Filed 6/14/23 Zang v. Xu CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

YANBIN ZANG,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JUN XU et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

B311357

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

20GDCV00485

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Ralph C. Hofer, Judge. Affirmed.

Liang Ly and Jason L. Liang for Defendants and 

Appellants Jun Xu, Joanie Yan, and J & C International Group, 

LLC.

FTW Law Group and Felix T. Woo for Defendants and 

Appellants Qi Shen, ZHL Management, Inc., HZV Holding, Inc., 

and Hong Kong Supermarket.

Jones, Davis & Jackson, Gary M. Jackson; Robin Min 

Chung Hou for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff and respondent Yanbin Zang (plaintiff) is a 

Chinese national who came to the United States on a tourist visa 

in September 2018. He hopes to immigrate to the United States

and sought assistance from the defendants and appellants—a 

handful of individuals and related companies (collectively, 

defendants) that purport to provide immigration and investment 

services to wealthy Chinese nationals.

1 Plaintiff generally alleges 

that defendants promised to obtain a visa and green card for him 

based on a $500,000 investment he made with them. But in 

reality, plaintiff contends, defendants deceived him about the 

nature of the investment, the basis for his visa application, and 

other related matters. He also contends that his visa 

application—which defendants concealed from him—was riddled 

with fraudulent statements and that his signature on the 

application was forged. As a result, plaintiff’s immigration status 

is at risk.

Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against defendants,

asserting claims for violation of the Immigration Consultants Act, 

fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, breach of 

fiduciary duty, and unfair competition. Defendants, organized 

into two groups, filed special motions to strike the operative 

1 The defendants and appellants are Jun Xu, Joanie Yan, J & C 

International Group, LLC, Qi Shen, ZHL Management, Inc., and Hong 

Kong Supermarket. Defendant HZV Holding, Inc., is listed as an 

appellant on the opening and reply briefs as well as the notice of 

appeal filed by the attorney for Qi Shen. However, defendants state 

that HZV Holding is no longer pursuing its appeal because the trial 

court sustained a demurrer as to the only cause of action asserted 

against this defendant.
3

complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

2

Generally, defendants asserted that filing a petition with the 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

(Immigration Service) is statutorily protected petitioning activity 

and that plaintiff’s claims lack the minimal merit required to 

survive an anti-SLAPP motion.

The trial court denied both motions and defendants appeal. 

Although the court agreed with defendants that filing an 

immigration petition is protected activity, it found that the 

majority of plaintiff’s allegations related to unprotected activities 

such as concealing the petition, misrepresenting the basis of the 

petition, and misleading plaintiff with respect to his investment. 

Further, and to the extent that any of the allegations implicated 

activity protected under section 425.16, the court found plaintiff’s 

evidence sufficient to overcome defendants’ motions. We affirm

the orders denying the special motions to strike.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Immigration and Investment Plan

Plaintiff is a Chinese national. He arrived in California on 

a tourist visa in September 2018 and hopes to immigrate to the 

United States. To that end, after plaintiff arrived in the Los 

Angeles area, he contacted defendant Meiju Group, LLC, a 

company he understood to offer immigration services to Chinese 

nationals. In late September 2018, he met with defendant David 

Chang at Meiju Group’s offices. Chang advised plaintiff that he 

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.
4

could obtain a green card3 if he made investments in the United 

States and suggested an investment opportunity involving

defendant Hong Kong Supermarket. Specifically, Chang took 

plaintiff to the Hong Kong Supermarket location in Monterey 

Park and represented that plaintiff could use that market as an 

investment to obtain his green card. Plaintiff signed an 

agreement retaining Meiju Group and Chang as “migration 

agents” and transferred $120,000 to a bank account at Chang’s 

direction.

Chang introduced plaintiff to defendant Jun Xu, who 

Chang represented was the owner of Hong Kong Supermarket. 

Plaintiff met with Xu and Chang in early October 2018. Xu told 

plaintiff that he could obtain an L-1A work visa and ultimately a 

green card by investing in Hong Kong Supermarket. Xu implied

that he had a personal connection with an immigration officer to 

facilitate the matter. In addition, Chang and Xu advised plaintiff 

that defendant J & C International Group, LLC (J & C) was a 

company that provided cross-border investment opportunities 

and had been providing investment management and 

immigration services to high net-worth Chinese nationals since 

2015.

At Xu’s request, plaintiff signed a service contract with 

J & C, which plaintiff was told would replace his agreement with 

Meiju Group. Xu advised plaintiff that, pursuant to the service 

contract, plaintiff would have the right to supervise and manage 

3 Having a green card (officially known as a Permanent Resident Card) 

allows you to live and work permanently in the United States. 

(<https://www.uscis.gov/green-card> [as of June 13, 2023], archived at 

<https://perma.cc/4BJ2-9JM3>.)
5

the company in which he invested, and that he would work at the 

company and receive a salary. Plaintiff promised to invest 

$500,000 in Hong Kong Supermarket and pay J & C for 

immigration services; J & C guaranteed that plaintiff would 

receive either a green card or a refund of his investment. J & C 

also promised that it would provide immigration services in strict 

compliance with applicable laws and regulations. At Xu’s 

direction, plaintiff transferred $500,000 to defendant HZV 

Holding, Inc., which Xu represented as his company’s investment 

arm.

After plaintiff signed the service contract with J & C and 

transferred the funds to HZV Holding, Xu introduced plaintiff to 

defendant Joanie Yan. Xu told plaintiff that Yan would prepare 

his L-1A work visa application and plaintiff provided Yan with 

various supporting documents including a copy of his passport 

and his tourist visa application. Yan assembled the materials 

under the direction of defendant James Yang, an attorney 

retained to submit the visa application on behalf of defendant 

ZHL Management, Inc.

In late April 2019, plaintiff learned that his visa 

application had been approved. Specifically, he received a copy of 

a notice sent from the Immigration Service to Yang at the office 

of his law firm, defendant Pegasus Law Group. The notice was 

addressed to ZHL Management, Inc., which was designated as

plaintiff’s employer and the petitioner for the visa. Plaintiff 

subsequently contacted Xu, Yan, and Chang on multiple 

occasions regarding his employment.

In July 2019, plaintiff married Lisa Fan, a citizen of the 

United States.
6

In August 2019, Yan directed plaintiff to report for work at 

Hong Kong Supermarket in Monterey Park. He did so but was 

given no tasks and no one provided any information about his 

duties, responsibilities, authority, or salary. Plaintiff was 

directed to sit in an executive office during business hours on his 

first day but on the second day was told that none of the other 

executives came to work and it was not necessary for him to do 

so.

Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the arrangement and, in late 

August 2019, contacted Chang, Xu, and Yan to address his 

concerns, including the fact that he had not been paid after 

working for ZHL Management for more than one month. He also 

requested but was not provided with a copy of the L-1A visa 

application. Plaintiff advised that he needed a copy of the 

application because his new wife planned to file a request for a 

green card on his behalf. Yan advised plaintiff that he could not 

obtain an investment-based green card if his wife were to file a 

spousal request for a green card.

In mid-September, plaintiff’s wife filed a spousal request 

for plaintiff’s green card with the Immigration Service. At Yan’s 

direction, plaintiff then signed a document terminating the 

service agreement with J & C. Yan promised to send him a copy 

of the visa application but did not do so.

In mid-January 2020, plaintiff and his wife reported to the 

Immigration Service for an interview relating to the spousal 

green card application. But when the immigration officer asked 

plaintiff questions about the visa application submitted on behalf 

of ZHL Management, plaintiff was unable to confirm the 

information in the application. According to the immigration 

officer, that visa application stated that plaintiff worked at the 
7

Hawaiian Gardens location of Hong Kong Supermarket, which 

had been closed for some time. The officer advised that the

previous visa application was under investigation. During the 

interview, plaintiff saw the first page of the visa application and 

observed that his signature had been forged.

After the interview, plaintiff contacted Xu and Yan. Xu 

gave plaintiff a list of questions and answers he could use to 

prepare for any subsequent immigration interview. The answers 

were mostly false, however. Xu also informed plaintiff that his 

“investment” had been reduced to $300,000 and had been placed 

in the Hawaiian Gardens location of Hong Kong Supermarket 

which had closed in September 2019, not in the Monterey Park 

location as plaintiff had understood.

In late January 2020, plaintiff received a W-2 form 

indicating that he had been paid $25,000 by ZHL Management in 

2019. But plaintiff had only received one paycheck in the amount 

of $4,056.39. Plaintiff’s complaints to Yan went unanswered.

Eventually, in May 2020, plaintiff hired an attorney to help 

him obtain a copy of the visa application submitted on behalf of 

ZHL Management. The attorney contacted Yang, who refused to 

provide a copy of the application. Shortly thereafter, Yan called 

plaintiff and told him to stop requesting a copy of the visa 

application. If he did not, Yan said, she would use her 

connections at the Immigration Service and Xu’s connections 

with the Chinese Embassy and the Chinese police to “resolve” the 

matter.

Plaintiff’s attorney contacted Yang again in early June 

2020 to request a copy of the visa application. Yang responded by 

sending the attorney a copy of a statement by defendant Qi Shen

(Shen statement). The Shen statement indicated that plaintiff’s 
8

employment with ZHL Management had been terminated as of 

November 2019 because plaintiff had committed financial fraud 

in China. It also stated that ZHL Management had revoked its 

visa application and would notify the Chinese Embassy and 

Chinese Consulate of plaintiff’s “current case status.”

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff initiated the present action in June 2020. The 

operative second amended complaint includes seven causes of 

action. As pertinent here, the first cause of action for violation of 

the Immigration Consultants Act, the second cause of action for 

fraudulent misrepresentation, the third cause of action for 

fraudulent concealment, and the fourth cause of action for breach 

of fiduciary duty are asserted against Xu, Yan, and J & C

(collectively, Xu defendants). Shen and ZHL Management are 

also named in the third cause of action. The fifth cause of action 

for violation of the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code,

§ 17200) is asserted against J & C and Hong Kong Supermarket.

The sixth cause of action (a request for an accounting) is asserted 

against Hong Kong Supermarket and HZV Holding.4 Plaintiff 

sought penalties under the Immigration Consultants Act, 

economic damages of $620,000, punitive damages, and attorney’s 

fees.

Generally, the complaint alleges that defendants worked in 

concert to lure plaintiff into making an investment in one of their 

4 The seventh cause of action for legal malpractice is asserted against 

Yang and Pegasus Law Group. In addition, Chang, Meiju Group, and 

ZJL Management are named as defendants in the lawsuit. As these 

defendants are not parties to the present appeal, we will not discuss 

any claims or issues relating only to them.
9

businesses in furtherance of a plan to provide sham employment 

to support a falsified visa application.

3. The Xu Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike Under 

Section 425.16

3.1. Motion

The Xu defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion in which 

Shen, ZHL Management, and Hong Kong Supermarket 

(collectively, Shen defendants) joined. The Xu defendants moved 

to strike each of the six causes of action asserted against them in 

its entirety on the ground that the claims target protected 

petitioning activity. The Xu defendants described the conduct 

targeted by the operative complaint as “the provisioning of lawful 

immigration services, following the advice of an attorney, and the 

submission of an immigration petition.” Such conduct, they 

asserted, falls squarely within the protection afforded by 

section 425.16, subdivision (e), which defines protected activity as 

including “any written or oral statement or writing made in 

connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 

legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official 

proceeding authorized by law.”

In support of their special motion to strike, the Xu 

defendants submitted three declarations. The first, by Yang, 

stated that “[t]he allegations of the Second Amended Complaint 

are wrong. Based on [plaintiff’s] relationship and duties with 

ZHL and any related entities as set forth in the I-129 Petition

and RFE Response, there is nothing unlawful or irregular about 

the I-129 Petition.” The second declaration, by Yan, stated that 

she followed the directives of Yang at all times, “did not do 

anything improper,” and “never tried to threaten Plaintiff, at any 
10

time or in any way. I certainly did not report Plaintiff to either 

the [Immigration Service] or to any Chinese authorities. The 

allegations in the Second Amended Complaint are not true.” The 

third declaration, Xu’s, also attested that the allegations in the 

operative complaint “are absolutely false.” He stated, further, 

that J & C was “duly authorized to provide certain immigration 

services as a registered consultant and provided all services 

lawfully.” In addition, and to ensure compliance with 

immigration laws, J & C had hired Yang to prepare and submit 

the L-1A visa application on behalf of ZHL Management. Like 

Yan, Xu denied that J & C did anything improper and further 

denied threatening plaintiff or contacting either the Immigration 

Service or Chinese authorities.

3.2. Opposition

Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing as to the first prong 

that the Xu defendants failed to establish that their conduct was 

protected and, as to the second prong, that his evidence 

established a prima facie case sufficient to withstand the antiSLAPP motion. Plaintiff observed that the Xu defendants’ motion 

was vague, as it failed to specify exactly what conduct they 

claimed was protected petitioning activity. Further, plaintiff 

emphasized that his claims were not aimed at the act of filing the 

visa petition, but rather their acts of inducing his investment 

with false promises to obtain a green card. In addition, citing 

Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, plaintiff argued that the 

Xu defendants’ illegal activity, which formed the basis of his 

complaint against them, is not protected under the anti-SLAPP 

statute.

In any event, plaintiff asserted, he had established a prima 

facie case as to each of his claims. He submitted his own 
11

declaration in support of the opposition, in which he attested to 

the facts stated in the complaint and set forth, ante. Plaintiff’s 

attorney also provided a declaration in support of the opposition, 

in which she disclosed information she had discovered about the 

Xu defendants and their related companies.

3.3. Reply

In reply, the Xu defendants insisted that they provided 

legitimate and lawful immigration services and that plaintiff’s 

allegations to the contrary were utterly false.

3.4. Ruling

The court denied the motion. The court noted that the 

motion broadly challenged five5 causes of action without 

differentiating among them, making the court’s analysis 

somewhat difficult. In any event, the court found that the first 

cause of action for violation of the Immigration Consultants Act 

was based on the breach of statutory duties owed to plaintiff, not 

any protected petitioning activity. The fourth and fifth causes of 

action, the court found, were predicated on that same conduct. As 

to the second and third causes of action for fraudulent 

misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, the court 

observed that the thrust of plaintiff’s complaint related to luring 

plaintiff into their investment for a green card scheme and 

threatening him with deportation when he was dissatisfied—not 

the lawful provision of immigration services. In sum, the court 

5 The cause of action for an accounting did not name the Xu 

defendants.
12

concluded, the conduct targeted by the operative complaint was 

not activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.6

4. The Shen Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike Under 

Section 425.16

4.1. Motion

The Shen defendants also filed a special motion to strike 

under section 425.16. The Shen defendants requested that the 

court strike the third cause of action for fraudulent concealment 

in its entirety and strike specific paragraphs of the complaint 

relating to their conduct. According to the Shen defendants, the 

allegations in the operative complaint relating to their conduct 

are found in paragraph 56 [Yan’s phone call to plaintiff in which 

she threatened to use her influence with the Immigration Service 

and Xu’s influence with the Chinese Embassy and Chinese 

police], paragraphs 58–61 and 83 [Yang’s act of sending the Shen 

statement to plaintiff’s counsel], paragraphs 95 and 96 [the Shen 

defendants’ act of making the Shen statement, in furtherance of 

the wrongful acts of the other named defendants], and 

paragraphs 80–83 and 96 [the Shen defendants’ participation in 

the overall investment and immigration conspiracy by 

threatening plaintiff with deportation, terminating plaintiff’s 

employment at ZHL Management, intimidating plaintiff by 

suggesting they had personal influence with Chinese officials, 

and claiming that they revoked their visa application.] The Shen 

defendants asserted that each of the allegations against them 

6 The court went on to conclude that plaintiff had offered sufficient 

evidence to establish that he was likely to prevail on his claims. 

Because we resolve this matter at the first-prong stage, we need not 

discuss the court’s second-prong analysis.
13

related to petitioning activity, i.e., communications with 

government officials, protected under Civil Code section 47, 

subdivision (b). In support of their motion, the Shen defendants 

submitted a declaration by Shen attesting that he had not 

contacted the Immigration Service, the Chinese Embassy or 

Consulate, or any other Chinese government officials about 

plaintiff.

4.2. Opposition

Plaintiff opposed the motion. In support of the opposition, 

plaintiff submitted his own declaration and a declaration by his 

attorney. Each declaration is identical to the corresponding 

declaration submitted in support of the opposition to the Xu 

defendants’ special motion to strike. Plaintiff asserted that each 

of the Shen defendants committed acts designed to support the 

immigration and investment scheme developed by the Xu 

defendants. Specifically, plaintiff argued that Hong Kong 

Supermarket provided the investment opportunity, ZHL 

Management provided the sham employment, and Shen, as the 

“frontman” of ZHL Management, purportedly terminated his 

employment. These actions, plaintiff urged, are not protected 

activity and are illegal and therefore unprotected under the antiSLAPP statute for that additional reason. In any event, plaintiff 

asserted, his evidence sufficiently established a prima facie case 

as to each of his causes of action.

4.3. Reply

In reply, the Shen defendants reasserted that plaintiff’s 

claims against them arose from protected activity. They denied 

their conduct was illegal and, in any event, argued that plaintiff 

failed to make a prima facie case.
14

4.4. Ruling

The court denied the motion. As in its ruling on the Xu 

defendants’ special motion to strike, the court noted that the 

third cause of action was predicated on the Xu defendants’ 

immigration for investment scheme and the Shen defendants’ 

participation in that scheme by providing the investment vehicle 

and sham employment, none of which is protected petitioning 

activity. Further, in making the Shen statement, the Shen 

defendants assisted the Xu defendants in their efforts to conceal 

plaintiff’s visa application from him. And it was not evident, in 

any case, that the Shen statement was directed to anyone other 

than plaintiff. In short, the court found, the Shen statement was 

part of a larger conspiracy to defraud plaintiff. The court rejected 

the Shen defendants’ further argument that the Shen statement 

was protected by the litigation privilege.

5. Appeal

The court filed its orders on the special motions to strike on 

March 8, 2021. The Xu defendants and the Shen defendants 

timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. General Principles of the Anti-SLAPP Statute

Under the anti-SLAPP statute, a defendant may move to 

strike claims “ ‘arising from any act ... in furtherance of the 

[defendant’s] right of petition or free speech under the United 

States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection 

with a public issue.’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 

7 Cal.5th 871, 884.) Section 425.16 does not completely insulate a 

defendant’s protected speech but instead provides a mechanism 
15

“for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from” 

protected activity. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384

(Baral).) 

Courts apply a two-prong test when evaluating an antiSLAPP motion. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) Under the 

first prong, the defendant must establish that the challenged 

claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. (Baral, at 

p. 384) If the defendant establishes that the plaintiff’s claims 

arise out of protected activity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff at 

the second prong to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on its 

claims. (Ibid.)

At the second prong, the plaintiff must make a prima facie 

showing of facts sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. 

(Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1368.) The court’s 

analysis is similar to the evaluation of a summary judgment

motion. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) “The court does not

weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is 

limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient 

claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to 

sustain a favorable judgment. [The court] accepts the plaintiff’s 

evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to 

determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” 

(Id. at pp. 384–385.) If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing 

of a likelihood of success, the court should deny the anti-SLAPP 

motion unless, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence 

defeats the plaintiff’s claim. (Wong, at p. 1368.)

We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP 

motion, and we exercise our independent judgment in 

determining whether the challenged claims arise from protected 
16

activity. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University

(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).)

2. The court properly denied the Xu defendants’ antiSLAPP motion.

“[A] claim is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike if its 

elements arise from protected activity. [Citation.] Courts deciding 

an anti-SLAPP motion thus must consider the claim’s elements, 

the actions alleged to establish those elements, and whether 

those actions are protected. [Citation.]” (Bonni v. St. Joseph 

Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1015.) More particularly, at 

the first step of the analysis under the anti-SLAPP statute, the 

moving defendant carries the burden to establish that the

plaintiff’s claims arise out of protected activity. (Baral, supra, 

1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) To meet that burden, the defendant must 

identify all allegations of protected activity in the plaintiff’s 

complaint and the claims for relief supported by those 

allegations. (Id. at p. 396.) The defendant also must identify “the 

elements of the challenged claim[s] and what actions by the 

defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis 

for liability.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.)

In their special motion to strike, the Xu defendants

asserted that all of plaintiff’s claims arise out of “the provisioning 

of lawful immigration services, following the advice of an 

attorney, and the submission of an immigration petition.” Such 

conduct, they claimed, falls squarely within the protection 

afforded by section 425.16, subdivision (e) [defining protected 

activity as including “any written or oral statement or writing 

made in connection with an issue under consideration or review 

by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official 

proceeding authorized by law”]. The Xu defendants failed, 
17

however, to discuss any of the specific allegations in plaintiff’s 

complaint or connect those allegations with the five causes of 

action asserted against them. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 

p. 396.) The Xu defendants did not identify the elements of

plaintiff’s causes of action, nor did they explain how their alleged 

protected conduct established those elements. (Park, supra, 2 

Cal.5th at p. 1063.) Moreover, the Xu defendants did not address 

the fact that many of plaintiff’s claims are based largely, if not 

entirely, on allegations concerning conduct that is not protected 

under the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Baral, at p. 396 [where a 

complaint includes allegations arising out of protected and 

unprotected activity, defendant must show the challenged causes 

of action arise out of the protected activity].) Indeed, the thrust of 

plaintiff’s complaint relates to a complex scheme designed to 

divest him of more than $600,000, based on the false promise 

that his so-called investment and sham employment would 

enable him to obtain a green card. And as we will explain, 

plaintiff’s specific allegations about the visa application focus 

primarily on the fact that the Xu defendants concealed the 

content of the application from him—not the fact that they filed 

the application in the first instance.

On appeal, the Xu defendants take a similarly broad-brush 

approach, claiming that “[t]he entire complaint thus falls easily 

within the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute.” But again, they 

do not discuss the elements of plaintiff’s claims, which vary 

considerably. With respect to the first cause of action, for 

example, plaintiff must establish that the defendants violated the 

Immigration Consultants Act by making “false or misleading 

statements to a client while providing services to that client[,]”

making a “guarantee or promise to a client, unless the guarantee 
18

or promise is in writing and the immigration consultant has some 

basis in fact for making the guarantee or promise[,]” making a 

“statement that the immigration consultant can or will obtain 

special favors from or has special influence with the United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Services, or any other

governmental agency, employee, or official, that may have a 

bearing on a client’s immigration matter[,]” or “[charging] a client 

a fee for referral of the client to another for services which the 

immigration consultant cannot or will not provide to the client.” 

(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22444.) Plaintiff has alleged conduct on the 

part of the Xu defendants as to each of these categories, none of 

which involves the purportedly protected activity of “provisioning 

of lawful immigration services, following the advice of an 

attorney, [or] the submission of an immigration petition.”

The Xu defendants’ approach fares no better with respect to 

plaintiff’s two fraud claims. To prevail, plaintiff must establish

“(1) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or 

nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (3) intent to 

defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and 

(5) resulting damage. [Citation.]” (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. 

Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 990.) The misrepresentations 

complained of in the second cause of action include, for example, 

that the Xu defendants promised in the service agreement to 

provide lawful immigration services but did not, that they 

promised to provide a legitimate investment and employment 

opportunity but did not, that they worked in concert to convince 

plaintiff that if he invested money with them he would be entitled 

to a green card, and that they would submit a visa application 

based on plaintiff’s status as an investor but did not. Similarly,

the allegations relating to the third cause of action implicate the 
19

Xu defendants’ collective action to conceal their wrongful acts 

from plaintiff by, for example, forging his signature on the visa 

application and refusing to provide him with a copy of the 

application. To the extent these allegations relate to the 

preparation and submission of the visa petition to the 

Immigration Service, they do so only tangentially. The complaint 

cannot be fairly read to allege that the submission of the visa 

petition, standing alone, is a basis for relief. (See Baral, supra, 1 

Cal.5th at p. 394 [“Allegations of protected activity that merely 

provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot 

be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.”].) In other words, the 

Xu defendants’ contention that the conduct targeted by the 

complaint is limited to, or even focused mainly upon, the 

provision of lawful immigration services misrepresents the 

substance of the operative complaint.

Finally, and as to the fourth cause of action, the Xu 

defendants did not separately address the breach of fiduciary 

duty claim below or on appeal. We need not do so. (Placer County 

Local Agency Formation Com. v. Nevada County Local Agency 

Formation Com. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 793, 814 [“We need not 

address points in appellate briefs that are unsupported by 

adequate factual or legal analysis.”].)

7

In sum, the Xu defendants filed a cursory anti-SLAPP 

motion and failed to meet their burden under the first prong of 

the anti-SLAPP statute. The court, therefore, properly denied 

their motion. (See, e.g., Symmonds v. Mahoney (2019) 31 

Cal.App.5th 1096, 1103–1104 [noting court need not reach the 

7 Similarly, the Xu defendants do not address the fifth cause of action 

for violation of the Unfair Competition Law.
20

second prong of anti-SLAPP analysis where moving defendant 

fails to establish the first prong].)

3. The court properly denied the Shen defendants’ antiSLAPP motion.

As noted, at the first step of the analysis under the antiSLAPP statute, the moving defendant must establish that the 

plaintiff’s claims arise out of protected activity. (Baral, supra, 

1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) The Shen defendants moved to strike the 

third cause of action for fraudulent concealment as well as 

paragraphs 56, 58–61, 80–83, and 94–96 of the operative 

complaint on the ground that the allegations concern conduct 

protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and/or the litigation 

privilege. The elements of the cause of action are “(1) a 

misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or 

nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (3) intent to 

defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and 

(5) resulting damage. [Citation.]” (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. 

Dana Corp., supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 990.) 

We first analyze the specific paragraphs the Shen 

defendants sought to strike. As an initial matter, we note that 

paragraph 56 does not include any allegations as to the Shen 

defendants. Instead, that paragraph relates to Yan’s phone call to 

plaintiff in which she threatened to use her influence with the 

Immigration Service and Xu’s influence with the Chinese 

Embassy and Chinese police if plaintiff continued in his efforts to 

obtain a copy of the visa application.

The remaining paragraphs, however, do target actions 

taken by the Shen defendants. Paragraphs 58–61, 81, and 95 all 
21

relate specifically to the Shen statement.8 The other paragraphs 

(80, 82–83, and 96) allege that the Shen statement was used to 

intimidate plaintiff as part of the ongoing conspiracy among all 

defendants to further the investment and immigration scheme.9

With respect to the Shen statement specifically, plaintiff alleges 

that the content of the statement (threats to withdraw ZHL 

Management’s visa application and threats to inform various 

Chinese officials about plaintiff’s immigration status) was 

designed to discourage him from continuing to seek a copy of the 

visa application, i.e., to support the Xu defendants’ concealment 

of the application.

The Shen defendants asserted that the allegations against 

them relate to privileged communications protected under Civil 

Code section 47, subdivision (b), which they claimed were

necessarily protected under section 425.16. But it is not always 

8 The Shen statement, as translated, reads: “Based on the 

investigation conducted by all parties, Yanbin Zang, a former C.E.O. of 

ZHL Management, Inc., has been suspected of committing a serious 

financial fraud when he was holding the position as a senior officer of 

China Zhongpu Group (see the attachment), and now he has been 

listed as a suspect wanted by the Chinese Police. In an attitude of 

being responsible for ZHL Management, Inc., the Company has 

removed Yanbin Zang from the position as C.E.O. of ZHL Management 

Inc. in November 2019 and has submitted the request to the USCIS to 

revoke his L-1 visa petition. At the same time, ZHL Management Inc. 

will send a further notice to the Chinese Embassy and the Chinese 

Consulates in the United States regarding Yanbin Zang’s current case 

status. [¶] This declaration is hereby made! [¶] ZHL Management Inc. 

CEO [¶] Shen Qi [¶] June 4, 2020[.]”

9 The Shen defendants’ appellate briefing also discusses paragraph 94 

of the operative complaint. Their special motion to strike, however, did 

not include a request to strike that paragraph.
22

the case that conduct protected by the litigation privilege is also 

protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. Although there is some 

overlap between the litigation privilege and the anti-SLAPP 

statute, “ ‘[t]he scope of the protections afforded to litigationrelated communications under the anti-SLAPP statute and that 

afforded by the litigation privilege [citation] are not identical. The 

two statutes “are substantively different statutes that serve quite 

different purposes ... .” ’ [Citation.]” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health 

System, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 301; cf. Flatley v. Mauro, 

supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 325 [“Civil Code section 47 does not 

operate as a limitation on the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. 

The fact that Civil Code section 47 may limit the liability of a 

party that sends to an opposing party a letter proposing 

settlement of proposed litigation does not mean that the 

settlement letter is also a protected communication for purposes 

of section 425.16.”].) 

Although the Shen defendants also claim that the Shen 

statement is protected petitioning activity covered under the 

anti-SLAPP statute, they offer no legal analysis to support that 

contention. Nor does it appear from the face of the statute that 

the Shen statement is, in fact, protected activity. Section 425.16, 

subdivision (e), defines the conduct protected under the statute:

“As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of 

petition or free speech under the United States or California 

Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any 

written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, 

executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding 

authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing 

made in connection with an issue under consideration or review 

by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official 
23

proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement 

or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in 

connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other 

conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right 

of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection 

with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

Plainly, the Shen statement is not included in the first 

category, as the statement was not made to any official body. 

Indeed, it is unclear from the face of the Shen statement and the 

supporting declaration why or in what context the Shen 

statement was made. The Shen statement is also not within the 

scope of the third and fourth categories because the Shen 

statement does not relate to a matter of public interest. (See, e.g., 

FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 145–

146 [“In articulating what constitutes a matter of public interest, 

courts look to certain specific considerations, such as whether the 

subject of the speech or activity ‘was a person or entity in the 

public eye’ or ‘could affect large numbers of people beyond the 

direct participants’ [citation]; and whether the activity ‘occur[red] 

in the context of an ongoing controversy, dispute or discussion’

[citation], or ‘affect[ed] a community in a manner similar to that 

of a governmental entity[.]’ ”].) Therefore, only the second 

category remains, which protects “any written or oral statement 

or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration 

or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other 

official proceeding authorized by law.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) “A 

statement is ‘in connection with’ an issue under consideration by 

a court in a judicial proceeding within the meaning of clause (2) 

of section 425.16, subdivision (e) if it relates to a substantive 

issue in the proceeding and is directed to a person having some 
24

interest in the proceeding. [Citation.]” (Fremont Reorganizing 

Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1167.) Here, 

although the Shen statement references plaintiff’s visa 

application, it is not at all clear that the statement relates to the 

substantive issue under consideration in the pending 

immigration matter. At most, the Shen statement merely 

provides context for plaintiff’s allegations that defendants 

engaged in a scheme to defraud him. Thus, the statement does 

not fall within the ambit of this protected category. (See Baral,

supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394 [noting “[a]llegations of protected 

activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim 

for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute”].)

In sum, the Shen defendants failed to establish that the 

operative complaint targets speech or conduct protected under 

the anti-SLAPP statute. Accordingly, the court properly denied 

their special motion to strike.

DISPOSITION

The orders denying the special motions to strike under 

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 are affirmed. Plaintiff 

shall recover his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:
25

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.