alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## United States Court of Appeals
**For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________

No. 23

- 2184

___________________________
Joshua A. Lapin

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

EverQuote, Inc., also known as EverQuote; John Doe Sender, doing business as BuzzBarrelReview.com, doing business as dzlosurverys.com, doing business as emails

- jobsdelivered.com, doing business as Entirelybelieve.com, doing business as JobsDeliver.com, doing business as expectcarecare.com, doing business a s JobSharkNL.com, doing business as NationalShopperSurvey.com, doing business as NationalSurveysOnline.com, doing business as exigentmediagroup.com, doing business as enrichedtechnologies.com, doing business as ConsumerDigitalSurvey.com, doing business as drivingmarketinggroup.com, doing business as surveyandgetpaid.com, doing business as tummyheadmediagroup.com, doing business as thebestcreditcheck.com, doing business as thefreetree.co, doing business as dlzoffers.com, doing business as nationaldigitalsurv ey.com, doing business as dealzingo.com, doing business as rumorfox.com

Defendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of South Dakota - Southern

____________

Submitted: March 11, 2024 Filed: March 14, 2024 [Unpublished]

____________-2- Before BENTON , ERICKSON , and STRAS

, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Joshua Lapin appeals following the district court’s 1 dismissal of his pro se complaint for failure to state a claim . Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

, this court affirms.

After careful de novo review of the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, this court conclude s that Lapin had standing to raise his claims, see TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez , 594 U.S. 413 (2021) ; see also Rydholm v. Equifax Info.

Servs. LLC , 44 F.4th 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2022) (appellate court can review standing for first time on appeal) ; and find s no basis for reversal, see Jessie v. Potter , 516

F.3d 70 9 , 712 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review ) ; First Colony Life Ins. Co. v.

Berube , 130 F.3d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1997) (same).

The judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

1 The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota.
# D

- 1



# APPENDIX D **: CONCENTRA**  **TION BREAKT HROUGH CUR**  **VES FOR ABANDONED BOREHOLES**  **AND DISCONTINUOUS CO NFINING**  **UNIT RUNS**  **AB**
**- R1,**  **AB**
**- R2,**  **AB**
**- R3, CBD** 
**- R1,**  **AND CBD**
**- R2**  See Table 2

- 12 and 2

- 13 for run details.

# D

- 2 0.00E+00 1.00E-01 2.00E-01 3.00E-01 4.00E-01 5.00E-01 6.00E-01 7.00E-01

0.00E+00 5.00E+03 1.00E+04 1.50E+04 2.00E+04 2.50E+04 Time (days)RelativeConcentration

528 856 1840



# Figure D
**- 1: Run AB** 
**- R1** 

0.00E+00 1.00E-01 2.00E-01 3.00E-01 4.00E-01 5.00E-01 6.00E-01

0.00E+00 5.00E+03 1.00E+04 1.50E+04 2.00E+04 2.50E+04 Time (days)RelativeConcentration

528 856 1840



# Figure D
**- 2:**  **Run AB**
**- R**  **2**

# D

- 3 0.00E+00 1.00E-01 2.00E-01 3.00E-01 4.00E-01 5.00E-01 6.00E-01 7.00E-01 8.00E-01 9.00E-01

0.00E+00 5.00E+03 1.00E+04 1.50E+04 2.00E+04 2.50E+04 Time (days)RelativeConcentration

528 856 1840



# Figure **D**
**- 3:**  **Run AB**
**- R**  **3**

0.00E+00 1.00E-01 2.00E-01 3.00E-01 4.00E-01 5.00E-01 6.00E-01

0.00E+00 5.00E+03 1.00E+04 1.50E+04 2.00E+04 2.50E+04 Time (days)RelativeConcentration

528 856 1840



# Figure D
**- 4:**  **Run CBD**
**- R1** 

# D

- 4 0.00E+00 2.00E-02 4.00E-02 6.00E-02 8.00E-02 1.00E-01 1.20E-01 1.40E-01 1.60E-01 1.80E-01 2.00E-01

0.00E+00 5.00E+03 1.00E+04 1.50E+04 2.00E+04 2.50E+04 Time (days)RelativeConcentration

528 856 1840



# Figure D
**- 5:**  **Run CBD**
**- R2**
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 200218 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Goldfield Corporation (the"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2005 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the"Report"), I, John H. Sottile, Chairman of the Board of Directors,President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002, that:

(1)   The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and result of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906 has been provided to The Goldfield Corporation and will beretained by The Goldfield Corporation and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.

```
 
```

Date:May 13, 2005

```
/s/ John H. SottileJohn H. Sottile Chairman of the Board of Directors,        President and Chief Executive Officer
```

```
 
```

```
 
```
# C_2023179EN.01000501.xml

| 22.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 179/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 179/5

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 30 March 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny — Poland) — Dyrektor Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej v Gmina L.

(Case C-616/21, (1) Gmina L.)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Taxation - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 2(1)(c) - Supply of services for consideration - Article 9(1) - Meanings of ‘taxable person’ and ‘economic activity’ - Municipality which arranges for asbestos removal for the benefit of its residents who own immovable property and who have expressed the wish for that - Reimbursement of the municipality by a subsidy from the competent provincial authority of 40 % to 100 % of the costs - Article 13(1) - Municipalities not subject to tax for the activities or transactions carried out as public authorities)

(2023/C 179/06)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Dyrektor Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej

Defendant: Gmina L.

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2(1), Article 9(1) and Article 13(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax

must be interpreted as meaning that where a municipality has arranged by means of an undertaking to carry out transactions involving asbestos removal and collection of asbestos products and waste, for the benefit of its residents who own immovable property and who have expressed interest in that regard, where such an activity is not intended to obtain income on a continuing basis and does not give rise, on the part of those residents, to any payment, since those transactions are financed by public funds, does not constitute a supply of services subject to value added tax.

---

(1)  OJ C 95, 28.2.2022.

---
## THE ATJXBRNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

Decemberll. 1975

TheBriorable~Jackscm Emzutive Director TexasYouthBuhcil 201 East 14th street Austin, Texas 78701

Bar Mr. aBckson: CQinion No. n-748
Fe: Administrationof the l%zlnssma.intajnadhyths lkxas Youth Council for E"dnegleded

.
Youhaveaskedtwoquestionsamemingthea&ninistrationofthe ~YouthQuncil's~fordependentandnsglectedchildren. Your questions

are: (1) Mayhouseparentsheenployedonalive-in hasis witbut violating

article 5159d, V.T.C.S.? (2) May the TexasYouthCouncil contjnue

tooffer educationalsl?rvices,includinglmusingandmeals, onavoluntarybasis toresidentsof thehmzswhc have reached

ths age of eighteen(1811 Youhaveinfoxm&usthatthehousepa?xntsinvolm?dwnlldhe umrrisd

couples and Would

be paid not less than $7,560.00 per person

par snnun. Article

5159d reqires a nCn.imn

wage of $1.40

per hour subject to certain

exceptions.

Secticm 4(b) (3)exempts

",y person

wloyed in a . . .professional

capacity."

We neednotd&emue*theror inwhat circunstancesahouseparent~dbewithinthis~m,forunder ths infomationyouhave suppliedtous it is clearthat article 5159d, assuningits

applicability,

wouldmtpmhibit this eqloymnt. A salary of $7,560.00

per annunis roughly equivalent

o $145.00

per week. Thus, suchaneroplayeecouldbe~~toworkalmost104 imursper weekwithxt any violation of article

5159d. You have informed us that ~the~parentswillprabablywork55to6Ohoursperweekandwill therefore

receivemre than themininunwage. It may also be notedthat sections

5(c)and 5(d)are applicable.

p. 3172'Ibe

Honorable

Ikm Jackson

- page tm (H.-

748)

Your secondguestionishhetherthe TexasYouthCouucilmayamtinuetooffereducationalservices, inclwlinghousing

andmeals, to residents

of the l-mes

when they reach18 years of age. Article

5143d, section 9a,V.T.C.S.

provides: Subject to such policies

as the Texas

Youth Councilmayadopt,theCorsicanaStateliane, theWestlkxasChil&en'sRcmat Pyote, and the Waco Stats

l-km2 may accept

for amnission any child

betmen the ages of three (3) years and eighteen(18)

years whc is a fullorphan, ahalf-omhan.ora demndentaudneclscted child, and may offer,

if needed,

car& treatment, education,andtrainiug,tosuchchildrenasare admitted

thereto untiltheyha reached the age of +zwenty-ona

(21) years. (&zaSlS added)
In our view,this article clearly authorizes

the provision

of care audaducationon

avoluntarybasis

tc residents

of thehams*have reached ths age of 18 b.xt

not 21. WetelievetheLegislature iutended to specify

thatotherpersons,

at the discretionof theYouthCouncil, wouldamtinue tcbe qualified for these

benefits

witbutregard to theirlegalinfancy

or adultstatus. Attorney General @inion H-585 (1975).canpare

Attorney

General C&ion H-83 (1973). SUMMARY UnderthestatedfactstheTexasYouth Cbuncilmay~loyhouseparentsonalive-in basis without violating

article 5159d. TheYouthCcuncilmyamtinue tooffer educatimlalservicesandcare,includingmsals andlxmsing,

on amluutarybasis to residents ofl-uaes

fordepemkntamdneglectedpersons andorphansaftertheyreachl8yearsofage anduntiltheyreach21yearsofage.

AttorneyGeneral

of lkxas

p. 3173. .

The Homrable F&m Jackson - page three (H-748)

p. 3174
Exhibit99.2

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Goldfield Corporation (the"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the"Report"), I, Stephen R. Wherry, Vice President, Treasurer and ChiefFinancial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                    (1)   The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

                    (2)   The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultof operations of the Company.

/s/ Stephen R. WherryStephen R. Wherry Vice President, Treasurer and   Chief Financial Officer August 13, 2002
# C_2021462EN.01002501.xml

| 15.11.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 462/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.11.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 462/25

---

Appeal brought on 14 June 2021 by Apologistics GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 21 April 2021 in Case T-282/20, Apologistics GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-369/21 P)

(2021/C 462/28)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Apologistics GmbH (represented by: H. Hug, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Markus Kerckhoff

By order of 22 September 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal was not allowed to proceed and that the appellant shall bear its own costs.

---
# C_2021148EN.01001301.xml

| 26.4.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/13

---

Action brought on 12 March 2021 — European Commission v Republic of Poland

(Case C-166/21)

(2021/C 148/17)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: C. Perrin and M. Siekierzyńska, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Poland

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare that, by depriving importers of ethyl alcohol used for the production of medicines who do not opt for the application of a duty suspension arrangement of the possibility of relying on the mandatory exemption from excise duty, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 27(1)(d) of Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages, (1) and has infringed the principle of proportionality; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that, by depriving importers of ethyl alcohol used for the production of medicines who do not opt for the application of a duty suspension arrangement of the possibility of relying on the mandatory exemption from excise duty, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 27(1)(d) of Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages, (1) and has infringed the principle of proportionality;

| — | order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Republic of Poland introduced national legislation according to which importers of ethyl alcohol used for the production of medicines who do not opt for the application of a duty suspension arrangement are deprived of the possibility of relying on the exemption from excise duty.

In the Commission’s view, this constitutes a failure to fulfil obligations under Article 27(1)(d) of Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages, and has infringed the principle of proportionality.

According to that provision of the directive, where alcohol is used for the production of medicines, Member States are obliged to exempt it from excise duty under the conditions laid down by them for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and of preventing any evasion, avoidance or abuse. In the Commission’s view, making the exemption from excise duty dependent on the application of a duty suspension arrangement is not necessary for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of that exemption or of preventing any evasion, avoidance or abuse. It is also contrary to the principle of proportionality.

---

(1)  OJ 1992 L 316, p. 21.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 573 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 573

  Requiring Members of the House of Representatives to pay, from the 
   Official Expenses Allowance, the actual cost of extraneous matter 
     printed in that portion of the Congressional Record entitled 
                       ``Extensions of Remarks''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 6, 1994

 Mr. Pomeroy submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                 the Committee on House Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  Requiring Members of the House of Representatives to pay, from the 
   Official Expenses Allowance, the actual cost of extraneous matter 
     printed in that portion of the Congressional Record entitled 
                       ``Extensions of Remarks''.

    Resolved, 

SECTION 1. PAYMENT REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS.

    In each case of extraneous matter printed in that portion of the 
Congressional Record entitled ``Extensions of Remarks'', the actual 
cost involved shall be paid out of the Official Expenses Allowance of 
the Member who submits the matter. The amounts so paid shall be 
credited to the applicable appropriation relating to publication of the 
Congressional Record.

SEC. 2. AUTHORITY OF THE SPEAKER.

    The Speaker shall have authority to specify such standards and to 
make such determinations as may be necessary to assure compliance with 
this resolution.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    As used in this resolution--
            (1) the term ``actual cost'' means the actual cost, as 
        determined by the Public Printer;
            (2) the term ``extraneous matter'' means matter not related 
        to the legislative business of the day; and
            (3) the term ``Member of the House of Representatives'' 
        means a Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident 
        Commissioner to, the Congress.
                                 <all>
```
UNITED STATES NAVY–MARINE CORPS

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

_________________________

No. 201800169

_________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee

v.

Alexander M. BRADSHAW

Lance Corporal (E-3), U.S. Marine Corps

Appellant

_________________________

Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judge: Lieutenant Colonel Eugene H. Robinson, Jr., USMC.

For Appellant: Major David A. Peters, USMCR.

For Appellee: Brian K. Keller, Esq.

_________________________

Decided 9 October 2018

_________________________

Before FULTON, CRISFIELD, and GERDING, Appellate Military Judges

_________________________

After careful consideration of the record, submitted without assignment of 

error, we affirm the findings and sentence as approved by the convening 

authority. Art. 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). 

FOR THE COURT

RODGER A. DREW, JR.

Clerk of Court
To: Dennis Mills/AWA/FAA@FAA

Cc: "Joel Murdock" < j mmurdoc k @fedex.com>, "Mark Hansen" < j mhansen@fedex.com>, "Jim

Bowman" < j lbowman@fedex.com>, "Robert Moreau" <rdmoreau@fedex.com>

Date: 05/08/2012 11:19 AM

Subject: FedEx EFVS Disptach Exemption Request--Status change

Hello Dennis—

FedEx Express would like to officially withdraw our pending request for an EFVS Dispatch Exemption.

We are requesting to withdraw the exemption at this time for internal reasons.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Thank you!

Josh

Josh Kendrick

Managing Director

FedEx Flight Technical Operations/Regulatory Compliance

j kendrick @ fedex

. com

C: +1 901 579 9018

O: +1 901 224 0802

3131 Democrat Road

Building C173

Memphis, TN 38118

‐ 0102
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted), Wayne Wetherell, Chief Financial Officerof ImageWare Systems, Inc. (the ***“Company”***), hereby certifies that, to the best of myknowledge:

 

1.               The Company’s Amendment No. 1 to its annualreport on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ended December 31, 2005 (the ***“Report”***) fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, as amended; and

 

2.               The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of theCompany at the end of the periods covered by the Report and the results ofoperations of the Company for the periods covered by the Report.

 

 
| Dated:   April  30, 2006 |
|-----------------------------------------|
|                                    |
| / s/  Wayne Wetherell                   |   |
| Wayne  Wetherell                        |
| Chief  Financial Officer                |

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to ImageWare Systems, Inc. and will be retained by ImageWare Systems,Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff uponrequest.

 

----
# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed January 13, 2021

. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D20

- 0569

Lower Tribunal No. 15

- 15102

________________



### The Children ' s Home Society of Florida, a non

- party

, Petitioner,

vs.



### K.W., K.J., R.B., R.B. and R.B.,

Respondent s

.

A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami

- Dade County, Laura Anne

Stuzin

, Judge.

Klein Glasser Park & Lowe, P.L., and Kayla A. Riera

- Gomez and Andrew M.

Feldman

, for petitioner.

Thomasina F. Moore, Statewide Director of Appeals and Laura J. Lee, Senior

Attorn ey (Tallahassee), for the Statewide Guardian a d Litem Office

.

Karla Perkins, Appellate Counsel for the Department of Children & Families.

Before LOGUE, LINDSEY and LOBREE

, JJ.

PER CURIAM.2 The Children’s Home Society of Florida (“CHS”)

, a non

- party to the

dependency proceeding below, seeks a writ of common law certiorari directed at the

lower court’s March 9, 2020 order holding it in civil contempt and imposing a fine

of $2,500 per day to compel compliance with a prior order

.

A party cannot be held in contempt for non

- compliance with a court order if

the party did not have the present ability to comply with the court order. See

, e.g.

,

Wilcoxon v. Moller , 132 So. 3d 281, 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Harris v. Hampton

,

70 So. 3d 747, 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Boby Express Co. v. Guerin , 930 So. 2d

842, 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). In addition, the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure

impose specific requirements on any order finding a party in contempt. Rule 8.286,

which applies to all indirect civil contempt proceedings, provides : “I f the court

orders

. . . a coercive fine

. . . f or failure to comply with a prior order, the court must

set conditions for purge of the contempt, based on the contemnor ’ s present ability to

comply

. ” Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.286( e)

. The same rule also expressly requires “ a separate

affirmative finding that th e contemnor has the present ability to comply with the

purge and the factual basis for that finding .” Thus, before imposing contempt

sanctions, the lower court was obligated to make affirmative findings, supported by

facts, that CHS had the ability to com ply with the conditions for the purge of the

contempt

. It did not do so. See Dep’t of Children & Families v. R.H. , 819 So. 2d

858, 862 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); see also Winton v. Saffer , 158 So. 3d 703, 704 (Fla.3 3d DCA 2015) ; Creative Choice Homes, II, Ltd. v. Keystone Guard Servs., Inc. , 137

So. 3d 1144, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)

. As such, the lower court departed from the

essential requirements of the law in finding that CHS had (and now has) the ability

to comply with the a mended o rder adjudging it gui lty of indirect civil contempt.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for certiorari and quash the order under

review.