alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ellene B. RESMONDO, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS OF FLORIDA, INC., a corporation, et al., Defendants.

No. Q-351.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 25, 1972.

*73Roderic G. Magie, of Levin, Warfield, Graff, Mabie & Rosenbloum, Pensacola, for plaintiff.

Charles R. Timmel, of Timmel, Handley & Campbell, Fort Walton Beach, for defendants.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule 4.6, 32 F.S.A., the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit for Escambia County has certified the following question to this Court, to wit:

> “Where a husband is injured as a result of alleged negligence as a result of an accident which occurred on or about August 18, 1967, the husband subsequently files suit which such suit is subsequently settled in December, 1969 by stipulation and entry of consent judgment without a finding of fault and cancellation of such judgment as attached hereto, may the wife of the defendant at the time of the accident and settlement maintain a cause of action for loss of care, affection and consortium following settlement of such prior suit?”

The trial court in its order of certification, after citing Gates v. Foley,1 stated: “. . . this Court being of the opinion that such case is not clear precedent to the issues herein and that there is no other controlling precedent upon which to determine the issues herein . . .” We agree with the trial court and therefore entertain the question as certified.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gates, this State clearly followed the common law doctrine that a wife did not possess a cause of action for loss of consortium.2 Just as clearly, however, did Gates abrogate the prior decisions of the Supreme Court and establish a right of action on the part of a wife for loss of consortium. The following statement in Gates creates the lack of controlling precedent as to the instant cause:

> “. . . We further hold that her right of action is a derivative right and she may recover only if her husband has a cause of action against the same defendant. This means that the tort-feasor was negligent and the husband was free from contributory negligence.”

Here, the statement of facts reflect that a consent judgment was entered in favor of the husband against the same defendant. The said judgment did not find that the defendant tort-feasor was negligent and the husband was free from contributory negligence. Thus, the ultimate question is: Did the instant judgment abate the wife’s cause of action? We conclude that it did not. The wife’s claim is actionable against the same defendant; however, under the stated facts, upon trial, she must not only prove the damages sustained by *74her for loss of consortium but must also prove the negligence of the alleged tort-feasor and the lack of contributory negligence on the part of the husband.

The question certified is answered in the affirmative.

SPECTOR, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., and RAWLS, JJ., concur.

1

. Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 (Fla.1971).

2

. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla.1952).
# C_2021297EN.01002201.xml

| 26.7.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 297/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.7.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 297/22

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 22 April 2021 — Coca-Cola European Partners Deutschland GmbH v L.B.

(Case C-257/21)

(2021/C 297/24)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesarbeitsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: Coca-Cola European Partners Deutschland GmbH

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: L.B.

Questions referred

| 1. | Does a collectively agreed rule implement Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC, (1) within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, if that collectively agreed rule provides for a higher level of compensation for irregular night work than for regular night work? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does a collectively agreed rule implement Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC, (1) within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, if that collectively agreed rule provides for a higher level of compensation for irregular night work than for regular night work?

| 2. | If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:Is a collectively agreed rule that provides for a higher level of compensation for irregular night work than for regular night work compatible with Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union if that rule is intended to compensate not only for the adverse effects on health caused by night work but also for the burden arising from the greater difficulty in planning for irregular night work? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Is a collectively agreed rule that provides for a higher level of compensation for irregular night work than for regular night work compatible with Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union if that rule is intended to compensate not only for the adverse effects on health caused by night work but also for the burden arising from the greater difficulty in planning for irregular night work?

---

(1)  Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).

---
No. 10775.

#### Walz, by etc., *v.*The Cincinnati Traction Co.

Decided December 8, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Hamilton county.

*Messrs. Cobh, Howard & Bailey*and *Mr. Thomas L. Michie,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. George H. Warrington,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Si-iauck, Crew and Spear, JJ., concur.
#### Clarence SIMPSON v. STATE. (2 cases.)

Nos. 37626, 37849.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 1969.

Appeals dismissed without opinion. 211 So.2d 862.
# C_2020271EN.01005301.xml

| 17.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 271/53 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 271/53

---

Action brought on 3 July 2020 — DZ Bank v SRB

(Case T-410/20)

(2020/C 271/66)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: DZ Bank AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank, Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) (represented by: H. Berger and K. Helle, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board (SRB)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the decision of the Single Resolution Board of 15 April 2020 on the calculation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund collected in advance for 2020 (SRB/ES/2020/24), including its annexes, in so far as the contested decision, including Annex I and Annex II, concerns the applicant’s contribution; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of the Single Resolution Board of 15 April 2020 on the calculation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund collected in advance for 2020 (SRB/ES/2020/24), including its annexes, in so far as the contested decision, including Annex I and Annex II, concerns the applicant’s contribution;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The action is based on eleven pleas in law which are essentially identical or similar to those put forward in Case T-405/20, DZ Hyp v SRB.

---
----

----

|   |                                       |
|--------|--------------------------------------------|
|   | /s/       PETER M. MCCORMICK          |   |
|   | Peter      M. McCormick                    |
|   | President      and Chief Executive Officer |
|   |                                       |
|   |                                       |

|   |                                            |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|
|   | /s/       MARTY J. SCHWENNER               |   |
|   | Marty      J. Schwenner                         |
|   | Vice      President and Chief Financial Officer |
|   |                                            |
|   |                                            |

----

----
# C_2023104EN.01000702.xml

| 20.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 104/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 104/7

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 2 February 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden — Netherlands) — Criminal proceedings against TF

(Case C-806/21, (1) TF (Drug precursors))

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Drug precursors - Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA - Article 2(1)(d) - Person involved in the transport and distribution of precursors used for the illicit production or manufacture of drugs - Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 - Scheduled substances - Article 2 - Concept of ‘operator’ - Article 8(1) - Circumstances suggesting that scheduled substances might be diverted for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances - Obligation to notify those circumstances - Concept of ‘circumstance’ - Scope)

(2023/C 104/08)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Party in the main proceedings

TF

Other party to the proceedings: Openbaar Ministerie

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2(d) of Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 on drug precursors, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1258/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013,

must be interpreted as meaning that a person who participates, in the context of an illegal activity, in the placing on the market of scheduled substances in the European Union is not an ‘operator’ for the purposes of that provision.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 138, 28.3.2022.

---
#### AARON MARSHALL, Jr. *vs.*LAYTON & SIPPLE.

The costs of witnesses not sworn, will not be taxed if objected to, unless the party summoning them shall show that they were or might have been material under the issues joined in the cause. The affidavit of the party uncontradicted, will be suffi. cient for this purpose.

Ibtdeb. assumpsit. Narr. Pleas. Issues. Trial and verdict for plaintiff.

*Ridgely,*for defendants,

moved that the court disallow to the plaintiff the costs of six witnesses, summoned *by*him and not sworn.

*Cullen*

objected.

*Cullen*and *Frame,*for plaintiff.

*Brinckloe*and *Ridgely,*for defendants.

*Per Curiam.*

Costs are to be taxed by the court. But it is not true that the defendant is bound to pay the costs of all the witnesses the other party may choose to summon. Neither will it do to establish the general rule, that no witnesses fees shall be allowed who are not sworn. In general they will be taxed, as they are in most cases in fact material. But when the allowance of the costs of witnesses who are not sworn is objected to, the court will require the party summoning them to show their materiality, or a reasonable ground to suppose they would be material, under the issues in the cause.

The plaintiff made affidavit that these witnesses were not summoned to increase costs, but in truth, because the counsel under the pleadings in the case deemed them to be material, and that they would have been material but for the failure of the defence on points raised by the pleadings.

*The Court*said they would not disallow these costs. Prima facie, if a witness be not sworn he will be considered not material; but the affidavit of the party producing the witness that he was material, and not summoned with a view to increase costs, and this affidavit uncontradicted, will remove the prima facie impression.

Motion disallowed.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-22-00747-CR

Ricardo GONZALEZ,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CR1779

Honorable Jennifer Peña, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE CHAPA, JUSTICE RODRIGUEZ, AND JUSTICE VALENZUELA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

SIGNED August 21, 2024.

_____________________________

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Postal Service

# AGENCY:

                        Postal ServiceTM.                    

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

# DATES:

*Date of required notice:*                         June 26, 2018.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Elizabeth Reed, 202-268-3179.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The United States Postal Service® hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on June 21, 2018, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a                     *USPS Request to Add Priority Mail Contract 451 to Competitive Product List.*                     Documents are available at                     *www.prc.gov,*                     Docket Nos. MC2018-184, CP2018-258.                

Elizabeth Reed

Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law.

[FR Doc. 2018-13702 Filed 6-25-18; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 7710-12-P
#### Patricia Miceli, Respondent, v Gloria A. Tramutolo et al., Respondents, and Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation, Appellant.

[655 NYS2d 591]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Mastro, J.), dated March 26, 1996, as denied its motion to limit the damages recoverable against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured when she was struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant Gloria A. Tramutolo, who had leased the vehicle, pursuant to a long-term lease, from the defendant Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation (hereinafter Nissan). We reject Nissan’s contention that vicarious liability under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 should be limited to the minimum amount of insurance required pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370 *(cf., Morris v Snappy Car Rental,*84 NY2d 21). Rosenblatt, J. P., Copertino, Pizzuto, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.
# C_2023035EN.01001001.xml

| 30.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 35/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 35/10

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 8 December 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzgericht — Austria) — P GmbH v Finanzamt Österreich

(Case C-378/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Harmonisation of fiscal legislation - Common system of value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 203 - Adjustment of the VAT return - Recipients of services who are not entitled to make deductions - No risk of loss of tax revenue)

(2023/C 35/11)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: P GmbH

Defendant: Finanzamt Österreich

Operative part of the judgment

Article 203 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive (EU) 2016/1065 of 27 June 2016

must be interpreted as meaning that a taxable person who has supplied a service and who has stated on the invoice an amount of value added tax (VAT) calculated on the basis of an incorrect rate is not liable, under that provision, for the part of the VAT invoiced incorrectly if there is no risk of loss of tax revenue on the ground that the recipients of that service are exclusively final consumers who do not have a right to deduct input VAT.

---

(1)  OJ C 349, 30.8.2021.

---
| Date:  September      4, 2008 | /s/ Marc T.      Giles                                  |   |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                    | Marc      T. GilesPresident      and Chief Executive Officer                                                                                                                                                                 |   |
|                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |   |
| Date:  September      4, 2008 | /s/ Michael R.      Elia                                     |   |
|                                    | Michael      R. EliaExecutive      Vice President and Chief Financial Officer                                                                                                                                                |   |
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Clarence Johnson, Appellant.

[655 NYS2d 394]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated February 20, 1996 *(People v Johnson,*224 AD2d 635), which affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered November 12, 1992.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see, Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745). O’Brien, J. P., Joy, Altman and Florio, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>  5


<S>                         <C>

<PERIOD-TYPE>                 12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         1,276,417
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  1,805,679
<ALLOWANCES>                                     157,187
<INVENTORY>                                            0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               5,092,320
<PP&E>                                        65,426,503
<DEPRECIATION>                                27,502,855
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                43,264,070
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          5,163,967
<BONDS>                                       12,300,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                       97,450
<COMMON>                                         203,319
<OTHER-SE>                                    25,499,334
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  43,264,070
<SALES>                                                0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               8,974,041
<CGS>                                                  0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 10,173,995
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (20,893)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,469,207
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (2,450,457)
<INCOME-TAX>                                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (2,450,457)
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (2,450,457)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.016)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      (.016)







</TABLE>
No. 10613.

#### The Ohio Central Traction Co. *v.*Kiess.

Decided January 12, 1909.

Error to Circuit Court of Crawford county.

*Mr. Anson Wickham*and *Messrs. Cummings, McBride & Wolfe,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. R. V. Sears*and *Messrs. Leuthold & Leuthold,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Crew, C. J., Summers, Spear and Price, JJ., concur.
H. Res. 447

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

June 9, 1994.

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule

XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the

Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of

the bill (H.R. 4539) making appropriations for the Treasury

Department, the United States Postal Service, the Executive

Office of the President, and certain Independent Agencies,

for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for other

purposes. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with.

All points of order against consideration of the bill are

waived. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall

not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the

chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on

Appropriations. After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. Points of

order against provisions in the bill for failure to comply with

clause 2 of rule XXI are waived except as follows: beginning

with ‘‘: Provided’’ on page 4, line 6, through ‘‘Treasury’’ on
2

HRES 447 EH

line 9; and page 87, line 3, through page 88, line 2. Where

points of order are waived against only part of a paragraph,

a point of order against matter in the balance of the paragraph may be applied only within the balance of the paragraph and not against the entire paragraph. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such

amendments as may have been adopted. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

SEC. 2. At any time after the adoption of this resolution

the Committee on Appropriations may file a supplemental report on H.R. 4539 as part 2 of House Report 103–534.

Attest:

Clerk.