1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 10 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r
. Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s UNITE D STATE S v . T I NKLE NB ERG
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 09–1 49 8. Ar g u ed Feb r u a r y22, 2011 —Dec ided M ay26, 2011 The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Act) provides, inter alia, that in “anyc a se

in which a plea of not guiltyis en ter e d, th e tr ial

. . . shall c o mmenc e with insev e n t yday s ” afterth e ar r a ig n m en t, 18 U. S. C. §3161(c )(1), bu t lis ts a n u m berof ex c l usion s from the 70-day period, including “delay resulti n g from any p r etrial motion , from the filing of the mo

tion through th e co nclusion of the hearing on, or othe r p r ompt dispo

sition of, such motion,” §3161(h)(1)(D).

Res p ondent Tinklenb erg’s tria l on federa l drug a n d gun c h a r ges beg a n287 day s afterh i s ar r a ig n m en t. The Dis t rictCou r tdenied his motion to dis m iss the indic tment on the gr ound that the tr ial v i olated the Act’s 70-d a y requirement, finding th at21 8 of th e da y s fell wi th in
va rious of the Act’s exclus ions , leav ing 6 9 nonex c ludab l e da ys , thus makingthe tr ial ti mely

. On Tinklenber g’ s appeal fr om his c o nv i c tion , th e Six t h Cir c u it ag r e ed th at man yof th e 287 day s wer eex c l u d

able, bu tc o n c lu ded th at 9 d a y s du r i n gwhic hth r ee pr et r i al mot i on s wer epending wer enot, bec a use the motio n s did not ac tuallyc a use a delay, or the expectation of delay, of trial. Sincethese 9 days were suffic i ent to br ingthe number of no nexcludabl e days above 70, the court found aviola t ion of th e Act. And given tha tTinklenb erg ha d already served his prison sentence, it o r dered the indictment dis

misse d with prejudice. Held : 1. The Act contains no requi r ement thatt h e filing of ap r etrial mo

tion actually caused, or was expect ed to cause, delay of a trial. Rath er , §3161 (h)(1)(D) stops th e SpeedyTr ial c l oc k fr om r u n n i ng automa tic a llyupon the fil i ngof a pretrial motion irrespective of whetherthe motion has anyimpac t on when the trial begins. Pp. 3– 12.2 UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG Syllabus(a) The Sixth Circuit reasoned that subparagraph (D)’s “delay resulting from” phrase, read most natu rally, requires a court to applythe exclusion provision only to motions that actually cause a trial delay, or the expectation of such a de lay. While such a reading is linguistically reasonable, it is not th e only reasonable interpretation. The subparagraph falls within a gene ral set of provisions introduced by the phrase: “The following periods of delay shall be excluded.” §3161(h). That phrase is followed by a list that includes “[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proc eedings concerning the defendant, including. . . .” §3161(h)(1). Thislatter list is followed by a sublist, each member (but one) of which is introduced by the phrase “delay resulting from . . . .” Ibid. Those words are followed by a more specific description, such as “any pretrial motion” from its “filing” “through the conclusion of the hearin g on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” §3161(h)(1)(D). The whole paragraph can be read as requiring the automatic exclusion of the members of that specific sublist, while referring to those memb ers in general as “periods of delay” and as causing that delay, not because Congress intended the judge to determine causation, but be cause, in a close to definitional way, the words embody Congress’ ow n view of the matter. Thus, language alone cannot resolve the basic question presented. Pp. 4–7. (b) Several considerations, take n together, compel the conclusion that Congress intended subparagra ph (D) to apply automatically. First, subparagraph (D) and neighboring subparagraphs (F) and (H) contain language that instructs courts to measure the time actually consumed by the specified pretri al occurrence, but those subparagraphs do not mention the date on which the trial begins or was expected to begin. Second, during the 37 years since Congress enacted the statute, every other Court of Appeals has rejected the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation. Third, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation would make the subparagraph (D) exclusion significantly more difficult to administer, thereby hindering the Act’ s efforts to secure fair and efficient trials. Fourth, the Court’s conc lusion is reinforced by the difficulty of squaring the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation with the “automatic application” rule expressed in, e.g., Hendersonv. United States , 476 U. S. 321, 327. Fifth, the legislative history also supports the Court’s conclusion. Sixth, becaus e all the subparagraphs but one under paragraph (1) begin with the phrase “delay resulting from,” the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation woul d potentially extend well beyond pretrial motions and encompass such matters as mental and physical competency examinations, interloc utory appeals, consideration of plea agreements, and the absence of essential witnesses. Pp. 7–12. 2. The Sixth Circuit also misint erpreted §3161(h)(1)(F), which excludes from the 70-day calculation “delay resulting from transporta-3 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Sy llabu s tion of any defendant .

. . to and fr om places of examination .

. . , ex c e pt that anytime c o nsumed in ex c e ss of ten day s
. . . shall be pr e sumed to be unr easonable.” The lowerc o ur ts ag r eed that a tot a l of 20 tr an spor ta t i onday s h a d elapse d when T i nklenberg was evaluated forc o mpeten cy , an d th at bec a u s e th e Government provi d ed no justi

fication, alldays in excess of the 10d a ys s p ecified in the st atute wer e unreasonable. However, the Sixth Circui texempted 8 weekend days and holidays f r om the count on the th eor yth at su bpar a g r a ph(F) in

corporated Fe deral Rule of Crimin al Pr oc edu r e 45(a), wh ic h, at th e time, excluded such days when co mputing any periodspecified in “r ules” and “c our tor der [ s]” that was less than 11 days. Thus , the Circuit considered only twotransp or tatio nday s ex c e ssiv e , and the parties concede that the eight extr ad a y s w e r ee n o u ght om a k et h e difference bet w een compliance with, and violation of, the Act.

Th is Cou r t exer c i ses its dis c r e tionto consider the subsidiary sub

par a g r aph(F) qu estionbec a u s e doin g so is fairer to Tinklenberg, who h a s alr e adyse rv ed h i s sen t en c e
. Inth e C o u r t’ s v i ew , su bpar ag r a ph (F) does not in corporate Rule 45. The Act d oes not say th at i tdoe s so, t h e Gover n m e ntgives no g ood rea s on for s u ch area ding, a n d t h e Rule itse lf, as it existe d a tth e relevant tim e , sta t ed itap plied to rules
an d c o u r t or der s , bu t said n o th in gabou tst atu t es. Th e fac tth at Ru le 45 i s r e v i sed f r om time to t i me al so ar g u es ag ain s t i t s d i r e c tapplic a t i on t os u b p a r a g ra ph (F) b e c a us e s u ch cha n ges , likelyre flect i ng co n sider a tions o t herthan those r e lated to the Ac t, maywell leav e c o ur ts tr eatingsimil a rdefendants differ e ntly

. The betterr e adinginc l ude s weeken d day s an d h o liday s insu bpar ag r a ph(F)’ s 10-d a yper i od u n der t h e com m o n-la w rule t h a ts u ch da ys are included w h en cou n t i ng a st atu t or yti me per i od of 10 d a y s unless a statute sp ecifically ex

c l udes them. M a nyc o ur ts hav etr eated sta t utor ytime per i ods this
w a y , an d Cong r e ss h a s ten d ed spec if icall yto exclude weekend days
an d h o liday s f r om st atu t or y time per i ods o f 10 days when it intended that result. I n deed, Rule 4 5 has b een recently modifiedto require a simi larr e su lt. Pp. 12–14.

3. Although the Six t h Cir c uit’ s inter p r e tations of su b p ar ag r a phs (D) and (F) are both mi staken, the conclusions the court drew from it s int e rpret a tions in relevantpa rtca ncel ea ch ot her out , s u ch t h a t the c o ur t’ s ultimate c o nc lusion that Tinkle nber g ’ s tr ial f a iled to c o m plywith the Ac t’ s deadline is c o rr ec t. Pp. 1 4–1 5. 579 F. 3d 58 9, affir m ed.

B REYER , J., delivered the opinion of the Cour t, in whic h K ENNEDY , G IN SB U R G , ALI TO , an d S OTO MAYOR , JJ., joined, and in which R OBERTS , C. J., and S CALIA an d T HOMAS , JJ., joined as to P a rts I and III. S CALIA , J., filed a nopinion co ncu rrin gin pa rta n d conc urri ng in t h e j u dgm e nt ,4 UNITED STAT ES v. TINKLENBERG Sy llabu s in which R OBERTS , C. J., and T HOMAS , J., joined. K AGAN , J., took no part in the co nsideration or decision of the case._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt

NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s
. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–1 49 8 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JASON L O UIS TINKL E N BER G
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [M ay26, 2011 ] J USTICE B RE YE Rdelivered the opinion of the C o urt. The Speedy Trial Act o f 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq. , provides th at in “any case in which a plea of not guilty i s entered, the trial .

. . shall commence within seventy day s ” from the later of (1) the “filing date” of the inf o rmation or indictment or (2) the defendant’s initial appea r ance before a judicial of ficer ( i.e. , the arraign m ent). §3161(c)(1). The Act goes on to list a set of exclusions from the 70-d a y period, including “ dela y resultin g

from any pretrial mo

tion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” §3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III) (empha sis added). The United States Court of Ap peals for the Si xt h Circui t held in this case thata pretrial motion falls within th is exclusion only if it “actually cause[s] a delay, or the expec

tation of a delay, of trial.” 579 F. 3d 589, 59 8 (2009). In our view, however, the statutory exclusion does not con

tain this kind of causation requirement. Rather, the filing of a pretria lmotion falls within th is provision irrespectiv e of whether i tactually causes, or is expected to cause, delay2 UNITED STAT ES v. TINKLENBERG Opinion of theCourt in starting a trial. I Jason Louis Tinklenberg, the respo n dent, was convicte d of violatin g federal drug and gun laws. 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm); 21 U. S. C. §843(a)(6) (possessionof items used to manufacture a controlled substance). He ma de his initia l appearance before a ju dicial officer on Octob e r 31, 200 5, and the Speedy Tri a l clock then began to run. His trial began on August 14, 2006, 28 7 days later. Just before trial, Tinklenberg asked th e Distri ct Court to di smiss the in

dictment o nthe grou nd that the trial came too late, vio

lating the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day requirement. The DistrictCo urt denied the motion after findi n g that21 8 of the 287 days fell within various Speedy Trial Act exclu

sions, leaving 69 none xcludable days, thereb y ma king the trial timely. On appeal the Sixth Circuit agr eed with the District Court that many of the 287 days were excludable. But it disagreed with the District Court about the excludability of time related to th ree pretri al mo tions. The Government filed the fir s t motion, an unopposed motion t o conduct a video depos i tion of a witness, on August 1, 2 006; the Dis

trict Court disposed of the motion on August 3, 2006. Th e Government filed the s e cond motion, an unopposed motion to bring seized firearms into the courtroom a s evidence at trial, on August 8, 2006; the District Court di sposed of th e motion on August 10, 2006. Tin k lenberg filed the third motion, a motion to dismiss the indictment under t h e Speedy Trial Act, on August 11, 2006; the District Co urt denied that motion on August 14, 2006. In the Sixth Circuit’s view, the nine days duri ng which t h e three mo

tions were pending were not excludable bec ause the m o tions did not “ac t ually cause a delay, or the e x pectation of delay, of trial.” 579 F. 3d, at 598. Because these 9 days3 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt were sufficient to bring the number of nonexcl u dable days above 70, t h e Court of Appeals fou n d a violation of the Act. And gi ven the fact th at Tink len b erg had a l ready served his prison sentence, itordered the District Court to di s miss the indictment wi th prejudice

. We grante dcertiorariat the Government’s request in order to review the Sixth Circuit ’s motion-by-motion cau

sation test. We now reverse its determination. But be

cause we a gree with the defendant about a subsidiary matter, na mely, the exclusion of certain h o lidays and week end days during the period in which he was trans

ported for a competency examina t ion, id ., at 597, we af

firm the Court of Appe als’ ultimate conclusion. II A In relevantpart the Speedy Trial Act sets forth a basi c rule: “In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant .

. . shall commence within seventy days from [the later of (1)] the filing date .

. . of the information or indictment, or . . . [(2)] the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial of ficer of the court in which s u ch char ge is pending .

. . . ” §3161(c)(1) (2006 ed.). The Act the nsays that the “following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing .

. . the time within which the trial . . . m u st commence.” §3161(h) (2006 ed., Supp. III). It lists seven such “periods of delay

. ” It describes the first of these seven excludable periods as “(1) Any pe riod of delay resultin g from other proceed

ings concerning the defendant including but not lim

ited to— “(A) del a y resultin g fro m any proceeding .

. . to de

termine the mental competency or physical c a pacity of4 UNITED STAT ES v. TINKLENBERG Opinion of theCourt the defendant; “(B) delay resultin g fro m trial with respect to other charges . . . ; “(C) delay resultin g fro m any interlocutory appeal; “(D) delay resultin g from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the mot i on through the conclusion of the hearing on, or oth e r prompt disposition of, such motion; “(E) delay resultin g f rom any p r oc eeding relating to the transfer of a case [ o r defendant] . . . from another district . . . ; “(F) delay resultin g fro m transportation of a n y de

fendant from another district, or to and from places of examination or hospitalizatio n, except tha t any time consumed in excess of ten days .

. . shall b e p r esumed to be unrea sonable; “(G) de la y resultin g f rom consideration by th e court of a propose dplea agreement . . .; “(H) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed t h irty da ys, du ring wh ich any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advise

ment by the court.” Ibid. (2006ed. and S u pp. III) (emphasis added). B The particular provis ion before us, subparagraph (D), excludes from the Speedy Trial period “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” §316 1(h)(1)(D). The question is whether this provision stop s the Speedy Trial clockfrom running automatically upon the filing of a pre trial motion irrespective of whethe r the moti on has any impac to n when the trial begins. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, we believe the answer to this question is yes. We begin with the Act’s langua ge. The Sixth Circuit5 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt based its answer prim arily upon that langua ge. It argu ed that the phrase “delay resulting from,” read most natu

rally, requires a court to apply the exclusion p r ovision onl y to those “motion[s]” that “ac t ua lly cause a delay, or t h e expectation of a delay, of trial.” 579 F. 3d, at 598. We agree that such a reading is lingu istically reasonable, bu t the Court of Appeals wrote that there “is no conceivable way to read this language othe r than to require a delay to resul t from any pretri al motion before excludable tim e occurs.” Ibid

. See also ibid . (“[T]he statute is clear”). An d here we disagree. When the Court of Ap peals says that its rea d ing is the only way any reasonab le person could read this language, it overstates its claim. For one thing, even though the word “delay” ordinarily indicates a postponement, it need not inevitably do so. Compare The American Herita ge Dictionary 480 (4th ed. 2000) (“[t]o postpone until a later time” or “[t]o cause to be later or slower than expected or desired”) with ibid . (“[ t]he interv al of time between two events”). In any event, terms must be read in their statu

tory contex t in order to de termine how the provision in question sh ould be applied in an in dividual case. Statutory language that describes a particular circum

stance, for example, might require a judge to examine each individual case to see if that circumstan ce is present. But, altern atively, it might ask a judge instead to look at more general matters, such as when a statute requires a judge to increase the sentence of one convicte d of a “crime of violence” without requiring the judge to determine whether the particular crime at issue in a particular cas e was committed in a violent manner. See Taylor v. United Sta t es , 495 U. S. 575, 6 02 (1990) (“crime of vio l ence” char

acterizes the generic cr ime, not the particularact commit

ted). Similarly a stat ute that fo rbids the importation o f “wild birds” need not require a court to decid e whether a particular parrot is, i nfact, wildor domesticated. It m a y6 UNITED STAT ES v. TINKLENBERG Opinion of theCourt intend to place the entire sp ecies within that definition without inv e stigation of the chara cteristics of an individ

ual specime n
. See United S t atesv. Fift y-T h ree(53) Ec lec

tus Pa rrots , 685 F. 2d 1131, 1137 (CA9 1982). More than that, sta t utory language can sometimes specify that a set of circumstances exhibits a certain cha r acteristic vi rtually as amatte r of definition and irrespec

tive of how a courtm a y view it in a partic u lar case. A statute tha tdescribes “extorti on” as a “crime of violence” makes that fact so bydefinition, without asking a court to second-guess Congress about t h e matter. 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)( B)(ii) (2006 ed.) (defining “violent felony” to include extortion for purposes of the Armed Career Crimi

nal Act). The statute before us, t h ough more complex, can be read similarly. The pretria lmotion subparagra phfalls within a general set of provisions introduc e d by the phrase: “Th e following p e riods of delay s hall be excluded.” §3161(h) (2006 ed., Supp. III). T hat phrase is then followed by a list that includes “[a]ny period of del a y resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including .

. . . ” §3161(h)(1). This latter list is f o llowed by a sublist, eac h member (b ut one) of which is in troduced by the phrase “delay resulting from .

. . ,” ibid. ( 2006 ed. an d Supp. III) , which words are followed by a more specific descripti o n, such as “an ypretrial motion” from its “filing” “through the conclusion of the h e aring on, or o t her prompt dispositio n of, such motion.” §316 1(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III). T h e whole paragraph can be read as requiring the automat ic exclusion of the members of that specific s ublist, while referring to those members in ge n e ral as “periods of dela y” and as causing that delay, not because Congress intended the judge to determine causation, but because, in a close to definitional way, the words em body Congress’ own view of the matter. It is not far f etched to d e scribe the members of the spe

-7 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt cific sublistin the statute befo re us in this definitional sense—as “periods of delay” or a s bringing about delay. After all, the exclusio n of any of the specific periods de

scribed always delays the expiration of the 70-day Speed y Trial deadline. Or Congress might have described the specific periods listed in paragraph (1) as “periods of de

lay” and “delay[s] resu lting from” simply because periods of the type described often do cause a delay in the start of trial. Bothexplanations show th at, linguistically speak

ing, one ca n read the statutory exclusion as automatically applying to the specific periods d e scribed wi thout leavin g to the district court th e taskof determining whether th e period described would or did actually caus e a postpon e ment of the trial in the particul a r case. T hus, language alone cannot resolve the basic question presented in th is
case. But when read in context and in light of the stat

ute’s struct ure and purpose, we think it clear that Co n gress intended subparagraph (D) to apply automatically. C We now tu rn to several considerations, which, ta ke n together, convince us that the subparagra phs that specifi

cally list co mmon pretr i al occurrences apply a u tomatically in the way we have j u st described. First, subparagra ph (D) clarifies that the t r ial court should measure the period of excludable delay for a pretrial motion “from the filing of the motionthrough the conclusi on of the h e aring on, or other prompt disposition of such motion,” but nowhere does it mention the date on which the trial begins or was expected to begin. §3 161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III). Thus, it is best read to instruct measurement of the time actually consumed by consideration of the pretrial mo

tion. Two other related subpara g raphs conta i n clarifyin g language that contemplates mea s urement of the tim e actually consumed by the specified pretrial occurrence without re gard to the commencement of the trial. See8 UNITED STAT ES v. TINKLENBERG Opinion of theCourt §3161(h)(1)(F) (“An y ti me consumed in excess of ten days from the date an order of removal or an order directin g such trans portation, and the de fendant’s a rrival att h e destination shall b epresumed to be u n reasonable”); §3161(h)(1)(H) (“delay reasonably attributable to any period, notto exceed thirty days, during which any pro

ceeding concerning the defenda n t is actually under a d

visement by the court”). If “delay” truly ref e rred to the postponement of trial, then presumably tho s e subpara

graphs wou l d instruct that excludable period s should be measured f r om the da te that trial was other w ise sched

uled to begin. Second, we are impressed that du ring the 37 years since Congress enacted the Speedy Tr ial Act, ev ery Court of Appeals has considered the question before us now, and every Court of Appeals, implic itl yor explicitly, has re

jected the i n terpretati on that the Sixth Circu it adopted i n this case. See UnitedSta t es v. Wilson , 835 F. 2d 1440, 1443 (CADC 1987) (explicit), abrogated on other grounds by Bloat ev. United States , 559 U. S. ___ (20 10); United Sta t es v. H ood , 469 F. 3d 7, 10 (CA1 20 06) (explicit); United S t a t es v. Cobb , 697 F. 2d 38, 42 (CA2 1982) (ex

plicit), abrogated on other grounds by Hendersonv. United Sta t es , 476 U. S. 321 (1986); United Statesv. Novak , 71 5 F. 2d 810, 813 (CA3 1 983) (explicit) abrogate don other grounds by Hendersonv. UnitedStates , 47 6 U. S. 321 (1986); United S t a t esv. Dorlouis , 107 F. 3d 2 48, 253–254 (CA4 1997) (explicit); United S t a t esv. Green , 508 F. 3 d 195, 200 (CA5 2007) (explicit); Un ited S t a t es v. Montoya , 827 F. 2d 1 43, 151 (CA7 1987) (explicit); Un ited S t a t esv. Titlba ch , 3 39 F. 3d 69 2, 698 (CA8 2003) (implicit); United Sta t esv. V a n Brandy , 726 F. 2d548, 551 (CA9 1984) (explicit); UnitedS t atesv. Vogl , 374 F. 3d 976, 985–986 (CA10 2004 ) (explicit); United Sta t esv. Stafford , 697 F. 2d 1368, 1371 –1372 (CA11 1983) (explicit). This unanimity among the lower courts about the meaning of a statute of9 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt great p r act i cal administrative im portance i nthe daily working lives of busy trial judges i s itself entitled to strong consideration, particularly when those courts have main

tained that interpretati on consistently over a long a period of time. See GeneralDynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline , 540 U. S. 581, 593–594 (2004). Third, the Sixth Cir c u i t’s interpre tation would make the subparagra ph (D) excl usion signif icantly more difficult to administer. And in doi n g so, it wo uld significantly hinder the SpeedyTrial Ac t ’ s efforts to secure fair and efficien t criminal trial proceedings. See Zedner v. Unit e dSt at es , 547 U. S. 489, 497 (20 06) (noting that the Act’s exceptions provide “ne c essary flexibility”); H. R. Rep. No. 93–1508, p. 15 (1974) (t he Act seeks to achieve “efficiency in the proc

essing of cases which is commensurate with due process”); S. Rep. No. 93–1021, p. 21 (1974). Trial judges may, for example, set trial date s beyond 7 0 days inlight of othe r commitments. And in doing so, a trial judge may well be aware, based on his or her experience, that pretrial mo

tions will li kely consume the extra time—even though the judge may know little about which specific motions will be filed, when, and how many. How i s that judge to apply th e Sixth Circuit’s approach, particularly whe nseveral, in

cluding unanticipated, pretrial proceedings did consume the time in question? Moreover, what is to happen if several excludable and several non e xcludable potential causes of delay ( e.g., pre trial motions to take deposi tion s, potential scheduling conflicts, v a rious health examinations, etc.) coincide, particularlyin multidefendant cases? Can the judg e, motion by motion, decide which motions were responsible and which were not re sponsible for postponin gwha toth

erwise might have been an earl ier trial date? And how is a defendant or his attorney to predict wheth e r or when a judge will l a ter find a particular motion to h a ve caused a postponement of trial? And if th e matter is difficult to10 UNITED STAT ES v. TINKLENBERG Opinion of theCourt predict, how is the attorney to k n ow when or whether he or she sh o u ld seekfu rther postponement of the 70-da y deadline? With considerable time and ju dicial effort, perhaps through the use of various presumptions, courts could fin d methods for overcoming these and other a d ministrative difficulties. In some in stances, the judge may know at the time of filin g that a given motion i s easily res o lved or that its complexity will almost certainly postpone the trial

. Judges could note on the record their predi ctions about whether the motion will postpone trial at the time that the motion is filed. Parties coul d also stipulate a s to whether a given mo tion would be excluded from the Speedy Trial clock

. But those theoretical strategies would not pre v ent all or evenmost mistakes, needl e ss dismiss als of indic t

ments, and potential retrials after appeal—all of which exact atoll in terms o f the fairne ss of and c o nfidence in the criminal justice sy stem. Andany suchf u ture stra t e gies for administering the SixthCircuit’s rule cannot provide a present justification for turningthe federal judicial system away from the far less obstacle-strewn path that the system has long traveled. Fourth, we are reinforced in our conclusion by the diffi

culty of sq uaring the Sixth Circu it’s interpr e tation wit h this Court’s precedent. In Henders onv. United States , 476 U. S. 321 (1986), the Court rejected the con t ention tha t the exclusion provision for pretri al motions governs only reasonable delays. The Court there con c luded (as the Court of Appeals had held) that the exclusion “was in

tended to be automatic.” Id ., at 327 (quoting United Sta t es v. Henderson, 746F. 2d 619, 62 2 (CA9 1984); intern al quotation marks omitted). See also Bloatev. Uni t ed Sta t es , 559 U. S. ___ (2010) (hol ding based in part on the view that the exclusion appli e s “automatically” to th e specified period of de lay). Hen d erson didnot consider whether a t r ial court m u st determine whether the pretrial11 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt motion actually caused postponement of the trial in ea ch individual case. But the Si xthCircuit’s i n terpretati on would nonetheless sign ificantly limit the pre m ise of “auto

matic application” upon which the case rests. Fifth, for those who fi nd legislativ e history useful, it is worth while noting, (a s this Cou rt noted in Hend erson) that the Senate Report concerning the reenactment of the provision in 1979 described it, along withthe other provi

sions in §3161(h)(1), as referring to “specific an d recur r in g periods of time often found in criminal cases,” and charac

terized them as “automatically excludable delay,” S. Rep. No. 96–212, p. 9 (1979). See H. R. Rep. No. 93–1508, at 21 (“The time l i mits would be toll ed b yhearings, proceedings and necess ary delay which normally occur prior to the trial of cri minal cases” (emphasis added)); S. Rep. No. 9 3

– 1021, at 21 (“[The Act] has ca refully constructed exclu

sions and exceptions which permit normal pre

- trial prepa

ration in the ordinary noncomplex cases which represent the bulk of business in the Federal courts”). B u t cf. id. , at 35 (paragra ph (h)(1) excludes “[d]elays causedbyproceed

ings relating to the defendant” (emphasis added)). Sixth, because all the subparagraphs but one under paragra p h (1) begin with the phrase “delay resulting from,” the Sixth Cir c u i t’s interpre tation would potentially extend well beyond pretrial motions and encompass such matters as mental and physical competency examinations, interlocutory appeals, consid eration of pl ea agreements, and the absence of es sential witnesses. See §3161(h)( 1 ) (2006 ed., S u pp. III); §3161(h)(3)(A) (2006 ed .). Given t h e administrative complexity the causation requirement would brin g about in all these areas, those Circuits th at have considered a ca usation requirement in respect to these other matters h a ve rejecte d it. See, e.g. , Un ited Sta t esv. Pet e , 525 F. 3d 844, 852 ( CA9 2008) (interlocutory appeal); United Statesv. Miles , 290 F. 3d1341, 135 0 (CA11 2002) (unavailability of ess e ntial witnesses); United12 UNITED STAT ES v. TINKLENBERG Opinion of theCourt Sta t es v. R o binson , 887 F. 2d 65 1, 656–657 (CA6 1989 ) (trial on other charge s). That f u rther com p lexity, along with these lower court holdin gs, reinforce our conclusion. We consequently disagree with t h e Sixth C i rcuit tha t the Act ’ s ex clusion requires a court to findt hat the eve n t the exclusi o n specifica lly describes, here the filing of th e pretrial motion, actually caused o rwas expec t ed to caus e delay of a trial. We hold that the Act contains no such requirement. III Tinklenberg also argues that the Sixth Circuit wrongly interpreteda differentexclusio n provision, this time the provision excluding “delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from another district, or to and from places o f exami

nation or hospitalization, except that any ti me con sumed inexcess of tendaysfrom the date an order of removal or an order directing s u ch transp o rtation, and the defendant’s arrival at the destination shall be presum e d to be unre a sonable .” §3161(h)(1)(F) (2006 ed., Supp. III) (emphas is added). The District Court granted Tinklenberg’s request for a competency evaluation and he wa s transported to a medi

cal facility for examination. The lower courts agreed that a total of 2 0 transportation days elapsed an d that since the Government provi d ed no justification, all days in excess of the 10 days specified in the statute were unrea sonable. But in cou n ting those excess da ys, the cou r t exempted week end days and holidays. Since Veterans Day, Than ksgiving Day, and three weekends all f e ll within the 20-day period, only 2 days, not 10 days, were considered excessive, during which the 70-day Spee dy Trial Act cl ock continu e d to tick. Tinklenberg argues that subparagraph (F) does not13 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt exempt we ekend days and holidays; hence the court should hav e considered 10, not 2, days to be excessive. And the parties concede that those 8 extra ticking days are enough to mak e the difference be tween compliance with, and violation of, the Act. As the Solicitor General no tes, we may consider, or “decline to entertain,” alternative grounds foraffirmance. See UnitedSta t esv. Nobles , 42 2 U. S. 225, 242, n. 16 (1975). In t h is case, we believe it treats Tinklenberg, who has already served his sentence , more fairly to consider the alternative ground and ther eby more fully to dispose o f the case. The Sixth Circuit exempted week end days and holidays because it believed that subpara graph (F) i n corporated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(a). At the relevan t time, that Rule excluded w eek end days and holidays when computing any period of time specified in the “rules,” in “any local rule,” or in “any court order” that was less than 11 days. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 4 5 (a) (2005). But in ou r view subpa r agraph(F) does not incorporate Rule 45. The Act does not say that it incorporates Rule 45. The Gov

ernment has given us no good reason for reading it as incorporating the Rule. And the Rule itself, as it existed at the relevant time, said that it applied to “rules” and t o “orders,” bu t it said nothing about statutes. Other things being equal, the fact that Rule 45 is revised from time to time also a r gues again s t its direct application to subpara

graph (F). That is because those changes, likely reflecting considerations other than those related to the Speedy Trial Act, may well leave courts treating si milar defen

dants differently. Without relying upon a cross-reference to Rule 45, we believe the better reading of s ubparagra ph (F) would include weekend days and holidays in its 10-day tim e period. Under the common-law rule, weekend days an d holidays are included when counting a statutory ti me14 UNITED STAT ES v. TINKLENBERG Opinion of theCourt period of 1 0 days unle ss the stat ute specifically excludes them. See 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Time §22, p. 589 (2001) (in calculating time periods expressed in stat utes, “when the time stipulated must necessarily include one or more Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, those days will not be excluded, in the absence of an e x press proviso for their exclusion”). Many courts have treated sta t utory tim e periods this way. See, e.g. , Ho weis env. Chapman , 195 Ind. 381, 383–384, 145 N. E. 48 7, 488 (1924); Americ a n Tobacco Co . v. Strickl i ng , 88 Md. 500, 508–511, 41 A

. 1083, 1086 (1898). An d Congress has tended specifically to exclude week end days and holi days from statutory time p e r i o d s o f 1 0 d a y s w h e ni ti n t e n d e dt h a tr e s u l t

. C o m p a r e 18 U. S. C. §3142(d)(2 ) (permitting the temporary deten

tion of certain defendants “for a period of notmore than ten days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays”) and 5 U. S. C. §552a(d)(2)(A) (requiring an agency to acknowledg e receipt of a request t o amend ag ency record s within “10 days (excluding Sa turdays, Sun d ays, and le gal public holidays)”) wi th 18 U. S. C. §2518(9) (es t ablishing a 10-day period for disc losing applications forand court orders authorizing wir e taps without specifically excluding weekends and holidays) and §4244 (a) (providing a 10-day period after conviction for f iling a motion to request men

tal health t r eatment without specifically excl uding week

ends and holidays). Indeed, Rule 45 has b een recently modified so that now (though not at the time of Tinklen

berg’s proce e dings) it requires asi milar resul t

. Fed. Rul e Crim. Proc. 45(a)(1) (2010) (instructing that weekend da ys and holidays are to be countedwhen calculating all time periods, including sta t utory time periods for which n o alternative method of computing time is specif ied). * * * We disagree with the Sixth Circ uit’s interp retation of both subparagraph (D) and subparagraph (F), and no w15 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of theCourt hold that its interpret a tions of those two provisions are mistaken. Nonetheless the conclusions the court dre w from those two inter p retations in relevant part canc el each other out such th at the cour t’s ultimate conclusion that Tinklenberg’s tria lfailed to c o mply with the Speedy Trial Act’s deadline is correct. T h erefore, the Sixth Cir

cuit’s judgment ordering dismissal of the indictment on remand is Affirmed.
J USTICE K AGAN tookno part in the consideration or decision of t h is case._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of S CALIA , J. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–1 49 8 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JASON L O UIS TINKL E N BER G
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [M ay26, 2011 ] J USTICE S CALIA , with whom T HE C HIEF J US T I C E and J USTICE T HOMA Sjoin, concurring in part andconcurrin g in the judgment. I join Parts I and III of the Court’s opinion. I agree wit h the judgment of the Court in Part II that a pretrial motion need not actually postpone a trial, or create an expecta

tion of post ponement, in order for its pendency to be ex

cluded under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III). But I think that conclusion is entirely clear from the text of the Speedy Trial Act, and see no need to look beyond the text. The clarity of th e text is do ubtless why , as the Court’s opinion points out, ante , at 8, every Circuit disagrees with the Sixth Cir c u i t’s conclusion. That is the direction in which the causality proceeds: Clarity of text produce s unanimit y of Circuits

—not, as the Court’s opinion would have it, unanimity of Circuits clarifies text. As the Court discusses, ante , at 5, the word “ d elay” ca n mean postponement, b u t it can also mean an“interval of time between two events.” Amer ican Herita ge Dictiona r y 480 (4th ed. 2000). One might refer to the “delay” between two tick s of a clock , or betw een seeing lightning and hear

ing thunde r , but tha t does not imply that the first post

poned or slowed the second. H e re there are substantial textual indications that the wo rd “delay” similarly refers2 UNITED STAT ES v. TINKLENBERG Opinion of S CALIA , J. to the period between ticks of th e speedy tr ial clock—in other word s, the period during which the Speedy T r ia l Act’s 70-da y requirement is tolled. Interpreting the “delay” referred to in §3161(h)(1)(D) (or referred to anywhere else in §3 16 1(h)) as the delay of a trial date* would make little sens e in light of the context of the provision and the structure of the statute. Section 3161(h)(1)(D) specifies starting an d stopping points for the excludable “delay” that bear no re l a tion whatsoever to the actual amount of time that a trial might be postponed by a pretrial mo tion. It equates the “delay resulting from any pretrial motion” to the period of time between “the filin g of the mo tion” and “the conclu s i ono f th e h e a ri n g o n , or othe r prompt dispositio n of, suchmotion.” This equatio n i s possible if “ d elay” refer s to an interval of time excludable for purposes of the Spe e dy Trial Act, but it mak e s no sense if “delay” re fers to the t i me a trial is postponed. Consider, for example, a pretrial motion that is pending for 10 days but causes the districtcourt to push back a trial’s begin

ning by only one day. In such a situation, §3161(h)(1)(D) would require that the entire 10 -day period be excluded for Speedy Trial Act p u rposes. Neighboring statu t ory provisions, moreover, link the excludable “delay” to t h e time consumed by the specified event, not the number of days a trial is postponed. Sectio n 3161(h)(1)(H), for example, excludes “delay reasonably attributable to any p e riod, not to exceed thirty days , during which any pro c eeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court.” And §3161(h)(1)(F) excludes “delay res u lting from transporta

-

——————

* I consider only this po ssi bili ty, and not the ex tende dmeaningin

vented b yth e S i xth Circ uit (“expe ctat ion of a dela[y] of trial”)

— pres umab l y to expla i n how dela y ca n b ec o mputed ex ante , befor eany tr ial del a yh a s ac tu a llyoc c u r r e d. See 579 F. 3d 5 89, 59 8 (2 00 9). “[E]x p ec tation of a delay” is simplynot one of the po ssi ble meanings of “delay.”3 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of S CALIA , J. tion .

. . ex cept that a n y time consumed in excess of ten days from .

. . an order directing su ch transpo rtation, and the defendant’s arri val at the destination shall be pre

sumed to be unreasonable.” If “delay” means trial delay, it makes little sense for C o ngress to h a ve placed a limit upon the “time consumed” in transport ing a defendant rather than upon the permissible postpon e ment of trial date. The Speedy Trial Act’s structure also sug g ests that §3161(h)(1)(D) is mean t to apply automatically and is not dependent on predicate findings of postponement. Secti on 3161(h) lists various types of delay that ma y b e excluded, the first six of which (including §3161(h)(1)(D)) make no reference to any required findings. But the se venth, which excludes “delay resulting fr om a continuance granted by any judge,” conditions that exclusion upon certain find

ings, §3161(h)(7)(A). Inlight of this difference in formula

tion, we have held that th e first six exclusions are “ ‘auto

matic,’ ” apply “re gardless of the specifics of the case,” and require no district-cou rt findings. Bloate v. Unit e dSta t es , 559 U. S. ___, ___, n

. 1 , ___ (2010) (slip op., a t1, n. 1, 6); see also Hendersonv. UnitedSta t es , 476 U. S. 321, 327 (1986). Tin k lenberg’s incorporation of a thres h old inquiry into §3161(h)(1)(D) wo uld make it none of thes e things. Delay of trial is also ruled out bythe fact that the text is forward look ing. It says that the “following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing .

. . the time within which the trial .

. . must commen c e .” §3161(h) (emphasis added). This is des i gned to enable the determination in advanceof the date bywhich the trial “must commence.” Quite obviously, if t h e specifie d delays did not cou n t unless and until they delayed the trial, one could not kno w whether th ey counted until after the fact. And on tha t interpretati on the pro vision should have re ad, not “ t h e time within which t h e trial .

. . must commence,” but rather “ t he time withi nwhich th e trial .

. . should have commenced.”4 UNITED STAT ES v. TINKLENBERG Opinion of S CALIA , J. And finally, there are the administrative difficulties that arise when “delay” is ta ken to mean “delay in tria l ,” discussed in the Court’s opinion a tpages 9–10. These ar e not relevant on their o w n, but onl ybecause they bear upon the meanin gof the text. When on e of two possible m e an ings yields impractica ble results, the other meaning is more likely correct. Tinklenberg would invent a thres h old inquiry applicable only to §3161(h)(1)(D): If, he says , at least s o me delay of the trial da te has occur r ed, then th e entire per i od specified in §3161(h) (1)(D) may be excluded. This makes no s e nse. First, nothing in the statute supp orts treating the word “delay” as atrigger for an exclusion of an unrelated period of time; quite the oppos i te, §3161(h)(1)(D) treats the period of “delay” and the pendency of the pretrial motion equiva lently. Second, that interpre tatio nwould ascribe different meanings to the word “delay” as i tis used th roughout th e Speedy Tri a l Act. “[D]elay resulting from any interlocu

tory appeal,” §3161(h)(1)(C), for e x ample, wo uld refer to the number of days a trial was postponed; but “delay resulting from any pre trial motion,” §3161(h)(1)(D), would refer to the different period sp ecif ied in thatparagraph. Identical words used in different parts of a statute are pre

sumed to have the same meaning absent indication to the contrar y , and here no such indication exists. See IBP, Inc. v. Alva rez , 546 U. S. 21, 34 (2005). Tinklenberg also argu es that his interpreta tion draws support fro m the phra se “resulting from,” which appears after the word “delay” in §3161(h) (1)(D). He asserts that this phrase “underscores t hat Subsection (D) excludes periods of delay that occur as a consequence of pretrial motions, not merely th e time during which s u ch motions are pending.” Brief for Respondent 17. That is true enough, butit sheds nolight on th e meaning of the word “delay.” Cf. Bloate , sup ra, at ___, n. 9 (slip op ., at 8, n. 9)

. There is n o thing odd in saying that an interval of exclu d

-5 Cite as: 56 3 U

. S. ____ (2011) Opinion of S CALIA , J. able time u n der §3161 (h)(1)(D) arises “as aconsequence” of a party’s having filed a pretrial motion; if no pretrial motion is fi l e d, no delayresults.