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T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N S T A T E ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E T W E L F T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

S M I T H C O U N T Y

C O C H R A N

, J

. , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t i n w h i c h K E L L E R

, P

. J

. , a n d

W O M A C K

, J O H N S O N

, K E A S L E R

, H E R V E Y

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c o n c u r r e d

. M E Y E R S

, J

. , d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e

.

O P I N I O N

W e g r a n t e d r e v i e w i n t h i s c a s e t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e l e g a l a n d f a c t u a l s u f

f i c i e n c y

s t a n d a r d s t h a t g o v e r n T e x a s c i v i l p r o c e e d i n g s s t i l l a p p l y t o t h e r e j e c t i o n o f a n a f

f i r m a t i v e

d e f e n s e a f t e r t h i s C o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n i n B r o o k s v

. S t a t e

. W e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e y d o

. B e c a u s e

1

323 S.W .3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The State Prosec uting Attorne y ’s two 1

g rounds for r eview a

re a s follows:

1. Did the cour

t of appe als err

in holding that the jury ’s re jection of the a ffirma tive defe nse

of inability

to pay child support was a g ainst the g rea t weig ht and pre pondera

nce of theMatlock Pag e 2

t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s m i s t a k e n l y c o n f l a t e d t h o s e t w o d i s t i n c t s t a n d a r d s i n t h i s c r i m i n a l

n o n s u p p o r t c a s e

, w e w i l l r e m a n d t h e c a s e t o t h a t c o u r t t o a g a i n r e v i e w t h e l e g a l ( a n d

, i f 2

n e c e s s a r y

, f

a c t u a l ) s u f

f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g t h e j u r y ’ s r e j e c t i o n o f a p p e l l a n t ’ s

“ i n a b i l i t y t o p a y ” a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e

.

I

.

I n 1 9 9 9

, a p p e l l a n t w a s j u d i c i a l l y d e t e r m i n e d t o b e t h e f a t h e r o f a f

i v e

- y e a r

- o l d g i r l a n d

o r d e r e d t o p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t

. F r o m t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g

, a p p e l l a n t f r e q u e n t l y f

a i l e d t o p a y t h e

$ 1 9 1

. 4 0 m o n t h l y c h i l d s u p p o r t

. I n s t e a d

, h e w a s “ d o i n g d r u g s

. . . c r y s t a l m e t h

, h e r o i n

, a n d 3

e v e r y t h i n g e l s e y o u c o u l d t h i n k o f

. ” A p p e l l a n t i n t r o d u c e d i n t o e v i d e n c e h i s “ b o o k

- i n b o o k

o u t ” S m i t h C o u n t y j a i l s h e e t t h a t s h o w e d h i s n u m e r o u s c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s a n d a r r e s t d a t e s

b e t w e e n F e b r u a r y 1 6

, 1 9 9 5

, a n d J u n e 4

, 2 0 0 9

. T h e s e c h a r g e s i n c l u d e d h a r a s s m e n t

, D W L S

,

m i s d e m e a n o r t h e f

t

, t w o D W I s

, f

a m i l y

- v i o l e n c e a s s a u l t

, s e v e r a l c h a r g e s o f n o n p a y m e n t o f

c h i l d s u p p o r t

, t r e s p a s s

, i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h a n e m e r g e n c y c a l l

, a n d b u r g l a r y

.

evidenc e whe n the majority of Texas appe llate cour

ts, including the Ty

ler c ourt, apply

the

civil leg al suffic iency

standard of

revie w announc ed by

the Texas Supreme Court in

Sterner v. M

arathon Oil Company , 767 S.W .2d [686] (Tex. 1989), and the f actua l

sufficie ncy

standard in Meraz v . State , [785] S.W .2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), has

been se vere ly

underc ut by Brooks v. State , 323 S.W .3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)?

2. Apply ing the Sterner leg al suffic iency

standard, doe s the fac t of incar cer ation alone

satisfy the appe llant’s burden on the aff irmative def

ense of inability to pay child support

by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e?

Matlock v . State , No. 12-09-00358- CR, 2012 W L 426613, at *8-11 (T ex. App.–Ty ler 2

Fe b. 8, 2012).

Appellant testified that he was a lso ordere d to pay child support for two other children, 3

and that he a

nd his wife have three children, f or a total of six children that appe llant is supposed

to support.Matlock Pag e 3

M o s t r e c e n t l y

, a p p e l l a n t w a s c h a r g e d w i t h s i x t e e n c o u n t s o f n o n s u p p o r t f o r f a i l i n g t o

p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t o n t h e f i r s t o f e a c h m o n t h f

r o m F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 6 t h r o u g h N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 6

,

i n J a n u a r y 2 0 0 8

, i n J u n e 2 0 0 8

, a n d f r o m S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 t h r o u g h D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 8

. T h e 4

e v i d e n c e w a s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t p a y t h e r e q u i r e d c h i l d s u p p o r t d u r i n g t h o s e

s i x t e e n m o n t h s

. T h e o n l y q u e s t i o n w a s w h e t h e r h e h a d t h e a b i l i t y t o m a k e t h o s e p a y m e n t s

. 5

C h i e f D e p u t y P i n k e r t o n o f t h e S m i t h C o u n t y S h e r i f f ’ s O f f i c e t e s t i f i e d t h a t j a i l i n m a t e s

c a n n o t r e c e i v e a n y m o n e y f o r t h e j o b s t h a t t h e y m a y d o i n t h e j a i l

, a l t h o u g h a t r u s t y m a y

r e c e i v e g o o d

- t i m e c r e d i t s

. C h i e f P i n k e r t o n a l s o a g r e e d t h a t t h o s e w h o h a d m o n e y b e f o r e

t h e y w e n t t o j a i l w o u l d s t i l l h a v e t h a t m o n e y

, a n d “ t h e y c a n p a y w h o e v e r t h e y w a n t t o p a y

. ”

A n a p p o i n t e d l a w y e r w h o h a d r e p r e s e n t e d a p p e l l a n t b e t w e e n 2 0 0 5 a n d 2 0 0 7 t e s t i f i e d

t h a t a p p e l l a n t w a s j a i l e d o n p r e v i o u s n o n s u p p o r t c h a r g e s f o r m o r e t h a n a y e a r

. H e w a s t h e n

c o n d i t i o n a l l y r e l e a s e d o n p r o b a t i o n t o s t a y a n d w o r k a t t h e F a m i l y P r a y e r C o u n s e l i n g C e n t e r

,

a r e s i d e n t i a l d r u g

- t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m

. T h e C e n t e r p a i d a p p e l l a n t $ 5 0

. 0 0 a w e e k a n d

f o r w a r d e d t h e r e s t o f h i s p a y c h e c k f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s

. B u t a p p e l l a n t ’ s p r o b a t i o n w a s

r e v o k e d i n 2 0 0 8

, a n d h e w a s o r d e r e d t o s e r v e 1 8 0 d a y s i n j a i l

. H i s p r o b a t i o n o f f i c e r s a i d t h a t

See T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 25.05(a) (“A n individual commits an off ense if the individual 4

intentionally

or knowing ly

fails to provide support for the individual’s child y oung er tha n 18

y ear s of ag e, or f

or the individual’s child who is the subjec t of a c ourt order requiring the

individual to support the child.”).

See id. , § 25.05(d) ( “I t is an aff irmative def

ense to prose cution under this sec tion that 5

the ac tor could not provide support f or the a ctor’s c hild.”). The de fenda nt must prove an

aff irmative def

ense by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e, the sa me standar d of proof as that

employ ed in civil case s.Matlock Pag e 4

a p p e l l a n t w a s n o t a g o o d p r o b a t i o n e r ; s h e a s s u m e d “ i t w a s h i s d r u g a d d i c t i o n t h a t k e p t h i m

f r o m p a y i n g h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t a s o r d e r e d

. ” A p p e l l a n t w a s c o n t i n u o u s l y i n j a i l o n p r e v i o u s

n o n s u p p o r t c h a r g e s f

r o m M a r c h 6

, 2 0 0 5

, t h r o u g h M a r c h 2 4

, 2 0 0 6

, a s w e l l a s a t v a r i o u s t i m e s

i n 2 0 0 7 a n d 2 0 0 8

.

A p p e l l a n t t e s t i f

i e d t h a t h e h a s a c o l l e g e d e g r e e i n e l e c t r o n i c s

, b u t t h a t h e c a n ’ t f i n d

w o r k i n e l e c t r o n i c s

. “ T h e y ’ r e n o t h i r i n g

. ” H e h a d l o o k e d a l l t h e w a y f r o m H o u s t o n t o T y l e r

.

H e h a d w o r k e d i n f

a s t

- f o o d r e s t a u r a n t s

, b u t s o m e t i m e s t h e y w o u l d n ’ t h i r e h i m b e c a u s e h e

w a s “ o v e r

- q u a l i f

i e d

. ” H e w o r k e d a t t h e F a m i l y C a r e C e n t e r f o r a l m o s t a y e a r a f

t e r h e w a s

r e l e a s e d f

r o m j a i l i n M a r c h

, 2 0 0 6

. H i s s a l a r y w a s a u t o m a t i c a l l y s e n t o f f f o r c h i l d

- s u p p o r t

p a y m e n t s f

o r h i s d a u g h t e r a n d a n o t h e r s o n

. A f t e r a b o u t s i x m o n t h s w o r k i n g a t t h e C e n t e r

,

a p p e l l a n t o b t a i n e d a c o m m e r c i a l d r i v e r ’ s l i c e n s e a n d g o t a j o b w i t h B a s i c E n e r g i e s

, a

t r u c k i n g c o m p a n y

, w h e r e h e m a d e $ 1 3

. 0 0 a n h o u r

. B u t h e l o s t t h a t j o b a f t e r a m o n t h b e c a u s e

h e w a s n ’ t “ r e a d y t o b e a r o u n d o t h e r p e o p l e

. ” H e l a t e r g o t a j o b w i t h S h e l l T a n k e r

. A p p e l l a n t

t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e d i d n ’ t m a k e a n y c h i l d s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s f o r e i t h e r h i s d a u g h t e r o r s o n w h i l e

h e w a s i n j a i l b e c a u s e “ I d i d n ’ t h a v e n o m o n e y

. N o b o d y w o u l d g i v e m e m o n e y

. ” D u r i n g

t h o s e p e r i o d s o f t i m e

, h e w a s n o t “ a b l e t o p r o v i d e a n y f u n d i n g o r s o u r c e s o f i n c o m e t o p a y

a n y s u p p o r t t o w a r d ” h i s d a u g h t e r

.

W h e n a s k e d b y t h e p r o s e c u t o r i f h e h a d “ a n y m o n e y w h a t s o e v e r i n s a v i n g s

, ” a p p e l l a n t

s a i d t h a t h e d i d n o t

. H e s a i d t h a t h e h a d a s k e d h i s u n c l e

, a d e n t i s t i n M a r s h a l l

, f o r h e l p i n

p a y i n g h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t

, b u t h i s u n c l e g a v e h i m “ Z e r o

. ” T h e r e w a s n o s u g g e s t i o n t h a tMatlock Pag e 5

a p p e l l a n t o w n e d a c a r

, a h o u s e

, o r a b a n k a c c o u n t

. T h e r e w a s e v i d e n c e t h a t h e w a s e s t r a n g e d

f r o m h i s w i f

e a n d t h a t h e h a d b e e n s t a y i n g w i t h v a r i o u s r e l a t i v e s w h e n h e w a s n o t i n j a i l o r

a t t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n c e n t e r

.

B a s e d u p o n t h i s e v i d e n c e

, t h e j u r y f o u n d a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y o n a l l s i x t e e n c o u n t s o f

n o n s u p p o r t a n d s e n t e n c e d h i m t o c o n f i n e m e n t i n a s t a t e j a i l f

a c i l i t y f o r t w o y e a r s w i t h a f

i n e

o f $ 1 0

, 0 0 0 o n e a c h c o u n t

.

O n d i r e c t a p p e a l

, a p p e l l a n t c l a i m e d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s l e g a l l y a n d f a c t u a l l y

i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ’ s r e j e c t i o n o f h i s “ i n a b i l i t y t o p a y ” a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e

. T h e

c o u r t o f a p p e a l s f

o c u s e d o n C o u n t I

– t h e f a i l u r e t o p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t o n F e b r u a r y 1

, 2 0 0 6

–

a n d t h e u n d i s p u t e d e v i d e n c e t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a d b e e n i n t h e S m i t h C o u n t y j a i l f o r t h e e l e v e n

m o n t h s p r e c e d i n g t h a t d a t e

. T h e c o u r t n o t e d t h a t t h e r e w a s n o e v i d e n c e t o s u g g e s t t h a t

a p p e l l a n t h a d m o n e y t o p a y h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n t h a t m o n t h o r t h a t h e “ h a d a s o u r c e

f r o m w h i c h h e c o u l d b o r r o w o r o b t a i n t h e m o n e y t o p a y t h a t c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n

. ” 6

T h e r e f o r e

, t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s h e l d t h a t

, “ a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g a l l o f t h e e v i d e n c e r e l e v a n t t o

A p p e l l a n t ’ s a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e o f i n a b i l i t y t o p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t

, . . . t h e j u r y ’ s f i n d i n g o f

g u i l t a s t o C o u n t I o f t h e i n d i c t m e n t i s s o a g a i n s t t h e g r e a t w e i g h t a n d p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e

e v i d e n c e a s t o b e m a n i f e s t l y u n j u s t

. ” I t e n t e r e d a j u d g m e n t o f a c q u i t t a l o n C o u n t I

.

7 8

Matlock , 2012 WL 426613, at *10. 6

Id. 7

Id. at *12. 8Matlock Pag e 6

A s t o t h e o t h e r c o u n t s

, t h e e v i d e n c e w a s i n c o n f l i c t b e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t a d m i t t e d t h a t

h e h a d a c o l l e g e d e g r e e i n e l e c t r o n i c s a n d h a d w o r k e d d u r i n g m u c h o f t h a t t i m e

, s o m e t i m e s

a s a t r u c k d r i v e r m a k i n g $ 1 3

. 0 0 a n h o u r

. A s t o t h o s e c o u n t s

, a p p e l l a n t ’ s t e s t i m o n y w a s

“ e q u i v o c a l

, c o n f

l i c t i n g

, a n d u n c l e a r [

, ] ” a n d t h u s t h e j u r y ’ s f i n d i n g a g a i n s t t h e a f

f i r m a t i v e

d e f e n s e w a s “ n o t s o a g a i n s t t h e g r e a t w e i g h t a n d p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e a s t o b e

m a n i f e s t l y u n j u s t

. ” I t u p h e l d t h o s e f i f t e e n c o n v i c t i o n s

. 9

I I

.

T h e S t a t e p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t

, a r g u i n g t h a t t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s e r r e d b y a p p l y i n g a

f a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r t h e e v i d e n c e w a s l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t

t o s a t i s f y a p p e l l a n t ’ s b u r d e n t o p r o v e h i s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e

. W e a g r e e

, b u t f

i r s t w e b r i e f

l y

e x a m i n e h o w t h e s t a n d a r d o f p r o o f i s r e l a t e d t o t h e s t a n d a r d s o f r e v i e w i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s

.

A

. B u r d e n o f P r o o f / S t a n d a r d o f R e v i e w f o r E l e m e n t s o f

O f f e n s e ( J a c k s o n / B r o o k s )

U n d e r B r o o k

s v

. S t a t e

, w e r e v i e w t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e 1 0

e l e m e n t s o f a c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e f o r w h i c h t h e S t a t e h a s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f u n d e r t h e s i n g l e

s u f f i c i e n c y s t a n d a r d s e t o u t i n J a c k s o n v

. V i r g i n i a

. U n d e r t h a t s t a n d a r d

, w e v i e w t h e

1 1

e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e v e r d i c t a n d d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a n y r a t i o n a l t r i e r

Id. at *11. 9

323 S.W .3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 1 0

443 U.S. 307 (1979). 1 1Matlock Pag e 7

o f f a c t c o u l d h a v e f

o u n d t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s o f t h e o f f e n s e b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t

. 1 2

T h e J a c k s o n s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i s t h a t r e q u i r e d f o r c r i m i n a l c a s e s w h e n t h e s t a n d a r d o f p r o o f

i s t h a t o f “ b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t

. ”

T h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w a p p l i e s t o t h e e l e m e n t s o f a n o f f e n s e t h a t t h e

S t a t e m u s t p r o v e b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t

, b u t i t d o e s n o t a p p l y t o e l e m e n t s o f a n

a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e t h a t t h e d e f

e n d a n t m u s t p r o v e b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e

. 1 3

P r i o r t o B r o o k

s

, w e u s e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l T e x a s c i v i l b u r d e n s o f p r o o f a n d s t a n d a r d s o f r e v i e w

i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e s w h e r e t h e r e

j e c t i o n o f a n a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e i s

e s t a b l i s h e d b y a “ p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e

. ” O u r d e c i s i o n i n B r o o k s d i d n o t a f

f e c t 1 4

Id. at 319; see Brook

s , 323 S.W .3d at 895 (“ the Jack son v. Virginia leg al-suff iciency 1 2

standard is the only

standard tha t a re viewing court should apply in determining whether

the

evidenc e is sufficie nt to support each e lement of a criminal off

ense tha t the State is require d to

prove be y ond a re asonable doubt.”).

See B rooks , 323 S.W .3d at 924 n.67 (Cochr an, J., concurring ) (noting that this Court 1 3

had “pr operly

adopted the T exas civil standards of leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

for those f

ew

instances in cr iminal cases in which the burden of proof is a pr eponder ance of the e vidence , as

occur s with affirma tive defe nses.”)

.

See V an Guilder v. State , 709 S.W .2d 178, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (def endant who 1 4

had prove n her a ffirma tive defe nse of insanity as a ma tter of law

was e ntitled to acquittal;

rec og nizi ng that there was no e vidence to rebut def endant’ s insanity

defe nse and c oncluding that

“no ra tional trier of f

act c ould have f

ound that [defendant] failed to prove her a ffirma tive defe nse

by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e”) ; Meraz v . State , 785 S.W .2d 146, 153-56 (Te x . Crim. App.

1990) (holding that Texas civil standards of r eview a pply in assessing fac tual sufficie ncy of the

evidenc e of jury ’s ver dict reje cting a def endant’ s aff

irmative def

ense of insanity or

incompetenc y

); Cleveland v . State , 177 S.W .3d 374, 386-91 (Te x . App.–Houston [1 Dist.] st

2005, pet. re f’d) (setting out and apply ing c ivil st andar ds of re view to claims of leg al and f actua l

insufficienc y

of the e vidence to rejec t defe ndant’s punishment “sudden pa ssion” claim that he

had the bur den to prove by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e); Howard v. State , 145 S.W .3d 327,

329-36 (Te x . App.–For

t Worth 2004, no pet.) (setting out a nd apply ing c ivil st andar ds of re view

for a ssessing both the le g al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence to rejec t defe ndant’s

aff irmative def

ense of “inability to pay ” in prosec ution for cr iminal nonsupport).Matlock Pag e 8

t h a t l i n e o f c a s e s

. W e c o n t i n u e t o u s e t h o s e c i v i l s t a n d a r d s i n r e v i e w i n g a j u r y ’ s r e j e c t i o n o f

a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e

.

B

. S t a n d a r d o f R e v i e w o n L e g a l S u f f i c i e n c y C o n c e r n i n g A f f i r m a t i v e D e f

e n s e

( M o d i f i e d S t e r n e r )

I n S t e r n e r v

. Ma r a t h o n O i l C o

. , t h e T e x a s S u p r e m e C o u r t s e t o u t t h e s t a n d a r d o f 1 5

r e v i e w t h a t a p p l i e s w h e n a n a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s t h a t t h e r e w a s “ n o e v i d e n c e ” ( l e g a l l y

i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e ) t o s u p p o r t a n a d v e r s e f i n d i n g o n w h i c h t h a t p a r t y h a d t h e b u r d e n o f

p r o o f b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e :

A p a r t y a t t e m p t i n g t o o v e r c o m e a n a d v e r s e f a c t f i n d i n g a s a m a t t e r o f

l a w m u s t s u r m o u n t t w o h u r d l e s

. F i r s t

, t h e r e c o r d m u s t b e e x a m i n e d f o r

e v i d e n c e t h a t s u p p o r t s t h e j u r y ’ s f i n d i n g

, w h i l e i g n o r i n g a l l e v i d e n c e t o t h e

c o n t r a r y

. S e c o n d

, i f t h e r e i s n o e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e f a c t f i n d e r ’ s a n s w e r

,

t h e n

, t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d m u s t b e e x a m i n e d t o s e e i f t h e c o n t r a r y p r o p o s i t i o n i s

e s t a b l i s h e d a s a m a t t e r o f l a w

. 1 6

T h e m a j o r i t y o f c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s t h a t h a v e a d d r e s s e d t h e i s s u e o f t h e l e g a l s u f f i c i e n c y

o f t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a j u r y ’ s r e j e c t i o n o f a n a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e h a v e

f o l l o w e d t h e S t e r n e r s t a n d a r d

. T h a t s t a n d a r d h a s

, h o w e v e r

, b e e n m o d i f i e d b y t h e T e x a s 1 7

767 S.W .2d 686 (Tex. 1989). 1 5

Id. at 690; see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Franc is , 46 S.W .3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per 1 6

curia m) (“When a

party attacks the leg al suffic iency of an a dverse finding on an issue on which

she has the bur den of pr oof, she must demonstrate on appea l that the evidenc e esta blishes, as a

matter of la

w, all vital fac ts in support of the issue.”); see ge nerally , W. W endell Ha ll, Standards

of Revie w in T

exas , 29 S T

. M A R Y ’ S L .J . 351, 481–82 (1998).

See, e .g. , Cleveland, 177 S.W.3d at 387-88; Howard , 145 S.W .3d at 333-35; see also 1 7

Rodriguez-Flores v . State , 351 S.W .3d 612, 636-37 (Te x . App.–Austin 2011, no pet); Perez v

. State , 323 S.W .3d 298, 304-05 (Te x . App.–Amar illo 2010, pet. ref’ d); Bradshaw v. State , 244

S.W .3d 490, 502 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2007, pet. re f’d) ; Nolan v. State , 102 S.W .3d 231, 238

(Tex. App.–Houston [14t h Dist.] 2003, pet. re f’d)

.Matlock Pag e 9

S u p r e m e C o u r t ’ s 2 0 0 5 d e c i s i o n i n C i t y o f K e l l e r v

. W

i l s o n

, w h i c h r e f

i n e d t h e t e s t f

o r l e g a l

1 8

s u f f i c i e n c y c l a i m s i n c i v i l c a s e s

. T h u s

, w e a d o p t t h e m o d i f i e d s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w o f t h e 1 9

A minority

of the c ourts of appe als have used the Meraz fac tual-suffic iency

standard to

revie w all suffic iency -of- the-e vidence claims conc erning an af firmative de fense

. See, e .g.,

Patterson v. State , 121 S.W .3d 22, 24 (Tex. App.–Houston [1s t Dist.] 2003, pet. dism’d) (stating

that courts of the appea ls do not have jurisdiction to review the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence

reje cting an af

firmative de fense , and conc luding that whe n a def endant se eks appe llate re view of

an adve rse f

inding on a

n aff irmative def

ense, he invokes only

the appe llate cour

t’s fac tual

sufficie ncy

revie w); Naasz v. State , 974 S.W .2d 418, 421 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1998, pe t. ref’ d)

(“When a defe ndant see ks appellate revie w of a jury ’s fa ilure to make a

finding on which the

defe ndant has the bur den of pr oof, such a s on an af firmative de fense , the def endant invokes our

fac tual revie w jurisdiction.”).

The Te x arka

na Court of Appe als discussed these two diverg ent lines in Ballard v. State

, 161 S.W .3d 269, 271-72 (Te x . App.–Texarkana 2005), aff’d ,193 S.W .3d 916 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006), and it conc luded that our de cision in Meraz did not ex clude a

leg al suffic iency

revie w of

the evidenc e. Id. at 271. The Te x arka na cour t rea soned that this Court sim ply did not address

the leg al suffic iency

of the e vidence to support a jury ’s re jection of a

n aff irmative def

ense in

Meraz . We were conce rned only with the fac tual sufficie ncy of the e vidence to rejec t the

defe ndant’s cla im of incompetenc e. See M eraz , 785 S.W .2d at 147 (noting that the issue to be

resolved w as def

endant’ s “asse rtion that the adve rse r esolution of his incompetency plea wa s

ag ainst the g rea

t weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e” a

nd thus was fa ctually

insufficient

to support the jury ’s adve rse f inding on incompe tency

). On discr etionary

revie w of Ballard , we

ag ree d with the Texarkana court’s discussion of the two separ ate standa rds for le g al and f

actua l

sufficie ncy

of the e vidence to support the adver se finding on defe ndant’s cla im that he had

voluntarily

rele ased the kidnap victim in a safe place . 193 S.W .3d at 918 (“ On appe al, appe llant

claimed that the e vidence was leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to support a f irst-deg ree

ag g rava ted kidnapping conviction. . . .bec ause no r ational trier of fac t could have f

ound that the

complainant had not be en voluntarily rele ased in a

safe place , whether

revie wed in the lig ht most

favor able to the ve rdict or in a ne utral lig ht. The cour t of appe als disag ree d and held the e vidence

sufficie nt, say ing tha t ‘leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence supported the tria l court’s

conclusion that [defenda

nt’s] actions did not consti tute “voluntary rele ase” to trigg er mitig ation

of [defenda

nt’s] puni shment for a g g rava ted kidnapping .’”) . We would not have discussed both

the leg al and f

actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence in Ballard had we not ag ree d that both standards

could apply

to an af firmative de fense or other c laim that the defe ndant must prove by a

preponde ranc e of the evidenc e.

168 S.W .3d 802 (Tex. 2005). 1 8

See id. at 827. The Te x as Supreme Court e x plained that 1 9

[t ]he final test for leg al suffic iency must alway s be whe ther the e vidence at trial

would enable rea sonable a nd fair- minded people to re ach the verdic t underMatlock Pag e 10

l e g a l s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a n a d v e r s e f i n d i n g o n a n a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e :

W h e n a n a p p e l l a n t a s s e r t s t h a t t h e r e i s n o e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a n a d v e r s e

f i n d i n g o n w h i c h s h e h a d t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f

, w e c o n s t r u e t h e i s s u e a s a n

a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e c o n t r a r y w a s e s t a b l i s h e d a s a m a t t e r o f l a w

. W e f

i r s t s e a r c h

t h e r e c o r d f

o r e v i d e n c e f

a v o r a b l e t o t h e f

i n d i n g

, d i s r e g a r d i n g a l l c o n t r a r y

e v i d e n c e u n l e s s a r e a s o n a b l e f a c t f i n d e r c o u l d n o t

. I f w e f i n d n o e v i d e n c e

s u p p o r t i n g t h e f

i n d i n g

, w e t h e n d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e c o n t r a r y w a s

e s t a b l i s h e d a s a m a t t e r o f l a w

. 2 0

I n r e v i e w i n g t h e l e g a l s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a n a d v e r s e f i n d i n g o n t h e

a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e o f a n i n a b i l i t y t o p a y i n a n o n s u p p o r t p r o s e c u t i o n

, w e f i r s t l o o k f

o r

e v i d e n c e ( “ m o r e t h a n a m e r e s c i n t i l l a ” ) t h a t s u p p o r t s t h e j u r y ’ s i m p l i e d f i n d i n g t h a t t h e 2 1

d e f e n d a n t c o u l d p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t

, a n d w e d i s r e g a r d a l l e v i d e n c e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s 2 2

revie w. Whether a

revie wing court be g ins by considering all the evidenc e or only

the evidenc e supporting the ver dict, leg al-suff iciency revie w in the prope r lig ht

must credit fa vorable evidenc e if re asonable jurors could, a nd disreg ard c ontrary

evidenc e unless re asonable jurors could not.

Id.

One Ford M

ustang VIN 1FAFP40471F207859 v. State , 231 S.W .3d 445, 449 (Tex. 2 0

App.–Waco 2007, no pet.) ; see also RM Crowe Prope rty Servic es Co., L.P. v. Strategic Energy

, L.L.C

. , 348 S.W .3d 444, 448 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2011, no pe t.); Dallas County Const able v.

Garden City Boxing Club, Inc ., 219 S.W .3d 613, 616 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2007, no pe t.); Sellers v.

Foster , 199 S.W .3d 385, 392 (Tex. App.–For t Worth 2006, no pet.).

“Evidenc e does not e x cee d a scintilla if it is ‘so weak a s to do no more than cr eate a 2 1

mere surmise or suspicion’ that the f act e x ists.” In re Estate of Campbell , 343 S.W .3d 899, 904

n.6 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2011, no pet.) ( quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d 598,

601 (Tex. 2004)).

See H oward v. State , 145 S.W .3d 327, 330-36 (Te x . App.–For t Worth 2004, no pet.) 2 2

(re viewing the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence to support jury ’s re jection of

defe ndant’s af

firmative de fense of inability to pay in criminal nonsupport prosec ution).Matlock Pag e 11

i n a b i l i t y t o p a y u n l e s s a r e a s o n a b l e f a c t f i n d e r c o u l d n o t d i s r e g a r d t h a t e v i d e n c e

. I f n o 2 3

e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s t h e j u r y ’ s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e f

e n d a n t c o u l d p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t

, t h e n w e

s e a r c h t h e r e c o r d t o s e e i f t h e d e f e n d a n t h a d e s t a b l i s h e d

, a s a m a t t e r o f l a w

, t h a t h e d i d n o t

h a v e t h e a b i l i t y t o p a y h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t

. I f t h e r e c o r d r e v e a l s e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g t h e 2 4

d e f e n d a n t ’ s p o s i t i o n t h a t h e d i d n o t h a v e t h e a b i l i t y t o p a y

, b u t t h a t e v i d e n c e w a s s u b j e c t t o

a c r e d i b i l i t y a s s e s s m e n t a n d w a s e v i d e n c e t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e j u r y w a s e n t i t l e d t o d i s b e l i e v e

,

w e w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r t h a t e v i d e n c e i n o u r m a t t e r

- o f

- l a w a s s e s s m e n t

. 2 5

O n l y i f t h e a p p e a l i n g p a r t y e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e c o n c l u s i v e l y p r o v e s h i s

See City of Keller , 168 S.W .3d at 827 (holding that, in leg al-suff iciency revie w, cour

ts 2 3

view the e vidence in the light most favor able to the ve rdict, cr edit supporting e vidence if

rea sonable juror s could do so, and disreg ard c ontrary evidenc e unless re asonable jurors could

not); Burns v. Rochon , 190 S.W .3d 263, 267 (Tex. App.–Houston [1s t Dist.] 2006, no pet.)

(“Mor e than a

scintilla of evidenc e exists i f the e vidence furnishes some r easona ble basis for

differ ing c onclusions by

rea sonable minds about a vital fa ct’s existence.” ).

See Ste rner , 767 S.W .2d at 690. 2 4

See G rider v. Mik

e O’ Brien, P.C. , 260 S.W .3d 49, 56 (Tex. App.–Houston [1s t Dist.] 2 5

2008, pet. re f’d) (“The jury ’s fa ilure to find a pa rticular f act ne ed not be supporte d by any

evidenc e, bec ause the jury acts a s the ultimate decision maker on the cr edibility

of the

proponent’s c ase a

nd is free to disbelieve the e vidence prese nted by the par ty with the burden of

proof.” ); Y

ap v. ANR Freight System s, Inc ., 789 S.W .2d 424, 425-26 (Te x . App.–Houston [1st

Dist.] 1990, no pet.) (pa

rty asser ting that he had esta

blished his claim “as a

matter of la

w” e ven

though jur

y made a dverse finding must show that reasona ble minds could not differ on tha t

element) ; see also W. W endell Ha ll, Standards of Review in Texas , 34 S T

. M A R Y ’ S L .J ., 1, 165-

66 (2002) ( noting that some c ases hold that “undisputed” evidenc e ca nnot be ig nored in leg al

sufficie ncy

revie w while other

case s hold that jury

may disbelieve e ven uncontr adicted te stimony

offe red by

party with the burden of

proof; conc luding that “ [g]iven the scope of revie w, which

require s the court to disreg ard a ll evidence contra ry to the verdic t, the latter line of c ases is

clea rly corr ect whe n the appe llant raises a n ‘as a matter of la

w’ c halleng e”)

.Matlock Pag e 12

a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e a n d “ t h a t n o r e a s o n a b l e j u r y w a s f r e e t o t h i n k o t h e r w i s e

, ” m a y t h e 2 6

r e v i e w i n g c o u r t c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e i s l e g a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ’ s

r e j e c t i o n o f t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e

. A p p l y i n g t h a t s t a n d a r d t o c r i m i n a l c a s e s

, 2 7

w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o a n a c q u i t t a l o n a p p e a l d e s p i t e t h e j u r y ’ s a d v e r s e

f i n d i n g o n h i s a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e o n l y i f t h e e v i d e n c e c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e s h i s

a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e u n d e r t h e m o d i f

i e d t w o

- s t e p S t e r n e r t e s t

. 2 8

C

. S t a n d a r d o f R e v i e w o n F a c t u a l S u f f i c i e n c y C o n c e r n i n g A f f i r m a t i v e D e f

e n s e

( M e r a z )

A c r i m i n a l d e f

e n d a n t m i g h t a l s o r a i s e a f a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y c h a l l e n g e t o t h e j u r y ’ s

a d v e r s e f i n d i n g o n h i s a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e

. I n t h a t e v e n t

, w e t u r n t o M e r a z

, o u r s e m i n a l 2 9

Tanner v. Nationwi de Mut. Fire I ns. Co. , 289 S.W .3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2009); see City of 2 6

Keller , 168 S.W .3d at 823 (“ J udg ment without or ag ainst a jury verdic t is proper a t any

course of

the proc eeding s only

when the la

w does not allow re asonable jurors to dec ide otherw ise.”).

See V an Guilder v. State , 709 S.W .2d 178, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 2 7

See Clev eland , 177 S.W .3d at 390 (c oncluding that evidenc e conc erning jury ’s neg ative 2 8

finding on defe ndant’s cla im of “sudden pa ssion” was leg ally sufficie nt as a matter

of law) ; see

also Champagne v. State , No. 13-11-00657- CR, 2012 W L 2469677, at *3 (Te x . App.–Corpus

Christi J une 28, 2012) ( not desig nated f or publication) ( following Cleveland and conc luding that

evidenc e wa s leg ally

sufficie nt to support jury ’s implied neg ative finding on defe ndant’s

aff irmative def

ense of inability to pay in criminal nonsupport prosec ution); W oods v. State , No.

06–05–00150–CR, 2006 W L 1389581, at *1-2 (T ex. App.–Tex arka na May 23, 2006, no pet.)

(not desig nated f

or publication) ( evidenc e that def endant, who w as able to work and e ligible f or

rehire by a pre vious employ er, but did not seek r ehire , was leg ally sufficie nt to support jury ’s

reje ction of inability -to-pay defe nse in criminal nonsupport prose cution).

Tec hnically , a def

endant’ s claim is not one of “f actua l insufficienc y .” He is really 2 9

arg uing tha t he had of

fer ed so much e vidence in support of his affir mative-de fense claim and the

State offe red so little evidenc e re butting his defe nse, that the jury ’s re jection of his af

firmative

defe nse is ag ainst the g rea t weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. See Stone v. State , 823

S.W .2d 375, 380-81 (Te x . App.–Austin 1992, pet. ref ’d). The defe ndant is claiming that his

evidenc e is more than suf ficient to support his aff

irmative def

ense, w hile the State’s evide nce isMatlock Pag e 13

c a s e o n f a c t u a l s u f

f i c i e n c y

, i n w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t c l a i m e d t h a t t h e j u r y ’ s r e j e c t i o n o f h i s

i n c o m p e t e n c y p l e a

– a p l e a t h a t h e h a d t h e b u r d e n t o p r o v e a n d t h u s i s s i m i l a r t o a n a f f i r m a t i v e

d e f e n s e

– w a s a g a i n s t t h e g r e a t w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e

. I n M e r a z

, w e a d o p t e d t h e c i v i l 3 0

s t a n d a r d s o f f

a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y r e v i e w b e c a u s e t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f i s t h a t o f “ p r e p o n d e r a n c e

o f t h e e v i d e n c e

, ” t h e s a m e b u r d e n a s i n c i v i l p r o c e e d i n g s

. I n m a k i n g a f a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y 3 1

c l a i m

, t h e d e f

e n d a n t i s a s s e r t i n g t h a t

, c o n s i d e r i n g t h e e n t i r e b o d y o f e v i d e n c e

, t h e j u r y ’ s

a d v e r s e f

i n d i n g o n h i s a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e w a s s o “ a g a i n s t t h e g r e a t w e i g h t a n d

p r e p o n d e r a n c e ” o f t h a t e v i d e n c e t o b e m a n i f e s t l y u n j u s t

. 3 2

insufficient to re but it.

Meraz , 785 S.W .2d at 147. I n Meraz , we ove rruled Van Guilder to the extent that it 3 0

had held that the c ourts of appe al did not have the a uthority to determine if a

jury finding on an

aff irmative def

ense w as ag ainst the g rea t weig ht of the evide nce. Id. at 154-55. We did not

overr ule the basic holding of Van Guilder that a def endant may

establish an af

firmative de fense

as a ma tter of law . I n Van Guilder , howeve r, we used a le g al standar d of re view that wa s tied to

criminal burde ns of proof, so w e over ruled that c riminal standard in Meraz when we adopted

civil standards for

both leg al and f

actua l sufficienc y

revie w for a ffirma tive defe nses. See V an

Guilder , 709 S.W .2d at 181 (“ [W ]e hold that in reviewing a ca se involving a n aff irmative

defe nse, the c ourt of appe als must review the evidenc e on the a ffirma tive defe nse by looking a t

the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the implicit findi ng by the jury with respec t to such

aff irmative def

ense a nd then deter

mine, by examining all the evide nce c oncer ning the aff

irmative

defe nse, if any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found that the de fenda nt failed to prove his

defe nse by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. . . . The test evalua tes the leg al suffic iency of the

evidenc e using a leg al standar d.”); Meraz , 785 S.W .2d at 152-54 (f inding that a

modified

Jack son standard is not appr opriate f or re viewing the leg al or fa ctual suff iciency of the e vidence

to rejec t an af

firmative de fense and adopting civil standards of r eview)

.

Meraz , 785 S.W .2d at 149, 153-55. 3 1

Id. , at 154-55 (“ when the c ourts of appe als are called upon to e x erc ise their fa ct 3 2

jurisdiction, that is, ex amine whe ther the a ppellant prove d his affirma tive defe nse or other fac t

issue wher e the law

has desig nated that the de fenda nt has the burde n of proof by a pre pondera

nce

of evide nce, the corr ect standa rd of r eview is whe ther a fter c onsidering all the evidenc e re levant

to the issue at hand, the judg ment is so ag ainst the g rea t weig ht and pre pondera nce of theMatlock Pag e 14

I n t h e f a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y r e v i e w o f a r e

j e c t e d a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e

, a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t

v i e w s t h e e n t i r e t y o f

t h e e v i d e n c e i n a n e u t r a l l i g h t

, b u t i t m a y n o t u s u r p t h e f u n c t i o n o f

t h e

j u r y b y s u b s t i t u t i n g i t s j u d g m e n t i n p l a c e o f t h e j u r y ’ s a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e w e i g h t a n d

c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s ’ t e s t i m o n y

. T h e r e f o r e

, a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t m a y s u s t a i n a 3 3

d e f e n d a n t ’ s f

a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y c l a i m o n l y i f

, a f t e r s e t t i n g o u t t h e r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e a n d

e x p l a i n i n g p r e c i s e l y h o w t h e c o n t r a r y e v i d e n c e g r e a t l y o u t w e i g h s t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g

t h e v e r d i c t

, t h e c o u r t c l e a r l y s t a t e s w h y t h e v e r d i c t i s s o m u c h a g a i n s t t h e g r e a t w e i g h t o f t h e

e v i d e n c e a s t o b e m a n i f e s t l y u n j u s t

, c o n s c i e n c e

- s h o c k i n g

, o r c l e a r l y b i a s e d

. 3 4

I f a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o n d u c t i n g a f a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y r e v i e w f

i n d s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e

s u p p o r t i n g t h e a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e s o g r e a t l y o u t w e i g h s t h e S t a t e ’ s c o n t r a r y e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e

v e r d i c t i s m a n i f

e s t l y u n j u s t

, t h e n t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t m a y r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s j u d g m e n t

a n d r e m a n d t h e c a s e f

o r a n e w t r i a l

. T h e r e m e d y i n b o t h c i v i l a n d c r i m i n a l c a s e s f o r a n

a p p e l l a t e r e v e r s a l b a s e d u p o n a f a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y c l a i m t h a t t h e j u r y ’ s v e r d i c t i s a g a i n s t t h e

evidenc e so as to be ma

nifestly unjust.”); see also Cleve land , 177 S.W .3d at 387 (following

Meraz in assessing fac tual sufficie ncy of the e vidence to rejec t defe ndant’s cla im of sudden

passion); Howard , 145 S.W .3d at 335-36 (f ollowing Meraz

in assessing fac tual sufficie ncy of the

evidenc e to re

ject def endant’ s claim of inability to pay child support).

Meraz , 785 S.W .2d at 154; see also Johnson v . State , 23 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 3 3

2000) (f actua l-sufficie ncy

revie w re quires appe llate cour t to affor d “due de fer ence ” to a jury ’s

deter mination); Cleveland , 177 S.W .3d at 390-91.

Meraz , 785 S.W .2d at 154 n.2 (quoting Pool v. Ford Motor Co ., 715 S.W .2d 629, 635 3 4

(Tex. 1986)).Matlock Pag e 15

g r e a t w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e i s a n e w t r i a l

, n o t a n a c q u i t t a l

. 3 5

W i t h t h a t g e n e r a l b a c k g r o u n d

, w e t u r n t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e

.

I I I

.

I n t h i s c a s e

, a p p e l l a n t c l a i m e d o n d i r e c t a p p e a l t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s “ l e g a l l y a n d

f a c t u a l l y i n s u f

f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ’ s r e j e c t i o n o f a p p e l l a n t ’ s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e o f

i n a b i l i t y t o p a y

. ” T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s s e t o u t a p p e l l a n t ’ s a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g C o u n t s I 3 6

a n d I I :

[ H ] e w a s i n j a i l t h e e n t i r e t w o m o n t h s i n w h i c h i t w a s a l l e g e d t h a t h e f a i l e d t o

p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t

. F u r t h e r

, A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t

, e v e n w h e n h e w a s n o t i n

j a i l

, h e w a s i n a r e h a b i l i t a t i o n c e n t e r t h a t l i m i t e d h i s a b i l i t y t o e a r n e x t r a

i n c o m e t o p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t

. 3 7

T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s t h e n s t a t e d t h a t

, i n M e r a z

, t h i s C o u r t “ d i s c u s s e d t h e s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w

f o r a c r i m i n a l c a s e i n v o l v i n g a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e i n w h i c h t h e d e f

e n d a n t h a s t h e b u r d e n

o f p r o o f

. ” T h a t i s t r u e

, b u t w h a t w e d i d n o t m a k e p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r i n M e r a z w a s t h a t w e

3 8

w e r e d i s c u s s i n g o n l

y f a c t u a l s u f

f i c i e n c y a n d w h e t h e r t h e “ t h e a d v e r s e r e s o l u t i o n o f [ t h e

See id . at 156 (a ffirming judgme nt of court of appea ls remanding the ca se for a new 3 5

competenc y

trial based on the defe ndant’s fa ctual suff iciency challeng e); Cropper v. Caterpillar

Tractor Co ., 754 S.W .2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988) (cour t of appe als may

reve rse a nd rema nd a ca se

for ne w trial if it conclude s that the jury ’s “f ailure to find” is ag ainst the g rea t weig ht and

preponde ranc e of the evidenc e); see, e .g. , Cleveland, 177 S.W.3d at 388 n.9 (“an a ppellate c ourt

holding that f

actua l insufficienc y

of the e vidence to support the jury ’s neg ative finding on the

issue of sudden pa ssion would result in a rema nd for a new punishment trial”)

.

Appellant’s B rief on D irec t Appeal a t iii. 3 6

Matlock , 2012 WL 426613, at *8. 3 7

Id. at *9. 3 8Matlock Pag e 16

d e f e n d a n t ’ s ] i n c o m p e t e n c y p l e a w a s a g a i n s t t h e g r e a t w e i g h t a n d p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e

e v i d e n c e

. ” T h u s

, t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s i n M e r a z

, h a v i n g f o u n d t h a t t h e j u r y ’ s f

i n d i n g o f 3 9

c o m p e t e n c y w a s a g a i n s t t h e g r e a t w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e

, r e m a n d e d t h e c a s e f o r a n e w

c o m p e t e n c y t r i a l b a s e d o n M e r a z ’ s f a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y c l a i m

. W e a f f i r m e d t h a t 4 0

d i s p o s i t i o n

. 4 1

I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e

, t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s c o n f l a t e d t h e d i s t i n c t l e g a l a n d f a c t u a l

s u f f i c i e n c y s t a n d a r d s i n s t a t i n g t h a t

w h e n c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s e x a m i n e w h e t h e r a n a p p e l l a n t p r o v e d h i s a f f i r m a t i v e

d e f e n s e b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e

, t h e c o r r e c t s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i s

w h e t h e r a f

t e r c o n s i d e r i n g a l l o f t h e e v i d e n c e r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e

, t h e

j u d g m e n t i s s o a g a i n s t t h e g r e a t w e i g h t a n d p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e a s

t o b e m a n i f

e s t l y u n j u s t

. 4 2

T h a t i s t h e f

a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w f o r a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e s

. A n d i f t h e

d e f e n d a n t ’ s f

a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y c l a i m i s s u s t a i n e d

, t h e n h e i s e n t i t l e d t o a n e w t r i a l i n w h i c h

h e m a y o n c e a g a i n r a i s e h i s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e

. I n t h i s c a s e

, t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a p p l i e d t h e

s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w f

o r f a c t u a l s u f

f i c i e n c y a n d s u s t a i n e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s c l a i m o n C o u n t I

.

Meraz , 785 S.W .2d at 147-48. The court of a ppeals ha d alre ady

reje cted Me raz’s cla im 3 9

that the evidenc e wa s leg ally insufficient to support an a dverse finding on his incompetency

claim bec ause the re w as “some e vidence ”–more than a mer e scintilla–of compe tency

. Meraz v

. State , 714 S.W .2d 108, 115 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1986) (re jecting defe ndant’s cla im that “the

jury ’s ver dict [on competency ] was contrar y to the evidenc e as a

matter of la

w”)

, aff’d , 785

S.W .2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

Id. at 109. 4 0

Meraz II

, 785 S.W .2d at 156 (a ffirming court of a ppeals’s judg ment). 4 1

Matlock , 2012 WL 426613, at *9. 4 2Matlock Pag e 17

H o w e v e r

, i t r e n d e r e d a j u d g m e n t o f a c q u i t t a l a s i f i t h a d g r a n t e d h i s l e g a l s u f f i c i e n c y c l a i m

.

T h e S t a t e P r o s e c u t i n g A t t o r n e y ( S P A ) a r g u e s t h a t t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s e r r e d b y f a i l i n g

t o a p p l y t h e m o d i f

i e d S t e r n e r v

. Ma r a t h o n O i l C o m p a n y l e g a l

- s u f f i c i e n c y s t a n d a r d t o

a p p e l l a n t ’ s c l a i m

. W e a g r e e

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s w a s r e q u i r e d t o f i r s t d e c i d e i f

t h e r e w a s

“ s o m e ” e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a r e a s o n a b l e j u r y ’ s f i n d i n g t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a d t h e a b i l i t y t o p a y

h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t o n F e b r u a r y 1

, 2 0 0 6

. I f t h e r e w a s s o m e e v i d e n c e

, t h e n t h e c o u r t m u s t r e j e c t

a p p e l l a n t ’ s l e g a l s u f

f i c i e n c y c l a i m

. I f t h e r e w a s n o s u c h e v i d e n c e

, t h e n t h e c o u r t m u s t 4 3

e x a m i n e t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d t o s e e i f a p p e l l a n t e s t a b l i s h e d h i s i n a b i l i t y t o p a y a s a m a t t e r o f

l a w

. H i s l e g a l s u f

f i c i e n c y c l a i m “ s h o u l d b e s u s t a i n e d o n l y i f t h e c o n t r a r y p r o p o s i t i o n i s 4 4

c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d

. ” 4 5

T h e S P A a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s e r r o n e o u s l y h e l d t h a t “ t h e f a c t o f

i n c a r c e r a t i o n a l o n e ” s a t i s f i e d e i t h e r t h e l e g a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y o r f

a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y s t a n d a r d

. W e

Sterner , 767 S.W .2d at 690. 4 3

Id. 4 4

Dow Chemical Co. v. Francis , 46 S.W .3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001). After setting out its 4 5

standard of

revie w in this case, the c ourt of appe als stated that “[e]ven if the only evidenc e

offe red on the question of the af firmative de fense is produced by the def endant, ‘ the jury

may

acc ept or re

ject any or all of the te stimony

of any witness.’” Matlock

, 2012 WL 426613, at *10

(quoting Madrid v. State , 595 S.W .2d 106, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)). I n the context of civil

leg al-suff iciency revie w involving a

preponde ranc e-of

-the-e vidence standard, tha t statement must

be modified slig htly

afte r City of Keller

to rea d: “The jury

may acc ept or re

ject any or all of the

testimony of any witness if a re asonable juror could do so” or, more g ener ally , “Evidenc e ca n be

disreg arde d whene ver r easona ble jurors c ould do so.” City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802,

811 (Tex. 2005). Conversely , “an a ppellate c ourt conduc ting a leg al suffic iency

revie w ca

nnot

‘disreg ard undisputed e vidence that allows of only one log ical infe renc e.’ B y definition, such

evidenc e ca

n be viewe d in only

one lig ht, and re asonable jurors ca n rea ch only

one conc lusion

from it. J urors a

re not fr ee to r eac h a ver dict contra ry to such evidenc e[.] ” Id. at 814.Matlock Pag e 18

a g r e e w i t h t h e S t a t e ’ s p o s i t i o n i n t h e a b s t r a c t

. B u t w e d o n o t r e a d t h e l o w e r c o u r t ’ s o p i n i o n

a s h o l d i n g ( a n d t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t r e f l e c t ) t h a t a p p e l l a n t e s t a b l i s h e d h i s “ i n a b i l i t y t o p a y ”

a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e b a s e d s o l e l y u p o n t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t h e h a d b e e n i n c a r c e r a t e d f o r t h e

e l e v e n m o n t h s p r e c e d i n g t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t p a y m e n t d u e o n F e b r u a r y 1

, 2 0 0 6

. A p p e l l a n t

t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e h a d n o s a v i n g s a n d n o o t h e r s o u r c e s o f i n c o m e d u r i n g a t l e a s t s o m e o f t h a t

t i m e

. H o w e v e r

, w e n o t e t h a t

, i f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s i n t e n d e d t o r e v e r s e a j u r y ’ s v e r d i c t u s i n g

a f a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y r e v i e w u n d e r M e r a z

, i t m u s t “ d e t a i l [ a l l o f ] t h e e v i d e n c e r e l e v a n t t o t h e

i s s u e ” a n d “ s t a t e i n w h a t r e g a r d t h e c o n t r a r y e v i d e n c e g r e a t l y o u t w e i g h s t h e e v i d e n c e i n

s u p p o r t o f t h e v e r d i c t

. ” 4 6

B e c a u s e t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s c o n f l a t e d t h e s t a n d a r d s f

o r l e g a l a n d f

a c t u a l s u f

f i c i e n c y

r e v i e w

, w e a r e u n c e r t a i n i f i t f o u n d t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a d c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d h i s “ i n a b i l i t y

t o p a y ” a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e a s a m a t t e r o f

l a w

. G i v e n i t s a n a l y s i s

, t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s m a y

h a v e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g t h e j u r y ’ s i m p l i c i t r e j e c t i o n o f a p p e l l a n t ’ s

a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e w a s a g a i n s t t h e g r e a t w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e u n d e r a M e r a z f a c t u a l

s u f f i c i e n c y c l a i m

. I f t h e c o u r t t h o u g h t t h a t t h e j u r y ’ s f a i l u r e t o f

i n d t h a t a p p e l l a n t w a s u n a b l e

t o p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t o n F e b r u a r y 1

, 2 0 0 6

, w a s a g a i n s t t h e g r e a t w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e

, t h e n

i t s h o u l d r e v e r s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n o n C o u n t I a n d r e m a n d t h e c a s e f o r a n e w t r i a l o n t h a t c o u n t

.

O r t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s m i g h t r e a c h a n e n t i r e l y n e w c o n c l u s i o n b a s e d u p o n t h e s t a n d a r d s o f

r e v i e w t h a t w e h a v e s e t o u t a b o v e

.

Pool v. Ford Motor Co. , 715 S.W .2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). 4 6Matlock Pag e 19

W e t h e r e f

o r e r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a n d r e m a n d t h e c a s e t o t h a t

c o u r t f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n

.

D e l i v e r e d : F e b r u a r y 2 7

, 2 0 1 3

P u b l i s hMatlock Pag e 20