IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 14–0510

Filed September 12, 2014

IN THE MATTER OF EMILY SUSAN DEAN,

District Associate Court Judge.

On application of the Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications.

State commission on judicial qualifications filed application 

recommending three-month suspension of district associate judge. 

APPLICATION GRANTED; JUDICIAL OFFICER SUSPENDED. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Grant K. Dugdale and 

Kevin R. Cmelik, Assistant Attorneys General, for complainant.

Elaine F. Gray of Fehseke & Gray Law Offices, Fort Madison, for 

respondent.
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APPEL, Justice. 

In this case, we consider a recommendation by the Iowa 

Commission on Judicial Qualifications (the Commission) to suspend a 

district associate judge for three months as a result of behavior related to 

alcohol consumption. The gravamen of the original complaint that 

triggered commencement of the proceeding was a report that the judge 

arrived at a courthouse in an intoxicated state and could not perform her 

scheduled judicial duties. For the reasons expressed below, we conclude 

that a suspension without pay should be imposed, but limit the 

suspension to thirty days. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background. 

A. The Precipitating Incident. On May 9, 2012, the Commission 

received a complaint from a district court judge regarding District 

Associate Judge Emily Dean. The precipitating incident that gave rise to 

the complaint was the arrival of Judge Dean at the Henry County 

Courthouse that morning where she was said to be physically unable to 

take the bench. The complaint indicated reports that Judge Dean had 

been consuming alcohol prior to her arrival at the courthouse. The 

complaint also recited a history of Judge Dean’s absence from work for 

health-related reasons presumed to be alcohol related. On May 10, the 

Commission entered an order suspending Judge Dean from her judicial 

duties pending investigation and action on the complaint. 

B. Attorney General’s Report to the Commission. The attorney 

general’s office conducted an investigation of the facts alleged in the 

complaint and issued a report, which was admitted as State’s Exhibit 1 

at the hearing. With respect to the incident on May 9, the attorney 

general’s report indicated that Judge Dean had been drinking a colorless 

liquid and fell asleep in the car while being driven by her court reporter 
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from Fort Madison to Mount Pleasant. Upon arriving at the courthouse, 

Judge Dean swayed and was unsteady. Her court reporter recognized 

that she was not in a condition to take the bench and obtained 

assistance from an employee in the county attorney’s office to persuade 

Judge Dean not to take the bench and to leave the courthouse. Her 

court reporter drove her back to Fort Madison and contacted a family 

member. Later that day, she was hospitalized for severe alcohol 

intoxication. She remained in the hospital for three days. The attorney 

general’s office interviewed the witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the 

incident. There was no suggestion in the report of inappropriate conduct 

on the part of Judge Dean on May 9, beyond her arrival at the 

courthouse in a state of intoxication. 

In a letter to the attorney general’s office submitted pursuant to 

the investigation, Judge Dean began by admitting that she is an alcoholic 

and generally recounted her struggle with the disease, stating she 

initially addressed the problem locally through weekly substance abuse 

counseling and additional mental health counseling. She suffered a 

grand mal seizure in November 2011 as a result of alcohol withdrawal 

and participated in inpatient alcohol treatment at Hazelden in Center 

City, Minnesota, in December 2011. She stated that she attended a 

second inpatient treatment program at The Abbey in Bettendorf, Iowa, in 

April 2012. Upon further inquiry by the attorney general’s investigator, 

however, Judge Dean admitted that she left both programs shortly before

completion. 

Judge Dean did not contest the basic facts surrounding the May 9 

incident, although she stated she had “very little recollection of that 

morning.” After leaving the courthouse, Judge Dean stated that her 

family took her to Great River Medical Center’s emergency unit, where 
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she was admitted into the intensive care unit. She remained hospitalized 

for three days. She characterized the May 9 event as “hitting bottom” in 

her struggle with alcoholism. 

The report also noted other incidents of alcohol-related conduct. 

An assistant county attorney stated that in February and March of 2012, 

there were occasions when Judge Dean appeared “disoriented” and 

“disheveled.” Additionally, the report described an incident in 

Fort Madison in which lawyers and litigants were assembled in the 

courtroom. According to the report, Judge Dean took the bench and 

stated, “Why are all of you here?” The report stated Judge Dean’s court 

reporter called Judge Dean’s father who arrived and escorted her from 

the courthouse. 

The report further described other events. Judge Dean apparently 

decided to test a “panic button” to see if law enforcement would respond, 

which they did. Additionally, in May of 2012 a citizen filed a complaint 

alleging that a female driving Judge Dean’s husband’s car had urinated 

in a public street. The citizen followed the car to a destination that fit 

the description of Judge Dean’s mother’s residence. Judge Dean 

admitted she knew of the allegation, but could not remember what 

happened and could not deny it. No charges were filed. 

The report also canvassed Judge Dean’s recovery efforts after 

May 9. According to Hugh Grady of the Iowa Lawyers Assistance 

Program (ILAP), Judge Dean had made excellent progress in a twelve-step 

program. Judge Dean had also signed a contract to abide by all 

conditions imposed by ILAP, including monitoring by Mr. Grady, regular 

attendance at meetings with a sobriety support group, and preparation of 

a relapse plan. Mr. Grady and professionals at Great River Addiction 
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Services did not recommend another round of inpatient treatment for 

Judge Dean. 

C. Charges Brought by the Commission. After the attorney 

general’s investigation and subsequent report, the Commission filed a 

notice of charges against Judge Dean and set the matter for hearing. In 

the notice of charges, the Commission alleged that Judge Dean violated 

canon one and canon two of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, 

including rule 51:1.2 and rule 51:2.5(A). See Iowa Code of Judicial 

Conduct Canons 1, 2; id. rs. 51:1.2, 51:2.5(A). First, the Commission 

charged that by appearing at the Henry County Courthouse while 

intoxicated, Judge Dean failed to avoid impropriety, raised doubt about 

her integrity, and eroded confidence in the judiciary. As a result, the 

Commission alleged a violation of rule 51:1.2, which requires judges to 

promote confidence in the judiciary. See Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct 

R. 51:1.2. Second, the Commission charged that by being intoxicated 

and unable to handle assigned cases on one or more occasions, Judge 

Dean failed to demonstrate the competence and diligence required in the 

performance of judicial duties. As a result, the Commission alleged a 

violation of rule 51:2.5(A), relating to the competence, diligence, and 

cooperation of a judge. See id. r. 51:2.5(A). 

Judge Dean filed an answer admitting the charges. Although 

Judge Dean admitted to the charges, it is our duty to review the findings 

of the Commission de novo and evaluate the facts to determine if a 

violation occurred. See In re Meldrum, 834 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Iowa 2013); 

cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Gailey, 790 N.W.2d 801, 

804 (Iowa 2010) (“Our rules require us to determine whether [the]

conduct violates our ethical rules.”). In doing so, we look to both 

attorney and judicial disciplinary cases and note that principles in
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attorney disciplinary matters are generally applicable to judicial 

disciplinary matters. See In re McCormick, 639 N.W.2d 12, 18 (Iowa 

2002) (observing sanctions related to attorney misconduct should be 

comparable in judicial disciplinary proceedings).

D. Hearing Before the Commission. The Commission held its 

hearing on October 31, 2012. At the hearing, the State rested on the 

admissions by Judge Dean that she had violated the rules of judicial 

conduct. Later in the proceeding, however, in addition to the attorney 

general’s report, the State offered into evidence medical records related to 

Judge Dean’s efforts to address her alcoholism. 

Judge Dean put on testimony from alcohol counselors and her 

husband. James Towlerton, a substance-abuse counselor at Great River 

Addiction Services, testified Judge Dean had made excellent progress in 

dealing with her alcoholism since the May 9 incident. Mr. Towlerton 

noted Judge Dean had “totally involved herself” in Alcoholics Anonymous 

(AA) and attended two meetings a day the majority of time since May 9. 

Mr. Grady testified that contrary to her efforts prior to May 9, Judge 

Dean was now “fully invested in recovery” with “a completely different 

commitment” to a recovery program. Her husband testified about the 

long and painful family history of frustration and broken promises 

related to Judge Dean’s alcoholic behavior, followed by “a complete 180 

degree turn” after May 9. 

Judge Dean also testified. She recounted the course of her 

alcoholism and her unsuccessful past efforts to address it. She generally 

asserted that other than the occasion on May 9, she did not come to 

work intoxicated. She admitted that she lost her zest for the job and that 

she quit doing any more than was necessary, but she asserted she 

handled her workload in a timely manner. With respect to the citizen 
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report that she urinated in public, she had limited memory of the event 

and could neither affirm nor deny what happened. She denied any 

improper or alcohol-affected conduct in connection with testing the panic 

button, though she admitted law enforcement was not pleased by her 

experiment. Judge Dean stated she had no recollection of the assistant 

county attorney’s report of an occasion when she was confused by the 

presence of lawyers and litigants in the courtroom.

Notwithstanding failed past efforts to deal with her alcoholic 

behaviors, Judge Dean testified that since May 9, AA has become the 

center of her life. She now recognizes she is an alcoholic and she cannot 

allow herself to drink. In light of her path to recovery, Judge Dean 

declared she was desperately ready to go back to work. She recognized 

her conduct “tarnished the reputation” of the judicial branch, but 

suggested her experience would give her insight into her work as a judge. 

At the hearing, a monitoring agreement between Judge Dean and 

the ILAP was introduced into evidence. Under the terms of the 

monitoring agreement, Judge Dean, among other things, agreed to 

remain abstinent from alcohol and mood altering drugs, to attend a 

minimum of five AA meetings per week, to find and use a sponsor, to 

meet with Mr. Grady and Mr. Towlerton on a regular basis, to provide 

random urine samples upon request, and to provide proof of compliance 

to the ILAP on a quarterly basis. The monitoring agreement further 

provided that any noncompliance would be reported to the Commission. 

Mr. Grady called the monitoring agreement “the key” or, more 

ominously, “the hammer.” Judge Dean testified she was in full 

agreement with all of the provisions of the monitoring agreement. She 

stated, “I can’t do my job appropriately if I’m actively using alcohol.” 
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On the issue of sanction, the State indicated that a private 

admonition would probably do as much as anything for Judge Dean, but 

the public and the profession needed to know the matter was being taken 

seriously. Therefore, the State urged at the very least a public 

reprimand. The State further recommended the sanction of removal from 

office or a suspension without pay stayed pending Judge Dean’s 

continued sobriety and compliance with the monitoring agreement with 

the ILAP. 

Judge Dean noted she had already been off work seeking 

rehabilitation for five months. She was prepared to live with any 

sanction the Commission proposed and noted that having the hammer 

was probably a “good idea.” She primarily wanted to go back to work. 

E. Commission Rulings. 

1. Reinstatement order. On November 2, 2012, the Commission 

entered an order reinstating Judge Dean to her judicial duties. The 

reinstatement order, however, incorporated in substance the terms of the 

monitoring agreement introduced into evidence at the hearing. The 

reinstatement order provided that Mr. Grady or his designee shall 

immediately report to the Commission any failure to meet the 

requirements of the monitoring agreement. Upon such a report, the 

Commission would determine an appropriate response depending upon 

the nature of the failure. The monitoring agreement was to remain in 

effect for two years from the date of the order. 

2. Application to discipline a judicial officer. On March 27, 2014, 

the Commission filed an application with this court to discipline a 

judicial officer pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.2106 (2011). The 

Commission entered findings of fact, noting among other things that 

prior to May 9, 2012, Judge Dean wrestled with alcoholism and at times 
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appeared in court disoriented and disheveled. The Commission also 

found that Judge Dean relieved herself on a public street while under the 

influence of alcohol. The Commission further found that on May 9, 

2012, Judge Dean arrived at the Henry County Courthouse in an 

intoxicated state and, through the intervention of staff, was persuaded to 

leave rather than take the bench. The Commission noted Judge Dean 

acknowledged, and the Commission found, that Judge Dean violated 

canon one and canon two of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, 

including rule 51:1.2 and rule 51:2.5(A).

The Commission noted that while alcoholism is an illness, there 

remained the issue of an appropriate sanction for Judge Dean’s improper 

conduct. The Commission recognized the challenging nature of the task 

when alcoholism causes an otherwise competent and diligent jurist to 

violate her professional responsibilities. While the Commission 

applauded Judge Dean’s so far successful effort to control her alcohol 

use since May 9, the Commission believed that in determining the 

appropriate sanction, restoring public confidence in the judicial system 

and deterring other judges from engaging in similar unethical conduct 

were the main purposes of judicial discipline. The Commission noted 

that while a lesser sanction might be appropriate for a single incident of 

alcohol-induced behavior outside the courthouse, Judge Dean appeared 

intoxicated on the bench, in the courthouse, and in public. 

The Commission recommended that Judge Dean be suspended for 

three months without pay. Because of potential disruption to the Eighth 

Judicial District that would result from a three-month suspension, the 

Commission recommended the suspension be imposed in increments of 

no less than one week at a time, as scheduled by the chief judge of the 

district. The Commission further emphasized that during the period of 
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suspension, Judge Dean should continue to comply with the monitoring 

agreement described in the Commission’s order for reinstatement. 

II. Scope of Review.

“Our standard of review of a recommendation of judicial discipline 

by the commission on judicial qualifications is de novo.” In re 

McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 15. The ethical violation of a judge must be 

established by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. In re Block, 

816 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 2012). 

III. Discussion.

A. Violations of Judicial Ethics. In this case, the Commission 

charged, and Judge Dean has admitted, violation of rules 51:1.2 and 

51:2.5(A). Rule 51:1.2 states that “[a] judge shall act at all times in a 

manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, 

and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the 

appearance of impropriety.” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:1.2. 

Rule 51:2.5(A) provides that “[a] judge shall perform judicial and 

administrative duties competently and diligently.” Id. r. 51:2.5(A). In 

order to sanction a judge, a violation of the rules must be “substantial.” 

Iowa Code § 602.2106(3)(b). 

Like the Commission and Judge Dean, we find there is ample 

evidence to support these charges. There can be little dispute that the 

appearance of a judge in an intoxicated state at the courthouse unable to 

perform scheduled judicial duties violates both rules. On that day, 

Judge Dean did not promote public confidence in the independence, 

integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and did not perform her duties 

competently or diligently. 

In finding the violations, we do not base them upon Judge Dean’s 

mere status as an alcoholic, but rather on her conduct. The purpose of 
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judicial disciplinary proceedings is “to restore public confidence in the 

judicial system and its judges,” as well as deter future misconduct, not to 

punish an individual judge. In re Meldrum, 834 N.W.2d at 653–54; In re 

Block, 816 N.W.2d at 365. Thus, any disciplinary sanction we may 

impose, as a result of the violations in this case, arises not a result of 

Judge Dean’s status as an alcoholic, but rather because of the effect of 

her conduct on public confidence in the judicial branch and the need to 

deter future similar misconduct. 

B. Sanctions. Discipline may be imposed for a substantial 

violation of the canons of judicial ethics. Iowa Code § 602.2106(3)(b); In 

re Block, 816 N.W.2d at 364–65. In determining a suitable sanction, we 

look to the goals of discipline and the entire record, considering both 

mitigating and aggravating factors, including related misconduct 

stemming from the judge’s alcoholism. See In re Block, 816 N.W.2d at 

365–66; cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marzen, 779 

N.W.2d 757, 765 (Iowa 2010) (noting even if the evidence failed to 

establish an alleged charge, that evidence could constitute an 

aggravating factor to support a more severe sanction). We must be 

satisfied that there is a sufficient nexus between the other related 

incidents in the record and the larger goals of judicial discipline in 

imposing a proper sanction. 

Initially, we note that in two cases we have imposed public 

reprimands on judges who committed a first offense of driving a motor 

vehicle while intoxicated. In re Block, 816 N.W.2d at 363; In re Weaver, 

691 N.W.2d 725, 725 (Iowa 2004). An argument can be made that this 

case is similar to the drunk-driving cases. The drunk-driving cases, 

however, did not involve intoxication of a judge when reporting for 

judicial duties at the courthouse but instead represented discrete and 
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uncharacteristic private events. We think the appearance of a judge in a 

state of intoxication at the courthouse has an obvious direct linkage to 

the performance of judicial duties and to public respect for the integrity 

of the judicial process. Further, the record in this case shows additional 

improper conduct related to alcohol consumption. The drunk-driving 

cases do not provide us with much guidance here. 

Other jurisdictions have dealt with alcohol-related misconduct by 

judges. In In re Krake, 942 So. 2d 18, 20–28 (La. 2006), a judge was 

suspended for six months due to appearing intoxicated at public and bar 

events, appearing hung over on the bench, and requiring several leaves 

of absences from the bench to obtain treatment. The judge was later 

suspended for the balance of his term as a result of failure to abide with 

ongoing monitoring requirements. In re Krake, 976 So. 2d 162, 163–64

(La. 2008). 

Another case involving judicial misconduct arising from alcoholism 

is Idaho Judicial Council v. Becker, 834 P.2d 290 (Idaho 1992). In this 

case, the Idaho Supreme Court found that a judge’s habitual 

intemperance, abuse of alcohol, and conviction for driving under the 

influence detracted from public confidence in the integrity of the 

judiciary and warranted a three-month suspension. Id. at 290. In 

imposing its sanction, the Idaho court stressed the importance of 

maintaining the integrity of the judiciary. Id. at 293. 

There is some caselaw from other states imposing more lenient 

sanctions than Krake and Becker. In In re Kirby, 354 N.W.2d 410, 421

(Minn. 1984), the Minnesota Supreme Court found that discourteous 

treatment of female attorneys, public intoxication, conducting judicial 

business with alcohol on his breath, and habitual tardiness warranted a 

public censure. The Kirby court noted there was only one instance in 
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which Judge Kirby was intoxicated while performing judicial duties and 

there was no showing the use of alcohol had an effect on any of his 

decisions. Id. at 417. The Minnesota Court recognized, however, the 

importance of “the perception of the public upon the administration of 

justice in general and upon the over 200 other judges in this state in 

particular.” Id. 

On balance, we think the conduct demonstrated by the record in 

this case requires a suspension. The public cannot accept, the bar 

cannot condone, and we cannot tolerate judges showing up for work 

intoxicated. In addition, Judge Dean’s alcohol consumption casts a 

shadow across her discretionary decision-making, even if she was not 

specifically intoxicated when in court and even if her discretionary 

decisions were timely made and not subject to reversal on appeal. 

We consider both aggravating and mitigating factors in determining 

an appropriate sanction. In re Block, 816 N.W.2d at 365–66 (listing ten 

factors we generally consider in determining an appropriate sanction in 

each case); In re McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 16 (same). In this case, there 

are aggravating factors. There are reports in the attorney general’s 

investigation, which we find credible, that Judge Dean was occasionally 

disoriented and disheveled. While the evidence related to Judge Dean 

relieving herself in public is an anonymous police report and therefore 

problematic, we do not find Judge Dean’s asserted lack of memory 

comforting. Ordinarily, such a remarkable charge would be met with a 

quick and firm denial. It is apparent that Judge Dean had consumed 

alcohol in sufficient quantities that she could not sufficiently remember 

the nature of her conduct to deny the charge of highly unusual conduct. 

See In re Block, 816 N.W.2d at 365 (noting factors include “whether the 
14

misconduct is isolated or a pattern of misconduct” and “the nature, 

extent, and frequency of the acts of misconduct”).

But there are also important mitigating factors. There have been 

no prior complaints regarding Judge Dean. Cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Bieber, 824 N.W.2d 514, 527 (Iowa 2012) (noting, in 

attorney disciplinary case, that the “lack of a prior disciplinary record is 

an important mitigating factor”). While the misconduct was severe on 

May 9 and obviously disrupted the judicial system, Judge Dean did not 

assume the bench and preside over cases. Cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 110 (Iowa 2012) (noting 

lack of harm to third parties is significant mitigating factor in attorney 

disciplinary case). The State at the hearing emphasized that Judge Dean 

had fully cooperated with the Commission in the investigation of this 

matter. Cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Axt, 791 N.W.2d 

98, 103 (Iowa 2010) (noting cooperation with attorney disciplinary 

authorities as mitigating factor). 

Our cases, however, hold that while alcoholism is no legal 

justification, excuse, or defense for unethical conduct, the recognition of 

alcoholism and rehabilitative efforts can be a mitigating factor in 

disciplinary proceedings. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 660–61 (Iowa 2013) (canvassing attorney 

disciplinary cases); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Roush, 827 

N.W.2d 711, 719 (Iowa 2013). 

We recognize that Judge Dean was not working while she sought

rehabilitation between May and November of 2012. This absence is not a 

substitute for the sanction of suspension in this case. Absence due to

rehabilitation and disciplinary sanctions serve overlapping, but distinct, 

purposes. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Maxwell, 705 
15

N.W.2d 477, 480 (Iowa 2005). Absence from duty due to rehabilitation

does not “specifically address unethical conduct and the need to deter 

future conduct.” Id. Further, a rehabilitative absence for judicial officers 

occurs with pay rather than without pay. By contrast, lawyers are not 

permitted to earn fees while under disability suspension. See id. r.

35.17(5) (“No attorney suspended due to disability under this rule may 

engage in the practice of law in this state until reinstated by order of the 

supreme court.”). Nonetheless, absence for the purpose of rehabilitation, 

like disability suspensions for attorneys, may be considered a mitigating 

factor in determining the length and adequacy of a disciplinary 

suspension. Cf. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 662–63; Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d 528, 543–44 (Iowa 2013). 

The record in this case establishes that after a substantial period 

of difficult and painful struggle with alcoholism, Judge Dean has 

confronted her disease and now has demonstrated a deep personal 

commitment to recovery. She appears to have overcome the denial, 

recovered from the embarrassment, recognized the depth of the problem 

of alcohol dependence, and most importantly has been able to establish 

the kind of supportive framework associated with successful recovery 

over a lifetime. It has not been an easy road for her and will not always 

be an easy road in the future. But, the fact Judge Dean has chosen to 

commit herself to a disciplined program of recovery is a significant 

mitigating factor and offers her the potential of a continued successful 

judicial career. Indeed, our state is no stranger to recovering alcoholics 

who have performed outstanding judicial service after successfully 

confronting the disease. 

We note that Judge Dean and the ILAP have agreed to a monitoring 

agreement that was in substance incorporated into the Commission’s 
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order for reinstatement. The monitoring agreement was to remain in 

effect for two years from the date of the order, which time period has

nearly elapsed. We regard the monitoring agreement as an agreement 

involving Judge Dean, the ILAP, and the Commission. We do not regard 

the monitoring agreement as a formal sanction that requires our review 

on this application. The parties agreed in the event that Judge Dean 

fails to meet her obligations under the recovery monitoring agreement, 

the Commission will be notified and additional sanctions will be 

considered based upon the facts and circumstances of the violation. We 

do believe, however, that the presence of this voluntary monitoring 

agreement, and Judge Dean’s successful compliance with it, provides us 

with additional confidence that the public will be adequately protected by 

the sanction we impose here today. 

Based upon the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude 

that in order to protect the integrity of and respect for the judiciary, the 

application of the Commission should be granted and a thirty-day 

suspension without pay should be imposed upon Judge Dean. Judge 

Dean is entitled to no compensation during the course of the disciplinary 

suspension, except for fringe benefits. In order to allow for the orderly 

transition of judicial business, the suspension shall take effect seven 

days after the entry of this opinion. 

IV. Conclusion.

For the above reasons, we grant the application and hold that 

Judge Dean should be suspended from her judicial position for a period 

of thirty days without pay, except for fringe benefits. The suspension 

shall commence on September 20, 2014.

APPLICATION GRANTED; JUDICIAL OFFICER SUSPENDED.