COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Annunziata, Kelsey and Senior Judge Overton Argued by teleconference

FELIX COBBS, III MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 2683-03-3 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON SEPTEMBER 14, 2004 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY William N. Alexander, II, Judge Glenn L. Berger (Berger & Thornhill, on brief), for appellant. Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant A ttorney General (Je rry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

A jury convicted appellant of possession of a firearm by a felon, fe lony elude and reckless driving. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior failure to appear for trial, admitting evidence of unrelated incidents of flight, and admitting statements he made on those occasions. Appellant argues th e evidence was irrelevant and immaterial. We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND On September 23, 2000, Trooper Jackson pursued a vehicle driven by appellant at speeds up to 100 miles per hour. Jackson act ivated his siren and bl ue lights, but appellant did not stop until he

lost control and went into a ditch. Jackson searched ap pellant’s car and found a firearm. Appellant was arrested, released on bond, and his trial was set for February 13, 2001 . However, appellant

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - failed to appear for his trial an d the trial court issued a capias. The court subsequently convicted appellant of failing to appear fo r his February 13, 2001 trial. On September 28, 20 01, Officer Lovell of the Martinsv ille Police Depa rtment stopped appellant’s vehicle. Lovell asked to see appellan t’s license and registratio n, but appellant “spun off.” Lovell pursued appellant, but lost sight of him. Lovell next saw appellant on January 16, 2002, at the Danville City Jail. Appellant told Lovell he fled from him in September 2001 “because of charges he had out of Chatham.” On January 14, 2002, acting on a tip concerni ng appellant’s location, several officers from the Danville Police Department appr oached a residence. Appellant fled the re sidence, but Officer Pickeral intercepted appellant and told him that he was under arrest . Pickeral testified appellant replied, “Fuck you police” and continued to run. Pickeral followed, tackle d appellant and took him into custody. Appellant had a fa lse identification card in the na me of “Tony X. Outlaw” when arrested by Pickeral. Officer Pa ce fingerprinted appellant at th e Danville City Ja il and testified appellant asked if Pace was going to take hi m upstairs where fingerprints were taken by a computerized system. Pace testifie d he told appellant “ it took entirely too lo ng to catch him and I wasn’t going to lose him again by taking him out of the jail.” Pa ce testified appellant laughed and said, “Yeah, if I get out of here, I’m gonna go to Japan . . . .” Over appellant’s objection, th e trial court admitted into evidence appell ant’s conviction for failing to appear at tria l for the charges, appellant ’s statement to Lovell th at he fled “because of charges he had out of Chat ham,” and appellant’s statement to Pace that he would “go to Japan” if he had a chance to get out of jail. The trial court also admitted evidence of appe llant’s failure to stop for Lovell, his attempt to elude Pickeral, his statement to Picker al, and his possession of a false

identification card.- 3 - ANALYSIS Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency to prove an issue in a case. Relevant evidence may be excluded only if the prejudicial effect of the eviden ce outweighs its probative value. The question whether the prejudicial effect of evidence exceeds its probative value lies within the trial court’s discretion. Goins v. Commonwealth , 251 Va. 442, 461-62, 470 S.E.2d 114, 127 (1996). “As a general rule, only under limited circum stances may evidence of other offenses by an accused be admitted to prove the offense at bar.” Langhorne v. Commonwealth , 13 Va. App. 97, 101, 409 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1991). “Although flight to avoid prosecuti on is evidence of another crime, it is nevertheless admissible to show a consciousness of guilt.” Id. at 102, 409 S.E.2d at 479. “Evidence of flight from authoritie s that occurred days, or even months, after a crime is admissible, as ‘any fli ght at a time when it may be to avoid arrest, prosecution, or confinement tends to show a consciousness of guilt.’” Ricks v. Commonwealth , 39 Va. App. 330, 335, 573 S.E.2d 266, 268 (2002) (citation omitted). “The remoteness in time of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence a nd not to its admissibility.” Langhorne , 13 Va. App. at 103,

409 S.E.2d at 480. Here, as in Langhorne , appellant knew of the charges pending against him and knew, at the time of his flights from the authorities, th at he was being sought in connection with those charges. Appellant’s failure to appear at his tr ial was relevant to prove a consciousness of guilt, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence of appellant’s conviction. Appellant fled from Lovell in September 2001, wh ich was only seven months after he failed to appear for trial; the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence of appellant’s flight from Lovell. Although the evidence of appe llant’s flight from Pick eral was approximately eighteen months after the incident, the charges were still pending and the remoteness in time of the flight went to its weight and not to its admissibility. When told he was under arrest by- 4 - Pickeral, appellant cursed him and continued to r un. Appellant later admitted to Lovell he fled because of the outstanding charges, and appellan t told Pace he would go to Japan if he could escape from jail. Appellant’s statements and hi s possession of a false identification card were also relevant to prove appellant’s consciousness of guilt, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in determining the pr obative value of the evidence ou tweighed its prejudicial effect. Appellant concedes this Court has allowed ev idence of flight as probative of guilt, but argues the remoteness of the evid ence of his flight and its pr ejudicial value outweighed any probative value of the evidence. Appellant reques ts that this Court reconsider the holding in Langhorne and overrule it. “Under the rule of stare decisis, a decision by a panel of this court is an established precedent.” Robinson v. Commonwealth , 13 Va. App. 540, 543, 413 S.E.2d 661, 662 (1992). We find nothing in the circumstances of this case leading us to believe that a departure from Langhorne is justified. Accordingly, we a ffirm appellant’s convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon, felony elude and reckless driving.

Affirmed.