See T EX
. P E N A L C O D E A NN
. § 31

. 0 3 (a), (e) (5) (V ernon S up p 20 0 8 ). 1

See T EX
. P E N A L C O D E A NN
. § 12

. 4 2 (a)( 3 ) ( V ernon S up p
. 20 0 8 ). I f i t i s shown o n t he t ri al of a t hi rd 2 d egree f el o ny t hat t he d ef

end ant has b een o nce b ef o re convict ed of a f

el o ny , on co nvi ct i o n he s hal l be punis hed f o r a se c o n d d e g re e felo n y. Id
. 

## NO. 12-08-00267-CR

IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTR ICT

TYLER, TEXA S

KENNETH DOUGLAS CA PEHAR T, § APPEAL F ROM THE 402ND APPELLANT
V. § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF
TH E ST ATEOFTEX

AS, APP ELL EE § WO OD CO UN TY , T EXAS
MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION Kenne th Douglas Capeha

rt appe als his conviction for thef t. I ntw o is s u e s , Appellant ar gues that th e e vid e nc e is l e ga lly a ndfa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his c on vic tio n. W e a ff

irm.
B ACKG ROUND Appellant wa s char ged by indictment w ith thef t, a third degre e felony. More spe cifica lly, 1 theind ic tme nt a lle ge d th a t A pp e llant u nla wf ull y a pp ro priated , b y a c qu iring a ndoth e rw ise

exer cising control over property, three Lufkin pum p jacks and one 210 gallon storage tank, valued

a t $2 0, 00 0 o r m or e , b ut l e ss tha n $1 00 ,0 00 , fr om the ow ne r w ith ou t hi s e ff e c tiv e c on se nt andwi th the intent to deprive the owner of the prope rty. The indictment also include d an enhancement pa ra gr apha lle gin g th a t A pp e llant h a d b e e n c on vic te d of a fe lon y prior to thec omm iss ionof thi s offe nse. Appellant plea ded “not guilty.”

2Appel l an t ma k es n o c l ai m t h at t h e pr oper t y de s cr i bed i n t h e i n di ct men t w as l oca t ed on t h e n or t h s i de of 3 t h e y ar d. 2 At tria l, J e rry Ca vin e ss t e sti fi e d that he is the fi e ld sup e rv iso r or pu mpe r fo r PO & G o il

c omp a ny a ndov e rs e e s pr od uc tio n a t a W oo d Cou nty , Te xa s pr op e rty. He state d th a t th is p ro pe rty is a c e ntr a l f a c ili ty t a nk

batte ry or , inoth e r w or ds , a ya rd sto ra ge fa c ili ty (the “ ya rd ” ). Ca vin e ss stated t hat t here are oil tanks, water tanks, vessels, pumping units, repair pipe, and structura l pipe at th e y ar d

. He a dmitted there is scra p metal and e quipment at the yar d that has bee n there for year s, and that, on occ asion, it i s o v er g ro wn wi th grass and w eeds. I n September of 2007, Caviness asked Pete Ed Moss to clean up the yard, haul off the sc rap me tal and junk, and ke ep the proce eds. He test i fi ed that he wa lked through the ya rd with Moss and pointed out what wa s “good” and what wa s scra p. Further, he told Moss that all of the scra p, exce pt f

or some pipe, wa s located on the north side of the yard. He stated that there wer e two storage tanks at the ya rd, one 3 21 0 b arr e l “ go od ” ta nk

a ndon e 40 0 b arr e l sc ra

p tank . Ca vin e ss s tate d th a t hesp ecif ic a lly tol d Moss to take a separator along wit h the s cra p storage tank, identified as standing up, containing large holes, and a

pproximately twenty fe et tall. Howeve r, he never gave Moss pe rmission to t ake the“ go od ” sto ra ge ta nk , id e nti fi e d a s layin g o n it s si de . A lth ou ghCa vin e ss w a s a wa rethat Mo ss
was wor king with someone, he did not know who it was. At on e po int , Ca vin e ss n oti c e d th e “ go od ” sto ra ge ta nk wa s mi ssi ng a nda tte mpt e d to

c on ta c t Mo ss. Ap pr ox imate ly t wo we e ks late r and a ft e r be ing a way f ro m th e ya

rdfo r e igh t days , h e n o t iced f

our Lufkin 160 pump jac ks weremissing, t hree units of which wer e complete , working, and usa

ble. Caviness said he did not give Appe llant, Moss, or anyone else pe rmission to take the pump ja ck s o r t he “good” storage tank from the ya rd. On Nove mber 10, 2007, he

re po rt e d th e the ft

of thepu mp j a c ks

. Stephen Pfeife r testified that he is the owner of an oil company and that the comp an y ’s centr al offic e is in Houston, Texas. Hestated th at t h e company acquir ed the pr operty in Wood County, Texas oper ated by PO & G. Pfeife r wa s awa re that Caviness authorize d Moss to take a separ ator, but wa s not told t hat Caviness wa s clea ning up the yard. He testified that, in November 2007, there wer e thre e pump jack s with spare pa rts on the Wood County property, but admitted that w e e ds we regr ow ing ov e r tho se pu mp j a c ks

. He state d that, on No ve mbe r 1 0, 20 07 , Ca vin e ss inf orme d h im that th e se thre e pu mp j a c ks ha d b e e n ta ke n f ro m th e ya

rd . A lth ou ghCa vin e ss3

located the pump jacks, P feife r t estified that key components had already be en lost, taken off , or cut up for sc rap. Pete Ed Moss testified that he r uns a bulldozer

and wor ks in c onstruction. He state d that in S e pte mbe r 2 00 7 Ca vin e ss g a ve him “ a bu nc h o f j un k” a lon g a f

e nc e ro w. Ac c or din g to Mo ss, Caviness showed him “e xactly what to get,” including a large rusted tank and a separator . He took Appellant to the yar d, telling Appellant that he would split the proce eds with him if he helped haul the scra p. Howeve r, Moss could not rec all wh at he told Appellant a bout what they we re ta

king from the ya

rd. He an d Ap p el l ant worke d for a bout two thirds of a day, took the sc rap the y gather ed to a scra

p yard in T omball, and sold it. After that day, he ne ver w ent bac k to the yard. Moss reca lled telling Appe llant that Caviness gave him a la rge r usted tank and, be cause he began
ru nn ing a bu lld ozer on ano th e r j ob , to ld A pp e llant t o ta lk t o Ca vin e ss a bo ut the ta nk . H e a lso might have told Appellant to talk to Caviness about the sepa rator. Moss testified that he neve r ga ve Ap pe llant p e rm iss ionto t ake th ree pu mp j a c ks fr om the ya rdno r d id C a vin e ss g iveMo ss permission to take those pump jacks. Further , he could not r eca ll if the scra p he hauled that day contained pa

rts of pump ja cks. He state d that he took the scr ap Caviness ga ve him that was “ up that fenc e row ,” which may or may not have included small parts of a pump jack. Robert Reaga n testified that Appellant asked him to help clean up the yard i n Wood County. He took his truck, trailer , and tra ctor to the ya rd and state d that he and A ppellant wer e the only ones cle aning up the yar d. While there , Appellant told him what was to be hauled off and specific ally told him t o leave some rods and good pipes. As they were working, Reaga n noticed pumping units and stated that he hauled thr ee pump jac ks from the W ood County yard to a scr ap ya rdbe tw e e n Su lph ur Spring s a nd Com o. Mic ha e l Ed wa rd Rog e rs te sti fi e d that he wo rk s f or PO & G as a pumpe r. He s t at ed t h at h e goes through the ya rd in Wood County twice a day for

app ro xim a te ly t e n mi nu te s. Rog e rs state d th a t Mo ss m e t Ca vin e ss at th e ya rdone mo rni ng in September 2007 and that, although he saw Moss at t he yard again shortly there afte r, he did not see Moss hauling any scra

p out of the ya

rd. He said he saw Appellant at the ya rd twice , but did not believe that he talked to Appe l l an t ab o u t what he was re moving from the yar d. Rogers saw Appellant wor

king on a bi g tank, getti ng it rea dy to move. He believed that ther e we re a bout three pu mp ja c k s a t th e y ar d , o n ly o n e o f w h ic h lo o k e d to b e in g o o d w o rk in g c o n d it io n , a n d a ll of which had w eeds and grass growing around them. Rogers denied giving anyone permission to takeA n i nd i vi d ual ad judge d gui l t y of a second de gree f el o ny s hal l be punis hed by i m p ri sonm ent f o r any t erm 4

o f no t m o re tha n twe n ty yea rs o r le ss th a n two ye a rs a n d , i n a d d iti o n , a fine no t t o e x c e e d $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 . T EX
. P E NAL C O D E A NN
. § 12

. 3 3 (V ernon 2 0 0 3 ). 4 three pump jacks nor did he se e Moss take th o s e p ump jacks. He also denied giving Appe llant permission to take the pump jac ks or the “good” storage tank. Ric ha rdRe e d te sti fi e d th a t heis the ow ne r o f R e e d Scr ap Y ardin H op kin s Co un ty, Te xa s. On Novembe r 10, 2007, he bought some oilfield scra p from Appe llant including pump jacks. He identified the scr ap as being the pump jacks de picted in photographs a dmitted by the State. Reed also stated that Moss was not with Appellant whe n Appellant sold the pump jacks to him. After the trial conc lu d ed , t h e jury found A ppellant guilty of theft, $20,000 or more , but less than $100,000, as cha

rged in the indictment a nd assessed his punishment at twen t y y ears of imprisonment and a $10,000 fine

. This appea l followed. 4

E VI DE NT I ARY S UF FI CI E NCY Inhis fi rs t a ndse c on d is su e s, Ap pe llant a rg ue s th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e ga lly and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his c on vic tio n. Mo resp e c if ic a lly , h e c on te nd s th a t th e State ’s e vid e nc e fails to establish that he forme d t h e al l eged intent to deprive the owne r of the pr operty. Inste ad, he argue s, th e ev i d en ce supports his mis take of fac t rega rding the items to be re moved from the property. Stand ard of Re view “Le gal suffic iency is the constitutional minimum re quired by the Due Proc ess Clause of the Fourteenth Ame ndment to sustain a criminal convic tion.” Esc ob e do v . St ate , 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. A pp.–San Antonio 1999, pet. re f’d) (citing Ja c ks on v . Vi rg inia , 443 U.S. 307, 315-16, 99 S. Ct . 2781, 2786-88, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)) . The standa rd of r eview is whe ther a ny rational trie r o f f a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of th e off ense b e yo nda

re a so na bledo ub t. Jackson , 4 43 U. S. at 31 9, 99 S. Ct . at 27 89 ; La Cour v . St ate , 8 S.W.3d 670, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The e vidence is viewed in the light most favorable t o t h e v er d i ct

. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 31 9, 99 S. Ct . at 27 89 ; La Cour , 8 S.W .3 d at 671

. Th e c on vic tio n w ill be su staine d “ un le ss i t is found t o be irrational or unsupported by morethan a ‘ mere modicum’ of the e vidence .” Mo re no
v . St ate , 75 5 S.W .2 d 86 6, 86 7 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ). Th e jury is theso le jud ge of thec re dib ili ty of witnesses and of the we ight to be given their testimony. Bar ne s v . St ate , 876 S.W.2d 316, 3215

(T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). Any re c on c ili a tio n o f c on fl ic ts andc on tr a dic tio ns in the e vid e nc e is entirely within the jury’s domain. Lo sa da v . St ate , 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). If a revie wing court finds the e vidence legally insufficie nt to support a conviction, the re sult is an

a c q u itta l. T

i b b s v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31, 41-42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217-18, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982). In conduc ting a fac tual sufficie ncy re view of the evidenc e supporting the jury’s ve rdict, we consider a ll of the evidenc e we ighed by the jury that tends to prove the existenc e of the elementa l fa ct i n dispute and compa re it to the evide nce that tends to disprove that fac t. See Santellan v. Sta te , 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Ultimately, we must ask whethe r a ne utral

re vie w o f a ll the e vid e nc e , both fo r an d ag a ins t the fi nd ing , d e mon str a te s th a t th e pr oo f o f g uil t is so obviously weak as to unde rmine our c onfidenc e in the jury’s de termination, or t h e proof of guilt, although adequate if taken a lone, is greatly outweighed by contra ry proof

. Jo hnso n v . St

ate , 23 S.W .3 d 1 , 1 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); see also O r tiz v . St ate , 9 3 S. W .3 d 7 9, 87 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2002) (ve rdict will be set aside “only if the evidenc e supporting guilt is so obvi ously weak, or t he contr ary e vidence so overwhe lmingly out weighs the supporting evide nce, a s to render the

c on vic tio n clear ly w ro ng a ndma nif e stl y u nju st” ); see Sims v . St ate , 99 S.W.3d 600, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A clearly wrong and manifestly unjust verdic t occur s wherethe jury’s finding “shocks the c onscienc e” or “clear ly demonstrates bias.” Jo ne s v . St ate , 944 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)

. Al th o u g h w e ar e au th o r iz e d to d is a g r e e w ith th e ju r y ’ s d e te r mi n a ti o n , e v e n if p r o b a tive evidenc e exists that supports th e v erdict, see Cle wis v . St ate , 9 22 S.W .2 d 1 26 , 1 33 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1996), our evaluation should not substantially intrude upon the jury’s role as the sole judge of the we ight and cre dibilit y of witness testimony. Sant ellan , 939 S.W.2d at 164. It is not enough that we might har

bor a subjective level of rea sonable doubt to overturn a conviction that is founded on legally suffic ient evidenc e. See Wa tso n v . St ate , 204 S.W.3d 404, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Wher e ther e is conflicting evide nce, the jury’s ver dict on such matters is g en er al l y regarded a s conclusive. See Van Z

and t v . St ate , 932 S.W.2d 88, 96 (Tex. A pp.–El Paso 1996, pet. ref ’d). W e
c a nn ot d e c larethat a c on fl ic t in thee vid e nc e jus tif ie s a ne w t ri a l si mpl y b e c aus e we dis a gr e e wi th the jury’s re solution of the conflict. See Watson , 204 S.W.3d at 417. Furthe r, in or de r to e va luate fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y, we sh ou ld m e a su ree le me nts of theof fe ns e6

as def ined in a hypothetica lly corre ct jury cha rge f or th e ca se. Gr

ott i v . St ate , 273 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. Ap p
. 2 0 08). This cha rge a ccur ately promulgate s the law, is authoriz ed by the indictment, does not unnece ssarily incre ase the state’s burden o f p roof or restrict the state’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particula r offe nse for which the def endant wa s tried. Id. at 280-81. Appli cable Law A person commits a n offe nse if he unlawfully appr opriates pr operty with intent to deprive the owner

of the prope rty. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 31.03(a) (V er n o n Supp. 2008). Appropriation o f property is unlawful if it is without the owner ’s ef fec tive consent. Id . § 31.03(b)( 1). “Appr opriate” means to acquir e or otherwise exer cise control over property other than re al prope rty. Id . § 31.01(4)( B) (Ve rnon S upp. 2008). It is a defense to prosec ution that the actor through mistake forme d a re asona b l e belief about a matter of f act if his mistaken be lief negate d the kind of

culpability require d for c ommissi on of the off ense. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 8.02(a) (Ve rnon 2003). “ Kind of culpa bility” means “c ulpable mental state .” Be gg s v . St ate , 597 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)

. A d e fe nd a nt’ s e xc lus ivea ndun e xp la ine d p os se ssi on of pr op e rty r e c e ntl y s tol e n p e rm its an infe renc e that the de fendant is the one who commit t ed t h e offense. Rol le rso n v . St

ate , 227 S.W .3 d 7 18 , 7 25 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Po nc io v . St ate , 185 S.W.3d 904, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). An a ccuse d’s intent at t he ti me of a n incident must usually be inferr ed fr om circumstantial evidenc e rath er than direc t proof. Sc ott v . St ate , 202 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex. A pp.–Texa rkana 2006, pet. re f’d) (citing He rna nde z v . St ate , 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ). Ana lys is In his brief, Appellant argues t hat t he evidence supports his mi stake of f act r egar ding what

wa s to be re mov e d f

ro m th e W oo d Co un ty pr op e rty. Ap pe llant co nte nd s tha t th e State faile d to establish that he knew the three pump ja cks and the “good” storage tank wer e not to be re moved. Ho we ve r, thee vid e nc e sh ow s th a t Ca vin e ss t oldMo ss t o cle a n up the ya rda ndsp e c if

ic a lly tol d him that, except f

or some pipe, all of the scra p metal was located on the north side of the yar d. He

a lso ga ve Mo ss p e rm iss ionto t ake these pa rator a ndthesc ra

p s tor a ge tank, but

ne ve r g a ve him pe rm iss ion to take thr e e pu mp ja c ks or the“ go od ” sto ra ge ta nk . O n N ov e mbe r 1 0, 20 07 , Ca vin e ss reported t hat t hree pump jacks, along with the “good” storage tank, wer e missing from the yar d.7

P fe i fer testified that he wa s awa re that Caviness gave Moss permission t o take a separ ator fr om the yar d. He a lso stated that bef o re t h is incident, three pump jac ks with spare pa rts wer e at the yard. Mo ss t e sti fi e d th a t th e sc ra p g ive n to him

by Ca vin e ss w a s a lon g a fe nc e ro w. He tol d Appellant that Caviness ga ve him a lar ge rusted tank and to talk to Ca viness about the tank and, po ssi bly , th e se pa

rator . M os s te sti fi e d th a t he ne ve r ga ve Ap pe llant p e rm iss ionto t ake thr e e pu mp jacks fr om the yard. Further , afte r that day, he never returne d to the yard. Reaga n stated that Appe llant told him what wa s to be remove d from the ya rd and r eca lled hauling three pump ja cks fr om the yard. Roger s testified that he ne ver ga ve Appe llant permission to take thre e pump jacks or the “good” storage tank from the ya rd. Reed t es t i fi ed t hat, on November

10, 2007, he bought some oilfield scra p from Appe llant that included pump jacks. He also stated that Moss w as not w ith Appe llant w hen the sale was conducte d. Thus, t h e e v i dence shows that none of the witnesses–Caviness, Pfeife r, Moss, or Rogers–ga ve Appe llant permission to ta ke three pump ja cks and the “good” storage tank. Further, shortly af ter the the ft was r eporte d, the pump jacks we re loc ated in a sc rap ya rd af ter be ing sold by Appellant. See Rollerson , 227 S.W .3 d at 72 5; Po nc io , 185 S.W.3d at 905. Because Appe llant removed the pump jacks and the “good” stora ge tank f

rom the yard and sol d them, we conclude that he formed the re quisite intent to exer cise control over the proper ty. See Sc ott , 202 S.W.3d at 408. Viewing the e vidence in the light mos t favora

ble to the jury’s ve rdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fac t c ould ha ve found thee le me nts of

the ft be yo nda re a so na bledo ub t. T he re fo re , th e e vid e nc e is le ga lly su ff ic ie nt t o support Appellant’s c onviction. Ha vin g d e te rm ine d th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e ga lly su ff ic ie nt to sup po rt

theve rd ic t, w e a dd re ss fac tual sufficie ncy and c onsider the r ec o rd in its entirety. See Johns on , 23 S.W.3d at 11. Ca vin e ss t e sti fi e d th a t he on ly sho we d Moss wh a t scr ap w a s to be re mov e d f ro m th e ya

rd , a nddid not know who was working wit h Moss. Moss could not rec all what he told Appellant re garding wh a t w a s to be re mov e d f ro m th e ya

rd . Re a ga n te sti fi e d t hat Ap pe llant s pe c if ic a lly tol d h im t o leave some rods and good pipe s in the yard. Roger s did not bel i ev e h e talked to Appellant

re ga rd ing wh a t hewa s ta

kin g f ro m th e ya

rd . Co ntr ary to th e ve rd ic t, M os s’ s in abil ity to r e c a ll what he told Appe llant a

bout w hat was to be taken from the yard may cast doubt on Appe llant’s be lie f r e ga

rd ing wh a t w a s to be re mov e d. Ho we ve r, the ju ry may c ho os e to b e lie ve so me t est imony and disbelieve other testimony. See Losada 7 2 1 S. W

. 2 d a t 3 0 9

. H e r e , th e jury8

d etermined the cr edibility of the witnesses and r esolved the e videntiary inconsistenc ies in the State’s fa vor, which is its prer ogative as f act f inder. Having re viewed the rec ord in its e ntirety, we conclude that the jury wa s entitled to find Appellant guilty of theft. Our revie w of the r ecor d as a whole, with c onsideration given to a ll of the evidenc e, both for and ag ai n s t the jury’s finding, has not re veale d to us any evidenc e that

c aus e s u s to c on c lud e that th e pr oo f o f g uil t is so obvi ou sly w e ak o r i s o the rw ise so gr e a tly

ou tw e igh e d b y c on tr ary pr oo f a s to re nd e r A pp e llant’ s c on vic tio n clearly wr on g o r m a nif e stl y unjust. See Or

tiz , 9 3 S. W .3 d at 87 ; Johns on , 2 3 S. W .3 d at 11 ; Jones , 9 4 4 S.W.2d at 648. Consequently, the evidenc e is fac tually sufficie nt for the jury to find Appellant guilty of theft a s alleged in the indictment. Ac cordingly, Appe llant’s first and sec ond issues are overr uled.

D I S PO S I T I ON Th e jud gme nt o f the tria l c ou rt is affirmed

.

JA M ES T. WOR THEN Chief J ustice
Opinion delivere d J une 30, 2009. P an elconsi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and H oyl e, J.

(DO N OT PUBL I SH)