Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 64A05-1703-CC-583 | October 27, 2017 Page 1 of 9

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Indiana Department of 

Workforce Development,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Kristofer Hugunin,

Appellee-Respondent.

October 27, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

64A05-1703-CC-583

Appeal from the Porter Superior 

Court

The Honorable Roger V. Bradford, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

64D01-1508-CC-6627

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] In this interlocutory appeal, the Indiana Department of Workforce 

Development (“Workforce Development”) appeals the trial court’s denial of its 
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motion for summary judgment in its action against Kristofer Hugunin 

(“Hugunin”).1 Concluding that Workforce Development is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law, we reverse and remand with instructions for the 

trial court to grant Workforce Development’s summary judgment motion.

[2] We reverse and remand with instructions.

Issue

The sole issue for our review is whether trial court erred in 

denying Workforce Development’s summary judgment motion.

Facts

[3] In 2009 and 2011, Hugunin applied for and received emergency unemployment 

compensation benefits. However, a subsequent investigation determined that 

Hugunin had received employment income at the same time he was receiving 

unemployment benefits. In May 2013, Workforce Development mailed 

Hugunin investigation case histories and a Determination of Eligibility (“the 

Determination”), which provided in relevant part as follows:

You claimed benefits during the period 01/03/2009 to 

05/14/2011. An investigation of this claim period was 

 

1 Workforce Development refers to Hugunin using his initials. However, this Court has previously 

determined that, notwithstanding the confidentiality mandate of INDIANA CODE § 22–4–19–6 and Indiana 

Administrative Rule 9(G), “it is appropriate for this Court to use the full names of parties in routine appeals 

from the Review Board.” Moore v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Development, 951 N.E.2d 301, 306 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2011). See also J.M. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Development, 975 N.E.2d 1283, 1285 n. 1 

(Ind. 2012) (noting that the Court’s practice “going forward will be to keep the[ ] parties confidential only if 

they make an affirmative request”). Because Hugunin did not make such an affirmative request, we will 

utilize his name.
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conducted to determine whether or not you failed to disclose or 

misrepresented material facts which, if known, would have 

disqualified you or rendered you ineligible, or would have 

reduced your benefits for the following reasons: employment 

and earnings. . . 

Based on available evidence, it must be concluded that you 

knowingly failed to disclose, or falsified material facts. 

Therefore, the penalties prescribed by Chapter 13, Section 1.1 of 

the Laws of Indiana relating to the Department of Workforce 

Development apply.

You received benefits to which you were not entitled and which 

you are now liable to repay the Department . . . .

This determination will become final on 5-31-13 if not appealed. 

(App. 32). The Determination further informed Hugunin how to initiate an 

appeal.

[4] Hugunin failed to respond to the Determination. Two years later, in August 

2015, Workforce Development filed a verified petition for civil enforcement, 

wherein it asked the trial court to enter an order enforcing the Determination

and to order Hugunin to pay Workforce Development $20,190.75 plus interest. 

In October 2015, Hugunin filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and a jury 

demand. 

[5] In May 2016, Workforce Development filed a motion for summary judgment. 

In its memorandum in support of its motion, Workforce Development argued 

that pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 22-4-13-1.1(a), Hugunin was required to 

accurately report all earnings while claiming benefits. Workforce 

Development’s designated evidence revealed that Hugunin had failed to report 
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earnings for the claim weeks he worked. He therefore knowingly failed to 

disclose or falsified information regarding earnings that would have made him 

ineligible for unemployment benefits. Workforce Development argued that 

because he failed to properly report his wages, he was required to repay the full 

amount of the benefits received plus penalties. Workforce Development further 

claimed that because Hugunin had failed to appeal the determination within the 

statutorily required ten days, the administrative ruling became final and 

unappealable. Workforce Development argued that the “undisputed facts of 

this case permit[ted] the Court to determine that [Hugunin was] indebted to 

[Workforce Development]” in the amount of $20,685.30. (App. 14). 

According to Workforce Development, the case involved no factual dispute and 

the agency was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[6] In his response, Hugunin admitted that the Determination was sent to his last 

known address. However, he contended that at the time the letter was sent, he 

was incarcerated in the Porter County Jail and had not received it. He 

designated a March 2013 sentencing order in support of his response. His sole 

argument was that Workforce Development had failed to follow Indiana Trial 

Rule 4.3, which requires service of summons upon an incarcerated person to be 

made by delivering or mailing a copy of the summons to the official in charge 

of the institution. Workforce Development replied that Hugunin had 

“conflate[d] service pursuant to the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure with 

service as provided for within the Indiana Code for administrative findings by 

[Workforce Development].” (App. 48). According to Workforce 
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Development, Hugunin had “failed to cite to the proper Indiana Code 

provisions regarding service for [Workforce Development’s] administrative 

orders; rather, [Hugunin] incorrectly cite[d] to the Indiana Rules of Trial 

Procedure, which do not govern service of administrative orders by [Workforce 

Development].” (App. 49). Workforce Development argued that pursuant to 

INDIANA CODE § 22-4-17-2, it was “required only to send its administrative 

orders to the claimant’s last known address.” (App. 49). Workforce 

Development further pointed out that the determination was not returned to 

Workforce Development as undeliverable when sent to Hugunin’s last known 

address.

[7] The trial court summarily denied Workforce Development’s summary 

judgment motion without a hearing, and Workforce Development filed a 

motion to certify the matter for interlocutory appeal. The trial court certified 

the matter, and Workforce Development sought this Court’s permission to 

appeal. We granted the request and accepted the interlocutory appeal. 

Decision

[8] At the outset, we note that Hugunin has failed to file an appellee’s brief. When 

an appellee fails to submit a brief, we need not undertake the burden of 

developing an argument for the appellee. Santana v. Santana, 708 N.E.2d 886, 

887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Applying a less stringent standard of review, we may 

reverse the trial court if the appellant can establish prima facie error. Id. 

However, we may in our discretion decide the case on the merits. Kladis v. 
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Nick’s Patio, Inc., 735 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). We exercise 

such discretion in this case.

[9] Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 

56(C); Knighten v. E. Chi. Hous. Auth., 45 N.E.3d 788, 791 (Ind. 2015). The 

movant’s burden is to show that its designated evidence, with all conflicts, 

doubts, and reasonable inferences resolved in the nonmovant’s favor, 

affirmatively negates the nonmovant’s claim. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 

1003 (Ind. 2014). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show an issue of 

fact affecting the outcome of the case that requires resolution by the fact-finder. 

Id. In the present case, the meaning of a statute is at issue, and because the 

relevant facts are not in dispute, the construction of the statute presents a pure 

question of law for which disposition by summary judgment is appropriate. See 

Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Anderson, 661 N.E.2d 907, 908 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1996), trans. denied.

[10] Workforce Development originally alleged that Hugunin had failed to comply 

with INDIANA CODE § 22-4-13-1.1, which provides as follows:

Sec. 1.1. (a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this article, 

if an individual knowingly:

(1) fails to disclose amounts earned during any week in the 

individual’s waiting period, benefit period, or extended 

benefit period; or

(2) fails to disclose or has falsified any fact that would 

disqualify the individual for benefits, reduce the 
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individual’s benefits, or render the individual ineligible for 

benefits or extended benefits, the individual forfeits any 

wage credits earned or any benefits or extended benefits 

that might otherwise be payable to the individual for any 

week in which the failure to disclose or falsification caused 

benefits to be paid improperly.

(b) In addition to amounts forfeited under subsection (a), an 

individual is subject to the following civil penalties for each 

instance in which the individual knowingly fails to disclose or 

falsifies any fact that if accurately reported to the department 

would disqualify the individual for benefits, reduce the 

individual's benefits, or render the individual ineligible for 

benefits or extended benefits:

(1) For the first instance, an amount equal to twenty-five 

percent (25%) of the benefit overpayment.

(2) For the second instance, an amount equal to fifty 

percent (50%) of the benefit overpayment.

(3) For the third and each subsequent instance, an amount 

equal to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefit 

overpayment.

(c) The department's determination under this section constitutes 

an initial determination under IC 22-4-17-2(a) and is subject to a 

hearing and review under IC 22-4-17-3 through IC 22-4-17-15.

[11] Workforce Development further argued that it had complied with INDIANA 

CODE § 22-4-17-2, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(e) In cases where the claimant's benefit eligibility or 

disqualification is disputed, the department shall promptly notify 

the claimant and the employer or employers directly involved or 

connected with the issue raised as to the validity of such claim, 

the eligibility of the claimant for waiting period credit or benefits, 

or the imposition of a disqualification period or penalty, or the 
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denial thereof, and of the cause for which the claimant left the 

claimant's work, of such determination and the reasons thereof.

(f) Except as otherwise hereinafter provided in this section 

regarding parties located in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, 

unless the claimant or such employer, within ten (10) days after 

the notification required by subsection (e), was mailed to the 

claimant's or the employer's last known address or otherwise 

delivered to the claimant or the employer, asks for a hearing 

before an administrative law judge thereon, such decision shall 

be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance 

therewith.

(Italics added).

[12] Our review of the undisputed designated facts in this case reveals that, as set 

forth in Workforce Development’s memorandum in support of its summary 

judgment motion, Hugunin failed to report earnings for the claim weeks that he 

worked. Workforce Development notified Hugunin of its findings in a 

Determination of Eligibility and advised him that he was liable to pay the 

benefits to which he was not entitled. The determination, which was sent to 

Hugunin’s last known address, also advised Hugunin that it would become final 

on May 31, 2012 if not appealed, and it set forth the requirements for the 

initiation of an appeal. Hugunin did not appeal the determination. Based upon 

these undisputed facts, Workforce Development complied with the relevant 

statutes and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its verified petition 

for civil enforcement. The trial court therefore erred in denying Workforce 
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Development’s summary judgment motion.2 Accordingly, we reverse and 

remand with instructions for the trial court to grant Workforce Development’s 

summary judgment motion.

[13] Reversed and remanded. 

Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur. 

 

2 Although Hugunin has failed to file an appellee’s brief, we note that at the summary judgment stage, he 

argued that he was incarcerated when Workforce Development sent the Determination to his last known

address. According to Hugunin, Workforce Development had failed to comply with Trial Rule 4.3, which 

required service of summons upon an incarcerated person to be made by delivering or mailing a copy of the 

summons to the official in charge of the institution. Assuming that the Determination was in the nature of a

summons, both the Indiana Supreme Court and this Court have held in numerous cases that the rules of trial 

procedure “are not applicable to proceedings before the administrative agencies nor to the proceedings 

requisite to invoking the jurisdiction of reviewing judicial authority.” Clary v. Nat’l Friction Prod. Inc., 290 

N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1972). See also Margrat, Inc. v. Ind. State Bd. of Tax Com’rs, 448 N.E.2d 684, 685 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1982) and cases cited therein. But see Ball Stores, Inc., v. State Bd. of Tax Com’rs, 316 N.E.2d 674, 677-78 

(Ind. 1974) (determining that where “the statute [governing an appeal from the Industrial Board] is silent as 

to the method of computing the time for filing an appeal and giving notice to the Board[,] Trial Rule 6(A) 

provides the method for computing the thirty day time span when the thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, 

Sunday, or holiday”).