Filed 9/21/22 In re Mello CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re WILLIAM MELLO,

On Habeas Corpus.

F082667

(Kern Super. Ct. No. HC016544A)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order granting writ of habeas corpus. David R. Zulfa, Judge.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, 

Maria G. Chan and Colby Mills, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant Christian 

Pfeiffer, Warden of Kern Valley State Prison. 

Scott Concklin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent

William Mello.

-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Peña, J.
2.

INTRODUCTION

William Mello (respondent) is currently serving a sentence of life without the 

possibility of parole for murder. In 2019, a prison official found him guilty of possessing 

contraband based on the discovery of a sewing needle secreted inside of a pen on his 

bunk. As a sanction for the violation, the prison assessed a 30-day loss of credits and 

other inmate privileges. 

Respondent challenged the disciplinary finding in a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, arguing he was authorized to possess the needle for religious purposes. The 

superior court granted the petition, ruling the prison failed to produce “some evidence” 

respondent was not authorized to possess the needle. 

The prison (appellant) appeals from the superior court’s ruling. We conclude the 

superior court’s ruling does not comport with the applicable standard of review for prison 

disciplinary proceedings, and that the prison’s guilty finding was supported by “some 

evidence.” We reverse. 

BACKGROUND

In May 2019, during a random search of respondent’s cell, a correctional officer 

discovered two sewing needles “inside some writing pens on [respondent’s] assigned 

[b]unk.” Respondent admitted the needles belonged to him and told the correctional 

officer he had possessed them for a long time and had forgotten about them. The 

correctional officer examined the sewing needles and concluded they are the same type of 

needles used in Prison Industry Authority (PIA). Based on the discovery of the needles, 

the correctional officer authored a “Rules Violation Report” for “Possession of 

[D]angerous [C]ontraband.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3006, subd. (a).)

1

 

1 All further regulatory references are to title 15 of the California Code of 

Regulations. 
3.

Respondent pled not guilty at his disciplinary hearing. He elected to give a 

statement and told the hearing officer he was “using the needles” for his “[N]ative 

[A]merican stuff,” and that one needle is for “beading,” and one is for “leather work.” 

Respondent presented no other evidence and called no witnesses. At the conclusion of 

the hearing, the hearing officer found respondent guilty and assessed a 30-day loss of 

credits and other inmate privileges. The hearing officer based his finding on the report of 

the correctional officer who discovered the needles, and “photographic evidence which 

depicts ... 2 needles 1 used for sewing and 1 from a sewing machine used in PIA.” 

Respondent exhausted his administrative remedies through the prison and filed a 

habeas petition in the superior court. In the petition, respondent alleged there was 

insufficient evidence to support his disciplinary finding because, as a Native American 

inmate, he was authorized to possess two sewing needles. Respondent cited to the 

prison’s “Religious Personal Property Matrix,” which allows eligible inmates to possess 

“Beading Materials,” including “Needles, limited to 2 per inmate, size 10 and/or 12.” 

(§ 3190, subd. (b).) 

The superior court issued an order directing appellant to submit an informal 

response, stating it had insufficient information to adjudicate the writ petition. At the 

superior court’s direction, appellant provided a photograph of the two needles found in 

respondent’s cell, a photograph of a needle from a sewing machine used by the PIA, and 

a photograph of needles approved for possession by “Native American Indigenous 

inmate[s].” The photograph of approved needles includes exemplars of “SHARPS” 

needles, sizes 10 and 12. In the informal response, appellant stated it does not dispute 

that respondent is classified as a “Native American Indigenous inmate,” and as such, 

“may possess up to two needles, of size 10 or size 12.” 

After receiving informal briefing from both parties, the superior court issued an 

order to show cause, stating: 
4.

“Upon a review of these photographs it does appear that the needles found 

in [respondent’s] cell resemble those approved for a Native American 

Indigenous inmate to possess and do not resemble the type of needles used 

by PIA in the sewing machines. Specifically, a sewing machine needle 

such as used by the PIA has an eyelet near the sharp end of the needle 

whereas beading and leather/boot needles both have the eyelet opposite the 

sharp end of the needle.” 

Appellant filed a return to the order to show cause and submitted a declaration 

from the hearing officer who conducted respondent’s disciplinary hearing. In the 

declaration, the hearing officer further explained his reasons for finding respondent 

guilty: 

“I specifically recall that while presiding over [respondent’s] May 

29, 2019 disciplinary hearing, I compared a picture of the needles found in 

[respondent’s] bunk with an actual needle used in a [PIA] sewing machine. 

I found that one needle, the heavier, thicker needle, was from a PIA sewing 

machine. PIA sewing needles are not authorized for possession by Native 

American Indigenous Inmates. I found that the other needle was a hand 

sewing needle, not from a PIA sewing machine.” 

The superior court granted respondent’s habeas petition without ordering an 

evidentiary hearing, stating: 

“This Court finds, based on the photographs of the needles in question and 

examples of needles used for beading and leather work - size 10 or 12 and 

PIA needles provided by [respondent] and [appellant], the needles found in 

[respondent’s] cell resemble those approved for possession by a Native 

American Indigenous inmate and do not resemble needles used by

PIA in the sewing machines.

“The Court finds [appellant] failed to produce ‘some evidence’ in support 

of the [rules violation report] that the needles found in [respondent’s] cell 

were contraband for a Native American Indigenous inmate to possess.” 

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the hearing officer’s finding that respondent was guilty of 

possessing contraband was supported by sufficient evidence, and that the superior court’s 
5.

order granting the habeas petition cannot be reconciled with the highly deferential “some 

evidence” standard of review. We agree. 

I. Standard of Review.

A. We review the superior court’s ruling de novo. 

“In a habeas corpus proceeding, once the issues have been properly joined, the 

court may grant (or deny) the relief sought without ordering an evidentiary hearing as 

long as resolution of the petition does not depend on any disputed issue of fact. 

[Citation.] When this procedure is employed ... to review the evidentiary basis for prison 

disciplinary action, the trial court’s task is simply to evaluate whether, given the 

documentary record summarizing the facts accepted by the parties, there is sufficient 

evidence to support the action taken. In such circumstances, the usual deference that 

would apply to the review of a trial court’s ruling based on its superior ability to resolve 

factual questions (e.g., the credibility of witnesses appearing before it) is unwarranted. 

The facts being undisputed, the question presented on appeal is a question of law, and we 

review such questions de novo.” (In re Zepeda (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1497 

(Zepeda).)

Here, the superior court’s ruling was based on a set of undisputed facts, as it relied 

on information that was before the hearing officer. The superior court reviewed the 

photograph of the needles from respondent’s cell and found they look more like the 

needles he is authorized to possess than the PIA sewing machine needles he is not 

authorized to possess. Although additional evidence, such as the declaration of the 

hearing officer, was added after the superior court issued an order to show cause, it did 

not create a conflict in the evidence and merely served to clarify the evidence at the 

disciplinary hearing, which was not contemporaneously recorded. Therefore, we apply a 

de novo standard of review, and afford no deference to the superior court’s ruling. 

(Zepeda, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497; In re DeLuna (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 585, 
6.

591 [“When, as here, the trial court rules on a habeas corpus petition without conducting 

an evidentiary hearing, we independently review the documentary evidence on appeal.”].)

B. We review the hearing officer’s disciplinary finding for “some 

evidence.”

“Prisoners are entitled to minimal due process safeguards in disciplinary matters 

involving the possible loss of early release credits.” (In re Rigsby (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 

1011, 1016–1017, citing Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 558.) “[D]ue process 

in this context requires only that there be some evidence to support the findings made in 

the disciplinary hearing.” (Superintendent v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 457 (Hill).) 

Thus, “to insure that the prisoner is not arbitrarily deprived of good conduct credits, the 

findings of the prison authorities must be supported by ‘some evidence.’ ” (In re 

Rothwell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 160, 165 (Rothwell).) 

The “some evidence” standard of review is “extraordinarily deferential.” (Zepeda,

supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.) “Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does 

not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of 

witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is 

any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary 

board.” (Hill, supra, 472 U.S. at pp. 455–456.) Reversal is not appropriate even if “in 

the reviewing court’s view, there is a realistic possibility the prisoner being disciplined is 

not guilty of the charged infraction.” (Zepeda, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.) 

Respondent contends that a more stringent standard of review is appropriate 

because Penal Code section 2932, subdivision (c)(5), which states that prison rule 

violations must be found by a preponderance of the evidence, created a higher standard of 

proof than what is mandated by federal due process. (See Hill, supra, 472 U.S. at 

p. 456.) We disagree. Application of the “some evidence” standard to the review of 

prison disciplinary findings in California prisons is well established. (See Zepeda, supra, 

141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498; Rothwell, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 165–166; In re 
7.

Rigsby, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1017; In re Johnson (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 290, 

299–300.) In Rothwell, the court held that Penal Code section 2932, subdivision (c)(5), 

has no bearing on the standard of review, because “appellate review of factual findings is 

‘governed by the degree to which it is appropriate to presume correctness of such 

determinations.’ ” (Rothwell, at p. 166.) The court explained that a deferential standard 

of review is warranted in this context given that inmates facing disciplinary action by a 

prison are not entitled to the “ ‘full panoply of rights’ ” afforded to criminal defendants, 

and because prison administrators face the unique and difficult challenge of maintaining 

order and ensuring the safety of guards and inmates. (Id. at pp. 166–167.) 

Respondent argues Rothwell’s reasoning has been undermined by Conservatorship 

of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, which held that, when reviewing a finding made by clear 

and convincing evidence, “an appellate court must attune its review for substantial 

evidence to the heightened degree of certainty required by this standard.” 

(Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 997.) Respondent contends we should 

apply similar logic to his disciplinary finding based on the heightened evidentiary 

standard required by Penal Code section 2932, subdivision (c)(5). We decline to do so. 

Conservatorship of O.B. addresses the applicable standard of review of an order 

appointing a limited conservatorship in a probate matter. (Conservatorship of O.B., at 

p. 995.) It has nothing to do with prison discipline. While the high court’s holding 

applies broadly to review of all findings by clear and convincing evidence, the opinion 

makes no mention of the “some evidence” standard. Accordingly, we decline to deviate 

from Rothwell. 

II. The hearing officer’s ruling was supported by “some evidence.”

The hearing officer’s ruling was based on two findings. First, the hearing officer 

found the needles constituted “dangerous property” within the meaning of applicable 

prison regulations. (§ 3006, subd. (a).) Second, the hearing officer found one of the two 
8.

needles did not meet the exception for personal religious property. Upon review of the 

record, we conclude both findings were supported by “some evidence.” 

A. Respondent possessed “dangerous property.”

Respondent was found guilty of possessing “dangerous property” in violation of 

section 3006, subdivision (a). This subdivision states, in pertinent part: “Inmates shall 

not possess or have under their control or constructive possession any weapons ....”

Respondent does not dispute that he possessed the needles. The remaining 

question is whether his needles constituted weapons. We conclude they do. We agree 

with the hearing officer’s statement that needles “present a threat to the safety of staff and 

inmates, and security of the institution,” and that they can be “used to create weapons, 

which may then be used against other inmates or staff.” Needles are sharp objects 

designed to puncture. Even in their unaltered state, respondent’s needles could have been 

used to inflict significant injury on an inmate or staff member. When combined with 

other materials, such as a handle, their potential danger becomes even greater. 

Accordingly, we conclude the hearing officer’s conclusion the needles were “dangerous 

property” was supported by “some evidence.” 

B. One of respondent’s needles did not meet the exemption for religious 

personal property.

The remaining issue is whether respondent was nonetheless authorized to possess 

the needles as religious personal property. We conclude “some evidence” supports the 

hearing officer’s conclusion that one of the two needles did not meet the applicable 

exemption.

Appellant does not dispute that respondent was entitled to possess two needles as 

described in the “Beading Materials” section of the Religious Personal Property Matrix. 

Section 3190, subdivision (b) authorizes eligible inmates to possess specific “religious 

personal property” items as set forth in the Religious Personal Property Matrix, which is 
9.

incorporated into the regulation by reference.2 The matrix sets forth various categories of 

qualifying religious personal property items, such as “altar cloth” and “prayer oil.” 

Respondent relies on a category titled “Beading Materials,” which states:

“Beads may be wood, plastic, or natural material (i.e. stone, bone, seed, 

etc.) no larger than 1/4” in diameter. Total quantity limited to 12 hanks. 

Finished items shall be multi colored. Sinew or String in rolls no greater 

than 50 feet in length. Needles, limited to 2 per inmate, size 10 and/or 12. 

Any misuse of beading materials may result in loss of this privilege.” 

(Italics added.) 

We have reviewed the photographs of respondent’s needles, the photograph of an 

exemplar sewing machine needle from the PIA, and the photograph submitted by 

appellant of needles approved for possession by “Native American Indigenous 

inmate[s].” These photographs support the hearing officer’s finding. One of 

respondent’s needles is significantly thicker than the other. This thicker needle, when 

compared to the two exemplars, looks more like the PIA sewing machine needle. The 

thinner needle, on the other hand, looks more like the approved size 10 or size 12 sewing 

needles. We, therefore, agree with the hearing officer’s assessment of the evidence. The 

thicker of the two needles was too thick to be an authorized needle. 

We also find the manner in which respondent stored the needles constituted 

consciousness of guilt. Respondent did not possess the needles openly. We are not 

persuaded, as was the superior court, by respondent’s claim he placed the needles inside 

of his pens as a means of safe storage. The more reasonable conclusion is that 

respondent hid the needles in the pens because he knew he was not allowed to possess 

one of them. 

2 The updated Religious Personal Property Matrix can be accessed at the public 

website for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: 

<https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/regulations/cdcr-regulations/dom-appendices/>
10.

Following the superior court’s reasoning, respondent contends the thicker needle 

could not have been a PIA sewing machine needle because of the position of its eye. He 

asserts it is “common knowledge” that a hand sewing needle has the eye at the blunt end, 

whereas a sewing machine needle has the eye closer the sharp end. We disagree. The 

identification of different types of sewing needles requires specialized knowledge related 

to a trade and hobby that is not universally practiced. Even if we were to accept 

respondent’s general premise that many, or even most, sewing machine needles have an 

eye closer to the sharp end, we certainly could not conclude, on this record, that all 

sewing machine needles are so configured. Sewing is an expansive trade that involves 

many different tools for many different tasks. Because there is nothing in the record 

describing the type of equipment used in the PIA, we do not presume to know what type 

of sewing machine needles are used. Instead, we rely on the hearing officer’s 

institutional knowledge. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we accept the 

hearing officer’s conclusion that the thicker of respondent’s needles was a PIA sewing 

machine needle. 

Respondent also argues that even if the thicker needle was a PIA sewing machine 

needle, he is authorized to possess it because it is still a “needle” within the meaning of 

the Religious Personal Property Matrix. This argument ignores that the section 

authorizing possession of two needles specifies that the needles are “beading materials.” 

(See People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1131 [“ ‘[W]henever possible, 

significance must be given to every word [in a statute] in pursuing the legislative 

purpose, and the court should avoid a construction that makes some words 

surplusage.’ ”].) Interpreting this category of the Religious Personal Property Matrix as 

allowing possession of a sewing machine needle would not comport with all applicable 

regulatory language. Moreover, the acquisition of property by inmates, including 

religious personal property, is limited to authorized vendors. (§ 3190, subd. (k)(4) 

[“Special purchases of religious items will be from departmentally-approved vendors of 
11.

religious items only”], § 3190, subd. (g) [Inmates may only receive packages ordered 

from “a departmentally-approved inmate package vendor”].) No regulation authorizes 

the requisition of religious personal property from the PIA. Thus, a PIA sewing machine 

needle is not exempted by the Religious Personal Property Matrix and constitutes 

contraband. 

The highly deferential “some evidence” standard requires only a “modicum of 

evidence.” (Hill, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 450.) Based on our de novo review, we conclude 

the superior court did not afford the hearing officer the appropriate level of deference. 

The hearing officer found, based on his experience and institutional knowledge, that one 

of respondent’s needles was a PIA sewing machine needle, and not of the type approved 

for possession by inmates as religious property. This was sufficient to support the 

disciplinary finding. Accordingly, we conclude the superior court erred by failing to find 

the hearing officer’s ruling was supported by “some evidence.”3

DISPOSITION

The superior court’s order granting respondent’s petition for writ of habeas corpus 

is reversed. 

3 Appellant also contends the superior court lacked habeas jurisdiction, arguing his 

loss of credits did not implicate due process because he is serving a sentence of life 

without the possibility of parole. Because we reject respondent’s habeas claim on the 

merits, we need not address this contention.