alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 61 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 61

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                      February 4, 1993.
    Resolved, That the requirement of clause 4(b) of rule XI for a two-thirds 
vote to consider a report from the Committee on Rules on the same day it is 
presented to the House is hereby waived with respect to a resolution providing 
for consideration of a bill relating to family and temporary medical leave for 
certain employees.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
#### Larry M. EDDIE, Appellant, v. Marvin Edward MURPHY, Appellee.

No. I-365.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.

Jan. 16, 1968.

Mahon & Mahon, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Davisson F. Dunlap, of Ulmer, Murchison, Kent, Ashby & Ball, Jacksonville, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on authority of Morse Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Kravitz, 197 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1967).

CARROLL, DONALD K., acting C. J., and RAWLS and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit10.4**

 

**TERMNOTE B**

 
| $8,632,590 |   | April 30, 2002 |
|------------|--------|---------------------|

 

For value received, the undersigned, MACKIE DESIGNSINC. (“Borrower”), promises to pay to the order of U.S. BANK NATIONALASSOCIATION (“U.S. Bank”), at 1420 Fifth Avenue, Seattle,Washington 98101, or such other place or places as the holder hereof maydesignate in writing, the principal sum of Eight Million Six Hundred Thirty-TwoThousand Five Hundred Ninety Dollars ($8,632,590) in lawful immediatelyavailable money of the United States of America, in accordance with the termsand conditions of that certain Amended and Restated Credit Agreement of evendate herewith by and between Borrower and U.S. Bank (together with allsupplements, exhibits, amendments and modifications thereto, the “Credit Agreement”).  Borrower also promises to pay interest onthe unpaid principal balance hereof, commencing as of the date hereof, in likemoney in accordance with the terms and conditions and at the rate or ratesprovided for in the Credit Agreement.

 

Borrower and all endorsers, sureties and guarantorshereof jointly and severally waive presentment for payment, demand, notice ofnonpayment, notice of protest and protest of this Note, and all other noticesin connection with the delivery, acceptance, performance, default, dishonor orenforcement of the payment of this Note except such notices as are specificallyrequired by this Note or by the Credit Agreement, and they agree that theliability of each of them shall be unconditional without regard to theliability of any other party and shall not be in any manner affected by anyindulgence, extension of time, renewal, waiver or modification granted orconsented to by U.S. Bank. Borrower and all endorsers, sureties and guarantors hereof(1) consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, waivers ormodifications that may be granted by U.S. Bank with respect to the paymentor other provisions of this Note and the Credit Agreement; (2) consent to therelease of any property now or hereafter securing this Note with or withoutsubstitution; and (3) agree that additional makers, endorsers, guarantorsor sureties may become parties hereto without notice to them and withoutaffecting their liability hereunder.

 

This Note is the Term Note B referred to in theCredit Agreement and as such is entitled to all of the benefits and obligationsspecified in the Credit Agreement, including, but not limited to, anyCollateral and any conditions to making advances hereunder.  Terms defined in the Credit Agreement areused herein with the same meanings. Reference is made to the Credit Agreement for provisions for therepayment of this Note and the acceleration of the maturity hereof.

 
|   | MACKIE DESINGNS  INC. |
|--------|-----------------------|
|   |                  |
|   |                  |
|   | By:                   |   |
|   |                  | Name: |   |
|   |                  | Title: |   |

 

----
No. 10644.

#### Fauble *v.*David, Admr.

Decided January 19, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court of Cuyahoga county.

*Mr. .Charles F. Morgan,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. J. C. FLeald*and *Mr. Edward David,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Spear, Davis and Sitaucic, JJ., concur.
# C_2023015EN.01002102.xml

| 16.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 15/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 15/21

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 10 September 2021 — GP and BG v Banco Santander, S. A.

(Case C-561/21)

(2023/C 15/23)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Supremo

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: GP and BG

Respondent: Banco Santander, S. A.

Questions referred

| 1. | Is it compatible with the principle of legal certainty to interpret Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) as meaning that the limitation period for an action to recover payments made pursuant to an unfair term does not begin to run until that term has been declared invalid by a final judgment? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is it compatible with the principle of legal certainty to interpret Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) as meaning that the limitation period for an action to recover payments made pursuant to an unfair term does not begin to run until that term has been declared invalid by a final judgment?

| 2. | If such an interpretation is incompatible with the principle of legal certainty, do Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC preclude an interpretation according to which the starting point of the limitation period is the date of the judgments of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) laying down case-law on the effects of restitution (judgments of 23 January 2019)? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If such an interpretation is incompatible with the principle of legal certainty, do Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC preclude an interpretation according to which the starting point of the limitation period is the date of the judgments of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) laying down case-law on the effects of restitution (judgments of 23 January 2019)?

| 3. | If such an interpretation is incompatible with Articles 6(1) and 7(1), do those articles preclude an interpretation according to which the starting point of the limitation period is the date of the judgments of the Court of Justice holding that an action for restitution may be subject to a limitation period (essentially, the judgment of 9 July 2020, Raiffeisen Bank SA, Joined Cases C-698/10 and 699/18, and the judgment of 16 July 2020, Caixabank SA, Joined Cases C-224/19 and C-259/19, which confirmed the former)? |
| --- | --- |

3.

If such an interpretation is incompatible with Articles 6(1) and 7(1), do those articles preclude an interpretation according to which the starting point of the limitation period is the date of the judgments of the Court of Justice holding that an action for restitution may be subject to a limitation period (essentially, the judgment of 9 July 2020, Raiffeisen Bank SA, Joined Cases C-698/10 and 699/18, and the judgment of 16 July 2020, Caixabank SA, Joined Cases C-224/19 and C-259/19, which confirmed the former)?

---

(1)  OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.

---
EXHIBIT 24.1

Power of Attorney

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned hereby constitutes and appoints Harris Ravine, David Kirwan and Mary Beth Wallingford the undersigned's true
and lawful attorneys-in-fact and agents, each with full power and substitution for the undersigned and in the undersigned's name, place and stead, in any and all capacities, to
sign Fischer Imaging Corporation's Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002 (the "Form 10-K") and any or all amendments to the
Form 10-K, and to file the same, with all exhibits thereto and other documents in connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission, granting unto each of said
attorneys-in-fact and agents full power and authority to do and perform each and every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully to
all intents and purposes as the undersigned might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that either of said attorneys-in-fact and agents, or his substitute
or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereto.

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has caused this Power of Attorney to be executed as of this 13th day of April, 2004.

| |  | /s/TODGER ANDERSONSignature
| |  | ---------------------------
| |  | Todger AndersonPrint Name: 

---

QuickLinks
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Donald Ray ROBINSON v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, State of Louisiana, et al.

No. 62608.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 1, 1978.

In re: Donald Ray Robinson applying for writ of habeas corpus and certiorari. Parish of Bossier.

Writ denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

     <ARTICLE> 5
     <LEGEND>
     This schedule  contains summary  financial information  extracted from  the
     unaudited  condensed financial statements  of T.  Rowe Price  Realty Income
     Fund I,  A No-Load  Limited Partnership included  in the  accompanying Form
     10-K Report  for the year ended September 30,  1996 and is qualified in its
     entirety by reference to such financial statements.
     </LEGEND>
     <CIK> 0000752743
     <NAME> T. ROWE PRICE REALTY INCOME FUND I, A NO-LOAD LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
            
     <S>                             <C>
     <PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
     <FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1996
     <PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
     <PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
     <CASH>                                       2,290,000
     <SECURITIES>                                         0
     <RECEIVABLES>                                  329,000
     <ALLOWANCES>                                   175,000
     <INVENTORY>                                          0
     <CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
     <PP&E>                                      45,312,000
     <DEPRECIATION>                               9,519,000
     <TOTAL-ASSETS>                              38,729,000
     <CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
     <BONDS>                                              0
     <PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
     <PREFERRED>                                          0
     <COMMON>                                             0
     <OTHER-SE>                                  37,814,000<F2>
     <TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                38,729,000
     <SALES>                                              0
     <TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,171,000
     <CGS>                                                0
     <TOTAL-COSTS>                                8,774,000
     <OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
     <LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
     <INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
     <INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,603,000)
     <INCOME-TAX>                                         0
     <INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,603,000)
     <DISCONTINUED>                                       0
     <EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
     <CHANGES>                                            0
     <NET-INCOME>                               (2,603,000)
     <EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0<F3>
     <EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
     <FN>
     <F1>Not contained in registrant's unclassified balance sheet.
     <F2>Partners' capital.
     <F3>Not applicable.  Net income per limited partnership unit is ($25.85).
     </FN>
# C_2021471EN.01003301.xml

| 22.11.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 471/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.11.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 471/33

---

Order of the President of the Court of 18 August 2021 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Braşov — Romania) — S.C. Techno-Gaz K.F.T. PAKS v U.A.T. Comuna Dalnic

(Case C-298/21) (1)

(2021/C 471/45)

Language of the case: Romanian

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 329, 16.8.2021.

---
<PAGE>   1
GENOVESE DRUG STORES, INC.

EXHIBIT 11

STATEMENT RE:  COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE

(IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE AMOUNTS)



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                    Twelve Weeks Ended       Twenty-Eight Weeks Ended
                                                 ----------------------------------------------------
                                                 August 15,    August 16,    August 15,    August 16,
                                                    1997          1996          1997          1996
                                                 ----------    ----------    ----------    ----------
<S>                                                <C>           <C>           <C>           <C>
Primary:

Weighted average shares outstanding (A)             12,398        12,216        12,365        12,215

Equivalent shares-dilutive stock options (B)          --            --            --            --
                                                   -------       -------       -------       -------

                                                    12,398        12,216        12,365        12,215
                                                   =======       =======       =======       =======

Net income                                         $ 1,283       $ 1,816       $ 3,112       $ 3,112
                                                   =======       =======       =======       =======

Net income per common share (A)                    $   .10       $   .15       $   .25       $   .25
                                                   =======       =======       =======       =======
</TABLE>



(A)      Adjusted, where appropriate, to reflect the effect of the 10 percent
         stock dividend distributed on January 14, 1997.


(B)      The effect of equivalent shares of dilutive stock options is not
         significant to net income per common share for any period presented.


         There is no significant difference between primary and fully diluted
net income per common share.


                                       -9-
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Robert Lee KNIGHTEN v. Hayden J. DEES, Warden/Dixon Corr. Inst., C. Paul Phelps, Secretary/La. Dept. Corr. & Inst., Jewel Williams, Record Custodian, D.C.I., et al.

No. 62639.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 1, 1978.

In re: Robert Lee Knighten applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and habeas corpus. Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Writ denied. Upon this review, we find no error was committed. We therefore deny the application, pretermitting whether an administrative “hearing” should have been held prior to the ex parte correction of the erroneous record of the relator’s discharge.
#### MARY W. LYNCH, Ex’x. of JOSEPH I. LYNCH, dec’d., deft., *vs.*ZADOCK HILL, plff.

A justice of the peace can render judgment only on a day to which the case stands adjourned ; but objection cannot he taken to this if the parties appeared and went into trial on another day.

Sussex,

October term, 1845.

This was a certiorari directed *to*Justice Edward Dingle, to send up the record and proceedings in a *313certain action at the suit of Zadock Hill against Mary W. Lynch, executrix of Joseph I. Lynch, deceased.

The justice returned the record of an action commenced by summons on the 25th of May, 1844, upon a promissory note under seal, executed by Joseph I. Lynch, on the 7th of May, 1836, for $50, with two credits endorsed amounting to $40. The summons was made returnable on the 8th of June, 1844, “ at Waples & Hickman’s storehouse, before Edward Dingle aforesaid.” This process was returned “ summoned.” The defendant appeared. Plaintiff produced the note with the credits endorsed. The next entry was “ Plaintiff and defendant both appeared on the 22d day of this inst., June, and after hearing the proofs and allegations of both parties, I gave judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant as of assets, for debt $24 68, *costs*of suit 56 cts.—$25 24.”

The principal exceptions were: 1st. That the warrant of summons did not sufficiently ascertain the *place*of appearance of the parties. 2d. That the return day mentioned in the summons, was the 8th of June, which was the day of trial; and judgment was rendered on the 22d of June, without any regular continuance of the cause.

*Layton,*for defendant below.

*The Court*

thought the last exception would have been a fatal objection to the judgment, but for the appearance of -both plaintiff and defendant on the 22d of June, and the fact that they both entered into the trial that day, without objection.

Judgment affirmed.
#### William Ray RODEHEAVER, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Respondent.

No. P-30.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 18, 1971.

William Ray Rodeheaver, in pro. per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

SPECTOR, Judge.

This is a habeas corpus petition seeking to set aside a guilty plea to two in-formations for larceny of an automobile and grand larceny. At the time said pleas were tendered and accepted, four other informations charging petitioner with the commission of crimes were nolle prossed.

The claim of petitioner rests on Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), which held that it is error to accept a guilty plea where the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his guilty plea. Petitioner’s reliance on Boykin is mislaid. His guilty plea was entered in 1965. Boykin was decided June 2, 1969. The Florida Supreme Court refused to apply Boykin retroactively in Johnson v. Wainwright, Fla., 238 So.2d 590, decided July 13, 1970. In Odle v. State, 241 So.2d 184 (Fla.App.1970), the court held Boykin not to be entitled to> retroactive application relying on Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S.Ct. 1498, 23 L.Ed. 2d 16 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), and a host of authorities from other jurisdictions.

Since the guilty plea in the case at hand was pre-Boykin, it is unaffected by that decision.

Petitioner’s reliance upon the provisions of Rule 1.170, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A., is equally unavailing since the plea also antedates the adoption of the rule.

Petition denied.

WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and Carroll, Donald, J., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph T. “Rip” SMITH.

No. 59830.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 10, 1978.

Frank J. Gremillion, Hynes & Gremillion, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Warren J. Hebert, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Laura Thorn, Plaintiff, v Ellen (Esther) Sylvester, Also Known as Esther Baldwin, Respondent, and Paul A. Martineau, Appellant.

[654 NYS2d 829]

In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for breach of contract to pay legal fees, the plaintiff’s attorney, Paul A. Martineau, appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Cow-hey, J.), entered April 15, 1996, as, upon granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for the imposition of costs and sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR part 130, directed him to pay the defendant’s counsel $4,400 in attorneys’ fees and awarded $200 in statutory costs.

Ordered that the order and judgment is modified, on the law, by (1) deleting the award of attorneys’ fees and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for the imposition of costs and sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR part 130, and (2) reducing the statutory costs awarded to $100; as so modified, the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the appellant.

The appellant contends that his refusal to withdraw as counsel for the plaintiff does not constitute sanctionable conduct pursuant to 22 NYCRR part 130. We agree.

At a preliminary conference, the defendant addressed his concerns about the appellant’s continued representation of the plaintiff in the face of what the defendant believed was a plainly apparent conflict of interest. The court nevertheless directed discovery to proceed, and, by order dated August 21, 1995, directed that the defendant’s deposition should take place on September 7, 1995, at the appellant’s office. Under the circumstances, the appellant’s refusal to voluntarily withdraw as counsel for the plaintiff cannot be considered frivolous conduct *(see,*22 NYCRR 130-1.1).

*431Further, since the defendant made duplicate motions for the same relief, statutory costs should have been limited to $100 *(see,*CPLR 8202).

Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, the appellant’s failure to take an appeal from two so-called decisions and orders, dated January 2, 1996, and March 11, 1996, respectively, does not preclude review of these issues on the appeal from the order and judgment entered thereon. Both these so-called decisions and orders directed the prevailing party to "Submit order”, and thus were, in actuality, decisions *(see, Funk v Barry,*89 NY2d 364; Siegel, NY Prac § 250 [2d ed]), from which no appeal lies *(see, e.g., Schicchi v Green Constr. Corp.,*100 AD2d 509).

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit, or need not be addressed in light of our determination. Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.