The other defe ndant in this suit is Thomas D. Walsh, I nc., the mana g ement compa ny 1 for the pr operty

wher e Milloy

and the c hildren lived. F ELE CIA TAYLOR, ind ividu ally and as le ga l gu ar dia n of he r m ino r c hildr e n D. B. and T .B., P la in t if f,
v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., De fend ant s. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Ci vi l A cti on 08 -00 57 8 (H HK)

MEMORAN DUM OP IN ION Fe lecia T aylor, individually and on beha lf of two childre n, D.B . and T.B ., who ar e in her
car e, bring s this action ag ainst the District of Columbia and a numbe r of its employ ees (“ Di str ic t” ), Annie Mil loy , th e c hil dr e n’ s f or me r f os te r c are pr ov ide r ( “ Mil loy” ), and Luc ill e Hicks, one of

the owner s of the prope rty wher e Milloy

and the c hildren lived bef ore the children
wer e re moved. Taylor asser ts claims ag ainst the District under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 alleging 1 violations of D.B. a

nd T.B.’ s constitutional rights, and c laims ag ainst Hicks asser ting c ommonlaw tort ca

uses of a ction. Arguing that the court may not exercise supplementa l jurisdiction over the common-law claims broug ht ag ainst her, Hic ks moves to dismi ss this sui t (as ag ainst her) for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction [#50] . Upon consider ation of the motion, the opposition thereto, and the
rec ord of this ca se, the c ourt conc ludes that the motion should be gr anted.2 I. BACKG ROUND Pertinent to the instant motion, and accor ding to Ta ylor’s complaint, the c ircumstance s g iving r ise to this sui t are as follows. In May 2000, the District re moved D.B . and T.B . from the custody of their birth mother out of conce rn for

their hea lth and welfa

re. The following month, the y we re pla c e d into f

os te r c are wi th d e fe nd ant M ill oy . Wh ile the c hil dr e n w e re liv ingwi th Milloy , the District re g ularly tested their blood lea d levels, which showe d “sustained blood lea d levels for 2-4 times the upper

normal limits.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 29. In September 2002, the District conducte d a lea d inspection test that confirme d that there
wer e lea d-base d paints in Mill oy ’s re sidence . The followingmonth, Mil loy and Hicks r ece ived a written “N otice of D efe ct” infor ming them that “ lead- based pa ints [ had] been identified on [the] proper ty ,” and dir ectingthem to corre ct the lea d-base d paint hazard within 10 day s of the notice. Id . ¶ 33. Tay

lor alleg es that D.B . and T.B . suffe red injuries a s a re sult of the failure of the
owner s and mana g er of

the prope rty

to corre ct the lea d hazard at Mill oy ’s re sidence and the failure of the District to re quire c ompliance with the Notice of De fec t. Around Mar ch 2003, in re sponse to alleg ations that D.B. a nd T.B. ha d been inappropriately

exposed to sex ual ac tivity by Milloy and sexually

assaulted while in he r ca re, the District remove d D.B . and T.B . from Milloy ’s ca re a nd place d them with Taylor, with whom they prese ntly reside. T aylor filed this suit in t he Superior Court f or the District of Columbia, and it was re moved to this court based on the District’s notice that this court ha s fede ral que stion jurisdiction. Taylor’s complaint asse rts District of Columbia common-law c laims of neg lige nce, g ross neg lige nce, a

nd brea ch of the implied warra nty of habitability

ag ainst Hicks (“ state-law claims”), a

nd cause s of ac tion based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ag ainst the District.In h e r o pp os iti on br ie f a s w e ll a s d

ur ingor a l argume nt, Ta

ylor argue s f or the fi rs t ti me 2 that irrespe ctive of the court’s a bility to exercise supplementa l jurisdiction over her state-law claims ag ainst Hicks, the cour t never theless has diver sity

jurisdiction in thi s case . The c ourt reje cts this argument beca use, amongother possible re asons, Tay lor did not alleg e fa cts that establish diversity

jurisdiction in her complaint. Se e J un g v . A ss’n o

f A m. Me d. Col ls. , 3 00 F. Supp. 2d 119, 163 (D.D.C. 2004) (“ [T] he Court [will not] permit plaintiffs to supplement the . . . alleg ations in their complaint with additional assertions from their brief. It is ax iomatic that the complaint may

not be amende d by

the brief s in oppositi on to a motion to dis miss.”) (interna l citation omitted). On May 12, 2009, following the ora l argument, Taylor filed a “Notice of Filing ,” in which she states that “on Ma y 4, 2009, Plaintiffs, D.B. a nd T.B. w ere adopted by Plaintiff Fele cia Ta

ylor, . . . , and a ccor dingly are now, if not prior to their a doption, citiz ens of the state of Ma

ryland . . . .” [#91]. Tay lor’s “N otice of F iling” doe s not affe ct the outcome of this mot ion beca

use “[d]i versity

of citizenship is assessed at the time the suit is filed.” Se e Bu sh v. Butler , 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (2007) ( citing Freeport-M cMoRan, I

nc. v. K N Energy

, Inc. , 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991)). 3 II. AN AL YSI S Hicks moves to dismiss t his case a g ainst her on the grounds that this court lacks subjec t matter jurisdiction. Hicks ar g ues that this court ca nnot exercise supplementa l jurisdiction over Taylor’s state- law cla ims because the fa cts that g ive rise to these claims do not form par t of the
same c ase or

controve rsy

that g ives rise to Tay

lor’s fe dera l claims. In the alter native, Hicks argues that if the c ourt finds that it may exercise suppleme ntal jurisdiction over the state- law claims, the cour

t should neverthele ss decline to exerc ise supplemental jurisdiction beca use the state -l aw c la ims su

bs tanti a lly

pr e do min ate ov e r t

he fe de ra l c la ims . B e c a

us e Hi c ks ’ f

ir st
argume nt i s c or

re c t, t he c ourt ne e d n ot a

nd do e s n ot a dd

re ss H ic ks ’ a lte rn ativ e argume nt. 2 Under the J udicial Improvements Ac t, a district court may exercise suppleme ntal jurisdiction over state- law cla ims that are “ so relate d to the [federa l claims] t hey form par t of the
same c ase or

controve rsy .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) . In order for a fede ral c laim and a state -law claim to form par

t of the “sa

me ca se or c ontroversy ,” the c laims must derive from a “common nucleus of ope rative f

act.” United Mine W

orkers v . Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Cla ims4

derive from a “ common nucleus of ope rative f act” only if the plaintiff would ordina rily be expected to try

them all in one judicial proc eeding
. Id . I f there is almost no factual or le g al overla p betwee n the state a

nd fede ral c laims, a common nucleus of operative fac t does not exi st. Che lse a Co nd

o. Un it O wne rs A ss’n v . 1 81 5 A St. , Co nd o. Grou p, LLC , 468 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 (D.D.C. 2007). Hicks ar g ues that a c ommon nucleus of oper ative fa ct does not exist here bec ause the claims ag ainst her a

nd the claims ag ainst the other de fenda nts require a “muc h differ ent leg al and fac tual analy sis.” Hicks’ Mot. to Dismiss at 9. Hicks points out t hat claims ag ainst her stem solely from the pr esenc e of a

lead- based pa int hazard on the prope rty that she owns with others. In contra st, the fede ral c laims ag ainst the District involve (1) whether the District was de ficient in its selection, training , supervision, and re tention of social wor kers a nd foster c are licensing
a g e nts , a nd (2 ) whe the r t

he Di str ic t w a s n e g lig e nt i n p la c ingthe c hil dr e n w ithMil loy in t he fi rs t place and then f

ailing to r emove them whe n the District bec ame a war e of the hazardous conditions in Mil loy ’s household, to wit, the lead- based pa int hazard and the e x posure of the
c hil dr e n to ina

pp ro pr iate se xua l a c tiv ity and se xua l a ssa

ult
. Taylor rejoins that the fa cts of the c ase w arr ant a de termination that the cour t may exercise suppleme ntal jurisdiction over the c laims ag ainst Hicks. The c ase upon which Tay lor primarily relies , Morgan v. Barry

, 785 F. Supp. 187 (D.D .C. 1992), howeve r, provides sc ant support for he r position. I n Morgan , the plaintiff sued D istrict police offic ers unde r § 1983 and various common-la

w theorie s for wr ong fully evictingher f

rom her home
. Id . at 189. In denying the def endants’ motion to dismiss the common-lawtort claims for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction, the court found the e x erc ise of supplementa l jurisdiction appropriate be cause the5

plaintiff’s common-la

w claims and § 1983 c laims both arose fr om “one se t of events” —specific ally , the dispossession and eviction of the pla intiff. Id. at 192. Tay lor argues that simil ar to the f

acts in Morgan , a common nucle us of oper ative fa ct exist s in the case at bar beca use both the fe dera l claims and state- law cla ims stem from one eve nt: the exi stence of a haz ardo us env ir on men t at th e pro pert y th at r esu lt ed i n i nj uri es t o D. B. an d T .B. Taylor’s cha

rac terization of the fa cts that g ive rise to both the state- law cla ims and the fede ral c laims as a sing le set of e vents as in Morgan fa ils . T he re is l itt le do ub t th at T aylor ’s § 1983 claims and state- law cla ims both derive from the e x istence of a lea d-base d paint hazard at the pr op e rt

y . T his , h ow e ve r, is the e xtent of the c omm on a lit ie s b e tw e e n th e state -l aw c la ims raised a g ainst Hicks and the § 1983 c laims raised a g ainst the District. The e vents that trig g er liability for Hic ks and for

the District ar e complete ly separ ate: Hicks’ liability stems from an alleg ed fa ilure to reme dy

the lead- based pa int hazard, wher eas the District’s liability stems from its a lle g e d f

a ilure to c omp e l H ic ks to r e me dy the le a d- ba se d p a int

ha zar d, or

mor e g e ne ra lly , to keep D .B. a

nd T.B. sa fe f

rom harm. Ta

ylor’s state- law cla ims ag ainst Hicks involve fa cts such as whe ther Hic ks knew a

bout the lead- based pa int hazard, and whe ther she, a s an owne r (but not the manag er) of the prope rty , had a duty to remedy

the lead- based pa int hazard, and if so, what steps she took to remedy

the hazard. In contra st, Taylor’s cla ims ag ainst the District depe nd on fac ts that will show whether the D istrict knew of the lead- based pa int hazard, and whe ther the duty of ca re ow ed to D.B . and T.B . require d the District to compel the mana g er a nd owner s of the prope rty , including H icks, to remedy the lead- based pa int hazard or take other a ctions to keep D.B . and T.B . from beingexposed to the lead-ba sed paint hazard. Although T aylor’s fe dera l and state-la w claims g ener ally

relate to the pre sence of a le ad-Hicks also ar g ues that a c ommon nucleus of oper ative fa ct does not exist because the 3 e nti rese t of

fa c ts r e late d to Ta

ylor ’s fe de ra l c la ims are no t all re le va nt t o th e state -l aw c la ims , and be c a us e no fe de ra l c la ims are a lle g e d a g a ins t he r. Th e c ourt c on c lud e s th at th e se argume nts la c k me ri t. F ir st, Hi c ks ’ i nte rp re tatio n o f a “ c omm on

nu c le us of

op e ra tiv e fa c t” imp ro pe rl y constricts the a

naly sis for exercisingsupplemental jurisdiction. State-law c laims and fede ral c la ims ne e d n ot d e ri ve fr om t he e xac t sa

me se t of fa c ts i n o rd e r f

or a c ourt to e xer c ise supplemental jurisdiction. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc. , 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 49 (D.D .C. 1999) (“ su pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n is wa rr ante d b e c a

us e the fa c ts und e rl yingthe fe de ra l and state c la ims are simil ar e noug h to cre ate a common nucleus of ope rative f acts” ) (inter

nal quotations omitt ed). Second, whe ther fe dera l claims are alleg ed ag ainst Hicks is of no conse quence beca use the statutory require ments for e x erc ising supplementa l jurisdiction are the same for pa rties that ar e sued for both state and fe dera l claims and those that ar e sued only for state -law c laims. See Exx on Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc

. , 5 45 U. S. 5 46 , 5 59 (2 00 5) (“ [Sec tio n] 13 67 (a ) i s a br oa d ju ri sd ic tio na l g ra

nt, wi th n o d ist inc tio n d

ra wn be tw e e n p e nd e nt- c la im a nd pe nd e nt- pa

rt y case s.”). 6 bas ed p ain t h az ard, th e fact s n eces sary to pro ve t hatth e Di st ri ct b reach ed a dut y of ca re t o D. B. and T.B . would provide little insight into whether Hicks unlawf

ully failed to re medy

the leadbased pa int hazard. See Singh v . GeorgeW ashington Univ. , 3 68 F . Su pp . 2 d 5 8, 72 (D .D .C. 20 05 ) ( c ourt

la c ke d s up ple me nta l juri sd ic tio n o ve r a state de fa

matio n c la im b e c a

us e the fa c ts neede d to prove the de famation claim would provide no insight into the fa cts nee ded to prove the fede ral discr imination claim), rev’d on other grounds , 508 F.3d 1097 ( D.C. Cir. 2007). Acc ording ly , the state a

nd fede ral c laims here do not de rive fr om a common nucleus of operative fac t and the cour

t concludes that it shoul d not exercise supplementa l jurisdiction over the statelaw c la ims a lle g e d a g a ins t H ic ks
. 3 III . C ON CL USI ON F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , H ic ks ’ m oti on to d ism iss [#50 ] is g ra

nte d. An a pp ro pr iate order acc ompanies this memorandum opinion.
Henr y H. Kenne dy , J r. Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge