UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MICHAEL G. STEVENS,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

AT-1221-14-0743-W-2

DATE: July 26, 2023

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Michael G. Stevens, Daphne, Alabama, pro se.

Filomena Gehart and William V. Cochrane, Jr., Eglin Air Force Base, 

Florida, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

denied his request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA) 

appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following 

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; 

 

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation 

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative 

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision 

were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, 

and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material 

evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due 

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully 

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not 

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. 

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to

address the appellant’s allegations of whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(9), we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant filed an IRA appeal alleging that in reprisal for 31 alleged 

protected disclosures that he made between March 2005 and June 6, 2012, and 

more recently between July 10, 2012, and May 31, 2013, he was subjected to 

13 personnel actions, which occurred between May 13, 2013, and May 13, 2014. 

Stevens v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-14-0743-

W‐1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1.2 He did not request a hearing. Id. at 11. 

The administrative judge found that the appellant had raised nonfrivolous 

allegations of Board jurisdiction and issued a detailed jurisdictional order 

identifying the specific disclosures and personnel actions over which the 

appellant had established Board jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 26.

¶3 After affording the parties an opportunity to file close-of-record 

submissions, the administrative judge issued an initial decision, denying the 

 

2

The appellant’s initial appeal was dismissed without prejudice on September 1, 2016,

and automatically refiled 30 days later. IAF, Tab 34.
3

appellant’s request for corrective action. Stevens v. Department of the Air Force, 

MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-14-0743-W-2, Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID). The 

administrative judge found that the appellant proved by preponderant evidence 

that he made a protected disclosure in March 2005, when he reported a Federal 

Travel Regulations violation comprising the denial of his travel request for a 

3-day temporary duty assignment in Maitland, Florida. ID at 7-8. However, the 

administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove that this protected 

disclosure in 2005 was a contributing factor in the agency’s personnel actions, the 

earliest of which occurred 8 years later. ID at 8. The administrative judge also

found that the agency had strong evidence in support of its personnel actions,

which stemmed from a Headquarters Command notification that funding for the 

appellant’s position and many others would be eliminated. Id.

¶4 The administrative judge further found that the appellant failed to prove by 

preponderant evidence that his remaining protected disclosures were protected. 

The administrative judge found that the appellant’s alleged disclosures 6, 9-10, 

12, and 19-20 concerned complaints to various individuals about his reassignment 

from a GS-12 Physical Scientist (Environmental) position to a GS-11 

Environmental Engineer position in the Compliance section, as part of a 

reorganization following the headquarters notification that funding for the 

appellant’s position and many others would be eliminated. ID at 5, 9. The 

administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove that these alleged 

disclosures amounted to a disclosure of one of the categories of wrongdoing set 

forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) because they merely amounted to questions and 

concerns regarding the agency’s decision to reassign him and/or disagreement 

over the agency’s decision to abolish his position. ID at 9-12. 

¶5 The administrative judge found that the appellant’s alleged disclosures

13-16, 21, 24-25, and 27 involved his stated concerns regarding an Environmental 

Restoration Program (ERP) manager’s potential conflict of interest in that he 

believed that the ERP Manager was requesting that certain contractors perform 
4

work outside of their scope and, as a result, the ERP Manager might treat them 

more favorably when awarding a contract in the future if she subsequently served 

on the Performance Base Contract Board (PCB). ID at 5, 12‐13. The 

administrative judge found that such disclosures were not protected because a 

reasonable person would not have believed that they amounted to a disclosure of 

any of the categories of wrongdoing under section 2302(b)(8) to the extent the 

disclosures were speculative in nature, presupposed that the ERP Manager would 

serve on the PCB and the subject contractor would bid on a contract, and, 

ultimately, disclosed a conflict of interest that might never materialize. ID 

at 12-14. 

¶6 The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) 

File, Tab 1. The agency has opposed the appellant’s petition, and the appellant 

has filed a reply. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶7 On petition for review, the appellant largely reiterates his alleged 

disclosures without explaining how they amount to a disclosure of any of the 

categories of wrongdoing identified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). PFR File, Tab 1 

at 7-19. He does not identify any error in the administrative judge’s finding that 

his disclosures about his reassignment (disclosures 6, 9-10, 12, and 19-20) were 

not protected because they amounted to mere disagreement with the agency’s 

decision to abolish his position3or that his disclosures concerning the ERP 

 

3

The appellant’s alleged disclosures 6, 9, and 10 involved disclosures made in the 

context of a grievance. IAF, Tab 26 at 6-7. The Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 stat. 1465, extended the Board’s 

jurisdiction over IRA appeals to claims of reprisal for engaging in protected activity by 

filing a complaint or grievance seeking to remedy whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(8). 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(a), 2302(b)(9)(A)(i); Mudd v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7 (2013). Here, however, the appellant has not proven, or 

even argued, that his grievances involved remedying a violation of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(8). Thus, the administrative judge properly analyzed whether these alleged 

disclosures amounted to protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
5

Manager’s alleged potential conflict of interest (disclosures 13‐16, 21, 24‐25, 

and 27) were not protected because they were too speculative. Nor does he 

challenge the administrative judge’s finding that he failed to prove that his 2005 

disclosure regarding travel reimbursement was a contributing factor in any of the 

agency’s personnel actions. Id. at 3. To the extent the appellant has not 

identified any specific error in the administrative judge’s analysis, the Board will 

not embark upon a complete review of the record. See Baney v. Department of 

Justice, 109 M.S.P.R. 242, ¶ 7 (2008); Tines v. Department of the Air Force, 

56 M.S.P.R. 90, 92 (1992).

¶8 On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred 

generally in finding that his disclosures were not protected because he previously 

found that they were protected in a July 26, 2016 jurisdictional order. PFR File, 

Tab 1 at 4-6. He also argues that the agency and/or the administrative judge 

failed to show that his disclosures were not protected and/or were not a 

contributing factor in the agency’s personnel actions. Id. at 4, 6. Such arguments 

misconstrue the relevant burdens of proof in an IRA appeal. In his jurisdictional 

order, the administrative judge did not find that the appellant proved the merits of 

his appeal. Rather, he found that the appellant raised nonfrivolous allegations 

that he made a protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in the agency’s 

decision to take a personnel action, and thus established Board jurisdiction, 

entitling him to a hearing, if requested. IAF, Tab 26. Because the appellant did 

not request a hearing, the administrative judge properly issued a close -of-record 

order, notifying the appellant of his ultimate burden of proving the merits of his 

appeal by establishing those same elements by preponderant evidence. 4 IAF,

Tab 26 at 20; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(4). The appellant’s argument that the 

agency and/or the administrative judge failed to show that his disclosures were 

 

4

The administrative judge also had previously notified the appellant regarding these 

burdens. IAF, Tab 2. 
6

not protected is similarly unavailing because it is the appellant’s burden to prove 

that he made a protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in a personnel 

action. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Lu v. Department of Homeland Security, 

122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7 (2015).

¶9 On review, the appellant also contends that the administrative judge erred in 

using improper terminology when he referred to the appellant’s disclosures as 

relating to his reassignment instead of a downgrade or change to lower grade. 

PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. However, any such error does not provide a basis for 

reversal to the extent the appellant has not explained how this error was 

prejudicial and the record reflects that, although the administrative judge referred 

to it as a reassignment, he acknowledged that the reassignment was from a GS-12 

Physical Scientist position (Environmental) to a GS-11 Environmental Engineer 

position. ID at 5, 9; see Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 

282 (1984) (stating that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s 

substantive rights provides no basis for reversing an initial decision).

¶10 Regarding the appellant’s alleged protected disclosures concerning the ERP 

Manager’s alleged conflict of interest (disclosures 13-16, 21, 24-25, and 27), the 

appellant asserts that the administrative judge discussed, but did not identify,

disclosures 21, 25, and 27 by number, and failed to discuss certain other alleged 

disclosures. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. In particular, he contends that the 

administrative judge did not identify disclosure 13, but acknowledges that the 

administrative judge quoted a portion of this email disclosure in the initial 

decision. Id. Regarding disclosure 14, the appellant asserts that the 

administrative judge did not identify this disclosure and incorrectly described the 

contents of his supervisor’s email response to this alleged disclosure. Id. 

However, we have reviewed this disclosure and find that it disclosed the same 

essential facts as disclosure 13, which the administrative judge quoted, and the 

administrative judge properly characterized the appellant’s supervisor’s reply. ID

at 13, IAF, Tab 14 at 39-40, 43-44. The appellant also contends that the 
7

administrative judge did not identify or discuss disclosure 24. PFR File, Tab 1

at 5. However, this disclosure amounts to a forwarded email of the appellant’s 

disclosure 21, which the administrative judge referenced. ID at 13 n.6; IAF,

Tab 13 at 42, Tab 26 at 11. In any event, because the appellant’s disclosures

concerning the ERP Manager’s alleged conflict of interest all disclosed the same 

essential facts, any failure on the administrative judge’s part to specifically 

discuss the details of each disclosure does not provide a basis for reversal because 

the analysis in the initial decision also would apply to each of these alleged

disclosures.

¶11 The appellant’s alleged disclosure 16 was made to the Department of 

Defense Inspector General (IG). Although the administrative judge analyzed this 

disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), he did not analyze whether it amounted to 

protected activity under section 2302(b)(9)(C), which includes disclosing 

information to an agency’s IG.

5

 Therefore, we modify the initial decision to 

address this issue. Under the broadly worded provision of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(9)(C), disclosing information to an agency’s IG is protected regardless 

of content, as long as the disclosure is made “in accordance with applicable 

provisions of law.” Fisher v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 11, ¶ 8. 

Thus, we find that the appellant proved by preponderant evidence that he engaged 

in protected activity when he disclosed information on January 10, 2013, to the 

agency’s IG office by filing a hotline complaint concerning the ERP Manager’s 

alleged conflict of interest. IAF, Tab 14 at 52-56. 

 

5 During the pendency of this appeal, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2018 (NDAA), Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed into law on 

December 12, 2017. Section 1097 of the NDAA amended various provisions of Title 5 

of the U.S. Code. In particular, it amended 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) to include 

disclosing information to the Inspector General “or any other component responsible for 

internal investigation or review.” 131 Stat. 1283, 1616. However, the result here 

would be the same under both pre- and post-NDAA law because the appellant disclosed 

information to the agency’s IG.
8

¶12 However, we find that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant 

evidence that his disclosing information to the IG was a contributing factor in any 

of the six agency personnel actions at issue in this appeal.

6

 The appellant has not 

offered any evidence establishing that the relevant deciding officials were aware 

that he filed an IG complaint. Rather, he asserts on review that the IG’s email 

response to him, which indicated that the IG had referred his concerns to the 

appropriate authorities within the Department of Defense for information and any 

action they deemed appropriate, IAF, Tab 14 at 57, “most likely raised a few 

feathers” with management, PFR File, Tab 1 at 15. Such a bare statement fails to 

prove that the appellant’s supervisor or human resources specialist or any other 

individual involved in the personnel actions was aware of his IG complaint. See

Jones v. Department of the Treasury, 99 M.S.P.R. 479, ¶ 8 (2005) (finding that an 

appellant’s insinuation and unsubstantiated speculation that an individual knew of 

his prior whistleblowing activity did not amount to a nonfrivolous allegation of 

contributing factor). Additionally, although the record below reflects that the

appellant informed the legal office and Captain A.N. that he had contacted the IG

and sent them a copy of his IG complaint, such individuals do not appear to have 

been involved in making the decision to take the relevant personnel actions. 7 

 

6

In the jurisdictional order, the administrative judge found that the appellant 

established Board jurisdiction over the following personnel actions: (1) on June 4, 

2013, his supervisor informed him that he would no longer be the designated point of 

contact for a contractor and took away other duties; (2) on June 12, 2013, the 

appellant’s supervisor detailed him to perform GS-11 Compliance duties; (3) in 

June/August 2013, the appellant’s supervisor denied his request for an alternative work 

schedule; (4) on November 26, 2013, the appellant’s detail to GS-11 duties was 

extended to a date not to exceed February 2, 2014; (5) on February 2, 2014, the 

appellant’s GS-11 detail ended and he was returned to his former GS-12 position, 

however, between February 2 and May 6, 2014, his actual duties remained those of a 

GS-11 Environmental Engineer; and (6) on or about April 10, 2014, a human resources 

employee informed the appellant that his former position had been abolished; IAF, 

Tab 26 at 14-17.

7 We are unable to discern from the appellant’s lengthy submissions below any specific 

argument concerning whether the officials involved in taking the relevant personnel 

actions were aware of his IG complaint. However, the appellant bears the burden of 
9

IAF, Tab 12 at 16, Tab 13 at 54-56. Thus, the appellant has not established 

contributing factor via the knowledge/timing test. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1) 

(explaining that an employee may demonstrate contributing factor through 

circumstantial evidence that the official taking the personnel action knew of the 

protected activity and the personnel action occurred within a period of time such 

that a reasonable person could conclude that the protected activity was a 

contributing factor in the personnel action). 

¶13 Further, the appellant has not proven contributing factor considering the 

strength of the agency’s evidence and the lack of motivation on the part of the 

individuals who took the personnel actions. Rumsey v. Department of Justice, 

120 M.S.P.R. 259, ¶ 26 (2013) (stating that if an appellant fails to satisfy the 

knowledge/timing test, the Board must consider other evidence, such as that 

pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the 

personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was personally directed at the 

proposing or deciding official, and whether those individuals had a desire or 

motive to retaliate against the appellant). The appellant’s IG complaint 

concerned an alleged conflict of interest on an ERP manager’s part and was not 

directed at his supervisor or the human resources specialist who took the relevant 

personnel actions. Thus, we are unable to discern a motive to retaliate on the part 

of the relevant officials. Further, as the administrative judge found, the agency 

had strong evidence in support of its actions, which stemmed from a 

headquarters-directed reorganization in which the appellant’s position was 

abolished. Accordingly, we modify the initial decision to find that the appellant 

has not proven by preponderant evidence that his protected activity in disclosing 

 

proving contributing factor, 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(4), and it is 

not the Board’s obligation to pore through the record to construe and make sense of 

allegations set forth at various parts of a voluminous case file, see Keefer v. Department 

of Agriculture, 92 M.S.P.R. 476, ¶ 18 n.2 (2002).
10

information to the IG was a contributing factor in any of the agency’s personnel 

actions.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS8

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the 

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain 

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of 

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate 

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following 

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not 

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and 

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule 

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of 

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your 

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file 

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your 

chosen forum. 

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review 

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions 

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you 

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking 

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court 

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

 

8

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated 

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the 

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
11

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of 

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you 

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action 

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain 

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination 

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you 

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on 
12

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be 

entitled to representation by a court‐appointed lawyer and to waiver of any 

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective 

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding 

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the 

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must fil e 

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the 

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or 

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised 

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or 
13

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s 

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), 

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of 

competent jurisdiction.9The court of appeals must receive your petition for 

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of pa rticular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

 

9

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain 

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on 

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on 

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of 

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195, 

132 Stat. 1510. 
14

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their 

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

 /s/ for 

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board