*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 25, 2006*

Decided September 26, 2006

Before

 Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 05-4081

JAN CRAMER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JAMES SCHROEDER, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 05-C-311-S

John C. Shabaz,

Judge.

O R D ER

In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal inmate Jan Cramer claimed

that a deputy United States marshal, several jail guards, and medical staff working

for a private contractor failed to promptly diagnose and treat his leukemia while he

was housed in a county jail awaiting sentencing in federal court. At initial

screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the district court allowed Cramer to proceed

against the deputy marshal, three guards, and three nurses. The court later

granted summary judgment for the deputy and guards but dismissed the complaint

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-4081 Page 2

without prejudice as to the nurses because Cramer never served them with process. 

We affirm the judgment.

Deputy Marshal Kirchenwitz and jailers Buzick, Schroeder, and Sims are the

four defendants who were dismissed at summary judgment; we recount the facts

relevant to them in the light most favorable to Cramer. See Alexander v. City of

South Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 2006). From March 12 through June 4,

2002, Cramer was confined at the Dane County Jail in Madison, Wisconsin,

pursuant to an agreement between the United States Marshals Service and the

county sheriff. In early April he began experiencing dizziness, headaches, and

blurred vision, and at some later point he also experienced rectal bleeding. Cramer

was evaluated by jail medical personnel, who, among other things, scheduled him to

see an ophthalmologist on April 23. That appointment, however, was rescheduled

for April 30 because Cramer was due in federal court that day. When Kirchenwitz

transported him from the jail to court on April 23, Cramer complained that he had a

bad headache and thought he was going blind. Four days later, on April 27, Cramer

tendered a written request for medical attention for his vision problems to Buzick,

who delivered the request to the nursing staff. Later that same day Cramer also

told Schroeder that he was having difficulty seeing and had a headache, and

Schroeder likewise contacted a nurse. Finally, just before midnight on April 29,

Cramer informed Sims that he felt faint and nauseous, and Sims too summoned a

nurse. Cramer saw the ophthalmologist the next day. That visit, according to

Cramer, prompted more tests and the discovery of leukemia. Cramer, who waited

to sue until May 2005, does not say whether his condition was treated successfully.

On appeal Cramer makes four arguments. First he contends that the district

court should have compelled the jail guards to produce copies of both his written

requests for medical care and the grievances he later submitted complaining about

the treatment he received. Prior to summary judgment the court had directed the

guards to provide Cramer with copies of the documents, but they replied that no

additional records could be located. If Cramer was not satisfied with this answer,

he should have moved to continue the deadline for responding to the motions for

summary judgment and submitted an affidavit setting forth, in detail, the missing

discovery and the information it would have provided. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f);

Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, No. 05-1990, 2006 WL 2473421, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 29,

2006). Instead he waited until two months after judgment was entered before

moving to compel production. By then it was too late.

Cramer next argues that the district court erred in granting the motions for

summary judgment without waiting for his responses in opposition. When the court

initially ruled, it thought Cramer had missed the deadline for responding, but in

fact Cramer’s submissions had been timely mailed and were still in transit. The

court, however, reconsidered its decision after those documents were received, and
No. 05-4081 Page 3

thus the precipitate ruling could not have harmed Cramer. See English v. Cowell,

10 F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The harmless error doctrine saves premature

rulings when the district court is found to have entertained the non-movants’

arguments on a prior or subsequent motion, such as a motion to reconsider.”).

Cramer further asserts that the district court’s ruling at summary judgment

was erroneous, but this contention is frivolous. Prison officials violate the Eighth

Amendment only when they knowingly disregard an objectively serious risk to an

inmate’s health, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 848 (1994); Greeno v. Daley, 414

F.3d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2005), and guards who relay an inmate’s complaints to

medical staff are generally entitled to rely on the treatment decisions made by

medical professionals. See Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010-11 (7th Cir.

2006); Greeno, 414 F.3d at 656; see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir.

2004) (“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or

their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison

official . . . will not be chargeable with . . . deliberate indifference.”). In this case,

even assuming that Cramer has accurately represented the nature of his illness,

there was no reason for Deputy Marshal Kirchenwitz or the three jail guards to

have recognized the seriousness of his condition. Kirchenwitz, as far as this record

reveals, was sent to the jail only because Cramer needed transportation to a

scheduled appearance in federal court, and the three guards all communicated

Cramer’s complaints to nurses at the jail. Nothing in the record suggests that any

of the four were deliberately indifferent to Cramer’s condition.

Finally, Cramer argues that the district court erred in dismissing the three

unserved nurses without giving advance notice of the impending action. See Fed. R.

Civ. Proc. 4(m). We have held, however, that a lack of notice will not compel

reversal unless the plaintiff was prejudiced. Blaney v. West, 209 F.3d 1027, 1032

(7th Cir. 2000). Cramer moved for reconsideration after judgment was entered and

specifically called the court’s attention to the lack of notice; the court denied

Cramer’s motion, but it did so after weighing his arguments that the suit should

proceed against the nurses. Thus, the initial lack of notice could not have

prejudiced Cramer. See id. at 1031-32 (holding that plaintiff was not prejudiced by

premature dismissal of unserved defendants where he bypassed opportunity to

move for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and omitted lack-of-notice

argument from later motion to vacate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). Moreover, as the

district court recognized, the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Wisconsin is

six years, see Wis. Stat. § 893.53; Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 409 (7th Cir. 1989),

so the dismissal of the nurses was not tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice. 

AFFIRMED.