NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FANG YANG, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 15-71740 

Agency No. A201-037-815 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 5, 2018**

Pasadena, California

Before: GOULD and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,*** Chief 

District Judge.

Fang Yang, a citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Dana L. Christensen, Chief United States District 

Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 13 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

decision finding her ineligible for asylum as an alien who has been persecuted on 

account of religion under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208, 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of 

removal and denial of asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition for 

review and remand. 

Because the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, we treat the IJ’s 

decision as that of the BIA. See Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 

2009). We review questions of fact for substantial evidence. See Hoque v. 

Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). Where evidence may support a 

contrary finding but does not compel it, this Court does not reverse BIA decisions. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992)

(“To reverse the BIA finding we must find that the evidence not only supports that 

conclusion, but compels it.”).

Substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s conclusion that Yang failed to 

establish asylum eligibility on the basis of past persecution under 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(b)(1). Yang, a practitioner of the religion I-Kuan Tao, was arrested 

along with other worshippers during a gathering at her grandfather’s temple. 

Officers from the Yantai Public Security Bureau detained Yang for three days. 

During that time, the officers interrogated Yang and threatened to send her to an 

education camp, which is akin to jail. Yang was forced to squat facing a wall for 
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forty minutes. The officers also struck Yang in her face and kicked her in her 

thighs. The officers released Yang on the condition that she no longer attend IKuan Tao services and report weekly to the Public Security Bureau, which she did. 

Upon release, Yang was fired from her job for her participation in an “illegal evil 

cult organization.” Taken together, these actions compel a finding of persecution. 

See Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the 

totality of the circumstances compelled a finding of persecution where petitioner 

was detained for a day and a half and coerced into signing a document saying he 

would no longer believe in Christianity). Accordingly, the BIA erred in concluding 

that Yang did not suffer past persecution.

Because we conclude that Yang has established past persecution, she is 

entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution 

under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). “The burden then shifts to the INS to show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that country conditions have changed to such an 

extent that the petitioner no longer has a well-founded fear that [s]he would be 

persecuted if [s]he were to return.” Duarte de Guinac v. I.N.S., 179 F.3d 1156, 

1159 (9th Cir. 1999). However, because neither the IJ nor the BIA reached this 

question with the burden appropriately placed on the Government, we remand to 

the agency for a determination of whether the Government can rebut the 

presumption that Yang has a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Guo, 361 
4 

F.3d at 1204; see also Chand v. I.N.S., 222 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[B]ecause neither the IJ nor the BIA found that the harm Chand suffered rose to 

the level of persecution, they did not accord Chand the presumption, and therefore 

did not consider whether changed conditions in Fiji were sufficient to rebut it.”).

PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED.