NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANPREET SINGH, AKA Ravi Thapa, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 17-72793 

Agency No. A208-191-871 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 13, 2020**

San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and GWIN,*** District 

Judge.

Manpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the 

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirming the Immigration 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 15 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for asylum, withholding from removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 

8 U.S.C. section 1252(a)(1). We deny the petition for review. 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding. The 

agency’s adverse credibility finding was “supported by omissions” of “new 

allegations that tell a ‘much different––and more compelling––story of persecution 

than [the] initial application.’” Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2016), quoting Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The IJ and Board relied on Singh’s omissions in his asylum application and 

accompanying written declaration about whether his June 2014 attackers were

government officials and whether he was threatened by the police after attempting 

to report the attack. On direct examination at his merits hearing, Singh testified that 

the police refused to take his report and demanded he “better go away” or that they 

would “beat [him] too.” However, Singh’s written declaration, which described this 

same incident, omitted any claim that the police physically threatened him. In 

addition, on cross-examination, when pressed about how he was able to identify his 

June 2014 attackers as government officials, Singh pointed to the sticker on his 

attackers’ van, which allegedly displayed the logo from the Badal and BJP parties. 

Yet, in his written declaration, Singh swore that he had observed the stickers on the 

van in the second incident in December 2014. Because Singh’s claim for asylum 
3 

was based on his fear that members of the Badal and BJP parties would target him 

if he returned to India, the Board reasonably concluded that Singh had omitted

allegations in his asylum application that were “crucial to establishing” whether he 

would be “persecuted for [his] political opinion.” Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 

1057 (9th Cir. 2010).

Because these details were crucial to establishing Singh’s eligibility, we 

distinguish the principal case on which he relies––Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966 (9th 

Cir. 2014). Unlike the material omissions here, the omissions supporting the 

agency’s adverse credibility finding in Lai were immaterial to his 

application. See id. at 973-74. Accordingly, Lai is inapposite.

The Board did not err in rejecting Singh’s explanation for his omissions. 

When asked by the IJ about the omissions, Singh testified that he “wrote whatever 

[he] remembered” and that he “knew” that he could “tell all these things” at his 

merits hearing. However, Singh’s belief that it was “not necessary” to include an 

allegation because it “would be discussed at the [merits] hearing” was “not 

persuasive enough to compel the conclusion that the omissions were immaterial.” 

Kin, 595 F.3d at 1057. Accordingly, Singh’s explanation was implausible “in light 

of the importance of the omitted incidents to his asylum claim.” Zamanov, 649 F.3d 

at 974 (citation omitted). 

Because Singh was not credible, he was not eligible for asylum. See Farah v. 
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Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). He therefore necessarily failed to 

meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Pedro-Mateo v. 

I.N.S., 224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we deny Singh’s petition 

for review of the Board’s decision as to his asylum and withholding of removal 

claims. 

The Board also did not err in affirming the IJ’s denial of Singh’s CAT claim. 

Singh’s challenge to the Board’s denial of his CAT claim is based solely on the IJ’s 

adverse credibility finding. Because the record does not compel reversal of the 

adverse credibility finding, the record likewise does not compel reversal of the 

Board’s denial of the CAT claim. 

PETITION DENIED.