alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 10.68


                               THIRD AMENDMENT TO
                               ------------------
                AMENDED AND RESTATED 1997 SHARE COMPENSATION PLAN
                -------------------------------------------------

     This  Third  Amendment  to the Amended and Restated 1997 Share Compensation
Plan  (this  "Amendment") is executed by Triton Energy Limited, a Cayman Islands
company  ("Triton"),  effective  as  of  May  16,  2001.

                                R E C I T A L S:
                                ---------------

     A.     Triton  has adopted the Amended and Restated 1997 Share Compensation
Plan  (the  "Plan")  effective  as  of  December  2,  1998;  and

     B.     In accordance with the terms of the Plan, the Board of Directors has
adopted  certain  amendments  to  the  Plan.

     NOW,  THEREFORE,  in  accordance  with  the  terms of the Plan, the Plan is
amended  in  the  following  respects:

     1.     Section 5.7(a) of the Plan is hereby amended by adding the following
sentence  to  the  end  of  such  Section:

     "Notwithstanding  anything  in the foregoing, or any other provision of the
Plan,  to  the  contrary, from and after May 16, 2001, there shall be no further
grants  of  Stock  Options  under  this  Section  5.7."


     2.     Except  as  amended  by  the provisions of this Amendment, all other
provisions  of  the  Plan  remain  in  full  force  and  effect.

     IN  WITNESS WHEREOF, Triton has caused this Amendment to be executed by its
duly  authorized  officer effective as of the date and year first above written.

                                           TRITON  ENERGY  LIMITED



                                           By:_________________________________
                                              James C. Musselman, President and
                                              Chief Executive Officer
# C_2021019EN.01005601.xml

| 18.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 19/56 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 19/56

---

Action brought on 15 October 2020 — OG v EDA

(Case T-632/20)

(2021/C 19/60)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: OG (represented by: S. Pappas and N. Kyriazopoulou, lawyers)

Defendant: European Defence Agency (EDA)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the decision of the European Defence Agency of 13 December 2019, by which the applicant had not been placed on the reserve list of suitable candidates; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of the European Defence Agency of 13 December 2019, by which the applicant had not been placed on the reserve list of suitable candidates;

| — | annul the decision of the Chief Executive of EDA by which the complaint of the applicant against the EDA decision of 13 December 2019 was rejected, to the extent it offers an additional reasoning; and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of the Chief Executive of EDA by which the complaint of the applicant against the EDA decision of 13 December 2019 was rejected, to the extent it offers an additional reasoning; and

| — | order compensation in the amount of EUR 3 000 (three thousand euros) for the non-material damage suffered by the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

order compensation in the amount of EUR 3 000 (three thousand euros) for the non-material damage suffered by the applicant;

| — | order the defendant to bear its costs as well as the applicant’s costs for the current proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to bear its costs as well as the applicant’s costs for the current proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging infringement of the essential procedural requirement to state reasons. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the essential procedural requirement to state reasons.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of equal treatment, transparency, objectivity and sound administration. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of equal treatment, transparency, objectivity and sound administration.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the vacancy notice, illegal or insufficient reasoning and manifest error of assessment vitiating the assessment of the qualifications of the applicant in respect of the post to be filled. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the vacancy notice, illegal or insufficient reasoning and manifest error of assessment vitiating the assessment of the qualifications of the applicant in respect of the post to be filled.

---
# C_2021009EN.01002801.xml

| 11.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 9/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 9/28

---

Action brought on 5 November 2020 — Muratbey Gida v EUIPO — M. J. Dairies (Triple helicoid cheese)

(Case T-662/20)

(2021/C 9/40)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Muratbey Gida Sanayí Ve Tícaret AŞ (Istanbul, Turkey) (represented by: M. Schork, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: M. J. Dairies EOOD (Sofia, Bulgaria)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the design at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Design at issue: International registration designating the European Union in respect of the design No DM/080641-0002 (Triple helicoid cheese in colour yellow)

Contested decision: Decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 August 2020 in Case R 1925/2019-3

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision and dismiss the application of the other party before the Board of Appeal for a declaration of invalidity in respect of the contested international registration No DM/080641-0002 designating the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision and dismiss the application of the other party before the Board of Appeal for a declaration of invalidity in respect of the contested international registration No DM/080641-0002 designating the European Union;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.

---
# C_2020087EN.01002801.xml

| 16.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 87/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 87/28

---

Action brought on 3 February 2020 — Bezos Family Foundation v EUIPO — SNCF Mobilités (VROOM)

(Case T-56/20)

(2020/C 87/34)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Bezos Family Foundation (Seattle, Washington, United States) (represented by: A. Klett and M. Schaffner, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: SNCF Mobilités, établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial (Saint-Denis, France)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark VROOM — Application for registration No 17 569 997

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 November 2019 in Case R 1288/2019-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | reject the opposition No B 3 051 050; |
| --- | --- |

—

reject the opposition No B 3 051 050;

| — | authorize the registration of the European Union trade mark application ‘VROOM’ No 17 569 997; |
| --- | --- |

—

authorize the registration of the European Union trade mark application ‘VROOM’ No 17 569 997;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and before the EUIPO (Board of Appeal and Opposition Division) including the necessary expenses of the applicant in those proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and before the EUIPO (Board of Appeal and Opposition Division) including the necessary expenses of the applicant in those proceedings.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Christopher Ellison, Appellant.

[656 NYS2d 900]

Appeal by the defendant, as limited by his motion, from a sentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Demarest, J.), imposed May 24, 1995, on the ground that the sentence is excessive.

Ordered that the sentence is affirmed.

The defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal on the ground that the sentence was excessive cannot be deemed knowing, voluntary, and intelligent *(see, People v Rolon,*220 AD2d 543). We have considered the defendant’s contention that the sentence was excessive, and find it to be without merit *(see, People v Kazepis,*101 AD2d 816). Mangano, P. J., Bracken, Copertino, Sullivan and McGinity, JJ., concur.
#### WESTWARD HO! RESTAURANTS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Jo-Ann SKIJUS, Executrix of the Estate of John Skijus, Deceased, Appellee.

No. 70-526.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 7, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-14-00210-CV 

________________________

IN RE WILLIAM WALTER YOUNGSTROM, RELATOR 

 

Original Proceeding Arising from the 355th District Court 

Hood County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 12355; Honorable Ralph H. Walton, Jr., Presiding 

 

June 16, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

Relator, William Walter Youngstrom, proceeding pro se, files this mandamus 

proceeding complaining of Matthew A. Mills, his court-appointed appellate attorney in 

Youngstrom v. State, Cause Number 07-13-00385-CR. He alleges Mills refused to 

raise certain issues in his direct appeal which denied him effective assistance of 

counsel.1 We dismiss this proceeding for want of jurisdiction.

 

1

This Court delivered its opinion and judgment affirming Relator’s conviction for delivery of a 

controlled substance on June 9, 2014. See Youngstrom v. State, No. 07-13-00385-CR, 2014 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 6215, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 9, 2014, no pet. h.).
2

This Court has the authority to issue a writ of mandamus necessary to enforce 

our jurisdiction, consistent with the principles of law regulating such a writ, against a 

judge of a district or county court in our district. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. ' 22.221(a), (b) 

(West 2004). An attorney representing an appellant on direct appeal is not within our 

jurisdictional reach. Furthermore, Relator has not demonstrated that issuance of a writ 

of mandamus is necessary to enforce our jurisdiction. In re Coronado, 980 S.W.2d 691, 

692-93 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Consequently, we have no authority to 

issue a writ of mandamus against Matthew A. Mills.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed for want of 

jurisdiction.

Patrick A. Pirtle

 Justice
#### Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, Appellant, *v.*John William Johnston, III, Appellee.

Argued March 6, 1975,

before Judges Crumlish, Jr., Kramer and Rogers, sitting as a panel of three.

*497
      *John L. Heaton,*Assistant Attorney General, with him *Anthony J. Maiorana,*Assistant Attorney General, *Robert W. Cunliffe,*Deputy Attorney General, and *Israel Packet,*Attorney General, for appellant.

*John W. Johnston, III,*appellee, for himself.

April 14, 1975:

Opinion by

Judge Crumlish, Jr.,

This is an appeal by the Department of Transportation from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County sustaining an appeal by John William Johnston, III (Appellee) from a thirty (30) day suspension of his operator’s license under section 618(b)(2) of The Vehicle Code, Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, *as amended,*75 P.S. §618 (b)(2). The suspension resulted from his conviction for speeding 79 miles per hour in a 65 miles per hour zone on Interstate 79 on June 3, 1972 in violation of section 1002(b) (8), 75 P.S. §1002 (b) (8).

In rescinding the suspension, the lower court relied solely upon its prior decision in *Commonwealth v. Walker*(No. SA 530 of 1973), which held that a suspected speeder must be tracked on radar for a distance of at least one-quarter mile, as required of conventional speedometer clockings under section 1002 (d) (1), 75 P.S. §1002 (d)(1), before his license can be suspended for a violation of section 1002(b)(8). *Walker*is presently on appeal to this Court. We need not reach that issue here, however, as Appellee did not challenge the validity of his arrest or conviction on this basis in the court below. He, in fact, admitted in open court to his violation of section 1002 (b) (8). Given these circumstances, the lower court erred as a matter of law in sustaining his appeal.

*498Order

And Now, this 14th day of April, 1975, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is reversed, and the Department of Transportation is directed to reimpose a thirty (30) day suspension of the operator’s license of John William Johnston, III, within thirty (30) days of this Order.
No. 10722.

#### Griffis *v.*The Eaton Telephone Co.

Decided November 10, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Preble county.

*Mr. A. R. Griffis,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Gilmore, Gilmore &*Saylor, for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Shauck, Crew and Spear, JJ., concur.
# C_2020191EN.01003802.xml

| 8.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 191/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 191/38

---

Action brought on 9 April 2020 — JH v Europol

(Case T-208/20)

(2020/C 191/52)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: JH (represented by: M. Quaas, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare that the order adopted on 2 April 2019 by the defendant’s head official discharging the applicant with immediate effect from leadership of the organisational unit GDPT (Personal Protection) of the Governance Directorate of the European Police Office (Europol) was unlawful; and |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that the order adopted on 2 April 2019 by the defendant’s head official discharging the applicant with immediate effect from leadership of the organisational unit GDPT (Personal Protection) of the Governance Directorate of the European Police Office (Europol) was unlawful; and

| — | order the defendant to pay the applicant such compensation as the Court may deem appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the applicant such compensation as the Court may deem appropriate.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The action is based on the following pleas in law:

| 1. | Infringement of the Europol Staff Regulations
  The applicant claims that the preconditions for the contested disciplinary measure under the Europol Staff Regulations have not been met. The defendant has disregarded the applicable provisions of the Staff Regulations and attempts to justify the adopted disciplinary measure (only) months later through a retroactive redeployment order and by reference to a reorganisation. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Infringement of the Europol Staff Regulations

The applicant claims that the preconditions for the contested disciplinary measure under the Europol Staff Regulations have not been met. The defendant has disregarded the applicable provisions of the Staff Regulations and attempts to justify the adopted disciplinary measure (only) months later through a retroactive redeployment order and by reference to a reorganisation.

| 2. | Injury to health and incapacity for work
  Furthermore, the applicant seeks compensation because his health has demonstrably been harmed as a result of the unlawful measure and his further professional activity has therefore become impossible. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Injury to health and incapacity for work

Furthermore, the applicant seeks compensation because his health has demonstrably been harmed as a result of the unlawful measure and his further professional activity has therefore become impossible.

---
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

-- -- -- --

NO. 18-1194

SM ARCHITECTS, PLLC AND

ROGER STEPHENS

v.

AMX VETERAN SPECIALTY

SERVICES, LLC

§

§

§

§

§

§

Dallas County,

5th District.

October 4, 2019

Petitioner's petition for review, filed herein in the above numbered and styled case,

having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denied.

January 17, 2020

Petitioner's motion for rehearing of petition for review, filed herein in the above

numbered and styled case, having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denied.



I, BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas, do hereby certify

that the above is a true and correct copy of the orders of the Supreme Court of Texas in the case

numbered and styled as above, as the same appear of record in the minutes of said Court under

the date shown.

It is further ordered that petitioner, SM ARCHITECTS, PLLC AND ROGER

STEPHENS, pay all costs incurred on this petition.

WITNESS my hand and seal of the Supreme Court of Texas, at the City of Austin, this

the 21st day of January, 2020.

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

By Monica Zamarripa, Deputy Clerk

FILE COPY
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# FI LED JU N 06 2011 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS09- 73002 2 § 1 2 5 2 . W e r e v ie w d e n o v o q u e s tio n s o f law , Ca z a r ez - G u tie rr ezv . A s h c r o ft , 382 F . 3 d9 0 5 , 9 0 9 ( 9 th C i r . 2 0 0 4 ) , a n dwe d e n yth e p e t i t i o n f o rr e v i e w. T he I Jpr ope r l yc onc l ude d tha tP a z ar i n- C a s tr e j on’ s c onvi c t i on f

orvi ol a t i ng Ca l i f o rn i aH e a l th a n dSa f

e tyCo d e § 1 1 3 7 8 i s a n a g g r a v a t e df e l o n yu n d e r8 U . S. C. § 1 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 3 ) ( B ) . See R endo n v. Mukasey , 520 F . 3d 967, 976 ( 9th C i r . 2008) (“ [P ] o ssessi o n o f a co n tro l l edsub st an ce w i th th e i n t en tt o sel l co n t ai n s a tr a f f ic k in g e le m e n t an dis a n a g g r a v a te df e lo n y .” ) ; se e al

so U ni ted States v. V al le -Montalbo , 47 4 F . 3d 11 97 , 12 01 (9th C i r. 20 07 ) ( se ct i on 11 37 8 cri m i nal i ze s o n lyp o s s e s s io n o f

ac o n tr o lle ds ub s tan c e w ith th e in te n t to s e ll) . P E T I T I ON F OR RE V I E W DE NI E D.
EXHIBIT 12.1

                        SARBANES-OXLEY CEO CERTIFICATION

I, R. Andrew Kingston, Chief Executive Officer of DynaMotive Energy Systems
Corporation, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 20-F of DynaMotive Energy
Systems Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The Registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:

   (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
   disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
   to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant, including
   its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
   entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
   prepared;

   (b)Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant's disclosure controls and
   procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
   effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
   the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

   (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant's internal
   control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered
   by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely
   to materially affect, the Registrant's internal control over financial
   reporting; and

5. The Registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of the internal control over financial
reporting, to the Registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
Registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

   (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
   operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
   reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant's ability to record,
   process, summarize and report financial information; and

   (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
   employees who have a significant role in the Registrant's internal control
   over financial reporting.

Date:   June 28, 2006


/s/ R. Andrew Kingston
-------------------------------
By: R. Andrew Kingston
Title: Chief Executive Officer