Filed 10/30/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SIX 

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

VINCENT MEDRANO, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

2d Crim. No. B324567

(Super. Ct. No. CR28216) 

(Ventura County)

Vincent Medrano again appeals an order denying his Penal 

Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.1 The order was 

made at the prima facie stage of the proceedings. This is his 

second petition for resentencing. 

In 1991 appellant was convicted of two counts of first 

degree murder with a multiple-death special-circumstances 

finding (§§ 187, 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), two counts of attempted 

first degree murder (§§ 664/187, 189), and one count of conspiracy 

to commit first degree murder (§ 182). The jury found true 

allegations that a principal in the commission of the offenses had 

been armed with a firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) Appellant 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 

was sentenced to prison for 50 years to life plus one year for a 

firearm enhancement. In 1994 we affirmed the judgment in an 

unpublished opinion, People v. Medrano (Jul. 26, 1994, B065832). 

 In 2019 appellant filed his first section 1172.6 petition. 

After issuing an order to show cause, the trial court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d). 

The trial court denied the petition, and we affirmed in People v. 

Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, hereafter referred to as 

“Medrano” or “our 2021 opinion.” We held “that section [1172.6] 

relief is unavailable to a petitioner [such as appellant] 

concurrently convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to 

commit first degree murder where both convictions involve the 

same victim” because the “[c]onviction of conspiracy to commit 

first degree murder shows, as a matter of law, that the ‘target 

offense’ is murder . . . .” (Id. at p. 179.)

 In the present appeal we conclude that the above holding is 

the law of the case and conclusively establishes at the prima facie 

stage that appellant is not entitled to resentencing based on his 

second 1172.6 petition. Accordingly, we again affirm. 

 Our conclusion may be at variance with the holding of 

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50 (Harden): “[P]rior 

to [an evidentiary] hearing under section [1172.6], subdivision 

(d)(3), the law-of-the-case doctrine cannot conclusively establish 

disentitlement [to relief under section 1172.6].” We explain below 

why the holding of Harden is inapplicable here. 

Facts 

 The following facts are taken verbatim from Medrano, 

supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 179: Appellant and Carlos Vargas 

purchased a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle. Appellant “scored” 

the “tip” of the rifle’s bullets in the belief that “the scoring would 
3 

make the bullets more explosive.” As overt act No. 7 underlying 

the conspiracy charge, the jury found that appellant, Vargas, 

Edward Throop, and Joseph Scholle “discussed among 

themselves committing a drive-by shooting.” Vargas drove them 

to Cabrillo Village in Ventura County. “Throop held the rifle and 

sat in the back seat next to appellant.” Throop pointed the rifle 

out the window and fired multiple shots at a group of people 

attending a baptism party. As Vargas drove away, Scholle 

shouted the names of rival gangs. Two men attending the 

baptism party died of gunshot wounds. Two other men were shot 

but survived. 

Our 2021 Medrano Opinion 

 In our 2021 opinion we concluded: “The prosecutor met his 

burden [at the evidentiary hearing] of proving, ‘beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that [appellant] is ineligible for resentencing.’ 

(§ [1172.6], subd. (d)(3).) Appellant’s conviction of conspiracy to 

commit first degree murder rendered him ineligible as a matter 

of law. The conviction established that he had not been 

‘convicted of . . . [first degree] murder under a natural and 

probable consequences theory.’ (§ [1172.6], subd. (a).) He was 

convicted of first degree murder under a direct aiding and 

abetting theory, i.e., he knew and shared the murderous intent of 

the actual perpetrator, Throop.” (Medrano, supra, 68 

Cal.App.5th at p. 186.) 

Section 1172.6 and Its Legislative History 

 Section 1172.6 was added to the Penal Code by Senate Bill 

No. 1437 and became effective on January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, 

ch. 1015, § 4.) Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) originally provided, 

“A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural 

and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the 
4 

court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s 

murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any 

remaining counts when” certain conditions apply. 

Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.6 was amended by 

Senate Bill No. 775 (S.B. 775). (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) S.B. 

775 added the following ground for relief to section 1172.6, 

subdivision (a): the petitioner’s murder conviction was pursuant 

to a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person based 

solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” S.B. 775 also 

amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to expand eligibility for 

resentencing to persons convicted of “attempted murder under 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” 

After a section 1172.6 petition is filed, “the court shall hold 

a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima 

facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie 

showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall 

issue an order to show cause.” (Id., subd. (c).) 

If an order to show cause is issued, the court shall conduct 

an evidentiary hearing to determine the petitioner’s eligibility for 

relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the evidentiary hearing, the 

burden is on the People “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder . . . .” 

(Id., subd. (d)(3).) 

Guidelines for Conducting the Prima Facie Hearing 

“While the trial court may look at the record of 

conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a 

prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry 

under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie 

inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘“the court takes 

petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary 
5 

assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to 

relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court 

must issue an order to show cause.”’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 

Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) 

“Appellate opinions . . . are generally considered to be part 

of the record of conviction. [Citation.] However, . . . the probative 

value of an appellate opinion is case-specific, and ‘it is certainly 

correct that an appellate opinion might not supply all answers.’” 

(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) 

“In sum, the parties can, and should, use the record of 

conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a 

petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under [section 

1172.6], subdivision (c).” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972, fn. 

omitted.) “The record of conviction will necessarily inform the 

trial court's prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing 

the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those 

that are clearly meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.)

The Second Section 1172.6 Petition

 Appellant filed this second section 1172.6 petition after the 

effective date of the amendment of that section by S.B. 775. In 

the trial court he asserted, “This petition is based on S.B. 775, 

which amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to include [as 

grounds for relief], in addition to felony-murder or murder under 

the [natural and probable consequences] doctrine, any ‘other 

theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on 

that person’s participation in a crime.’” Appellant argued that he 

had made a prima facie showing that he was convicted of murder 

pursuant to a theory under which malice had been imputed to 

him based solely on his participation in the drive-by shootings. 

In addition, he argued that he had made a prima facie showing 
6 

that he was convicted of both murder and attempted murder 

under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Relying 

on Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45, appellant contended the 

law of the case doctrine was inapplicable at the prima facie stage 

of a section 1172.6 proceeding. 

The People’s Opposition and the Trial Court’s Ruling 

 In opposition to appellant’s second section 1172.6 petition, 

the People argued that our holding in Medrano, supra, 68 

Cal.App.5th 177, is the law of the case. In denying the second 

petition, the trial court explained, “[B]ased on the reasoning o[f] 

the appellate opinion, specifically with regards to the conviction 

for conspiracy, I will find that the petition is barred, as a matter 

of law.” 

The Law of the Case Doctrine 

“‘“The doctrine of the law of the case is this: That where, 

upon an appeal, the [reviewing] court, in deciding the appeal, 

states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the 

decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and 

must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in 

the lower court and upon subsequent appeal, and . . . in any 

subsequent suit for the same cause of action . . . .”’ The principle 

applies to criminal as well as civil matters [citations] . . . .” 

(People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786.) “We will apply the 

law of the case doctrine where the point of law involved . . . was 

 ‘“actually presented and determined by the court.”’” (People v. 

Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 197.) But “the doctrine will not be 

adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision, 

e.g., where there has been a ‘manifest misapplication of existing 

principles resulting in substantial injustice’ [citation], or the 

controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a 
7 

decision or [statutory amendment] intervening between the first 

and second appellate determinations [citation].’” (Stanley, supra, 

at p. 787.)

Applicability of the Law of the Case Doctrine at 

the Prima Facie Stage of a Section 1172.6 Proceeding 

Appellant claims the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable 

at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 proceeding. He relies 

on Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45. There, the Court of Appeal 

held: “At the prima facie stage of an [1172.6] proceeding, it is of 

course impossible to know what the evidence will ultimately be at 

an evidentiary hearing that has not yet occurred. We thus agree 

with Harden that prior to a hearing under section [1172.6], 

subdivision (d)(3), the law-of-the-case doctrine cannot 

conclusively establish disentitlement [to relief under section 

1172.6].” (Id. at p. 50. 

The Court of Appeal credited Harden’s argument, which 

was as follows: “[The] law of the case [doctrine] cannot be invoked 

where there is a ‘“substantial difference in the evidence”’ on 

retrial of the particular issue. [Citation.] . . . [I]f at [an 

evidentiary] hearing under subdivision (d) of section [1172.6], the 

evidence material to [Harden’s] role in the murder were 

substantially the same [as the evidence in Harden’s 2001 trial], 

then law-of-the-case principles would compel the same legal 

conclusion to be drawn, i.e., that she was the actual killer. But if 

the evidence were materially different on that issue, . . . [the] law

of the case [doctrine] would not apply. This is because law of the 

case ‘controls the outcome on retrial only to the extent the 

evidence is substantially the same.’ [Citation.] Where ‘“there is a 

substantial difference in the evidence to which the [announced] 

principle of law is applied, . . . the [doctrine] may not be 
8 

invoked.”’” (Harden, supra, at p. 50; see People v. Boyer (2006) 38 

Cal.4th 412, 442 [“the law-of-the-case doctrine governs only the 

principles of law laid down by an appellate court, as applicable to 

a retrial of fact, and it controls the outcome on retrial only to the 

extent the evidence is substantially the same. [Citation.] The 

doctrine does not limit the new evidence a party may introduce 

on retrial”].) 

Appellant asserts, “Harden precludes the court from 

invoking the law of the case doctrine at the prima facie stage 

because it is unclear what the evidence will be at an evidentiary 

hearing that has yet to occur. [Appellant] may present evidence 

at the evidentiary hearing that contradicts [this court’s] 

conclusion [in our 2021 opinion] that [he] harbored an intent to 

kill.” 

The holding in Harden should be limited to prohibiting 

application of the law of the case doctrine at a prima facie 

hearing where the appellate court’s prior determination 

concerned the sufficiency of the evidence at the petitioner’s trial. 

The issue in Harden was whether the doctrine should apply to 

the Court of Appeal’s determination in an earlier opinion (People 

v. Harden (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 848) that “there was 

insufficient evidence [at the trial] to sustain a finding that 

Harden’s role was anything other than that of [the] actual killer.” 

(Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 50.) At an evidentiary 

hearing conducted pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d), 

Harden would have had the opportunity to introduce new 

evidence showing that she was not the actual killer. Therefore, 

the sufficiency of the evidence determination in the earlier 

opinion in Harden could not be the law of the case at the prima 

facie stage of Harden’s section 1172.6 petition. 
9 

Unlike Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45, in Medrano, 

supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 177, we were not concerned with an 

appellate court’s prior determination of the sufficiency of the 

evidence at appellant’s trial. Instead, we were concerned with 

the effect of the jury’s finding that appellant was guilty of both 

first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree 

murder. We enunciated the following principle of law: “[S]ection 

[1172.6] relief is unavailable to a petitioner concurrently 

convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first 

degree murder where both convictions involve the same victim” 

because the “[c]onviction of conspiracy to commit first degree 

murder shows, as a matter of law, that the ‘target offense’ is 

murder . . . .” (Id. at p. 179.) This principle of law necessarily 

applies where, as here, the petitioner has also been concurrently 

convicted of attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to 

commit first degree murder and both convictions involve the 

same victim. 

At a section 1172.6, subdivision (d) evidentiary hearing, 

appellant could not introduce new evidence that would affect the 

validity of the principle of law enunciated in our 2021 Medrano

opinion. This is the key distinction between Medrano and 

Harden. Unlike appellant, the petitioner in Harden theoretically 

could have introduced new evidence to controvert the appellate 

court’s prior determination that, based on the evidence 

introduced at trial, she must have been the actual killer. Thus, 

in contrast to Harden, the principle of law enunciated in our 2021 

opinion is the law of the case. 

This principle of law was not altered by S.B. 775’s 

amendment of section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to expand eligibility 

to persons convicted of murder pursuant to a “theory under which 
10

malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s 

participation in a crime.” (Ibid., italics added.) A person cannot 

be convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder based on 

such “imputed” malice. We noted in Medrano, supra, 68 

Cal.App.5th at p. 184: “According to an instruction given before 

the jury started its deliberations (CALJIC No. 6.10), it could 

convict appellant of conspiracy to commit first degree murder 

only if it found he had acted ‘with the specific intent to agree to 

commit the public offense of first degree murder and with the 

further specific intent to commit such offense.’ In view of this 

instruction, the conspiracy conviction shows that the jury found 

appellant had specifically intended to commit first degree 

murder.” Appellant cannot relitigate this issue. “[A] section 

[1172.6] petition is not a means by which a [petitioner] can 

relitigate issues already decided.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 

Cal.App.5th 539, 549.) 

As to the requisite intent for conspiracy to commit first 

degree murder, the CALJIC instruction given to the jury at 

appellant’s trial is consistent with current CALCRIM No. 563, 

which requires the People to prove that the defendant, 

personally, intended to kill the victim. Each charge and 

conviction for a separate count stands or falls on its own. (People 

v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1651, 1657.) Thus, even if there 

were some instructional error as to the murder and attempted 

murder counts, it could not be used to impeach the jury’s finding 

of intent to kill as to the conspiracy count. This finding is as true 

today as it was in 1991 when the jury returned its guilty verdicts. 
11

Appellant’s Claim that Law of the Case Doctrine Does 

Not Apply Because Our 2021 Medrano Opinion 

Conflicts with Our Earlier Medrano Opinion

 Appellant argues, “[T]he law of the case doctrine should not 

apply at all in this case [because we] rendered two irreconcilable 

opinions on the issue of whether the jury found that [he had] 

harbored the specific intent to kill.” The two opinions – our 2021 

opinion and the earlier opinion – are not in conflict. In our 2021 

opinion we rejected appellant’s similar contention. We noted that 

in our earlier opinion “[w]e did not consider whether, by 

convicting appellant of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, 

the jury necessarily found that he had harbored the specific 

intent to kill.” (Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 186.)

Application of the Law of the Case Doctrine 

Will Not Result in an Unjust Decision 

 Appellant has not shown that, by applying the law of the 

case doctrine, we would be shutting our eyes to a manifest 

misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial 

injustice. As our Supreme Court observed: “‘[A]ll conspiracy to 

commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit premeditated 

and deliberated first degree murder.’” (People v. Beck & Cruz

(2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 641-642.) “[A] conviction of conspiracy to 

commit murder requires a finding of intent to 

kill . . . .” (People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607.)

Disposition 

 The order denying appellant’s second section 1172.6 

petition for resentencing is affirmed. 
12

 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. 

YEGAN, J. 

We concur: 

GILBERT, P. J. 

BALTODANO, J.
Michele M. Castillo, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, William Quest, Snr. 

Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.