### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 18

– 1427
Filed October 18 , 2019

HEATHER YOUNG, DEL HOLLAND, and BLAKE HENDRICKSON, Appellants/Cross

- Appellees,

vs. THE IOWA CITY COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT; CHRIS LYNCH, Individually and in His Capacity as President of the Board of Directors and Director; LaTASHA DeLOACH, Individually and in Her Capacity as Director of the Iowa City Community School District; BRIAN KIRS CHLING, Individually and in His Capacity as Director of the Iowa City Community School District; and PAUL ROESLER, Individually and in His Capacity as Director of the Iowa City Community School District, Appellees/Cross

- Appellants

.

Appeal from the I owa District Court for Johnson County, Sean McPartland, Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal, and defendants cross

- appeal, from portions of a district court order granting a summary judgment in plaintiffs’ action for injunctive relief and damages arising from defend ants’ decision not to submit to the county election commissioner plaintiffs’ ballot proposal regarding the demolition of a local elementary school. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
.

Gregg Geerdes, Iowa City , for appellant s/cross

- appellees.

Andrew J. Bracken, Kristy M. Latta, and Emily A. Kolbe of Ahlers & Cooney, P.C., Des Moines , for appellee s/cross

- appellants.2

APPEL , Justice. In this case, we consider a series of claims arising out of the refusal
of the Iowa City Community School District (school district or Board) to authorize the placement of a ballot issue at an election to be held on Septe mber 12, 2017 , after a petition bearing over 2 000 signatures had been timely filed with the B oard. The ballot measure would have asked the voters whether they approved the demo li tion of Hoover Elementary School and the use of the proceeds for school district purposes.
After the B oard refused to direct the county auditor to place the matter on the ballot in the upcoming electi on, the plaintiffs filed suit in
district court. The plai ntiffs sought a writ of certiorari, a writ of mandamus, injunctive relief, and damages against the school district and individual board members who voted against placing the measure on the
ballot. The defendants answered and filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory relief. The district court entered an injunction directing the defendants to place the matter on the ballot . Because absentee ballots had already been issued, the district court directed that the matter be placed on the next general election ballot following September 12. The district court granted
the defendants su mmary judgment on the plaintiff s ’ claims for damages and any other relief. The plaintiffs appealed. T he plaintiffs seek reversal of the district court order declining to awar d damages for alleged violations of t he United
States Constitution.
The defendants cross

- appealed. In their c ross

- appeal , the defendants claim that the district court erred in determining that, under state law, the school district was required to place the ballot measure supported by the petitioners on the ballot.3 For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that the dis trict court erred in granting the plaintiffs injunctive relief. We conclude that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all claims. As a result, we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the order of the district court. We
remand the case to the district co urt for dismissal.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
. A. Factual Background. In 2013, the board of directors of the Iowa City Community School District adopted a “F acilities M aster P lan” ( FMP )

. The demolition of Hoover Elementary Sch ool and the construction of a structure to become part of Iowa City High School on the former Hoover Elementary site was part of the FMP. The school district sought voter approval of a $191 million bond
issue to finance the execution of the FMP . The election w as set for September 12, 2017. The school district intended to keep Hoover
Elementa ry School open through the 2018

– 20 19 school year after which it would be closed, the building demolished, and the site used for other

purposes by Iowa City High S chool. On June 29, 2017, the p laintiffs filed a petition with the school district seeking to require the district to also place on the September 12
ballot a narrow question

. Specifically, the petition asked that the following question be placed on the S eptember 12 ballot : Shall the Iowa City Community School District

. . . demolish the building known as Hoover Elementary School . . . after the 2018

- 2019 school year, with the proceeds of any resulting salvage to be app lied as specified in Iowa Code s ection 297.22(b)? Prior to receipt of the petition, the school district sought the advice
of counsel regarding the legality of the proposed ballot measure. In a letter
dated June 22, 2017 , the B oard’s counsel advised that the question the4 petitioners sou ght to place on the ballot was not “authorized by law” un der Iowa Code section 278.2(1) (2017)

. According to the June 22 opinion, the
demo lition of Hoover Elementary School was not a “ sale, lease, or other disposition” of a schoolhouse subject to submissi on to the voters under Iowa Code section 278.1(1)( b ). The opinio n emphasized that while in 2008
th e Iowa legislature amended the Code to define “dispose” or “disposition”
to “include [] the exchange, transfer, demo li tion, or destruction of any real
or othe r property of the corporation,” the legislature deleted that provision the next year. According to the legal opinion, the legislative history “expresses a clear legislative intent to remove from the voters decision making authority over demolition of scho ol district owned structures.” After receipt o f the petition on June 29, the B oard requested a supplemental and expanded opinion from counsel , which was provided in a letter dated July 6, 2017. The July 6 opinion repeated the legislative history cited in the original June 22 opinion but further cited definitions
of d ispose and d isposition found in Merriam Webster Law Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary as having the common denominator of “the transfer of ownership and control of property to another pe rson or entity.” Further, the July 6 legal opinion noted that under Iowa Code section
278.1 (1)( b ) , the voters must vote on the “application to be made of the proceeds.” As a result, according to the opinion, a disposition involves a
transaction for mon etary gain. The FMP , however, included an estimated

cost of demolition at $500,000. The July 6 legal opinion additionally noted that the possibility of placing any demolition before the voters would “hamstring a district’s ability to properly manage and utilize its properties for the benefit of the school community.” Regardi ng proposed next steps for the B oard, the July 6 legal opinion stated that it was “not wholly clear” how the B oard should proceed5 with the petition and recommended that the B oard rej ect the petitio n as not “authorized by law,” notify the county commissioner of elections of the filing of the petition and the B oard’s action, and direct that the measure not be on the ballot in September. In the alternative, the legal opini on stated that a member of the B oard could file an objection to the petition
under Iowa Code section 277.7. After receiving the advice of counsel, the B oard vote d against placing the plaintiff s ’ narrow question on the September 12 ballot.
B. Proceedings Before District Court.
1. The p laintiffs’ petition and the d efendants ’ answer and

c ounterclaim. On July 17, 2017, the p laintiffs brought an action in district

court seeking a writ of certiorari, a writ of mandamus, temporary and permanent injunctive re lief, a nd declaratory relief. The p laintiffs also prayed for damages, attorneys ’ fee s, interest, and court costs. The gist of the petition was that the defendants refused to submit a legally sufficient petition to the Johnson County Commissioner of Elections, t hereby depriving the plaintiffs and voters of the opportunity to vote on the ballot

measure. The defendants filed an answer generally denying the material allegations of the plaintiffs ’ petition. The plaintiffs amended their petition on September 8 to include a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The defendants answered the amended petition and filed a counterclai m seeking declaratory relief. The defendants asserted in their counterclaim that the
demolition of the school was not a di sp osition under Iowa Code section s 297.22(1) or 278.1 (1) ( b ). Further, the defendants suggested that a vote rejecting the demolition of a school building at the direction of the voters would not constrain the B oard from exercising its independent power to
do so.6

2. Issuance of temporary i njunction. The district court held a hearing on the plaintiff s ’ application for temporary injunction on August 24, 2017. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that th ey had established a likelihood of success on the merits, that the right to vote was threatened by the Board’s actions and inactions, and that the balance of harms favored the entry of a temporary injunction placing the matter on the September 12 ballot an d enjoining the defendants from demolishing
Hoover until the referendum is held. The plaintiffs further asked that all early ballots filed for the September 12 ballot be invalidated as they did not present the ballo t measure sought by the plaintiffs. The defendants responded that there was little likelihood that the plaintiffs would prevail on the merits, that they lacked standing to bring the action, that no right of action existed under applicable statutes, and that the public would be
harmed if the B oa rd was not allowed to conduct its business as planned. On September 6, 2017, t he district court entered it s order on the temporary injunction matter. At the outset, the district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to seek enforcement of applica ble statu t es and
that the plaintiffs had a private right of action to enforce them. The district
court further concluded that the B oard was legally constrained in it s challenge to the petition by its failure to file an objection under Iowa Code section 277.7 and that it lacked authority to unilaterally determine the petition was unauthorized by law. Turning to the question of whether a temporary injunction should be granted, the district court found that the plaintiffs demonstrated substantial injury or damages would result if an injunction was not granted. The district court granted the plaintiff s a temporary injunction requiring the B oard to direct the Johnson County Commissioner of Elections to p lace the plaintiffs’ ballot measure before the voters at the7

next regular election. Further, t he district court denied the plaintiffs ’ request to invalidate early ballots cast in con nection with the September 12, 2017 election; to place the referendum on the September 12 ballot; or , in the alternative, to schedule a sp ecial election on the matter. Additionally, t he district court declined to enter an injunction preventing the B oard from demolishing Hoover, noting that there were no immediate plans to do s o. Following the district court’s temporary injunction, the voters in Johnson County approved the FMP at the Sept ember 2017 general election.
3

. Ruling on m otions for s ummary j udgment. The parties filed

comp rehensive competing motions for summary judgment. In their summary judgment papers, the plaintiffs sought rulings from the district

court that (a ) the defendants violated state election laws; (b) the de fendants
violated both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985; (c) no de fendant has qualified immunity; (d) no d efendant has absolute immunity; (e) the plaintiffs are entitled to damages that the court should calculate and assess against the defendants, jointly and severally, including actual, nominal, presumed
substantial , and punitive, as well as attorneys’ fees, interest, expenses, and court costs, or, in the alternative, schedule a hearing on damages ; ( f) demolition of a schoolhouse is a disposition of the same under all applicable statutes; ( g) if a majority vote against the ballot me asure, preservation is binding on the defendants; ( h) the temporary injunction previously entered should b e expanded and made p ermanent, the bond exonerated, and the plaintiffs given other appropriate relief to protect against further deprivation and diss ipation of their constitutional rights;
and ( i) the affirmative defenses asserted by the defendants are without
merit as a matter of law.8
In turn, the defendants filed a generally mirror

- image motion seeking summary judgment in the defendants favor on all issues raised by the plaintiffs. In addition, the defendants sought rulings f rom the district court that (a) the plaintiffs lack standing to litigate; ( b) the plaintiffs do not have a private right of action under Iowa Code section s 278.1 or 297.22 to bring the action; ( c) the term “disposition” does not include demo li tion of a school building; ( d) the plaintiffs’ claims are moot; ( e) the plaintiffs’
claims are time barred as the B oard has approved the FMP ; and ( f) it is the
role of the B oard, and not the plaintiffs, to make decisions r egarding
demo li tion of a school building. After a hearing , the district court entered an order on the motions
for su mmary judgment on April 26, 2018

. At the outset, the district court found that the p laintiffs were entitled to the remedy already provided
under Iowa ele ction law directing the B oard to place the matter on the next general election ballot but denied any relief beyond that already ordered. As part of its order, the district court repeated its earlier conclusion that
the term “ disposition” within the scope of Iowa Code section 278.1 (1)( b )

en compasses demolition

. Further, the district court extended its previous injunction to prohibit the B oard from taking any steps to demolish or otherwise dispose of Hoover Elementary School prior to the vote.
The distr ict court denied the plaintiffs summary judgment on their
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims . The district court held that there was

no ev idence in the record to support the plaintiffs’ claims of violation of their right to vote or First Amendment rights. On their due process claims, the district court found that procedural due process was satisfied through
the court hearing and action , as the plaintiffs have obtained the requested relief of having the proposition placed on the ballot. With respect to substantive due process, the district court concluded that nothing in the9

record shocks the conscience of the court or interferes with rights implicit in ordered liberty. The district court further found no conspiracy to violate constitutional rights of the plaintiffs , noting that all the actions of the defendants were taken in connection with regularly held Board meetings

an d discussions were part of the B oard’s responsibilities. The district court also considered the question of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as a
matter of law because they were not acting outside the clearly established scope of their discretionary authority.
The district court considered whether the vote on the ballot proposition su bmitted to the voters would be b inding on the B oard. In its narrative, the d istrict court stated that a “yes” vote on the proposition would require the school district to proceed with demolition. Meanwhile , the district court indicated that if “no” prevailed , nothing in the language of the proposition would require preservation o f the Hoover building. Yet,

t he district court ended its discussion by concluding that the binding nature and effect of an eventual vote was not ripe for adjudication.
4

. Additional ruling of the district court

. In its ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the district court asked the parties to make written submissions to the court regarding whether any issues remain open for
resolution now and identifying what spe cific issues remain going forward
for tri al. The plaintiffs responded that the district court should make the injunction permanent and exonerate the cash bond posted by the plaintiffs, clarify its ruling regarding the impact of a no vote on the B oard , and award the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and the costs of the action. The defendants responded that no further issues remained for trial and the10

case could be closed. In response, the district court released the bond but
denied further relief.
5

. Appeals. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal of all
adverse rulings. The defendants cross

- appealed.
II. S tandard of Review. We review rulings on motions for summary judgment for correction
of errors at law. Winger Contracting Co. v. Cargill, Inc

. , 926 N.W.2d 526,
535 (Iowa 2019); Morris v. Steffes Gr p ., Inc. , 924 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 2019). Where constitutional issues are involved, however, review is de

novo. Wei zberg v

. City of Des Moines , 923 N.W.2d 200, 211 (Iowa 2018 ) ; Rolfe State Bank v. Gunderson , 794 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 2011)

. III. D iscussion.
A. Meaning of “Disposition” Under Iowa Code Section 278.1.
1. Introduction

. A threshold issue in this litigation is whether the district court was required to instruct the county auditor to place the plaintiffs’ question raised in its petition on the November 2017 general
election ballot

. Two key provisions in the Iowa C ode are controlling.
Iowa Code s ection 278.1 empowers voters of a school dis trict to
decide certain issues. Iowa Code s ection 278.1 (1)( b ) provides,

T h e voters at the regular election shall have the power to [ ]

. . . .

. . . direct the sale, lease, or other disposition of any schoolhouse or school site . . . and the application to be made of the proceeds thereof

. Iowa Code s ection 278.2 provides the m anner in which citizens may place questions within the scope of Io wa Code s ection 278.1 on the ballot. In order for citizens to require the school board to place a question on the ballot under Iowa Code section 278.1, a petition conforming to the11

standard s outlined in Iowa Code section 278.2 must be presented to the school board with the signatures of the requisite number of voters. If such a provision is pre sented to the board, Iowa Code s ection 278.2 state s that “[ t ]he board .

. . s hall [] direct the cou nty commissioner of elections to provide in the notice of the regular election for the submission of any proposition authorized by law to the voters. ” There is no dispute that the petition presented by the plaintiffs in
this case has the requisite number of signatures. The fighting issue, however, is whether the plaintiffs’ propo sed ballot question concerns a
d isposition of property entitling them to present the issue to the voters.
2. Preservation of statutory interpretation question in the district

court. The plain tiffs claim that the defendants failed to preserve in the district court the question of whether a demolition is a disposition under
Iowa Code section 278.1 (1)( b ) . Th e defendants raised the issue in their brief resisting t he motion for injunction and again in their brief in support of summary judgment. The district court also explicitly ruled upon the
issue in its f i ndings of fact, conclusions of law, and r ulin g on application
for t emporary i njunction and incorpo rated the ruling in its r uling on motions for summary j udgment. We find the issue has been adequately preserved. Lamasters v. State , 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iow a 2012) (“Where
the trial court’ s ruling, as here, expressly acknowledges that an issue is
before the court and then the ruling necessarily decides that issue, that is sufficient to preserve error.”) ; s ee also M eier v. Senecaut , 641 N.W.2d 532,
540 (Iowa 2002) (“The claim or issue raised does not actually need to be used as the basis for the decision to be pres erved, but the record must at least reveal the court was aware of the claim or issue and litigated it.”);
Metz v. Amoco Oil Co. , 581 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1998) (“Our preservation12 rule requires that issues must be presented to and passed upon by the
distri ct court before they can be raised and decided on appeal.”). The plaintiffs also assert that the defendants are not entitled to relief because they failed to file objections to the petition with the objections committee or failed to bring a declaratory ac tion in dist rict court after the plaintiffs presented their petition. See Beren t v

. City of Iowa City , 738 N.W.2d 193 , 197

– 201 (Iowa 2007). This procedural question

— akin to an exhaustion requirement

— is separately considered in division III.B below.
3. Position s of the p arties. The plaintiffs maintain that the term

“ other disposition” includes demolition of an existing school building. The plaintiffs point to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary , which states that “disposition” includes “the ac t or the power of disposing” and “dispose of ” means “ to ge t rid of, throw away, discard .” According to the plaint iffs, disposition in Iowa Code s ection 278.1 (1)( b ) includes action “ to get rid of” of a building and “ to get rid of” a building includes demolition. The plaintiffs assert they are using an ordinary rather technical approach

t o interpretation of the statute and cite State v. Tarbox , 739 N.W.2d 850,
85 3

– 5 4 (Iowa 2007) for that proposition

. The plaintiffs further note that under Iowa Code s ection 278.1 (1)( b ) , the voters may direct the disposition of a “schoolhouse or school site.” By including separate terms for school house and school site in the statute, the plaintiffs maintain that the legislature must have intended that the term “disposition” applies to disposition of a school house that does not involve disposition of the s ite; in other words, demo li tion of a school house
absent sale of t he underlying site

. The plaintiffs additionally assert that the school district is
inconsistent in its treatment of the term “ other disposition” (and “dispose of”) in re lated statutes. The plaintiffs claim that the school district13 interprets the term “d ispose of” in Iowa Code section 297

. 22 (describing the power of the school board to “dispose of, in whole or in part, a schoolhouse, school site, or other property belonging to the district”) to include demolition, but then interprets the term “ other dispo sit ion” in Iowa
Code section 278.1 (1)( b ) (describing the power of voters to “direct the sale, lease, or other disposition of any schoolhouse or school site or other property belonging to the corporation”) to not i nclude demolition

. Finally, the plaintif fs assert that to the extent the statute is ambiguous, it should be liberally interpreted to promote citizen access to
the ballot. In support of their argument, the plaintiffs cite Devine v.
Wonderlich , 268 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa 1978) (en banc) . In Devine , this court emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to vote in elections for officeholders such as county supervisor

. Id. at 623. In contrast, the defendants claim that the demo li tion of a building
is not a n “ other dispositio n” of property under Io wa Code section
278.1 (1)( b )

. In support of their argument, the defendants argue that “ other dispositio n” does not include demolition because the statute gives voters the power not simply to direct disposition of the property but also to direct “the applic ation to be made of the proceeds thereof.” Iowa
Code § 278.1 (1)( b )

. Demolition, the defendants note, is not a process that leads to proceeds. The defendants do not shy away from a battle of dictionaries. The
d efendants point out that the Merriam Webster Law Dictionary defines “disposition” as “ transfer to the care or possession of another” and “dispose
of” as “to transfer to the control or ownership of another. ” Further, the
defendants note that Black’s Law Dictionary defines “disposition” as “ [ t he ] act of disposing; transferring to the care or possession of another” and “dispose of” as “to alienate or direct the ownership of property, as14 disposition by will . . . to exercise finally , in any manner, one’s power of control over; to pass into contro l of someone else; to alienate, relin quish, part with, or get rid of ; to put out of the way; to finish with; to bargain away.”
The defendants further note that the Iowa l egislature in 2008 enacted legislation providing a definition of “ other disposition ” and “dispose of” for purposes of Io wa Code s ection s 278. 1 and 297.22 that
included “demolition.” See 2008 Iowa Acts ch. 1148, §§ 1

– 2 (codififed at Iowa Code § 278.1 (1) ( b ) and § 297.22 (2009)). This legislation, however, was repealed the following sessi on
. See 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 10, §§ 1

– 2, 4 (codified at Iowa Code § 278.1 (1) ( b ) and § 297.22 (Supp. 2009))

. According
to the defendants , th e history of the adoption and then rejection of a legislative definition of the term “disposition” that included demolition demonstrates a legislative intent not to include demolition within the scope
of the statutes. See Summerhays v

. Clar k , 509 N.W.2d 7 48, 751 (Iowa 1993) (en banc) ( finding that removal of a word from a statute indicates desire to narrow its scope).
The defendants note that the B oard has broad and exclusive power
to determine the location of a school house under Iowa Code sections 297. 1
and 279.11. See Kinney v. Howard , 133 Iowa 94, 96, 110 N.W. 282 , 283 (1907) (holding the relocation of the schoolhouse site “was a matter for the school board of the township” pursuant to Iowa Code sections 2 773 (now section 297.1) and 2801 (1897) and c ould not be questioned by injunction) . According to the defendants, the ab ility to determine that
Hoover E lementary should be located at another location implies the ability to use its current location for other purposes, including demo li tion
and use of t he site for other school purposes.15 Finally, the defendants assert that Iowa Code section 278.1 (1)( b ) should not be interpreted to vest the voters with the power of referendum for every demo li tion of school property. According to the defendants,
under the plaintiff s ’ theory, any demolition of, say, a wall or a part of a building (as happens with renovations and routine maintenance) co uld trigger a voting process.
4

. Discussion. If a statute is unambiguous, we look no further than the express language of the statute. See State v. Howse , 875 N.W.2d 684,
69 1 (Iowa 2016); State v. Tesch , 704 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2005). If the statute is ambiguous, however, we use a variety of meth ods, including traditional tools of statutory construction, to determin e the meaning of the

statute. State v. Doe , 903 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Iowa 2017); State v

. Nall , 894 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2017)

. A statute is ambiguous if “reasonable minds could differ or be
uncertain as to the mea ning of a statute.” Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v.
Branstad , 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995 ) ; s ee also State v. M cIver , 858 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa 2015). Further, we h ave stated that “[ w ] ords are
often chameleons , draw ing their color from the context in which they are
found.” Rolfe State Bank , 794 N.W.2d at 564 . Ambigu ity may arise not only from word s themselves but “from the general scope and meaning of a
statute when all its provisions are examined.” Carolan v. Hill , 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996). Upon our review of Iowa Code section 278.1 (1)( b ) , we conclude the

term “o ther disposition” is ambiguous. It certainly could reasonably be interpreted to include demolition of buildings. On the other hand, in context, it could also reasonably be interpreted to include transactions involving on ly the transfer or exchange of ownership of schoolhouses, school sites, and other school distric t property, but not mere demolition.16 We do not find a number of the arguments advanced by the parties regarding this question to be very persuasive

. For example, w e do not find
that the amendments to Iowa Code section s 278 .1 and 297 .22 definitions
tha t occurred i n 2008 and 2009 are dispositive regarding legislative intent

. In 2008, the legislature amended language in the Iowa Code to authorize the board of directors of a school district to dispose of school property and prohibited voters from taking a ction contrary to the board for a one year period. See 2008 Iowa Acts ch. 1148, §§ 1

– 3 (codified at Iowa Code § 278.1, § 297.22, and § 297.25 (2009)). Among other things, the legislation specifically defined “dispose” and “disposition” to include “the

ex change, transfer, demolition , or destruction of any real or other property of the corporation .” Id. § 1 ( codified at Iowa Code § 278.1 (1) ( b ) (2009)) (emphasis added )

. I f t his definition remained in the C ode today, this litigation would
not have arisen

. But in 2009, the legislature repealed the changes made
in 2008 , including the definitio n of d ispose and disposition that specifically
included demolition. 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 10, §§ 1

– 4 (codified at Iowa Code § 278.1 (1)( b ) , § 297.22, and § 297.25). The repeal did not simply remove a term from a legislative definition, but repealed the entire legislative definition along with other provisions of the statute. Id. The end result
was that the law was returned to its pre

- 2008 position , not only on
definitio nal issues, but on issues related to the power of voters and school boards that were also addressed in the 2008 legislation. While the school district argues that the repeal demonstrates that the legislature intended to exclude demolition, we think this conclusion does not necessarily follow. The legisla ture certainly decided that it was unsatisfied wit h the changes enacted in 2008, but t he changes in 2008, however, included an expansion of the power of school boards and a17 limitation on the power of voters in connection with dis position of all manner of school property. The legislature apparently decided to ret urn the law to its prior state which, as we have observed, is ambiguous. It is
not clear whether the 2008 legislative definition of d ispose an d d isposition was designed to clarify or modify preexisting law.
We also do not believe the scope of the statute authorizing voter referenda should be broadly construed in favor of voters is a helpful or persuasive concept. The plaintiffs rely upon Dev ine , 268 N.W. 2d 620.
Devine involved the elections of representatives in our government, a process that the Supr eme Court has identified as essential to our democracy. Id. at 623; see also Wesberr y v. Sanders , 376 U.S. 1, 17 , 84 S. Ct. 526, 535 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”)

. The Devine case dealt with regulation of the election process itself, namely, how challenged
ballots should be treated in an election contest. 268 N.W.2d at 624. In that context, we emphasized that statutes regulating the process of election of representativ es of government should be “construed liberally in favor of giving effect to the voter’s choice.” Id. at 623.
We do not in any way retreat from Devine . But the context of this

case before us is different. Here, we are not dealing with regulation of the voting process in an election of our governmental representative s. Instead, we are trying to di vine the boundary between the power our legislature has
allocated to the voters on the one hand and school boards on the other.
While democratic values may b e promoted in referenda, the school
boa r d is comprised of democratically elected officials empowered to
conduct the school district ’s business th rough the deliberative process.18 Both the actions of the voters through the referendum process and
decisions of elected officials in a deliberat iv e setting have been established by the legislature and are entitled to respect. We are not inclined to expansively read the power of the voters at the expense of the deliberative processes of the elected school board through a rule of construction

. We think a straight up interpretation of the applicable statutes is a better approach than one that puts a thumb on the scale in favor of the voters acting through referenda. After all, the voters have elected the school
b oard members too

. Upon our review of the applicable statutes and briefing s of the parties, we conclude that the defenda nts have the better argument. The precise unit of language to be examined is not “disposition” or even “other disposition, ” but rath er “sale, lease, or other disposition.” Iowa Code § 278.1 (1)( b ) (2017). A sale or lease involves the transfer of an interest in property to a third party. Applying the rule of ejusdem generis , any o ther disposition must also involve a transfer of an int erest to a third party , as in a gift. See generally In re Estate of Sampson , 838 N.W.2d 663, 670 (Iowa 2013) (finding that statutory interpretation required analysis of a term “with reference to the other items in the list”) ; Sallee v

. Stewart , 827 N.W.2d 128, 153 (Iowa 2013) (“[W]hen a phrase . . . is added to a laundry list of terms all of which relate to [a larger theme], we interpret [the phrase in question] to be similar in character to the other [listed terms], all of
which rel ate to [the larger them e]. The fancy term for this is ejusdem generis.” (Citation omitted.) ) ; Iowa Comprehensive Petrol. Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co. , 606 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Iowa 2000) (“Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis , general words which follow speci fic words are tied to the meaning and purpose of the specific words

. ”)

.19 A trial court in Florida recently struggled wi th the question of
whether the demo li tion of a pier building provided the basis for a referendum under a city charter provision that re quired voter approval when waterfront property owned by the city wa s “sold, donated, or leased.”
See Ford v. City of St. Petersbu rg , No. 522012CA010312, 2 013
WL 9668711 , at *3 ( Fla. Ci r . Ct. Apr. 5, 2013). The charter provision
defined “sale” to include “any ‘ permanent disposition of an interest in real property other than a utility easement. ’ ” Id

. The district court held that the purpose of the provision was to protect waterfront property from being alienated to third parties without the consent of the electorate and did not include demolition and repurposing of property. Id. The trial court holding

w as affirmed on appeal in an unpublished opinion. See Ford v. City of
St. Petersburg , No. 2D13

– 2118, 2013 WL 6283709, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. Further, as argued by the defendants, the provision of the statu te also authorizes the voters to direct “the application to be made of the proceeds thereof.” Iowa Code § 278.1 (1)( b ) . D i recting application of proceeds would fit awkwardly if the statute was interpreted to include
demo li tion of property where no sale or transfer is involved a nd no proceeds a re generated. Although perhaps it could be argued that the voters would have an interest directing the disposition of the salvage or rubble, “[w]e look for a reasonable interpretation that best achieves the statute’s purpose and avoids absurd results.” S tate v . Gonzalez , 718 N.W.2d 304, 3 08 (Iowa 2006). Another factor that tips us toward the position of the defendants is
the definitions found in the Meriam Webster Law Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary . These sources, of course, are designed to be used in a legal context, but that is hardly a disqualifying notion when the key issue20 is whether the power to direct d isposition of certain property rests with the
school district or the voters.
The se legal definitions are consistent, for example, with the Uniform Probate Code, which generally provides personal representatives and

conservators with the authority “acquir e or dispose of an asset” but under a separate section authorizes trustees and personal re presentatives to “raze . . . buildings.” See Unif. Probate Code § 3

– 715 (6)

– (7) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 208

– 09 (2013); id. § 5

– 425(7)

– (8), 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. 116

– 17. Apparently, the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code believe the
author ity to “dispose of an asset” is distinct as a concept, and is not
inclusive of the authority to “raze . . . buildings.” We recognize that Webster’s Third New International Dictionary , cited by the plaintiffs, is a widely used dictionary. But it often contains multipl e definitions. This case is no exception. One of the definitions for
d isposition in this dictionary is “the transfer of property from one to another (as by gift, barter, or sale, or by will). ” Disposition , Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabr. ed. 2002).
We also note that the B oard is vested with nondelegable authority
under the Iowa Code to de termine the site of schools. See Kinney , 133
Iowa at 96, 104 , 110 N.W. at 283, 286 ; James v

. Gettinger , 123 Iowa 199, 203, 98 N.W. 723, 724 ( Iowa 1904) . Here, the B oard has determined that the site of an elementary school, Hoover Elementary, should be changed, that the current Hoover facility be demolished at its current site, and that the Hoover site should be repurposed and used in connectio n with the development of Iowa City High. In ou r view, while the voters under Iowa
Code s ection 278.1 (1)( b ) could direct that the property be sold, leased, or even given away, they cannot use the referendum mechanism as a vehicle21 to control the use of pro perty within the district by the B oard for various school purposes. We are also influenced by the apparent purpose of the statute. The parties have not provided, nor have we found, pertinent legislative history for the original statutory language

. Yet, from the langu age and structure
of Iowa Code s ection 278.1 (1)( b ) and 278 .2, we think it clear that the purpose of the statute is to give voters an avenue to regulate the relationship between school districts and third parties. By giving voters the po tential to direct the disposition of school property, the legislature has provided a check on potential abuse by elected school officials in their real estate relationships with third parties

. When no third party is involved, however, the risk of abuse re lated to the management of the district’s real property is not present. Finally, we address arguments to the contrary raised by the plaintiffs. We do not think the use of the terms “schoolhouse” and “ school
site” in Iowa Code section 278.1 (1)( b ) cuts i n favor of the plaintiffs’ approach. The use of two terms make it clear, for instance, that a lease of a schoolhouse and a sale of unimproved property both fall within the scope
of the statute.
W e also do not see our approach as inconsistent with Iowa Code
section 2 9 7.22. Under our approach, the term “disposition” in both Iowa
Code section 278.1 (1)( b ) and Iowa Code section 2 9 7.22 do not include
demolition. Authority for the school board s to demolish buildings m ay be found in other statutory provision s. See , e.g. , Iowa Code § 274.1 (empowering school district s to “hold property”); id. § 279.8 (requiring
rules “ for the care of school house, grounds, and property ” ); id. § 279.39 ( empowering school b oard s to provide suitable buildings for each school).22

For all of the above re asons, we conclude that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether a “disposition” included demolition of a building without the transfer of property to a third party.
B. Procedural Mechanisms Re lated to Challenges to the
Referendum Process.
1. Introduction. Even assumi ng that the term “ other disposition” does not include demolition, the question arises as to whether the school district is nonetheless prohibited from refusing to direct the county auditor to place the matter on the ballot

. T he petition in this case had the requi si te number of signatures, addresses, and dates under Iowa Code section s 277.4 , 277.7, and 278.2, and no objections were filed challengin g the petition under Iowa Cod e s ection s 277.5 and 277.7

. See id. §§ 277.4, .5, .7; id. § 278.2. The question arises regarding whether a government al entity may launch a substantive challenge to the lawfulness of a petition that contains the requisite number of signatures. Specifica lly, may a governmental entity refuse to place a referendum measure on the ballot based on substantive illegality, or must the government entity file a preelection declaratory action challenging the validity of the referendum? In considering these issues , the parties dispute the meaning and applicability of this court’s ruling in Berent , 738 N.W.2d 193

. Berent
involved the intersection of t hree statutes: Iowa Code section 362.4 , section 364.2, and section 372.11. Id. at 199

– 201. The gist of the plaintiff ’ s claim was that the city council unlawfully refused to place on the ballot certain amendments to the city charter on the ground s that the proposed charter provisions were illegal. Id. at 196.
In Beren t , three petitions were submitted to the city clerk pursuant to Iowa Code section 362.4 asking that three amendments to the city23 charter be placed on the ballot. Id. at 197

– 98

. The city clerk determined that the requisite number of electors had signed the petition and accepted them for filing. Id

. at 198

. Seven individuals and the League of Women
V oters filed timely objections to the petitions. Id. As a result, an objections committee was formed to consider the three petitions. Id

. The objections committee in Beren t sustained at least one objection to each proposed charter amendment. Id. One was found to be misleading, and two others were found to be “legally insufficient” because the substance of the proposals did not deal with general structure of governance and t hus were not the proper subject for a city charter. Id. at
198

– 99. The district court found that the objections committee had exceeded its authority. Id. at 199

. The city appealed. Id. We affirmed. We noted that under Iowa Code section 362.4, a peti tion to amend a city charter is “valid” if it has the requisite number of signatures of eligible electors including their place of residence and the date upon which the petition was signed

. Id. at 200

. Further, under Iowa
Code s ection 372.11, the legisla ture directed that the city council “must”
submit “valid” proposed charter amendment s to the voters. Id. We concluded that the objections committee thus exceeded its statutory authority when it sustained objections to the charter proposals based on
groun ds other than “validity” under Iowa Code section 362.4. Id. at 200

– 01. We then considered whether the city could launch a preelection challenge to the substantive legality of the proposed charter amendments.
Id. at 201. In concluding that it could launch such an action, we noted that the city had a pecuniary interest in avoiding the cost of a special
election. Id. at 202

– 03

. We also determined that the question of the validity of the proposed charter amendments was ripe for judicial24

resolution. I d. at 203

– 06

. On the merits, we concluded that two of the proposed charter amendments were inconsistent with Iowa law , and as a result, the city was under no ob ligation to place the questions on the ballot.
Id. at 206

– 13

. One of the proposals, however, was not substantively invalid and the voters were entitled to be heard on the question. Id. at
210

– 13

. 2. Position s of the p arties. Relying upon Beren t , the plaintiffs contend that once a referendum petition is timely filed with the requisite
number of signatures, addresses and dates under Iowa Code section s 277.4 and 278.2 , the defendants had no choice but to direct the county auditor to place the matter on the general election ballot.
The defendants find Ber en t inapposite. They focus our attentio n on the language of Iowa Code s ection 278.2 which directs the school board to place on the ballot petitions “authorized by la w.” Unlike the restrictive language in the statutes in Beren t , the defendants assert that the legislative directive ( that the boar d shall place measures arising from citizen petitions on the ballot ) is thus qualified by the requirement that the proposed ballot measure first be a uthorized by law. According to the defendants, the school district, consistent with the statute, declined to direct the county commissioner to place the matter on the ballot because the qu estion posed did not involve a d isposition of school property as required by the statute.
3. Discussion. In deciding whether the defendants have failed to preserve their c laim under Beren t , the starting point is examination of the
statutes involved

. In Beren t , the statutory language was quite limited and did not give the city the authority to engage in substantive review of a proposed charter revision. Id. at 200

– 01, 205

– 06

.25 The language in Iowa Code s ection 278.2, however, is markedly
different. The school district is directed to forward to the county auditor only those petitions that are “authorized by law.” Iowa Code § 278.2. No such limitation appeared in the l anguage of the statutes involved in Berent , which mandated that the city council place “valid” petition s , i.e. , petitions
with sufficient valid signatures, on the ballot. 738 N.W.2d at 201. As a result, we conclude that Beren t does not control in the v ery different statutory envi ronment presented by Iowa Code s ection
278. 1 (1)( b ) . We conclude that the school district properly determined that the proposed ballot measure was not authorized by law because it did not
direct the sa le, lease, or other disposi tion of school property.
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude that the demo li tion of a school building is not a dispo sition under Iowa Code s ection 278 .1(1)( b ) and that the school district properly determined that because the ballot measure was not “authorized by law ,” it was under no legal obligation to require the county auditor to place the matter on the ballot. In light of our holding, all other
issues rais ed in the plaintiffs’ petition are either moot or resolved agains t the plaintiffs on the merits. As a result, the district court judgment in this case is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter remanded to the
district court for dismissal of th e action. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
WITH DIRECTIONS.