Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re Maureen D., 2015 IL App (1st) 141517

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re MAUREEN D., Found to Be a Person Subject to Involuntary 

Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. 

Maureen D., Respondent-Appellant).

District & No. First District, Sixth Division

Docket No. 1-14-1517

Filed

Rehearing denied

August 14, 2015

September 10, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2014-

COMH-000812; the Hon. Paul A. Karkula, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Ann Krasuski, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Hines, 

for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, 

Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Hoffman and Justice Lampkin concurred in the

judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Respondent, Maureen D., appeals the order of the trial court authorizing the involuntary 

administration of psychotropic medications to her pursuant to section 2-107.1(a-5)(4) of the 

Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 

5/2-107.1(a-5)(4) (West 2014)). Respondent contends the State failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that she was subject to involuntary treatment because no evidence 

showed she was advised, in writing, of the side effects, risks and benefits of the psychotropic 

medications as well as alternatives thereto as required by section 2-102(a-5) of the Mental 

Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2014)). We affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Dr. James Corcoran, a psychiatrist, filed a petition seeking to involuntarily administer 

psychotropic medications to respondent pursuant to section 2-107.1(a-5)(4) of the Mental 

Health Code. Section 2-107.1(a-5)(4) provides: 

“(4) Psychotropic medication and electroconvulsive therapy may be administered 

to the recipient if and only if it has been determined by clear and convincing evidence 

that all of the following factors are present. *** 

 (A) That the recipient has a serious mental illness or developmental disability. 

 (B) That because of said mental illness or developmental disability, the 

recipient currently exhibits any one of the following: (i) deterioration of his or her 

ability to function, as compared to the recipient’s ability to function prior to the 

current onset of symptoms of the mental illness or disability for which treatment 

is presently sought, (ii) suffering, or (iii) threatening behavior. 

 (C) That the illness or disability has existed for a period marked by the 

continuing presence of the symptoms set forth in item (B) of this subdivision (4) 

or the repeated episodic occurrence of these symptoms. 

 (D) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm. 

 (E) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about 

the treatment.

 (F) That other less restrictive services have been explored and found 

inappropriate. 

 (G) If the petition seeks authorization for testing and other procedures, that 

such testing and procedures are essential for the safe and effective administration 

of the treatment.” (Emphasis added.) 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4) (West 2014). 

¶ 4 Before respondent can make a reasoned decision about her medications, she first must be 

advised about their risks and benefits. In re Tiffany W., 2012 IL App (1st) 102492-B, ¶ 13. 

Pursuant thereto, section 2-102(a-5) of the Mental Health Code provides in pertinent part: 

“If the services include the administration of *** psychotropic medication, the 

physician or the physician’s designee shall advise the recipient, in writing, of the side 

effects, risks, and benefits of the treatment, as well as alternatives to the proposed 

treatment, to the extent such advice is consistent with the recipient’s ability to 

understand the information communicated.” 405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2014). 
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¶ 5 “The rationale underlying the requirements of section 2-102(a-5) is to not only ensure 

that a respondent is fully informed, but also ‘to ensure that a respondent’s due process rights 

are met and protected.’ [Citation.] Strict compliance is necessary to guard a respondent’s 

fundamental liberty interest in refusing invasive medication [Citation.] Verbal notification is 

insufficient and the right to receive written notification under section 2-102(a-5) cannot be 

waived by a respondent.” In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1072 (2011). 

¶ 6 II. THE HEARING 

¶ 7 At the hearing on the petition on April 18, 2014, respondent’s sister, Mary S., testified 

respondent was diagnosed with a personality disorder in 1990 and hospitalized at MacNeal 

Hospital in Berwyn. Respondent was hospitalized again in 1994 at Northwestern Memorial 

Hospital and diagnosed as bipolar. She was prescribed medications, specifically, Lithium and 

Stelazine. Upon her discharge from Northwestern Memorial Hospital, respondent received 

outpatient treatment from Dr. Burton, her psychologist, for several years and continued to 

take the medications. During that time period, respondent did “very well”; she owned her 

own condominium, ran marathons, got along with her family, and “looked great.”

¶ 8 Around 2006 or 2007, respondent lost her job and stopped taking her medications. 

Without her medications, respondent became “progressively paranoid,” believing everybody 

was against her and that Mary S. was abusing their mother. Mary S. last saw respondent in 

2011, about three years prior to the hearing. 

¶ 9 Dr. Corcoran testified he is a psychiatrist who works full-time as the medical director at 

Chicago-Read Mental Health Center (Chicago-Read) and he also works part-time for the 

Du Page County jail. Dr. Corcoran testified that in 2013, respondent was briefly hospitalized 

at Chicago-Read for causing a disturbance at the Chicago Public Library. She refused 

treatment and was subsequently discharged. 

¶ 10 Dr. Corcoran testified that later, in October 2013, respondent fell into arrears in her 

payments to the condominium association and eviction proceedings were initiated. When the 

sheriff tried to serve her, she refused to open the door and the sheriff forced it open. 

Respondent was then taken into custody and charged with misdemeanor obstruction of 

service. In December 2013, respondent was found unfit to stand trial on the misdemeanor 

charge and she stayed in jail while waiting for placement at a minimum-security facility. 

When a bed opened up at Chicago-Read on January 29, 2014, respondent was transferred 

there to be restored to fitness. 

¶ 11 Dr. Corcoran evaluated respondent in February 2014, and he also performed subsequent 

evaluations. During many of the evaluations, respondent asked questions Dr. Corcoran was 

unable to answer, an “explosive argument” ensued, and respondent spoke and shouted in a 

“monologue of 5 to 10 solid minutes.” Dr. Corcoran was then “able to maybe ask a question, 

*** but the answer [he] got was confusing, disorganized and based on delusions.”

¶ 12 Dr. Corcoran opined that respondent suffers from bipolar affective disorder, manic type, 

and was currently symptomatic. Respondent talks about a conspiracy of gang members and 

Serbian/Baltic Nazis in her neighborhood who attempted to get her evicted. Respondent also 

has suffered socioeconomic decline because, although she had worked various jobs in the 

past, she has not worked recently. 
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¶ 13 Dr. Corcoran testified that respondent exhibits “suffering behavior” in that when he tries 

to talk to her, she appears quite anguished and agitated and she shouts and screams. 

Respondent has exhibited threatening behavior, specifically, when she engaged in some type 

of “altercation” with the sheriff who attempted to serve her during the eviction proceedings, 

and also on February 14, 2014, when she was so resistive to medication that she was placed 

in a “physical hold.” Respondent also was placed on a phone restriction at Chicago-Read 

because she was making harassing phone calls to the Cook County sheriff’s office.

¶ 14 Dr. Corcoran testified about the psychotropic medications he wanted to administer to 

respondent, their dosages, side effects, and benefits. He requested to administer Lithium, 

which respondent has taken before, and several other medications. Dr. Corcoran also testified 

he attempted to give respondent written information in February 2014 and again on March 

17, 2014, regarding the psychotropic medications he wanted to administer, including their 

benefits and side effects, as well as the nonmedical alternatives to the proposed treatment. In 

response to the written information, respondent stated: “I don’t need that. I don’t need 

medication.”

¶ 15 Dr. Corcoran testified that respondent does not have the capacity to make a reasoned 

judgment about the treatment he was seeking for her. When asked why not, Dr. Corcoran 

explained: “Because her paranoid delusions about what has happened in her life and the 

deterioration that she has experienced are so heavily ingrained at this point that she is not 

able to listen to reason.” Dr. Corcoran has explored less restrictive alternatives to 

psychotropic medications, such as group and individual therapy, but he found them to be 

inappropriate for respondent given her lack of insight into her illness. Dr. Corcoran opined 

that the benefits of the psychotropic medications outweighed their harm and that without 

administration of the psychotropic medications, respondent’s prognosis was “very poor.”

¶ 16 On cross-examination, Dr. Corcoran testified in pertinent part: 

“Q. And when you were talking about the written information about the treatment, 

your written information about the medication–

 A. Yes. 

 Q. You testified that you attempted to give the information. What do you mean by 

attempted? 

 A. I handed it to her, and she walked away from me. 

 Q. Okay. Did she take it in her hands? 

 A. No. I left it on the counter in the nursing station because she walked away. 

 Q. Okay. 

A. I said [to respondent] here’s some information about medication. This was 

some time ago when I thought originally that she may have the capacity to consent to 

medication, and I have since realized that she doesn’t.

 Q. Okay. So you left the papers on the counter? Did you take them and put them 

on her nightstand or on her bed? 

A. I’m not allowed in her room. I don’t go into a female patient room.”

¶ 17 Following Dr. Corcoran’s testimony, respondent was called to testify, but she stated that 

she preferred to read a statement. The court refused to allow respondent to read her 

statement, and she did not testify. 
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¶ 18 Following all the testimony and closing arguments, the trial court granted Dr. Corcoran’s 

petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic medications to respondent. Respondent now 

appeals, contending the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she was 

subject to involuntary administration of psychotropic medications because no evidence 

showed she was advised, in writing, of the side effects, risks and benefits of these 

medications as well as alternatives thereto as required by section 2-102(a-5) of the Mental 

Health Code. 

¶ 19 III. ANALYSIS 

¶ 20 Initially, we note the underlying judgment, entered on April 18, 2014, was limited to 90 

days, which have passed. Therefore, we cannot grant respondent any effectual relief and her 

appeal is moot. See In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45 (2004) (holding that after the 90-day 

period for the administration of involuntary treatment has passed, the circuit court’s order no 

longer has any force or effect, the reviewing court cannot grant any meaningful relief and, 

therefore, the case is moot and any decision would be advisory in nature). See also In re 

Nicholas L., 407 Ill. App. 3d at 1070 (“An appeal is moot when no actual controversy is 

presented or when the issues raised in the trial court have ceased to exist, rendering it 

impossible for the court of review to grant effectual relief to the appellant.”); People v. Hill, 

2011 IL 110928, ¶ 6 (“The mootness doctrine provides that we must dismiss an appeal when 

the issues involved have ceased to exist because intervening events have made it impossible 

for us to grant effectual relief.”).

¶ 21 However, respondent argues we should reach the merits of her appeal based on the public 

interest exception to the mootness doctrine and the “capable of repetition yet avoiding 

review” exception to the mootness doctrine. We agree. Our supreme court has stated: 

“The public interest exception allows a court to consider an otherwise moot case 

when (1) the question presented is of a public nature; (2) there is a need for an 

authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers; and (3) there is 

a likelihood of future recurrence of the question.” In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 

355 (2009). 

¶ 22 In the present case, the question presented by respondent involves whether section 

2-102(a-5) of the Mental Health Code was sufficiently complied with, which we have held 

“qualifies as a matter of a public nature.” In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill. App. 3d at 1071. See also 

In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 46 (“the procedures courts must follow to authorize the 

involuntary medication of mental health patients involve matters of ‘substantial public 

concern’ ” (quoting In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402 (2002))). “Moreover, the vast 

number of cases addressing the issue of compliance with section 2-102(a-5) (see, e.g., In re 

Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d 251, 263-64 (2008); In re Dorothy J.N., 373 Ill. App. 3d 332, 

336-37 (2007)) indicates both a need for an authoritative determination for the future 

guidance of public officers and the likelihood of future recurrence.” In re Nicholas L., 407 

Ill. App. 3d at 1071. Accordingly, the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine is 

applicable here. See In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 45-46 (applying the public interest 

exception to consider respondent’s appeal from an order authorizing the involuntary 

administration of psychotropic medication, even though more than 90 days had passed and 

the circuit court’s order no longer had any force or effect).
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¶ 23 The “capable of repetition yet avoiding review” exception also applies here. This 

exception has two elements. “First, the challenged action must be of a duration too short to 

be fully litigated prior to its cessation. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation that 

‘the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.’ ” In re Alfred 

H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 358 (quoting In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998)). 

¶ 24 In the present case, the parties agree the first element has been met because the trial 

court’s involuntary medication order lasted only 90 days. The second element also has been 

met. The record indicates respondent was prescribed psychotropic medications in the past; is 

likely to be prescribed these medications in the future due to the ongoing nature of her 

illness; and, given her history of refusing such medications and the written information about 

them, she will again refuse to accept any written information about such medications. Thus, 

there is a reasonable expectation that respondent would be subjected to the same action, 

involving the same issue, as here; accordingly, we will address respondent’s appeal on the 

merits. See In re Katarzyna G., 2013 IL App (2d) 120807, ¶ 9 (holding that respondent’s 

appeal from an order authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, 

in which she raised an issue involving the propriety of the written information she was given 

about the medication, involved a question capable of repetition yet avoiding review sufficient 

to allow the reviewing court to “bypass mootness and consider the merits of [the] appeal”).

¶ 25 On the merits, respondent argues that the State failed to show by clear and convincing 

evidence that she lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the requested 

psychotropic medications as required by section 2-107.1(a-5)(4) of the Mental Health Code 

because no evidence showed she was advised, in writing, of the risks, benefits and side 

effects of the medications, as well as alternatives thereto, as required by section 2-102(a-5). 

Respondent contends that although Dr. Corcoran twice attempted to give her this written 

information, he failed in his attempts when she walked away from him without taking it and 

so then he left the information on the counter at the nurses’ station. Respondent argues that 

leaving the written information on the counter at the nurses’ station was not sufficient to 

comply with section 2-102(a-5) and that, at the very least, Dr. Corcoran should have left the 

information on her nightstand, or in her room or her “personal area” where she would have 

the opportunity to read it at a time and manner of her choosing. Respondent contends that Dr. 

Corcoran’s failure to comply with section 2-102(a-5) means that the State failed to meet its 

burden of proving that she lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about her 

treatment and, therefore, we must reverse the order for the involuntary administration of 

psychotropic medications.1

 

1Respondent makes no argument that the written information Dr. Corcoran attempted to provide 

her regarding the psychotropic medications was in any way deficient, i.e., that it failed to inform her of 

the risks, benefits, and side effects of the medications and any alternatives and accordingly the issue is 

waived (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)); further, the written information was not 

included in the record on appeal and therefore any issue involving the sufficiency of the information is 

resolved against respondent, the appellant, who has the duty to provide a complete record on appeal. 

Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). Rather, the only issue preserved for review is 

respondent’s contention that since Dr. Corcoran attempted, but failed, to hand her the written 

information, and then left it on the counter at the nurses’ station, section 2-102(a-5) was not complied 

with and we should reverse the order authorizing the involuntary administration of the psychotropic 

medications. 
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¶ 26 We review de novo whether Dr. Corcoran complied with section 2-102(a-5) here. Id. 

¶ 13. When examining the trial court’s order authorizing the involuntary administration of 

psychotropic medications, we will not reverse the order unless it was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence such that the opposite conclusion was apparent or the findings were 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. In re A.W., 381 Ill. App. 3d 950, 957 

(2008). 

¶ 27 In re A.W. is dispositive on the issue of whether Dr. Corcoran complied with section 

2-102(a-5). A.W.’s psychiatrist at McFarland Mental Health Center filed a petition seeking to 

involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to him. Id. at 952. At the hearing on the 

petition, the psychiatrist testified in pertinent part that certain written information regarding 

A.W.’s medication was “ ‘put in his box for him.’ ” Id. at 953. The trial court subsequently 

granted the petition. Id. at 954. A.W. appealed. Id. 

¶ 28 This court stated: 

“[S]imply placing the written notification in a respondent’s ‘box’ (or anywhere other 

than in the respondent’s hands–or at least an attempt to place the notification in his 

hands) is not sufficient [to comply with section 2-102(a-5)]. Instead, we urge the 

psychiatrist or her designee to follow the procedure suggested by Justice Steigmann 

in his special concurrence in Dorothy J.N. See Dorothy J.N., 373 Ill. App. 3d at 

337-39 *** (Steigmann, J., specially concurring). In particular, (1) the psychiatrist or 

her designee who comes into contact with the respondent should have prepared, in 

advance, a written list of the side effects, risks, and benefits of the proposed 

treatment, as well as alternatives to the proposed treatment; (2) during the 

psychiatrist’s examination of the respondent, she should present a copy of the list to 

the respondent, thus complying with the requirement that the respondent be advised, 

in writing, of that information ‘to the extent such advice is consistent with the 

recipient’s ability to understand the information communicated’ (405 ILCS 

5/2-102(a-5) (West 2006)); and (3) the psychiatrist or her designee should attempt to 

explain the list’s contents to the respondent.” (Emphases added.) Id. at 958. 

¶ 29 Thus, In re A.W. held that to comply with section 2-102(a-5), the psychiatrist or his 

designee should present the written information advising of the side effects, risks and 

benefits of the treatment to respondent, ideally by placing the information in her hands. Id. 

However, since respondent cannot be forced to accept such a tender of the written 

information against her will, section 2-102(a-5) is complied with as long as the psychiatrist 

or his designee attempts to place the information in respondent’s hands, even if the attempt is 

unsuccessful. Id. Further, although not expressly required by section 2-102(a-5), the 

psychiatrist or his designee also should attempt to explain the contents of the written 

information to respondent, i.e., respondent should at least be told that the written information 

addresses her proposed treatment. Id. 

¶ 30 Dr. Corcoran’s undisputed trial testimony indicates he made two attempts to present 

respondent with written information regarding her proposed psychotropic medications, once 

in February 2014 and again on March 17, 2014, when he handed her the information and he 

said to her: “Here’s some information about medication.” However, respondent refused to 

accept the tenders of the written information, stating she does not need medication, and she 

walked away from Dr. Corcoran, thus ending any further discussion. Only after respondent 

refused to accept the tenders of the written information did Dr. Corcoran place it on the 
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counter in the nurses’ station. Dr. Corcoran’s two attempts to tender the written information 

to respondent in February and March 2014 satisfied the requirement of section 2-102(a-5), 

even though respondent refused to accept the tenders and walked away. Contrary to 

respondent’s argument, neither section 2-102(a-5), nor the interpreting case law obliged Dr. 

Corcoran to leave the written information in any particular place (such as her nightstand, or 

in her room, or “personal area”) upon her refusal to take it. 

¶ 31 Accordingly, as Dr. Corcoran testified to his compliance with section 2-102(a-5) and to 

respondent’s lack of capacity to make a reasoned decision about her treatment, the State met 

its burden of proof regarding her lack of capacity and the trial court’s order authorizing the 

involuntary administration of the psychotropic medications was not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. 

¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court. 

¶ 33 Affirmed.