alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2021320EN.01003001.xml

| 9.8.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 320/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.8.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 320/30

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 25 May 2021 — K. v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

(Case C-325/21)

(2021/C 320/30)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: K.

Respondent: Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Article 29 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180[, p. 31]) be interpreted as meaning that a current transfer time limit, as referred to in Article 29(1) and (2), restarts at the point at which the foreign national, after having obstructed the transfer by a Member State by absconding, lodges a fresh application for international protection in another (in this case, a third) Member State? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must Article 29 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180[, p. 31]) be interpreted as meaning that a current transfer time limit, as referred to in Article 29(1) and (2), restarts at the point at which the foreign national, after having obstructed the transfer by a Member State by absconding, lodges a fresh application for international protection in another (in this case, a third) Member State?

| 2. | If Question 1 must be answered in the negative, must Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, read in the light of recital 19 of that regulation, be interpreted as precluding an applicant for international protection from successfully arguing, in the context of an appeal against a transfer decision, that that transfer cannot proceed because the time limit for a previously agreed transfer between two Member States (in this case, France and Austria) has expired, with the result that the time limit within which the Netherlands can effect the transfer has expired? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If Question 1 must be answered in the negative, must Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, read in the light of recital 19 of that regulation, be interpreted as precluding an applicant for international protection from successfully arguing, in the context of an appeal against a transfer decision, that that transfer cannot proceed because the time limit for a previously agreed transfer between two Member States (in this case, France and Austria) has expired, with the result that the time limit within which the Netherlands can effect the transfer has expired?

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#### Daniel LASKY, Executor of the Estate of Louis Lasky, Deceased, Appellant, v. Pearl GOLDEN, for the use and benefit of Beverly Lasky, Appellee.

No. 71-1268.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 8, 1972.

*71Malspeis, Lococo & Brown and Jay D. Schwartz, North Miami, for appellant.

Nelan. Sweet, Miami Beach, for appel-lee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

HENDRY, Judge.

Appellant is Daniel Lasky, executor of the estate of Louis Lasky, deceased. Louis Lasky was the defendant below who was sued by appellee-plaintiff Pearl Golden, his former wife, in his status as the divorced natural father of the use appellee-plaintiff Beverly Lasky. Appellant seeks review of a judgment styled a “final judgment” entered after a hearing before the circuit court relating to child support.

The “child”, Beverly Lasky, age twenty-six at the time of the hearing, was the daughter of appellee-plaintiff, Pearl Golden and the defendant, Louis Lasky. They were divorced in February 1964. Beverly Lasky was at the time of hearing institutionalized in the South Florida Mental Hospital, suffering from a form of epilepsy and mental problems. She was, prior to the instant hearing, declared incompetent by a Florida court after she had attained her majority. Her mother alleged in this independent action that she was unable to support her daughter but that Mr. Lasky, her divorced husband, was able to do so.

The court ruled, and so recited in the judgment appealed, that proffered evidence of Beverly’s marriage (which she later had annulled) and of her gainful employment with her father prior to the adjudication of her incompetency lacked materiality, and therefore was inadmissible. The court found, and so stated in the judgment, that Beverly was then unable to support herself and, based on Perla v. Perla, Fla.1952, 58 So.2d 689 and Fincham v. Levin, Fla.App.1963, 155 So.2d 883, that her father was liable for her support. See: Farr v. Farr, Fla.App.1971, 249 So.2d 761.

We hold that it was error for the trial court to exclude the proffered evidence. The mental and physical capacity of the daughter before and after she reached her majority and at and during her marriage were material to the court’s determination of whether or not the father’s liability for the support of his daughter should continue after she reached her majority.

For the reasons stated the judgment appealed is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.
259 La. 757

#### Eugene V. WANLESS v. Lawrence P. SMITH.

No. 51597.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 28, 1971.

In re: V. V. Radionoff, Trustee for Eugene V. Wanless, and Mrs. Miriam Gaddes, divorced wife of Eugene V. Wanless applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 248 So.2d 343.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal we find no error of law in the judgment complained of.
EXHIBIT
      32.1





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Whitemark Homes, Inc. (the “Company”)
      on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2006 as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each
      of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby
      certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
      906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:




1.  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2.  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.




Date:November
              14, 2006/s/
              *William
              D. Rigsby*William D. RigsbyChief Executive OfficerDate: November 14, 2006/s/
              *Russ
              Christensen*Russ ChristensenActing Principal Financial
              Officer





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to Whitemark Homes, Inc. and will be retained
      by Whitemark Homes, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
      or its staff upon request.
259 La. 633

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Alton A. BERTHELOT.

No. 51639.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 5, 1971.

In re: Alton A. Berthelot applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and stay order.

Writ denied. There is no error of law in its judgment under relator’s complaints.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

The certification set forth below is hereby made solely for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and may not be relied upon or used for any other purposes.

In connection with the Annual Report of Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Paul J. Mooney, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



| | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 or other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.



|                      |  |  |  |                        
|--------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Dated: August 9, 2007 |  |  |  | /s/ Paul J. Mooney     
|                      |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an
Exhibit to this report and should not be considered filed as a part of this report
#### James E. FRANKLIN v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA et al.

No. 54174.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 14, 1973.

In re: Insurance Company of North America and Borden, Inc. applying for certiorari, or Writ of Review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Calcasieu. 284 So.2d 158.

Writ denied. The result is correct.
#### Milo W. BEKINS et al. v. LINDSAY-STRATHMORE IRRIGATION DISTRICT.

No. 8221.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

April 5, 1937.

W. Coburn Cook, of Turlock, Cal., for appellants.

Hankins & Hankins, of San Francisco, Cal., A. L. Cowell, of Stockton, Cal., and Jas. R. McBride, of Lindsay, Cal., for appellee.

Before WILBUR, GARRECHT, and MATHEWS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of motion of appellants to dispense with printing of transcript, advance cause for hearing, etc., and oral presentation of motion by counsel for respective parties, ordered motion granted, that a decree of reversal providing for remand of cause with instructions to lower court to enter a decree dismissing the cause be filed and entered; mandate of this court to issue as provided in Rule 32.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 280 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 280

Expressing the sense of the House that a schedule should be adopted to 
         require three consecutive 5-day work weeks per month.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 19, 1993

 Mr. Roemer (for himself, Ms. Dunn, Ms. Shepherd, Mr. Allard, and Mr. 
 Fingerhut) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                         the Committee on Rules

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Expressing the sense of the House that a schedule should be adopted to 
         require three consecutive 5-day work weeks per month.

Whereas the profound uncertainty of the current scheduling of legislative 
        activity in the House of Representatives disrupts the legislative 
        process and the efficient workings of the House of Representatives in 
        ways that make changes imperative;
Whereas taxpayer dollars are not being utilized as effectively as they could in 
        the administration of the duties and scheduling of the House of 
        Representatives;
Whereas the current schedule makes it difficult to conduct committee hearings 
        and meetings while the House is in session, disrupting the coordination 
        of legislative activity and the fulfillment of Congress' oversight 
        responsibilities;
Whereas the current schedule often provides inadequate time for the thoughtful 
        consideration of the Nation's important business;
Whereas scheduling floor votes at the beginning and end of the week, having 
        recorded committee attendance and votes, and using computer scheduling 
        could improve committee attendance and reduce conflicts resulting from 
        simultaneous committee meetings; and
Whereas a more predictable and organized schedule would allow Members to use 
        their time more effectively with both their constituents and their 
        families: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that 
a formal schedule should be adopted of three consecutive 5-day work 
weeks for legislative business in Washington, followed by a week in 
which Members may attend to important matters in their districts.

                                 <all>
```
# Official Journal C 201/2010

| | ISSN 1725-2423
  doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2010.201.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 201 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5323 July 2010 |

ISSN 1725-2423

doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2010.201.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 201

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5323 July 2010

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2010/C 201/01 | Explanatory Notes to the Combined Nomenclature of the European Communities | 1 |
| 2010/C 201/02 | Explanatory Notes to the Combined Nomenclature of the European Communities | 2 |
| 2010/C 201/03 | Explanatory Notes to the Combined Nomenclature of the European Communities | 3 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2010/C 201/01

Explanatory Notes to the Combined Nomenclature of the European Communities

1

2010/C 201/02

Explanatory Notes to the Combined Nomenclature of the European Communities

2

2010/C 201/03

Explanatory Notes to the Combined Nomenclature of the European Communities

3

---

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2010/C 201/04 | Euro exchange rates | 4 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2010/C 201/04

Euro exchange rates

4

---

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2010/C 201/05 | Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Tris(2-chloro-1-methylethyl)phosphate originating in the People's Republic of China | 5 |

V   Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

European Commission

2010/C 201/05

Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Tris(2-chloro-1-methylethyl)phosphate originating in the People's Republic of China

5

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
#### William Clayton KNIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. R-202.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 19, 1973.

Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and Thomas C. Turner, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Proápect, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

This cause having been orally argued before the court, the briefs and record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court hereby appealed is affirmed.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ., concur.
#### Jimmy W. ALLBRITTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. R-21.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Aug. 31, 1972.

Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Donald K. Rudser, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The briefs and the record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and the appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921) and Bateh v. State, 208 So.2d 846 (Fla.App.1968).

CARROLL, DONALD K„ Acting C. J., and RAWLS and JOHNSON, J J., concur.
<PAGE>

                                EXHIBIT NO. 11
                                --------------

                    BUREAU OF ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING, INC.
                    -------------------------------------

              CALCULATION OF NET INCOME (LOSS) PER COMMON SHARE
              -------------------------------------------------


                                                Three Months Ended
                                     ----------------------------------------
                                     March 31, 1997            March 31, 1996
                                     --------------            --------------
Net income (loss) as reported on 
 a pro forma consolidated basis       $ 4,002,000               $(1,193,870)
                                      ===========               =========== 

Weighted average number of common
 shares outstanding                     4,616,391                 2,932,891

Stock options and warrants issued
 prior to initial public offering at
 prices less than initial public
 offering price                                 0                     9,715

Other stock options and warrants (a)            0                         0

Common shares assuming full 
 conversion of preferred shares        86,667,166                         0
                                      -----------               ----------- 

Total weighted average common shares
 and equivalent common shares          91,283,557                 2,942,606
                                      ===========               =========== 

Income (loss) per share               $      0.04               $     (0.41)
                                      ===========               =========== 
 
(a)      Stock options and warrants issued subsequent to
         December 31, 1995 were not dilutive and accordingly not 
         considered in the calculation above.
#### JOSEPH JOHNSON *vs.*JACOB BOONE’S Administrator.

If one member of a firm make a payment to one who has an account against him, and also an account against the firm; the creditor must apply the payment to the individual account, unless he can show a consent to have it otherwise applied.

Assumpsit. Pleas, non assumpsit, payment, &c.

The question in the case was as to the application of a payment made on account.

The plaintiff was a ship-chandler, and furnished articles for defendant’s vessels. One of the vessels, the “ Hermit,” belonged to defendant alone; another, the “ Rachel and Sally,” belonged to “ Boone & Brown,” and a third, the “ Eclipse,” belonged to “ Boone, Brown & Tomlinson.” Articles furnished for these vessels were charged to them separately; and payments made, if general, were entered to such account as the plaintiff saw tit. One of the credits to the account of the “ Eclipse,” was of “ cash received of Jacob Boone, by draft on Neall & Barratt, $47 87,” which the defendant contended should be credited to the “ Hermit,” which was Boone’s vessel; the payment appearing to have been made by Boone.

To which it was replied, that all the accounts stood in the name • *173of Boone “ for the several vesselsthat on a general payment made by him without instructious, the plaintiff had the right to apply it to which account he pleased; and that the sum of $47 87 being at the time the precise balance due on account of the “ Eclipse,” showed that, the payment was meant for that account.

*Bates,*for plaintiff,

*Frame,*for defendant.

*Per curiam.*

Where there are distinct demands against a firm, and the individuals of the firm, if money of the partners be paid, though generally, it cannot be applied to the individual debt; and so, vice versa, a payment by the individual cannot be credited to the partnership account, unless there be evidence of consent. *Roscoe Evid.*248-9. If this was a payment by Boone individually, the plaintiff must show his consent to the application he has made of it, or that such was at the time Boone’s intention; otherwise it must now be credited to the “ Hermit.” The draft was probably inclosed in a letter, and which would show, perhaps, on what account the money was paid.

Verdict for plaintiff.