*

 After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary.  Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 18, 2008*

Decided June 26, 2008

Before

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐3431

JANE STOLTEY,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JOHN BROWN, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 05 C 2159

Michael P. McCuskey,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Claiming that she was arrested without probable cause for trespassing on the

main campus of the University of Illinois and that she was jailed for five days on

excessive bail, Jane Stoltey sued the university’s board of trustees and two members of

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐3431 Page 2

the university police department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The district court granted

summary judgment for the defendants.  We affirm.

Stoltey has a long and rocky history with the university.  Though she says she is

not homeless, she is often seen sleeping on campus and carrying shopping bags holding

personal belongings.  Since the late 1970s, when she was first arrested for stealing and

exploding fireworks on campus, Stoltey has been the subject of numerous complaints

based on her behavior in the Illini Union building.  Students, visitors and university

employees have reported, among other complaints, that Stoltey has pestered them at

events, hoarded leftover food, and played her radio in a bathroom while sleeping there.

Because the building is not open to the public, the university has issued her at least five

no‐trespass letters over the last 25 years warning that she is not allowed inside.

Most recently, on three occasions in the spring of 2003, building service workers

saw Stoltey tear down “daily event sheets” posted inside the Illini Union.  In June 2003,

the university served Stoltey with a no‐trespass letter listing the dates of those incidents

and explaining that her actions had obstructed the day‐to‐day business of the building.

The letter warned Stoltey that she was not authorized to enter the Illini Union and that,

if she did, she would be arrested for criminal trespass.  Six days later, the university

gave Stoltey another letter telling her that the ban would expire on June 2, 2004.

Despite the no‐trespass letters, Stoltey was again seen in the building on July 18,

2003.  Corporal John Brown and another university police officer were dispatched to

remove Stoltey but could not find her.  Brown nevertheless wrote a police report after

interviewing Susan Sanders, a building‐services employee who reportedly saw Stoltey

ride an elevator to the second floor and enter a restroom.  Sanders told Brown that she

had known Stoltey for several years and recognized her by sight.  Before writing the

report, Brown confirmed that the university had issued a valid no‐trespass letter to

Stoltey.  In his report, Brown described Stoltey as “homeless” because, as he explained

at summary judgment, he often had seen her on campus carrying shopping bags with

personal possessions, and a month earlier he had found her sleeping on campus at 3:00

a.m.  Even though the no‐trespass letter listed an address for Stoltey, he based his

assessment on his experience, explaining that several individuals in the community

lived on the streets despite having a mailing address.

A month later, an assistant state’s attorney filed an information charging Stoltey

with criminal trespass to real property based on the July 18 incident.  A state‐court

judge found that probable cause existed to arrest Stoltey, issued an arrest warrant, and
No. 07‐3431 Page 3

set bail at $2,500.  On July 27, a deputy sheriff arrested Stoltey.  Brown was not involved

in obtaining the warrant or arresting Stoltey.  Stoltey remained in jail until August 1,

when she was able to post bond.  The charge was dismissed, however, in October 2004.

In October 2005, Stoltey filed an amended complaint naming as defendants the

board of trustees, Corporal Brown, and Brown’s boss, Krystal Fitzpatrick, who at that

time was the assistant director of public safety at the university.  The district court was

unable to parse any federal claims from this complaint, but dismissed it without

prejudice as to the individual defendants so that Stoltey could try again to formulate

claims against them personally.  The court concluded, however, that sovereign

immunity and other hurdles precluded Stoltey from suing the board or bringing

official‐capacity claims against the other defendants.  In her second amended complaint,

as interpreted by the defendants without objection, Stoltey claimed that Brown and

Fitzpatrick had caused her to be arrested without probable cause in violation of the

Fourth Amendment.  According to Stoltey, she was arrested and jailed because Brown

had “falsely” stated in his police report that she was homeless, and because Brown and

Fitzpatrick had not adequately investigated the July 18 incident.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.  They included, as required by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 7.1, a statement of undisputed

material facts.  They argued that summary judgment was appropriate as to Fitzpatrick

because she had no personal involvement in the police report, the arrest, or the bond

hearing.  They also contended that summary judgment was appropriate as to Brown

because he was not involved in the charging decision, the arrest, or the bond hearing

and could not be held accountable for any Fourth Amendment violation related to the

arrest based solely on having written a truthful police report.  Stoltey, however, did not

file a response complying with Local Rule 7.1, despite having been advised of the

requirements in writing by the district court.  Instead, she merely expressed

disagreement with some of the defendants’ facts and said she would present testimony

at trial to support her version of events.  The court granted summary judgment to the

defendants, accepting their statement of undisputed facts and finding that there was

“no basis for Plaintiff’s claims.”

On appeal Stoltey argues that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment because, she says, material issues of fact exist.  Although Stoltey continues to

disagree with some of the content of the defendants’ statement of undisputed facts, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting the entire document as true

because Stoltey did not comply with Local Rule 7.1.  See Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of the City
No. 07‐3431 Page 4

of Chicago, 385 F.3d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 2004); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.

2003).  Rule 56 instructs that if the adverse party does not properly respond to a motion

for summary judgment, summary judgment “should, if appropriate, be entered against

that party.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).  Local Rule 7.1 requires the non‐movant to submit

one list identifying those material facts on which the parties agree and a separate list,

supported by evidence, of those still in dispute.  See C.D. Ill. R. 7.1(D)(2)(b)(1),(2).

Stoltey did not include either list in her response, and we have repeatedly said that it is

within the district court’s discretion to strictly enforce local rules regarding summary

judgment by accepting the movant’s version of facts as undisputed if the non‐movant

has failed to respond in the form required. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bay Area Bus. Council,

Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2005); Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922

(7th Cir. 1994); Koszola, 385 F.3d at 1109.  Moreover, the district court notified Stoltey, a

pro‐se plaintiff, of the requirements for a response to a motion for summary judgment

and the consequences of failing to comply and provided her with a copy of Rule 56(e).

See Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992).  Thus, in our de novo review we

rely on the defendants’ statement of undisputed facts but view these facts in the light

most favorable to Stoltey.  See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006).  

The district court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants

because no genuine issue of material fact exists.  See Wagner v. Washington County, 493

F.3d 833, 835‐36 (7th Cir. 2007).  Stoltey claims that she was arrested without probable

cause because, she alleges, Corporal Brown falsely represented in his police report that

she was homeless and the prosecutor presumably relied on that report when applying

for the arrest warrant.  But whether she was homeless is irrelevant to the question of

probable cause to arrest her for criminal trespass.  See 720 ILCS 5/21‐3(a)(2); United

States v. Kincaid, 212 F.3d 1025, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000).  Stoltey also contends that Brown

failed to properly investigate whether she actually entered the Illini Union on July 18

and whether Sanders was reliable, but Brown was under no duty to investigate further.

See Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 743‐44 (7th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that

complaint of single witness is generally sufficient to establish probable cause unless

officer has reason to doubt witness); Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir.

2000) (holding that “report from a single, credible” witness can be basis for probable

cause).  Stoltey additionally failed to produce evidence that Brown concealed or

destroyed security‐camera footage that, she says, would have confirmed that she was

not in the building that day.

Finally, Stoltey alleges that, after she was arrested, the judge required her to post

bail rather than release her on her own recognizance because the police report‐‐again,
No. 07‐3431 Page 5

falsely, according to her‐‐said she was homeless.  She thus claims that she was

wrongfully jailed for five days while raising the cash for her bond.  But there is no

evidence in the record that Brown deliberately or recklessly stated that Stoltey was

homeless, much less that the representation in the police report that she was homeless

affected the judge’s decision to set bail, so no constitutional violation occurred.  See

Mannoia v. Farrow, 476 F.3d 453, 458 (7th Cir. 2007); Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d

1000, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000).  And to the extent that Stoltey has sued Fitzpatrick on the

basis of these same claims, summary judgment was proper because Fitzpatrick was not

personally involved in writing the police report, obtaining the arrest warrant, arresting

Stoltey, or setting her bail.  See Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2006); Gentry

v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995).

Stoltey also argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in

refusing to enlist pro bono counsel to assist her.  In reviewing her three motions, the

magistrate judge and district court applied the correct standard and concluded that she

could competently litigate the case given its level of complexity, see Pruitt v. Mote, 503

F.3d 647, 654‐55 (7th Cir. 2007).  In any event, an attorney could not have salvaged

Stoltey’s case because her claims are legally groundless, see id. at 659; Dellenbach v.

Hanks, 76 F.3d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 1996).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED