alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### F. A. D. ANDREA, INC., v. RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA.*

No. 6123.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Feb. 16, 1937.

Samuel E. Darby, Jr., of New York City, for appellant.

Thomas G. Haight, of Jersey City, N. J., Abel E. Blackmar, Jr., of New York City, and William G. Mahaffy, of Wilmington, Del., for appellee.

Before BUFFINGTON, DAVIS, and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

*

Writ o£ certiorari denied 57 S.Ct. 754, 81 L.Ed. —.

PER CURIAM.

In the final analysis, this is a bill pray'ing a mandamus ordering a defendant who owns patents, but has no trust or contractual relation with the plaintiff, to grant licenses thereunder. On hearing, the court below, following its opinion, reported in 14 F.Supp. 226 — to which reference avoids needless repetition' of the facts in the case — -dismissed the bill. Thereupon plaintiff took this appeal.

As stated in its brief, the question involved is whether a patent owner, who is in an alleged dominating and controlling position “with respect to a pool or combination of all of the "pertinent patent rights to all of the large companies of the industry, can be compelled by court decree (under the provisions of section 16 of the Clayton Act [15 U.S.C.A. § 26]) to grant plaintiff a license under the patents of tne pool on the same terms and conditions that such licenses have been granted to others.”

After argument and consideration had, we find ourselves in accord with the trial judge’s reasoning and construction, and as a further opinion would be but an attempt by this court to clothe in different wording what has been already said by the court below, we limit ourselves to affirming the court’s decree on its own opinion.
258 La. 545

#### Petition of SECURITY INSURANCE CO. OF HARTFORD.

No. 51355.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 26, 1971.

In re: Security Insurance Company of Hartford applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Writ granted. The judgment of the trial court denying the petition of Security Insurance Company of Hartford for a medical examination of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Scramuzza is reversed and an examination is ordered on a date to be hereafter fixed by the trial judge.

Articles 1434 and 1493 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure authorize the Court when good cause is shown to order a claimant to submit to a medical examination as part of the procedure for the perpetuation of testimony. The ruling of the trial judge that the court is without authority to issue such an order until the claimant files suit is in error.
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
FOUND IN THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE YEAR-TO-DATE, AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



         In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Golden  Enterprises,  Inc.
(the  "Company")  on Form 10-Q for the first  quarter  ended  August 31, 2004 as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),  I, Mark W.  McCutcheon,  Chief  Executive  Officer  of the  Company,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

Dated:   October 8, 2004



/s/ MARK W. MCCUTCHEON
-------------------------------------
Mark W. McCutcheon
President and Chief Executive Officer

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to Golden Enterprises, Inc. and will be retained by Golden Enterprises,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its staff upon
request.
#### In the Matter of Jennifer O. and Others, Infants. Jefferson County Department of Social Services, Respondent; *937Mark L. O., Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[722 NYS2d 205]

—Appeal unanimously dismissed without costs (see, *Matter of Anonymous v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,*70 NY2d 972, 973-974, *rearg denied*71 NY2d 994). (Appeal from Order of Jefferson County Family Court, Hunt, J. — Mental Hygiene Law.) Present — Hayes, J. P., Wisner, Scudder, Kehoe and Burns, JJ.
#### WILLIAM ANDER *vs.*CURTIS J. and CHARLES H. ROSS.

If witnesses be sworn by a magistrate before the commissioner to take depositions, it is sufficient.

Narr. in assumpsit.

In this case the plaintiff offered in evidence the deposition of Cannon Dawson, taken on a commission directed to Joseph Olds, of Picka*277way county Ohio, authorizing him to examine witnesses to be brought before him, they being first sworn before him. It was objected to, because it did not appear that the witness was sworn by the commissioner.

*Rogers*and Wootten, for plaintiff.

*Cullen*and Frame, for defendants.

The jurat showed that the witness was sworn in the presence of the commissioner by a magistrate of the county of Pickaway. The court overruled the objection, and admitted the deposition.
#### TILE SERVICE, INC., Appellant, v. Richard REICHEK, d/b/a Commercial Construction Company, Appellee.

No. 69-818.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 21, 1970.

Rehearing Denied May 6, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
H. Res. 470

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

June 29, 1994.

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall

be in order to consider the conference report to accompany

the bill (H.R. 4454) making appropriations for the Legislative Branch for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995,

and for other purposes. All points of order against the conference report and against its consideration are waived. The

conference report shall be considered as read.

Attest:

Clerk.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6959

ROMAINE FRANCIS,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

C. T. WOODY, Sheriff, in his capacity as Sheriff for the 

City of Richmond; SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT FOR THE CITY OF 

RICHMOND; ANDERSON, Medical Worker; ROBERTSON, Captain of 

the City of Richmond Sheriff's Department,

 Defendants – Appellees,

and

STANLEY NELSON FURMAN, Doctor,

 Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior 

District Judge. (3:09-cv-00235-REP)

Submitted: October 13, 2011 Decided: October 18, 2011

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Romaine Francis, Appellant Pro Se. Robert A. Dybing, William 

Daniel Prince, THOMPSON MCMULLAN, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for 
2

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Romaine Francis appeals the district court’s order 

granting summary judgment for the Appellees on his various 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) claims. We have reviewed the record and 

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the 

reasons stated by the district court. Francis v. Woody, No. 

3:09-cv-00235-REP (E.D. Va. July 11, 2011). We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-20046 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JOSE BLAS VARGAS-SAUCEDO, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-01-CR-450-ALL

-------------------- February 20, 2003 Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Jose Blas Vargas-Saucedo appeals his conviction and sentence for being found in the United States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Vargas-Saucedo argues that the sentencing provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are unconstitutional on their face and as applied in his case. He contends that the unconstitutional portions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 should be severed from the statute. He asks us to vacate his conviction and sentence, reform the judgment to reflect a conviction only underNo. 02-20046 -2- 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and remand his case for resentencing under that provision.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. Vargas-Saucedo acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres , but asserts that the decision has been called into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000). He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit , 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. The Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
No. 10742.

#### The Protected Home Circle *v.*Sulzer.

Decided March 2, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court of Hamilton county.

*Mr. J. A. Mc-Laughry*and *Mr. B. A. Hulszvitt,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Bates & Meyer,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Crew, C. J., Spear, Davis, Si-iauck and Price, JJ., concur.
ORIGINAL 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

OP 24-0349 

KIMBERLY COLE, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

BRADLEY BRAGG, LEWIS and CLARK 

COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, and 

BRIAN GOOTKIN, DIRECTOR OF MONTANA 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

Respondent. 

ORDER 

FILED 

JUN 1 1 2024 

Bowen Greenwood 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

State of Montana 

Kimberly Cole petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus and includes an 

"affidavit" that has not been notarized. She requests release, alleging "cruel and unusual 

punishment inflicted" by the law enforcement personnel at the Lewis and Clark County 

Detention Center (LCCDC). Cole asserts that "[t]he jail staff has been using removal of 

prescribed medication as punishment[,] and that "[t]he Lewis & Clark County Jail and its 

medical staff have been over dosing [her] while in jail." Cole states that her years-long 

prescription of suboxone has been doubled "to 16 mg at once to 'save time'[.]" Cole 

requests that the Department of Corrections change its medication restrictions policy and 

reinstatement of her "MAT Program medication to include all medications . . . ." 

A writ for extraordinary relief "shall be commenced and conducted in the manner 

prescribed by the applicable sections of the Montana Code Annotated for the conduct of 

such or analogous proceedings and by these rules." M. R. App. P. 14(2). A writ of 

mandamus, also known as mandate, is specific and statutorily driven. To state a claim for 

mandamus, a party must show entitlement to the performance of a clear legal duty by the 

party against whom the writ is directed and the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate 

remedy at law. Section 27-26-102, MCA; Smith v. Missoula Co., 1999 MT 330, ¶ 28, 297 

Mont. 368, 992 P.2d 834. 

06/11/2024

Case Number: OP 24-0349
Cole is not entitled to relief via a writ of mandate against the LCCDC. While she 

has referenced various constitutional provisions, Cole has not demonstrated entitlement to 

the performance of a clear legal duty by the LCCDC. Section 27-26-102(1), MCA; Smith, 

¶ 28. Furthermore, she is no longer placed in the LCCDC. Since the filing of her Petition 

and according to available electronic documents, Cole has been placed in Passages 

Assessment and Sanction Center in Billings, as of May 29, 2024. This Court cannot 

provide the relief that she has requested and through this remedy. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Cole's Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED and 

DISMISSED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Supreme Court is directed to 

CLOSE this matter as of this Order's date. 

The Clerk is also directed to provide a copy of this Order to: counsel of record; 

Bradley Bragg, LCCDC; and Kimberly Cole, Passages Assessment and Sanction Center, 

1001 South 27th Street, Billings, MT 59101. 

4"\, 

DATED this I 1 —day of June, 2024. 

Chief Justice 

2
----

----

|   | 10.1** | Supply, Distribution and Related Services Agreement dated May 29, 2011 by and between the Company and C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. |
|--------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 31.1*   | Certification of the Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 31.2*   | Certification of the Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | * | Filed with this Form 10-Q/A |
|--------|---|-----------------------------|

|   | ** | Confidential treatment has been requested for certain portions thereof pursuant to a confidential treatment request filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) on July 29, 2011.  These provisions have been omitted from the filing and submitted separately to the Securities and Exchange Commission. |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined t hat

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________ No. 98-50005 Summary Calendar

____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DURENCESS MARSHALL,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court, for the Western District of Texas (USDC No. W-97-CR-54-1)

_________________________________________________________________ October 20, 1998
Before KING, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Durencess Donnell Marshall appeals his convictions concerning

cocaine base: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute;
distribution; and aiding and abetting distribution.

Marshall challenges the admission at trial of testimony of the

conviction of coconspirator Lo Ford. Not raised at trial, this

issue is co nsidered only for plain error. F E D

. R. C RIM

. P. 52(b);

United States v. Calverley
, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en2

banc). In reviewing introduction of a coconspirator’s guilty plea,

we consider (1) whether there was any limiting instruction; (2) the
purpose of the plea’s introduction; (3) whether the plea was used
as substantive evidence of guilt; and (4) whether introduction of

the plea was invited. U nited States v. Samak , 7 F.3d 1196, 1198

(5th Cir. 1993). Ford’s conviction was introduced to rebut defense

claims of preferential treatment fo r witnesses, not to show

Marshall’s guilt. Defense counsel repeatedly discussed
coconspirators’ crimi nal records. Accordingly, we find no plain

error.

Next, Marshall contests the drug quantities attributed to him,
claiming inconsistencies between witnesses. We review this issue

for clear error, see United States v. Young , 981 F.2d 180, 185 (5th

Cir. 1992). Even the most conservative reports of drug quantities
bought and sold by Marshall each week, considered in light of how

long Marshall dealt them, produce an amount far more than the 1.5

ki lograms necessary for an offense level of 38. S ee U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(c)(1). No clear error exists.
Finally, Marshall disputes the enhancem ent for his role as

manager or supervisor in the conspiracy. We also review this issue

for clear error, see United States v. Musquiz
, 45 F.3d 927, 932-33
(5th Cir. 1995). The record shows more than five participants in

the conspiracy (for instance, the cooperating drug de alers).

Marshall concedes supervising Remy Phillips, enough for

enhancement. S ee U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), application not e 2(“supervisor of one or more other participants”). Again, no clear

error exists.

AFFIRMED
#### THOMAS DEPARTMENT STORE & VICKSBURG, INC. and Ernest Thomas v. CHARLES F. SMITH & SON, INC.

No. 46834.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Nov. 6, 1972.

Ellis & Ellis, George K. Mihalyka, Vicksburg, for appellants.

Teller, Biedenharn & Rogers, Vicksburg, Daniel, Coker, Horton, Bell & Dukes, John B. Clark, Jackson, for appellee.

Before RODGERS, P. J., and JONES, INZER, ROBERTSON and BROOM, JJ.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Warren County; Ben Guider, Judge.

Affirmed on direct and cross appeal.
No. 00-1006.

#### McCoy et al. *v.*Chicago Heights Park District et al.

C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### In the Matter of Bradford Applegate, Petitioner, v Philip Coombe, Jr., as Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.

[656 NYS2d 949]

Spain, J.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review two determinations of respondent Commis*837sioner of Correctional Services which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

Petitioner was found guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules in connection with statements he allegedly made seeking to end the peaceful status of an inmate protest over a proposal to double bunk inmates. Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, the findings of guilt are supported by substantial evidence. The testimony of the correction officers who authored the misbehavior reports corroborated the reports’ versions of the events, as did the the testimony of the correction officers who allegedly actually heard petitioner make the statements. Petitioner’s testimony and that of the inmates to the effect that he never made the statements merely raised questions of credibility for the Hearing Officer to resolve (see, *Matter of Lopez v Coughlin,*207 AD2d 490). The same is true with respect to petitioner’s claim that the reports were retaliatory in nature. Petitioner’s remaining arguments on this point have been reviewed and similarly rejected for lack of merit.

We also reject petitioner’s contention that the Hearing Officer erred in refusing his request for additional witnesses. The record fully supports the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that the proposed testimony was either irrelevant or redundant *(see, Matter of Johnson v Coombe,*228 AD2d 755). With respect to petitioner’s contention that one of the misbehavior reports violated 7 NYCRR 251-3.1 (b) insofar as it was not endorsed by those employees with personal knowledge of the facts, we note that because petitioner has failed to show any actual prejudice as a result thereof, annulment is not warranted *(see, Matter of Colucci v Scully,*173 AD2d 953). All of the correction officers who allegedly heard petitioner’s statements testified at his hearing. Finally, we find nothing in the record to support petitioner’s claim that the Hearing Officer was biased or that the outcome of the hearing flowed from the alleged bias *(see, Matter of Nieves v Coughlin,*157 AD2d 943). Petitioner’s remaining arguments have been considered and are rejected as unpersuasive.

Mikoll, J. P., White, Casey and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determinations are confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
#### Sam RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. Bruce MEEKS and Amalia Meeks, his wife, Appellees.

No. 71-806.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 12, 1972.

Robert B. McGowan, Tampa, for appellant.

Law Offices of Joseph E. Johnston, Jr., Brooksville, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant filed his notice of appeal on November 8, 1971 appealing a final judgment entered on October 6, 1971. The notice of appeal having been filed more than 30 days from the entry of the final judgment, this court does not have jurisdiction of the cause and, therefore, the appeal is dismissed ex mero motu.

LILES, A. C. J., and HOBSON and MANN, JJ., concur.