DA 10-0348

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2011 MT 154

KALISPELL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

MEA-MFT, and WILLIAM HARTFORD,

 Petitioners and Appellees,

 v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, KALISPELL

HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5,

 Respondent/Counter Claimant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,

In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV 09-1076C

Honorable Stewart E. Stadler, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Jeffrey M. Hindoien (argued); Kaleva Law Offices; Helena, Montana

For Appellees:

Karl J. Englund (argued); Karl J. Englund, P.C.; Missoula, Montana

Argued: April 15, 2011

Submitted: April 26, 2011

Decided: June 28, 2011 

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

June 28 2011
2

Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 The Board of Trustees (Board) for Kalispell High School District No. 5 (District),

appeals the order entered by the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, 

compelling arbitration of a grievance filed by William Hartford (Hartford). Hartford’s 

grievance alleges his employment as a teacher was terminated “without just cause” in 

violation of a collective bargaining agreement. We affirm.

¶2 Did the District Court err by compelling arbitration of Hartford’s grievance

under the collective bargaining agreement?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 Hartford was a high school science teacher. Hartford’s employment with the 

District began in the 1999-2000 school year and continued through the 2007-2008 school 

year. He was tenured. On May 29, 2008, Hartford and the Board entered into a written 

contract governing Hartford’s employment for the 2008-2009 school year (the Teacher’s 

Contract). At that time, Hartford was properly certified as a teacher. He held a teaching

certificate valid from July 1, 2003, to June 30, 2008. Paragraph 3 of the Teacher’s 

Contract provides: “It is understood that the Teacher either holds a valid teaching 

certificate under the laws of Montana or will have obtained such certificate before 

October 1 of the year this contract is executed, otherwise, this contract is voidable at the 

option of the District.” 

¶4 In effect for school years 2007-2009 was a collective bargaining agreement, 

entitled “Comprehensive Agreement” (CBA), which was entered into between Kalispell 
3

School District No. 5 and the Kalispell Education Association (KEA), an affiliate of 

MEA-MFT. Article 1.1 of the CBA states the agreement is entered into “pursuant to and 

in compliance with the Montana Public Employees Collective Bargaining Law Title 39, 

Chapter 31, Revised Codes of Montana, as amended . . . to provide the conditions of 

employment for teachers during the duration of this Agreement with respect to wages, 

hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment.” Article 2.1 states “the 

District recognized the Kalispell Education Association as the Exclusive Representative 

of the appropriate unit.” Article 2.2 states:

Appropriate Unit: The Association shall represent members of the 

appropriate unit which shall consist of all teachers and long-term substitute 

teachers of the District who are certificated in Class I, II, IV, or V as in 

Section 20-4-106, specialists requiring a license under the laws of the State 

of Montana, and whose positions call for or require such certification . . . . 

Article 5 of the CBA is entitled Teacher and Exclusive Representative Rights, and Article 

5.6 provides “[n]o teacher shall be disciplined, reprimanded, reduced in rank or 

compensation, discharged, or deprived of any professional advantage without just 

cause.”1 Article 13, as required by § 39-31-306(5), MCA,2 contains a grievance 

 

1

 Section 20-4-207(1), MCA, provides “[t]he trustees of any district may dismiss a teacher before 

the expiration of the teacher’s employment contract for good cause,” and specifies the procedure 

to follow in doing so. Section 20-4-207(2)-(3), MCA. Under § 20-4-207(5), MCA, “[a]ny 

teacher who has been dismissed may in writing within 20 days appeal the dismissal . . . . The 

teacher may appeal a decision to terminate an employment contract to the county superintendent 

if the teacher’s employment is not covered by a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to Title 

39, chapter 31. If the employment of the teacher is covered by a collective bargaining 

agreement, a teacher shall appeal a decision to terminate an employment contract to an 

arbitrator.”

2

 Section 39-31-306(5), MCA, provides in pertinent part: “An agreement to which a school is a 

party must contain a grievance procedure culminating in final and binding arbitration of 
4

procedure that culminates in final and binding arbitration of unresolved grievances. A

grievance must be submitted in writing to a designee of the District under Article 13.6, 

and if not first resolved through informal discussion, may be appealed through various 

levels to the Superintendent of Schools and then the Board of Trustees. CBA, Arts. 

13.7.1 through 13.7.3. “In the event that the parties are unable to resolve a grievance, it 

may be submitted to arbitration as defined herein,” under Article 13.8.1. 

¶5 On June 30, 2008, Hartford’s Montana teaching certificate expired by his 

inadvertence in failing to renew it. Because no party was aware of the expiration, 

Hartford began teaching in the fall of 2008 as usual. At some point prior to November 4, 

2008, the county superintendent notified the District that Hartford’s teaching certificate 

had expired. The District’s superintendent notified Hartford of the expiration of his 

certification and informed him he was no longer eligible to receive compensation under 

his Teacher’s Contract, pursuant to § 20-4-202, MCA. Hartford continued to teach at the 

District as a non-certified substitute teacher, and the Board took no further action on 

Hartford’s Teacher’s Contract. On December 11, 2008, the high school principal 

terminated Hartford’s employment. Seven days later, Hartford obtained a new teaching 

certificate, with a validation date of July 1, 2008, and effective until June 30, 2011.

¶6 In January 2009 Hartford sought to file a grievance, alleging that he had been 

terminated “without just cause” in violation of Article 5.6 of the CBA. The District 

 

unresolved and disputed interpretations of agreements. The aggrieved party may have the 

grievance or disputed interpretation of the agreement resolved either by final and binding 

arbitration or by any other available legal method and forum, but not by both.”
5

superintendent, and later the Board, denied Hartford’s request to grieve the issue, 

claiming the matter did not constitute a valid grievance under the CBA on grounds that 

Hartford was not a member of the bargaining unit at any point during his employment in 

the fall of 2008, he was not a “teacher” as defined under Montana law during his 

employment in the fall of 2008, and he had not validated his employment status as a 

“teacher” in the fall of 2008 as required by § 20-4-202, MCA. Hartford and the KEA 

attempted to advance the grievance process to arbitration pursuant to Article 13.8 of the 

CBA, but the District refused to participate. 

¶7 In August 2009 Hartford and the KEA filed a petition to compel arbitration in the 

District Court. The District opposed the petition and filed a counterclaim for declaratory 

judgment, followed by a motion for summary judgment, requesting a determination that 

§ 20-4-201, MCA, prohibits a Montana school district from entering into or maintaining 

an employment contract with an individual as a teacher when the individual does not 

possess a valid Montana teaching certificate, and that therefore the Teacher’s Contract 

became void as a matter of law the moment Hartford ceased to possess his teaching 

certificate. Hartford and the KEA also sought summary judgment.

¶8 The District Court entered an order granting Hartford and the KEA’s motion and 

denying the same for the District, reasoning “[t]he School District’s arguments that once 

Mr. Hartford’s certification expired all previously applicable contracts and rights 

evaporated is not supported by statute and case law. His employment contract continued 

without interruption as it had not been voided by the Trustees.” The court reasoned the 
6

Teacher’s Contract and the CBA “were both subject to law which include provisions for 

those situations where a teacher, qualified by education and training, did not have a 

current registered certificate.” The court stated that “[i]ronically” Hartford had obtained 

a new certificate seven days after dismissal that was retroactive to July 1, 2008, “thereby 

vitiating the District’s arguments that he was excluded from the collective bargaining 

agreement.” The District Court concluded “the dispute falls under the umbrella of the 

Comprehensive Agreement,” and ordered the matter submitted to arbitration as provided 

in the CBA. The District appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” M. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review a district court’s decision 

to grant summary judgment de novo. Edwards v. Cascade Co. Sheriff’s Dept., 2009 MT 

451, ¶ 38, 354 Mont. 307, 223 P.3d 893. When no dispute exists as to the material facts, 

we review whether the court correctly applied the law. Edwards, ¶ 38. We review a 

district court’s conclusions of law regarding arbitrability to determine whether they are 

correct. Missoula Co. High Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trustees, 259 Mont. 438, 440, 857 

P.2d 696, 697 (1993); see also Higgins Dev. Partners, LLC v. Skanska U.S.A. Bldg., Inc., 

2009 MT 287, ¶ 12, 352 Mont. 243, 216 P.3d 199 (citing Ratchye v. Lucas, 1998 MT 87, 

¶ 14, 288 Mont. 345, 957 P.2d 1128).
7

DISCUSSION

¶10 Did the District Court err by compelling arbitration of Hartford’s grievance 

under the collective bargaining agreement? 

¶11 The Uniform Arbitration Act (the Act) is generally applicable to labor agreements. 

Section 27-5-113, MCA; Missoula Co., 259 Mont. at 441, 857 P.2d at 698. Section 27-5-

115, MCA, of the Act states, in pertinent part:

Proceedings to compel or stay arbitration. (1) On the application 

of a party showing an agreement described in 27-5-114 and the opposing 

party’s refusal to arbitrate, the district court shall order the parties to 

proceed with arbitration; but if the opposing party denies the existence of 

the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the 

determination of that issue raised and shall order arbitration if it finds for 

the applying party or deny the application if it finds for the opposing party.

. . .

(5) An order for arbitration may not be refused on the ground that 

the claim in issue lacks merit or good faith or because no fault or grounds 

for the claim sought to be arbitrated have been shown.

“It is essential to keep in mind . . . that arbitration is a matter of contract . . . .” Greater 

Missoula Area Fedn. of Early Childhood Educators v. Child Start, Inc., 2009 MT 362, 

¶ 25, 353 Mont. 201, 219 P.3d 881 (citing Solle v. Western States Ins. Agency, 2000 MT 

96, ¶ 22, 299 Mont. 237, 999 P.2d 328). When a court is asked to compel arbitration of a 

dispute, “the threshold inquiry is whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.” 

Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 2009 MT 329, ¶ 7, 353 Mont. 6, 218 P.3d 486 (citing Solle, ¶ 22; 

State ex rel. Bullock v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2009 MT 261, ¶ 15, 352 Mont. 30, 217 P.3d 

475; § 27-5-115, MCA). The United States Supreme Court has stated as axiom that 

“‘arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration 
8

any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.’” AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. 

Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 1418 (1986) 

(quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 

574, 582, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 1353 (1960)).

¶12 In its opening brief, the District states its issue on appeal as whether the Teacher’s 

Contract “is void under Montana law,” and argues the “‘crux’ of this entire matter” is the 

“construction or validity” of the Teacher’s Contract. “That threshold question,” the 

District posits, “involves only the application of Montana law and has absolutely nothing 

to do with the terms of the CBA. In short, the debate here boils down to the legal effect 

(if any) of that ‘Teacher’s Contract’ as of the point in time that Mr. Hartford undisputedly 

ceased to possess a professional teaching certificate . . . .” (Emphasis in original.) The 

District argues the Teacher’s Contract became void as a matter of law when Hartford’s 

certification expired, by virtue of § 20-4-201(1), MCA, which provides that school 

district trustees “have the authority to employ any person as a teacher or specialist, but 

only a person who holds a valid Montana teacher or specialist certificate . . . . Each 

teacher or specialist must be employed under written contract . . . .” The District argues 

Hartford’s lapse in certification rendered his contract as one “prohibited by statute,” 

contrary to Montana public policy, and void. The District’s position essentially requires 

the conclusion that the Teacher’s Contract, which is “voidable at the option of the 

District” when a teacher fails to hold certification, conflicts with statute, because at that 
9

point the District no longer had the choice or option under the statute to continue 

employing Hartford.

¶13 The District seems to switch directions in the middle of briefing, at least in part. 

Despite its opening argument that the threshold question “has absolutely nothing to do 

with the terms of the CBA,” but only the void contract, it argues in reply that the case 

turns on the undisputed fact that Hartford was not certified at the time his employment 

was terminated and “the black and white language of the applicable CBA that specifically 

limits its coverage to individuals who possess a valid Montana teaching certificate.” 

(Emphasis added, original emphasis omitted.) The District’s arguments well illustrate the 

difficulty presented in defining the precise issue to be decided under the two contracts at 

issue, the Teacher’s Contract and the CBA, and determining whether arbitration is 

mandated.

¶14 Under its various arguments, the District too narrowly focuses on selected facts, 

and fails to consider the larger factual record. The District asserts the Teacher’s Contract 

is “prohibited by statute” on the basis of § 20-4-201(1), MCA, and § 28-2-603, MCA, 

which declares void contracts with an unlawful single object, due to Hartford’s temporary 

loss of certification. However, it is also undisputed that Hartford’s Teacher’s Contract 

had a lawful object when it was entered, thus satisfying § 28-2-602, MCA, which states 

“[t]he object of the contract must be lawful when the contract is made . . . .” Thus, the 

District indeed had “the authority to employ” Hartford, who then held “a valid Montana 

teacher or specialist certificate.” Section 20-4-201(1), MCA. Further, it is undisputed 
10

that Hartford was initially a member of the bargaining unit pursuant to Article 2.2 of the 

CBA.

¶15 The lapse in Hartford’s certification occurred after the Teacher’s Contract was 

entered, and notice of the lapse was given by the county superintendent during the 

2008-2009 school year, around November 1, pursuant to § 20-4-202, MCA. That statute

provides that a teacher who fails to register his certificate with the county superintendent 

“within 60 calendar days” after beginning to provide services “is not eligible to receive 

any further compensation under the contract of employment until the person has 

registered the certificate,” and that “the district may not pay any teacher who has not 

registered the person’s certificate until the county superintendent does notify the district 

of the registration.” Section 20-4-202(1), MCA. Notably, the statute does not require 

termination of the teacher’s employment, but rather requires cessation of further 

compensation under the employment contract until the teacher registers the certificate. 

Perhaps in recognition of this provision, the District changed Hartford’s status to a 

non-certified substitute teacher, and he continued to teach. Section 20-4-202, MCA, does 

not further address the employment contract’s status, particularly its voidability. The 

Teacher’s Contract, by its own terms, was made “voidable at the option of the District.” 

Hartford’s employment was terminated by the high school principal on December 11, 

2008, and Hartford obtained his new teaching certificate seven days later, with a 

validation date of July 1, 2008. He attempted to file a grievance asserting the termination 

of his employment was “without just cause” in January 2009.
11

¶16 The CBA does not reference the provisions of 20-4-202, MCA, regarding notice 

and loss of pay for teachers who fail to register their certificates, nor otherwise address

the status of a teacher/unit member who temporarily loses certification during the term of 

the agreement, and re-obtains it. Article 13.1 of the CBA provides that an arbitrable

grievance is “a dispute or disagreement between the teacher and the District as to the 

interpretation or application of terms and conditions contained in this Agreement.” 

¶17 For purposes of the judicial determination of arbitrability, the record demonstrates 

significant questions regarding the status of the Teacher’s Contract and the application of 

the CBA, and that these questions are intertwined. The continued validity of the 

Teacher’s Contract and Hartford’s membership under the CBA after he temporarily lost

certification and regained it retroactively present questions of interpretation and 

application of the contracts. The District sought a declaration that Hartford’s Teacher’s 

Contract was void as a matter of law, and, upon that premise, sought a secondary 

determination that Hartford retained no further rights under the CBA, thus foreclosing his 

grievance. But these questions, under these facts, are not that simple; and that bears upon 

the issue of arbitrability.

¶18 The United States Supreme Court has explained that the “presumption of 

arbitrability” means that “‘[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be 

denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not 

susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be 

resolved in favor of coverage.’” AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 650, 106 S. Ct. at 1419 
12

(quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83, 80 S. Ct. at 1353). 

Recently, in Granite Rock Company v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, ___ U.S. 

___, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2858 (2010), the Supreme Court explained that courts determining 

arbitrability of a dispute should apply the presumption if the arbitration agreement “is 

ambiguous about whether it covers the dispute at hand.” We have likewise 

acknowledged that “[s]tate and federal policies generally favor arbitration when a valid 

arbitration agreement exists between the parties.” Higgins Dev., ¶ 19 (citing the Federal 

Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006), and AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 650, 106 

S. Ct. at 1419); see also Solle, ¶ 21. The presumption of arbitrability “is particularly 

applicable where the clause is as broad” as it was in AT&T Technologies, which provided 

for arbitration “‘of any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this 

contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder . . . .’” AT&T Technologies, 475 

U.S. at 650, 106 S. Ct. at 1419. 

¶19 Similarly, we have recognized, in the context of exhaustion of remedies, that the 

policy of the state of Montana favors resolving labor disputes under the terms of a 

collective bargaining agreement. Klein v. State ex rel. Mont. Dept. of Corrections, 2008 

MT 189, ¶ 11, 343 Mont. 520, 185 P.3d 986 (citing Small v. McRae, 200 Mont. 497, 

503-04, 651 P.2d 982, 986 (1982)). “‘Only . . . where it is certain that the arbitration 

clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement is not susceptible to an 

interpretation that covers the dispute is an employee entitled to sidestep the provisions of 
13

the collective bargaining agreement.’” Klein, ¶ 11 (quoting Small, 200 Mont. at 504, 651 

P.2d at 986). 

¶20 Further, in deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular 

grievance to arbitration, “a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying 

claims.” AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649, 106 S. Ct. at 1419. As previously noted, 

§ 27-5-115(5), MCA, prohibits a court from refusing an order for arbitration “on the 

ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or good faith or because no fault or grounds for 

the claim sought to be arbitrated have been shown.” See e.g. Ratchye, ¶ 25. 

¶21 As noted above, significant questions have been raised in this record about the 

status of the Teacher’s Contract and the application of the CBA to Hartford, a 

teacher/unit member who temporarily lost certification. Under the presumption, 

arbitration of a grievance “should not be denied unless it may be said with positive 

assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the 

asserted dispute,” and doubts are “resolved in favor of coverage.” AT&T Technologies, 

475 U.S. at 650, 106 S. Ct. at 1419 (internal quotation marks omitted). An arbitrable 

grievance under Article 13.1 of the CBA consists of “a dispute . . . as to the interpretation 

or application of terms and conditions contained in this Agreement.” We cannot say with 

“positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that 

covers the asserted dispute.” We therefore conclude Hartford’s grievance is subject to 

arbitration under the CBA.
14

¶22 We conclude the questions raised by this matter are properly submitted to 

arbitration, and we decline to address the merits of those issues. We hereby modify any 

conclusions entered by the District Court which are inconsistent with this opinion.

¶23 Affirmed.

/S/ JIM RICE

We concur: 

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER

/S/ BRIAN MORRIS