alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2023083EN.01000601.xml

| 6.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 83/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 83/6

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 19 January 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo — Spain) — Administración General del Estado, Confederación Nacional de Autoescuelas (CNAE), UTE CNAE-ITT-FORMASTER-ECT v Asociación para la Defensa de los Intereses Comunes de las Autoescuelas (AUDICA), Ministerio Fiscal

(Case C-292/21, (1) CNAE and Others)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 2006/123/EC - Services in the internal market - Article 2(2)(d) - Substantive scope - Service in the field of transport - Provision of road safety awareness and re-education courses for the recovery of driving licence points - Concession to operate a public service - Article 15 - Requirements - Division of the relevant territory into five lots - Quantitative and territorial limit on access to the activity concerned - Overriding reasons in the public interest - Justification - Road safety - Proportionality - Service of general economic interest)

(2023/C 83/06)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Administración General del Estado, Confederación Nacional de Autoescuelas (CNAE), UTE CNAE-ITT-FORMASTER-ECT

Respondents: Asociación para la Defensa de los Intereses Comunes de las Autoescuelas (AUDICA), Ministerio Fiscal

Operative part of the judgment

Article 15 of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market

must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the award of the contract for the provision of road safety awareness and training courses for the purposes of the recovery of driving licence points must be made by means of a public service concession, in so far as that legislation goes beyond what is necessary to attain the general interest objective pursued, namely the improvement of road safety.

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(1)  OJ C 329, 16.8.2021.

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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. AP-76,148

EX PARTE ARTEMIO GONZALO LOPEZ, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 2006CR0452-D3(A) IN THE 341ST DISTRICT COURT

FROM WEBB COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of attempted capital

murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 

Applicant contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to

timely file a notice of appeal. We remanded this application to the trial court for findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

The trial court has determined that trial counsel failed to timely file a notice of appeal. We
2

find, therefore, that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time appeal of the

judgment of conviction in Cause No. 2006CR0452-D3(A) from the 341st Judicial District Court of

Webb County. Applicant is ordered returned to that time at which he may give a written notice of

appeal so that he may then, with the aid of counsel, obtain a meaningful appeal. All time limits shall

be calculated as if the sentence had been imposed on the date on which the mandate of this Court

issues. We hold that, should Applicant desire to prosecute an appeal, he must take affirmative steps

to file a written notice of appeal in the trial court within 30 days after the mandate of this Court

issues.

Delivered: May 6, 2009

Do Not Publish
#### Louis V. de la VERGNE v. Hugues J. de la VERGNE, II, and Charles E. de la Vergne, Jr.

No. 12084.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

July 10, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 31, 1978.

Louis R. Koerner, Jr., New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.

C. Ellis Henican, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.

Before BLANCHE, COVINGTON and CHIASSON, JJ.

BLANCHE, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment denying a motion for confirmation of preliminary default.

*1238Plaintiff-appellant brought this suit for specific performance of an agreement involving property in St. Tammany Parish. It is the same property which the trial court had previously decreed should have been partitioned by licitation.1 Plaintiff was a defendant in the partition suit and let that suit go to judgment without putting at issue the agreement which he now asserts gives him the right to specific performance. After considering the evidence submitted by the plaintiff on confirmation, the trial court denied the motion, stating:

> “In reviewing the record in this case and carefully considering the evidence presented on December 12, 1977, the court has concluded that the proof offered does not justify the relief sought. In addition the property that is the subject of this case is the same property that another division of this court has decreed should be partitioned by licitation and although this matter is now on appeal the court observes that the defendant had every opportunity to raise the claim that he asserted in this case, but did not do so for reasons that are not now apparent to the court.” (Record, p. 23)

The agreement sought to be enforced is represented by two writings, both dated the same date, one written by Hugues de la Vergne, II, (Exhibit H-l) and one written by Charles de la Vergne, Jr. (Exhibit C-l). The agreements are identical except for the order of the signatures:

> “Louis buys homesite (700 X 1200 approx) from Uncle Jules & Aunt Claire for 4 of total price from them of $350,-000 & from Hugues to Charles their interest based on same purchase price.

> “Heirs of C.E.V. buy the remainder (vacant land) from Uncle Jules & Aunt Claire for % of total price and sell part after 9 months to pay purchase price and to acquire new road.”

As we read the agreement, it does not contain any obligatory language which would require the parties to buy or sell according to its terms. At most, it indicates nothing more than an expression of intention between the parties thereto. Furthermore, whatever were the intentions of the parties as expressed by the above agreement, the trial judge could have considered them abandoned, as he took judicial notice of the partition suit in another division of the court which had gone to judgment without appellant having offered the agreement in defense thereof.

For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying plaintiff’s motion for preliminary default, at plaintiff’s costs,

AFFIRMED.

1

. This judgment was affirmed by this Court on the 12th day of June, 1978, in Appeal No. 11,984 on the docket of this Court.
Exhibit 32-1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the
Quarterly Report of The Goldfield Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the three months ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John H. Sottile,
Chairman of the Board of Directors, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to The Goldfield Corporation and will be retained by The Goldfield Corporation
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



/s/ JOHN H. SOTTILEJohn H. SottileChairman of the Board of Directors, President and Chief
Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)August 13, 2008
# C_2023278EN.01000601.xml

| 7.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 278/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 278/6

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Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 June 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal correctionnel de Villefranche-sur-Saône — France) — Criminal proceedings against K.B., F.S.

(Case C-660/21, (1) K.B. and F.S. (Raising ex officio of an infringement in criminal proceedings))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Area of freedom, security and justice - Judicial cooperation in criminal matters - Directive 2012/13/EU - Articles 3 and 4 - Obligation for the competent authorities to inform suspects and accused persons promptly of their right to remain silent - Article 8(2) - Right to invoke a breach of that obligation - National legislation prohibiting the trial court from raising such a breach of its own motion - Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union)

(2023/C 278/07)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal correctionnel de Villefranche-sur-Saône

Parties in the main proceedings

K.B., F.S.

Operative part of the judgment

Articles 3 and 4 and Article 8(2) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, read in the light of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude national legislation which prohibits the trial court in a criminal case from raising of its own motion, with a view to the annulment of the procedure, a breach of the obligation imposed on the competent authorities, under Articles 3 and 4 of that directive, to inform suspects or accused persons promptly of their right to remain silent, where those suspects or accused persons have not been deprived of a practical and effective opportunity to have access to a lawyer in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, if necessary having obtained legal aid as provided in Directive (EU) 2016/1919 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings, and where they, like their lawyers, if any, have had a right of access to their file and the right to invoke that breach within a reasonable period of time, in accordance with Article 8(2) of Directive 2012/13.

---

(1)  OJ C 24, 17.1.2022.

---
EXHIBIT 10.1

COMPANY:  Global Marine Inc. (the "Company")

ITEM:     Resolutions of the Board of Directors

SUBJECT:  Director Compensation

DATE:     August 5, 1997


          RESOLVED that the resolutions of this Board of Directors
adopted on August 3, 1994, relating to directors  fees and expense
reimbursement be, and they hereby are, superseded in their
entirety, and that the following resolutions be, and they hereby
are, effective in their stead; and it was further

          RESOLVED that the fees payable to directors of the
Company who are not officers or employees of the Company be, and
they hereby are, $7,000 per quarter (payable with respect to each
calendar quarter on the date of the regular meeting of the Board of
Directors during such calendar quarter), plus $1,000 for
participation in each regular meeting of the Board of Directors,
whether in person or by telephone, $1,000 for attendance at each of
the Company s annual management conferences, $1,500 for attendance
at each special meeting of the Board of Directors, $1,000 for
participation by telephone in each special meeting of the Board of
Directors, and $500 for participation in each meeting of any
Committee of the Board of Directors, whether in person or by
telephone; and it was further

          RESOLVED that each director shall be reimbursed for all
expenses incurred by such director in attending each annual
management conference and each meeting of the Board of Directors of
the Company including regular meetings, special meetings and
meetings of any Committee of the Board of Directors, and that
payment of such expenses shall be made upon receipt by the Company
of an invoice or expense account covering such expenses.
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 133 (Wednesday, July 11, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 32179]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-14837]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 10459]


In the Matter of the Designation of al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB), aka 
Saraya al-Ashtar, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Pursuant to 
Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended

    Based upon a review of the Administrative Record assembled in this 
matter, and in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary 
of the Treasury, I conclude that there is a sufficient factual basis to 
find that the relevant circumstances described in section 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (hereinafter ``INA'') (8 
U.S.C. 1189), exist with respect to al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB), also 
known as Saraya al-Ashtar.
    Therefore, I hereby designate the aforementioned organization and 
its aliases as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 
of the INA.
    This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.

    Dated: June 19, 2018.
Michael R. Pompeo,
Secretary of State.
[FR Doc. 2018-14837 Filed 7-10-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4710-AD-P
No. 10612.

#### The Electric Railway & Power Co. et al. *v.*Bair et al., Commissioners of Sandusky County.

Decided October 6, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Sandusky county.

*Mr. J. F. Bunn*and *Mr. Basil Meek,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Mr. M. W. Hunt*and *Messrs. Garver, Carver & Garver,*for defendants in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Shauck, Crew, Spear and Davis, JJ., concur.
#### Henry BRADY, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-928.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 3, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-6803

ROBERT HOLLAND KOON, Petitioner - Appellant,
versus CHARLES M. CONDON, South Carolina Attorney General, Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort. C. Weston Houck, Senior District Judge. (CA-01-3101-9-12) Submitted: August 3, 2005 Decided: August 16, 2005 Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert Holland Koon, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Chief Deputy Attorney General, William Edgar Salter, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* On limited remand, the district court found that April 16, 2004, is the earliest date that Koon could have properly delivered the notice to prison officials for mailing to the court. SeeFed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988). - 2 - PER CURIAM: Robert Holland Koon seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s order was entered on the docket on March 16, 2004. The notice of appeal was filed, at the earliest, on April 16, 2004. * Because Koon failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We further deny Koon’s motions for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the- 3 - materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
SCWC-16-0000355

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

 

DEBBIE S. QUEL,

Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant/Appellant,

vs.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF HAWAI#I, 

Respondent/Respondent-Appellee/Appellee. 

 

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-16-0000355; CIVIL NO. 15-1-1308)

ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Pollack, and Wilson, JJ.)

Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant/Appellant Debbie S.

Quel’s application for writ of certiorari filed on July 6, 2018,

is hereby accepted and will be scheduled for oral argument. The

parties will be notified by the appellate clerk regarding

scheduling.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, August 27, 2018.

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Richard W. Pollack

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-16-0000355

27-AUG-2018

03:55 PM
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 24

                           SMITHWAY MOTOR XPRESS CORP.

                               Powers of Attorney

      The undersigned directors of Smithway Motor Xpress Corp., a Nevada
corporation, do hereby make, constitute and appoint G. Larry Owens and Douglas
C. Sandvig, and either of them, the undersigned's true and lawful
attorneys-in-fact, with power of substitution, for the undersigned and in the
undersigned's name, place and stead, to sign and file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1934, as amended, the Company's
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2005, any and all
amendments and exhibits to such Annual Report on Form 10-K and any and all
applications, instruments, and other documents to be filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission pertaining to such Annual Report on Form 10-K or any
amendments thereto, granting unto said attorneys-in-fact, and either of them,
full power and authority to do and perform any and all acts necessary or
incidental to the performance and execution of the powers herein expressly
granted.

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the undersigned have hereunto set their hands
as of March 27, 2006.

/s/ Terry G. Christenberry
---------------------------------------
Terry G. Christenberry

/s/ Labh S. Hira
---------------------------------------
Labh S. Hira

/s/ Herbert D. Ihle
---------------------------------------
Herbert D. Ihle

/s/ Marlys L. Smith
---------------------------------------
Marlys L. Smith
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Linda Smith, Appellant.

[737 NYS2d 843]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Martin Rettinger, J.), rendered December 4, 1998, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of four counts of grand larceny in the fourth degree and three counts of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, and sentencing her, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 2 to 4 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant’s application made pursuant to *Batson v Kentucky*(476 US 79). The record supports *368the court’s determination that the prosecutor’s proffered justifications for striking three prospective jurors were not pretextual. The court’s findings in this regard are entitled to “great deference” *(People v Hernandez,*75 NY2d 350, 356, *affd*500 US 352). The court properly credited the prosecutor’s disclaimer of having treated similarly situated panelists disparately on the basis of race, since there were significant differences in the situations of the challenged and unchallenged panelists at issue.

During jury selection, the court properly exercised its discretion in imposing reasonable time limits upon voir dire and in precluding several questions by defense counsel that were repetitious and improper in form *(see, People v Jean,*75 NY2d 744; *People v Boulware,*29 NY2d 135, 140, *cert denied*405 US 995). Defendant was not precluded from pursuing any relevant lines of inquiry. Concur — Williams, J.P., Mazzarelli, Rosenberger, Wallach and Lerner, JJ.
Order entered June 27, 2018

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05 - 18 - 00094 - CR No. 05 - 18 - 0009 5 - CR No. 05 - 18 - 0009 6 - CR MATTHEW BARRETT O'SH EA, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . F15 - 51850 - R , F15 - 75167 - R & F15 - 75168 - R 

### O RDER Before the Court is the June 21, 2018 request of court reporter Debi Harris for an extension of time to file the reporter’s record in appellate cause number 05

- 18

- 00094

- CR. We GRANT the request to the extent that we ORDER the reporter’s record in all three of the above appeals filed within TEN DAYS of the date of this order.

/s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE