alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Request for Information FAA-2015-7197 

9-AWA-AVS-333Exemptions (FAA) 

Dear Mr. Moore:

This letter is in regards to your amendment to exemption request Federal Aviation Regulatory Docket 

No. FAA­2015­7197.

The amendment requests to operate a Skylift­built logistics support unmanned aircraft (UA) with a 

maximum take­off weight of up to 100 lbs. In response to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

request for information the petitioner further noted its UA “...can sustain lifts of external loads over 

200 lbs.” The FAA requires the additional information to process your petition.

x A detailed description of the aircraft design and configuration for the referenced UA focusing 

on the UA systems’ features and flight characteristics to include, but not limited to:

o Detailed 3 view drawings with scale of the aircraft and any launch and recovery 

equipment if applicable

o Operational history with supporting statistics; particularly where Skylift was the principal 

operator

o Results of analysis and flight testing of UAS

o Lessons learned from repairs and alterations performed during operations to include 

design changes and fixes due to operational failure(s)

o Details of any injuries or property damage resulting from flight/ground operations

o Safety analysis of any failure modes such as lost link, fly­away, loss of control, etc.

x Copies of manuals, photographs, videos/telemetry may be provided as support

x Any other information to support an analysis of operational safety with unmanned aircraft in 

excess of 55 lbs.

Please submit the additional information (non­proprietary) to your docket at www.regulations.gov .

Once your information is submitted, please save your tracking number and submit your tracking 

number along with the information submitted to the docket, and any proprietary information 

electronically via e­mail to 333exemptions@faa.gov.

If you want us to process your request any further, we must receive the information described above by 

12/07/2016. If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further.

FAA Office of Rulemaking

Sent: Wednesday, November 23, 2016 7:56 AM 

To: jesse.moore@skyliftglobal.com

Request for Information FAA-2015-7197 Page 1 of 1

https://email.dot.gov/owa/9-AWA-AVS-333Exemptions@faa.gov/?ae=Item&t=IPM.Not... 11/23/2016
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 127 (Monday, July 2, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 30937]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-14184]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Notice of Proposals To Engage in or To Acquire Companies Engaged 
in Permissible Nonbanking Activities

    The companies listed in this notice have given notice under section 
4 of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1843) (BHC Act) and 
Regulation Y, (12 CFR part 225) to engage de novo, or to acquire or 
control voting securities or assets of a company, including the 
companies listed below, that engages either directly or through a 
subsidiary or other company, in a nonbanking activity that is listed in 
Sec.  225.28 of Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.28) or that the Board has 
determined by Order to be closely related to banking and permissible 
for bank holding companies. Unless otherwise noted, these activities 
will be conducted throughout the United States.
    Each notice is available for inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank 
indicated. The notice also will be available for inspection at the 
offices of the Board of Governors. Interested persons may express their 
views in writing on the question whether the proposal complies with the 
standards of section 4 of the BHC Act.
    Unless otherwise noted, comments regarding the applications must be 
received at the Reserve Bank indicated or the offices of the Board of 
Governors not later than July 17, 2018.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Prabal Chakrabarti, Senior Vice 
President) 600 Atlantic Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts 02210-2204. 
Comments can also be sent electronically to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2b69647805787968056a5b5b4742484a5f4244455805684446464e455f586b494458054d59490544594c"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="33717c601d6061701d7243435f5a5052475a5c5d401d705c5e5e565d474073515c401d5541511d5c4154">[email protected]</span></a>:
    1. Cape Cod Five Mutual Company, Harwich Port, Massachusetts; to 
indirectly acquire voting shares of Summit Technology Consulting Group, 
LLC, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and thereby engage in management 
consulting and data processing activities pursuant to section 
225.28(b)(9) and 225.28(b)(14) of Regulation Y.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 27, 2018.
Ann Misback,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2018-14184 Filed 6-29-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
# C_2022171EN.01001401.xml

| 25.4.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 171/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.4.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 171/14

---

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 10 March 2022 — European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium

(Case C-60/21) (1)

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Article 45 TFEU - Article 28 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area - Free movement of workers - Direct taxation - Income tax - Deductions - Maintenance annuities - Equal treatment - Discrimination between resident and non-resident taxpayers)

(2022/C 171/17)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: W. Roels and V. Uher, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Kingdom of Belgium (represented by: C. Pochet, P. Cottin and S. Baeyens, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Declares that, by refusing the deduction of maintenance annuities or capital sums in lieu of such annuities and supplementary annuities from taxable income to debenture holders who are not resident in Belgium and who receive less than 75 % of their professional income there and who cannot benefit from the same deduction in their Member State of residence on the basis of the small amount of their taxable income in that State, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 45 TFEU and Article 28 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that, by refusing the deduction of maintenance annuities or capital sums in lieu of such annuities and supplementary annuities from taxable income to debenture holders who are not resident in Belgium and who receive less than 75 % of their professional income there and who cannot benefit from the same deduction in their Member State of residence on the basis of the small amount of their taxable income in that State, the Kingdom of Belgium has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 45 TFEU and Article 28 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992;

| 2. | Orders the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 98, 22.3.2021.

---
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

                    Notice is hereby given of the cancellation of the National Cancer Institute Special Emphasis Panel, August 7, 2018, 10:00 a.m. to August 7, 2018, 5:00 p.m., National Cancer Institute Shady Grove, 9609 Medical Center Drive, 7W260, Rockville, MD 20850 which was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on June 8, 2018, 83 FR 26703.                

This meeting has been cancelled due to no proposal submissions.

Dated: July 5, 2018.

Melanie J. Pantoja,

Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2018-14757 Filed 7-10-18; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20
- 1254

CANDIDO DELOS ANGELEZ MARTINEZ , Petitioner ,

v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General , Respondent

.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

.

Submitted : August 24, 2020 Decided: August 28, 2020

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and QUATTLEBAUM , Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by un published per curiam opinion

.
Candido Delos Angelez Martinez, Petitioner Pro Se. Robert Michael Stalzer, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURI AM: Candido Delos Angelez Martinez (“ Martinez”), a native and citizen of El Salvador , has filed a pro se petition for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the Immigration Judge’s written decision (1) finding Martinez’s applicat ion for asylum was time

- barred ; and (2) denying on the merits Martinez’s applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture

. On appeal,
we confine our review to the issues raised in the informal brief. See 4th Cir . R. 34(b). However, e ven affording Martinez’s pro se informal brief a liberal construction, see Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (instructing courts to liberally construe pro se documents) , we conclude that Martinez has failed to challenge any aspect of the Immigration Judge’s dispositive rationale, which th e Board expressly adopted by affirming the order of removal for the reasons set forth by the Immigration Judge. W e therefore hold
that Martinez has forfeited appellate review of the Boar d’s order. See Jackson v. Lightsey , 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014 ) ( “The informal brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that brief.”)

. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. W e dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
| Date:  December      8, 2008 | /s/ Marc T.      Giles                                  |   |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                   | Marc      T. GilesPresident      and Chief Executive Officer                                                                                                                                                                 |   |
|                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |   |
| Date:  December      8, 2008 | /s/ Michael R.      Elia                                     |   |
|                                   | Michael      R. EliaExecutive      Vice President and Chief Financial Officer                                                                                                                                                |   |
#### Arlander WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 41917.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 1, 1972.

Charles Tindell, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., and DREW, J., (Retired), concur.

ERVIN, J., dissents.
#### HIRONS *vs.*GRIFFIN.

A return of non est inventus to a subpoena issued to a sheriff of one county, is not sufficient to admit the reading a deposition when it appears that the witness resided in another county.

Appeal. On jhe trial of the cause the defendant offered to read the deposition of Isaac M. Register, taken de bene esse, and to lay the ground, he produced a subpoena issued to the sheriff of New Castle county and returned non est inventus. It appeared that the witness resided in Kent county.

*Gilpin,*for plaintiff,

objected to reading the deposition in evidence, because it appeared from the evidence, that Isaac M. Register resided in the county of *Kent,*over which county this court has jurisdiction ; and a return of non est by the sheriff of New Castle county was not sufficient to let in the deposition. Depositions taken de bene esse, are only to be read in case of departure of the witnesses *out of the state, fyc. Sec.*16, *Constitution.*

*Hamilton.*

The usual course has been adopted in this case to order a subpoena for the witness and get a return of non est to it.

*Gilpin,*for plaintiff.

*Hamilton,*for defendant.

*Court.*

This is an important question of practice. The common practice is to take out a subpoena within the county, and get a return of non est inventus as a foundation for reading the deposition. Now is this sufficient evidence that the witness has departed from the state? Is this the legal evidence? Unless this appears, or some of the other reasons mentioned in the constitution, you have no right to read the deposition.

Here it appears from the deposition that the witness lived in Kent, where it was taken. What evidence is a return of non est by the sheriff of New Castle that the witness had left the state. We do not decide that if the subpoena had been issued to the sheriff of the county where the witness resided, it would not have been sufficient. This case does not require it.

The safest course on this subject is, to prove the departure of the witness out of the state by testimony at the bar; or to prove circumstances which would satisfy the court that he is not in the state.

Deposition rejected.
#### Theodore BRADLEY, Appellant, v. Leon BASS, Appellee.

No. M-160.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 10, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.'
[No. 593-1.

Division One—Panel 2.

July 12, 1971.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. John Henry Long, Jr., *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 52381, William J. Wilkins, J., entered April 28, 1970. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
#### Gerald ROSS and Anna Mae Ross, Appellants, v. Michael S. HACKER, as Assignee of A. Barry Kon, Appellee.

No. 73-547.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 16, 1973.

Caidin, Rothenberg, Kogan & Kornblum, Miami, for appellants.

Hacker & Phelps, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PEARSON, Judge.

The appellants successfully defended an action brought by the appellee for specific performance of a contract to sell real property. The appellee claimed the right to purchase the property through an assignment of the contract. The contract provided for costs and attorney’s fees as follows : “In connection with any litigation arising out of the contract, the prevailing .party shall be entited [sic] to recover all costs incurred, including reasonable attorney’s fees.”

The final judgment dismissing appellee’s complaint was entered March 23, 1973; it contained the following provision:

> “2. The Court reserves jurisdiction to assess and enter judgment for costs and reasonable attorneys fees to be hereafter taxed.”

Thereafter, on April 5, 1973, the trial court denied appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees.

The trial judge did not set forth the ground for the denial of attorney’s fees in his order. However, the plaintiff-appellee contended before the trial court that as a result of the contract being cancelled prior to its assignment, the provision for attorney’s fees ceased to exist. We hold that the plaintiff is estopped to maintain such a position in an action in which he has sought s )ecific performance of a contract providing for attorney’s fees. Cf. Keller v. Penovich, Fla.App.1972, 262 So.2d 243; Federated Mutual Implement and Hardware Insurance Company v. Griffin, Fla.App.1970, 237 So.2d 38.

*400Wherefore, the order denying attorney s fees is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to the trial court to set a fee in accordance with the value of the services rendered.

Reversed and remanded.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HARSIMRAN SINGH,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-75173

Agency No. A078-974-211

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 17, 2012** 

Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Harsimran Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen

removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for

FILED

JAN 24 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-75173

abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, Najmabadi v. Holder, 597

F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to reopen as

untimely where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order,

see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of

changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time

limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v.

Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether

circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not

have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future

persecution.”).

We reject Singh’s contention that the BIA failed to consider evidence

because he has not overcome the presumption that the BIA reviewed the record.

See Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006). Singh’s contention

that the BIA applied a higher standard is belied by the record.

Finally, we decline to reconsider Singh’s contentions regarding the

immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination because this court already

decided that issue in Singh v. Gonzales, 206 Fed. Appx. 707 (9th Cir. 2006). See

Merritt v. Mackey, 932 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that under the
3 08-75173

“law of the case doctrine,” one panel of an appellate court will not reconsider

questions which another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PATRINA HARRISON,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.
WHOLE FOODS MARKET,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 20

- 17446

D.C. No. 4:20

- cv

- 04867

- JSW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 19, 2021 * *

Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Patrina Harrison appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

with prejudice her action alleging various federal and state law claims arising from
various incidents while shopping. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo a district court ’ s dismissal un der Federal Rule of Civil

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Harrison’s request for oral argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied. 

# FILED

JUL 22 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 20

- 17446

Procedure 12(b)(6). L.A. Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. , 869 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir.

2017). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

The district court dismissed Harrison’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim for failure to

state a claim without explanation . However, Harrison alleged that she was denied

the opportunity to contract because she is African American, in contrast to

similarly situated w hite customers. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for intentional discrimination. See Lindsey v. SLT L .A.

,
LLC , 447 F.3d 1138, 114 5 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth elements of a 42 U.S.C. §

1981 claim in a non

- employment context ). We vacate the judgment and remand

for further proceedings on this claim.

The district court d eclin ed to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Harrison’ s state law claims after dismissing h er federal claims. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367 (c)(3)

. Because we vacate the dismissal on one of Harrison ’s federal claims,

we remand for the district court to reconsider whether it will exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Harrison ’s state law claims. See Fang v. United States , 140 F.3d

1238, 124 3

- 44 (9th Cir. 1998)

. In her opening brief, Harrison fails to address the dismissal of her remaining

claims and has therefore waived h er challenge to the district court’s order

regarding those claims

. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington , 350 F.3d 925
, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e will not consider any claims that were not actually3 20

- 17446

argued in appellant’s opening brief.”); Acosta

- Huerta v. Estelle , 7 F.3d 139, 144
(9th Cir. 1993) (issues not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening

brief are wai ved

. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED

.