# United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 16-4053

___________________________ United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.
Jamie L. Ballard
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________ Submitted: September 18, 2017 Filed: October 5, 2017 [Published]

____________ Before COLLOTON, BENTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM.Jamie L. Ballard challenges the substantive reasonableness of the 121-month sentence the district court 1 imposed after she pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. We affirm.
After Ballard entered her guilty plea, the United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report that calculate d an advisory Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months in prison. At the senten cing hearing, Ballard sought a downward variance. She acknowledged that she had numerous prior misdemeanor convictions, but emphasized that her most recent convictions were for non-violent offenses and that she was addicted to drugs. She also pointed out that she had never served prison time, that the amount of methamphetamine she had possessed wa s only slightly above the threshold for a two-level increase to he r Guidelines offense level, that she had children, that she was attending school at th e time of her arrest, and that she had a history of consistent employment. The government noted, among other things, that Ballard had tested positive for methamphetami ne several times since her initial arrest, and that, as result, the magistrate j udge had revoked her pre-trial release.
The district court sentenced Ballard to 121 months in prison, followed by 3 years of supervised release. The court noted that Ballard—who was only 31 years old at the time she was sentenced—had no fewe r than 31 prior convictions, and reasoned that, although they were all misdemeanors, the convictions reflected a continued course of criminal conduct and a lack of e ffort on Ballard’s part to stop using drugs or to otherwise rehabilitate herself. The district c ourt referenced 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and explained that it was imposing a 121-m onth sentence “for punishment, deterrence and to serve the ends of justice, to affo rd adequate deterrence to criminal conduct by [Ballard], to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”

1 The Honorable Dean Whipple, United St ates District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
-2-On appeal, Ballard contends that her sentence is substantively unreasonable. In her view, the district c ourt failed to consider mitig ating factors that should have received considerable weight, and committe d a clear error in judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.

We review the substantive reasonablen ess of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, considering the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Feemster , 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (e n banc). “‘A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to c onsider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives signifi cant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgmen t.’” United States v. Jenkins , 758 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Feemster , 572 F.3d at 461).
We disagree with Ballard’s assertion thatthe district court failed to consider important mitigating factors. District c ourts “need not specifically respond to every argument made by the defendant or mechan ically recite each § 3553(a) factor.” United States v. Struzik , 572 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Ballard’s counsel clearly articulated seve ral mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing, and the sentencing record reflects that the district court considered those factors but gave them little weight relative to other § 3553(a) factors.

The district court also did not commit a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors. “The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Borromeo , 657 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011). Here, the district court did not clearly err by giving great weight to Ballard’s extensive history of criminal conduct, or by giving littleweight to her hist ory of drug addiction and the fact that her previous offe nses were all misdemeanors. See United States v. Farmer , 647 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A district court’s choice to assign

-3-relatively greater weight to the nature and circumstances of the offense than to the mitigating personal characteristics of the defe ndant is well within its wide latitude in weighing relevant factors.”). The distri ct court imposed a within-Guidelines-range sentence after considering the § 3553(a) factors, giving great weight to Ballard’s extensive history of relatively minor offenses, and considering—but finding unpersuasive—her arguments in favor of mitig ation. The district court did not fail to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, give significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fact or, or commit a clear error of judgment in considering the appropriate factors. SeeJenkins , 758 F.3d at 1050. Accordingly, we affirm.

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