In the 

Missouri Court of Appeals 

Western District

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent,

v.

JEREL T. JACKSON,

Appellant.

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WD76819

OPINION FILED: June 24, 2014

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri

The Honorable John M. Torrence, Judge

Before Division Three: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge 

and Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

Jerel Jackson ("Jackson") appeals from the trial court's judgment convicting him 

of two counts of murder in the second degree, one count of assault in the first degree, and 

three counts of armed criminal action, and sentencing him to a total of twenty years 

imprisonment. Jackson asserts that the trial court committed plain error when it 

proceeded with a sentencing without first determining that Jackson knowingly, 
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voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right under section 557.0361to have a jury 

recommend the sentences to be imposed. We affirm. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

Following a jury trial, the trial court entered a judgment convicting Jackson of two 

counts of murder in the second degree, one count of assault in the first degree, and three 

counts of armed criminal action. The trial court sentenced Jackson to concurrent 

sentences of twenty-two years for each murder count, twenty-two years for the assault 

count, and three years for each count of armed criminal action. Jackson appealed, and we 

affirmed the judgment in part, vacated the judgment in part, and remanded to the trial 

court for jury-recommended sentencing. State v. Jackson, 385 S.W.3d 437 (Mo. App. 

W.D. 2012). 

On remand, Jackson, through his counsel, filed a written request for the court to 

assess punishment without a jury recommendation. At a hearing, the trial court asked 

whether Jackson wished "to waive his right to have a jury hear the sentencing issue." 

Jackson's counsel answered in the affirmative, and Jackson remained silent. The trial 

court proceeded with a bench trial to determine Jackson's sentencing. Following the 

bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment that concurrently sentenced Jackson to 

twenty years for each murder count, twenty years for the assault count, and three years 

for each count of armed criminal action. 

Jackson appeals. 

 

1All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 as supplemented unless otherwise indicated. 
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Standard of Review

Jackson concedes that he did not object when the trial court proceeded with the 

sentencing trial without a jury. Thus, Jackson seeks plain error review pursuant to Rule 

30.20. "[P]lain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of 

the court when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted 

therefrom." Rule 30.20. Plain error review requires a two-step process. State v. Rios, 

314 S.W.3d 414, 422 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). First, we must determine whether the 

claimed error "facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest 

injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In other words, the error must be "evident, obvious, and clear." Id. If we find that an 

error was established on the face of the claim, we may proceed to the second step: 

whether manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice will occur if the error is left 

uncorrected. Id. 

Analysis

Jackson argues that the trial court committed plain error in conducting a 

sentencing trial without a jury because it failed to determine first that Jackson's waiver of 

jury sentencing was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Jackson points out that pursuant 

to section 557.036, he had a right to jury sentencing. Jackson contends that because the 

record does not demonstrate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of this right, he 

was denied due process, a manifest injustice requiring reversal and remand. 

Section 557.036 creates a statutory right to jury-recommended sentencing. It 

provides, in relevant part: 
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2. Where an offense is submitted to the jury, the trial shall proceed in two 

stages. At the first stage, the jury shall decide only whether the defendant 

is guilty or not guilty of any submitted offense. The issue of punishment 

shall not be submitted to the jury at the first stage.

3. If the jury at the first stage of a trial finds the defendant guilty of the 

submitted offense, the second stage of the trial shall proceed. The issue at 

the second stage of the trial shall be the punishment to be assessed and 

declared. . . . 

The statutory right to jury-recommended sentencing may be waived upon written request 

filed with the trial court before voir dire begins. Section 557.036.4. 

Here, Jackson's counsel filed a written request for the trial court to assess 

punishment. The request stated, in its entirety: 

COMES NOW Defendant, Jerel T. Jackson, by and through counsel, 

Steven Willibey, and, pursuant to Section 557.036 RSMo 2004, hereby 

requests that the Court assess punishment in this case.

This written request constituted a valid waiver of jury-recommended sentencing. We 

cannot convict a trial court of committing plain error when it has followed the letter of 

the law. 

Jackson argues that although the written waiver may have satisfied the 

requirements of section 557.036.4, in the absence of specific inquiry of Jackson on the 

subject, the trial court could not assess whether the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary in denial of his due process rights. Jackson cites no authority in support of this 

proposition. Moreover, Jackson's argument fails to apprehend that the right to jury 

sentencing is statutory, not constitutional, in its origin. State v. Emery, 95 S.W.3d 98, 

102 (Mo. banc 2003). Jackson is entitled to nothing more than the statute requires insofar 

as waiver of the right to jury-recommended sentencing is concerned. Jackson's written 
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request that sentencing be determined by the court effectively waived his rights under 

section 557.036.

Moreover, "[a] defendant waives his right to a jury at the punishment stage of trial 

when he allows the judge to determine his sentence without invoking his statutory right." 

State v. Weaver, 178 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005). In both Emery and 

Weaver, the defendants allowed the trial courts to determine their sentences without 

raising their statutory right for a jury-recommended sentence. Both judgments, insofar as 

they related to sentencing by the trial court, were affirmed. Here, Jackson stood idly by 

when the trial court asked about, and his trial counsel confirmed, Jackson's intention to 

waive his statutory right to jury-recommended sentencing. 

The record reflects that Jackson waived his statutory right to a jury-recommended 

sentence. The facts in this case are materially indistinguishable from those in State v. 

Price, No. WD76385, 2014 WL 2478695 (Mo. App. W.D. June 3, 2014), where we 

recently rejected an identical claim that due process rights are implicated unless a trial 

court conducts specific inquiry on the record of a defendant who has waived in writing, 

and by silent acquiescence, his statutory right to jury-recommended sentencing. 

The trial court did not commit error, plain or otherwise. Jackson's point on appeal 

is denied. 

Conclusion

We affirm.

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Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur