### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 641 -CR

Da vid Hoo ve r , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 390TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 3040 865 , HO NORAB LE JULIE H . KO CUREK , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
David Hoove r appe als his con v i ct i o n by a jury of the off

ense of indece ncy

with a child by contac t. See Tex. P enal C o d e An n . § 21.11 (West 2003). The tria l court asse ssed punishment at 35 y ear s in the I nstitu t i o n al Di v ision of the Texas Depar tment of Criminal J ustice. I n seven points of err or, appellant complains that the trial court unduly restric ted testimony reg arding the out cry witness’s bi as and motive and otherwise i mproperly admitted evidenc e. We af firm the judgme nt of conviction.
F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND

The State’s e vidence at trial s h o wed that appellant lived in the same a partment complex as A.M., the complainant who wa s seven y ear s old at t he ti me of the incident, her six -y ear old brother, O.M., a

nd their mother, D.M. I n the ear ly eveningof Mar ch 24, 2004, bec ause he r stove
wa s n ot w or

kin g , D .M . s e nt t

he c hil dr e n to a

fr ie nd ’s a pa rtme nt t o g e t di nn e r. At

so me po int , A .M
.2

and O. M
. en co u n t ere d appellant, who invited them into his apar tment. The childre n watche d television, and appe llant offer ed them some beans to eat in the ki tchen. A.M. testified that while she
wa s i nt h e k i t ch en ap p el l an tt o u ch edh er “m i d d l e p art ” u n d er

h er cl o t h i n g. D.M. testified that the c hildren re turned to her apar tment with a man she did not know. D.M. obser

ved that the children’ s pants wer e unzipped. Appellant asked her if she neede d any help fixi ng her c ar a

nd if she wa s marrie d. I n her children’s presenc e, appe llant told her, “You have g oo d k ids .” He the n le ft the a pa rtme nt. Be cause the childre n seeme d scar ed and “ acte d like they wer e in trouble,” D
. M
. a sked the m w hat ha d ha

pp e ne d. As A. M. be g an c ry ing , s he tol d h e r m oth e r t

hat th e c hil dr e n h a d b e e n in the man’s a

partment a

nd that he had “ pulled her pa nts down and wa s messing with her be tween he r leg s.” D.M. re ported the inc ident to the police that evening . Two we eks later , A.M. and O.M. we re int e rv ie we d at th e Ce nte r f or Chi ld P ro te c tio n b y

Cy nd i Ca ntu , a fo re ns ic int e rv ie we r. A. M. tol d Cantu that appellant had touched her on her “middle part” that she uses “ to pee with.” D .M. and the children later identified a ppellant in a photog raphic line-up. A def ense w itness who lived three doors awa y from ap p el lant testified that he wa s vis iti ngwi th a

pp e lla nt o n th e e ve nin g in q

ue sti on . Ap pe lla

nt’ s do or wa s op e n and the c hil dr e n “ jus t
c a me up to the a

pa rtme nt. ” Th e ne ig hb or

te sti fi e d th a t he sa

w the c hil dr e n, watc he d th e m th e wh ole time they wer e in the apa

rtment, and ne ver sa

w appe llant touch either c hild.
AN AL YSI S Appellant con t en d s t hat the trial c ourt err ed in (i) r estricting cross-e x amination of D. M. , A .M .’ s mo the r, wh o w as the o utc ry wi tne ss, (i i) a llo wi ngthe a dmi ssi on of ina dmi ssi bleAlthough t h e S t at e u rges that it “is not entirely clea r that this claim was pre serve d for 1 appellate revie w,” we conclude that the par ties were awa

re of the nature of the c omplaint and that it was prese rved. Se e Ma y na rd v . S tat e , 685 S.W .2d 60, 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).

3 hear s ay and then refusing a limiting instruction, (iii) inadver tently allowing the playing of an inadmissible portion of a videotape d statement, and ( iv) allowing testimony by a w it n ess “e x pressing an opinion on the t ruthfulness of the complainant’s alleg ations.” We revie w a tria l court’s de cision to admit or exclude evidenc e using an abuse of discre tion stand ar d

. Mozo n v . S tat e , 991 S.W .2d 84 1, 84 6- 47 (T e x. Cr im

. App . 199 9) ; Mo ntgom e ry v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on re h’g ).
Lim itation on Cros s-Exam inati on

I n his first point of error , appellant a sserts that his rig ht to confront and c ross-examine wi tne sse s und e r t

he Sixth Am e ndme nt of the Con sti tut ion wa s v iol a te d w he n th e tr ia l c ourt un du ly
re str ic te d h is c ro ss- e xami natio n o f D .M ., the c omp la ina nt’ s moth e r an d the State ’s ou tc ry wi tne ss. 1 Specifica lly , appellant soug ht to cross-e x amine D.M. about her application to the Attorne y Gene ral for c rime victim’s compensation and a subse quent re quest of the Attorne y Ge n er al ’s office for a ref und of t he money beca

use D.M. had failed to provide rece ipts as require d showing that the money
was used for

moving e x penses. Appe llant sought to question D.M. and to off er doc umentary evidenc e, including the written a pplication for c ompensation and the A tto rn ey General’s le tter reque st. He urg ed that the ev i d en ce was a dmissibl e to show bias or motive unde r Texas Rule of Evidence 613. See Tex. R. Evi d. 613. The State urg ed that the e vidence was improper impeachme nt4

and ina dmi ssi ble un de r Te xas Rul e s of Ev ide nc e 60 8 and 60 9 b e c a us e it w a s una dju dic a te d c on du c t. See Tex. R. Evi d. 608-09.

The Six th Amendment g uara ntees the r ight of an accuse d in a cr iminal prosecution to confront the w itnesses ag ainst him. U.S. C onst. amend. VI . “Confrontation means m o re tha n being allowed to c onfront the witness phy sically .” Davis v. Alask a , 4 15 U. S. 3 08 , 3 15 (1 97 4) . I ts fundame ntal purpose is to secur e f o r the def endant the oppor

tunity to cross-e x amine the a ccuse r. Id . at 315-16. Both rules 608 and 613(b) addre ss impea chment of witnesses. Tex
. R
. E v id. 608, 613(b). Rule 608 a llows the cre dibilit y of a w itness to be attacke d or supported in the f orm of op ini on or re pu ta tio n te sti mony

on ly by refer e nc e to t

he wi tne ss’ s c ha

ra c te r f or tr uth fu lne ss or untruthfulness a

nd o n l y af

t er the cha

rac ter of the witness for truthfulne ss has bee n attacke d. Te x. R. E v id

. 6 0 8 ( a )

. Ru le 6 0 8 ( b ) e xp r e s s ly b ar s im p e a c h in g a w it

n e s s ’ s g e n e r a l c hara cter for truthfulne ss with specific instanc es of c onduct ot h er than conviction of a crime a s provided in r ule 60 9. Te x. R. E vid . 6 08 (b ). No r m ay sp e c ific in st ances of con du c t be pr ov e d b y e xtri ns ic evidenc e. Id. I n contra st, rule 613(b) pe rmits impea ching a witness by “proof of circ umstances or state me nts sh ow ing bia s or int e re st” on the pa rt of the wi tne ss. Te x. R. E vid . 6 13 (b ). Un lik e ru le 608(b), r ule 613(b) doe s not e x pressly bar the use of specific instances of conduct to show bias or interest. Com

pa re Tex. R. Evid. 608(b), with Tex. R. Evid. 613(b). Rule 608 does not bar e vidence of spec ific ac ts not resulting in convic tion as an impeachme nt de vice in a ll instanc es. I t proscribe s
s u ch p ro of only

when of fer ed for a par ticular purpose —to establish a witness’s cha rac ter for5

ve ra c ity —s o th e jur

y may inf e r that he is mor e or le ss l ike ly to b e te sti fy

ingtr uth fu lly . Sp e c if

ic a c ts may , howeve r, be pr oved for other purposes. For example, a witness’s acts may reve al a bias towa rd or ag ainst one of the litig ants. 1 Steven Goode et al., Texas Practice : Gu i de t o t h e T exas Rule s of Evidenc e: Ci vi l

and Criminal

§ 6 08 .1 (3 d e d. 20 02 ). Rul e 60 8 d oe s n ot a dd re ss atte mpt s to impeach a

witn es s throug h bias. Id. (c i t i n g Di x on v . S tat e , 2 S.W .3d 263, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (op. on r eh’g )).

Thus, rule 6 0 8 ad dre s s es a w i t n es s ’s gen er al ch ar ac t er fo r t ru t h fu l n es s an d

rule 613(b) addre sses a witness’s trustwor thiness in the particular case beca use of some bias or intere st. Unlike

a tta c ks on

a wi tne ss’ s c ha

ra c te r f or tr uth te lli ng , b ia s o r i nte re st m ay ari se wh e n th e wi tne ss h a s a financ ial stake in the outcome of the c ase. E.g. , Cox v . S tat e , 523 S.W .2d 695, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 75 ) ( a dmi tti nge vid e nc e that pr os e c uti on wi tne ss f ile d c ivi l a c t i o n

a g a i n s t a c c u s e d) ; Ste rn s v . S

tat e , 86 2 S.W.2 d 687 , 690 (T e x. Ap p. —T y le r 199 3, no pe t.) (a llo wi ng te sti mony that pr os e c uti on

wi tne ss was infor mant who was pa id fifty

dollars per

case ). I n a he ari ngou tsi de the pr e se nc e of the jur y , a pp e lla nt s ou g ht t o s ho w that D .M
. applied for

and re ce i v ed benef

its from the Crime Victims’ Compensation Progr am of the Te x as Attorney Gene ral’s O ffice . He arg ued that the application, a victim impact statement, a nd a letter reque sting repa

y ment wer e rele vant to show that D.M. soug ht f inancial g ain as a

conseque nce of

the inc ide nt. Ap pe lla

nt s ou g ht t o s ho w that D .M . s ub mit te d a vic timimp a c t st a te me nt c on ta ini nga fa lseThe assistant manag er of the apar tment complex also t estified at tria l that D.M. was evic ted 2 fo r n on pa y me nt o f r e nt. 6 state me nt t

hat sh e wa s e vic te d be c a

us e the a pa rtme nt mana g e me nt b e lie ve d a pp e lla nt t o b e inn oc e nt. At the he ari ng , D .M . a dmi tte d th a t sh e wa s e vic te d f or no np ay me nt o f r e nt. 2 At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the trial court c oncl u d ed that the evidenc e had
ne g lig ibl e pr ob a tiv e va lue and a llo we d a

pp e lla nt t o in qu ir e on ly

wh e the r D .M . “ ma de a cla im t o crime vic tim’s compensation as a result of this prosecution and ha s she re ceive d money .” The court
e xclu de d th e “ e xtra

ne ou s le tte rs ” and

“ wh a t is g oin g on

be hind it .” On c ro ss- e xami natio n, D. M. then testified that she ma de a claim for victim compensation based on the facts of t he case a nd that sh e so ug ht mon e y so sh e c ou ld mov e : “I did n’ t know the y wa s g oin g to g ive y ou mon e y lik e that. Ijus t kn ow the y wo uld he lp y ou mov e . T hat’ s a ll I kn ow .” Ap pe lla

nt a rgue s th a t f

a lse state me nts g iven in connec tion with an application for vic tim compensation subjects the applica nt to criminal p r o s e c u t i o nf

o r p e r j u r y. The trial co u rt did not abuse its discretion in excluding a por tion of the proff

ere d evidenc e. The re w as no showing that the valid i ty of D.M.’s c laim hinge d upon the pursuit or outcom e of the prosec ution. D.M. evidently lear ned of a nd filed an a

pplication afte r she r eporte d the incident to law e nforc ement. She testified that she “got the paper work fr om the advoca cy

cente r” wher e A.M. g ave he r videotape d statement. The benefits wer e paid to D.M. a y ear befor e trial. The proff ere d evidenc e does not show a tendenc y to lie, and it is only marg inally

probative on the issue of bias or motive. More over, the rec ord reflec ts that D.M. was e ffe ctively impeache d beca

use she was inca rce rate d at t he ti me of trial se rving a sente nce f or for g ery and she ha d g iven custody of her7

c hil dr e n to a re la tiv e . We c on c lud e that the sc op e of pe rm iss ibl e c ro ss- e xami na tio n w a s a pp ro pr ia te beca use the de g ree of possible rele vance of the evidenc e as prese nted was so low a s to be within the

“ zon e of re a so na ble dis a g re e me nt, ” and we th us de c lin e to f ind that th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d i s c r e t i o nb y e x c l u d i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y.

As su min g the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by re fu sin g to p e rm it a pp e lla nt t o c ro ss- e xami ne D. M.
conce rning the applica t i o n , we are satisfied that any err or wa s harmless. See D elaware v. Van Ar sd all , 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). D.M. admitted befor e the jury that she m ade the claim in order to move from the c omplex , that she had not made rent pa y ments on time, that an eviction lawsuit had been f iled ag ainst her, that she had filed a civil suit aga inst the apartment c omplex based on

a lle g a tio ns of se xua l a

bu se , and tha t sh e wa s in c arc e ra

te d at th e tim e of

tr ia l f or fo rg e ry . T he re is
no e vi dence that sh e inf lue nc e d h e r d a

ug hte r’ s te sti mony

or pr e ssu re d e ith e r c hil d to fa

br ic a te alleg ations. We overrule appellant’ s first point of err or.
Prior Cons ist e nt Sta te ments I n his se cond, third and fourth points of error , appellant c laims the trial court e rre d in a llo wi ng Cynd i Ca nt u, a fo re ns ic int e rv ie we r w iththe Ce nte r f or Chi ld P ro te c tio n, to t e sti fy to prior consistent stateme nts made by the co m p l ai n an t in her videotape d interview a nd that the trial court e rre d in failing to give a limiting instruction and a f urther instruc tion in the charg e. Be cause Cantu was not the out cry witness, appellant objected to her testimony about A.M.’s prior
c on sis te nt s ta te me nts
.

The c ontroversy

arises f rom discre panc ies in A.M.’s testimony , which provide s context for Cantu’s testimony

. At trial, A.M. testified that the a ssault occur red a s she was standing8

in appellant’s kitche n. She testified that s h e was wea ring shorts, that the shorts “stay ed up,” a nd that appellant touched her “ middle part” unde r her panties for

a “shor t time.” On cr oss-examination, defe nse counse l elicited testimony that A.M. had stated dur ing he r interview wi th Cantu that the in c id e n t h a

p p e n e d a t h e r mo th e r ’ s h o u s e an d th a t s h e w a s w e ar in g “ p an ts
. ” D e f e n se counse l play ed portions of A.M.’ s videotaped inter view. The following t es t imony then occ urre d during questioning of

A.M.: Q [Defense Counsel] : Do y ou reme mber that y ou spoke with a lady named Cy

ndi Cantu at the Children’s Advoc acy Center? A [A .M .]: Ye s. Q [D e f e n s e Co u n s e l] : And y ou spoke to h e r a b o u t t w o w e e k s a f

te r th is all was su pp os e d to have ha

pp e ne d, ri g ht? A [A .M .]: Ye s. Q [De fe ns e Couns e l]: Ok ay . An d wh e n y ou sp ok e to he r, y ou tol d he r that th is a ll

ha pp e ne d at y our m om’ s h ou se . D o y ou re me mbe r t

hat? A [A.M.] : No. Q [Defense Counsel] : Do y ou reme mber that y ou made a videotape w ith her, and she asked y ou, wher e did this all happen, and y ou to l d her that it happened at y our mom’s house ? Do y ou reme mber that? L et me ask y o u t his, [ A.M.]: Do y ou reme mber a short time ag o, rig ht here in this courtroom, y ou just looked at a videota

pe? A [A .M .]: Ye s. Q [Defense Counsel] : And do y ou reme mber seeing that portion of the videota pe wher e y ou wer e talking with Ms. Cantu? A [A .M .]: Ye s.9

Q [Defense Counsel] : And do y ou reme mber telling her that it happen ed at y our

mom’s house? A [A .M .]: Ye s. Q [D e f e n s e C o u n s e l ]: Ok a y . So , th a t d i d h a p p e n . Y o u d i d t e l l he r tha t, ri g ht? You saw that on the videotape? A [A.M.] : I t didn’t happen at my mother’s house. Q [Defense Counsel] : I t didn’t happen at y our mother’ s house? A [A.M.] : No. Q [ Def ense Counsel] : But y ou did tell Ms. Cantu that it happened at y our mother’s

house, rig ht? We looked at that tog ether . Do y ou reme mber that? Also, [A.M.] , y ou told us t h at y ou wer e wea ring shorts when this was a ll supposed to have ha pp e ne d. Do y ou

re me mbe r t e lli ngthe jur

y that? A [A .M .]: Ye s. Q [Defense Counsel] : But y ou told Ms. Cantu that y o u we re we ar ing pants. Do

y ou reme mber that? Do y ou reme mber l o o k i ng at that on the videotape ? A [A .M .]: Ye s. Q [D e f e n s e Co u n s e l] : And what did y ou tell Ms. Ca n tu 1 3 d ay s a f

te r th is was supposed to ha

ve happene d? What did y ou tell her y ou we re we ari ng ? [A. M. ], y ou do n’ t ha ve to t hink abo ut i t. J ust tell the jury

what y ou saw. A [A .M .]: Th e y we re lik e pa

nts , b ut t he y we re sh or

t li ke sh or ts. Q [D e fe ns e Couns e l]: So, y ou we re n’ t w e ari ngpa

nts ; y ou we re we ari ngsh or

ts? A [A .M .]: Jean s ho rt s, pa nts
. Q [D e fe ns e Couns e l]: Yo u w e re we ari ngpa nts ; is that r ig ht?10

A f t e r t h e c o u rt s u s t a i n e d t h e S t a t e ’ s o b j e c t i o n t h a t d e f

e n s e c o u n s e l w a s m i s s t a t i n g A
. M
. ’ s t e s t i m o n y, A.M. testified, “It was like these pa nts, but they

didn’t pass my knees.” Def ense c ounsel then asked tha t “ th o s e p o rti o n s o f th e v id e o ta

p e b e p u b li s h e d to th e ju r y . ” O nr e d ir e c t e xa mi n a tion, the pr os e c uto r s ou ght to pl ay A. M. ’s state me nt o n th e vid e ota pe “ a bo ut h owit h a

pp e ne d in the kitchen a

nd she wa s standing up.” These por tions of the vid eo t ap ed interview w ere play ed without objection.

When the State then ca lled Cantu to tes t i fy , the prosec utor soug ht to elicit A.M.’s sta t ements on t he videotape that wer e inconsistent with her state ments on cross-e x amination p u r s u an t to r

u le 8 0 1 (e) (1)( B)

. See Tex. R. Evi d. 801(e) (1)( B) . Appellant objec ted that the statements we re i n admi ssible hear say beca use Cantu was not a

n outcry witness who would be permitted to relate the st atements made to her. The court allowed Cantu to testify to prior consistent state me nts ma de by

A. M. Ap pe lla

nt r e qu e ste d th a t the c ourt g ive a lim iti ngins tr

uc tio n at th e tim e the te sti mony

wa s e lic ite d an d ag a in in the c ha rg e . The c ourt

a g re e d a nd the n e xpla ine d th a t be c a

us e appellant ha d not reque sted any instruction, she would g ive the instruction “stra ight f rom the book.” Appellant then a sked that the c ourt g ive an instruction that the testimony was only to be used to rebut

a c la im o f m oti ve and

no t f or a ll p ur po se s, and

the c ourt re je c te d th e re qu e st. Cantu then testified about c erta in statements made by A.M. during the videotape d
c on ve rs a tio n. Al tho ug h Can tu te sti fi e d to sev e ra l pri or state me nts that w e re inc on sis te nt w iththo se
e lic ite d fr om A.M. by

de fe ns e c ouns e l, a

pp e lla nt o bje c ts o nly

to t he c ourt ’s a dmi ssi on

of a sin g le state me nt that he co nte nd s w a s in a dmi ssi ble . H e c omp la ins that Ca ntu te sti fi e d th a t A .M . h a d to ld11

he r— c on sis te nt w ithA. M. ’s dir e c t te st im on y —t hat a pp e lla nt h a d to uc he d h e r “ mid dle pa rt ” underne ath her

clothing w hen they

wer e both standing in appellant’s kitche n. But the r ecor d is clear that the cour

t allowed t h e S t at e to elicit ot her statements—inconsistent with those elicited on cross-e x amination and consistent with those elicited on direc t—to counter de fense counsel’s e ffor t to impeach A.M.’s te stimony with selecte d portions of the vid e ota

pe . T hu s, the c ou

rt a llo we d th e State to i ntr od uc e Cantu ’s te stimony

that A .M . to ld he r t hat ap pel lant h a d to uc he d h e r “ mid dle pa rt ” un de rn e a th h e r c lot

hin g wh e n th e y

we re bo th standing in the kitchen of a ppellant’s apa

rtment to counter a

portion of the videotape ref lecting that A.M. was in her

mother’s house w hen it happene d. I n Sa uc e da v . S

tat e , t h e defe nse soug ht to introduce the testimony of a CPS case worke r who intervi ewed the victim about the alleg ed incident. 129 S.W.3d 116, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The State ar g ued that if such te stimony wer e allowed, the State w ould be entitled to introduc e, i n i t s en t i rety , a videotape of the intervie w. Id. at 118-19. Althoug h the vid e ota pe c on ta ine d nume ro us re fe re nc e s to un c ha rg e d o ff e ns e s, the tr ia l c ourt

ru le d th a t th e State could introduce the entire tape into evidenc e if the casew orker testified, under the rule of optional completene ss. Id. at 118-19 & n.3 (citing Tex. R. Evid. 107). Be cause he did not wish to introduce the video itself, defe nse counsel did not call the case worke r to te stify , and appe llant was convic ted. After the court of appeals upheld the conviction, the court of criminal appeals re verse d, holding that the admission of testimony reg ardingselec ted portions of t he videotape would not “open the door ” to the admission of the entire vide otape. Id. at 121.12 The c ourt found, howe ver, that the co ntents of the tape wer e subjec t to the rule of optional completene ss, and that the rule is implicated when a party attempts to have a portion of a taped state ment “g iven in evidenc e.” Id. at 122 (citing Tex

. R. Evid. 107). The adverse party is then entitled to introduce into evidenc e the r emaining parts of the “ac t, declar ation, conver sation, writing
or re c or de d state me nt” or

any re la te d “ a c t, d e c lara

tio n, c on ve rs a tio n, wr iti ngor re c or de d s ta te me nt”

n e c e s s ar y to a f u ll u n d e r s ta

n d in g o f th e e v id e n c e. W as hin gto n v . S

tat e , 856 S.W .2d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). I n W ashington , the cour

t of criminal appe als held that the a dmission of the ta pe wa s e rr or

be c a us e no me nti on

of the ta pe wa s ma de duri ng c ro ss- e xami natio n and the de fe ns e made no attempt to introduce the ta pe’s c ontents into evidence

. Id

. I n Sauceda , the exist ence of the videotape w as mentioned fr equently during cross-e x amination. 129 S.W .3d at 122. For an omitted portion of a state ment to be admitt ed, the plain languag e of r ule 107 specifie s that it must be “on the s ame subject” and must be “ne cessa ry to make it fully

understood or to explain the same.” Te x . R. Evid. 107. Thus, so long as the porti ons of the stateme nt offer ed by the State we re on

the same su

bje c t int ro du c e d by the de fe nd ant, and we re of fe re d f or the purp os e of explaining the whole conve rsation on the same subject, the stateme nts were proper ly admitted. Sauceda , 129 S.W .3d at 123.

Addre ssing A.M.’ s comment that she wa s in her mother’ s house when the incident happene d, Cantu expl ained, “ The wa y Iunderstood it was that she was telling me how the e vent started. She star

ted off a t her house a

nd then ende d up at his house.” Cantu c ontinued: [A] s she went on to tell me, it beca me clea r that she wa s starting off t h e ev ent by be inga t he r m oth e r’ s h ou se , a nd the n mo vin g to t

he g uy ’s ho us e , as she c a lle d h im,13

or the white guy , as she ca l led him, and that that was a ctually wher e the touching happene d. And so Ithink be ca u s e of the hesitancie s, the nervousne ss or trauma that she was havin g a t th a t ti me , th a t w a s w hat w a s ma kin g it a lit tle con fus ing fo r h e r t o ta lk about it. But I t h ink she was ve ry clea r by the end of

the interviewabout what happene d and whe re it happe ned.
Be cause selec tive portions of the conte nts of the videotape d interview w ere rele vant to the portions of the intervie w offe red by the def ense, the challeng ed evidence w as admissible on the g round of optional completeness to avoid leavinga fa lse impression as to A.M.’s stateme nts. See Tex. R. Evi d. 10 7. Th u s , u

p o n a s h o w i n g b y t h e S t a t e t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e v i d e o t a

p e w a s o f

f e re d in
re sp on se to the po rt ion s int ro du c e d by

the de fe ns e and

wa s n e c e ssa

ry to m a ke A. M. ’s te sti mony fu lly understood, the evidenc e was a dmissibl e. See Sauc eda , 129 S.W .3d at 124. M oreove r, bec ause the evidenc e wa s admissible under rule 107 for all purposes, no limit ing instruc tion was nec essar y at the time the evidenc e wa s introduced or in the charg e. Appellant’s second, t hird, and fourth points of
err or ar e over

ruled.
Ina dv e rte nt P

lay ing of Ina dmiss ibl

ePo rtion o

f V ide ota pe d St atement I n his f ifth and six th points, appellant contends that the trial cour t errone ously

denied his moti ons for mistrial when the judge inadver tently play ed a por

tion of a videotaped statement of A.M.’s brother , O.M., that was inadmissible. He ur g es that the seg ment inadver tently play ed wa s not rele vant and include d ref

ere nce to a

n extraneous offe nse. The State responds that the e x cer pt was
no t in a dmi ssi ble and , f

ur the r, that the tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in de nying the mot ion s.14 We reviewa trial c ourt’s denial of a motion for mistrial unde r an abuse of discretion standard. W

e ad v . S tat e , 1 29 S.W. 3d

12 6, 12 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Tre v ino v . S tat e , 991 S.W .2d 849, 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A m istrial is appropr iate for “a na rrow c lass of hig hly

prejudicia l and incur able error s” and is used t o terminate a trial proce eding when the e rror is so prejudicial that “expenditure of f

urther time and expense would be wastef ul and futile.” W

oo d v . S tat e , 18 S.W .3d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The determination of whether a g iven error necessitates a mistrial must be made by

examining the par

ticular fa cts of the c ase. L a d d v . S tat e , 3 S
. W
. 3 d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

Appellant objec ted to a portion of the vide otaped inte rv i ew of O.M. af ter it was play ed for

the jury . Although the rec ord is unclea r, an e x cer

pt that ref err ed to appe llant touching “O.M. on the bottom” wa s evidently play ed duri n g O. M.’s testimony and at the c onclusion of the trial when the State soug ht to reopen the evidenc e to play the tape. I n both instanc es, the trial court de nie d a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n f

or a mis tr ia l a ft e r i ns tr

uc tin g the jur

y to d isr e g ard

the e xce rp t. The indictment rec ited the instance of abuse ag ainst A.M. alone. In its noti ce of intent to introduce evidenc e of extraneous conduct, the State listed nineteen e x trane ous acts it soug ht t o i n t ro d u ce at t ri al , i n cl u d i n g t h e f o l l o wi n g:
On or a bout March 24, 2004, in Tr avis County , Texas, the defe ndant committed the offe nse of indece ncy with a child by sexual c ontact ag ainst [O. M
. ] b y t ouching [O.M.] on his “behind,” ove r the pa nts, with the defenda

nt’s hand. On or about Marc h 24, 2004, in Travis Count y , Texas, the defendant commit ted the offe nse of indece ncy with a child by sexual c ontact ag ainst [O.M.] b y t o u ch ing [O. M. ] on h is p e nis

.15

Whe n O .M . te sti fi e d, de fe ns e c ouns e l ob je c te d to the int

ro du c tio n o f a

ny e vid e nc e of

a bu se of O. M. The prose cutor a gre ed n o t to elicit the testimony at that time. The c ourt ag ree d that “[i] t’s not coming out rig ht now” and dir ecte d the State “not to talk about that.”

Prior to O.M.’s t estimony two day s later, at the reque st of the par ties, the court play ed three seg ments of O.M.’s videotaped interview and advised the jury that one— t h e f i rst—was pr e se nte d b y

the de fe ns e and the ne xt t wo by the State
. Th e re c or d s ho ws that, a s th e ta pe e vid e ntl y beg an play

i ng the sec ond seg ment as off ere d by the State, def

ense c ounsel objecte d to a seg ment offe red by

the State as a

prior consistent stateme nt and ask ed t h at t h e v ideotape be stopped. The following colloquy

then occ urre d at the benc h: [Defense Counsel] : I o b j ec t t o t h e s h o wi n g o f t h at l ast portion. That had absolutely

no rele vance to this case, and it wa s an extraneous offe nse. I t talked about [O.M.] ’s bottom being touc hed. [C ourt]: Did y ou touch y our sister? [D e f e n s e Co u n s e l] : What I h e ar d w a s th a t h e to u c h e d my b o tt o m. Wh e r e we re

y ou wh e n h e tou c he d y our b ott om? [C ourt]: On the sec ond one? [Defense Counsel] : Right, the sec ond one y ou just showed. [ C o u rt ] : O k ay. [P rosec utor]: The portions I reque sted to be play ed— [C o u rt] : Your obje c ti o nis n o te d

. I t’ s o v e r r u le d a t t h is p o in t. I f

that wa s p la y e d , it w a s in a d v e rte n t o n th e p art o f th e Court. I wa s— jus t so the re c or d wi ll re fl e c t, I wa s the on e that wa s in char g e of the videotape, a nd I ’m trying to g et the numbe rs rig ht. I t’s very difficult beca use I ’m workin g t wo differ entThe rec ord shows that the two motions for mistrial relate to the same seg ment of the tape , 3 wh ic h make s re fe re nc e , in so me mann e r no t fu lly re fl e c te d in the re c or d, to a pp e lla nt t ou c hin g O. M. on the “bottom.” 16 re mot e s. Yo ur

ob je c tio n is no te d. I f t

hat—i t’ s su sta ine d if that c a me ou t. Y ou

c a n a sk fo r a mis tr ia l. [De fe ns e Couns e l]: I ’m a sk ingfo r a

mis tr ia l. [Court ]: I t w ill be de nie d at th is p oin t. [D e f e n s e Co u n s e l] : And I ’d ask that th e ju r y b e in s tr u c te d to d is r eg ard that portion. [Court ]: Ido n’ t kn owif the y he ard that. [De fe ns e Couns e l]: Of

c ours e the y

he ard it. [C ourt]: I t might bring more attention to it . You want m e to s ay , the

on ly e vid e nc e y ou

ne e d to c on sid e r i s th e fi rs t sn ipp e t a t th is p o i n t ? O k ay.
Th e c ourt the n g a ve a

lim itingins tr

uc tio n th a t “ the on ly

e vid e nc e that y ou

are to c on sid e r at th is point is t he first portion of the videotape that I play ed back to you that was prese nted by the def ense,
an d t h at ’s at this point.” Defe nse counse l then offe red that portion into evidence a nd inquired of O.M. about his statement on the videotape that his sister was wea ring a dre ss on the day

in question. As the trial dre w to a close , the S tate moved to reope n the evidence to “show prior consistent statements of [O.M.]” After the court overr uled def ense c ounsel’s objec tion to the St ate’ s reope ning, two tape seg ments wer e play ed. After the e x cer pts were play ed, def

ense c ounsel objecte d that the excerpt a

bout “contac t with [ O.M.]’s bottom ” was ag ain i nadver tently play ed. He a sked the
c ourt to a dv ise the ju ry to d isr e g ard that po rt ion

and re qu e ste d a

mis tr ia l. The c ourt denied the

317

mot ion fo r m istri a l, b ut g a ve an in str uc tio n: “ Withre g ard

to t he fi rs t pl ay

ba c k, the Court

ins tr uc ts y ou that y ou are only to c onsider the portion that will be admitted into e vidence

. I f y ou need to se e it ag ain, i t’s the porti on wher e [ O.M.] is asked about his sister on the m iddle part and where it was.” The St a te th e n o f

f e r e d th e e xh ib it s in to e v id e n c e , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l d id n o t f

u rth e r o b je c t, an d the exhibi ts were admitted.

After eac h playing of

the excerpt, the tria l court g rante d appellant’ s reque st for a
c u r a t i v e i n s t r

u c t i o n . A p p e l l an t d i d

n o to b j e c tt o t h e c u r a t i v e i n s t r

u c t i o ng i v e nb y

t h e t r i a l c o u rt
. It is not clear f

rom the re cord wh et h er the par ties confe rre d sufficie ntly with the court to avoid the p l a y i n g o f t h e e x ce rp tt h at ev en ap p el l an tch ar ac t er i z es as i n ad v er t en tan d an ac ci d en t
. Al t h o u gh appellant c ontends that the touching constituted an extraneous offe nse and w as there fore inadmissible, the State asserte d that the evidence had “bec ome relevant” with O.M.’s testimony . But the re cord is not clea

r pre cisely

what questions and a

nswers a re the subject of the obje ction. And t h e j u d ge h ads o m e d i ff

i cu l t y i nd ec i p h er i n g wh at wa s s a i d o n t h e r ec o rd i n g. Al t h o u gh t h e j u d ge sug g ested that the jury

may not have hear d “that,” defe nse counsel responde d that “of c ourse they he ard it. ” Th e pr e c ise langua g e ob je c te d to nev er app ears in t he re c or d b e fo re us on

a pp e a l or in appellant’ s brief e x cept to the e x tent we have re fer red to it here

. Assuming O.M.’ s complained-of testimony

about t he contact was a

ref ere nce to a

n extraneous offe nse, the tr i al co u rt ’s instruction to disreg ard w as suffic ient to cure any harm or prejudice from this event. Se e Ma rsh all v . S tat e , N o . A P
- 7 5 , 0 4 8 , 2 0 0 6 T e x . C r i m . A p p . LE X IS 2444, at *24 (Te x . Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2006) (citing Y ou ng v. Stat e , 137 S.W .2d 65, 69-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (mistrial not require d wher e prejudice is c urable by instruction to disreg ard) ;18

Ov all e v . S

tat e , 13 S.W .3d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (instruction to disreg ard usua lly cure s prejudice from ref

ere nce to e x trane ous offe nse))

. Upon re viewing the re cord, w e find no indication that th e e xce rp t in fl a me d th e jur y wi th i nf or ma tio n r e gardi ng ot her

a lle g atio ns a g a ins t a

pp e lla nt. There fore , we c onclude that the t rial court’s instruction to disreg ard c ured a ny possible prejudicial eff ect of the witness’s testimony . We overrule appellant’ s fifth and sixt h points of error

. Wit ne ss’ s O pin ion Te

sti mony I n his seventh point of error, appellant contends that the trial court e rre d in allowing the witness Cantu to directly express an opinion on the truthfulness of A.M.’ s alleg ations and that
e x p e rtw i t n e s s e s ar e b ar

r e d f r o m p r e s e n t i n g s u c h t e s t i m o n y. When A.M. g ave c onflicting testimony in her intervie w wit h Cantu, Cantu testified that she thoug ht A.M. was ner vous and traumatiz ed. After Cantu testified t hat at the beg inning of the interviewA.M. said the incident ha ppened at “my

mom’s ho u s e” and the “ white g uy ” wa s “outside,” the following exchang e occ urre d: [Pro se c uto r]: Th a t do e sn ’t se e m to make se ns e , d oe s it ? [Defense Counsel] : Objection. That snippet of t he videotape t hat t he jury is g oing to be o f f e r e d s p e a k s f o r it s e lf

. I ’ m g o in g to o b

je c t t o any re int e rp re ta tio n o f t

hat. [C ourt]: Over ruled. [P rosec utor]: So wh en s h e’s sa y ing to you in the very

beg inning that the touching took place at her house, but she was i n s ide and he was outside her

house, h o w did y ou—based on your c on ve rs a tio n w ith [A. M. ] an d y our t ra ini ngand

e xpe ri e nc e in this field, how did y ou interpre t that give and take ?19

Af te r t he c ourt ov e rr ule d d e fe ns e c ouns e l’ s o bje c ti on th at Cant u w a s “ te lli ngthe jur

y ho w t o interpre t the evidenc e,” Cantu testified: “The way Iunderstood it was that she w as telling me how the eve nt started. She starte d off at her house a nd then ende d up at his house.” Wit hout objection, Cantu the n te sti fi e d th a t A .M . e xhibi te d c on fu sio n a bo ut t he se qu e nc e of

e ve nts :
Ithink that in the beg inning, a s we talke d about, she seeme d a little confused. A nd I wa s confuse d about wher e the a ctual touchingevent ha ppened. B ut then as she went on to te ll me, it bec ame c lear that she wa s starting off the e vent by being at her mot he r’ s h ou se , a

nd the n mo vin g to t

he g uy ’s ho us e , a s sh e c a lle d him , o r t he wh ite g uy , as she c alled him, and that that was a ctually wher e the touchinghappene d. And so Ithink because of t he hesitancies, t he nervousness or tra uma that she wa s having a t t h a t t i m e , t h a t w a s w h a t w a s m a k i n g i t a l i t t l e c o n f u s i n g f o r h e r t o t a lk a

bo ut i t. But I think she was very clea r by the end of

the interviewabout what ha ppened a nd wher e it happene d.
On cross-e x amination, the following testimony occur red a s defe nse counse l asked Cantu about he r role of “ g ather ing inf

ormation” in the investig atory stag e of the case : Q [D e f e n s e C o u n s e l ]: Wel l , o n e p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a tt h e c h i l d

w a s ma kin g a fa lse a c c us a tio n, isn ’t

it? A [Cantu] : That’s a lway s possible on any case . Q [De fe ns e Couns e l]: So w he n y ou ’r e sa y ingthat y ou ’re tr y in g to be imp art ia l, how wer e y ou impartial to Mr. Hoover ? A [C antu]: My job, ag ain, is to collect i n fo rm ation from the c hild. I can’ t sugg est information t o the child or g ive them any information. I

just ask them questions so they tell me what they know. Q [D e f e n s e Co u n s e l] : Well, did y ou look for any e v id e n c e th a t t

he child was g iving you a fa lse alleg ation? A [Cantu] : Ag ain, my job is not to collect evidenc e on the entire c ase.20

Q [ Def ense Counsel] : I ’m asking : Did y ou collect a ny evidenc e fr om the child that would sug g est that she wa s making a fa lse alleg ation? A [Ca ntu ]: No , I

did no t.
C an tua c kn o w l e d g e d

t h a ts h e w o u l d

n o tkn o w i f

A
. M
. f a b r i c a t e d h e r t e s t i m o n y: Q [Defense Counsel] : And so if [ A. M
. ] m ad e t h i s u p , y o u wo u l d n ’t know the

differ ence ? A [C antu]: What I ’m d o i n g is collecting information and ba sing that

information—y ou know, what I ’ve done is reflected what sh e ’s tol d me and

he r e mot ion s. Q [Defense Counsel] : I f [A.M.] made this up, y ou wouldn’t know the diffe renc e,

would y ou? A [C antu]: No. I would n ’t k n o w fr o m

— b ec au s e I d i d n ’t do the complete investig ation. Q [Defense Counsel] : I f [A.M.] made this up, y ou wouldn’t know t he diffe renc e? A [Ca ntu ]: No , I

wo uld n’ t.
Cantu the n te sti fi e d o n r e dir e c t: Q [ Prosecutor]: Ma’a m, based on y our t raining and ex perie nce and base d on y our i nterviewof [A.M.] , do y ou possess an opinion on wh e the r [A .M .] w a s te lli ngy ou the tr uth or no t? A [C antu]: Ba sed on what I saw, she seeme d to be very traumatized by

an eve nt. And she described an event that c ould have g iven her that trauma for

her. Q [Pro se c uto r]: So the tr a uma that y ou ob se rv e d in he r wa s c on sis te nt w ith what she d escr ibed happe ning to he r at the ha nds of the de fe nd ant?21

A [Ca ntu ]: Ye s. Appellant urg es that this last ex cer pt constituted impermissibl e t e s ti mo ny c o n cer ning A.M.’s cr edibility

and the truth of he r alleg ations. Alt houg h Cantu was aske d her opinion on whether A.M. was telling the truth, she re sponded with her observations of A.M.’ s emotional state. Th is e vid e nc e is a dmi ssi ble to m e e t or e xpla in h e r t e sti mony

g ive n in re sp on se to d e fe ns e qu e sti on ing . A ny

e rror in the a dmi ssi on

of the c omp la ine d- of

e vid e nc e , h ow e ve r, wa s h arm le ss be c a us e the po rt ion s o f t

he re c or d s e t out a

bo ve sh owtha

t a pp e lla nt b ro ug ht o ut e sse nti a lly

the same evidenc e bef

ore it wa s elicited by

the State or that e ssent i al l y t h e same evidenc e wa s broug ht out without objection. Se e Ma rsh all , 2 0 0 6 T ex . C ri m . Ap p . L E XIS 2 4 4 4 , at * 3 0 (c i t i n g Le da yv . S tat e , 983 S.W .2d 713, 716-18 (Tex

. Crim. App. 1998) (improper admission of evidence is harmless when other such e vidence is admitted without obj ection)) . We overrule appellant’ s seventh point of er ror.
CO NC LU SION Having overr

uled appellant’s points of error, we aff irm the judg ment of convic tion.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 27, 2007 Do No t Pu

bli sh