J-A32012-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

JOSEPH THOMAS GAINER, 

 Appellant No. 1673 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 4, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0017534-2009 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OTT, and STABILE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2016 

 Appellant, Joseph Thomas Gainer, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered following his conviction of criminal homicide, robbery and 

criminal conspiracy. We affirm. 

 The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history of this 

case as follows: 

[Appellant] was charged with Criminal Homicide,1

Robbery,2 Carrying a Firearm Without a License3 and Criminal 

Conspiracy4 in relations [sic] to events that occurred when he

was 17 years old. Prior to trial, the firearms charge was 

dismissed. Following a jury trial held before [the trial court] 

from April 11-14, 2011, [Appellant] was convicted of SecondDegree Murder and all remaining charges. On April 20, 2011, 

[Appellant] appeared before [the trial court] and was sentenced 

to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Timely Post-Sentence 

Motions were filed and were denied by operation of law on 

September 26, 2011. [Appellant] appealed, raising a Miller 

claim, among other issues. [The trial court] conceded that the 

sentence was illegal and the Superior Court remanded the case 
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for re-sentencing. [Appellant] was re-sentenced on September 

4, 2014 to a term of imprisonment of 35 years to life. Timely 

Post-Sentence Motions were filed and were denied on September 

[18], 2014. This appeal followed.[1] 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2501(a) 

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3701(a)(1)-4 counts 

3

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §6106(a)(1) 

4

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §903(a)(1) 

Briefly, the evidence presented that on the evening of 

October 16, 2009, Albert Bock was working as a bartender at the 

K & M Pub in Mt. Oliver. His girlfriend, Samantha Snelsire and 

his friends Paul Malloy and Michael Plish were hanging out at the 

bar while Bock worked. After closing the bar in the early 

morning hours of October 17, 2009, Bock and his friends left the 

bar and went to Bock’s house at 310 Beltzhoover Avenue in the 

Beltzhoover section of the City of Pittsburgh, where they sat on 

the porch and talked. Inside the house were Bock’s brother, 

Tony and Tony’s son, DJ. 

Bock and his friends were on the porch for a few minutes 

when [Appellant] and two other men came onto [the] porch and 

pointed guns at Bock and his friends. [Appellant] and the other 

two men went to each of the victims and forcibly took money, 

keys and cell phones out of their pockets. When [Appellant] 

determined that was not enough, he demanded that Bock bring 

him into the house so he could take more things. When Bock 

refused, saying that his young nephew was in the house, 

[Appellant] tried to enter the house on his own. He was stopped 

by Bock’s dog who ran at him. [Appellant] put the gun to Bock’s 

head and demanded that he tie up the dog and let him in the 

house. When Bock again refused, saying that his young nephew 

was inside the house, [Appellant] shot Bock in the head, killing 

him instantly. 

[Appellant] and his friends fled the scene. However, 

[Appellant] returned to Bock’s house at approximately 5:00 a.m. 

By that time, the police and crime scene technicians were 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Appellant and the trial court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 

1925. 
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processing the crime scene. [Appellant] spoke briefly to the 

homicide detectives and told them he was going to his 

grandfather’s house to get some stereo equipment. The 

Detectives took his contact information and also some pictures 

because they thought his behavior was odd. Later, they 

included [Appellant’s] picture in a photo array, where he was 

identified by Snelsire, Malloy and Plish. [Appellant] was arrested 

and confessed to the crime. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 1-3. 

 Appellant presents the following issues for our review: 

1. Whether the Trial Court erred making the determination 

not to suppress Appellant’s statement and found that Appellant 

knowingly waived his Miranda[2] rights and made a voluntary 

confession where the police knew at the time of arrest for 

criminal homicide that Appellant was 17 years old when he 

asked for his parent and a lawyer? 

2. Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Appellant 

“opened the door” regarding the inventory list from the search 

that was conducted of Appellant’s parents[’] home such as to 

allow the Commonwealth to present rebuttal witness testimony 

indicating the presence of a gun when Appellant’s mother on 

cross-examination by the prosecutor stated that she did not see 

a warrant and only “got a piece of paper that said what they 

were removing from my house”? 

3. Whether the Appellant, as an indigent defendant, was 

prejudiced by the denial of the Trial Court to allow him to use 

the same sophisticated audio system consisting of Bluetooth 

headsets for each juror to play the Commonwealth’s eyewitness 

taped statements when that equipment was used for the playing 

of his taped statement? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

____________________________________________ 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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 Appellant first argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by 

failing to suppress Appellant’s statement confessing to the murder. 

Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant maintains that “[t]he evidence presented 

at the suppression hearing viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a parent/counsel 

and knowingly and intelligently confessed to the crime.” Id. 

The standard of review an appellate court applies when considering an 

order denying a suppression motion is well established. An appellate court 

may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the 

evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 

1199, 1203 (Pa. 2007). Where the record supports the factual findings of 

the trial court, the appellate court is bound by those facts and may reverse 

only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. Id. However, it 

is also well settled that the appellate court is not bound by the suppression 

court’s conclusions of law. Id. 

With respect to factual findings, we are mindful that it is 

the sole province of the suppression court to weigh the credibility 

of the witnesses. Further, the suppression court judge is entitled 

to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented. However, 

where the factual determinations made by the suppression court 

are not supported by the evidence, we may reject those findings. 

Only factual findings which are supported by the record are 

binding upon this [C]ourt. 
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Commonwealth v. Caple, 121 A.3d 511, 517 (Pa. Super. 2015). In 

addition, we are aware that questions of the admission and exclusion of 

evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 

reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. 

Freidl, 834 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. Super. 2003).3 

Miranda warnings are required where a suspect is subjected to 

custodial interrogation. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 814 A.2d 264, 271 

(Pa. Super. 2002). Custodial interrogation is defined as “questioning 

initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 

way” and is confined to interactions in which the “police should know that 

their words or actions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 

response.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Ingram, 814 A.2d at 271. 

With regard to waiver of Miranda rights, this Court has explained: 

Miranda holds that “[t]he defendant may waive effectuation” of 

the rights conveyed in the warnings “provided the waiver is 

made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” The inquiry has 

two distinct dimensions. First the relinquishment of the right 

must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of 

____________________________________________ 

3

 On October 30, 2013, our Supreme Court held that the scope of review of 

a suppression court’s decision is limited to the evidence produced at the 

suppression hearing, and not the whole record. In the Interest of L.J., 79 

A.3d 1073, 1076 (Pa. 2013). That case does not apply here, however, 

because the ruling is prospective and was decided after this case had 

commenced. Id. at 1089 (stating that the ruling applies to “all litigation 

commenced Commonwealth-wide after the filing of this decision.”). 
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a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or 

deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full 

awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and 

the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the 

“totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” 

reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 

comprehension may a court properly conclude that Miranda

rights have been waived. 

In Re: T.B., 11 A.3d 500, 505-506 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

 Furthermore, this Court has stated the following in assessing whether 

a juvenile knowingly waived his Miranda rights: 

A determination of whether a juvenile knowingly waived his 

Miranda rights and made a voluntary confession is to be based 

on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including 

a consideration of the juvenile’s age, experience, 

comprehension, and the presence or absence of an interested 

adult. In examining the totality of circumstances, we also 

consider: (1) the duration and means of an interrogation; (2) 

the defendant’s physical and psychological state; (3) the 

conditions attendant to the detention; (4) the attitude of the 

interrogator; and (5) “any and all other factors that could drain a 

person’s ability to withstand suggestion and coercion.” “[W]e 

acknowledge that the per se requirement of the presence of an 

interested adult during a police interview of a juvenile is no 

longer required. Nevertheless, it remains one factor in 

determining the voluntariness of a juvenile’s waiver of his 

Miranda rights.” 

Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 746-747 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(internal citations omitted). 

A confession obtained during a custodial interrogation is 

admissible where the accused’s right to remain silent and right 

to counsel have been explained and the accused has knowingly 

and voluntarily waived those rights. The test for determining the 

voluntariness of a confession and whether an accused knowingly 

waived his or her rights looks to the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the giving of the confession. The Commonwealth 
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bears the burden of establishing whether a defendant knowingly 

and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 

Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 748 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

The trial court provided the following explanation for its ruling on this 

issue: 

At the time of his arrest, [Appellant] was 17 years and 10 

months old. He had an extensive history with the juvenile 

justice system, including arrests for burglary, guns and auto 

theft. He was arrested in the presence of his mother and the 

arresting Detective, Detective James McGee, waited at 

[Appellant’s] home with his mother until his stepfather arrived 

and he could explain the situation. Detective McGee told 

[Appellant’s] mother and stepfather what the charges were and 

asked them to come to the homicide office. [Appellant’s] 

interrogation was delayed for two and a half hours while waiting 

for his parents to arrive. When they did not arrive, Detective 

McGee spoke to [Appellant’s] stepfather on the telephone and 

was advised that they were not coming. At that point, the 

Miranda rights waiver form was read and explained to 

[Appellant]. He signed the waiver form indicating he understood 

his rights and agreed to speak with the detectives. He did not 

request an attorney or his parents at any time. 

At the suppression hearing, [Appellant] stated that several 

detectives wearing suits stormed his porch with guns drawn, 

and, without speaking, threw him to the ground and took him 

away while his mother screamed. He claimed that the detectives 

told him he “wouldn’t never come home” unless he said what 

they wanted, in which case he would get “juvenile life”. 

 At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, [the trial 

court] made findings of fact before ruling on the Motion. It 

stated: 

THE COURT: As to the issue of the statement given 

by [Appellant], the issue of credibility will be 

resolved in favor of the Commonwealth. 

[Appellant] wishes for me to believe that he stated

that he shot someone for juvenile life. I’m not sure 
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what that’s about. But I found the statement of the 

officer to be consistent and clear, and therefore I will 

deny the motion to suppress. Your objection, 

[counsel], is noted for the record. 

The totality of circumstances clearly supports [the trial 

court’s] finding that [Appellant] knowingly, voluntarily and 

intelligently waived his Miranda rights before confessing to the 

crime. [Appellant] was just months away from his 18

th birthday 

and had an extensive history in the juvenile justice system. His 

parents were advised of the charges and chose not to attend the 

interrogation. [Appellant] did not ask for his parents or a lawyer 

at any time. His testimony that he only confessed to the crime 

because the detectives told him he would get “juvenile life” is 

both confounding and incredible. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 3-5 (internal citations omitted). 

Likewise, our review of the record indicates the totality of the facts 

support the trial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s motion to suppress. 

Appellant was seventeen years and ten months old at the time of his arrest 

and interview by the police. N.T., 4/11/11, at 18. Appellant had previous 

exposure to the legal system. As reflected by the “rap sheet” presented by 

the Commonwealth at the suppression hearing, Appellant had a criminal 

history consisting of seven previous arrests, for a variety of offenses, most 

of which were felonies. Id. at 38. Appellant did not display any trouble 

understanding the questions on the Miranda forms. Id. at 20-21. 

Appellant provided responses which Officer McGee wrote on the form. Id. at 

20. Appellant placed his signature at the bottom of the form. Id. Appellant 

did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs or alcohol at the time. 

Id. at 21. 
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Regarding the lack of presence of Appellant’s parents at the police 

station, the record reflects that Appellant’s mother was notified by the police 

that Appellant was being arrested and would be interviewed. N.T., 4/11/11, 

at 15. Appellant’s mother asked if she could call Appellant’s stepfather, to 

advise him of the situation. Id. at 15-16. Officers permitted Appellant’s 

mother to contact Appellant’s stepfather, and Officer James McGee waited at 

Appellant’s house until Appellant’s stepfather arrived. Id. at 16. Officer 

McGee provided the information regarding where Appellant would be taken 

and advised Appellant’s parents to come to the station. Id. at 16. 

Appellant’s mother and stepfather indicated that they would be present at 

the police station during questioning. Id. at 29-31, 35. When Officer McGee 

arrived at the station and met with Appellant there, he indicated to Appellant 

that he believed that Appellant’s parents were “on their way” and advised 

Appellant that they would wait to proceed with questioning until Appellant’s 

parents arrived. Id. at 17. The police delayed questioning of Appellant due 

to their expectation that Appellant’s parents were on their way to the 

station. Id. at 31, 33. After two-and-one-half hours had elapsed, 

Appellant’s parents were contacted regarding their whereabouts and Officer 

McGee was then informed that Appellant’s mother and stepfather would not 

be coming to the station. Id. at 17, 23, 33-34. After Appellant was 

informed that his mother and stepfather would not be coming, he responded 

“okay.” Id. at 18. When asked if Appellant would speak to the police 
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without his mother or stepfather being there, Appellant indicated that he 

would. Id. at 19. During the course of the interview, Appellant never 

requested that an attorney, a parent, or other adult be present during 

questioning. Id. at 21-22. The interview of Appellant following issuance of 

the Miranda warnings lasted approximately three hours. Id. at 34. 

In summary, Appellant was seventeen, had previous exposure to the 

legal system, was only briefly questioned by police, and understood the 

questioning and his rights. Officers made significant effort to inform 

Appellant’s parents of the procedure involving Appellant and to enable 

Appellant’s parents to be present during questioning. Despite being 

informed of his right to such, Appellant did not request that an attorney or 

his parents be present during questioning. Consequently, we conclude that 

the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress his 

statement to police. 

 Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the 

Commonwealth to introduce impeachment testimony on a collateral matter. 

Appellant’s Brief at 23. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the trial court 

erred in allowing the Commonwealth to present testimony in rebuttal to 

Appellant’s mother’s testimony regarding items found in and removed from 

Appellant’s home pursuant to the search warrant. Id. at 23. Appellant’s 

mother testified that only letters and mail had been taken from Appellant’s 

room, and such was indicated on an inventory sheet. Id. at 24. The 
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Commonwealth presented testimony that a large caliber handgun was also 

taken out of the house pursuant to the search and as such, was indicated on 

the inventory sheet. Id. at 25. Additionally, Appellant argues that his 

mother did not have personal knowledge of the inventory because 

Appellant’s father, and not his mother, received the inventory receipt. Id. at 

26. Appellant maintains that he was severely prejudiced by admission of the 

rebuttal testimony regarding the handgun, and accordingly, should be 

granted a new trial. Id. at 27-28. 

 Our Supreme Court has provided the following guidance in addressing 

admission of rebuttal testimony: 

It is clear that a defendant may present any admissible 

evidence relevant to any mitigating circumstance, including any 

evidence regarding the character and record of the defendant ... 

[but] the defendant is not entitled to present, without challenge 

or rebuttal by the Commonwealth, false or misleading evidence 

or to create a false impression of his character or record. 

Furthermore, “the admission of rebuttal testimony is within the 

sound discretion of the trial court,” and the appropriate scope of 

rebuttal evidence is defined by the evidence that it is intended to 

rebut. Where the evidence proposed goes to the impeachment 

of the testimony of his opponent’s witnesses, it is admissible as 

a matter of right. Rebuttal is proper where facts discrediting the 

proponent’s witnesses have been offered. 

Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 401-402 (Pa. 2013) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). 

 Appellant’s mother, Starlet Lellock, testified at trial and during crossexamination admitted to receiving an inventory of the items removed from 

her home during the search. N.T., 4/14/11, at 389-390. On re-direct, she 
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provided the following testimony regarding the items removed from her 

home and listed on the inventory: 

 [Appellant’s counsel]: And the form that you referred to, 

the inventory sheet, what was on there? 

 [Ms. Lellock]: The first thing that it had, they had taken 

letters from my son’s room, like mail, and I believe that’s all that 

was on there, the first-yeah. 

Id. at 392-393. 

 After the defense rested, the Commonwealth sought to introduce the 

testimony of Detective Scott Evans in rebuttal to Ms. Lellock’s testimony. 

The following exchange took place between the Commonwealth, Appellant’s 

counsel and the trial court: 

[The trial court]: [Commonwealth], rebuttal? 

[Commonwealth]: Yes, Your Honor. May we approach?

(Thereupon, the following discussion was held at sidebar.) 

[Commonwealth]: Your Honor, I just didn’t know if this was 

going to be – you know, the issue about - when Mrs. Lellock 

testified about what was in the inventory, taken out of her 

house, she said that’s all. 

[Appellant’s Counsel]: She did not say that’s all. 

[Commonwealth]: She did. 

[The trial court]: She said letters, mail, that’s it. 

[Appellant’s counsel]: Then I asked her whether she read the 

whole thing. She said I didn’t pay any attention to that. 

[The trial court]: But it’s still opening the door. 
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[Commonwealth]: They took a large caliber handgun out of the 

house. And the detective who gave her a copy of the search 

warrant and gave the father a receipt is present to testify to all 

of that. Can he testify to that? 

[The trial court]: Yes. 

N.T., 11/14/11, at 413-414. 

On the stand, Detective Scott Evans provided the following testimony: 

[Commonwealth]: Now, did you author a report regarding the 

execution of the search and arrest warrants? 

[Detective Evans]: Yes. 

[Commonwealth]: Did you give a copy of the search warrant 

application to [Appellant’s] mother, Starlet Lellock? 

[Detective Evans]: Yes, I did. 

[Commonwealth]: Okay. And is that documented in your 

report? 

[Detective Evans]: Yes, it is. 

[Commonwealth]: Okay. Did you give a copy of the receipt or 

the inventory to [Appellant’s] father, George Lellock? 

[Detective Evans]: Yes. 

[Commonwealth]: And again, is that documented in your 

report? 

[Detective Evans]: Yes, it is. 

[Commonwealth]: The items that were authorized to search for, 

do they include any revolver type of firearm? 

[Detective Evans]: Yes. 

* * * 
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[Commonwealth]: And during your search of the residence, can 

you tell me what you found and what you listed on the inventory 

when you gave that to Starlet Lellock? 

[Detective Evans]: Can I review it? I haven’t - I know we got a 

gun out of the house. 

[Commonwealth]: Okay. Specifically, there was a firearm that 

you took out of the house? 

[Detective Evans]: Dessert [sic] Eagle. I believe it was a 

Dessert [sic] Eagle. I’m fairly certain. 

[Commonwealth]: Okay. Is that a handgun? 

[Detective Evans]: Yes, it is. 

[Commonwealth]: Okay. Also indicia and that kind of thing? 

[Detective Evans]: Yes. 

[Commonwealth]: Okay. Would it be fair to say that the 

handgun that you took out of the house ultimately turned out 

not to be the weapon that was used to kill Albert Bock? 

[Detective Evans]: That’s correct. 

N.T., 11/14/11, at 426-428. 

The trial court provided the following analysis on this issue: 

It is clear from the record . . . that Ms. Lellock opened the 

door to testimony about the gun removed from her home when 

she was asked on re-direct what was on the inventory sheet. By 

stating that the inventory sheet listed letters and mail and 

“that’s all that was on there”, Ms. Lellock clearly opened the door 

to testimony that a gun had been recovered from her residence, 

and so the Commonwealth was entitled to walk through it. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 9. 

We agree. Ms. Lellock testified as to the contents of the inventory list. 

As a result, she opened the door to questioning regarding the contents of 
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that inventory list. See Commonwealth v. Weiss, 81 A.3d 767, 800 (Pa. 

2013) (where appellant testified that he was not capable of hitting someone 

with a tire iron, appellant opened the door to rebuttal testimony of a witness 

who observed appellant hit an individual with a tire iron in a separate 

incident.). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the 

Commonwealth to offer testimony to rebut the false and misleading 

testimony presented by Ms. Lellock. Ballard, 80 A.3d at 401-402. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s second claim fails. 

In his final claim, Appellant contends that he was prejudiced by the 

means of presentation of evidence at trial. Appellant’s Brief at 30. 

Specifically, Appellant represents: 

The Commonwealth utilized a sophisticated audio system 

consisting of Bluetooth headsets for each juror to play the 

Appellant’s taped statement in court. This system allows each 

juror to have individual control over the volume of their 

respective ear pieces thus, creating an ideal individual 

experience for listening to audio evidence. In sharp contrast, 

Appellant’s counsel was forced to use a “boombox” to play the 

audio tape to the jury. The “boombox” had to be played very 

loudly so that all jurors could hear but in doing so the audio tape 

sounded garbled and lost its audibility. 

Id. at 30-31. Appellant argues that, as an indigent defendant, he was 

unfairly prejudiced by presentment of the evidence in this manner, and as a 

result, should be granted a new trial. Id. at 36. 

Our standard of review regarding evidentiary issues is well-settled: 

The admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of the trial court 

and only a showing of an abuse of that discretion, and resulting 

prejudice, constitutes reversible error. An abuse of discretion is 
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not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or 

misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will 

or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. 

Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 724-725 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

 The trial court provided the following explanation in support of its 

denial of Appellant’s request to replay the two witnesses’ recorded 

statements on the Commonwealth’s audio equipment: 

At trial, [Appellant] introduced the recorded statements of 

eyewitnesses Michael Plish and Samantha Snelsire during their 

cross-examinations. The statements were played through 

defense counsel’s computer and the jury was given transcripts of 

the recording so they could follow along. [The trial court] was 

able to hear the statements and confirmed with the jury that 

they were also able to hear the statements. Later in the trial, 

the Commonwealth introduced [Appellant’s] confession and 

played the audio recording for the jury. The Commonwealth 

used audio equipment with headsets for the jurors. Immediately 

thereafter, [Appellant] began to argue [and asserted that it was 

not a fair trial if the witness’s statement were not played on the 

same audio equipment]. 

 [The trial court] does not own audio equipment used by 

the Commonwealth and cannot force the Commonwealth to allow 

[Appellant] to use its audio equipment. The audio recordings 

presented by defense counsel were audible to both [the trial 

court] and the jury and the jury was also given a transcript of 

the recordings so they were able to follow along with the audio. 

[Appellant] was not prejudiced in any way by the 

Commonwealth’s refusal to share its audio equipment and 

[Appellant] was not discriminated against in any way due to his 

indigent status. This claim is meritless. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 9-10. 
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 The record reflects that the audio statements made by Mr. Plish and 

Ms. Snelsire were played by the defense during cross-examination of each 

witness. N.T., 4/13/11, at 155, 211. As noted by the trial court, these 

statements were played by defense counsel through her laptop. Id. Of 

particular relevance is the fact that nobody objected to the clearness or 

audibility of these statements when they were played.4 Id. 157-168, 211-

227. Additionally, a transcript of the recorded statement was provided 

simultaneously with the audio statement for the jurors’ benefit. Id. at 156-

157, 326. 

 Subsequently, during the testimony of Detective James McGee, the 

Commonwealth played the audiotaped statement Appellant had given to 

homicide detectives following his arrest. N.T., 4/13/11, at 328. Based on 

the record, it appears that this audio equipment involved individual headsets 

for the jurors.5 Id. at 325-328. At that point, defense counsel requested 

that she be permitted to use this particular equipment to replay Mr. Plish’s 

and Ms. Snelshire’s statements. Id. at 325-326. The trial judge denied this 

____________________________________________ 

4

 We note that when Appellant’s counsel initially began to play Ms. Snelsire’s 

statement, the court and jury indicated they were having difficulty hearing 

the statement. The volume was adjusted and there was no subsequent 

indication that the court or the jury was having difficulty hearing the audio 

statement. 

5

 The Commonwealth asserts that the equipment used to play Appellant’s 

statement belonged to the Allegheny County Office of the District Attorney. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 34. 
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request on the basis that the statements when originally played were audible 

and that she did not want that evidence presented a second time. Id. at 

325-326. The trial judge also noted that the jurors indicated that they could 

hear the statements. Id. at 326-327. 

 Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Appellant was prejudiced by the 

trial court’s denial of his request to utilize the Commonwealth’s audio 

equipment to replay the statements of witnesses Plish and Snelsire. As 

noted, there is no evidence that the jurors or court were unable to hear the 

statements, nor was there an objection made that the statements were 

inaudible. Transcripts of the statements were provided along with the 

statements, thus ensuring that the jurors understood the statements. 

Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 

allow Appellant to play the statements for the jury a second time. Replaying 

those statements may have resulted in undue emphasis being placed on that 

testimony and prejudice to the Commonwealth’s case. Commonwealth v. 

Taylor, 596 A.2d 222, 223 (Pa. Super. 1991) (holding that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the replaying of an audio 

statement based on its conclusion that replaying the statement would tend 

to emphasize the recorded statements over the other evidence admitted at 

trial and, therefore, would be improper.). Accordingly, Appellant’s final 

claim lacks merit. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 1/25/2016