United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-2404 

CHARKEEM HYATT, 

Petitioner, Appellant, 

v. 

BRUCE GELB, Superintendent, 

Respondent, Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Torruella and Barron, Circuit Judges. 

David M. Skeels and Committee for Public Counsel Services, on 

brief for appellant. 

Susanne Reardon, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau, 

Appeals Division, and Maura Healey, Attorney General, on brief for 

appellee. 

October 19, 2016 
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Charkeem Hyatt, petitionerappellant, contests the district court's denial of his petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Hyatt argues 

that Massachusetts state courts failed to apply the United States 

Supreme Court's holding in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 

122 (1934), in denying his request to be present during the jury 

view of the crime scene. After careful consideration, we affirm 

the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief. 

I. Background 

On federal habeas review, the findings of fact of a state 

court "shall be presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); 

see Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 592–93 (1982) (per curiam). 

Accordingly, we must accept them unless convinced by clear and 

convincing evidence that they are erroneous. Lynch v. Ficco, 438 

F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 

24, 26 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc)). We take the facts as presented 

by the Massachusetts Appeals Court, which affirmed Hyatt's 

conviction, supplemented with other record facts consistent with 

the state court's findings. Scoggins v. Hall, 765 F.3d 53, 54 

(1st Cir. 2014). 

A. Trial 

In July 2009, Hyatt was involved in the shooting of four 

people outside a bar in the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston, 
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Massachusetts. A grand jury in Suffolk County indicted Hyatt on 

the following counts: one count of unlawful possession of a 

firearm, one count of unlawful possession of ammunition, one count 

of possession of a loaded firearm, three counts of aggravated 

assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, three counts of 

assault with a dangerous weapon, and four counts of possession of 

a firearm in the commission of a felony. 

Hyatt pled not guilty to all counts, and a jury trial 

commenced on February 6, 2012, before Justice Brady of the 

Massachusetts Superior Court. On February 8, Justice Brady 

discussed the logistics and rules for a jury view of the scene 

where the shooting took place, which would take place on the 

following day. Hyatt's trial counsel requested Hyatt's presence 

during the view. Justice Brady responded that Hyatt could not go 

because of security reasons. He added, "He's in custody. I can't 

bring him. I don't have enough security people for that. I've 

never had a defendant [attend a view], other than one who's on the 

street." 

Later that day, Hyatt's counsel renewed her request that 

Hyatt be allowed to accompany the jury on the view. In response 

to the request, the court engaged in the following exchange: 

THE COURT: Look, I'm sorry. He's in custody for very 

serious charges. It's a very serious event. I'm not 

going to allow him to come on the view because I just 

don't have adequate security. Further, I can't have 
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him without chains out there, so the jury is going to 

be there. It just isn't a workable situation. So I 

understand that the [Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 

Court] has never changed the Judge's discretion about 

that, so if you want, you've made an objection, that's 

fine, I've overruled it. But I'm not going to allow 

it. 

. . . 

MS. ODIAGA: I think the jury is going to be made more 

aware of the fact that he is in custody by his absence. 

THE COURT: I probably have done maybe thirty views 

without defendants there, and I never said anything 

special. If you can think of anything you want me to 

say, I'd be happy to do it, but I think probably most 

lawyers feel that it's better left unsaid. Maybe the 

jury will just assume that they never come. But if 

you can think of anything tomorrow, by all means I'd 

be happy to consider it, okay? 

The next morning, the view proceeded as scheduled, 

without Hyatt in attendance. Both Hyatt's counsel and the 

prosecutor representing the Commonwealth were permitted to point 

out certain features of the scene to the jury, but neither was 

allowed to make any argument or offer other commentary. At no 

point before or during the view did anyone draw any attention to 

the fact of Hyatt's absence. 

On February 16, 2012, the jury returned a verdict of 

guilty on all counts except the three counts charging him with 

assault by means of a dangerous weapon. Following the jury's 

verdict, Hyatt was sentenced to a term of twelve to fifteen years 

of imprisonment. 
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B. Proceedings in Massachusetts Appellate Courts 

Hyatt appealed his conviction to the Massachusetts 

Appeals Court, alleging that his exclusion from the view violated 

his constitutional rights to due process and his presumption of 

innocence. The Appeals Court rejected his arguments and affirmed 

the conviction. Commonwealth v. Hyatt, No. 12–P–1257, 2014 WL 

2178782, at *1-3 (Mass. App. Ct. May 27, 2014). It noted that it 

was bound by "a long-standing precedent that a defendant does not 

have the right to be present for a view and that a defendant's 

absence does not offend his rights under the United States 

Constitution or [the Massachusetts] Declaration of Rights." Id. 

at *1 (citing cases). Relying on this precedent, the Appeals 

Court held that Justice Brady had acted "well within his authority" 

when he cited "security" as the reason to deny Hyatt's request to 

attend the view. Id. 

The Appeals Court also noted that even if exclusion from 

a jury view could constitute a due process violation, Hyatt had 

failed to make the required showing that that violation had caused 

him "substantial harm." Id. It also mentioned that it was 

unpersuaded by Hyatt's attempt to analogize Justice Brady's 

refusal to allow him to attend the view to allowing a defendant to 

be seen by the jury in prison garb or shackles, which requires 

particularized findings. Id. 
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Hyatt petitioned the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 

Court for further review, but his petition was denied. 

Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 15 N.E.3d 762 (Mass. 2014). 

Hyatt then filed a petition for habeas corpus relief 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the 

District of Massachusetts, alleging that the trial court violated 

his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment when it denied his request to accompany the jury on a 

view of the crime scene. The district court denied the petition, 

but granted a certificate of appealability. Hyatt v. Gelb, 142 

F. Supp. 3d 198, 205 (D. Mass. 2015). This appeal ensued. 

II. Analysis 

A. Standard of Review 

We review the district court's denial of habeas relief 

de novo. Sánchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 293 (1st Cir. 2014). 

"Our de novo review encompasses the district court's own 

'determination of the appropriate standard of review of the state 

court proceeding.'" Id. (quoting Zuluaga v. Spencer, 585 F.3d 27, 

29 (1st Cir. 2009)). The district court is not entitled to 

deference. Healy v. Spencer, 453 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). 

Rather, in these cases, we must "determine whether the habeas 

petition should have been granted in the first instance." 

Sánchez, 753 F.3d at 293. 
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B. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Standards 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 ("AEDPA"), habeas relief 

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that 

was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-- 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States; or (2) resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Hodge v. Mendonsa, 739 F.3d 34, 41 (1st 

Cir. 2013); Zuluaga, 585 F.3d at 29. Only a legal or factual 

error that is objectively unreasonable warrants relief. Cooper 

v. Bergeron, 778 F.3d 294, 299 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing White v. 

Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014)). 

"An adjudication is on the merits[,] giving rise to 

deference under § 2254(d) of AEDPA, if there is a decision finally 

resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata effect, that is 

based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a 

procedural, or other, ground." Scott v. Gelb, 810 F.3d 94, 99 

(1st Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). "[A] state-court adjudication of an issue framed in 

terms of state law is nonetheless entitled to deference under 
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section 2254(d)(1) as long as the state and federal issues are for 

all practical purposes synonymous and the state standard is at 

least as protective of the defendant's rights." Id. (alteration 

in original) (quoting Foxworth v. St. Amand, 570 F.3d 414, 426 

(1st Cir. 2009)). 

"For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable 

application of federal law is different from an incorrect 

application of federal law." Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112, 122 

(1st Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)). "A state court's 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 

relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of [the state court's] decision." Id. at 122-23 

(alteration in the original) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). "The more general the rule, the more leeway 

courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations." 

Id. at 123 (quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664). "Thus, to obtain 

federal habeas relief, a petitioner must show 'the state court's 

ruling on the claim . . . was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing 

law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Id. 

(quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103). 

 
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C. Hyatt's Claims 

Hyatt alleges that the Appeals Court's decision was 

contrary to clearly established federal law because it did not 

identify or apply the correct federal standard as to when a 

defendant has a right to be present at a view. He points out that 

the applicable standard was announced in Snyder, 291 U.S. 97, where 

the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant's exclusion from 

a view of the crime scene was a denial of due process under the 

Fourteenth Amendment, but notes that the Appeals Court did not 

even mention it in its decision or cite any other federal authority 

in support of its conclusions and, instead, relied on "a long line 

of state court decisions." He also posits that "whether to exclude 

a defendant from a view must be determined in the light of the 

whole record," but the Appeals Court failed to do so.1

Hyatt is correct that the Appeals Court did not cite 

Snyder or other federal precedent directly. We note, however, 

that the precedent on which the Appeals Court relied did so. 

Hyatt, 2014 WL 2178782, at *1 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 438 

 

1 In the state courts and the district court Hyatt also claimed 

that Justice Brady's refusal to permit his attendance at the view 

undercut his presumption of innocence, as it is similar to 

appearing before the jury in prison garb or shackles. Because 

this argument was not meaningfully discussed in his brief as a 

ground for relief before this Court, and it would fall outside of 

the scope of the certificate of appealability, we limit our 

discussion accordingly. 
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Mass. 142, 150-51 (2002) (citing Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-08)). 

And, in any event, a state court need not cite or even be aware of 

Supreme Court cases to be entitled to deference under § 2254(d) 

"so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts them." See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 

3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). 

In this case, the Appeals Court held that a defendant 

does not have a right to be present for a view and that a 

defendant's absence does not offend his constitutional rights. 

The Appeals Court recognized that "the particular circumstances of 

a case may be such that events at a view may deny a defendant a 

fair proceeding and thereby deprive him of due process," but noted 

that a defendant making such a claim must show substantial harm 

and Hyatt failed to do so. 

In Snyder, the Court noted that while a defendant has a 

right to be present at trial, "a view is not a 'trial' nor any 

part of a trial in the sense in which a trial was understood at 

common law." Snyder, 291 U.S. at 113. It further stated that "in 

a prosecution for a felony the defendant has the privilege under 

the Fourteenth Amendment to be present in his own person whenever 

his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the 

fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." Id. 

at 105-06. The Supreme Court clarified that "[n]owhere in [its] 
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decisions . . . is there a dictum, and still less a ruling, that 

the Fourteenth Amendment assures the privilege of presence when 

presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow." Id. at 

106-07. Accordingly, "[s]o far as the Fourteenth Amendment is 

concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due 

process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be 

thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only."2 Id. at 107-

08. And "the justice or injustice" of excluding a defendant in a 

particular set of circumstances "must be determined in the light 

of the whole record." Id. at 115. The Supreme Court concluded 

in Snyder that the denial of the defendant's request to be present 

when the jury viewed the crime scene and the prosecutor and defense 

counsel pointed out to the jury specific things they wanted them 

to observe, did not constitute a denial of due process. Id. at 

122. 

Hyatt seems to interpret Snyder as the default being in 

favor of attendance unless a judge makes particularized findings 

based on the entire record justifying a defendant's absence from 

 

2 The Supreme Court noted that "fairness is a relative, not an 

absolute concept." Snyder, 291 U.S. at 116. "It is fairness with 

reference to particular conditions or particular results. 'The 

due process clause does not impose upon the States a duty to 

establish ideal systems for the administration of justice, with 

every modern improvement and with provision against every possible 

hardship that may befall.'" Id. at 116-17 (quoting Ownbey v. 

Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1921). 
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a view. The Appeals Court's interpretation of federal law, 

however, seems to be aligned with the district court's reading of 

Snyder as holding "that the default is that a defendant has no 

right to be at a view unless there are particular circumstances 

making such exclusion unfair." Hyatt, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 204 

(quoting Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996) 

("The lesson of Snyder is that, if in any given case the exclusion 

of the defendant from a jury view is found to be a deprivation of 

due process, it is not because the Constitution guarantees the 

defendant an absolute right to be present; it is only because his 

absence, under the particular circumstances of his case, can be 

said to have denied him a fair proceeding.")). It is unnecessary 

to determine which interpretation is more consistent with Snyder, 

as it suffices to say that the Appeals Court's decision did not 

contradict, nor was it an unreasonable application of, the Supreme 

Court's holding in Snyder. See Mendonsa, 739 F.3d at 41-43. We 

acknowledge that there might be a case where a defendant's absence 

from a view may deny the defendant "fair and just" proceedings 

and, thus, constitute a due process violation. See Snyder, 291 

U.S. at 105-08. We note, however, that Hyatt did not make any 

showing to the Appeals Court that, under the circumstances of his 

case, his exclusion from the view denied him of a fair and just 

proceeding or thwarted his opportunity to defend against the 
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charges he was facing. The record shows that, as in Snyder, 

counsel for both parties did not present any evidence during the 

view, but merely pointed out particular aspects at the scene to 

the jury. In addition, Hyatt and his counsel had the opportunity 

to review existing photographs, video, and maps related to the 

view prior to trial. At trial, his counsel cross-examined the 

Commonwealth's identification witnesses about their opportunity to 

view the shooter and their truthfulness. He presented testimony 

of three witnesses to demonstrate that he was not the shooter. 

Finally, in addition to the lack of substantial harm, Hyatt was on 

trial for "very serious charges," and Judge Brady noted there was 

a lack of sufficient security personnel available. 

In light of the above, we cannot conclude that the 

Appeal's Court ruling "was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Linton, 812 

F.3d at 123 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103). 

III. Conclusion 

The Appeals Court did not rule "contrary to" or 

unreasonably apply "clearly established Federal law." 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Hyatt's 

habeas corpus petition. 

Affirmed.