THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

R.C. Frederick Hanold, III and Rose F. Hanold, and 

Carol R. Mitchell and George P. Mitchell, Jr., 

Respondents, 

v. 

Watson's Orchard Property Owners Association, Inc., a 

South Carolina Corporation, and Pelham Farm, LLC, a 

South Carolina Corporation, Legacy One, LLC, a South 

Carolina Corporation, SESP LLC, a South Carolina 

Corporation, an unknown Trustee of the Revocable Trust 

Agreement Dated March 19,1996 established by James 

B. Stephens as amended, and unknown Jay Stephens and 

Mike Stephens as Co-Personal Representative of the 

Estate of James B. Stephens, Defendants, 

Of whom Pelham Farm, LLC, a South Carolina 

Corporation, Legacy One, LLC, a South Carolina 

Corporation, an unknown Trustee of the Revocable Trust 

Agreement Dated March 19, 1996 established by James 

B. Stephens as amended, and unknown Jay Stephens and 

Mike Stephens as co-Personal Representative of the 

Estate of James B. Stephens, are the Petitioners. 

v. 

Property Owners in Watson's Orchard Subdivision: N. 

Carter Poe, III; McNally Reeves, as Trustee of the 

Residual Trust under item Five of the Last Will and 

Testament of Hattie L. Reeves dated February 9, 1998; 

Janet B. Yusi; Lucy S. Tiller; James G. Stephens; Rachel 

P. McKaughan; Ramon J. Ashy and Jana Ashy; 

Christopher D. Scalzo and Heather V. Scalzo; Erma R. 

Rash, as Trustee of the Erma R. Rash Revocable Trust 

dated February 12, 2010; James Edwin Conrad, as 

Trustee of the James Edwin Conrad Living Trust dated 
 

September 7, 2010; Sue Lane Conrad; Horst H. H. 

Eschenberg and Floride C. Eschenberg; Caryl L. Clover, 

as Trustee of the Caryl L. Clover Revocable Living Trust 

Agreement dated May 12, 1999; Mary F. Newell; 

Timothy M. Conroy and Elizabeth W. Conroy; Nathan 

Scolari; Joel Wells Norwood and Lynn Norwood; J. 

Lynn Shook; Juan Hernandez and Janice M. Pelletier; 

Scott P. Payne and Kathleen H. Payne; Joe G. Thomason 

and Dana L. Henry Thomason; Traci Segura; Cameron E. 

Smith and Joan B. Smith; Charles E. Howard and Sharon 

F. Howard; Penelope J. Galbraith; Meredith C. Vry; 

Delores B. Mitchell; Lisette M. Silva and Mary F. 

Colley; Ilona K. Alford and William G. Alford; George 

T. McLeod and Martha T. McLeod; Ronald S. Wilson 

and Robin E. Wilson; The Merrill J. Gildersleeve and 

Anore L. Novak Revocable Living Trust dated 

November 1, 1996; Anna Marie T. Azores and Kim O. 

Gococo; Ashley Westrope as Trustee of Martha 

Randolph Westrop Trust dated June 6, 1988; Cliff C. 

Jollie and Martha W. Jollie; David A. Saliny and Xiaoli 

Saliny; Lecia S. Franklin; Dean D. Varner and Deborah 

P. Varner; W. Frank Durham, Jr.; Christine M. Howard; 

Samuel P. Howard, Jr. and Jane H. Howard; Manfred E. 

Kramer and Jane J. Kramer; Mary J. Steele; James J. 

Barrett, III and Kimberly A. Barrett; Richard A. Herman 

and Patricia L. Herrman, Third Party Defendants. 

Appellate Case No. 2015-001555 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 

Appeal from Greenville County 

Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27702 

Heard October 20, 2016 – Filed February 15, 2017 

AFFIRMED 

John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Nichols Thompson & 

Delgado, LLC, of Columbia, and William D. Herlong, of 

The Herlong Law Firm, LLC, of Greenville, both for 

Petitioners. 

Randall S. Hiller, of Randall S. Hiller, P.A., of 

Greenville, for Respondents. 

JUSTICE HEARN: In this action to enforce restrictive covenants, we affirm the 

court of appeals in finding Petitioners' property was not developed into discrete 

lots to entitle them to voting rights under the covenants. We write now only to 

clarify that portion of the court of appeals' opinion that may be read to conflate the 

terms "developed" and "improved." 

DISCUSSION 

The facts of this case are not in dispute and can be found in the court of 

appeals opinion, Hanold v. Watson's Orchard Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 412 

S.C. 387, 772 S.E.2d 528 (Ct. App. 2015). 

 We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the term "developed" as 

contained in the restrictive covenants is unambiguous, and its plain and ordinary 

meaning connotes conversion of raw land into an area suitable for building, 

residential, or business purposes. See, e.g., Sleasman v. City of Lacey, 159 

Wash.2d 639, 643, 151 P.3d 990, 992 (2007); Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 

618 (3d ed. 1986). To the extent the court of appeals may have used the terms 

"developed" and "improved" interchangeably, we note the terms are not 

synonymous and the requirements for improved land, such as the installation of 
utilities or buildings, are not necessary to meet the lower threshold of developed 

land. Therefore, we hold the court of appeals should have limited its inquiry to 

consider only evidence as it relates to "developed" lots, and any consideration of 

whether the property was "improved" was not pertinent. 

However, we find any error in the application of the two terms did not affect 

the outcome of the case at hand, and we agree with the court of appeals' conclusion 

that Petitioners did not "develop" their property under the plain meaning of the 

restrictive covenants. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals' opinion is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED. 

BEATTY, C.J. and KITTREDGE, J., concur. Acting Justice 

Costa M. Pleicones, concurring in a separate opinion in which 

FEW, J., concurs. 
ACTING JUSTICE PLEICONES: I respectfully concur in result only, and 

would dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted rather than affirm as modified. 

In my opinion, the Court of Appeals properly construed the term "developed" in 

the context of the document in which it appears. E.g., Reyhani v. Stone Creek 

Cove Condo. II Horizontal Prop. Regime, 329 S.C. 206, 494 S.E.2d 465 (Ct. App. 

1997). I fear that by dictating the meaning of the terms "developed" and 

"improved," the majority may inadvertently alter the meaning of documents, 

Reyhani, supra, or create a conflict with legislative enactments. E.g., S. C. Code 

Ann. § 29-6-10 (2) (2007) (defining "improve" in the subchapter governing 

payments to contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers). Because I agree with the 

majority that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed, I concur in 

that result here. 

FEW, J., concurs.