alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CITY OF HIALEAH, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. John W. ALLMAND and John Allmand Boats, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.

No. 67-536.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Feb. 20, 1968.

Ralph F. Miles, Hialeah, for appellant.

Dean, Adams, George & Wood, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The City of Hialeah has appealed a final judgment directing it to permit the completion of an industrial plant according to plans submitted by appellee, John W. Allmand and John Allmand Boats, Inc. The City had previously issued a building permit to appellees and the trial judge held that the City was estopped from interference with the progress of the work.1 We affirm.

*10The appellant, City, assigns as error the entry of the final judgment and urges, under its point presented upon appeal that a ministerial act of its public works director is not a sufficient ground upon which to evoke the doctrine of estoppel against the City. The judgment of the trial court is sustained under the holdings in the following cases: Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, Fla.1950, 44 So.2d 808; Bregar v. Britton, Fla.1954, 75 So.2d 753; Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, Fla.1963, 151 So.2d 433; City of Gainesville v. Bishop, Fla.App. 1965, 174 So.2d 100.

Affirmed.

1

.

> “ * * * It is the ruling of this Court that the Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonably use and enjoy the said premises in the manner contemplated at the time that the premises were planned and the building permit was issued by the Defendant. The Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to satisfactorily comply with governing rules and regulations pertaining to the enclosures, indicated parking spaces on paved areas, and air pollution. On completion of the foregoing by the Plaintiffs, the Defendant is hereby ordered to forthwith issue a permanent Certificate of Occupancy and occupational license to the Plaintiffs so that they might continue to enjoy the reasonable use of said premises for industrial purposes.”
EXHIBIT 32





<PAGE>



     In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of Whitemark  Homes,  Inc. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the period  ending  June 30, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission (the "Report"),  Barry Reese,  the Principal
Executive and Financial Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that to the best of his knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects the financial condition and results of the Company.


September 5, 2012                   By:  /s/ Barry Reese
                                         ---------------------------------
                                         Barry Reese, Principal Executive and
                                         Financial Officer
<PAGE>
#### Mildred Bell Rucker LITTEL, Appellant, v. Lena Bell Hunnicutt RUCKER, Appellee.

Nos. Q-58, Q-59 and Q-60.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Aug. 31, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 27, 1972.

*172Floyd G. Yeager, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Ralph L. Thomas, Orange Park, for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks reversal of orders entered in three cases consolidated below and on appeal. In the orders entered by the lower court, appellee was granted custody of the minor child in one case, appointed guardian of the child in the second case and administratrix of the estate of the child’s father in the third case. The orders in the first two cases clearly fall within the sound discretion of the trial court based on his judgment as to what is in the best interest of the child. This court can find no abuse of that discretion which would warrant reversal.

The third order appointing appellee administratrix of the father’s estate is assailed on the ground that appellant did not receive proper notice that application for letters of administration had been filed. It is quite true, as contended by appellant, that no such notice was given to appellant. Instead, appellant was served with a notice relating to the guardianship proceedings. Although appellant had not received proper notice of the petition for letters of administration, she must have had actual notice thereof inasmuch as on January 15, 1971, appellant filed an answer to the petition, albeit belatedly, praying that she be appointed as administratrix. By this time, of course, appellee had been appointed ad-ministratrix as of January 12, 1971. On August 6, 1971, the county judge denied appellant’s prayer that she be appointed administratrix and reaffirmed the earlier order of January 12, 1971, appointing appel-lee administratrix.

While it is clear that the notice received by appellant concerning the guardianship matter did not suffice to place her on notice of the petition for letters in the probate matter, it is equally clear that appellant having actually filed an answer which she directed to the petition for letters and “citation issued but of the above mentioned court”, by which answer she objected to the appointment of appellee as administra-trix and further requested the court to appoint her to that office, appellant cannot now assert that she had no notice of the pending application of the petition for letters of administration filed by appellee. By having submitted herself by her answer addressed squarely to the issues in litigation, appellant negated the need for notice by citation as required by Section 732.43(3), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

Appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error respecting the entry of the three orders reviewd herein, the same are hereby affirmed.

SPECTOR, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., and RAWLS, JJ., concur.
Exhibit99.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Goldfield Corporation (the"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the"Report"), I, Stephen R. Wherry, Vice President, Treasurer and ChiefFinancial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

        (1)   The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

        (2)   The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultof operations of the Company.

/s/ Stephen R. WherryStephen R. Wherry Vice President, Treasurer and   Chief Financial Officer November 13, 2002
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 September 8, 2020

s0831

Order 

Clerk

September 8, 2020

159271

LEONARD S. BOHN, Individually and as

Representative of a Class of Similarly

Situated Persons and Entities,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 159271

COA: 339306

Wayne CC: 15-013727-CZ

CITY OF TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 29, 2019 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the 

case of DAART v City of Detroit (Docket No. 158852) is pending on appeal before this 

Court and that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in the present 

application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE 

pending the decision in that case.
No. 11206.

#### Murphy *v.*The Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Co.

Decided February 16, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court of Cuyahoga county.

*Mr. Hermann*Preusser, for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey*and *Messrs. Higley & Maurer,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Crew, C. J., Summers, Spear, Davis, Shauck and Price, JJ., concur.
[No. 356-2.

Division Two.

September 29, 1971.]

#### Roy J. Mitchell *et al., Respondents,*v. Robert H. Cromer *et al., Defendants,*Albert L. Blankenship *et al., Appellants.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Mason County, No. 9832, Hewitt A. Henry, J., entered June 22, 1970. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
#### The C. *&*P. Transit Co., Etc., *v.*The Public Utilities Commission. Schelling *v.*The Public Utilities Commission. Kennedy et al. *v.*The Public Utilities Commission. The Cambridge & Caldwell Red Star Line *v.*The Public Utilities Commission.

*Public Utilities Commission*— Motor *transportation companies —Certificates of public convenience or necessity*— Section *614-84 et seq., General Code (110 O. L., $11).*

(Nos. 18462 to 18465

Decided May 13, 1924.)

Error to the Public Utilities Commission.

*Messrs. Seott & Scott; Mr. James Joyce*and *Mr. Randolph W. Walton,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Mr. G. G. Crabbe,*attorney general, and *Mr. John W. Bricker,*for defendant in error.

*667It is ordered and adjudged by this court, that the orders of the Public Utilities Commission be and the same are hereby, affirmed, upon the reasoning and authority of *McLain*v. *Public Utilities Commission, ante,*1, and *Royal Green Coach Co.*v. *Public Utilities Commission, ante,*41.

*Orders affirmed.*

Marshall, C. J., Robinson, Matthias and Allen, JJ., concur.

Wanamaker, J., not participating.
Exhibit 31.2

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOSECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 200215 U.S.C. SECTION 7241

I, Stephen R. Wherry, certify that:

1.    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of The Goldfield Corporation;

2.    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.    The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a.    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b.    (paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986)

c.    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

d.    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.    The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

----

 

a.    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b.    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

 

Date: August13, 2003

 

 

/s/ Stephen R. WherryStephen R. Wherry Vice President, Treasurer and     Chief Financial Officer
#### Gilomino DIAZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 67-163.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Jan. 23, 1968.

Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender, and Edward J. Winter, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Arthur L. Rothenberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Theft of a television set and $400 occurred in a hotel under circumstances such as to cause the police to regard the appellant as a suspect. He was apprehended by police officers, and prior to being charged with an offense the appellant voluntarily signed a written consent for the police to search the room he occupied in another hotel, for the alleged stolen property. In making the search the officers discovered and seized a quantity of marijuana seeds, constituting contraband items. That evidence was used in the prosecution of the appellant when subsequently charged with unlawful possession of marijuana. He was convicted and adjudged guilty of that offense in a non-jury trial. On this appeal by him therefrom it is contended the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and that the court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence above referred to.

An argument advanced on behalf of the appellant was that inasmuch as the consent he granted was to search his hotel room for the stolen property and money, the trial court should have suppressed the *38evidence consisting of marijuana found in his room as being beyond the scope of the authorized search and the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. The argument lacks merit. Inasmuch as the officers were conducting an authorized search of the premises for the alleged stolen property they were entitled to seize the.contraband items found therein. See Joyner v. City of Lakeland, Fla. 1956, 90 So.2d 118, 122; 29 Fla.Jur., Search and Seizure, §§ 41, 45; 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 83.

We also have considered the appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction; and we hold the contention is without merit. The contraband was found in the appellant’s jewelry box, reposing on the desk in his hotel room. The possibility that the contraband could have belonged to another person and been placed therein by one in the employ of the hotel, asserted and relied on by appellant was properly considered by the trial court to be inadequate to refute or offset the evidentiary effect of the discovery-of marijuana in his hotel room.

No reversible error having been made to appear the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.
# C_2022191EN.01000601.xml

| 10.5.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 191/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.5.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 191/6

---

Appeal brought on 20 September 2021 by Svenska Metallkompaniet AB against the order of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 5 July 2021 in Case T-191/21, Svenska Metallkompaniet v EUIPO — Otlav (Window fittings)

(Case C-610/21 P)

(2022/C 191/06)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Svenska Metallkompaniet AB

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

By order of 11 February 2022, the Vice-President of the Court of Justice held that the appeal was dismissed as inadmissible and that Svenska Metallkompaniet AB should bear its own costs.

---
| Dated:  January 13, 2011 | /s/ Samuel Martin                     |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|                               | Samuel Martin                         |
|                               | President and                         |
|                               | Chief Executive Officer               |
|                               |                                  |
|                               |                                  |
| Dated:  January 13, 2011 | /s/ Brenda M. Galgano                 |
|                               | Brenda M. Galgano                     |
|                               | Senior Vice President,                |
|                               | Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer |
#### Jay B. DENNIS, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 70-164.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 13, 1970.

Habeas corpus denied.
No. 10975.

#### Pugh, Treasurer, *v.*Van Behren.

Decided November 24, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Franklin county.

*Mr. George S. Marshall,*city solicitor, and *Mr. John L. Davies,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Kinkead, Sheets & West,*for defendant in error.

Former judgment adhered to.

Price, C. J., Shaucic, Summers and Spear, JJ., concur.
#### Marie Sanders HURKS v. L. H. BOSSIER et al.

No. 62726.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 15, 1978.

In re: Mid-State Materials, Inc. and U. S. Fire Insurance Company, applying for cer-*791tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Lake Charles, State of Louisiana.

Writ denied.
Exhibit99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Goldfield Corporation (the"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2003 as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the"Report"), I, John H. Sottile, Chairman of the Board of Directors,President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002, that:

(1)    The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

(2)    The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultof operations of the Company.

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to The Goldfield Corporation and will be retained by The GoldfieldCorporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

/s/ John H. SottileJohn H. Sottile Chairman of the Board of Directors,    President and Chief Executive OfficerMay 15, 2003
##### 



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the
periods expressed in the Report.
  /s/ Marshall O. LarsenName:
    Marshall O. LarsenTitle:
    Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer/s/ Scott E. KuechleName:
    Scott E. KuechleTitle:
    Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer 54
No. 10897.

#### Brown et al., County Commissioners, *v.*The Akron & Chicago Junction Railroad Co. et al.

Decided November 17, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Medina county.

*Mr. W. H. McClure,*prosecuting attorney; *Mr. F. W. Woods; Mr. E. P. Thomas*and *Messrs. Cushing & Siddal,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Mr. J. M. ■Les-sick; Mr. Lee Elliott*and *Mr. Frank Heath,*for defendants in error.

Judgment as to five thousand dollars reversed, and in other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Si-iauck, Crew, Summers and Davis, JJ., concur.
# C_2021278EN.01003001.xml

| 12.7.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 278/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 278/30

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein oikeus (Finland) lodged on 22 April 2021 — Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö Fennia v Koninklijke Philips N.V.

(Case C-264/21)

(2021/C 278/42)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Korkein oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö Fennia

Respondent: Koninklijke Philips N.V.

Questions referred

| 1. | Does the concept of producer within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Product Liability Directive (1) presuppose that a person who puts his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product, or who has allowed them to be put on the product, also presents himself as the producer of the product in some other manner? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does the concept of producer within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Product Liability Directive (1) presuppose that a person who puts his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product, or who has allowed them to be put on the product, also presents himself as the producer of the product in some other manner?

| 2. | If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative: Based on what considerations is his presentation as a producer of the product to be evaluated? Is it relevant to that evaluation that the product was manufactured by a subsidiary of the trade mark proprietor and distributed by another subsidiary? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative: Based on what considerations is his presentation as a producer of the product to be evaluated? Is it relevant to that evaluation that the product was manufactured by a subsidiary of the trade mark proprietor and distributed by another subsidiary?

---

(1)  Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 1999 amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (OJ 1999 L 141, p. 20).

---
#### KIWANIS CLUB OF DELRAY BEACH, Florida, Petitioner, v. Jane L. ROBINSON and R. Forster Robinson, her husband, Respondents.

No. 42842.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 16, 1972.

Certiorari denied. 265 So.2d 387.

ERVIN, Acting C. J, and CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ, concur.
# C_2022084EN.01002201.xml

| 21.2.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 84/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.2.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 84/22

---

Appeal brought on 1 August 2021 by Rezon OOD against the judgment of the General Court delivered on 16 June 2021 in Case T-487/20, Rezon v EUIPO

(Case C-476/21 P)

(2022/C 84/27)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Parties

Appellant: Rezon OOD (represented by: M. Yordanova-Harizanova, advokat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 10 December 2021, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) ordered as follows:

| 1. | The appeal is not allowed to proceed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The appeal is not allowed to proceed.

| 2. | Rezon OOD shall bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rezon OOD shall bear its own costs.

---