alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### George Franklin VAUGHN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-564.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 16, 1971.

Rehearing Denied May 19, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### LEWIS and ROBERT WEST, appellants *vs.*ROBERT A. HOUSTON, respondent, plaintiff below.

Meney paid through ignorance or mistake of a *fact,*may be recovered back in the action of asssumpsit; but not where the party had full means of knowledge in his power.

Appeal from the judgment of a Justice of the Peace;'in an action of-assumpsit. Pleas, non-assumpsit, &c. Issues.

The defendants below, the Messrs. West, originally brought an action of assumpsit in this court, against the plaintiff below, R. A. Houston, for $90, and recovered $44,50. The costs in that case wore-$15,15 ; and there was no1 affidavit filed to enable the plaintiffs to recover costs under sec. 37, *Dig.*351. The costs were erroneously taxed by the prothonotary in making up the record, and'the defendant in that case paid them, supposing that the plaintiffs had filed an affidavit -under the -above section, which would entitle them to costs. This suit was brought to recover back the costs so paid,

*Houston,*for plaintiff below

*Cullen,*for defendants.

Cullen, for defendants,

moved a nonsuit, on the ground that money paid by a person under mistake of *law;*Or for want of noticing a *fact*within his knowledge or power, cannot be recovered back in this action. (2 *East. Rep.*468; 1 *Eng. C. L. Rep.*43; 1 *Dallas Rep.*147; 9 *Cowen*674; 1 *Esp. N. P. C.*84, 279; 2 *Ibid*546; 2 *Johns. Ch. R.*51, 60; 13 *Eng. C. L. R.*323-5, 293; 1 *Wend. R.*355; *Smith’s Leading Cases*174; 3 *Hall’s N. Y. Rep. 252*; 3 *Wend. Rep.*69, 72.)

*Houston,*contra,

said that the payment was made under a mistake of fact, and could be recovered back. Most of the cases cited, arose under mistake of law. (13 *Eng. C. L. R.*293; 1 *Leigh. N. P.*54.) The plaintiff in this case was misled bv the costs being taxed *as if an*affidavit had been filed. (1 *Steph.*N. *P.*347-8; 2 *East. Rep.*469.)

*The Court*

ordered a nonsuit. Where there is a payment in ignorance or mistake of a fact, it may be recovered back, unless the I mistake arises from the negligence of the party to examine and take notice of information within his full means of knowledge. Here the plaintiff was party to the very record of the judgment which he was paying, which record showed the fact he now alledges he was ignorant of.
# C_2021019EN.01006201.xml

| 18.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 19/62 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 19/62

---

Action brought on 11 November 2020 — Celler Lagravera v EUIPO — Cyclic Beer Farm (Cíclic)

(Case T-673/20)

(2021/C 19/66)

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Celler Lagravera, SLU (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: J.L. Rivas Zurdo, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Cyclic Beer Farm, SL (Barcelona, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for the European Union figurative mark ‘Cíclic’ — Application for registration No 17 948 980

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 August 2020 in Case R 465/2020-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision in so far as, by dismissing the appeal of Celler Lagravera, SLU, it confirms the Opposition Division’s decision No B 3 071 125 upholding the opposition against all the goods covered by EU trade mark No 17 948 980 ‘Cíclic’ (figurative) designating ‘wines’ in Class 33; and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision in so far as, by dismissing the appeal of Celler Lagravera, SLU, it confirms the Opposition Division’s decision No B 3 071 125 upholding the opposition against all the goods covered by EU trade mark No 17 948 980 ‘Cíclic’ (figurative) designating ‘wines’ in Class 33; and

| — | order the party or parties opposing this action to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the party or parties opposing this action to pay the costs.

Plea in law

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

NCLN20, INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

2012-5001 

______________________

 

 Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Case No. 02-CV-1282, Judge Susan G. Braden. 

______________________ 

JUDGMENT 

______________________ 

GEORGE ELLIOTT ELLIS, The Ellis Law Firm, of 

Brooklyn, New York, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

DOUGLAS K. MICKLE, Senior Trial Counsel, 

Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United 

States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued 

for defendant-appellee. With him on the brief were 

STUART F. DELERY, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and STEVEN J.

GILLINGHAM, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief 

was DIANNE FOOSE, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, 

United States Department of Homeland Security, of 

Washington, DC. 

______________________ 
THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

 PER CURIAM (BRYSON, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges). 

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36. 

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

November 7, 2012 /s/ Jan Horbaly 

 Date Jan Horbaly 

 Clerk
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 21-0456

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

NEIL LYNN NUNES,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time to 

produce transcripts on appeal, and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Court Reporter Julie Pesanti 

DeLong is granted an extension of time to and including November 21,

2022, within which to prepare, file, and serve the transcripts requested 

on appeal. 

The Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order upon the district court 

and the court reporter.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

October 20 2022

10/20/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0456
GLD-423 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-3451

___________

IN RE: EARL A. PONDEXTER,

Petitioner

____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(Related to W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-13-cv-00732)

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

September 12, 2013

Before: FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 18, 2013)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Earl A. Pondexter, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, petitions for a writ of 

mandamus which, liberally construed, seeks to compel District Judge Nora B. Fischer to 

recuse herself from the underlying District Court case. Pondexter’s petition also argues 
2

that the District Court wrongfully dismissed his complaint in the underlying action. See

W.D. Pa. 2:13-cv-00732.

1

Mandamus is a drastic remedy available in only the most extraordinary

circumstances. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). 

While mandamus is available to review a District Court’s refusal to recuse pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 455(a), see Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 

1993), Pondexter’s threat to name Judge Fischer as a defendant in his case does not 

provide the basis for her recusal. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 

2006). To require disqualification every time a litigant files suit against a judge would 

allow litigants to improperly “judge shop.” See In re Taylor, 417 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 

2005). As Pondexter has not shown any reason for Judge Fischer to recuse herself 

pursuant to § 455(a), he is not entitled to mandamus relief on that ground.

To the extent that Pondexter seeks to argue that the District Court wrongfully 

dismissed his complaint, Pondexter is separately seeking relief through the appellate 

process and is therefore not entitled to mandamus relief. See In re Baldwin, 700 F.3d 

122, 127 (3d Cir. 2012). 

For the reasons above, the mandamus petition will be denied. 

 

1

In his complaint, Pondexter requested that the District Court reinstate a previous 

lawsuit where the District Court granted summary judgment against Pondexter, which 

this Court affirmed on appeal. See C.A. 12-3954. The District Court dismissed 

Pondexter’s instant complaint and denied his motion for reconsideration. Pondexter has 

separately appealed from that ruling. See C.A. 13-3366.
EX-10.35.3





 Exhibit 10.35.3 

THIRD AMENDMENT TO MASTER REPURCHASE AGREEMENT 

Dated as of June 2, 2017 
 Between:

 LOANDEPOT.COM, LLC, as Seller 
 and 

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., as Buyer 
 The
Parties have agreed to amend (for the third time) the Master Repurchase Agreement dated June 3, 2016 between them (the “Original MRA”, as amended by the First Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated October 19, 2016
and the Second Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated February 28, 2017, the “Amended MRA” and as amended hereby and as further supplemented, amended or restated from time to time, the “MRA”), to extend
the latest Termination Date, and they hereby amend the Amended MRA as follows. 
 All capitalized terms used in the Amended MRA and used,
but not defined differently, in this amendment have the same meanings here as there. The sole Section of this Amendment is numbered as Section 2(a) to correspond to the number of the only Section of the Amended MRA amended hereby. 

2. Definitions; Interpretation 
 (a)
Definitions 
 A. The definition of “Termination Date” is amended to read as follows: 

“Termination Date” means the earliest of (i) the Business Day, if any, that Seller designates as the Termination Date by
written notice given to the Buyer at least thirty (30) days before such date, (ii) the Business Day, if any, that Buyer designates as the Termination Date by written notice given to the Seller at least sixty (60) days before such
date, (iii) the date of declaration of the Termination Date pursuant to Section 12(b)(i) and (iv) August 31, 2017. 

B. The following new definition is added to Section 2(a), in alphabetical order: 

“Third Amendment to MRA” means the Third Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated June 2, 2017 by and between the
Parties, amending this Agreement. 
 (The remainder of this page is intentionally blank; counterpart signature pages follow) 












 As amended hereby, the Amended MRA remains in full force and effect, and the Parties hereby
ratify and confirm it. 
  

			
	JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Carolyn Johnson

		 	Carolyn Johnson
		 	Authorized Officer
	
	LOANDEPOT.COM, LLC
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Mike Smith

		 	Mike Smith
		 	Chief Accounting Officer

 Counterpart signature page to Third Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement
<PAGE>



January 1, 1999


Ms. Valerie Looi
60A Jalan 19/3
46300 Petaling Jaya
Selangor


Dear Ms. Looi

REDESIGNATION OF EMPLOY

We are pleased to inform you that you have been redesignated as Vice President
of Corporate Affairs with effect from January 1, 1999.

Your basic salary for this position will be RM4,300.00 per month subject to
review by the Company from time to time.

Please indicate your acceptance by signing and returning the duplicate copy of
this letter to us.


Yours sincerely
ANIMATED ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES SDN BHD


 /s/ Patrick S.H. Lim


PATRICK S.H. LIM
Managing Director

                           Agreed and accepted by:



                             /s/ Valerie Looi
                           ................................
                           Name : Valerie Looi
                           Date :  Jan 1, 1999
#### Clinton W. Kinsella, Respondent, *v.*Traviss D. Lockwood, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

March, 1913.)

Negotiable instruments — consideration — bills, notes and checks.

A promissory note made payable only to the payee is non-negotiable and does not import a consideration.

An allegation that such note had been given for a valuable consideration is a mere legal conclusion and not of a fact.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment in favor of plaintiff overruling defendant’s demurrer to the complaint, interposed on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

McLear & McLear (Eobert E. McLear, of counsel), for appellant.

Eespondent filing no brief.

Bijur, J.

The complaint pleads a note drawn payable to the payee, but not to order or to bearer. Under section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law a note in that form is not negotiable. Fulton v. Varney, 117 App. Div. 572, 575. It therefore does not import consideration. Deyo v. Thompson, 53 App. Div. 10. While the complaint alleges that it had been given *“*for a valuable consideration,” such an allegation is merely a statement of a legal conclusion and not of a fact. Browning, King & Co. v. Terwilliger, 144 App. Div. 516, 519.

Judgment reversed and demurrer sustained, with leave, however, to plaintiff to plead over within six days, on payment of costs of the action to date and with costs of this appeal to appellant.

Seabuby and Geeaed, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed, and demurrer sustained, with leave to plaintiff to plead over on payment of costs, with costs of this appeal to appellant. •
1

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

ROSA SERRANO D/B/A THE LENS 

FACTORY,

 

 Appellant,

v.

CITY BANK AND OLD REPUBLIC 

NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

 Appellees.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-15-00044-CV

Appeal from the

County Court at Law No. 7

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 2015-DCV-1079)

O R D E R

Appellant filed an affidavit of indigence directly with the Court in the above-styled and 

numbered appeal, and Appellees responded by filing contests. The Court has determined that it 

is necessary to refer the contests on the affidavit of indigence to the trial court for the purpose of 

hearing evidence and granting relief. TEX.R.APP.P. 20.1(h)(4). 

It is therefore ordered that the trial court conduct a hearing on Appellees’ contests within 

ten days after the trial court receives this order as required by Rule 20.1(i)(2)(B), or within 

twenty days after the date of an order extending the time for a hearing as permitted by Rule 

20.1(i)(3). At the hearing, the burden will be on Appellant to prove the allegations contained 

within the affidavit of indigence. See TEX.R.APP.P. 20.1(g)(1). In the event the trial court does 

not conduct the hearing and rule upon the contest by the deadlines specified by Rule 20.1, the 
2

affidavit’s allegations will be deemed true, and Appellant will be allowed to proceed on appeal 

without advance payment of costs. TEX.R.APP.P. 20.1(i)(4). 

The trial judge shall forward its order on the contests to the District Clerk of El Paso 

County, Texas as soon as possible but no later than three days after the order is signed. The 

District Clerk shall prepare and forward a supplemental clerk’s record containing the order on 

the contests to this Court as soon as possible but no later than five days after the trial court files 

the order. Further, the trial court’s reporter shall prepare, certify, and file the record of the 

hearing on the contests with this Court as soon as possible but no later than five days after the 

hearing on the contests. In the event the trial court sustains the contests and Appellant appeals

that decision, the deadline for filing the reporter’s record as specified in Rule 20.1(j)(3) will be 

applicable. Further, Appellant must comply with the requirements of Rule 20.1(j) in order to 

challenge any adverse ruling. 

The appellate deadlines in this appeal shall be suspended pending resolution of 

Appellees’ contests to the affidavit of indigence. The Court will enter an order reestablishing the 

appellate deadlines after the indigence issue is resolved.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of May, 2016.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez and Hughes, JJ.

(Hughes, J., not participating)
EXHIBIT 32.2

Certification

I, Howard E. Ehler, certify that:

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of GeoResources, Inc. (the Company) for the period ended September 30,
2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Howard E. Ehler, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Howard E. EhlerHoward E. EhlerChief Financial OfficerNovember 12, 2008
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6486

VEOTIS HARDING,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

JOHN W. OWENS,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:13-hc-02212-BO)

Submitted: August 27, 2015 Decided: September 3, 2015

Before WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Veotis Harding, Appellant Pro Se. Seth Morgan Wood, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Veotis Harding seeks to appeal the district court’s order 

construing his “motion of actual innocence” as one under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), and docketing it within his criminal case. 

The motion is proceeding in Harding’s criminal docket.* This 

court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral 

orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. 

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). The 

order Harding seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an 

appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

 * Although the clerk’s order accompanying the district 

court’s order states that “respondent’s motion to dismiss is 

granted and this action is hereby dismissed,” the motion is 

proceeding under Harding’s criminal docket. Thus, the clerk’s 

order is erroneous.
EXHIBIT 32
 
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 (2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the
dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.
 Date:  April 28, 2010
    /s/ Jeffrey S. GormanJeffrey S. GormanPresident and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)/s/ Wayne L. KnabelWayne L. KnabelChief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                           UT
<CIK> 0000040779
<NAME> GPU, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                     1,000
<CURRENCY>                                  US DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                    7,488,943
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                  2,083,627
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                       1,058,431
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                     2,203,008
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,834,009
<COMMON>                                       331,958
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                    1,007,885
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                          2,259,753    <F1>
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>               3,519,270    <F2>
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          421,500    <F3>
<PREFERRED>                                     66,478
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                         4,064,192
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                             299,618
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                       0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                  411,140
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                       12,500
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                      3,145
<LEASES-CURRENT>                               131,276
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>               3,904,890
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>               12,834,009
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                    1,043,109
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                            66,293
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     783,475
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     849,768
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                        193,341
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                              43,102
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                 236,443
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                       102,162    <F4>
<NET-INCOME>                                   133,780    <F5>
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                          0
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                  133,780
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        60,414
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                      274,479
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                         214,381
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.07
<FN>
<F1> INCLUDES ACCUMULATED OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME/(LOSS) OF
<F1> ($14,733).
<F2> INCLUDES REACQUIRED COMMON STOCK OF $80,326.
<F3> INCLUDES SUBSIDIARY-OBLIGATED MANDATORILY REDEEMABLE PREFERRED
<F3> SECURITIES OF $330,000.
<F4> INCLUDES DIVIDENDS ON SUBSIDIARY-OBLIGATED MANDATORILY REDEEMABLE
<F4> PREFERRED SECURITIES OF $7,222 AND PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS OF
<F4> SUBSIDIARIES OF $2,975.
<F5> INCLUDES MINORITY INTEREST NET (INCOME)/LOSS OF ($501).
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### BURR’S CASE.

Free negroes being in this State prior to the act of 1851, arc not subject to its penalties, though non-residents.

In the matter of the application of William Burr, negro. Habeas corpus to the jailer of Sussex county.

The prisoner was committed by Justice Morris, for non-payment of a fine of $50, imposed on him, on the information of George Harris, charging him, the said William Burr, free negro, with being a non-resident and being in the State of Delaware, contrary to the statute, &c.

*Layton,*for petitioner.

*Houston*and *Robinson,*contra.

*The Court*

discharged the petitioner, on proof that he did not come into the State *after*the passing of the act of 1851; and could not, therefore, be subject to its penalties.

The act must receive a strict, and not an enlarged construction beyond its terms, which are highly penal.

Petitioner discharged.