alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IV

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 424

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Members of Congress should have the opportunity to offer an amendment striking an

employer mandate in any legislation to reform our health care system.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 11, 1994

Mr. TAUZIN (for himself and Mr. HASTERT) submitted the following

resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that

Members of Congress should have the opportunity to

offer an amendment striking an employer mandate in

any legislation to reform our health care system.

Whereas small businesses are the engine of job creation in

our economy—generating some 95 percent of all new

jobs;

Whereas jobs should not be pitted against health care reform;

Whereas an employer mandate is a tax on jobs that must be

paid regardless of a firm’s financial health;

Whereas extensive, complex, and costly reporting and recordkeeping would be required under an employer mandate;

Whereas independent studies show that employer mandates

would result in the loss of between 850,000 and 3.8 mil-
2

HRES 424 IH

lion American jobs, causing millions of Americans to be

laid off or left without work;

Whereas another 23 million American workers would see reductions in their wages, benefits, and/or hours worked, as

a result of employer mandates, according to independent

studies;

Whereas small businesses and their employers are among

those impacted most severely by the shortcomings of our

health insurance system;

Whereas the shortcomings in our health care system can be

fixed without the additional burden of an employer mandate;

Whereas access to affordable health care insurance for all

Americans can be achieved without an employer mandate;

Whereas a reasonable, affordable, comprehensive health care

reform bill could be enacted this year without an employer mandate; and

Whereas the insistance on requiring an employer mandate

impedes a reasonable, affordable, comprehensive health

care reform bill from being enacted this year: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that Members of Congress should have the op3 portunity to offer, debate, and vote on an amendment

4 striking any employer mandate in any legislation to reform

5 our health care system.

Æ
#### BUSHMAN *v.*ESTLEMAN.

1. Waters and Watercourses — Artificial Drainage Ditch — Navigable Waters.

In suit to enjoin trespass on plaintiffs’ private lake, finding of trial court that artificial drainage ditch through which defendants passed in order to reach said lake is not navigable in fact, *held,*supported by testimony.

2. Injunction — Private Lake — Artificial Drainage Ditch.

Where small, unmeandered lake is wholly within plaintiffs’ land, they are entitled to enjoin defendants from going upon it through unnavigable artificial drainage diteh connecting lake - ’ with pond on defendants’ land.

Appeal from Washtenaw; Sample (George W.), J.

Submitted October 14, 1931.

(Docket No. 103, Calendar No. 35,567.)

Decided December 8, 1931.

Bill by F. E. Bushman and others against Charles F. Estleman and others to enjoin trespassing on plaintiffs’ land. Cross-bill by defendants against plaintiffs to enjoin interference with enjoyment of certain alleged rights of navigation. . Decree for plaintiffs. Defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

*Dwyer & Dwyer,*for plaintiffs.

*Carl H. Stuhrberg,*for defendants.

Clark, J.

Located wholly within plaintiffs’ land is a small lake known as Independence lake. The lake was not meandered. Plaintiffs have title to all the land surrounding and underlying the lake. Defendant Charles F. Estleman owns and, with other *244defendants, occupies land west of plaintiffs’ land. At its closest point, defendants’ land is 389 feet from the lake. An artificial drainage ditch connects the lake with a pond on defendants’ land. Defendants asserted the right to go from their land, pulling or poling small boats through the drainage ditch, to and upon the lake, and continued to do it against plaintiffs’ protests and against their efforts to prevent it. This bill was filed for injunction. Plaintiffs had decree. Defendants have appealed.

Passing the question that there is no evidence that the lake is a navigable body of water *(Giddings*v. *Rogalewski,*192 Mich. 319), and the further question that this drainage ditch, constructed and used as such, whether public ditch or private drain, is not a public highway *(Moore*v. *Sanborne,*2 Mich. 519 [59 Am. Dec. 209]), we agree with the trial court that the ditch is not navigable in fact; the finding being well supported by the testimony. We need not discuss again the test of navigability, there being already great abundance of discussion in the cases cited and in *Collins*v. *Gerhardt,*237 Mich. 38; *Putnam*v. *Kinney,*248 Mich. 410, and cases there cited.

The case' is as if there were no ditch and defendants were trespassing upon plaintiffs’ land to reach the unmeandered lake wholly within plaintiffs’ title and description. *Giddings*v. *Rogalewski, supra.*That the court may and should enjoin these repeated and continued trespasses there is no doubt.

Affirmed, with costs to plaintiffs.

Butzel, C. J., and Wiest, McDonald, Potter, Sharpe, North, and Fead, JJ., concurred.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstancesset forth in 5TH CIR.R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 16, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-50570

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RICARDO MONTANO-LARA,

Defendant-Appellant.

––––––––––––––

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

No. 2:04-CR-698-ALL-WWJ

––––––––––––––

Before JOLLY, DAVIS and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ricardo Montano-Lara appeals from his guilty-plea conviction for illegal reentry into the

United States. He argues that the district court misunderstood its sentencing discretion under United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). He concedes that, because he failed to object on this basis

in district court, this issue is reviewed only for plain error. Examination of the sentencing transcript

does not indicate that the district court failed to recognize its proper role in the post-Booker

sentencing scheme. Accordingly, Montano-Lara has not shown plain error on this basis.
No. 05-50570

-2-

Montano-Lara’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States,

523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although Montano-Lara contends that Almendarez-Torres was

incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in

light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments

on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d

268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Montano-Lara properly concedes that his

argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to

preserve it for further review.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
#### Joaquin Alberto MENDEZ and Oscar Alvarez, Appellants, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 73-183, 73-325.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 17, 1973.

*526Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Steven Rappaport, Asst. Public Defender, for appellants.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Joel D. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.

HENDRY, Judge.

Appellants were charged by information with one count of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and one count of buying, receiving and concealing stolen property. They pleaded not guilty to both counts, waived jury and were tried and convicted of both charges in the Criminal Court of Record for Dade County, Florida. The court imposed one sentence on each defendant for both offenses: appellant Mendez was sentenced to three years in the State Penitentiary and appellant Alvarez was sentenced to one year in the County Jail.

On appeal appellants are contending, among other things, that the court erred in convicting them of the charges under both counts of the information. They contend that both felonies prescribed in §§ 811.16 and 814.03(2), Fla.Stat, F.S.A., are so related that conviction under both statutes amounts to two convictions for only one crime.

 Since the sentence imposed upon each appellant was less than each could have received for either felony, we are not concerned with the propriety of the sentences, as was the case in Yost v. State, Fla.App.1971, 243 So.2d 469, wherein we held that if an information charges two crimes, but each is a facet or phase of the same criminal transaction, only one sentence could be imposed; and that sentence should be for the highest offense charged. However, we do note that in the Yost case, and in others dealing wtih the same point of law, the courts have uniformly upheld the separate *convictions*for crimes arising *527out of the same criminal transaction, even while finding the sentences rendered thereon to be illegal. See also, Caivano v. State, Fla.App.1973, 276 So.2d 245; Gonzalez v. State, Fla.App.1972, 268 So.2d 552; Hunt v. State, Fla.App.1972, 264 So.2d 855; Carr v. State, Fla.App.1972, 264 So.2d 871.

 Moreover, although we recognize that the offenses prescribed in §§ 814.03(2) and 811.16, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., are related, it is generally held that where two separate statues are violated two separate and distinct crimes have occurred. See, Steele v. Mayo, Fla.1954, 72 So.2d 386; Kish v. State, Fla.App.1967, 198 So.2d 639; Turner v. State, Fla.App.1972, 267 So.2d 882; Cooper v. State, Fla.App.1972, 261 So.2d 859.

We are, therefore, of the view that the trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty on both counts of the information and imposing one sentence upon each of them.

We have considered all other points on appeal and have concluded that no reversible error has been made to appear. Therefore, the judgments and sentences appealed from are hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.
#### Ralph R. MAGNA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 76-1232.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 27, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 9, 1977.

Warner S. Olds, Public Defender, William W. Herring and Stuart M. Lerner, Asst. Public Defenders, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard P. Zaretsky, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

DAUKSCH, Judge.

The issue in this case is the admissibility of a declaration against penal interest when the unavailability of the declarant is not shown. Mr. Justice Hatchett, speaking for our Supreme Court, answered the question in *Baker*v. *State,*336 So.2d 364 (Fla.1976), by saying at page 370:

> “Because we have concluded that admissions against interest need not be excluded as hearsay, testimony of persons who have heard a confession should be considered on motion for new trial, *when the person confessing is unavailable to testify himself.”*(Emphasis added.)

In *Baker,*supra, it was alleged on a motion for new trial that J. E. Johnson had declared that Baker was innocent of the crime (according to Johnson’s wife) and that Johnson had committed the crime (according to Johnson’s mother-in-law). The appellant court reversed the Order for new trial because the newly discovered evidence, warranting the new trial,1 was inadmissible because it was hearsay. Our Supreme Court in reversing said admissions or declarations against penal interest are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. *Baker,*supra.

In this case, at trial, Appellant tried to introduce evidence through testimony of Mrs. Brants that James Newton on various occasions had made admissions and other inculpatory statements regarding the murder for which Appellant was on trial. A proffer of her testimony was properly made and excluded from introduction before the jury.

Before an admission against penal interest is admissible it must be shown that the person confessing is unavailable to tes*1089tify himself. The reason for such a requirement is obvious; if the person confessing is available to testify, he should be brought into court so the jury can hear his testimony directly. The burden of showing the unavailability of the declarant is on the party which offers the out-of-court statement. In the present case no attempt was made to establish the unavailability of the declarant; therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s rejection of the proffered testimony.

AFFIRMED.

ALDERMAN, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur.

1

. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.600.
# C_2023024EN.01001601.xml

| 23.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 24/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 24/16

---

Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 27 September 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Kleve — Germany) — AB and Others v Ryanair DAC

(Case C-307/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Air transport - Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 - Common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of cancellation or long delay of flights - Article 5(1)(c) - Right to compensation if flight is cancelled - Contract for carriage concluded through an online travel agent - Information on the cancellation of the flight communicated by means of an email address automatically generated by the travel agent - Failure to ensure that the passenger was properly informed)

(2023/C 24/21)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Kleve

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: AB and Others

Defendant: Ryanair DAC

Operative part of the order

Article 5(1)(c) and Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91

must be interpreted as meaning that the operating air carrier must pay the compensation provided for by those provisions in the event of a flight cancellation of which the passenger was not informed at least two weeks prior to the scheduled time of departure where that carrier sent the information in good time to the only email address communicated to it in the course of the booking, without, however, being aware that that address could be used only to contact the travel agent, through which the reservation had been made, and not the passenger directly and that that travel agent did not send the information to the passenger in good time.

---

(1)  OJ C 310, 2.8.2021.

---
# C_2021502EN.01001201.xml

| 13.12.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 502/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.12.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 502/12

---

Appeal brought on 17 March 2021 by Luis Gonzalo Segura del Oro Pulido against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 3 February 2021 in Case T-701/20, Segura del Oro Pulido v Commission

(Case C-225/21 P)

(2021/C 502/18)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Luis Gonzalo Segura del Oro Pulido (represented by: J. Jover Padró, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 29 September 2021, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being manifestly inadmissible and orders Luis Gonzalo Segura del Oro Pulido to bear his own costs.

---
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Larry D. CALLOWAY v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, State of Louisiana, et al.

No. 62609.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 1, 1978.

In re: Larry D. Calloway applying for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari. Parish of Orleans.

Writ denied.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIGUEL OROZCO INFANTE,

 Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 14-70716

Agency No. A200-157-530

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 24, 2016** 

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Miguel Orozco Infante, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order of removal. We dismiss the petition for review.

FILED

MAR 02 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We lack jurisdiction to consider Orozco Infante’s unexhausted contentions

that the IJ violated his constitutional, statutory, and regulatory rights to counsel by

denying his request for an additional continuance, or that he qualifies for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. See

Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (we lack jurisdiction to

review legal claims not presented in an alien’s administrative proceedings before

the BIA).

We also lack jurisdiction to consider any claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, because Orozco Infante did not raise it with the BIA in a motion to

reopen. See Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring

exhaustion of ineffective assistance of counsel claim through a motion to reopen

before the BIA).

Finally, we lack jurisdiction over claims regarding prosecutorial discretion, 

see Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder, 688 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 2012), and do not consider

evidence outside the administrative record, see Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th

Cir. 1996) (en banc) (the court’s review is limited to the administrative record).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.

2 14-70716
#### Pauline T. SAWYER, formerly Pauline T. Roberts, Petitioner, v. Mary Alice WORTH, Individually and as executrix of the Estate of Howard W. Worth, Respondent.

No. 44853.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 19, 1974.

Certiorari denied.

ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN and McCAIN, JJ., concur.

DEKLE, J., dissents.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

                  BOISE CASCADE OFFICE PRODUCTS CORPORATION
                          SIGNIFICANT SUBSIDIARIES

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                     State or Other
                                      Jurisdiction      Percentage of
                                    of Incorporation  Voting Securities
                                    or Organization         Owned
                                    ----------------  -----------------
        <S>                         <C>                    <C>

        BCOP Nevada Company         Nevada                 100.0

        Grand & Toy Limited         Ontario, Canada        100.0

        Jean-Paul Guisset-JPG S.A.  France                  90.0

        The Reliable Corporation    Delaware               100.0

        Reliable Deutschland GmbH   Hamburg, Germany       100.0

        Reliable France S.A.        France                  90.0
</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATION OF THE
COMPANY'S FORM 10-K, WHICH IS ATTACHED, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000752634
<NAME>                        EARTH SEARCH SCIENCES, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                         1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                           6,119,562
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      467,621
<ALLOWANCES>                                        33,912
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 6,923,244
<PP&E>                                          12,991,743
<DEPRECIATION>                                     982,757
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  18,932,230
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           19,308,174
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                      1,000,000
<COMMON>                                        22,455,002
<OTHER-SE>                                     (21,369,612)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    18,932,230
<SALES>                                          1,526,446
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,526,446
<CGS>                                            1,796,412
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,808,179
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       641
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,136,995
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (5,177,983)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (5,177,983)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
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<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (5,177,983)
<EPS-BASIC>                                         (0.048)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (0.048)





</TABLE>