alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### EDWARD MESSICK *vs.*CANNON DAWSON.

Several suits cannot be brought on a single cause of action, so as to bring it within th§ jurisdiction of a justice of the peace.

Certiorari to justice Redden.

The defendant filed an affidavit with his assignment of errors, stating that the judgment in this case was one of two obtained on a single cause of action, which was for the price of a horse at sixty dollars, and which the plaintiff had split, with a view to bring it within the jurisdiction of a justice of *the peace.*

Depositions on both sides were taken on interrogatories filed; and, it appearing to the court that the cause of action on which the two suits were brought before the justice was single, and had been improperly divided, the judgment was reversed on this ground, *(a.)*

*Layton*for Messick.

*Wootten*and *Frame*for Dawson,

(a.)

) Layton *vs.*Polk. Same *vs.*Same.

Supreme Court, Kent, October Term 1814. Action for money had and re*51ceived. The plaintiff claimed twenty-seven dollars and thirty cents as mo» ney *levied and made, by the said William Layton, constable, by the sale if the goods, ópc., of Reuben Taylor on*executions; which sum of twenty-seven dollars and thirty cents, was legally applicable to a certain execution against the said Reuben Taylor, *in favor of the said Joseph Polk.*May 15, 1812. Judgment for plaintiff by default for debt $27 80. Costs 56 cents.

The record in the second cause was precisely in the same words, with the single exception, that the debt demanded in that case was $25 22.

Assignment of errors. The said William Layton by Thomas Clayton, his attorney, saith there is manifest error in the record and proceedings aforesaid in this, to wit: — That the debt demanded by the said Joseph Polk against the said William Layton amounted to the surtí of fifty-dollars and fifty-two cents; and for the purpose of recovering the said debt, the said Joseph Polk instituted two suits before the said justice, demanding part of the said debt in each suit; and judgment was accordingly given for a part of the said debt in each of the said suits, although the said debt was one en» tire demand, of which the said justice had not cognizance. Therefore, the said William Layton prays, that' the proceedings and judgment aforesaid, for the cause aforesaid, and others appearing on the said proceedings may he reversed and held for nothing. These causes came on to-day together.

*Per curiam.*— 4t appears upon the face of the record that the cause of action was divided, in order to recover the money before a justice of the peace; the whole of the demand being above £12, which is not allowable-— the proceedings are erroneous.

Judgments reversed.

Judgment reversed,
Table 2A. Distribution of TIN Costs and Benchmarks for TINs with 1+ EPs - without EP Adjustment

5%

Cost per Capita 137,694 $9,690 $7,778 $52 $1,999

Specialty-Adjusted Benchmark

weighted by % EPs 137,694 $10,079 $1,026 $6,381 $7,677

weighted by % Charges 137,694 $10,056 $1,069 $6,381 $7,677

Specialty-Adjusted Cost per Capita

weighted by % EPs 137,694 $10,153 $7,890 $53 $2,274

weighted by % Charges 137,694 $10,173 $7,884 $53 $2,277

Table 2B. Distribution of TIN Costs and Benchmarks for TINs with 1+ EPs - with EP Adjustment

5%

Cost per Capita 137,694 $9,690 $7,778 $52 $1,999

Specialty-Adjusted Benchmark

weighted by % EPs 137,694 $10,105 $841 $7,359 $8,720

weighted by % Charges 137,694 $10,094 $879 $7,359 $8,724

Specialty-Adjusted Cost per Capita

weighted by % EPs 137,694 $10,152 $7,933 $52 $2,220

weighted by % Charges 137,694 $10,161 $7,931 $52 $2,221

TIN Measure # TINs Mean StDev Min

TIN Measure # TINs Mean StDev Min
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99%

$3,099 $5,794 $8,860 $11,426 $15,525 $20,153 $37,804 $314,472

$8,923 $9,792 $10,435 $10,702 $10,767 $10,993 $12,434 $14,064

$8,658 $9,775 $10,438 $10,716 $10,767 $10,993 $12,506 $14,064

$3,590 $6,437 $9,268 $11,815 $15,949 $20,574 $38,619 $322,778

$3,605 $6,480 $9,288 $11,843 $15,938 $20,562 $38,660 $322,778

10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99%

$3,099 $5,794 $8,860 $11,426 $15,525 $20,153 $37,804 $314,472

$8,789 $10,021 $10,202 $10,516 $10,519 $10,710 $13,556 $14,928

$8,789 $10,021 $10,202 $10,516 $10,519 $10,840 $13,556 $14,928

$3,488 $6,326 $9,303 $11,880 $15,969 $20,635 $38,815 $321,528

$3,497 $6,348 $9,314 $11,886 $15,953 $20,639 $38,840 $321,528

Percentiles

Max

Percentiles

Max
Exhibit 32.2



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Secured Digital Applications,  Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the year ending  December 31, 2005 as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Voon Fui Yong, Chief Accounting Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.


/s/ Voon Fui Yong
-----------------
Voon Fui Yong
Chief Accounting Officer
April 20, 2006
#### HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Petitioners, v. Edna R. MYERS and Dale E. Myers, her husband, Respondents.

No. 41161.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 5, 1972.

Certiorari denied. 247 So.2d 83.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
EX-10.35.4





 Exhibit 10.35.4 

FOURTH AMENDMENT TO MASTER REPURCHASE AGREEMENT 

Dated as of August 31, 2017 

Between: 
 LOANDEPOT.COM, LLC, as Seller 

and 
 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., as Buyer 

The Parties have agreed to amend (for the fourth time) the Master Repurchase Agreement dated June 3, 2016 between them (the
“Original MRA”, as amended by the First Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated October 19, 2016, the Second Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated February 28, 2017 and the Third Amendment to Master
Repurchase Agreement dated June 2, 2017, the “Amended MRA” and as amended hereby and as further supplemented, amended or restated from time to time, the “MRA”), to extend the latest Termination Date, and they
hereby amend the Amended MRA as follows. 
 All capitalized terms used in the Amended MRA and used, but not defined differently, in this
amendment have the same meanings here as there. The sole Section of this Amendment is numbered as Section 2(a) to correspond to the number of the only Section of the Amended MRA amended hereby. 

2. Definitions; Interpretation 
 (a)
Definitions 
 A. The definition of “Termination Date” is amended to read as follows: 

“Termination Date” means the earliest of (i) the Business Day, if any, that Seller designates as the Termination Date by
written notice given to the Buyer at least thirty (30) days before such date, (ii) the Business Day, if any, that Buyer designates as the Termination Date by written notice given to the Seller at least sixty (60) days before such
date, (iii) the date of declaration of the Termination Date pursuant to Section 12(b)(i) and (iv) August 30, 2018. 

B. The following new definition is added to Section 2(a), in alphabetical order: 

“Fourth Amendment to MRA” means the Fourth Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated August 31, 2017 by and between
the Parties, amending this Agreement. 
 (The remainder of this page is intentionally blank; counterpart signature pages follow) 












 As amended hereby, the Amended MRA remains in full force and effect, and the Parties hereby
ratify and confirm it. 
  

			
	JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Carolyn Johnson

		 	Carolyn Johnson
		 	Authorized Officer
	
	LOANDEPOT.COM, LLC
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Mike Smith

		 	Mike Smith
		 	Chief Accounting Officer

 Counterpart signature page to Fourth Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement
#### Jean Cobb COLLYER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-835.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Oct. 26, 1973.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Norman J. Kapner, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and C. Marie Bernard, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals judgments of conviction and sentences for sale of LSD and sale of PCP (Counts I and II, respectively). We have carefully considered the evidence in the record and the briefs and heard oral argument and are of the opinion that as to Count I the defendant has failed to demonstrate reversible error. Cf. Marion v. State, Fla.App., 283 So.2d 53 opinion filed September 7, 1973; Ashley v. State, Fla.1972, 265 So.2d 685. Accordingly, that judgment and conviction is affirmed. With respect to Count II, the judgment and conviction is set aside under the authority of State v. Camil, Fla.1973, 279 So.2d 832.1

Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part.

OWEN, C. J., and MAGER and DOWNEY, JJ., concur.

1

. At the time of the offense charged under Count II, PCP was not specifically listed under Sec. 404.01, F.S., so as to bring such drug withiu the proscriptions of Sec. 404.02. For a more fuller discussion see State v. Camil, supra.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lamar Cook, Also Known as Lamar Stroud, Appellant.

[654 NYS2d 871]

Mikoll, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (McGrath, J.), rendered July 27, 1995, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of assault in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the second degree and assault in the third degree.

Defendant pleaded guilty to all of the crimes charged in the indictment emanating from a physical altercation between him and John Regan, occurring on October 2, 1994, during which defendant commanded his pit bull dog to attack the victim, resulting in numerous bites to his legs and groin. Defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender to a term of imprisonment of 31/2 to 7 years for the crime of assault in the second degree and concurrent one-year jail terms for the remaining crimes.

Defendant contends on this appeal, *inter alia,*that the plea bargain was violated, the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive and he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. While the proper remedy to challenge a violation of a plea agreement is for defendant to make a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL article 440 *{see,*CPL 440.10 [1] [b]; *cf., People v Auslander,*169 AD2d 853), were we to consider such claim we would reject it. Defendant’s on-the-record exchange with County Court negates defendant’s present assertion of an off-the-record plea bargain. The court was thus free to sentence defendant to the harshest permitted term of imprisonment of 31/2 to 7 years.

Defendant’s claim that the sentence was harsh and excessive is likewise unavailing given his extensive criminal record and *748the heinous nature of the crimes which he committed while there was a warrant out for his arrest on a probation violation *(see, People v Fish,*235 AD2d 578; *People v Gressler,*235 AD2d 599).

Finally, our review of the record discloses that defense counsel provided defendant with meaningful representation during the course of the proceedings and that defendant indicated to County Court that he was satisfied with his legal representation. In view of this, we reject defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel *(see, People v Washington,*233 AD2d 684, 688-689; *People v English,*215 AD2d 871, 873, *lvs denied,*86 NY2d 793, 87 NY2d 900). We have considered defendant’s remaining arguments and find that they are either unpreserved for our review or lacking in merit.

Cardona, P. J., Crew III, White and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT NO. 11



<TABLE>

                              GERBER SCIENTIFIC, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES

                                 COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS



<CAPTION>

                                             Three Months                 Six Months
                                                Ended                        Ended
                                              October 31                  October 31           
                                     ---------------------------   ---------------------------
                                         1997           1996           1997           1996    
                                     ------------   ------------   ------------   ------------


   <S>                               <C>            <C>            <C>            <C>   
   Net earnings                      $  5,496,000   $  5,135,000   $ 10,067,000   $  6,738,000
                                     ============   ============   ============   ============ 



   Weighted average shares of
     common stock outstanding
     during the period                 22,679,135     23,231,530     23,001,000     23,220,984


   Common stock equivalents:

     Common stock attributable
     to stock options (treasury
     stock method)                        645,571         95,580        516,597        129,042
                                     ------------   ------------   ------------   ------------


   Average common shares
     outstanding                       23,324,706     23,327,110     23,517,597     23,350,026
                                     ============   ============   ============   ============


     Net earnings per common share   $        .24   $        .22   $        .43   $        .29
                                     ============   ============   ============   ============
    

   Note:  Net earnings per common share as calculated above is presented on a
          primary and fully diluted basis.

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT NO. 10.9

MEMORANDUM

 

 

 

To:  Bernard J. Demko

From:  Marc T. Giles

Re:  Appointment

Gerber Scientific, Inc. (the "Company")

Date:  December 7, 2001

 

The Board of Directors of Gerber Scientific, Inc. (the "Board") has appointed you a Senior Vice President of Gerber Scientific, Inc. effective December 7, 2001.

In addition, effective December 7, 2001, the Management Development and Compensation Committee of the Board has awarded you options to purchase 20,000 shares of the Common Stock of the Company and a restricted stock award of 5,000 shares, pursuant to the Company's 1992 Employee Stock Plan.

You will remain Chief Operating Officer of Gerber Technology, Inc.

If this memorandum sets forth our agreement on the subject matter hereof, kindly sign and return to the Company the enclosed copy of this memorandum, which will then constitute our agreement on this subject.

 

 

Marc T. Giles

President and CEO

 

Agreed this 7 day of December, 2001

 

 

_______________________________

Bernard J. Demko
#### Campbell *v.*Lovgren.

(Division A.

Dec. 10, 1934.)

[157 So. 901.

No. 31412.]

*386Geo. T. & Chas. S. Mitchell, of Tupelo, for appellant.

Reily & Parker, of Meridian, and W. B. Lucas and L. L. Martin, both of Macon, for appellee.

Argued orally by George T. Mitchell, for appellant, and by W. B. Lucas, for appellee.

*387Smith, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the eonrt.

This is an appeal from a decree modifying a former order of the court below in a divorce proceeding awarding the custody of a child to- its father, with the right to its mother to visit it at intervals. The father of the child lives in Macon, Mississippi, and its mother in Chicago, Illinois. The decree appealed from modified the former decree to the extent that the father was directed to deliver the custody of the child to its mother on June 15, 1934, in the city of Macon, and the mother was authorized to retain its custody for a period of two months, at the end of which period she was to- redeliver it to its father. The appeal is by the father, and there is no cross appeal by the mother.

The period of time during which the custody of the child was changed by the decree appealed from having expired, the questions presented by the record have become purely academic, and therefore no- actual controversy is presented for the decision of this court, from which it follows that the appeal should be dismissed. McDaniel v. Hurt, 92 Miss. 197, 41 So. 381; Pafhausen v. State, 94 Miss. 103, 47 So. 897; Kemper County v. Neville, 95 Miss. 56, 48 So. 727; Whidden v. Broadus, 108 Miss. 664, 67 So. 155; Hughes v. Ball, 1401 Miss. 812, 106 So. 626.

Though earnestly requested by counsel to depart from this rule and to say whether or not the decree of the court below should have been rendered, in order that the court may be guided thereby should another petition be filed for the modification of the decree rendered in the divorce proceeding, we do not feel at liberty to do so. Such an opinion would be merely advisory, and the rendering of opinions of that character are not within the province of this court. Moreover, whether or not that decree should be modified will depend on facts and circumstances that may exist when a petition for that purpose is heard by the court.

Appeal dismissed.
ORIGINALINTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFMONTANADA20-0495STATEOFMONTANA,PlaintiffandAppellee,v.JESSEJAMESFINLEY,DefendantandAppellant.MAY102022BovvE,nGrr2,E•nwoodClerkofSupremeCourtnfMc,ntanaORDERPursuanttoM.R.App.P.16(5),thepartiesinthismatterhavestipulatedandmoveforanorderremandingthisproceedingtotheTwentiethJudicialDistrictCourt,LakeCounty.Thepartiesagreethatunderthefactsofthiscase,AppellantJesseJamesFinleyshouldbeentitledtoasentencereductionof1,293daysofelapsedtimeand431daysofcreditfortimeserved,foratotalof1,724days.ThepartiesaskthisCourttoremandthisproceedingtotheDistrictCourtwithinstructionstoamenditsjudgmentaccordingly.Therefore,ITISORDEREDthatthiscaseisREMANDEDtotheTwentiethJudicialDistrictCourtforentryofanamendedjudgmentandsentence.ThecourtisdirectedtograntDefendantJesseJamesFinleyasentencereductionof1,293daysofelapsedtimeand431daysofcreditfortimeserved,foratotalof1,724days.TheClerkisdirectedtoprovidecopiesofthisOrdertoallcounselofrecord,totheClerkofCourtforLakeCounty,andtotheHonorableJamesA.Manley,presidingDistrictJudge.DatedthisIbdayofMay,2022.ChiefJustice05/10/2022Case Number: DA 20-0495.e-*"10:eJustices2
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 311 Reported in House (RH)]

                                                 House Calendar No. 122

103d CONGRESS

  1st Session

                              H. RES. 311

                          [Report No. 103-369]

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3450) to implement the 
                  North American Free Trade Agreement.

_______________________________________________________________________

                           November 16, 1993

        Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

                                                 House Calendar No. 122
103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 311

                          [Report No. 103-369]

 Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3450) to implement the 
                  North American Free Trade Agreement.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 16, 1993

  Mr. Beilenson, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following 
resolution; which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3450) to implement the 
                  North American Free Trade Agreement.

    Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution 
the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the 
House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of 
the Union for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3450) to implement the 
North American Free Trade Agreement. The first reading of the bill 
shall be dispensed with. All points of order against the bill and 
against its consideration are waived. General debate shall proceed 
without intervening motion, shall be confined to the bill, and shall 
not exceed eight hours, with two hours for debate in favor of the bill 
controlled by Representative Rostenkowski of Illinois or a designee, 
two hours for debate in opposition to the bill controlled by 
Representative Gephardt of Missouri or a designee, two hours for debate 
in favor of the bill controlled by Representative Michel of Illinois or 
a designee, and two hours for debate in opposition to the bill 
controlled by Representative Solomon of New York or a designee. 
Pursuant to section 151(d) of the Trade Act of 1974, after general 
debate the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House. 
Pursuant to section 151(f)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974, the previous 
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill to final passage 
without intervening motion.
```
EXHIBIT
        32
 
 
 **Rule
        13a-14(b) Certification**
 
 
 Pursuant
        to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
        Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Chang-On International,
        Inc. (the “Company”) certifies that:
 
 1.      The
        Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the period ended
        September 30, 2007 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of
        Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
        78m or
        78o(d)); and
 
 2.      The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 Date:
        November 14, 2007
 
 **/s/
        Li Guomin**
 Li
        Guomin
 Chief
        Executive Officer and Chief Financial
        Officer
#### Sandsbury LEE, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Respondent.

No. 71-1.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 20, 1971.

Habeas corpus denied.