Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 09A02-1702-CR-454 | November 16, 2017 Page 1 of 19

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kristina L. Lynn

Lynn and Stein, P.C.

Wabash, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine Cooper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kenny Purvis,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 16, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

09A02-1702-CR-454

Appeal from the Cass Superior 

Court

The Honorable Richard A. 

Maughmer, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

09D02-1506-F5-53

Baker, Judge.
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[1] Kenny Purvis appeals his convictions for Level 6 Felony Theft,1 Level 6 Felony 

Conspiracy to Commit Theft,2 and Level 5 Felony Corrupt Business Influence.3 

He contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that 

the sentence imposed by the trial court was inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offenses and his character. Finding sufficient evidence and that the 

sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts

[2] On May 9, 2015, an employee of the Walmart in Logansport found an empty 

cell phone box in the sporting goods aisle and notified Brady Herrington, an 

Asset Protection Officer, about the discovery. Herrington investigated and 

reviewed digital security footage from Walmart’s security cameras. While 

watching the footage from earlier that day, he observed a member of a group of 

four individuals “quickly” grab the cell phone and conceal it underneath 

clothing in their shopping cart. Tr. Vol. II p. 42. Tracking the group’s

movement, Herrington observed members of the group, including two 

individuals later identified as Purvis and Adam Wakefield, select and conceal 

“multiple video games in the same method as the cell phone.” Id. at 43. The 

individuals then exited the store without paying for the merchandise and drove 

away in a red truck. Based on their behavior and the manner in which they 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1).

2

Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2; I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a)(1).

3

Ind. Code § 35-45-6-2(3).
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concealed the merchandise, Herrington suspected that the group was involved 

in “Organized Retail Crime” and sent out a “BOLO” or “Be On Look Out” 

notification to other stores in the area. Id. at 37, 54. 

[3] On May 15, 2015, another employee at the same Walmart discovered “a lot of 

empty . . . keeper boxes”

4

in the hardware aisle, hidden behind some light bulbs. 

Id. at 55, 69. Herrington reviewed the security footage for that day; he

recognized Purvis from the prior incident and observed him grabbing multiple 

copies of the same game. At that time, Wakefield and another individual were 

with Purvis and, after taking the games, the group “split up” and took the 

games out of view of the cameras, near the hardware aisle. Id. at 60-61. Soon 

thereafter, Wakefield and the unidentified individual left; however, they 

returned less than twenty minutes later. The group took a labyrinthine route 

through the store before stopping at the hardware aisle “for a while[.]” Id. at 

81. Another Asset Protection Officer, Amy Powers, testified that, based on her

personal experience, their routes were unusual for most shoppers but “typical 

for shop lifting teams.” Id. at 84. The individuals exited the Walmart and 

drove away in the same red truck from the first incident.

[4] On May 19, 2015, Powers recognized Purvis, Wakefield, and a woman, later 

identified as Charlene Reiner, pushing a cart filled with clothing through the 

 

4 Keeper boxes are plastic security cases containing magnetic strips that set off an alarm if the keeper boxes 

are not deactivated and removed before exiting the store. They are meant to deter theft and are commonly 

used to store “high theft items,” such as video games, Blu-ray discs, DVDs, and SD cards. Tr. Vol. II p. 55, 

108.
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video game aisle. Based on her suspicions and experience, Powers contacted 

local police and followed Wakefield, who was pushing the cart. Before 

reaching the checkout or the exit, Wakefield was stopped and he, Purvis, and 

Reiner were escorted to the Asset Protection Office. Upon examining the cart, 

Powers discovered over $400 worth of electronics and video games hidden 

inside and under clothing. After interviewing all the individuals, the police 

searched each of them and discovered that Wakefield had four empty Walmart 

bags in his pockets. Soon thereafter, with Purvis’s consent to search, the police 

discovered a Walmart bag containing eight copies of a newly released video 

game in his truck. The games in the truck retailed for $59.96 apiece and had 

just been released that day. While Purvis denied stealing from the Walmart, he 

admitted that he knew the games in the truck were stolen and that Wakefield 

told him he planned to steal from the Walmart.

[5] Subsequent investigation by the Logansport Police Department uncovered that 

Purvis offered and sold “a lot of video games” on an informal Facebook garage 

sale page. Id. at 140, 156; State’s Ex. 6. The garage sale page contained 

multiple posts from Purvis’s personal Facebook page advertising the sale of 

dozens of “unopened”—and sometimes “brand new”—video games at heavily

discounted prices; some of the games still had Walmart stickers on them. Tr. 

Vol. II p. 140, 156. Several of Purvis’s posts and messages to potential 

customers indicated that he could acquire specific games and he sometimes 

solicited other Facebook users, asking if they wanted a specific game.
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Additionally, some of the sales occurred in the Logansport Walmart parking 

lot. 

[6] On November 2, 2016, the State filed amended charges against Purvis including 

Level 6 felony theft, Level 6 felony conspiracy to commit theft, and Level 5 

felony corrupt business influence. The State also alleged that Purvis was an

habitual offender. Purvis’s jury trial took place on January 4 and 5, 2017, and 

the jury found Purvis guilty of all charges. On January 6, 2017, Purvis admitted

to being an habitual offender. On January 30, 2017, the trial court sentenced 

Purvis to six years for the corrupt business influence conviction and enhanced it 

by an additional six years because of Purvis’s habitual offender status. For each 

of the remaining convictions, the trial court sentenced Purvis to a two-and-onehalf-year term, each to be served concurrently with the corrupt business 

influence conviction. Thus, the trial court sentenced Purvis to an aggregate, 

executed sentence of twelve years imprisonment. Purvis now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[7] Purvis first argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of each 

charge. When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do 

not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bond v. State, 

925 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Instead, we consider only the 

evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, and we will affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute 
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substantial evidence of probative value to support the verdict. Id. Reversal is 

appropriate only when a reasonable trier of fact would not be able to form 

inferences as to each material element of the offense. Id.

A. Theft

[8] To convict Purvis of Level 6 felony theft, the State was required to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he “knowingly or intentionally exert[ed] 

unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the 

other person of any part of its value or use,” and that “the value of the property 

is at least seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) and less than fifty thousand dollars 

($50,000)[.]” I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(A). 

[9] First, Purvis contends that there is no evidence that he left Walmart with any 

video games. However, it is undisputed that there is video evidence from May 

9 and 15 showing Purvis and others quickly taking and concealing video games. 

State’s Ex. 2-4. There is no evidence of Purvis or any of his cohort paying for 

any of these items or placing them back on the shelves before leaving Walmart. 

These circumstances alone would be sufficient to support the determination that 

Purvis knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over Walmart’s 

property with an intent to deprive Walmart of the property’s value. See K.F. v. 

State, 961 N.E.2d 501, 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he theft statute does not 

require the State to prove that a defendant was found in possession of the stolen 

property or that the property was later recovered in order to find that a person 

committed theft.”); see also Hampton v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1074, 1079 (Ind. Ct. 
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App. 2007) (“[A] criminal conviction may be based solely on circumstantial 

evidence.”). 

[10] Furthermore, the following evidence bolsters this conviction:

• On every occasion, Purvis and his team quickly grabbed and concealed 

the items, suggesting that they did not intend to buy the video games and 

that they did not want anyone to see them with the games. Tr. Vol. II p. 

42.

• On May 15, Purvis was last seen with the concealed video games 

walking towards the hardware section and, later that day, an employee 

found nine empty keeper boxes in the same section.

• On May 19, after spending time in the video game aisle with Purvis and 

Reiner, Wakefield was found with four hidden Walmart bags and over 

$400 worth of electronics and video games concealed under and inside 

clothing in a shopping cart.

• Purvis’s truck contained a Walmart bag with eight stolen copies of a 

video game that was released that day. 

We find that the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the 

evidence could have allowed a reasonable factfinder to determine that Purvis 

knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over Walmart’s 

property with an intent to deprive Walmart of the property’s value.

[11] Next, Purvis contends that the State failed to demonstrate that the value of the 

stolen property equaled or exceeded $750. For the purpose of theft, the value of 

property is “the fair market value of the property at the time and place the 

offense was committed[.]” I.C. § 35-43-4-2(b)(1). Purvis argues that even 
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though there is evidence that he and his accomplices stole dozens of video 

games on May 9 and 15, the State failed to demonstrate which ones were 

stolen, making valuation of the video games speculative at best. See Lane v. 

State, 175 Ind. App. 543, 547, 372 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (1978) (reversing 

conviction for theft of goods greater than a $100 value where the State failed to 

provide any evidentiary support for the value of the stolen goods).

[12] However, additional facts provide a sufficient basis for a factfinder to infer the 

$750 value. Herrington testified that, at the time of the theft, the video games 

found in Purvis’s vehicle retailed for $59.96 apiece, meaning that the eight 

games had a fair market value of approximately $480. Tr. Vol. II p. 63. 

Considering that those games, which were released that day, were in or next to 

a Walmart bag and Purvis admitted that they were stolen, a reasonable 

factfinder could have inferred that Purvis stole these games from the 

Logansport Walmart. 

[13] Furthermore, after Purvis, Wakefield, and Reiner were detained on May 19, 

Amy Powers testified that their cart contained eight games, retailing for 

approximately $400. Id. at 100. Considering the value of the games in the cart

and the number of games that can be seen taken on the security footage from

May 9 and 15, a reasonable factfinder could have inferred that the $400 worth 

of games was characteristic of the value of the games stolen on May 9 and 15. 

Lastly, Purvis, Wakefield, and Reiner were not required to leave the store to 

satisfy the material elements of theft, meaning that the value of the games found 

concealed in their cart is probative of the total value of the stolen goods. 
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Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the material element that the 

value of the stolen property equaled or exceeded $750.

[14] In sum, there was sufficient evidence to support Purvis’s conviction for Level 6 

felony theft.

B. Conspiracy

[15] Next, Purvis argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 

conspiracy to commit theft. “A person conspires to commit a felony when, 

with intent to commit the felony, the person agrees with another person to 

commit the felony” and “either the person or the person with whom he or she 

agreed perform[s] an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.” I.C. § 35-41-5-

2. “The State is not required to prove the existence of an express agreement[]” 

but there must be enough evidence to infer an agreement. Kemper v. State, 35 

N.E.3d 306, 310 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. “‘It is sufficient if the minds 

of the parties meet understandably to bring about an intelligent and deliberate 

agreement to commit the offense.’” Porter v. State, 715 N.E.2d 868, 870-71 (Ind. 

1999) (quoting Williams v. State, 274 Ind. 94, 96, 409 N.E.2d 571, 573 (1980)).

[16] Here, Purvis and Wakefield were together during each trip to Walmart. They

stole the same types of items, concealed them in the same manner and location, 

and came and left together in the same vehicle. A reasonable factfinder could 

infer an understanding or agreement to commit felony theft from this degree of 

coordination. See, e.g., Phares v. State, 506 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) 

(jury could infer an agreement from acts demonstrating the use of tactics and 
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planning). Further, Purvis does not dispute that the concealment of the games 

was an overt act in furtherance of stealing the games. Accordingly, there was 

sufficient evidence to support Purvis’s conviction for Level 6 felony conspiracy 

to commit theft.

C. Corrupt Business Influence

[17] To convict Purvis of Level 5 felony corrupt business influence under Indiana’s 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act,5the State was 

required to prove that he was “employed by or associated with an enterprise, 

and . . . knowingly or intentionally conducts or otherwise participates in the 

activities of that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity[.]” I.C. § 

35-45-6-2(3). 

[18] First, we must determine whether Purvis was associated with an “enterprise,” 

which is defined, among other things, as “a union, an association, or a group, 

whether a legal entity or merely associated in fact.” I.C. § 35-45-6-1(c)(2). 

“[T]he hallmark of an enterprise is structure. . . . A RICO enterprise is an 

ongoing group of persons ‘associated through time, joined in purpose, and 

organized in a manner amenable to hierarchical or consensual decisionmaking.’” Miller v. State, 992 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting

United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir. 1996)). 6 Additionally, 

 

5

I.C. ch. 35-45-6.

6 Though the federal RICO Act and Indiana’s RICO Act are distinct, see Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 769 

(Ind. 2016), we have noted that relatively “little has been written in Indiana upon the definition of 
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because a RICO enterprise is more than a group who got together to commit a 

pattern of racketeering activity, there should be sufficient evidence to infer that 

the group is an “‘organization with a structure and goals separate from the 

predicate acts themselves.’” Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 

673, 675 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 

(7th Cir. 1991)). 

[19] We find that Purvis’s group was an enterprise for the purposes of RICO. The 

thefts were joined in time and purpose: within the span of three weeks, Purvis 

and at least two others met and stole primarily video games from the same 

location on at least three separate occasions. The group acted in a manner that 

was amenable to hierarchal decision-making because Purvis was the one 

providing transportation, selling games on the garage sale page, and interacting 

with and soliciting customers—he was in a strong position to direct the group’s 

efforts towards certain items and actions. See, e.g., Waldon, 829 N.E.2d at 176-

77 (finding a RICO enterprise where defendant recruited three juveniles to 

commit a series of burglaries, he provided transportation, they had a consistent 

method in how they performed the crimes, and they made “regular . . . attempts 

at burglary[]”). Further, there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable 

factfinder could have inferred a “structure and goals separate from the predicate 

acts . . . .” Stachon, 229 F.3d at 675. The State produced twelve pages of 

 

‘enterprise,’” Waldon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 168, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), disapproved on other grounds by

Jackson, 50 N.E.3d at 774-75, and we have observed that “federal cases concerning the general construction 

of the Act are instructive,” Miller, 992 N.E.2d at 794.
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Purvis’s Facebook posts selling apparently new and unopened games. State’s 

Ex. 6. The earliest post was created on December 15, 2014, and the posts 

extend to May 9, 2015. Some of the games in the posts have Walmart stickers 

on them and many are priced at half off their retail value. In sum, a reasonable 

factfinder could have inferred that the group stole the games, not simply to 

obtain the games, but for the ultimate goal of reselling them for profit. 

[20] Second, we must determine whether Purvis engaged in “racketeering activity,” 

which means “to commit, to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit a 

violation of, or aiding and abetting in a violation” of any of the listed offenses, 

including theft. I.C. § 35-45-6-1(e)(14). As explained above, there was 

sufficient evidence to support Purvis’s conviction for theft. In other words, 

there was sufficient evidence to support the determination that Purvis engaged 

in racketeering activity because he committed multiple thefts. 

[21] Third, we must consider whether Purvis’s behavior amounted to a “pattern of 

racketeering activity,” which is defined as “engaging in at least two (2) incidents 

of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intent, result, accomplice, 

victim, or method of commission, or that are otherwise interrelated by 

distinguishing characteristics that are not isolated incidents. . . .” I.C. § 35-45-6-

1(d). Our Supreme Court recently explained that:

[T]he statute does not apply to sporadic or disconnected criminal 

acts. Thus, although failure to prove continuity [of the acts] is 

not necessarily fatal to a corrupt business influence conviction—

since it is not a separate element in the statute—the State must 

still demonstrate that the criminal incidents were in fact a 
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“pattern” and not merely “isolated” incidents. And evidence of a 

degree of continuity or threat of continuity is certainly helpful in 

establishing the necessary “pattern.”

Jackson, 50 N.E.3d at 775-76 (footnote omitted).

[22] We find that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Purvis’s conduct 

constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. The thefts had a common 

intent—to steal and resell video games. During each theft, Purvis acted with

multiple accomplices. Purvis used the same method to commit each theft—

concealing video games under a pile of clothes in a shopping cart—and stole 

from the same victim. Purvis also drove most, if not all, of the group to and 

from Walmart in the same vehicle. Considering these common threads, we 

conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Purvis’s conduct was 

a “pattern of racketeering activity” and not sporadic, unrelated, or isolated 

incidents. I.C. § 35-45-6-1(d).7

[23] Purvis relies on Robinson v. State, 56 N.E.3d 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. 

denied, in contending that Indiana’s RICO Act does not apply to him. In 

Robinson, Robinson and his fiancée visited a local Walmart. The two split up 

and Robinson went to the electronics department. He quickly selected a home 

security camera and went to the men’s apparel section, leaving soon thereafter 

 

7 We do not mean to suggest, by listing a common intent, result, accomplice, victim, and method of 

commission, that the statutory definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” requires that all or even most of 

these factors be satisfied.
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without the camera. Id. at 654-55. Robinson and his fiancée then met up and 

left the store; several hours later employees found the camera box, which was 

missing several parts. Nearly three weeks later, the two returned to the same 

Walmart and began repeating the same steps as the previous visit. However, 

after a store employee spotted Robinson opening a box of the same type of 

security camera, police were called and Robinson was arrested and charged 

with several offenses, including Level 5 felony corrupt business influence. A

jury ultimately convicted Robinson of, among other things, corrupt business 

influence. Id. at 655. 

[24] Robinson appealed and this Court reversed his corrupt business influence 

conviction. In reasoning that Indiana’s RICO Act did not apply to Robinson, 

this Court observed:

Here, Robinson twice shoplifted or attempted to shoplift similar 

items from the same Walmart store. Beyond that, there is no 

evidence of any kind of ongoing criminal enterprise. There is no 

evidence of Robinson having acquired any property through 

“racketeering activity” other than the items he stole or attempted 

to steal from Walmart. There is no evidence of extensive 

planning or increasing sophistication of Robinson’s crimes. 

There is no evidence he enlisted any accomplices to work with 

him; the record does not contain any evidence that [Robinson’s 

fiancée] was aware of Robinson’s criminal actions, and she 

denied having any knowledge of them. Robinson was not any 

kind of criminal mastermind, nor did he work for one. The 

crimes were isolated and sporadic.
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Id. at 659. The Court also noted that Robinson and his crimes were not the 

type of person or activity that the General Assembly intended to be covered by 

the RICO Act. Id. at 659-60. 

[25] The facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from Robinson. As 

noted earlier, Purvis stole or attempted to steal dozens of games to resell them 

for profit—he did not steal a game or two simply to play them at home. Unlike 

Robinson, Purvis acted in concert with a cohort of accomplices who were not 

only aware of Purvis’s goals but actively assisted him in achieving them. On 

every occasion, Purvis was accompanied by at least one other person and 

sometimes as many as three others. Purvis and his accomplices also 

demonstrated significant planning and sophistication in executing their crimes: 

they came to the video game section with a ready-made place to conceal the 

games; they hid the games across the store, returning later to retrieve them; they 

knew about the keeper boxes and came prepared to remove them; and their 

movements demonstrated forethought because the group regularly split up after 

concealing the games and took circuitous routes through the store in a manner 

that was typical for “shop lifting teams.” Tr. Vol. II p. 84. For these reasons, 

we have little difficulty in distinguishing the present case from Robinson or in 

finding that Indiana’s RICO Act applies here.

8

 

8

Purvis also contends that his “conduct is not the type of crime that the RICO Act is intended to punish.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 12. To the extent that he relies on Robinson for this proposition, we have discussed why his 

situation is distinguishable from that case. Notwithstanding that point, we find that his conduct satisfied the 
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[26] In sum, there was sufficient evidence to establish that Purvis was associated 

with an enterprise, and knowingly or intentionally participated in the activities 

of that enterprise through a pattern of thefts. In other words, there was 

sufficient evidence to support Purvis’s conviction for corrupt business influence.

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[27] Finally, Purvis argues that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that this 

Court may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender. We must “conduct [this] review with 

substantial deference and give ‘due consideration’ to the trial court’s decision—

since the ‘principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ and 

not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence . . . .” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 

1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 

2013)) (internal citations omitted).

[28] Purvis was convicted of three crimes. The sentencing options and outcomes for 

each conviction are as follows:

• He was convicted of one Level 5 felony, for which he faced a sentence of 

one to six years, with an advisory term of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-

2-6(b). He received a six-year term, which was enhanced by six years 

because of his habitual offender status. I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i)(2) (for a person 

 

clear, unambiguous language of the statute, which is the best indicator of legislative intent. See Day v. State, 

57 N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016).
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convicted of a Level 5 or 6 felony, minimum enhancement is two years; 

maximum enhancement is six years).

• He was convicted of two Level 6 felonies, for which he faced a sentence

of six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory term of one 

year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). For each count, he received a two and one-half 

year term, to be served concurrently with the Level 5 conviction.

Thus, the trial court imposed an aggregate, fully-executed sentence of twelve 

years imprisonment, with credit for twenty-five days served. Had the trial court 

imposed maximum, fully consecutive terms on all convictions, Purvis would 

have received an aggregate term of seventeen years.

[29] With respect to the nature of Purvis’s offenses, Purvis actively participated with 

a group to steal and resell video games on a large scale. The trial court found 

that Purvis was the “leader” of the group, and there is no doubt that he played 

an instrumental role in the offenses by providing transportation, aiding in the 

concealment of the games, and soliciting and conducting resales. Tr. Vol. II p. 

222. Purvis argues that the loss to Walmart was minimal, considering its size

and the fact that it did not seek restitution. However, the size of the store does 

not negate the severity of his crime. Further, the evidence demonstrates that 

Purvis and his cohort stole or attempted to steal at an alarming rate (at least 

$800 worth of video games in a ten-day span) and showed no indication of 

slowing down. Many of the games from the earlier Facebook posts still had 

Walmart stickers on them and a reasonable factfinder could have inferred, 

based on all these circumstances, that the three incidents in May 2015 were not 

the only times that Purvis and his accomplices stole from Walmart. 
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[30] With respect to Purvis’s character, he concedes that he has multiple prior felony 

convictions, including: Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine; Class C 

felony burglary; Class D felony theft; Class D felony aiding, inducing, or 

causing theft; and Class D felony possession of marijuana; as well as two 

misdemeanor convictions and three adjudications as delinquent. Appellant’s

Confidential App. p. 6-9. Despite his considerable criminal history, Purvis 

contends that “his record is certainly not the worst of the worst.” Appellant’s 

Br. p. 22. However, it is undisputed that, although Purvis received the 

maximum sentence on every conviction and the maximum habitual offender 

enhancement, he will not serve the maximum possible sentence because his 

sentence for each of the two Level 6 counts will be served concurrently to the 

Level 5 term. See Wells v. State, 904 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“The 

maximum possible sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst 

offenders.”). While he also claims to have a close relationship with his family, 

he provides no reason why this mitigates any of his behavior. Purvis’s record 

reveals that he has failed to take advantage of numerous chances to learn from 

his mistakes—including an earlier conviction for felony theft—and his history 

demonstrates an unwillingness or an inability to conform his behavior to the 

rule of law.

[31] In sum, we do not find the sentence imposed by the trial court to be 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses or Purvis’s character.
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[32] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.