alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

 The petition in this case was filed on June 10, 1998, and is therefore governed by the provisions

of the 19 95 Pos t-Convic tion Proc edure Act. See Comp iler’s Notes, T.C.A. § 40-30-201 (1997).

FILED

December 29, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

ARNETT MCNEAL, )

)

Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9809-CR-00263

)

 vs. ) SHELBY COUNTY

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) No. P-20060

)

Appellant. )

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the trial

court judgment by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This case represents an appeal from the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for postconviction relief. On February 17, 1989, the petitioner pled guilty to aggravated

kidnapping, aggravated rape and two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon. It also

appears that on May 25, 1989, the petitioner pled guilty to grand larceny and four

counts of armed robbery. No appeal was taken from these convictions. On June 10,

1998, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction attacking the validity of his guilty

pleas. Finding that the statute of limitations had expired, the trial court dismissed the

petition without a hearing.

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-30-202(a)1, a person in custody under a sentence

of a court of this state must petition for post-conviction relief within one year of the date

of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken or, if

no appeal is taken, within one year of the date on which judgment became final. The

Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides several limited exceptions to the one-year

statute of limitations, however none of them are applicable to the present case. See §

40-30-202(b). Contrary to the petitioner’s argument, the petition in this case was filed
2

 The pe tition would als o be barred und er the pre vious thre e year statu te of limitation s. See

T.C.A. § 40-30 -102 (19 90) (rep ealed); Passa rella v. State, 891 S.W .2d 619 (Tenn . Crim. App.), perm . to

app. denied, (Tenn. 1994).

2

well beyond the applicable statute of limitations, and is, therefore, untimely.2

Accordingly, the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition without an

evidentiary hearing or appointment of counsel. T.C.A. § 40-30-206(b). 

It is, therefore, ORDERED that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in

accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Costs of this appeal

shall be taxed to the state.

__________________________________

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE

__________________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

__________________________________

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Randolph E. BROUSSARD.

No. 53167.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 1, 1973.

In re: Randolph E. Broussard applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

Writ refused. There is no error in the ruling denying the motion to suppress which is the only error presented.
Exhibit 32








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Annual Report of Taitron Components Incorporated (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each of the undersigned officers of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to such officer’s knowledge:








(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.










Dated:  March 31, 2011
By:
/s/ Stewart WangStewart WangChief Executive Officer and President(Principal Executive Officer)




Dated:  March 31, 2011
By:
/s/ David VanderhorstDavid VanderhorstChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
# C_2015142EN.01001801.xml

| 29.4.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 142/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.4.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 142/18

---

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions given at its meeting of 2 December 2013 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39685(1) Fentanyl

Rapporteur: Latvia

(2015/C 142/07)

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission that the ‘co-promotion agreement’ and its addendum (the ‘agreement’) concluded by the parties had the object of restricting competition within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission that the ‘co-promotion agreement’ and its addendum (the ‘agreement’) concluded by the parties had the object of restricting competition within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission’s draft decision as regards the conclusion that the agreement between the parties was capable of having an appreciable effect upon trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission’s draft decision as regards the conclusion that the agreement between the parties was capable of having an appreciable effect upon trade between Member States.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission that the conditions of Article 101 paragraph 3 TFEU are not met. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission that the conditions of Article 101 paragraph 3 TFEU are not met.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission’s draft decision as regards all addressees of the draft decision, specifically regarding parental liability. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission’s draft decision as regards all addressees of the draft decision, specifically regarding parental liability.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment as regards the duration of the infringement. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment as regards the duration of the infringement.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Official Journal of the European Union

---
# Incentive Awards Program Annual Report

                - Title:  Incentive Awards Program Annual Report 
                - Form #:         SF69      
                - Current Revision Date:  Obsolete
                - Authority or Regulation:  
                - Special Instructions:             Cancelled 05/1981.  Replacement OPM Form 1465.    

PDF versions of forms use Adobe      ReaderTM.      Download Adobe ReaderTM

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Exhibit 4.2


 


Consent of Independent Registered
Public Accounting Firm


We have issued our
report dated January 12, 2021, with respect to the financial statement of Advisors Disciplined Trust 2052 contained in Amendment
No. 2 to the Registration Statement on Form S-6 (File No. 333-249502) and related Prospectus. We consent to the use of the aforementioned
report in the Registration Statement and Prospectus, and to the use of our name as it appears under the caption “Experts”.


 


/s/ Grant
Thornton LLP


 


Chicago, Illinois


January 12, 2021
#### JOSIAH WALKER’S Adm’r. d. b. appellant *vs.*JOHN CHAMBERS, Jr., p. b , respondent.

A contract made with a minor apprentice to serve beyond full age, is invalid.

Sucli a contract is not against policy; it may be for the minor’s benefit; and may be ratified by him after majority.

The ratification must be express. It cannot be implied from his continuing to work after full age.

A probate must be signed, as well as sworn to.

This was an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace in an action of assumpsit, for work and labor as a journeyman carpenter. The plaintiff made proof of the time and value of his work, and presented a probate sworn to, *but not signed;*and closed.

The defence offered to prove that Chambers was an apprentice to Walker, under a contract with his mother, when he was put to apprenticeship, ratified by him after majority, to work one year after he came of age.

*Mr. Bayard*

objected to proof of such contract, even though ratified, as against policy. *The Court*admitted the evidence.

He then contended before the jury, that if such a contract could be ratified, the ratification must be express, and not by implication. That continuing to work after full age, did not necessarily imply a working under, or ratification of, the contract.

*Mr. Whiteley,*for defendant,

contended that there was proof of express ratification. He also objected to the sufficiency of the probate.

*Mr. Bayard*

admitted that the probate was insufficient, and produced another regularly signed.

*The Court,*to the jury:

The contract under which the plaintiff began his apprenticeship with Walker, does not hind him after full age. He was a minor, incapable of contracting. The mother had no power to bind him by any contract reaching beyond his full age. Yet such a contract is capable of ratification and may be made valid, by the ratification of the party, after he comes of age.

There are some contracts made with infants, which are incapable of ratification, because they are against public policy; such are contracts for goods sold a minor to trade on during his minority. Others being for the minor’s benefit may be confirmed by him.

We think this contract not such as is incapable of confirmation, because of any conflict with public policy. Such contracts as this *312may be for the minor’s benefit; and therefore, may bé ratified and confirmed by him. But such ratification must be express, and not by mere implication; and must be made with full knowledge of the party’s rights. (2 *Greenl. Ev.,*293, § 376.)

*Mr. Bayard,*for plaintiff.

*Mr. Whiteley,*for defendant.

The plaintiff had a verdict.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 23



[KIRKPATRICK, PHILLIPS & MILLER
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
LETTERHEAD APPEARS HERE]



                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
                        -------------------------------


We have issued our report dated November 11, 1999, accompanying the consolidated
financial statements incorporated by reference in the Annual Report of NS&L
Bancorp, Inc. on Form 10-KSB for the year ending September 30, 1999. We hereby
consent to the incorporation by reference of said reports in the registration
statement of NS&L Bancorp, Inc. on Form S-8 (File No. 333-1566, effective
February 21, 1996).


/s/ Kirkpatrick, Phillips & Miller



December 24, 1999
Springfield, Missouri
#### Willie ANDREWS v. MARION STATE BANK.

No. 54235.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 4, 1974.

In re: Willie Andrews applying for Cer-tiorari, or Writ of Review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Union. 286 So.2d 375.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal the result is correct.
Exhibit 99

Supplemental Segment Information
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-6279

DAMON LOUIS WHEELOUS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

DAVID GARRAGHTY, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

VIRGINIA,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge.

(CA-97-444-2)

Submitted: April 27, 1999 Decided: September 13, 1999

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Damon Louis Wheelous, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Drummond Bagwell,

Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying

his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.

1998) as untimely filed. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly,

we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on

the reasoning of the district court. See Wheelous v. Garraghty,

No. CA-97-444-2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 16, 1999). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 3.1
 Articles of Incorporation of GeneLink, Inc., as amended
(Amended through June 2, 2009)
  1.
    
    The name of the corporation is: GeneLink, Inc.
 2.
    
    The address of this corporations registered office in this Commonwealth is:
 
 3.
    
    THE CORPORATION IS INCORPORATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW OF 1988.
 4.
    
    The aggregate number of shares authorized is: 250,000,000 shares of common stock having $.01
par value per share.
 5.
    
    The purpose of the corporation is as follows:
 The Corporation shall have unlimited power to engage in and to do any lawful act concerning
any and all lawful business for which corporations may be incorporated under the Business
Corporation Law of 1988, as amended, including but not limited to the power to engage in the
manufacture, fabrication, assembly, merchandising and distribution of various items.
 6.
    
    The shareholders of the corporation shall not have the right to cumulate their votes for the
election of directors of the corporation.
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Cheryl Booker QUALLS v. David CALDWELL, Justice, Second Judicial District Court.

No. 63006.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 11, 1978.

In re: Cheryl Booker Qualls applying for supervisory writs and stay order. Parish of Jackson.

Granted and previous stay order vacated. The trial judge is ordered to grant a recess and refer the motion to recuse to another judge in accordance with C.Cr.P. 675.

SUMMERS, J.,

agrees that the stay order previously issued should be vacated. Otherwise the trial should proceed. Applicant has an adequate remedy by appeal in the event of conviction. The motion to recuse has not been heard due to applicant’s fault.
# INSTRUCTIONS

# 532111 Pass Rental Car
15-3228 (Con) Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1 AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 1 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 25 th 2 day of April, two thousand sixteen. 3 PRESENT: 4 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 5 Chief Judge , 6 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 7 DENNY CHIN, 8 Circuit Judges. 9

______________________________________ 10 National Football League Management Council, 11 Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, 12 and 13 National Football League, 14 Defendant-Appellant, 15 16 -v.- No. 15-3228 (Con) 17 S UMMARY O RDER 18 National Football League Players Association, 19 on its own behalf and on behalf of Tom Brady, 20 Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee , 21 and 22 Tom Brady, 23 Counter-Claimant-Appellee , 24and 1 Michelle McGuirk, 2 Appellant

. 3

______________________________________ 4 FOR APPELLANT: Michelle L. McGuirk, pro se, New York, 5 N.Y. 6 7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 8 DECREED that the district court’s order is AFFIRMED. 9 Appellant Michelle McGuirk moved in the district court to intervene in National Football 10 League Management Council, et al . v. National Football League Players Association, et al. , Nos. 11 15-2801, 15-2805. The motion was denied. The parties’ appeal to this Court was resolved in an 12 opinion filed simultaneously with this summary order. Because McGuirk has failed to identify any 13 adequate legal basis for her intervention, the district court’s order is affirmed. 14 For the Court: 15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 16 17

-2-
Consent of Independent Accountants

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration
statement of CompDent Corporation, on Form S-8 (File
Numbers 33-97372 and 33-12227) of our report dated February 9, 1998,
except as to the information presented in Note 8
for which the date is March 16, 1998, on our audits of the
consolidated financial statements and financial statement
schedules of CompDent Corporation as of December 31, 1997 and 1996,
and for each of the three years in the period ended
December 31, 1997, which report is included in the Annual Report on
Form 10-K.

                                             COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.

Atlanta, Georgia
March 27, 1998
#### Robert W. ELTING, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-130.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 31, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jose Mercado, Appellant.

[655 NYS2d 474]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Felice Shea, J.), rendered June 24, 1994, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the first and second degrees, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to concurrent terms of 10 to 20 years and 6 to 12 years, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to strike the entire direct testimony of a prosecution witness who refused to answer one question posed by the prosecutor regarding the identity of the participants in the robbery, and when it instructed the jury, with defendant’s approval, that the witness’s refusal to answer could be considered in assessing his credibility *(see, People v Chin,*67 NY2d 22). There was no violation of the Confrontation Clause because the defense was given the opportunity to expose infirmities in the witness’s direct testimony through cross-examination *(Delaware v Fensterer,*474 US 15, 22). Further, defendant utilized the witness’s refusal to answer to his benefit, and has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the court’s ruling.

The trial court’s supplemental instructions regarding accomplice liability did not alter the theory of prosecution.

We perceive no abuse of discretion in sentencing. Concur— Wallach, J. P., Nardelli, Williams and Tom, JJ.
#### SARAH HAINES *vs.*JAMES WISE.

Quere. What is the law of trespasses by road' cattle *t*Is the owner of cattle turned* upon the public roads liable for all trespasses on private property; or only upon such: as is enclosed by lawful fence ? .

Replevin for a cow. Narr., in the detinuit. The defendant avowed that he took the cow damage feasant. Replication and issue.

The proof in the case was that plaintiff’s cow with others, broke into the defendant’s garden, in the town of New Castle, and destroyed his cabbages. He took her up and sent notice to the owner, who refused to go for her, but sued out a writ of replevin.

*Mr. Wales,*for the plaintiff,

contended: 1 st. That it was lawful for the owners of cattle to suffer them to run at large. 2d. That the charter of New Castle provides a specific remedy for cattle trespassing, and requires them to be put in the public pound. *(Dig.*625.) *2443d. That it was incumbent on defendant in this case to prove that he had sufficient fences and gates, and that the breach was actually made by *this*cow. The evidence was that she was there with two others.

*Wales,*for plaintiff.

*Rogers, jr.,*for defendant.

It has been decided by Judge Parsons, (Massachusetts,) that there is no common law in relation to fences. It is all the subject of statutory enactments.

*Mr. Rogers*

replied, that the act of assembly referred to was obsolete. It had never been used. There had never been a public pound or pound-keeper. But if it were in full force it was only a special remedy, to be used or not as the party pleases; leaving him still his choice of the several remedies at common law.

But this defendant, injured by the trespassing cow, was not seeking to recover damages. He was only defending himself against a claim for damages for taking up a cow which was eating up his garden. He had shown a proper and legal defence to such an action by pleading and proving that he took the cow damage feasant.

He insisted, moreover, that by the common law, every man’s land was enclosed by an ideal, invisible fence, sufficient to protect it against trespassing cattle, or to afford .him the means of redress for all injuries thence accruing. *No*one has the right *to*turn his cow out on the public without being answerable for all the damages she may do.

*The Court*

declined expressing an opinion on the other points of the case, as it was only necessary to state that the avowry was sustained if the evidence was credited; the issue being whether the cow was taken doing damage.

Verdict for defendant.
# Aug 2019
----

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

of 28 September 2004

in Case T-216/03: Mario Paulo Tenreiro v Commission of the European Communities (1)

(Officials - Mobility - Refusal of promotion - Consideration of comparative merits)

(2004/C 300/78)

Language of the case: French

In Case T-216/03: Mario Paulo Tenreiro, an official of the Commission of the European Communities, residing in Kraainem (Belgium), represented by G. Vandersanden, lawyer, against Commission of the European Communities (Agents: A. Bordes and L Lozano Palacios, with an address for service in Luxembourg) — application for, in substance, annulment of the Commission's decision, published on 14 August 2002, establishing the list of officials promoted to grade A4 in the 2002 procedure, in so far as it does not contain the applicant's name, the Court of First Instance (Single Judge: M. Pirrung); D. Christensen, Administrator, for the Registrar, gave a judgment on 28 September 2004, in which it:

----

(1)OJ C 200 of 23.8.2003.

----
#### STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS v. Mary Alice MURPHY et al.

No. 53926.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 14, 1973.

In re: State of Louisiana, through the Department of Highways applying for stay order.

Application denied. There is nothing presented for review.