t understand the question, ma’am. 

THE COURT: Well, your answers to the Court, I mean, is - - 

are making a clear record that you’re not qualified legally. We 

know that. As your lawyer said, the law does state that 

individuals, even though they’re not qualified in the law, they 

can represent themselves if they want to. But you’re 

acknowledging in all of my questions really that you’re not that 

well versed on any of these legal issues. Your attorney is very 

well versed

[Riggle]: I know. 

THE COURT: - - on these issues. 

[Riggle]: I don’t even watch Law & Order, Your Honor, so I – I –

THE COURT: You what?

[Riggle]: I said I don’t even watch Law & Order, so I am - -

* * * * *

[Riggle] - - I am completely out of my depth. But at the same 

time, I feel like nobody cares about my life as much as I do. So 

I’m going to give it my best shot, and - - and that’s going to be 

that. 

* * * * *

THE COURT: Is it - - and you’re ready to go to trial today?
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[Riggle]: I really would like a continuance, but I’m going to - - I 

mean, just time to get all of the discovery and everything. But 

you know, I’m - - I’m not - - I’m not going to press that issue if 

the State’s ready to go and the witnesses are here and - - and - -

you know, I - - I realize this case has been dragging on for over a 

year now.

And just - - I’m just ready to get it over with. I’m already - - like 

I said, Your Honor, I’m - - I’m already doing the rest of my life in 

prison.[1]

* * * * *

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So what are you saying, Mr. 

Riggle? That - -

[Riggle]: I’m ready to go to trial. 

THE COURT: Okay. You understand that you’re going to do 

so at your own detriment. 

[Riggle]: I understand I’m probably going to lose, Your Honor. 

* * * * *

[Riggle]: I’m - - I’m- - I’m oh and one at trial with an attorney. I 

don’t know what I would be by myself. That’s - - that’s where I 

sit. 

And I don’t feel as though if I get a continuance, it - - I don’t feel 

it would help me to be one and oh any more than going today 

would. There’s just nothing to learn from - - from time at this 

point . . . .

 

1 Riggle had previously received a total sentence of sixty years for three counts of child molesting as level 1 

felonies under a separate cause number. See Riggle v. State, No. 49A02-1704-CR-787, slip op. at 3 (Ind. Ct. 

App. December 29, 2017).
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THE COURT: No. But, I mean, with respect to your preparing 

of your defense, whatever that might be - -

[Riggle]: I’m- - I’m

THE COURT: - - or reviewing the discovery and so forth - -

[Riggle]: Right. 

* * * * *

[Riggle]: I’m just going to wing it today, Your Honor, if - - if you 

allow that. 

THE COURT: I really - - I mean, I was - - I was right there, as 

far as your right to represent yourself and you giving you pro se

status. But winging it today is a little concerning to the Court. 

[Riggle]: Your Honor, if I may, if you put it out for two weeks, a 

month, two months, however long, on that day I’ll just be 

winging it, more or less, you know. There’s - - there’s no way for 

me to adequately become an attorney overnight. 

THE COURT: I understand and - - but the Court has, over - -

over the years - - and we currently still have some defendants on 

our dockets that are representing themselves. And quite frankly, 

it’s the Court’s experience that they usually try and get as many 

continuances as they can because they’re, you know, really trying 

to get up to speed on those issues that they think are important to 

their case. 

I mean, your - - you’re saying you’re ready to wing it, and you’re 

always going to wing it. I mean, why wing it when you have an 

attorney?

[Riggle]: I’m going to give it my very best effort. And I’m not 

sure that anybody else would try as hard as I would. 

THE COURT: Well, I understand the sentiment that no one 

cares about your case as much as you do. I think probably every 
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defendant should feel like that in some sense, that you know, it’s 

most important to them. 

But my guess is that in most of our cases, the - - the person right 

next to the defendant who cares the most about the case is the 

defendant’s attorney. So - - and again, we’re going back to that 

person is an individual who’s trained in the law and ready to 

represent you. 

But at this point, I don’t - - I don’t think I can make more of a 

record than I’ve already done that the Court has cautioned you 

about doing this, that the Court recommends that you be 

represented by counsel. But you know, my job is also to - - to 

follow the law and the Constitution. And I take an oath to do 

that. 

And if you, knowing all of these dangers, still wish - - wish to 

represent yourself, I have to give you the right to do that. So I 

will show that at this time, the Court is granting the defendant’s 

right to proceed pro se in this matter. 

Now, I have a document that I used when I went through all the 

questions with you. I’d like to send it out to you so that you can 

review it and - - and then fill out your certification part as the 

defendant. 

[Riggle]: (Complying.)

THE COURT: Do you want a copy of that?

[Riggle]: No. 

THE COURT: All right. And are you - - so you want me to - - 

then at this point I will grant Mr. McShane’s motion to withdraw 

as well? That’s what you want is that right?

[Riggle]: Yes. 
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THE COURT: Okay. We’ll show that’s granted. And so now 

let’s turn to our trial. Are you ready to proceed to trial at this 

time?

[Riggle]: I am, Your Honor. 

Id. at 44-55.

[11] The document referenced by the court and signed by Riggle states:

COURT ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST 

TO PROCEED PRO SE

The Court hereby grants the defendant’s request to proceed pro se

and certifies that it has advised the defendant:

* * * * *

14. The defendant understands the charges against him, 

the possibility that there may be lesser included offenses, 

and the possibility that there may be defenses or mitigating 

circumstances that the defendant may not be aware of. 

The court further notes the defendant has assured this court:

1. The defendant has sufficient educational background 

and mental capacity to conduct his defense. 

2. That no one has made any promises or threats to get 

the defendant to waive his right to counsel and the 

waiver is made freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and 

understandingly. 

3. The defendant understands he will receive no special 

treatment from the court due to his lack of legal 

expertise. 
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4. The defendant believes it is in his best interest to defend 

himself despite the advisement of rights listed above. 

5. The defendant still elects to waive his right to counsel 

and proceed pro se. 

DEFENDANT’S CERTIFICATION

As the defendant in this cause, I certify that the court has advised 

me of the rights listed above, has answered any questions I have 

about those rights, and has given me the opportunity to consult 

with counsel about these rights. With full knowledge of these 

rights and advisements, I still wish to proceed by representing 

myself without benefit of counsel. 

Appellant’s Appendix Volume 2 at 150-151. Riggle refused standby counsel. 

During the trial, he cross-examined the State’s witnesses, recalled one of the 

State’s witnesses in his case-in-chief, gave a closing argument, and objected 

during the State’s closing argument. The jury found him guilty, and the court 

sentenced him to an aggregate term of seventy-five years. 

Discussion

[12] The issue is whether Riggle made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver 

of his right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states through 

the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a criminal defendant the right to 

counsel before he may be tried, convicted, and punished. Hopper v. State, 957 

N.E.2d 613, 617 (Ind. 2011) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.

Ct. 2525 (1975)). “This protection also encompasses an affirmative right for a 

defendant to represent himself in a criminal case.” Id. (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. 

at 807). “[W]hen a criminal defendant waives his right to counsel and elects to 
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proceed pro se, we must decide whether the trial court properly determined that 

the defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Jones v. State,

783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind. 2003). Waiver of assistance of counsel may be 

established based upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the 

case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Id. 

“There are no prescribed ‘talking points’ the court is required to include in its 

advisement to the defendant; it need only come to a considered determination 

that the defendant is making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.” 

Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Leonard v. State, 579 

N.E.2d 1294, 1296 (Ind. 1991)). The Indiana Supreme Court has held that it is

sufficient that the trial court make the defendant “aware of the dangers and 

disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he 

knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Leonard, 579 

N.E.2d at 1295 (internal citation omitted). 

[13] In reviewing the adequacy of a waiver, we consider four factors: “(1) the extent 

of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision, (2) other evidence in the 

record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and 

disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the background and experience of the 

defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se.” 

Kubsch v. State, 866 N.E.2d 726, 736 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 

1127-1128 (quoting United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2001))), 

reh’g denied, cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1067, 128 S. Ct. 2501 (2008). It is the trial 

court that is in the best position to assess whether a defendant has knowingly 
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and intelligently waived counsel. Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1128. Under the 

fourth factor, “the court considers whether the defendant’s decision appears 

tactical or strategic in nature or seems manipulative and intending delay, 

inferring knowledge of the system and understanding of the risk and 

complexities of trial from more deliberative conduct.” Id. at 1128 n.6. We will 

“most likely uphold the trial judge’s decision to honor or deny the defendant’s 

request to represent himself where the judge has made the proper inquiries and 

conveyed the proper information, and reaches a reasoned conclusion about the 

defendant’s understanding of his rights and voluntariness of his decision.” Id. 

(quoting Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 410). 

[14] Riggle concedes that “the trial court engaged in what was, overall, an extensive 

inquiry into his decision to proceed pro se” and that the first and second Poynter

factors “weigh in favor of finding that [he] made a knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.” Appellant’s Brief at 14-15. However, 

he argues that “when the trial court, for all practical purposes, ignored [his]

assertion that he suffers from a serious, untreated mental illness, the trial court’s 

colloquy was for naught.” Id. at 18. He contends the court did not adequately 

address the context and circumstances in which he made his request. He asserts 

that the record is unclear on whether his decision to proceed pro se was tactical 

because the court did not sufficiently inquire into his mental illness and cites 

Drake v. State, 895 N.E.2d 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

[15] The State asserts that the trial court was correct in allowing Riggle to proceed 

pro se. It maintains that the court questioned Riggle extensively regarding his 
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decision to proceed without counsel and gave him every opportunity to change 

his mind and that he repeatedly asserted his desire to represent himself pro se. 

It maintains that Riggle understood he was waiving his right to counsel and that 

he understood the consequences of that waiver. It also asserts that the record 

sufficiently establishes that Riggle was not suffering from a mental health 

condition that affected his ability to understand his charges, his duties as a pro se

defendant, or the adverse consequences of self-representation that the court 

warned him against. 

[16] To the extent Riggle cites Drake, we find that case distinguishable. In Drake, we 

held that the first and second Poynter factors weighed in favor of finding that 

Drake did not make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to 

counsel because Drake was not adequately advised about or aware of the 

dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. 895 N.E.2d at 394. 

Further, there was no specific inquiry into Drake’s background, education, or 

abilities. Id. at 395. Drake’s standby counsel filed a motion for a competency 

evaluation, which placed Drake’s competency into question. Id. Drake’s father 

stated that he believed that Drake had manic depression and was a 

“conspiracist in his thought process,” and several witnesses testified that Drake 

had told them that his life was in danger and that there was a potential 

conspiracy to murder him. Id. We held that “the sparse record regarding 

Drake’s background, education, and abilities, coupled with Drake’s uncertain 

mental state, leads us to weigh this factor in favor of not finding a voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. We concluded that 
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Drake did not make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to 

counsel. Id. at 396.

[17] Unlike in Drake, Riggle concedes that “the trial court engaged in what was, 

overall, an extensive inquiry into his decision to proceed pro se” and that the 

first and second Poynter factors “weigh in favor of finding that [he] made a 

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 14-15. Indeed, the record reveals that the court engaged in an extensive 

colloquy with Riggle regarding the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation and that he insisted on proceeding pro se and rejected standby 

counsel. The record establishes that the court asked if Riggle had ever been 

treated for any mental illness, how long ago he received treatment, if he 

received any treatment for any mental health issues since he was charged in this

case, whether he was continuing to take his medication, and whether his not 

taking medication affected his ability to understand anything going on around 

him. Riggle testified that he had been treated for manic depression and bipolar 

disorder over a decade earlier, that he stopped taking a medication months 

earlier, and asserted that not taking medication did not affect his ability to 

understand anything going on around him. He engaged in responsive and 

coherent exchanges with the trial court. Further, the record reveals that his

decision to proceed pro se was tactical in nature as he testified that he believed 

he could do a better job on his own, he had concerns about how often his 

attorney had seen him, and that no one cared about his life as much as he did. 

We conclude that the trial court’s inquiry and Riggle’s responses were sufficient 
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to establish that Riggle made his decision to represent himself knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently.

Conclusion

[18] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Riggle’s convictions.

[19] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.