alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2022109EN.01001801.xml

| 7.3.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 109/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.3.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 109/18

---

Action brought on 21 December 2021 — European Commission v Czech Republic

(Case C-808/21)

(2022/C 109/25)

Language of the case: Czech

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: P. Ondrůšek and J. Tomkin, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Czech Republic

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Declare that, by denying citizens of the Union who are not nationals of the Czech Republic but who are resident in the Czech Republic the right to become members of a political party or political movement, the Czech Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare that, by denying citizens of the Union who are not nationals of the Czech Republic but who are resident in the Czech Republic the right to become members of a political party or political movement, the Czech Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

| — | Order the Czech Republic to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Czech Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Under Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he or she is not a national is to have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections and in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State.

In the Commission’s opinion, having regard to the fact that citizens of the Union who are not nationals of the Czech Republic but who are resident in the Czech Republic do not have the right to become members of political parties or political movements, those citizens of the Union cannot exercise the political rights conferred on them under Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union under the same conditions as nationals of the Czech Republic.

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IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 89

To amend the Rules of the House of Representatives to limit the size of

committees to 25 members and to prohibit Members from serving on

more than one standing committee.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 17, 1993

Ms. SNOWE submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Rules

RESOLUTION

To amend the Rules of the House of Representatives to

limit the size of committees to 25 members and to prohibit Members from serving on more than one standing

committee.

1 Resolved, That clause 6(a) of rule X of the Rules of

2 the House of Representatives is amended by adding at the

3 end the following:

4 ‘‘(3) No committee shall have more than 25 members.

5 ‘‘(4) No Member (including the Resident Commis6 sioner from Puerto Rico and each Delegate to the House)

7 may serve on more than one standing committee. Service
2

•HRES 89 IH

1 on the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct shall

2 not count for purposes of the preceding sentence.’’.

Æ
#### The SEAGRAVE CORPORATION, formerly known as Seakoff Corp., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VISTA RESOURCES, INC., formerly known as The Seagrave Corporation, Eastern Vista Corp., formerly known as Armour Glass East Corp., Western Vista Corp., formerly known as Flour City Architectural Metals Corporation, Arnold A. Saltzman, Carl J. Simon and Herbert J. Kirshner, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 62, Docket 82-7238.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Finally Submitted June 7, 1983.

Decided July 1, 1983.

*96Michael C. Silberberg, Goldenbock & Ba-reli, New York City, submitted motion for plaintiff-appellant.

Milton S. Gould, Shea & Gould, New York City, submitted cross-motion for defendants-appellees Saltzman, Simon and Kirsh-ner.

Before LUMBARD, MESKILL and CAR-DAMONE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The motion to clarify the order of this Court dated December 27, 1982 and reported at 696 F.2d 227 is granted. The cross-motion for final relief by this Court is also granted.

In our previous opinion we remanded this case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Sweet, J.) which had dismissed the complaint without having the benefit of our decision in *Golden v. Garafalo,*678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982). The purpose of the remand was to afford the district court an opportunity to make a determination as to whether or not the instruments involved possessed the common characteristics of stock so as to make the transaction in question subject to the federal securities laws. On remand, the district court, in a decision dated May 5, 1983, held that the instruments possessed the attributes of stock and that the transaction involved securities within the meaning of the federal securities law. The question of whether the promissory note possessed these common characteristics was not reached in light of the holding regarding the stock.

This Court had retained jurisdiction of the case pending resolution of the remanded issue. With that issue now determined, the order dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case is remanded for trial. By this action we terminate the jurisdiction we had previously retained.
[No. 375-2.

Division Two.

October 29, 1971.]

#### The City of Tacoma, *Respondent,*v. Rodney E. Mewhirter, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 38709, Horace G. Geer, J., entered September 30, 1970. Appeal *dismissed*and judgment *affirmed*by unpublished opinion pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2003



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003, each of the undersigned officers of GlycoGenesys, Inc. (the
Company), hereby certifies, to his knowledge, that:



|(1) | the Companys quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the Three Months Ended June 30, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods
presented in the Report.
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|Dated: | August 16, 2004
|------ | ---------------



|       |  |                    |  |        |  |                     
|------ |  | ------------------ |  | ------ |  | --------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ John W. Burns  |  | By:    |  | /s/ Bradley J Carver
|Name:  |  | John W. Burns      |  | Name:  |  | Bradley J Carver    
|Title: |  | SVP, CFO Secretary |  | Title: |  | CEO President
### 5]\3Srn -d)3 /
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y ys-^? RECEIVED COURTOF CRIMINALAPPEALS IP. 2015
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kamal Gajadhar, Appellant.

[724 NYS2d 2]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Felice Shea, J.), rendered December 18, 1998, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree, attempted rape in the first degree, burglary in the first degree (two counts) and sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts), and sentencing him, as a violent felony offender, to three terms of 10 to 20 years, a term of 6 to 12 years, and two terms of 3 to 6 years, all to run concurrently, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly exercised its discretion in declining to conduct an inquiry when, during jury deliberations, and after the alternates had been dismissed, defense counsel apprised the court of a conversation with a released alternate who had reported that during the trial a sitting juror had been having trouble understanding the proceedings and had been aided by other jurors. The court relied on its own observations and the parties’ voir dire to determine that the juror fully understood the trial testimony and did not have a language problem. The court, noting that defense counsel’s complaints were based on the hearsay statements of a panelist who was no longer a part of the trial when the statements were made, declined to conduct an inquiry into the sitting juror’s conduct. We find no indicia of juror “misconduct” (see, *People v Clark,*81 NY2d 913, 914) or of prejudice to the defense (see, *People v Irizarry,*83 NY2d 557, 561) to require an inquiry. There was no claim made that the subject juror had improperly discussed the facts of the case or come to any conclusion as to defendant’s guilt *(compare, People v McClenton,*213 AD2d 1, 4-5, *appeal dismissed*88 NY2d 872). The court had a full opportunity to observe the sitting juror and was unaware of anything that might have lent credence to defense counsel’s claims (see, *People v Gillis,*213 AD2d 422, *lv denied*85 NY2d 973). Concur — Mazzarelli, J. P., Andrias, Wallach, Lerner and Rubin, JJ. [As amended by unpublished order entered Apr. 26, 2001.]
# C_2021431EN.01000701.xml

| 25.10.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 431/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.10.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 431/7

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 31 May 2021 — Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, other parties: S.S., N.Z., S.S.

(Case C-338/21)

(2021/C 431/04)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

Other parties: S.S., N.Z., S.S.

Question referred

Must Articles 27(3) and 29 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (1) be interpreted as not precluding national legislation such as that at issue here, in which a Member State has opted to implement Article 27(3)(c), but has also granted the suspensive effect that can be applied to the implementation of a transfer decision, to a review or appeal against a decision in proceedings concerning an application for a residence permit on the grounds of trafficking in human beings, which, while not being a transfer decision, does nevertheless temporarily prevent the actual transfer?

---

(1)  OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JOHN ANTONIO CRUZ,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 135 MM 2023

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of March, 2024, the Petition for Leave to File Petition for 

Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is DENIED.
March 12, 2015 

Mr. Steven R. Mitchell 

Producer/Director 

eMedia Films – Lake tahoe 

P.O. Box 3250 

Olympic Valley, CA 96146 

Dear Mr. Mitchell: 

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It 

explains why we cannot process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days. 

Why We Cannot Process Your Request 

We entered your March 4, 2015, exemption request on behalf of eMedia Films – Lake Tahoe 

into the public docket (No. FAA-2015-0523), but we are unable to process your request any 

further. The information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy 

enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following: 

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole. 

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request. 

What You Should Do 

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 
2 

If We Do Not Hear From You 

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Nia Daniels 

Program Analyst, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division 

Enclosure
<PAGE>   1



                                                                    Exhibit 11.1


                                 ProSource, Inc.
                        Computation of Earnings Per Share
                    For the periods ended September 30, 1995
                             and September 28, 1996
                (Dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)
                                   (Unaudited)




<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                              Thirteen Weeks Ended            Thirty-Nine Weeks Ended
                                                          ----------------------------     -----------------------------
                                                          September 30,  September 28,     September 30,   September 28,
                                                            1995(1)          1996(1)         1995(1)          1996(1)
                                                          -------------  -------------     -------------   -------------
<S>                                                             <C>         <C>             <C>              <C>      
Net earnings (loss) applicable to common stock             $(   734)        $  1,357        $ (2,730)        $(16,600)
                                                           ========         ========        ========         ========

Weighted average common shares outstanding                    5,228            5,310           4,234            5,304

Additional shares assuming exercise of stock
 option and warrants                                           --                 45            --               --
                                                           --------         --------        --------         --------

    Shares used for primary earnings per share                5,228            5,355           4,234            5,304
                                                           ========         ========        ========         ========

Earnings per share:

    Net earnings (loss)                                    $  (0.14)        $   0.25        $  (0.64)        $  (3.13)
                                                           ========         ========        ========         ========
</TABLE>

(1) Weighted average common shares outstanding have been restated to include the
effect of a 100-to-1 stock split declared in November 1996.
maidennovationagreemente






NOVATION AGREEMENT  This Novation Agreement (as amended, supplemented, restated or otherwise modified from time to time,  this "Novation Agreement") is made as of August_, 2020 between:  All INSURANCE MANAGEMENT LIMITED,  a company organized under the laws of the Islands ofBennuda ("AlllM");  AMTRUST FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,  a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware {"AFSI"); and  MAIDEN REINSURANCE LTD.  a company organized under the laws of Vennont (the "Compaoy")  (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Parties")  WHEREAS, AlllM and the Company have entered into that certain Asset Management Agreement, dated  January I, 2018, a copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A (the "Management Agreement");  WHEREAS, AJJJM desires to be released and discharged from its obJjgations to the Company under the  Management Agreement and the Company has agreed to release and discharge AtrrM;  WHEREAS, the Parties have agreed that as and from the date of the foffective Date (as defined in the  signature page below), the Management Agreement shall be novated to AFSI so that from the Effective  Date AFSI shall be bound by the tenns of the Management Agreement in place of AllIM and agrees to  acknowledge and expressly assume in the name, place and stead of AillM all liabilities and obligations of  AIIIM under the Management Agreement.  NOW THEREFORE, for valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby  acknowledged by each Party, the Parties agree as follows:  SECTION 1 - NOV A TION AND RELEASE  1.1 Novation  As oftbe Effective Date, AfSI agrees and undertakes to perform the obligations of AIIIM under the  Management Agreement, whether arising prior to, on or subsequent to the Effective Date, and agrees to  be bound by the terms and conditions of the Management Agreement in every way as if AFSI were  nan1ed as a party to the Management Agreement in place of AIIIM. AFS! agrees to perform any and all  past, present and future obligations of AlIIM under the Management .Agreement.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 95-40739

Summary Calendar

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SUSAN ANN LINDSEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

(6:90-CR-71-2)

_________________________________________________________________

March 21, 1996

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Susan Ann Lindsey, pro se, appeals the denial of her motion

for a reduction of sentence. We AFFIRM.

I.

After pleading guilty to possession of a listed chemical with

intent to manufacture a controlled substance, and possession of a

firearm during a drug-trafficking crime, Lindsey was sentenced in

May 1991 to ten years imprisonment for possession, and a

consecutive five-year term for the firearm offense. Her offense
- 2 -

level for the possession offense was calculated pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, based on the amount of methamphetamine that could

have been manufactured with the precursor chemicals.

In 1995, Lindsey moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a

sentence reduction pursuant to § 2D1.11, which became effective in

November 1991, and established a base offense level for possession

of precursor chemicals. The district court denied the motion,

accepting the magistrate judge's finding (objected to by Lindsey)

that, because Lindsey's offense involved the attempt to manufacture

methamphetamine, retroactive application of § 2D1.11 would not

change the sentence, because § 2D1.11(c) provides that, if the

offense involved, inter alia, attempting to manufacture a

controlled substance, § 2D1.1 (the provision under which Lindsey

was sentenced) is applicable.

II.

A refusal to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed

only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Shaw, 30 F.3d 26,

28-29 (5th Cir. 1994). Based upon our review of the record, the

finding that Lindsey's offense involved the attempt to manufacture

methamphetamine was not clearly erroneous. See United States v.

Mimms, 43 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, because the

sentence under § 2D1.11(c) would be the same as that imposed, the

district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reduce

it.
- 3 -

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the denial of Lindsey's motion to

reduce sentence is

AFFIRMED.
# C_2023173EN.01000702.xml

| 15.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 173/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 173/7

---

Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 23 March 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus — Finland) — Proceedings brought by Booky.fi Oy

(Case C-662/21, (1) Booky.fi)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Articles 34 and 36 TFEU - Free movement of goods - Measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction - Recordings of audiovisual programmes - Online sale - Legislation of a Member State requiring classification according to age and labelling of programmes - Protection of minors - Recordings already classified and labelled in another Member State - Proportionality)

(2023/C 173/09)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Subject matter of the main proceedings

Applicant: Booky.fi Oy

Third party: Kansallinen audio-visuaalinen instituutti (KAVI)

Operative part

Articles 34 and 36 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude legislation of a Member State which, with the objective of protecting minors against audiovisual content capable of harming their well-being and their development, requires that audiovisual programmes recorded on a physical medium and marketed via an online store have previously been the subject of an inspection procedure and classification, according to age limits, and corresponding labelling in accordance with the law of that Member State, including where those programmes have already been the subject of a comparable procedure and of comparable classification and labelling in application of the law of another Member State, provided that that legislation is appropriate for securing the attainment of that objective and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it;

In that regard, the fact that some of the recordings that may be marketed in the Member State in question from another Member State are excluded from the scope of that legislation is not of decisive importance, provided that such a limitation does not compromise the attainment of the objective pursued. Nor is it decisive that the national legislation concerned does not provide for a derogation from that requirement where it may be established that the purchaser of a recording covered by that legislation is of full age.

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(1)  OJ C 24, 17.1.2022.

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