alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
11 TH C OURT O F A PPEALS

E ASTLAND

, T EXAS

J UDGMENT

Gary Lee Reed

, * From the 350t h District Court

of Taylor County,

Trial Court No. 11360

- D

.

Vs. No. 11

- 1 6

- 00 303

- CR * November 17, 2016

The State of Texas

, * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

(Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J. , and Bailey, J. )

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that the

appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction . Therefore, in accordance

with this court ’ s opinion, the appeal is dismissed.
H. Res. 4

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

January 5, 1993.

Resolved, That the Clerk be instructed to inform the

President of the United States that the House of Representatives has elected Thomas S. Foley, a Representative from the

State of Washington, Speaker; and Donnald K. Anderson, a

citizen of the State of California, Clerk of the House of Representatives of the One Hundred Third Congress.

Attest:

Clerk.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anthony Grays, Appellant.

[655 NYS2d 383]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Fisher, J.), rendered September 6, 1995, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

As part of a "buy and bust” operation, an undercover police officer purchased four bags of crack cocaine for twenty dollars from the defendant. Within a minute of the transaction, the back-up team apprehended the defendant and, upon a confirmatory identification of the defendant by the undercover officer, arrested him. Twenty dollars of pre-recorded money was recovered from the defendant.

A *Wade*hearing was conducted wherein the defendant moved unsuccessfully to call the undercover officer as his own witness to provide a complete account of the circumstances under which the identification procedure was conducted. While the defendant acknowledges that he does not have an unqualified right to call a witness at a *Wade*hearing *(see, People v Chipp,*75 NY2d 327, *cert denied*498 US 833), he nevertheless claims that his case is an exception to the general rule in that the People’s evidence was "noticeably incomplete” without the undercover officer’s testimony *(see, People v Harvall,*196 AD2d 553; *People v Ford,*188 AD2d 613). The record, however, bears out that the court was provided with the factual detail necessary to assess whether the identification procedure was unconstitutional *(see, People v Padilla,*219 AD2d 688).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a *304reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Bracken, J. P., Santucci, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.
#### Wallace J. HECHENBERGER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 70-786, 70-787.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 21, 1971.

Rehearing Denied May 19, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
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</TABLE>
[Cite as State v. Howard , 2018-Ohio-309.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

v. : No. 17AP-242 (C.P.C. No. 13CR-4407) John M. Howard, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Defendant-Appellant. :

M E M O R A N D U M D E C I S I O N

Rendered on January 25, 2018

Ron O'Brien , Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert , for appellee.

Koenig & Long, LLC, Charles A. Koenig and Todd A. Long , for appellant.

ON MOTIONS

TYACK, J. {¶ 1} Counsel for John M. Howard has filed a motion requesting that we certify a conflict between our decision rendered on November 30, 2017 and a decision from the Second District Court of Appeals in State v. Snoeberger , 2d Dist. No. 24767, 2013-Ohio1375. We do not see a certifiable conflict. {¶ 2} In our Howard case, a trial court judge informed the defendant quite clearly that, if he continued repeating his habit of violating the terms of his community control, defendant was going to be sent to prison. Howard again violated the terms of his community control and the trial court judge did as promised. {¶ 3} In the Snoeberger case, the trial court judge did not make the specific promises made to John Howard. The judge in Snoeberger never told Snoeberger what the prison sentence would be. This clearly distinguishes the two cases.No. 17AP-242 2

{¶ 4} We also note that counsel for Howard did not clearly state the proposition of law to be certified but, instead, set forth an extended question which counsel wishes for the Supreme Court of Ohio to answer. {¶ 5} The motion to certify a conflict is denied. {¶ 6} Counsel has also filed an application for reconsideration. Counsel acknowledges that our decision clearly addresses the question s of whether or not the trial court judge could enforce the terms of incarceration suspended at the original time Howard appeared in court for a sentencing. {¶ 7} The application for reconsideration is also denied.

Motions denied

. BROWN, P.J., and LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concur.
#### Byron SHERRILL et al., Appellants, v. Thomas A. MOYE, Appellee. Frank C. HOBBS, Appellant, v. Thomas A. MOYE, Appellee. Byron SHERRILL et al., Appellants, v. Thomas A. MOYE, Appellee.

Nos. 67-592, 67-593 and 67-599.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Feb. 20, 1968.

Cunningham & Weinstein, Miami, for Sherrill.

Smathers & Thompson, Miami, for Hobbs.

Walters, Moore & Costanzo, Feibelman, Friedman, Hyman & Britton, Miami, for appellee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J. and PEARSON and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed upon the rule that an appellate court will not reverse an order granting a temporary restraining order unless an abuse of discretion is made to clearly appear. Curtis Pools, Inc. v. Fulton, Fla.App.1959, 115 So.2d 442.

Affirmed.
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations

West Building Ground Floor, Room w12-140

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E.

Washington, DC 20590

Application to Amend

Section 333 Exemption No. 14044

Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-4570

March 19th 12, 2016

Petitioner:

Florida Drone Pros, LLC

P.O. Box 22205

Ft Lauderdale, FL 33335

Cell: 954-646-4435

Email: floridadronepros@gmail.com

Website: legaldronepics.com

Greetings,

By letter from the FAA dated Dec 22, 2015 an Exemption 333 was granted to Florida Drone Pros, LLC for 

relief under Section 333. That letter was marked Section 333 Exemption No. 14044 Regulatory Docket 

No. FAA-2015-4570. 

Florida Drone Pros, LLC hereby requests that the exemption so granted be amended to include DJI 

Phantom 4 models. Relevant facts and reasoning are:

 DJI has announced they will discontinue the Phantom 2 model which was approved in Florida 

Drone Pros, LLC Exemption No. 14044.

 Size, weight and performance specification of the DJI Phantom 4 (“P4”) are substantially similar 

to those of the DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ (“P2”) and Phantom 3 (P3) in all relevant respects:

PHANTOM	4	Specs:

Weight	(Including	Battery)

Max	Ascent	Speed 6	m/s	(Sport	mode)

Max	Descent	Speed 4	m/s	(Sport	mode)

Max	Speed 20	m/s	(Sport	mode)

Max	Service	Ceiling	Above	Sea	Level 19685	feet	(6000	m)

Max	Flight	Time Approx.	28	minutes

Operating	Temperature	Range 32°	to	104°	F	(0°	to	40°	C)

Satellite	Systems GPS	/	GLONASS

Hovering	Accuracy Vertical:	

+/- 0.1	m	(when	Vision	Positioning	is	active)	or	+/-0.5	m

Horizontal:	

+/- 0.3	m	(when	Vision	Positioning	is	active)	or	+/-1.5	m

o

 The findings, rationale and conclusions contained in the FAA’s Exemption No. 14044 apply 

without modification to this application to include the DJI Phantom 4 model in Exemption No. 

14044.
Thank you for your consideration of this important request. Please advise us of any additional 

information that is required.

Sincerely,

Lee Borkowski

Florida Drone Pros, LLC.

P.O. Box 22205

Ft Lauderdale, FL 33335

Cell 954-646-4435
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTION FOR EN BANC RECONSIDERATION

Appellate case name: Raymond Gene Lazarine v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-19-00982-CR

Trial court case number: 1411997

Trial court: 184th District Court of Harris County

It is ordered that the motion for en banc reconsideration is DENIED. 

Judge’s signature: /s/ Veronica Rivas-Molloy

 Acting for the Court

The en banc court consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly, Goodman, Landau, 

Hightower, Countiss, Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Farris.

Date: February 17, 2022
# C_2023329EN.01001801.xml

| 18.9.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 329/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 329/18

---

Order of the President of the Court of 7 July 2023 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation — France) — Recamier SA v BR

(Case C-707/21, (1) Recamier)

(2023/C 329/23)

Language of the case: French

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 64, 7.2.2022.

---
Motion GRANTED and Order filed April 23, 2014. 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-14-00296-CV

____________

IN RE PLATINUM ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC., Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

234th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2012-30972

ORDER

On April 21, 2014, relator Platinum Energy Solutions, Inc. filed a petition 

for writ of mandamus in this court. Relator asks this court to order the Honorable 

Wesley Ward, Judge of the 234th District Court, in Harris County, Texas, to set 

aside his order, dated March 31, 2014, granting real parties in interest’s motion for 

clarification of order, entered in trial court number 2012-30972, styled Starstream 
Capital, LLC, et al. v. L. Charles Moncla, Jr., et al.. Relator claims respondent 

abused his discretion by ordering relator to produce forty-three categories of 

requested documents.

Relator also has filed an unopposed motion for temporary stay of 

proceedings below. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(b), 52.10. On April 21, 2014, relator 

asked this court to stay proceedings in the trial court pending a decision on the 

petition for writ of mandamus.

It appears from the facts stated in the petition and motion that relator’s 

request for relief requires further consideration and that relator will be prejudiced 

unless immediate temporary relief is granted. We therefore GRANT relator’s 

motion and issue the following order:

We ORDER the trial court’s March 31, 2014 order granting real parties in 

interest’s motion for clarification of order in trial court cause number 2012-30972, 

Starstream Capital, LLC, et al. v. L. Charles Moncla, Jr., et al., STAYED until a 

final decision by this court on relator’s petition for writ of mandamus, or until 

further order of this court.

In addition, the court requests real parties in interest to file a response to the 

petition for writ of mandamus on or before May 7, 2014. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.4.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Jamison.
#### Gortney *v.*City of New Albany.

(Division A.

Feb. 4, 1935.)

[158 So. 921.

No. 31583.]

J. W. P. Boggan, of Tupelo, for appellant.

*897Cook, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellant was convicted in the municipal court of the city of New Albany on the 30th day of August,' 1934, and on the same day he perfected an appeal to the next term of the circuit court by filing a prdper bond conditioned to require his appearance at the next term of the' circuit court of Union 'county, to be held on the fourth Monday of January, 1935. On October 3, 1934, in pursuance of a proper order of the circuit judge, a special term of the circuit court of Union county was convened, and on that day, upon the failure of the appellant to appear, an order was entered dismissing his appeal and' directing the issuance of a writ of procedendo to' the lower court; and from this judgment an appeal to this court was prosecuted.

The appellant’s contention here is that, since his appeal bond was returnable to the next regular -term of the circuit court to be held on the fourth Monday of January, 1935, and was conditioned for his appearance at that term, the cause was not triable at a special term convened before that' date, and that, consequently, the court was without authority to dismiss the appeal at such special term,

*898It has been frequently held by this court that a civil case is not triable at a special term of the court, unless it was triable at the preceding regular term. Commercial Bank v. Galloway, 6 How. 515; Hatto v. Brooks, 33 Miss. 575; Williams Bros. v. Bank, 132 Miss. 178, 95 So. 843. But we know of no- case which has expressly decided- the- point in reference to criminal appeals from the court of a justice of the peace.

Section, 6-8, Code 1930, provides that appeals from a conviction of a criminal offense in a justice or police court may be taken by the execution of a proper bond “conditioned to appear before the -circuit court at the next term after such appeal shall be taken, to answer to the charge against him, and so- to- continue until discharged;” and the bond in the case at bar was so conditioned. The provision of this statute requiring the ap'pearance of an appellant ‘ ‘ at the next term after such appeal shall be taken” necessarily means that the bond shall be conditioned for the appearance of the appellant at the next regular term then fixed by law, or a special term already called and fixed by order of the circuit judge. If, at the time- an appeal is perfected, no- special term of the court has been ordered, the appeal must necessarily be returnable to the next regular term as fixed by law, and when the return day of an appeal has been so fixed, the appellant and his bondsmen cannot be adjudged in default for their failure to appear at a special term held prior to the next regular term. Consequently, the judgment o-f the court below dismissing the appeal at the special term, will be reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Mark Jay BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-265.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 16, 1973.

Thomas W. Kenworthy, Coral Gables, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., J. Robert Olian, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Linda C. Hertz, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before PEARSON and HENDRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was charged in the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County with an attempt to commit a felony in the third degree. The attempt was a misdemeanor. See Fla.Stat. § 776.04(3), F.S.A. Upon the reorganization of the criminal court system pursuant to Fla. Const. Art. V, F.S.A., the cause erroneously was transferred to the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit instead of to the County Court. See Fla.Const. Art. V, § 20(c)(4); Fla.Stat. § 34.01(1), F.S.A. Florida Transition Rule 4(2). Appellant was tried and found guilty. On motion for new trial, the question of lack of jurisdiction was presented but the motion was denied. This appeal followed.

The State, in its brief, has confessed its inability to support the action of the trial judge. We have examined the applicable provisions of the law and find that appellant’s conviction must be reversed upon authority of Boley v. State, Fla.App.1973, 273 So.2d 109.

Therefore, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to quash the information and to allow the State to amend or refile the information in the appropriate court depending on what it wishes to allege. See Pope v. State, Fla.App.1972, 268 So.2d 173.

Reversed and remanded.
# C_2022318EN.01001401.xml

| 22.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 318/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 318/14

---

Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 7 July 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden — Netherlands) — Staatssecretaris van Financiën v X

(Case C-194/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Articles 184 and 185 - Adjustment of deductions - Taxable person who did not exercise their right of deduction before the expiry of a limitation period - No possibility of making that deduction in the context of adjustment)

(2022/C 318/18)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Staatssecretaris van Financiën

Respondent: X

Operative part of the judgment

Articles 184 and 185 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2010/45/EU of 13 July 2010

must be interpreted as not precluding a taxable person who failed to exercise, before the expiry of the limitation period laid down by national law, the right to deduct value added tax (VAT) relating to the acquisition of goods or services, from being denied the possibility of subsequently making that deduction, by way of an adjustment, at the time when those goods or services are first used for the purposes of taxed transactions, even where no abuse of rights, fraud or loss of tax revenue has been established.

---

(1)  OJ C 228, 14.6.2021.

---
Exhibit 13.1



CERTIFICATION



The certification set forth below is being submitted
in connection with the annual report of Israel Chemicals Ltd. on Form 20-F (the “Report”) for the purpose
of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)
and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  Asher Grinbaum, the Acting Chief
Executive Officer, and   Kobi Altman, Chief Financial Officer of Israel Chemicals Ltd., each certifies that, to the best of his
knowledge:



|1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Israel Chemicals Ltd.
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|Date: | March 15, 2017
|----- | --------------







|/s/ Asher Grinbaum                                            
|--------------------------------------------------------------
|Asher Grinbaum
        
        Acting Chief Executive Officer







|/s/ Kobi Altman                            
|-------------------------------------------
|Kobi Altman
        Chief Financial Officer
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

July 29, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 135822(70) Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 135822 COA: 270194 Wayne CC: 06-001037-01 ANTHONY DWAYNE JAMES, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion for r econsideration of this Court’s April 28, 2008 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

d0721 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

July 29, 2008

Clerk
#### John H. GREENBURG, Appellant, v. WUESTHOFF MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a Florida non-profit corporation, authorized to do business in the State of Florida, and Eduardo B. Beltram, Appellees.

No. 69-282.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 13, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.