[Cite as Matrix Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Merriman, 2011-Ohio-4419.]

 Court of Appeals of Ohio

 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 No. 96280 

MATRIX ACQUISITIONS, L.L.C. 

 

 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

SCOTT R. MERRIMAN

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-716873 
BEFORE: Kilbane, A.J., Boyle, J., and Rocco, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 1, 2011 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Orville E. Stifel, II 

5310 Franklin Boulevard 

P.O. Box 602780 

Cleveland, Ohio 44102 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Parri J. Hockenberry 

Cheek Law Office, L.L.C. 

471 East Broad Street - 12th Floor 

Columbus, Ohio 43215
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J.: 

{¶ 1} This case came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant 

to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1. 

{¶ 2} Defendant-appellant, Scott Merriman (Merriman), appeals from 

the trial court’s order granting plaintiff-appellee, Matrix Acquisitions, L.L.C. 

(Matrix), summary judgment and awarding Matrix $31,057.33. Finding 

merit to the appeal, we reverse and remand. 

{¶ 3} In January 2010, Matrix filed suit against Merriman, alleging that 

Merriman defaulted on a credit card issued to him by Chase Bank USA, N.A. 

(Chase). Matrix purchased the obligations allegedly owed by Merriman from 

Turtle Creek Assets, Ltd., which purchased the debt from Chase. The 

complaint alleges that Merriman owes $26,921.22 ($19,596.08 plus $7,325.14 

in accrued interest) and future interest and costs. In response, Merriman 

filed an answer denying that he ever had a credit card with Chase. 
{¶ 4} On July 26, 2010, Matrix moved for summary judgment, arguing 

that it is the assignee of Chase and is entitled to recover from Merriman the 

amount owed on Merriman’s Chase account.1 On August 3, 2010, the trial 

court held a settlement conference, at which the court ordered that “discovery 

cut-off is 10/29/2010” and the “response to dispositive motion(s) to be filed by 

11/30/2010.” Merriman did not file anything with the court from August 

3, 2010 to November 10, 2010. On November 10, 2010, which was prior to the 

expiration of the response time (November 30, 2010) stated in the trial court’s 

order, the court granted Matrix’s motion for summary judgment. Then on 

December 10, 2010, the trial court issued a judgment in Matrix’s favor in the 

amount of $19,596.08, plus $11,461.25 in accrued interest, future interest, and 

costs. 

{¶ 5} It is from this order that Merriman appeals, raising two 

assignments of error for review. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE 

“The court erred and denied [Merriman] due process by 

ruling on and granting Matrix’s motion for summary 

judgment prior to [the] expiration of the response time 

provided by the court’s own previous order.”

 1Matrix filed two separate supplemental memoranda in support of its motion 

for summary in August 2010. 
{¶ 6} Merriman argues the trial court prematurely granted Matrix’s 

motion for summary judgment, in direct contradiction to its August 3, 2010 

order. Matrix concedes this point and we agree. 

{¶ 7} In the instant case, the trial court set a schedule for discovery, the 

filing of dispositive motions, and the responses. The order provides in 

pertinent part: “discovery cut-off is 10/29/2010” and the “response to 

dispositive motion(s) to be filed by 11/30/2010.” On November 10, 2010, prior 

to the expiration of the stated response time, the trial court granted the 

following order: 

“[Matrix’s] motion for summary judgment as to 

[Merriman] * * * filed 07/26/2010, is granted. * * * The 

court, having considered all the evidence and having 

construed the evidence most strongly in favor of the 

non-moving party, determines that reasonable minds can 

come to but one conclusion, that there are no genuine 

issues of material fact, and that [Matrix] is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.”

{¶ 8} In Mackey v. Steve Barry Ford, Inc. (May 30, 1991), Cuyahoga App. 

No. 58681, this court addressed an analogous situation where the trial court 

granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment prior to its stated 

response deadline. We stated that: “[t]he trial court, in its inherent 

authority to set a briefing schedule for one of its cases, told the parties that 

they had until October 31, 1989 to respond to any dispositive motion. This 

order clearly afforded plaintiff the opportunity until the end of October to file 
any responsive pleadings. The court’s action on September 26, 1989 

[granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment] deprived plaintiff of the 

stated response time in which he was entitled to file briefs and evidentiary 

materials.” As a result, we found that the trial court “has inherent authority 

to conduct the management of its cases and set discovery and briefing 

schedules. To simply collapse the time for responses, without notice, after 

previously setting down a specific response time amounts in our opinion to an 

abuse of discretion.” 

{¶ 9} Just as in Mackey, the trial court in the instant case granted Matrix 

summary judgment prior to the expiration of the response time it set for 

dispositive motions. As such, we find the trial court abused its discretion. 

{¶ 10} Thus, the first assignment of error is sustained. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO 

“The court erred in granting summary judgment where 

Matrix failed to carry the moving party’s initial burden.”

{¶ 11} In the second assignment of error, Merriman argues Matrix failed 

to produce evidence demonstrating that he was the individual who opened, 

used, or was responsible for the Chase account. However, based on our 

disposition of the first assignment of error, we overrule the second assignment 

of error as moot. See App.R.12(A)(1)(c). 
{¶ 12} Accordingly, judgment is reversed. The case is remanded so 

Merriman shall have the remainder of time set by the trial court to respond to 

Matrix’s motion for summary judgment. 

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, J., and 

KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR