UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OFAP P EA LS F OR VE TER AN S CL AI M S

N O . 97-1220
W A LTER C. H UDS ON , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. T OGO D. W EST , J R ., S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe lla nt' s App lic atio n f

or Attor ne y F e e s a nd Expe ns e s
(De cided April 25, 2000 )

Mi c ha e l E. W

ild ha be r, of Was hin g ton , D .C. , w a s o n th e ple a din g s f or thea pp e lla nt. Leigh A. Bradley , G e ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n Garv in , A s s i s t antG e n e r a l C o un s e l ; Thomas A. Mc Laughlin , Special Assistant to the Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Miche le R. Katina , of Washington, D.C., wer e on the plea ding f or the a ppellee.
Be fore NEB EKER, Chief Judge , and HOLDAWAY and STEI NB ERG, Judges

. HOLDAWAY, Judge , filed th e o p i nion of the Court. STEI NB ERG, Judge , filed a concur ringopinion.
HOLDAWAY, Judge : T his c ase is be fore the Court on the appellant' s application for an

awa rd of atto rn e y fe e s and e xpe ns es un der the E qu a l A c c e ss t o Just ic e Ac t ( EA JA) , 2 8 U .S. C. § 2 41 2. In th e un de rl yingc a se on theme ri ts, thea

pp e lla nt a pp e a le d a May

19 97 B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Appea ls (BVA or B oard) decision which found that he had not submit ted new a nd materia l evidence in order to r eopen his c laim for a me ntal disorder. On appe al to this Court, the Secr etar y conce ded that the VA r eg ional office (VARO) had er red by failingto issue a Statement of the Case(SOC) afte r thea pp e lla nt h a d f ile d a tim e ly No tic e of

Di sa gre e me nt (

NO D) to a Nove mbe r 1 99 3 VAR O decision. Pursuant to its hol ding in Tab lazon v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 359 (1995), the Court found that the Novembe r 1993 VARO de cision had not yet become final as a r esult of the VARO' s err or, thus prec luding the Court f

rom exercisingjurisdiction ove r the matter. Since it did not have jurisdiction2

over the matter, the Court dismissed the appe al in a J uly 1999 memorandum decision. The Court noted, howeve r, that the a ppellant' s claim befor e the VA RO was s t ill open and ac cording ly , the

a pp e lla nt wa s e nti tle d to a dju dic atio n at the B oa rd le ve l fo r his a

pp e a l of the No ve mbe r 1 99 3 VAR O decision. Subsequently , the appe llant filed a ti mely application for attorney fee s and expenses under EAJA. The Secre tary responde d to this application by arguing that in order f or the Court to awa

rd EAJA fees, the Court must have jurisdiction ove r the underly ing action. Since the Court found that it did not have jurisdiction over the May 1997 Boa rd decision and dismiss ed the appe al, the Secr etar y
aver red that the appellant' s EAJ A application mustalso be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant c ountere d the Secre tary' s argument by stating that his a ppeal wa s the functional e quivalent to a writ of manda

mus, a nd pursuant to the "c ataly st theory " heis the preva iling par ty and entitled to EAJ A fe es. F urthermor e, the a ppellant argued that EAJ A fees may be grante d for writs of mandamus whe re the Court ha s potential jurisdiction over the unde rlying matter and thus the Court

c ou ld a wa rd EA JA f e e s in thi s in sta nc e a s w e ll.

I. AN AL YSI S EAJA is a waiver

of sover eign immunity , and its provisions mustbe strictly construed in the g overnme nt's f

avor. Se eGr iv ois v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 100, 101 (1994). The EAJ A s tatute provides that: [A] court shall awa rd t o a prevailing party

other than the United States fee s and other expenses . .
. incurre d by that party in a ny civil action . . ., brought by or ag ainst the Un ite d St ate s in any court having jurisdiction of that action , unless the cour t finds that the position of the United S tates was substantially justified or that other spe cial c ir c ums tanc e s ma

ke an a wa rd un jus t. 28 U. S.C. § 241 2( d) (1 )( A) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . The re fo re , a Cour t may no t awa

rd EA JA f e e s unle ss it had jurisdiction to award the relief reque sted duringthe merits l itigation. He ath v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 400, 403 ( 1998). It is clea r from the J uly 1999 memorandum decision that the Court did no t ha ve jurisd ic tio n o ve r t

his matte r a s a

re su lt o f the VA RO ' s pro c e dura l de fe c t. N on e the le ss, the appe llant argues that the C ourt has j urisdiction to grant him attorney fee s under EAJ A pursuant to t he Al l Wr its Ac t ( AWA ), 28 U. S.C. § 1 65 1. As state d a bo ve , th e a

pp e lla nt b e lie ve s th at hi s3

appea l was the func tional equivalen tof a pe tition for a writ of manda mus and his application for EAJA fees should be tre ated a s if he had f iled such a pe tition. Un de r t he AWA , a ll f

e de ra l c ourt s h ave jurisd ic tio n to iss ue writs " ne c e ssa ry or a pp ro priate in aid of their r espec tive jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)

. The AWA is designed to pr event the Court's jurisdiction fro mbeingfrustrated by an unlawf

ul act of or

a fa ilure to ac t by

an infe rior tribunal. Se e ge ne ra lly

, H e ath , 11 Vet.App. at 402-03. This Court has held that " jurisdiction to is sue
a writ of mandamus pursuant to the AWA re lies upon not actual jurisdi ct i o n b ut potential juri sd ict io n. " Id. at 402. Ther efor e, if the Court might eventually have jurisdiction over the matter if no t f or th e un lawf

ul a c tio ns of

or fa ilureto a c t by

an in fe ri or

tribu na l, t he Court may e xer c ise jurisdiction to issue a writ to preve nt that potential jurisdiction from beingfrustrated. Of c ourse, the AWA does not expand the Court's g ener al jurisdiction but rather is to be used only for this limit ed purpose. S

e eR o c h ev
. Ev a

p o ra te d M il k A s s 'n , 3 19 U. S. 2 1, 26 (1 94 3) ; In the Matter of the Fe e Agreem ent of Cox , 1 49 F .3 d 1 36 0, 13 63 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 8) ; He ath , 11 Vet.App. at 403 Reg ardle ss of whether this appea l was the "f unctional equivalent" of a petition for a writ of mandamus, the fact of the m atter is that it was not a petiti on but an appe al. The AWA simply does not apply if the appellant does not f ile a petition f

or a writ, and thus, the AWA is not releva nt in the Court's e x amination of its jurisdiction of this EAJA application. Whil e the appellant is cor rec t that the Court' s jurisdiction to i ssue a writ is premised upon its potential jurisdiction over the underlying matter a nd that th e C ourt may

subsequently

awa rd EAJA fees in a

ppropriate circ umstances ba sed on that potential jurisdiction, the Court mustpossess actu al jurisdiction over this appea l from the Boa rd in order

to award EAJA fees for the appe al. Therefore, the Court must conclude that since it did not have actua l jurisdiction over the appea l of the May 1997 Boa rd dec ision, the underlying

a c t i o ni nth i s E A JAa

p p l i c at i o n , th e C o urtd o e s n o th av e j uri s d i c t i o nt o c o n s i d e r th e E A JA application itself.

II. CO NC LU SION Up o nco n s i d er at i o no f th e f o re go i n g an al y s i s an d

th e pl ea d i n gs o f th e part i es , th e ap p el l an t 's application for

attorney fee s and expenses under

EAJA is DI SMI SSED.See 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 4 1 2 (d )( 1 )( A ); 3 8 U .S .C . § 7 1 0 5 (d )( 1 ); 3 8 C .F .R . § § 1 9 .2 6 , 1 9 .2 9 , 1 9 .3 0 (1 9 9 2 ) (r e la ting to 1 issu a n c e o f S ta te m e n t o f C a se ); H ol l an d v. G ob er , 10 V et

. A p p
. 43 3 , 43 6 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ( ap p l y i ng t i t l e 3 8 s t at ut o ry and re g u la to ry p ro v isio n s, c ited a b o v e in this n o te , ap p lica b le to issu a n c e o f S ta te m e n t o f C a se ); Lo c he r v
. Br own , 9 V et

. App. 5 3 5 , 5 3 7 (1 9 9 6 ) (" S e c re ta ry m u st sh o w su b sta n tial ju stif ic a tio n fo r b o th h is a d m inistra tive a n d li tiga tio n p o sitio n s" in o rder t o avo i d award of at t o rney f ees and exp enses unde r t he E q ual A ccess t o Just i ce A ct , 2 8 U

. S.C

. § 2 4 1 2 (d) (E A JA ), when ap p l i cat i o n t heref o r i s t i m el y f

i l ed by prevai l i ng pa rt y ).

A l t houg h t he C our t ha s r ecogn i zed t hat i t "has t he po wer t o s et as i de any judgment wher e nece s s ar y t o prot ect 2 the inte g rity o f i ts o w n p ro c e sse s" , M c Nar on v
. Br own , 10 V et

. A p p
. 61 , 63 (19 9 7 ) ( ci t i ng S a rg en tv. C o l u m b i a F o rest P ro d u c ts, In c ., 7 5 F .3 d 8 6 , 8 9 (2 d C ir. 1 9 9 6 )) , t hi r d m ot i on t o r ecal lj ud gm entand m an da t e deni ed , M cNa ro n v. W est , 1 2 V et

. A p p
. 33 4 (19 9 9 ) ( no t i ng t hat ap p el l ant had f ai l ed i n t wo earl i er mo t i o ns t o present argument present ed i n hi s t hi rd
m o t i o n t o recal l judgm ent and m and at e), t here are m any reasons why, i n t hi s case, i t wo ul d b e unwi se t o recal l judgm ent an d ma n dat e. O u r di s cr et i on ar y pow er t o r ec al l j u dg men t a n d ma n dat e s h ou l d be u s ed on l y "s par i n g l y " an d "f or g ood ca u s e or t o pr ev en t i n

j u s t i ce , an d on l y wh en ' u n u s u al ci r cu ms t an ce s ex i s t s u f f i ci en t t o j u s t i f

y modi f i ca t i on or r ec al l of a pr i or j u dg men t

. ' " I

bi d. ; see a lso Cal der on v
. Thomps on , 523 U

. S. 538, 550 ( 1998) ( r ev er s i n g l owe r cou r t ' s r ec al l of mandat e a nd not i ng t hat" [ i ] n l i gh t o f t he prof ound i nt er es t s i n re po s e at t ach i ng t o t he mandat e o f a cour t

. . . t he po wer [t o recal l s uch m and at e] can be exe rci sed o nl y i n ext raord i nary ci rcum st ances" ( inte rn al quo t at i o n om i t t ed )) ; K u tsch ero u sky v. W

est , 1 2 V e t.A p p . 3 6 9 , 3 7 1 (1 9 9 9 ) (p e r c u ria m ) (r e c a llin g m a n d a te , up o n m o tio n o f t h e S e c re ta ry, whe n nec es s ar y t o cl ar i f y b as i s f or Court ' s ea r l i er deci s i on)

. M oreove r , "t he mere que s ti oni ng of a co urt ' s reasoni ng, con s t r u ct i on , or a ppl i ca t i on of t h e r el ev an t l aw i s i n s u f f i ci en t by i t s el f

t o just i f y the reca l l of

a ma n dat e. " M cNar on , 4 STEI NB ERG, Judge , concur

ring : The Court holds that it does not have jurisdiction over the pe nd inga pp lic atio n fo r atto rn e y fe e s and e xpe ns e s un de r the Eq ua l Ac c e ss t o Just ic e Ac t, 2 8 U .S. C. § 2412(d) (E AJ A), ba sed on the Court' s J uly 20, 1999, single -judg e memora ndum decision that dismiss ed the a

ppellan t 's claim for la ck of jurisdiction. Hu ds on v . W est , 1 99 9 WL

55 42 28 (V e t. Ap p. July 20 , 1 99 9) (m e m. d e c.). Al tho ugh I be lie ve that th at me mor and um d e c isi on

wa s le g a lly incorre ct, I

am constrained t o vote to dismiss the EAJA application based on the binding pr ece dential action of the Court in He ath v . W est , wher e the Court held that it must dismiss an EAJA application that is ba sed on a merits adjudication over which the Court ha d no jurisdiction be cau s e, "[ a] s the languag e of th e E AJ A s tatute makes c lear , jurisdiction is a prere quisite to, not a product of, [the] application [of the EAJA] ". He ath , 11 Vet.App. 400, 404 ( 1998). I so vo te re luc tantl y , how e ve r, be c a us e Ibe lie ve that ha d th e me ri ts d e c isi on be e n c or re c tly de c ide d, thea

pp e lla nt wo uld ve ry lik e ly have be e n entit le d to an E AJA a wa rd a s a pr e va ili ngpa

rt y in a m atter wherethe Secr etar y' s position at the administrative stag e wa s not substantially justified. 1 Ihav e c o n s id e r e d wh e th e r th e Co urt c o u ld p r o p e r ly r e a c h b a c k an d c o r r e c t th e e r

r o r in the underlying me morandum dec ision through a rec all of judgme nt and mandate , and I have c oncluded th atthat would not be wise a s a g ener al matter a nd espec ially

in the absenc e of the appellant' s havingreque sted that the Court take suc h action. Ihave a lso c oncluded that it would be 210 V et

. A pp
. at 63 (emphas i s added) ( ci t i ng , i nt er al i a, S a rg e n t, 7 5 F .3 d a t 9 0 ).
I n t hi s ca s e, t he benef i t l ost by t he appel l an t d ue to t he C our t ' s ha vi ng di s mi s s ed hi s appeal r at her t han rem and i ng hi s cl ai m i s t hat he has b een d eni ed the p roce d ural a d vant age o f " exp ed i t i o us t reat m ent " t hat he wo ul d have o b ta ine d b y vir tue o f a C o u rt re m a n d o f his c la im

. See V et er an s ' B en ef i t s I mpr ov eme n t s Act of 1994, Pub. L. N o. 103- 4 4 6 , § 3 0 2 , 10 8 Stat

. 46 4 5 , 46 5 8 (19 9 4 ) ( Se cret ary "shal l t ake such act i o ns as may be nece ss ary t o pro vi d e f o r t he expedi t i ous t r eat ment , b y t he [ B oard of V et er ans ' Ap peal s ] an d by

. . . [ a D epar t ment of V et er ans Af

f ai r s ( V A ) r egi onal o f f i ce (R O )] , of any cl ai m t hat has b een rem and ed by" t hi s C o urt ). T hi s i s no t t he sort of " i njus t i ce" t hat warrant s t he re c a ll o f ju d g m e n t an d m a n d a te

. I n a d d iti o n , t h e a p p e llan t d id no t se e k re v ie w b y a p a n e l o f t h is C o u rt o f t h e leg a lly er r oneous Ju l y 20, 199 9, memo r andum deci s i on, di d not appeal t hatdeci s i on t o t he U

. S. C our t of Ap peal s f

or t he Federa l C irc u it, a n d ha s n o t m o v e d the C o u rt to w ithd ra w it s ju d g m e n t an d m a n d a te . A ll o f the se a re fac to rs tha t we igh he a v ily a g a ins t t h e re c a ll o f j u d g m e n t a n d m a n d a te in this in sta n c e
. S ee C a l d ero n , su p ra ( "[t ] he s pari ng us e of t he po wer d e m o n stra te s [th a t] it is o n e o f la st reso rt , t o b e hel d i n res erve agai nst grave, unf o rs een co nt i ngenci es"); H i nes v
. Royal I nd e m
. Co

. , 25 3 F.2d 1 1 1 , 1 1 3

- 1 1 4 (6t h C i r. 19 5 8 ) ( ho l d i ng t hat a m o t i o n t o recal l judgm ent and m and at e t hat "a t t acks t he co rr ect ness of t he judgm ent as a m at t er of l aw .
. . . i s o b vi o usl y a pe t i t i o n f o r r eheari ng unde r a di f f erent nam e" , and d enyi ng such m o t i o n as no t t i m e ly f iled ); cf

. Le r oy v. Ci t

y of Hous t on , 9 0 6 F .2 d 1 0 6 8 , 1 0 7 5 (1 9 9 0 ) (d e c linin g to w ithd ra w ju d g m e n t an d m a n d a te in c a se w h e re m a tter ha d b e e n li tiga te d b y " e x p e rie n c e d a tto rn e ys" w h o " a d a m a n tly ref used t o f i l e a mo t i o n t o recal l t he m and at e" ). B u t cf. C o h e n v . E mp ire B lu e C ro ss a n d B lu e S h ie ld , 142 F. 3d 116, 11 9 (2d. Ci r
. 199 8) (s ua s po nt e rec al l i ng m andat e i n or der t o re i ns t at e a pp eal di s mi s s ed bas ed on i mp r op er procedur al rul i ng regardi ng de ad l i ne f o r f i l i ng m o t i o n f

o r ext ensi o n of t i m e t o f i l e no t i ce o f

ap p eal ).

In H ea t h v. W

est , t he C o urt revi ewed a t the E A JA st age t he q uest i o n whet her i t had had jur i sdi ct i o n ove r t he 3

u n d e r ly ing p e tit io n fo r e x tra o rd ina ry re lief, o v e r w h ic h it ha d e x e rc ise d ju risd ic tio n b y d e n ying the p e tit io n
. H ea th , 1 1 V et

. A p p
. 4 0 0 , 4 0 1

- 0 2 (19 9 8 ). T he C o urt de t erm i ned t hat jur i sdi ct i o n ove r t he p et i t i o n had i n f act be en l acki ng, and tha t no ju risd ic tio n c o u ld thu s b e ha d o v e r a n E A J A a p p lica tio n b a se d o n tha t p e tit io n
. I d. at 40 4

. I n t hi s case, t he C o urt cou l d h av e appl i ed H e a th in th e o p p o site m a n n e r, to fi n d tha t we ha d a c tua lly h a d ju risd ic tio n o v e r th e un d e rlying a p p e a l, as dem o nst rat ed i n pa rt II

. of t hi s st at em ent , and t hus have juri sdi ct i o n ove r t he E A JA ap p l i cat i o n. T hen, in t urn, t he C o u rt c o u ld ha v e d e te rm ine d tha t t h e a p p e llan t sh o u ldha v e p re v a iled o n the m e rits, ha d ju risd ic tio n b e e n p ro p e rly e x e rc ise d (a n d the n p ro c e e d e d to c o n sid e r fa v o r a b ly t h e a p p e lla n t' s E A J A a p p lica tio n b a se d o n the V A R O ' s e rr o r in failing to issu e a S ta te m e n t o f t h e C a se , s ee tex t at n o te 1 a n d a u tho r it ie s c it e d i n n o te 1 , ab o v e . I ha v e reje c te d this ap p roac h here beca use I be l i eve t hat i t wo ul d requi re t he C o urt t o engage at t he E A JA s t age i n a "seco nd m ajo r l i t i gat i o n" o f t h e m e rits, a re su lt tha t I b e liev e is h igh ly u n d e sira b le a n d h a s b e e n s tro n g ly d isc o u ra g e d b y th e U .S . S u p re m e C o u rt. S ee , e.g ., J

a c o b se n v . West , 13 V et

. A p p
. 35 , 37 (en banc o rder) ( Stei nb erg, J. , dis sent i ng) ( and cases ci t ed t herei n, d isc u ssin g this C o u rt' s re c o g n iti o n o f S u p re m e C o u rt' s a d m o n iti o n s a g a ins t en g a g ing in s e c o n d m a jo r liti g a tio n in reachi ng de ci si o n on ap p l i cat i o n f o r E A JA f

ees). M o reove r, as p o i nt ed out i n no t e 2 , ab o ve, t he ap p el l ant has no t s o ught a n y su c h e x tra o rd ina ry a c tio n he re a n d d id no t d isp u te t h e C o u r t' s J u ly 1 9 9 9 m e m o ra n d u m d e c isio n d ism issin g his a p p e a l. 5 unwise for

the Court to ext end He ath , s up ra , by rec onsidering its jurisdi ction and dete rmining that it had had

j ur i s d i c t i o no v e r

th e m e r i t s l i t i g atio n an d th e r e f o r e h a s j ur i s d i c t i o no v e r th e E A JA application. 36 I. Re le va ntBac kgr ound The Court' s J uly

1999 decision set for

th the fol l o wi n g fac ts, upon which this concurring opinion is premised. In Februar y 1993, a Department of Veter ans Affairs (VA) reg ional office(RO) iss ue d a de c isi on de nyingthea

pp e lla nt' s c la im to re op e n his pr e vio us ly and fi na lly dis a llo we d c la im for se rvice connec tion for a mental disorder. In Marc h 1993, the appellant filed an NOD as to that Februar y 1993 VARO dec ision. The RO, in response , reope ned the a ppellant' s disallowed claim but deniedserviceconnec tion, and, in so doing, stated: " Since this action has re opened the claim, no furth er acti on is tak en on the [ Mar ch 199 3 NOD]

. . . becaus e it is con si dere d favor abl y res ol ved ". Hudson , 1999 WL554228, at *1 (interna l quotations omi tted). B ased on its conclusion that the

a c tio n r e qu ir e d b y

theMarc h 199 3 NO D ha d be e n co mpl e te d, the RO " did no t sen d th e a pp e lla nt a Statement of Case ( SOC)". Ibi d. In May 1997, the B oard of

Veter ans' Appea ls (Boa

rd or B VA) deter mined that new a

nd materia l evidencehad not bee n prese nted to reope n the pre viously and finally disallowed cla im for servic e conne ction for a mental disorder

. On July 20, 1999, the Court issued a single -judg e memora ndum decision that dismissed the

a pp e lla nt' s appea l on theba sis that heha d n ot f ile d a tim e ly No tic e of

Di sa gre e me nt (

NO D) in

c o nn e c ti o n w it

h th e M ay 1 9 9 7 B o ar d d e c is io n
. Hud so n, su pra . On appe al to this Court, and as

rec ited in the Court's July 1999 memorandum decision, the Secre tary had conc eded a nd the Court held " that the B oard [had] committ ed . . . er ror by failing to ensure that the [ RO] issue an S OC". Id. at *3. The Sec retary ' s brief in the unde rlying c ase, f iled in September 1998, madethe following

conce ssion: The Sec reta

ry agree s that the RO was i n corr ect that the [a]ppellant' s Marc h 1993 [NOD] was "fa

vorably resolved" in light of the RO' s ultimate de nial. Thus, it is the Secre tary' s p o s i t i o n that thereis a pendingclaim to reope n a cla im for servic e connec tion for a psychiatric disorder . . . . The [a ]p pella nt su bm itted atimel y [NOD ] with the denial in March 1993. . . . There fo re , the C ourt sho uld

remand the issue . . . for a

[S ]t atement of

the [C] ase to be issued on this matter. Secre tary' s Brief at 11 (emphasis adde d). In response to th e S ec retary' s reque st for a r emand, the appellant f

iled in October

1998 a reply

brief that stated that "be cause of the virtual agree ment of the p arti e s , th e Co urt c o u ld v ie w th e p le a d in g s o n th is is s u e a s c o n s ti tuti n g
. . . a jo in t m o t i on for

remand ." Reply

at 5 (e mphasis added)

. T h e Court's July 1999 memorandum de cision, howeve r,7

did not re m an d th e matter; instead, the Court dismissed the appe al for la ck of jurisdiction, citing Tab lazon v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 359 ( 1995). Hudson , 1999 WL554228, at *3.
II. Analysi s as to Legal Basis f or Court 's Jul y 1999 Mem orandum De cision In Tablazon , the Court was pre sented with an a ppeal ba sed on an N OD that had be en filed in May 1976. Tablazon , 8 Vet.App. at 360. The Court g ener ally has jurisdiction to review a final BVA dec ision only

wher e an NOD was filed on or afte r November 18, 1988, seeVeter ans' J udicial Review Ac t, Pub. L . No. 1 0 0 -6 8 7 § 402, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988) (found at 38 U.S.C. § 7251

no te ) [h e re ina ft e r V JRA § 4 02 ]; V e le z v
. W est , 1 1 Vet.App. 148, 157 ( 1998) (" Court has no jurisdiction over an issue absent a post-November

18, 1988, NOD, e x pressingdisagree ment with an RO' s decision on that issue or with an RO's fa ilure to adjudicate that [iss ue]"), a nd, there fore , the Court in Tablazon corr ectly conclude d that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim at is sue there

. Tablazon , 8 Vet.App. at 361. Although the Tablazon op ini on do e s n ot e xpre ssl y state tha t th e lim its imp os e d b y

VJRA§ 4 02 fo rm e d th e ba sis fo r i ts c on c lus ion that it la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n o ve r t

he c la im, th e C o urt h a s s u

b s e qu e nt l y d e t e r

m i ne d th a t T

a b lazon must have bee n based on the lack of a post-VJ RA NOD be causethere was no other leg al basis upon which a dismiss al of the casefor lac k of jurisdiction could have been ba sed. Se eEvan s ( Bi lly ) v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 396, 400 ( 1999). The instant ca se is not simi lar to Ta b la zon b ec au s e h erethe appe llant's Ma rch 1993 N OD

was c learly

a post-VJRA § 402 NOD. It is now well established by the C ourt' s case law that whe re the Court is "pre sented . . . with a tim ely NOD as to [ a] claim . . . reg ardingwhich the RO ha s never
re sp on de d b y

iss uin g an SOC a s r e qu ir e d b y law a nd re gulatio n" , th e Court has jurisdiction over the

a pp e a l and wi ll " va c ate theB VAde c isi on
. . . and re mand [the matte r] to theB oa rd ' fo r a pp ro priate pro cedural compl ian ce, s peci fi cal ly th e is su ance o f an S OC '." Fe nd e rso n v . W

est , 12 Vet.App. 119, 1 3 2 (1 9 9 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Holland v. Gober , 1 0 V e t.A pp . 4 33 , 4 36 (1 99 7) ); se eals o E v an s ( Bi lly ) , s up ra ; Ma nli nc on v . W

est , 12 Vet.App. 238, 240- 41 (1999). Thus, be cau s e th e C o urt' s J uly 1999 memorandum de cis i o n d i s m i s s ing this appe al was, on its fa ce, ba sed on the a pplication of the inapplicable leg al pre cede nt of Tablazon rathe r tha n upo n th e mor e re c e nt p re c e de nti a l op ini on s in Fende rson, Manlincon, Evans (B illy) , and Holland, th e Court ' s a c tio n w a s n ot l e g a lly c or re c t.8

Howeve r, as I

have stated, I

do not believe that ther e is an a ppropriate way

for the Court to re ctify that err oneous re sult at this poi nt.

III. Conclusi on Ihope that the prac tice followed in the merits decision her e in its mispl ace d relianc e upon Tab lazon , s up ra , will not be r epeated and that, instea d, in the future the Court will, in accorda nce with Manlincon, Evans (

Billy) , Fende rson , and Holland, a ll su pra , consistently

rema nd rathe r than dismiss as t o an appealed claim wher e a V J RA § 402 jurisdiction-confe rringNOD ha s been f iled as to an RO dec ision that did notaff ord all re lief re quested on a claim raised to the R O but wher e an SOC (or Supplemental SOC) has not yet bee n issued pursuant to that NOD.