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[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 549 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 549

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the President 
should work to achieve a clearly defined agreement which establishes a 
    multilateral export control regime to stem the proliferation of 
   militarily critical products, technology, and advanced strategic 
 weapons to rogue regimes that jeopardize international peace and the 
                national security of the United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 27, 1994

 Mr. Gilman submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the President 
should work to achieve a clearly defined agreement which establishes a 
    multilateral export control regime to stem the proliferation of 
   militarily critical products, technology, and advanced strategic 
 weapons to rogue regimes that jeopardize international peace and the 
                national security of the United States.

Whereas the United States and its partners in the Coordinating Committee 
        (hereinafter referred to as ``CoCom''), the multinational body that 
        controlled strategic exports to the former Soviet Union and other 
        Communist States, agreed to disband the organization on March 31, 1994;
Whereas no successor has yet been established to replace CoCom;
Whereas multilateral controls are urgently needed to thwart efforts of Iran, 
        Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and other rogue regimes to acquire advanced 
        strategic weapons and militarily critical products and technology that 
        could contribute to such nations' efforts to build threatening offensive 
        weapons capabilities;
Whereas the United States should make a high-level effort to achieve an 
        effective replacement control regime to CoCom;
Whereas the Administration has been trying for more than one year to negotiate 
        such a replacement regime that would merge the existing CoCom regime for 
        East-West technology controls into a global nonproliferation regime and 
        would specifically target rogue regimes such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, 
        and Libya;
Whereas support by such regimes for threatening activities, including acts of 
        international terrorism, poses a national security threat to the United 
        States and its allies;
Whereas the Administration is now giving active consideration to the inclusion 
        in this replacement regime of Russia, other former Warsaw Pact States, 
        and possibly China;
Whereas police in Germany have made 4 seizures this year of nuclear contraband 
        from Russia where nuclear facilities are vulnerable to pilfering;
Whereas the plutonium in one such seizure was 87 percent of a highly enriched 
        isotope used in nuclear weapons and is alleged to originate from a 
        Russian nuclear weapons plant;
Whereas the Administration needs to ensure that Russia takes prompt and 
        effective action to tighten export controls on nuclear weapons 
        components;
Whereas Russia has sold destabilizing weapons to Iran and has not indicated that 
        it is prepared to stop or curtail such sales in the future;
Whereas the Administration should oppose Russian membership in the CoCom 
        successor regime until Russia unconditionally terminates the sale and 
        transfer of all advanced conventional weapons to Iran and any other 
        rogue regimes;
Whereas the Administration has failed to publicly identify Russia as a country 
        that is transferring advanced conventional weapons to Iran pursuant to 
        the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992; and
Whereas Russia and other countries should qualify for membership only to the 
        extent that they are beginning to implement effective export controls, 
        adhering to the control lists and the guidelines of the existing 
        multilateral regimes (including the Nuclear Supplier's Group, the 
        Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group), adhering to 
        the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the existing 
        biological and chemical weapons conventions, and agreeing to stop 
        providing destabilizing weapons to rogue regimes: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives 
that--
            (1) the President should work to achieve a clearly defined 
        agreement which establishes a multilateral export control 
        regime to stem the proliferation of militarily critical 
        products and technology and advanced strategic weapons to rogue 
        regimes that jeopardize international peace and the national 
        security of the United States and its allies; and
            (2) no country should qualify for membership unless it has 
        begun to implement effective export controls, adheres to the 
        control list and the guidelines of the existing multilateral 
        regimes including the Nuclear Supplier's Group, the Missile 
        Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group, adheres to 
        the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 
        existing biological and chemical weapons conventions, and has 
        stopped providing advanced strategic weapons to Iran, Iraq, 
        Libya, and North Korea.
                                 <all>
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