FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 07-30270

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  CR-06-00296-10-

JCC HAO QUANG TRAN,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 6, 2008—Seattle, Washington

Filed June 24, 2009

Before: Harry Pregerson, William C. Canby, Jr. and

John T. Noonan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson;

Dissent by Judge Noonan

7671
COUNSEL

Allen M. Ressler, John C. Dorgan, Browne & Ressler, Seattle,

Washington, for the defendant-appellant.

Catherine L. Chrisham, Susan M. Roe, Assistant United

States Attorneys, Seattle, Washington, for plaintiff-appellee

the United States of America.

7674 UNITED STATES v. TRAN
OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Hao Quang Tran (“Tran”) appeals his

jury convictions for conspiracy to possess more than 100 kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and § 846, and two counts of

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Tran

argues that the district court erred by admitting a portion of

a co-defendant’s redacted plea agreement as substantive evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A). Tran further argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting his

convictions. Although we find that the district court did not

err in its evidentiary rulings, we reverse Tran’s convictions

because there was insufficient evidence to support them.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Marijuana Importation and Distribution

Scheme

In June 2006, the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was investigating a

marijuana importation and distribution organization. Undercover federal agents arranged to rent a warehouse facility to

an organization suspected of importing marijuana, while

maintaining surveillance of the facility. Agents observed a

trailer truck being driven into the warehouse. Then a man

drove a series of different cars into and out of the warehouse.

The trailer was then removed. 

After monitoring the warehouse for approximately two

weeks, the agents obtained a search warrant with approved

delayed notification. Inside the warehouse, the agents found

an insulated cargo container. Some insulation had been

UNITED STATES v. TRAN 7675
removed from the walls of the container to make a space for

contraband.

On June 27, 2006, a new trailer was brought into the warehouse. Agents followed the same man who had been observed

earlier as he drove cars into and then out of the warehouse and

over to the mall. Agents stopped each car after it departed

from the mall. They found marijuana in every car. In total, the

agents seized approximately 344 kilograms, or over 700

pounds, of marijuana.

Tran, the defendant in this case, was a passenger in a silver

Mustang, one of the cars stopped by the agents. The silver

Mustang was being driven by Tam Nguyen (“Nguyen”). The

car was registered not to Tran or Nguyen, but to a third party.

Nothing was found in the backseat of the car, but agents discovered approximately twenty-seven kilograms, or slightly

over sixty pounds, of marijuana in garbage bags inside the

trunk. Tran and Nguyen were promptly arrested.

B. Tran’s Trial

Tran was charged with conspiracy to possess more than

100 kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute and two

counts of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

Nguyen, the driver of the silver Mustang, pleaded guilty to

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Tran pleaded

not guilty and proceeded to trial.

The government called Nguyen to testify against Tran.

Nguyen stated that he had known Tran for about a year and

that Tran had lived with him for about a month prior to their

arrests. According to Nguyen, Tran was with him in the car

when Nguyen picked up the marijuana, but Tran was not

involved in the marijuana distribution scheme. Nguyen stated

that Tran was with him at the time of their arrests because

Nguyen was tired that day and asked Tran “to go hang out”

with him.

7676 UNITED STATES v. TRAN
The prosecuting attorney questioned Nguyen regarding

how he learned of the drug transaction. According to Nguyen,

he was at home alone when he received a phone call from a

Vietnamese-speaking woman regarding the marijuana pick

up. Nguyen stated that Tran was staying with him at the time,

but was not present during the phone call. Nguyen testified

that the woman gave him a code and told him that someone

would call him when it was time to pick up the marijuana.

Nguyen testified that a man, later identified as Britton, the

same man seen driving cars into and out of the warehouse,

called him, identified Nguyen by his code, and arranged to

meet him at the McDonald’s at the mall. At the McDonald’s,

Tran was sitting and eating while Nguyen spoke with Britton.

Britton drove away in Nguyen’s car. Half an hour later, Britton brought the car back to Nguyen. Nguyen testified that this

was the first time he picked up a load of marijuana. Nguyen

did not remember what he told the prosecuting attorney and

an ICE agent, Agent Ingersoll, during an interview a week

before he testified at trial regarding Tran’s involvement in the

drug operation. He also did not remember saying in the interview that Tran set up the drug transaction. He testified that he

did not know whether Tran had a connection with the people

in Canada who were supplying the marijuana.

The government called Agent Ingersoll to impeach

Nguyen. The district court allowed Agent Ingersoll’s testimony not for its truth, but only to impeach Nguyen’s credibility. Agent Ingersoll stated that he was present in a pre-trial

interview with Nguyen, during which Nguyen told a very different story than what he had recounted at trial. According to

Agent Ingersoll, Nguyen stated that he had worked for Tran,

and that he expected to be paid by Tran for transporting the

marijuana. According to Agent Ingersoll, Nguyen had further

stated that the woman that Nguyen spoke to on the phone was

a contact of Tran’s, and that Tran was standing next to

Nguyen during the phone conversation. Finally, according to

Agent Ingersoll, Nguyen said that Tran was with him during

UNITED STATES v. TRAN 7677
the marijuana exchange because it was the first time that

Nguyen had picked up marijuana, and Tran was teaching him

what to do. 

The district court instructed the jury that Nguyen’s unsworn

pre-trial statements to Agent Ingersoll were admitted only to

assist the jury in judging Nguyen’s credibility. The court

explained that Agent Ingersoll’s testimony could not be considered for any purpose other than Nguyen’s credibility. 

The government then sought to admit a redacted portion of

Nguyen’s plea agreement under Federal Rule of Evidence

801(d)(1)(A).1 The Statement of Facts in the plea agreement

reads in relevant part: “Tam Phy Quy Nguyen, together with

Hao Quang Tran, picked up approximately 70 pounds of marijuana for redistribution that night.” Tran objected to the

admissibility of the plea agreement, arguing that the statement

in the plea agreement was not inconsistent with Nguyen’s incourt testimony, and that the introduction of the plea agreement would violate his right of confrontation. The district

court admitted the evidence over Tran’s objection.

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)2, the district court

also admitted, over Tran’s objection, evidence that Tran had

previously been involved in marijuana deals. That evidence

was admitted solely for the purpose of showing Tran’s knowl1Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)provides in relevant part that a prior

statement by a witness is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant testifies at the trial

or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement,

and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, and

was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing,

or other proceeding, or in a deposition . . . .” 

2Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person

in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,

. . . .” (emphasis added). 

7678 UNITED STATES v. TRAN
edge. Two government witnesses, Tham Pham and Chad

Shaw, testified regarding Tran’s previous dealings in marijuana.

At the time of his testimony, Pham pleaded guilty to a drug

related charge in a different jurisdiction. Pham admitted that

he was testifying against Tran in the hopes that his cooperation would aid him at sentencing.

Pham stated that Tran used to work for him, moving drug

money from California to Washington. According to Pham, in

2001, he had been involved in a three-month operation moving marijuana from Canada to the United States using trailer

trucks. Pham testified that in that operation, individuals would

bring their cars to a designated location, leaving their keys on

the visors of their cars. An unidentified individual (never seen

by Pham) would place the marijuana in the cars. 

Pham also testified that in 2003 he twice received marijuana from Tran. A friend of Pham’s in Canada would bring

the marijuana into the United States, then Tran would pick it

up and bring it to Pham in Washington state. 

The government also presented Chad Shaw as a witness.

Shaw had previously been convicted for conspiring to distribute the drug MDMA, also known as ecstasy. Shaw testified

that he worked for Pham, delivering marijuana from Seattle

to Minnesota in 2004. Shaw stated that he met Tran through

Pham, and that on several occasions Tran was present when

marijuana was being delivered.

The district court expressly limited the admissibility of the

evidence presented by Pham and Shaw to the issue of Tran’s

knowledge.3

3The district court instructed the jury: “You have heard evidence of

other crimes engaged in by the defendant. You may consider that evidence

only as it bears on the defendant’s knowledge and for no other purpose.”

UNITED STATES v. TRAN 7679
In addition to the testimony of Agent Ingersoll, Nguyen,

Pham, and Shaw, the government’s case in chief involved the

testimony of several ICE agents. In addition to impeaching

Nguyen’s testimony, Agent Ingersoll testified about his role

in renting the warehouse space to members of the drug operation. He did not mention Tran during his testimony. Agent

Cagen also testified regarding the plan to rent the warehouse

space, and also did not mention Tran in his testimony. Agent

Abeyall testified that he was present when Tran and Nguyen

were arrested and that there was marijuana in the trunk of the

car. A final agent testified regarding the total weight of marijuana found as a result of the ICE operation, and the amount

of marijuana found in the car driven by Nguyen. At the close

of the government’s case, Tran moved for a judgment of

acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, arguing that the government had not made a prima facie case on

all the elements of the charged offenses. The motion was

denied.

The jury found Tran guilty on all three counts. Tran was

sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment. On appeal, he

argues that: (1) the district court erred by admitting a statement in Nguyen’s plea agreement as a prior inconsistent statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A); (2) the

district court erred by concluding that Nguyen’s plea agreement was “given under oath” and therefore admissible as substantive evidence of Tran’s guilt; and (3) there was

insufficient evidence from which the jury could find Tran

guilty of the charges. We discuss each of Tran’s arguments in

turn.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Nguyen’s Plea Agreement Was Admissible as a

Prior Inconsistent Statement.

Tran first contends that the district court erred when it concluded that Nguyen’s plea agreement constituted a prior

7680 UNITED STATES v. TRAN
inconsistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). We review a

district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc); United States v. Hernandez-Herrera, 273 F.3d 1213,

1217 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We review the admission of evidence

under an exception to the hearsay rule for abuse of discretion.”). “Evidentiary rulings will be reversed for abuse of discretion only if such nonconstitutional error more likely than

not affected the verdict.” United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d

876, 882 (9th Cir. 1994).

[1] Rule 801(d)(1)(A) provides that a trial witness’s out-ofcourt statement is not hearsay if the statement is “inconsistent

with the declarant’s testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.” We have stated that “trial judges

must retain a high degree of flexibility in deciding the exact

point at which a prior statement is sufficiently inconsistent

with a witness’s trial testimony to permit its use in evidence.”

United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1977).

The district court ruled that the statement in Nguyen’s plea

agreement was inconsistent with Nguyen’s in-court testimony. We conclude that the court by so ruling did not abuse

its discretion. Nguyen’s in-court testimony was vague and

evasive. He testified that he picked up the marijuana because

he was “young and stupid and did some stupid things” and

that he was in the car on that night to “pick up whatever was

in the car.” Nguyen conceded that Tran was with him on that

night, but stated that Tran was not involved in the drug deal.

Nguyen also testified that he did not remember the names of

the people who told him about the marijuana transportation

scheme. And although he could remember meeting with the

prosecuting attorney and Agent Ingersoll the week before his

testimony, he did not remember what he had told them about

Tran’s involvement.

[2] The portion of Nguyen’s plea agreement that was

admitted into evidence was inconsistent with Nguyen’s relucUNITED STATES v. TRAN 7681
tant and evasive in-court testimony. Under an abuse of discretion standard, it was not error for the district court to admit

this statement. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ruling admitting the plea agreement’s statement. 

B. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err by Concluding Nguyen’s Plea Agreement was “Given Under

Oath.”

Tran next argues that the plea agreement was not admissible as substantive evidence against him because it was not

“given under oath.” Because Tran did not object to the use of

Nguyen’s plea agreement statement as substantive evidence at

the time of trial, we review for plain error. See Jones v.

United States, 527 U.S. 373, 388 (1999). Under a plain error

standard, relief is not warranted unless there is: (1) an error;

(2) that was plain; and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 389. Even if these conditions are met,

reversal is discretionary and will be granted only if the error

“seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Dallman, 533 F.3d

755, 761 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Ameline,

409 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)).

[3] It was not plain error for the court to admit into evidence Nguyen’s plea agreement statement that “Tam Phu Quy

Nguyen, together with Hao Quang Tran, picked up approximately 70 pounds of marijuana for re-distribution that

night[ ]” as substantive evidence against Tran. Nguyen’s

redacted plea agreement states that Nguyen “understands that

before entering this plea of guilty, he will be placed under

oath.” No evidence was presented that the trial court departed

from the customary practice of placing Nguyen under oath

before Nguyen signed the plea agreement. A transcript of the

Nguyen’s plea hearing shows that Nguyen was in fact under

oath when he pleaded guilty in court. While under oath,

Nguyen also agreed that he had carefully reviewed the written

7682 UNITED STATES v. TRAN
plea agreement, and that all the terms of his agreement with

the government were contained therein.

[4] Moreover, the district court’s admission of Nguyen’s

plea agreement including the single statement noting Tran’s

presence with Nguyen does not “seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 1998). There was

plenty of other evidence in the record—including Nguyen’s

testimony that Tran was with him on the night they were

arrested, and the testimony of the ICE agent who arrested

Nguyen and Tran—showing that Tran was together with

Nguyen the night of the drug deal. 

C. There Was Insufficient Evidence Supporting the

Charges Against Tran.

Tran also contends that there was insufficient evidence to

support his convictions for conspiracy to possess marijuana

with intent to distribute, and for two counts of possession of

marijuana with intent to distribute. We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v.

Antonakeas, 255 F.3d 714, 723 (9th Cir. 2001). “Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we

must determine whether any rational jury could have found

[the defendant] guilty of each element of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Esquivel-Ortega, 484 F.3d

1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 2007). It is “the responsibility of the trier

of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts

to ultimate facts.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979).

1. Conspiracy Conviction

[5] Tran argues that the government failed to prove that he

participated in the conspiracy to possess marijuana for distribution. To successfully prosecute Tran on the conspiracy

UNITED STATES v. TRAN 7683
charge, the government was required to prove: (1) that within

five years leading up to and including June 27, 2006, there

was an agreement between two or more people to commit the

crime of possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute it;

and (2) that Tran became a member of the conspiracy, knowing of at least one of its objects and intending to help accomplish it. 

“[O]nly a slight connection is necessary to support a conviction of knowing participation” in a conspiracy. United

States v. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d 1166, 1167 (9th Cir. 1991).

“ ‘[S]light connection’ in this context does not mean that the

government’s burden of proving a connection is slight.”

United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 263 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th

Cir. 2001).

[6] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, the evidence was insufficient to show that Tran

had even a slight connection to the conspiracy. The principal

evidence presented to the jury was: 

• The in-court testimony of Nguyen, in which

Nguyen stated that Tran was present in the car

during the drug transaction but denied that Tran

was involved in the drug conspiracy.

• The testimony of government agents describing

the marijuana distribution operation generally,

but not mentioning any role by Tran in the conspiracy.

• A single sentence in Nguyen’s plea agreement

stating that “Tam Phu Quy Nguyen, together with

Hao Quang Tran, picked up approximately 70

pounds of marijuana for re-distribution that

night.”

• The testimony of Agent Ingersoll admitted solely

for impeachment, recounting that, during a pre7684 UNITED STATES v. TRAN
trial interview with the FBI and the prosecuting

attorney, Nguyen had implicated Tran in the drug

conspiracy.

• The testimony of two government witnesses,

Pham and Shaw, describing their prior drug dealings with Tran, admitted for the limited purpose

of showing Tran’s knowledge.

Once these pieces of evidence are confined to the purposes for

which they were admitted, the government’s proof against

Tran only amounts to: (1) Tran’s presence as Nguyen’s passenger during the marijuana deal; and (2) Tran’s knowledge

of marijuana distribution tactics, based on the testimony of

Pham and Shaw that was admitted for the limited purpose of

showing Tran’s knowledge under Rule 404(b). 

[7] The evidence presented against Tran and the reasonable

inferences drawn from that evidence do not support even a

slight connection between Tran and the conspiracy. The evidence at trial showed the sophisticated drug distribution ring

and named several individuals connected to it. Tran’s name,

however, was not mentioned during that testimony. Tran’s

name was mentioned only in connection with his arrest. Tran

did not own the silver Mustang carrying marijuana in the

trunk, nor was he the driver. No evidence was introduced at

trial from which it could be inferred—much less proved

beyond a reasonable doubt—that Tran participated in the conspiracy in any manner.

[8] Tran’s presence as a passenger in the silver Mustang

while the marijuana was transported, and his knowledge of

marijuana and marijuana distribution was insufficient as a

matter of law to establish his guilt on the conspiracy charge.

“It is not a crime to be acquainted with criminals or to be

physically present when they are committing crimes.”

Herrera-Gonzales, 263 F.3d at 1095. “Our cases have established that presence at the location of a conspiracy’s activities,

UNITED STATES v. TRAN 7685
while the activities are taking place, knowing that they are

taking place, without proof of intentional participation in the

conspiracy, cannot support a conspiracy conviction.” Id. at

1097.

Under our case law, Tran’s conviction on the conspiracy

charge cannot stand. Two other cases in which we found

insufficient evidence of participation in a conspiracy are illustrative.

In Sanchez-Mata, law enforcement agents linked a silver

Audi to a remote location where marijuana was discovered.

925 F.2d at 1167. Sanchez-Mata was never seen in that vicinity. Id. When officers stopped the silver Audi, Sanchez-Mata

was a passenger. Id. The agents could smell marijuana from

the outside of the car, and discovered 141 pounds of marijuana in the trunk of the Audi. Id. Sanchez-Mata did not resist

arrest or carry a weapon. Id. There were no drugs in the passenger compartment of the Audi. Sanchez-Mata did not own

the car, nor did he have a key to it. His fingerprints were not

on the drugs. Id. At trial, the government offered evidence

that Sanchez-Mata previously pleaded guilty to a drug-related

charge. Id. at 1168. This evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of showing that Sanchez-Mata “knew what marijuana smelled like and must have recognized the strong odor

present.” Id. Sanchez-Mata was convicted of conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to

distribute marijuana. Id. at 1167. We reversed both convictions. Id. at 1170. 

With respect to Sanchez-Mata’s conspiracy conviction, we

observed that there was insufficient evidence of even a slight

connection between the defendant and the conspiracy. Id. at

1167-68. Although the government had offered evidence from

which the jury could have concluded that Sanchez-Mata knew

that marijuana was present, we held that “knowledge that

drugs are present is not enough to prove involvement in a

drug conspiracy.” Id. at 1168 (citing United States v. Pena7686 UNITED STATES v. TRAN
gos, 823 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1987), United States v. Lopez, 625

F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1980), and United States v. Cloughessy,

572 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1977)). Although it was undisputed

that a conspiracy existed, there was insufficient evidence from

which a rational jury could have concluded that Sanchez-Mata

was a participant in that conspiracy. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d

at 1170.

In United States v. Estrada-Macias, 218 F.3d 1064, 1064

(9th Cir. 2000), the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to

manufacture methamphetamine. Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents learned of large shipments of pseudoephedrine tablets, often used to make methamphetamine.

Id. at 1065. The tablets were delivered to an apartment. Id.

Agents followed a man, Ramirez-Vasquez, driving a truck

carrying ten cases of the tablets from that first apartment to

a second apartment. Id. Less than two hours later, a car driven

by another man, Garcia, arrived at the second apartment. Id.

The car was stopped and Garcia was questioned. Id. EstradaMacias was a passenger in that car. Id.

That same day, the agents learned that a second shipment

of tablets was being shipped to another house. Id. Within

hours of the delivery of the tablets to that house, Garcia and

Estrada-Macias were observed being picked up by RamirezVasquez. Id.

After obtaining a warrant, the agents searched the house

and a trailer parked in the driveway of the house. Id. They

found substantial evidence that methamphetamine was being

manufactured in the trailer. Id. Estrada-Macias, VasquezRamirez, and Garcia were all arrested. Id. at 1066. EstradaMacias initially lied to the agents about where he lived, but

quickly admitted that he had been living in the trailer for the

preceding three months. Id. Estrada-Macias was convicted of

conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. Id.

In reversing that conviction, we held that the evidence was

“certainly sufficient to raise a strong inference that [EstradaUNITED STATES v. TRAN 7687
Macias] must have known that several individuals living

around him were engaged in a conspiracy to manufacture

methamphetamine. That inference is not strong enough to permit conviction. ‘Mere casual association with conspiring people is not enough.’ ” Id. (quoting Cloughessy, 572 F.2d at

191). Absent evidence of Estrada-Macias’s participation in

the conspiracy, his knowledge of the conspiracy, and sleeping

in a trailer used to manufacture methamphetamine was insufficient to support his conviction. Id.; see also HerreraGonzalez, 263 F.3d at 1097 (discussing Estrada-Macias).

Like the appellants in Sanchez-Mata and Estrada-Macias,

Tran was clearly present when a drug conspiracy was underway. Law enforcement officers and co-defendant Nguyen testified that Tran was the passenger in a car that was carrying

a large quantity of marijuana in its trunk. And as in SanchezMata and Estrada-Macias, a rational trier of fact could have

inferred that Tran had knowledge of the presence of drugs and

that a drug conspiracy was underway. 

[9] As in Sanchez-Mata and Estrada-Macias, however, the

government produced insufficient evidence from which a

rational jury could have concluded that Tran had even a slight

connection to the conspiracy. Tran’s name was never mentioned by the law enforcement officers who described the

marijuana smuggling operation at Tran’s trial. Tran did not

drive the car carrying the marijuana, nor was he the owner of

that car. The marijuana was found in the trunk of the car, but

not in the passenger compartment with Tran. The government

urges us to affirm Tran’s convictions, but it did not even

attempt to distinguish Tran’s case from Sanchez-Mata or

Estrada-Macias, nor did it point to any cases in support of its

position. 

The evidence against Tran was not sufficient to support his

conspiracy conviction. The testimony by two government witnesses, Pham and Shaw, attesting to Tran’s earlier connections with marijuana distribution were admitted solely for the

7688 UNITED STATES v. TRAN
limited purpose of showing that Tran knew what marijuana

was and how those involved in a marijuana conspiracy distribute the contraband. Agent Ingersoll’s testimony recounting

what Nguyen, the driver of the silver Mustang, told both him

and the prosecuting attorney about Tran’s role in the conspiracy was admitted solely to impeach Nguyen’s credibility and

for no other purpose. The court acknowledged that these two

pieces of evidence were admitted for those limited purposes.

[10] Lastly, there is the single sentence in Nguyen’s

redacted plea agreement’s statement of facts that “Tam Phu

Quy Nguyen, together with Hao Quang Tran, picked up

approximately 70 pounds of marijuana for redistribution that

night.” A rational jury could not find beyond a reasonable

doubt that Tran was guilty of conspiracy on the basis of

Nguyen’s statement, which supports no more than Tran’s

presence at the site of conspiratorial conduct carried on by

others. Accordingly Tran’s conviction for conspiracy to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute is vacated.

2. Possession with the Intent to Distribute 

Convictions

To successfully prosecute Tran on the charges of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, the government

was required to prove: (1) that Tran knowingly possessed

marijuana on June 27, 2006 (the date of his arrest); and (2)

that he possessed it with the intent to distribute it, or that he

aided and abetted Nguyen in the commission of the crime. 

[11] A conviction for possession with intent to distribute

may be based on one of three legal theories: (1) coconspirator liability, United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640,

645-47 (1946); (2) aiding and abetting, United States v.

Savinovich, 845 F.2d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 1988); and (3) exercising dominion and control over the contraband. United

States v. Behanna, 814 F.2d 1318, 1319 (9th Cir. 1987).

Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d at 1168. Because the government

UNITED STATES v. TRAN 7689
failed to prove that Tran was part of a conspiracy, Tran cannot

be guilty of possession with intent to distribute on a coconspirator theory. Id.

With respect to the aiding and abetting theory, we

explained in Sanchez-Mata:

Aiding and abetting . . . makes a defendant a principal when he consciously shares in any criminal act

whether or not there is a conspiracy. Nye & Nissen

v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1948). But it is

necessary that the defendant “in some sort associate

himself with the venture, that he participate in it as

in something that he wishes to bring about, that he

seek by his action to make it succeed.” Id. at 619.

Id. at 1168-69. 

[12] The government has not offered sufficient evidence

from which a rational jury could have found Tran guilty of

possession on an aiding and abetting theory. The evidence and

the reasonable inferences drawn from it support only a finding

that Tran was present as a passenger in the silver Mustang and

aware that the car contained marijuana. No evidence was

offered from which a rational jury could find that Tran “consciously share[d]” in Nguyen’s criminal act of possessing the

marijuana with the intent to distribute it. Sanchez-Mata, 925

F.3d at 1169. Therefore, an aiding and abetting theory does

not support Tran’s convictions for possession with intent to

distribute.

Finally, the government may prove possession with intent

to distribute by showing that Tran exercised dominion and

control over the contraband. Under this theory, “the government must prove that the defendant both knows of the presence of the contraband and has the power to exercise

dominion and control over it.” Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d at

1169 (citing Behanna, 814 F.2d at 1319). Again, “[m]ere

7690 UNITED STATES v. TRAN
proximity to contraband, presence on property where it is

found, and association with a person or persons having control of it are all insufficient to establish constructive possession.” United States v. Rodriguez, 761 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th

Cir. 1985). Furthermore, “it is ‘well established that a passenger may not be convicted unless there is evidence connecting

him with the contraband, other than his presence in the vehicle.’ ” Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d at 1169 (quoting United States

v. Ramos, 476 F.2d 624, 625 (9th Cir. 1973)).

Again, our decision in Sanchez-Mata compels the reversal

of Tran’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute.

In Sanchez-Mata, the government was able to show that the

defendant was present in a car carrying 141 pounds of marijuana in its trunk. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d at 1167. The car

smelled so strongly of marijuana that the police could smell

the drug from outside the vehicle. Id. The government offered

evidence in the form of Sanchez-Mata’s prior drug conviction

which showed that Sanchez-Mata knew what marijuana

smelled like. Id. at 1168. Nevertheless, we held that the government could not prevail on this theory because it failed to

show that Sanchez-Mata had dominion or control over the

drugs. Id. at 1169. We observed that Sanchez-Mata did not

have a key to the car or its trunk, was not driving the car, and

did not own the car. Id. The evidence showed that SanchezMata was a passenger in the car, but no evidence connected

him to the drugs. Id.

[13] Likewise, Tran was clearly present in the silver Mustang when law enforcement stopped it. There was a large

quantity of marijuana in the trunk of the car. The jury could

have reasonably concluded that, based on the testimony

regarding Tran’s past conduct relating to marijuana, he knew

that marijuana was in the car. There was not, however, other

evidence presented which would show that Tran exercised

dominion or control over that marijuana. Tran was not driving

the car, and the car was not his. Nothing but his presence connected him to the marijuana in the car. See id. (quoting

UNITED STATES v. TRAN 7691
Ramos, 476 F.2d at 625 (explaining that “it is ‘well established that a passenger may not be convicted unless there is

evidence connecting him with the contraband, other than his

presence in the vehicle.“) (emphasis added))); accord

Esquivel-Ortega, 484 F.3d at 1225. Accordingly, the convictions for possession with intent to distribute also is vacated.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not err by admitting a redacted portion of Nguyen’s plea agreement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A). The evidence against Tran was, however,

insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction for

conspiracy or his convictions for possession with intent to distribute. His convictions are reversed.

REVERSED.

NOONAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The redacted plea agreement of co-conspirator Nguyen,

admitted as substantive evidence against Tran, states:

Tam Phu Quy Nguyen, together with Han Quong

Tran, picked up approximately 70 pounds of marijuana for redistribution that night. [italics supplied]

Nguyen’s statement is sufficient to establish that Tran was

a participant in the conspiracy to distribute marijuana and was

himself in possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

The co-conspirator Nguyen declares clearly and unequivocally that together he and Tran picked up the 70 pounds for

redistribution.

The majority, faced with this statement, says that it “supports no more than Tran’s presence at the time of conspirato7692 UNITED STATES v. TRAN
rial conduct carried on by others.” The majority misreads the

sentence. The sentence does not say that Tran stood by while

Nguyen picked up the drugs. The sentence states that Nguyen

and Tran together picked up the drugs for distribution. The

verb “picked up” is an active verb. The modifier “together”

refers to joint action by the two conspirators. In any court in

the land Nguyen’s statement, if believed, would establish

Tran’s guilt of the crimes with which he was charged. 

In addition to this evidence, sufficient in itself to prove

Tran’s guilt, the government offered the following facts confirmatory of the conspiracy and of Tran’s more than slight

connection to it:

A well-organized drug ring was smuggling marijuana from

Canada and distributing it in the U.S. The gang was operating

out of a suburban warehouse where cars showed up to get

batches of the drug. Tran was in one of the cars loaded from

the warehouse. Nguyen, the driver, 22 at the time, appears to

be naive if not stupid. It’s unlikely that the gang would let

him have 70 pounds of the drug without having him under

control. Tran had plenty of experience in drug smuggling

from Canada. No plausible reason was given why he should

be sitting in a car to which the drugs are offloaded unless he

was part of the conspiracy. Nguyen gave a vague account of

how he knew Tran and why he was there, and Nguyen was

impeached. A rational juror could infer that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Tran was the conspiracy’s man to shepherd the

drugs in the car. This reasonable conclusion chimes with

Nguyen’s evidence that he and Tran together picked up the

marijuana.

I dissent from the majority’s reversal of Tran’s conviction.

UNITED STATES v. TRAN 7693