alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Harry Kenneth MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-598.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 13, 1973.

Rehearing Denied May 7, 1973.

Alfred J. Skaf and Joseph A. Varón, of Varón, Stahl & Kay, Hollywood, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Fredric J. Scott, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

REED, C. J., and OWEN, J., concur.

WALDEN, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, with opinion.

WALDEN, Judge

(concurring in part, dissenting in part) :

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority judgment which affirms in*195sofar as it approves the appellant’s judgment and conviction of breaking and entering Carl’s Furniture Store with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: grand larceny. In my opinion the evidence, circumstantial as it was, was insufficient as a matter of law to show the defendant’s guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. 13 Fla.Jur., Evidence, §§ 417 and 435.
# C_2020390EN.01003901.xml

| 16.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 390/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 390/39

---

Action brought on 1st September 2020 — SRB v EDPS

(Case T-557/20)

(2020/C 390/56)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Single Resolution Board (SRB) (represented by: H. Ehlers, M. Fernandez Ruperez, J. King, agents, H. Kamann, M. Braun and F. Louis, lawyers)

Defendant: European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision; and

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its application, the SRB seeks the annulment of the decision of the EDPS of 24 June 2020 under its complaint references 2019-0947, 2019-0998, 2019-0999, 2019-1000 and 2019-1122, which held that the SRB infringed Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 (1).

In support of its action, the SRB relies on two pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging that the information shared with the third party was not ‘personal data’ within the wording and purpose of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.

Second plea in law, alleging that the EDPS infringed the right to a good administration pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union by not revealing sufficient information on the complaints.

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39).

---
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 1098

_____________________________
R EBECCA M. G AY , Appellant,

v.

C HRISTOPHER M. G AY , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County

. Marci L. Goodman , Judge

.
December 31, 2018

P ER C URIAM

. Rebecca M. Gay appeals a final judgment of marriage dissolution ’s imputation of income , which affec t ed the child support calculation s

. The lower court imputed two thousand dollars of monthly income to Ms. Gay without finding that h er unemployment was voluntary. We reverse.

Our standard for review ing decisions imputing income under section 61.30(2)( b), Florida Statutes, is whether the trial court’ s decision is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Leonard v. Leonard , 971 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). According to the statute, m onthly income can be imputed to an unemployed parent only i f such unemployment “ is found

. . . to be voluntary.” § 61.30(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017)

. See, e.g.

, Marlowe v. Marlowe , 1232 So. 3d 1194, 1195

– 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ( reversing where the trial court failed to “ provide any factual basis for its conclusion tha t the former wife was voluntarily underemployed ” ). Here, the judgment imput e s income to Ms. Gay without a find ing that she was voluntarily unemployed . The trial court ’s order noted that Ms. Gay had been dismissed from prior employment in 2010 due to work performance issues and refusing to take a drug test

. I t did not find , however, th at this termination was voluntary. T he order also noted that Ms. Gay was employ ed more recently by family members

. This work also came to an end , b ut again there was no i ndication that this work ended voluntarily

. Other record evidence indicate s that Ms. Gay was applyi ng for jobs on a weekly basis and intended to take class es and become registered to work as a n echocardiogram and ultrasound technician. On this record, and without key findings support ing the imputation of income

, we must reverse and remand for re consideration of the decision to imput e income and of the child support calculation

.

R EVERSED and R EMANDED

.

R OWE , O STERHAUS , and K ELSEY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

Kim Anthony Skievaski of Kim Anthony Skievaski, P

. A

. , Pensacola, for Appellant.

Christopher M. Gay, pro se, Appellee.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITOR

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Amendment No. 1 to Form S-3
Registration Statement No. 333-96039 of Clariti Telecommunications
International, Ltd. of our report dated September 25, 2000 appearing in the
annual report on Form 10-K of Clariti Telecommunications International, Ltd.
for the year ended June 30, 2000, and to the reference to us under the heading
"EXPERTS" in the Prospectus, which is a part of such Registration Statement.



                                           s/COGEN SKLAR LLP
                                           -----------------
                                           COGEN SKLAR LLP


Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania
September 25, 2000
#### NATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, a Nebraska corporation, et al., Appellants, v. The STUYVESANT INSURANCE COMPANY of New York, a New York corporation, Appellee.

No. 67-42.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Dec. 5, 1967.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
# C_2023035EN.01002001.xml

| 30.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 35/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 35/20

---

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 15 December 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Centro Petroli Roma Srl v Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli

(Case C-597/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Articles 53 and 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Article 267 TFEU - Scope of the obligation on national courts or tribunals of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling - Exceptions to that obligation - Criteria - Situations in which the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt - Condition related to the national court or tribunal of last instance being convinced that the matter would be equally obvious to the other courts or tribunals of last instance of the Member States and to the Court of Justice)

(2023/C 35/22)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Centro Petroli Roma Srl

Defendant: Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli

Operative part of the order

Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law may refrain from referring to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of EU law and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it where the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The question whether such a possibility exists must be assessed on the basis of the characteristic features of EU law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union.

That national court or tribunal is not required to establish in detail that the other courts or tribunals of last instance of the Member States and the Court would give the same interpretation, but must have obtained the conviction, according to an assessment which takes account of those factors, that the matter would be equally obvious to those other national courts or tribunals and to the Court.

---

(1)  Date lodged: 27.9.2021.

---
# C_2020359EN.01001101.xml

| 26.10.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 359/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 359/11

---

Action brought on 18 August 2020 — Republic of Lithuania v Commission

(Case T-537/20)

(2020/C 359/15)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Parties

Applicant: Republic of Lithuania, represented by R. Dzikovič and K. Dieninis

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision (1) in so far as it is addressed to the Republic of Lithuania and relates to the ‘Early Retirement’ measure (measure 113); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision (1) in so far as it is addressed to the Republic of Lithuania and relates to the ‘Early Retirement’ measure (measure 113);

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on one plea in law. It claims that the Commission, when adopting the contested decision, by which it imposed on Lithuania a correction of EUR 2 186 447,97 on the ground of a weakness of key controls, breached Article 52(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, (2) and Articles 34(6) and 35(1) of Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 (3) and failed to comply with the principle of proportionality and the duty to cooperate.

The Commission, when determining the scale of the non-compliance, the nature of the infringement and the financial harm caused to the European Union, applied to Lithuania a flat-rate correction, although ex post checks were carried out by the Lithuanian authorities which were based on criteria which had been improved in the light of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-508/15, Republic of Lithuania v Commission, the results led to an accurate estimation of the actual harm caused to EU funds, and the scale of the non-compliance was so small that the Commission was entirely able to discontinue the investigation.

---

(1)  Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/859 of 16 June 2020 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2020 L 195, p. 59).

(2)  Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 549).

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 of 6 August 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to paying agencies and other bodies, financial management, clearance of accounts, rules on checks, securities and transparency (OJ 2014 L 255, p. 59).

---
# C_2021053EN.01005101.xml

| 15.2.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 53/51 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.2.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 53/51

---

Action brought on 17 December 2020 — Deutschtec v EUIPO — Group A (HOLUX)

(Case T-738/20)

(2021/C 53/67)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Deutschtec GmbH (Petershagen/Eggersdorf, Germany) (represented by: R. Arnade, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Group A NV (Hasselt, Belgium)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark HOLUX — Application for registration No 17 371 378

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 October 2020 in Case R 223/2020-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision and the decision of the Opposition Division of EUIPO of 26 November 2019 in case B 3 051 677 to the extent it upholds the opposition; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision and the decision of the Opposition Division of EUIPO of 26 November 2019 in case B 3 051 677 to the extent it upholds the opposition;

| — | order EUIPO to bear the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to bear the costs.

Plea in law

| — | The contested decision lacks the necessary conclusion drawn from the fact that the terms ‘common metal and alloys thereof’ as well as ‘metal goods’ in Class 6 are too vague. Furthermore, it lacks a diligent analysis whether the addressees in the market would consider goods deriving from the same origin. |
| --- | --- |

—

The contested decision lacks the necessary conclusion drawn from the fact that the terms ‘common metal and alloys thereof’ as well as ‘metal goods’ in Class 6 are too vague. Furthermore, it lacks a diligent analysis whether the addressees in the market would consider goods deriving from the same origin.

---
## U NITED 

## S TATES 

## N AVY



## – M ARINE 

## C ORPS 

## C OURT OF 

## C RIMINAL 

## A PPEALS

_________________________ No. 201 800169

_________________________ 

### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Appellee

v.


### Alexander M. BRADSHAW Lance Corporal ( E

- 3 ) , U.S. Marine Corps Appellant

_______________________ __ Appeal from the United States Navy

- Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judge: Lieutenant Colonel Eugene H. Robinson
, Jr. , USMC.

For Appellant: Major David A. Peters
, USMC R

. For Appellee: Brian K. Keller, Esq

.

_________________________ Decided 9 Octo ber 2018

____________________ _____ Before F ULTON , C RISFIELD , and G ERDING , Appellate Military Ju dges

_________________________ After careful consideration of the record, submitted without assignment of error, we affirm the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority. Art. 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).

FOR THE COURT

RODGER A. DREW, JR. Clerk of Court
#### THE STATE *vs.*STEPNEY JACKSON and WESLEY JACKSON, n.

A tenant is liable to indictment undei' the act of 1831, for cutting timber, if the landlord’s consent be disproved.

And any one employed by the tenant is also liable.

The defendants were indicted under the act of January 21, 1831, (8 *Del. Laws,*51,) for cutting trees, getting and conveying away staves, &c., from the land of I. T. Cooper. They cut the timber and got staves for the *tenant*of the land ; and two questions arose in the case — 1st. Whether a *tenant*is liable to indictment under the act, for cutting his landlord’s timber; and 2d. Whether other persons employed by the tenant are so liable.

*W. H. Rogers,*deputy attorney general, for the state.

*Bates,*for defendants.

*The Court*

expressed the opinion that an indictment would lie against the tenant, but it would be necessary for the prosecution to show that the cutting was *against*the consent of the landlord or owner which would generally require a stipulation in the lease against cutting. But where the cutting is excessive, it may be left to a jury, without the production of a lease prohibiting it, to say if it was not against the landlord’s consent; and so of a cutting for *staves,*or for other purposes not within the usual range of a tenant’s license.

They were also of opinion on the other point, that any other person was liable for cutting timber contrary to the act, though employed by a tenant, and that it was not necessary for the state to prove that such person *kneio*it to be against the consent of the owner. Such a construction would repeal the act; as it would be impossible to dive into the defendant’s breast for his knowledge on the subject.

Verdict of conviction.
# C_2020222EN.01003802.xml

| 6.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 222/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 222/38

---

Action brought on 15 May 2020 — Eggy Food v EUIPO (EGGY FOOD)

(Case T-287/20)

(2020/C 222/42)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Eggy Food GmbH & Co. KG (Osnabrück, Germany) (represented by: J. Eberhardt and R. Böhm, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU figurative mark EGGY FOOD — Application for registration No 1 795 2953

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 March 2020 in Case R 1316/2019-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order the publication of the application for registration of the EU mark No 1 795 2953; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the publication of the application for registration of the EU mark No 1 795 2953;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7219
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus OLAWALE AKERE, a/k/a Willie, Defendant - Appellant.
No. 99-7119
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus OLAWALE AKERE, a/k/a Willie, Defendant - Appellant.Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge. (CR-94-174-A, CA-97-1081-AM) Submitted: November 18, 1999 Decided: November 23, 19992 Before WILKINS, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.Olawale Akere, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas More Hollenhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Bernard James Apperson, III, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on July 21, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on July 22, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 3 PER CURIAM: Olawale Akere seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.1999), and declining to allow in camera review of certain documents. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Akere , Nos. CR-94-174-A; CR-94-174-A (E.D. Va. December 17, 1997 & July 22, 1998). * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 11

         Golden West Financial Corporation
   Statement of Computation of Basic and Diluted
                 Earnings Per Share
  (Dollars in thousands except per share figures)



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                    Three Months Ended
                                                          March 31
                                             ----------------------------------
                                                  2002              2001
                                             ----------------  ----------------
Income before Cumulative Effect of
<S>                                            <C>                 <C>
    Accounting Change                          $    238,081        $  176,079
Cumulative effect of accounting change,
    net of tax                                          -0-            (6,018)
                                             ----------------  ----------------
Net Earnings                                   $    238,081        $  170,061
                                             ================  ================

Weighted Average Shares                         155,415,549       158,478,170
Dilutive effect of outstanding
    common stock equivalents                      2,154,801         2,216,727
                                             ----------------  ----------------
Diluted Average Shares Outstanding              157,570,350       160,694,897
                                             ================  ================

Basic Earnings Per Share before
    Cumulative Effect of Accounting Change     $       1.53         $    1.11
Cumulative effect of accounting change,
    net of tax                                          .00              (.04)
                                             ----------------  ----------------
Basic Earnings Per Share                       $       1.53         $    1.07
                                             ================  ================

Diluted Earnings Per Share before
    Cumulative Effect of Accounting Change     $       1.51         $    1.10
Cumulative effect of accounting change,
    net of tax                                          .00              (.04)
                                             ----------------  ----------------
Diluted Earnings Per Share                     $       1.51         $    1.06
                                             ================  ================
</TABLE>