alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31.1



CERTIFICATION

I, Marc T. Giles, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Gerber Scientific, Inc.;

2.   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.   The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)   Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)   Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c)   Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.   The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function(s)):

a)   All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b)   Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date:   September 9, 2004

| | /s/ Marc T. Giles                     | 
| | ------------------------------------- | 
| | Marc T. Giles
Chief Executive Officer |
IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 223

Relating to a question of the privileges of the House.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 22, 1993

Mr. GEPHARDT submitted the following resolution; which was considered and

agreed to

RESOLUTION

Relating to a question of the privileges of the House.

Whereas the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia on July 19, 1993, announced that the former

Postmaster of the House of Representatives was pleading

guilty to criminal counts of conspiracy and aiding and

abetting the embezzlement of public funds;
2

HRES 223 ATH

Whereas the operation of the House Post Office during the

tenure of the former Postmaster was the subject of a bipartisan Task Force to Investigate the Operation and

Management of the House Post Office of the Committee

on House Administration;

Whereas the former Task Force published a public report on

July 24, 1992, in which were included portions of transcripts of its proceedings;

Whereas the House on July 22, 1992, voted to provide both

the public report and all the records of the former Task

Force to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct

and to the Department of Justice, but declined to make

the transcripts of the former Task Force’s proceedings

public;

Whereas one of the reasons the House declined to make the

transcripts of proceedings of the former Task Force public at that time was a concern that such release not compromise an ongoing criminal proceeding conducted by the

United States Attorney for the District of Columbia; and

Whereas the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia on July 21, 1993, communicated to the Speaker

and the Republican Leader his strong objection to the

public release of the records of the former Task Force as

follows:
3

HRES 223 ATH
4

HRES 223 ATH

Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House that, when

2 the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia

3 at any time informs the House that he has no objection

4 to the public release of the transcripts of proceedings of

5 the former Task Force, then the House immediately shall

6 take up and bring to a vote the question of the release

7 of the transcripts of proceedings of the former Task

8 Force; and be it further

9 Resolved, That the Speaker is directed to commu10 nicate to the United States Attorney for the District of

11 Columbia the request of the House that he promptly ad12 vise the House when he determines that he has no objec13 tion to the public release of the transcripts of proceedings

14 of the former Task Force; and be it further

15 Resolved, That the Clerk is directed to transmit

16 promptly such communication of the Speaker and a

17 copy of this resolution to the United States Attorney for

18 the District of Columbia.

Æ
[No. 1134-1.

Division One—Panel 2.

February 28, 1972.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. James C. Ronny, *Appellant.*
#### Paul J. CRAWFORD et al., Appellants, v. Hughes JOHNSON and Hilda P. Johnson, Appellees.

No. 72-934.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 15, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

We are asked to certify to the Supreme Court as a question of great public interest the question whether “a municipality, in the process of enacting changes in a zoning ordinance,” may “maintain the ‘status quo’ by adopting resolutions declaring a moratorium prohibiting the issuance of building permits until the changed zoning ordinance becomes effective.” We decline to do so because in affirming the judgment of the trial court we did not answer the question involved in City of Boynton Beach v. Carroll, Fla.App.4th 1973, 272 So.2d 171. This case hinges on an entirely different question. The appellees in this case sought and obtained a variance from the zoning adjustment board. Thereafter the city had a clear right to seek review of that decision in the Circuit Court pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 176.16 (1971), F.S.A., and chose not to do so. It also chose not to obey the decision arrived at by the zoning adjustment board. It was therefore properly ordered by the trial court, in this man*405damus action, to issue the zoning permit. We affirmed the decision of the trial court because the city did not avail itself of the remedy provided by statute.

The suggestion to have the question certified to the Supreme Court is therefore denied.

MANN, C. J., and LILES and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Michael A. KONCIR, Jeanne Koncir and Marion Hutchens.

No. 63002.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 15, 1978.

In re: Michael A. Koncir, Jeanne Koncir and Marion Hutchens, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and for a stay order. Parish of Concordia.

Writ granted.

The petition of the relator in the above entitled and numbered case having been duly considered, It is ordered that a Writ of Certiorari issue herein, directing the Honorable Richard P. Boyd, Jr. Judge of the 7th Judicial District, Court for the Parish of Concordia, to transmit to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, on or before the 29th day of September, 1978, the record in duplicate, or a certified copy of the record in duplicate, of the proceedings complained of by the relator — herein, to the end that the validity of said proceedings may be ascertained. It is further ordered that the aforesaid Judge of said Court and the respondent through counsel shall show cause, in this court, on the day to be fixed by this court at 10 o’clock A.M., why the relief prayed for in the petition of the relator should not be granted.
# C_2023155EN.01001802.xml

| 2.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 155/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 155/18

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 2 March 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Hovrätten för Nedre Norrland — Sweden) — AI v Åklagarmyndigheten

(Case C-666/21, (1) Åklagarmyndigheten)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Road transport - Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 - Scope - Article 2(1)(a) - Article 3(h) - Notion of ‘carriage by road of goods’ - Notion of ‘maximum permissible mass’ - Vehicle fitted out as a temporary private living space and for the non-commercial loading of goods - Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 - Tachographs - Article 23(1) - Requirement for regular inspections by approved workshops)

(2023/C 155/21)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Hovrätten för Nedre Norrland

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: AI

Defendant: Åklagarmyndigheten

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014, read in conjunction with Article 3(h) of Regulation No 561/2006, as amended,

must be interpreted to the effect that the notion of ‘carriage by road of goods’, within the meaning of the first of those provisions, covers carriage by road by a vehicle whose maximum permissible mass, within the meaning of Article 4(m) of Regulation No 561/2006, as amended, exceeds 7,5 tonnes, including where it is fitted out not only as a temporary private living area but also for the non-commercial loading of goods, without that vehicle’s cargo capacity or the category in which it appears in the national road traffic register having any effect in that regard.

---

(1)  OJ C 24, 17.1.2022.

---
#### Benjamin SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-1114.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 28, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                         305,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               305,000
<PP&E>                                         450,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 705,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,060,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   (305,000)       
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                20,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,300,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (6,187,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (6,187,000)        
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (6,187,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.77)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.77)
        

</TABLE>
#### Willie Wise MAXWELL, Jr., Petitioner, v. Uriel BLOUNT, Jr., as Judge of the Felony Court of Record, Volusia County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 41372.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 5, 1972.

J. David McFadden, of Wagner & Ber-tone, Holly Hill, for petitioner.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

A writ of certiorari was issued in this case. After heaing oral argument and examining the record and the briefs, the Court is of the opinion that the writ of certiorari should be discharged on the authority of State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, Fla., 261 So.2d 172 opinion filed April 5, 1972.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C. J., and CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
# C_2020390EN.01004201.xml

| 16.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 390/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 390/42

---

Action brought on 29 September 2020 — Roller v EUIPO — Flex Equipos de Descanso (Dormillo)

(Case T-597/20)

(2020/C 390/60)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Roller GmbH & Co. KG (Gelsenkirchen, Germany) (represented by: W. Zürbig, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Flex Equipos de Descanso, SA (Getafe, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: International registration designating the European Union in respect of the word mark Dormillo — International registration designating the European Union No 1 407 881

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 June 2020 in Case R 2847/2019-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | reject the opposition of the opponent as far as protection of international registration No 1 407 881 is refused for the European Union for all the contested goods and services of classes 20, 24 and 35; |
| --- | --- |

—

reject the opposition of the opponent as far as protection of international registration No 1 407 881 is refused for the European Union for all the contested goods and services of classes 20, 24 and 35;

| — | grant protection for the contested international registration Dormillo No 1 407 881 for all contested designated goods and services for the territory of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

—

grant protection for the contested international registration Dormillo No 1 407 881 for all contested designated goods and services for the territory of the European Union;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 72(2) in conjunction with Article 8(1)b of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 72(2) in conjunction with Article 8(1)b of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### ADC Construction, LLC, Appellant, v Empire City Subway Co., Ltd., et al., Respondents.

[736 NYS2d 6]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane Solomon, J.), entered on or about June 20, 2001, which, in an action by plaintiff public works contractor against defendant utilities to recover money due for work performed under an interference agreement, granted defendants’ motion for a stay pending arbitration, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Defendants dispute the quality, necessity and “reasonableness” of plaintiffs performance under the interference agreement, and claim that plaintiffs demand for further payment is subject to a broad arbitration clause contained in plaintiffs contract with the City. Under addendum No. 5, section U of plaintiffs contract with the City, entitled “Additional Contract Requirements Applying to Work Performed in the Presence of Privately Owned Utility Facilities,” plaintiff was required to enter into interference agreements with certain utilities, which, if not promptly concluded, were to be arbitrated under a nar*230row clause contained in section U, paragraph 4. Under the broad clause now invoked by defendants contained in section U, paragraph 7, “any dispute between the [utility] Company(ies) and the Contractor regarding any issue related to the performance of, or payment for, interference work, including but not limited to, any indirect or impact costs incurred by the Contractor due to the Interference Work and/or to the existence of facilities owned or operated by the Company(ies) on the line of the work” was to be arbitrated in accordance with specified procedures designed to prevent delay contained in paragraph 8. Plaintiff argues that the dispute is not arbitrable because the interference agreement does not itself contain an arbitration clause. As the IAS court held, “[plaintiff] is simply wrong.” The interference agreement expressly states that it “arises out of’ plaintiffs contract with the City and is “made pursuant to” addendum No. 5, section U thereof, and its merger clause, on which plaintiff heavily relies, expressly excepts section U. Plaintiffs argument that the dispute is not arbitrable at least insofar as it involves oral agreements for interference work not listed in the interference agreement overlooks paragraph 5 of section U, which requires the contractor to take particular steps, designed to prevent delay and promote dispute resolution with the utility, “[i]f during construction the Contractor encounters an interference that it believes is not covered by the Interference Agreement.” It is clear that if the steps called for in paragraph 5 do not result in a settlement with the utility, the dispute is subject to arbitration under paragraph 7. We have considered and rejected plaintiffs other arguments. Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Rosenberger, Lerner, Rubin and Buckley, JJ.
# C_2008262EN.01S00301.xml

| 15.10.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 262/s3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.10.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 262/s3

---

NOTE TO THE READER

NOTE TO THE READER

The institutions have decided no longer to quote in their texts the last amendment to cited acts.

Unless otherwise indicated, references to acts in the texts published here are to the version of those acts currently in force.

---
|   | a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting. |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                                                                                   | /s/ Michael R. Elia                    |   |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Michael R. Elia Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer) |
# Aug 2022
<PAGE>

                                                              Exhibit 10.25

PSINET CORPORATE PERFORMANCE BONUS PLAN

The following represents a summary of the 1996 PSINet Corporate Performance
         Bonus Plan:

Amount: between 0 and 10% of gross PAID salary from July 1 through December 31,
         1996.

Eligibility: All PSINet Inc. US-based employees (not including Inside Sales,
         Outside Sales, Consumer Wholesale Sales or Corporate Technical
         Support--which have separate performance bonus plans or InterCon
         Systems Corporation employees)

Measurement:

    -  U.S. Revenue.

    -  Number of U.S. Corporate Customers.

    -  Number of U.S. Wholesale Consumer Customers.

    -  U.S. Retention Rate.

    -  Consolidated Cash, cash equivalents and short-term.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent

v. ANGELA C. WALDRON, Petitioner : : : : : : : : : : : No. 123 WAL 2015 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 15th day of July, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED
.
## NO. 12

- 15

- 00126

- CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

IN THE INTEREST OF T . W.,
C. W., JR., W. W., S. W. AND D. W.,

CHILDREN §

§

§ APPEAL FROM THE 392N D

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
HENDERSON COUNTY, TE XAS

MEMOR ANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM
On May 8, 2015, D.G.M. filed a pro se “Notice of Partial Appeal” complaining of the trial court’s order striking the intervenor ( D.G.M. ) and his pleadings without prejudice. On May 20, 2015, this court notified D.G.M., pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 37. 2 and
42.3
, that the information received in this appeal does not contain a final judgment or other appealable order. See Metromedia Long Distance, Inc. v. Hughes , 810 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Tex. App.

– San Antonio 1991, writ denied) (recognizing order dismissing or striking petition in intervention may not be appealed by intervenor before entry of final judgment). D.G.M. was further informed that the appeal would be dismissed if the information received in the appeal was

not amended on or before June 19, 2015, to show the jurisdiction of this court. The deadline for amendment has passed, and D.G.M. has not shown the jurisdiction of this court. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed
, as to D.G.M. only
, for want of jurisdiction

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 37. 2,
42.3. Opinion delivered July 8, 2015. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

( PUBLISH )

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JULY 8 , 2015

NO. 12

- 15

- 00126

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF T. W ., C. W., JR., W . W., S. W. AND D. W ., CHILDREN

Appeal from the 392nd District Court of Henderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. FAM 15

- 0010

- 392) THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record; and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that this court is without jurisdiction of the appea l as to D.G.M. only , and that the appeal should be dismissed.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this court that this appeal be, and the same is, hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction as to D.G.M. only ; and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.

By per curiam opinion

. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.
# all_lease12012018