alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
263 La. 109

#### STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS v. James M. MENEFEE et al.

No. 52883.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 19, 1972.

In re: The State of Louisiana, through the Department of Highways applying for certiorari, or writ or review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Ouachita. 266 So.2d 226.

Writ denied. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal the judgment is correct.
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. William Michael CASERTA and John D. Benson, Appellees.

Nos. 77-1611 and 77-1612.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 16, 1978.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles A. Stampelos, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

R. N. Koblegard, III, Fort Pierce, for appellee, John D. Benson.

Ben L. Bryan, Jr., Fort Pierce, for appel-lee, William Michael Caserta.

LETTS, Judge.

This interlocutory appeal stems from a refusal by the trial judge to permit the State to amend the information. We reverse.

We have no quarrel with the trial judge’s order granting the motion to suppress the evidence. Judge Sample expressly found that the officers were lying about the facts of their alleged probable cause to search the hangers for contraband contained iri two aircraft. However, we feel his understandable disgust with the authorities may be what prompted him to refuse the State’s motion to amend the information and in this he was in error.

The original information contained two counts and read as follows:

> I.

> “. . . did then and there unlawfully deliver a controlled substance, to wit: CANNABIS, commonly known as marijuana, in an amount in excess of One-Hundred (100) Pounds, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(l)(a);”

> II.

> “. . . did then and there unlawfully have in their actual or constructive possession a controlled substance, to wit: CANNABIS, commonly referred to as marijuana, in an amount in excess of One-Hundred (100) Pounds, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(l)(a)2;”

*1145The requested amended information deleted Count I and amended Count II to read as follows:

II.

> “. . . did then and there unlawfully possess with the intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance, to wit: CANNABIS, commonly known as marijuana, in an amount in excess of One-Hundred (100) Pounds in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(l)(a)2;”

We cannot see how this amended information would have changed the facts, or the defense, in the case at bar and the appellees would not have been prejudiced thereby. In such event technical defects are to be excused unless prejudice is shown. *Michigan v. Tucker,*417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), *Lackos v. State,*339 So.2d 217 (Fla.1976). The statute the defendants were charged under was the same [§ 893.13(l)(a)(2) Fla.Stat.1977]1 and the amendment did not prejudice nor surprise the defendants. Nor was the original motion to amend filed on the morning of the trial, same being filed at least 30 days prior thereto.

Accordingly, we are of the view that the amendment to the information should have been permitted under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.1400).

REVERSED AND REMANDED IN ACCORDANCE HEREWITH.

DOWNEY, C. J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur.

1

. We assume, however, that the original information should have read Fla.Stat. 893.13(l)(a)2 in Count I and Fla.Stat. 893.13(l)(b) in Count II.
IV

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 485

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that any health care

reform legislation passed by Congress must ensure access to and the

continued advancement of medical technology.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 20, 1994

Mr. RAMSTAD (for himself and Mr. VALENTINE) submitted the following resolution; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that

any health care reform legislation passed by Congress

must ensure access to and the continued advancement

of medical technology.

Whereas the United States enjoys high quality health care

largely because patients have access to the latest medical

technology;

Whereas medical technology not only improves the health of

the citizenry, but also provides cost-effective delivery of

care;

Whereas medical technology, the driving force behind advances in quality and improved efficiency, must play an

integral role in reforming the health care delivery system;
2

•HRES 485 IH

Whereas substantial capital investment is needed to bring the

full benefits and cost-savings from technology to health

care delivery;

Whereas the development of medical technology requires large

investments in research and development which are generated largely by the private sector;

Whereas artificial health care spending limits in any form—

whether they be immediate price controls or controls that

are triggered at a future date—will discourage private investment and hinder the development of medical technology;

Whereas the world depends on American innovation for the

development of and access to medical technology;

Whereas research and technology development related to information and computer technology and application of

those research results to the health care industry are essential to achieving the cost savings necessary to pay for

health care reform;

Whereas innovation and competition, not price controls or rationing, are the key to cost-control and high-quality

health care; and

Whereas drug and therapy rationing would have unintended

consequences and actually lead to decreased competitiveness among suppliers and higher costs for consumers:

Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved,

2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

3 This resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Medical Innova4 tion Resolution’’.
3

•HRES 485 IH

1 SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

2 It is the sense of Congress that any legislation en3 acted to reform health care delivery in the United States

4 must not include provisions such as price controls and lim5 its on national health care expenditures that would restrict

6 access to medical technology or hinder its development.

Æ
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, Thomas R. Moberly, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of G&K Services, Inc.;

2.   Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
     statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
     make the statements made, in light of circumstances under which such
     statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
     this quarterly report;

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
     information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all
     material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash
     flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
     quarterly report.

Date: November 6, 2003

                            By:    /s/ Thomas R. Moberly
                                 ----------------------------------------------
                                 Thomas R. Moberly, Chief Executive Officer
                                 (Principal Executive Officer)




                                                                              22
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1




                        Consent of Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-3 No. 333-80669) of Borders Group, Inc., in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 333-88805) pertaining to the Borders Group, Inc. 1998 Stock Option Plan
and in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-79559) pertaining to the
Borders Group, Inc. Management Stock Purchase Plan, Borders Group, Inc. Stock
Option Plan, Borders Group, Inc. Employee Stock Purchase Plan, Borders Group,
Inc. Director Stock Plan, Borders Group, Inc. 401(k) Plan, and Borders Group,
Inc. Savings Plan for Employees Working in Puerto Rico of our report dated March
15, 2001, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Borders
Group, Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended
January 28, 2001.

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Detroit, Michigan
April 20, 2001
|EXHIBIT 31.1                       
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|I, Alston D. Correll, certify that:
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|                    |                                                                                                          | b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.
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|                    |                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                              
|                    |                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                              
|                    |                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                              
|Date: July 29, 2004
|                    |                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                              
|                    | /s/ ALSTON D. CORRELL                            
Alston D. Correll
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
-  Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) 
-  Filing an Appeal Online      -  DAB E-File 
  -  Medicare Operations Division (MOD) E-File 
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  -  Appeals to the Medicare Appeals Council (Council)        -  Forms 
    -  Fully Integrated Duals Advantage (FIDA) Demonstration Project 
-  Alternative Dispute Resolution Services      -  Sharing Neutrals 
  -  ADR Training 
  -  Other ADR Services 
-  DAB Decisions      -  Board Decisions 
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-  Stakeholder Feedback 
-  Careers      -  Open Career Opportunities 
  -  Internships & Externships 
-  About DAB      -  Organizational Overview 
  -  Who are the Judges? 
  -  DAB Divisions 
  -  Contact DAB 

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# Board Decisions

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Content last reviewed March 11, 2024
#### In the Matter of Mary Peoples, Petitioner, v New York City Housing Authority et al., Respondents.

[723 NYS2d 6]

—Determination of respondent New York City Housing Authority, dated November 10, 1998, which terminated petitioner’s public housing tenancy on the ground of nondesirability, unanimously modified, on the law, the penalty of termination vacated, the matter remanded to respondents for imposition of a lesser penalty, and this proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of Supreme Court, New York County [Paula Omansky, J.], entered *260September 24, 1999) otherwise disposed of by confirming the remainder of the determination, without costs.

This Court has the authority to review an administrative sanction that “shocks the judicial conscience and, therefore, constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law” *(Matter of Featherstone v Franco, 95*NY2d 550, 554). The drastically disproportionate remedy of expelling petitioner from her home for this incident, after her long and unblemished tenancy, amounts to such an abuse of discretion *(see, Matter of Holiday v Franco,*268 AD2d 138).

While substantial evidence supports respondents’ finding that petitioner “physically confronted” and “accosted” the Housing Authority’s representative during an inspection of her apartment for repairs, and while this is certainly a very serious breach of respondents’ rules, the penalty of termination shocks our sense of fairness. As the Hearing Officer noted in urging respondents to exercise “self restraint” in imposing a penalty, petitioner experienced “considerable frustration” because of the inspector’s refusal to acknowledge that her apartment was in almost constant need of repair; furthermore, petitioner suffered more distress as a result of the altercation than did the inspector, who was not seriously injured and required no medical attention, and petitioner has had an otherwise blemish-free, 24-year tenure in public housing. Accordingly, we remand the matter for imposition of a lesser penalty *(Matter of Spand v Franco,*242 AD2d 210, *lv denied*92 NY2d 802; *Matter of Winn v Brown,*226 AD2d 191; *Matter of Milton v Christian,*99 AD2d 984). Concur — Sullivan, P. J., Andrias, Wallach, Lerner and Buckley, JJ. [The unpublished Decision and Order of this Court entered herein on December 21, 2000 is hereby recalled and vacated.]
#### SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY v. Jacqueline GUNN, wife of George A. Gunn, Jr., and George A. Gunn, Jr., Individually and as husband and wife.

No. 5884.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Nov. 30. 1973.

*405J. Paul Demarest, Favret & Favret, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.

Ross P. LaDart, Harvey, for defendant-appellant.

Before REDMANN, LEMMON and SCHOTT, JJ.

REDMANN, Judge.

A wife appeals from a judgment casting her for purchases she made from plaintiff department store during the three days immediately following her physical separation (and filing of suit for judgment of separation) from her husband, on a charge account she had applied for in her husband’s name a month previously.

The wife asserts legal principles such as the wife’s separate estate’s nonliability for community debts, the community’s continuance despite physical separation, necessity of termination of agency of wife for husband on his charge accounts, etc. However, we can only view this case as one where the trial court has made a credibility determination in accepting the husband’s testimony rather than the wife’s on the crucial questions of whether the account was opened with the husband’s consent or even with his knowledge, and whether the actual purchases in early November were made by the wife as a convenience to the just-separated husband, on his instructions and for his benefit, as Christmas gifts for his family.

> “[T]he reviewing court must give great weight to the factual conclusions of the trier of fact; where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. * * * ” Canter v. Koehring Co., La.1973, 283 So.2d 716, 724.

We are unable to say the trial judge erred.

Although the wife did purport to act as the agent of the husband and the plaintiff sold to her in that purported capacity, the trial court’s factual conclusion is that her acts were unauthorized by and unknown to the husband. The applicable legal principle is that of C.C. art. 3010, that an act exceeding the mandatory’s power “is null and void with regard to the principal, unless ratified by the latter, and the attorney is alone bound by it in his individual capacity.” 1 See also Nationwide Fin. Co. of Gretna, Inc. v. Pitre, La.App.1971, 243 So.2d 326.

The judgment is affirmed.

1

. Because the creditor has not appealed from the dismissal of the husband we need not recite that the community is not bound for the wife’s debt; Adams v. Golson, 1937, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876. See also Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., La.1973, 287 So.2d 497, allowing execution against the community for the husband’s pre-nuptial debts, theorizing that the husband’s patrimony includes community assets and liabilities, while the wife’s patrimony includes only “the imperfect ownership without use of one-half of the community” (in addition to her separate property).
[No. 337-2.

Division Two.

July 28, 1971.]

#### R. H. Cooper *et al., Respondents,*v. Morley Brotman *et al., Appellants.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clallam County, No. 17447, Joseph H. Johnston, J., entered August 8, 1969. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 226 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 226

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                         July 27, 1993.
    Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker 
may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 2667) making emergency supplemental appropriations for relief from 
the major, widespread flooding in the Midwest for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 1993, and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill shall 
be dispensed with. All points of order against consideration of the bill are 
waived. General debate shall be confined to the bill and the amendments made in 
order by this resolution and shall not exceed ninety minutes equally divided and 
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on 
Appropriations. After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment 
under the five-minute rule and shall be considered as read. The modification to 
the bill printed in part 1 of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying 
this resolution shall be considered as adopted in the House and in the Committee 
of the Whole. All points of order against the bill, as modified, are waived. No 
amendment to the bill, as modified, shall be in order except the amendment 
printed in part 2 of the report. The amendment printed in part 2 of the report 
may be offered only by the named proponent or a designee, shall be considered as 
read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided 
and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, and shall not be subject to 
amendment. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the 
Committee shall rise and report the bill, as modified, to the House with such 
amendment as may have been adopted. The previous question shall be considered as 
ordered on the bill and amendment thereto to final passage without intervening 
motion except one motion to recommit.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
<PAGE>   1


                                                                      Exhibit 10

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

April 26, 2000



Mr. John Appel
[Address]
[Address]


Dear John:

As we have discussed, it is important to GTE that you remain with the company at
least through the closing of the merger. That being the case, if you remain with
GTE at least through the closing (or, if later, June 30, 2000) but separate as a
result of the merger thereafter, GTE will calculate your lump sum pension
benefit using the interest rate as of July 1, 2000 or the interest rate that
would ordinarily be used given your actual separation date, whichever would
provide you with the highest lump sum benefit. This special interest rate
protection will only be applicable if you elect to receive a lump sum pension
distribution following your separation, and any increase in the amount to which
you are entitled as a result of this commitment will be payable from the general
assets of GTE.

John, I want to thank you again for your flexibility. We need your leadership
now - more than ever. I truly appreciate this additional commitment.

Sincerely,



J. Randall MacDonald
Executive Vice President -
Human Resources & Administration

JRM:wh

c:       J. T. D'Angelo, Jr.
         E. D. Singer
H. Res. 158

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

April 22, 1993.

Resolved, That the following named Members, Resident

Commissioner, and Delegates, be, and they are hereby, elected to the following standing committees of the House of Representatives:

COMMITTEE ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Ronald V. Dellums, California, to rank following Fortney Stark of California.

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR: Robert A.

Underwood, Guam.

Attest:

Clerk.
#### Paul G. SWARTZFAGER v. MISSISSIPPI STATE TAX COMMISSION.

No. 45451.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Nov. 3, 1969.

John L. Jeffries, Laurel, for appellant.

James D. Hester, Laurel, Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., by John E. Stone, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Bennie W. BROOKS v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT.

No. 38758.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1969.

Habeas Corpus denied without opinion.
#### James Douglas BROOKINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-1123.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 17, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 9, 1971.

Engel & Halpern, Miami, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and J. Robert Olian, Miami, for appellée.

Before SWANN, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of a denial, after an evidentiary hearing, of a motion under Rule 1.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33' F.S.A. to vacate a judgment of conviction for second degree murder entered upon a jury verdict and sentence *562therefor. The denial of an earlier motion to vacate the same judgment and sentence was affirmed in Brookins v. State, Fla.App.1965, 174 So.2d 578.

The judgment herein appealed is affirmed, see: Brookins v. State, supra; Mitchell v. State, Fla.App.1967, 203 So.2d 676, cert. den. 392 U.S. 913, 88 S.Ct. 2073, 20 L.Ed.2d 1371 (1968); Brown v. State, Fla.App.1966, 191 So.2d 612. See generally, Stewart v. State, Fla.App.1966, 184 So.2d 489.

Affirmed.