The Clerk of the Court is directed to c onform the of ficial c aption to this caption. * 0 5 -1 6 6 4 -cv V iv e s v . C it y o f N e w Y o rk
U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT
August Term, 2005 (Argued: Dec ember

16, 2005 Dec ided: May 1, 2008) Docke t No. 05-1664-c v

CA RL OS V I VE S, Plaintiff-Appellee ,-vTH E CI TYOF NE W YO RK and RA YM ON D KEL L Y, Commis sio ne r o f t he Ne w Y or

k Ci ty Pol ic e De pa

rtme nt, * De fe nd ants -A pp e lla nts .

B e fo re : PO OL ER, KA TZ MA NN , a nd PARKE R, C ir c uit

Judg e s.

De fe nd ants City

of Ne w Y or k ( “ City” ) a

nd Commis sio ne r R ay

mon d K e lly

a pp e a l a jud g me nt a

wa rd ingpla int if

f C arl os Vi ve s $ 3, 30 0 in

dama g e s f

or the City ’s vio latio n o f h is Four th and Four

teenth Amendme nt rig hts. The sole issue pre sented by the appe al is whether

the City ’s ac knowledg ed policy of enf orcingNew Y ork Penal L aw § 240.30( 1) is a policy within the2

meaningof Monell v. Depa rtment of Social Servic es of the City of Ne w York, 436 U .S. 658 (1 97 8) , th at c a

us e d th e vio latio n o f V ive s’ s r ig hts . We fi nd the re c or d in su ff

ic ie nt t o r e so lve thi s issue and ther efor e vac ate a nd rema nd. VACATED a

nd REMANDED.

EL I Z AB ETH I . FREEDMAN , Assistant Corporation Counsel (Michae l A. Cardozo, Corporation Couns e l of

the City of Ne w Y or k, F ra nc is F . Ca

puto a nd Cary n Ro se nc ra

ntz, As sis tant Cor po ratio n Co un se ls, on

the br ie f) , N e w Y or

k, NY , f or De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts . CH RI STO PHE R D UN

N ( Ar thu r E ise nb e rgand

Cor e y Sto ug hto n o n th e br ie f) , N e w Y or k Ci vil L iberties Union F oundation, New Y ork, NY, f or Plaintiff-Appe llee.

POOL ER, Circuit J udg e: IN TR OD UC TIO N Carl os Vi ve s se nt a

Ne w Y or k Ci ty (“ City” ) p oli tic ian wri tte n mate ri a ls t hat w e re lik e ly to cause her a larm and that did alarm her . As a re sult, he was ar rested f or violating New Y ork Penal L aw § 240.30( 1), which c riminaliz es such a ctions, and deta ined for se vera l hours. In a decision that has not bee n appea led, the United Stated District Court for the Southern District of New Y ork (Sche indlin, J .) held that Sec tion 240.30(1) is unconstitutionally overbr oad on its fac e. In the deter

mination now under re view, the district cour t held that the City

promulg ated a

policy within the meaningof Monell v. Depa rtment of Social Servic es of the City of Ne w York, 436 U
. S
. 6 5 8 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , b y c h o o s i n gt o e n f o r c e S e c t i o n2 4 0
. 3 0 ( 1 )
. D am a g e s w e r e th e ntr i e d t o a j ur y, which aw arde d Vives $3,300. On a ppeal, the City

argues that its enforc ement of Sec tion 240.30(1) c annot be c onstrued as a Monell policy . We find that the rec ord bef ore the district3

court did not justify

a g rant of summar

y judgme nt and there fore vacate and r emand f or fur ther pr oc e e din g s th at c ou ld i nc lud e a dd iti on a l di sc ov e ry , b ri e fi ngby Ne w Y or k’ s So lic ito r G e ne ra l,
and a ne w d e c isi on

by the dis tr ic t c ourt . BACK GR OUND Vi ve s, a re sid e nt o f t

he City , s ome tim e s se nd s p re ss c lip pin g s a nd wr itt e n s tate me nts to “people of the Jewish faith with the intent to alarm them about c urre nt world eve nts that have be e n p ro ph e sie d in

the B ibl e , in c lud ingthe un if ic atio n o f t

he Euro pe an c ountrie s into a sin g le political and military

entity .” Vives v. City

of Ne w York, 305 F . Supp. 2d 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“ Vives I ”) ( quoting August 21, 2003, affidavit of Carlos Vives ¶ 4) , rev’ d in part, 405 F.3d 115 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (“V ives I I ”). H e sent one such pac ket to J ane H offman, who was then a candidate for L ieutenant Gove rnor. Althoug h City police off

icer s found no threatening statements in the pac ket, they wer e instructed by

their super

vising lieutena

nt to arre st Vives for
a g g ra vate d h ara ssm e nt i n v iol atio n o f S e c tio n 2 40 .3 0, wh ic h p ro vid e s th at “ [a] p e rs on is guil ty of ag g ravated har assment in the sec ond deg ree when, with intent to hara ss, annoy , threaten or alar m another pe rson, he or

she . . . [1] communicates w ith a person, a nony mously or otherw ise, by . . . mail . . ., in a manner likely to cause annoyance or ala rm.” As a re su lt o f t

his arr e st, Vi ve s w a s h e ld i n a c e ll f or se ve ra l ho ur s. Ultimately , the district attorney

declined to pr osecute . Vives sued the City , the two detec tives who arr ested him, and Ray mond Kelly , the police commissioner, alleg ing, inter alia, that his arr est and subseque nt detention violated his First and F ourt h A me ndme nt r ig hts . H e so ug ht d ama g e s, a de c laratio n th at Se c tio n 2 40 .3 0( 1) is unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits merely “annoy ing or alar ming” speec h, and injunctive4

relief
. The pa

rties cr oss-moved for

summary judgme nt. The district court he ld that (1) be c a us e Se c tio n 2 40 .3 0( 1) vio late d th e F ir st A me ndme nt, the of fi c e rs la c ke d p ro ba

ble c a us e to
arr est Vives and violate d the Four th Amendment, Vives I

at 301-02; (2) the offic ers did not establish that they

wer e entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law , id. at 303; and (3) inj un c tiv e re lie f w ou ld i ssu e a g a ins t K e lly pr oh ibi tin ghim

fr om e nf or c ingthe ob

je c tio na ble portion of the statute a g ainst Vives but not ag ainst others, id. at 304. De fe nd ants br ou g ht a

n inte rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l c ha lle ng ingthe qu a lif ie d immun ity deter mination. W ithout deciding whether the statute wa s constitutional, we reve rsed, holding “that def endants did not have fair notice of sec tion 240.30(1)’s purpor ted unconstitutionality .” Vives I I , 405 F.3d a

t 118. I n a sepa

rate partial c oncurr ence and par tial dissent, J udg e Carda

mone argued that the c ourt should have r eac hed the issue of Section 240.30(1)’ s constitutionalit y and found it to be unconstitutional. See id. at 119-24 (Car damone, J., concurr ing in pa rt and dissenting in par

t). Even be fore our dec ision in Vives I I , the City moved for judg ment pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil P roce dure 12( c), c ontendingthat Vives could not establish that any City policy
cause d him harm bec ause Sec tion 240.30(1) was e nacte d by the state leg islature. The district
c ourt de nie d th e City ’s mot ion in a n o ra l de c isi on . T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ld t hat th e re wa s a dis po sit ive dif

fe re nc e be tw e e n s tate statut e s th at a mun ic ipa lity

is r e qu ir e d to e nf

or c e and state statut e s th at a

mun ic ipa lity

is m e re ly a uth or ize d to e nf

or c e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt

c on c lud e d th at a municipality

cannot be liable for e nforc ing a mandatory

state statute but it can be liable for
e nf or c ingstatut e s th at me re ly a uth or ize e nf

or c e me nt b y

mun ic ipa lit ie s. Ha

vin gde nie d th e Rul e5

12(c) motion, the court allowed the parties to pursue discovery to determine whether

New Y ork require d or commande d the city to enforc e state pe nal laws. After discovery , the par

ties cross-move d for summary judgme nt on municipal liabilit y . Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt t o p la int if

fs be c a us e it w a s und isp ute d th at th e City ha d a pr a c tic e and

po lic y of e nf or c ingSe c tio n 2 40 .3 0( 1) and the City of fe re d n o e vid e nc e that it
w a s ma n d ate d to e n f o r c e th e s tatute . V iv e s v . Ci ty o f N e wY o r k , N o . 0 2
- Ci v - 6 6 4 6 , 2 0 0 4 WL 2997947, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y . Dec . 27, 2004). Followinga jury

trial on damag es, the City appea led, contendingsolely that the district court e rre d when it held that the City ’s policy of enf orcingSection 240.30(1) is a municipa l policy within the meaningof Monell. DI SCU SSIO N Where a plaintiff claims a c onstitut ional violation as a conse quence of the de cision of a municipality

to enforc e an unc onstitut ional state statute, blame c ould theoretica lly be allocated thr e e wa y s: f ir st, to t he sta te that e na c te d th e un c on sti tut ion a l st atut e ; se c on d, to t he mun ic ipa lity that chose to e nforc e it; and third, to the individual employ ees who direc tly violated plaintiff’s ri g hts . A s a

pr a c tic a l matte r, ho we ve r, dama g e s a re no t ava ila

ble a g a ins t th e state be c a

us e it i s
no t a pe rs on wi thi n th e me anin gof

Se c tio n 1 98 3. Will v . M ic h. De p’ t of State Pol ic e , 4 91 U. S. 58 , 6 4 ( 19 89 ). Mo re ov e r, lik e the ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants in t his c a se , in div idu a l e mpl oye e s w ill of te n b e a ble to s uc c e ssf

ull y a sse rt qu a lif ie d immun ity . T hu s, the pla int if f w ill of te n b e le ft to
a s s e rth i s d am a g e s c l a i mo n l y a g a i n s tth e mun i c i p a l i ty. Un lik e a state , a mun ic ipa lity

is a pe rs on wi thi n th e me anin gof

Se c tio n 1 98 3, se e Mo ne ll, 436 U.S. at 690, and, unlike individual defe ndants, a municipality may not assert qua lified6

immunit y based on its g ood faith belief that its actions or policies ar e constitutional, see Ow en v. City of Ind e pe nd e nc e , 4 45 U. S. 6 22 , 6 50 (1 98 0) . T he Ow e n Co ur t e xpla ine d it s d e c isi on

no t to
e xten d q ua lif ie d immun ity

to m un ic ipa lit ie s a s f

oll ow s: We believe that today ’s dec ision, togethe r with prior pre cede nts in thi s are a, pr op e rl y a llo c ate s [th e c os ts o f o ff ic ia l mi sc on du c t] amon gthe thr e e pr inc ipa ls i n the sce nario of the § 1983 cause of ac tion: the victim of the constituti onal deprivation; the officer

whose c onduct ca

used the injury ; and the public, as repr esente d by

the municipal entity . The innoce nt individual who is harmed by an a bu se of g ov e rnme nta l a

uth or ity is a ssu re d th at he wi ll b e c omp e ns ate d f or his injury . The off

endingofficia l, so long a s he conduc ts himself in good fa ith, may g o a bo ut h is b us ine ss s e c ur e in t he kn ow le dg e that a

qu a lif ie d immun ity

wi ll pr ote c t hi m f

or pe rs on a l li a

bil ity fo r d ama g e s th at are mor e a pp ro pr iate ly c ha rg e a ble to t he po pu la c e a s a

wh ole . A nd

the pu bli c wi ll b e fo rc e d to be ar o nly the c os ts o f i nju

ry inf lic te d b y the “ e xec uti on

of a g ov e rnme nt’ s p oli c y

or c us tom , wh e the r m a de by

its lawm ake rs or

by tho se wh os e e dic ts o r a c ts m ay fa ir ly be sa id to repre sent offic ial policy .” Owen, 445 U .S. at 657 (quoting Mone ll, 436 U.S. at 694). Thus, a municipality is liable for e ven its good fa ith constitut ional violations presuming that the municipality has a policy

that cause s those violations. See id. “[T] he wor d ‘policy ’ g ener ally implies a course of ac tion consciously chosen f rom amongvarious alter

natives.” O klahoma City

v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). Policy , in the Mo ne ll s e ns e , ma

y of c ours e be ma de by

the mun ic ipa lity ’s le g isl ativ e bo dy , s e e Ow e n, 44 5 U .S.
at 62 8- 29 , b ut i t a lso may be ma de by

a mun ic ipa l of

fi c ia l “ po sse ss[i ng ] fi na l a uth or ity to
e sta bli shmun ic ipa l po lic y

wi th r e sp e c t to the a c tio n o rd e re d. ” Pe mba ur v. City of Cin c inn ati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). In identifying the officia l havingauthority with respec t to a particula r issue, fede ral c ourts must analy ze state law. McMillian v. Monroe County , 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997). The c rux of the Cit y ’s ar g ument is that although it has a “policy in fac t” of e nforc ing the7

Penal L aw, it is the State’s ena ctment of Sec tion 240.30(1) that ca used Vives’ s constitutional violation. The City

contends that “ [a] municipality does not implement or execute a policy officia lly adopted a

nd promulg ated by

its officer s when it mere ly enfor ces the Penal L aw of the State that cre ated it.” Appe llants’ Br . at 22; cf. City of Ne w York v. State, 631 N .Y.S.2d 553, 55 5 ( 19 95 ) ( ho ldi ngthat N e w Y or k Ci ty , a s a

“ c re atur e [] or

a g e nt[]” of

the state may

no t su e it) ; Trenton v. Ne w J erse y , 262 U.S. 182, 185-87, 191 (1923) ( holding that a municipality

acts a s an ag ent of the state in exercising the power s deleg ated to it by the state). The issue of whether

—and under

what cir cumstance s—a municipality can be liable for enfor cinga state la

w is one of f

irst impression in thi s circuit. It is also one of g reat significa nce both to injured citiz ens, who may be able to rec over a g ainst a municipality when other

avenue s of re cover

y are cut off if

we r ule in favor

of Vives, a

nd to municipalities, which may incur signific ant and una

nticipated liability

in the same e vent. L ike the district cour t, we look to the de c isi on s o f o the r c ir c uit s f or g uid anc e , b ut w e be ar i n mi nd that th e se de c isi on s a

re us e fu l on ly insofar a s they

illumi nate the f

oundational question of whe ther a municipal policy

maker has
m a d e a m e an i n g f

u l an d c o n s c i o u s c h o i c e th atc a

u s e d a c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i n

j ur y. Three circ uits—the Si x th, Ninth, and Eleventh—have issued dec isions that, to varying de g re e s, su

pp or t pl a int if f’ s c on te nti on

that a mun ic ipa lity

e ng a g e s in

po lic y makin gwh e n it deter mines to enforc e a state law that a uthorizes it t o perf

orm ce rtain ac tions but does not mandate that it do so. S ee G arne r v. Memphis Police Dep’ t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (h old ingthat munic ipa lity ’s po lic y of a llo wi ngde a dly

fo rc e in c e rt a in s itu atio ns wa s a Mo ne ll policy even though a state statute a uthorized the use of de adly forc e in the situations allowed by the mun ic ipa lity

a s w e ll a s o the rs , b e c a

us e the state law d id n ot r e qu ir e the us e of de a dly fo rc e inThe City relies on a

differ ent Six th Circuit case, Pusey v. City of Young ston, 11 F.3d 1 652 (6th Cir. 1993), in which the c ourt held that a municipa l prosecutor acte d on behalf

of the state whe n she prose cuted a state cr ime. I d. at 657. In this case, the two individual police office rs may

have be en ac ting on be half of the state whe n they arr ested Vive s. Howeve r, Vives does not argue that the City should be vicar iously

liable for the office rs’ a ctions. Rather, he c la ims that th e City

its e lf fo rm ulate d a n unc on sti tut ion a l po lic y

that a llo we d h is a

rr e st. 8 any situation); Evers v. County of Custer, 745 F .2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (holdingthat 1 County B oa rd ’s iss ua nc e of a de c laratio n th at pl a int if

f’ s r oa d w a s p ub lic su ff

ic e d to imp os e liability althoug h state law a llowed such a decla ration); Cooper v. D illon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1222- 23 (11th Cir. 2005) (holdingthat municipality could be liable f

or enf orcingan unconstitutional state statute whe n (1) a

municipal ordinanc e prohibited a ll crimes proscr ibed by state law, a

nd (2) the state lawmere ly

authorized enfor ceme nt without requiringit). Whil e these decisions ca

n be re ad to sug g est that a distinction should be made be tween a state law ma

ndatingmunicipal action and one that mere ly authorizes it, in each c ase the policy maker was a lleg ed to have g one beyond mere ly enfor cingthe state statute. In Evers, the County Boa rd issued a de clar ation subjectinga par ticular piec e of pr operty

to a finding authorized by

state law. See Evers, 745 F .2d at 1198. In Gar ner, the municipality

promulg ated a deadly forc e policy

that differ ed fr om the policy authorized by

state law a lbeit in way s that restric ted the use of

deadly forc e. See G arne r, 8 F .3d at 361. Fina lly , in Cooper, the municipality

enac ted an or dinance ref lectingits int ent to enfor ce state cr iminal law and the office r who de cided to enf orce this ordinance a g ainst the plaintiff wa s a policy maker . See Cooper, 403 F .3d at 1221-23. The City ’s position is s upported—a g ain to vary ing de g ree s—by

Four th, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit authority . See B ockes v. F ields, 999 F.2d 788, 791 (4th Cir. 1993) ( holding thatA later panel of the Seventh Circuit re ad Surplus Store as incor poratingthe 2 mandate/a

uthorize disti nction and thus as consistent with Gar ner. See Be thesda L

uthera n Homes and Servs., Inc. v. L eea

n, 154 F.3d 716, 718 ( 7th Cir. 1998). That portion of B ethesda Luthera n is dicta, howeve r, bec ause the court found the policy in issue to be mandatory

and thus furthe r held that the city

was not liable. I d. at 718-19. 9 county board did not ac t in a policy -makingcapa city when it fire d plaintiff bec ause te rmination proce dures a

nd criter ia wer e pre scribed by the state a lthough the state proc edure s allowed the county board some disc retion); Surplus Store and Exch., Inc. v. City of De lphi, 928 F.2d 788, 79 1 ( 7th Cir . 1 99 1) (h old ingins uf fi c ie nt f or Mo ne ll l ia

bil ity pla int if f’ s c la im that munic ipa lity had a policy

of enf orcingstate statutes and stating : “I t is difficult to im ag ine a municipal policy more innocuous a

nd constitutionally

permissible, and whose causa l connec tion to the alleg ed violation is m ore attenuated, than the ‘policy ’ of e nforc ing state law.” ); Whit esel v. 2 Seng enber g er, 222 F .3d 861, 872 (10th Cir. 2000) (statingthat it was not clea r whe ther policies of state e ntity

authorized ce rtain ac tions but “emphasiz[ ing] that the [municipal entity ] cannot be liable for me rely

implementing a

policy cre ated by

the state [entity ]”). As with the ca ses supportingplaintiff’s position, none of these decisions is square ly on po int . A lth ou g h Surp lus Sto re c on ta ins br oa d la ngua g e , it inv olv e s n ot t

he e nf or c e me nt o f a

state statut e but r athe r t

he us e of state statut e s b y

an in div idu a l e mpl oye e to c arr y out an a lle g e dly unconstitutional action. See Surplus Store, 928 F.2d at 789. Moreover , there was no a lleg ation that any policy maker had eve r consider ed whe ther the pa rticular state statutes at issue should be used by city employ ees. B ockes’ holding—that a county board doe s not act as a

policy maker when it fire s an employ ee pur suant to state proc edure s—is tange ntial to the issue before us. Finally , the Whitesel court re manded so that the pa rties could off

er e vidence as to whethe r the county board ha d formulated a

constitutionally

offe nsive policy , finding that the re cord w as notThe City also claims that its positi on is supported by decisions from the F irst, Third, 3 and F ifth Circuits. I n eac h instance, the claimed support is illusory , restingon either mis a pp re he ns ion

or ina c c ur ate c itatio n o f t

he re le va nt c a se . T he City ’s c itatio n f ro m th e F ir st Circuit is to t he opinion of a sing le conc urringjudge . See Ye o v. Town of L exington, 131 F.3d 24 1, 25 7 ( 1s t Cir . 1 99 7) (S tahl, J., c on c ur ri ng ). Th e in- ba

nc ma jority did no t di sc us s Mo ne ll liability beca use it decide d that plaintiff fa iled to show state ac tion. See id. at 248 n.3. The Third Circuit did not decide the issue of municipal liability

but rather

simply discussed an argument made by

the par ties, quoting both Surplus Store and Ga rner in doing so. See Doby

v. De Cr e sc e nzo , 1 71 F .3 d 8 58 , 8 68 -6 9 ( 3d Cir . 1 99 9) . F ina lly , th e F if th C ir c uit ’s de c isi on , E c ho ls v. Park e r, 90 9 F .2 d 7 95 , 8 01 (5 th C ir . 1 99 0) , h old s o nly that a c ounty of fi c ia l is a c tin ga s a

state ag ent when he or she e nforc es a state policy , a proposition that is not relevant to the issue be fore us. 10 sufficie ntly

develope d to gr ant summary judgme nt to either par

ty . 222 F.3d at 871-72. Th e re fo re , it

did no t de te rm ine wh e the r a

ny pa rt ic ula r a c tio n o n th e pa

rt of the mun ic ipa lity
w o u l d c o n s t i tu t e f

o r mu l at i o no f

a p o l i c y. 3 There beingno decide d tilt t owar d either pa rty ’s position in t he dec isions of our sister circ uits, we turn to an ana ly sis of the extent to which those decisions rest on conside rations pertinent to identifying a

Monell policy . Of the r equire ments that we pre viously discussed, the two put into is sue by

the City are that (1) a

policy will ordinarily

be the r esult of a c onscious choice and (2) the policy

must actually

cause the constitutional violation. S ee T uttle, 471 U.S. at 823. Unfortunately , Evers, B ockes, a nd Whit esel do not ar

ticulate an e x planation tied to the “consc ious choice” and ca usation require ments for imposing liability on municipalities. Howeve r, Surplus Store, Gar ner, a nd Cooper do. Surplus Store focuse s in part on the ca usation require ment, holding that the c onnection betwe en a municipa lity ’s dec ision to uphol d state law and the subseque nt constituti onal violation is sim ply too “attenuated.” 928 F .2d at 791. Gar ner
a lso a dd re sse s c a us atio n b ut h old s th at be c a us e the mun ic ipa lity

wa s f re e ne ve r t o u se de a dly forc e, its decision to do so under r estricted c ircumstance s cause d the death of plaintiff’sWhil e we hold here that a municipality ’s “de cision” to fulfill a mandatory obligation 4 does not constitute a “c hoice,” we do not express an opinion on whe ther ince ntives or pena lties imposed by

the state or f

eder al g overnme nt on a municipality as a c onsequenc e of a

“dec ision” can be so coer cive a s to transform a “choic e” into an “ obligation.”

11 dece dent. 8 F.3d a

t 365. For the same re ason, the Ga rner court he ld that the municipality had
e xer c ise d a

c on sc iou s c ho ic e wh e n it de c ide d to us e de a dly

fo rc e in t he sit uatio ns se t f

or th i n it s policy . I d. at 364. In Cooper, the Ele venth Circuit focuse d on the def endant c hief of police ’s conscious dec ision to enforce a state statute a g ainst plaintiff. 403 F.3d at 1223. As we have
no te d p re vio us ly , Surp lus Sto re is s ome thi ngof an o utl ie r b e c a

us e it i nv olv e d th e us e of a state statute rathe r than the e nforc ement of the statute. And Ga rner and Cooper do not sug g est that
ever y time a municipality

decide s that, as a g ener al matter, it will enfor ce the state pena l law, the municipality

is liable. Fr eedom to ac t is inherent in the conc ept of “ choice .” The ref ore, in a ddressingthe conscious choic e re quirement, we ag ree with all circuits to addre ss state laws mandating
e nf or c e me nt b y

mun ic ipa l po lic e of

fi c e rs that a

mun ic ipa lity ’s de c isi on

to h on or thi s o bli g atio n is
no t a c on sc iou s c ho ic e . A s a

re su lt, the mun ic ipa lity

c ann ot b e lia

ble un de r M on e ll i n th is
c ir c ums tanc e . On

the oth e r h and , if

a mun ic ipa lity

de c ide s to e nf

or c e a statut e that it

is 4 authorized, but not require d, to enforc e, it may have c reated a municipal policy . Howeve r, we do
no t be lie ve that a

me re mun ic ipa l di re c tiv e to e nf or c e a ll s tate and

mun ic ipa l la

ws c on sti tut e s a city policy to enforc e a pa

rticular unc onstitut ional statute. In our view, the “consc ious” portion of the “ conscious choic e” r equire ment may be lac king in these circ umstances. While it is not require d that a municipality know that the statute it dec ides to enfor ce a s a matter of municipal po lic y is a n unc on sti tut ion a l st atut e , s e e Ow e n, 44 5 U .S. at 65 0, it i s n e c e ssa ry , at a min imum,In this case, the pla intiff does not argue that liability exis ts based on a City

custom, see 5 Bd. of Comm’rs of Br

y an Cty . v. Br own, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). The ref ore, w e have no occa sion to consider the role of consc ious decision makingin a “c ustom” case
. 12 that a municipal policy

maker have f ocused on the particula

r statute in question. We, theref ore, hold that there must have been c onscious decision makingby the City ’s policy

maker s befor e the City can be held to have ma de a c onscious choice
. Evidence of a c onscious choice may , of 5
course , be dire ct or c ircumstantial. These c onclusions lead us to two subsidiary questions, neither of which ca n be re solved
on the re c or d b e fo re us : ( 1) wh e the r t he City ha d a me anin g fu l c ho ic e a s to wh e the r i t w ou ld enfor ce Sec tion 240.30(1); and (2) if so, whether the City adopted a

discrete policy

to enforc e Section 240.30(1) that r epre sented a conscious choic e by

a municipal policy

maker
. I. Meaningf

ul Choi ce The fir st question is m ore diff icult than it might seem in lig ht of the City ’s appa rent
conce ssion that the Cit y

has the discr etion to determine “ how best to allocate limited police
resour ces a

nd priorities” in dec iding whe n and whe ther it will enforc e a pa rticular se ction of the Penal L aw. L etter of

Eliz abeth I . Fr eedma

n dated 7/13/07, at 2. To be sure, discr etion to enforc e
or no t e nf or c e a statut e in a

n in div idu a l si tuatio n is dif fe re nt f ro m di sc re tio n to c ho os e no t to enfor ce a statute—or, as in this case , portions of a statute—at all. But we simply cannot deciphe r whe ther the City purports to have this latter discretionar y power . Amongthe questions
on rema nd is whether the City

had the powe r to instruct its officer s not to enforc e a por tion of Section 240.30(1) be cause it was unconstitutional or a wa ste of re source s, or for some other
rea son. Certainly

the par ties have not identified a

provision of state law or

regulation that require sIn this respec t, Section 240.30 differ s signific antly from Ne w York State A g ricultural 6 and Mark e ts L aw § 37 1, wh ic h th e Ne w Y or k App e llate Di vis ion , T hir d D e pa rtme nt, he ld cre ated a duty of enf orce ment for law

enfor ceme nt office rs. See In re Jurnove, 832 N.Y.S.2d 655, 656-57 (2d De p’t 2007). Section 371 provide s: “A constable or police of fice r must . . . issue an appe ara

nce ticke t . . ., summon or arre st, and bringbefor e a c ourt or mag istrate having jurisdiction, any

person of

fendingag ainst any

of the provisions of a

rticle twe nty -six of the ag riculture a

nd marke ts law.” (e mphasis added)
. 13 a municipality

to enforc e the state penal law . Fur ther, Sec tion 240.30(1) itself does not constitute such a mandate bec ause it simply define s an off

ense w ithout directing municipal of fi c ia ls t o ta

ke any ste ps to a c t w he n th e statut e is v iol ate d. Ho we ve r, we are un c e rt a in 6 whether the City ’s ver

y status as a “ cre ature [] or ag ent[] of the state,” City of Ne w York, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 555, obliga

tes it to enforc e state la

ws. (We re cog nize that New Yor k has somewhat
a lte re d th e ba lanc e of

po we r b e tw e e n th e state and the c ity by ame nd ingthe c on sti tut ion to allocate cer

tain home rule pow ers to loca l gove rnments. See N.Y . Const. art. 9; see also N.Y
. Mun. Home Rule L aw § 10.) No r d o N e w Y or

k c a se s a dd

re ssi ngind ivi du a l of

fi c e rs ’ d isc re tio n n ot t o e nf or c e state laws re solve this question. An indivi dual who asks a court to direc t a local of

ficial to enf

orce a law w ill lik e ly

fa il b a se d o n th e dis c re tio n a c c or de d to mun ic ipa lit ie s a nd /or ind ivi du a l of

fi c e rs in de te rm ini ngwh e n to e nf

or c e state law. Se e Pe ra zzo v. L ind sa y , 2 90 N. Y. S.2 d 9 71 , 9 72 -7 3 ( 1s t Dep’ t), aff

’d on opn. below, 296 N .Y.S.2d 957 (1968). “It is the settled policy of the c ourts not to reviewthe exercise of

discretion by

public officia ls in the enforc ement of State statutes, in the absenc e of a

clea r violation of some constitutional mandate.” Gay nor v. Rockef

eller, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584, 592 (1965); cf . Town of Castle Rock, Colo., v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2 00 5) (d e c lin ingto f

ind a pr op e rt y ri g ht i n th e e nf

or c e me nt o f a

re str a ini ngor de r i n p art

be c a us e of “ [t]he de e p- ro ote d n atur e of law- e nf or c e me nt d isc re tio n, e ve n in the pr e se nc e of

se e min g ly14

mandatory

leg islative commands”) . These c ases c oncer n the first sort of discr etion that we po sit e d —

c a se -b y -c a se dis c re tio na

ry a uth or ity and the re fo re are no t r e le va

nt. We found no prec edent a ddressingthe issue we be lieve to be c ontrolling: whe ther the Police Depa

rtment’s policy

maker s can instruc t its officers not to enf orce a g iven sec tion—or po rt ion the re of — o f t he pe na l la

w. On e c a se do e s a dd

re ss t he a uth or ity of a state c ourt

to enfor ce its own orde rs by direc ting a

writ of mandamus to a police depa rtment. See In re B oung Jae Jangv. B ro wn , 5 60 N. Y. S.2 d 3 07 , 3 10 (2 d D e p’ t 19 90 ) ( ho ldi ngthat th e Ne w Y or k St ate Supreme Court has the r equisite authority based on “ [t he cour

t’s] i nhere nt authority

to interpret the Constitut ion, which the Police De partment is sworn to uphold, [and] New York City Charter § 435(a) .” Howe ver, a

state cour

t’s authority

to require a police de partment to enf orce the
c ourt ’s or de r i s o nly

tang e nti a lly

re late d to the sta

te ’s a uth or ity to r e qu ir e a

po lic e de pa

rtme nt t o enfor ce the state’s pe nal statutes. Fur ther, e ven if the state may require municipalities to enforc e state pena l laws, there is no evidence curr ently befor e us that it has done so. Thus, B oungJ ae J ang , like the ca ses addr essingthe police de partment’s discr etion to enforc e or not e nforc e a particula r pena l statute dependingon particula r circ umstances, doe s not resolve the issue be fore
us . In a

n e ff or t to re so lve our u

nc e rt a int y c on c e rn ingthe e xiste nc e of a state mand ate to enfor ce state pena l law, we dir ecte d the par ties to consider whe ther Ne w York City Charter § 4 35 (a ) c on sti tut e s su c h a mand ate . It pr ov ide s: The police depar

tment and forc e shall have the power and it shall be their duty

to . . . enfor ce a

nd preve nt the violation of all laws and or dinance s in force in the city ; and for the se purpose s to arre st all persons guilty of violating any

law or or din anc e fo r t

he su pp re ssi on or punis hme nt o f c ri me s o r o ff e ns e s.In the 1936 Charter , Section 435(a) was simply Section 435. 7 15 This provision was approve d by the voters of

New Y ork City

in 1936 as part of

their appr oval of a
c ha rt e r p ro po se d b y

the Ne w Y or

k Ci ty Cha rt e r R e vis ion

Commis sio n. Se e L a

ur e nc e Ar no ld Tanzer, The New Y ork City Charter 1-2 (1937)
. The a

uthority to propose the c harte r wa s 7 deleg ated to the Ne w York City Charter Revision Com mission by the state leg islature, L . 1934,
c h. 86 7, a ft e r t

he Ne w Y or

k Co ns tit uti on wa s ame nd e d to a llo w the state to d e le g ate c e rt a in leg islative powers to municipalities and to prohibit the state f rom leg islating in these a rea s of “home r ule.” See Mooney

v. Cohen, 272 N.Y. 33, 37 (1936) . Section 435 derive s from Section 315 of an e arlier

char ter e nacte d for Ne w York City by New Y ork State. Tanzer at 353. Section 315 of the Gr eate r Ne w York Char ter, Chapter

378, L aws of 1897 pr ovided that the police depar tment had the duty

to “enf orce and pre vent the violation of all laws a nd ordinanc es in forc e in said city .” L etter f

rom Elizabeth I . Fr eedma n, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Cit y of Ne w York, to the Court 2 (July 13, 2007). Th e City argue s th at be c a

us e Se c tio n 4 35 (a ) d e ri ve s f ro m st ate -e na c te d Se c tio n 3 15 , it “ is

. . . a g e ne ra lize d St ate po lic y , n ot a mun ic ipa l e na c tme nt. ” I d. Ho we ve r, the City a lso steadfa stly

ref uses to deny

that it lacks ca se-by -ca se discre tion in determining whether to enforc e
any pa rt ic ula r p e na l st atut e and

su g g e sts that it

c an ma ke po lic y de c isi on s a

bo ut whic h s tatut e s to
e nf or c e in t he c ours e of

a llo c atin gits re so ur c e s. F oc us ingon the c ha rt e r p ro vis ion

a s it e xists tod ay and no t on its his tor y , V ive s c on te nd s th at it

c ann ot b e vie we d a s a

mand ate fr om t

he state beca use it was adopte d by

the voters of

the City
. In light of the unclea

r ca se law a

nd the par ties’ diffe ringpositions on S ection 435(a ), the centr al question of whe ther the City is mandated by

New Y ork State to enfor ce a ll penal lawsAs we e xpla ine d in Vi ve s I I , Se c tio n 2 40 .3 0( 1) is n ot “ ‘s o g ro ssl y and fl a g ra ntl y 8 un con st it ut io nal th at a ny

pers on of r easo nab le p rud ence w ou ldbe b ou ndto see i ts fl aws .’” 4 05 F. 3 d at 1 1 8 ( qu o ti n gCo n n e c ti c ut e x r e l B lume n th a l v
. Cr o tt y , 3 4 6 F
. 3 d

8 4 , 1 0 3 ( 2 d

Ci r . 2 0 0 3 )
. We there fore leave for a

nother da y the question of whe ther c erta in statutes that might technic ally be on the bo ok s— fo r e xamp le , a nti -m isc e g e natio n la

ws —a re so ob vio us ly

and de e ply unconstitutional that the mere f act of their enf orce ment g ives rise to a stronginfere nce that the mun ic ipa lity

mus t ha ve ma de a

“ c on sc iou s c ho ic e ” to e nf or c e the m. 16 rema ins unresolved. We would bene fit—and we believe the district court would as we ll—from the Ne w Y or

k So lic ito r G e ne ra l’ s v ie w o f t he ob lig atio n o f t

he Ne w Y or

k Po lic e De pa

rtme nt t o
e nf or c e the Pe na l L aw. F ur

the r, the state ha s a

n inte re st i n th is q

ue sti on that is no t a de qu ate ly
re pr e se nte d b y

e ith e r o f t

he pa rt ie s. Vi ve s, of

c ours e , s e e ks to m a ximize the City ’s pe rm iss ibl e dis c re tio n. An d, wh ile it m ay be in t he City ’s int e re st i n th is c a se to c la im that it ha s a n o ve ra ll duty to e nf or c e the pe na l la

w, it m ig ht n ot b e in i ts i nte re st g e ne ra lly to a rgue that it s d isc re tio n is constraine d. Since the City ’s appa rent c oncession on this point may not be def

initive, we expect
on rema nd that the district court a s well as the pa rties would welc ome the views of the New York Solicitor Genera l on this i ssue. II. Conscious Ch oice We h ave he ld t od ay

that a mun ic ipa lity

c ann ot b e he ld l ia

ble sim ply fo r c ho os ingto enfor ce the entire Pena l L aw. In light of that holding, we must know whether the City went 8 beyond a g ener al policy

of enf orcingthe Penal L aw to foc us on Section 240.30(1). Sec tion 435(a) on its face establishes that the City has a g ener al policy

of enf orcingstate pena l law. This is not
e no ug h. Ho we ve r, the re is s ome e vid e nc e —a lbe it n ot c on c lus ive e vid e nc e —th at th e City did
make a c on sc iou s c ho ic e to e nf

or c e Se c tio n 2 40 .3 0( 1) in a n unc on sti tut ion a l ma

nn e r. Th is evidenc e is in the form of e x amples of how a n individual can violate Sec tion 240.30(1) that ar e contained in police depar tment training manuals issued to prospec tive police off icer s.“[T] he author ity to make municipal policy is nece ssarily

the authority

to make fina l 9 policy . When an offic ial’s discre tionary decisions ar e constra ined by policies not of that officia l’s making , those policies, rather than the subordinate’ s depar tures fr om them, are the ac t of the municipality . Simi larly , when a subordinate’ s decision is subject to revie w by the municipality ’s authorized policy maker s, they

have r etained the authority to measure the officia l’s conduct f

or conf ormanc e with their policies. I f the a uthorized policy

maker s approve a subordinate’ s decision and the ba sis for it, their ratific ation would be cha rg eable to the municipality

beca use their de cision is final.” St. L ouis v. Prapotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion) (interna l citation omitt ed). 17 F or ins tanc e , o ne manu a l sa

y s: J ohn, intending to a

nnoy Ann, sends her

anony mous letters in which he c alls her “fat” and “ ug ly .” The letters annoy Ann. J ohn has committed Ag g ravated Har assment 2nd Degree .” An oth e r e xamp le re a ds : John , inte nd ingto a

nn oy a fe ma le , s e nd s h e r a

no ny mou s le tte rs in whic h h e c a lls her a “whor e,”a

“prostitute,” a

nd a “bitch.” The fe male is annoyed by the letters. Johnha s c omm itt e d A g g ra vate d H ara ssm e nt 2 nd

De g re e . John c ou ld b e pr op e rl y char g ed with Ag g ravated Har assment 2nd Degree beca use he intende d to annoy

the fe ma le by se nd inghe r t

ho se ano ny

mou s le tte rs . In g iving these examples, the Poli ce D epar tment put flesh on the bones of Sec tion 240.30(1) and appar ently

instructed off

icer s that they

could make a

rre sts for constitutionally protec ted conduc t. We s ay “ a pp are ntl y ” be c a

us e the re is muc h th at w e sti ll d o n ot k no w a bo ut t he se manu a ls —including who wrote the m, how policy makingofficia ls view them, to what e x tent they have 9 been use d to train or assist offic ers, a nd whether

any additional documents or dire ctives circ ulated within the depar

tment limi t their application in these circumstanc es. These are all issues to be explored on remand. We unde rscor e that the manua ls are simply one indication of de partmenta l policy —and ther efor e Vives r emains fr ee to a dvance other e vidence and ar g uments establishing that the City

made a conscious choic e to enf

orce the statute in an unc onstitut ional manner
. III. Causation18

Resolution of the policy

issue should also resolve the issue of causation. Rely ing principally

on Boa rd of County

Commi ssioners of B ry an County v. Br own, 520 U.S. 397 (1997), the City urg es that the violation of Vives’ s constitutional rights was not c aused by its int entional act. Rathe r, the City

contends, the injury

to Vives was a

result of a ctions taken by the ac tors who have immunity

in this case—the state , which ena cted Sec tion 240.30, and the individual office rs. Whil e we ag ree that Br

y an County

sets out the appropr iate test for deter mining whe ther a municipal action ca

used a c onstitut ional injury , we disagree with the City ’s claim that application of the B ry an County

test to the fac ts of this case doe s not allow a findingthat the City ’s policy
c a us e d V ive s’ s in

jur y . In B ryan Co un ty , th e a lle g e d mu nic ipa l a c tio n w a s a

sh e ri ff ’s de c isi on

to hire a relative, Stacy

Bur ns, without subjecting him to an ade quate ba ckg round che ck. B ry an County , 520 U.S. at 401. Bur ns, who had be en convic ted of misdemea nors includingassault and battery , later a lleg edly

used excessive for ce a g ainst the plaintiff, Ji ll Brown. See id. at 400-01. There was no a lleg ation that Br y an County

had a policy

of fa iling to scre en applica nts or one of using e x cessive f

orce . Rather, B rown soug ht to hold the county liable base d on the sherif f’s sin g le a c t of

fa ili ngto p ro pe rl y

sc re e n B ur

ns ’s ba c kg ro un d. Th e B ryan Co un ty Court c are fu lly dis tin g uis he d b e tw e e n th e sit uatio n p re se nte d to it a

nd a sit uatio n in wh ic h a mun ic ipa lity

is
a l l e g e d t o h av e f o r mu l at e d a p o l i c y. In th e f

i r s ti n s t an c e i n v o l v i n ga

s i n g l e a c t i o nb y a policy maker , the Court held that “r igor ous standards of culpability

and ca usation must be applied to e ns ur e that th e mun ic ipa lity is n ot h e ld l ia

ble so le ly fo r t he a c tio ns of

its e mpl oye e .” 52 0 U .S. at 405. Howe ver, the Court also car efully noted that wher e “a

plaintiff claims that a pa

rticular municipal action itself violates fe dera l law, or dire cts an e mploy ee to do so,” the alleg ation rende rs “issues of f

ault and ca

usation straig htforwa

rd.” I d. at 404 (sec ond emphasis adde d); see19

Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Har

tford, 361 F .3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2004) (“ Monell established that a lle g ingthat a

mun ic ipa l po lic y

or or din anc e is i tse lf

un c on sti tut ion a l is a lw ay s su ff ic ie nt t o establish the nec essar

y causa l connec tion between the municipality and the c onstitut ional deprivation, because an employ ee’ s act of e nforc ing a n unconstitutional muni cipal policy may be considere d the ac t of the municipality itself.”). The Br

y an County

Court also said: “Simil arly , the conclusion that the a ction taken or direc ted by

the municipality

or its authorized decisionmaker itself violates fede ral lawwill also determine that the municipa l action was the moving f orce behind the injury

of which the plaintiff complains.” 520 U .S. at 405. In li g ht o f B ryan Co un ty

and Amne sty Am e ri c a , th e ans we r t o th e c a us atio n in qu ir

y mus t flow fr om the district court’s una ppeale d holding that Sec tion 240.30 is unconstit utional, and the deter mination—y et to be def

initively made—of

whether a City policy maker made a conscious choice to instruct office rs to enfor ce Sec tion 240.30(1) when the City was not re quired to do so. CO NC LU SION For the re asons we ha

ve discussed, w e vac ate a nd rema nd in order that the district court may solicit briefingfrom the Solicitor Gene ral on whe ther state la w imposes an oblig ation on the City to enforc e Section 240.30(1) and cla rify the re lationship between the manuals and de partment po lic y . A ft e r t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

iss ue s it s n e w o pin ion , e ith e r p art y may re sto re jur isd ic tio n to thi s court by filing a copy of the district cour

t’s new opinion with this court. See United States v. Jac ob so n, 15 F .3 d 1 9, 22 (2 d Ci r. 19 94 ). Up on re c e ipt of that de c isi on , th e Cle rk

sh a ll s e t a
sc he du le fo r s ub mis sio n o f a su pp le me nta l jo int

a pp e nd ix an d b ri e fs
.