Comptroller General’s Authority to Relieve

Disbursing and Certifying Officials From Liability

S tatutory provisions purporting to authorize the C om ptroller G eneral, an agent o f C ongress, to 

relieve certifying and disbursing officials in the executive branch from liability for illegal or 

im proper paym ents are unconstitutional.

August 5, 1991

M e m o r a n d u m O p i n i o n f o r t h e G e n e r a l C o u n s e l

J u s t ic e M a n a g e m e n t D i v i s i o n

This responds to your request for our advice about a proposal to amend 

Department of Justice Order 2110.29B (Sept. 17, 1981), which prescribes 

the procedures for requesting a decision of the Comptroller General pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3529.' Decisions of the Comptroller General purportedly 

may relieve certifying and disbursing officers from liability for illegal or 

improper payments. See 31 U.S.C. § 3527(b)(2) (disbursing officials); id. § 

3528(b) (certifying officials). In your view, this asserted authority of the 

Comptroller General raises a substantial separation of powers question in 

light of Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). You therefore believe that 

DOJ Order 2110.29B should be revised to instruct such accountable officers 

to seek the advice of the component’s General Counsel (or of this Office) 

whenever they are unsure of the legality of paying a particular claim. We 

agree with you that the statutory mechanism is unconstitutional insofar as it 

purports to empower the Comptroller General to relieve executive branch 

officials from liability. Accordingly, we agree that DOJ Order 2110.29B 

should be revised along the lines you suggest.

I. The Statutory Framework

31 U.S.C. § 3529 establishes a mechanism for certain executive branch 

officials to obtain the opinions of the Comptroller General. It states that

1 See Memorandum for William P. Ban, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from 

Jams A. Sposato, General Counsel, Justice Management Division, Re: Comptroller General’s Decision

M aking A uthority over the Executive Branch (Apr. 16, 1990) (the “JMD Memo”).

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(a) A disbursing or certifying official or the head of an agency 

may request a decision from the Comptroller General on a 

question involving —

(1) a payment the disbursing official or head of the 

agency will make; or

(2) a voucher presented to a certifying official for 

certification.

(b) The Comptroller General shall issue a decision requested 

under this section.

Section 3529 is closely connected with the two immediately preceding 

sections of title 31, which purportedly authorize the Comptroller General to 

relieve disbursing and certifying officials from liability for mispayments. 

Section 3527(c) states that the Comptroller General, on his own initiative or 

on a written request of the head of an agency,

may relieve a present or former disbursing official of the agency 

responsible for a deficiency in an account because of an illegal, improper, or incorrect payment, and credit the account for 

the deficiency, when the Comptroller General decides that the 

payment was not the result of bad faith or lack of reasonable 

care by the official.

Section 3528(a) sets forth the responsibilities of certifying officials, among 

which is that of

(4) repaying a payment—

(A) illegal, improper, or incorrect because of an 

inaccurate or misleading certificate;

(B) prohibited by law; or

(C) that does not represent a legal obligation under 

the appropriation or fund involved.

Section 3528(b) declares that the Comptroller General

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may relieve a certifying official from liability when the Comptroller General decides that . . . (i) the obligation was incurred 

in good faith; (ii) no law specifically prohibited the payment; 

and (iii) the United States Government received value for [the] 

payment.

The Comptroller General has taken the position that “where there is doubt 

as to the legality of a payment, the certifying officer’s only complete protection from liability for an erroneous payment is to request and follow the 

Comptroller General’s advance decision” under this statutory procedure. 55 

Comp. Gen. 297, 300 (1975). The Comptroller General has also asserted 

that “in view of the certifying officer’s statutory right to request and obtain 

an advance decision from the Comptroller General regarding the lawfulness 

of any payment to be certified we can see no reason for concluding that the 

agency’s general counsel’s conclusions of law regarding such payment are 

‘binding’ on the agency’s certifying officers.” Id. In general, the Comptroller General is of the opinion that an accountable officer “is automatically 

liable at the moment of a loss or shortage. To mitigate this rule, however, 

Congress has provided a mechanism for relief. If the agency requests relief 

in conformity with the statutory conditions, and if [the] GAO agrees with 

the administrative determinations, relief will be granted.” United States 

General Accounting Office, Office of General Counsel, Principles o f Federal

Appropriations Law 10-40 (1982); 14 Comp. Gen. 578, 583 (1935).

II. Analysis

We accept the Comptroller General’s construction of 31 U.S.C. §§ 3527, 

3528, under which those statutes purport to authorize him in appropriate 

cases to relieve disbursing and certifying officers from liability for improper 

payments. But we believe that the statutes, so construed, are unconstitutional. In our view, the Comptroller General, as the agent of Congress, 

cannot issue interpretations of the law that are binding on the executive 

branch. Moreover, the Comptroller General’s assertion of the power to relieve executive branch officials from liability for improper payments usurps 

the Executive’s prosecutorial discretion and prevents the President from exercising his inherent supervisory authority over the conduct of executive 

branch officers. DOJ Order 2110.29B implements this unconstitutional statutory procedure. Accordingly, it must be revised.

In Bowsher, the Supreme Court, relying on the fact that Congress had 

retained removal power as to the Comptroller General, held that that officer was 

an agent of the legislative branch who “may not be entrusted with executive 

powers.” 478 U.S. at 732.2 The Court further held that the responsibilities

2 The Court has recently reaffirmed Bowsher. See Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v Citizens

fo r the Abatement o f Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 275 (1991).

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assigned to the Comptroller General under the statute at issue in that case 

“plainly entail[ed] execution of the law in constitutional terms.” Id. at 732- 

33. The Court explained that

[interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement [a] 

legislative mandate is the very essence of “execution” of the 

law. Under § 251 [of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 

Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat.

1038], the Comptroller General must exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the Act. He must 

also interpret the provisions of the Act to determine precisely 

what budgetary calculations are required. Decisions of that 

kind are typically made by officers charged with executing a 

statute. . . . [0]nce Congress makes its choice in enacting 

legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly — by passing 

new legislation. [Citation omitted.] By placing the responsibility for execution of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 

Deficit Control Act in the hands of an officer who is subject 

to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the 

executive function. The Constitution does not permit such 

intrusion.

Id. at 733-34.

Similarly, when the Comptroller General reviews the decision of a disbursing or certifying officer under 31 U.S.C. § 3529 in order to determine 

whether that decision complies with the law, the Comptroller General is 

necessarily interpreting the provisions of the underlying law. This is plainly 

an executive rather than a legislative function:3 the Comptroller General is 

engaging in the “execution of the law in constitutional terms,” and is taking 

decisions “typically made by officers charged with executing a statute,” i.e.,

the accounting officers themselves or the agency legal counsel on whom 

they rely. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-33. It follows that the Comptroller 

General, as an agent of the legislative branch, cannot constitutionally perform this function. Moreover, the Comptroller General is asserting the 

authority to bind persons in the executive branch to his construction of the 

law, even in cases in which the Attorney General or other executive branch 

legal officers may have reached contrary conclusions. But Congress may 

not determine the legal rights, duties and relations of persons outside the

3 Even assuming arguendo that the functions assigned to the Comptroller General could somehow be 

characterized as "legislative” rather than “executive,” the constitutional difficulty would remain intractable. “Congress may not delegate the power to legislate to its own agents.” Metropolitan Washington

Airports Auth. v. Citizens fo r the Abatement o f Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. at 275.

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legislative branch except by conforming to the constitutional procedures of 

bicameral passage of a bill and presentment to the President.4 A fortiori the 

Comptroller General may not make such legal determinations.5

Furthermore, in purporting to authorize the Comptroller General to relieve an executive branch official from liability for an improper payment, 

Congress has usurped the Executive’s “exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.” United States v. Nixon, 418 

U.S. 683, 693 (1974). “A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the 

law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution 

entrusts the responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’ 

Art. II, § 3.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (per curiam).6 If the 

Comptroller General or any other agent of the legislative branch could relieve a governmental official from liability for mispayment of public moneys, 

then the executive branch would be deprived of the discretion to decide 

whether to bring suit to recover the funds from that official. The result 

would be an unconstitutional invasion of the Executive’s responsibility to 

take care that the laws be faithfully executed.7

Finally, under the Constitution the President has general supervisory authority over the executive branch.8 This, of course, is specifically true of 

accounting officers within the Executive.9 Because the statutes here in question would prevent the President from bringing an action to correct what in 

his view was an illegal payment by an executive branch official if the

4 See Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens fo r the Abatement o f Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 

U.S. at 275; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S 919, 952 (1983).

5 This conclusion accords with our repeated view that in the event of a conflict between a legal opinion 

o f the Attorney General and that of the Comptroller General, executive branch officers are bound to 

follow the opinion o f the Attorney General. See, e.g.. Debt Obligations o f the National Credit Union

Adm inistration, 6 Op. O.L.C. 262,263 & n.4 (1982).

6 See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, 

whether through criminal or civil process, is in general committed to its own absolute discretion; in 

particular, decision whether to indict “has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive 

B ranch”); Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transportation Union, 474 U.S. 3, 7 (1985) (per curiam); The

Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1869); The Jewels o f the Princess o f Orange, 2 Op. 

Att’y Gen. 482, 486-92 (1831) (Taney, A.G.); I William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws o f

England 243 (W illiam D. Lewis ed., 1897) (“though the making of laws is entirely the work o f . . . the 

legislative branch, o f the sovereign power, yet the manner, time, and circumstances of putting those 

laws in execution must frequently be left to the discretion of the executive magistrate”).

’’M orrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), supports this conclusion. There the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel, a prosecutor whose removal was “squarely in the hands of the 

Executive Branch.” Id. at 686; see also id. at 692 n.31 (civil enforcement powers analogous to criminal 

prosecutorial powers vested in agencies w hose officers are removable by the President for cause). As 

explained above, the power to remove the Comptroller General lies with Congress.

•See M orrison u Olson, 487 U.S. at 692, 696; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); Sierra

Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Inspector General Legislation, 1 Op. O.L.C. 16, 17 

(1977).

9See The Federalist No. 72 at 369 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987) (“the preparatory plans 

o f finance, the application and disbursement o f the public monies, in conformity to the general appropriations o f the legislature . . . these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to be most 

properly understood by the administration o f government. The persons, therefore, to whose immediate 

managem ent these different matters are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of 

the chief m agistrate [i.e., the President]; and, on this account, they oug h t. . . to be subject to his superintendence”).
Comptroller General opined that the payment was not illegal, they would 

impair the President’s authority to supervise the conduct of his subordinates.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Comptroller General cannot constitutionally relieve disbursing and certifying officers from liability. Because 

DOJ Order 2110.29B is based on the assumption that the Comptroller General has such authority, it must be rescinded.

We agree with your suggestion that a revised DOJ Order should instruct 

accountable officers to seek the advice of their components’ general counsels whenever they are in doubt about the legality of paying or certifying a 

particular claim. (In cases raising significant or novel legal questions, the 

component general counsels are free to seek an opinion from this Office.) 

Furthermore, in the future, the Department should decline to process requests from accountable officials for Comptroller General opinions purporting 

to relieve them of liability; and the revised DOJ Order should advise such 

officials that it will not necessarily decline to bring suit for the recovery of 

funds because the Comptroller General has purported to relieve an official 

of liability. In addition, the revised DOJ Order should state that this Department will not bring suit against an official to recover a payment if that 

official has obtained from his or her component general counsel (or, where 

appropriate, from this Office) an opinion advising him or her that the payment could legally be made.10 Finally, we agree with your recommendation 

that the revised DOJ Order should be signed by the Attorney General.

JOHN O. McGINNIS 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

10 Under 5 U.S.C. § 5512(a), the pay of an accountable official “in arrears to the United States shall be 

withheld until he has accounted for and paid into the Treasury of the United States all sums for which he 

is liable.” In our view, this provision could not be applied if this Department had determined that the 

official was not liable.

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