If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

RUDOLPH WIDMAR, Personal Representative of 

the ESTATE OF DOUGLAS WIDMAR,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

November 9, 2023

v No. 362012

Oakland Circuit Court

WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL, DR. MARK 

FRIKKER, MARIO RAUL VILLALBA, MD, 

SHRUTI SEVAK, and EMILY ABBOTT,

LC No. 2018-169341-NH

Defendants-Appellants,

and

JEFFREY S. FISCHGRUND, MD, DR. JAD 

KHALIL, DR. WAEL GHACHAM, BEAUMONT 

ORTHOPEDIC CENTER, DR. LILLY, and 

ANDREW PALAZZOLO, MD,

Defendants.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and RIORDAN and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this wrongful-death medical malpractice action, defendants William Beaumont 

Hospital, Dr. Mark Frikker, Dr. Mario Raul Villalba, Dr. Emily Abbott, and Dr. Shruti Sevak 

(collectively “defendants”) appeal by leave granted the trial court’s order denying their motion in 

limine to strike plaintiff’s standard-of-care expert, Dr. Steven Salzman, D.O., and to preclude him 

from giving expert testimony regarding the standard of care applicable to these defendants. We 

conclude that the one most relevant specialty applicable to these defendants is surgical critical 

care. Although Dr. Salzman specializes in surgical critical care, because Drs. Frikker and Villalba 

are board-certified in surgical critical care, and Dr. Salzman is not, Dr. Salzman is not qualified 

under MCL 600.2169(1)(a) to testify regarding the standard of care applicable to Drs. Frikker and 

Villalba. However, because Drs. Sevak and Lilly similarly are not board-certified in surgical 
-2-

critical care, Dr. Salzman’s lack of board certification in that specialty does not disqualify him 

from providing standard-of-care testimony against them. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse 

in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

This action arises from treatment that plaintiff’s decedent, Douglas Widmar, received at 

Beaumont Hospital in October 2015. The decedent sustained traumatic injuries when he 

accidentally crashed his ultralight plane on October 8, 2015. Emergency responders intubated him 

with an endotracheal ventilator before transporting him to the surgical intensive care unit at 

Beaumont Hospital. His injuries included a nondisplaced cervical spinal fracture, other spinal 

fractures, fractures in both legs, a traumatic head injury, and a punctured lung. An orthopedic 

team decided to treat the cervical spinal fracture without surgery, by placing the decedent’s neck 

in a collar while the fracture healed naturally. 

The decedent remained on a ventilator until October 21, 2015, when Dr. Frikker made the 

decision to perform a percutaneous tracheostomy. This procedure is performed bedside rather than 

in an operating room. The purpose of the procedure is to begin weaning the patient off the 

ventilator. It is typically done for patients who have been on a ventilator for 14 days or more. 

Performing a percutaneous tracheostomy on a patient with a cervical spinal fracture carries the risk 

of displacing the fracture.

Dr. Frikker and Dr. Villalba are board-certified specialists in general surgery and surgical 

critical care.

1 Dr. Sevak and Dr. Abbott were surgical residents working under Dr. Villalba’s 

supervision. These four defendants performed the percutaneous tracheostomy procedure on the 

decedent. On October 22, 2015, the day after the procedure, the decedent showed signs of 

paralysis on his right side. The orthopedists treating him decided that the cervical fracture required 

surgical treatment. The “fixation” surgery was performed on October 22. Plaintiff contends that 

the decedent was not quadriplegic before the tracheostomy was performed. In November 2015, 

the decedent was discharged from Beaumont Hospital and admitted to the University of Michigan 

spinal rehabilitation unit. He was later transferred to a Veterans Administration Hospital in Ohio. 

He died on February 11, 2017.

 

1 Specifically, Dr. Frikker and Dr. Villalba are certified by the American Board of Surgery in 

surgical critical care. The American Board of Surgery defines “surgical critical care” as “a 

specialty of surgery and a primary component of general surgery related to the care of patients 

with acute, life-threatening or potentially life-threatening surgical conditions.” See 

https://www.absurgery.org/default.jsp?aboutsccdefined#:~:text=Surgical%20critical%20care%2

0is%20a,potentially%20life%2Dthreatening%20surgical%20conditions (accessed November 2, 

2023). 
-3-

Plaintiff alleges that defendants negligently performed the percutaneous tracheostomy 

procedure without taking sufficient safeguards to avoid displacement of the cervical fracture.2 

According to plaintiff, the residents used excessive force when they implanted the tracheostomy 

device, causing displacement of the fracture and dissection of a vertebral artery. This necessitated 

urgent corrective surgery and a Halo brace. Plaintiff’s complaint was supported by an Affidavit 

of Merit (AOM) executed by Dr. Steven Salzman, D.O. Dr. Salzman opined that the tracheostomy 

should have been performed in the operating room or not performed until the cervical fracture was 

healed. Dr. Salzman is board-certified in the specialty of general surgery, but not the specialty of 

surgical critical care. Dr. Frikker and Dr. Villalba are board-certified in both specialties. The 

residents have no board certifications.

Defendants moved in limine to strike Dr. Salzman as a standard-of-care expert. They 

argued that he was not board-certified in surgical critical care, and therefore, was not qualified to 

testify against Dr. Villalba and Dr. Frikker, both of whom were board-certified in surgical critical 

care. Defendants also argued that Dr. Salzman could not testify as an expert in the field of general 

surgery because he spent the majority of his professional time practicing surgical critical care. 

Plaintiff argued that defendants were practicing the specialty of general surgery when they 

performed the percutaneous tracheostomy. The trial court found that there was a question of fact 

regarding the specialty that defendants were practicing and denied defendants’ motion in limine. 

This Court granted defendants’ interlocutory application for leave to appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

“This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the ‘qualification of a witness as an expert 

and the admissibility of the testimony of the witness . . . .’ ” Lenawee Co v Wagley, 301 Mich App 

134, 161; 836 NW2d 193 (2013), quoting Surman v Surman, 277 Mich App 287, 304-305; 745 

NW2d 802 (2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a circuit court chooses a result that falls 

outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Lenawee Co, 301 Mich App at 162. 

Any preliminary questions of law, including the interpretation and application of statutes, are 

reviewed de novo. Mueller v Brannigan Bros Restaurants & Taverns, LLC, 323 Mich App 566, 

571; 918 NW2d 545 (2018). “[T]he trial court necessarily commits an abuse of discretion if it 

makes an incorrect legal determination.” Id.

The four elements that a plaintiff must prove in an action for medical malpractice are:

(1) the appropriate standard of care governing the defendant’s conduct at the time 

of the purported negligence, (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care, 

(3) that the plaintiff was injured, and (4) that the plaintiff’s injuries were the 

proximate result of the defendant’s breach of the applicable standard of care. 

[Craig ex rel Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 86; 684 NW2d 296 (2004).]

 

2 Plaintiff also named as defendants other orthopedic doctors who were involved in other aspects 

of the decedent’s treatment and care, but they are not parties to this appeal. This appeal only 

involves plaintiff’s claims against the defendants who participated in the percutaneous 

tracheostomy. 
-4-

With respect to the standard of care for a specialist, “the plaintiff has the burden of proving 

that in light of the state of the art existing at the time of the alleged malpractice” that the defendant 

“failed to provide the recognized standard of practice or care within that specialty as reasonably 

applied in light of the facilities available in the community or other facilities reasonably available 

under the circumstances . . . .” MCL 600.2912a(1)(b). The standard of care applicable to a 

specialist in a medical malpractice action is “that of a reasonable specialist practicing medicine in 

the light of present day scientific knowledge.” Naccarato v Grob, 384 Mich 248, 254; 180 NW2d 

788 (1970). 

MCL 600.2169(1) provides, in pertinent part:

In an action alleging medical malpractice, a person shall not give expert 

testimony on the appropriate standard of practice or care unless the person is 

licensed as a health professional in this state or another state and meets the 

following criteria:

(a) If the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is 

a specialist, specializes at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the action 

in the same specialty as the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony 

is offered. However, if the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony 

is offered is a specialist who is board certified, the expert witness must be a 

specialist who is board certified in that specialty.

(b) Subject to subdivision (c), during the year immediately preceding the 

date of the occurrence that is the basis for the claim or action, devoted a majority 

of his or her professional time to either or both of the following:

(i) The active clinical practice of the same health profession in which the 

party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is licensed and, if 

that party is a specialist, the active clinical practice of that specialty.

(ii) The instruction of students in an accredited health professional school 

or accredited residency or clinical research program in the same health profession 

in which the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is 

licensed and, if that party is a specialist, an accredited health professional school or 

accredited residency or clinical research program in the same specialty.

A. TRIAL COURT’S ROLE AS GATEKEEPER

A threshold issue is whether the trial court erred by ruling that the jury could decide the 

issue whether general surgery or critical care medicine was the most relevant specialty for the 

decedent’s tracheostomy procedure. The trial court “may admit evidence only once it ensures, 

pursuant to MRE 702, that expert testimony meets that rule’s standard of reliability.” Gilbert v 

DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 782; 685 NW2d 391 (2004). “This gatekeeper role applies 

to all stages of expert analysis.” Id. (emphasis omitted). In Woodard v Custer, 476 Mich 545, 

570-572; 719 NW2d 842 (2006), our Supreme Court held that it is the role of the trial court, and 

not the jury, to determine which of a defendant physician’s specialties is relevant for purposes of 
-5-

determining an expert’s witness’s qualification. The Court alluded to the trial court’s wellestablished gatekeeping role in determining the reliability of expert testimony. Id. at 571 n 16. 

Thus, the trial court erred by delegating that decision to the jury.

B. MOST RELEVANT SPECIALTY

In Woodard, the defendant physician was board-certified in pediatrics, with certificates of 

special qualifications in pediatric critical care medicine and neonatal-perinatal medicine. Id. at 

554. The plaintiff’s proposed expert was board-certified in pediatrics, but without certificates of 

special qualifications. Id. at 554-555. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to strike the 

plaintiff’s expert on the ground that he was not qualified under MCL 600.2169 to testify against 

the defendant physician. Id. at 555. In Woodard’s companion case, Hamilton v Kuligowski, the 

defendant physician was board-certified in general internal medicine, with a specialty in general 

internal medicine. Id. at 556. The plaintiff’s proposed expert was board-certified in general 

internal medicine, and devoted a majority of his professional time to the treatment of infectious 

diseases, a subspecialty of internal medicine. Id. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s 

expert was not qualified to testify against the defendant physician because the plaintiff’s expert 

did not devote the majority of his professional time to the practice or teaching of general internal 

medicine. Id. The Supreme Court explained:

Although specialties and board certificates must match, not all specialties 

and board certificates must match. Rather, § 2169(1) states that “a person shall not 

give expert testimony on the appropriate standard of practice or care unless . . . .” 

(Emphasis added.) That is, § 2169(1) addresses the necessary qualifications of an 

expert witness to testify regarding the “appropriate standard of practice or care,” 

not regarding an inappropriate or irrelevant standard of medical practice or care. 

Because an expert witness is not required to testify regarding an inappropriate or 

irrelevant standard of medical practice or care, § 2169(1) should not be understood 

to require such witness to specialize in specialties and possess board certificates 

that are not relevant to the standard of medical practice or care about which the 

witness is to testify. As this Court explained in McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 

24-25; 597 NW2d 148 (1999), “[MCL 600.2169(1)] operates to preclude certain 

witnesses from testifying solely on the basis of the witness’ lack of practice or 

teaching experience in the relevant specialty.” (Emphasis added.) [Woodard, 476 

Mich at 558-559.]

The Court also noted that § 2169(1) uses the terms “the same specialty” and “that 

specialty,” not “the same specialties” or “those specialties.” Woodard, 476 Mich at 559. The 

Court further stated:

Obviously, a specialist can only devote a majority of his professional time to one 

specialty. Therefore, it is clear that § 2169(1) only requires the plaintiff’s expert to 

match one of the defendant physician’s specialties. Because the plaintiff’s expert 

will be providing expert testimony on the appropriate or relevant standard of 

practice or care, not an inappropriate or irrelevant standard of practice or care, it 

follows that the plaintiff’s expert witness must match the one most relevant 

standard of practice or care—the specialty engaged in by the defendant physician 
-6-

during the course of the alleged malpractice, and, if the defendant physician is board 

certified in that specialty, the plaintiff’s expert must also be board certified in that 

specialty. [Id. at 560 (emphasis omitted).]

Regarding the meanings of the words “specialty” and “subspecialty,” the Court stated that 

a “subspecialty” is “a particular branch of medicine or surgery in which one can potentially become 

board-certified that falls under a specialty or within the hierarchy of that specialty.” Id. at 562. 

“[I]f a defendant physician specializes in a subspecialty, the plaintiff’s expert witness must have 

specialized in the same subspecialty as the defendant physician at the time of the occurrence that 

is the basis for the action.” Id. “[I]n order to be qualified to testify under § 2169(1)(b), the 

plaintiff’s expert witness must have devoted a majority of his professional time during the year 

immediately preceding the date on which the alleged malpractice occurred to practicing or teaching 

the specialty that the defendant physician was practicing at the time of the alleged malpractice, 

i.e., the one most relevant specialty.” Id. at 566.

The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff’s proposed expert in Woodard did not 

satisfy the same specialty requirement because the defendant specialized in pediatric critical care 

medicine, pediatric critical care medicine was the most relevant specialty, and the plaintiff’s expert 

did not practice or teach pediatric critical care medicine in the year preceding the alleged 

malpractice. Id. at 577. The Court stated that “ ‘Critical’ is defined as ‘[d]enoting a morbid 

condition in which death is possible.’ ” Id. at 576, quoting Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (26th 

ed.) (alteration in original). In Hamilton, the Court concluded that the plaintiff’s expert witness 

“did not devote a majority of his time to practicing or teaching general internal medicine” because 

he instead “devoted a majority of his professional time to treating infectious diseases.” Id. at 578. 

The witness acknowledged that he was “not sure what the average internist sees day in and day 

out.” Id.

Woodard establishes that it is necessary to consider all relevant circumstances in 

determining what specialty defendants were practicing when they performed the tracheostomy. 

The mere fact that a tracheostomy may be considered a relatively simple or straightforward 

procedure, or the fact that the procedure was performed in the intensive care unit (ICU), are not 

dispositive. The analysis requires consideration of the definition of the practice of surgical critical 

care. In Woodard, 476 Mich at 575, the Court noted that Stedman’s Medical Dictionary defines 

“critical” as “ ‘[d]enoting a morbid condition in which death is possible.’ ” Defendants quote the 

Medline Plus website, which states:

Critical care is medical care for people who have life-threatening injuries 

and illnesses. It usually takes place in an intensive care unit (ICU). A team of 

specially-trained health care providers gives you 24-hour care. This includes using 

machines to constantly monitor your vital signs. It also usually involves giving you 

specialized treatments.3

 

3

https://medlineplus.gov/criticalcare.html#:~:text=Critical%20care%20is%20medical%20care,co

nstantly%20monitor%20your%20vital%20signs (accessed October 3, 2023).
-7-

Defendants argue that Dr. Salzman’s testimony demonstrates that defendants were 

practicing in the area of critical care when they performed the particular percutaneous 

tracheostomy at issue in this case, given the decedent’s other injuries. Indeed, Dr. Salzman stated 

that a tracheostomy is contraindicated in a patient with a cervical spine injury. He stated that there 

are risks, including life-threatening risks, associated with oral endotracheal intubation, but these 

risks had to be balanced against the benefit of maintaining a stable airway. At the time of the 

decedent’s hospitalization, the “teachings were you wanted to try to change over if you can’t get 

the patient off the ventilator.” It was considered preferable “to change an endotracheal tube to a 

tracheostomy tube so that you can potentially wean them, suction them, and all of these other 

things and potentially try to get them off the vent quicker in all of these things.” Patients on an 

endotracheal tube needed to be sedated. There was risk of pneumonia. When the decedent was 

admitted to the hospital, he had a Glasgow Coma Score of 3, meaning that he was unable to breathe 

independently. The decedent’s multiple injuries put him at a high risk for mortality. He had 

lumbar spine fractures, a fractured hip, fractures in both legs, and his lung was punctured. He was 

unconscious. He had significant head and neck trauma. The neck trauma put him at risk of a 

vertebral artery dissection. 

Dr. Salzman acknowledged in his deposition that his AOM “alludes to violations of the 

standard of practice for orthopedic surgeons, general surgeons, trauma and critical care surgeons, 

anesthesiologists and internists.” When asked, “You are not offering opinions regarding 

orthopedic surgeons; is that true?” he replied, “My opinions are based on the trauma critical care 

aspects of this.” Defendants argue that this testimony established that Dr. Salzman’s opinions 

were based on the standard of care for critical care treatment. Defendants also argue that Dr. 

Salzman’s opinion that the tracheostomy should have been performed in the operating room and 

not until the decedent’s cervical fracture was surgically stabilized are critical care issues. 

Defendants also cite Dr. Salzman’s testimony that there are life-threatening risks associated with 

prolonged use of an oral endotracheal tube, and that the change to the tracheostomy should be done 

if the patient cannot be weaned after 14 days. When asked if the decedent had a very high risk of 

death on October 8, 2015, Dr. Salzman replied, “He was critically injured. I don’t know about 

high risk of death. I think anybody who is a trauma patient, quote-unquote, is at a potential risk 

of death.” He also stated, “I think anybody that is critically injured like that is at high risk for 

mortality. I don’t know that we can put a number on it.” Dr. Salzman stated that the decedent’s 

head trauma put him at risk of long-term neurologic impairment. 

Plaintiff states that defendants testified in their depositions that the tracheostomy was an 

“elective” procedure, but the cited testimony does not fully support this assertion. Dr. Abbott 

answered affirmatively when asked whether the tracheostomy was an “elective procedure” and 

whether it was not “mandatory to save his life and it wasn’t something that had to be done on 

October 21st.” Dr. Abbott stated that she could not give a medical reason for performing the 

“elective percutaneous trach” before the fixation surgery on October 22. Dr. Sevak agreed that the 

procedure was elective. Dr. Jeffrey Fischgrund was asked if the tracheostomy “was a required 

event or an elective event?” He agreed that “it didn’t probably have to be done that minute, but 

the recommendation would be done at some time.” When asked why the tracheostomy was done 

before the decedent’s neck was surgically stabilized, Dr. Frikker stated:

The two things were quite independent. It’s our practice, and the practice around 

the country, that when someone has been on the ventilator, with an oral tracheal 
-8-

tube for about two weeks, and there’s no immediate prospect of getting that tube 

removed, then it’s safer and more comfortable for the patient to move that tube to 

a tracheostomy position. 

When Dr. Salzman testified that defendants violated the standard of care by performing the 

tracheostomy at bedside rather than in an operating room, he stated, “You are in a suboptimal 

environment, performing an elective procedure that clearly needed to be done, except it needed to 

be done at the appropriate time which it wasn’t because this patient should have been brought to 

the OR.” 

Considering all the relevant circumstances, we conclude that the decedent was a critical 

care patient under either party’s definition of critical care. The decedent had multiple injuries, 

including a traumatic head injury and multiple spinal fractures. Dr. Salzman’s theory was that the 

procedure should have been conducted in an operating room because the decedent’s cervical spine 

injury put him at a high risk of death or serious injury. The heightened risk of performing the 

procedure on a patient with a cervical fracture negates plaintiff’s attempt to portray the procedure 

as routine. Plaintiff emphasizes that the procedure was “elective,” but the evidence indicated that 

it was elective only in the sense that there was no specific need to perform the procedure and start 

weaning the decedent from the endotracheal ventilator on that specific day and time, but because 

of the risks of long-term endotracheal ventilation, it had to be done at some point. The purpose of 

the tracheostomy was not merely to make the decedent more comfortable, but to avoid the longterm risks of intubation.

Plaintiff also compares the decedent’s condition before the tracheostomy to his 

deterioration afterward to demonstrate that he was not a critical care patient until after defendants 

performed the procedure. Dr. Frikker explained that the original plan for treating the neck fracture 

was not surgical, but on the morning of October 22, the decedent showed signs of right-sided 

paralysis. The orthopedic surgeons decided to perform the stabilization because they could not 

determine the cause of the decedent’s right-side paralysis. Dr. Villalba admitted that there were 

no plans for surgery when they performed the tracheostomy. If there had been plans for surgery, 

he would have delayed the tracheostomy. 

Plaintiff cites testimony of Dr. Jad Khalil in support of his position that the decedent was 

not at risk of death, and thus not a critical care patient, until after the tracheostomy was performed. 

Plaintiff quotes Dr. Khalil as saying that he believed the decedent’s paralysis on October 22 was 

“the first instance where we noted that the fracture had displaced and merits surgical treatment.” 

Plaintiff cites Dr. Khalil’s testimony in support of his assertion that the decedent was not expected

to die on admission, but only destined after November 1 with “a couple of months to live.” 

However, Dr. Khalil’s actual testimony was as follows:

Q. For lack of a better term, Mr. Widmar wasn’t due to die, was he?

A. I don’t know the answer to that question, sir.

Q. Is there anywhere in the chart where you see anything suggesting 

between 10/8 and 10/22, that he had a high mortality or morbidity rate?
-9-

A. Yes. So, the fact that the high energy crash, the brain energy, and the 

neurologic function that he came with, and I believe he was resuscitated at the 

scene, so typically, medical literature would say that there is a high risk of mortality 

for these patients. 

Dr. Fischgrund stated that “the fracture that identified on day of admission, in my opinion, 

did not need surgery.” When asked if there was any indication in the decedent’s chart before 

October 22 that the decedent’s probability of survival was low, Dr. Fischgrund replied that “it’s 

general knowledge” that a 65-year-old person with a Glasgow Coma Scale Score of 3 had a low 

chance of survival. He stated that he did not believe surgical treatment was necessary until the 

fracture was displaced. 

Testimony regarding the decedent’s need for surgery to treat the cervical fracture on 

October 22, 2015, does not prove that he was not a critical care patient before and at the time of 

the tracheostomy. The decedent had multiple injuries. The fact that the orthopedic specialists 

changed his treatment plan for one of those injuries from noninvasive to surgical intervention does 

not indicate that his condition was not already critical.

In sum, the evidence establishes that Dr. Villalba and Dr. Frikker were practicing surgical 

critical care when they performed the percutaneous tracheotomy on the decedent on October 21, 

2015. Surgical critical care is therefore the most relevant specialty. Because Dr. Villalba and Dr. 

Frikker were both board-certified in surgical critical care, and Dr. Salzman was not, Dr. Salzman 

was not qualified under MCL 600.2961(1)(a) to testify regarding whether Dr. Villalba or Dr. 

Frikker breached the applicable standard of care. Accordingly, we reverse in part the trial court’s 

order to the extent that it denied defendants’ motion in limine to preclude Dr. Salzman’s standardof-care testimony against Drs. Villalba and Frikker. 

C. THE RESIDENTS

Conversely, the residents, Dr. Abbott and Dr. Sevak, are not board-certified in any 

specialty. Therefore, if the residents were practicing the specialty of surgical critical care when 

they participated in the tracheostomy, Dr. Salzman’s lack of board certification in that specialty 

does not disqualify him from offering standard-of-care testimony with respect to Dr. Abbott and 

Dr. Sevak.4 Defendants argue, however, that the residents were not practicing surgical critical care

for purposes of MCL 600.2169, but rather were merely performing a limited rotation in the ICU 

as part of their general surgery training. We reject this argument. 

In Gonzalez v St John Hosp & Med Ctr, 275 Mich App 290, 299; 739 NW2d 392 (2007), 

this Court held that “those physicians who are residents and limit their training to a particular 

branch or medicine or surgery and who can potentially become board-certified in that specialty are 

specialists for purposes of the analysis under MCL 600.2169(1).” In Reeves v Carson City Hosp, 

274 Mich App 622; 736 NW2d 284 (2007), the defendant physician was board-certified in family 

 

4 The submitted evidence otherwise indicated that Dr. Salzman devoted more than half of his 

professional time to the practice of surgical critical care, thereby satisfying the requirement in 

MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(i). 
-10-

practice, but she was practicing in the emergency room when she treated the plaintiff. Id. at 628. 

This Court held that “because Dr. Squanda was practicing emergency medicine at the time of the 

alleged malpractice and potentially could obtain a board certification in emergency medicine, she 

was a ‘specialist’ in emergency medicine under the holding in Woodard.” Id. at 630. 

Regarding a resident as practicing the advanced specialty is consistent with the focus on 

the work being performed in Reeves. Indeed, defendants acknowledged in their motion in limine, 

and Dr. Frikker and Dr. Villalba both averred in their affidavits, that the residents were practicing 

surgical critical care. We therefore conclude that the residents were engaged in the practice of 

surgical critical care when they participated in the percutaneous tracheostomy procedure. As a 

physician who devotes the majority of his time to the practice of surgical critical care, Dr. Salzman 

was qualified to give standard-of-care testimony against the residents. Accordingly, we affirm the 

trial court’s order to the extent that it denied defendants’ motion to preclude Dr. Salzman’s 

standard-of-care testimony against Drs. Abbott and Sevak. 

D. THE PARTIES OTHER ARGUMENTS

The parties raise additional arguments not directly related to the trial court’s order denying 

defendant’s motion in limine. Plaintiff argues that if this Court determines that Dr. Salzman is not 

qualified to give standard-of-care testimony against any of the defendants, it should hold that his 

testimony is still admissible for other purposes. Defendants argue that if Dr. Salzman is not 

qualified to give standard-of-care testimony against any of them, this Court should dismiss 

plaintiff’s claims against them. Alternatively, defendants argue that if Dr. Salzman is qualified to 

testify against the residents, the claims against the residents should still be dismissed because Dr. 

Salzman did not state in his deposition that they violated the standard of care. These arguments 

exceed the scope of this appeal. The admissibility of Dr. Salzman’s testimony for other purposes 

is an issue for the trial court to decide under the rules of evidence, after plaintiff has made an 

appropriate offer of proof and defendants have the opportunity to raise any objections. Further, 

whether dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Villalba and Dr. Frikker is required because Dr. 

Salzman is not qualified to offer standard-of-care testimony against them, and whether Dr. 

Salzman’s testimony supports a finding that the residents breached the applicable standard of care, 

are issues appropriately raised in a motion for summary disposition in the trial court.

III. CONCLUSION

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 

We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ Sima G. Patel