The Honor able Ave rn Cohn, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n Di s t ri ct of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0641n.06 No. 07-5299 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. MI CH AE LVA SSA R, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI ST R I CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

Be fore : COL E and COOK, Circ uit J udg es; COHN, District Judge. *
CO OK , Ci rc uit

Judg e . A jur

y c on vic te d Mic ha e l Va ssa r of c on sp ir ing to dis tr ibute and to pos s e s s w it

h th e in te n t to d is tr ib u te le s s th an f iv e h u n dr e d g r a ms o f c o c a in e , in v io la tion of 21 § U. S.C. 84 6, 84 1( a )( 1) , an d 841 (b )( 1) (A ), and of dis tr ibutin g c oc a ine , in viol a tio n of 2 1 § § U .S. C. 841(a) (1) a

nd 841(b)( 1)(C ). Va ssar a ppeals his conviction and se ntence . For the re asons that follow,
we a ff ir m.
I. Bac kgr ound
Vassar was a rre sted in Aug ust 2005 afte r i nvestig ators recorde d him selling 6.61 g rams of
coca ine t o Rick Fa

nn, an assoc iate of V assar ’s who had a g ree d to cooper ate with author ities. A g ra nd jur y ind ic te d V a ssa

r f or dis tr ibutin g c oc a ine (C ount 3 ), and —a lon g wi th D e we y

L y nn Phi lli ps ,No. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 2 - Jame s Ma rk Th or nto n, and Mic ha e l Ch arl e s Gun te r— fo r c on sp ir ingto d istri bu te and to p os se ss w ith the intent to distribute five kilogr ams of coc aine ( Count 1). The jury found Va ssar guilty

as cha rg ed in Count 3, and guilty

of conspiring to distribute a nd to possess with the intent to dis tribute less than 50 0 g ra ms o f c oc a ine , a c qu itt inghim of c on sp ir ing to dis tr ibute and po sse ss m or e tha n 5 00 g ra ms of coc aine. The district judg e, af ter c alculatinga Guidelines r ang e of 168 to 210 months, sentenc ed Va ssa r t o 1 44 mon ths ’ i mpr iso nme nt. Va ssa r n ow a pp e a ls.
II. Vassar’s Conviction
A. Suffic ie nc y o f the Indi c tm e nt
Va ssa r r a ise s nume ro us c ha lle ng e s to his c on vic tio n, arguin g fi rs t th a t Co un t 1 o f h is indictment was insufficient, a matter we r eview de novo. United States v. Gatewood , 173 F.3d 983, 98 6 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 9) . Sp e c if

ic a lly , V a ssa

r c la ims that Co un t 1 is un c on sti tut ion a lly va g ue be c a

us e it a ll e g e s th a t t

h e c o n s p ir a c y

b e g an“ o no r

b e f o r e Ja n u ar

y 1 , 2 0 0 4 ” an d

th a t i t i n v o lv e d

“ others known and unknown to the g rand jury .” He further protests its failure to alleg e that the c onspiracy
w a s u n l aw f

u l o r t h a t h i s p art i c i p a t i o nw a s kn o w i n g an d v o l u n t ar y.
Count 1 re a ds a s f

oll ow s:
Fr om on or befor e January 1, 2004, unti l o n o r ab o u t Aug ust 24, 2005, within t he Easter n District of Tenne ssee, the defe ndants, DEWEY L YNN PHI L L I PS, J AMES MARK THORNTON , MI CHAEL CARL VASSAR, MI CH AEL CHARL ES GUNTER, a

nd others known a

nd unknown to the g rand jury , did conspire, c on fe de rate and

a g re e wi th e a c h o the r a nd oth e rs bo th k

no wn and unkn ow n toNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 3 - distribute and to possess with intent to dis tribute five ( 5 ) kilogr ams or more of a m i x tu r e an d

s u b s t an c e c o n t a i n i n g a

d e t e c t a b l e a m o u n to f

c o c a i n e , a S c h e d

u l e II controlled substan ce , in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846, 841(a) (1) a

nd 841(b)( 1)(A)
. W e fi n d this langua g e suff icient. “An indictment is suffic ient ‘if it, first, contains the
e le me nts of

the of fe ns e c ha rg e d and fa ir ly inf

or ms a de fe nd ant of the c ha rg e a g a ins t w hic h h e mus t defe nd, and, second, enable s him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future pr osecutions for the same offe nse.’” United States v. Mohne y , 9 4 9 F. 2 d 8 9 9 , 9 0 3 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Hamling v. United States , 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). Courts have found indictments insufficie nt where they
are open-e nded as to both beg inning a nd end date s, se e Un ite d Sta te s v . Ce c il , 608 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1979), bu t su ff

ic ie nt wh e re the y fi x th e e nd of the c on sp ir a c y and pr ov ide an a

pp ro xima te start date, see United States v. Hultgren , 713 F .2 d 79, 89 (5 th C ir . 1 98 3) ; United States v. Simmons , No. 96-4196, 1998 WL231103, at *1, 1998 U.S. App. L EXI S 8222, at *3–4 (7 t h C ir. Apr. 27, 19 98 ); Un ite d S

tat es v . M itc he ll , 765 F.2d 130, 133 (10th Cir. 1985). And this court has obser ved that conspirac y

indictments ty

pically char g e “othe rs known and unknown t o the gra nd jury ;” such lang uag e d o es not rende r an indictment unc onstitut ionally vag ue. See U

nited States v. Pingleton , 216 Fe d. App’x 526, 529 (6th Ci r. 2007).
Vassar ’s rema ining challeng es to the indictment a lso la ck merit. See U nited States v. Barnes , No. 90-5165, 1991 WL1336, at *5, 1991 U.S. App. L EXI S 5 0 6 , at * 1 4 (6 th Cir. J an. 10, 1991) (i nd ic tme nt n e e d n ot s pe c if y that defendant “ kn ow ing ly ” c omm itt e d o ff e ns e be c a us e “ [i]t is we ll settled that an indictment f o r co n spiring to c ommit an offense need not a lleg e with technic alNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 4 - prec ision all the elem en t s essential to the commission of the offe nse which is the objec t of the
co n s p i ra cy ”) (c i t i n g United States v. Re ynolds , 762 F.2d 489, 494 (6th Cir. 1985) (internal c itation
and qu otatio n ma

rk s o mit te d) ). Th e di st ri ct court the re fo re c or

re c tly de nie d V a ssa

r’ s mo tio n to dismiss Count 1.
B. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence Next, Vassar a

rgues that the e v id e n c e does not suffice to sustain his conviction for conspira cy to d istri bu te c oc a ine . T his c ha lle ng e fa ils if , “a ft e r v ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the prosec ution, anyratio na l tr ie r o f f a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nt ia l e le me nts of the c ri me bey ond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). To prove a conspirac y
un de r 2 1 U .S. C. § 84 6, the g ov e rnme nt m us t dem on str ate “ (1 ) an a g re e me nt to v iol a te dr uglaws .

. . ; (2) knowledg e and intent to join t he conspira cy ; and (3) pa rticipation in the conspira cy .” United States v. Martinez , 43 0 F .3 d 31 7, 33 0 (6 th Cir
. 20 05 ). Th e a g re e me nt n e e d n ot b e fo rm a l; a “ ta c it or mater ial understandingamong the par ties” is enoug h. Id . (quo t i n g Uni ted Sta te s v . A v e ry , 128 F.3d 966, 970–71 ( 6th Cir. 1997) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Numerous witnesse s testified to Vassar ’s par ticipa ti o n in th e c o nspiracy . Stacy

L y nn Phill ips and Dewe y L y

nn Phill ips sa id that the y sold multiple-kilog ram quantities of coc aine to Va ssar fr om 20 03 thr ou g h th e su mme r o f 2 00 5. Ac c or din g to S ta c y Phi lli ps , u

p unti l late su mme r or

e arl y fa ll 2003, Vassar

boug ht a kilogr am of coca ine from him ever y fewwee ks and cla imed to be re selling it. Dewey

Phill ips testified that betwee n J anuar y 20 0 4 an d m i d-summer 2005, he sold Vassar a nNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 5 - av er ag e of one kilogr am per month, and that Michae l Gunter told Dew ey that he boug ht coca ine from Va ssar. Da

niel Rice stated that he purcha sed over two kilogr ams of coc aine, pa rt ially for
resa le, from Va ssar be tween Ma y 2004 and Janua ry 2 0 0 5
. Melissa Thomas witnessed V assar dis tr ibutin g wh a t a

pp e are d to be c oc a ine a t a loc a l ba r. F ina lly , Ri c k F ann

te sti fi e d th a t V a ssa

r s old him cocaine beg inning in e arly 2005. The e vidence sufficie ntly supports Vassar ’s conspira cy conviction. Despite a ll this testimony , Vassar urg es us to va cate his c onspiracy conviction bec ause the jury “most likely ” base d its finding of guilt on the rec orded sale of 6.61 g rams of coc aine to F ann, who was c ooperating with the g overnme nt. Vassar corr ectly observe s that an agre ement with a g overnme nt ag ent ca

nnot constitute an unlawful c onspiracy
. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . P e nn e ll , 737 F.2d 521, 536 (6th Cir. 1984). I n support of his argument, he notes that Count 3 involved a tra nsfer of
coca ine to Fa

nn, and that the jury

convicted him of conspiring to distribute less than 500 g rams of
coca ine, eve n though the evidenc e of the con s p i ra cy involving the Phillipses and others indicate d more than 500 g rams of c ocaine . Vassar relies on Y

ates v. United States , 354 U.S. 298 (1957), for th e pr op os iti on

that th e law “ re qu ir e s a ve rd ic t to be se t a sid e in c a se s w he re the ve rd ic t is supportable on one g round, but not on another, a nd it is i mpossible to t el l wh i ch gro und the jury selec ted.” Id. at 311–12.
Y ate s does not support Vassa

r’s c laim. I n Y

ates , the jury

instructions inc luded a “the ory of conviction . . . [that was] contr ar y t o law.” Griffin v. United States , 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991); seeNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 6 - Y ates , 3 54 U. S. at 31 1. He re , by c on tr a st, the ind ic tme nt and Judg e Gr e e r’ s in str

uc tio ns a c c ur a te ly state d the law; ind e e d, Va ssa r do e s no t c on te nd oth e rw ise
. Th e pr os e c uto r, a s Va ssa r con ced e s, descr ibed the conspira cy

to the jury

as involving Stac y and Dewey Phill ips selling Va ssar c ocaine that he then sold to others, a nd the evidence supports the c onviction for this conspirac y . See U nited States v. Newton , 389 F.3d 631, 636–37 ( 6th Cir. 2004 ) (upholding defe ndant’s conspira cy conviction despite testimony of g overnme nt ag en t beca use evide nce suf

fice d to show conspirac y betwee n defe ndant and other non-coope rating coconspirators). Additionally , contra

ry to Vassar ’s asser t ion, it does not follow from his acquittal for conspirac y involving more than 500 grams that the jury “re jected the Phill ips conspirac y .” The jury may have f ound bey ond a re asonab l e d o u b t Vassar ’s par ticipation in the conspirac y with the Phill ipses, but rema ined unconvinced t hat t he conspiracy involved over 500 g rams of coca ine. See Un i t ed S t a tes v. J

ackson , 4 7 3 F
. 3 d

6 6 0 , 6 6 9

– 7 0 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 7 ) ( e v id e n c e s u f f ic ie n tl y s u p p o rted conviction involving less than 50 g rams of coca ine, even though witnesses testified to more tha n 50 g rams, bec ause “ [t ]he j ury might have conclude d that eac h of the g overnme nt’s witnesses wa s
s o me w h a t—

b u t o n ly s o me w h a t— c r e d ib le , an d d is c o un te d

th e te s ti mo n y

a c c o r d in g ly” )
. We the re fo re re

je c t V a ssa

r’ s su ff ic ie nc y -o f- the -e vid e nc e argume nt.
C. Bill of

P artic ulars
Vassar also cha lleng es the adequa cy of the bill of par

ticulars. In his moti on befor e the tria l court, Va ssar re quested (a mong othe r thing s) disclosure of the name a nd addre ss of ea ch known butNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 7 - un name d c o- c on sp ir a tor , the date he joi ne d the c on sp ir a c y , an d the da te and pla c e of e a c h o f h is a c ts in f ur the ra nc e of the c on sp ir a c y . The ma g ist rate jud g e or de re d a BO P on the me anin g of

the ph ra se

“ on or be fo re J anu ary

1, 20 04 ” in C ount 1 , b ut o the rw ise de nie d V a ssa r’ s mo tio n. Va ssa

r a sse rt s that the cour

t erre d; we disagr ee. We revie w for a n abuse of

discretion. United States v. Crayton , 357 F.3d 560, 568 ( 6th Cir. 2004). A bill of particular s is “a tool to minimize surpr ise and a ssist [ the] defenda nt in obtaining the inf or ma tio n n e e de d to pr e pa

re a de fe ns e and to pr e c lud e a se c on d pro se c uti on fo r t he same c ri me s. I t is not m eant a s a t o o l
. . . to obtain detailed disclosure of all evide nce he ld by the g overnme nt befor e trial.” Un ite d S

tat es v . S ali sb ur y , 983 F.2d 1369, 1375 ( 6th Cir. 1993). I n challeng ing the district court’s de nial of a motion for a bill of pa rt i cu l ars, “ the def endant must show not only that the cour t abused its discret i o n , but that defe ndant ac tually suffe red sur

prise or othe r pre

judice at trial.” Id . at 1375.
F ir st, Va ssa

r argue s that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d by fa ili ng to g ra nt h is m oti on

wi th r e sp e c t to the ide nti tie s of unn a me d co c on sp ir a tor s in the ind ic tme nt. He c la ims that this d e fi c ie nc y pr e ve nts him from “plea d[i ng ] former jeopa rdy if cha rg ed aga in . . . with an unnamed c o-conspirator.” B ut the g overnme nt “is not require d to furnish the name [s ] o f all other c o-conspirators in a bill of particula rs.” Crayton , 357 F.3d at 56 8
. An d t o t he extent Vassar argues he w as surprise d by the g overnme nt’s use of a

ny other a lleg ed coc onspirators as w itnesses, the inclusion of “othe rs known and unknown” in the indictment provided Va ssar with suffic ient notice. Id
.No. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 8 - Second, he a

rg ues the g overnme nt’s statement reg ardingthe dates of the conspira cy

in the bill of particular s to be insufficient. The bil l of particulars ex plained that the phrase “ on or bef ore J anuar y 1, 2004” “simply

ref lects that the e x act date the conspira cy arose was unkn o wn t o the g overnme nt and the g rand jury althoug h the conspira cy

was clearly

in exi stence since on or a bout J anuar y 2004.” The bill further c larifies that t h e co n s pirac y beg an af ter Apr il 18, 2002. Vassar complains that this statement mislead him because i t d ep ri v ed him of notice that the prosec ution would prese nt Stacy

Phill ips as a witness testifying to a conspirac y

in 2003.
Vassar fails to show that the g overnme nt ina dequate ly responde d to the mag istrate judg e’s order . The bill of par

ticulars ac counted f

or the “ on or bef

ore” phrasing , and fur

ther limited the
c on sp ir a c y

to a ft e r A

pr il 1 8, 20 02 . A nd

a s w e e xpla ined, an ind ic tme nt t hat is op e n- e nd e d a s to beg inning dates but not end date s suffice s. See, e .g. , Hultgren , 713 F .2 d at 89. Va ssa r c ann ot u se a bill of particula

rs “to obtain deta iled disclosure o f all evide nce he ld by the g overnme nt before trial.” Sa lis bu ry , 983 F.2d at 1375.
Ev e n a ssumin g the g ov e rnme nt’ s bil l of pa rt ic ula rs wa s ina de qu a te , any e rr or wa s h arm le ss. See U nited States v. W

illiams , 962 F.2d 1218, 1226 ( 6th Cir. 1992) (conduc ting harmless err or
re vie w w he re g ov e rnme nt a lle g e dly fa ile d to c omp ly wi th bil l of pa rt ic ula rs or de r) . V a ssa

r a sse rt s he had no notice that the gover nment would prese nt Stacy Phill ips as a witness testify ing to a 2003 conspirac y , but the rec ord re veals the contra ry . Vassar

identified Stacy

Phill ips as a coc onspiratorNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 9 - cooper ating with the g overnme nt in his m otion for subpoena s, dated Fe bruar y 1, 2006. The district court did not err
. D. Mot ion to Qu estion the Jury F orem an
Vassar next arg ues that t he district cour t erre d by denying his re quest to question the jury fo re man a

bo ut the bas is o f t

he c on sp ir a c y

ve rd ic t. H e c la ims that th e jur y may have ba se d it s decision o nV a s s ar ’ s tr an s a c ti o nw it h F an n , an d

th a t t h e tr ia l j u d g e ’ s r e f

u s a l t o qu e s ti o nth e jury there fore violated his rig ht to a complete de fense . We reviewfor a n abuse of

discretion. United States v. Corrado , 304 F.3d 593, 603 ( 6th Cir. 2002).
We think that J udg e Gr eer corr ectly conclude d that Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 606(b) ba rre d him fr om g ra nti ngVa ssa

r’ s mo tio n. Rul e 60 6( b) pr oh ibi ts j ur or s f ro m te sti fy

ing :
as t o any matter or statement occ urringduring the cour se of the jur y ’s deliber ations or to the ef

fec t of anyt h i n g upon that or any other juror ’s mind or emotions as influencingthe juror to asse nt to or dissent from the ver dict o r i n d i ctment or conce rning the juror’ s mental proce sses in connec tion therewith.
See also United States v . Tines , 70 F.3d 891, 898 ( 6th Cir. 1995) (“A jur y ’s interpre tation and application of the co u rt ’s i n s t ructions is a par t of the deliber ative proc ess . . . cor rec tly excluded under Rule 606(b).” ). For policy rea sons, c ourts disfavor interrog ations into the jur y proce ss. See, e.g. , United States v. Logan , 250 F.3d 350, 379 (6th Cir. 2001). Rule 606(b) pe rmits a juror to testifyNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 10 - about pre judicial information or outside influenc e “imprope rly broug ht to the jury ’s attention,” but Vassar made no suc h showing here . The district cour t properly denied Va ssar’s motion.
E. Admission of

Coconspirator’ s Statem ents
Vassar c la im s th a t t

h e d is tr ic t c o u rt e r

r e d b y a ll o w in g D e w e y

Ph il li p s to te s ti f

y about statements made by

co-de fenda

nt Mic hael Gunter. The district cour t allowed the testimony

pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Evidence 801(d)( 2)(E) , which provides that: “[a] statement i s not hearsa y if . . . [it ] is o ff e re d a g a ins t a

pa rt y and is .
. . a state me nt by a c oc on sp ir a tor of a pa rt y duri ngthe c ours e and in furthe ranc e of the conspirac y .” To prope rl y ad m i t such statements, “it must first be deter mined that the conspirac y exis ted, that the def endant wa s a member

of the c onspiracy , and that th e c o - c o n s p ir a to r ’ s s tate me n ts w e r e ma d e ‘ in f u rth e r an c e o f th e c o n s p ir a c y . ’” United States v. Ge ssa , 9 7 1 F. 2 d

1 2 5 7 , 1 2 6 1 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 2 ) ( en b an c) (q u o t i n g United S t a t es v. V i n s on , 606 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1979)). We re view for clea r er ror. Id.
Va s s ar as s er t s t h at Gu n t er ’s s t at em en tt h a tVa s s ar s ai d Gu n t er m i gh tb e ab l e t o get dru gs from De wey Phill ips was “insufficient to establish a conspiracy ,” but he off ers no a rg ument. And as t he dis trict court reasone d: “The statement . . . attributed to Mr. Vassar, that Mr. Phill ips might be able to help Mr. Gunter , clea rly is an ef

fort to continue the illeg al conspira cy ; that is, Mr. Phi llips becominga sourc e of the coca ine rather than Mr . Vassar .” Va ssar ne x t argues that there was “ not a scintilla of evide nce” of the c onspiracy other than G unter’s statements, violating the rule that “[t] he contents of the statement . . . ar e not alone suf ficient to e stablish .
. . the exis tence of the conspira cyNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 11 - and the pa

rticipation there in of the dec lara nt and the party ag ainst whom the statement is offer ed.” Fe d. R. Evid. 801(d)( 2). Va ssar is mistaken that no evide nce e x isted. Stacy Phill ips testified that he ob ta ine d k ilo g ra

ms o f c oc a ine fo r Vas sar to dis tr ibute , a nd De we y Phi lli ps sa id t

hat he so ld Va ssa r a kil og ra m of c oc a ine mon thl y in 200 4 an d 2 00 5, and tha t he so ld a

kil og ra m of c oc a ine to Gunter. Such evidenc e suffices for Rule 801(d)(2) purposes. See United States v. Pierc e , 62 F.3d 8 1 8 , 8 2 7 ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) ( o b s e r v i n g t h a tt h e c o u rtn e e d s o n l y “ some independe nt, corrobor ating evidenc e” in or der to a dmit the coconspirator ’s statements). Finally , Vassar

contends De wey

Phill ips’s testimony

that Vassar no longe r sold drug s at the time Phil lips spoke with Gunter “de feated [his] being a member of [the] all ege d conspirac y ,”
r e n d e r in g G u n te r ’ s s tate me n ts in a d mi s s ib le
. See Fe d. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)( E) (state ment must be made “ during the cour se . . . of the conspirac y .”). B ut “[e]ven assuming that [Vassar] was no long er
an ac tive participa

nt in the conspirac y

. . . he is nonetheless pr esumed to be a continuing me mber, and is cha rg eable for the subsequent acts of co-c onspirators, so long [as] the conspira cy was ong oing and [Vassar] did not establish his affirmative w ithdrawa l from the conspira cy .” Unit ed Stat es v. Robinson , 390 F.3d 853, 882 (6th Cir. 2004). The dist rict court did not err by admitting Gunter ’s
ou t- of -c ourt state me nts
.
F . A dm iss ion of F ann’ s R e c or de d St at e m e nt
C i t i n g Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004), Vassar next argues that the district cour t violated his Si x t h Amendment Confrontation Cl ause r ights by admitting a r ecor ded hea rsayNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 12 - statement made by Rick Fa nn. But a statement is he arsa y only if offe red to pr ove t h e t ru t h o f t he matter as s er t ed. See Fe d. R. Evid. 801(c). In the re cordingat issue, Fa nn leave s a voice mail for “Mike” stating that he is looking to obtain a c ouple of c ar w indows. At trial, Fa nn testified that he and Va ssar spoke in c ode about dr ug transac tions, using ca r par ts t o re prese nt coca ine. The
rec ording thus de monstrated that Fa nn made statements to V assar about car s—it wa s not submit ted to prove the truth of Fa

nn’s statements. Indeed, the g overnme nt acknowle dg ed that F ann’s state ment
wa s “ on its fa c e fa lse .” Th e a dmi ssi on of F ann ’s vo ic e ma il m e ssa g e the re fo re did no t im pli c a te Vassar ’s Confronta t i o n C l au s e rig hts. See Tenne ssee v . Street , 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985) (“ The nonhear say

aspec t [ of an out-of

-cour t statement] . . . raises no Confrontation Clause conc erns.” ).
G. R ule 17(c) Subpoenas
Va ssa r f a ult s th e dis tr ic t

c ourt fo r q ua sh inga ho st o f s ub po e na s h e iss ue d und e r t he os te ns ibl e authority of F eder al Rule of Criminal Proc edure Rule 17(c)
. A par ty may use Rule 17(c ) subpoena s to o bta in d oc ument s if ( 1) the ite ms a re e vid e nti ary

and re le va nt; (2 ) t he ite ms a

re no t ot he rw ise procur able throug h due dilige nce pr ior to trial; (3) the pa rty cannot properly prepa

re f or trial without
su c h p re -t ri a l pro du c tio n an d insp e c tio n; a nd (4 ) t he a pp lic a tio n is ma de in g oo d f a ithand is n ot a fishing e x pedition. United States v. Nixon , 418 U.S. 683, 699 (1974). But such subpoenas are not intended to provide a means of disc overy for c riminal case s, United States v. J ustice , 14 F. App’ x 426, 432 (6th Cir. 2001), and the de cision to enforc e or quash a pretrial subpoena under Rule 17( c)
re sts wi th t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

and wi ll b e dis tur

be d o n a ppeal on ly

wh e re the a c tio n w a s c le arl yNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 13 - arbitra ry or without support in the rec ord. United States v. Hughe s , 895 F.2d 1135, 1145 (6th Cir. 1990).
Vassar ’s subpoena s sought r ecor ds, documents, and c omputer data from var ious law
e nf or c e me nt a g e nc ie s c on c e rn ingthe c ri min a l a c tiv ities of e ig ht p ote nti a l w itn e sse s a g a ins t hi m. Af te r r e vie wi ngthe su

bp oe na s’ c on te nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld that the y fa ile d to satis fy the re qu isi te criter ia, l arg ely beca

use t hey soug ht internal investigative files and gene ral im peac hment evidenc e, neither of which is a prope r subject f or a Rule 17(c) subpoe na. See U nited States v. Cuthbertson , 651 F.2d 1 89, 192 (3d Cir. 1981) (ina dmissibl e hea rsay materia ls not subject to Rul e 17(c )
su bp oe na ); Nixon , 4 18 U. S. at 70 1 ( “ the ne e d f or e vid e nc e to i mpe a c h witne sse s is ins uf fi c ie nt t o require its production in advance of trial.”)
. At the s ame tim e, however, the district court orde red production of c erta in documents and c larified th at i t placed no r estrictions on Vassa r’s use of compulsory

proce ss to obtain witnesses or documents for prese ntation at t rial (a nd, in fac t, Vassar later a vailed himself of this opportunity). On a ppeal, Va ssar identifies no err or in the district court’ s
ana ly sis . B e c a

us e the c ourt pr op e rl y lim ite d Va ssa r’ s use of Rul e 17 (c ) sub po e na s to pre ve nt h im fr om e mba

rk ing up on a c os tly and tim e -c on su min g fi sh ing e xpe dit ion , we c on c lud e that no a bu se
occur red.
H. P rosec utorial Misconduct
Vassar complains of four statements from the prosecutor’s closing arg ument, claiming that each o n e co n stitut es prose cutorial misconduct e ntitli ng him to a new trial. Only one of theNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 14 - sta t em ents drewan objec tion. W e re view that stateme nt for an a buse of discr etion, United States v. Tocco , 200 F.3d 401, 420 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 0 ), and the other s for plain e rror , United States v. Emuegbunam , 2 6 8 F. 3d 377, 406 (6th Cir. 2001). A two-step a naly sis applies to prosecutoria l misconduct claims. Fir st we dete rmine w h et h er the prosec utor’s statements we re imprope r, and then, i f t h ey were, we decide whether the statements we re f

lag rant in lig ht of four f

actor s: (1) whether they tended to mislea d the jury or pre judice the a ccuse d; (2) whe ther they wer e isolated or extensive; (3) whethe r they wer e deliber ately

made; and ( 4) the stre ng th of the evidence ag ainst the defe ndant. United States v. J ackson , 473 F.3d 660, 670 ( 6th Cir. 2007).
Va ssa r s ug g e sts that th e pr os e c uto r’ s r e fe re nc e s to “ oth e r contro lle d s ub sta nc e s” in h is summary of F ann’s testimony was improper

beca use the judg e had spe cifica lly order ed F ann to re fer only to “another substance” when testify ing about the other drug he said he order ed fr om Vassar , but this arg ument misrepre sents the re cord. The district judge instructed F ann to re fer to a “c ontrolled substance” rathe r than spec ifically identifying the drug as methamphe tamine. The pr osecutor’ s statements square d with both Fann’ s testimony and the judge’ s order s; thus, Vassar’s a rg ument lacks merit.
N ex t , Va s s ar

ac cu s es t h e p ro s ec u t o r o f c o m m i t t i n g m i s co n d u ct b y “i mp ro p er l y

[ t el l i n g] pe rs on a l st or ie s a

bo ut h is c hil dh oo d. ” Th e pr os e c uto r u rg e d th e jur

y no t to con si der th e po ssi ble g uilt or punishment of others, illustrating hi s p o i n t wi th a per sonal ane cdote involving his own attempts as a c hild to escape punishment for his misconduct by emphasizin g his brother’sNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 15 - malfea sance . The de fense employ ed a strateg y of defle cting attention from Vassar ’s conduc t toward that of his c oc on sp ir a tor s. Th e pr os e c uto r re sp on de d to thi s str a te g y by imp lor ing the jur or s n ot t o
c on sid e r the g uil t of

oth e rs bu t to fo c us on

the a c tio ns of

the a c c us e d. I n a

n e ff or t to e luc idate thi s (e nti re ly pr op e r) argume nt, the pr os e c uto r use d an e xamp le fr om h is o wn pa st. I n d oin g so , h e did
no t e xpre ss a

ny pe rs on a l opin ion

a s to the de fe nd ant’ s guil t, n or wa s th e sto ry

c a lc ulate d to inf

lame the jury . As such, no impropriety occur red.
Va ssa r a lso pr ote sts the pr os e c uto r’ s c ha ra c te ri zat ion

of de fe ns e argume nts a s “ re d h e rr ing s”
and “ c re a tiv e fi c tio n. ” Th is c ourt (l ike many

oth e rs ) f re qu e ntly us e s th e te rm

“ re d h e rr ing ” to descr ibe a fallac ious argument that distracts fr om the truth, see, e .g. , Un ite d S tat es v . U rri e ta , 520 F .3 d 5 69 , 5 82 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) , a nd ha s e xpre ssl y

a pp ro ve d a pr os e c uto r’ s u se of

the same te rm

in situations si milar to this one, United States v. More no , 899 F.2d 465, 468 ( 6th Cir. 1990). L ikewise, the prosec utor’s use of

“cr eative f

iction” in ref

ere nce to de fense ’s contention that an audio re cording somehow evinc ed Fann and Vassar sniffing coca ine consti tuted a prope r mea ns of sug g esting to the jury that, based upon the evidence presented at trial, the arg ument was im plausible and unworthy of belief. See U

nited States v. Collins , 78 F.3d 1021, 1040 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[C] ounsel must be g iven leewa y to argue re asonable infere nces f rom the evide nce.” ).
F ina lly , d ur ingc losi ng arg ume nt, the pr os e c uto r r e mark e d th a t “ no on e inv olv e d in thi s
narc otics traff

icking is goingto esca

pe justice.” This drew a

n objection from Vassar , and on appea l he c ha lle ng e s th is sta

te me nt a s an imp ro pe r e xpre ssi on of pe rs on a l op ini on . T he g ov e rnme nt r e bu tsNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 16 - Vassar ’s ar g ument wi t h two points. First, the rec ord lends some support to the stateme nt—a g overnme nt ag ent had testified a bout pending char g es a g ainst Stacy Phill ips, one of Va ssar’s
c oc on sp ir a tor s. Se c on d, the c omm e nt s ho uld be tol e ra te d be c a us e the pr os e c uto r m a de it i n r e sp on se to Vassar ’s ar g ument that the g overnme nt permitted more culpable individuals to avoid prosecution in exchang e for

testify ing a g ainst him. See B yrd v. Collins , 20 9 F .3 d 4 86 , 5 35 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) (“ Ca se law per mits comments that ar e made in r esponse to the argument and strateg y of def ense c ounsel.”) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s and c itatio n o mitte d) . A lth ou g h w e fi nd the govern ment argume nts pe rs ua siv e , w e ne e d n ot d e c ide thi s is su e . E ve n if the c omm e nt suf fe rs fr om som e imp ro pr ie ty , it
was a n isolated rema

rk unlikely

to cause prejudice and ther efor e does not wa rra nt a new trial. See United States v. Carter , 236 F.3d 777, 788 (6th Cir. 2001) (excusing imprope r comments as me re isolated rema

rks). B eca

use all of t h e s tatements fa ll short under the Jack son fac tors, we r ejec t Va ssa r’ s c la im.
I. Jur y I nst r uc ti ons
Th is c ou rt “rev ie w[s ] jur y ins tr uc tio ns a s a

wh ole to d e te rm ine wh e the r t he y a de qu a te ly inform the jury

of re levant conside rations and pr ovide a sound basis in law to aid the jury in rea ching its decision.” United States v. Layne , 192 F.3d 556, 574 ( 6th Cir. 1999). We r eview for a n abuse of discretion, and reve rse only wher e the instructions f ail to a ccur ately ref

lect the law or, if “view ed as
a whole, [t hey ] we re confusing , misleading , or pre judicial.” United St ates v. Prince , 214 F.3d 740, 761 (6th Cir. 2000) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted).No. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 17 - Vassar challeng es seve ral of the district court’s instructions. Fir st, he asser ts that he “wa s entitled to a cha

rg e on his theory

of defense” for Count 3. J udg e Gr eer instructed the jury

that Vassar denied distributing coca ine “on or about J une 16, 2005 as char g ed,” but V assar complains that the judge should have told the jury that Vassar admitted to drug addiction from 2004 to 2005, he use d
coca ine on J une 16, 2005 with Rick Fa nn, and his “only

offe nse” w as simple possession. The law, howeve r, does not entitle Va ssar to suc h an instruction. The district c ourt need not use a de fenda nt’s lang uag e in an inst ruction if its own “is ac curate and suff icient.” United States v. Mac k , 159 F.3d 208 , 2 1 8 ( 6 th

Ci r . 1 9 9 8 ) ( in te r

n a l q u o tati o nma

r k s an d c it a ti o no mi tt e d )
. V a s s ar ’ s p r o p osed instruction does not constitute a statement of law, but r ather repr esents a denial of the char g es and Va ssa r’ s v ie w o f the fa c ts. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t c omm it r e ve rs ibl e e rr or in d e c lin ingto g ive thi s instruction. Id. (no er

ror wher e instruction is not a statement of law but only an explanation of what de fe nd ant w ou ld h a ve state d h a d h e te sti fi e d) ; Un ite d Stat es v. C ho wdh ur y , 16 9 F .3 d 4 02 , 4 07 (6 th C i r . 1 9 9 9 ) ( n o r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r w h e r e d e f

e n s e ’ s p r o p o s e d i n s t r

u c t i o n w a s n o t a “ d i s t i n c t l e g a l t h e o r y” but merely

“a r ecitation of [Def

endant’ s] vi ew of

the fa cts”). Second, Va ssar c laims that the distric t co u rt er red by ref using to g ive a “ buy er- seller instruction.” He a

rg ues that such instructions ar e mandatory “whe n raised by

the eviden ce ” and fail u re to give the instruction confuse d the jury “as to the diff

ere nce be tween a

buy er- seller
r e lati o n s h ip an d a c o n s p ir a c y . ” H e r e , th e g o v e r n me n t p r e s e n te d e v id e n c e o f r e p e a t purcha ses of larg e drugquantities—evidenc e that supports a f inding of a conspira cy , not of a mer e buy er- seller relationship. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . B ro wn , 3 32 F .3 d 3 63 , 3 73 (6 th Cir . 200 3) . And “ a c on vic tio n w illNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 18 - no t be re ve rs e d f

or fa ilure to g ive a

buy e r- se lle r ins tr

uc tio n wh e re the dis tr ic t c ourt g a ve c omp le te instructions on the elements of c onspiracy .” United States v. Music k , 29 1 F
. Ap p’ x. 70 6, 73 0 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Riggs v. United States , 20 9 F .3 d 8 28 , 8 33 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt did not err in r efusingto give this inst ruction. Third, Vassa

r asse rts that t h e d i strict court should have included the names of the c odefe ndants in the court’ s jury instruction pertaining to the conspirac y char g ed in Count 1 of the indictment. The district court, f ollowing both the indictment and pattern instruction, listed the
c o- de fe nd ants c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt i n it s in str uc tio n a nd tol d th e jur

y that, t o ret ur

n a g uil ty verdic t, it mus t find Vassar a member of t he conspiracy char g ed in the indictment. The instruc tion
acc urate ly

stated the law, and Vassar offers no a rg ument to the contra

ry nor any authority to support his claim that the district court erre d. The dist rict court properly instructed the jury

on the conspira cy
co u nt. Se e id
. ( c o u rt n o t r e qu ir e d to in s tr u c t t h e ju r y th a t a c o n s p ir a c y

c an n o t e xis t b e tw een defe ndant and a

g overnme nt ag ent where “conspirac y involved multipl e other

persons with whom it was leg ally

possible for appe llant to conspire”)
. Finally , he cha lleng es Judge Gr eer ’s re fu s al t o instruct the jurors on simple possession. Va ssa r a pp e ars to a c kn ow le dg e tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt

c or re c tly de nie d h is r e qu e st w ithre sp e c t to Count 3, because simple possession is not a lesser-included offense of di stribution of a controlled substance. See U

nited States v. Colon , 268 F.3d 367, 376–77 ( 6th Cir. 2001). I nstead, he argues that the district court erre d by ref using this instruction for Count 1. But simple possession also does notNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 19 - c on sti tut e a

le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of c on sp ir a c y

to dis tr ibute a

nd po sse ss w ithint e nt t o d istri bu te
coca ine. Se e id . at 37 6. Thus , V a ssa r’ s c la im la c ks me ri t. We c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt did
n o ta b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o ni ni n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r

y.
III. Vassar’s Sentence
A. Re lyi ng o n Ac quit te d Co nduc t a t S e nt e nc ing
Va ssa r d isp ute s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on to f ind a fa c t tha t dif

fe re d fr om a

jur y -f ound fa c t. Spe c if ic a lly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d th a t he “ wa s in vo lve d in the dis tr ibutio n o r c on sp ir a c y to distribute betwee n 3.5 to 5 kilos of cocaine ,” while the jur y found Va ssar not g uilty

of cons piring to distribute more than 500 g rams. According to Vassar , this amounted to sentencinghim “for a n incorre ct conspirac y offe nse of conviction” in violation of both the Six th A mendment and t he principles of issue pr eclusion. Appe llant’s Br . at 65–68. We disag ree . As for his Six th Amendment jury -trial rig ht cha ll e n g e , V a s s a r fundame ntally

misunderstands the meaningof a jury ’s ac quittal. An acquittal is not a finding of innoce nce, but mer ely a neg ative statement that the e vidence fell short of pur g ing the jury ’s rea sonable doubts and ther efor e could not sustain a conviction. Un ite d Sta te s v . W hit e , 551 F .3 d 381 , 385 (6 th Cir . 200 8) (e n b anc ). F or Sixth Am e ndme nt p ur

po se s, thi s is the imp or

tant p oin t: T he jur

y found Va ssa

r guil ty of c on sp ir ingto distribute less than 500 g rams of c ocaine , and that ver dict alone e x posed Va ssar to a ma x imum
se nte nc e of

30 y e ars ’ i mpri so nmen t. 2 1 U .S. C. § § 8 41 (a )( 1) & 84 6. Al tho ug h th e dis tr ic t c ourt ,No. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

Va ssa r’ s b ri e f w ro ng ly

imp lie s a di s t i n c t i o n

b e t w e e n i s s u e p r e c l u s i o n

a n d c o l l a t e ra l e sto pp e l; 1 those are mere ly

differ ent names f

or the same doc trine. Dodrill v. Ludt , 764 F.2d 442, 443 ( 6th Cir. 1985). - 20 - in selecting a sente nce w ithin the rang e author iz ed b y the statute of c onviction, not only relied on
a c qu itt e d co nd

uc t but a lso us e d a

pr e po nd e ra

nc e sta nd ard , th is d oe s n ot r

un a fo ul o f t

he Sixth Am e ndme nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ne ith e r s e nte nc e d V a ssa r f or a c qu itt e d c on du c t no r i mp os ed its sentenc e under

an incor rec t statute of conviction. See W hit e , 5 51 F .3 d at 38 5. Thus , V a ssa r’ s Sixth Amendment cha lleng e fa ils.
Va ssa r i s c or re c t th a t se nte nc ing c ourt s “c ann ot re ly on a fi nd ingthat di re c tly

c on fl ic ts w ith the jury ’s ver dict.” Un ite d S tat es v . Co c k

e tt , 330 F.3d 706, 711 ( 6th Cir. 2003). B ut here , g iven the differ ing sta

ndards of proof, ther e is no conflict. Ag ain, the district cour t found by a preponderanc e of the evide nce that the conspira cy involved more than 500 g rams of c ocaine , while the jury found that th e e vid e nc e did

no t ov e rc ome its reasonable doubt . These f indings do not conf

lict. The differing standards of proof also doom Vassar ’s i ssue-pre clusion argument. Acc ording to Vassar , “issue pre clusion and collate ral e stoppel prohibit[ ed] J udg e Gr eer from ac ting a s a trier of fa c t to fi nd

a con sp ir acy

ob je c t di ff e re nt f ro m th e ob

je c t f ound by the jur y .” Th is a

rgume nt i s 1 flawe d. I ssue pre clusion, which bar s the relitig ation of a pr eviously decide d issue, only

operates if, among other re quirements, the previously decide d issue is “identica l” to the cur rent issue. N.L.R.B.

v. Master Slack and/or Master Trousers Corp. , 773 F.2d 77, 81 (6th Cir. 1985). Her e, because the stan d ards of proof diff

ere d, the issue at trial wa s not identical to the issue at sentenc ing, a nd theNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 21 - jury ’s ac quittal therefor e did not prec lude the district cour t’s drug -we ight f

inding.
B. P r oc e dur al a nd Subs ta nt ive Re as ona ble ne ss
Va ssa r c ha lle ng e s h is se nte nc e a s p ro c e dura lly and su bs tanti ve ly

un re a so na

ble . We be g in with his procedur al claims, finding that only one mer i t s d i s cu s sion. Vassar ma intains that Amendment 709 to § 4A1.2 of the SentencingGuidelines, issued seve ral months afte r his s entenc ing hear ing, r etroa ctively

undermines the district court’s cr iminal hist ory calc ulation. Not so. The district court cor

rec tly sentenc ed Va ssar unde r the ve rsion of the Guidelines in e ffe ct at the time of sentenc ing, United States v. Murillo-Inigue z , 318 F.3d 709, 714 (6 t h C i r. 2003), and Amendment 709 does not apply

retroa ctively , United States v. W ood , 5 26 F .3 d 8 2, 88 (3d Cir . 2 00 8) ; United States v. Marler , 5 27 F .3 d 8 74 , 8 77 n. 1 ( 9th Cir . 2 00 8) ; s e e a l

s o U n i t e d S t a te s v . S mi th , 30 7 F. Ap p ’x 9 6 6 , 9 6 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g W ood and Ma rle r with approva l in dicta). Turning to V a s s a r ’ s substantive claims, we star t by presuming the re asonable ness of Va ssar’s below-G uidelines sentenc e. United States v. Bailey , 264 F. App’x 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2008) (Just as we pr esume the r easona

bleness of a

within-Guidelines sentenc e, “it follows fr om simpl e log ic that [a] b e low -G uid e lin es sen tence
. . . is pr e su me d n ot t o b e un re a so na bly se ve re .” ). Va ssa

r f a ils to rebut this pre sumption. He first argues that, compar ed to his coconspirators’ sentenc es, his belowGuidelines sentenc e re flec ts an unwarra nted di sparity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6). And this d i s p ar ity , so the argument g oes, is the produc t of “prose cutorial misconduct by selec tive application manipulating the USSGs.” Appellant’s B r. at 62. We disag ree .No. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 22 - “Dispar ities betwee n the sentenc es of c oconspirator s can ex i s t for valid re asons, such a s differ ence s in criminal histories, the offe nses of c onviction, or one coconspirator’s decision to plead g uilty and coope rate with the g overnme nt.” United States v. Conatser , 514 F.3d 508, 522 ( 6th Cir. 2008). He re, a

n important differ ence j u s t i fi es the dispar ity that Vassar

challeng es—Va ssar’s coconspirators acc epted re s p o nsibili ty for their

criminal conduc t and coope rate d with law enfor ceme nt; Vas s ar d i d not. Accountingfor that diff ere nce—both in the pr osecutor’ s char g ing deter minations and in the court’s se ntencingdecisions—neither evidenc es prose cutorial misconduct nor contra

venes substantive r easona bleness. And more g ener ally , beca use Va ssar’s sentenc e fe ll below the Guidelines’ r ecommendation, his unw arr anted disparity claim stands on espec ially shaky g round. The Seventh C i rc u i t h as ob se rv e d th a t “ it i s p oin tle ss” fo r d e fe nd ants who r e c e ive wi thi n- Gu ide lin e s se nte nc e s to ra ise
unwar rante d-disparity

claims. United States v. Shrake , 5 15 F .3 d 7 43 , 7 48 (7 th C ir . 2 00 8) ; se e als o United States v. Kirchhof , 505 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2007). The G uidelines exist to help ensure that simil arly -situated def endants a re punished similarly
. United States v. Bosc arino, 437 F.3d 634, 6 3 8 (7 t h Cir. 2006). Thus, “[s] entenc ing dispa rities are at their e bb when the Guidelines are fo llo we d.
. . . T he mor e ou t- of -r ang e se nte nc e s th a t ju dg e s im po se . . . , th e mor e dis pa

ri ty the re wi ll be. A sentenc e within a proper ly asce rtained rang e there fore cannot be treated as unre asonable by ref ere nce to § 3553( a)( 6).” Id
. This r ationale applies with g reater forc e to defe ndants like Vassa r, who re ceive a below- Guidelines sentenc e.No. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 23 - Vassar never theless insists, despite the absenc e of supporting e vidence , that prosec utors “sec retly manipulated” his c oconspirator s’ sentenc es. Even if that alleg ation wer e tr u e—Va ssar offe rs nothing sug g esting it is—i t would not chang e our review he re, w hich conc erns only Vassar ’s
se nte nc e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt , a d d r e s s i n g V a s s a r ’ s p r o s e c ut o r i a l m i s c o n du c t and unwa rr ante d d isp ari ty
c la ims a t th e se nte nc inghe ari ng , c le arl y art ic ulate d th e fl aw i n V a ssa r’ s p os iti on :
Your attorney

. . . doesn’t ar g ue that somehow t he g overnme nt has made your sentenc e potentially

highe r through its char g ing de cisions; he argues that the g overnme nt has made othe rs’ s entenc es lower than the re al conduc t justi fied. I fr ankly do n’t se e ho w you or any de fe nd ant i n your s itu a tio n c an le g iti ma te ly complain that s o m eb o d y

else ha s g otten a lesser

sentenc e. To the e x tent that the g ov e rnme nt’ s c ha

rg ing de c isi on s or ple a ba rg a ini ng de c isi on s r e su lt i n d isp ari tie s, it se e ms to me that is up to t he c on g re ss t o a dd

re ss o r t he pu bli c to a dd

re ss; and that to [g ra nt a larg e r d ow nw ard

va ri anc e in t

his c a se ] wo uld

sim ply re qu ir e thi s cou rt to l o we r all sentenc es down to the leve l of the most lenient sentenc e that’s be en imp os e d. Ido n’ t th ink

that’ s w hat th e law requ ir es . . . a nd Ire je c t th a t a s a leg itimate consideration in sentence.

SentencingTr. 173–74. We ag ree with the district court. That his coc onspirators may have r ece ived lesser se ntence s does not by itself prove that Vassar ’s sentenc e is unr easona bly sever e, but is just as likely to show that his coconspirator s were sentenc ed too le niently
. And acc epting Vassar ’s position would cre ate a

rac e to the bottom in sentenc ing, forc ing district c ourts to se lect incre asing ly lenient
se nte nc e s.
Va ssa r a lso a tta c ks his se nte nc e ’s su bs tanti ve re a so na

ble ne ss o n th e g round that, i n h is
e sti ma tio n, his c on du c t do e s n ot q ua lif y a s a “ pe r se a ser iou s o ff

e ns e ,” bu t in ste a d amou

nts toNo. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 24 - nothing more than a “ casua l exchang e of dr ug s.” This char acte rization belittles the seriousne ss of Vassar ’s ac tions and belies the re cord in this case , which supports t h e d i s t ri ct court’s finding that Vassar traff icked at least 3.5 kilos of cocaine. Sentencing Tr. at 171. Vassar ’s 144-month sentenc e, which is well below the Guidelines ra ng e of 168 to 210 months, a lrea dy includes a la rg e downwa

rd varia nce, a nd he fa ils to show that his situati o n is so ex traordina ry as to requir e an e ven lar g er varia nce. We r ejec t Vassar ’s substantive re asonable ness cha lleng es.
C. Di sc ov e r y a t S e nt e nc ing
Vassar takes issue with the district c o u rt ’s d ecision deny ing him discove ry for se ntencing purp os e s. Ap pe lla

nt’ s B r. at 72 –7 3. Va ssa r do e s no t, ho we ve r, sp e c if y the inf or ma tio n he wo uld have soug ht in discovery
. Nor does he ex plain how t he publi cally available source s of information proved ina dequate for his purposes , a def ect that other

circ uit courts have r elied on in af firming d e n i a l s o f s e n t e n c i n g d i s c o v e r

y. See, e .g. , Un ite d S

tat es v . S po tte d E lk, 548 F.3d 641, 672 ( 8th Cir. 20 08 ) ( a ff

ir min g de c isi on

de nyingde fe nd ant a c c e ss t o h is c oc on sp irato rs’ PSRs) . V a ssa r m e re ly
ma int a ins that F e de ra l Ru le of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 32 (i )( 4) (i i) and U.S.S.G . § 6. A1 .3 su pp or t hi s discovery reque sts. W e re ad those rule s more nar rowly
. Rule 32(i)(4) (ii), rathe r than providing a broad rig ht to discovery , only require s a sentenc ing court “ to addre ss the defe ndant personally in order to pe rmit the defe ndant to speak or prese nt any information to mitigate the sentenc e.” The rule, in other words, allows de fenda

nts to present the information they

have.No. 07-5299

United States v. Vassar

- 25 - Nor doe s U.S.S.G. § 6.A1.3 aid Vassar . That Guideline te l l s u s , among other points, that “[w]hen any

fac tor import ant t o the sentenc ing de termination is rea sonably in dispute, the parties shall be g iven an a dequate opportunity to present infor

mation to the court re g arding that fac tor.” Id. U.S.S.G. § 6.A1.3 mentions nothi ng conce rning discovery
. I n the absence of e x press statutory authority , and without expli cit g uidance from the Sentencing Commi ssion, we leave the matter of sentenc ing disc overy

to the district court’s sound discretion. And be cause we d i s ce rn no abuse of discre tion here, w e re ject Va ssar’s discove ry arguments.
Vassar makes a related ar g ument that U.S.S.G. § 6.A1.3 somehow constrains the tim ing of sentenc ing he aring s. More spec ifically , he say s that the district cou rt er re d by “set[ting] Vassar’ s
s en t en ci n g af

t er co -c o n s p i ra t o rs wh o we re n o tas s er t i n g § 3 5 5 3 (a )( 1 )( 6 ) d i s p ar i t y , [ t h er eb y fa i l i n g] to provide Va ssar a

n adequate opportunity

to present r eleva

nt information.” Appe llant’s Br . at 73–74 (interna l quotation mar ks omitted). Vassar ag ain runs roug hshod over the ac tual lang uag e of U.S.S.G. § 6.A1.3, which say s nothing a bout scheduling sentenc ing he aring s.
Vassar raises othe r arg uments challeng ing his conviction and se ntence . We have c onsidered t h o s e a rgu m en t s an d

v i ew t h em as l ac k i n g.
AFF I RMED.