NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 15

- 3414

___________ ANDREW MATTERN; AMANDA MATTERN,

Appellants

v. CITY OF SEA ISLE; POWELL BIRCHMEIER & POW ELL; JAMES R. BIRCHMEIER, ESQ.; LIEUTE NANT ANTHONY G ARREFFI; PATROLMAN NICHOLAS GIOR DANO; DETECTIVE BRIAN HAMILTON; PATRO LMAN SHAWN LESNIEWSKI; DETEC TIVE SERGEANT WILLIAM MAMMELE; LIEUTENANT THOMAS MCQUILLEN; JOHN DOES 1

- 10; ABC, INC, 1

- 10

____________________________________ On Appeal from t he United States District Court for the District of New Jersey ( D.C. No. 1

- 14

- cv - 07231 ) District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle

____________________________________ Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 12 , 2016 Before: AMBRO , SMITH , and KRAUSE , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : August 24, 2016 )

OPINION *

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge

. Andrew and Amanda Matter n appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their Fourteenth Amendment due process claims , brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , against t he City of Sea Isle, New Jersey , and several officers with the City of Sea Isle Police Department. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I. Background 1 Appellant Andrew Mattern was hired by the City of Sea Isle to help clean up
debris that accumu lated along the city’s promenade following Hurricane Sandy. While driving a large truck in reverse along the promenade at about one or two miles per hour,
Mr. Mattern accidentally struck a pedestrian, Bernice Pasquarello , who had emerged onto the promenad e from a nearby path

. She was pronounced dead at the scene. Ms. Pasquarello was unable to see the reversing truck as a result of large bushes flanking each side of the access point, which likewise prevented Mr. Mattern from seeing Ms. Pasquarello

. Moreo ver, Ms. Pasquarello was unable to hear the truck over the
combination of her earmuffs and the twenty

- five mile per hour wind gusts coming off the
shore at that time

. A post

- accident investigation also revealed that the reverse beeper on Mr. Mattern’s tru ck was not worki ng on the day of the accident.

1 Be cause we write primarily for the parties , we will recite only as much of the factual and procedural history of this case as is helpful to our discussion. Because this case is an appeal from dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we accept the allegatio ns in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Matterns, the non

- moving part ies. See Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the following facts are taken from the Matt erns’ Amended Complaint and its supporting documents.3

After the accident, several police officers from the City of Sea Isle arrived on the scene. The first, Patrolman Nicholas Giordano, ob served that while it appeared Mr.
Mattern was “not impaired,” he was “v isibly emotional and shaken up about what occurred.” J.A. 112, 168 . Officer Giorda no directed Mr. Mattern to wait on a bench about twenty

- five feet from Ms. Pasquarello ’s body until another officer, Detective Sergeant William Mammele, arrived. Upon ar rival, Detective Sergeant Mammele similarly observed that Mr. Mattern was “visib ly shaken and very upset ” and noted that when he asked Mr. Mattern if he was “okay,” Mr. Mattern responded, “No, I just killed someone.” J.A. 113, 170 . Mammele asked Mr. Matt ern to “tell him what happened,” and Mr. Mattern recounted the accident’s
events in detail. J.A. 170

. In his report, Mammele noted that he detected “no sign of physical impairment nor an y odor of alcoholic beverage.” J.A. 170. While the police secured the scene, Mr. Mattern was placed in a police car by Lieutenant Anthony Garreffi. Eventually, Mr. Mattern was joined by Amanda Mattern, his wife, and Officer Giordano drove the two to a makeshift police station for investigation

. Officer Giordano sat wit h Mr. Mattern for about an hour in silence until the arrival of Lieutenant Thomas McQuillen, who noticed that Mr. Mattern was “visibly upset and appeared to have been crying.” J.A. 176

. While waiting for other investigators to arrive, Lieutenant McQuille n and the Matterns “ma[d]e small talk.” J.A. 177 . During that time, Mr. Mattern stated repeatedly
that he “was just driving the truck” and “had no idea where [Ms. Pasquarello ] came4

from.” J.A. 115

. After several hours at the makeshift station, the Matt erns retained an attorney who instructed them to leave. Before the Matterns left, however, Deacon Joseph Murphy, a minister who was at the station to speak with police officers and assess th eir need for “grief counseling,” asked whether “ he was needed to speak to Mr. Mattern, ” but “this request was rejected by the police off

- hand, and Deacon Murp hy was transported to the Pasqua rello’s residence

. ” J.A. 118

. The Matterns allege that , as a result of the accident and the “delay in medical attention,” Mr. Ma ttern “suffers from post traumatic stress disorder” for which he “receives regular therapy” and that his “mental trauma will be explained in detail by [a n ] expert medical witness.” J.A. 102

- 03, 116

- 17 . The Matterns further allege that Mr. Mattern was in “a state of mind which was visibly abnormal to everyone he encountered” and that he was “suffering from a mental trauma for which he was actively denied assistance.” J.A. 114

. Following these events , the Matterns brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Garreffi, Giordano, Mammele, and McQuillen (collectively, the “Named
O fficers”) and a Monell claim 2 against the City of Sea Isle claiming violations of Mr. Mattern’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. 3 The District Court dismissed both claims se t

2 Section 1983 permits claims against a municipality that has adopted a policy, custom, or practice that caused a violation of a claimant’s constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y

. , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
3 The Matterns agree that where, as here, medical attention is denied to a person during pre

- incarceration detainment, it is the Fourteenth Amendment that is implicated. However, the Matterns’ brief also references the Fourth and Eighth Amen dments. As a5

out in the Matterns’ Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) , and this appeal followed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review We have jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of the district courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 1291. We review de novo a district c ourt ’ s dismissal under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) . Merle v. United States, 351 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 2003). Rule 12(b)(6) instructs that a complaint must be dismissed if, after accepting as true all of the well

- plead ed facts alleged in the complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint fails to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. See, e.g., Hansler v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Network , 798 F.3d 149, 152 n.2 (3 d Cir. 2015). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” a proper articulation of the plaintiff ’ s grounds for relief “requires more than lab els and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action wil l not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

. We will affirm only if no relief

preliminary matter, we note that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by denial of medical care claims. See Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility , 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendm ents in the context of a denial of medical care claim). Moreover, as the District Court noted, Mr. Mattern’s Eighth Amendment rights are not implicated because Mr. Mattern was not a convicted prisoner at the time of the conduct at issue in this case. Id. (noting the Eighth Amendment applies only “after [the State] has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law” (alteration in original) (quoting City of Revere v. Mass

. Gen. Hosp. , 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983))). For these rea sons, the following discussion relates only to Mr. Mattern’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.6

could be granted under any set of fa cts the plaintiff could prove. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
III. Discussion The Mat terns argue on appeal that the Named O fficers violated Mr. Mattern’s Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying him medical attention for his psychological trauma in the aftermath of the accident. The Matterns further argue that the City of Sea Isle is liable pursuant to Monell for this constitutional violation because it failed to properly train its officers and first responders to provide psychological medical attention to those that cause such accidents. We address each claim in turn. A. § 1983 Claims Against the Named O fficers
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Matterns must show: “(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived [Mr. Mattern] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011). 4 “ The first step in e valuating a § 1983 claim is to ‘identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated’ and to determine ‘whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.’” Nicini v. Morra, 212

4 The Named Officers do not dispute that they were acting under color of state law, nor would the law support such an argument. See, e.g., Black v. Stephens , 662 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1981). Therefore, the only question on appeal is whether the Named Officers violated Mr. Mattern’s constitutional rights.7

F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998)).
In this case, the particular right at issue is Mr. Mattern’s right to medical care for psychologic al and emotional trauma

. I n assessing a pretrial detainee’s claim that he was
denied medical care , the relevant inquiry is whether the alleged denial was “impo sed for the purpose of punishment or whether it [was] but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” Hubbard v. Taylor , 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)). F or a denial of medical care to constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Matterns must demonstrate: “ (i ) a serious medical need, and (ii ) acts or omissions by [the N amed O fficers] that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility , 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F. 3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). 5 Notwithstanding our sympathy for all affected by this tragic accident, we agree with the District Court that

5 While the Eighth Amendment itself “has no application” until there has been a “formal adjudication of guil t,” City of Revere , 463 U.S. at 244, we evaluate these claims “under the standard used to evaluate similar claims brought under the Eighth Amendment,” Natale , 318 F.3d at 582; see also City of Revere , 463 U.S. at 244 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment provid es pre trial detainees with protections “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner”). There is an open question of “how much more protection unconvicted prisoners should receive” under the Fourteenth Amen dment. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 188 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993). Because the Matterns have not raised this issue on appeal, “we do not decide whether the Due Process Clause provides additional protections to pretrial detainees beyond those provided by th e Eighth Amendment to convicted prisoners.” Natale , 318 F.3d at 581 n.5.8

the facts as alleged in the Matterns’ Complaint fa il to establish either prong required for a Fourteenth Amendment denial of medical care claim.

1 . Serious Medical Need First, and with regard to prong one, a medical need is “serious” for purposes of a
denial of medical care claim if it is either “ one t hat has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro , 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (quotin g Pace v. Fauver , 479 F. S upp. 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1979) , aff’d , 649 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1981) )

. 6
As the District Court noted, the Complaint does not explicitly allege that Mr. Mattern was diagnosed with Post

- Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) by a medical
p rofessional. I t does allege , however, that Mr. Mattern “suffers from post traumatic stress disorder” for which he “receives regular therapy” and that his “mental trauma will be explained in detail by [the Matterns’] expert medical witness.” J.A. 102

- 03, 117

. Viewed in a light most favorable to the Matterns and drawing all reasonable inferences
therefrom , these allegations raise a reasonable inference that Mr. Ma ttern has been diagnosed with PTSD.

6 We emphasize that a “serious medical need may exist for psychological or psychiatric treatment, just as it may exist for physical ills.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc. , 766 F.3 d 307, 328 n.13 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986)), rev’d on other grounds , Taylor v. Barkes , 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015).9

However, “[t]he ability to satisfy [this] prong with a sh owing that the injury was diagnosed by a physician who mandated treatment necessarily contemplates the diagnosis being made before the defendant’ s alleged deliberate indifference.” Burgess v. Fischer , 735 F.3d 462, 477 (6th Cir. 2013)

. 7 For this reason , the post hoc diagnosis described in the Complaint is insufficient to establish that Mr. Mattern had a serious medical need that
could form the basis of a Fourteenth Amendment denial of medical care claim

. Nor do the facts as alleged in the Complaint estab lish the second type of serious
medical need

— one that is “so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Lanzaro , 834 F.2d at 347. A conclusion that certain facts would not make a serious medical need obvious to a lay person is not a conclusion
that no such need exists ; “[h]eart disease and HIV, unlike, for example, broken legs or bullet wounds, do not clearly manifest themselves in ways that are obvious and ascertainable to a lay person .” Montgomery v. Pinch ak , 294 F.3d 492, 494 (3d Cir. 2002)

. In this case, although Mr. Mattern’s being “visibly shaken ” and “em otional,” “crying , ” and responding “no” when an officer asked if he was “okay” would indicate to a lay person that he was distraught as a result of th e accident , J.A. 170, 176, these facts do not demonstrate a medical need “so obvious” that a lay person would “ easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention,” Lanzaro , 834 F.2d at 347

. Mr.

7 As the Sixth Circuit noted, “if a post hoc diagnosis of the . . . injuries would suffice” to establish a serious medical need, there would be “no need” for the second method of establishing such a need, i.e., demonstrating that “an injury was obvious to a lay person.” Burger , 735 F.3d at 477.10

Mattern ’s ability to make “small talk” with Detective Se rgeant Mammele and recount the
accident in detail further supports this conclusion. See , e.g., Grayson v. Ross , 454 F.3d 802, 809 (8th Cir. 2006) ( concluding a medical need resulting from substance abuse was not obvious where the claimant “ bec a me combativ e ” while being arrested but subsequently sat “ calmly in the back of the patrol car, followed directions, answered questions posed, and remained quiet and seated on a bench inside the jail ”).
T he Matterns argue that Deacon Murphy ’s presence for the purpo se of providing grief counseling to officers who observed the deadly accident demonstrates that police
realize that individuals involved in such accidents require medical attention and thus the need is obvious

. We cannot agree. Whatever support a general policy of having a doctor available might lend to a plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate an obvious medical need in his specific case, there was no such policy here. While Deacon Murphy’s presence may indicate that the police understand the value of a spiri tual counselor in the aftermath of an accident, it does not reflect an understanding of the “necessity for a doctor’s at tention” after such accidents, and thus this argument is also insufficient t o show that Mr. Mattern had an “obvious” need for medical at tention

. Lanzaro , 834 F.2d at 347 (emphasis added).
2 . Deliberate Indifference
Even a ssuming that the facts alleged in the Complaint did show that Mr. Mattern was suffering from a “serious medical need,” the Matterns could not satisfy the second requir ement of their claim

— that the Named O fficers acted with “deliberate indifference

. ”11

Natale , 318 F. 3d at 582

. For claims evaluated pursuant to Eighth Amendment standards,
deliberate indifference is a “subjective standard of liability” and thus a defendant c annot be held liable unless he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to [a complainant’s] health or safety.” Id. (quoting Nicini , 212 F.3d at 811; then quoting
Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). We have explained that deliberate
i ndifference is “evident” in certain circumstances , including: (i) the denial of reasonable requests for medical treatment that expose the complainant to undue suffering; (ii) knowledge of the need for medical care and the intentional refusal to provide suc h care; or (iii) the delay of necessary medical treatment for non

- medical reasons. See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346

- 47

. The Matterns invoke the second category of deliberate indifference under Lanzaro : They argue that Mr. Matte rn’s statement that he was “no t ok ,” together with the various officers’ observations of Mr. Mattern, “illustrates that the officials were told there

w as a need for medical attention and refused to acknowledge” it

. Appellants’ Br. 24. As noted above, however, the Complaint and its su pporting documents reflect merely that
the N amed O fficers noticed that Mr. Mattern was distraught , and, moreover, that they were able to converse with him and believed he was not impaired. T hese observations simply do not demonstrate knowledge of a need f or medical care. See Natale , 318 F.3d
at 582. Thus, even viewed in the light most favorable to the Matterns , the allegations in the Complaint do not rise to the “stringent standard” of deliberate indifference

. Bd. of Cty. Comm’ rs v. Brown , 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).12

B. § 1983 Claims A gainst the City of Sea Isle Because, as explained above, we conclude that the Matterns have not sufficiently pleaded a Fourteenth Amendment denial of medical care claim , the Matterns’ Monell claim against the City of Sea Isle must also fail

. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (stating if a municipal employee “inflicted no constitutional injury . . . it is inconceivable that [the m unicipality] could be liable”). Accordingly, we will affirm
the Distri ct Court’s dismissal of this claim

. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.