J. S 34 0 37 /20

NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

– SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INT. OF: S.M., A MINOR :

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

: APPEAL OF: K.P. AND B.M., MOTHER AND FATHER :

: No. 552 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 20, 2020, in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Orphans’ Court Division at No. 7 OC 2020

IN THE INT. OF: K.M., A MINOR :

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

: APPEAL OF: K.P. AND B.M., MOTHER AND FATHER :

: No. 553 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 20, 2020, in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Orphans’ Court Division at No. 8 OC 2020

IN THE INTEREST O F : B.M., A MINOR :

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

: APPEAL OF: K.P. AND B.M., MOTHER AND FATHER :

: No. 554 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 20, 2020, in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County Orphans’ Court Division at No. 9 OC 2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E. AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.J

. S 34 0 37 /20

- 2

-

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2020

In this consolidated appeal, K.P. (“Mother”) and B.M

. (“Father”)

(collectively, “appellants”) appeal from the February 20, 2020 decree s

granting the petition s of the Tioga County De partment of Human Services

(“ DHS ”) to involuntarily terminate their parental rights to their three minor

children, S.M. (born June 2015), K.M. (born June 2015)
, 1 and B.M. (born June

2016) (collectively, “Children ”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 251 1(a)(1), (2),

(5), and (b)

. After careful review, we affirm.

The juvenile court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history

of this case as follows:

[Appellants] in this action are the natural parents of [Children]. [DHS] has had leg al and phys ical custody of [Children]
, constantly since June 26[] , 2019, pursuan t to Court Order. [DHS] was initially granted
care, after [Children] w[ere] found in the custody of [appellants] , who had been found passed out in a motor vehicle, aside a road in Westfi eld Township, Tioga County. [Children] w[ere] subsequently adjudicated dependent after a full Adjudicatory Hearing. [DHS] was directed to provide services int ended to support [ appellants’ ] efforts to address their substance use disorder, lack of parenting skills, and other concerns. This case was review ed at regular intervals by the [juvenile c] ourt in the companion Dependency action, filed to Number [s 37 ] DP of 2019 [and 38 DP of 2019], the proceedings of which have been incorporated into the re cord of this proceeding.

[Children were adjudicated dependent on July 9, 2019.]

1 S.M. and K.M. are twins.J

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- During the course of the Dependency Proceeding, [Father] made no progress towards alleviating the circumstances, leading to the placement of [Children] and was found to be in minimal compliance with the Family Service Plan. [Mother] initially made efforts to address her substance use disorder, through her attendance at an in

- patient rehabilitation facility, but after her departure from post

- placement housing, [Mother] took no further steps to address her substance use disorder and immediately re lapsed. Throughout the de pendency of the De pendency Action, [DHD] offered services, specifically visitation, Effective Safe Parenting, and Intensive Case Management. The Effective Saf e Parenting Program is a program offered by [DHS], which is intended to support the participants in dealing with substance use disorder, in an effort to allow them to become effective and safe parents. The program requires regular substance use testing, a s well as regular meetings with service providers. The purpose of the meetings with the service provider are not simply to conduct substance use testing, but rather are intended to allow the participant to build a safe, stable recovery network, as well as permitting them to address parenting issues and other known concerns. The record in this case indicates that while [appellants] have periodically submitted to requested substance use tests, they have refused numerous efforts and requests by the Human Ser vice Provider to address underlying concerns related to parenting and treatment. The record furthe r reveals that both [Mother and Father] have failed to obtain recommended Substance Use Assessments, despite numerous requests to do so.

The testimony presented in this proceeding indicates that between early January to early February, the Service Provider, Clara Holley, attempted on 17 occasions, either by phone or in person to meet with [appellants] , with success being limited to 1 occasion, during a r eview of the Family Service Plan.

Rega rding visitation, [DHS] has, pursuant to Court Order, afforded both [Mother and Father] numerousJ

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- opportunities to participate in visitation and has supported efforts to permit visitation on the Court Order scheduled b y providing, at least on one occasion, gas cards, and on multiple occasions, throughout the life of this case, [DHS

- ] funded taxi

s ervice, to and from visitation. The record produced at the hearing established that [appellants] have participated in approxi mately one

- half of the scheduled visitations. Regarding other services, [appellants] have failed to regularly meet with or communicate wit h the cas [ ew ] orker in this case. [Children] are currently placed with foster parents in Bradford County, Pennsylvani a. [Children] have remained together, in this home, si nce approximately July of 2019. In the current placement, [Children’s] medical needs are att ended to by the foster parents. The Court notes that despite [Children’s] medical care remaining in the Westfield area, within miles of [appellants’] residence, [appellant s ] have failed to attend any medical or dental appointments after July of 2019.

Juvenile court opinion ( No. 552 MDA 2020; N o. 7 OC 2020), 2/20/20 at 2

- 4;

see also juvenile court opinion ( N o. 553 MDA 2020; No. 8 OC 2020), 2/20/20

at 2

- 4 , and juvenile court opinion ( No. 554 MDA 2020; No. 9 OC 2020),

2/20/20 at 2

- 4

.

On January 24, 2020 , DHS filed petition s to i nvoluntarily terminate

appellants’ parental rights to Child ren

. The juvenile court conducted a

termination hearing on February 18, 2020; appellants were not present for

this hearing but participate d via telephone. Following the hearing, the ju venile

court entered separate decree s for each appellant at each docket number,

inv oluntarily terminating their respective parental rights to Children pursuant

to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b)

. On March 12, 2020
, a ppellantsJ

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-

jointly filed a timely notice of appeal at each docket number, in compliance

with Commonwealth v. Walker
, 185 A.3d 9 69 (Pa. 2018), and its progeny

.

Thereafter , appellants jointly filed concise statement s of errors complained of

on appeal, in accorda nce with Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (a )(2)(i), at each docket

number. On April 17, 2020 , the juvenile court entered orders indicating that

it was relying on its findings of fact and opinion s it authored in support of its

decrees terminating appellants’ parental rights. This court sua sponte

consolidated appellants’ appeals by per curiam order on April 20, 2020

.
That same day, this court issued a rule to show cause order directing

appell ants to explain why their notice of appeal from two separate decrees at

each docket number should not be quashed, pursuant to, inter alia
, General

Electric Credit Corporation v. Ae tna Casualty and Surety Company
, 263

A.2d 448 ( Pa. 1970) (establishing a three

- part test to decide whether quashal

was warranted where a single notice of appeal was filed in response to multiple

final orders ); 20 Pa.P.R.A.C. § 512 (stating that one appeal from several

orders is discouraged). Thereafter, on May 8, 2020, this court issued an order

discharging its rule to show cause order and referring this issue to the merits

panel. In the interest of judicial economy, and in light of the fact that neither

DHS nor Children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) 2 has objected, we decline to

quash this matter on this basis and will proceed to address appellants’ issues

2 We note that DHS’s brief to this court was joined by Children’s GAL, Lenore Urbani, Esq., who was appointed by the juvenile court on March 16, 2020.J

. S 34 0 37 /20

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-

on the merits. See
, e.g. , In the Interest of P.S. , 158 A.3d 643, 648

(Pa.Super 2017) (declining to quash a juvenile’ s appeal taken from both an

order adjudicating him delinquent and a dispositional order entered following

the revocation of his probation on the basis that the issues raised in each were

closely related, the appellee d id not object, and the ap peal period had already

expired), appeal denied
, 174 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2017); K.H. v. J.R. , 826 A.2d

863, 870 ( Pa. 2003) (stating, “a ppellate courts have not generally quashed

appeals, provided that the issues involved are nearly iden tical, no objection to

the appeal has been raised, and the period for appeal has expired.”)

.
Appellants raise the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [juvenile] court err and abuse its discretion in finding that [DHS] provided by clear and convin cing evidence that the conditions which led to the removal and placement of [Children] continue to exist and that [Parents] cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time?

2. Did the [juvenile] court err and abuse its discre tion in finding that the [DHS] allowed sufficient time for [Parents] to respond to services by allowing termination parental rights after only eight months of services[?]

Appellant s’ brief at 8 (extraneous capitalization omitted)

.
In matters involving i nvoluntary termination of parental rights, our

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if th ey are supported by the record. If theJ

. S 34 0 37 /20

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- factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. [A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill

- will. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts th at often have first

- hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M. , 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted).

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoptio n Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101

- 2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis

of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior t o terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severi ng any such bond.

In re L.M. , 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have

defined “clear and convincing evidence” as that which is so “clear, direct,J

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-

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

convictio n, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

In re C.S. , 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) ( en banc ) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the ju venile court terminated appellants’ parental rights

pursuant to Sect ions 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.

-- The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) Th e repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well

- being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

. . . .
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of atJ

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- least six months, the conditions whi ch led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditio ns which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

. . . .
(b) Other considerations.

-- The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, in come, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therei n which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b).

Appellants’ first claim c hallenges the juvenile court’s decision to

terminate their parental rights to Children pu rsuant to Subsection 2511(a)(5).

(A ppellants’ brief at 8, 22

- 24

. ) However, w e need only agree with the juvenile

court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to

Section 2511(b), to affirm a decre e terminating parental rights. SeeJ

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-

In r e M.M. , 106 A.3d 114, 117 (Pa.Super. 2014). Instantly, we analyze the

juvenile court’ s decision to terminate appellants’ parental rights to Child ren

under Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his ph ysical or mental well

- being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of C.D.R. , 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

“ The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be

remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental

duties.” Id. “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s

vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the

necessity or availability of services, may prop erly be rejected as untimely or

disingenuous.” In re A.L.D

. , 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super. 2002) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Upon review, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence to

support the juvenil e court’s termi nation of appellants’ parental rights to

Child ren , pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). The record establishes thatJ

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-

“incapacity” under Section 251 1(a)(2) exists given that appellants have

demonstrated a repeated and continual inability to address their substan ce

abuse problems and parenting issues that led to the placement of Children

.
As noted, DHS became invol ved in this matter in June 2019 following a call to

the Tioga County 911 Center that appellants were sleeping or had overdosed

in a car parked on t he s ide of the roadway
, and that Children were found all

running around outside the vehicle and were filthy. (Notes of testimony,

2/18/20 at 34

- 36

. ) Heather Patterson, the DHS caseworker assigned to

Children, testified that at the time of the February 18, 2020 termination

hearing, Father had yet to make any effort to address his substance abuse

problems. ( Id. at 129.) Mot her, in turn, initially took steps to address her

substance abuse issues by attending an inpatient rehabilitation program, but

relapsed soon after her release from the program and took no further steps

to address her substance abuse issues. ( Id. at 128

- 32. ) At the time of the

termination hearing, both appellants had also failed multiple drug screenings.

( Id. at 98

- 103.)

The record furt her reflects that appellants have demonstrated an

u nwillingness to actively engage or cooperate with DHS; take advantage of

the visitation offered to them by DHS; or keep in regular contact with their

caseworker or service providers. Although DHS funded taxi service for

appellants to and from visitation, the record reflects that appellants have

participated in only approximately one

- half of the scheduled visits withJ

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-

Children and only sporadically attended the medical, dental, and/or

therapeutic appointmen ts of Children. ( Id. at 135

- 144 ). Additionally,

Clara Holl e y , the Effective Safe Parenting (“ESP”) caseworker assigned to

work with appellants to achieve the goals of reunification , testified that she

made 17 attempts to make contact with appellants in t he two months

preceding the termination hearing, and was successful only one time. ( Id. at

97, 103

- 104.) Patterson also testified as to the difficulty she had in contacting

appellants or getting them to engage in any services. ( Id. at 146, 167.) We

further agree with the juvenile court that “[n]o credible evidence indicates a

likelihood that either [appellant] will take steps to address substance use and

other concer ns in the foreseeable future.” ( Juvenile court opinion ( No. 552

MDA 2020; No. 7 O C 2020), 2/20/20 at 2, § 11. )

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the juvenile court that there

exists clear and convincing evidence of record to terminate appellants’

parental rights to Child ren pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). See

In re Adoption of C. D.R. , 111 A.3d at 1216.

Next, we address whether the termination of appellants’ parental rights

was in Children’s best interests, pursuant to Section 2511(b). With regard to

Section 2511(b), our supreme court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for t ermination under subsection (a) are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly int erpreted to include [i]ntangibles such asJ

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- love, comfort, security, and stability. .

. . [T]his Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost at tention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task.

In re T.S.M. , 71 A.3d at 267 (internal case citations omitted)

. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. Accordingly, the extent of

the bond

- effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the

particular case.” In re A doption of J.M. , 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super.

2010) (cita tions omitted). W hen evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not

required to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer

evaluations as well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) doe s not require a formal

bonding evaluation.” In re Z.P. , 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010)

(citations omitted). This court has long recognized that,

[w] hile a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best

- i nterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child , and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent.

. . .J

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-

In re Adoption of C.D.R. , 111 A.3d at 1219 (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, the juvenile court made the following findings with respect to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of each Child:

S.M.

The Court begins by acknowledging that there is a

bond betwe en each [appellant] and [S.M.] [S.M.] recognizes [appell ants] as parents and interacts with them during periods of visitation, in that context. The Court, however notes, that this bond and connection betwe en [S.M.] has not been in all ways positive. The Court notes that [S.M.] has been diagnosed with Post Tra umatic Stress Disorder. The Court further notes that the child, following an evaluation by [John] Higham, has been diagnosed with a person history of physical abuse, psychological abuse, and neglect in childhood.

The Court is also cognizant of and notes the position of the Legal Interest Attorney, appointed on behalf of [S.M.] , Attorney Megan Wells, after consultation with [S.M.], has indicated [S.M.’s] stated preference to no l onger have contact with either [appellant] , and a desire for permanency in the home of the current foster parent s. As discussed above, [S .M.] has, since removal from the custody of [appellants] , been attended to entirely by the foster parents, under the supervision of [DHS]

. The current foster resource provides transportation and access to medical services in [S.M.’s] home community of Westfield. [S.M.] has also been provided with the appropr iate and necessary dental care. [DHS] has taken steps to engage [S.M.] in recommended mental health therapy. The Court also notes that the testimony of the foster parent, Amber Swartley, indicating that she and her husband are prepared to provide permanency for [S.M.] and her siblings in the form of adoption, should the Court terminate the parental rights. Based upon the entirety of the reco rd presented, the CourtJ

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- determines that it is clearly in [S.M.’s] long

- term best inte rest that [appellant s ’ ] parental rights be terminated. [S.M.] is entitled to, pursuant to law, permanency, and while the Court is consc ious of the fact that [S.M.] has be en in placement for less than 1 year, the Court, as discussed above, has no confidence that [appellants] will take the necessary steps to reassume their parental responsibilities in the near future. A denial of termination at this point in time would resu lt in a continued languishing of [S.M.]
, in a state between the foster parents and [appellants]

. While the Court acknowledges that there are likely to be consequences in permanently severing the bond between [appellants] and [S.M.] , th e long

- term best interest of [S.M.] clearly outweighs the temporary discomfort or inconvenience occasioned by termination.

Juvenile court opinion ( No. 552 MDA 2020; N o. 7 OC 2020), 2/20/20 at 7

- 8

.

K.M.

The Court begins by acknowledging that there i s a

bon d between each [appellant] and [K.M.] . [K.M.] recognizes [appellants] as parents and interacts with them during periods of visitation, in that context. The Court, however notes, that this bond and connection between [K.M.] has not been in all ways positi ve, with a person [ sic ] history of physical abuse, psychological abuse, and neglect in childhood.

As discussed above, [K.M.] has, since removal from the custody of [appellants] , been attended to entirely by the foster parents, under the supervision of [DH S]

. The current foster resource provides transportation and access to medical services in [K.M.’s] home community of Westfield. The Court also notes that the testimony of the foster parent, Amber Swartley, indicating that she and her husband are prepared to provide permanency for [K.M.] and his siblings in the form of adoption, should the Court terminate the parental rights. Based upon the entirety of the record presented, the Court determines tha t it is clearly in the [K.M.’s] long

- term best interest that [appellants ’ ]J

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- parental rights be terminated. [K.M.] is entitled to, pursuant to law, permanency, and while the Court is

cons cious of the fact that [K.M.] has been in placement for less than 1 year, the Court, as discussed above, has no confidence tha t [appellants] will take the necessary steps to reassume their parental responsibilities in the near future. A denial of termination at this point in time would result in a

co ntinued languishing of [K.M] , in a state between the foster parents and [appella nts]

. While the Court acknowledges that there are likely to be consequences in permanently severing the bond between [appellants] and [K.M.] , the long

- term best interest of [K.M.] clearly outweighs the temporary discomfort or inconvenience occasioned by t ermination.

J uvenile court opinion ( No. 553 MDA 2020; No. 8 OC 2020), 2/20/20 at 7

- 8

.

B .M.

The Court begins by acknowledging that there i s a

bond between each [appellant] and [B.M.]. [B.M.] recognizes [appellants] as parents and interacts with them durin g periods of visitation, in that context. The Court, however notes, that this bond and connection between [B.M.] has not been in all ways positive, with a person [ sic ] history of physical abuse, psychological abuse, and neglect in childhood.

As discussed above, [B.M.] has, since removal from the custody of [appellants] , been attended to entirely by the foster parents, under the supervision of [DHS]

. The current foster resource provides transportation and access to medical services in [B.M.’s] home

commun ity of Westfield. The Court also notes that the testimony of the foster parent, Amber Swartley, indicating that she and her husband are prepared to provide permanency for [B.M.] and his siblings in the form of adoption, should the Court terminate the pare ntal rights. Based upon the entirety of the record presented, the Court determines tha t it is clearly in the [B.M.’s] long

- term best interest that [appellants ’ ] parental rights be terminated. [B.M.] is entitled to, pursuant to law, permanency, and while the Court isJ

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- cons cious of the fact that [B.M.] has been in placement for less than 1 year, the Court, as discussed above, has no confidence that [appellants] will take the necessary steps to reassume their parental responsibilities in the near future. A d enial of termination at this point in time would result in a

co ntinued languishing of [B.M] , in a state between the foster parents and [appellants]

. While the Court acknowledges that there are likely to be consequences in permanently severing the bond bet ween [appellants] and [B.M.] , the long

- term best interest of [B.M.] clearly outweighs the temporary discomfort or inconvenience occasioned by termination.

J uvenile court opinion ( No. 554 MDA 2020; No. 9 OC 2020), 2/20/20 at 7

- 8

. Our standard of review requires us to accept the juvenile court’s findings

of fact and credibility determinations where, as here, they are supported by

the record. See In re T.S.M. , 71 A.3d at 267. Accordingly, we agree with

the juvenile court that the t ermination of appellants’ parental rights to

Children was proper under Section 2511(b).

In their final claim, appellants contend the juvenile court erred “ in

finding that the [DHS] allo wed sufficient time for [appellants ] to respond to

services by allowing termination [of] parental rights after only eight months

of services .” (Appellants’ brief at 8). Here, appellants failed to specifically

raise or develop this issue in a separate section in the “A rgument ” portion of

their appellate b rief, opting instead to meld this argument in to their discussion

of Section 2511(a)(5)

. ( See appellants’ brie f at 19

- 24.) Having already found

that termination of appellant s ’ parental rights was proper under Section

2511(a)( 2), and cognizant of the fact that we need only agree with theJ

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- 18

-

juvenile court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) to affirm a

termination decree, see In re M.M. , 106 A.3d at 117 , we need not address

this issue.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court did not

abuse its discretion by in voluntarily terminating appellants’ parental rights to

Child ren pursuan t to Section 2511(a)(2 ) and (b). Accordingly, we affirm the

juvenile court’s February 20, 2020 decrees

.

Decree s affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 09/16/2020