alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 295 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 295

Providing for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2872) to prevent and 
  punish crime, to strengthen the rights of crime victims, to assist 
     State and local efforts against crime, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            November 4, 1993

Mr. McCollum submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                         the Committee on Rules

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Providing for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2872) to prevent and 
  punish crime, to strengthen the rights of crime victims, to assist 
     State and local efforts against crime, and for other purposes.

    Resolved, That immediately after the adoption of this resolution 
the House shall resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on 
the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2872) to 
prevent and punish crime, to strengthen the rights of crime victims, to 
assist State and local efforts against crime, and for other purposes, 
the first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with, and all points 
of order against the bill and against its consideration are hereby 
waived. After general debate which shall be confined to the bill, and 
which shall not exceed three hours equally divided and controlled by 
the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-
minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for 
amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House 
with such amendments as may have been adopted. The previous question 
shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to 
final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit, 
with or without instructions.

                                 <all>
```
#### Mayson, ad. vs. Edington, ad.

On the trial of a cause *de novo*in the Circuit Court, the partie's may introduce other evidence than that contained in the bill of exceptions (Sullivan, *ad. vs. Veadman, ante.)*

Where there is a conflict of testimony, the court will not disturb the verdict of the jury, or the finding of the court below.

*Appeal from, Desha Circuit Court.*

Hon. John C. Murray, Circuit Judge.

Garland & Randolph, for appellant.

*209Mr. Justice Compton

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was a proceeding in the Probate Court for allowance and classification of a claim — being a physician’s bill for professional services — against the estate of Gerge C. Britt, deceased. On appeal to the Circuit Court'a trial *de novo*was had, and judgment rendered against the estate of Britt for $360 50, from which the administrator has appealed to this court.

For a reversal of the judgment two objections are relied on by the appellant: 1st. That on the trial *de novo,*the Circuit Court' permitted evidence other than that contained in the record of the proceedings in the Probate Court, to be introduced; and 2d. That the finding of the circuit judge,"who tried the cause, sitting as a jury, was not warranted by the evidence. That there is nothing in the first objection, see *Sullivan, adm’r vs. Deadman,*decided at the present term. Nor is the second objection well taken. True, there is some conflict in the evidence as to whether the professional services were rendered *gratis,*and as to whether the charges were exorbitant; but then there is nothing better settled by the decisions of this court than that the verdict of the jury, or the finding of the court, in such cases, will not be disturbed here-.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### Pope et al. vs. Macon et al.

Where a party holds lands under a tax sale, the matter of the *sixth and seventh sections of chapter*106, *Gould's*Digest, that is, the filing of an affidavit of the tender of the taxes and interest, etc., and of the value of the improvements made, is as good a defence to an action of ejectment as to a bill in chancery, *(Úraig vs, Managint*21 *Ark.*319,) and may be presented, either by motion or by plea in abatement.

*Writ of Error to Jefferson Circuit Cowrt.*

lion. John C. Murray, Circuit Judge.

Bell *&*Carlton, for the plaintiffs.

Garland & Randolph, for the defendants.

Mr. Justice Fairchild

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiffs in -error brought an action of ejectment for a lot of ground in Pine Bluff, and were met by a plea in abatement, that the land, including the lot, had been purchased at a sheriff’s sale for the non-payment of taxes, by persons under whom the defendants, through sundry conveyances, claimed : that .the lot had been held under the purchase, and taxes paid Thereon, since its occurrence, in 1855 ; that improvements had been put upon it, and that the plaintiffs, before bringing their suit for the recovery of the lot, had. not filed in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court of Jefferson county, an affidavit setting forth that they had tendered to the purchasers of the land, their agents or legal representatives, the full amount of all taxes and costs paid on account thereof, with interest thereon at the rate of one hundred per centum upon the amount first *645paid therefor, and twenty-five per centum per annum upon all costs and taxes paid on the land from the time said costs and. taxes were paid, and the full value of all improvements, of whatever kind and description made on said lot, and that the same had been refused.

The plaintiffs demurred to the plea, their demurrer was overruled, and upon their refusing to answer over, final judgment was rendered against them, to which they sued out a writ of error.

The plea is in strict accordance with the sixth and seventh sections of *oh.*106, *Gould’s*Digest, and presents, as matter in abatement to an action of ejectment, the same defence that was interposed in *Craig vs.*Flanagin, 21 *Ark.*319, to a bill in chancery, by way of motion to dismiss, made under the eighth section of the Act.

The defence might have been made in this suit by motion, but if good on motion, it is good in a plea of abatement. Hence, the only enquiry is, if the matter of the plea present a proper defense to the suit; and that inquiry has been affirmatively answered by this court in the case mentioned. The defenses in that case, as in this, were that the law was unconstitutional, and that the sales at which' the purchases were made were void for noncompliance with the revenue law. For answer to the arguments made in this case, we refer to the opinion in *Craig vs, Flanagin,*and affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.
# Nov 2020
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 97-40195

Summary Calendar

_____________________

THOMAS L. ATCHISON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JAMES A. COLLINS, DIRECTOR,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

(9:94-CV-94)

_________________________________________________________________

August 25, 1997

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Thomas L. Atchison, Texas prisoner no. 605353, appeals, pro

se, the district court’s dismissal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2), of his civil rights complaint. The record shows that

no defendant was deliberately indifferent to his Atchison’s serious

medical needs; therefore, we do not address his contention that the

district court erred by dismissing, as time-barred, those claims
against certain of the defendants. Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d

320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991); Bickford v. International Speedway Corp.,

654 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1981). 

Atchison’s claim that Dr. Ronald Reed denied him medical care

is baseless. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its

discretion either by not ordering discovery on the claim of racial

discrimination or by dismissing the retaliation claims against Dr.

Reed and “John Doe”. Richardson v. Henry, 902 F.2d 414, 417 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 901 (1990), and cert. denied, 498

U.S. 1069 (1991); Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.

1986). 

Atchison’s motions for appointment of counsel, transfer of his

retaliation claims, discovery, reinstatement of his complaint, and

a hearing on “accrual” are DENIED.

The judgment is

AFFIRMED.
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           2,485
<SECURITIES>                                     1,672
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,318
<ALLOWANCES>                                       903
<INVENTORY>                                     11,676
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                34,017
<PP&E>                                          15,385
<DEPRECIATION>                                   6,892
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  42,947
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           11,150
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                        36,139
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    42,947
<SALES>                                         49,604
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                49,604
<CGS>                                           32,697
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   32,697
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                23,576
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  71
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (6,237)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,549)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (4,688)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (4,688)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.78)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.78)
        

</TABLE>
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 

***** 

CLERK'S REQUEST FOR EXTENSION 

OF TIME TO FILE CLERK'S RECORD 

Appellate Case Number: 03-15-00011-CV Trial Court Number: 14-0187-C26 

Style: Clare Trevarthen VS. Counsel/Party Requesting Record: 

vs. 

Name David Rogers 

Firm: ------------------------- Address: 1201 Spyglass Drive., Suite 100 

Austin, TX 78746 

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC; Auction.com; 

Jeremiah McClain: Pamela Cirkiel 

Shamica Thomas; and Helen G. Kinneman 

Phone: 512-923-1836 

I, Angela Garcia. Deputy of Williamson County District Clerk, am unable to file the clerk's record in the 

above styled case by January 23, 2015 for the following reasons: 

xxxx Appellant has not paid or made arrangements to pay for the record. 

Appellant has only made a partial payment for the record. 

Appellant has made required payment and has fled a written designation, but due to work 

load, I have been unable to complete the record. 

Other (specify) 

2 Notices have been mailed out to the attorney regarding cost of Clerks Record. As of today January 16, 

2015, there has been no reply. 

I estimate the record in this appeal to be approximately 1 volume(s) with each volume being no 

more 1MB. 

It is respectfully requested that an extension be granted to: (date) February 27,2015 

LISA DAVID 

Address: -------~:;D-Hi~st-Rrit--~ct:-~.C,.+[fG-l€r;'-l'ok-------

Williamson County 

P. 0. Box 24 

Telephone: (512) _943-1212 ___ _ 

Fax: (512)_943-1222 _____ _ 

Additional information reflected on back 

***PLEASE RETURN ORIGINAL TO COURT OF APPEALS- DO NOT FAX*** 

Third Court of Appeals, P.O. Box 12547, Capital Station, Austin, TX 78711-2547
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE JOHNSTON
INDUSTRIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF APRIL 3, 1999 AND
FOR THE QUARTER THEN ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-04-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-03-1999
<CASH>                                       1,525,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               37,374,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,392,000
<INVENTORY>                                 57,300,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           104,136,000
<PP&E>                                     240,965,000
<DEPRECIATION>                             144,982,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             217,254,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      105,221,000
<BONDS>                                    126,493,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     1,246,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  45,281,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               217,254,000
<SALES>                                     65,032,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            65,032,000
<CGS>                                       57,730,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               57,730,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             6,716,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                47,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,118,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (2,602,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (855,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (1,747,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (1,747,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     (.16)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.16)
        

</TABLE>
#### John W. McRAE, Appellant, v. Hon. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director Division of Corrections, Appellee.

No. 74-233.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 5, 1974.

Habeas corpus denied.
#### THE STATE *vs.*ANSLEY WHITBY.

The defendant was indicted for an assault and battery on Isaac M. Hazel. Hazel was the keeper of a hotel in Camden, and the *495defendant being in his house, Hazel used towards him certain expressions meant jocularly, but offensive in themselves, and taken offensively. The defendant then cursed him, and was ordered from the house. He went out on the pavement, and was ordered away, but refused to go, drawing his knife and threatening violence. Hazel then threw a porter bottle and hit the defendant on the head, wounding him severely. Whitby then rushed in the house, and cut Hazel badly on the side of his neck.

*The Court*

charged :—All persons have the right to go to an inn, as guests, or for the purpose of selling any thing, which was the defendant’s business on this occasion. Coming as a guest he has a right to remain there so long as he behaves himself peaceably and properly, he paying for the entertainment. If he go there for the purpose of selling articles, when that is done he is to leave, if the owner of the house desires him; and if he refuse, the inn-keepcr, like any other proprietor of a house, has the right to order him away, and to enforce that order gently, or with so much force as is necessary. If the party refuse to go and arm himself, threatening to resist, the inn-keeper is not bound to commence his removal by such gentle modes as would be evidently ineffectual and dangerous to himself.

A man’s authority, inn-keeper or other, in this respect, is not confined to the walls of his house, but extends to the pavement or walk before the door. The public highways are such for use as highways; and for a man to plant himself on the highway before another’s house, to curse and abuse him, would be as wrong in itself, and as mischievous in its consequences, as to attempt the same thing in the house. The defendant was convicted.
#### PETEE D. PALMER *vs.*JEREMIAH SKILLENGER.

In an action for an assault, the day is immaterial, and proof of an assault any day be» fore the action, will be sufficient.

Trespass assault and battery. Pleas, son assault demesne, and act of limitations. Replications and issues.

The declaration laid the trespass on the 8th of October, 1848, and

*Mr. Layton*

objected to proof of any other assault and battery, prior to that time. (1 *Steph. N. P.,*222 , 1 *Harr. & Johns.,*483: 3 *Harr. & McHen.,*593,1 *Bing. Rep.,*317; 1 *Hsp. Rep.,*58; *Cro. Eliz.,*268.)

Houston.

The day laid in the narr is immaterial, but if the defendant plead son assault, &c., *and prove*an assault by the plaintiff *on any day,*it will be sufficient, unless the. plaintiff have by a new assignment specified another day.

*The Court*

said that the particular issue being on the plea of son assault demesne on the 8th of October, 1848, and replication of de injuria sua proprio, &c., the defendant should begin with his evidence, and if he proves an assault on him by the plaintiff, on any *235day before the action brought, the plaintiff will not be allowed to answer it by proof of an assault on any other day, unless he re-assign.

*Cullen*and *Houston,*for plaintiff.

*Robinson*and *Layton,*for defendant.

The defendant’s counsel objected to going on with their evidence first, bécause there was another plea and issue, viz: the act of limitations; and he objected also to the plaintiff being allowed to prove any other assault than on the 8th of October, 1848.

*The Court*

directed the plaintiff to proceed, and admitted proof on another day, to which defendant’s counsel excepted.

The plaintiff had a verdict.
#### Michael Menashi, Appellant, v Pamela G. Menashi, Respondent.

[721 NYS2d 838]

—In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Westches*523ter County (Shapiro, J.), entered November 9, 1999, as awarded the defendant pendente lite child support and tax-free maintenance in the amounts of $2,267 and $3,000 per month, respectively, directed him to pay the unreimbursed medical expenses of the defendant and the parties’ son, and awarded the defendant an interim attorney’s fee and an expert fee in the sums of $10,000 and $5,000, respectively, and (2) an order of the same court, dated April 6, 2000, as denied that branch of his motion which was for leave to renew.

Ordered that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

The proper remedy for any perceived inequities in a pendente lite award is a speedy trial (see, *Tillinger v Tillinger,*141 AD2d 535, 536; *see also, Frankenbach v Frankenbach,*244 AD2d 524; *Walker v Walker,*193 AD2d 730). An appellate court will rarely modify such an award, “and then only under exigent circumstances such as where a party is unable to meet his or her financial obligations or justice otherwise requires” *(Bagner v Bagner,*207 AD2d 367, 368). The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that such circumstances exist. Accordingly, modification of the award is not warranted.

The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. O’Brien, J. P., Santucci, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
House Calendar No. 106

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 286

[Report No. 103–309]

RESOLUTION

Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 334)

for other purposes.Tribe of Cheraw Indians of North Carolina, andto provide for the recognition of the Lumbee

OCTOBER 27, 1993

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be

printed
IV

House Calendar No. 106

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 286

[Report No. 103–309]

Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 334) to provide for the recognition of the Lumbee Tribe of Cheraw Indians of North Carolina, and

for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 27, 1993

Mr. HALL of Ohio, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following

resolution; which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be

printed

RESOLUTION

Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 334) to provide

for the recognition of the Lumbee Tribe of Cheraw Indians of North Carolina, and for other purposes.

1 Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this

2 resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of

3 rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee

4 of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consider5 ation of the bill (H.R. 334) to provide for the recognition

6 of the Lumbee Tribe of Cheraw Indians of North Carolina,
2

HRES 286 RH

1 and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill shall

2 be dispensed with. Points of order against consideration

3 of the bill for failure to comply with clause 2(l)(2)(B) of

4 rule XI are waived. General debate shall be confined to

5 the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and

6 controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member

7 of the Committee on Natural Resources. After general de8 bate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the

9 five-minute rule. Each section shall be considered as read.

10 At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amend11 ment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the

12 House with such amendments as may have been adopted.

13 The previous question shall be considered as ordered on

14 the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without

15 intervening motion except one motion to recommit.
#### Smith vs. Carrigan.

The depositions falling far short of sustaining the allegations of the bill against the sworn denial of the answer, the bill is dismissed for want of equity.

*556
      *Appeal from Independence Circuit Cov/rt in Chancery.*'

Hon. William E. CaiN, Circuit Judge. •

Stillwell & Woodruff, for appellant.

Mr. Chief Justice English

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Smith obtained judgments at law against Carrigan on two writings obligatory, made by one Wood as principal, and Carrigan as security.

Carrigan sought, by the bill in this-case, to injoin the judgments on the grounds that he signed the bonds, at the request of Wood, and on his representation that one McMillen was to sign them as. co-surety; and delivered them to Wood upon the express condition that they were not to be delivered to Smith until Mc-Millen signed them. But that Wood fraudulently delivered them to Smith, without the signature of McMillen, and that Smith was cognizant of the fraud, etc.

The material allegations of the bill, on which the relief is asked, are denied by the sworn answer of Smith, and the depositions read upon the hearing fall far short of sustaining the allegations against the sworn denial, etc.

The court below erred in rendering a decree for injunction, as prayed by the bill; and the decree must be reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to dissolve the injunction, and dismiss the bill for want of equity.