F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

A. D

. , a M i n o r ; J. E. , a

Min or ; S UE C AS EY , Plaintif

fs-Appellee

s ,

v.
S T A T E O F C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL , Defendant ,

and
S TEP HE N M AR K GR AF ,

Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 09-16460

D.C. No. 3:0 7- c v- 05 48 3- SIA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

2

A. D

. , a M i n o r ; J. E. , a

Min or ; S UE C AS EY , Plaintif

fs-Appellee

s ,

v.
S T A T E O F C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL , Defendant ,

and
S TEP HE N M AR K GR AF ,

Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 09-17635

D.C. No. 3:0 7- c v- 05 48 3- SI

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he No rt he rn Di str ic t of

Ca lif or nia Susan I llston, Dist rict Judge, Pre siding Argued and Submitted Se pte mbe r 1 8, 20 12 —Sa

n F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia Filed Apr il 3, 2013
Be fore : Arthur L . Alarc ón, Diarmuid F . O’Sca nnlain,
and N. Rand y Smith, Cir c uit

Judg e s. Op ini on by Judg e N. R. Sm ithA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 3

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Civil Rights The pa nel af firmed the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for judgme nt a s a matter of law in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
a c tio n and re ve rs e d the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s awa rd of attor

ne y s’ fee s and re manded. Plaintiffs alleg ed that police of fice r Stephen Mar

kg raf vio late d f e de ra l and

state law whe n he sh ot a nd kil le d th e ir mother Ka

ren Eklund at the end of a hig h-spee d chase . The panel he ld that it was clearly established that a police of fice r violates the Four

teenth Amendment due proce ss c lause if he kil ls a su sp e c t whe n a c tin gwi th the p ur po se to h arm , unrelated to a leg itimate law enf orce ment objective. Deter mining that the jury rea sonably found t h at Markgraf sh ot E klu nd wi th a p ur

po se to h arm

unre late d to a

le g iti mate lawe n f o r c e me n t o b

je c ti v e , th e p an e l h e ld

th at M ar

k g r af could not asser

t qualified immunit y in a post-ver dict motion for judg ment as a matter of law

. Th e pan el also he ld t

hat du e to a

n inte rv e nin gc ha

ng e in the law, the district c ourt’s conc lusion that it could not
c on sid e r a

mo unts d isc us se d in

se ttl e me nt n e g oti atio ns in deter mining the amount of a re asonable attorney s’ fe e aw ard was no long er in line with Ninth Circu i t ca s es . The pa nel
reve rsed the f

ee a war d and re manded f

o r a d eter mination of
a re asonable fee in light of In reKe k

au oh a- Al isa , 674 F.3dA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

4 1083, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2012), and Ingram v. O roudjian , 647 F.3d 925, 927 ( 9th Cir. 2011).

CO UN SEL
Edmund G. Br own , J r., James M. Schiavenza, Paul T. Hammer ness, Tom Bla

ke (br iefe d), and John P. Devine (bri e f e d an d ar gu e d ) , O f

f ic e o f th e A tt o r

n e y G e n e r a l of Ca lif or nia , Sa n F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

orn ia, f or De fe nd antAp pe lla nt. Amitai Schwartz (brief

ed and argued), Moira Duver nay , L aw Offic es of Amitai Schwartz, Emery ville, California; J ohn H. Scott (briefe d), L izabeth N. de Vr ies, Scott L aw Fi rm , San F r an c is c o , Ca li f

o r n ia ; T h o ma s P. G r e e rty , M arti n e z, Ca lif or nia , f or Pla int if fs -A pp e lle e s.

OP IN ION
N.R. SMI TH, Circuit J udg e: A police of

fice r, who violat es another ’s constitutional rig ht, will rece ive qualified immunity from suit u n der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the rig ht the office r viola t ed wa s n ot protec ted by

clea rly established law at t he ti me he acted. See Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 232 ( 2009). Since 1998, clea r prec edent has established that a police offic erviolates the F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt d

ue pr oc e ss c la

us e if he kil ls a suspect whe n actingwith the purpose to har m, unrelate d to a leg itimate law enf

orce ment objective. Theref ore, onc e a jur

y has found ( with rea sonable support in th e evidence) suc h a due proc ess violation on the part of the officer, h e m ay notA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 5

succe ssfully asser

t qua lified immunit y in a p ost-verdic t motion for judgme nt as a matter of law.
District courts have broad discret i o n when a war ding
atto rn e y s’ fe e s. Ho we ve r, du e to a n inte rv e nin gc ha

nge in
our ca se law, the district court’s conclusion that it could not
c onsi de r a

mou nts dis c us se d in

se ttl e me nt n e g oti atio ns in deter mining the a

mount o f a re asonable fee awa rd is no longe r in line with Ninth Circuit cases.
We t he re fo re a ff

ir m the dis tr ic t court in p art , a nd we mus t re ve rs e and

re mand in p art

. I. F acts
Around 2:00 a.m. on Mar ch 23, 2006, dis patch notified California Highway

Patrol (CHP) office rs Stephen Mar kg raf and Nathan J ohnson that police wer e pursuinga s tolen vehicle into their O akland division are a. The d ri ver of the
s t o l en v eh i cl e w as tra v el i n g wi th o u th ea d l i gh t s ath i gh speeds, usingall lanes of the fre eway
. T he drive r, later ide nti fi e d a s K are n E klu

nd , wa s the ve hic le ’s on ly oc c up ant. Mark graf and Johnson i nterc epted a nd beg an following Eklund. When E klund be g an to cr oss the Ba y Br idge , Offic er Sarah Wratha ll and Serg ean t L aura Clare of

the CHP’s Golden Gate Divi sion in S an F ranc isco also joined the pursuit. Eklund crosse d the bridge at over one hundred miles per hour and continued on c ity s tree ts in S an F ranc isco at speeds up to fifty miles per hour. Eventually , Eklund turned
onto a str e e t that de a d e nd e d into a c ul- de -s a c and

hit a c ha in link fence . Markgraf

s t opped his vehicle broadside of Ekl un d ’ s an d s o me th ir ty f e e t b e h in d it , f

o ll o w e d by Wrathall, Clare, a

nd other patrol cars

. Markgraf g ot out of his vehicle a

nd drewhis weapon, leaving J ohnson (who wa sA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

6

tr yingto r e mov e his se atbe lt) sti ll i n the po li c e un it. M ar k g r a f th e nr anto th e r igh t o f

E k lu n d ’ s v e h ic le to take
cover by a par ked ca r. At that point, Eklund backe d into Markg raf and Johnson’s po lic e c ar. She the n d

ro ve fo rwa

rd and sto pp e d. Whil e Eklund’s ca

r was stopped, Markgraf looked i nside and did not
s e e any w e a

p o n s
. H e th e n tr ie d un s u c c e s s f u ll y to open the door and br eak a window while yelling at Eklund to turn off the ca r, bec ause the chase was over. In response , Eklund y elled “F uck you,” re verse d ag ain, and rammed t he poli ce c ar two more times. As t h e confrontation betwe en Eklund and M ark gra f e s ca l at ed , C l ar e—wh o wa s th e s u p erv i s o r i nch ar ge of the San Franc isco are a that night—yelled “cross-f ire” and

“ g e t on the sid e wa lk guy s” to g e t a ll the of fi c e rs on the same side of the stre et. Approxim ately ten s econds later, Mar kg raf op e ne d f ir e on Ek lun d. Af

te r the sh oo tin gsta

rt e d, Cla re tol d Markgraf to “stop.” Ne verthe less, Markgraf continued, firing twelve r ounds at Eklund throug h the passeng er- side window
and e mpt yingthe ma g a zine of his gun
. Whe n he sto pp e d to reloa d, C l ar e told Markgraf , “Enough.” Althoug h other of fi c e rs ha d the ir gun s dr awn , no on e e lse fi re d a shot

. Twenty -five se conds ela

psed fr om the first ra m m i ngto any fi ri n g. A.D. and J.E. (collec tively , “Plaintiffs”) a re Eklund’ s children; they

wer e twelve and ten year s old, respec tively , at the tim e of

the ir mot he r’ s d e ath. Th e y

br ou g ht s uit instate c ourt a lle g ing vio latio ns of

the ir F ourt h a nd F ourt e e nth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and raisingone state law c ause of action for wrong ful death. The ac tion was
re mov e d to fe de ra l c ourt . Plai nti ff s th e n a ba nd on e d a ll
c la ims e x cep t th e ir

F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt d

ue pr oc e ss c la im.A.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 7

Markgraf moved for summar

y judgme nt, asserting that he
was e ntitled to qualified im munity

. The dist rict court denied the mot ion . T he c ourt

re a so ne d that, b a se d o n th e Pla int if fs ’ s h o w in g , a r e a s o n a

b le ju r y c o u ld f in d th at M ar

k g r af use d deadly forc e with a pur

pose to harm Eklund unre lated to a leg itimate law enf

orce ment objective. Such conduct violated the clea rly established law set out in County of Sacramento v. Le wis , 523 U.S. 833 (1998). Additionally , the c o u rt c on c lud e d that Pla int if

fs ’ c a se wa s ana log ou s to “obv iou s” case s, wher e t h er e does not ne ed to be a materia lly

simil ar case for the r ight to be c lear ly established.
J us t be fo re tr ia l, t

he c ourt g ra nte d Pl a int if

fs ’ m oti on s to e xclu de c e rt a in ev ide nc e duri ngthe lia bil ity ph a se of the tr ia l. First, the court agree d to exclude the expert testimony of a medical doc tor who would have testi fi ed as to her opinion that Eklund was intox icated w ith amphetamines duringthe inc ide nt. Se c on d, the c ourt gra nte d Pl ain tif

fs ’ m oti on

in limine to ex clude e vidence of Eklund’s a rre st recor d and criminal history

. At trial, Markgraf

’s intent i n s h o oting Eklund wa s at issue. Markgraf

testified that he shot Eklund, beca use he w as afr aid she would succ eed in ge tting past the pa rked ve hicles and ther eaf

ter run o ver the other off icer s at the sce ne. He also thought he saw two office rs behind Eklun d ’s vehicle. Ot h er o ff i ce rs t es t i fi edth ey we re al l o nth e s i d ew al k , th o u gh Wratha ll said sh e wa s st and ingbe hin d th e ve hic le . So me testified th at t h e vehicle was stopped or moving f

orwa rd at the tim e of

the sh oo tin g ; othe rs te sti fi e d th e y c ou ldn ’t re c a ll. None of the offic ers be lieved Eklund’s ve hicle posed an imm e diate thr e at to the ir

liv e s.A.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

8
At the close of

Plaintiffs’ case -in-chie f, Mar kg raf moved for judgme nt a s a matter of law (JMOL ), but the district court denied the motion. Afte r ele ven day s of trial, t h e jury returne d a ver dict in favor of Plaintiffs, and awa rded $30,000 to e a c ho f

th e m i na

b if ur c ate d d ama g e s p h a s e
. M ar

k g raf the n r e ne wed

his JMOL

mot ion . T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso denied that motion.
Dra wingall infere nces in fa

vor of the ve rdict, the district court found that the jury coul dhave r easona

bly conclude d that Markgraf

acte d with a purpose to harm unrelated to a leg itimate law enf

orce ment objective ba sed on evide nce that (1) Eklund’s c ar w as c o n t ai ned in a de ad-e nd street; (2) Eklund ref

used to g et out of her ca r an drepe atedly said, “F uck you” to Ma

rkg raf ; (3) the of fice rs wer e positioned such that they wer e not in the path of Eklund’s car ; (4) other of f ic e r s te s ti f

ie d th e y d id n o t f e e l t h r e ate n e d n o r d id they perc eive a

n immediate t hreat at t he ti me of the shooting ; (5) five other office rs had their guns drawn but none fire d other than Markgraf

; (6) Eklund’s c ar w as either stopped or g oing forwa rd at the time of the shooting; (7) the l o cation of E k l un d ’ s c ar

w a s n o tc o n s i s t e n tw i th M ar k g r a f ’ s t e s t i m o ny; and (8 ) Mar kg ra f s ho t E klu nd tw e lve tim e s, e mpt

yinghis gun.
The district cour

t also g rante d Plaintiffs ’ motion for
atto rn e y s’ fe e s, award ing$4 89 ,6 31 in f e e s and $6 ,4 02 .5 9 in costs for wor

k on the m erits; and $63,490 in fee s and $337.86 in c os ts f or w ork d on e on

the fe e pe tit ion . T he c ourt a lso g rante d post-judgme nt interest.
Mark g r a f ti me ly a p p e a le d ( 1 ) th e d e n ia l o f

qu a li f ied immunit y ; ( 2) the verdic t, ba sed on the exclusion of evidence
o f E k l un d ’ s amp h e t am i n e i n t o x i c at i o nan d c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y,A.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 9

W e d o no t ne e d to a d d re ss M a rk g ra f’ s a p p e a l o f t h e d istric t co u rt’s 1 d e n i a l o f h i s s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n , b e c a u s e a j u r y h a s r e n d e r ed a v e rd ic t sinc e M a rk g ra f m a d e the m o tio n
. See O r t iz v

. J or dan , 1 3 1 S . C t. 8 8 4 , 88 8

– 8 9 (20 1 1 ). and fa ilure to g ive hi s proposed inst ructions; (3) the de nial of his mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt; and (4) t he aw ard of

1
atto rn e y s’ fe e s.
When we first hear d Markgraf ’s appe al, we r ever sed the denial of q u al i fi ed immunity in his renewe d motion for J MOL

. A.D. v. Markgraf , 636 F.3d 555, 562 ( 9th Cir. 2011), withdraw n by 67 6 F .3 d 86 8 (9 th Cir

. 20 12 ). Con sis te nt w ith our dec ision in favor of Ma rkg raf , we va cate d the di strict court’s a war d of attorne y s’ fe es. Id. Plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing . After

consideration of the petition, we wi thd re w o ur or ig ina l op ini on

and or de re d th e pa

rt ie s to submit suppl emental br i efs addressingtwo issues. A.D. , 67 6 F .3 d 8 68. F ir st, we a sk e d “ wh at de g re e of de fe re nc e , if any , should th[ e] cou rtg ive the jury ’s implicit finding that [Markg raf

] used deadly forc e with the purpose to cause harm
unre late d to a

le g iti mate law e nf

or c e me nt o bje c ti ve, and

if defe renc e is due, how doe s this affec t t h e availability of qualified immunity

in this case? ” Id. S econd, we aske d “[d] oes the subjec tive re q u irement in this case that [Markg raf

] act with a purpose to h ar m unrelated to a le g iti mate law e nf

or c e me nt ob

je c tiv e in or de r to vi olat e [P l ai n tiffs’] Fourtee nth Amendment rig ht to familial association af

fec t the qualified immunity inquiry ? ” Id. We held oral a

rgument addre ssing these issues on September 18, 2012.A.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

10

M a rk g ra f p re se rv e d h is p o s it io n o n q u a lif ie d im m u n ity— re n e w e d in 2
a Rul e 50( b) mot i on a f t er t r i al

— by br i n g i n g a Rul e 5 0 (a) mot i on f or J M O L b e fo re the c a se w a s su b m itt e d to the ju ry. See Tor t u v

. Las Vegas M et ro. P o l i ce D ep ’t , 556 F. 3d 107 5, 108 3 (9t h Ci r
. 200 9) ( not i ng t hat wh en a qu al i f

i ed i mmun i t y c l ai m c an n ot be r es ol v ed bef or e t r i al du e t o a f act ual co nf

l i ct , a l i t i gant m ust m ake a R ul e 5 0 (a) m o t i o n t o preserve t he i ss ue f o r r evi ew o n a R ul e 5 0 (b) m o t i o n). II. Ana lys is
A. The di s tric t court

properly denied Markgraf’s
r e ne wed m ot ion forJM OL. 2
We revie w the district court’s de nial of Mar kg raf ’s asser tion of qualified immunity as raised in a re newe d motion for JMOLde novo. Pavao v . Pagay , 30 7 F .3 d 9 15 , 9 18 (9 th Cir. 2002 ). “Such a judgment is proper if the evidenc e, c o n s tr u e d i n th e l i g h t m o s t f

av o r a b l e t o th e n o n m o v i n gp arty, permits only one rea sonable conclusion, and that conc lusion is contrar y to the jury ’s ver dict.” Id. Thus, althoug h under de
no vo re vie w we do no t de fe r t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on to deny Markgraf

’s m otion, we give significa nt defe renc e to t he jur y ’s ve rd ic t and to t

he no nmo vin gpa

rt ie s ( he re , Pl a int if

fs ) wh e n de c idi ng wh e the r that dec isi on wa s cor re c t. Un de r t

his fr am e w o r k , w e a f f i r mth e d i s tr i c tc o urt , b e c a u s e i tp r o p e rl y followed that standa

rd of r eview when it denied Ma rkg raf ’s
r e n e w e d m o t i o nf o r J M O L.
Be fore discussing the qualified im m unity defe nse, we must review the nature of Plaintiffs’ c laim ag ainst Markgraf

. Plaintiffs argue that, when Markgraf shot and killed Eklund, he vio late d th e ir

F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt d

ue proc e ss r ig hts by interfe ringwith the liberty interest they (like all childre n) have i n the “c ompanionship and society” of the ir mother. Curnow v. R i d

g ecre st Police , 952 F.2d 321, 325 ( 9th Cir.A.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 11

19 91 ); see also More land v. Las Vegas Metro. PoliceDep’ t , 159 F.3d 365, 371 ( 9th Cir. 1998). P o l ice c onduct violates due proc ess if it “shocks the conscienc e.” Po rte r v . O sb or n , 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 ( 9t h C ir. 2008). Conscienc e-shoc king actions ar e those take n with ( 1 ) “d eliberate indiffer ence ” or (2) a “purpose to harm . . . unre lated to leg itimate law enfor ceme nt objectives.” Id. Th e lo wer “ de lib e ra

te indiffer e n c e ” standa

rd applies to cir cumstance s where “ac tual deliberation is practical.” W ilkinson v. Torres , 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir

. 2010). Howe ver, in c ircumstance s where an office r ca nnot prac tically deliberate, such a s where “a la w enfor cem en t office r make s a snap judg ment beca use of a n esca lating situation, his conduct may only be found to shock the c on sc ie nc e if

he a c ts w ith a purp os e to h arm unre late d to leg itim at e law enforc ement objec tives.” Id. The pa rties do not dispute that the heig htened “ purpose to harm” standar d applies to this case.

I ll e g it im ate la

we n f o r c e me n t o b

je c ti v e s in c lude “bully [i ng ] a suspect or g et[ti ng ] even.” Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). Moreove r, eve n if the off icer “ultimately

eff ectuat[ es] an arr est,” he still violates the due pr oc e ss c la

us e if he us e d f

or c e wi th o nly an ille g iti mate purpose in mind. See Porter , 5 46 F .3 d at 1140 . T he purp os e t o h ar ms t an d ar d

i s a s u b j e c t i v e s t an d ar d

o f c u l p a b i l i ty.
Consist ent with th i s l aw, the district court instructed the jury that the “pur

pose to harm” standard g overne d Markgraf ’s c o n d u c t. A f te r b e in gg iv e nth at i n s tr

u c ti o n , th e ju

r y f ound that Ma rk g ra f ha d a c te d w itha

purp os e to h arm

unre late d to a leg itimate law enfor ceme nt obje ctive whe n he shot Eklund. The jury thus render ed a ve rdict for Plaintiffs. In his renew ed motion for J MOL , Markgraf t h en ag ain asser ted qualified immunit y as a de fense

.A.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

12
A def endant will re ceive qualified immunity if one of two conditions are me t. First, immuni t y wi ll be applied if the plaintiff has not “a lleg ed” or “shown” fac ts that would make out a constitutional violation. Pearson , 555 U.S. at 232. Second, eve n if the Plaintiff has shown such a violation, the defe ndant is entitled to qualified immunity if the
c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht a lle ge dly vio late d w a s n ot “ ‘c le arl y established’ at the time of defe ndant’s all eged misconduct.” Id. B e c a us e we c an pro c e e d thr ou g h th e se ana ly tic a l st e ps in
any o r d er, id. at 236, we f irst addre ss whether

the
c on sti tut ion a l law g ov e rn ingMargkr a f’ s c on du c t w a s c le arl y established whe n he shot Eklund.
1. On March 23, 2 0 0 6, it was clearly established law t hata s ta te offic ial , who a c ts with a purpos e to harmunrelated to a legitim ate law enforcem ent objec tive, viol ates t he F ourtee nth Am endm ent due process c lause. By Marc h 23, 2006—the day that Markgraf

shot Eklund—it was clearly established that a police offic er, who acts with the purpose to harm unre lated to a leg itimate law enfor ceme nt objective, violates the rig hts protected by the Four teenth Amendme nt due process clause . In 1998, the S up reme Court held that a police of fice r, who a cts under circ u m stance s where “ac tual deliberation is [ not] prac tical,” violates due proc ess if he acts with a “purpose to cause harm unrelated to the leg itimate obje ct of ar rest.” Le wis , 5 23 U. S.
at 83 6, 85 1; see also More land , 1 59 F .3 d at 37 2; c f. P o r ter , 546 F.3d at 1137 (c oncludingthat deliberation was not pr a c ti c a l in a “ r a

p id ly e s c a lati n g
. . . c o n f

r o n tati o n ” )

. Since Le wis , we a lso identified (in addition to arre st) self-pr otection and th e p r o te c ti o no f

th e p u b li c a s le g it im ate o b

je c ti v e s th at c ou ld j us tif

y a po lic e of

fi c e r a c tin g wi th t

he purp os e to h arm
.A.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 13

N o t ab l y , i n P ort er , t h e p a r tie s a g re e d tha t t h is law w a s c le a rly 3
es t abl i s h ed by 2003— n ea r l y t h r ee y ea r s be f or e M ar kgra f

s h ot Ekl u n d. See Po r t er , 5 4 6 F

. 3 d at 11 4 0

. A d d i t i o nal l y , we ackno wl ed ge t hat t here
m ay b e o t he r “l eg i t i m ate law e nfo rce m en t o b je cti ve s” in ad d i t i o n to t ho se listed

. H o w e v e r, n e ithe r M a rk g ra f n o r t h e P la intiff s h a s su g g e ste d a n y. M arkgraf

only i d e nt i f

i es one “l egi t i m at e p urpo se” on ap p eal : pro t ect i ng t he safet y of o t he r o f

f i ce rs. See M oreland , 159 F.3d at 373. Take n toge ther, these case s e sta bli sh e d t hat a

po lic e of fi c e r who a c te d w iththe purp os e to harm a c ivilian, unrelated to the leg itimate law
e nf or c e me nt ob

je c tiv e s o f a

rr e st, se lf -d e fe ns e , o r t

he de fe ns e of o th e r s , v i o l at e d

th e F o urt e e n thA m e n dm e n td u e p r o c e ss clause

. 3
To be c le ar ly

e sta bli sh ed, the f

or e g oin glaw o nly

mus t have be e n “ su ff

ic ie ntl y c le ar that a re a so na ble of fi c ia l w ou ld
u n d e r s t an d th at w h at h e [ w a s ] d o i n g v i o l at e [ d ] [a constitutional] rig ht.” Hope v . Pelzer , 536 U.S

. 730, 739 (2002). Rea sonablene ss is not a d em anding standar d. The

“ state of the law” wa s su ff

ic ie ntl y c le ar i f i t g ave “ fa ir
wa rn ing ” to a

n o ff ic e r t hat hi s c on du c t wa s unc on sti tut ion a l. Id. at 741.
After Le wis and Moreland, n o r e a so nable off ic e r c ou ld fa ir ly have be lie ve d th at it

wa s c on sti tu tio na l to sh oo t a civilian with the subjective purpose to har m u n related to a le g iti mate ob

je c tiv e . E ve n if

tho se c a se s a

re fa c tua lly distinguishable, that is irre levant in t h i s case , beca use the constitutional rule they

establi s h ed “appl[ies] wit h obvious clar ity to [Markg raf

’s conduc t] .” Id. (qu o t i n g United States v. Lanier , 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)) . Fur ther, be cause we a

re c on fi ne d to the jur

y ’s fa c tua l fin din g that Mar kgra f a c te d w ith
a purp os e to ca

us e Ek lun d’ s death u

nr e late d to any

le g iti mate law e nf or c e me nt o bje c tiv e , w e are e sse nti a lly c omp e lle d toA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

14 deny Markgraf

qualified immunity

—it would be “c lear

to a re a so na ble off ic e r” that ki lli nga

pe rs on wi th n o le g iti mate law enf orce ment purpose violates the Constitution. See Brosseau v. Hauge n , 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per c uriam). This is one of those ra

re ca ses in which the c onstitut ional rig ht at issue is de fined by a standard that is so “obvious” that
w e mu s t c o n c lu d e

—

b a s e d o nth e ju

r y ’ s f in d in g—that qu a lif ie d immun ity

is i na pp lic a ble , e ve n wit ho ut a

c a se direc tly on point. See H

ope , 536 U.S. at 740–41 (re cognizi ng that “a g ener al constitutional rule alre ady identified i n the de c isi on a l law may a

pp ly wi th obv iou s cla

ri ty to the sp e c if

ic conduct in question”) . Acc ording ly , we conclude that it was clea rl y established law when Mar kg raf shot Eklund that actingwith the purpose to ha rm unrelated to a leg itimate law
e nf or c e me nt o bje c tiv e vio late d d ue pr oc e ss.
Mar k g r a f ar gu e s th at t

h e “ p ur p o s e to h ar

m” s ta n dard outlined in Le wis and Moreland c ann ot be “ c le arl y established,” be cause the standard is too g ener al. He c autions that the Supreme Court has “re peate dly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in par

ticular—not to define clea rly established la wat a h ighle v e l o f

g e n e r a li ty .” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 131 S. Ct . 2074, 2084 (2011) ( internal c i t ation omitted). Ho we ve r, we do no t anti c ipate th at our ana ly sis wi ll a dd

to the Sup re me Court ’s ta lly of su c h c a se s.
T h e Su p r e me Co urt h a s r e

je c te d p r o p o s e d d e f

in it ions of
c le arl y e sta

bli sh e d law a s “ too g e ne ra l” wh e n th ey mer e ly restate the applica

ble constitutional standard . For example, in al-Kidd

the Supreme Court i n d icated that “[t] he g ener al proposition . . . that an unrea sonable sear ch or seizure violates the Four th A m en dment is of littl e help in dete rmining wh e the r t he vio lative natur e of

pa rt ic ula r c on du c t is c le arl y established.” al-Kidd , 1 31 S. Ct . a t 20 84 . Si mil arl y , inA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 15

Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987), the Court
a c kn ow le dg e d th at “ the ri g ht t o d ue pro c e ss o f l aw i s q

uit e clea rly established by

the Due Process C lause, a nd thus there is a sense in wh ich any

action that violates that Clause . . . violates a c lear ly established right.” The Court then r ejec ted th e n o t i o nth atth e l aw , d e f i n e d ats u c ha l e v e l o f g e n e r a l i ty, wa s “ c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d” fo r q

ua lif ie d immun ity

purpose s. Rather, to be c lear ly

established, “in the light of pre -existi ng law the unlaw fulness must be appa rent.” Id. at 640. App l y i ngthe principles of al-Kidd and Anderson to t

his
case , we c ould not say

that it is clearly

established law ( for purposes of qua lified immunit y ) t h at whate ver “ shocks the
c on sc ie nc e ” vio late s d

ue pr oc e ss. Ho we ve r, the Sup re me Court has define d t h e l aw of due proc ess that g overne d Mark g ra f’ s c on du c t w ithmor e pa rt icul ari ty . Are a so na

ble police office r in Markgraf ’s position would have known that actingwith a purpose to ha rm unrelated to a leg itimate law enfor ceme nt objective (suc h as ar rest, self- defe nse, or the defe nse of other s) violates due pr ocess. Where, a s here , a jury has d eter

mined that the offic er a cted with such a purp os e , w e mus t c on c lud e tha t he v iol ate d c le arl yA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

16

I n a n Ei gh t h Amendm ent ca s e, t he N i nt h Ci r cui t he l d t hat “ t he gen er al 4
r u l e t h at pr i s on of

f i ci al s c an n ot de l i ber at el y di s r eg ar d a s u bs t an t i al r i s k of
se rio u s h a rm to a n inm a te ” w a s n o t sufficie n tly d e fine d to b e “c le a rly
es t abl i s hed l aw. ” E s t at e of F ord v. R am i r ez
- P al m er , 301 F. 3d 1043, 1 0 5 0

– 5 1 (9t h C i r. 20 0 2 ). T hi s was bec ause, unde r t he E i ght h A m end m ent st and ard, “ i t wo ul d not b e cl ear t o a reas o na b le pri son o f f i ci al when t he ri sk o f ha rm [f rom a de ci si o n] changes f rom be i ng a risk o f s om e h a rm to
a s ubs t ant i alrisk o f s er i ous ha r m. ” I d. I ndeed t he qual i t at i ve di f f er enc e b e tw e e n the d e g re e o f risk th a t will re s u lt i n li a b ili ty un d e r th e E igh th A m e n d m e n t’s stan d a rd , an d tha t wh ic h w ill no t, is a fac t-b o u n d inq u iry. H o wever, w e d o not need t o engage i n t he same so rt of f act

- b o und i nq ui ry to a n a lyz e th e F o u rte e n th A m e n d m e n t d u e p ro c e ss c la u se vio la tio n in this
case. T he st and ard f o r a due p roce ss v iolat i o n— p urpo se t o harm
u n re la te d to a leg iti m a te law e n fo rc e m e n t o b je c tiv e

— d o e s n o t co n ta in und ef i ned qua l i t at i ve el em ent s (“ subst ant i al ri sk” and “s eri o us harm ”) l i ke t he E i ght h A m end m ent s t and ard d o es. A l t ho ugh “ l egi t i m at e” i s such a q u a lif ie r, we (and the d i st ri ct co urt ) have adeq uat el y de f i ned i t f o r t he p u rp o se s o f th is c a se b y na m ing sp e c ifi c “leg iti m a te ” o b je c tive s. S ee a lso su p ra n ot e 3. e s t a b l i s h e d l awan d d e n y h i mqu a l i f

i e d i m m un i ty. See

4 Anderson , 483 U.S. at 639–40.
2. The jury fou nd th at Mar kgraf vi olated P lai nt iffs’ c ons ti tu ti ona l r igh ts
. Mark g ra f i s n ot e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity , b e c a

us e Pla int if fs have sh own th at he vio late d th e fo re g oin gc le arl y established law. T he Supreme C o u rthas for mulated the doctrine of q u ali fied immunity to dispose of “insubstantial claims” at the earliest stag e of litigation possible. See H arlow
v . F itz ge ra ld , 4 57 U. S. 8 00 , 8 18 (1 98 2) ; Hunter v. Bryant , 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (“[W] e repe atedly have stre ssed the imp or tanc e of re so lvi ngimmun ity

qu e sti on s at th e e arl ie st po ssi ble sta g e in l iti g atio n. ” ). Thus , d e fe nd ants ty pic a lly
asser t qualified immunity

in a motion to dis miss or moti on for summary

judgme nt. At those stages, a court may g rantA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 17

M a rk g ra f ar g u e s tha t we c a n n o t d e te rm ine , b a se d o n the ju ry’s v e rd ic t, 5 tha t he sh o t E k lun d w ith the p u rp o se to ha rm he r u n re la te d to a leg iti m a te la w e n fo rc e m e n t o b je c tive

. H o w e v e r, w e c a n infe r t h a t t h e ju ry m a d e this find ing b y vie w ing the ju ry’s v e rd ic t i n lig h t o f th e j u ry in stru c tio n s. See W ee ks v

. Ang el one , 5 2 8 U .S . 2 2 5 , 2 3 4 (2 0 0 0 ) (“ A ju ry is p re su m e d to f o l l o w i t s i nst ruct i o ns. ”). T he jur y i nst ruct i o ns specif ie d th a t t he jur y shoul d f i nd t hat M arkgraf

vi o l at ed P la i nt i f

f s’ due pro cess ri ght s i f he “act ed i n a m anner whi ch shocks t he co nsci ence.” C o nsi st ent wi t h t he
c le a rly e sta b lishe d la w o u tli n e d a b o v e , s upr a P art II

. A

. 1 , t he i nst ruct i o ns d efi ne d “sho ck s t he co nsc i en ce ” a s “act[i ng ] wit h a p urp o se to ca use [ Ekl u n d’ s ] de at h u n r el at ed t o t h e l eg i t i mat e l aw e n f or ce men t pu r pos es of t aki ng her i nt o cust o d y , s el f

- d ef ense, or t he d ef

ense of other s. ” H avi ng r ece i ved t hes e i ns t r uct i ons , t he j ur y un ani mo us l y conc l uded t hat M ar kg r af had vi o l at ed P l ai nt i f

f s’ due pro cess ri ght s. P res um i ng t hat the jury f ol l owed t hes e i ns t r uct i ons ( M ar kg r af does not ar gu e ot her wi s e) , we can c o n c lud e tha t t h e ju ry fo u n d M a rk g ra f sho t E k lu n d f o r a n il le g iti m a te qu a lif ie d immun ity

if the pla int if

fs have n ot ma de out a constitution al v iolation, based on the fa cts alleg ed or “shown.” See P earson , 555 U.S. at 232. Her e, Plaintiffs have done more than “ show” that Markgraf violated their due proce ss rig hts—they

proved it to a jury

. There fore , the jury ’s verdic t ag ainst Markgraf

is sufficient to deny

him q u alified immun ity on thi s p ro ngof

the ana ly sis

. Markgraf argues that we should disreg ard the j u ry ’s finding and analy

ze, objectively , whether

he could haveacte d with a leg itimate objective. However , the ver dict prec ludes us from hy

pothesizi ngabout whethe r Mar kg raf could have believed that a legitimate law enfor ceme nt objective e x isted.

“ [D]e fe rence to t

he jur y ’s vie w o f t

he fa c ts p e rs ist s throug hout eac h prongof the qua li fied immunity inquiry .” Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gome z , 585 F.3d 508, 528 ( 1 s tC i r
. 2 0 0 9 )

. A c c o r d i n gt o th e j ur y ’ s v i e wo f

th e f a c ts, Markgraf shot Eklund without a leg itimate law enf orce ment objective. We would not be defe rring to that view if we now

5A.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

18

p u rp o se

— a p u rp o se o the r tha n ta k ing h e r in to c u sto d y, d e fen d ing him se lf,
o r def end i ng other off

i cers. Lo gi cal l y , t he jury wo ul d have had t o m ake t hi s f i nd i ng i n ord er t o e nt er a verdict a gai nst M arkgraf o n P l ai nt i f

f s’ due p ro c e ss c la im

. See i nf

r a n ot e 6.

O ur op i ni o n i n Sl om an v. Tad l ock s u ppor t s t h i s a n al y s i s
. 21 F

. 3d 1462, 6 14 65 –6 6 ( 9t h Ci r
. 19 94 )

. The r e , w e di s c u s s e d t h e e f f e c t a j u r y v er di ct agai nst a de f

end ant on a Fir st A m end m ent cl ai m (whi ch has a s ub ject i ve c u lp a b ili ty stan d a rd ) w o u ld ha v e o n the q u a lif ie d im m u n ity a n a lysis. I d. at 14 6 8

– 6 9

. A t t ri al , t he d ef end ant ’ s subject i ve “mo t i ves f o r t he act i o ns he t oo k w er e a t i s s ue. ” See i d. at 14 6 8

. T he jur y f o und t hat t he d ef

end ant “i nten d ed t o i nterfere wit h [P l ainti f f ]’ s p o l i t i ca l ac t i vit y and t ha t i t wa s a sub st ant i al or mo t i vat i ng f act or i n h i s conduc t

. ” Id

. W e hel d t hat , as a r es ul t of t he j ur y ’ s f

i ndi ng , “ t he di s t r i ct cour t coul d not ha ve do ne ot her tha n to c o n c lud e tha t a re a so n a b le o ff ic e r i n [th e d e fen d a n t’s] p la c e w o u ld hav e k nown hi s conduc t vi ol at ed [ t he pl ai nti f f ’ s ] cl ear l y es t abl i s hed
cons t i t ut i onal r i gh t s
. ” I d. at 1469. T h er ef

or e, t h e def

en dan t wo ul d not hav e been en t i t l ed to q ual i f i ed i mm un i t y , ha d t he cour t f ace d t hi s i s s ue. Likewi se her e, t he jur y ’ s verdict f i nd i ng tha t M a rkgraf

act ed wi t h a
s ubj ect i ve pur po s e t hat i s prohi bi t ed by cl ear l y es t abl i s hed c ons t i t ut i onal la w p ro h ib its us fro m gr a n ting him q u a lif ie d im m u n ity. C o n siste n t with Sl om an , t hi s i s so even i f a reas o nab l e o f

f i cer coul d ha ve sh o t E k lun d w ith t he pur po s e t o har m f

or s om e l egi t i mat e g oal bas ed on an object i ve vi ew o f t he f ac t s.

In s u ppor t of

our an al y s i s i n our pre v i ou s opi n i on , w e ci t ed G r ah am v. 7 Connor , 49 0 U

. S. 3 8 6 , 3 9 6

– 9 7 (1 9 8 9 ) f o r t he p rop o si t i o n t hat “ we i gno re M arkgraf ’ s subjec ti ve m o t i ves and co nsi d er hi s act i o ns i n l i ght of t he t ot al i t y of

t he ci r cums t anc es
. ” A. D. , 63 6 F. 3d at 561

. H owever , qual i f i ed h e l d th atM ar

k g r a f w a s e n t i t l e d t o qu a l i f i e d i m mun i ty, beca use he could have believed a leg itimate law enf orce ment ob je c tiv e e xiste d und e r t

he c ir c ums tanc e s. Although such an 6 inq uir y might b e a

pp ro pr iate wh e n a

de fe nd ant a sse rt s qu a li f ie d immu n it y in a mo ti o nf o r s umm ar y ju d g me n t or

a pr e - v e r d i c t JM O L m o t i o n , th e j ur y ’ s v i e w o f th e f

a c ts mus t g overn our

analy sis o nce litig ation has ende d with a jury ’s ve rd ic t. 7A.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 19

i m m uni t y was not at i ss ue i n G r aham

. R at her, t he C o urt w as expl ai ni ng tha t, w h e n d e te rm inin g w h e th e r a p o lice o ff ic e r u se d e x c e ssiv e fo rc e in vi o l at i o n of t he Fo u rt h A m end m ent , t he p rop er anal y si s o f t he
cons t i t ut i onal cl ai m— not of qual i f i ed i mm un i t y

— was objec t i ve. G r aham , 490 U

. S. at 397

. T he pas s age w e cit ed reads: “ A s i n ot her Fourt h Amendm ent cont ext s , . . . t he ‘ r eas onabl ene s s ’ i nqui r y i n a n excessi ve f

o rce case i s an o b ject i ve o ne: t he q uest io n is w h e t her t he
o f f i cers’ act i o ns are ‘ o b ject i vel y reas o nab le ’ i n l i ght of t he f act s and ci rcum st ances co nf

ronti ng t hem , wi t ho ut regard t o t hei r underl y i ng i nt ent or mot i vat i on. ” Id

. Pl ai n l y , t h at s t at eme nt o nl y gove r n s t h e an al y s i s of whe t her , i n a F our t h A mendm ent ex ces s i ve f orce ca s e, t he def

endan t us ed a reasonab l e am o unt of f o rce. A cco rdingl y , this sta t em ent i n G r aham do es not af

f ect our an al y s i s of

M ar kg r af ’ s qual i f

i ed i mm un i t y def

ens e.

I n s uppo r t of

hi s ar gu ment , M ar kg r af ci t es t wo cas es f

r om o t her 8 ci rcui t s t hat do not ap p l y t o t he i ss ues r ai sed in thi s ap p eal

. I n St een v. M ye rs , 48 6 F. 3d 10 17 , 10 23 ( 7t h Ci r
. 200 7), t he Seven t h Ci r cui t r evi ewed Markgraf al so worrie s that “if the [court] looks to any
a lle g e d [im

pro per] mot ive s [un de r t he ‘p ur po se to h arm ’ pr on g ],” as th e jur

y ’s ve rd ic t c omp e ls u s to do he re , “ tho se motives will nec essar ily

prec lude a subseque nt determination tha t any th in g c o u ld h av e b e e n d o n e w it h a le g it im ate law
e nf or c e me nt o bje c tiv e .” To us , thi s is no t a pr ob le m. In f a c t, we a pproved of

just such a re sult in P o r ter . There , we a c kn ow ledged that

an o ff ic e r who us e d f

or c e a g a ins t a su sp e c t to “ tea ch hi m a

le sso n” or

“ g e t e ve n” wo uld

vio late the Four teenth Amendme nt due proc ess clause under Le wis , “eve n though [the off

icer was] ultimately

eff ectuating a

n arr est.” Porter , 5 4 6 F. 3 d

at1 1 4 0

–4 1 (qu o t i n g Davis v. Twp. of Hillsi de , 190 F.3d 167, 172–73 (3d Cir. 1999) (Mc Kee , J ., concur ring )). Thus, e ven if a

n office r’s use of forc e could be justified after

the fa ct by

a leg itimate objective (suc h as eff ectuating a

rre st) he can still be held liable for a
c on sti tu ti on a l vi olatio n if he us e d f

or c e fo r a

n il le g iti mate purpose. 8A.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

20

t h e en t r y of

s u mmar y j u dg men t on a due p roces s c l ai m i n f av or of d ef end ants. Aft er r evi ewing co nf l i ct i ng evi d ence ab o ut t he d ef end ant
o ff ic e r’s a lleg e d m o tive to ha rm the su sp e c t ag a ins t ev id e n c e o f a l egi t i m at e o b ject i ve (pursui t af t er f l eei ng f rom a tr a ff

i c st o p ), t he co urt
co ncl ud ed t hat t here was not “ suf f i ci ent evi d ence of som e i nt ent t o harm tha t go e s b e y o n d ” the leg iti m a te o b je c tive o f p u rs u ing a su sp e c t wh o is flee ing fro m a tra ff

ic sto p
. I

d. at 10 2 3

– 2 4

. R at her t han supp o rt M a rk g ra f’ s a rg u m e n t, St een un derc ut s i t , by i mp l y i ng t hat evi dence of an i nt ent t o harm co ul d ove rr i d e reco gni zed legi t i m at e l aw enf o rcem ent
o b ject i ves i n est ab l i shi ng a due pro cess vi o l at i o n. Si m i l arl y, G raves v. Thom as , 4 5 0 F .3 d 1 2 1 5 (1 0 th C ir. 2 0 0 6 ) d o e s n o t sup p o rt M a rk g ra f’ s argum ent

. I n G r aves , t he T ent h C i rcui t revi ewed t he d i st ri ct co urt ’ s grant
o f sum m a ry j u d g m e n t t o the d e fen d a n t p o li c e o ff ic e r. I d. at 12 2 0

. T he p a n el af f i rme d , be cause t he reco rd supp o rt ed , “ i n s p ad es, ” a “ l egi t i m a te
o b ject of arrest,” w it ho ut “ l egi t i m at el y s uggest [i ng] an i nt ent of [t he of f i cer ] t o cau s e har m un r el at ed t o t he ar r es t

. ” I d. a t 1 2 2 3 . T h u s, G r aves d o e s n o t ad d re ss a c a se li k e the insta n t o n e w h e re a ju ry h a s f o und t hat t he def endan t ac t ed wi t h a p urpose t o har m, un r el at ed t o a l egi t i mat e l aw enf orce ment object i ve. Markgraf is not without r ecour se just be cause the jury has
re nd e re d a

verd ict a g a ins t hi m. H e c ou ld h ave dir e c tly attacke d the suffic iency

of the e vidence to support the jury ’s verdic t on appea l, but he di d n o t

. However, e ven if he had done so her e, we agree with th e d i s t rict cour t that there w as s u f f i c i e n te v i d e n c e t o s u

p p o r t th e j ur

y ’ s v e r d i c tattr i a l

. In deny i ngMarkgraf

’s re newe d motion for J MOL , the district
c ourt c ite d th e fo llo wi ngfa c ts a s su pp or tin gthe ve rd ic t: (1) Ms. Eklund’s car

was c ontained in a de adend stree t; (2) Ms. Eklund refused to g et out of he r c ar and re pe ate dly

sa id “ fu c k you ” to Markgraf ; (3) the of

fice rs wer e positioned
su c h th at th e y

we re no t in

the path o f M s. Eklund’s vehicle ; (4) other offi ce rs at the
scene testified that they

did not feel thre atene d nor did they perc eive a

n immediate threat atA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 21

the time of the shooting ; ( 5) five othe r off icer s had guns drawn but no one other than Off icer Mark g ra f fi re d; ( 6) of

fi c e rs te sti fi e d th at Ms

. Eklund’s ca

r wa s either s topped or g oing forwa rd at the time of the shooting; (7) the location of the Eklund vehicle at the time of the sh oo ting wa s n ot c on sis te nt w ith Markgraf ’s testimony ; and (8) Offic er Markgraf shot Ms. Eklund 12 ti mes and emptied his gun.
This evidence supports the rea sonable i n fe renc e that Markgraf acte d with the purpose to har m unrelate d to a le g iti mate law enforc e me nt o bje c tiv e . T hat is su ff ic ie nt t o sustain the verdic t aga i n s t Markg raf in the fac e of a

n attack on the suffic iency

of the e vidence

. There fore , we a ffirm the district c ourt’s denia l of Mark g ra f’ s r e ne we d moti on fo r JMOL

. Th e jur y re a so na bly fo u n d that Markgraf

shot Eklund with a purpose to har m unrelated to the leg itimate law enf orce m en t o bjectives of
arr e st, se lf

-d e fe ns e , o r d e fe ns e of oth e rs . It w a s c le arl y established before the ir enc ounter that such c onduct violated Plaintiffs’ substantive due proc ess rights. There fore , M ar k g r a f i s n o te n t i t l e d

t o qu a l i f i e d i m mun i ty.
None of the qualified imm u n i ty case s Markgraf

cites
con t ro l our dec ision, because none addr ess the pre cise issue in t his c a se . H e re , th e natur e of the c on sti tut ion a l c la im (conta ining a

subjective e lement), a

nd the ca se’s pro ce du ral posture (r aisingqualified immunity in a post -ver dict motion fo r JMO L ), re qu ir e s d e fe re nc e to t he jur y ’s fi nding s th at is not pr esent in ca ses with other c onstitut ional liability theories or whe re qualified immunit y is asserted at a diffe rent stag e ofA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

22
l i t i gati on. Se eBran c h v . Tu nn e ll , 9 3 7 F

. 2 d 1 3 8 2 , 1 3 8 5

– 86 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting t he tension that arises when applying the qualified immunity framework to a

n underlying constitutional violation with a subjective ele ment), overruled
on oth e r g

ro un ds by

Ga ilb ra ith v . Cn ty . o

f Sa nta Cla ra , 30 7 F .3 d 1 11 9, 11 26 (9 th C ir . 2 00 2) . Fo r ins tanc e , unli ke in F ourt h A me ndme nt c a se s, Pla int if fs ’ d ue pr oc e ss c la im i s based on a subjective, rathe r t han objective , standard of culpability

. Cf. Tho mp so n v. Ma hr e , 110 F.3d 716, 721–23 (9 th C ir . 1 99 7)

. Whil e in a Fo ur th Ame ndme nt c a se we c ou ld choose not to acc ept the jury ’s conclusion that t h e o ff i cer ’s conduct wa s unrea sonable, he re, w e ca nnot disreg ard the jury ’s re asonable fi n d ing of fac t that Markgraf

acte d with a subjective ba d intent.
Fur t h er, unlike a

motion to di smiss or moti on for summary judgme nt, we must defe r to t he fa cts as they wer e rea sonably fo u n d by

the jury —we do not dra

w our own infere nces f

rom them. See Sloman , 21 F. 3 d at 1469 (conf irming that the di strict court was corr ect to defer to the jury ’s findingthat the def endant a cted w ith unconstitut ional subj ect ive int e nt whe n r uli ngon his qu a lif

ie d immun ity defe nse af

ter a jury verdic t); cf. Dunn v . Ca stro , 621 F.3d 1196, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (a naly zing first prongof qu a lif ie d immun ity ana ly sis in mot ion to d ism iss ); W ilkinson , 61 0 F .3 d at 55 4 ( ana ly

zingde nial of qu a lif

ie d immun ity

in motion for summary

judgme nt). Markgraf downplay s the signif

icanc e of the differ ence betwee n case s in wh i ch a jury has re ndere d a ver dict and those that are stil l at t h e motion to dism iss or summary jud g me nt s ta g e . H e argue s th at th e se c a se s are re le va nt, be c a us e “ [q]ua lif

ie d immun ity

de c isi o n s o n

m o t i on to d ism iss or summary

jud gment [bot h require ] defere nce to theA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 23

pla int if f’ s e vid e nc e or

a lle g atio ns .” Th e se c a se s, he argue s, “demonstrate the prope r use of underp i n n ing f

acts whe n re a c h i n g l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t th e i m mun i ty i s s u e
. ” Hi s ana ly s is mi s s e s th e p o int th at c o urts mu s t d e a l w ith the underpinningfac ts differen t l y once the jury

has re ndere d a verdic t. See, e .g. , W ina rto v . To sh iba Am. Ele cs. Com po ne nts , Inc. , 274 F.3d 1276, 1283 ( 9th Cir. 2001).

In prac tice, our a

naly sis might have t h e eff ect of fore closing qualified immunity defe nses in simil ar c ases wher e a jur

y finds that a de fe n d ant has violated the constitution by acting with a prohibit ed int ent. Howe ver, w e do no t ho ld that a

c ourt cannot

conduct a n objective qua lified i m munity analy sis after a

jury verdic t. M

c K e n n a v

. E d ge ll , 617 F.3d 432, 438–46 ( 6th Cir. 201 0 ) (r eviewingqualified immunit y defe nse after jury verdic t). Rather, post-ve rdict, a court must apply

the qualified immunity

framework to the fac ts that the j ury

found (includingthe def

endant’ s subjective intent). McKenna , 6 1 7 F. 3 d at4 3 7 (qu o t i n g Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc. , 380 F.3d 893, 9 00 (6th Cir. 2004)) (“[W] here the leg al question of qualifie d imm u nity turns upon which version of the fac ts one ac cepts, the jury , not the judge , must determine liability .”). Moreove r, a de fenda nt wh o loses at trial has other options. He could di r e c tly
c ha lle ng e the jury ’s find ing s und e r t he g e ne ra lly

a pp lic a ble J MOLstandards. The defe ndant could also att ack the jury instruct i ons as inadequate statements of c lear ly established law ( e.g. , the judg e fa iled to identify a cle arly established le g iti mate law e nf

or c e me nt p ur

po se that ha d s ome su

pp or t in the fa cts). Se e Me dtron ic, I nc . v . W hite , 526 F.3d 4 87, 493 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, while our holdingwill narr o w the
numbe r o f c a se s in wh ic h a de fe nd ant wh o lo se s at tr ia l w illA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

24

W e al so d o not f

i n d it a “ t roub l i ng i ss ue” t hat , ap p l y i ng our ho l d i ng, 9 di f f er ent r es ul t s mi gh t be obt ai ned wh en qual i f i ed i mm un i t y i s r ai s ed as
a po s t

- v e r di c t de f

e n s e t o bo t h F ou r t h a n d F ou r t e e n t h Ame n dm e n t c l a i ms i n t he same ca s e. T h i s i s s i mpl y a f ea t u r e of t h e di f

f er i n g n at u r e of

t he
co nst i t ut i o nal cl ai m s— o ne wi t h a s ub ject i ve i nt ent e lem ent and one w itho u t. Cf

. Cr awf ord- El v

. Br i t t on , 523 U

. S. 574, 584–94 ( 1998) ( r ej ect i ng a h ei gh t ene d pl eadi ng s t andar d i n cas es al l egi ng cons t i t ut i onal vio l ati o ns w i t h a sub je cti ve i nten t elem en t ev en t ho ug h thi s m i gh t i nc rea se t he num b er of

s ub je c tive int ent co nst i t ut i o nal cl ai m s t hat wo ul d s urvi ve t o s um m ary judgm ent i n qua l i f i ed i m m uni t y cases ). rec eive qua lified immunit y , it doe s not leave suc h a def endant without recour se. 9

In sum, we af

firm the district court’s de nial of Mar kg raf ’s re new ed motio n f

or JMOL . T he dis tr ic t c ourt c or re c tly conclude d that, on the fa cts as the jury found them, Mar

kg raf violated clea

rly established law. L ike the district cour t, we a lso are bo un d b y

the jur y ’s fi nd ing s.
B. We r e ve r se and re m and the fee awar d so th atth e district c ourt m ay con s i der the am ounts of Markgraf’s set tlem ent off ers in deter m inin g a r e as ona ble fee awar d.
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

awa rd e d Pl a int if

fs $5 53 ,1 20 in attorney s’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) for hours expended both on the merits and on the f ee pe tition. W e re view that
awa rd for abuse of discretion. McCown v. City of Fontana , 565 F.3d 1097, 1101 ( 9th Cir. 2009). “A district court by definition abuses its discretion whe n i t m ak es an error of law.” Koon v. United States , 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). Due to an interve ning c hang e in our c as e l aw, the district c ourt committe d s u c h an e r

r o r h e r e
. T hu s , w e mu s t r e v e r se and
rema nd the fe e aw ard.A.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 25

42 U.S.C. § 1988( b ) au thorizes courts to awar d a
rea sonable attorney s’ fe e to t he pre vailing pa rty in an ac tion to enforc e § 1983. We presume the “lodesta r” a mount (the product of a

rea sonable n u m ber of

hours worke d multipl ied by a re asonable hourly

rate ) to be a

rea sonable fe e. City of Ri v e rsi dev . R iv e ra , 4 7 7 U

. S

. 5 6 1 , 5 6 8 ( 1 9 8 6 )

. U l t i m at e l y, howeve r, “[t] he re asonable ness of the fee is de termined primarily by ref ere nce to the level of suc cess a chieve d by the plaintiff.” Mc Cow n , 565 F.3d at 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2008) (c i t i n g He ns le

yv . Ec k e rh ar t , 4 6 1 U

. S

. 4 2 4 , 4 3 6 ( 1 9 8 3 ) )

. In e va luatin gthe Pla int if

fs ’ l evel o f s uc c e ss, dis tr ic t c ourt s sh ou ld co ns ide r two qu e sti on s: “F ir st, did the pla int if f f a il t o preva il on claims that wer e unrelated to t he cla ims on which he s u c c e e d e d ? Se c o n d , d id th e p la inti f f a c h ie v e a le v e l of
succe ss that makes the hours re asonably expended a sat i s fa ct o ry

basis for makinga fe e aw ard? ” See id. at 1103 (qu o t i n g Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Markgraf argued both be low and on appea l that Plainti ffs achie ved a low level of suc cess by g oing to tria l. He fur

ther
argue s th at th e dis tr ic t c ourt sh ou ld h ave c on sid e re d amou nts discussed in pre- trial sett l ement neg otiations as evidence of Plaintiffs’ limit ed succe ss. The district court did not consider these amounts, because it concluded that then -c o ntrolling Ninth C ircuit prec edent inter pretingFe dera l Rule of Evidence 40 8 p re c lud e d it

fr om c on sid e ri ngthe m.
B y re fu sin gto c on sider the amou nts dis c us se d in settlement neg otiations, the district co u rt corr ectly applied then-e x isting Nint h Circuit case law. Se eMc Cow n , 565 F.3d
at 1 1 0 4 n
. 4 ( n o ti n gth at c o urts “ g e n e r a ll y r e f r a in from ref ere ncingproposed se ttlement ag reem ents in light of Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 408”). Howeve r, whe n revie wingA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL

26
a district court’s decision for leg al error, we must “apply the law in e ffe ct at the time [we] rende r[] [our ] decision.” Hende rson v. United Sta tes , 133 S. Ct . 1121, 1126 (2013). Under the law now in e ff

ect, Fede ral Rule of Evide nce 408 does not bar district c ourts in the Ninth Circuit from considering amounts discussed in settlement neg otiations as evidenc e of the ex t en t of the plaintiff’s suc cess. Se eIn re Ke k au oh a- Al isa , 674 F.3d 1083, 1093–94 ( 9t h C i r. 2012); Ingram v. O roudjian , 6 4 7 F

. 3 d 9 2 5 , 9 2 7 ( 9 th Ci r. 2011). Thus, the district court’s c onclusion that it could not consider those amounts, though a ppropriate at the time, has now chang ed. We must then reve rse the fee awa rd and re mand for
a d et ermination of a rea sonable fe e in light of In re Ke k au oh a- Al isa and Ingram

. On re mand , th e dis tr ic t c ourt has t he dis c re tio n ( 1) to consider the amounts discussed in settlement neg otiations, or not; and (2) to g ive those amounts as much or a s litt le weight as it sees fit. See Lohman v . Durye a Borough , 574 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2009) (a cknowledg ing that settlement offe rs ar e “cle arly only one fa ctor to be c onsidered i n t he aw ard of fee s,” and that the district court “is also free to rejec t such
e vid e nc e a s n ot b e ari ngon su c c e ss” ); cf. In r e K

ekauohaAl isa , 674 F.3d at 1093–94; Ingram , 647 F.3d 925 (adopting Lohman ’s holding that Fede ral Rule of Evide nce 408 does not ba r c o n s i d e ratio n o f s e ttl e me nt o ff e rs wh e n ma

kin gatto rn e y s’ fee awa rds). It is not our place to opine a s to how that discretion should be e x erc ised.
C. Consistent wi th our 2011 opin ion, w e re jec t M ar kgr af’ s o th e r c lai m s.
Pr e vio us ly , M ark g ra f m a de tw o o the r c la ims on a pp e a l: First, that the district cour t erre d in excluding evidenc e ofA.D. V

. C AL I F OR NI A H I GHW AY P ATR OL 27

Eklund’s drugusag e and c riminal hist o ry . Second, that the district court er

red by failingto i n cl u de portions of Markgraf ’s jury instructions. Nothing ha s chang ed since we denied both of these claims in our first opinion. A.D. , 636 F.3d at 560 nn.1–2. The evidenc e was prope rly excluded be c a us e Ek lun d’ s c on du c t wa s no t in iss ue duri ngthe lia bil ity ph a se of the tr ia l. F ur

the r, the dis tr ic t court did no t a bu se its discretion in formulatingt h e j ury instructions. “Having
corr ectly stated what the law was [under Le wis ], t h e court was not oblig ed to state what the law was not .” Id. at 560 n.1 (empha sis in original). Nor di d the cour t abuse its discretion in f ai l ing to instruct on the “ contours” of the standar d as Mark g ra f p ro po se d, be c a us e his ins tr

uc tio ns cov e re d p oints that wer e not in issue.
III. Conclusion
The district cour

t corre ctly

denied Ma

rkgra f’s re newe d motion for J MOL , beca

use the jury

rea sonabl y found that Markgraf shot Eklund with a purpose to harm unre lated to a le g iti mate law e nf

or c e me nt o bje c tiv e . H ow e ve r, we re ve rs e and re mand the fe e aw ard to pe rm i t t h e d istrict court to redeter mi n e t h e amount of a rea sonable fe e in light of an interveningchang e in our c ase la w.
AF F IRM ED in par t, RE VE RSE D a nd REM AN DE D in p art. The pa

rties shall bear their own c osts on appeal. See Fe d. R. App. P. 39(a)(4)

.