COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-17-00245-CV

MITCHELL REITMAN AND

MELINDA REITMAN

APPELLANTS

V.

ROGER L. YANDELL APPELLEE 

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FROM THE 153RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 153-246953-10

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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In a single issue, Appellants Mitchell and Melinda Reitman assert that the 

trial court erred by compelling them to arbitrate their claims against Appellee 

Roger L. Yandell. Following the arbitration compelled by the trial court, the 

arbitrator signed his “Reasoned Arbitration Award” on August 17, 2016. 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

Subsequently, on November 10, 2016, Yandell filed an application to confirm the 

arbitration award under the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) and sought entry of a 

final judgment. On May 18, 2017, the Reitmans filed a response to Yandell’s

motion to confirm the arbitration award. The Reitmans’ response alleged various 

challenges to the arbitration award—including that Yandell was not a party to the 

arbitration agreement and that, instead, only his business, RLY Investments, Inc.,

was a party to it. In addition, the prayer in the Reitmans’ response requested 

that the trial court vacate the award. The trial court subsequently signed a final 

judgment confirming the arbitration award. The Reitmans timely perfected this 

appeal from the final judgment confirming the arbitration award.

On appeal, the Reitmans set forth the tedious path their claims against 

RLY Investments, Inc. took in the trial court and in the first compelled arbitration 

and the equally tedious path that their claims against Yandell individually took in 

the trial court and in a second compelled arbitration. The Reitmans contend that 

the trial court erred by compelling the second arbitration of their claims against 

Yandell individually for a variety of reasons, including that their claims against 

him were torts and that Yandell was not a party to the contract containing the 

arbitration provision. The Reitmans also contend on appeal that the arbitrator’s 

award of attorney’s fees to Yandell in the second arbitration was arbitrary and 

capricious.2

 

2As pointed out by Yandell, a complete record from the second compelled 

arbitration is not before us. 
3

Yandell contends on appeal that the trial court did not err by confirming the 

arbitration award and, in fact, was required to confirm it because the Reitmans 

did not timely file a motion to vacate the arbitration award within three months or 

within ninety days of the date the August 17, 2016 second arbitration award was 

filed or delivered as required under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the 

TAA, respectively. Yandell argues that to the extent the Reitmans’ response to 

his motion to confirm the arbitration award can be construed as a motion to 

vacate, it was not timely filed and points out that if the Reitmans’ response is not 

construed as a motion to vacate, then the trial court was required to confirm the 

award because no motion to vacate it was on file.3

Both the FAA and the TAA require a party to file a motion or application to 

vacate, modify, or correct the arbitrator’s award within a set time after the award 

is filed or delivered: three months under the FAA and ninety days under the 

TAA. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 12 (West 2009) (FAA provision providing that “[n]otice of 

a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse 

party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered”); 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 171.088, 171.091 (TAA provisions setting 

forth, respectively, grounds seeking and time limit for making application to 

vacate award and application to modify or correct award). Under either the FAA 

 

3See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 171.087, 171.088, 171.091 

(West 2011) (requiring trial court to confirm arbitration award unless statutory 

grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting award are offered by application 

filed within the ninety-day rule).
4

or the TAA, a party who fails to timely seek to vacate, modify, or correct an 

arbitrator’s award forfeits his right to seek judicial review of the award.4 And 

under either the FAA or the TAA, a trial court must confirm an arbitration award 

unless statutory grounds are offered (via an application filed within the threemonth or the ninety-day rule, respectively) for vacating, modifying, or correcting 

the award.

5

 

 

4See, e.g., Craig v. Sw. Sec., Inc., No. 05-16-01378-CV, 2017 WL 

6503213, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding 

that once FAA’s three-month period for filing motion to vacate has expired, a 

party may not attempt to vacate an arbitration award for any reason) (citing 

Turner v. Tex//Tow Marine Towing & Salvage, LLC, 502 S.W.3d 368, 372–73 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.)); Slay v. Nationstar Mortg., 

L.L.C., No. 02-09-00052-CV, 2010 WL 670095, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

Feb. 25, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that “Slay did not seek to vacate, 

modify, or correct the arbitrator’s award within three months or ninety days of the 

award and forfeited his right to seek judicial review of the arbitrator’s award”); 

Mauldin v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., No. 02-07-00208-CV, 2008 WL 4779614, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 30, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that party 

waived right to judicial review of arbitration award under FAA when he “filed his 

motion to vacate the arbitration award—in which he raised the same arguments 

he now raises on appeal—well beyond . . . [the] three[-]month deadline”); La. 

Nat. Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 458, 462 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding TAA’s ninety-day time 

period for filing motion to vacate arbitration award is “a limitations period after 

which a party cannot ask a court to vacate an arbitration award”). 

5See, e.g., Schlobohm v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 806 F.2d 578, 580 n.2 

(5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that under FAA, “[a] court must grant an order 

confirming the award unless it finds that the award should be vacated, modified, 

or corrected” per 9 U.S.C. § 10 or § 11); Kreit v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 530 

S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (explaining 

that under TAA the trial court is required to confirm an arbitration award unless 

grounds are timely offered for vacating, modifying, or correcting the award per 

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies sections 171.087, 171.088, 171.091); In re 

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 419 S.W.3d 318, 326 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, orig. 

proceeding) (recognizing that in absence of service of notice of motion to vacate 
5

The Reitmans did not seek to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration 

award signed on August 17, 2016, until their May 18, 2017 response to Yandell’s 

motion to confirm the award. Under either the FAA or the TAA, to the extent the 

Reitmans’ response to Yandell’s motion to confirm the arbitration award may be 

construed as an application for vacatur, modification, or correction of the 

arbitration award, it was not timely, and the Reitmans have therefore forfeited 

their right to seek judicial review of the award.6

We overrule the Reitmans’ sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment 

confirming the arbitration award.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and KERR, JJ.

DELIVERED: March 15, 2018

 

before FAA’s three-month deadline, trial court must grant order confirming 

award).

6See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 171.087, 171.088, 171.091.