SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2335-18T3

REGINALD HELMS,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE 

PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Submitted May 11, 2020 – Decided July 15, 2020

Before Judges Ostrer and Susswein.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

Weil Gotshal & Manges, attorneys for the appellant 

(Richard Michael Heaslip and Rachel A. Farnsworth on 

the briefs). 

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Suzanne Marie Davies, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Petitioner, Reginald Helms, appeals from a final agency decision by the New 

Jersey State Parole Board (Board) revoking his parole and ordering him to serve 

one year in state prison for violating conditions of parole supervision for life 

(PSL).

1 Helms was administratively convicted of violating three PSL

conditions: (1) refraining from the purchase, use, possession, distribution, or 

administration of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) or an imitation CDS; 

(2) failing to follow a curfew; and (3) driving without a valid license. He 

contends the Board failed to prove these violations by clear and convincing 

evidence. He denies he possessed a CDS or imitation CDS and contends that 

the curfew and driving-without-a-license violations should be excused or at least 

mitigated because he was suffering a medical emergency at the time and was 

attempting to get to the hospital. He further contends the Board failed to 

establish that his violations were serious and persistent and that revocation of 

parole was desirable. 

We have carefully reviewed the record in view of the applicable principles 

of law governing this appeal, including the deference we owe to an 

1

 Helms completed the one-year term and has since been released from state 

prison. He contends this appeal is not moot because there may be future 

ramifications from the present administrative convictions and parole revocation. 

We have decided to hear this appeal on its merits. 
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administrative agency acting within the ambit of its expertise. Although we 

believe more might have been done to prove that the envelopes seized by police 

contained heroin or an imitation CDS, we affirm the Board's findings and its 

final order revoking parole. 

I.

In 2006, a jury convicted Helms of second-degree sexual assault and thirddegree endangering the welfare of a child. He was sentenced on those 

convictions to an aggregate term of ten years imprisonment, subject to the No 

Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. As required by NERA, the 

court imposed a three-year term of parole supervision which was to begin 

immediately upon his release from prison. In addition, Helms was placed on 

PSL pursuant to Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23. 

After completing the custodial portion of his sentence, Helms was arrested 

while on parole for possession of CDS and driving without a license. As a result, 

his parole was revoked and he was returned to custody.

Helms was subsequently released from prison and placed in the Re-Entry 

Substance Abuse Program (RESAP). While in RESAP, Helms's three-year 

parole supervision term under NERA expired. After he was released from 
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RESAP, the Board continued to supervise Helms pursuant to his sentence of 

PSL. 

Less than six months after being released from reimprisonment following 

revocation of parole, Newark Police stopped and ticketed Helms for operating a 

vehicle without a valid driver's license. Helms's parole officer did not initiate 

the parole revocation process for that violation. Instead, the parole officer 

imposed a curfew of 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. as a general condition of PSL. 

On March 21, 2018, just two months after being placed under curfew, the 

police stopped Helms around midnight while he was operating a motor vehicle. 

The police seized suspected CDS during the encounter. Helms was charged with 

the disorderly persons offense of failing to turn CDS over to a law enforcement 

officer in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(c).2 

Parole authorities initiated the process of revoking parole based upon this 

incident. Helms waived a probable cause hearing and proceeded directly to a 

final parole revocation hearing. Helms entered a plea of not guilty to violating 

PSL condition twelve, refraining from the use, possession, distribution, or 

administration of any narcotic drug, CDS or CDS analog, imitation CDS or 

imitation CDS analog. Helms entered a guilty-with-an-explanation plea to 

2

 The municipal court charges were eventually dismissed.
5

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violating PSL condition nineteen, failing to comply with a curfew established 

by the assigned parole officer. Helms also entered a guilty-with-an-explanation 

plea to violating PSL condition twenty, refraining from operating a motor 

vehicle without a valid license. 

II.

Helms testified that on March 21, 2018, he suffered a medical emergency 

around midnight and became concerned for his life when his legs became stiff 

and he began to feel dizzy. Helms called a friend, Kaheem James, and asked for 

a ride to the hospital because, Helms claimed, he could not afford an ambulance 

or a taxi. James arrived at Helms's residence driving his girlfriend's car. James 

told Helms that Helms needed to drive the car. Helms agreed to do so. 

Soon after, Newark Police Officer Lake initiated a traffic stop based on 

an equipment violation. Officer Lake discovered there was an active traffic 

warrant for Helms and directed him to step out of the vehicle. As Helms exited 

the vehicle, Officer Lake observed "a little yellow soda cap with [seventeen] 

envelopes of heroin [fall] off of his person[] onto the floor." Based on his 

training and experience, Officer Lake believed the envelopes contained heroin. 

Helms testified that he never possessed the envelopes and that they did 

not fall from his person when he exited the vehicle. 
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The hearing officer found the testimony of Officer Lake to be detailed, 

credible, and reliable. The hearing officer concluded, based on Officer Lake's 

testimony, that there was clear and convincing evidence that Helms was in 

possession of CDS or imitation CDS in violation of PSL condition twelve. The 

hearing officer also found that there was clear and convincing evidence to 

support the two other violations to which Helms pleaded guilty. The hearing 

officer rejected Helm's claims with respect to a medical emergency. 

The hearing officer recommended that Helms's PSL release status be 

revoked and that Helms serve a twelve-month term of incarceration. A Board 

panel affirmed the hearing officer's findings. Helms thereafter filed an 

administrative appeal to the full Board. Subsequently, the Board issued a Notice 

of Final Agency Decision affirming the parole revocation decision. 

III.

Helms raises the following contentions for our consideration:

POINT I

THE DECISION OF THE PAROLE BOARD WAS 

ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR 

UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY 

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD, 

BECAUSE THE PAROLE BOARD FAILED TO 

ESTABLISH BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 

EVIDENCE THAT MR. HELMS SERIOUSLY OR 
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PERSISTENTLY VIOLATED HIS CONDITIONS OF 

PAROLE.

A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT 

ESTABLISH THAT OFFICER LAKE 

CONFISCATED IMITATION CDS.

B. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT 

ESTABLISH THAT MR. HELMS 

POSSESSED THE CONFISCATED 

SUBSTANCE.

C. [DEFENDANT'S PAROLE OFFICER] 

HAS NOT PRESENTED CLEAR AND 

CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF MR. 

HELMS'S SERIOUS OR PERSISTENT 

VIOLATION OF PSL CONDITIONS.

POINT II

THE FINAL AGENCY DECISION OF THE PAROLE 

BOARD WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR 

UNREASONABLE, AND NOT SUPPORTED BY 

SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE 

RECORD AS A WHOLE, BECAUSE THE PAROLE 

BOARD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT 

REVOCATION OF MR. HELMS'S PAROLE WAS 

DESIRABLE.

In addition, Helms raises the following points in his reply brief:

POINT I

IT WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS FOR THE 

BOARD TO FIND THAT MR. HELMS VIOLATED 

CONDITION [TWELVE], BECAUSE OFFICER 

LAKE'S TESTIMONY WAS PATENTLY NONCREDIBLE AND NO OTHER EVIDENCE WAS 
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OFFERED TO SATISFY THE CLEAR AND 

CONVINCING STANDARD OF PROOF.

POINT II

THE BOARD'S "SERIOUS AND DESIRABLE" 

FINDING WARRANTS CAREFUL SCRUTINY, NOT 

UNFETTERED DEFERENCE.

POINT III

THE BOARD'S FINAL DECISION DID NOT 

CONSIDER, AND IN ITS LETTER BRIEF DOES 

NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS, SEVERAL 

MATERIAL FACTS.

IV.

We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing 

this appeal. The standard of review is deferential to the Board. Our review is 

limited to evaluating whether the Board acted arbitrarily or abused its 

discretion. In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205–06 (App. Div. 1993). "The 

question for a [reviewing] court is '"whether the findings made could reasonably 

have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record,"

considering "the proofs as a whole," with due regard to the opportunity of the 

one who heard the witnesses to judge of their credibility.'" Hobson v. N.J. State 

Parole Bd., 435 N.J. Super. 377, 388 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Close v. 

Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)). The burden is on the challenging 
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party to show that the Board's actions were arbitrary, unreasonable, or 

capricious. Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App. 

Div. 1993).

Although most parole actions require only a preponderance of the 

evidence, revocation of parole must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.12(c)(1); N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.15(c). Clear and 

convincing evidence persuades the fact finder "that the truth of the contention is 

'highly probable.'" Hobson, 435 N.J. Super. at 387 (quoting In re Perskie, 207 

N.J. 275, 290 (2011)). "Stated differently, the evidence must be sufficient to 

'"produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the 

truth of the allegations sought to be established."'" Ibid. (quoting In re 

Purrazzella, 134 N.J. 228, 240 (1993)). The evidence must be "so clear, direct 

and weighty and convincing as to enable either a judge or jury to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re 

Registrant R.F., 317 N.J. Super. 379, 384 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting In re 

Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 74 (1993)). "Implicit in that standard is a court's obligation 

to reverse where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the agency's 

decision, is inadequate to meet the standard of proof." Hobson, 435 N.J. Super. 

at 388.
10 A-2335-18T3

Furthermore, the Board should only revoke parole for serious and 

persistent violations of parole. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.12(a)(1); see also Hobson, 

435 N.J. Super. at 391 ("Absent [a] conviction of a crime, the Board has 

[revocation] authority only if the parolee 'has seriously or persistently violated 

the conditions of his parole.'" (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4–123.60)). Further, the 

Board must determine "[w]hether [the] revocation of parole is desirable." 

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.12. 

In Hobson, we noted, "[t]he Legislature did not further define the type of 

conduct it intended to capture within the statutory standard—'seriously or 

persistently violated.' And the Board has not adopted a regulation to guide 

exercise of its expertise to distinguish cases in which parole should and should 

not be revoked." 435 N.J. Super. at 382. Accordingly, this determination falls 

to the Board's "highly predictive and individualized discretionary appraisals." 

Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 224 N.J. 213, 222 (2016) (quoting Beckworth v. 

N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 359 (1973)). 

V.

A.

We turn next to Helms's arguments concerning the Board's finding that he 

possessed CDS or imitation CDS. We first examine his contention that the State 
11 A-2335-18T3

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the envelopes recovered 

by Officer Lake contained CDS or imitation CDS. 

Helms submits the circumstances of the present case are substantially 

identical to those we confronted in Hobson—a case where we concluded that the 

Board failed to prove an imitation CDS violation by clear and convincing 

evidence. We therefore closely examine that precedent to discern the 

similarities and differences between the facts in that case and the facts in the 

matter before us. 

The panel in Hobson began its analysis by noting that, "[t]he term

[imitation] is not defined and its meaning must be derived from the text of the 

definition of the crime." 435 N.J. Super. at 388–89. After examining the 

statutory text of the imitation CDS offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-11, the 

Hobson court looked to whether the testimony presented in that case supported 

a finding of imitation CDS. 435 N.J. Super. at 389. The panel determined: 

[the parole officer involved in the stop] provided the 

only evidence tending to establish that the green 

vegetative substance [the parolee] possessed was an 

"imitation controlled dangerous substance." [The 

officer] said, "[i]t was a green vegetative substance that 

was packaged as CDS." [The officer's] testimony, 

however, included no comparison of the packaging she 

observed in this case and the packaging of CDS.

Without such a comparison, that testimony was not 

even adequate to prove by a preponderance of the 
12 A-2335-18T3

evidence that the substance [the parolee] had "was 

packaged in a manner normally used for the unlawful 

distribution of controlled dangerous substances or 

controlled substance analogs.'"

[Ibid.] 

We further noted, "[t]here was no evidence that the green vegetative substance 

the officers claimed to find was marijuana. Neither the substance nor a 

photograph of the evidence was produced at the hearing." Id. at 385. 

We turn now to the evidence presented in the case before us. The 

following exchange occurred between Officer Lake and the parole officer who 

questioned him at the revocation hearing: 

Q:·Have you had any occasion to make arrests 

involving CDS?

A:·Yes, I have.

Q:·Approximately how many arrests have you made 

involving CDS?

A: Probably between eight to ten.

. . . .

Q: Can you describe the circumstances that led to the 

stopping of the vehicle?

. . . .

A: At that time we asked Mr. Helms to step out of the 

vehicle. When he stepped out of the vehicle, it was like 
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a ·little yellow soda cap with 17 envelopes of heroin 

fell off of his persons onto the floor.· They were -- they 

were labeled -- red stamp labeled overdose.· And at that 

time we placed him under arrest for the warrant and for 

that CDS heroin.

. . . .

Q: All right. Now, based on your training and 

experience, was the physical appearance of the 

substance subsequently that was the same as CDS?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay.

A: It was CDS heroin.

Q: Okay. Based on your training and experience, was 

the substance packaged in the matter normally used for 

the unlawful distribution of CDS of marijuana, heroin, 

cocaine, et cetera?

A: Yes, CDS heroin.· Yes.

The evidence presented in the case before us suffers from some of the 

same weaknesses that led us to reverse the final agency decision revoking 

Hobson's parole. As in Hobson, no evidence was presented that the suspected 

CDS had been tested forensically. Also as in Hobson, the State in this case did 

not introduce into evidence the seized envelopes or photographs of them. 

Officer Lake's barebones testimony, moreover, is in some respects comparable 

to the testimony we found inadequate in Hobson. Although here the officer did 
14 A-2335-18T3

compare the appearance of the substance he recovered to the appearance of CDS, 

he did so in a cursory and conclusory manner.3 

Significantly, however, Lake testified that the envelopes were labeled 

"overdose." We believe this important fact distinguishes this case from the facts 

presented in Hobson. Labels by their nature serve to represent what is contained 

inside a package. The imprint of the brand "overdose" clearly evokes an opiate 

substance such as heroin. At the very least, glassine bags bearing that ominous 

label were meant to be seen as containing CDS. We therefore conclude that 

sufficient evidence was adduced to support the hearing officer's conclusion that 

the small envelopes contained either heroin or imitation heroin. 

3

 We note that Officer Lake also testified as to his training, explaining he was 

a recent graduate from the State Police Academy where he attended a two-day 

class where instructors showed officers different types of drugs in person. 

Helms challenges the officer's training and experience in narcotics enforcement. 

We agree the officer's training and experience is limited. However, we deem 

the assessment of the appropriate weight to give to the officer's knowledge about 

CDS packaging based on training and experience to be a question vested in the 

discretion of the hearing officer and Board. Cf. LaBracio Family P'ship v. 1239 

Roosevelt Ave., Inc., 340 N.J. Super. 155, 165 (App. Div. 2001) ("[T]he weight 

to be given to the evidence of experts is within the competence of the factfinder."). There is no bright-line threshold of experience below which a police 

officer's opinion is deemed to be unreliable. We therefore decline to substitute 

our judgment for the hearing officer's credibility determination that was 

accepted by the Board. 
15 A-2335-18T3

We add that Officer Lake was subjected to effective cross-examination, 

and counsel argued forcefully that the officer's training and experience was 

inadequate to support his conclusion. We decline in these circumstances to 

reject the credibility assessment made by the hearing officer and ultimately 

adopted by the Board. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 

65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) ("[A]ppellate function is a limited one: we do not disturb 

the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are 

convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the 

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests 

of justice." (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. Of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 

(App. Div. 1963))). 

B.

We next address Helm's contention that the Board failed to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that Helms possessed the envelopes that were 

recovered by Officer Lake. Helms argues that he was not the owner of the car 

and claims he was unaware of any CDS that may have been placed in it by the 

owner.

Helms challenges the credibility of Officer Lake's version of events. He 

contends the officer did not observe the packets fall from his person but rather 
16 A-2335-18T3

found them on the ground after Helms had been arrested and secured in the 

police car. He argues that it strains credulity that seventeen envelopes fell out 

of a soda cap. He also claims the Board should have obtained and presented 

police body camera and dash camera recordings of the incident. He submits he 

is entitled to an inference that the video recordings would have supported his 

testimony that the envelopes did not fall from his person when he exited the car. 

These contentions all share a common theme; they relate to the credibility 

of Officer Lake's testimony and the credibility of Helms's competing testimony. 

These same arguments were presented to the hearing officer. We do not believe 

the hearing officer abused his discretion in crediting Officer Lake's testimony. 

State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) ("An appellate court 'should give 

deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced 

by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the 

case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 

146, 161 (1964))). 

In sum, when viewed in the light most favorable to the agency's decision, 

Hobson, 435 N.J. Super. at 388, we conclude the hearing officer could find by clear 

and convincing evidence, based on the credible testimony of the officer, that Helms 

possessed and dropped multiple glassine bags of a white substance labeled 
17 A-2335-18T3

"overdose." In view of the deferential standard of review, especially given the 

hearing officer's opportunity to assess live testimony, we accept the Board's 

factual findings and affirm the administrative conviction relating to the 

possession of CDS or imitation CDS. 

VI.

We turn next to Helms's contention that the curfew and driving-withouta-license violations should be excused or mitigated by reason of medical 

emergency. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.14(c)(2)(ii) affords a parolee the right at a 

revocation hearing to admit that he or she committed the parole condition, "but 

there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violations(s) and 

make revocation inappropriate and that the reasons are complex or otherwise 

difficult to develop or present." 

It seems implausible to us that Helms would agree to drive his friend's car 

while suffering the dizziness and stiffening of the legs as he now claims. The 

record before us shows that the hearing officer and Board considered the alleged 

medical emergency and rejected it as mitigation for the violations to which 

Helms pleaded guilty. We conclude the Board did not abuse its discretion in 

rejecting the medical emergency defense. 
18 A-2335-18T3

VII.

Finally, we address Helms's contention that the Board failed to establish 

that he "has seriously or persistently violated the conditions of his parole,"

N.J.S.A. 30:4–123.60(b), and that the "revocation of parole is desirable." 

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.12(c)(2). As we have noted, this is not the first time Helms's 

parole was revoked. Even after serving time in prison for past parole violations, 

he has continued to commit violations. Helms's repeated incidents of driving 

without a license not only posed risks to public safety but demonstrate the need 

to impress upon him yet again that he must comply with all PSL conditions. We 

therefore conclude the Board did not abuse its broad discretion in determining 

that revocation and another year of imprisonment is necessary and appropriate 

to address Helms's persistent misconduct. Acoli, 224 N.J. at 222. 

To the extent we have not addressed them, any other arguments raised by 

Helms in this appeal lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.