THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

R.C. Frederick Hanold, III and Rose F. Hanold, and Carol R. Mitchell and George P. Mitchell, Jr., Respondents,

v.

Watson's Orchard Property Own ers Association, Inc., a South Carolina Corporation, and Pelham Farm, LLC, a South Carolina Corporation , Legacy One, LLC, a South Carolina Corporation, SESP LLC, a South Carolina Corporation, an unknown Trust ee of the Revocable Trust Agreement Dated March 19,1996 established by James B. Stephens as amended, a nd unknown Jay Stephens and Mike Stephens as Co-Persona l Representative of the

Estate of James B. S tephens, Defendants,

Of whom Pelham Farm, LLC, a South Carolina Corporation, Legacy One , LLC, a South Carolina Corporation, an unknown Trust ee of the Revocable Trust Agreement Dated March 19 , 1996 established by James B. Stephens as amended, a nd unknown Jay Stephens and Mike Stephens as co-Persona l Representative of the Estate of James B. Stephens, are the Petitioners.

v.

Property Owners in Watson's Orchard Subdivision: N. Carter Poe, III; McNally Ree ves, as Trustee of the

Residual Trust under item Five of the Last Will and

Testament of Hattie L. Reeves dated February 9, 1998; Janet B. Yusi; Lucy S. Tiller; James G. Stephens; Rachel P. McKaughan; Ramon J . Ashy and Jana Ashy; Christopher D. Scalzo and Heather V. Scalzo; Erma R. Rash, as Trustee of the Erm a R. Rash Revocable Trust dated February 12, 2010; James Edwin Conrad, as Trustee of the James Edwin Conrad Living Trust datedSeptember 7, 2010; Sue L ane Conrad; Horst H. H. Eschenberg and Floride C. E schenberg; Caryl L. Clover, as Trustee of the Caryl L. Cl over Revocable Living Trust Agreement dated May 12 , 1999; Mary F. Newell; Timothy M. Conroy and Eliz abeth W. Conroy; Nathan Scolari; Joel Wells Norwood and Lynn Norwood; J. Lynn Shook; Juan Hernandez and Janice M. Pelletier; Scott P. Payne and Kathleen H. Payne; Joe G. Thomason and Dana L. Henry Thomason; Traci Segura; Cameron E. Smith and Joan B. Smith; Ch arles E. Howard and Sharon

F. Howard; Penelope J. Galbr aith; Meredith C. Vry; Delores B. Mitchell; Lisette M. Silva and Mary F. Colley; Ilona K. Alford and William G. Alford; George

T. McLeod and Martha T. McLeod; Ronald S. Wilson and Robin E. Wilson; The Merrill J. Gildersleeve and

Anore L. Novak Revocable Living Trust dated November 1, 1996; Anna Mar ie T. Azores and Kim O. Gococo; Ashley Westrope as Trustee of Martha Randolph Westrop Trust date d June 6, 1988; Cliff C. Jollie and Martha W. Jollie; David A. Saliny and Xiaoli Saliny; Lecia S. Franklin; Dean D. Varner and Deborah

P. Varner; W. Frank Durham, J r.; Christine M. Howard; Samuel P. Howard, Jr. and Jane H. Howard; Manfred E. Kramer and Jane J. Kramer; Mary J. Steele; James J. Barrett, III and Kimberly A. Barrett; Richard A. Herman and Patricia L. Herrman, Third Party Defendants.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001555

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT O F APPEALSAppeal from Greenville County Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 27702 Heard October 20, 2016 – F iled February 15, 2017

AFFIRMED

John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Nichols Thompson & Delgado, LLC, of Columbia, and William D. Herlong, of The Herlong Law Firm, LLC, of Greenville, both for

Petitioners.

Randall S. Hiller, of Randall S. Hiller, P.A., of Greenville, for Respondents.

JUSTICE HEARN: In this action to enforce restric tive covenants, we affirm the court of appeals in finding Petitioners' property was not devel oped into discrete lots to entitle them to voting rights under the covenants. We write now only to clarify that portion of the court of appeals' opinion that may be read to conflate the terms "developed" and "improved."

DISCUSSION

The facts of this case are not in dispute and can be found in the court of appeals opinion, Hanold v. Watson's Orchard Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. , 412

S.C. 387, 772 S.E.2d 528 (Ct. App. 2015).

We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the term "developed" as

contained in the restrictive c ovenants is unambiguous, and its plain and ordinary meaning connotes conversion of raw land into an area suitable for building, residential, or bus iness purposes. See, e.g., Sleasman v. City of Lacey , 159 Wash.2d 639, 643, 151 P. 3d 990, 992 (2007); Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 618 (3d ed. 1986). To the extent the court of appeals may have used the terms "developed" and "improved" interchangeably, we note the terms a re not synonymous and the requirements for improved land, such as the installation ofutilities or buildings, are not necessary to meet the lower threshold of developed

land. Therefore, we hold the court of appeals should have limi ted its inquiry to consider only evidence as it rela tes to "developed" lots, and a ny consideration of whether the property was "i mproved" was not pertinent.

However, we find any error in the application of the two terms did not affect the outcome of the case at hand, and we agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that Petitioners did not "develop" their property under the pla in meaning of the

restrictive covenants.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals' opinion is affir med.

AFFIRMED.



### BEATTY, C.J. and KITTREDGE, J., concur. Acting Justice Costa M. Pleicones, concurring in a separate opinion in which FEW, J., concurs.ACTING JUSTICE PLEICONES : I respectfully concur in result only, and would dismiss certiorari as impr ovidently granted rather than a ffirm as modified. In my opinion, the Court of Appeal s properly construed the term "developed" in

the context of the documen t in which it appears. E.g., Reyhani v. Stone Creek Cove Condo. II Horizontal Prop. Regime , 329 S.C. 206, 494 S. E.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1997). I fear that by dictating the meaning of the terms "deve loped" and "improved," the majority may i nadvertently alter the meaning of documents, Reyhani, supra, or create a conflict with legislative enactments. E.g., S. C. Code Ann. § 29-6-10 (2) (2007) (defini ng "improve" in the subchapter governing payments to contractors, subcon tractors, and suppliers). Becau se I agree with the majority that the decision of t he Court of Appeals should be affirmed, I concur in

that result here.

FEW, J., concurs.