BATISTA v OFFICE OF RETIREMENT SERVICES

Docket No. 166305. Argued on application for leave to appeal April 16, 2024. Decided 

July 30, 2024.

Patricia Batista, David Britten, Timothy Donohue, and others brought an action in the 

Court of Claims against the Office of Retirement Services (ORS), alleging, among other things,

that the ORS had violated the Public School Employees Retirement Act (the Retirement Act),

MCL 38.1301 et seq., when it used salary schedules that it had created in order to determine 

plaintiffs’ retirement allowances or pension payments. Plaintiffs were current or retired public 

school superintendents and administrators who worked under personal employment contracts 

rather than collective-bargaining agreements (CBAs). Under the Retirement Act, pension 

payments to certain public school employees, including superintendents and administrators, are 

calculated using a formula set forth in MCL 38.1384(1) that includes an employee’s years of 

credited service and their “final average compensation.” The Retirement Act provides that an 

employee’s compensation generally includes salary and wages but, under MCL 38.1303a(3)(f),

does not include annual pay increases beyond those provided in the “normal salary schedule” for 

the current job classification. MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) also provides that if the current job 

classification in the reporting unit has fewer than three members, the normal salary schedule for 

the most nearly identical job classification in the reporting unit or in similar reporting units is to

be used. To determine whether compensation was excluded under MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) when 

calculating an employee’s final average compensation, the ORS used a formula in a manual it 

prepared annually that included normal salary increase (NSI) schedules for superintendents and 

administrators. Plaintiffs in this case received annual increases in compensation, but the ORS did 

not include all of these increases when calculating plaintiffs’ final average compensation under the 

NSI schedules to determine the amount of their pensions. As a result, plaintiffs filed this action, 

arguing, in part, that the Retirement Act did not authorize the ORS to create the NSI schedules and 

apply them to plaintiffs. Defendants moved for summary disposition. The Court of Claims, 

CHRISTOPHER M. MURRAY, J., granted defendants’ motion except with respect to plaintiffs’ claim 

alleging a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), MCL 24.201 et seq. The parties 

subsequently filed cross-motions for summary disposition of the APA claim, and the Court of 

Claims granted defendants summary disposition of this claim as well. Plaintiffs appealed. The 

Court of Appeals, FORT HOOD, P.J., and MARKEY and GLEICHER, JJ., reversed and remanded the 

case to the Court of Claims for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs, holding that the ORS does 

not have statutory authority under the Retirement Act to create NSI schedules and that the 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Syllabus Chief Justice:

Elizabeth T. Clement

Justices:

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch

Kyra H. Bolden

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

Reporter of Decisions:

Kathryn L. Loomis
schedules were therefore invalid. The Court of Appeals also held that MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) does 

not govern public school employees who, like plaintiffs, work under personal employment 

contracts rather than CBAs. 338 Mich App 340 (2021). Defendants sought leave to appeal in the 

Supreme Court, which affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that ORS lacks the authority to 

create and implement its own NSI schedules, reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding that MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f) does not govern public school employees who work under personal employment 

contracts rather than CBAs, vacated the inconsistent parts of the Court of Appeals judgment, and 

remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address how MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) applies to public 

school employees who do not work pursuant to CBAs and to further address how the holding 

affected plaintiffs’ claims in this case. 511 Mich 973 (2023). On remand, the Court of Appeals, 

GLEICHER, C.J., and MARKEY and LETICA, JJ., again reversed the Court of Claims’ judgment. The 

Court of Appeals held that because plaintiffs were not subject to normal salary schedules for 

current job classifications, the exception to the exclusion in the first sentence of MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f) did not apply, meaning that annual increases in compensation could not be included 

in the calculation of their retirement allowance. The Court of Appeals then explained, however, 

that if any of the plaintiffs fell within the ambit of the second sentence of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f), 

which pertains to job classifications that have fewer than three members, they must be

“shoehorned” into an existing normal salary schedule, thus creating a possibility that some if not 

all of their annual compensation increases could be included when calculating their final average 

compensation. The Court of Appeals noted that it was constrained by the statutory language, 

recognized the unfairness of the result, and implored the Legislature to address the flaws in the 

statutory language. ___ Mich App ___ (2023) (Docket No. 353832). Plaintiffs sought leave to 

appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered oral argument on the application and directed the 

parties to address whether the phrase “normal salary schedule” in MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) refers only 

to a provision contained in a CBA and, if not, from what other source a “normal salary schedule” 

may be derived. 513 Mich 1008, 1008 (2024).

In an opinion by Justice WELCH, joined by Justices VIVIANO, BERNSTEIN, and CAVANAGH,

the Supreme Court held:

The term “normal salary schedule” is a (1) written document (2) established by statute or 

approved by a reporting unit’s governing body (3) that indicates the time and sequence of 

compensation, and (4) conforms to a norm, rule, or principle—i.e., it applies to a generally 

applicable job classification rather than to a specific employee. The phrase “normal salary 

schedule” is not a term of art that refers only to employees operating under a CBA. Public school 

employees may have a normal salary schedule regardless of whether they are employed under a 

CBA or a personal employment contract. The Court of Appeals’ holding that plaintiffs work under 

personal employment contracts and were not subject to normal salary schedules for current job 

classifications was vacated. Although plaintiffs do not work under CBAs, the record was

insufficient to determine whether they were otherwise subject to a normal salary schedule as 

defined in the majority opinion. For job classifications that have fewer than three members, MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f) authorizes ORS to look outside the relevant school district when necessary to find 

the most nearly identical job classification in the reporting unit or in similar reporting units. The 

case was remanded to the Court of Claims for further proceedings.
1. In general, under MCL 38.1384(1), when a member retires from service, they receive a 

retirement allowance that equals the product of their total years, and fraction of a year, of credited 

service multiplied by 1.5% of their final average compensation. The Retirement Act defines a 

“member” as, with some exceptions, a public school employee. A member’s “final average 

compensation” is defined under MCL 38.1304(12) as, in relevant part, “the aggregate amount of a 

member’s compensation earned within the averaging period in which the aggregate amount of 

compensation was highest divided by the member’s number of years, including any fraction of a 

year, of credited service during the averaging period.” “Compensation” generally means the 

remuneration earned by a member for service performed as a public school employee and includes 

salary and wages under MCL 38.1303a(1) and (2). However, MCL 38.1303a(3) excludes certain 

types of remuneration from the definition of “compensation.” Relevant to this case, MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f) excludes compensation “in excess of an amount over the level of compensation 

reported for the preceding year except increases provided by the normal salary schedule for the 

current job classification” and specifies that in cases where the current job classification in the 

reporting unit has fewer than three members, “the normal salary schedule for the most nearly 

identical job classification in the reporting unit or in similar reporting units shall be used.” The 

Court of Appeals correctly held that MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) applies to all members regardless of 

whether the member is employed pursuant to a CBA or a personal employment contract. It also 

correctly held that, for annual compensation increases to count toward the final average 

compensation, the increase must be provided for in a “normal salary schedule.”

2. The term “normal salary schedule” is not defined in the Retirement Act, and it had not 

previously been defined by Michigan’s appellate courts. It was therefore appropriate to consult a 

lay dictionary that was contemporaneous with the statute’s enactment. In Merriam-Webster’s 

Collegiate Dictionary (8th ed), the contextually appropriate definition of “normal,” for purposes 

of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f), was “according with, constituting, or not deviating from a norm, rule, or 

principle: REGULAR”; the definition of “salary” was “fixed compensation paid regularly for 

services”; and “schedule” was variously defined as “a written document,” “a statement of 

supplementary details appended to a legal or legislative document,” “a written or printed list,” or 

a “timetable.” Both the Legislature and Michigan’s appellate courts have indicated that in the 

context of public employment, a “salary schedule” may be set by statute or by the relevant 

governing body. Further, a consideration of the statutory context indicated that the Legislature 

viewed “normal salary schedule” as referring to a generally applicable salary schedule for 

employees in a “job classification” and not to a salary schedule that is applicable only to a 

particular employee, meaning that the term applies to positions rather than to people. Therefore,

in the context of the Retirement Act, a “normal salary schedule” is a (1) written document, (2) 

established by statute or approved by a reporting unit’s governing body, (3) that indicates the time 

and sequence of compensation, and (4) conforms to a norm, rule, or principle—i.e., it applies to a 

generally applicable job classification rather than to a specific employee.

3. The phrase “normal salary schedule” is not a term of art that refers only to employees 

operating under a CBA. Although Michigan cases have used the terms “salary schedule” and “job 

classification” in the context of CBAs, the fact that such terms may be and often are included in a 

CBA does not mean that the Legislature intended such terms to refer only to CBAs. Other sources 

of Michigan law have used the term “salary schedule” outside the CBA context, and several 

statutes refer to a “job classification” without a clear reference to collective bargaining. In 
addition, other jurisdictions have used the term “salary schedule” outside of CBAs. Additional 

considerations suggest that “normal salary schedule” was not used as a term of art in the statute, 

including the fact that no Michigan statute or court decision has defined the term and the term is 

not included in Black’s Law Dictionary. In sum, there was nothing in MCL 38.1303a(3)(f), the 

Retirement Act broadly, other Michigan statutes, or Michigan caselaw to suggest that the 

Legislature intended “normal salary schedule” to apply exclusively to public school employees 

working under a CBA, as the Supreme Court had already held in this case. MCL 38.1303a(3)(f)

clearly provided that yearly salary increases are not considered compensation unless they are 

“provided by the normal salary schedule for the current job classification,” meaning that those who 

do not fall within the second sentence of that provision (i.e., employees in a job classification of 

three or more employees) must have a normal salary schedule in order to count salary increases as 

part of their “final average compensation.” If only a CBA could include a “normal salary 

schedule” under MCL 38.1303a(3)(f), then employees working under personal employment 

contracts would never be entitled to credit for salary increases, and nothing in the statutory scheme 

indicated that the Legislature intended such a result.

4. The Court of Appeals’ reversal of the Court of Claims’ judgment was affirmed, but its 

analysis was reversed or vacated in several respects. First, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ 

analysis, public school employees may have a normal salary schedule regardless of whether they 

are employed under a CBA or a personal employment contract. Second, the Court of Appeals’ 

holding that “plaintiff members work under personal employment contracts and are not subject to 

anything that could reasonably be construed or described as normal salary schedules for current 

job classifications” was vacated. Although plaintiffs do not work under CBAs, the record was 

insufficient to determine whether they are otherwise subject to a normal salary schedule. Third, 

for cases where the current job classification in the reporting unit has fewer than three members, 

MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) authorizes ORS to look outside the relevant school district when necessary 

to find the most nearly identical job classification in the reporting unit or in similar reporting units. 

Reading the statute in this way was textually sound and prevented the unfairness identified by the 

Court of Appeals. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the Court of Claims for 

further proceedings.

Chief Justice CLEMENT, joined by Justice BOLDEN, concurring dubitante, stated that she 

was not completely comfortable with defining “normal,” “salary,” and “schedule” in isolation and 

then putting the pieces together to define the phrase “normal salary schedule.” She would have 

read “normal salary schedule” in MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) as one phrase thatshould, ideally, be defined 

in its entirety. Nevertheless, she could locate no useful definitions of “normal salary schedule” as 

one phrase taken as a whole, and, assuming the phrase could be defined by combining the 

definitions of its individual words, she found the majority’s statutory interpretation persuasive. 

Additionally, she was hesitant to rely on the sources the majority cited that apparently referred to 

salary schedules in a context not involving a CBA. She noted that none of the sources used the 

whole phrase “normal salary schedule,” and the sources were not completely clear that the 

employees to which the salary schedule applied did not have a CBA. Nevertheless, she agreed

with the majority that finding no example of “normal salary schedule” used outside the CBA 

context does not necessarily indicate that “normal salary schedule” can be used only in the CBA 
context, and she had found no definition of “normal salary schedule” explicitly stating that the 

term is inextricably linked to a CBA. Ultimately, she concurred with the majority opinion because

it provided guidance on how to calculate the retirement allowance for public school employees 

under personal employment contracts, and she did not wish to perpetuate confusion and unfairness 

when she was not certain that the majority was wrong. She encouraged the Legislature to amend 

the statute in order to clarify the definition of “normal salary schedule,” particularly whether a 

normal salary schedule can exist outside the CBA context.

Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Justice WELCH, concurring, agreed in full with the majority 

opinion, but wrote separately to summarize the current state of the public school employees’ 

retirement system and to urge the Legislature to revisit the governing statutory scheme to ensure 

that the retirement allowances of public school employees were consistent with the reasonable 

expectation that their pensions would fairly reflect compensation earned during their careers. She 

noted that it is yet to be determined how the change in the status quo wrought by this litigation 

will apply to work that occurred before these decisions were rendered, including how the Court’s 

decisions in this case will affect the retirement allowances of public school employees who 

previously worked without an applicable “normal salary schedule.” Moreover, she urged the 

Legislature to assess, among other things, (1) the appropriate definition of “normal salary 

schedule,” (2) how to calculate the retirement allowances for employees who relied on the nowinvalidated NSI schedules and did not have an applicable normal salary schedule during prior years 

of employment, and (3) the requirement in MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) that retirement credit for 

employees in a job classification with fewer than three members be determined on the basis of a 

normal salary schedule created for a different job classification. 

Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, noted that the majority opinion went beyond the Court of 

Appeals’ holding to define “normal salary schedule,” and he questioned the Court’s decision to 

establish a final, authoritative interpretation of this phrase without the benefit of the lower courts’ 

wisdom, given the complexity of the issue presented. He also raised several concerns with the 

definition the majority chose, noting that it did not include the full definition of “salary,” which is 

not merely “compensation” but compensation that is “fixed” or “paid regularly”; that it included

two definitions of “schedule” without explaining why two definitions were needed for one word; 

and that it did not explain which word in the phrase “normal salary schedule” indicates that it must 

be “established by statute or approved by a reporting unit’s governing body.” He expressed 

concern that the majority’s definition of “normal salary schedule” contained traps and flaws that 

were not immediately apparent. He would have deferred offering an authoritative construction of 

“normal salary schedule” until after the Legislature had an opportunity to amend MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f) or, if the Legislature declined to do so, until the lower courts had a reason and 

opportunity to develop the issue.
FILED July 30, 2024

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PATRICIA BATISTA, DAVID BRITTEN, 

TIMOTHY DONAHUE, AARON 

GAFFNEY, JOHN HEWITT, RONALD 

KOEHLER, AMY SWANTEK, CHRIS 

THOMSON, and MICHIGAN 

ASSOCIATION OF SUPERINTENDENTS 

AND ADMINISTRATORS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v No. 166305

OFFICE OF RETIREMENT SERVICES, 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL 

EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM BOARD, 

PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM BOARD 

MEMBERS, and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

OF RETIREMENT SERVICES,

Defendants-Appellees.

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

OPINION Chief Justice:

Elizabeth T. Clement

Justices:

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch

Kyra H. Bolden
2

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

WELCH, J. 

This case concerns the Public School Employees Retirement Act, MCL 38.1301 et 

seq. (the Retirement Act). The issue is what salary increases are used to calculate the 

retirement allowance of public school employees who work under personal employment 

contracts rather than under collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). For the reasons set 

forth in this opinion, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part the Court of 

Appeals’ judgment. In so doing, we define the term “normal salary schedule” as a (1)

written document (2) established by statute or approved by a reporting unit’s governing 

body (3) that indicates the time and sequence of compensation, and (4) conforms to a norm, 

rule, or principle—i.e., it applies to a generally applicable job classification rather than to 

a specific employee. We remand to the Court of Claims for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are current or retired public school superintendents and administrators 

who work or worked under personal employment contracts, not CBAs. Under the 

Retirement Act, pension payments to certain public school employees, including 

superintendents and administrators, are calculated using a formula that includes an

employee’s years of credited service and, relevant here, their “final average 

compensation.” MCL 38.1384(1). The issue in this case is whether certain compensation

increases are included when calculating the “final average compensation” to determine the 

retirement allowance.
3

The Retirement Act provides that an employee’s “compensation” generally “means 

the remuneration earned by [the] member for the service performed as a public school 

employee,” MCL 38.1303a(1), and includes “salary and wages,” MCL 38.1303a(2). 

However, not all “compensation” is reportable for the purpose of calculating an employee’s 

final average compensation. See MCL 38.1303a(3) (providing specific exclusions to the 

definition of “compensation”). Pertinent to this case, MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) provides that 

compensation under the Retirement Act does not include: 

Compensation in excess of an amount over the level of compensation 

reported for the preceding year except increases provided by the normal 

salary schedule for the current job classification. In cases where the current 

job classification in the reporting unit has less than 3 members, the normal 

salary schedule for the most nearly identical job classification in the reporting 

unit or in similar reporting units shall be used.

The Retirement Act does not define “normal salary schedule,” and we have not had an 

opportunity to interpret the phrase.

The Office of Retirement Services (ORS) administers the retirement system. Each 

year, ORS prepares the Reporting Instruction Manual (the Manual), which is designed to 

ensure the accuracy of account information and pension payments for employees. The 

Manual states that it is a summary of basic plan provisions found in the Retirement Act 

and that the Retirement Act governs if there are any discrepancies between the Retirement 

Act and the Manual. Beginning as early as 2004, ORS started to create normal salary 

increase (NSI) schedules for superintendents and administrators, which it later began 

including in the Manual. 

The NSI schedules set forth annual allowable compensation increase percentages. 

ORS based these schedules on the statewide average salary increase percentages for a job 
4

classification and then doubled that number to establish the applicable NSI percentage 

tables. Yearly compensation increases at or below a particular enumerated percentage 

constituted reportable compensation that were used to calculate a member’s final average 

compensation. But annual compensation increases above that percentage were considered

nonreportable compensation that was excluded when calculating the final average 

compensation. Plaintiffs in this case received annual increases in compensation, not all of 

which ORS used to calculate their final average compensation under the NSI schedules. 

Thus, a portion of plaintiffs’ respective pay increases did not factor into their pensions.

Plaintiffs commenced this action in the Court of Claims. In their amended 

complaint, they asserted, among other things, that the Retirement Act does not authorize 

ORS to create the NSI schedules and apply them to plaintiffs. Through two separate and 

extensive orders, the Court of Claims rejected plaintiffs’ arguments and granted 

defendants’ motion for summary disposition.

The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed and remanded the case to 

the Court of Claims for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Batista v Office of 

Retirement Servs, 338 Mich App 340; 980 NW2d 107 (2021), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 

and vacated in part 511 Mich 973 (2023). The Court of Appeals held that ORS does not 

have statutory authority under the Retirement Act to create NSI schedules and that the 

schedules were therefore invalid. The Court of Appeals also held that MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) 

does not govern public school employees who, like plaintiffs, work under personal 

employment contracts.

Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court and, following oral argument, we 

affirmed in part and reversed in part. Batista v Office of Retirement Servs, 511 Mich 973 
5

(2023). In our order, we affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that ORS lacks the 

authority to create and implement its own NSI schedules. However, we reversed the Court 

of Appeals’ holding that MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) does not govern public school employees

who work under personal employment contracts rather than CBAs. We therefore vacated 

elements of the Court of Appeals’ analysis that were inconsistent with our order. We then 

remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address how MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) applies to 

public school employees who do not work pursuant to CBAs and to further address how 

our holding affects plaintiffs’ claims in this case.

On remand, the Court of Appeals once again reversed the Court of Claims’ 

judgment. Batista v Office of Retirement Servs (On Remand), ___ Mich App ___; ___ 

NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 353832). The Court of Appeals observed that, under the 

exception to “compensation” in MCL 38.1303(3)(f), “[a]ny increase in annual 

compensation is not includable in calculating a retirement allowance except when the 

increase is reflected in ‘the normal salary schedule for the current job classification.’ ” Id. 

at ___; slip op at 5. The panel held that plaintiffs “are not subject to anything that could 

reasonably be construed or described as normal salary schedules for current job 

classifications.” Id. at ___; slip op at 5-6. Thus, the panel held that the exception to the 

exclusion “in the first sentence of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) for ‘increases provided by the 

normal salary schedule for the current job classification’ does not apply, effectively 

meaning that annual increases in compensation cannot be included in the calculation of a 

member’s retirement allowance.” Id. at ___; slip op at 6. The Court of Appeals then 

explained, however, that its analysis changes when “construing the second sentence of 

MCL 38.1303a(3)(f), which is triggered when, within a particular reporting unit, a member 
6

works in a job classification that has fewer than three members.” Id. at ___; slip op at 6. 

The Court of Appeals reasoned:

In that situation, a “normal salary schedule” must be utilized, and it is entirely 

irrelevant whether the member works under a personal employment contract 

or does not otherwise work pursuant to a “normal salary schedule.” The 

Legislature appears to have assumed that a member falling within the 

parameters of the second sentence of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) would not be 

covered by his or her own “normal salary schedule.” The retirement 

allowance for these members is calculated using “the normal salary schedule 

for the most nearly identical job classification in the reporting unit or in 

similar reporting units . . . .” MCL 38.1303a(3)(f). Therefore, if plaintiff 

members fall within the ambit of the second sentence of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f), 

they must be shoehorned into an existing normal salary schedule. And when 

they receive annual increases in compensation, there is at least a possibility 

of including some if not all of the increases in calculating a final average 

compensation, unlike those plaintiff members who fit within the first 

sentence of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f). [Id. at ___; slip op at 6 (emphasis added)].

The Court of Appeals “recognize[d] the unfairness produced by [its] construction 

of the two distinct provisions in MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) . . . .” Id. at ___; slip op at 6. 

However, “given the language of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f)” and this Court’s prior order, the 

panel held that it had “no choice in reaching [its] conclusion because [it] may not legislate 

from the bench[.]” Id. at ___; slip op at 6. The panel then “implore[d] the Legislature to 

address the patent flaws in the statutory language.” Id. at ___; slip op at 6. This appeal 

followed.

We ordered oral argument on plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal and directed 

the parties to address: “(1) whether the phrase ‘normal salary schedule’ in MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f) refers only to a provision contained in a collective-bargaining agreement; 

and (2) if not, from what other source may a ‘normal salary schedule’ be derived.” Batista 

v Office of Retirement Servs, 513 Mich 1008, 1008 (2024).
7

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary 

disposition to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Johnson v VanderKooi, 502 Mich 751, 761; 918 NW2d 785 (2018). We also review de 

novo questions of statutory interpretation. Hegadorn v Dep’t of Human Servs Dir, 503 

Mich 231; 931 NW2d 571 (2019).

III. DISCUSSION

The “Michigan public school employees’ retirement system [was] created for the 

public school employees of this state.” MCL 38.1321. The retirement system is intended 

to “be a qualified pension plan created in trust under section 401 of the internal revenue 

code, 26 USC 401 . . . .” MCL 38.1408(1). In general, “upon [a] member’s retirement 

from service . . . , a member shall receive a retirement allowance that equals the product of 

the member’s total years, and fraction of a year, of credited service multiplied by 1.5% of 

the member’s final average compensation.” MCL 38.1384(1).1

 A member’s “final average 

compensation” is defined, in part, as “the aggregate amount of a member’s compensation 

earned within the averaging period in which the aggregate amount of compensation was 

highest divided by the member’s number of years, including any fraction of a year, of 

credited service during the averaging period.” MCL 38.1304(12).

1 A “member” is, with some exceptions, “a public school employee.” MCL 38.1305(1). 

There is no dispute that the individual plaintiffs are members. The term “retirement 

allowance” is defined as “a payment for life or a temporary period provided for in this act 

to which a retirant, retirement allowance beneficiary, or refund beneficiary is entitled.” 

MCL 38.1307(5).
8

“When interpreting a statute, ‘our goal is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, 

focusing first on the statute’s plain language.’ ” People v Pinkney, 501 Mich 259, 268; 912 

NW2d 535 (2018), quoting Madugula v Taub, 496 Mich 685, 696; 853 NW2d 75 (2014). 

“ ‘In so doing, we examine the statute as a whole, reading individual words and phrases in 

the context of the entire legislative scheme.’ ” Pinkney, 501 Mich at 268, quoting 

Madugula, 496 Mich at 696. When an undefined statutory term is a legal term of art, the 

term “must be construed in accordance with its peculiar and appropriate legal meaning.” 

Iliades v Dieffenbacher North America Inc, 501 Mich 326, 336; 915 NW2d 338 (2018). 

“When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature 

intended its plain meaning and we enforce the statute as written.” People v Miller, 498 

Mich 13, 23; 869 NW2d 204 (2015), citing Madugula, 496 Mich at 696.

Recall that “compensation” generally “means the remuneration earned by a member 

for service performed as a public school employee” and includes “salary and wages.” MCL 

38.1303a(1) and (2). The Retirement Act also excludes the following types of 

remuneration from the definition of “compensation”:

(a) Payments for unused sick or annual leave.

(b) Bonus payments.

(c) Payments for hospitalization insurance and life insurance 

premiums.

(d) Other fringe benefits paid by and from the funds of employers of 

public school employees.

(e) Remuneration paid for the specific purpose of increasing the final 

average compensation.

(f) Compensation in excess of an amount over the level of 

compensation reported for the preceding year except increases provided by 
9

the normal salary schedule for the current job classification. In cases where 

the current job classification in the reporting unit has less than 3 members, 

the normal salary schedule for the most nearly identical job classification in 

the reporting unit or in similar reporting units shall be used. [MCL 

38.1303a(3)].[2]

This case involves interpretation of the final subsection, MCL 38.1303a(3)(f).

As a threshold matter, we agree with the Court of Appeals that MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) 

applies to all members regardless of whether the member is employed pursuant to a CBA 

or a personal employment contract. We also agree that, for annual compensation increases 

to count toward the final average compensation, the increase must be provided for in a 

“normal salary schedule.”

A. NORMAL SALARY SCHEDULE

The Court of Appeals declined to define “normal salary schedule” when interpreting

MCL 38.1303a(3)(f). Yet the Court of Appeals held that, whatever that term may mean, 

plaintiffs “are not subject to anything that could reasonably be construed or described as 

normal salary schedules for current job classifications.” Batista (On Remand), ___ Mich 

App at ___; slip op at 5-6. Because the term is essential to understanding the statute, we 

define the term in this opinion.

3

2 MCL 38.1303a(5)(a) and (b) provide that the retirement board, based on information and 

documentation provided by a member, shall determine “[w]hether any form of 

remuneration paid to a member is identified in this section” and “[w]hether any form of 

remuneration that is not identified in this section should be considered compensation 

reportable to the retirement system under this section.” In cases “where a petitioner seeks 

to have remuneration included in compensation reportable to the retirement system, the 

petitioner shall have the burden of proof.” MCL 38.1303a(6).

3 The dissent argues that we go “beyond the Court of Appeals’ holding to define the phrase 

‘normal salary schedule.’ ” We disagree. The Court of Appeals interpreted the phrase in 

its initial opinion. See Batista, 338 Mich App at 358 (“We find it abundantly clear from 

the Legislature’s references to ‘the’ normal salary schedule and ‘the’ current job 
10

When, as in this case, there is no statutory definition for a term, we frequently 

consult lay dictionaries as a starting point in determining a term’s plain meaning. See 

Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269, 276; 753 NW2d 207 (2008); see also Spectrum 

Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503, 513; 821 NW2d 117 

(2012) (“ ‘Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded 

its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are 

used.’ ”) (citation omitted). “Courts should ordinarily use a dictionary that is 

contemporaneous with the statute’s enactment.” Sanford v Michigan, 506 Mich 10, 21

n 19; 954 NW2d 82 (2020), citing Ronnisch Constr Group, Inc v Lofts on the Nine, LLC, 

499 Mich 544, 563 n 58; 886 NW2d 113 (2016). One contextually appropriate definition 

of “normal,” for purposes of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f), is “according with, constituting, or not 

classification that the Legislature was necessarily alluding to schedules and classifications 

that were familiar to school personnel and already in place in the particular contextual 

setting of collective bargaining. The references to ‘normal salary schedule’ for a ‘job 

classification’ plainly pertain to salary schedules contained in collective-bargaining 

agreements.”). Although our prior order vacated that portion of the opinion, we remanded 

this case to the Court of Appeals “to address how MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) applies to public 

school employees who do not work pursuant to collective bargaining agreements and to 

further address how this holding affects plaintiffs’ claims in this case.” Batista, 511 Mich 

at 974. 

On remand, the Court of Appeals declined to expressly define “normal salary 

schedule,” but it necessarily applied that phrase when it concluded that plaintiffs are not 

subject to a normal salary schedule. We then granted leave, directing the parties to address 

the meaning of the phrase “normal salary schedule.” Thus, the meaning of the phrase has 

long been a focus of this litigation, and this Court received full briefing on the issue. We 

must therefore define the phrase so that we may properly review whether the Court of 

Appeals reached the correct conclusion. Although we could, of course, remand again to 

the Court of Appeals to more clearly articulate the definition that it applied on remand, we 

agree with Justice CAVANAGH that there is no rule or compelling reason to delay resolution 

of this issue.
11

deviating from a norm, rule, or principle: REGULAR.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 

Dictionary (8th ed). That same dictionary defines “salary” as “fixed compensation paid 

regularly for services.” Id. Finally, a “schedule” can be “a written document,” “a statement 

of supplementary details appended to a legal or legislative document,” “a written or printed 

list,” or a “timetable.” Id.

Beyond dictionaries, we look to our caselaw and other sources of Michigan law. 

Neither the Legislature nor this Court have ever defined “normal salary schedule.” 

However, both have indicated that in the context of public employment, a “salary schedule” 

may be set by statute or by the relevant governing body. See, e.g., Bischoff v Wayne Co, 

320 Mich 376, 392; 31 NW2d 798 (1948) (citing a civil service regulation referring to a 

“salary schedule” created by the Civil Service Commission); Bd of Control of Mich State 

Prison v Auditor General, 197 Mich 377, 382; 163 NW 921 (1917) (referring to a “salary 

schedule” fixed by statute); Robins v Wayne Co, 335 Mich 41, 43; 55 NW2d 166 (1952) 

(referring to “the salary schedule and salary plan of Wayne county adopted by the Wayne 

county board of supervisors”); MCL 600.8273, as added by 1980 PA 438 (tying certain 

employees’ compensation to “a classification and salary schedule developed by the state 

judicial council”).

Finally, we examine the statutory context when defining “normal salary schedule.” 

See Pinkney, 501 Mich at 268. The first sentence of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) refers to the 

“normal salary schedule for the current job classification.” MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) (emphasis 

added). It is clear, therefore, that the Legislature viewed a “normal salary schedule” as 

referring to a generally applicable salary schedule for employees in a “job classification” 
12

and not to a salary schedule that is applicable only to a particular employee. In other words, 

the term applies to positions, rather than to people. 

Putting these pieces together and “reading individual words and phrases in the 

context of the entire legislative scheme,” Pinkney, 501 Mich at 268, quoting Madugula, 

496 Mich at 696, we hold that in the context of the Retirement Act, a “normal salary 

schedule” is a (1) written document (2) established by statute or approved by a reporting 

unit’s governing body (3) that indicates the time and sequence of compensation, and (4) 

conforms to a norm, rule, or principle—i.e., it applies to a generally applicable job 

classification rather than to a specific employee.

Plaintiffs argue—and the Court of Appeals suggested—that “normal salary 

schedule” is a term of art that refers only to employees operating under a CBA. See Batista 

(On Remand), ___ Mich App at ___ n 3; slip op at 6 n 3. We disagree. “Pursuant to MCL 

8.3a, undefined statutory terms are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning, unless the 

undefined word or phrase is a term of art.” People v Thompson, 477 Mich 146, 151; 730 

NW2d 708 (2007).4

 Here, plaintiffs have failed to show that “normal salary schedule” 

should be construed inconsistently with the ordinary meaning detailed earlier. Plaintiffs 

cite Michigan cases that have used the terms “salary schedule” and “job classification” in 

4 A “term of art” is “[a] word or phrase having a specific, precise meaning in a given 

specialty, apart from its general meaning in ordinary contexts.” Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed); accord MCL 8.3a (“All words and phrases shall be construed and understood 

according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and 

phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, 

shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”). 
13

the context of CBAs.5

 However, the fact that such terms may be and often are included in 

a CBA does not mean that the Legislature intended such terms to refer only to CBAs. As 

noted earlier, other sources of Michigan law have used the term “salary schedule” outside 

the CBA context.6 Similarly, several statutes refer to a “job classification” without a clear 

reference to collective bargaining. See, e.g., MCL 339.6115(1)(d)(ii) (referring to an

individual who, “[w]hile serving in the armed forces, served as a plumber or in an 

5 Regarding “job classification,” plaintiffs cite Police Officers Ass’n of Mich v Grosse 

Pointe Farms, 197 Mich App 730, 736-737; 496 NW2d 794 (1992), and AFSCME Council 

25 v Faust Pub Library, 311 Mich App 449, 460-461; 875 NW2d 254 (2015). But neither 

case held that “job classification” is only used in CBAs; rather, those cases held that a job 

classification is relevant to identifying a “community of interests” when creating a 

collective bargaining unit. As for “salary schedule,” plaintiffs point to Kalamazoo City Ed 

Ass’n v Kalamazoo Pub Sch, 406 Mich 579; 281 NW2d 454 (1979); Ranta v Eaton Rapids 

Pub Sch Bd of Ed, 271 Mich App 261; 721 NW2d 806 (2006); and Martin v East Lansing 

Sch Dist, 193 Mich App 166; 483 NW2d 656 (1992). But nothing in those cases expressly 

or implicitly suggests that the relevant language contains terms of art. Kalamazoo City Ed 

Ass’n, 406 Mich at 591, speaks of the “automatic salary progression schedule” that the 

particular parties in that case had incorporated into each CBA. It does not use the term 

“normal salary schedule,” nor does it suggest that that term has a particular meaning. The 

other two cases simply speak of particular salary schedules in the labor disputes at issue in 

each case. 

6 It is also notable that the statute governing pensions for police officers and firefighters, 

MCL 38.556, specifically addresses collective bargaining when defining “average final 

compensation” for that group of public employees. See MCL 38.556(1)(f). Other sections 

of Chapter 38 also mention collective bargaining expressly. See MCL 38.1615a (requiring 

that certain police officers who were “a bargaining unit employee covered by the state 

police defined benefit retirement plan” make certain contributions to a reserve fund); MCL 

38.1624(4) (requiring that certain police officers who were hired “as a new bargaining unit 

employee” use a certain payment option). The Legislature has thus demonstrated that it 

knows how and when to specify that pension requirements under Chapter 38 are limited to 

employees who work under a CBA. The fact that the Legislature did not include such 

language in MCL 38.1303a(3) counsels against reading such a requirement into the statute. 

Also, those statutes do not refer to a “normal salary schedule,” which runs contrary to 

plaintiffs’ argument that a normal salary schedule is intimately linked to CBAs.
14

equivalent job classification”); MCL 38.68c(13)(f)(2) (referring to a retirant who 

“performs work that is solely the duty, service, or work included in the job classification 

of nonexclusively represented employees”); MCL 45.554a(3) (directing an agency to 

maintain a publicly searchable website that includes “[t]he number of active transportation 

employees of the county road agency by job classification and wage rate”). In addition,

though not as pertinent to whether “normal salary schedule” is a term of art in Michigan,

other jurisdictions have used the term “salary schedule” outside of CBAs. See, e.g., Buntin 

v Breathitt Co Bd of Ed, 134 F3d 796, 798 n 2 (CA 6, 1998) (referring to salary schedules 

for nonunion school administrators); Fla Stat 1012.22(1)(c) (defining “salary schedule” as 

“the schedule or schedules used to provide the base salary for district school board 

personnel”); Okla Stat, tit 70, § 4517 (requiring that boards of education establish salary 

schedules, including for administrators); Wash Rev Code 28A.405.200 (indicating that 

“annual salary schedules . . . shall be the basis for salaries for all certified employees” in a 

school district). 

Additional considerations suggest that “normal salary schedule” was not used as a 

term of art in the statute. It appears that no Michigan statute or court decision has defined

the term. Cf. Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52, 63; 903 NW2d 366 (2017) (recognizing that a 

term of art may be reflected in caselaw); see also Perry v Kalamazoo State Hosp, 404 Mich 

205, 211; 273 NW2d 421 (1978). And the term is not included in Black’s Law Dictionary. 

See Wilcox v Wheatley, 342 Mich App 551, 558; 995 NW2d 594 (2022) (indicating that a 

statutory term is unlikely to be a legal term of art if “Black’s Law Dictionary does not 

define it”). In sum, there is nothing in MCL 38.1303a(3)(f), the Retirement Act broadly, 

other Michigan statutes, or Michigan caselaw to suggest that the Legislature intended 
15

“normal salary schedule” to apply exclusively to public school employees working under 

a CBA. 

Indeed, we have already held that the normal salary schedule limitation applies to 

all public school employees—regardless of whether their employment is subject to a CBA. 

See Batista, 511 Mich at 973. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute is clear 

that yearly salary increases are not considered compensation unless they are “provided by 

the normal salary schedule for the current job classification.” MCL 38.1303a(3)(f).7

 The 

inescapable implication is that those who do not fall within the second sentence of that 

provision (i.e., employees in a job classification of three or more employees) must have a 

normal salary schedule in order to count salary increases as part of their “final average 

compensation.” If only a CBA could include a “normal salary schedule” under MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f), then employees working under personal employment contracts would 

never be entitled to credit for salary increases. Nothing in the statutory scheme indicates 

that the Legislature intended such a result, which further counsels against plaintiffs’ 

argument that the phrase “normal salary schedule” is limited to terms in a CBA.

B. APPLICATION

Having defined the term “normal salary schedule” as not being limited to CBAs, 

our analysis differs from that of the Court of Appeals in several key respects. We therefore 

7 Plaintiffs argue that MCL 38.1303a(f)(3) merely governs annual raises for all employees, 

but does not apply to all employees, such that anyone who is not employed under a CBA 

is essentially exempt from the limitations identified in that provision. But such an 

exemption is not reflected in the text or structure of the statute.
16

affirm the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the Court of Claims’ judgment, but we reverse its 

analysis as described in this section.

First, as our definition indicates, we hold that public school employees may have a 

normal salary schedule regardless of whether they are employed under a CBA or a personal 

employment contract. Nothing in the definition of “normal salary schedule” precludes 

application to nonbargaining positions. After all, many public employees in nonbargaining 

positions are paid according to a written list established or approved by a reporting unit’s 

governing body that indicates the time and sequence of compensation and conforms to a 

regularized norm. Neither the statute nor our caselaw suggest that only employees working 

under a CBA are subject to a normal salary schedule.

Second, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ holding that “plaintiff members work 

under personal employment contracts and are not subject to anything that could reasonably 

be construed or described as normal salary schedules for current job classifications.” 

Batista (On Remand), ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5-6. Although plaintiffs do not 

work under CBAs, the record is insufficient to determine at this juncture whether they are 

otherwise subject to a normal salary schedule as defined in this opinion.

8

Third, we provide further clarity on how to interpret the second sentence of MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f) in light of the definition of “normal salary schedule.” Recall that the 

provision’s second sentence states that “[i]n cases where the current job classification in 

the reporting unit has less than 3 members, the normal salary schedule for the most nearly 

8 The Court of Appeals did not address—and we do not either, in light of the lack of briefing 

on the issue—whether a governing authority in a reporting unit could adopt a retroactive 

normal salary schedule for years previously worked by a public school employee who was 

not subject to a normal salary schedule when the work occurred. 
17

identical job classification in the reporting unit or in similar reporting units shall be used.” 

MCL 38.1303a(3)(f).9

 

Thus, for those job classifications, the statute authorizes ORS to look outside the 

relevant school district when necessary to find “the most nearly identical job classification 

in the reporting unit or in similar reporting units.”10 See also MCL 38.1303a(5) (requiring 

ORS to determine what counts as “remuneration” under the Retirement Act). Reading the 

statute this way is not only textually sound, but it also prevents the “unfairness produced” 

by the Court of Appeals’ reading. Batista (On Remand), ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 

6. Although administrators who fall within the ambit of the second sentence “must be 

shoehorned into an existing normal salary schedule,” id. at ___; slip op at 6, the statute as 

interpreted in this opinion provides school districts and ORS with the flexibility to look 

inside and outside of administrators’ school districts to find the most appropriate and 

comparable salary schedule to determine those administrators’ pensions.

9 “ ‘Reporting unit’ means a public school district, intermediate school district, public 

school academy, tax supported community or junior college, or university, or an agency 

having employees on its payroll who are members of this retirement system.” MCL 

38.1307(3). Plaintiffs make a passing argument that MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) limits any 

reportable annual increase in compensation to the specific salary figure provided in the 

borrowed salary schedule rather than a percentage increase or dollar-amount increase. 

They emphasize the word “amount” at the beginning of that provision. See MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f) (“Compensation in excess of an amount over the level of compensation 

reported for the preceding year except increases provided by [the relevant salary 

schedule].”). But the salary schedule is used to determine the “increases” over the prior 

year’s salary, which plainly is not limited to the specific salary figure.

10 In addition, nothing precludes school districts from looking to a “normal salary schedule” 

from other school districts when adopting or approving a “normal salary schedule” for a 

particular “job classification.”
18

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ reversal of 

the Court of Claims’ judgment but reverse the analysis of the Court of Appeals as described 

in the previous section. Finally, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ holding that plaintiffs are 

not subject to normal salary schedules for current job classifications. We do not decide 

whether plaintiffs are subject to a “normal salary schedule” as defined in this opinion, and 

instead we remand to the Court of Claims for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

Elizabeth M. Welch

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Megan K. Cavanagh
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PATRICIA BATISTA, DAVID BRITTEN, 

TIMOTHY DONAHUE, AARON 

GAFFNEY, JOHN HEWITT, RONALD 

KOEHLER, AMY SWANTEK, CHRIS 

THOMSON, and MICHIGAN 

ASSOCIATION OF SUPERINTENDENTS 

AND ADMINISTRATORS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v No. 166305

OFFICE OF RETIREMENT SERVICES, 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL 

EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM BOARD, 

PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM BOARD 

MEMBERS, and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

OF RETIREMENT SERVICES,

Defendants-Appellees.

CLEMENT, C.J. (concurring dubitante).

I concur in the majority opinion, though I have some doubts regarding its analysis. 

Namely, I read “normal salary schedule” in MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) as one phrase, which 

should ideally be defined in its entirety. I am not completely comfortable with defining 

“normal,” “salary,” and “schedule” in isolation, and then putting the pieces together to 

define the phrase “normal salary schedule.” Additionally, though the majority cites various 

sources apparently referring to salary schedules in a context not involving a collective 
2

bargaining agreement (CBA), I am hesitant to rely on this authority.1

 The out-of-state 

statutes and case are in a very similar, if not identical, context as our own statute, all 

involving school employees. None of the sources uses the whole phrase “normal salary 

schedule,” but rather just “salary schedule[s]” or “annual salary schedule.” While the 

Michigan sources speak of salary schedules for different kinds of employees and the outof-state sources speak of salary schedules for school employees generally, including for 

personnel and administrators, the sources are not completely clear that the employees to 

which the salary schedule applied do not have a CBA. I simply do not know enough about 

the use of CBAs for various kinds of employees in order to be confident that the examples 

the majority cites are certainly examples of normal salary schedules being used outside the 

CBA context.

Nevertheless, I see merit in the majority opinion. I can locate no useful definitions 

of “normal salary schedule” as one phrase taken as a whole. Assuming that “normal,” 

“salary,” and “schedule” can be defined individually and then combined to create a 

1 See ante at 11, citing Bischoff v Wayne Co, 320 Mich 376, 392; 31 NW2d 798 (1948) 

(citing a civil service regulation referring to a “salary schedule” created by the Civil Service 

Commission); Bd of Control of Mich State Prison v Auditor General, 197 Mich 377, 382; 

163 NW 921 (1917) (referring to a “salary schedule” fixed by statute); Robins v Wayne Co, 

335 Mich 41, 43; 55 NW2d 166 (1952) (referring to “the salary schedule and salary plan 

of Wayne county adopted by the Wayne county board of supervisors”); MCL 600.8273, as 

added by 1980 PA 438 (tying certain employees’ compensation to “a classification and 

salary schedule developed by the state judicial council”). See also ante at 14, citing Buntin 

v Breathitt Co Bd of Ed, 134 F3d 796, 798 n 2 (CA 6, 1998) (referring to salary schedules 

for nonunion school administrators); Fla Stat 1012.22(1)(c) (defining “salary schedule” as 

“the schedule or schedules used to provide the base salary for district school board 

personnel”); Okla Stat, tit 70, § 4517 (requiring that boards of education establish salary 

schedules, including for administrators); Wash Rev Code 28A.405.200 (indicating that 

“annual salary schedules . . . shall be the basis for salaries for all certified employees” in a 

school district). 
3

definition for “normal salary schedule,” the majority’s statutory interpretation is 

persuasive. Additionally, even though I am not completely convinced that we have found 

an example of “normal salary schedule” used outside the CBA context, I wholeheartedly 

agree with the majority that finding no such example does not necessarily indicate that 

“normal salary schedule” can be used only in the CBA context.

2

 Tellingly, I have found 

no definition of “normal salary schedule” explicitly saying that the term is inextricably 

linked to a CBA. 

Finally and importantly, the majority opinion provides much-needed guidance on 

this important issue of calculating the retirement allowance for public school employees 

under personal employment contracts. I would not perpetuate confusion and unfairness 

when I am by no means certain that the majority is wrong. For these reasons, despite my 

lingering questions, I concur with the majority. At the same time, I encourage the 

Legislature to amend the statute in order to clarify the definition of “normal salary 

schedule,” particularly whether a normal salary schedule can exist outside the CBA 

context. 

Elizabeth T. Clement

Kyra H. Bolden

2 See ante at 13 (“However, the fact that such terms may be and often are included in a 

CBA does not mean that the Legislature intended such terms to refer only to CBAs.”). 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PATRICIA BATISTA, DAVID BRITTEN, 

TIMOTHY DONAHUE, AARON 

GAFFNEY, JOHN HEWITT, RONALD 

KOEHLER, AMY SWANTEK, CHRIS 

THOMSON, and MICHIGAN 

ASSOCIATION OF SUPERINTENDENTS 

AND ADMINISTRATORS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v No. 166305

OFFICE OF RETIREMENT SERVICES, 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL 

EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM BOARD, 

PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM BOARD 

MEMBERS, and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

OF RETIREMENT SERVICES,

Defendants-Appellants.

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). 

I concur in full with the majority opinion. I write separately to summarize the

current state of the public-school employees’ retirement system and to urge the Legislature 

to revisit this scheme. Most importantly, I emphasize that it is yet to be determined how 

our decisions in this case will affect the retirement allowances of public-school employees 

who previously worked without an applicable “normal salary schedule.” Given the change 

in the status quo wrought by this litigation, many public-school employees now face 
2

uncertainty regarding their retirement pensions. Legislative guidance could help to ensure 

that the retirement allowances of public-school employees are consistent with the 

reasonable expectation that their pensions would fairly reflect compensation earned during 

their careers.

I. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

As the majority explains, a public-school employee’s1 retirement allowance is 

determined in part by their compensation earned, MCL 38.1384(1); MCL 38.1303a(1), 

which generally includes their “salary and wages,” MCL 38.1303a(2). However, an 

employee only receives credit toward their retirement allowance2 for yearly salary 

increases to the extent these increases are consistent with a “normal salary schedule.” See 

MCL 38.1303a(3)(f). For many years, the Office of Retirement Services (ORS) generally 

used the “normal salary schedule” provided in a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA)

for any employee who worked pursuant to such an agreement. By contrast, ORS created 

and applied its own “normal salary increase” (NSI) schedules for any employee who

worked pursuant to a personal employment contract. Last year, this Court affirmed the 

Court of Appeals’ holding that ORS “lacks the authority to create and implement its own 

1 Only a public-school employee who fits the definition of “member” under MCL 

38.1305(1) receives a retirement allowance. In this opinion, I use interchangeably 

“member,” “public-school employee,” and “employee” to refer to an individual who is 

entitled to a retirement allowance.

2 For ease of reference, I refer in this opinion to credit toward an employee’s retirement 

allowance as “retirement credit” or “credit.”
3

[NSI] schedules.” Batista v Office of Retirement Servs, 511 Mich 973, 973 (2023).3 The 

critical question now is how the retirement system will function without these ORS-created 

NSI schedules.

Read together, the decisions from this Court in this case establish the following:

1. All public-school employees—whether they work under CBAs or personal 

employment contracts—only receive retirement credit for yearly salary increases to the 

extent those increases are consistent with a “normal salary schedule.” MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f).4

 

2. A “normal salary schedule” is a “(1) written document (2) established by statute

or approved by a reporting unit’s governing body (3) that indicates the time and sequence 

of compensation, and (4) conforms to a norm, rule, or principle—i.e., it applies to a 

generally applicable job classification rather than to a specific employee.”5

 While a normal 

salary schedule may be found in a CBA, it is not limited exclusively to a term in a CBA.6

 

3. ORS lacks the authority to create and implement NSI schedules to calculate the 

pensions of any public-school employees, including those who work under personal 

employment contracts.

7

4. For employees in a job classification with three or more members, credit for 

yearly salary increases is determined by the normal salary schedule for the job 

classification in which they work. MCL 38.1303a(3)(f). If a job classification with three 

or more members does not have a normal salary schedule, employees in that job 

classification do not receive any credit for yearly salary increases.8

3 Nothing in this Court’s holdings in this case affects the use of a “normal salary schedule” 

in a CBA for employees in a job classification with three or more members.

4 Batista, 511 Mich at 973; ante at 9, 15.

5 Ante at 2, 12.

6 Ante at 12-15. 

7 Batista, 511 Mich at 973.

8 Ante at 9, 15; see also Batista v Office of Retirement Servs (On Remand), ___ Mich 

App___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023); slip op at 5-6.
4

5. For employees in a job classification with fewer than three members, credit for 

yearly salary increases must be determined on the basis of “the normal salary schedule for 

the most nearly identical job classification in the reporting unit or in similar reporting 

units . . . .” MCL 38.1303a(3)(f).9

 In effect, this means it is impossible for a job 

classification with fewer than three members to have its own normal salary schedule, and 

salary increases for any employee in such a job classification must be compared to another

job classification’s normal salary schedule. 

Importantly, the Court has not addressed how this change in the status quo applies 

to work that occurred before these decisions were rendered. For example, the Court has 

not addressed “whether a governing authority in a reporting unit could adopt a retroactive 

normal salary schedule for years previously worked by a public school employee who was 

not subject to a normal salary schedule when the work occurred.” Ante at 16 n 8. 

Relatedly, the Court has not addressed whether the now-invalidated ORS-created NSI 

schedules must be disregarded for employees who are currently receiving a retirement 

allowance that was calculated on the basis of those schedules. While such questions 

remain, these issues have not been raised by the parties or decided below, so they are not 

ripe for our review. 

Nonetheless, these lingering issues are likely to be important going forward,

especially to public-school employees with reasonable expectations that their pensions will 

reflect increases in compensation received during their careers. Everyone involved 

reasonably relied on the validity of the ORS-created NSI schedules for many years. In 

light of that reliance, it is possible that many reporting units’ governing bodies may not 

have established or approved normal salary schedules for job classifications with three or

9 Ante at 16-17; see also Batista (On Remand), ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6.
5

more employees who do not work pursuant to a CBA.10 Absent legislative intervention, 

these important issues—and likely others—remain to be addressed first by the parties on 

the ground and, if necessary, in subsequent litigation.

II. LEGISLATIVE ACTION

I join the Court of Appeals and my colleagues in imploring the Legislature to 

consider amending the statutory scheme. Among other things, I urge the Legislature to 

assess: (1) the appropriate definition of “normal salary schedule,” (2) how to calculate the 

retirement allowances for employees who relied on the now-invalidated NSI schedules and 

did not have an applicable normal salary schedule during prior years of employment, and 

(3) MCL 38.1303a(3)(f)’s requirement that retirement credit for employees in a job 

classification with fewer than three members be determined on the basis of a normal salary 

schedule created for a different job classification. 

I question whether the statute as currently written is unintentionally inconsistent 

with the Legislature’s broad intent, which I suspect was that all employees’ retirement 

credit would be subject to a normal salary schedule limitation and that no employees would 

be deprived entirely of credit for yearly salary increases. Yet it seems possible under the 

current scheme that some public-school employees could receive no credit for yearly salary 

increases. At minimum, many public-school employees are now left with uncertainty

regarding their retirement allowances. This undesirable state of affairs is partially

attributable to the fact that there is no statutory definition of “normal salary schedule” and 

10 Notably, nothing in the Public School Employees Retirement Act, MCL 38.1301 et seq.,

currently requires a reporting unit’s governing body to establish or approve a “normal 

salary schedule” for such job classifications. 
6

that there is minimal authority using that precise phrase in Michigan or elsewhere. This

lack of guidance created understandable uncertainty regarding what “normal salary 

schedule” means.11 

The Court today settles the question by defining “normal salary schedule,” and I 

agree with the Court’s decision to do so. Defining that phrase not only ensures the proper 

resolution of this case but also provides broader guidance on how the scheme should 

function without the ORS-created NSI schedules. When interpreting a statute, our role is 

not to make policy decisions but rather to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s 

intent. As this case illustrates, this is not always a straightforward task. As the highest 

court in Michigan, it is our responsibility to have the final word on the proper interpretation 

of Michigan law, especially where an issue is difficult and jurisprudentially significant.12 

11 This uncertainty is reflected by ORS’ prior practice of creating its own NSI schedules 

and in the different interpretations of “normal salary schedule” offered in this litigation by 

the Court of Appeals, the parties, and the various amici. 

12 I agree entirely with Justice ZAHRA that “[t]he lower courts’ role in developing 

Michigan’s jurisprudence is critical to this Court’s functioning.” Post at 8 n 11; see also

In re Certified Questions from the United States Dist Court, Western Dist of Mich, 505 

Mich 1159, 1162 (2020) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring) (highlighting the “immense value in 

the meaningful analysis and perspective offered by our intermediate appellate court”). 

However, I disagree with his contention that it is premature for this Court to define “normal 

salary schedule.” In its initial review of this case, the Court of Appeals issued a published 

decision that defined the phrase “normal salary schedule” as limited to a term in a CBA. 

See Batista v Office of Retirement Servs, 338 Mich App 340, 358; 980 NW2d 107 (2021)

(“We find it abundantly clear from the Legislature’s references to ‘the’ normal salary 

schedule and ‘the’ current job classification that the Legislature was necessarily alluding 

to schedules and classifications that were familiar to school personnel and already in place 

in the particular contextual setting of collective bargaining.”), affirmed in part, reversed in 

part, and vacated in part 511 Mich 973 (2023). This Court vacated that holding and, while 

the Court of Appeals on remand declined to definitively resolve the issue, it again 

suggested in another published decision that “we remain of the belief that the Legislature 

was speaking of schedules in collective-bargaining agreements.” Batista (On Remand), 
7

In doing so, we endeavor “to apply the statutory language as best as possible as 

written . . . .” Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 171; 615 NW2d 702 

(2000) (emphasis added). I believe that the Court adopts the best interpretation of “normal 

salary schedule” given the applicable statutory language, pertinent caselaw, and statutory 

context. That said, I agree with Chief Justice CLEMENT that the legislative intent on this 

point is not entirely clear, and I join her in inviting the Legislature to examine the issue and 

amend the statute if it believes we misunderstood its intent or if it wishes to make a different 

policy choice regarding how to calculate a member’s retirement allowance. 

Moreover, as discussed earlier in this opinion, there was widespread reliance for 

many years on the now-invalidated ORS-created NSI schedules. Public-school employees 

without a CBA reasonably relied on the assurance that they would receive retirement credit 

for salary increases to the extent they were consistent with those schedules. Relatedly, it 

seems possible that reporting units’ governing bodies did not recognize that it was 

necessary to establish or approve a normal salary schedule in order for these employees to 

receive retirement credit for salary increases, and therefore there may be employees who 

did not have an applicable normal salary schedule during prior years of work. Absent any 

remedial action, these employees may not be entitled to retirement credit for yearly salary 

increases, which is not what the Legislature likely intended. Given the Legislature’s 

primacy in matters involving the state’s fiscal and public policy, explicit legislative 

___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6 n 3. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals has opined on 

the issue the Court resolves in this case. I also note that this Court explicitly directed the 

parties to brief the proper definition of “normal salary schedule,” Batista v Office of 

Retirement Servs, 513 Mich 1008 (2024), and multiple amicus briefs filed in this Court 

also addressed that issue. 
8

guidance on how to calculate the retirement allowances of such employees would be 

beneficial.

Finally, I encourage the Legislature to assess MCL 38.1303a(3)(f)’s treatment of

employees in a job classification with fewer than three members. The statute currently 

mandates the use of a normal salary schedule created for a different job classification when 

assessing the retirement allowances for these employees. As the Court of Appeals 

remarked, “[t]he Legislature appears to have assumed that a member falling within the 

parameters of the second sentence of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) [i.e., a member in a job 

classification with fewer than three members] would not be covered by his or her own 

‘normal salary schedule.’ ” Batista (On Remand), ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6. But

it is not readily apparent why a salary schedule could not be created and used to determine 

those members’ retirement credit for yearly salary increases. Such an approach may be 

preferable to the current one, which requires a comparison to a salary schedule that is not 

tailored to the specific job classification or reporting unit at issue. As the majority

recognizes, the statutory scheme “provides school districts and ORS with the flexibility to 

look inside and outside of administrators’ school districts to find the most appropriate and 

comparable salary schedule to determine those administrators’ pensions.” Ante at 17. 

Nonetheless, any comparison is likely to be imperfect.

III. CONCLUSION

I join in full the majority opinion, which I believe faithfully interprets the applicable

statutes as written. However, I recognize that the Court’s decisions in this case alter the 

status quo and create grave uncertainty for many public-school employees. My hope is 
9

that the Legislature will take swift action to undertake a comprehensive reassessment of 

this scheme in light of our holdings in order to provide clarity and ensure the fair treatment 

of public-school employees.

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PATRICIA BATISTA, DAVID BRITTEN, 

TIMOTHY DONAHUE, AARON 

GAFFNEY, JOHN HEWITT, RONALD 

KOEHLER, AMY SWANTEK, CHRIS 

THOMSON, and MICHIGAN 

ASSOCIATION OF SUPERINTENDENTS 

AND ADMINISTRATORS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v No. 166305

OFFICE OF RETIREMENT SERVICES, 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL 

EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM BOARD, 

PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM BOARD 

MEMBERS, and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

OF RETIREMENT SERVICES,

Defendants-Appellees.

ZAHRA, J. (dissenting).

This case pertains to MCL 38.1303a’s definition of “compensation.” More 

specifically, at issue is whether certain public school employees may include their year-toyear pay increases when calculating the basis of their pensions, or whether their year-toyear pay increases are excluded from the basis of their pension by MCL 38.1303a(3)(f). 

The majority opinion affirms aspects of the Court of Appeals’ opinion but then goes 

beyond the Court of Appeals’ holding to define the phrase “normal salary schedule.” But 
2

MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) is poorly drafted and perplexingly complex. Interpreting the phrase

“normal salary schedule” is thus a difficult task, especially when done without the benefit 

of lower-court intervention that undoubtedly would develop the issue.1

 Besides, I am not 

convinced that this Court needs to define the phrase “normal salary schedule” at this 

juncture.2

 Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion and would remand this matter 

to the Court of Appeals to define that phrase, which would simultaneously afford the 

Legislature the opportunity to amend MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) and provide clarity to this 

portion of the statute if it wishes to do so.

1 The issue addressed in the majority opinion is one of statutory interpretation. It is a 

quintessential role of this Court to provide meaning to the law enacted by our Legislature. 

Admittedly, some statutes may be interpreted by this Court without legal development in 

the lower courts. This is not such a case. The phrase “normal salary schedule” appears to 

have its origins in collective-bargaining agreements (CBAs), something the Legislature 

knew when it enacted MCL 38.1303a(3)(f). Accordingly, as advocated by the plaintiffs, 

the phrase may be a term of art entitled to an interpretation not found in lay dictionaries. 

2 Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that defendants violated the Public School 

Employees Retirement Act, MCL 38.1301 et seq.; Article 9, § 24 of the Michigan 

Constitution; the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201 et seq.; and the state and 

federal right to due process by creating and implementing salary increase schedules. 

Throughout this litigation, plaintiffs and defendants agreed that plaintiffs were not subject 

to the “normal salary schedule.” Therefore, no court ever needed to define “normal salary 

schedule.” This Court’s order remanding to the Court of Appeals raised an irrelevant issue, 

“whether the phrase “normal salary schedule” in MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) refers only to a 

provision contained in a collective-bargaining agreement.” The answer to that question is 

irrelevant, however, because regardless of whether the phrase “normal salary schedule” 

applies only in a collective-bargaining agreement, only in a personal contract, or in both, 

plaintiffs are undisputedly not subject to normal salary schedules. Accordingly, while the 

definition of the phrase “normal salary schedule” may someday be important, it is not 

important to this litigation. This Court errs by rushing to answer a question that is not 

necessary to the outcome of this case, and it compounds its error by doing so without the 

benefit of the lower courts’ review.
3 

I. APPLICABLE LAW AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

MCL 38.1301 et seq. is the Public School Employees Retirement Act. MCL 

38.1303a(1) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act, ‘compensation’ 

means the remuneration earned by a member for service performed as a public school 

employee.” Subsection (2) states that “[c]ompensation includes salary and wages” and 

specifies eight detailed categories of pay that are included in the definition of 

“compensation.” Meanwhile, Subsection (3) details six categories of pay that are excluded 

from the meaning of “compensation.” At issue is the sixth exclusion, which provides: 

Compensation does not include any of the following: 

* * * 

(f) Compensation in excess of an amount over the level of 

compensation reported for the preceding year except increases provided by 

the normal salary schedule for the current job classification. In cases where 

the current job classification in the reporting unit has less than 3 members, 

the normal salary schedule for the most nearly identical job classification in 

the reporting unit or in similar reporting units shall be used.[3] 

Previously, the ORS created salary schedules and used those to calculate plaintiffs’ 

benefits. This Court ended that practice when, in a prior appeal in this case, we held that 

the ORS lacks authority to create salary schedules.4

 But we remanded this case to the 

Court of Appeals “to address how MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) applies to public school employees

who do not work pursuant to collective bargaining agreements [CBAs] and to further 

3

 MCL 38.1303a(3). 

4 See Batista v Office of Retirement Servs, 511 Mich 973, 973 (2023) (“We AFFIRM the 

Court of Appeals’ holding that the [ORS] lacks the authority to create and implement its 

own normal salary increase schedules.”).
4 

address how this holding affects plaintiffs’ claims in this case.”5 On remand, the Court of 

Appeals held that the first sentence of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) applies to employees who are 

subject to “normal salary schedules” and work under CBAs, while the second sentence of 

MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) applies to said employees regardless of whether they work under 

CBAs or personal employment contracts. The Court of Appeals did not define “normal 

salary schedules” because “[t]he current litigation solely concerns the validity of ORS’s 

creation of [normal salary increase (NSI)] schedules, and as we ruled earlier, the ORS 

lacked statutory authority under the Retirement Act to create and implement the NSI 

schedules, which ruling the Supreme Court affirmed. Accordingly, there is no need to 

address plaintiffs’ additional arguments.”6 As noted earlier, the parties do not dispute that 

plaintiffs do not work under “normal salary schedules.” Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal 

the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and we ordered oral argument on the application. Batista 

v Office of Retirement Servs, 513 Mich 1008 (2024). 

II. ANALYSIS 

The majority opinion goes beyond the holding of the Court of Appeals to define the 

phrase “normal salary schedule,” which—until now—has not been defined by any

Michigan court.7

 

5 Id. 

6 Batista v Office of Retirement Servs (On Remand), ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d 

___ (2023) (Docket No. 353832); slip op at 6. 

7 The majority opinion denies that it goes beyond the Court of Appeals’ holding to define 

the phrase “normal salary schedule” by claiming that the Court of Appeals “interpreted” 

that phrase in its initial, now vacated opinion when it said: 
5

We find it abundantly clear from the Legislature’s references to ‘the’ normal 

salary schedule and ‘the’ current job classification that the Legislature was 

necessarily alluding to schedules and classifications that were familiar to 

school personnel and already in place in the particular contextual setting of 

collective bargaining. The references to ‘normal salary schedule’ for a ‘job 

classification’ plainly pertain to salary schedules contained in collectivebargaining agreements.

I suspect that no one would be more surprised than the members of the Court of 

Appeals panel in this case to learn that a majority of this Court is treating their discussion 

of the definite article “the” that preceded the relevant phrase “normal salary schedule” as 

interpreting that entire phrase. Indeed, it is obvious that the Court of Appeals is discussing 

MCL 38.1303(f)(3)’s use of the word “the” because that is the key word it placed in 

quotation marks. A definition is “a statement of the meaning of a word . . . .” MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). It is confounding to me that the majority 

opinion treats the Court of Appeals’ discussion of the word “the” as though it defined the 

phrase “normal salary schedule.”

Next, the majority opinion claims that “[w]e . . . granted leave, directing the parties 

to address the meaning of the phrase ‘normal salary schedule’ ” and that “the meaning of 

the phrase has long been a focus of this litigation . . . .” This is wrong twice over. First, 

this Court directed the parties to address “(1) whether the phrase ‘normal salary schedule’

in MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) refers only to a provision contained in a collective-bargaining 

agreement; and (2) if not, from what other source may a ‘normal salary schedule’ be 

derived.” Batista, 513 Mich at 1008. We did not direct them in simple terms to define the 

phrase “normal salary schedule,” and while defining that phrase may be necessary to 

determine whether it applies in CBAs only, CBAs and private contracts, or private 

contracts only, that is an issue we should leave for the lower courts to first address. In turn, 

this undermines the majority opinion’s contention that we received “full briefing on the 

issue.” Plaintiffs devoted one page (out of 43) to defining the phrase; meanwhile, 

defendants devoted only one paragraph of their 37-page response to defining the phrase. 

Because we received almost no relevant or helpful briefing on the definition of “normal 

salary schedule” and no lower court ever defined the phrase, I would not define it now. 

Second, it is duplicitous to argue that a phrase that no lower court has ever defined “has 

long been a focus of this litigation.” Indeed, on remand, the Court of Appeals held that 

“our Supreme Court upheld our central holding” “that the ORS lacked the authority to 

create and implement its own NSI schedules.” Batista (On Remand), ___ Mich App at 

___; slip op at 2. Besides, the parties have agreed from the very beginning that plaintiffs 

do not work under “normal salary schedules”; therefore, that irrelevant phrase’s definition 

cannot be the focus of this litigation. See paragraph 141 of the first amended complaint, 

in which plaintiffs complained of being treated differently “than other school employees 
6

Given the complexity of the issue presented, I question the Court’s decision to dive 

headfirst into a final, authoritative interpretation without the benefit of the lower courts’ 

wisdom. As Chief Justice CLEMENT’s concurrence dubitante aptly points out, she (and, I 

would argue, the entire Court) “simply do[es] not know enough about the use of CBAs for 

various kinds of employees in order to be confident that the examples the majority cites 

are certainly examples of normal salary schedules being used outside the CBA context.” 

The use of CBAs for various kinds of employees and the meaning of “normal salary 

schedule” inside and outside the context of CBAs are questions that ought to be developed 

by the lower courts so that this Court’s first holding on the issue is informed, necessary, 

and authoritative, as opposed to merely authoritative.

that are actually paid on a normal salary schedule”; see also page 29 of plaintiffs’ brief on 

first appeal in the Court of Appeals, arguing that “absent [defendants’] intervention, there 

is no ‘normal salary schedule’ for [plaintiffs] and similarly-situated individuals.” 

Meanwhile, on page 16 of their brief on first appeal in the Court of Appeals, defendants

argued that “[t]he Retirement Act expressly limits the crediting of increases in 

‘compensation’ to those that fall within a normal salary schedule,” so plaintiffs, who do 

not fall within a normal salary schedule, may not credit increases in their compensation. 

The majority opinion’s statement that the meaning of the phrase “normal salary schedule” 

“has long been a focus of this litigation” thus ignores hundreds of pages of the parties’

briefs that state the contrary and the lower courts’ holdings that did not consider the phrase 

enough of a “focus” to this litigation to even define it. The majority opinion concludes by 

explaining that “there is no rule or compelling reason to delay resolution of this issue.” 

The majority misses the point of this dissent, which is not that the Court cannot define the 

phrase “normal salary schedule” without waiting for the full wisdom of the lower courts,

but simply that it is imprudent and ill-judged to do so. In sum, this Court should wait for 

the lower courts to actually define the phrase “normal salary schedule” before offering an 

authoritative interpretation. And while these proceedings develop on remand, the 

Legislature just might answer the call of this Court to define the phrase “normal salary 

schedule.”
7

The need for lower-court development of this legal issue is evident from the 

definition of “normal salary schedule” cobbled together in the majority opinion, which

defines “normal salary schedule” by looking at the meaning of each word individually:

One contextually appropriate definition of “normal,” for purposes of MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f), is “according with, constituting, or not deviating from a 

norm, rule, or principle: REGULAR.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 

Dictionary (8th ed). That same dictionary defines “salary” as “fixed 

compensation paid regularly for services.” Id. Finally, a “schedule” can be 

“a written document,” “a statement of supplementary details appended to a 

legal or legislative document,” “a written or printed list,” or a “timetable.” 

Id.

The majority opinion then concludes that the phrase “normal salary schedule” means a “(1)

written document (2) established by statute or approved by a reporting unit’s governing 

body (3) that indicates the time and sequence of compensation, and (4) conforms to a 

regular norm, rule, or principle—i.e., it applies to a generally applicable job classification 

rather than to a specific employee.” 

This definition raises several concerns.

8

 One issue with the definition of “normal 

salary schedule” found in the majority opinion is that it does not include the full definition 

of “salary.” The cited dictionary defines “salary” as “fixed compensation paid regularly

for services.”9 In the context of “normal salary schedule,” however, the majority opinion

defines “salary” as merely “compensation.” The majority opinion does not explain why 

the definition of “normal salary schedule” does not require that the compensation be 

8 I do not aspire to produce an exhaustive list of the many latent ways in which the majority 

opinion’s ad hoc definition of “normal salary schedule” might go awry. Instead, I merely 

provide a few examples of patent flaws in the majority opinion’s definition. These 

examples show why we ought not rush to judgment in this case. 

9 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (8th ed) (emphasis added).
8

“fixed” or “paid regularly,” as provided in the cited dictionary. The definition provided 

in the majority opinion also selects two definitions of “schedule” without explaining why 

two definitions are needed for one word. The Court holds that for something to qualify 

as a “normal salary schedule” it must be both “written” and “indicate[] the time and 

sequence of each operation,” which are alternative definitions of “schedule.”10 I am left 

to question why two definitions for the same word are needed, why one definition is 

insufficient, and why three or more is too many. Perhaps the practical wisdom of the 

lower courts might explain why two definitions, no more and no fewer, are needed. But 

we simply do not have the benefit of a developed lower-court record on this point. Last, 

the majority opinion does not explain why a “normal salary schedule” must be 

“established by statute or approved by a reporting unit’s governing body.” It is logical 

to assume that only a “normal salary schedule” that is approved by an authoritative body 

will govern school administrator’s pensions, but the majority opinion fails to explain 

where that requirement is found in the three-word phrase “normal salary schedule.” In 

sum, the definition of “normal salary schedule” provided in the majority opinion is rife 

with traps and flaws that are both seen and unseen. Given the complexity of this issue, I 

would defer the defining of this critical phrase to the lower courts for further 

jurisprudential development rather than issuing an improvised, undeveloped definition, 

like the Court does today.11

10 Id.

11 The lower courts’ role in developing Michigan’s jurisprudence is critical to this Court’s 

functioning. Lower courts’ development of a particular legal issue enables us to fully 

consider that issue before weighing in with a final, authoritative interpretation. We should 
9

That a majority of my colleagues urge the Legislature to provide clarity as to the 

proper interpretation and application of MCL 38.1301a(3)(f) bolsters my belief that we

should not rush to define “normal salary schedule” at this juncture. In her concurrence,

Chief Justice CLEMENT, joined by Justice BOLDEN, “encourage[s] the Legislature to 

amend the statute in order to clarify the definition of ‘normal salary schedule . . . .’ ” And 

Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Justice WELCH, “urge[s] the Legislature to revisit this 

[statutory] scheme,” concluding, “My hope is that the Legislature will take swift action 

to undertake a comprehensive reassessment of this scheme in light of our holdings in 

order to provide clarity and ensure the fair treatment of public-school employees.”12 It

is apparent to me—in the same way it is apparent to a majority of this Court—that MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f) contains flaws. I would therefore defer offering an authoritative

construction of “normal salary schedule” until after the Legislature has had an 

opportunity to amend MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) or—if the Legislature declines to amend MCL 

38.1303a(3)(f)—until the lower courts have had a reason and opportunity to develop the 

issue. 

In conclusion, I am not at all certain that the definition of “normal salary schedule” 

adopted in the majority opinion is correct. The Court errs by improvidently offering a 

definitive interpretation of “normal salary schedule” without directing the lower courts 

not abandon one of this state’s greatest jurisprudential tools—the multitiered court 

system—absent a pressing need. Here, the majority opinion does not identify any such 

need. 

12 Below, the Court of Appeals “implore[d] the Legislature to address the patent flaws in 

the statutory language [of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f)].” Batista (On Remand), ___ Mich App at 

___; slip op at 6.
10

to develop the issue. Allowing the lower courts to weigh in first would also afford the 

Legislature an opportunity to amend MCL 38.1303a(3)(f), as requested by a majority of 

the Court. Accordingly, I dissent.

Brian K. Zahra