### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 00 77 -C V

______________________________ B ESSI E L EE , M I CK EY GE RA L D, SR., AN D A L LOC CU PAN TS, Ap pe lla nts V. AURORA L OAN SERVI CES, L .L .C., Appellee

On Appea l from the County Court at L aw No. 4 Dallas County , Texas Trial Court No. CC-08-04704-D

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r a n d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice Moseley2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Be ssie L ee took out a $455,000.00 var iable intere st rate loan a nd secur ed the loan w ith a deed of tr us t on re a l pr op e rt

y in F a rm e rs B ra

nc h, Da lla s Co un ty , T e x as. L ee was e ve ntu a lly un a ble to comply with the terms of the loa

n and Aurora L oan S ervic es, L .L .C. (Aurora ), the then- holder of the loan and lien, a cce lerated the note a nd fore closed the lien throug h a trustee' s sale. Aurora purcha sed the re al estate at the trustee ' s sale on Apr il 1, 2008. On e we e k a ft e r t

he fo re c los ur e , A ur or a

c a us e d tw o c op ie s o f a

no tic e to v a c a te a dd

re sse d to L ee to b e ma il e d ( o n e o f w h ic h w a s d ir e c te d to h e r a t th e a d dr e s s o f th e f o r e c lo s e d p r o p e rty

and another of which w as di re cted to her at a L as Ve g as, Ne vada, a ddress) a nd a third to be mailed

a dd re sse d to " Oc c up a nt" a t th e a dd re ss o f t he fo re c los e d r e a l pr op e rt y : 92 08 Hi dd e n L a ke s Co ur t, Gra nd Prairie, Te x as 75104. All t h re e co p ies, having been se nt by cer tified mail, were returne d unclaimed. Aurora then ca used an a ction in forc ible detainer to be filed in a D allas County justice court

on May 12 , 200 8, namin g L e e a nd " a ll oc c up a nts " a s def e nd a nts . A de fa

ult jud g me nt f

or fo rc ibl e detainer was re ndere d in favor of Aurora in that justi ce cou rt ac t i o n M ay 20, 2008. Although the appea l bond (or paupe r' s aff idavit in lieu of bond) for the ap p ea l fr om the justice court is not contained in the r ecor d, it would appear that Mickey

Ger ald made a pro se appea ranc e in the justice court a nd took steps to appeal the a ction; it was dockete d with the Dallas Count y Court at L aw Number 4. A fter a

hear ing (during which Ge rald testified that he was le asing the prope rty and hadL e e ' s a ff ida vit state s, " Ido no t know a Mic ke y Ge ra ld, Sr

. I have ne ve r co mmunic a te d w ith 1 him in any

way . Ihave ne ver e ntere d into any leasing ag ree ment with this i ndividual. Ihave ne ver authorized Mr. Ge rald to occ upy this property , and his occupation of t he property was and is without my knowledg e and c onsent. Ihave never rec eived any renta l pay ments from Mr. Ger ald or any other ind ivi du a l. A ny

a nd a ll r e pr e se ntatio ns ma de by Mr . G e ral d to thi s Co ur

t or a ny oth e r a uth or ity reg ardinghis association with me are false a nd fra udulent." Orig inally

appea led to the Fifth Court of Appea ls, this case was transfe rre d to this Court by 2 the Tex as S upreme Court pursuant to its docket e qualization efforts. See T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 73.001 (Ve rnon 2005). We ar e unaw are of any conflict between prece dent of the Fifth Court of Appea ls and that of this Court on any rele vant issue. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 41.3. T h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d t o s u g g e s tt h e r e a r e o t h e r o c c u p a n t s l o c a t e d

o n t h e p r o p e rt y. 3

3 an option to purcha se it ), the County Court at L aw g rante d a judg ment g ranting possession of the 1 proper ty to Aurora

. Although L ee is the named defe ndant and a notice of a

ppeal pur ports to bear 2 her sig nature , L ee ha s filed an aff idavit w ith this Court w here in she maintains that she neve r filed this appeal or authorized its prosec ution on her beha lf, that her sig nature on the notice of appea l was forg ed, and that she, in fa ct , d o es n o t ev en know Ge rald at all; she reque sts that this appea l be dismiss ed as to he r. We dismiss t his appea l as to L ee. 3 I n a si ng le i ssue raised for the first time on appea l to this Court, Ger ald asks for r ever sal of the tr ia l c ourt ' s jud g me nt be c a us e he c la ims Auro ra ' s pe tit ion fo r fo rc ibl e de ta iner insu ff ic ie ntl y descr ibed the prope rty , even though the above street addre ss was included. Aurora argues the a

ppeal i s fr i v o l o u s an d

as k s t h i s C o u rt t o aw ar d

d am age s , t h e s u

p er s ed ea s an d

ap p ea l b o n d s , an d

at t o rn ey 's fee s and costs.4

Ge ra ld' s so le po int

of a pp e a l is tha

t he a lle g e s that the pr op e rt y the su bje c t of the laws uit

is insufficiently descr ibed. Aurora argues it is entitled to da mag es for f

rivolous appea l under Rule 45 of the Te x as Rules of Appellate Procedur e. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 4 5. Auro ra a lso a sk s th e Court

to

awa rd it the $20,000.00 superse deas bond a nd $10,000.00 appea l bond, as we ll as attorney ' s fee s and costs. I. Ana lys is I n o rd e r t o p re se rv e the iss ue of su ff ic ie nt p ro pe rt

y de sc ri pti on fo r ap pe llate re vie w, Ge ra ld

was re quired to make a timely , specific objection to the county court. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a) ; Mitchell v. Citifinancial Mortgage Co. , 192 S.W .3d 882, 883 (Tex. A p p . — Da llas 2006, no pet.). Th e re is n oth ingbe fo re us that su g g e sts he c omp la ine d a bo ut t he suffi cie ncy

of the pr op e rt

y descr iption below. There fore , Ger ald fa iled to preser ve this issue for a

ppellate r eview. Id. Even ha d he ra ised the issue at trial, Ge rald' s contention has no mer it. Rule 741 of the Te x as Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure state s th a t a c omp la int

fo r f or c ibl e de ta ine r " sh all des cri be the land s, ten eme nt s o r pr emi ses . . . wi th su ffi cie nt cert ain ty to id ent if

y t h e s a m e." T EX . R. C IV . P. 741. Ger ald argues that a metes and bounds desc ription of the prope rty is require d. This is sim ply not the law. A street address ena bles one to identify

a piec e of pr operty

in an ac tion for forc ible detainer ;

sever al ca ses have held that a stre et addr ess provides the de scription require d under Rule 741. Mi tc he ll , 1 92 S.W. 3d

a t 88 3; P o we ls o n v . U

. S

. B a n k Na t' l A s s 'n , 1 2 5 S. W. 3 d

8 1 0 , 8 1 2 ( T e x.5

App.—Dallas 2004, no pe t). Fur ther, Ge rald' s contention is simply wrong ; the petition incorporate s the de e d o f tr

us t e xec ute d by L e e by re fe re nc e to it, a nd the de e d of tr us t de sc ri be d the pr op e rt

y a s: L OT 671 I

N BL OCK 1 OF L AKE RI DGE SECTI ON 12, AN ADD I TI ON TO TH E CI TY OF GRAND PRAI RI E, DAL L AS COUNTY, TEXA S, ACCO R DI NG TO THE C I T Y OF GRAND PRAI RI E, DAL L AS COUNTY, TEXA S, ACCOR DI NG TO THE MAP OR PL AT THEREOF R ECORDED I N VOLUME 98043, PAGE 91, PL AT RECORDS, DAL L AS COUNTY, TEXA S. Th is p a ra g ra

phno t on ly

su ff ic ie ntl y de sc ri be s th e pr op e rt

y fo r t he purp os e s o f a

n a c tio n in forc ible detainer , but would allow one to obtain the m etes and bounds description from the D allas County re a l pr op e rt

y re c or ds . As s uc h, the re c a n b e no qu e sti on that th e ple a din g re qu ir e me nts reg ardingthe prope rty descr iption as contained in Rule 741 of the Texas Rules of Civil P roce dure

wer e met. Even in othe r kinds of issues which might require more string ent standar ds, "Awriting

ne e d n ot c on ta in a

me te s and

bo un ds pr op e rt

y de sc ri pti on

to be e nf or c e a ble ; ho we ve r, it mus t f

ur nis h th e dat a to id ent if

y th e pro pert y wi th reas on abl e cert ain ty ." Tex. Builders v. Keller , 928 S.W .2d 479, 481 (Tex. 1996). The de scription meets that standar d. Ne xt, sh ou ld w e de te rm ine that this ap pe a l wa s fr ivo lou s af te r c on sid e ri ngthe re c or d, br ie fs , a nd oth e r pa pe rs fi le d, Rul e 45 of the Te xas Rule s of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure pe rm its us to a wa rd " jus t dam ages." Solares v. Solares , 232 S.W .3d 873, 883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pe t.). Recove ry is authorized if the appe al is objectively frivolous and c aused injury t o Au ro ra . See id. ; Njuku v. Middleton , 2 0 S. W.3 d 17 6, 17 8 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 0, pe t. d e nie d) . A n a pp e a l is fr ivo lou s if

it6

was broug ht with no reasona ble g rounds for r ever sal of the tria l court's j u d gm en t. Solares , 232 S.W .3d at 883; Ke ith v . S oll s , 256 S.W .3d 912, 919–20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pe t.). Her e, Ge rald' s sole g round for appea l was not prese rved for review. Even if he had pr eser ved thi s a lle g e d e rr or a t tr ia l, jus t a pe re mpt or y g lanc e a t or br ie f re vie w of Auro ra ' s p e tit ion

fo r f or c ibl e detainer , the dee d of trust , R u le 741 of the Te x as Rules of Civil P roce dure, a nd rele vant ca selaw would have shown that Aurora ' s descr iptions of t he property wer e suff icient for the circ umstance of this suit . Acc ording ly , Ger ald had no r easona ble g round to believe that the trial cour t's judg ment

wo uld be re ve rs e d. Th e fi lin g of thi s app e a l has de la y e d A ur or a ' s r ig htf

ul p os se ssi on

to t he pr op e rt

y and has c aused it to expend time, money , eff ort, and other re source s to defend the appea l. We ag ree with Aurora

that this appeal wa s patently frivolous and that it is entitled to damag es under Rule 45 of the Te x as Rules of Appe llate Proce dure. There fore , discretionar

y sanctions may

be aw ar ded. W

all ing for d v . Tr ini ty

Un iv e rsa l I

ns . Co. , 253 S.W .3d 720, 728 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, pet. denied)

. Proof by aff idavit is a proper method of establi s h i n g t h e appr opriate sa nction for the f

iling of a frivolous appe al. Te

x . S tat e Ta e k wo n d o A s s 'n v . Lo n e S

ta r S ta teTa e k wo n d o A s s 'n , No. 08-01-00403- CV, 2002 WL 1874852, at *3 (Te x . App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.) (not de signa ted for p u b l i ca tion) (citing Smith v. Brown, 51 S.W .3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) ). Auror a' s attorney has filed an af fidavit wher ein he states that the cha rg e for his service s in defendingthis appeal wa s $150.00 per hour . Ger ald has c halleng ed neither the form nor

the substance of this affidavit.7

Howeve r, althoug h in his affidavit Auror a' s attorney swea rs that at lea st t h i rt y -four hours

wer e expended pe rfor

ming leg al servic es in this matter, he doe s not differ entiate be tween se rvice s perf ormed at the trial court level and services performe d there afte r i n this appeal. Instead, Aur ora simply asks us to awa

rd $7,640.00, without proof or statement justify ing this amount. On the othe r hand, other

Texas co u rt s o f ap peals have aw arde d damag es in situations in which no evidence of damag es we re p ro vided to the cour ts as the base s for the a

war ds. See Njuku , 20 S.W .3d at 178 (a wa rdi ng $5 ,0 00 .0 0) ; Salley v. H ouston Li ghting & Power Co. , 8 0 1 S. W. 2 d 2 3 0 , 2 3 2 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D i s t

. ] 1 9 9 0 , wr i t d e n ie d) (a

wa rd ing$6 ,0 00 .0 0) ; Ro se nth al v . Na t'l Te rra zzo Tile & Ma r b l e, In c. , 742 S.W .2d 55, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1987, no writ) (a war ding $2 ,5 00 .0 0) . With th e un a ns we re d a lle g a tio ns by L e e that G e ra ld h a s f

or g e d h e r n a me to d oc ume nts employ ed in this appea l and her statements that Ger ald is appar ently a simp l e t respasser on the pr op e rt y , w e fi nd

thi s si tuatio n a

nd Ger a ld' s a c tio ns c on c e rn ingthe a pp e a l pa rt ic ula rl y e g re g iou s. We a lso re c og nize that G e ra l d ' s u nw a rr a nte d a c tio n in

de pr ivi ngAuro ra

of po sse ssi on

of the pr op e rt

y by p r o s e c u ti n g th is f

r iv o lo u s a

p p e a l h a s o c c a s io n e d d ama g e to A u r o r a . A c c o r d in g ly , w e awa rd Aurora $7,500.00 ag ainst Gera ld for this frivolous appea l as just damag es. Aurora also asks that the Court aw ard it r ec o v er y u nder both the $20,000.00 supe rsede as bond and the $10,000.00 appea l bond. A judgme nt of a c ounty court (or county court at law) a fter an appe al of an ev i ct i o n from a justice court may not be stay ed pendingappea l under a ny circ umstance unle ss, within ten day s of the si g ning of the judg ment, the appe llant files a super sedea s8

bond in an amount set by

the county

court. T EX . P R OP . C ODE ANN . § 2 4. 00 7 ( Ve rn on 20 00 ). Rul e 43.5 of the Te x as Rules of Appellate Procedur e states that "[w]hen a court of appea ls affirms the tria l

co u rt j u d gm en t , . . . t h e co urt o f ap p ea l s m u s t re n d er j u d gm en t aga i n s t t h e s ure t i es o n t h e ap p el l an t 's

su pe rs e de a s bo nd , if a ny , fo r the pe rf or manc e of the judgm ent ." T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.5. The superse deas bond in this case was intende d to ind emnify Aurora from losses ca

used by delay of appea l. Se e Baxter v. Gates o f No rm an die , N o . 0 5

- 0 3

- 0 0 2 4 5

- CV , 2 0 0 4 WL 3 0 3 5 9 4 , a t * 1 ( T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s F e b. 18 , 20 04 , n o p e t.) ; Muniz v. Vasquez , 797 S.W .2d 147, 150 (Tex. App.—Houston [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 1 9 9 0 , n o w r i t )

. H o w e v e r , s u c h a b o n d i s n o ta n u n c o n d i t i o n a l a g r e e m e n tt o p a y a liquidated amount; it impos es only a conting ent or c onditional liabili ty

. Baxter , 2004 WL 303594, at *1. " [T] he dama g es ca nnot be deter

mined in a

n appellate court but must be de termined by proof of f act s t rans pi ri ng aft er j ud gment andd u r i n g t h e p e n d ency of t he ap peal ." Id. Thus, bey ond the sanction asse ssed ab o v e, we may not summarily

asce rtain the amount of monetary damag es

occa sioned by

this delay

on appea l. Id. ; Mu niz , 797 S.W .2d at 150. Rather, it would be the duty of Aurora to show the extent of its damag e or loss. Baxter , 2 0 0 4 W L3 0 3 5 9 4 , at * 1 (c i t i n g State v. W att s , 197 S.W .2d 197, 199 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1946, writ ref' d)). Her e, bec ause Aurora has simply asked the Court to awa rd it r ecove ry under the $20,000.00 superse deas bond without pr oviding adequate rea soning or proof of the damag es sustained by it, we deny Aurora ' s reque st. Howeve r, in ac corda nce wi t h Rule 43.5, we re nder judg ment ag ainst the surety on Ger ald' s supersede as bond for perf ormanc e of the judgme nt, sa nctions assessed here in, and9

the appe llate costs taxed ag ainst Gera ld. See R obertson v. ADJ P'ship, L td. , 204 S.W .3d 484, 496 (T e x. Ap p. —B e a

umo nt 200 6, pe t. d e nie d) ; Atlas Capital Corp. v. Virani , 1 S. W. 3 d 2 5 4 , 2 5 5 ( T e x. App.—Texarkana

1999, no pet.). Next, Aurora se eks for

this Court t o awa

rd it the $10,000.00 appea l bond without showing us the authority

under w hi ch i t co u l d b e done or ade quate br iefing to justi fy it. An action in a fo rc ibl e de ta ine r p ro c e e din g is a sp eci al proc e e din g g ov e rn e d und e r p a rt ic ula r r ule s and statut e s. Haginas v. Malbis Mem 'l Found. , 163 Tex. 274, 354 S .W.2d 368, 371 (1962 ). An ap peal bond, which is f iled in the justice c ourt , g ua ra nte e s tha t an ap pe lla

nt w ill pr os e c ute his a

pp e a l in the c ounty court with eff

ect or pay all costs and dama g es which ma y be adjudg ed ag ainst him. T EX . R. C IV . P. 749. Be cause Ger ald prosecuted his appea l with the county court at law (albeit unsucce ssfully and rathe r spec iou s ly

) , a n d the superse deas bond w ill cover Aur ora if G era ld fails to execute per formanc e of the judg ment, Aurora

is not entitl ed to the $10,000.00 appe al bond filed with the justice c ourt as liq uid a te d d a ma g e s. Finally , Aurora

asks this Court to awa

rd i t attorney ' s fee s and costs under Sec tion 24.006 of the Texas Property

Code. Rule 752 of t he Tex as Rules of C ivil Procedur e st ates, " [o] n the trial of the ca use in the coun t y

court," Aurora

"sha ll be permitted to plead, pr ove and r ecove r" damag es which " may include .

. . rea sonable attorney fee s in the justice court a nd county courts provide d, as to attorney

fee s, that the require ments of Section 24.006 of the Texas Prope rty Code have been me t." T EX . R. C IV . P. 7 52 ; see VolumeMillwork, Inc. v. W . Houston Airport Corp. , 218 S.W .3d 722, 73210

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) . Section 24.006 sets out the proce dure a nd proof require d to obtain attorney ' s fee s and costs. We may revie w an awa

rd of attorney ' s fee s and/or costs, or the lack the reof , for a n abuse of discretion. Lugo v . H

e rre ra , No

. 03 -0 8- 00 21 5- CV , 20 08 WL 48 23 16 3, a t *3 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin Nov. 7, 2008 , n o p e t. ) ( me m. o p . )

. H o w e v e r , n e it h e r th e ju s ti c e c o u rt n o r th e c o u n ty c o u rt a t la w

awa rded attorney ' s fee s or costs to Aurora ; further , the re cord w e have indicates that Aur ora did not offe r proof

at the trial c ourt level re g arding rea sonable and nece ssary fee s or the costs incurre d by Aurora

. Aurora has not pr ovided (and we do not f ind) any authority permitting us to e nter a n awa rd of a tto rn e y ' s f

e e s o f thi s ty

pe whe re this ma tte r w a s n ot c on sid e re d f ir st b y the tr ia l c ourt

. Acc ording ly , we de ny

an aw ard of

attorney ' s fee s to Aurora

. II. Conclusion As stated above , the appe al as to L ee is dismiss ed because the appe al was f iled without her authority or her knowledg e. We c onclude both that G era ld f ailed to pr eser

ve er ror on his sole g round for a ppeal a nd that Ger ald' s appea l was meritless and frivolous; acc ording ly , we de ny Ger ald' s point of er ror. I t is therefor e ord ere d, adjudg ed, and de cre ed that Ge rald pa y to Aurora

the sum of $7 ,5 00 .0 0 a s ju st d a ma g e s f or the fi lin g of

thi s f ri vo lou s a pp e a l. We a lso re nd e r j ud g me nt a g a ins t the surety on Ger ald' s superse deas bond for perf ormanc e of the judgme nt, sa nctions assessed he rein, and appe llate costs taxed ag ainst Gera ld. We de n y b o t h Aurora' s reque sts to award it fur ther11

a tto rn e y ' s f

e e s and c os ts a nd to aw a rd it the $1 0, 00 0. 00 a pp e a l bond fi le d in th e jus tic e c ourt . In a ll other re spects, we aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: J anuar y 26, 2009 Date D ecide d: J anuar y 27, 2009