RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 09a0351p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

JUDY WILLIAMS,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

REDFLEX TRAFFIC SYSTEMS, INC., CITY OF

KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE, BILL HASLAM as

Mayor of the City of Knoxville, Tennessee,

KNOXVILLE CITY COUNCIL, REDFLEX

TRAFFIC SYSTEMS, INC., d/b/a

WWW.PHOTONOTICE.COM, MICHAEL L.

SULLIVAN, GORDON CATLETT, JOSEPH

BERNARD, and UNKNOWN PERSONS,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 08-5545

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.

No. 06-00400—Thomas W. Phillips, District Judge.

Argued: June 10, 2009

Decided and Filed: October 2, 2009 

Before: MARTIN, RYAN, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Gerald L. Gulley, Jr., GULLEY OLDHAM, PLLC, Knoxville, Tennessee, for

Appellant. Michael S. Kelley, KENNERLY, MONTGOMERY & FINLEY, P.C.,

Knoxville, Tennessee, Ronald Eugene Mills, CITY OF KNOXVILLE LAW

DEPARTMENT, Knoxville, Tennessee, Charles W. Swanson, SHEPPEARD, SWANSON

& MYNATT, PLC, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Gerald L. Gulley,

Jr., GULLEY OLDHAM, PLLC, Knoxville, Tennessee, David B. Hamilton, NORWOOD

LAW OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Michael S. Kelley, KENNERLY,

MONTGOMERY & FINLEY, P.C., Knoxville, Tennessee, Ronald E. Mills, CITY OF

KNOXVILLE LAW DEPARTMENT, Knoxville, Tennessee, Charles W. Swanson,

SHEPPEARD, SWANSON & MYNATT, PLC, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellees. 

MARTIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SUTTON, J., joined.

RYAN, J. (p. 7), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

1
No. 08-5545 Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, et al. Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. In 2005, the City of Knoxville entered into

a contract with Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. for cameras to take photographs of cars that run

red lights. An ordinance provides that the owner be sent notice of the violation and assessed

a $50 “civil penalty.” Redflex handles the legwork for issuing tickets. It installs and manages

the cameras and its employees review photos to determine if someone ran a red light. If they

did, and their license plate is visible, the incriminating photos are sent to the Knoxville

Police Department where an officer is to view them and send a citation to the car’s registered

owner. Williams v. Redflex Traffic Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22723, *7

(E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008).

Plaintiff Judy Williams’s car went through an intersection, was photographed by

Redflex, and, shortly thereafter, she received a citation. This citation, as prima facie evidence

of a violation, gave her three options: pay the $50 fine, complete an affidavit of nonresponsibility that she was not the driver (and name the actual driver), or schedule a hearing

at Knoxville City Court. The citation stated that if she scheduled a hearing she would be

assessed a $67.50 “court processing fee.” Williams instead took no action, and later filed this

federal suit contending that the procedures Knoxville uses to hear challenges to the

imposition of the fines violate the federal and Tennessee Constitutions, as well as Tennessee

state-law. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. On appeal, she contends that she

has standing in view of the apparent “processing fee,” and reasserts her challenges to

Knoxville’s procedures, along with her supplemental state-law claims.

At oral argument, the parties made a key agreement: that Knoxville would provide

Williams with a hearing. Thus, although Williams has standing to challenge the ticket itself

because of the improper “fee,” the city’s agreement to give her a hearing renders her

challenges to the hearing’s procedures unripe, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal.
No. 08-5545 Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, et al. Page 3

I.

Knoxville, Tennessee enacted the “Automated Enforcement” ordinance, Knoxville

Code § 17-210, to permit a traffic control system premised on photographs of cars that run

red lights. To make it a reality, in December 2005 Knoxville signed a contract with codefendant Redflex, which specializes in such photo enforcement programs. The contract

designates Redflex an “independent contractor,” and the company’s employees install and

monitor the cameras, identify potential violators, and send photos to the Knoxville Police

Department. An officer is supposed to view the snapshot and send a signed citation to the

car’s registered owner. Redflex keeps more than 50% of the tickets’ proceeds.

Williams’s car went through an intersection in August 2006, Redflex identified it as

having run a red light, and she received a citation—though directly from Redflex, containing

only a facsimile of an officer’s signature. It stated that she violated the local ordinance, and

its instructions gave her three rather unattractive options. First, she could pay a $50 fine by

mail or in person. If she chose that option, the citation provided that no record of the

violation would be kept or sent to her insurance company or the department of motor

vehicles. Second, Williams was given the option of completing an “Affidavit of NonResponsibility” stating that she was not driving her car when it went through the red light

(while naming who was driving). This option also provided boxes for the owner to indicate

if they had sold their car or if their car or license plate had been stolen. Third, Williams was

given the option of scheduling a hearing at Knoxville City Court. This option further stated

that “[t]o schedule a hearing you will be assessed a court processing fee of $67.50.” This was

apparently some kind of misprint: defendants vigorously contend that no such “processing

fee” is in fact imposed for requesting a hearing. But there is no debate that this was printed

clearly on the citation.

Williams did not respond to the ticket, and later filed this suit in federal court against,

among others, Redflex and the City of Knoxville. Her complaint alleged a variety of state

and federal claims, including (but not limited to) violations of her procedural due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution, and violations of state
No. 08-5545 Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, et al. Page 4

1

In full, her Complaint alleged: (1) constitutional and statutory violations under

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988; (2) violation of the Tennessee Open Records Act; (3) outrageous

conduct or intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligence or gross negligence under

the Governmental Tort Liability Act; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) vicarious liability; and

(7) violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Most of these are

not pressed on appeal.

constitutional and statutory law.1 The defendants moved for summary judgment. The

district court— though stating its view that the program was “Orwellian” and “may

violate U.S. or Tennessee constitutional” law—granted defendants’ motion to dismiss

on the ground that Williams lacked standing. Redflex, No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 22723. Williams appeals to this Court, focusing her appeal on the standing

question and, assuming this Court has jurisdiction, whether the ordinance and red light

program violates federal or state law. Finally, at oral argument, the parties made a key

agreement: Knoxville would give her a hearing. This is important to our disposition.

II.

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, and must draw all

reasonable inferences in Williams’s favor. Crawford v. TRW Auto., 560 F.3d 607, 611

(6th Cir. 2009). The district court dismissed Williams’s claims for want of standing. To

satisfy “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” under Article III, a plaintiff

must make three showings: (1) an injury in fact—meaning the invasion of a legally

protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the

challenged actions—meaning that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendants’

conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision—meaning that the prospect of obtaining relief from a favorable ruling is not

speculative. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). “[T]he party

invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id at 561.

Each standing element “must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which

the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence

required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id.
No. 08-5545 Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, et al. Page 5

Williams contends that the procedures Tennessee provides for citation hearings

are constitutionally inadequate. Yet she has not yet experienced the procedures she

challenges, and so, at first blush, it appears difficult to question the district court’s

conclusion that Williams lacked standing; without having been injured by these

procedures, she resembles a mere outsider with a non-justiciable “general grievance.”

See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995) (“[W]e have repeatedly refused to

recognize a generalized grievance against allegedly illegal government conduct as

sufficient for standing to invoke the federal judicial power.”); Herrada v. City of Detroit,

275 F.3d 553, 558 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Herrada lacks standing to argue that hearings are not

held despite requests by vehicle owners, because she elected to pay the fine rather than

request a hearing.”). But this case is more complicated than that.

Williams is unlike the plaintiffs who simply failed to invoke the procedures they

challenged. Cf. Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702, 710 (M.D.N.C. 2003);

Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 906 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (dismissing

claims by litigants who “cannot claim the inadequacy of the process that they made no

effort to bring into play”). Instead the citation Williams received not only told her that

she owed a $50 fine and that she was entitled to a hearing, it appeared to, erroneously,

condition her right to a hearing on her up front payment of a $67.50 “court processing

fee.” In defending this apparent requirement, defendants make much of the fact that it

was a mistake and that if Williams had actually requested a hearing, she would not have

been charged any fee (at least up front). Appellees’ Br. at 26-27. Yet, that alone cannot

allay concerns because there is no question that the citation quite clearly stated the fee

requirement—which was higher than the fine itself—thus making requesting a hearing

apparently a terrible bargain for those who receive tickets. That the citation was

inaccurate must be irrelevant: plaintiffs cannot be required to be clairvoyant and may,

justifiably, rely on what their notice in fact says. 

Indeed, a notice that offers the ticketed the choice between paying a a $50 fine

and having to pay $67.50 to challenge it offers no choice at all. Standing requires

plaintiffs who bring such claims to have suffered an injury that is fairly traceable to the
No. 08-5545 Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, et al. Page 6

violation for which they seek redress. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Here, we can fairly say

that few rational persons would pay their parking ticket if challenging it was conditioned

on paying a non-refundable fee over and above the cost of the ticket, and this is what the

ticket she received appeared to require. The fact that she did not pay at all does not

change what the ticket offered her; it remained an irrevocably bad bargain. Imagine, for

example, if the ticket was for $50 but the fee was $100,000—we would not say there that

it was improper not to pay the fee to challenge the procedures. That Williams received

an improper processing fee over and above the price of the ticket itself gives her standing

enough to get in the courthouse door.

But she gets her no further than that. Because Knoxville has now promised to

give her a hearing, her claim, which challenges the specifics of the procedures Knoxville

offers for a ticket hearing, is unripe. The ripeness inquiry requires this Court to consider

two questions: “(1) [I]s the claim fit for judicial decision in the sense that it arises in a

concrete factual context and concerns a dispute that is likely to come to pass? [A]nd,

(2) what is the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration?” Warshak v.

United States, 532 F.3d 521, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Here, Williams admits that she challenges procedures she has not

experienced. As a result, until she gets this first-hand experience—which Knoxville has

now promised—her challenge would amount to non-justiciable “litigation by

hypothetical.” Warshak, 532 F.3d at 529. Thus, because Williams did not invoke

Tennessee’s procedure, any claim regarding their inadequacy is purely speculative and

was properly dismissed.

III.

In sum, although the improper processing fee gave Williams standing to get her

foot into the door, her claim is nevertheless unripe because Knoxville has now promised

to give her a hearing, and until then she cannot point to any procedures that she

experienced and wishes to challenges. Thus, we AFFIRM the dismissal of plaintiff’s

claims.
No. 08-5545 Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, et al. Page 7

_____________________

CONCURRENCE

_____________________

RYAN, Circuit Judge, concurring. While I agree with my colleagues that the

district court’s judgment should be affirmed, I do not agree that the plaintiff had standing

to bring this federal lawsuit. 

In my judgment, the Honorable Thomas W. Phillips of the district court got it

precisely right: Judy Williams had no standing to sue because she failed to show that

she personally suffered “an actual or imminent” injury that is both “concrete and

particularized” and “not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). She suffered

no injury at all, not even the cost of a telephone call to the Knoxville City Court to

request a hearing. Had she made such a call, she would have been given a hearing date

and learned that no processing fee would be assessed. 

I would affirm the district court’s judgment on Judge Phillips’s well written

opinion.