alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
----

| NAME                                                    |   | JURISDICTION OF INCORPORATION                      |
|---------------------------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------------|
| N.E.T. Europe Ltd.                                      |   | United Kingdom (with a branch registered in Dubai) |
| NET Europe SAS                                          |   | France                                             |
| N.E.T. Federal, Inc.                                    |   | Delaware                                           |
| N.E.T. Japan, Inc.                                      |   | Delaware (with a branch registered in Japan)       |
| Network Equipment Technologies Australia Pty Limited    |   | Australia                                          |
| Quintum Technologies, LLC                               |   | Delaware                                           |
| Quintum Telecommunication Technology (Shanghai) Limited |   | China                                              |
| Quintum Technologies (Hong Kong) Limited                |   | Hong Kong (with a branch registered in Taiwan)     |
|                                                    |   |                                               |

----
#### Clarence POWELL, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-1105.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 8, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
No. 00-1017.

#### Beckman Instruments, Inc., et al. *v.*Cincom Systems, Inc.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Exhibit 10.7
AMENDMENT #2
TO THE
PEOPLES SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO.
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN
As authorized by Section 7.2 of Peoples Security Bank & Trust Co. Employee Stock Ownership Plan (“Plan”) as amended and restated effective January 1, 2015, the employer, Peoples Security Bank and Trust Company, hereby amends the Plan in the following manner:
FIRST: Employer Contribution Allocation Formula
Section 3.2(c)(1) is amended to provide an allocation formula under which each eligible participant constitutes his own separate classification. As amended, Section 3.2(c)(1) shall read as follows:
The employer shall make a separate employer contribution for the plan year with respect to each classification. The trustee shall be notified by the employer in writing as to the amount being contributed with respect to each classification. Forfeitures for the plan year shall be allocated among the classifications in the same proportion as the separate employer contributions for the plan year. Each eligible participant shall constitute his own separate classification.
SECOND: Effective Date
This amendment is made effective as of January 1, 2019.
THIRD: Remaining Plan Provisions
All other provisions of the Plan remain in full force and effect.
Executed this 30 day of August, 2019 by the duly authorized agent of Peoples Security Bank and Trust Company.
/s/ Debra E. Adams​ ​​ ​
Title: Board Secretary
#### William Herbert RICHARDSON, Jack E. Bennett, Miles Tommy Burket Headen, James Henry Bolden, Harry James Bolden, Frank White Andrews, and John Paul Rogers, Petitioners, v. CITY OF PLANT CITY, Respondent.

No. 69-27.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

May 16, 1969.

Certiorari dismissed.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 15, 2018

No. 04-17-00434-CV

Roger WIATREK,

Appellant

v.

Laura WIATREK,

Appellee

From the 218th Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas

Trial Court No. 14-12-0756-CVW

The Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The Appellee’s Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Response Brief is 

GRANTED. The Appellee’s brief is due on March 19, 2018. No further extensions of time will 

be granted absent extraordinary circumstances.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 15th day of February, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
* District Judge of the Southern District of Texas,

sitting by designation.

** Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 17, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 02-30291

_____________________

JAMES V. JIMINEZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant,

v.

PAW PAW’S CAMPER CITY, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana 

00-CV-1756-N

_________________________________________________________________

Before KING, Chief Judge, DAVIS, Circuit Judge, and ROSENTHAL*,

District Judge. 

PER CURIAM:**

After carefully reviewing the record and considering the

briefs of the parties and the argument of counsel, we are

satisfied that the district court committed no reversible error

in this fact intensive case.

AFFIRMED.
2
#### In the Matter of Mark P. McNamara, Petitioner, v Glenn S. Goord, as Commissioner of Correctional Services, Respondent.

[736 NYS2d 635]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

Petitioner, a chapel aide, was charged with violating several prison disciplinary rules after a correction officer observed him at his desk in the chapel typing a letter on paper bearing the letterhead of the facility’s Coordinating Chaplain, John Gainey. The letter was addressed to the Salvation Army and sought assistance “for an inmate and his family” who were at odds with the facility’s administration over interpreting the terms of a Family Court order of visitation. This correspondence was interpreted by the reporting officer as a request made by petitioner for assistance with his personal legal problems while impersonating Gainey by corresponding on his letterhead stationery.

At petitioner’s disciplinary hearing, Gainey testified that he had authorized petitioner, as his chapel aide, to prepare letters for his subsequent approval and signature, some of which were sent to organizations seeking donations of books and other items needed by the prison ministry. Gainey stated, however, that he had not authorized the letter to the Salvation Army soliciting legal assistance on behalf of an anonymous inmate.

Petitioner was found guilty of the charges of unauthorized *910solicitation of goods or services and of forging or counterfeiting a facility document. Substantial evidence of petitioner’s guilt of the charge of unauthorized solicitation was presented in the form of the misbehavior report, together with the attached copy of the letter to the Salvation Army typed by petitioner on Gainey’s letterhead stationery, and the testimony given by Gainey that the letter had not been authorized by him (see, *Matter of Early v Coughlin,*207 AD2d 588, 589). The same documents and testimony constituted substantial evidence that petitioner violated the rule that prohibits forging or counterfeiting a facility document. Petitioner’s remaining contentions have been examined and found to be without merit.

Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Spain, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
#### Walter H. BAILEY, Petitioner, v. E. David FREDRICK and Mary R. Fredrick, his wife, Respondents.

No. 71-153.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 20, 1971.

Appeal dismissed.
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<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-2000
<CASH>                                          41,173
<SECURITIES>                                         0
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<BONDS>                                              0
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<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,360,666)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    41,173
<SALES>                                        121,918
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               211,595
<CGS>                                                0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               282,271
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              25,806
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (70,736)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       853
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (71,589)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (71,589)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.02)
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</TABLE>
#### Elmer MULLINS and W. E. Blake v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 46943.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 30, 1972.

Fountain D. Dawson, Greenville, for appellants.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Karen Gilfoy, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before RODGERS, P. J., and JONES, INZER, ROBERTSON and BROOM, JJ.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Tate County; Dick R. Thomas, Judge.

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 31.2



CERTIFICATION



I, John F. McGrath, Jr., Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Network Equipment Technologies, Inc., certify that:



1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Network Equipment Technologies, Inc.;

2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4.  The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:



(a)

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)

Paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release 33-8238;

(c)

Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(d)

Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b)

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



June 08, 2004

/s/ John F. McGrath, Jr.



John F. McGrath, Jr.

Vice President and Chief Financial Officer



#
# C_2020247EN.01001702.xml

| 27.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 247/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 247/17

---

Action brought on 4 May 2020 — KG v Parliament

(Case T-251/20)

(2020/C 247/26)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: KG (represented by: S. Rodrigues and A. Champetier, lawyers)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the Parliament’s decision dated 4 February 2020 rejecting her complaint of 29 November 2019: |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the Parliament’s decision dated 4 February 2020 rejecting her complaint of 29 November 2019:

| — | annul, if need be, the Parliament’s decision dated 30 August 2019 rejecting her initial request of 4 April 2019; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul, if need be, the Parliament’s decision dated 30 August 2019 rejecting her initial request of 4 April 2019;

| — | order the defendant to compensate the applicant for non-material damage estimated, ex æquo et bono, at the sum of EUR 5 000; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to compensate the applicant for non-material damage estimated, ex æquo et bono, at the sum of EUR 5 000;

| — | order the defendant to reimburse to the applicant all the legal costs incurred and the fees of the applicant’s retained legal counsel. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to reimburse to the applicant all the legal costs incurred and the fees of the applicant’s retained legal counsel.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging the misinterpretation of Article 20(3) of Annex XIII of the Staff Regulations and the breach of the principle of continuity of service. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging the misinterpretation of Article 20(3) of Annex XIII of the Staff Regulations and the breach of the principle of continuity of service.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging breach of the principles of legitimate expectations and acquired rights. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging breach of the principles of legitimate expectations and acquired rights.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging breach of the right to a good administration and of the duty of care. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging breach of the right to a good administration and of the duty of care.

---
#### Johnnie Lee MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-558.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 6, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. Dufford DYER, Appellant, v. Leigh S. WILSON, as Sheriff of Brevard County, Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-784.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 29, 1972.

*242Daniel F. Citak, Titusville, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

OWEN, Judge.

By petition for writ of habeas corpus appellant sought to test the legality of his arrest under an executive rendition warrant issued upon demand of the State of Georgia. This appeal is from the order which denied the petition and remanded the petitioner to custody.

The demand for extradition was accompanied by an authenticated copy of a warrant supported by an affidavit made before a committing magistrate of the State of Georgia. Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the affidavit to substantially charge a crime under the laws of the demanding state. The court refused to pass upon the sufficiency of the affidavit, concluding that this would be a proper subject for determination by the courts of the demanding state.

Petitioner, having properly raised in the habeas corpus proceeding the question of whether the affidavit made before the magistrate in the demanding state substantially charged petitioner with having committed a crime under the laws of Georgia, is entitled to have that issue determined by the court as a jurisdictional pre-requisite essential to the issuance of the rendition warrant. State ex rel. Huston v. Clark, 1935, 121 Fla. 161, 163 So. 471; Cossette v. State, Fla.App.1969, 221 So.2d 427. The test, both by statute, Section 941.03, F.S.1969, F.S.A., and case law, Chase v. State, 1927, 93 Fla. 963, 113 So. 103, is whether the affidavit *substantially*charges a crime under the law of the demanding state.

The order is reversed and this cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

WALDEN and MAGER, JJ., concur.
#### Bruce WALTERS, a minor, by his father and next friend, Glenn Walters, and Glenn Walters, individually, Appellants, v. INDEPENDENT CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 71-227.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 15, 1972.

Dick Lee and Dennis S. Silver, of Lee & Hockett, Sarasota, for appellants.

L. Norman Vaughan-Birch, of Wood, Scheb, Whitesell, Drymon & Warren, Sarasota, for appellee.

McNULTY, Judge.

The four year old plaintiff-appellant was seriously injured while playing with his nine year old brother in and about defendant-appellee’s unfenced concrete plant when the plant was closed for business on a Saturday afternoon. Plaintiff’s complaint was predicated on attractive nuisance and there was much evidence introduced in an effort to establish the requisites thereof. The trial judge directed a verdict in favor of defendant-appellee, however, finding that, “ . . . there had been no evidence adduced that was legally sufficient to support a verdict for the Plaintiffs, and that as a matter of law, there had been no evi*187dence presented by the Plaintiffs upon which a jury could find the Defendant guilty of any actionable negligence.”

We are of the view that the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, presented jury questions as to whether, in the light of all the circumstances, an attractive nuisance existed in fact; if so, whether defendant-appellee was chargeable with knowledge thereof; whether defendant-appellee was indeed negligent in the premises; and whether plaintiff-appellant was capable or was guilty of contributory negligence. A directed verdict was therefore improper. See Fouraker v. Mullis (Fla.App.1960), 120 So.2d 808; and 23 Fla.Jur., Negl., § 63 et seq. Also, cf., Tynan v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. (Fla.1971), 254 So.2d 209.

Reversed.

PIERCE, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
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<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
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<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,176
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           65,230
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<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           105
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   130,717
<SALES>                                         90,530
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                90,530
<CGS>                                          100,328
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  240,179
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   196
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   866
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,545
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (152,495)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (152,495)
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.81)
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