alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2021329EN.01000501.xml

| 16.8.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 329/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.8.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 329/5

---

Appeal brought on 13 January 2021 by Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções, Lda, Paulo Eduardo Matos Gomes de Azevedo, Julião Maria Gomes de Azevedo, Isabel Maria Matos Gomes de Azevedo against the order of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 16 December 2020 in Case T-416/20 REC Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções and Others v Court of Justice of the European Union and Others

(Case C-21/21 P)

(2021/C 329/06)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Appellants: Comprojecto-Projectos e Construções, Lda, Paulo Eduardo Matos Gomes de Azevedo, Julião Maria Gomes de Azevedo, Isabel Maria Matos Gomes de Azevedo (represented by: M. Ribeiro, advogado)

Other parties to the proceedings: Court of Justice of the European Union, General Court of the European Union, European Central Bank

By order of 30 June 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible and ordered the appellants to bear their own costs.

---
#### Gary L. SPENCE, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.

No. 74-75.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 28, 1974.

Habeas corpus denied.
# C_2023179EN.01000401.xml

| 22.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 179/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 179/4

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 30 March 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny — Poland) — Gmina O. v Dyrektor Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej

(Case C-612/21, (1) Gmina O.)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Taxation - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 2(1)(a) and (c) - Supply of goods and services for consideration - Article 9(1) - Meanings of ‘taxable person’ and ‘economic activity’ - Municipality which organises the installation of renewable energy on its territory for its residents who own immovable property and who have expressed the wish to be equipped with renewable energy systems - Their contribution amounting to 25 % of the subsidisable costs, without being able to exceed a maximum value agreed between the municipality and the interested property owner - Reimbursement of the municipality by a subsidy from the competent provincial authority of 75 % of the subsidisable costs - Article 13(1) - Municipalities not subject to tax for the activities or transactions carried out as public authorities)

(2023/C 179/05)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Gmina O.

Defendant: Dyrektor Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2(1), Article 9(1) and Article 13(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax

must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a municipality supplies and installs, through an undertaking, renewable energy systems for its residents who own their property and who have expressed their wish to be equipped with renewable energy systems, where such an activity is not intended to obtain income on a continuing basis and gives rise, on the part of those residents, solely to a payment covering at most one quarter of the costs incurred, the balance being financed by public funds, does not constitute a supply of goods and services subject to value added tax.

---

(1)  OJ C 95, 28.2.2022.

---
#### ROUSE v. FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY CO.

No. 38635.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 220 So.2d 632.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

969 

CA 12-00420 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

QP, INC., PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V ORDER

THE FLANDERS GROUP, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

A decision order having been entered December 28, 2012, affirming

an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Kenneth R. Fisher, J.),

dated October 5, 2011, in a breach of contract action,

Now, upon the Court’s own motion, with knowledge that a

stipulation of discontinuance was filed by the parties in the Monroe

County Clerk’s Office on November 29, 2012, without notice to this

Court, 

It is hereby ORDERED that the decision order entered December 28,

2012, is vacated and the appeal is dismissed as moot. 

Frances E. Cafarell

Entered: January 8, 2013

Clerk of the Court
#### James THOMPSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 40588.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 23, 1971.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 1971.

Certiorari denied. 240 So.2d 831.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.

DEKLE, J., dissents.
#### Robert George MISKE, Petitioner, v. Malcolm E. BEARD, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 70-426.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 27, 1970.

Habeas corpus denied.
# C_2021028EN.01006201.xml

| 25.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 28/62 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/62

---

Action brought on 27 November 2020 — Beelow v EUIPO (made of wood)

(Case T-702/20)

(2021/C 28/92)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Timo Beelow (Wuppertal, Germany) (represented by: J. Vogtmeier, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark made of wood — Application for registration No 18 061 410

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 September 2020 in Case R 108/2020-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs, including the costs incurred in the appeal proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs, including the costs incurred in the appeal proceedings.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
# C_2021028EN.01006301.xml

| 25.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 28/63 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/63

---

Action brought on 30 November 2020 — OI v Commission

(Case T-705/20)

(2021/C 28/93)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: OI (represented by: S. Orlandi, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the decision not to include his name on the reserve list for internal competition COM/03/AD/18; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision not to include his name on the reserve list for internal competition COM/03/AD/18;

| — | order the European Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, put forward principally, alleging failure to adequately state reasons. The applicant takes the view that the statement of reasons consists of literal assessments, which are not consistent with the grades awarded. Moreover, the selection panel has not communicated the assessment criteria adopted before the tests, so that neither the applicant nor the appointing authority were able to check the legality of those criteria. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, put forward principally, alleging failure to adequately state reasons. The applicant takes the view that the statement of reasons consists of literal assessments, which are not consistent with the grades awarded. Moreover, the selection panel has not communicated the assessment criteria adopted before the tests, so that neither the applicant nor the appointing authority were able to check the legality of those criteria.

| 2. | Second plea in law, put forward in the alternative, alleging a manifest error of assessment committed by the selection panel since that panel was not in a position to justify to the requisite legal standard the manifest inconsistencies between the literal assessments and the numerical grades, having regard to a comparison with comparable assessments of other candidates. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, put forward in the alternative, alleging a manifest error of assessment committed by the selection panel since that panel was not in a position to justify to the requisite legal standard the manifest inconsistencies between the literal assessments and the numerical grades, having regard to a comparison with comparable assessments of other candidates.

---
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350) The certification set forth below is hereby made solely for the purpose of satisfying the
requirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and may not be relied upon or used
for any other purposes. In connection with the Annual Report of Wheeling-Pittsburgh Corporation (the Company) on Form
10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), I, James G. Bradley, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:  (1)
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 or other document
authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within
the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the
Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request. Date: March 14, 2005By:
    /s/          James G. BradleyJames G. BradleyChief Executive Officer The foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an
Exhibit to this report and should not be considered filed as a part of this report.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 01-50523

Summary Calendar

BRUCE H. WITHERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES; CONTINENTAL

CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

(EP-0-CV-3-EP)

December 3, 2001

Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

This lawsuit arose out of an injury sus tained by the

plaintiff, Bruce H. Withers (Withers), when he was struck by a

vehicle operated by an uninsured motorist. Just prior to the

accident, Withers was traveling in a vehicle owned by his employer,2

Stan’s Frozen Foods, during the course and scope of his employment.

Withers stopped at a roadside rest stop to use the facilities.

Withers parked the vehicle in the parking lot, exited the vehicle,

and had taken about three o r four steps across the parking lot

toward the restroom facilities when he was struck by the uninsured

vehicle. The vehicle which Withers had been driving was insured by

his employer through the Defendants, CNA Insurance Companies and

Continental Casualty Company. After the accident Withers filed a

claim for uninsured motorist benefits under his employer’s policy.

The Defendants denied the claim. Withers then sued the Defendants,

claiming that he qualified as “an insured” under the policy and

that the Defendants breached their c ontractual duty to him by

denying coverage. Withers also claimed that the Defendants’

refusal to cover his injuries vio lates the Texas Deceptive Trade

Practice Act (DTPA) and the Texas Insurance Code and constitutes a

violation of the Defendants’ duty of good faith and fair dealing to

him. The Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that

Withers i s not entitled to recover because he was not an insured

under the policy. The district court conducted a summary judgment

hearing and concluded that the Defendants’ motion should be

granted. Withers appeals to this Court.

We have read the briefs , the record excerpts, and relevant

portions o f the record. For the reasons stated by the district

judge in his Order filed under date of May 7, 2001, we affirm the

Final Judgment entered of even date therewith.3 AFFIRMED

.
#### Susie Frances BUTLER v. CITY OF WINTER GARDEN.

No. 38538.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1969.

Appeal dismissed without opinion. 219 So.2d 767.
#### STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Gerald William DICKERSON, Respondent.

No. 44811.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 15, 1974.

Certiorari denied. 285 So.2d 699.

ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### Daniel Joseph COLANGELO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-838.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 21, 1970.

Bernard Paul Pettie, Jr., Fort Lauder-dale, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See State of Florida v. Eck-roth, Supreme Court, 238 So.2d 75, opinion filed July 8, 1970.

WALDEN, REED and OWEN, JJ„ concur.
# C_2021128EN.01002501.xml

| 12.4.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 128/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.4.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 128/25

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour administrative d’appel de Versailles (France) lodged on 2 February 2021 — JP v Ministre de la Transition écologique, Premier ministre

(Case C-61/21)

(2021/C 128/31)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour administrative d’appel de Versailles

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: JP

Respondents: Ministre de la Transition écologique, Premier ministre

Questions referred

| 1. | Must the applicable rules of EU law resulting from the provisions of Article 13(1) [...] and of Article 23(1) [...] of Directive 2008/50/EC of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe [(OJ 2008 L 152 p. 1)] (1) be interpreted as entitling individuals, in the event of a sufficiently serious breach by an EU Member State of the obligations resulting from those rules, to claim compensation from the Member State concerned for damage to their health in cases where there is a direct and certain causal link with the deterioration in air quality? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must the applicable rules of EU law resulting from the provisions of Article 13(1) [...] and of Article 23(1) [...] of Directive 2008/50/EC of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe [(OJ 2008 L 152 p. 1)] (1) be interpreted as entitling individuals, in the event of a sufficiently serious breach by an EU Member State of the obligations resulting from those rules, to claim compensation from the Member State concerned for damage to their health in cases where there is a direct and certain causal link with the deterioration in air quality?

| 2. | On the assumption that the provisions referred to above may indeed give rise to such an entitlement to compensation for damage to health, to what conditions is that entitlement subject, in particular with regard to the date on which the existence of the failure attributable to the Member State concerned must be assessed? |
| --- | --- |

2.

On the assumption that the provisions referred to above may indeed give rise to such an entitlement to compensation for damage to health, to what conditions is that entitlement subject, in particular with regard to the date on which the existence of the failure attributable to the Member State concerned must be assessed?

---

(1)  OJ 2008 L 152, p. 1.

---
#### Mabel M. FEIG, Appellant, v. Willard George FEIG, Appellee.

No. 70-573.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 26, 1971.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Orange County; Richard Cooper, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
EXHIBIT 11

                          GENRAD, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
                        Computation of Earnings Per Share
                                   (Unaudited)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                       Three Months Ended
                                                                 April 4,             March 29,
                                                                   1998                 1997
                                                              --------------       --------------
<S>                                                           <C>                  <C>
Basic earnings per share:

Net income available to common stockholders                   $    8,909,000       $   11,717,000
                                                              ==============       ==============

Weighted average number of common shares outstanding              27,395,000           26,221,000
                                                              ==============       ==============

Basic earnings per share                                      $         0.33       $         0.45
                                                              ==============       ==============

Diluted earnings per share:

Net income available to common stockholders                   $    8,909,000       $   11,717,000
                                                              ==============       ==============

Weighted average number of common shares outstanding              27,395,000           26,221,000

Weighted average incremental shares from the assumed
  conversion of stock options and restricted stock awards          2,226,000            1,885,000
                                                              --------------       --------------

Total:                                                            29,621,000           28,106,000
                                                              ==============       ==============

Diluted earnings per share                                    $         0.30       $         0.42
                                                              ==============       ==============
</TABLE>



                                       16
PROGRAM NUMBER PRINT ORDER NUMBER JACKET NUMBER DEPT. REQ. NUMBER 

CONTRACTOR 

NON-COMPLIANCE GOV’T DELAY-WHAT WAS DELAY, NUMBER OF DAYS-DESCRIBE BELOW 

DELIVERY DUE DATE ADJUSTED (GPO ONLY) ACTUAL DATE RECEIVED 

(Attach Receipts) 

SHORTAGE 

COPIES SHORT MISSING MATERIALS 

SPECIFICATION NON-COMPLIANCE/GOV’T DELAY 

AGENCY TELEPHONE N O . SIGNATURE DATE 

NON-COMPLIANCE/CHANGE REPORT GPO Form 907 (R 10-90)

GPO : 1996 0 - 170-056 1

INTERNAL

CARTON
# C_2023104EN.01002102.xml

| 20.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 104/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 104/21

---

Order of the President of the Eighth Chamber of the Court of 14 November 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad — Bulgaria) — Criminal proceedings against ZhU, RD

(Case C-805/21, (1) ZhU (Confiscation of an instrumentality of crime))

(2023/C 104/29)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

The President of the Eighth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 138, 28.3.2022.

---
#### CARRAS *v.*BUNGALOW SANDWICH SHOPPE CO.

1. Appeal and Error. — Delayed Appeal — “Culpable Negligence” —Court Rules.

.Where garnishee defendant’á failure to appeal from default judgment in common pleas court was due 'solely to attorney’s negligence, it was not guilty of “culpable negligence” under Court Rule. No. 57,. § 2, denying right to delayed appeal.

2. Same — -Attorney and Client — Negligent Attorney Should be Required to Testify. .

i Where motion for delayed appeal is based solely on attorney’s negligence, attorney should' be required to testify on hearing, in order that court may not be imposed upon, and that attorneys who disregard their 'duties may be disciplined.

Appeal from Wayne; Chenot (James E.), J.

Submitted January 8, 1932.

(Docket No. 83, Calendar No. 36,036.)

Decided March 2, 1932.

Garnishment proceedings in common pleas court by Gus D. Carras against Bungalow Sandwich Shoppe Company, a Michigan corporation, gar*468nishee defendant. On motion by garnishee defendant for special leave to appeal to circuit court. Motion dismissed. Garnishee defendant appeals.

Reversed.

*Kerr, Lacey & Scroggie (John Ferguson,*of counsel), for plaintiff.

*Max Kahn (L. V. Pylkas,*of counsel), for garnishee defendant.

Fead, J.

This is review of denial of defendant’s motion for special leave to appeal to circuit court from a judgment against it in common pleas court.

The showing was that defendant was served with garnishee summons, denied liability to the principal defendant, employed an attorney-at-law to represent it, relied on him to do so, the attorney failed to file disclosure until two days after judgment, judgment was taken against defendant for failure to file a disclosure, and defendant did not know that a judgment had been rendered against it until an officer appeared with an execution some five weeks after its rendition.

The question is whether, under Court Rule No. 57, § 2, a party is guilty of “culpable negligence” where he intrusts his case to an attorney, relies on him, and the negligence is solely that of the attorney. For reasons which are sufficiently set up in *Frank*v. *Union Trust Co.,*239 Mich. 646, the answer is in the negative.

The order denying leave to appeal will be set aside and leave granted, but without costs.

We think the circuit judge should summons the attorney retained by defendant for investigation of his claimed negligence. In future cases of this sort, *469we suggest it would be good practice to require an attorney so charged with negligence to testify on the hearing of the motion for delayed appeal, in order that the court may not be imposed upon, and that attorneys who disregard their duties may be disciplined.

Clark, C. J., and McDonald, ■ Potter, Sharpe, North, and Butzbl, JJ., concurred with Fead, J. Wiest, J., concurred in the result.