alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2022472EN.01001501.xml

| 12.12.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 472/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.12.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 472/15

---

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 20 October 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Varhoven administrativen sad — Bulgaria) — Komisia za zashtita na lichnite danni, Tsentralna izbiratelna komisia v Koalitsia ‘Demokratichna Bulgaria — Obedinenie’

(Case C-306/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Protection of personal data - Regulation (EU) 2016/679 - Scope - Article 2(2)(a) - Meaning of ‘activity which falls outside the scope of Union law’ - National and European Elections - Article 6(1)(e) - Lawfulness of processing - Article 58 - Act adopted by the supervisory authorities limiting, or where appropriate, prohibiting the video recording of the determination of the election results at electoral premises)

(2022/C 472/17)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Varhoven administrativen sad

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Komisia za zashtita na lichnite danni, Tsentralna izbiratelna komisia

Defendant: Koalitsia ‘Demokratichna Bulgaria — Obedinenie’

Operative part of the judgment

| 1. | Article 2(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
  must be interpreted as meaning that the processing of personal data in the context of the organisation of elections in a Member State is not excluded from the scope of that regulation. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Article 2(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),

must be interpreted as meaning that the processing of personal data in the context of the organisation of elections in a Member State is not excluded from the scope of that regulation.

| 2. | Article 6(1)(e) and Article 58 of Regulation 2016/679,
  must be interpreted as meaning that those provisions do not preclude the competent authorities of a Member State from adopting an administrative act of general application which provides for the limitation or, where appropriate, the prohibition of the video recording of the determination of the electoral results in polling stations during elections in that Member State. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Article 6(1)(e) and Article 58 of Regulation 2016/679,

must be interpreted as meaning that those provisions do not preclude the competent authorities of a Member State from adopting an administrative act of general application which provides for the limitation or, where appropriate, the prohibition of the video recording of the determination of the electoral results in polling stations during elections in that Member State.

---

(1)  OJ C 329, 16.8.2021.

---
# C_2021182EN.01003401.xml

| 10.5.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 182/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.5.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/34

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 22 February 2021 — Deutsche Lufthansa AG v ZR

(Case C-107/21)

(2021/C 182/48)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

Defendant: ZR

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees that is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).

---
IV

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 572

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relating to the

eradication of slavery where it exists throughout the world.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 6, 1994

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts submitted the following resolution; which was

referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relating to the eradication of slavery where it exists throughout the world.

Whereas credible groups concerned with human rights have

documented the existence of slavery in many countries in

the world;

Whereas the enslavement of one human being by another is

a denial of the humanity of the individual who is

enslaved; and

Whereas the practice of slavery is often justified by those

scourges of civilized people—racial and religious prejudice: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that—
2

•HRES 572 IH

1 (1) the Secretary of State should include a full

2 report on slavery where it exists throughout the

3 world in the annual human rights report of the Sec4 retary of State;

5 (2) the United States Government should work

6 with regional organizations such as the Organization

7 of American States, the Organization of African

8 Unity, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,

9 and the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as with

10 appropriate United Nations organizations, to draw

11 up a multinational plan to put an end to slavery

12 where it exists throughout the world; and

13 (3) the eradication of slavery should be an im14 portant goal of the United States Government in all

15 of its activities.

Æ
#### Claude R. KIRK, Jr., et al., Petitioners, v. Anton L. HEEB, Jr., et al., Respondents.

No. 40874.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 12, 1971.

Certiorari denied. 243 So.2d 445.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.

BOYD, J., dissents.
#### Duncan vs. Bateman.

A man who sells lumber for building a house is not entitled to the lien provided for in the statute *(Gould's Dig., ch.*112, *sec.*1;) though it is the privilege of a mechanic or builder to include in his lien the price for materials furnished.

*Error to Jefferson Cvremt Court.*

I-Ion. John O. Murray, Circuit Judge.

Gallagher, for the plaintiff.

Garland & Bandolph and Yell, contra.

Mr. Justice Fairchild

delivered the opinion of .the court.

“All artisans, builders and mechanics of every description, who shall perform any work and labor on any building, edifice, or tenement, . ' . shall have an absolute lien on such building, edifice, or tenement, for such work and labor, as well as *328for materials furnished by them, in and about such work and labor,” *Gould’s Dig., ch.*112, *sec.*1.

The question is presented whether a man who sells lumber for building a house is entitled to the lien provided for in the foregoing statute.

A lumber man is not an artisan, a builder, or a mechanic, and to no other does the statute extend a lien upon a building. That a mechanic or builder may include in his lien the price for materials furnished for the building is his privilege, but that is no reason why one who furnishes materials without doing any work should have a lien. A man who sells lumber for a house has no lien upon it any more than a merchant who sells nails to be used in the building, and neither has a lien,.because the statute does not give it to him; while the builder or mechanic has a lien for the same, or any other articles he may furnish for his labor performed upon the house, because the statute does give him such lien. We apply such law as exists, and cannot extend a statute restricted in terms to a particular class of persons, to a man not in that class.

The Circuit Court gave an opposite construction to the statute allowing to Bateman the benefit of the lien, and therefore its judgment must be reversed.

A remark upon this statute, in *Brown vs. Sullivan, 5 Ark.*220, if considered without a reference to the statute, might induce the belief that the lien would operate for those who furnish materials for building under contract with the owner of the ground, but that was not the point under consideration, and if it had been decided so as to include Bateman’s account, the decision would have been wrong.

Other questions are made upon pleadings by Duncan, but it is useless to notice them, for the matter decided was raised and settled on the trial of the case, in such a way as to require our review of Bateman’s action. And it being held that Bateman had no lien under the statute, other errors that may have been committed against Duncan need not be noticed. *Hicks vs. Branton,*21 *Ark.*192.
Exhibit 23.1




                        Consent of Independent Auditors




The Board of Directors and Stockholders
Parallel Petroleum Corporation:


We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements
(No. 33-46959, No. 33-57348 and No. 333-34617) on Forms S-8, and the
registration statements ( No. 33-90296 and No. 333-11021) on Forms S-3, of
Parallel Petroleum Corporation of our report dated February 3, 1998, relating
to the balance sheets of Parallel Petroleum Corporation as of December 31,
1997 and 1996, and the related statements of income, stockholders' equity,
and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December
31, 1997, which appears in the December 31, 1997 annual report on Form 10-K
of Parallel Petroleum Corporation.



                                   /s/  KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP


Midland, Texas
March 23, 1998
# Official Journal C 88A/8 Ma

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 88A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 618 March 2018 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 88A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 618 March 2018

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | V   Announcements |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) |
| 2018/C 88 A/01 | Notice of open competition — EPSO/AD/356/18 — Administrators (AD 5) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO)

2018/C 88 A/01

Notice of open competition — EPSO/AD/356/18 — Administrators (AD 5)

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 98-50005

Summary Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DURENCESS MARSHALL,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court,

for the Western District of Texas

(USDC No. W-97-CR-54-1)

_________________________________________________________________

October 20, 1998

Before KING, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Durencess Donnell Marshall appeals his convictions concerning

cocaine base: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute;

distribution; and aiding and abetting distribution.

Marshall challenges the admission at trial of testimony of the

conviction of coconspirator Lo Ford. Not raised at trial, this

issue is considered only for plain error. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b);

United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
2

banc). In reviewing introduction of a coconspirator’s guilty plea,

we consider (1) whether there was any limiting instruction; (2) the

purpose of the plea’s introduction; (3) whether the plea was used

as substantive evidence of guilt; and (4) whether introduction of

the plea was invited. United States v. Samak, 7 F.3d 1196, 1198

(5th Cir. 1993). Ford’s conviction was introduced to rebut defense

claims of preferential treatment for witnesses, not to show

Marshall’s guilt. Defense counsel repeatedly discussed

coconspirators’ criminal records. Accordingly, we find no plain

error.

Next, Marshall contests the drug quantities attributed to him,

claiming inconsistencies between witnesses. We review this issue

for clear error, see United States v. Young, 981 F.2d 180, 185 (5th

Cir. 1992). Even the most conservative reports of drug quantities

bought and sold by Marshall each week, considered in light of how

long Marshall dealt them, produce an amount far more than the 1.5

kilograms necessary for an offense level of 38. See U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1(c)(1). No clear error exists.

Finally, Marshall disputes the enhancement for his role as

manager or supervisor in the conspiracy. We also review this issue

for clear error, see United States v. Musquiz, 45 F.3d 927, 932-33

(5th Cir. 1995). The record shows more than five participants in

the conspiracy (for instance, the cooperating drug dealers).

Marshall concedes supervising Remy Phillips, enough for

enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), application note 2
(“supervisor of one or more other participants”). Again, no clear

error exists.

AFFIRMED
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 128 (Tuesday, July 3, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 31158]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-14215]



[[Page 31158]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


Center for Scientific Review; Amended Notice of Meeting

    Notice is hereby given of a change in the meeting of the Center for 
Scientific Review Special Emphasis Panel, July 19, 2018, 08:00 a.m. to 
July 20, 2018, 06:00 p.m., National Institutes of Health, 6701 
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD, 20892 which was published in the Federal 
Register on June 26, 2018, 83 FR Pg 29803.
    This meeting was changed from a 2-day meeting to a 1-day meeting. 
The meeting is now July 19, 2018 from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The 
meeting is closed to the public.

    Dated: June 27, 2018.
Natasha M. Copeland,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2018-14215 Filed 7-2-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
July 23, 2015

In accordance with the enclosed Memorandum Opinion, below is the judgment in the numbered cause set out herein to be entered in the Minutes of this Court as of the 23rd day of July, 2015.

10-14-00030-CR	DARRYL DEWAYNE WILLIAMS v. THE STATE OF TEXAS - ON APPEAL FROM THE 19TH DISTRICT COURT OF McLENNAN COUNTY - TRIAL COURT NO. 2012-750-C1 – AFFIRMED - Memorandum Opinion by Justice Scoggins:

	“This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Court below, and the same being considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that there was no error in the judgment, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the judgment be in all things affirmed, and that the appellant pay all costs in this behalf expended and that this decision be certified below for observance.”

# image1.png
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ricardo ESCOBAR v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 53844.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 21, 1973.

In re: Ricardo Escobar applying for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus.

Application not considered. The return of the clerk of the trial court of September 5, 1973 shows that there is no record that the application was filed in the trial court. This Court will not consider a post-conviction application or contentions raised for the first time in this Court.
<PAGE>   1

EXHIBIT 11 - STATEMENTS RE:  COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS


                           COMMUNITY BANCSHARES, INC.
                   COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE

The following tabulation presents the calculation of primary and fully diluted
earnings per common share for the years ended December 31, 1995, 1994 and 1993.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                            1995         1994         1993    
                                                                       ------------  -----------  ------------
                                            
<S>                                                                    <C>           <C>           <C>
Reported net income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    $  2,704,798  $  2,687,954  $  2,572,366

Dividend requirements on 8% cumulative preferred stock (1)  . . . .             -0-           -0-        65,008
                                                                       ------------  ------------  ------------

Earnings on common shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    $  2,704,798  $  2,687,954  $  2,507,358
                                                                       ============  ============  ============

Weighted average common shares outstanding  . . . . . . . . . . . .       1,681,892     1,681,892     1,290,290
                                                                       ============  ============  ============

Earnings per common share - primary and fully diluted
  Income from continuing operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    $       1.62  $       1.60  $       1.94
                                                                       ============  ============  ============

  Net income  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    $       1.62  $       1.60  $       1.94
                                                                       ============  ============  ============
</TABLE>


(1) The dividend requirements on the 8% cumulative preferred Stock were
    computed at the annual rate of 8% on the stated value of the preferred
    stock for the actual number of days outstanding for the period.
#### Rachel MECHLOWITZ, Appellant, v. LITTLE RIVER BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 66-992.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Oct. 3, 1967.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 24, 2015

d1116 

# Order

Clerk November 24, 2015

150936(44)(46)(51)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 150936

COA: 317206

Kent CC: 12

- 009542

- FH

CHRISTOPHER LEE JOHNSON,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s June 12, 2015

order is considered, and it is DENIED, becaus e it does not appear that the order was

entered erroneously. The motion to add issue and motion for bond pending appeal are

DENIED.
# United States Court of Appeals **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________
October 5, 2012

ERRATA

______________________

Appeal No. 2012-3110

STEPHEN W. GINGERY,

v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Decided: October 5, 2012

______________________

This opinion is nonprecedential. Please add the following to the top of the first page of the opinion:

N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential.
EXHIBIT 12.1

                       SARBANES-OXLEY CEO CERTIFICATION

I, R. Andrew Kingston, Chief Executive Officer of DynaMotive Energy Systems
Corporation, certify that:

1.     I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 20-F of DynaMotive Energy
Systems Corporation;

2.     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this report;

3.     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The Registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:

       (a)   Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
        disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
        supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
        Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to
        us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
        which this report is being prepared;

       (b)   Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant's disclosure
        controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
        about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as
        of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
        evaluation; and

       (c)   Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant's internal
        control over financial reporting that occurred during the period
        covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is
        reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrant's internal
        control over financial reporting; and

5.     The Registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of the internal control over financial
reporting, to the Registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
Registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

       (a)   All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
       design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which
       are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant's ability to
       record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

       (b)   Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
       other employees who have a significant role in the Registrant's
       internal control over financial reporting.

Date:   May 30, 2005

        /s/ R. Andrew Kingston
        ----------------------

By:     R. Andrew Kingston

Title:  Chief Executive Officer

??

??

??

??