[Cite as In re A.C., 2019-Ohio-4788.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

IN RE A.C. : 

 No. 108236 

A Minor Child : 

 

[Appeal by A.C., Father] : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 21, 2019 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Juvenile Division 

Case No. AD18900944 

 

Appearances: 

Wargo Law, L.L.C., and Leslie E. Wargo, for appellant. 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Anthony R. Beery and Cheryl Rice, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

Appellant, A.C. (“Father”), appeals an order of the Juvenile Division 

of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas (the “juvenile court”) granting legal 

custody of his daughter (“A.C.”) to her maternal great-uncle (“Uncle”). Father 

claims the following three errors: 
1. The trial court erred by denying the Father’s motion for continuance 

because the Father had a medical issue, thus, precluding him from 

testifying at the hearing. 

2. The trial court erred by denying the Father’s motion for first 

extension of temporary custody. 

3. The trial court erred by denying the Father’s request for a new social 

worker. 

4. Because the trial court did not continue the hearing after Father 

became ill and did not grant the Father’s motion for a first extension of 

temporary custody, it did not have all the competent and credible 

evidence before it to render a decision to grant permanent custody to 

the uncle. 

We find no merit to the appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

In January 2018, the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and 

Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”) filed a complaint alleging that A.C. was 

a neglected and dependent child due to her parents’ failure to care for her special 

medical needs. A.C. was born prematurely and remained hospitalized for four 

months after birth due to a heart condition and problems with her immune system. 

The complaint for temporary custody further alleged that (1) A.C.’s mother 

(“Mother”) and Father were unwilling to follow medical advice; (2) Mother had 

untreated mental health and substance abuse issues; and (3) A.C.’s older brother, 

K.J., was already in the emergency custody of CCDCFS due to Mother’s failure to 

provide for his medical needs. The agency also filed two motions for emergency 

predispositional temporary custody. Following a hearing in February 2018, the 

court granted emergency custody of A.C. to CCDCFS, and A.C. was placed in the care 
of Uncle. Thereafter, in March 2018, Father filed a motion requesting that legal 

custody be granted to himself with an order of protective supervision. A magistrate 

denied the motion. Father objected to the magistrate’s decision, and the trial court 

overruled the objections. 

In July 2018, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify custody and asked the 

court to grant legal custody of A.C. to Uncle. Prior to a hearing on the motion, Father 

filed a motion for extension of temporary custody and for removal of the assigned 

social worker. 

On October 25, 2018, the court held a hearing on the parties’ 

competing motions, beginning with Father’s request for the removal of the assigned 

case worker. Father alleged that extended family members of the assigned case 

worker, Rosalind Bailey (“Bailey”), were close friends with members of Mother’s 

family, including Uncle. He claimed that “Bailey’s cousin Ryan and [Uncle] are very 

good friends.” (Father’s motion for first extension of temporary custody and request 

for a new social worker p. 2.) He further alleged that “Ms. Bailey knows his wife’s 

mother and grandmother and was consequently aware of his wife being on the outs 

with her family over money,” and that he and Mother know Bailey’s grandmother 

and have been in her home. (Father’s motion for first extension of temporary 

custody and request for a new social worker p. 2.) 

Father alleged at the hearing that his stepchild played at Bailey’s 

grandmother’s home and that Bailey’s grandmother lives down the street from 

Uncle. (Tr. 6.) Father also alleged that Mother’s mother has been friends with 
Bailey’s grandmother “for years” and that they live in close proximity to each other. 

(Tr. 6.) Bailey denied these allegations and denied that any of her relatives live 

anywhere near Uncle. (Tr. 6.) Indeed, Bailey testified that both of her grandmothers 

are deceased; one grandmother died before Bailey was born and her other 

grandmother passed away in 2014, long before A.C. was born. (Tr. 16.) Bailey also 

stated that she does not know any of the individuals named in Father’s motion. (Tr. 

16.) According to Bailey, Father wanted her removed from the case because he did 

not like the information she relayed to him from A.C.’s medical providers. She 

explained: 

So I guess with that information, he didn’t want me to be on the case 

because he didn’t like the information that I spoke to him that was 

given to me from the service providers. 

(Tr. 10.) 

Father’s lawyer nevertheless argued that Father does not trust Bailey 

and believes “she has spoken falsely about facts in the case” and, therefore, Father 

did not feel he could work with her. Counsel argued that Father loves A.C. and 

“could have done much better if he had a different social worker who [sic] he could 

trust.” (Tr. 19.) Father admitted that he did not work his case plan the way he should 

have, but asserted his failure to do so was because he did not get along with Bailey. 

(Tr. 19.) He asked the court to extend temporary custody in order to allow him the 

opportunity to work on his case plan with a different case worker. 

The magistrate denied Father’s motion to remove A.C.’s case worker. 

Based on the parties’ arguments and Bailey’s testimony, the magistrate found no 
genuine conflict between Bailey and Father. (Tr. 23.) The court, therefore, 

proceeded to a hearing on CCDCFS’s motion to modify the temporary custody of 

A.C. and award legal custody of A.C. to Uncle. 

Bailey testified that A.C.’s older brother, K.J., was already in the legal 

custody of Uncle. Therefore, if the court were to grant legal custody of A.C. to Uncle, 

the siblings would be together. (Tr. 25.) Mother’s case plan required her to complete 

parenting and domestic violence classes, undergo mental health treatment, and 

demonstrate that she can provide for A.C.’s basic needs. (Tr. 27.) According to 

Bailey, Mother made no attempt to complete any of these objectives. (Tr. 27.) 

Father’s case plan also required him to complete parenting and 

domestic violence classes, have regular visits with A.C., and complete a 

psychological assessment through the court psychiatric clinic. Father was given an 

appointment for the psychological assessment, but he rescheduled it three times and 

failed to show up for the third appointment. (Tr. 29-30.) The court clinic closed his 

case pursuant to a policy that limits appointments to no more than three 

rescheduled appointments, and Father never completed the assessment. (Tr. 29.) 

Bailey testified that the psychological assessment was necessary 

because (1) the agency received reports that Father used excessive discipline with 

K.J., who was 11 years old, (2) Father refused necessary medical care for A.C., and 

(3) Mother and Father failed to obtain proper medical care for K.J., while K.J., who 

is A.C.’s half-brother, was still in Mother’s custody. (Tr. 30.) 
The domestic violence assessment was a necessary component of 

Father’s case plan because Father used excessive discipline on K.J., and the court 

had issued a no-contact order prohibiting Father from having contact with K.J. (Tr. 

32.) There were also concerns that Father was negatively influencing Mother’s 

decisions regarding A.C.’s care. (Tr. 32.) 

Father was given a copy of his case plan as well as referrals for 

domestic violence and parenting classes at several agencies, including West Side 

Community House, Fatherhood Initiative, Cleveland Heights Collaborative, and 

others. Father was assigned to a case manager at West Side Community House, who 

informed Bailey that Father did not want to interact with him. (Tr. 33.) The agency 

had referred Father for services at Family Solutions before Bailey was assigned to 

the case, and Father also refused those services. (Tr. 34.) 

Visitation with A.C. started in February 2018. Bailey testified that 

Father came to one visit in March, one doctor’s appointment in April, and two visits 

in May 2018. Father had no visits with A.C. between May 2018 and October 25, 

2018, the day of the hearing on CCDCFS’s motion for legal custody to Uncle. West 

Side Community House stopped scheduling visits in July 2018, because Father 

repeatedly failed to show up. (Tr. 35.) 

Bailey testified that A.C. was “doing great” in Uncle’s care. Uncle 

ensures that she receives all medical treatments, including regular physical and 

occupational therapy. A.C. did not receive services through Help Me Grow, 

however, because her parents never granted permission for the program, and their 
permission was required while she was in temporary custody. (Tr. 36.) Bailey 

testified that Uncle had also passed all background checks, had an appropriate 

home, and had legal custody of A.C.’s half-brother, K.J. 

Bailey opined that an order granting legal custody of A.C. to Uncle 

was in the child’s best interest. Although there was still time for an extension of 

temporary custody, Bailey believed an immediate award of legal custody to Uncle 

was better for A.C. because A.C. needs permanency. Bailey testified that neither 

parent had demonstrated the ability to care for A.C.’s special medical needs. A.C. 

requires regular physical and occupational therapy and regular visits to a 

pulmonologist for treatment of pulmonary hypertension. (Tr. 40-42.) A.C. also has 

ongoing issues related to her premature birth and was still going to a preemie clinic. 

(Tr. 40.) Bailey testified that legal custody would be better for A.C. than an extension 

of temporary custody because Father has not worked on his case plan and has not 

demonstrated that he is able to care for A.C.’s medical needs. (Tr. 42-43.) Although 

Father interacts with A.C. appropriately and expresses his love for her, he has not 

demonstrated that he can support A.C. financially. (Tr. 38-39.) 

Father arrived over an hour late for the hearing and missed most of 

Bailey’s testimony. After Bailey’s testimony, the magistrate reviewed the statement 

of understanding with Uncle, explaining his responsibilities with respect to A.C. if 

he were awarded legal custody. Uncle indicated that he understood and accepted 

the responsibilities. (Tr. 53.) The court then recessed to give Father an opportunity 

to consult with his lawyer before taking the stand. However, when the hearing 
resumed, Father’s trial counsel informed the court that Father had a panic attack, 

was having trouble breathing, and left the courthouse. Counsel requested a 

continuance of the hearing due to a medical emergency. (Tr. 62.) The magistrate 

denied the continuance on grounds that Father arrived late for the hearing, he knew 

he was due to testify next and knew he was likely going to be arrested pursuant to 

an active arrest warrant. (Tr. 63-64.) 

Thereafter, the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) recommended that the 

court grant legal custody of A.C. to Uncle. The GAL explained that A.C. has “really 

flourished” in Uncle’s care and that A.C.’s medical conditions have been improving. 

Uncle is Mother’s uncle and has facilitated a healthy relationship between Mother 

and A.C. (Tr. 68.) 

The magistrate granted CCDCFS’s motion to award legal custody of 

A.C. to Uncle. Father objected to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court overruled 

father’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision. Father now appeals the 

trial court’s judgment.1 

II. Law and Analysis 

A. Continuance 

In the first assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred in 

denying his request for a continuance of the hearing. He contends he was precluded 

 1 Mother has not appealed the trial court’s judgment. 
from testifying due to a medical condition and that the trial court’s denial of a 

continuance violated his right to due process. 

The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests in the 

sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 423 N.E.2d 

1078 (1981). An abuse of discretion implies a decision that is unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 144 Ohio St.3d 571, 

2015-Ohio-4915, 45 N.E.3d 987, ¶ 13. When applying the abuse of discretion 

standard, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial 

court. Vannucci v. Schneider, 2018-Ohio-1294, 110 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). 

The right to parent one’s children is a fundamental right protected by 

the Due Process Clause of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. In re M.W., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103705, 2016-Ohio-2948, ¶ 9. A fundamental requirement 

of due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard. Id.

However, a parent’s right to be present at a custody hearing is not 

absolute. In re C.K., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108313, 2019-Ohio-4167, ¶ 20, citing 

In re M.W. at ¶ 10. While courts must ensure that due process is provided in 

parental termination proceedings, “a parent facing termination of parental rights 

must exhibit cooperation and must communicate with counsel and with the court in 

order to have standing to argue that due process was not followed in a termination 

proceeding.” In re Q.G., 170 Ohio App.3d 609, 2007-Ohio-1312, 868 N.E.2d 713, 

¶ 12 (8th Dist.). Any potential prejudice to a party denied a continuance is weighed 
against a trial court’s “right to control its own docket and the public’s interest in the 

prompt and efficient dispatch of justice.” Unger at 67. 

In Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 423 N.E.2d 1078, the Ohio Supreme 

Court noted that “[t]here are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a 

continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in 

the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the 

trial judge at the time the request is denied.” Id. at 67. In Unger, the court identified 

certain factors a court should consider in evaluating a motion for a continuance. 

These factors include: 

the length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have 

been requested and received, the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, 

opposing counsel and the court; whether the requested delay is for 

legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; 

whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise 

to the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors, depending 

on the unique facts of each case. 

Id. at 67-68. 

 Juv.R. 23 is also instructive and provides that “[c]ontinuances shall 

be granted only when imperative to secure fair treatment for the parties.” 

Loc.R. 49(C) of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Juvenile Division, 

further provides: 

No case will be continued on the day of trial or hearing except for good 

cause shown, which cause was not known to the party or counsel prior 

to the date of trial or hearing, and provided that the party and/or 

counsel have used diligence to be ready for trial and have notified or 

made diligent efforts to notify the opposing party or counsel as soon as 

he/she became aware of the necessity to request a postponement. This 

rule may not be waived by consent of counsel. 
Counsel requested a continuance on the day of trial due to an alleged 

medical emergency. Although counsel reported that Father was having trouble 

breathing and went to the emergency room, the court noted that Father arrived an 

hour late for the hearing and was aware of an outstanding arrest warrant that was 

likely to result in his arrest. In other words, the court concluded that Father’s 

purported medical emergency was dilatory and contrived. Indeed, Father had 

previously used dilatory tactics by filing motions asking for the magistrate to recuse 

herself, for a new GAL, and for a new case worker. In his request for a new case 

worker, he claimed he and Mother knew Bailey’s grandmother and that Bailey’s 

grandmother was intimately familiar with Mother’s family. Yet, Bailey testified that 

her grandmother passed away in 2014, long before A.C. was born. A medical 

emergency could be a legitimate basis for a continuance. But in this case, the trial 

court had a justifiable reason to believe that Father was manipulating the process 

rather than suffering a true medical emergency. We find no abuse of discretion in 

denying the requested continuance under these circumstances. 

The first assignment of error is overruled. 

B. Legal Custody to Uncle 

In the second assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred 

in denying Father’s motion for an extension of temporary custody. In the fourth 

assignment of error, Father argues the trial court lacked competent, credible 

evidence on which to grant legal custody to Uncle because Father was unable to 
testify at the hearing due to a medical emergency. We discuss these assigned errors 

together because they are interrelated. 

R.C. 2151.011(B)(21) defines legal custody as: 

a legal status that vests in the custodian the right to have physical care 

and control of the child and to determine where and with whom the 

child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline 

the child and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and 

medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and 

responsibilities. 

Thus, legal custody is significantly different from permanent custody. In re T.R., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102071, 2015-Ohio-4177, ¶ 32. Unlike permanent custody, 

where parental rights are completely terminated, parents who lose legal custody 

retain residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.2 Id.; 

R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(c). And although legal custody is intended to be permanent, 

parents may, under certain circumstances, petition the court for reunification with 

their children in the future. R.C. 2151.42(B). 

Because legal custody is a less drastic remedy than permanent 

custody, the trial court applies a less stringent evidentiary standard. “Unlike in a 

permanent custody proceeding, where an agency’s burden is by clear and convincing 

evidence, the standard in legal custody proceedings is a preponderance of the 

evidence.” In re M.D.R., 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2018-P-0032 and 2018-P-0033, 

2019-Ohio-1054, ¶ 16; see also In re G.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103706, 2016-

 2 Where a child is placed in legal custody of another person, the parents retain “the 

privilege of reasonable visitation,” the right to “consent to adoption,” “the privilege to 

determine the child’s religious affiliation,” and “the responsibility of support.” 

R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(c). 
Ohio-5242, ¶ 15. “Preponderance of the evidence means ‘evidence that’s more 

probable, more persuasive, or of greater probative value.’” In re J.B., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 103521, 2016-Ohio-5513, ¶ 54, quoting In re C.V.M., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 98340, 2012-Ohio-5514, ¶ 17. We review the record to determine if 

the trial court’s judgment is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. In re 

D.G.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107921, 2019-Ohio-3571, ¶ 25. 

A manifest weight of the evidence challenge concerns “‘the inclination 

of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of 

the issue rather than the other.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 

N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). A reviewing 

court “‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility 

of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the 

[factfinder] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice 

that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id., quoting State 

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). 

The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “the weight to be given the 

evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of facts.” State 

v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

“Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly competent 

to decide ‘whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular 

witnesses,’ we must afford substantial deference to its determinations of credibility.” 

Barberton v. Jenney, 126 Ohio St.3d 5, 2010-Ohio-2420, 929 N.E.2d 1047, quoting 
State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3709, 11 

(Aug. 22, 1997). 

We will not reverse an award of legal custody absent an abuse of 

discretion. In re C.D.Y., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108355, 2019-Ohio-4262, ¶ 8. 

When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court may not 

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Vannucci, 2018-Ohio-1294, 110 

N.E.3d 716, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). However, where the court’s decision on the child’s best 

interests is not supported by competent, credible evidence, then it is unreasonable 

and may be reversed. In re J.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108139, 2019-Ohio-3666, 

¶ 17, citing In re Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d 445, 455, 751 N.E.2d 552 (7th Dist.2001), 

and Bechtol v. Bechtol, 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 550 N.E.2d 178 (1990), syllabus. 

The statutory scheme governing the award of legal custody does not 

include a specific test or set of criteria, but Ohio courts, including this court, have 

held that the juvenile court must base its decision to award legal custody on the best 

interest of the child. In re B.B., 2016-Ohio-7994, 74 N.E.3d 904, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.); In 

re B.J., 2017-Ohio-315, 81 N.E.3d 975, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.); In re C.N., 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 27119, 2016-Ohio-7322, ¶ 26. 

In determining the best interest of the child in a legal custody case, 

the juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, and may look to the factors 

listed under R.C. 2151.414(D) for guidance even though these factors apply to 

permanent custody decisions. In re M.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105168, 2017-

Ohio-7481, ¶ 11. Those factors include the interaction of the child with the child’s 
parents, relatives, and caregivers; the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by 

the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem; the custodial history of the child; 

and the child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement. R.C. 2151.414(D). 

The magistrate found that Father failed to complete a psychological 

assessment, failed to complete parenting and domestic violence education services, 

did not consistently visit A.C., and did not consistently attend A.C.’s medical 

appointments even though he was permitted to do so. (Magistrate’s decision 

Oct. 29, 2018.) The magistrate also found that Father failed to make “significant 

progress on the case plan” and that “progress has not been made in alleviating the 

causes for the removal of the child from the home.” Id. 

The record supports the trial court’s findings. Bailey testified that 

Father did not complete any of his case plan objectives. He rescheduled the 

psychological assessment through the court clinic three times and failed to appear 

for the third and final appointment. The clinic’s policy precluded Father from 

scheduling any more appointments. (Tr. 29, 31.) 

Father was assigned to a case manager at West Side Community 

House, where he could have completed parenting and domestic violence classes. 

According to Bailey, Father did not want to interact with the case manager, and the 

case manager was unable to help him with services. Before Bailey was involved in 

this case, the agency referred Father to Family Solutions for services, but Father also 

refused its services. (Tr. 33.) Thus, the evidence showed that Father was not willing 
to cooperate with agency services designed to help him meet the objectives of his 

case plan so that he could be reunited with A.C. 

Bailey testified that Father failed to regularly visit A.C. Visits started 

in February 2018. Father came to one visit in March, one doctor’s appointment in 

April, and two visits in May. Father failed to attend any visits after May 2018, and 

West Side Community House officially stopped all visits in July 2018, because 

Father was not attending visits. (Tr. 35.) Thus, at the time of the legal custody 

hearing, Father had not seen A.C. in five months. 

Father now blames Bailey for his failure to make progress on his case 

plan. He asserts that Bailey “caused him consternation in completing his case plan 

and seeing his daughter.” (Appellant’s brief at 19.) He also asserts he was unable to 

work on his case plan due to a broken leg. (Tr. 46.) However, Bailey testified that 

she accommodated Father as much as possible. Pursuant to Father’s request, Bailey 

communicated with Father exclusively through emails. (Tr. 10.) She emailed Father 

to inquire about his progress and to provide him with information regarding A.C.’s 

doctor’s appointments, therapy sessions, and “all the information he needs.” (Tr. 

10.) Even after Father’s visits were stopped, Bailey continued trying to arrange 

visits. (Tr. 34-36.) Moreover, Father could have completed parenting and domestic 

violence education classes at West Side Community House without interacting with 

Bailey, but Father did not want to engage with the case worker there anymore than 

he wanted to work with Bailey. Father blamed Bailey for his failure to complete any 
of his case plan objectives even though he made no effort to pursue services that 

involved no interaction with Bailey. 

Furthermore, the GAL stated at the hearing that he believed an award 

of legal custody to Uncle was in A.C.’s best interest. The GAL advised the court that 

A.C.’s health conditions have improved since she has been in Uncle’s care. (Tr. 68.) 

He further stated that Uncle facilitates a loving relationship between A.C. and 

Mother. He explained: 

[W]hen I was there visiting, the mother was also there and I saw her — 

she has a great bond with her child and was holding her and, you know, 

they seem very happy together. So I’m in agreement with legal custody 

to [Uncle]. 

(Tr. 68.) Thus, A.C.’s wishes, as expressed by the GAL, were for an order granting 

legal custody to Uncle. 

Therefore, there was competent, credible evidence that A.C. was 

thriving in Uncle’s care and that Father was not making an effort to remedy the 

problems that caused A.C. to be removed from his care. A.C. had a bonded 

relationship with Uncle and very little interaction with Father. Furthermore, Bailey 

testified that A.C. needs a permanent home. We cannot say that awarding legal 

custody of A.C. to Uncle was an abuse of discretion under these circumstances. 

Father, nevertheless, argues the trial court should have given him an 

extension of temporary custody rather than awarding legal custody to Uncle. 

However, an extension of legal custody may only be granted if the court finds, by 

clear and convincing evidence, that 
the extension is in the best interest of the child, there has been 

significant progress on the case plan of the child, and there is 

reasonable cause to believe that the child will be reunified with one of 

the parents or otherwise permanently placed within the period of 

extension. 

R.C. 2151.415(D)(1). In other words, if the court finds that an extension is not in the 

child’s best interest or that reunification is not likely in the next six months, it is not 

required to grant an extension of temporary custody. In re Da.B., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 105886, 2018-Ohio-689, ¶ 17. See also In re C.M., 9th Dist. Summit 

No. 24380, 2009-Ohio-943, ¶ 24 (“Where the trial court finds that it is in the best 

interest of a child to be placed in legal custody as a permanent disposition, the trial 

court must necessarily deny an extension of temporary custody.”); In re G.B., 2d 

Dist. Greene No. 2017-CA-30, 2017-Ohio-8759 (Denial of extension of temporary 

custody was not an abuse of discretion where father failed to substantially comply 

with four objectives of his case plan and permanent custody was in the children’s 

best interest.). 

As previously stated, the trial court found, and the record 

demonstrates, that Father failed to make any significant progress on his case plan 

and that he failed to remedy the conditions that caused A.C.’s removal. Rather than 

work on his case plan, Father blamed others for his failure. It was, therefore, 

doubtful that A.C. could be reunified with Father within six months. We, therefore, 

find no abuse of discretion in denying Father’s request for an extension of temporary 

custody. 

The second and fourth assignments of error are overruled. 
C. Request for New Social Worker 

In the third assignment of error, Father argues that the trial court’s 

judgment should be reversed because the trial court denied his request to remove 

the assigned case worker. 

Father cites no legal authority to support his argument, and we have 

found no precedent addressing this issue. It is, therefore, an issue of first 

impression. In the absence of any legal authority dictating otherwise, we review the 

trial court’s decision denying Father’s request to remove the assigned case worker 

for an abuse of discretion since an appellate court reviews a juvenile court’s custody 

decision for an abuse of discretion. In re V.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 102903, 

103061, and 103367, 2015-Ohio-4991, ¶ 52. 

In his motion to have the case worker, Bailey, removed, Father alleged 

that one of Bailey’s grandmothers had a personal relationship with Mother’s family. 

Father’s motion further alleged that “he and his wife know Ms. Bailey’s 

grandmother[.]” Bailey testified, however, that both of her grandmothers are 

deceased; one grandmother died before she was born and the other grandmother 

died in 2014, long before A.C. was born. (Tr. 16.) Bailey also denied that she or her 

family had any connections to Mother’s family, and Father provided no evidence of 

any relationship between the families other than his bald accusations. The trial 

court assessed Bailey’s demeanor while testifying and found her testimony credible. 

In the absence of any contradictory evidence, we have no reason to doubt Bailey’s 
credibility and, therefore, find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s judgment 

denying Father’s motion to remove the assigned case worker. 

The third assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR