alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 23, 2015

No. 04-15-00408-CR

Armando Garcia VILLEGAS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 4, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 365296

Honorable Jason Garrahan, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Appellant’s brief was due to be filed on September 16, 2015. To date, neither the 

appellant’s brief nor a motion for extension of time has been filed. The clerk of this court has 

attempted to contact counsel by telephone but has been unsuccessful.

It is therefore ORDERED that either the appellant’s brief or a motion for extension of 

time to file appellant’s brief must be filed in this Court within ten days of the date of this 

order. Any motion for extension should include a reasonable explanation for the failure to 

timely file the appellant’s brief and the failure to timely file the motion for extension.

If counsel fails to timely respond, we will abate the case to the trial court for an 

abandonment hearing pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b).

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

N WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 23rd day of September, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Charles Arnold SEESHOLTS, Appellant, v. Elizabeth P. SEESHOLTS, Appellee.

No. 69-258.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 22, 1970.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Palm Beach County; James R. Stewart, Jr., Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
No. 11289.

#### Gill *v.*The State of Ohio.

Decided October 13, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Cuyahoga county.

*Mr. W. H. Boyd*and *Messr-s. Ross & Klingman,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. S. V. McMahon,*prosecuting attorney, and *Mr. P. L. A. Leighley,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Price, C. J., Shauck, Crew, Summers, Spear and Davis, JJ., concur.
# C_2021028EN.01005901.xml

| 25.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 28/59 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 28/59

---

Action brought on 18 November 2020 — Canisius v EUIPO — Beiersdorf (CCLABELLE VIENNA)

(Case T-694/20)

(2021/C 28/88)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Maria Alexandra Canisius (Vienna, Austria) (represented by: H. Asenbauer, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Beiersdorf AG (Hamburg, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark containing the word element CCLABELLE VIENNA — Application for registration No 17 592 461

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 September 2020 in Case R 2233/2019-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | partially annul the contested decision insofar as the opposition was upheld in respect of the goods in Classes 3 and 16; |
| --- | --- |

—

partially annul the contested decision insofar as the opposition was upheld in respect of the goods in Classes 3 and 16;

| — | order the defendant and Beiersdorf, should Beiersdorf join this proceeding, to pay its own costs and to bear all the fees and costs of the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant and Beiersdorf, should Beiersdorf join this proceeding, to pay its own costs and to bear all the fees and costs of the applicant;

| — | dismiss the opposition brought by Beiersdorf against the registration of application No 17 592 461 and order EUIPO to allow the (contested) application No 17 592 461 to proceed to the registration in relation to all goods and services applied for in Classes 3, 16, and 25 as well as order Beiersdorf to bear its own costs and pay all the fees and costs incurred by the applicant due to the opposition proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

dismiss the opposition brought by Beiersdorf against the registration of application No 17 592 461 and order EUIPO to allow the (contested) application No 17 592 461 to proceed to the registration in relation to all goods and services applied for in Classes 3, 16, and 25 as well as order Beiersdorf to bear its own costs and pay all the fees and costs incurred by the applicant due to the opposition proceedings.

Pleas in law

| — | Misapplication of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Misapplication of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Misapplication of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Misapplication of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
ALD
- 173 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 12

- 2100

___________ In re: REGINALD YOUNG, Petitioner

____________________________________ On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States Di strict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(Related to D.C. Crim. No. 2:05

- cr - 00307

- 003)

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

May 3, 2012 Before: SLOVITER, FISHER AND WEIS , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : May 17,2012 )

_________ OPINION

_________ PER CURIAM

. In this petition for mandamus, Reginald Young asks us to direct the “respondent” to rule on his application for a certificate of appealability. In form, t he petition reads less like a request for mandamus and more like a motion to expedite proceedings. In any case, it is moot; we denied Young’s request for a certificate of appealability. See United States v. Young , C.A. No. 12

- 1577. Therefore, this “mand amus petition” will be denied,2

as Young has obtained the ruling he seeks to compel. See Carr v. Am. Red Cross , 17 F.3d 671, 684 (3d Cir. 1994).
EXHIBIT 32

<PAGE>



     In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of Whitemark  Homes,  Inc. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the period  ending  June 30, 2010 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission (the "Report"),  Barry Reese,  the Principal
Executive and Financial Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that to the best of his knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects the financial condition and results of the Company.


September 5, 2012                  By:  /s/ Barry Reese
                                        ---------------------------------
                                        Barry Reese, Principal Executive and
                                        Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Golden Enterprises, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the third quarter ended February 29, 2008, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Mark W. McCutcheon, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

Dated:   April 10, 2008



/s/ Mark W. McCutcheon
----------------------
Mark W. McCutcheon
President and Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Golden Enterprises, Inc. and will be retained by Golden Enterprises,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission, or its staff, upon
request.

                                       21
#### Malachi TIMMONS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-966.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 8, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Jack CAYRE and Grace Cayre, his wife, Petitioners, v. BEE KAY REALTY CORP., a Florida corporation, et al., Respondents.

No. 42092.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 7, 1972.

Cushman & Cushman, Miami, for petitioners.

Laurence Feingold, of Fuller & Fein-gold, Miami Beach, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners seek review of the decision of the District Court of Appeal in this cause reported at 256 So.2d 539 (3rd D. C.A. Fla. 1972). Our examination of the record and briefs reveals no decisional conflict as is required by Article V, Section 4(2), Florida Constitution, F.S.A. For the benefit of the Bench and Bar, however, we note in passing that the quotation of the contract terms appearing in the District Court opinion is inaccurate, and should be as follows:

> “ . . . . This contract is subject to purchaser being able to qualify for and secure a mortgage in the minimum amount of $35,000.00 with interest not to exceed 8Purchaser shall have ten (10) days from the date of this contract to secure said mortgage; otherwise this contract shall become null and void and earnest money deposit shall be returned immediately to purchaser..."

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

It is so ordered.

CARLTON, Acting C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### Ralph J. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-1422.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 10, 1973.

Pollack, Yocum & Haggard, Alvin E. Entin, Miami, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Peter F. LaPorte, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was found guilty of robbery after a non-jury trial and was sentenced to five years in the state penitentiary. On this appeal, he urges that the court erred in refusing to allow him to withdraw on the day of trial a previously executed waiver of jury trial. The record shows that the appellant executed the waiver upon advice of privately-employed counsel who was present at the time the waiver was executed. Since the defendant executed a valid waiver, it was not error to deny his motion made immediately prior to trial to withdraw the waiver. In the case at bar, withdrawal of the waiver would have forced a continuance of the trial. See Floyd v. State, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 105; Baker v. State, Fla.App.1972, 269 So.2d 767.

Affirmed.
#### Arthur L. BIGELOW and D. Allen Johnson, Appellants, v. GORE NEWSPAPERS COMPANY, a corporation t/a Fort Lauderdale News and Sun Sentinel and the Players Club, Inc., Appellees.

No. 77-1433.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 4, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 1978.

*1230Jesse S. Faerber, of Brinkley & McNer-ney, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.

Neil G. Frank, of Friedman & Britton, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a partial summary judgment finding the appellants, Arthur L. Bigelow and D. Allen Johnson, liable to the appellee, Gore Newspapers Company, under a guaranty agreement, for advertising services allegedly rendered to The Players Club, Inc., a business previously owned by the appellants. There is an affidavit in the record which states that the services sued for were not rendered to The Players Club, Inc., but rather were rendered to the new owners of the business, a different corporate entity. This sworn statement alone creates an issue as to the liability of the appellants for the services alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, the partial summary judgment is hereby reversed.

ALDERMAN, C. J., and CROSS and AN-STEAD, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 53 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 53

    To amend the Rules of the House of Representatives to require a 
              rollcall vote on all appropriation measures.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 27, 1993

 Mr. Clement (for himself, Mr. Penny, Mr. Montgomery, Mr. Poshard, Mr. 
  Oxley, Mr. Goss, Mr. Hancock, Mr. Shays, Mr. Stump, Mr. Dornan, Mr. 
    Greenwood, Mr. Inglis, and Mr. McHugh) submitted the following 
        resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
    To amend the Rules of the House of Representatives to require a 
              rollcall vote on all appropriation measures.

    Resolved, That rule XV of the Rules of the House of Representatives 
is amended by adding at the end the following new clause:
    ``7. The yeas and neas shall be considered as ordered when the 
Speaker puts the question upon final passage of any bill or joint 
resolution, or conference report thereon, making appropriations.''.

                                 <all>
```
#### Jewell Eunice Hughes MITCHELL v. Leaman L. MITCHELL, Sr.

No. 2864.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Sept. 4, 1969.

Ford C. Stinson, Benton, for defendant-relator.

Gahagan & Kelly by Donald G. Kelly, Natchitoches, for plaintiff-respondent.

Lake Charles, Louisiana

August 7, 1969

WRITS DENIED: This Court will not exercise its supervisory jurisdiction save in cases where there is palpable error in the ruling complained of,- and then only if ir*224reparable injury will ensue. No such showing being made, the application is denied.

MILLER, J., dissents and will hand down written reasons.

SAVOY, J., is of the opinion that a writ should be granted.

MILLER, Judge

(dissenting)1.

I respectfully dissent from the finding that there was no palpable error in the trial court’s ruling and alternatively that no irreparable injury will ensue.

On June 23, 1969, the wife filed suit for separation in Natchitoches Parish, alleging cruel treatment. The husband filed exceptions of lack of jurisdiction alleging that Webster Parish is his domicile and the matrimonial domicile, and contending that he has not been guilty of cruel treatment. He alternatively contended that if there had been cruel treatment, this was condoned by reconciliation.

At the July 7, 1969 trial of the exception, it was established that Webster Parish was the matrimonial domicile, and that the wife moved to Natchitoches Parish on May 31, 1969. The wife failed to prove cruel treatment which would support a legal separation. Although several witnesses had been sequestered and some of the children of the marriage, were present at the hearing, the only witnesses to testify were the husband and wife. Her testimony was taken under cross-examination only. The testimony in the record suggests cruel treatment and while she may have evidence to prove cruel treatment, the record in its present state would not support a judgment of legal separation.

Proof of allegations of misconduct on the part of the husband is not only essential to a judgment in the wife’s favor on the merits of a suit for separation, but such proof is also a prerequisite to the venue of the Court. Landry v. Landry, 192 So.2d 237 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1966).

Since the wife did not prove cruel treatment, she cannot rely on the exception [explained in Comment (d)] to the jurisdictional rule provided in Code of Civil Procedure Article 3941. As I see it, by refusing this writ, we are permitting the Court to require a Webster Parish husband to defend a suit for judicial separation in Natchitoches Parish, before jurisdiction has been established in that court. Code of Civil Procedure Article 3941. Landry v. Landry, supra.

This constitutes irreparable injury, and I •respectfully dissent.

1

. This court’s writ denials were not published when this matter was handed down in 1969. I obtained permission to publish the dissent at this late date because the holding merits the attention of the bar. (Dissent handed down September 4, 1969.)
# C_2023164EN.01003401.xml

| 8.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/34

---

Order of the President of the First Chamber of the Court of 13 February 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof — Austria) — Grand Production d.o.o. v GO4YU GmbH, DH, GO4YU d.o.o, MTEL Austria GmbH

(Case C-423/21, (1) Grand Production)

(2023/C 164/45)

Language of the case: German

The President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 422, 18.10.2021.

---
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-6915

RICKEY EUGENE DALTON, Petitioner - Appellant,
versus DIRECTOR, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, Chief District Judge. (CA-03-142-7) Submitted: December 22, 2003 Decided: February 3, 2004
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Rickey Eugene Dalton, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Rickey Eugene Dalton, a state prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2254 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue for claims addressed by a district court absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 941 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Dalton has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
v~gID'~-DAKOTA MT Dept. Env,;onrne,~lcl CiLl3!lty

Permitting & COfllpl',,- : Ui'!I'iOn 

ADivision of MDU Resources Group, Inc Air Resources Managems:11 S.J,-e3~:

400 North Fourth Street 

Bismarck, NO 58501 

(701) 222·7900 

July 19,2005 

Ms. Trista Glazier
 

Air Quality Specialist
 

Department of Environmental Quality
 

Air Resources Management Bureau
 

P.O. Box 200901
 

Helena, MT 59620-0901
 

Re:	 Regional Haze BART Sources 

Dear Trista: 

This letter is written in response to your inquiry dated May 26, 2005 regarding identification of 

BART eligible units. At this time, none of Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.' s power plants in 

Montana qualify as BART eligible units. The lone coal plant (Lewis & Clark Station) that we 

operate in Sidney, MT was in existence and operating in 1958 and has not undergone 

reconstruction per the BART definition. We also operate natural gas and diesel fired combustion 

turbine peaking units in Glendive and Miles City that do not meet the eligibility BART 

requirements. 

If you have any questions, please give me a call at 701-222-7657 or contact Jay Skabo at 701­

222-7835. 

Sincerely, 

~Ck~&~ Senior Environmental Scientist 

cc:	 Jay Skabo\Jason Boeckel\File 

Craig Herbert - Lewis & Clark 

F lenvloirlMonlano_DEQIBART_NotificatIOn
#### JAXON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a corporation, Petitioner, v. Joan W. STEIN and Martin Stein d/b/a Regency Square Shopping Center, and Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, Respondents.

No. N-150.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 21, 1970.

Rehearing Denied June 16, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari denied.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk March 29, 2010

0322 

# Order

March 29, 2010

139819

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 139819 COA: 291096 Wayne CC: 05-003139-02 DEMOND EARL GOINS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 3, 2009 order of the Court of Appeals is considered , and it is DENIED, because the defendant has
failed to meet the burden of establishi ng entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).