1The HONORABLE E. RICHARD WEBBER, United States District Judge for

the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

2The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-3566

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Chad Joseph Sumner, * [PUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 10, 1999

Filed: March 26, 1999

___________

Before FAGG and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, and WEBBER,1 District Judge.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Chad Joseph Sumner appeals his conviction of robbery, a violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2111, and from the fifty-one month sentence imposed by the district court.2

We affirm.
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I.

On September 13, 1997, Sumner and several others were drinking on the

grounds of St. Mary’s Catholic cemetery on the Red Lake Indian Reservation.

Without warning, Sumner attacked Jerilyn Whitefeather, a member of the group. He

punched Whitefeather in the face, threw her to the ground, and kicked her. He then

demanded her car keys. After digging the keys out of one of Whitefeather’s pockets,

Sumner drove away in her car. The automobile was discovered abandoned the next

day. There was interior and exterior damage to the car, and the stereo system had

been removed.

II.

Sumner contends that the government violated the dictates of Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to inform him that a fingerprint analysis of

an envelope found in the car failed to match his own prints. The latent print analysis

of the envelope did not identify a matching set of fingerprints.

In order to prove a Brady violation, the “defendant must show that the

prosecution suppressed the evidence, the evidence was favorable to the

accused, and the evidence was material to the issue of guilt or

punishment.” Evidence is material under Brady “only if there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

“Reasonable probability” is defined as a “probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.”

United States v. Flores-Mireles, 112 F.3d 337, 339-340 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 118

S. Ct. 350 (1997) (citations omitted).

We conclude that no Brady violation occurred here. Although the fingerprint

analysis indicated that the prints did not match Sumner’s, that fact would have been
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of little or no import. In addition to Whitefeather, two other witnesses testified that

Sumner attacked Whitefeather and left with her car. In light of this testimony, there

is no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the results

of the fingerprint analysis been made known to Sumner prior to trial.

During the trial, the prosecutor asked a Red Lake police officer if he knew what

Sumner’s status was at the time of his arrest. The officer answered that Sumner “had

active tribal warrants in Red Lake and also an active federal warrant.” Defense

counsel’s objection on relevancy grounds was sustained and the answer was stricken.

Moments later, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The district court overruled the

motion, but gave the jury a cautionary instruction. Sumner contends that the district

court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. We do not agree. See,

e.g., United States v. Brown, 903 F.2d 540, 542 (8th Cir. 1990) (reference to the

defendant’s pretrial detention did not require a mistrial where the remark was isolated

and a cautionary instruction was given to the jury); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d

1347, 1362 (8th Cir. 1988) (witness reference to a state court indictment was harmless

error, where evidence from other witnesses confirmed the defendant’s guilt); United

States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 460 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversal of the conviction

was not proper when, although the court failed to give a curative instruction, the

improper prosecutorial comment had minimal cumulative effect and strong evidence

of the defendant’s guilt was presented).

Sumner also argues that the district court erred in imposing the two-level

sentencing enhancement that the Sentencing Guidelines call for if the victim of a

robbery suffers bodily injury. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A). Whitefeather testified

that Sumner punched her in the face and kicked her repeatedly. She was required to

visit the hospital for x-rays. In addition, she testified that her face was red and puffy

for a substantial period of time, that she had a black eye for three weeks, and that her

face was tender six months after the incident. Thus, this is not a case in which there

was not even a minimal showing of bodily injury, as was the case in United States v.
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Dodson, 109 F.3d 486 (8th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we conclude that the district

court did not clearly err in imposing the enhancement. See United States v. Coney,

949 F.2d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying clearly erroneous standard to sentence

enhancements).

The judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.