COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Clements and Felton 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

THURSTON TRENT KEENE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 0043-03-1 JUDGE WALTER S. FELTON, JR. 

DECEMBER 23, 2003 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 

S. Bernard Goodwyn, Judge 

 William E. Buyrn (Buyrn & Crook, on brief), for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Thurston Trent Keene appeals the decision of the trial court revoking two years and nine 

months of a previously suspended sentence. He contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction 

to revoke his suspended sentence because the court revoked the suspension after the statutory 

time limit set by Code § 19.2-306 expired. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On January 12, 1996, Keene was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of issuing two or more bad 

checks in violation of Code § 18.2-181.1.1

 The court sentenced Keene to three years imprisonment 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

1

 Code § 18.2-181.1 provides that 

It shall be a Class 6 felony for any person, within a period of 

ninety days, to issue two or more checks . . . in violation of 

§ 18.2-181, which have an aggregate represented value of $200 or 

more and which (i) are drawn upon the same account of any bank, 
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but suspended his sentence on condition that he serve thirty days in jail and be on supervised 

probation for an indeterminate period. On February 2, 1998, the court found that Keene violated the 

conditions of his probation and revoked the previously suspended sentence. The court then 

sentenced Keene to prison for two years and eleven months as a result of the probation violations, 

but then re-suspended two years and nine months of that sentence, conditioned on Keene’s good 

behavior and his being on supervised probation for an indeterminate period following his release 

from incarceration. 

 On October 30, 2002, the trial court was notified that Keene had violated his probation 

numerous times since his last revocation hearing. Based on these new allegations, the court held a 

second revocation hearing. At the hearing, Keene did not dispute that he had failed to maintain 

contact with his probation officer or that he failed to report his convictions for several other crimes 

during his probation period. Instead, Keene argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to resentence 

him and to extend his period of probation for a period longer than the maximum length of time he 

could have been sentenced at the original sentencing hearing. 

 The trial court rejected Keene’s argument, concluding that it retained jurisdiction to 

revoke the suspended sentence for a period of five years from the last revocation order dated 

February 2, 1998. On December 11, 2002, the court found that Keene violated the conditions of 

his probation, and sentenced him to serve two years and nine months in prison. It then 

re-suspended two years of his sentence conditioned on his being placed on supervised probation 

upon his release from confinement. 

banking institution, trust company or other depository and (ii) are 

made payable to the same person, firm or corporation. 
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II. JURISDICTION 

On appeal, Keene contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his suspended 

sentence on December 11, 2002, because the revocation occurred “beyond the maximum length 

of time he could be held on probation”2 pursuant to Code § 19.2-306. Keene argues that because 

he was convicted of a Class 6 felony, he was subject to a maximum sentence of five years 

incarceration at the time the original sentence was imposed. See Grant v. Commonwealth, 223 

Va. 680, 686, 292 S.E.2d 348, 351 (1982) (holding that under Code § 19.2-306, a suspended 

sentence may be revoked at any time until the end of the maximum period for which the 

defendant could have been sentenced initially, unless the court imposes a different period). 

Because the court originally sentenced him on January 12, 1996, Keene contends the maximum 

length of his sentence would have expired on January 11, 2001, a period of five years after his 

initial sentence. Keene argues that, even factoring in the extra year to bring him before the court 

under Code § 19.2-306, the court’s jurisdiction over his sentence expired January 11, 2002. We 

disagree. 

After a person is convicted, the sentencing judge is given by statute discretion to suspend 

the sentence in whole or in part and, in addition, may place that person on probation under such 

conditions as the judge considers appropriate. Code § 19.2-303. Another statute provides that 

the sentencing court “may fix the period of suspension for a reasonable time, having due regard 

 2

 We note that appellant, in his brief, refers to the court as revoking his “probation” rather 

than revoking his suspended sentence. While “probation” is often used interchangeably with 

“suspended sentence,” the terms refer to different sentencing matters. See Grant v. 

Commonwealth, 223 Va. 680, 292 S.E.2d 348 (1982); Carbaugh v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 

119, 449 S.E.2d 264 (1994). Probation may not exceed the period for which the sentence is 

suspended, but it may be imposed for a shorter period. Code § 19.2-304 permits the court to 

increase or decrease the period of probation or modify any condition of probation. A court may 

suspend the imposition or execution of a sentence with or without probation, and impose 

probation with or without supervision. 
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to the gravity of the offense, without regard to the maximum period for which the defendant 

might have been sentenced.” Code § 19.2-303.1. 

Among other things, Code § 19.2-306 provides the periods during which events that 

amount to cause for revocation must occur in order for a judge to revoke a suspended sentence. 

In pertinent part, Code § 19.2-306 provides that “[t]he court may [revoke the suspension of 

sentence], for any cause deemed by it sufficient which occurred at any time within the probation 

period, or if none, within the period of suspension fixed by the court, or if neither, within the 

maximum period for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to be 

imprisoned.” 

Here, the original sentencing court did not impose a specific period of suspension. 

Because Keene was convicted of a Class 6 felony, Code § 18.2-10(f) fixes the maximum 

confinement as a term of five years. Keene argues that the five-year period of suspension ended 

January 11, 2001, a period of five years from the date of the original sentencing order. We 

disagree. 

A plain reading of Code § 19.2-306 demonstrates that the trial court had jurisdiction on 

December 11, 2002 to revoke Keene’s suspended sentence, a sentence which the court imposed 

on February 2, 1998, following its revocation of the suspended sentence imposed on January 12, 

1996. The effect of that new sentence was to extend the five-year period of suspension for an 

additional five-year period. At that time, the trial court could have suspended the five-year 

suspended sentence for any additional period, being limited only by what would be “reasonable.” 

Code § 19.2-303.1. Because the trial court was again silent as to the period of suspension, the 

limitations of Code § 19.2-306 applied, imposing a period of suspension to be the maximum for 

which Keene could have been sentenced for a Class 6 felony, or five years. 
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Code § 19.2-303.1, which expressly provides that a trial court may suspend a sentence for 

a reasonable time, applies not only to a defendant’s initial sentencing but also to a sentence 

imposed in a subsequent revocation proceeding. Wright v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 148, 

153, 526, S.E.2d 784, 787 (2000); see Briggs v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 338, 343, 464 

S.E.2d 512, 514 (1995); Carbaugh v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 119, 122, 449 S.E.2d 264, 

266 (1994). 

In Wright, the appellant asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his 

suspended sentence because the period of his suspension expired five years from the date of the 

court’s original sentencing order suspending his sentence. Wright, 32 Va. App at 150, 526 

S.E.2d at 785. Wright reasoned that the original sentencing order, setting the first period of 

suspension, was final and could not be extended. Id. Affirming the trial court’s judgment, this 

Court held that “Code § 19.2-303.1, which expressly provides that a trial court may suspend a 

sentence for a reasonable time ‘in any case,’ pertains not only to a defendant’s initial sentencing 

but also to sentencing in revocation proceedings.” Id. at 153, 526 S.E.2d at 787. Thus, the trial 

court had “authority to extend the suspension period when it sentenced appellant following 

appellant’s violations of the conditions of his previously suspended sentence,” so that “[e]ach of 

the trial court’s revocation orders starts . . . new suspension periods, running from the dates of 

entry of the revocation orders.” Id. at 150-51, 526 S.E.2d at 785-86. 

Here, the trial court originally sentenced Keene to a term of three years imprisonment in 

January 1996. The court suspended the entire sentence, conditioned on Keene serving thirty 

days incarceration. Because the court did not specify a specific period of suspension, Code 

§ 19.2-306 provides that the period of suspension is the “maximum period for which the 

defendant might originally have been sentenced to be imprisoned.” In this case, the maximum 

period of imprisonment for a Class 6 felony is five years. Code § 18.2-10(f). 
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When the court initially revoked the suspended sentence, it sentenced Keene to a term of 

imprisonment, which it then re-suspended. The period of suspension was thereby fixed at five 

years from the date of that sentence. See Wright, 32 Va. App. at 150-51, 526 S.E.2d at 785-86. 

The court revoked Keene’s suspended sentence on February 2, 1998. When the court then 

sentenced Keene to a new term of imprisonment, and then re-suspended a portion of that 

sentence, a new five-year period of suspension began which, absent any additional revocations 

and new sentences, would end February 1, 2003. The final revocation order occurred on 

December 11, 2002, prior to February 1, 2003, and within five years of the sentence imposed by 

the trial court on February 2, 1998. Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke 

Keene’s suspended sentence, and we affirm. 

 Affirmed.