[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 18

- 12518 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 3:17

- cv - 00014

- TCB

RAY LOWE, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus

EXEL , INC. , Defendant

- Appellee.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________ (January 31, 2019) Before TJOFLAT , JORDAN and JILL PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 18-12518 Date Filed: 01/31/2019 Page: 1 of 92 Ray Lowe , proceeding pro se , appeals the district court ’ s grant of summary judgment in favor of Exel , Inc. in his rac e discrimination and retaliation suit brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , and his age discrimination suit brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. After careful review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs , we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Low e, who is African

- American , was a forklift operator in one of Exel’s warehouses. Exel evaluates employee productivity using a computer

- generated

“ LMS ” score . 1 Doc. 18

- 3 at 5 ( ¶ 9 )

. 2 Lowe acknowledged that when he was hired he received Exel’s criteria for evaluating employee productivity. Specifically, he was informed that f our monthly LMS scores of

- 10 or below within a 12

- month period would result in termination. Employees receive written warnings after each of the first three deficient LM S scores. Lowe earned monthly LMS scores of

- 13,

- 27,

- 16, and

- 10 within a 12

- month period and received written warnings after each of the first three scores

. Shortly after Lowe earned the score of

- 10, Exel fired him.
He was 53 years old at the time o f his termination.

1 The record does not disclose what LMS stands for. 2 “Doc. #” refers to the numbered entry on the district court’s docket. Case: 18-12518 Date Filed: 01/31/2019 Page: 2 of 93 After receiving a right

- to

- sue letter from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Lowe timely sued Exel for race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and age discrimination under the ADEA. At the close of discovery, Exel moved for summary judgment, which a magistrate judge recommended granting. Adopting the magistrate judge’s report and

recommen dations, t he district court granted summary judgment to Exel on all of Lowe’s claims. Lowe timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Brown v. Crawford , 906 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir. 1990). Summ ary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( a ). “The moving party bears the initial burden to show . . . that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. , 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “Only when that burden has been met does th e burden shift to the non

- moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a[n] . . . issue of [material] fact that precludes summary judgment.” Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and[,] by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that

Case: 18-12518 Date Filed: 01/31/2019 Page: 3 of 94 there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). A lthough w e view all the evidence and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party , Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) , “ [i] f the

non - moving party fail [s] to make a showing on an essen tial element of his case with respect to which he ha [s] the burden of proof, then the entry of judgment as a
matter of law is appropriate ,” Webb

- Edwards v. Orange Cty

. Sheriff’s Office , 525 F.3d 1013, 1029 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. “This Court provides pro se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings and papers.” S.E.C. v. Elliott , 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless , “a pro se litigant does not escape the essential b urden under summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment.” Brown , 906 F.2d at 670.
III. DISCUSSION We affirm the district court’s grant of Exel’s motion for summary judgment. For each of his claims, Lowe has failed to come forward with any facts that raise even the slightest doubt as to whether Exel’s explanation for his firing was a pretext for discri mination or retaliation.

Case: 18-12518 Date Filed: 01/31/2019 Page: 4 of 95 A. We Affirm the Grant of Summary Judgment to Exel on Lowe’s Race Discrimination Claim Under Title VII . Title VII prohibits employers from “discharg[ing] any individual . . . because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 2(a) (l). Where , as here, the plaintiff has admitted he has no direct evidence of race discrimination, we evaluate Title VII discrimination claims using the burden

- shifting framework from McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 802

- 05 (1973) . See Flowers v. Troup Cty., Ga. Sch

. Dist. , 803 F.3d 1327, 13 35

- 3 6 (11th Cir. 2015)

. First, the plaintiff must present a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. Second, the defendant must articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” basis for the discharge. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Third, the plaintiff must “present[] circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Smith v. Lockheed

- Mar tin Corp. , 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). One way a plaintiff may create a triable issue as to whether the employer’s proffered explanation for the discharge was pretextual is by showing “ weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies , or contradictions in the employer ’ s proffered legitimate reasons for its action [such] that a reasonable factfinder could find [the employer’s prof f

ered reasons] unworthy of credence.” Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc. , 610 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)

.

Case: 18-12518 Date Filed: 01/31/2019 Page: 5 of 96 Even assuming Lowe has satisfied the first step in the McDonnell Douglas framework by making out a prima facie case of race discrimination, we conclude that he has failed to demonstrate that Exel’s explanation for hi s termination is pretextual. Exel avers that Lowe was discharged because he earned four LMS scores of

- 10 or below within a 12

- month period. To support its explanation, Exel points to the computer

- generated LMS scores and the written warnings it furnished
to Lowe. In response, Lowe has not pointed to any facts that undermine Exel’s explanation. His briefs to the district court and this C ourt cite nothing that would create even a small puncture in Exel’s stated reasons for his termination. Likewise, our review of the more than 2 50 pages he inserted into the record in his response to Exel’s motion for summary judgment casts no doubt on Exel’s expla nation

. 3 Lowe even admitted in his deposition that he ha s no circumstantial evidence that supports his contention that he was fired because of his race. Without any facts suggest ing that Exel’s stated reason was pretextual, Lowe has failed to carry his b urden under the McDonnell Douglas framework of “ creat[ing] a triable issue concerning [his] employer’s discriminatory intent.” Smith , 644 F.3d at 1328

. And w ithout an issue

3 In addition to failing to come forward with any facts that call into question Exel’s stated explanation that he was fired because o f his four unsatisfactory LMS scores, Lowe also has no response to evidence showing that more than 90% of forklift operators at the Exel warehouse where Lowe worked are African

- American and that the next eight forklift operators hired after Lowe’s terminat ion were African

- America n.

Case: 18-12518 Date Filed: 01/31/2019 Page: 6 of 97 that needed to be tried, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Exel on Lowe’s Title VII rac e discrimination claim. See Brown , 906 F.2d at 670.
B. We Affirm the Grant of Summary Judgment to Exel on Lowe’s Retaliation Claim Un der Title VII. Title VII also prohibits employers from retaliating against an employee who opposes a n employment practice banned by Title VII or who participates in an activity aimed at enforcing the employee’s Title VII rights

. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 3 (a)

. Where, as here, the plaintiff has admitted he has no direct evidence of retaliation , we evaluate Title VII retaliation claims using the same burden

shifting fram ework from McDonnell Douglass

. See Smelter v. S. Home Care
Servs. Inc. , 904 F.3d 1276, 1293 (11th Cir. 2018). As with Lowe’s Title VII race discrimination claim , even assuming that Lowe has established a prima facie case of retaliation, we conclude that he has failed to cast any doubt on the veracity of Exel’s justification for his termination. Lowe has failed to cite

— and our own careful review has not uncovered

— anything in the record that calls into question Exel’s explanation that it fired Lowe due to his low productivity scores . Because Lowe has failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Exel’s nonretaliatory reason for firing him was actually a pretext for retaliation, t he district court properly granted summary judgment to Exel on Lowe’s Title VII retaliation claim. See Smelter , 904 F.3d at 1293; Brown , 906 F.2d at 670.

Case: 18-12518 Date Filed: 01/31/2019 Page: 7 of 98 C. We Affirm the Grant of Summary Judgment to Exel on Lowe’s Age Discrimination Claim Under the ADEA. The ADEA prohibits the “discharge [ of ] any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l). Where, as here, the plaintiff has admitted he has no direct evidence of age discrimination , we evaluate ADEA discrimination claims using the McDonnell Douglas burden

- shifting framework

. See Sims v. MVM, Inc. , 704 F.3d 1327, 1332

- 33 (11th Cir. 2013). As with Lowe’s Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims, even assuming he has made out a prima facie case of age discrimination, we conclude that he has failed to make any showing that Exel’s explanation for his firing was pretextual. Lowe’s briefs and our own review reveal nothing in the record that gives rise to any doubt as to the veracity of Exel’s stated reason that Lowe’s productivity was unacceptable . Lowe even admitted at his deposition that he is unable to identify any circumstantial evidence supporting his assertion of age discrimination. Because Lowe has failed to raise a genuine dispute of materi al fact regarding whether Exel’s nondiscriminatory reason for firing him was merely a pretext for discrimination , the district court properly granted summary judgment to Exel on Lowe’s ADEA age discrimination claim. See Sims , 704 F.3d at 1337;
Brown , 906 F.2d at 670. 4

4 To the extent that Lowe argues that he had insufficient time to respond to Exel’s motion for summary judgment and that he received unlawfully disparate overtime assignments and

Case: 18-12518 Date Filed: 01/31/2019 Page: 8 of 99 IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of Exel’s motion for summary judgment. AFFIRMED.

wages , this Court need not consider these argument s, as Lowe did not raise them below

. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp. , 43 F.3d 587, 598 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc)

. To the extent Lowe contend s that Exel falsified its written warnings, h e points to nothing in the record indicating they were fabricated, and our own review also reveals no evidence of fabrication. Lowe’s broad assertions that his “Exhibits . . . show how write

- ups were created weeks and sometimes months [after] an EEOC conta ct,” Doc. 21 at 1, and that the “evidence shows how files were removed and write

- ups surfaced following the subpoena for documentation from EEOC , ” Doc. 23 at 1, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Lowe must “set forth specific fact s ” from the record that tend to show a genuine dispute over the veracity of the LMS scores or written warnings. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). For example, to gather facts that might raise the possibility of document falsifica tion, Lowe could have deposed the authors of the write

- ups, secretaries or clerks who manage Exel’s personnel files, or Exel’s human resources manager. He has not done so. Exel also raises several issues regarding Lowe’s compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Northern District of Georgia’s Local Rules and possible inconsistencies among Lowe’s three claims. We need not address these issues because our de novo rev iew of the record confirms that the grant of summary judgment to Exel was proper.

Case: 18-12518 Date Filed: 01/31/2019 Page: 9 of 9