alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2021148EN.01000901.xml

| 26.4.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 148/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 148/9

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud (Czech Republic) lodged on 18 February 2021 — HJ

(Case C-101/21)

(2021/C 148/11)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Nejvyšší správní soud

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: HJ

Other party to the proceedings: Ministerstvo práce a sociálních věcí

Question referred

Does Article 2 of Directive 2008/94/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, in conjunction with Article 12(a) and (c) thereof, preclude [the application of] national case-law according to which a CEO of a trading company is not deemed to be an ‘employee’ for the purpose of the satisfaction of pay claims pursuant to Directive 2008/94/EC, for the sole reason that the CEO as an employee is, at the same time, a member of the statutory body of the same trading company?

---

(1)  OJ 2008 L 283, p. 36.

---
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 24, 2021

No. 04-21-00312-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF K.S.G.H. AND K.R.H.

From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019-PA-02157

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

ORDER

This is an accelerated appeal from an order terminating Appellant B.H.’s parental rights. 

On August 19, 2021, we issued an order explaining that from our review of the clerk’s record, it 

appeared Appellant B.H.’s notice of appeal was not timely filed. The clerk’s record shows the 

Order of Termination was signed by the trial court on June 12, 2021. Because this is an 

accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal was due on July 2, 2021. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b); 

TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.405. The clerk’s record reflects that Appellant B.H. did not file a notice 

of appeal until July 28, 2021. Thus, we ordered Appellant B.H. to show cause why this appeal 

should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

In response, Appellant B.H. has filed written proof that he e-filed his notice of appeal 

with the trial court clerk on June 28, 2021, but his notice of appeal was improperly rejected by 

the trial court clerk. Appellant B.H.’s notice of appeal was thus timely filed, and we have 

jurisdiction over this appeal. See Jamar v. Patterson, 868 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. 1993). 

We reinstate appellate deadlines. The clerk’s records and reporter’s records have been 

filed. We ORDER Appellant B.H. to file his brief on or before October 14, 2021.

_________________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 24th day of September, 2021.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
February 10, 2015



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

XUN HUANG AND YUYING DING , Appellant s
NO. 14

- 15

- 00091

- CV V.

RAJESH DALAL , Appellee

________________________________ Today the Court heard appellant s ’ motion to dismiss the appeal from the judgment signed by the court below on October 29, 2014. Having considered the motion and found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED

. We further order that all costs incurred by reason of this appeal be paid by appellant s , Xun Huang and Yuying Ding , jointly and severally

. We further order that mandate be issued immediately. We further order this decision certified below for observanc e.
No. 43.

#### Apalachicola Land & Development Company et al. *v.*W. A. McRae, Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida, et al.

Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida.

Submitted October 12, 1925.

Decided October 19, 1925.

*Messrs. Fred H. Davis*and *E. Tillman Davis,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Messrs. Rivers Buford*and *Fred T. Myers,*for defendants in error.

*Per Curiam.*

Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction on the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, sec. 2, 39 Stat. 726; *Jett Bros. Distilling Co.*v. *Carrollton, 252,*U. S. 1, 5-6.
# all_lease03122019
**EXHIBIT99.1**

 

**GATEWAY ENERGY CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES**

 

**OFFICER CERTIFICATION**

 

 

Pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we hereby certify that thisreport on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2003 fullycomplies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, and that the information contained herein fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of Gateway Energy Corporation and its subsidiaries for the periodspresented.

 

 
|   | /s/ Michael T. Fadden                   |   | /s/ Scott D. Heflin                     |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Chief  Executive Officer and  President |   | Chief  Financial Officer and  Treasurer |   |

 

 
| May 15, 2003 |   |   |   |
|--------------|--------|--------|--------|
| (Date)       |   |   |   |   |
|              |        |        |        |  |

 

----
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS OF JAMES W. LANDRUM,
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD ANDCHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AND MICHAEL H. MCILVAIN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENTAND
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

The undersigned officers of Golden
Chief Resources, Inc. hereby certify that (a) Golden Chiefss Annual Report on
Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (b  information contained in
the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of Golden Chief.

|                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
|-------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date:  July 27, 2004 | GOLDEN CHIEF RESOURCES, INC.
 /s/   JAMES W. LANDRUM
   By: James W. Landrum   Chairman of the Board and Chief   Executive Officer,   Golden Chief Resources, Inc.

 /s/   MICHAEL H. MCILVAIN
   By:  Michael H. McIlvain   Senior Vice President and Chief   Financial Officer,   Golden Chief Resources, Inc

A signed original of this written
statement has been provided to Golden Chief Resources, Inc. and will be retained by Golden
Chief Resources, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.
H. Res. 93

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

February 18, 1993.

Resolved, That the following named Member be, and is

hereby, elected to the following standing committees:

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS: Bernie Sanders, Vermont.

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS: Bernie

Sanders, Vermont.

Attest:

Clerk.
#### JACOB BIDDLE, for the use of JABEZ JENKINS *vs.*RICHARD J. COOPER’S Administrator.

Appearance and pleading to a *scire facias*is a *controverting*the suit, so as to deprive an administrator of the benefit of *sec.*14, *Dig.*227, in relation to costs.

Scire facias on a judgment. The defendant appeared by attorney,, and filed pleas to the action.

*139
      *Ridgely*

now confessed judgment, but insisted that the defendant was not liable for costs, on the ground that no probate had been made before suit brought, as required by law, *{Digest, 227,)*of which fact the defendant made affidavit; and that the defendant had not controverted the claim.

*Bates,*for plaintiff.

*■C. G. Ridgely,*for defendant.

*Per curiam.*

The defendant has *pleaded*to the *scire facias,*and this is *controuerting*the suit; for the plaintiff was bound to come prepared for trial, !and~it would not be just that he should pay the costs of witnesses, an expense which was made necessary by filing the pleas. If the defendant did not intend to controvert the demand, he should have permitted judgment to go against him without appearance or plea.

Judgment for plaintiff.
[No. 317-3.

Division Three.

October 15, 1971.]

#### *In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of*Jack Raymond Struck, Jr., *Petitioner,*v. Thomas G. Pinnock, *Respondent.*

Application filed in the Court of Appeals December 3, 1970, for a writ of habeas corpus. *Denied*by unpublished opinion pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
```

[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 133 (Wednesday, July 11, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 32113]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-14813]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. CP17-488-000; CP17-489-000]

Kinetica Deepwater Express, LLC; Kinetica Energy Express, LLC; 
Notice of Technical Conference

    Take notice that a technical conference will be held on Thursday, 
July 12, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. (Eastern Standard Time), in a room to be 
designated at the offices of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426.
    At the technical conference, the Commission staff and the parties 
to the proceeding should be prepared to discuss all issues and comments 
filed in the proceeding.
    Federal Energy Regulatory Commission conferences are accessible 
under section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. For accessibility 
accommodations please send an email to [email protected] or call 
toll free (866) 208-3372 (voice) or (202) 502-8659 (TTY), or send a fax 
to (202) 208-2106 with the required accommodations.
    All interested persons and staff are permitted to attend. For 
further information please contact Shannon ONeil at (202) 502-6046 or 
email [email protected].

    Dated: July 5, 2018.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2018-14813 Filed 7-10-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
```
#### Manuel S. CONDE, Appellant, v. FULL HOUSE, INC., SDRJJ Corporation, Florida corporations, Obert V. Emanuel, Toby Emanuel, and Joel N. Lee, Appellees.

No. 67-726.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Dec. 27, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 6, 1968.

*23Theodore M. Trushin, Miami Beach, for appellant.

Richard Mclver, Miami, for appellees.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Manuel S. Conde, challenges the propriety of two interlocutory orders entered by the court below.

The first order discharged appellee and its surety from their obligations under a bond which had been posted in order to obtain an “emergency injunction without notice” against the appellant. The trial judge found that the emergency injunction without notice had been entered properly.

Subsequently, the appellant was adjudged in contempt of court for failure to comply with a prior order of the trial court. The contempt order permitted appellant to purge himself of the contempt order by compliance with its terms, within thirty days, by the delivery of certain personal property to the appellees.

We find that there is substantial competent evidence in the record to support the finding and adjudication holding appellant in contempt of court.

The appeal from the other interlocutory order is dismissed, sua sponte. See Morris v. Rabara, Fla.App.1962, 145 So.2d 265; Bronk v. Bronk, 46 Fla. 474, 35 So. 870 (1903).

It is so ordered.
#### Martha HIDALGO, Appellant, v. Joseph OUTLER, Appellee.

No. 71-304.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 4, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Ernest Clyde CHARLES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-218.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 22, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Carlton SIMMONS.

No. 52984.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 8, 1973.

*386James B. Collins, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Warren E. Mouledoux, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frank T. Salter, Jr., Dist. Atty., James L. Babin, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Carlton Simmons was charged by Bill of Indictment for the manslaughter killing of James Ralph Williams in violation of La. R.S. 14:31, and after trial by jury was convicted and sentenced to nineteen (19) years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. On this appeal, he has urged one bill of exceptions taken to the trial court’s denial of his Motion for a Mistrial filed after case was submitted to the jury.

The grounds upon which the defendant based his bill of exceptions was on the fact that, though previously unnoticed either by counsel or the trial judge, defendant was tried under an indictment numbered 3361— 72, whereas counsel had been appointed to represent the defendant under a bill of information numbered 1896-72.

We are in accord with the trial judge’s explanation that:

> “ * * * apparently there was a Bill of Information filed charging the defendant with the offense for which he was tried. He was also indicted by the Grand Jury of the parish for the same offense. Even though (defense counsel) may have been appointed by the Court to represent the defendant in connection with the charge made by the Bill of Information — that is, under that number (1896-72) — it appears to the Court there is no question but (that counsel was) appointed to represent this defendant in connection with the offense of manslaughter, with which the State charged him as having occurred on January 22, 1972, in the death of James Ralph Williams. Of course, that is the charge which has been tried, and the mere fact that the State elected to try him under the Bill of Indictment rather than the Bill of Information, I don’t see that that makes any difference.”

The record shows counsel for defendant was present in court at every critical stage of the prosecution.

There is no merit to this bill.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
# C_2022266EN.01000801.xml

| 11.7.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 266/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 266/8

---

Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 16 May 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln — Germany) — RV

(Case C-724/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Citizenship of the Union - Article 21 TFEU - Right to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States - Criminal offence specifically concerning international child abduction - Restriction - Child protection - Proportionality)

(2022/C 266/10)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendant: RV

Interested party: Staatsanwaltschaft Köln

Operative part of the order

Article 21 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding the legislation of a Member State under which the removal by a parent of a child from the carer who is entitled to determine the place of that child’s residence, with the aim of taking the child abroad, attracts criminal penalties even in the absence of force, threat of serious harm or deception, whereas where such removal takes place in the territory of the first Member State, the same act is punishable only if recourse is had to force, threat of serious harm or deception.

---

(1)  Date lodged: 30 November 2021.

---
#### In the Interest of S. S. and W. S., Children. Juvenile Court Case No. 26-345.

No. 1633.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Sept. 29, 1967.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
No. 10684.

#### Eastman *v.*Eastman.

Decided February 2, 1909.

Error' to Circuit Court of Crawford county:

*Mr. Edtvard Vollrath,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Anson. Wickham*and *Mr.*
      *465
      *L. C. Heighner,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Crew, C. J., Summers, Shauck and Price, JJ., concur.
#### Timothy McGUIRE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-159.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 29, 1972.

Walter N. Colbath, Jr., Public Defender, and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Donald K. Rudser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In this case appellant was convicted of the crimes of possession of LSD and sale of LSD and sentenced by the court to two years for each conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. A review of the record on appeal indicates that the LSD possessed was the LSD sold thus in effect making the possession and sale a single transaction. Based upon the reasoning in Yost v. State, Fla.App.1971, 243 So.2d 469, only one sentence should have been imposed and that for the highest offense charged. See also Keenan v. State, Fla.App.1971, 253 So.2d 273; and Martin v. State, Fla.App.1971, 251 So.2d 283. In all other respects we are of the opinion that the appellant’s allegations of error are without merit. See Ramirez v. State, Fla.App.1970, 241 So.2d 744; Richardson v. State, Fla.1971, 246 So.2d 771; and Stunson v. State, Fla.App.1969, 228 So.2d 294.

Accordingly, the judgments as to the two counts are affirmed, but the sentences are vacated and the cause remanded with directions that the appellant be presented to the trial court and properly sentenced in accordance herewith.

Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part.

REED, C. J., and OWEN and MAGER, JJ., concur.
#### MARYLAND NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. et al., Petitioners, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 41569.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 17, 1971.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### Barbara A. DiLavore, Respondent, v John R. DiLavore, Appellant.

[655 NYS2d 447]

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered September 12, *3231991, which incorporated a stipulation of settlement entered on the record in open court on June 27, 1991, the defendant former husband appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Dunn, J.), dated February 9,1993, which appointed an appraiser for the former martial residence and directed that Timberpoint Realty act as the listing broker to sell the former marital residence at the appraised price, (2) from an order of the same court, dated March 9, 1994, which awarded the plaintiff interest on the $100,000 equitable distribution award provided in the judgment of divorce, directed that he vacate the former marital premises, and directed that a warrant of eviction be issued to evict him if he failed to vacate, (3) from an order of the same court, dated March 29, 1995, which awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees and receiver’s costs in connection with the sale of the former marital residence, (4) as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the same court, also dated March 29, 1995, as approved the receiver’s report, and (5) from an order of the same court, dated December 14, 1995, which denied his motion to stay enforcement of an income execution. The defendant also purportedly appeals from an order of the same court, dated August 5, 1993.

Ordered that the orders dated February 9, 1993, March 9, 1994, March 29, 1995 (awarding attorney’s fees and receiver’s costs), and December 14, 1995, are affirmed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

Ordered that the order dated March 29, 1995 (approving the receiver’s report), is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

Although the defendant purportedly appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, dated August 5, 1993, that purported appeal was dismissed by decision and order on motion of this Court dated April 10, 1996.

A stipulation of settlement should be construed in accordance with the intent of the parties and the purpose of the stipulation by examining the record as a whole *(see, Sklerov v Sklerov,*231 AD2d 622). In the instant case, the Supreme Court did not err in appointing an appraiser of the former marital residence or in directing that the former marital residence be listed for sale at the appraised price. The court also properly awarded counsel fees to the plaintiff for her post-judgment efforts to effectuate a sale of the former marital residence.

The defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review or are without merit. O’Brien, J. P., Santucci, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.
#### JOHNS-MANVILLE SALES CORP., Appellant, v. UNITED PURVEYORS, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 70-525.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 6, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
H. Res. 577

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

October 7, 1994.

Resolved, That the bill of the Senate (S. 1216) entitled

the ‘‘Crow Boundary Settlement Act of 1994’’, in the opinion

of this House, contravenes the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of the United

States and is an infringement of the privileges of this House

and that such bill be respectfully returned to the Senate with

a message communicating this resolution.

Attest:

Clerk.
257 La. 449

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Clay L. SHAW.

No. 51089.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 13, 1971.

In re: Clay L. Shaw applying for alternative writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Writ denied. The showing made does not warrant the exercise of our jurisdiction. In the event of conviction, the applicant has an adequate remedy by appeal.

HAMLIN, J.,

is of the opinion that, because of the showing made, and because of the exceptional circumstances of this prosecution, the application should be granted.
#### Russell W. MEARS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-112.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

May 9, 1969.

Appeal from Court of Record, Broward County; Russell E. Seay, Jr., Judge.

Appeal dismissed.