J-S27042-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

CLIFFORD E. YOUNT 

 Appellant No. 1810 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Order entered October 1, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County 

Criminal Division at Nos: CP-16-CR-0000377-2008; CP-16-CR-0000378-

2008; CP-16-CR-0000379-2008; CP-16-CR-0000382-2008 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and STABILE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2014

Appellant Clifford E. Yount appeals pro se the trial court’s October 1, 

2013 order denying his motion to compel the county “Prothonotary and[/]or 

the Clerk of Court[s], to follow the sentencing order as imposed by the [trial 

c]ourt.” Appellant’s Brief at 5.1

 Upon review, we vacate the order. 

The factual and procedural history of the case is not at issue here.2

 

The only issue raised concerns the cost provisions of the sentencing order. 

The order, in relevant part, provides: 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Elsewhere in the brief, Appellant seems to appeal from the judgment of 

sentence, not the order at issue here. Id. at 4. A review of Appellant’s 

argument, however, confirms he is challenging the October 1, 2013 order 

denying his motion to compel. 

2

 Briefly, Appellant was charged with several crimes in connection with four 

separate instances of delivery or possession with intent to deliver controlled 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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 [S]pecial conditions: 

 A. . . . . 

B. The defendant shall pay $100 to the clerk of courts 

pursuant to Act 198. 

C. The defendant shall submit a DNA sample and pay 

the costs. 

Sentencing Order, 3/11/09, at 2. 

 Following imposition of criminal sentence, the county prothonotary 

notified Appellant that a civil judgment was entered against him in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Clarion County Prothonotary in connection with each 

criminal conviction. For each civil judgment, both the trial court docket and 

a hand-filled form provide an item-by-item explanation of how the total 

amount was determined. For example, at docket number CR-377-2008, the 

$973.70 judgment includes restitution in the amount of $255.00, and costs 

in the amount of $718.70; regarding docket number CR-378-2008, the 

$766.00 judgment includes $345.00 in restitution and $421.00 in costs/fees; 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

substances. The Commonwealth moved to consolidate the cases based on 

the similarities of the cases. The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s 

motion for joinder. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted on all 

charges pertaining to delivery or possession with intent to deliver controlled 

substances. Appellant was sentenced to six to twelve years’ incarceration 

followed by one year probation. Appellant is currently serving his sentence 

at SCI Mercer. Appellant’s Brief at 1. For more information about the case, 

see Commonwealth v. Yount, No. 986 WDA 2012, unpublished 

memorandum (Pa. Super. filed June 5, 2013) (direct appeal), and 

Commonwealth v. Yount, No. 1479 WDA 2009, unpublished memorandum 

(Pa. Super. filed June 1, 2010) (PCRA). 
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regarding docket number CR-379-2008, the $526.00 judgment includes 

$421.00 in costs, and $105.00 in restitution; and regarding docket number 

CR-382-2008, the $746.00 judgment includes $421.00 in costs/fees, and 

$325.00 in restitution.3

 

The issue raised here is whether the civil judgments could include 

costs not provided for in the criminal sentencing order.4

 Appellant argues it 

could not. In support, among others, Appellant relies on Commonwealth 

v. LeBar, 860 A.2d 1105 (Pa. Super. 2004), for the proposition that 

[a]lthough [the] statute on imposition of court costs against 

criminal defendant provided for imposition of mandatory $60 

assessment, and [sic] inmate could not be held responsible for 

additional costs in absence of sentence or valid court order 

imposing other costs, fees, or restitution. 

Motion to Compel, 9/9/13, at 2. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 It appears all criminal dockets incorrectly show $105.00 for “Crime Lab 

User Fee – State Police” as a cost, as opposed to restitution. Cf. Sentencing 

Order at 2. 

As noted above, restitution is not at issue here, only costs. The same costs 

(“State Court Costs,” “Commonwealth Cost,” etc.) appear assessed at all 

dockets. However, dockets number CR-377-2008 and CR-382-2008 include 

also “Costs of Transportation,” which were not charged in CR-378-2008 and 

CR-379-2008. According to the Case Financial Information sheet of docket 

number CR-377-2008, payments were made toward the “Crime Victims 

Compensation” and “Victim Witness Service,” and last payment of $17.43 

occurred December 26, 2013. 

4

 As noted above, the only costs mentioned in the sentencing order are Act 

198 costs and costs associated with DNA testing. 
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The trial court, in its 1925(a) opinion, stated the claim was without 

merit “because all costs have been properly assessed pursuant to 16 P.S. 

§ 1403[5

 and] 18 P.S. § 11.1101[6].” Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/13 at 1. 

____________________________________________ 

5

 Section 1403 (relating to expenses incurred by the district attorney) reads 

as follows: 

All necessary expenses incurred by the district attorney or his 

assistants or any office directed by him in the investigation of 

crime and the apprehension and prosecution of persons charged 

with or suspected of the commission of crime, upon approval 

thereof by the district attorney and the court, shall be paid by 

the county from the general funds of the county. In any case 

where a defendant is convicted and sentenced to pay the costs 

of prosecution and trial, the expenses of the district attorney in 

connection with such prosecution shall be considered a part of 

the costs of the case and be paid by the defendant. 

16 P.S. § 1403. 

6

 The statute reads as follows: 

(a) Imposition.

(1) A person who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or who is 

convicted of a crime shall, in addition to costs imposed under 42 

Pa.C.S. § 3571(c) (relating to Commonwealth portion of fines, 

etc.), pay costs of at least $60 and may be sentenced to pay 

additional costs in an amount up to the statutory maximum 

monetary penalty for the offense committed. 

. . . . 

(c) Payment. This cost shall be imposed notwithstanding any 

statutory provision to the contrary. 

(d) Mandamus. The district attorney, the Office of Victims’ 

Services, the commission or any victim shall have standing to 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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The trial court quoted both statutes, but did not elaborate in any fashion 

how the costs sought by the Prothonotary fell within the purview of the two 

provisions. 

On appeal, the Commonwealth, similarly, argues the costs were 

properly assessed, relying on Section 11.1101, and Section 9721(c.1) for 

the proposition that 

In the event the court fails to issue an order for costs pursuant 

to section 9728, costs shall be imposed upon the defendant 

under this section [42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721]. No court order shall 

be necessary for the defendant to incur liability for costs under 

this section. The provisions of this subsection do not alter the 

court’s discretion under Pa.R.Crim.P. No. 706(C) (relating to 

fines or costs). 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(c.1).7

 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

seek a mandamus order requiring the county to collect the 

costs imposed by this section. 

(e) Court order. No court order shall be necessary in order 

for the defendant to incur liability for costs under this section. 

Costs under this section must be paid in order for the 

defendant to be eligible for probation, parole or accelerated 

rehabilitative disposition. 

18 P.S. § 11.1101. 

7

It should be noted that “Section 4(1) of 2010, Oct. 27, P.L. 949, No. 96, 

effective in 60 days [December 27, 2010], provides that ‘[t]he reenactment, 

amendment and addition of 42 Pa.C.S. [§] . . .9721(c.1) . . . shall apply to 

costs imposed on or after the effective date of this paragraph.’” 42 Pa.

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721, Historical and Statutory Notes. The costs at issue here 

were imposed in 2009. 
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Before we address the merits of this matter, we determine whether 

the trial court had jurisdiction over the motion.8

 We conclude it did not. 

Courts of common pleas generally enjoy original jurisdiction, except 

where jurisdiction has been placed in another court. This exception governs 

this case. The General Assembly has vested original jurisdiction over civil 

actions against the Commonwealth government in the Commonwealth Court. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 761(a). Here, it is undisputed Appellant is not challenging 

his sentence; rather, he is challenging the actions taken by the Clerk of 

Courts,9

 a Commonwealth officer.10 As such, Appellant should have brought 

this motion as a petition for review of a governmental determination within 

____________________________________________ 

8

“We have properly raised the question of subject matter jurisdiction sua 

sponte, since if the court below lacked subject matter jurisdiction, its order 

is void.” Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 151, 152 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Little, 314 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. 1974)). 

However, “[a]lthough the court of common pleas lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction, we have appellate jurisdiction since this an appeal from a final 

order.” Id. at 152 n.1. 

9 See Appellant’s Brief at 8. 

10 In Brown v. Levy, 73 A.3d 514 (Pa. 2013), the Supreme Court noted: 

[T]he clerk of court[s] . . . “is considered to be the 

Commonwealth government as a Commonwealth officer.” Id.,

at 7 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 102 (defining “Commonwealth

government” as “government of the Commonwealth, including 

the courts and other officers or agencies of the unified judicial 

system”); Pa. Const. art. V, § 15).

Id. at 519. 
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the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. 

Jackson, 858 A.2d 627, 629-30 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (costs 

deductions action by inmate in a state correctional institution is a civil action 

against an agency of the Commonwealth, the Department of Corrections, 

over which the Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction); Danysh, 833 

at 154 (same). See also Spotz v. Commonwealth, 972 A.2d 125 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2009),11 Commonwealth v. Parella, 834 A.2d 1253, 1255-56 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2003) (vacating the trial court’s order denying motion of inmate, 

who was serving sentence in a state correctional institution, to stop costs 

deductions because the Commonwealth Court had original jurisdiction; 

____________________________________________ 

11 In Spotz, the Commonwealth Court noted: 

[Clerk of Courts] argues that Spotz’s instant challenge is 

properly brought in the [t]rial [c]ourt as the sentencing court of 

record in this matter. We disagree. Spotz’s [Petition for Review 

of Governmental Action] clearly does not attack the . . . 

sentencing order underlying this matter; the nature of his 

challenge, in fact, relies upon the express wording of that 

sentencing order[, which did not include any express language 

assessing any fines, costs, or reimbursement imposed onto 

inmate]. Spotz is, in the instant matter, clearly and 

unequivocally challenging only the governmental action of 

[Clerk of Courts] and the [Department of] Correction 

Respondents in the wake of the sentencing order, which matter 

the [t]rial [c]ourt has no jurisdiction over under the instant facts. 

Id. at 134 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the highlighted quoted 

language is reproduced, without credit, in Appellant’s brief. Appellant’s Brief 

at 8. Appellant, in addition to not mentioning the source, does not mention 

Spotz brought his action in the Commonwealth Court, not the trial court. 
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however, “where the method by which an inmate seeks to end . . . 

deductions involves the validity or modification of the underlying sentence, 

original jurisdiction lies with the common pleas court,” regardless of the 

place of confinement. Parella, 834 A.2d at 1256). Because the common 

pleas court did not have jurisdiction, we vacate its order, without prejudice 

to Appellant to file a new action in the Commonwealth Court. See Jackson, 

858 A.2d at 630 (citing Danysh, 833 A.2d at 154 n.4; Parella, 834 A.2d at 

1255 n.5). 

Order vacated. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/7/2014