alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Gill et al. vs. Ward et al.

It is not necessary that the affidavit, prescribed by *section*180, *chap.*99, *Gould's Dig.,*should be signed by tbe affiant — the omission to sign it not affecting its validity.

*Appeal from Yell Oi/rcuit Oourt.*

Hon. JohN J. ClendeNIN, Circuit Judge.

Hollowell, for the appellants.

JoedaN and Williams & Martin, for the appellees.

Mr. Justice Compton

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace, in this case, upon the ground that the affidavit for the appeal, though duly certified by the justice before whom it was made, was not signed by the affiant.

• The language of the statute is, that *“*the applicant, or some person for him, shall *make*and file with the justice, an affidavit *17that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay,” etc., *Gould's Dig., ch.*99, *sec.*180.

An affidavit, as defined by Blackstone, is “ a voluntary oath before some judge or officer of the court, to evince the truth of certain facts.” 3 *Bl. Com.*304. In practice, it is said to be “ an oath or affirmation reduced to writing, sworn or affirmed to before some officer who has authority to administer it.” *Bouv. L. Dic.*79, *title, Affidavit.*It is not necessary that the affiant should sign the affidavit. He must *make*it; that is, he must swear to the facts stated, and they must be in writing. It is then his affidavit — and as evidence that it was sworn to by thé party, whose .oath it purports to be, it must be certified by the officer before whom it was taken; which certificate is commonly called the jurat, and must be signed by such officer.

That the signature of the party who makes the affidavit, is not essential to its validity, where there is no statute or rule of court, which requires the affidavit to be signed, was held in *Hilsman et al. vs. Garrard,*1 *Har.*124; *Redus vs. Wofford,*4 *Sme.*& *Mar.*579; *Shelton vs. Berry,*19 *Texas*154; *Millins vs. Shafer,*3 *Denio*60; *Jackson vs. Virgil,*3 *John.*540, and *Hoff vs. Spicer et al.*3 *Cain*190. And we have not been able to find any adjudications where it was held otherwise. True, Bacon defines an affidavit to be “ an oath in writing, signed by the party deposing, sworn before and attested by him who hath authority to administer the same.” 1 *Ba. Abr., title, Affidavit.*But this definition, as observed by Wheeler, J., in *Crist vs. Parks,*19 *Texas*235, is probably founded on the practice under rules of court in England. And although it is said — and wé think correctly — in some of the cases above cited, to be the better practice, that every officer before whom an affidavit is *made,*should require the party sworn, to subscribe his name to the body of the affidavit, yet, in all those cases, it is distinctly held that the omission of the affiant’s signature does not affect the validity of the affidavit.

It follows that the court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ *18appeal, and for this error the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Opinion issued December 20, 2012

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-12-01099-CR

———————————

IN RE SAMUEL ROY JACKSON, Relator

Original Proceeding on Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator, Samuel Roy Jackson, has filed, pro se, a petition for writ of 

mandamus, “seeking relief from a void judgment and void court order” rendered 

on October 28, 2004. Jackson contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to 

render the order, making its judgment void. Jackson further contends that the trial 

court erroneously reinstated the indictment on which he was convicted after its 
2

dismissal, did not have jurisdiction over the first or reinstated indictment, 

conducted a subsequent trial when there was no evidence to support his conviction, 

and refused to allow an impaneled jury to render its verdict. 

Jackson’s petition is for the purpose of obtaining relief from his felony 

conviction of the offense of aggravated robbery. On November 17, 2005, this 

Court affirmed Jackson’s conviction, making it final. Jackson v. State, No. 01-04-

01137-CR, 2005 WL 3072018, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 17, 

2005, pet. withdrawn). The exclusive remedy from final felony convictions is a 

writ of habeas corpus. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (West 2005). 

Only the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction in final post-conviction 

habeas corpus proceedings. See id.; Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. 

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App.

1995); In re McAfee, 53 S.W.3d 715, 717–18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2001, orig. proceeding). Thus, this Court is without authority to grant the relief

that Jackson seeks. See Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene, 910 S.W.2d at 

483; In re McAfee, 53 S.W.3d at 717–18; In re Murphy, No. 01-11-00120-CR, 

2011 WL 1326032, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 Dist.] Apr. 7, 2011, orig. 

proceeding) (mem. op.).

We dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus for lack of jurisdiction. All 

pending motions are denied.
3

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Sharp.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
<PAGE>
                           SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION


                                 CERTIFICATION
          (pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
                 Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)


In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June
30, 2001 of Golf Host Resorts, Inc. (the "Company") as filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") on the date hereof (the
"Report") and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I R. Keith Wilt, Vice President &
Treasurer of the Company, certify, that:

         1)       the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13
                  (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
                  amended; and

         2)       the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the company.


                                             /s/ R. Keith Wilt
                                             ----------------------------------
                                             Name:  R. Keith Wilt
                                             Title: Vice President & Treasurer
                                                    (Principal Financial
                                                    Officer)
                                             Date:  October 11, 2002
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Edward SHAFFETT.

No. 60556.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 10, 1978.

J. Daniel Rivette, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         517,937
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,063,319
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    301,665
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,897,349
<PP&E>                                      23,877,595
<DEPRECIATION>                            (18,433,302)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               7,488,884
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,024,473
<BONDS>                                      1,476,572
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        39,904
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,747,935
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 7,488,884
<SALES>                                      1,241,218
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,251,014
<CGS>                                          569,840
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  832,785
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              41,457
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                376,772
<INCOME-TAX>                                    34,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            342,772
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   342,772
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .09


</TABLE>
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-18-00201-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 141st District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 141-267462-13

Before Birdwell, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Bassel, J.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

SOLOY, L.L.C., Appellant

V.

ANKE MONTGOMERY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL 

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MARK MONTGOMERY, DECEASED;

AND EAGLEMED, L.L.C., Appellees
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

We have considered the parties’ “Agreed Motion to Dismiss Appeal Against 

the Montgomery Appellee with Prejudice.” We grant the motion and dismiss with 

prejudice the appeal against appellee Anke Montgomery only, in both her individual 

and personal representative capacities. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1), 43.2(f). The 

cause number will now be styled “Soloy, L.L.C. v. EagleMed, L.L.C.”

Per Curiam

Delivered: January 10, 2019
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1131 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 125

103d CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1131

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

  To extend the method of computing the average subscription charges 
   under section 8906(a) of title 5, United States Code, relating to 
               Federal employee health benefits programs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             June 30, 1993

                       Reported without amendment

                                                       Calendar No. 125
103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1131

  To extend the method of computing the average subscription charges 
   under section 8906(a) of title 5, United States Code, relating to 
               Federal employee health benefits programs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                June 17 (legislative day, June 15), 1993

Mr. Pryor (for himself and Mr. Stevens) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental 
                                Affairs

                             June 30, 1993

                Reported by Mr. Glenn, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To extend the method of computing the average subscription charges 
   under section 8906(a) of title 5, United States Code, relating to 
               Federal employee health benefits programs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF METHOD OF COMPUTING AVERAGE SUBSCRIPTION 
              CHARGES FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAMS.

    (a) In General.--The Act entitled ``An Act relating to the method 
by which Government contributions to the Federal employees health 
benefits program shall be computed for 1990 or 1991 if no Government-
wide indemnity benefit plan participates in that year'', approved 
August 11, 1989 (5 U.S.C. 8906 note; Public Law 101-76; 103 Stat. 556) 
is amended in subsection (a)(1) by striking out ``contract years 1990 
through 1993'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``contract years 1990 
through 1998''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that 
nothing in this section should be considered to reflect any view on the 
appropriateness, merits, or timing, or any other aspect of any 
comprehensive health care reform legislation.
```
# C_2023164EN.01000901.xml

| 8.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/9

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 16 March 2023 — European Commission v Ana Calhau Correia de Paiva

(Case C-511/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Rules on languages - Open Competition EPSO/AD/293/14 - Notice of competition - Limitation of the choice of the second language of the competition to English, French or German - Non-inclusion on the reserve list - Plea of illegality of the notice of competition - Admissibility)

(2023/C 164/11)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: I. Melo Sampaio, B. Schima and L. Vernier, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Ana Calhau Correia de Paiva (represented by: D. Rovetta and V. Villante, avvocati)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders the European Commission to pay, in addition to its own costs, the costs incurred by Ms Ana Calhau Correia de Paiva in the present appeal proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the European Commission to pay, in addition to its own costs, the costs incurred by Ms Ana Calhau Correia de Paiva in the present appeal proceedings.

---

(1)  OJ C 2, 3.1.2022.

---
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 131 (Monday, July 9, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31739-31740]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-14684]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Navy


Notice of Intent To Grant Exclusive Patent License; EnZinc, Inc.

AGENCY: Department of the Navy, DoD.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of the Navy hereby gives notice of its intent 
to grant to EnZinc, Inc., a revocable, nonassignable, exclusive license 
to practice in the field of use of a zinc electrode for use in a 
nickel-zinc battery for two- or three-wheeled electric vehicles; the 
field of use of a zinc electrode for use in a nickel-zinc battery for 
micro-grid energy storage; the field of use of a zinc electrode for use 
in a nickel-zinc battery in a start-stop vehicles; the field of use of 
a zinc electrode for use in a nickel-zinc battery for hybrid-electric 
vehicles; and the

[[Page 31740]]

field of use of use of a zinc electrode for use in a nickel-zinc 
battery for electric vehicles having at least four wheels, in the 
United States, the Government-owned invention described in U.S. Patent 
Application No. 15/666,724: Zinc Electrodes for Batteries, Navy Case 
No. 102,137.//U.S. Patent Application No. 15/797,181: Zinc Electrodes 
for Batteries, Navy Case No. 102,137.// and any continuations, 
divisionals or re-issues thereof.

DATES: Anyone wishing to object to the grant of this license must file 
written objections along with supporting evidence, if any, not later 
than July 24, 2018.

ADDRESSES: Written objections are to be filed with the Naval Research 
Laboratory, Code 1004, 4555 Overlook Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20375-
5320.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Amanda Horansky McKinney, Head, 
Technology Transfer Office, NRL Code 1004, 4555 Overlook Avenue SW, 
Washington, DC 20375-5320, telephone 202-767-1644.
    Due to U.S. Postal delays, please fax 202-404-7920, email: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#89fdeceae1fdfbe8e7c9fbecfaece8fbeae1a7e7fbe5a7e7e8fff0a7e4e0e5"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="96e2f3f5fee2e4f7f8d6e4f3e5f3f7e4f5feb8f8e4fab8f8f7e0efb8fbfffa">[email protected]</span></a> or use courier delivery to expedite 
response.

(Authority: 35 U.S.C. 207, 37 CFR part 404)

    Dated: June 29, 2018.
E.K. Baldini,
Lieutenant Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, 
Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 2018-14684 Filed 7-6-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 3810-FF-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM MACKIE
DESIGNS INC.'S CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND RELATED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS
OF INCOME AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED> 
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                       2,567,315
<SECURITIES>                                 9,908,340
<RECEIVABLES>                               11,555,736
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (530,000)
<INVENTORY>                                 18,565,557
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            43,972,617
<PP&E>                                      17,626,615
<DEPRECIATION>                             (7,428,544)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              54,810,272
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,904,246
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    29,176,711
<OTHER-SE>                                  17,978,315
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                54,810,272
<SALES>                                     17,354,240
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            17,354,240
<CGS>                                       10,525,273
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,525,273
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,321,230
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,653,604
<INCOME-TAX>                                   496,100
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,157,504
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,157,504
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .09
        

</TABLE>
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1048

To suspend temporarily the duty on DMAS.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 27 (legislative day, APRIL 19), 1993

Mr. KOHL (for himself and Mr. DANFORTH) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To suspend temporarily the duty on DMAS.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DMAS.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following

7 new heading:

‘‘ 9902.31.12 DMAS (Dimethyl acetyl

succinate) (provided for in

subheading 2918.30.50) ..... Free No change No change On or before

12/31/95 ’’.

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

9 this section applies with respect to goods entered, or with-
2

•S 1048 IS

1 drawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the

2 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
# C_2023164EN.01001201.xml

| 8.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/12

---

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 9 March 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad — Haskovo — Bulgaria) — JP EOOD v Otdel ‘Mitnichesko razsledvane i razuznavane’ /MRR/ v TD ‘Mitnitsa Burgas’

(Case C-752/21, (1) Otdel ‘Mitnichesko razsledvane i razuznavane’)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 - Union Customs Code - Legal remedies - Judicial cooperation in criminal matters - Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA - Smuggled goods - Goods belonging to a third party seized in the course of administrative-offence proceedings - National legislation excluding that third party from the category of persons entitled to bring an action against the administrative penalty notice ordering the seizure)

(2023/C 164/16)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Administrativen sad — Haskovo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: JP EOOD

Defendant: Otdel ‘Mitnichesko razsledvane i razuznavane’ /MRR/ v TD ‘Mitnitsa Burgas’

intervener: Okrazhna prokuratura — Haskovo

Operative part of the judgment

| 1. | Article 44 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code
  must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not provide for a right of appeal against an administrative penalty notice for a person whose property has been seized on the basis of such a decision but who is not regarded, in that decision, as the person committing the administrative offence connected with the penalty imposed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Article 44 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code

must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not provide for a right of appeal against an administrative penalty notice for a person whose property has been seized on the basis of such a decision but who is not regarded, in that decision, as the person committing the administrative offence connected with the penalty imposed.

| 2. | Article 4 of Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property
  must be interpreted as not applying to a decision concerning an act which does not constitute a criminal offence. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Article 4 of Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property

must be interpreted as not applying to a decision concerning an act which does not constitute a criminal offence.

---

(1)  OJ C 109, 7.3.2022.

---