alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C. SECTION 10A,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE**

**SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Arthur L. Freeman, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-QSB of Harrodsburg First FinancialBancorp, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements,and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respect the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have: 

 

(a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures tobe designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared; 

 

(b) [omitted inaccordance with SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986]; 

 

(c) evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls and procedures and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and****

 

(d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control, to the small business issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors: 

 

(a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process summarize and report financial information; and 

 

(b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small businessissuer’s internal controls. 

 

Date: May 13, 2004

/s/ Arthur L. Freeman

Arthur L. Freeman

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

 

2
No. 10849.

#### Barron *v.*Leach et al.

Decided February 2, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court of Lucas county.

*Messrs. Ray & Cor dill*and *Mr. John P. Crazvford,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Ray & Cordill; Mr. Johnson Thurston; Mr. J. P. Crawford*and *Mr. J. F. Stephenson,*for defendants in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Summers, Davis and Price, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 499 Agreed to House (ATH)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 499

   Providing for the concurrence by the House with amendments in the 
                 amendments of the Senate to H.R. 4429.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             August 1, 1994

 Mr. Hamilton submitted the following resolution; which was considered 
              under suspension of the rules and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   Providing for the concurrence by the House with amendments in the 
                 amendments of the Senate to H.R. 4429.

    Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution the bill (H.R. 
4429) (to authorize the transfer of naval vessels to certain foreign 
countries) with the Senate amendments thereto, shall be considered to 
have been taken from the Speaker's table to the end that--
            (1) the Senate amendments numbered 1 through 11 be, and the 
        same are hereby, agreed to; and
            (2) the Senate amendment number 12 be, and the same is 
        hereby, agreed to with an amendment as follows:
                    (A) Page 2, beginning on line 13, strike ``or any 
                other provision of law''.
                    (B) Page 3, strike line 3 and all that follows 
                through line 9.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-2535
HENRY T. SANDERS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versusTHE STATE OF MARYLAND; CIRCUIT COURT OF MARYLAND FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, Defendants - Appellees.
No. 99-1071
HENRY T. SANDERS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versusTHE STATE OF MARYLAND; CIRCUIT COURT OF MARYLAND FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, Defendants - Appellees.
No. 99-1345
HENRY T. SANDERS, Plaintiff - Appellant,* Judge Motz did not participate in consideration of this case. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) (1994). 2 versusTHE STATE OF MARYLAND; CIRCUIT COURT OF MARYLAND FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, Defendants - Appellees. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge; Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA-98-2387-PJM) Submitted: May 13, 1999 Decided: May 18, 1999 Before WIDENER and MOTZ, * Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Nos. 98-2535 and 99-1345 affirmed and No. 99-1071 dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Henry T. Sanders, Landover, Maryland, Appellant Pro Se. Maureen Mullen Dove, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM:Henry T. Sanders appeals three district orders: (1) the denial of relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1998) complaint under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2) (West Supp. 1998) (No. 98- 2535), (2) the issuance of an order to show cause why Sanders should not be sanctioned (No. 99-1071), and (3) the denial of Defendants’ motion for sanctions (No. 99-1345). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, in No. 98-2535, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Sanders v. Maryland , No. CA-98-2387-PJM (D. Md. Aug. 24, 1998). We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis in No. 99-1071 but dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. Finally, we affirm the denial of Defendants’ motion for sanctions in No. 99-1345 on the reasoning of the district court. See Sanders v. Maryland, No. CA-98-2387-PJM (D. Md. Feb. 25, 1999). We also deny all of Sanders’ outstanding motions, including his motions for a stay, general relief, an injunction, sanctions, settlement alternatives, restoration to theargument calendar, alternatives, an interim stay, ex parte interlocutory relief, affirmative relief, mandate, expedition of appeal,writ of habeas corpus, transfer, judgment on counter and crossclaims, dismissal, evidentiary hearing, a show cause order, leave to file a memorandum, and default. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in4 the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

Nos. 98-2535, 99-1345 - AFFIRMED No. 99-1071 - DISMISSED
IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 62

Providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House for expenses

of investigations and studies by the Committee on Education and Labor

in the first session of the One Hundred Third Congress.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY, 3, 1993

Mr. FORD of Michigan (for himself, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. GOODLING, and Mrs.

ROUKEMA) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on House Administration

RESOLUTION

Providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House

for expenses of investigations and studies by the Committee on Education and Labor in the first session of the

One Hundred Third Congress.

1 Resolved, That (a) for expenses of investigations and

2 studies by the Committee on Education and Labor (here3 inafter in this resolution referred to as the ‘‘Committee’’),

4 including expenses for—

5 (1) procurement of consultant services under

6 section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act

7 of 1946; and
2

HRES 62 IH

1 (2) provision of assistance for members of pro2 fessional staff obtaining specialized training under

3 section 202(j) of such Act;

4 there shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the House

5 not more than $4,036,251.

6 (b) Not more than $100,000 of the amount specified

7 in subsection (a) may be used for consultant services re8 ferred to in paragraph (1) of such subsection and not more

9 than $10,000 of such amount may be used for specialized

10 training referred to in paragraph (2) of such subsection.

11 SEC. 2. Payments under this resolution shall be made

12 on vouchers authorized by the Committee, signed by the

13 Chairman of the Committee, and approved by the Commit14 tee on House Administration.

15 SEC. 3. Amounts shall be available under this resolu16 tion for investigations and studies carried on during the

17 period beginning at noon on January 3, 1993, and ending

18 immediately before noon on January 3, 1994.

19 SEC. 4. Amounts made available under this resolution

20 shall be expended in accordance with regulations pre21 scribed by the Committee on House Administration.

Æ
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

MOTLEY CREW, LLC, A LAW FIRM, 

JOSEPH R. REISINGER ESQUIRE, LLC, 

AND JOSEPH R. REISINGER ESQUIRE,

 Petitioners 

 v. 

BONNER CHEVROLET CO. INC., PAUL 

R. MANCIA, RICHARD F. CROSSIN, 

JOHN J. GILL, JR., GENERAL MOTORS 

COMPANY, THOMAS N. CROSSIN, 

JOSEPH CROSSIN, AND JAMES E. 

MILLER, BONITA MANCIA, AND 

FRANCES A. MILLER, 

 Respondents 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 103 MM 2014 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 21st day of August, 2014, the Application for Extraordinary Relief 

and the Application for Leave to Amend are DENIED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
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<CASH>                                         449,627
<SECURITIES>                                    22,187
<RECEIVABLES>                                   86,234
<ALLOWANCES>                                     5,670
<INVENTORY>                                      4,191
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               558,048
<PP&E>                                       1,393,194
<DEPRECIATION>                                 146,311
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,988,869
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          263,537
<BONDS>                                      1,166,460
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                           338
<OTHER-SE>                                     283,552
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,988,869
<SALES>                                        422,238
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<CGS>                                                0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              62,298
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 73,551
<INCOME-TAX>                                    27,334
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             46,217
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    46,217
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.37
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.37
        

</TABLE>
#### Kenneth John THIERY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-571.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 22, 1970.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Palm Beach County; Culver Smith, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### ESTATE of Frank D. LORENZ, Deceased. Michael J. ZYNE, Appellant, v. Marjorie MARTIN and Dorothy Griffin, Appellees.

No. 71-765.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 19, 1971.

Irving E. Lewis, Miami, for appellant.

Paul & Thomson and John-Edward Alley, Miami, for appellees.

Before SWANN, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order of the county judges’ court of Dade County. The appellant, who was the executor of the estate involved, had been removed as executor by a prior order of the court. The order appealed from (1) disallowed a fourth final account which the appellant had been directed to file, and ordered the appellant to file on or before a certain date “an accurate, true, just, and complete final account;” (2) granted attorney fees in a certain amount to the attorneys for appel-lees as compensation for services rendered for the benefit of the estate, surcharging a portion thereof against the appellant; (3) ordered appellant to pay to the estate certain amounts found to be so owing; (4) directed that the fees allowed to attorneys for the appellees, and the costs, be paid out of the estate; (S) made certain provisions relating to payments of premiums on the appellant’s (executor’s) bond; (6) allowed in part and disallowed in part amounts which the appellant had paid or allocated to himself as executor as fees and for expenses; (7) made provision for enforcement of the orders therein relating to the appellant, by authorizing the filing of suit by the remaining executor, in event of noncompliance by the appellant; (8) directed that a copy of the order be delivered to the surety on the appellant’s bond; *(9)*and reserved jurisdiction until the filing and approval of the final account to determine whether the former executor (appellant) should be further surcharged.

The brief of the appellant, without setting forth any point or points involved, or specifying the assignments of error relied upon (see Rule 3.7, subd. F(4) FAR, 32 F.S.A.), presented a blanket challenge of the order, contending it was the product of procedural irregularities by the court and was not supported or justified by the record. Having considered the appellant’s arguments, in the light of the record and briefs, we conclude that reversible error had not been demonstrated. No useful purpose would be served by restatement here of the proceedings in the cause which took place over an extended period, or by detailing the arguments pro and con bearing on the propriety and correctness of the provisions of the order in question.

Affirmed.
DISMISS and Opinion Filed November 22, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-22-00608-CV 

CITY OF MCKINNEY, TEXAS, AND BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR 

CITY OF MCKINNEY, Appellants 

V. 

COWTOWN REDI MIX, INC., AND ISSAM AL-SHMAISANI, Appellees 

On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 401-05217-2020 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Molberg, and Justice Goldstein 

Opinion by Chief Justice Burns 

Before the Court are appellants’ and appellees’ respective petitions for 

permissive appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3. The parties seek to appeal the trial 

court’s interlocutory order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ motion and 

defendants’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment. 

Under section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, we 

may accept a permissive interlocutory appeal if (1) the order being appealed involves 

a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference 

of opinion, and (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 
 –2– 

ultimate termination of the litigation. See TEX.CIV. PRAC. &REM.CODE § 51.014(d), 

(f). Based on our review of the petitions and the record before us, we conclude that 

the parties have failed to establish that an immediate appeal might immediately 

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Accordingly, we deny the petitions 

and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 

ANN. § 51.014(f); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3, 42.3(a). 

220608F.P05 

 

/Robert D. Burns, III/

ROBERT D. BURNS, III 

CHIEF JUSTICE 
 –3– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

CITY OF MCKINNEY, TEXAS 

BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR 

CITY OF MCKINNEY, Appellants 

No. 05-22-00608-CV V. 

COWTOWN REDI MIX, INC, 

ISSAM AL-SHMAISANI, Appellees 

 On Appeal from the 401st Judicial 

District Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 401-05217-

2020. 

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice 

Burns. Justices Molberg and 

Goldstein participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is 

DISMISSED. 

 It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal. 

Judgment entered this 22nd day of November 2022.
SI0-1004()5-()0I 

CirV Of- OlLLtXil: S T/VI 1< IN 

Office of the Miiyrir 

March 23. 2010 

The Honorable Raymond H. Lah cod 

Secretary 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Ave, SE 

Washington, DC 20590 

Docket DOT-OST-2010-«HB 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

Thank you for the opportunity to exprers my suppurt for the application for antitrust immunity 

and proposed joint business agreement filed by American Airlines and Japan Airlines. The 

proposed alliance between these two airlines is vital for oneworld to compete effectively with 

the Star and SkyTeam alliance. This increased interalliance competition will in turn enhance the 

benefits of the Department's Open Skies policy - first by solidifying U.S.-Japan Open Skies, then 

by serving as a foundation for further liberalization across Asia. 

The City of College Station, Texas, is home of Texas A&M University, one of the largest research 

universities in the U.S. Of the 50,000 students and thousands of faculty, many hail from 

countries abroad. These students and faculty appreciate th-^ service that American Airlines 

provides to the entire region. Therefore, it is of great interest to me, as mayor of College 

Station, that you approve of this proposed alliance. 

After a thorough review, I encourage the Department of Transportation to approve this 

application as it v/ould enable these oneworld alliance airlines to work closely together to 

deliver highly competitive air transportation services. Approval for AA/JAL alliance will have a 

positive impact on air travel by offering customers more service, scheduling and pricing options 

and will help to ensure that customers continue to benefit from having three competitive ak 

alliances to choose from. 

' sirge you *o quickly approve this application. 

Ben White 

Mayor 

!' O Hi.>;\'>i6ii • iii.i 1 i..^^^.^\ 1 NS 

Ci.)!,! \:^^V. SlAllON • IIXA^ • s,. 

wvirtv.cstx.gov
No. 11215.

#### Catalano *v.*Cerri, Admr.

Decided November 17, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Cuyahoga county.

*Messrs. Hoyt, Dustin, Kelley, McKeehan & Andrews,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Harry F. Payer,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Price, C. J., Summers, Spear and Davis, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 200218 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Goldfield Corporation (the"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2003 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the"Report"), I, John H. Sottile, Chairman of the Board of Directors,President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002, that:

            (1)   The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

            (2)   The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and result of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906 has been provided to the Goldfield Corporation and will beretained by The Goldfield Corporation and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.

Date: November 14, 2003

/s/ John H. SottileJohn H. Sottile Chairman of the Board of Directors,    President and Chief Executive Officer
# C_2020247EN.01001901.xml

| 27.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 247/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 247/19

---

Action brought on 4 May 2020 — JR v Commission

(Case T-265/20)

(2020/C 247/28)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: JR (represented by: L. Levi and A. Champetier, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare the present action admissible and well-founded; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare the present action admissible and well-founded;

| — | annul the Commission’s decisions of 28 February 2020 and 9 April 2020 refusing to disclose personal data concerning the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the Commission’s decisions of 28 February 2020 and 9 April 2020 refusing to disclose personal data concerning the applicant;

| — | order the defendant to pay all the costs |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay all the costs

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, infringement of Regulation (EU) No 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39) and, in particular, Article 17 thereof. Finally, the applicant submits that the contested decisions infringe the fundamental right of access to personal data. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, infringement of Regulation (EU) No 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39) and, in particular, Article 17 thereof. Finally, the applicant submits that the contested decisions infringe the fundamental right of access to personal data.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of the principle of sound administration and infringement of Regulation No 2018/1725, in particular of Articles 14(1) and (2) and 17(3) of that regulation. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of the principle of sound administration and infringement of Regulation No 2018/1725, in particular of Articles 14(1) and (2) and 17(3) of that regulation.

---