# C_2020348EN.01002202.xml

| 19.10.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 348/22 |
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19.10.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 348/22

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Action brought on 27 July 2020 — LG and Others v Commission

(Case T-482/20)

(2020/C 348/32)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: LG and five other applicants (represented by: A. Sigal and M. Teder, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | annul, under Article 263 TFEU, a tacit decision of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) of 26 May 2020, rejecting the applicants’ claim for legal professional privilege with regard to communications between the applicants and their outside legal counsel, unless the applicants explain the context and content of such privileged communications; |
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annul, under Article 263 TFEU, a tacit decision of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) of 26 May 2020, rejecting the applicants’ claim for legal professional privilege with regard to communications between the applicants and their outside legal counsel, unless the applicants explain the context and content of such privileged communications;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
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order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on three pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the applicants’ right to legal professional privilege is a fundamental, though unwritten, right under EU law, as recognised in the case law of the Court of Justice. The exercise of this right cannot, it is argued, be conditional upon the applicants showing that their privileged communications have a substantive connection to the very investigation in which they are privileged; this would defeat the purpose of legal professional privilege. |
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1.

First plea in law, alleging that the applicants’ right to legal professional privilege is a fundamental, though unwritten, right under EU law, as recognised in the case law of the Court of Justice. The exercise of this right cannot, it is argued, be conditional upon the applicants showing that their privileged communications have a substantive connection to the very investigation in which they are privileged; this would defeat the purpose of legal professional privilege.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the applicants’ right to legal professional privilege stems separately from the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, particularly the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR (Article 7 of the Charter) and the right to defence under Article 6 of the ECHR (Article 47 of the Charter). The protection of legal professional privilege under the ECHR and the Charter does not depend, it is argued, on the purpose and content of the relevant communications, but only on the identity of their participants. |
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2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the applicants’ right to legal professional privilege stems separately from the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, particularly the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR (Article 7 of the Charter) and the right to defence under Article 6 of the ECHR (Article 47 of the Charter). The protection of legal professional privilege under the ECHR and the Charter does not depend, it is argued, on the purpose and content of the relevant communications, but only on the identity of their participants.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that, even if the right to legal professional privilege under the ECHR and the Charter can be constrained for the benefit of a public good, such constraints must take the form of a law. They cannot, it is argued, be based on a discretionary decision of an administrative author. |
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3.

Third plea in law, alleging that, even if the right to legal professional privilege under the ECHR and the Charter can be constrained for the benefit of a public good, such constraints must take the form of a law. They cannot, it is argued, be based on a discretionary decision of an administrative author.

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