(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

TRUMP ET AL. v. MAZARS USA, LLP, ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

No. 19–715. Argued May 12, 2020—Decided July 9, 2020* 

In April 2019, three committees of the U. S. House of Representatives

issued four subpoenas seeking information about the finances of President Donald J. Trump, his children, and affiliated businesses. The 

House Committee on Financial Services issued a subpoena to Deutsche

Bank seeking any document related to account activity, due diligence, 

foreign transactions, business statements, debt schedules, statements

of net worth, tax returns, and suspicious activity identified by 

Deutsche Bank. It issued a second subpoena to Capital One for similar 

information. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued 

a subpoena to Deutsche Bank that mirrored the subpoena issued by

the Financial Services Committee. And the House Committee on 

Oversight and Reform issued a subpoena to the President’s personal

accounting firm, Mazars USA, LLP, demanding information related to

the President and several affiliated businesses. Although each of the

committees sought overlapping sets of financial documents, each supplied different justifications for the requests, explaining that the information would help guide legislative reform in areas ranging from

money laundering and terrorism to foreign involvement in U. S. elections. Petitioners—the President in his personal capacity, along with

his children and affiliated businesses—contested the subpoena issued

by the Oversight Committee in the District Court for the District of

Columbia (Mazars, No. 19–715) and the subpoenas issued by the Financial Services and Intelligence Committees in the Southern District

of New York (Deutsche Bank, No. 19–760). In both cases, petitioners

contended that the subpoenas lacked a legitimate legislative purpose 

—————— 

* Together with 19–760, Trump et al. v. Deutsche Bank AG et al., on 

certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
 

 

 

 

2 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

Syllabus 

and violated the separation of powers. The President did not, however, 

argue that any of the requested records were protected by executive 

privilege.

In Mazars, the District Court granted judgment for the House and 

the D. C. Circuit affirmed, finding that the subpoena issued by the 

Oversight Committee served a valid legislative purpose because the

requested information was relevant to reforming financial disclosure 

requirements for Presidents and presidential candidates. In Deutsche 

Bank, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction and the Second Circuit affirmed in substantial part, holding that the Intelligence 

Committee properly issued its subpoena to Deutsche Bank as part of

an investigation into alleged foreign influence in the U. S. political process, which could inform legislation to strengthen national security 

and combat foreign meddling. The court also concluded that the subpoenas issued by the Financial Services Committee to Deutsche Bank 

and Capital One were adequately related to potential legislation on 

money laundering, terrorist financing, and the global movement of illicit funds through the real estate market. 

Held: The courts below did not take adequate account of the significant

separation of powers concerns implicated by congressional subpoenas 

for the President’s information. Pp. 7–20.

(a) Historically, disputes over congressional demands for presidential documents have been resolved by the political branches through

negotiation and compromise without involving this Court. The Court 

recognizes that this dispute is the first of its kind to reach the Court; 

that such disputes can raise important issues concerning relations between the branches; that similar disputes recur on a regular basis, including in the context of deeply partisan controversy; and that Congress and the Executive have nonetheless managed for over two 

centuries to resolve these disputes among themselves without Supreme Court guidance. Such longstanding practice “‘is a consideration 

of great weight’ ” in cases concerning “the allocation of power between 

[the] two elected branches of Government,” and it imposes on the Court 

a duty of care to ensure that it does not needlessly disturb “the compromises and working arrangements” reached by those branches. 

NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 524–526 (quoting The Pocket 

Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 689). Pp. 7–11.

(b) Each House of Congress has the power “to secure needed information” in order to legislate. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 

161. This power is “indispensable” because, without information, Congress would be unable to legislate wisely or effectively. Watkins v. 

United States, 354 U. S. 178, 215. Because this power is “justified 

solely as an adjunct to the legislative process,” it is subject to several

limitations. Id., at 197. Most importantly, a congressional subpoena 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

Syllabus 

is valid only if it is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task

of the Congress.” Id., at 187. The subpoena must serve a “valid legislative purpose.” Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 161. Furthermore, Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of “law enforcement,” because that power is assigned to the Executive and the 

Judiciary. Ibid. Finally, recipients of congressional subpoenas retain 

their constitutional rights and various privileges throughout the 

course of an investigation. Pp. 11–12. 

(c) The President contends, as does the Solicitor General on behalf 

of the United States, that congressional subpoenas for the President’s 

information should be evaluated under the standards set forth in 

United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, and Senate Select Committee on 

Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F. 2d 725, which would 

require the House to show that the requested information satisfies a 

“demonstrated, specific need,” 418 U. S., at 713, and is “demonstrably

critical” to a legislative purpose, 498 F. 2d, at 731. Nixon and Senate 

Select Committee, however, involved subpoenas for communications 

between the President and his close advisers, over which the President 

asserted executive privilege. Because executive privilege safeguards 

the public interest in candid, confidential deliberations within the Executive Branch, information subject to the privilege deserves “the 

greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice.” 

418 U. S., at 715. That protection should not be transplanted root and 

branch to cases involving nonprivileged, private information, which by 

definition does not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations.

The standards proposed by the President and the Solicitor General— 

if applied outside the context of privileged information—would risk seriously impeding Congress in carrying out its responsibilities, giving 

short shrift to its important interests in conducting inquiries to obtain

information needed to legislate effectively. Pp. 12–14.

(d) The approach proposed by the House, which relies on precedents 

that did not involve the President’s papers, fails to take adequate account of the significant separation of powers issues raised by congressional subpoenas for the President’s information. The House’s approach would leave essentially no limits on the congressional power to

subpoena the President’s personal records. A limitless subpoena 

power could transform the established practice of the political

branches and allow Congress to aggrandize itself at the President’s expense. These separation of powers concerns are unmistakably implicated by the subpoenas here, which represent not a run-of-the-mill legislative effort but rather a clash between rival branches of government 

over records of intense political interest for all involved. The interbranch conflict does not vanish simply because the subpoenas seek personal papers or because the President sued in his personal capacity. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

4 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

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Nor are separation of powers concerns less palpable because the subpoenas were issued to third parties. Pp. 14–18.

(e) Neither side identifies an approach that adequately accounts for 

these weighty separation of powers concerns. A balanced approach is 

necessary, one that takes a “considerable impression” from “the practice of the government,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401, 

and “resist[s]” the “pressure inherent within each of the separate

Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power,” INS v. Chadha, 462 

U. S. 919, 951. In assessing whether a subpoena directed at the President’s personal information is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress,” Watkins, 354 U. S., at 187, courts must 

take adequate account of the separation of powers principles at stake, 

including both the significant legislative interests of Congress and the 

unique position of the President. 

Several special considerations inform this analysis. First, courts 

should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President and his papers. 

“ ‘[O]ccasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two 

branches’ should be avoided whenever possible.” Cheney v. United 

States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 389–390 (quoting Nixon, 418 

U. S., at 692). Congress may not rely on the President’s information if 

other sources could reasonably provide Congress the information it 

needs in light of its particular legislative objective. Second, to narrow 

the scope of possible conflict between the branches, courts should insist 

on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative objective. The specificity of the subpoena’s request

“serves as an important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion into 

the operation of the Office of the President.” Cheney, 542 U. S., at 387. 

Third, courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered 

by Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative 

purpose. The more detailed and substantial, the better. That is particularly true when Congress contemplates legislation that raises sensitive constitutional issues, such as legislation concerning the Presidency. Fourth, courts should assess the burdens imposed on the 

President by a subpoena, particularly because they stem from a rival

political branch that has an ongoing relationship with the President 

and incentives to use subpoenas for institutional advantage. Other 

considerations may be pertinent as well; one case every two centuries 

does not afford enough experience for an exhaustive list. Pp. 18–20. 

No. 19–715, 940 F. 3d 710; No. 19–760, 943 F. 3d 627, vacated and remanded.

 ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG, 

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

Syllabus 

THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Nos. 19–715 and 19–760 

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

19–715 v. 

MAZARS USA, LLP, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

19–760 v. 

DEUTSCHE BANK AG, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[July 9, 2020]

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the 

Court. 

Over the course of five days in April 2019, three committees of the U. S. House of Representatives issued four subpoenas seeking information about the finances of President 

Donald J. Trump, his children, and affiliated businesses. 

We have held that the House has authority under the Constitution to issue subpoenas to assist it in carrying out its

legislative responsibilities. The House asserts that the financial information sought here—encompassing a decade’s

worth of transactions by the President and his family—will 

help guide legislative reform in areas ranging from money

laundering and terrorism to foreign involvement in U. S. 
 

 

2 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

Opinion of the Court 

elections. The President contends that the House lacked a 

valid legislative aim and instead sought these records to

harass him, expose personal matters, and conduct law enforcement activities beyond its authority. The question presented is whether the subpoenas exceed the authority of the

House under the Constitution. 

We have never addressed a congressional subpoena for 

the President’s information. Two hundred years ago, it was

established that Presidents may be subpoenaed during a 

federal criminal proceeding, United States v. Burr, 25 F. 

Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, Cir. J.), and

earlier today we extended that ruling to state criminal proceedings, Trump v. Vance, ante, p. ___. Nearly fifty years 

ago, we held that a federal prosecutor could obtain information from a President despite assertions of executive 

privilege, United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), and 

more recently we ruled that a private litigant could subject 

a President to a damages suit and appropriate discovery obligations in federal court, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681 

(1997).

This case is different. Here the President’s information 

is sought not by prosecutors or private parties in connection 

with a particular judicial proceeding, but by committees of

Congress that have set forth broad legislative objectives. 

Congress and the President—the two political branches established by the Constitution—have an ongoing relationship that the Framers intended to feature both rivalry and

reciprocity. See The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed.

1961) (J. Madison); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

That distinctive aspect necessarily informs our analysis of 

the question before us. 

I 

A 

Each of the three committees sought overlapping sets of 
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

financial documents, but each supplied different justifications for the requests.

The House Committee on Financial Services issued two 

subpoenas, both on April 11, 2019. App. 128, 154, 226. The 

first, issued to Deutsche Bank, seeks the financial information of the President, his children, their immediate family members, and several affiliated business entities. Specifically, the subpoena seeks any document related to 

account activity, due diligence, foreign transactions, business statements, debt schedules, statements of net worth, 

tax returns, and suspicious activity identified by Deutsche

Bank. The second, issued to Capital One, demands similar 

financial information with respect to more than a dozen

business entities associated with the President. The 

Deutsche Bank subpoena requests materials from “2010

through the present,” and the Capital One subpoena covers 

“2016 through the present,” but both subpoenas impose no

time limitations for certain documents, such as those connected to account openings and due diligence. Id., at 128, 

155. 

According to the House, the Financial Services Committee issued these subpoenas pursuant to House Resolution 

206, which called for “efforts to close loopholes that allow 

corruption, terrorism, and money laundering to infiltrate 

our country’s financial system.” H. Res. 206, 116th Cong., 

1st Sess., 5 (Mar. 13, 2019). Such loopholes, the resolution

explained, had allowed “illicit money, including from Russian oligarchs,” to flow into the United States through 

“anonymous shell companies” using investments such as

“luxury high-end real estate.” Id., at 3. The House also 

invokes the oversight plan of the Financial Services Committee, which stated that the Committee intends to review 

banking regulation and “examine the implementation, effectiveness, and enforcement” of laws designed to prevent 

money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
 

 

 

4 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

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H. R. Rep. No. 116–40, p. 84 (2019). The plan further provided that the Committee would “consider proposals to prevent the abuse of the financial system” and “address any 

vulnerabilities identified” in the real estate market. Id., 

at 85. 

On the same day as the Financial Services Committee, 

the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued an 

identical subpoena to Deutsche Bank—albeit for different 

reasons. According to the House, the Intelligence Committee subpoenaed Deutsche Bank as part of an investigation

into foreign efforts to undermine the U. S. political process.

Committee Chairman Adam Schiff had described that investigation in a previous statement, explaining that the 

Committee was examining alleged attempts by Russia to

influence the 2016 election; potential links between Russia 

and the President’s campaign; and whether the President

and his associates had been compromised by foreign actors

or interests. Press Release, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Schiff Statement on

House Intelligence Committee Investigation (Feb. 6, 2019). 

Chairman Schiff added that the Committee planned “to develop legislation and policy reforms to ensure the U. S. government is better positioned to counter future efforts to undermine our political process and national security.” Ibid. 

Four days after the Financial Services and Intelligence 

Committees, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform issued another subpoena, this time to the President’s

personal accounting firm, Mazars USA, LLP. The subpoena 

demanded information related to the President and several 

affiliated business entities from 2011 through 2018, including statements of financial condition, independent auditors’

reports, financial reports, underlying source documents, 

and communications between Mazars and the President or 

his businesses. The subpoena also requested all engagement agreements and contracts “[w]ithout regard to time.” 

App. to Pet. for Cert. in 19–715, p. 230. 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

Chairman Elijah Cummings explained the basis for the

subpoena in a memorandum to the Oversight Committee. 

According to the chairman, recent testimony by the President’s former personal attorney Michael Cohen, along with 

several documents prepared by Mazars and supplied by Cohen, raised questions about whether the President had accurately represented his financial affairs. Chairman Cummings asserted that the Committee had “full authority to

investigate” whether the President: (1) “may have engaged 

in illegal conduct before and during his tenure in office,” 

(2) “has undisclosed conflicts of interest that may impair his

ability to make impartial policy decisions,” (3) “is complying 

with the Emoluments Clauses of the Constitution,” and 

(4) “has accurately reported his finances to the Office of

Government Ethics and other federal entities.” App. in No. 

19–5142 (CADC), p. 107. “The Committee’s interest in 

these matters,” Chairman Cummings concluded, “informs 

its review of multiple laws and legislative proposals under 

our jurisdiction.” Ibid. 

B 

Petitioners—the President in his personal capacity, along

with his children and affiliated businesses—filed two suits 

challenging the subpoenas. They contested the subpoena

issued by the Oversight Committee in the District Court for

the District of Columbia (Mazars, No. 19–715), and the subpoenas issued by the Financial Services and Intelligence

Committees in the Southern District of New York (Deutsche 

Bank, No. 19–760). In both cases, petitioners contended 

that the subpoenas lacked a legitimate legislative purpose 

and violated the separation of powers. The President did 

not, however, resist the subpoenas by arguing that any of 

the requested records were protected by executive privilege. 

For relief, petitioners asked for declaratory judgments and 

injunctions preventing Mazars and the banks from complying with the subpoenas. Although named as defendants, 
 

6 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

Opinion of the Court 

Mazars and the banks took no positions on the legal issues

in these cases, and the House committees intervened to defend the subpoenas.

Petitioners’ challenges failed. In Mazars, the District 

Court granted judgment for the House, 380 F. Supp. 3d 76 

(DC 2019), and the D. C. Circuit affirmed, 940 F. 3d 710

(2019). In upholding the subpoena issued by the Oversight 

Committee to Mazars, the Court of Appeals found that the 

subpoena served a “valid legislative purpose” because the 

requested information was relevant to reforming financial

disclosure requirements for Presidents and presidential

candidates. Id., at 726–742 (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Rao dissented. As she saw it, the “gravamen” 

of the subpoena was investigating alleged illegal conduct by 

the President, and the House must pursue such wrongdoing 

through its impeachment powers, not its legislative powers. 

Id., at 773–774. Otherwise, the House could become a “roving inquisition over a co-equal branch of government.” Id., 

at 748. The D. C. Circuit denied rehearing en banc over

several more dissents. 941 F. 3d 1180, 1180–1182 (2019). 

In Deutsche Bank, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction, 2019 WL 2204898 (SDNY, May 22, 2019), 

and the Second Circuit affirmed “in substantial part,” 943 

F. 3d 627, 676 (2019). While acknowledging that the subpoenas are “surely broad in scope,” the Court of Appeals 

held that the Intelligence Committee properly issued its 

subpoena to Deutsche Bank as part of an investigation into 

alleged foreign influence over petitioners and Russian interference with the U. S. political process. Id., at 650, 658– 

659. That investigation, the court concluded, could inform

legislation to combat foreign meddling and strengthen national security. Id., at 658–659, and n. 59. 

As to the subpoenas issued by the Financial Services

Committee to Deutsche Bank and Capital One, the Court of 

Appeals concluded that they were adequately related to potential legislation on money laundering, terrorist financing, 
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

and the global movement of illicit funds through the real 

estate market. Id., at 656–659. Rejecting the contention

that the subpoenas improperly targeted the President, the

court explained in part that the President’s financial dealings with Deutsche Bank made it “appropriate” for the

House to use him as a “case study” to determine “whether 

new legislation is needed.” Id., at 662–663, n. 67.1 

Judge Livingston dissented, seeing no “clear reason why

a congressional investigation aimed generally at closing 

regulatory loopholes in the banking system need focus on 

over a decade of financial information regarding this President, his family, and his business affairs.” Id., at 687. 

We granted certiorari in both cases and stayed the judgments below pending our decision. 589 U. S. ___ (2019). 

II 

A 

The question presented is whether the subpoenas exceed

the authority of the House under the Constitution. Historically, disputes over congressional demands for presidential 

documents have not ended up in court. Instead, they have

been hashed out in the “hurly-burly, the give-and-take of 

the political process between the legislative and the executive.” Hearings on S. 2170 et al. before the Subcommittee 

on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Committee 

on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 (1975) 

(A. Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal

Counsel).

That practice began with George Washington and the 

—————— 1The Court of Appeals directed a “limited” remand for the District

Court to consider whether it was necessary to disclose certain “sensitive

personal details” (such as documents reflecting medical services received

by employees of the Trump business entities) and a “few” documents that

might not relate to the committees’ legislative purposes. 943 F. 3d 627, 

667–668, 675 (2019). The Court of Appeals ordered that all other documents be “promptly transmitted” to the committees. Id., at 669. 
 

 

 

8 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

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early Congress. In 1792, a House committee requested Executive Branch documents pertaining to General St. Clair’s

campaign against the Indians in the Northwest Territory, 

which had concluded in an utter rout of federal forces when 

they were caught by surprise near the present-day border

between Ohio and Indiana. See T. Taylor, Grand Inquest:

The Story of Congressional Investigations 19–23 (1955).

Since this was the first such request from Congress, President Washington called a Cabinet meeting, wishing to take

care that his response “be rightly conducted” because it 

could “become a precedent.” 1 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 189 (P. Ford ed. 1892). 

The meeting, attended by the likes of Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, and Henry

Knox, ended with the Cabinet of “one mind”: The House 

had authority to “institute inquiries” and “call for papers” 

but the President could “exercise a discretion” over disclosures, “communicat[ing] such papers as the public good

would permit” and “refus[ing]” the rest. Id., at 189–190. 

President Washington then dispatched Jefferson to speak

to individual congressmen and “bring them by persuasion

into the right channel.” Id., at 190. The discussions were 

apparently fruitful, as the House later narrowed its request

and the documents were supplied without recourse to the 

courts. See 3 Annals of Cong. 536 (1792); Taylor, supra, 

at 24. 

Jefferson, once he became President, followed Washington’s precedent. In early 1807, after Jefferson had disclosed 

that “sundry persons” were conspiring to invade Spanish

territory in North America with a private army, 16 Annals

of Cong. 686–687, the House requested that the President 

produce any information in his possession touching on the 

conspiracy (except for information that would harm the 

public interest), id., at 336, 345, 359. Jefferson chose not to 

divulge the entire “voluminous” correspondence on the sub-
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

ject, explaining that much of it was “private” or mere “rumors” and “neither safety nor justice” permitted him to “expos[e] names” apart from identifying the conspiracy’s “principal actor”: Aaron Burr. Id., at 39–40. Instead of the entire 

correspondence, Jefferson sent Congress particular documents and a special message summarizing the conspiracy. 

Id., at 39–43; see generally Vance, ante, at 3–4. Neither 

Congress nor the President asked the Judiciary to 

intervene.2 

Ever since, congressional demands for the President’s information have been resolved by the political branches

without involving this Court. The Reagan and Clinton

presidencies provide two modern examples:

During the Reagan administration, a House subcommittee subpoenaed all documents related to the Department of

the Interior’s decision whether to designate Canada a reciprocal country for purposes of the Mineral Lands Leasing 

Act. President Reagan directed that certain documents be

withheld because they implicated his confidential relationship with subordinates. While withholding those documents, the administration made “repeated efforts” at accommodation through limited disclosures and testimony 

over a period of several months. 6 Op. of Office of Legal

Counsel 751, 780 (1982). Unsatisfied, the subcommittee 

and its parent committee eventually voted to hold the Secretary of the Interior in contempt, and an innovative compromise soon followed: All documents were made available, 

but only for one day with no photocopying, minimal

notetaking, and no participation by non-Members of Congress. Id., at 780–781; see H. R. Rep. No. 97–898, pp. 3–8 

(1982). 

—————— 2By contrast, later that summer, the Judiciary was called on to resolve 

whether President Jefferson could be issued a subpoena duces tecum 

arising from Burr’s criminal trial. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 

30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807); see also Trump v. Vance, ante, at 5–7. 
 

10 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

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In 1995, a Senate committee subpoenaed notes taken by

a White House attorney at a meeting with President Clinton’s personal lawyers concerning the Whitewater controversy. The President resisted the subpoena on the ground 

that the notes were protected by attorney-client privilege, 

leading to “long and protracted” negotiations and a Senate 

threat to seek judicial enforcement of the subpoena. S. Rep. 

No. 104–204, pp. 16–17 (1996). Eventually the parties

reached an agreement, whereby President Clinton avoided 

the threatened suit, agreed to turn over the notes, and obtained the Senate’s concession that he had not waived any 

privileges. Ibid.; see L. Fisher, Congressional Research 

Service, Congressional Investigations: Subpoenas and Contempt Power 16–18 (2003). 

Congress and the President maintained this tradition of

negotiation and compromise—without the involvement of

this Court—until the present dispute. Indeed, from President Washington until now, we have never considered a dispute over a congressional subpoena for the President’s records. And, according to the parties, the appellate courts 

have addressed such a subpoena only once, when a Senate

committee subpoenaed President Nixon during the Watergate scandal. See infra, at 13 (discussing Senate Select 

Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 

498 F. 2d 725 (CADC 1974) (en banc)). In that case, the 

court refused to enforce the subpoena, and the Senate did 

not seek review by this Court.

This dispute therefore represents a significant departure

from historical practice. Although the parties agree that 

this particular controversy is justiciable, we recognize that 

it is the first of its kind to reach this Court; that disputes of 

this sort can raise important issues concerning relations between the branches; that related disputes involving congressional efforts to seek official Executive Branch information recur on a regular basis, including in the context of 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

deeply partisan controversy; and that Congress and the Executive have nonetheless managed for over two centuries to

resolve such disputes among themselves without the benefit of guidance from us. Such longstanding practice “ ‘is a 

consideration of great weight’” in cases concerning “the allocation of power between [the] two elected branches of Government,” and it imposes on us a duty of care to ensure that

we not needlessly disturb “the compromises and working 

arrangements that [those] branches . . . themselves have 

reached.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 524–526 

(2014) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 689 

(1929)). With that in mind, we turn to the question

presented. 

B 

Congress has no enumerated constitutional power to conduct investigations or issue subpoenas, but we have held

that each House has power “to secure needed information”

in order to legislate. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 

161 (1927). This “power of inquiry—with process to enforce 

it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.” Id., at 174. Without information, Congress

would be shooting in the dark, unable to legislate “wisely or 

effectively.” Id., at 175. The congressional power to obtain 

information is “broad” and “indispensable.” Watkins v. 

United States, 354 U. S. 178, 187, 215 (1957). It encompasses inquiries into the administration of existing laws,

studies of proposed laws, and “surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling 

the Congress to remedy them.” Id., at 187. 

Because this power is “justified solely as an adjunct to the

legislative process,” it is subject to several limitations. Id., 

at 197. Most importantly, a congressional subpoena is valid 

only if it is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate 

task of the Congress.” Id., at 187. The subpoena must serve

a “valid legislative purpose,” Quinn v. United States, 349 
 

 

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U. S. 155, 161 (1955); it must “concern[] a subject on which

legislation ‘could be had,’ ” Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 506 (1975) (quoting 

McGrain, 273 U. S., at 177). 

Furthermore, Congress may not issue a subpoena for the

purpose of “law enforcement,” because “those powers are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary.” Quinn, 349 U. S., at 161. Thus Congress may not 

use subpoenas to “try” someone “before [a] committee for 

any crime or wrongdoing.” McGrain, 273 U. S., at 179. 

Congress has no “‘general’ power to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures,” id., at 173–174, and “there is 

no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure,” 

Watkins, 354 U. S., at 200. “Investigations conducted solely

for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to

‘punish’ those investigated are indefensible.” Id., at 187. 

Finally, recipients of legislative subpoenas retain their 

constitutional rights throughout the course of an investigation. See id., at 188, 198. And recipients have long been

understood to retain common law and constitutional privileges with respect to certain materials, such as attorneyclient communications and governmental communications 

protected by executive privilege. See, e.g., Congressional 

Research Service, supra, at 16–18 (attorney-client privilege); Senate Select Committee, 498 F. 2d, at 727, 730–731 

(executive privilege). 

C 

The President contends, as does the Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the United States, that the usual rules 

for congressional subpoenas do not govern here because the

President’s papers are at issue. They argue for a more demanding standard based in large part on cases involving 

the Nixon tapes—recordings of conversations between 

President Nixon and close advisers discussing the break-in 

at the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters at 
 

 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

the Watergate complex. The tapes were subpoenaed by a

Senate committee and the Special Prosecutor investigating 

the break-in, prompting President Nixon to invoke executive privilege and leading to two cases addressing the showing necessary to require the President to comply with the 

subpoenas. See Nixon, 418 U. S. 683; Senate Select Committee, 498 F. 2d 725. 

Those cases, the President and the Solicitor General now 

contend, establish the standard that should govern the 

House subpoenas here. Quoting Nixon, the President asserts that the House must establish a “demonstrated, specific need” for the financial information, just as the Watergate special prosecutor was required to do in order to 

obtain the tapes. 418 U. S., at 713. And drawing on Senate 

Select Committee—the D. C. Circuit case refusing to enforce 

the Senate subpoena for the tapes—the President and the 

Solicitor General argue that the House must show that the 

financial information is “demonstrably critical” to its legislative purpose. 498 F. 2d, at 731. 

We disagree that these demanding standards apply here.

Unlike the cases before us, Nixon and Senate Select Committee involved Oval Office communications over which the 

President asserted executive privilege. That privilege safeguards the public interest in candid, confidential deliberations within the Executive Branch; it is “fundamental to the 

operation of Government.” Nixon, 418 U. S., at 708. As a 

result, information subject to executive privilege deserves 

“the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice.” Id., at 715. We decline to transplant that

protection root and branch to cases involving nonprivileged, 

private information, which by definition does not implicate 

sensitive Executive Branch deliberations. 

The standards proposed by the President and the Solicitor General—if applied outside the context of privileged information—would risk seriously impeding Congress in carrying out its responsibilities. The President and the 
 

14 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

Opinion of the Court 

Solicitor General would apply the same exacting standards 

to all subpoenas for the President’s information, without 

recognizing distinctions between privileged and nonprivileged information, between official and personal information, or between various legislative objectives. Such a 

categorical approach would represent a significant departure from the longstanding way of doing business between

the branches, giving short shrift to Congress’s important interests in conducting inquiries to obtain the information it 

needs to legislate effectively. Confounding the legislature 

in that effort would be contrary to the principle that: 

“It is the proper duty of a representative body to look 

diligently into every affair of government and to talk

much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and

the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every means

of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition

of the administrative agents of the government, the

country must be helpless to learn how it is being 

served.” United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 43 

(1953) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Legislative inquiries might involve the President in appropriate cases; as noted, Congress’s responsibilities extend 

to “every affair of government.” Ibid. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Because the President’s approach does not

take adequate account of these significant congressional interests, we do not adopt it. 

D 

The House meanwhile would have us ignore that these

suits involve the President. Invoking our precedents concerning investigations that did not target the President’s

papers, the House urges us to uphold its subpoenas because 

they “relate[] to a valid legislative purpose” or “concern[] a 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

subject on which legislation could be had.” Brief for Respondent 46 (quoting Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 

109, 127 (1959), and Eastland, 421 U. S., at 506). That approach is appropriate, the House argues, because the cases 

before us are not “momentous separation-of-powers disputes.” Brief for Respondent 1. 

Largely following the House’s lead, the courts below 

treated these cases much like any other, applying precedents that do not involve the President’s papers. See 943 

F. 3d, at 656–670; 940 F. 3d, at 724–742. The Second Circuit concluded that “this case does not concern separation 

of powers” because the House seeks personal documents 

and the President sued in his personal capacity. 943 F. 3d, 

at 669. The D. C. Circuit, for its part, recognized that “separation-of-powers concerns still linger in the air,” and 

therefore it did not afford deference to the House. 940 F. 3d, 

at 725–726. But, because the House sought only personal

documents, the court concluded that the case “present[ed]

no direct interbranch dispute.” Ibid. 

The House’s approach fails to take adequate account of 

the significant separation of powers issues raised by congressional subpoenas for the President’s information. Congress and the President have an ongoing institutional relationship as the “opposite and rival” political branches 

established by the Constitution. The Federalist No. 51, at 

349. As a result, congressional subpoenas directed at the 

President differ markedly from congressional subpoenas we

have previously reviewed, e.g., Barenblatt, 360 U. S., at 

127; Eastland, 421 U. S., at 506, and they bear little resemblance to criminal subpoenas issued to the President in the 

course of a specific investigation, see Vance, ante, p. ___; 

Nixon, 418 U. S. 683. Unlike those subpoenas, congressional subpoenas for the President’s information unavoidably pit the political branches against one another. Cf. In re 

Sealed Case, 121 F. 3d 729, 753 (CADC 1997) (“The Presi-
 

16 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

Opinion of the Court 

dent’s ability to withhold information from Congress implicates different constitutional considerations than the President’s ability to withhold evidence in judicial proceedings.”).

Far from accounting for separation of powers concerns, 

the House’s approach aggravates them by leaving essentially no limits on the congressional power to subpoena the 

President’s personal records. Any personal paper possessed

by a President could potentially “relate to” a conceivable

subject of legislation, for Congress has broad legislative

powers that touch a vast number of subjects. Brief for Respondent 46. The President’s financial records could relate 

to economic reform, medical records to health reform, school 

transcripts to education reform, and so on. Indeed, at argument, the House was unable to identify any type of information that lacks some relation to potential legislation. See 

Tr. of Oral Arg. 52–53, 62–65. 

Without limits on its subpoena powers, Congress could

“exert an imperious controul” over the Executive Branch

and aggrandize itself at the President’s expense, just as the 

Framers feared. The Federalist No. 71, at 484 (A. Hamilton); see id., No. 48, at 332–333 (J. Madison); Bowsher v. 

Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 721–722, 727 (1986). And a limitless 

subpoena power would transform the “established practice” 

of the political branches. Noel Canning, 573 U. S., at 524 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead of negotiating 

over information requests, Congress could simply walk

away from the bargaining table and compel compliance in 

court. 

The House and the courts below suggest that these separation of powers concerns are not fully implicated by the

particular subpoenas here, but we disagree. We would have 

to be “blind” not to see what “[a]ll others can see and understand”: that the subpoenas do not represent a run-of-themill legislative effort but rather a clash between rival 
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

branches of government over records of intense political interest for all involved. Rumely, 345 U. S., at 44 (quoting 

Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 37 (1922) (Taft, C. J.)). 

The interbranch conflict here does not vanish simply because the subpoenas seek personal papers or because the 

President sued in his personal capacity. The President is 

the only person who alone composes a branch of government. As a result, there is not always a clear line between

his personal and official affairs. “The interest of the man” 

is often “connected with the constitutional rights of the 

place.” The Federalist No. 51, at 349. Given the close connection between the Office of the President and its occupant, congressional demands for the President’s papers can

implicate the relationship between the branches regardless 

whether those papers are personal or official. Either way,

a demand may aim to harass the President or render him

“complaisan[t] to the humors of the Legislature.” Id., No. 

71, at 483. In fact, a subpoena for personal papers may pose

a heightened risk of such impermissible purposes, precisely 

because of the documents’ personal nature and their less

evident connection to a legislative task. No one can say that

the controversy here is less significant to the relationship

between the branches simply because it involves personal 

papers. Quite the opposite. That appears to be what makes

the matter of such great consequence to the President and

Congress.

In addition, separation of powers concerns are no less palpable here simply because the subpoenas were issued to

third parties. Congressional demands for the President’s

information present an interbranch conflict no matter 

where the information is held—it is, after all, the President’s information. Were it otherwise, Congress could sidestep constitutional requirements any time a President’s information is entrusted to a third party—as occurs with 

rapidly increasing frequency. Cf. Carpenter v. United 

States, 585 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 15, 17). 
 

 

18 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

Opinion of the Court 

Indeed, Congress could declare open season on the President’s information held by schools, archives, internet service providers, e-mail clients, and financial institutions. 

The Constitution does not tolerate such ready evasion; it

“deals with substance, not shadows.” Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (1867). 

E 

Congressional subpoenas for the President’s personal information implicate weighty concerns regarding the separation of powers. Neither side, however, identifies an approach that accounts for these concerns. For more than two 

centuries, the political branches have resolved information

disputes using the wide variety of means that the Constitution puts at their disposal. The nature of such interactions 

would be transformed by judicial enforcement of either of 

the approaches suggested by the parties, eroding a “[d]eeply 

embedded traditional way[] of conducting government.” 

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U. S., at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

A balanced approach is necessary, one that takes a “considerable impression” from “the practice of the government,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819); 

see Noel Canning, 573 U. S., at 524–526, and “resist[s]” the

“pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to

exceed the outer limits of its power,” INS v. Chadha, 462 

U. S. 919, 951 (1983). We therefore conclude that, in assessing whether a subpoena directed at the President’s personal information is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress,” Watkins, 354 U. S., at 187, 

courts must perform a careful analysis that takes adequate

account of the separation of powers principles at stake, including both the significant legislative interests of Congress

and the “unique position” of the President, Clinton, 520 

U. S., at 698 (internal quotation marks omitted). Several 

special considerations inform this analysis. 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

First, courts should carefully assess whether the asserted 

legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President and his papers. “‘[O]ccasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two branches’ should be 

avoided whenever possible.” Cheney v. United States Dist. 

Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 389–390 (2004) (quoting 

Nixon, 418 U. S., at 692). Congress may not rely on the

President’s information if other sources could reasonably 

provide Congress the information it needs in light of its particular legislative objective. The President’s unique constitutional position means that Congress may not look to him 

as a “case study” for general legislation. Cf. 943 F. 3d, at 

662–663, n. 67. 

Unlike in criminal proceedings, where “[t]he very integrity of the judicial system” would be undermined without

“full disclosure of all the facts,” Nixon, 418 U. S., at 709, 

efforts to craft legislation involve predictive policy judgments that are “not hamper[ed] . . . in quite the same way”

when every scrap of potentially relevant evidence is not 

available, Cheney, 542 U. S., at 384; see Senate Select Committee, 498 F. 2d, at 732. While we certainly recognize

Congress’s important interests in obtaining information 

through appropriate inquiries, those interests are not sufficiently powerful to justify access to the President’s personal

papers when other sources could provide Congress the information it needs. 

Second, to narrow the scope of possible conflict between 

the branches, courts should insist on a subpoena no broader 

than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative

objective. The specificity of the subpoena’s request “serves 

as an important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion 

into the operation of the Office of the President.” Cheney, 

542 U. S., at 387. 

Third, courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative purpose. The more detailed and 
 

20 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

Opinion of the Court 

substantial the evidence of Congress’s legislative purpose, 

the better. See Watkins, 354 U. S., at 201, 205 (preferring

such evidence over “vague” and “loosely worded” evidence 

of Congress’s purpose). That is particularly true when Congress contemplates legislation that raises sensitive constitutional issues, such as legislation concerning the Presidency. In such cases, it is “impossible” to conclude that a

subpoena is designed to advance a valid legislative purpose

unless Congress adequately identifies its aims and explains

why the President’s information will advance its consideration of the possible legislation. Id., at 205–206, 214–215. 

Fourth, courts should be careful to assess the burdens imposed on the President by a subpoena. We have held that 

burdens on the President’s time and attention stemming

from judicial process and litigation, without more, generally 

do not cross constitutional lines. See Vance, ante, at 12–14; 

Clinton, 520 U. S., at 704–705. But burdens imposed by a

congressional subpoena should be carefully scrutinized, for 

they stem from a rival political branch that has an ongoing 

relationship with the President and incentives to use subpoenas for institutional advantage.

Other considerations may be pertinent as well; one case 

every two centuries does not afford enough experience for 

an exhaustive list. 

When Congress seeks information “needed for intelligent 

legislative action,” it “unquestionably” remains “the duty of 

all citizens to cooperate.” Watkins, 354 U. S., at 187 (emphasis added). Congressional subpoenas for information

from the President, however, implicate special concerns regarding the separation of powers. The courts below did not 

take adequate account of those concerns. The judgments of 

the Courts of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit and the Second 

Circuit are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Nos. 19–715 and 19–760 

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

19–715 v. 

MAZARS USA, LLP, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

19–760 v. 

DEUTSCHE BANK AG, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[July 9, 2020]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. 

Three Committees of the U. S. House of Representatives 

issued subpoenas to several accounting and financial firms 

to obtain the personal financial records of the President, his

family, and several of his business entities. The Committees do not argue that these subpoenas were issued pursuant to the House’s impeachment power. Instead, they argue 

that the subpoenas are a valid exercise of their legislative 

powers.

Petitioners challenge the validity of these subpoenas. In 

doing so, they call into question our precedents to the extent 

that they allow Congress to issue legislative subpoenas for 

the President’s private, nonofficial documents. I would hold 

that Congress has no power to issue a legislative subpoena

for private, nonofficial documents—whether they belong to

the President or not. Congress may be able to obtain these 

documents as part of an investigation of the President, but 
 

 

2 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

to do so, it must proceed under the impeachment power.

Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the Courts of 

Appeals. 

I 

I begin with the Committees’ claim that the House’s legislative powers include the implied power to issue legislative subpoenas. Although the Founders understood that 

the enumerated powers in the Constitution included implied powers, the Committees’ test for the scope of those 

powers is too broad.

“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited;

and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the 

constitution is written.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 

137, 176 (1803). The structure of limited and enumerated 

powers in our Constitution denotes that “[o]ur system of

government rests on one overriding principle: All power 

stems from the consent of the people.” U. S. Term Limits, 

Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 846 (1995) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). As a result, Congress may exercise only those

powers given by the people of the States through the Constitution. 

The Founders nevertheless understood that an enumerated power could necessarily bring with it implied powers. 

The idea of implied powers usually arises in the context of 

the Necessary and Proper Clause, which gives Congress the 

power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and 

proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, 

and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” Art. I, §8, cl. 18. As I have previously explained, the Necessary and Proper Clause simply “made 

explicit what was already implicit in the grant of each enumerated power.” United States v. Comstock, 560 U. S. 126, 

161 (2010) (dissenting opinion). That is, “the grant of a gen-
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

eral power includes the grant of incidental powers for carrying it out.” Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and “Cruel and

Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 Va. L. Rev.

687, 741 (2016).

The scope of these implied powers is very limited. The 

Constitution does not sweep in powers “of inferior importance, merely because they are inferior.” McCulloch v. 

Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 408 (1819). Instead, Congress 

“can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the constitution, and the powers actually granted, must be such as 

are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.” 

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326 (1816). In 

sum, while the Committees’ theory of an implied power is

not categorically wrong, that power must be necessarily implied from an enumerated power. 

II 

At the time of the founding, the power to subpoena private, nonofficial documents was not included by necessary

implication in any of Congress’ legislative powers. This understanding persisted for decades and is consistent with the

Court’s first decision addressing legislative subpoenas, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881). The test that this 

Court created in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 

(1927), and the majority’s variation on that standard today,

are without support as applied to private, nonofficial documents.1 

A 

The Committees argue that Congress wields the same investigatory powers that the British Parliament did at the 

time of the founding. But this claim overlooks one of the 

fundamental differences between our Government and the 

British Government: Parliament was supreme. Congress is 

—————— 1 I express no opinion about the constitutionality of legislative subpoenas for other kinds of evidence. 
 

 

 

4 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

not. 

I have previously explained that “the founding generation did not subscribe to Blackstone’s view of parliamentary 

supremacy.” Department of Transportation v. Association 

of American Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 74 (2015) (opinion concurring in judgment). “Parliament’s violations of the law of 

the land had been a significant complaint of the American

Revolution.” Id., at 74–75. “And experiments in legislative 

supremacy in the States had confirmed the idea that even

the legislature must be made subject to the law.” Id., at 75. 

James Wilson, signer of the Constitution and future Justice, explained this difference to the Pennsylvania ratifying 

convention: “Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain [the 

supreme power] is lodged in the British Parliament; and I

believe there is no writer on the other side of the Atlantic” 

who thought otherwise. 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 471 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (Documentary History). In the United States, however, “the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable authority, remains 

with the people.” Id., at 472. And “[t]he Constitution

plainly sets forth the ‘few and defined’ powers that Congress may exercise.” Comstock, 560 U. S., at 159 (THOMAS, 

J., dissenting); see also McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 405; Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 176. This significant difference means 

that Parliament’s powers and Congress’ powers are not necessarily the same.

In fact, the plain text of the Constitution makes clear that

they are not. The Constitution expressly denies to Congress 

some of the powers that Parliament exercised. Article I, for 

example, prohibits bills of attainder, §9, cl. 3, which Parliament used to “sentenc[e] to death one or more specific persons.” United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 441 (1965). A 

legislature can hardly be considered supreme if it lacks the

power to pass bills of attainder, which Justice Story called 

the “highest power of sovereignty.” 3 Commentaries on the 
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Constitution of the United States §1338, p. 210 (1833). Relatedly, the Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws, §9, 

cl. 3, reinforcing the fact that Congress’ power to punish is 

limited.2 And in a system in which Congress is not supreme, the individual protections in the Bill of Rights, such

as the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, 

meaningfully constrain Congress’ power to compel documents from private citizens. Cf. 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries 203–205, n. § (1803); see also D. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period,

1789–1801, p. 268 (1997). 

 Furthermore, Kilbourn—this Court’s first decision on the 

constitutionality of legislative subpoenas—emphasized

that Parliament had more powers than Congress. There, 

the congressional respondents relied on Parliament’s investigatory power to support a legislative subpoena for testimony and documents. The Court rejected the analogy because the judicial powers of the House of Commons—the

lower house of Parliament—exceeded the judicial functions 

of the House of Representatives. Kilbourn, supra, at 189. 

At bottom, Kilbourn recognized that legislative supremacy

was decisively rejected in the framing and ratification of our 

Constitution, which casts doubt on the Committees’ claim 

that they have power to issue legislative subpoenas to private parties. 

B 

The subpoenas in these cases also cannot be justified

based on the practices of 18th-century American legisla-

—————— 2The Constitution also enumerates a limited set of congressional privileges. Although I express no opinion on the question, at least one early

commentator thought the canon of expressio unius meant that Congress

had no unenumerated privileges, such as the power to hold nonmembers 

in contempt. 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries 200, n. §

(1803). 
 

 

 

6 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

tures. Amici supporting the Committees resist this conclusion, but the examples they cite materially differ from the 

legislative subpoenas at issue here. 

First, amici cite investigations in which legislatures

sought to compel testimony from government officials on 

government matters. The subjects included military affairs, taxes, government finances, and the judiciary. Potts, 

Power of Legislative Bodies To Punish for Contempt, 74

U. Pa. L. Rev. 691, 708, 709, 710, 716–717 (1926) (Potts);

see also E. Eberling, Congressional Investigations: A Study 

of the Origin and Development of the Power of Congress To 

Investigate and Punish for Contempt 18 (1928) (Eberling).

But the information sought in these examples was official,

not private. Underscoring this distinction, at least one revolutionary-era State Constitution permitted the legislature

to “call for all public or official papers and records, and send 

for persons, whom they may judge necessary in the course 

of their inquiries, concerning affairs relating to the public 

interest.” Md. Const., Art. X (1776) (emphasis added). 

Second, 18th-century legislatures conducted nonlegislative investigations. For example, the New York colonial

legislature tasked one committee with investigating a nuisance complaint and gave it the “power to send for persons, 

papers and records.” Eberling 18; see also id., at 19 (investigation of a government contract obtained by alleged 

wrongdoing); Potts 716 (investigation of armed resistance).

But to describe this category is to distinguish it. Here, the 

Committees assert only a legislative purpose.

Third, colonial and state legislatures investigated and 

punished insults, libels, and bribery of members. For example, the Pennsylvania colonial assembly investigated 

“injurious charges, and slanderous Aspersions against the 

Conduct of the late Assembly” made by two individuals. Id., 

at 710 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 

717; Eberling 20–21. But once again, to describe this cate-
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

gory is to distinguish it because the subpoenas here are justified only as incidental to the power to legislate, not the 

power to punish libels or bribery. In short, none of the examples from 18th-century colonial and state history support a power to issue a legislative subpoena for private, nonofficial documents. 

C 

Given that Congress has no exact precursor in England 

or colonial America, founding-era congressional practice is 

especially informative about the scope of implied legislative 

powers. Thus, it is highly probative that no founding-era

Congress issued a subpoena for private, nonofficial documents. Although respondents could not identify the first

such legislative subpoena at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg.

56, Congress began issuing them by the end of the 1830s. 

However, the practice remained controversial in Congress 

and this Court throughout the first century of the Republic. 

1 

In an attempt to establish the power of Congress to issue

legislative subpoenas, the Committees point to an investigation of Government affairs and an investigation under 

one of Congress’ enumerated privileges. Both precedents 

are materially different from the subpoenas here.

In 1792, the House authorized a Committee to investigate

a failed military expedition led by General Arthur St. Clair. 

3 Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives of the

United States §1725, pp. 79–80 (1907) (Hinds). The Committee was “empowered to call for such persons, papers and

records as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.” Ibid. 

But the Committee never subpoenaed private, nonofficial 

documents, which is telling. Whereas a subpoena for Government documents does not implicate concerns about

property rights or the Fourth Amendment “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
 

 

 

8 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

against unreasonable searches and seizures,” a subpoena 

for private, nonofficial documents raises those questions. 

Thus, the power to subpoena private documents, which the 

Committee did not exercise, is a far greater power and

much less likely to be implied in Congress’ legislative powers. 

In 1832, the House investigated Representative Samuel 

Houston for assaulting Representative William Stanberry. 

Stanberry had accused Houston of collusion with Secretary 

of War John Eaton in connection with a bid for a Government contract, and the House initiated an investigation

into the truthfulness of Stanberry’s accusation. 8 Cong. 

Deb. 2550, 3022–3023 (1832). The House subpoenaed witnesses to testify, and one of them brought official correspondence between the Secretary of War and the President.

H. R. Rep. No. 502, 22d Cong., 1st Sess. 64, 66–67 (1832).

But official documents are obviously different from nonofficial documents. Moreover, the subpoenas were issued pursuant to the House’s enumerated privilege of punishing its

own Members, Art. I, §5, not as part of its legislative powers. Because these subpoenas were not issued pursuant to

a legislative power, they do not aid the Committees’ case. 

2 

As late as 1827, a majority of the House declined to authorize the Committee on Manufactures to subpoena documents, amid concerns that it was unprecedented. During

the debate over the resolution, one opponent remarked that 

“[t]here is no instance under this Government, within my

recollection, where this power has been given for the mere 

purpose of enabling a committee of this House to adjust the 

details of an ordinary bill.” 4 Cong. Deb. 865–866 (Rep.

Strong); see also id., at 862 (referring to “authority to bring 

any citizens of the United States . . . whom they might 

choose to send for, and compel them to give answers to 

every inquiry which should be addressed to them” as “very 
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

extraordinary”). Another opponent stated that the Committee had requested a power that had “not heretofore been 

thought necessary to enable that Committee to acquire correct information.” Id., at 866 (Rep. Storrs). A third called 

it “not only novel and extraordinary, but wholly unnecessary.” Id., at 874 (Rep. Stewart); see also id., at 884–885 

(Rep. Wright). No supporter of the resolution offered a specific precedent for doing so, and the House ultimately authorized the Committee to send for persons only. Id., at 

889–890. 

This debate is particularly significant because of the arguments made by both sides. Proponents made essentially 

the same arguments the Committees raise here—that the 

power to send for persons and papers was necessary to inform Congress as it legislated. Id., at 871 (Rep. Livingston).

Opponents argued that this power was not part of any legislative function. Id., at 865–866 (Rep. Strong). They also 

argued that the House of Commons provided no precedent 

because Congress was a body of limited and enumerated 

powers. Id., at 882 (Rep. Wood). And in the end, the opponents prevailed. Thus, through 1827, the idea that Congress had the implied power to issue subpoenas for private

documents was considered “novel,” “extraordinary,” and

“unnecessary.” Id., at 874. 

3 

By the end of the 1830s, Congress began issuing legislative subpoenas for private, nonofficial documents. See 

Eberling 123–126. Still, the power to demand information 

from private parties during legislative investigations remained controversial. 

In 1832, the House authorized a Committee to “inspect 

the books, and to examine into the proceedings of the Bank 

of the United States, to report thereon, and to report

whether the provisions of its charter have been violated or 
 

 

 

10 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

not.” 8 Cong. Deb. 2160, 2164. The House gave the Committee “power to send for persons and papers.” Id., at 2160. 

The power to inspect the books of the Bank of the United 

States is not itself a clear example of a legislative subpoena

for private, nonofficial documents, because the Bank was a 

federally chartered corporation and was required to allow 

Congress to inspect its books. App. to 8 Cong. Deb. 54

(1833). The investigation itself appears to have ranged

more widely, however, leading Congressman John Quincy 

Adams to criticize 

“investigations which must necessarily implicate not 

only the president and directors of the bank, and their 

proceedings, but the rights, the interests, the fortunes,

and the reputation of individuals not responsible for

those proceedings, and whom neither the committee

nor the House had the power to try, or even accuse before any other tribunal.” Ibid. 

Adams continued that such an investigation “bears all the

exceptionable and odious properties of general warrants 

and domiciliary visits.” Ibid. He also objected that the 

Committee’s investigation of the Bank was tantamount to

punishment and thus was in tension with the constitutional 

prohibitions on “passing any bill of attainder [or] ex post 

facto law.” Id., at 60. Thus, even when Congress authorized a Committee to send for private papers, the constitutionality of doing so was questioned.

An 1859 Senate investigation, which the Court of Appeals 

cited as precedent, underscores that legislative subpoenas

to private parties were a 19th-century innovation. Following abolitionist John Brown’s raid at Harper’s Ferry, Senate Democrats opened an investigation apparently designed to embarrass opponents of slavery. As part of the

investigation, they called private individuals to testify. 

Senator Charles Sumner, a leading opponent of slavery,

railed against the proceedings: 
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 11 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

“I know it is said that this power is necessary in aid of 

legislation. I deny the necessity. Convenient, at times, 

it may be; but necessary, never. We do not drag the

members of the Cabinet or the President to testify before a committee in aid of legislation; but I say, without 

hesitation, they can claim no immunity which does not

belong equally to the humblest citizen.” Cong. Globe,

36th Cong., 1st Sess., 3007 (1860). 

Sumner also addressed the matter of Parliament’s powers, 

calling them “more or less inapplicable” because “[w]e live 

under a written Constitution, with certain specified powers;

and all these are restrained by the tenth amendment.” 

Ibid. For Sumner, as for Adams, the power to issue legislative subpoenas to private parties was a “dangerous absurdity” with no basis in the text or history of the Constitution. 

Ibid.3 

4 

When this Court first addressed a legislative subpoena,

it refused to uphold it. After casting doubt on legislative

subpoenas generally, the Court in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 

103 U. S. 168, held that the subpoena at issue was unlawful

because it sought to investigate private conduct. 

In 1876, the House created a special Committee to investigate the failure of a major bank, which caused the loss of 

federal funds and related to financial speculation in the 

District of Columbia. Id., at 171. The Committee issued a 

subpoena to Kilbourn, an employee of the bank. Id., at 172. 

When he refused to answer questions or produce documents, the House held him in contempt and arrested him. 

Id., at 173. After his release, he sued the Speaker, several 

—————— 3 I note as well that Sumner expressly distinguished legislative subpoenas from subpoenas issued during “those inquiries which are in their 

nature preliminary to an impeachment.” Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st 

Sess., 3007 (1860). 
 

 

12 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Committee members, and the Sergeant at Arms for damages.

The Court discussed the arguments for an “impli[ed]”

power to issue legislative subpoenas. Id., at 183. As the 

Court saw it, there were two arguments: “1, its exercise by

the House of Commons of England . . . and, 2d, the necessity

of such a power to enable the two Houses of Congress to 

perform the duties and exercise the powers which the Constitution has conferred on them.” Ibid. 

The Court rejected the first argument. It found “no difference of opinion as to [the] origin” of the House of Commons’ subpoena power: 

“[T]he two Houses of Parliament were each courts of 

judicature originally, which, though divested by usage, 

and by statute, probably, of many of their judicial functions, have yet retained so much of that power as enables them, like any other court, to punish for a contempt of these privileges and authority that the power 

rests.” Id., at 184. 

Even after the division of Parliament into two houses, “[t]o

the Commons was left the power of impeachment, and, perhaps, others of a judicial character, and jointly they exercised, until a very recent period, the power of passing bills 

of attainder for treason and other high crimes which are in

their nature punishment for crime declared judicially by 

the High Court of Parliament.” Ibid. By contrast, the 

House of Representatives “is in no sense a court, . . . exercises no functions derived from its once having been a part 

of the highest court of the realm,” and has no judicial functions beyond “punishing its own members and determining 

their election.” Id., at 189. The Court thus rejected the notion that Congress inherited from Parliament an implied

power to issue legislative subpoenas. 

The Court did not reach a conclusion on the second theory 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 13 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

that a legislative subpoena power was necessary for Congress to carry out its legislative duties. But it observed 

that, based on British judicial opinions, not “much aid [is] 

given to the doctrine, that this power exists as one necessary to enable either House of Congress to exercise successfully their function of legislation.” Ibid. The Court referred 

to a collection of 18th- and 19th-century English decisions 

grounding the Parliamentary subpoena power in that

body’s judicial origins. Id., at 184–189 (citing Burdett v. Abbott, 104 Eng. Rep. 501 (K. B. 1811); Brass Crosby’s Case, 

95 Eng. Rep. 1005 (C. P. 1771); Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 

Eng. Rep. 1112 (K. B. 1839); and Kielley v. Carson, 13 Eng.

Rep. 225 (P. C. 1841)). The Court placed particular emphasis on Kielley, in which the Privy Council held that the Legislative Assembly of Newfoundland lacked a power to punish for contempt. The Privy Council expressly stated that 

the House of Commons could punish for contempt 

“‘not because it is a representative body with legislative functions, but by virtue of ancient usage and prescription . . . which forms a part of the common law of

the land, and according to which the High Court of Parliament before its division, and the Houses of Lords and 

Commons since, are invested with many privileges, 

that of punishment for contempt being one.’” Kilbourn, 

103 U. S., at 188–189. 

This Court also noted that the Privy Council “discusse[d] at 

length the necessity of this power in a legislative body for 

its protection, and to enable it to discharge its law-making

functions, and decide[d] against the proposition.” Id., at 

189. Although the Court did not have occasion to decide

whether the legislative subpoena in that case was necessary to the exercise of Congress’ legislative powers, its dis-
 

 

 

14 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

cussion strongly suggests the subpoena was unconstitutional.4 

The Court instead based its decision on the fact that the 

subpoena at issue “ma[de] inquiry into the private affairs of 

the citizen.” Id., at 190. Such a power, the Court reasoned,

“is judicial and not legislative,” id., at 193, and “no judicial 

power is vested in the Congress or either branch of it, save 

in the cases” of punishing Members, compelling Members’ 

attendance, judging elections and qualifications, and impeachment and trial, id., at 192–193. Notably, the Court

found no indication that the House “avowed to impeach the 

secretary,” or else “the whole aspect of the case would have

been changed.” Id., at 193. Even though the Court decided 

Kilbourn narrowly, it clearly entertained substantial

doubts about the constitutionality of legislative subpoenas

for private documents. 

D 

Nearly half a century later, in McGrain v. Daugherty, the 

Court reached the question reserved in Kilbourn—whether 

Congress has the power to issue legislative subpoenas. It 

rejected Kilbourn’s reasoning and upheld the power to issue

legislative subpoenas as long as they were relevant to a legislative power. Although McGrain involved oral testimony,

the Court has since extended this test to subpoenas for private documents. The Committees rely on McGrain, but this 

line of cases misunderstands both the original meaning of 

Article I and the historical practice underlying it. 

—————— 4 According to Justice Miller’s private letters, “a majority of the Court, 

including Miller himself, were of the opinion that neither House nor Senate had power to punish for contempt witnesses who refused to testify 

before investigating committees.” T. Taylor, Grand Inquest: The Story 

of Congressional Investigations 49 (1955). Only Justice Miller’s desire

to “ ‘decid[e] no more than is necessary’ ” caused the Court to avoid the 

broader question. Ibid. 
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 15 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

1 

Shortly before Attorney General Harry Daugherty resigned in 1924, the Senate opened an investigation into his 

“‘alleged failure’” to prosecute monopolists, the protagonists of the Teapot Dome scandal, and “‘many others.’” 

McGrain, 273 U. S., at 151. The investigating Committee 

issued subpoenas to Daugherty’s brother, Mally, who refused to comply and was arrested in Ohio for failure to testify. Id., at 152–154. Mally petitioned for a writ of habeas 

corpus, and the District Court discharged him, based 

largely on Kilbourn. Ex parte Daugherty, 299 F. 620 (SD 

Ohio 1924). The Deputy Sergeant at Arms who arrested

Mally directly appealed to this Court, which reversed. 

The Court concluded that, “[i]n actual legislative practice[,] power to secure needed information by [investigating 

and compelling testimony] has long been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate.” McGrain, 273 U. S., at 

161. The Court specifically found that “[i]t was so regarded 

in the British Parliament and in the Colonial legislatures 

before the American Revolution” and that “a like view has 

prevailed and been carried into effect in both houses of Congress and in most of the state legislatures.” Ibid. But the 

authority cited by the Court did not support that proposition. The Court cited the 1792 investigation of St. Clair’s

defeat, in which it appears no subpoena was issued, supra,

at 7–8, and the 1859 Senate investigation of John Brown’s 

raid on Harper’s Ferry, which led to an impassioned debate. 

273 U. S., at 162–164. Thus, for the reasons explained

above, the examples relied on in McGrain are materially

different from issuing a legislative subpoena for private, 

nonofficial documents. See supra, at 7, 10–11.5 

—————— 5The Court also cited decisions between 1858 and 1913 from state 

courts and a Canadian court, none of which are persuasive evidence 

about the original meaning of the U. S. Constitution. McGrain, 273 

U. S., at 165–167. 
 

 

 

16 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

THOMAS, J., dissenting

 The Court acknowledged Kilbourn, but erroneously distinguished its discussion regarding the constitutionality of 

legislative subpoenas as immaterial dicta. McGrain, supra, 

at 170–171 (quoting Kilbourn, supra, at 189). The Court 

concluded that “the two houses of Congress, in their separate relations, possess not only such powers as are expressly granted to them by the Constitution, but such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make the 

express powers effective.” McGrain, supra, at 173. 

Instead of relying on Kilbourn’s analysis, McGrain developed a test that rested heavily on functional considerations.

The Court wrote that “[a] legislative body cannot legislate 

wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect 

or change.” 273 U. S., at 175. Because “mere requests for

such information often are unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete,” “some means of compulsion are essential to obtain 

what is needed.” Ibid. 

The Court thus concluded that Congress could issue legislative subpoenas, provided that “the purpose for which the 

witness’s testimony was sought was to obtain information 

in aid of the legislative function.” Id., at 176. The Court 

has since applied this test to subpoenas for papers without 

any further analysis of the text or history of the Constitution. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 

U. S. 491, 504–505 (1975). The majority today modifies 

that test for cases involving the President, but it leaves the

core of the power untouched. Ante, at 18–20. 

2 

The opinion in McGrain lacks any foundation in text or

history with respect to subpoenas for private, nonofficial

documents. It fails to recognize that Congress, unlike Parliament, is not supreme. It does not cite any specific prece-
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 17 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

dent for issuing legislative subpoenas for private documents from 18th-century colonial or state practice. And it

identifies no founding-era legislative subpoenas for private

documents.6

 Since McGrain, the Court has pared back Congress’ authority to compel testimony and documents. It has held 

that certain convictions of witnesses for contempt of Congress violated the Fifth Amendment. See Watkins v. United 

States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957) (Due Process Clause); Quinn v. 

United States, 349 U. S. 155 (1955) (Self-Incrimination

Clause); see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 

153–154 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). It has also affirmed 

the reversal of a conviction on the ground that the Committee lacked authority to issue the subpoena. See United 

States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953). And today, it creates

a new four-part, nonexhaustive test for cases involving the 

President. Ante, at 18–20. Rather than continue our trend 

of trying to compensate for McGrain, I would simply decline

to apply it in these cases because it is readily apparent that

the Committees have no constitutional authority to subpoena private, nonofficial documents. 

III 

If the Committees wish to investigate alleged wrongdoing 

by the President and obtain documents from him, the Constitution provides Congress with a special mechanism for 

—————— 6The Court further observed that Congress has long exercised the

power to hold nonmembers in contempt for reasons other than failure to

comply with a legislative subpoena. McGrain, supra, at 168–169. The 

earliest case it cited, Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (1821), relied on 

arguments about Congress’ power of self-protection, id., at 226–227. 

Members of Congress defending the use of contempt for these other purposes made similar arguments about self-protection. 5 Annals of Cong. 

181–182 (1795) (Rep. W. Smith); id., at 189 (Rep. I. Smith). But the failure to respond to a subpoena does not pose a fundamental threat to Congress’ ability to exercise its powers. 
 

 

 

18 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

doing so: impeachment.7 

A 

It is often acknowledged, “if only half-heartedly honored,”

that one of the motivating principles of our Constitution is 

the separation of powers. Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 74 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). The Framers recognized that there are three forms 

of governmental power: legislative, executive and judicial.

The Framers also created three branches: Congress, the

President, and the Judiciary. The three powers largely 

align with the three branches. To a limited extent, however, the Constitution contains “a partial intermixture of

those departments for special purposes.” The Federalist 

No. 66, p. 401 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). One of 

those special purposes is the system of checks and balances, 

and impeachment is one of those checks. 

The Constitution grants the House “the sole Power of Impeachment,” Art. I, §2, cl. 5, and it specifies that the President may be impeached for “Treason, Bribery, or other high

Crimes and Misdemeanors,” Art. II, §4. The founding generation understood impeachment as a check on Presidential 

abuses. In response to charges that impeachment “confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same 

body,” Alexander Hamilton called it “an essential check in

the hands of [Congress] upon the encroachments of the executive.” The Federalist No. 66, at 401–402. And, in the 

Virginia ratifying convention, James Madison identified 

impeachment as a check on Presidential abuse of the treaty 

power. 10 Documentary History 1397. 

B 

The power to impeach includes a power to investigate and 

—————— 7 I express no view on whether there are any limitations on the impeachment power that would prevent the House from subpoenaing the

documents at issue. 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 19 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

demand documents. Impeachments in the States often involved an investigation. In 1781, the Virginia Legislature

began what Edmund Randolph called an “impeachment” of 

then-Governor Thomas Jefferson. P. Hoffer & N. Hull, Impeachment in America, 1635–1805, p. 85 (1984). This “most 

publicized and far-reaching impeachment inquiry for incompetence” included an “‘inquir[y] into the conduct of the 

executive of this state for the last two months.’” Ibid. The 

legislatures of New Jersey, id., at 92, and Pennsylvania, id., 

at 93–95, similarly investigated officials through impeachment proceedings.

Reinforcing this understanding, the founding generation

repeatedly referred to impeachment as an “inquest.” See 4 

Debates on the Constitution 44 (J. Elliot ed. 1854) (speech 

of A. Maclaine) (referring to the House as “the grand inquest of the Union at large”); The Federalist No. 65, at 397 

(Hamilton) (referring to the House as “a method of

NATIONAL INQUEST”); 2 Records of the Federal Convention 

154 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (record from the Committee of 

Detail stating that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be

the grand Inquest of this Nation; and all Impeachments

shall be made by them”); see also Mass. Const., ch. 1, §3, 

Art. VI (1780) (referring to the Massachusetts House of 

Representatives as “the Grand Inquest of this Commonwealth”). At the time, an “inquest” referred to an “[i]nquiry,

especially that made by a Jury” or “the Jury itself.” N. Bailey, Universal Etymological Dictionary (22d ed. 1770). 

The Founders were also aware of the contemporaneous

impeachment of Warren Hastings in England, in which the 

House of Commons heard witnesses before voting to impeach. P. Marshall, The Impeachment of Warren Hastings

40–41, 58 (1965). In the first impeachment under the new 

Constitution, Congressmen cited the Hastings impeachment as precedent for several points, including the power

to take testimony before impeaching. 7 Annals of Cong. 456 

(1797) (Rep. Rutledge); id., at 459 (Rep. Sitgreaves); id., at 
 

 

20 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

460 (Rep. Gallatin).

Other evidence from the 1790s confirms that the power 

to investigate includes the power to demand documents. 

When the House of Representatives sought documents related to the Jay Treaty from President George Washington, 

he refused to provide them on the ground that the House 

had no legislative powers relating to the ratification of treaties. 5 Annals of Cong. 760–762 (1796). But he carefully

noted that “[i]t does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for can be relative to any purpose under the cognizance of the House of Representatives, except that of an 

impeachment; which the resolution has not expressed.” Id., 

at 760. In other words, he understood that the House can 

demand documents as part of its power to impeach.

This Court has also long recognized the power of the

House to demand documents. Even as it questioned the 

power to issue legislative subpoenas, the Court in Kilbourn 

acknowledged the ability to “compel the attendance of witnesses, and their answer to proper questions” when “the

question of . . . impeachment is before either body acting in

its appropriate sphere on that subject.” 103 U. S., at 190. 

I express no view today on the boundaries of the power to

demand documents in connection with impeachment proceedings. But the power of impeachment provides the

House with authority to investigate and hold accountable 

Presidents who commit high crimes or misdemeanors. That 

is the proper path by which the Committees should pursue 

their demands. 

IV 

For nearly two centuries, until the 1970s, Congress never 

attempted to subpoena documents to investigate wrongdoing by the President outside the context of impeachment. 

Congress investigated Presidents without opening impeachment proceedings. See, e.g., 2 Hinds §1596, at 1043–

1045 (President James Buchanan). But it never issued a 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 21 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

subpoena for private, nonofficial documents as part of those

non-impeachment inquiries. Perhaps most strikingly, one 

proposed request for official documents from the President 

was amended after objection so that it “‘requested’” them

rather than “‘direct[ing]’” the President to provide them. 3 

id., §1895, at 193. 

Insisting that the House proceed through its impeachment power is not a mere formality. Unlike contempt,

which is governed by the rules of each chamber, impeachment and removal constitutionally requires a majority vote 

by the House and a two-thirds vote by the Senate. Art. I, 

§2, cl. 5; §3, cl. 6. In addition, Congress has long thought it 

necessary to provide certain procedural safeguards to officials facing impeachment and removal. See, e.g., 3 Annals 

of Cong. 903 (1793) (Rep. W. Smith). Finally, initiating impeachment proceedings signals to the public the gravity of

seeking the removal of a constitutional officer at the head

of a coordinate branch. 940 F. 3d 710, 776 (CADC 2019) 

(Rao, J., dissenting). 

* * * 

Congress’ legislative powers do not authorize it to engage

in a nationwide inquisition with whatever resources it 

chooses to appropriate for itself. The majority’s solution—

a nonexhaustive four-factor test of uncertain origin—is better than nothing. But the power that Congress seeks to exercise here has even less basis in the Constitution than the 

majority supposes. I would reverse in full because the 

power to subpoena private, nonofficial documents is not a

necessary implication of Congress’ legislative powers. If 

Congress wishes to obtain these documents, it should proceed through the impeachment power. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Nos. 19–715 and 19–760 

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

19–715 v.

MAZARS USA, LLP, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

19–760 v.

DEUTSCHE BANK AG, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[July 9, 2020]

 JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting. 

JUSTICE THOMAS makes a valuable argument about the

constitutionality of congressional subpoenas for a President’s personal documents. In these cases, however, I 

would assume for the sake of argument that such subpoenas are not categorically barred. Nevertheless, legislative

subpoenas for a President’s personal documents are inherently suspicious. Such documents are seldom of any special

value in considering potential legislation, and subpoenas 

for such documents can easily be used for improper non-legislative purposes. Accordingly, courts must be very sensitive to separation of powers issues when they are asked to

approve the enforcement of such subpoenas.

In many cases, disputes about subpoenas for Presidential 

documents are fought without judicial involvement. If Congress attempts to obtain such documents by subpoenaing a

President directly, those two heavyweight institutions can 
 

2 TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

use their considerable weapons to settle the matter. See 

ante, at 10 (opinion of the Court) (“Congress and the President maintained this tradition of negotiation and compromise—without the involvement of this Court—until the 

present dispute”). But when Congress issues such a subpoena to a third party, Congress must surely appreciate

that the Judiciary may be pulled into the dispute, and Congress should not expect that the courts will allow the subpoena to be enforced without seriously examining its legitimacy.

Whenever such a subpoena comes before a court, Congress should be required to make more than a perfunctory 

showing that it is seeking the documents for a legitimate 

legislative purpose and not for the purpose of exposing supposed Presidential wrongdoing. See ante, at 12. The House 

can inquire about possible Presidential wrongdoing pursuant to its impeachment power, see ante, at 17–21 (THOMAS, 

J., dissenting), but the Committees do not defend these subpoenas as ancillary to that power. 

Instead, they claim that the subpoenas were issued to

gather information that is relevant to legislative issues, but 

there is disturbing evidence of an improper law enforcement purpose. See 940 F. 3d 710, 767–771 (CADC 2019) 

(Rao, J., dissenting). In addition, the sheer volume of documents sought calls out for explanation. See 943 F. 3d 627, 

676–681 (CA2 2019) (Livingston, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part).

The Court recognizes that the decisions below did not

give adequate consideration to separation of powers concerns. Therefore, after setting out a non-exhaustive list of

considerations for the lower courts to take into account, 

ante, at 18–20, the Court vacates the judgments of the 

Courts of Appeals and sends the cases back for reconsideration. I agree that the lower courts erred and that these 

cases must be remanded, but I do not think that the consid-
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

erations outlined by the Court can be properly satisfied unless the House is required to show more than it has put forward to date. 

Specifically, the House should provide a description of the

type of legislation being considered, and while great specificity is not necessary, the description should be sufficient 

to permit a court to assess whether the particular records

sought are of any special importance. The House should 

also spell out its constitutional authority to enact the type

of legislation that it is contemplating, and it should justify 

the scope of the subpoenas in relation to the articulated legislative needs. In addition, it should explain why the subpoenaed information, as opposed to information available 

from other sources, is needed. Unless the House is required 

to make a showing along these lines, I would hold that enforcement of the subpoenas cannot be ordered. Because I 

find the terms of the Court’s remand inadequate, I must respectfully dissent.