234 April 12, 2023 No. 175

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CONNOR HARRISON SNODGRASS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Lane County Circuit Court

21CR01817; A175753

Jay A. McAlpin, Judge.

Submitted December 20, 2022.

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate 

Section, and Ingrid A. MacFarlane, Deputy Public Defender, 

Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, 

Solicitor General, and Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant 

Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and 

Hellman, Judge.

ORTEGA, P. J.

Affirmed.
Cite as 325 Or App 234 (2023) 235
236 State v. Snodgrass

ORTEGA, P. J.

Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for, 

among other charges, aggravated harassment (Count 1), 

arising from his conduct of spitting on a police officer’s pants. 

On appeal, he assigns error to the denial of his motion for a 

judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on that count. He argues that 

evidence that his spit landed on the officer’s pants is insufficient to establish the “physical contact” element for the 

purpose of a conviction under the applicable statute, ORS 

166.070. More specifically, defendant disputes whether the 

undefined term “physical contact” includes contact of saliva 

with an officer’s uniform or is limited to contact with the 

officer’s skin. The state argues in response that the legislature intended to criminalize spitting on a police officer, 

regardless of whether the saliva contacts the officer’s skin 

or uniform. We agree with the state that the legislature so 

intended, and accordingly conclude that the trial court did 

not err in denying defendant’s MJOA, and therefore affirm 

the judgment.

We review the denial of an MJOA for legal error, 

including where the “challenge to the legal sufficiency of the 

state’s evidence depends upon the meaning of the statute 

defining the offense.” State v. Street, 317 Or App 1, 4, 505 

P3d 425, rev den, 369 Or 705 (2022). “Then, based on the 

proper construction of the statute, we view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the state to determine whether 

a rational factfinder could have found the elements of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). With those standards in mind, 

we set forth the relevant facts, which are undisputed.

Officers Jones and Palki went to a grocery store in 

response to a report that defendant had taken a case of beer 

without paying and was drinking the beer outside the store. 

During the officers’ interaction with defendant, he spat at 

them three times, and one of those times defendant’s saliva 

landed on Jones’s pants. That conduct became the basis for 

the state to indict defendant for aggravated harassment. At 

trial, Jones testified that defendant spat at him and that 

some saliva landed on his left pant leg, but that no saliva 
Cite as 325 Or App 234 (2023) 237

contacted Jones’s skin, eyes, or mouth. Defendant did not 

dispute that his saliva hit Jones.

At the close of evidence, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not establish 

that any saliva came into physical contact with Jones within 

the meaning of ORS 166.070(1)(c). In defendant’s view, the 

term “physical contact” in the statute requires that saliva 

make contact with a person’s body, either through clothes 

or through direct contact, as opposed to contact only with 

clothing.

The trial court denied defendant’s motion. It concluded that the term “physical contact” in ORS 166.070(1)(c) 

addressed “the saliva and not the body of the subject” and 

that “[t]he legislature would have written it differently if 

they meant something other.” The court further concluded 

that “physical contact” included “a limited extended area of 

bodily integrity which would include clothing.”

In his appeal of the trial court’s ruling, defendant 

maintains his argument that evidence that saliva hit Jones’s 

pants but did not penetrate the clothing to reach Jones’s 

body is insufficient to establish that his saliva came into 

physical contact with Jones under ORS 166.070(1)(c). He 

asserts that the term “physical contact” as used in the statute means contact with a person’s body, directly or through 

clothing. The state contends that the legislature intended 

the statute to prohibit spitting on a public safety officer, 

regardless of whether the saliva contacts the officer’s skin 

or their uniform.

To address the parties’ arguments, we must engage 

in our usual mode of statutory construction, first considering the text and context of ORS 166.070(1)(c), and then 

examining any legislative history to discern what the legislature intended. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 

1042 (2009).

We thus begin by reviewing the text and context of 

ORS 166.070(1)(c), which provides:

“(1) A person commits the crime of aggravated harassment if the person, knowing that the other person is a:
238 State v. Snodgrass

“** * * *

“(c) Public safety officer, intentionally propels saliva at

the public safety officer, and the saliva comes into physical contact with the public safety officer, while the public 

safety officer is acting in the course of official duty or as a 

result of the public safety officer’s official duties.”

The legislature has not defined the term “physical contact” in ORS 166.070(1)(c) or any related provision. 

When the legislature has not defined a statutory term, but 

the term includes “words of common usage,” we examine its 

“plain, natural, and ordinary meaning” to determine what 

that term may mean, which can be accomplished by reference to a contemporary dictionary. State v. Castillo, 313 Or 

App 699, 705, 495 P3d 191 (2021) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). If a term has more than one meaning, the context of its use guides our determination of which of multiple 

meanings the legislature intended. State v. Fries, 344 Or 

541, 546, 185 P3d 453 (2008). A statute’s context “includes 

other provisions of the same or related statutes, the preexisting statutory framework within which the statute was 

enacted,” and prior decisions interpreting the relevant statutory wording. Ogle v. Nooth, 355 Or 570, 584, 330 P3d 572 

(2014).

Here, defendant relies on three main arguments. He 

first argues that the only applicable dictionary definitions 

for “physical” and “contact” suggest that physical contact, as 

used in ORS 166.070(1)(c), means an actual meeting between 

saliva and an officer’s skin, directly or through clothing. 

See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1706 (unabridged 

ed 2002) (defining the term “physical” as, among other definitions, “of or relating to the body”); id. at 490 (defining 

the term “contact” as, among other definitions, “union or 

junction of body surfaces: a touching or meeting”). Second, 

defendant contends that the absence of such a physical contact requirement in ORS 166.070(1)(a) and (b)—which punish the act of propelling “blood, urine, semen, feces or other 

dangerous substance” at staff members and at public safety 

officers—indicates that the legislature used the term physical contact in ORS 166.070(1)(c) to distinguish two different 

types of conduct. According to defendant, while sections (a) 

and (b) of the statute address simply propelling dangerous 
Cite as 325 Or App 234 (2023) 239

substances and risking contact with an officer’s clothing, 

section (c) addresses propelling saliva that actually reaches 

an officer’s body. Third, defendant relies on the definition of 

harassment under the 1971 criminal code, as discussed in 

two cases, to argue that saliva that connects with a person’s 

clothing but not with the person’s body does not make physical contact with the person.1 See State v. Keller, 40 Or App 

143, 145, 594 P2d 1250 (1979) (construing “offensive physical contact” for purposes of ORS 166.065(1)(a) (1971)); State 

v. Sallinger, 11 Or App 592, 597-98, 504 P2d 1383 (1972) 

(same).

We find defendant’s arguments unpersuasive. Neither

of defendant’s proposed dictionary definitions for the terms 

“physical” and “contact,” nor any of the other multiple dictionary definitions related to those terms, conclusively 

explains whether physical contact includes contact with 

clothing or only direct contact with the skin for the purpose 

of ORS 166.070(1)(c). Also, contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the absence of a physical contact requirement in ORS 

166.070(1)(a) and (b) is not an indication of what is required 

for “physical contact” in ORS 166.070(1)(c).

Moreover, the cases on which defendant relies do not 

help. Although both Sallinger and Keller consider “offensive 

physical contact” for the purpose of harassment to include 

contact that relates to contacting the body directly—such as 

striking, shoving, kicking, grabbing—neither case explains 

the meaning of physical contact as requiring direct contact with skin. As defendant himself recognized, in Keller

we clarified that our decision in Sallinger was not intended 

to be a “comprehensive enumeration of the acts prohibited” by the harassment statute. Keller, 40 Or App at 145. 

Indeed, contrary to defendant’s argument that physical contact requires contact with skin, Keller suggests that offensive physical contact is not limited to flesh-to-flesh contact. 

Ultimately, neither the text nor context of ORS 166.070(1)(c) 

clarifies whether the legislature intended to criminalize 

spitting on an officer’s clothing.

1 ORS 166.065(1)(a) (1971), amended by Or Laws 1987, ch 806, § 3, provided 

that “[a] person commits the crime of harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy 

or alarm another person, he *** [s]ubjects another to offensive physical contact.”
240 State v. Snodgrass

We turn to the legislative history. Gaines, 346 Or at 

172. Both parties rely on discussions during the Senate and 

House Committee hearings to support their opposing arguments. Defendant argues that, because legislators’ comments indicate that the legislature enacted ORS 166.070(1)(c) 

based on concerns regarding the health and safety of police 

officers, his proposed interpretation of physical contact, 

which requires actual body contact, is consistent with the 

statute’s legislative history. In opposing that argument, the 

state points to remarks by legislators suggesting that the 

legislature also intended to forbid spitting on an officer’s 

clothing.

As we explain below, we agree with the state that 

the legislative history of ORS 166.070(1)(c) indicates that 

“physical contact” is meant to require contact with the 

body but includes clothing. The legislature added the physical contact provision to ORS 166.070(1)(c) through Senate 

Bill (SB) 482 (2013) to criminalize spitting on a public 

safety officer. See Or Laws 2013, ch 477, § 1 (enacting ORS 

166.070(1)(c)). The prior version of ORS 166.070, which punished propelling certain “dangerous substances” at corrections officers, including “saliva,” did not include public safety 

officers and did not contain a physical contact requirement. 

ORS 166.070 (2009), amended by Or Laws 2013, ch 477, 

§ 1. As introduced, SB 482 also did not contain the term 

physical contact, but simply provided that “[a] person commits the crime of aggravated harassment [(a Class C felony)] if the person * * * propels saliva, blood, urine, semen 

or feces at [a] public safety officer.” SB 482 (2013) (as introduced). However, the legislature later amended the text of 

SB 482 to include the physical contact provision. The discussions regarding that amendment provide the basis for 

our conclusion that, contrary to defendant’s argument, spitting saliva on an officer’s pants can constitute aggravated 

harassment.

We begin by explaining the relevant parts of those 

discussions, which occurred during Judiciary Committee 

hearings in both houses. During the first relevant hearing 

in the Senate, a representative from the American Civil 

Liberties Union (ACLU), Becky Straus, stated:
Cite as 325 Or App 234 (2023) 241

“[I]n terms of the language of the bill, I’m a little worried about a broad sweep beyond the target harm here. * * * 

[W]hat I’m hearing which is certainly important behavior 

* * * particularly someone who’s carrying a disease, spitting more likely in the face of an officer, so as such, transmit that disease to the officer. I think that’s the harm that 

we should get at. I’m worried that the bill right now sweeps 

much more broadly than that. I think the current language 

right now is propel at. I’m worried that someone even spitting on the ground could be caught up in this. So, if there’s 

anything we can do to talk about narrowing that.”

Audio Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 482, 

Mar 5, 2013, at 21:28 (statements of ALCU representative 

Becky Straus), https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed 

Mar 15, 2023).

The Senate Committee on Judiciary Chair, Senator 

Prozanski, replied:

“I reviewed the statute again and as [Straus] stated 

on the record, it does state basically that an individual is 

guilty or would be guilty if they are propelling at the individual. So, I’m gonna look at that term at versus on; I think 

that’s something that we need to consider. * * * [I]t does 

require the act *** being intentional. *** [R]ight now, for 

an officer to be spat on, the charge would be harassment, 

which is a Class B misdemeanor. For aggravated harassment *** to be a Class C felony, it has to be one of these 

two categories, with those types of actions. If we modified 

the language that’s currently there and made it where 

that type of substance had to strike the individual, that 

would be the aggravated. And then if a prosecutor wanted 

to charge someone to say someone intentionally throws it 

at them or spits at them but misses them, then it would be 

an attempt. An attempt would drop it down one grade to a 

Class A misdemeanor.”

Id. at 23:18 (comments of Sen Floyd Prozanski) (emphases 

added).

At this point, Senator Kruse, comparing the proposed change to SB 482 with ORS 166.070(1)(b), which punishes the act of propelling “blood, urine, semen or feces at 

*** public safety officer[s]” but does not require that act 
242 State v. Snodgrass

to be intentional or that the substance strikes the officer, 

stated:

“I would submit that these other bodily fluids—even 

if they miss, that’s kind of different than spitting. ** * I 

do think there’s a differentiation. So, I’m not sure that we 

lower for these other things. [W]e just make sure that spitting is kind of separated.”

Id. at 25:28 (statements of Sen Jeff Kruse). In response to 

the comments above, the Senate Judiciary Committee, at 

a later hearing, discussed two proposed amendments to SB 

482: the -1 amendment, which included the physical contact requirement, and the -2 amendment, which did not.2

The committee ultimately chose the -1 amendment. Prior to 

making that decision, committee counsel Michael Schmidt 

introduced the -1 amendment as follows:

“There is a dash one amendment, which makes it clear 

that the legal conduct would *** be, if you propelled saliva 

it came into physical contact with the public safety officer. 

So not just kind of flinging it at but actually landing on.”

Audio Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 482, 

Apr 9, 2013, at 2:10 (comments of Senate Committee on 

Judiciary Counsel Michael Schmidt), https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed Mar 15, 2023) (emphases added). 

Addressing the substance of the amendment, a witness supporting SB 482 asked, “[I]n regards to the dash one amendment, * ** the [physical] contact, would that be skin contact or clothing contact?” Id. at 3:35 (question by witness, 

paramedic Greg Stoll). In response to Stoll’s question, Chair 

Prozanski responded, “Contact is contact, whether you got 

clothes on or you don’t have clothes on. You’d have clothes on, 

I would think.” Id. at 3:43 (comment of Sen Floyd Prozanski).

At the first House Committee on Judiciary hearing, counsel from the Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers 

2 The -1 amendment provided that a person would commit aggravated 

harassment if the person “intentionally propels saliva at the public safety officer, 

and the saliva comes into physical contact with the public safety officer.” SB 482 

(2013), -1 amendments (Mar 8, 2013). The -2 amendment, which was not adopted, 

provided that aggravated harassment would include conduct in which a person 

propels saliva at an officer, “know[ing] or believe[ing] that the person has a dangerous communicable disease.” SB 482 (2013), -2 amendments (Apr 1, 2013).
Cite as 325 Or App 234 (2023) 243

Association expressed the following concerns about to SB 

482:

“[I]n 2009, *** adding what is now subsection (b) [of 

ORS 166.070], so making it unlawful for someone to knowingly propel blood, urine, semen, or feces at a public safety 

officer out in the field, * * * not that there was consensus 

[but] the end result was * ** to exempt saliva from that, 

and it did come down to the question of, ‘Do we really want 

to felonize spitting at someone?’ * ** I do point out that the 

debate too in 2009 was really if you spit on an officer’s boot, 

is it a felony? And, as this is written—this amendment *** 

says that they must intentionally propel saliva at the officer and come into physical contact with the officer, but it 

doesn’t mandate that the contact be in an area that would 

subject the officer to infection. * ** I don’t know yet that this 

is still tight enough. I think it’s a serious question for the 

committee—Is spitting something that should be a felony?”

Audio Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, SB 482, 

May 6, 2013, at 56:40 (comments of Oregon Criminal Defense 

Lawyers Association representative Gail Meyer), https://olis.

oregonlegislature.gov (accessed Mar 15, 2023) (emphases 

added).

During the second House Committee on Judiciary 

hearing on SB 482, Representative Brent Barton—voting 

against the bill—stated:

“I think a Class C felony is a big deal. That is, in theory, *** punishable by more than a year in prison. * * * 

[T]his bill just talks generally spitting on, and I feel like 

it’s poorly defined. *** [P]otentially, spitting on an officer’s 

boots could land someone in jail for a year. *** [W]hen 

you have that framework, I’m concerned that it might lead 

to potentially arbitrary or unbalanced application of it. 

* * * [C]ertain political minorities and other kind of hightension social groups might end up bearing the burden of 

this prosecution more than others. *** [T]hat civil liberties 

implication concerns me.”

Audio Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, SB 482, 

Apr 29, 2013, at 7:47 (comments of Rep Brent Barton), https://

olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed Mar 15, 2023) (emphasis in original). During that same hearing, Representative 

Andy Olson, voting in favor of SB 482, stated:
244 State v. Snodgrass

“I appreciate what Representative Barton was saying, 

given the illustration of spitting on the boots as it would 

apply toward this one and what the reaction would be then 

on behalf of the officer. * ** I have been spat on a few times 

in my career; not once has it has ever been on the boots; it 

has always been toward the upper body toward the face, 

and I think that’s what this bill is designed for ** *.”

Id. at 10:28 (comments Rep Andy Olson).

We conclude, based on this history and on the legislature’s ultimate decision to pass SB 482 regardless of 

concerns about whether it made it a felony to engage in 

conduct such as spitting on an officer’s boots, that the legislature intended ORS 166.070(1)(c) to include spitting on 

an officer’s clothing. Although the concerns expressed by 

Representative Barton, in voting against it, that SB 482 

was “poorly defined,” and could lead to “arbitrary application” strike us as valid, we conclude that the legislature 

intended ORS 166.070(1)(c) to apply when saliva reaches an 

officer’s clothes. As the discussions of Senate Committee on 

the Judiciary demonstrate, the bill was intended to separate 

the punishable and nonpunishable conduct by excluding only 

conduct where the saliva “pass[ed] by” versus conduct where 

the saliva “land[ed] on” the officer. Thus, we conclude that 

“physical contact” in ORS 166.070(1)(c) includes the spitting 

of saliva on an officer’s clothing, regardless of whether the 

saliva touches the officer’s skin.

Having determined that ORS 166.070(1)(c) applies 

to conduct where a defendant’s saliva reaches an officer’s 

uniform, we must determine whether a rational factfinder 

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s conduct of spitting on Jones was sufficient to support 

a conviction under ORS 166.070(1)(c). Street, 317 Or App 1.

Viewing the “evidence in the light most favorable to the 

state” under Street, we conclude that a jury could have found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant propelled saliva 

at Jones and that the saliva came into physical contact with 

Jones. Considering that the other elements of the offense 

are undisputed on appeal, we conclude that the trial court 

did not err in denying defendant’s MJOA.

Affirmed.