alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The State vs. White.

Where a license to retail spirituous liquors has been granted bf the county court on the applieant paying the price for such license, and he has paid it to the county treasurer, and applied to the clerk for the license, although it was not proper for him to commence retailing until his license was issued by the clerk, the jury were warranted in finding that he was guilty of no criminal violation of the statute in retailing before the issuance of the license; and, of course, the person acting as his clerk was guilty of none.

*Error to Benton Circuit Court.*

Hon. J. J. Green, Circuit Judge.

Hollowell, for the State.

Mr. Chief Justice English

delivered the opinion of the court.

White was indicted in the Benton Circuit Court for retailing without license.

On the trial the State proved that, in the month of Decern*276ber, 1859, he sold ardent spirits, of different kinds, to persons in less quantities than one quart.

White, in justification, proved that *Elgy,*his father-in-law, presented a petition in accordance with the'statute, to the county court of Benton county, on the 6th of October, 1859, for license to retail ardent spirits; and the court made an order granting him license for twelve months, on his paying into the county treasury $25, the price prescribed by the court for the license.

On the same day, Elgy, in conformity to the.order, paid the sum required to the treasurer of the county, and took his receipt therefor.

Afterwards, he opened his grocery, or *bar,*as he called it, and employed White as a clerk, vrho was acting as such when he sold the spirits referred to by the witness for the state.

After Elgy paid the $25 to the county treasurer, and obtained his receipt, he saw the clerk of the county court on the street, and requested him to issue his license. He had the treasurer’s receipt in his pocket at the time, but did not show it to the clerk. The receipt was not filed with the clerk, nor the license issued until some time in the following spring.

Upon the above facts White was acquitted by a jury, under the charge of the court as to the law of the case, and the prosecuting attorney, deeming the state aggrieved by the acquittal, appealed to this court.

It was not proper for Elgy to commence retailing until his license was issued by the clerk, and delivered to him, but the court having made an order directing the license to be issued, upon his paying the price fixed into the county treasury, and he having accordingly paid the money to the treasurer, and obtained his receipt therefor, we think the jury were warranted in finding, upon the facts of the case, that he was guilty of no criminal violation of the statute *(Dig., chap.*169, *secs.*8, 11); and it follows, as a matter of course, that White, who was acting as his clerk, was not guilty of crime.

The judgment must be affirmed.
#### THE STATE, use of JOEL PRETTYMAN *vs.*WILLIAM HAZZARD and RHOADS HAZZARD, Adm’rs. of M. MAGEE.

On nul tiel record, it is not a variance that sums and dates in figures are set out in letters.

After the jury is sworn and an issue tried on the plea of nul tiel record, the court will not allow an amendment, changing the issues in fact.

*Quere.*Whether evidence of *depart*payment is admissible under a plea of payment?

Capias Debt on an administration bond. Narr, suggesting a devastavit. Pleas, nul tiel record ; payment, &e.; reps, and issues.

The defendants were administrators of one Marcus Magee, against whom, in his life time, Prettyman recovered a judgment for $750 00.

The narr averred assets; and, inter alia, a certain judgment due to Magee from Turpin, Jacob, and Charles Wright, which ought to have been collected by defendants, as administrators of said Magee, and applied to plaintiff’s judgment.

The pleas were — 1st. Nul tiel record, as to Prettyman’s judgment. 2d. Payment specially by execution sued out on said judgment. 3d. Payment generally. 4th. That defendants, as administrators of Ma-gee, had no knowledge of the debt due him from the Wrights.

Under the plea of nul tiel record, the variance insisted on was, that the record of the judgment stated sums and dates in figures, and the narr set them out in letters; but the court overruled the objection.

*Layton*for defendants

then asked leave to amend the pleadings by denying assets sufficient to pay the plaintiff’s demand; but

*The Court*refused the motion, the jury having been sworn and the defendants having in fact gone to trial on one of the issues in the cause. They remarked also, that the amendment would entirely change the other issues and take.the plaintiff by surprise, putting him to prove that assets sufficient had come to the defendants’ hands, which was denied by the pleadings.

Defendants then offered, under the plea of payment, a receipt from plaintiff for part of bis judgment. Objected to.

*Cullen.*

The judgment is for $750: with interest and costs. Nothing less than that sum will discharge or pay the judgment. Payment of a smaller sum cannot be held a payment ofthe greater; and as this evidence does not tend to establish a payment of the whole debt, it is not admissible under a plea of such payment. To suit such evidence the plea should have been set-off or *discount,*perhaps the latter. 9 *Johns. Rep.*332; 5 *ditto*391; 13 *ditto*353; *Chitty’s Pleadings,*for form of plea.

The Court gave no opinion on the point, the parties having compromised the case at the bar. *(Sed quere,*under the uniform prac*47tice of the bar in this state, is not evidence of such part payment admissible under the short plea of payment ?)

*Cullen*for plaintiff.

*Layton*for defendants.

Yerdict for plaintiff, by consent.
#### Charles TOWNS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-803.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 28, 1970.

Hughlan Long, Public Defender, and Alan S. Becker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, BARK-DULL and HENDRY, JJ.

*736PER CURIAM.

The appellant, defendant in the trial court, seeks review of his conviction and sentence, entered by the trial court pursuant to a jury verdict finding the appellant guilty of robbery. The sole question preserved for review on this appeal was the sufficiency of the evidence as to the identity of the appellant as the alleged culprit.

An examination of the record discloses substantial competent evidence to support the jury’s verdict on the question of identification and, therefore, this court should not disturb the verdict. Wright v. State, Fla.App.1966, 182 So.2d 264; Braxton v. State, Fla.App. 1969, 226 So.2d 692. It was within the province of the jury to resolve this question and to disregard the alibi offered by the appellant. Ray v. State, 159 Fla. 101, 31 So.2d 156; Taylor v. State, Fla. App. 1967, 199 So.2d 517; Weinshenker v. State, Fla.App.1969, 223 So.2d 561.

Therefore, the final judgment on the jury verdict and sentence thereon be and the same are hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.
#### Robert N. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-840.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 5, 1973.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender and Alan S. Becker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Joel D. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is by the defendant below from conviction following trial before the court without a jury, of the charged offenses of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: grand larceny, and grand larceny. The appellant contends the trial court committed error by denying his motions for acquittal made at the close of the state’s case and again at the close of the presentation of all of the evidence. In support thereof appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We have examined the record and considered the briefs and conclude that the contention is without merit. There was competent substantial evidence to support the judgment of conviction, as to the commission of the offenses and as to identity of the appellant as one of the perpetrators thereof.

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 10.2


                        GLOBAL MARINE INC.
                        EXECUTIVE DEFERRED
                   COMPENSATION TRUST AGREEMENT

                         FIRST AMENDMENT


          THIS FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE GLOBAL MARINE EXECUTIVE
DEFERRED COMPENSATION TRUST AGREEMENT, which was originally made
and entered into the 23rd day of February, 1996, but effective
January 1, 1995, by and between GLOBAL MARINE CORPORATE SERVICES
INC., a California corporation having its principal offices in
Houston, Texas ("Company"), and TEXAS COMMERCE BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, a national banking association ("Trustee");

          WHEREAS, the Company has established the Global Marine
Executive Deferred Compensation Trust (the "Trust") pursuant to the
Global Marine Executive Deferred Compensation Trust Agreement (the
"Trust Agreement"); and

          WHEREAS, the Company has reserved the right under Section
12 of the Trust Agreement to amend the Trust Agreement by a written
instrument executed by the Trustee and the Company;

          NOW, THEREFORE, the parties do hereby agree that Section
1 (b) of the Trust Agreement shall be amended effective as of
January 1, 1997, to read thereafter as follows:

          "(b)  The Trust shall be irrevocable from and after
          January 1, 1997."

          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused these
presents to be executed by their duly authorized officers this 26th
day of February, 1997.

                         GLOBAL MARINE CORPORATE SERVICES INC.


                         By:    /S/ J. L. MCCULLOCH
                                Vice President

                         TEXAS COMMERCE BANK NATIONAL
                              ASSOCIATION, Trustee


                         By:    /S/ M. S. GREENWOOD
                                Vice President
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-1098

_____________________________

REBECCA M. GAY,

Appellant,

v.

CHRISTOPHER M. GAY,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County.

Marci L. Goodman, Judge.

December 31, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Rebecca M. Gay appeals a final judgment of marriage 

dissolution’s imputation of income, which affected the child 

support calculations. The lower court imputed two thousand 

dollars of monthly income to Ms. Gay without finding that her 

unemployment was voluntary. We reverse.

Our standard for reviewing decisions imputing income under 

section 61.30(2)(b), Florida Statutes, is whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Leonard 

v. Leonard, 971 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). According to 

the statute, monthly income can be imputed to an unemployed 

parent only if such unemployment “is found . . . to be voluntary.” 

§ 61.30(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017). See, e.g., Marlowe v. Marlowe, 123 
2

So. 3d 1194, 1195–96 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (reversing where the 

trial court failed to “provide any factual basis for its conclusion 

that the former wife was voluntarily underemployed”). Here, the 

judgment imputes income to Ms. Gay without a finding that she 

was voluntarily unemployed. The trial court’s order noted that Ms. 

Gay had been dismissed from prior employment in 2010 due to 

work performance issues and refusing to take a drug test. It did 

not find, however, that this termination was voluntary. The order 

also noted that Ms. Gay was employed more recently by family 

members. This work also came to an end, but again there was no 

indication that this work ended voluntarily. Other record evidence 

indicates that Ms. Gay was applying for jobs on a weekly basis and 

intended to take classes and become registered to work as an

echocardiogram and ultrasound technician. On this record, and 

without key findings supporting the imputation of income, we 

must reverse and remand for reconsideration of the decision to 

impute income and of the child support calculation. 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ROWE, OSTERHAUS, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Kim Anthony Skievaski of Kim Anthony Skievaski, P.A., 

Pensacola, for Appellant.

Christopher M. Gay, pro se, Appellee.
| 1. | I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of ImageWare Systems, Inc.; and |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: April 23, 2015 | ImageWare Systems, Inc. By: /s/ S. James Miller, Jr. |   |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                 | S. James Miller, Jr.                                      |   |
|                 | Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)      |   |
# C_2020191EN.01001802.xml

| 8.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 191/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 191/18

---

Action brought on 20 February 2020 — Gruppe Nymphenburg Consult v EUIPO (Limbic® Types)

(Case T-96/20)

(2020/C 191/25)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Gruppe Nymphenburg Consult AG (Munich, Germany) (represented by: R Kunze and G. Würtenberger, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU word mark Limbic® Types — Application No 12 316 469

Contested decision: Decision of the EUIPO Grand Board of Appeal of 2 December 2019 in Case R 1276/2017-G

Forms of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 72(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 72(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 95 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 95 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 96 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 96 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
May 29, 2015 

Ms. Linda Dean Glover 

Field Data Solutions, Inc dba Electronic Data Solutions 

P.O. Box 31 

Jerome, ID 83338 

Dear Ms. Glover: 

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It 

explains why we can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days. 

Why We Can Not Process Your Request 

We entered your April 29, 2015, exemption request on behalf into the public docket 

(No. FAA-2015-1334), but we are unable to process your request any further. The 

information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For 

us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following: 

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the 

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief. 

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole. 

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption 

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you 

seek an exemption. 

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request. 

What You Should Do 

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 
2 

If We Do Not Hear From You 

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Brenda Robeson 

Program Analyst, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division 

Enclosure
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-7971

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

DERRICK ANTRON MUSE, a/k/a D, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior 

District Judge. (3:05-cr-00502-REP-1) 

Submitted: January 7, 2009 Decided: January 14, 2009 

Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Derrick Antron Muse, Appellant Pro Se. Sara Elizabeth Chase, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Derrick Antron Muse seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order granting his motion for reduction of sentence 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (2006). In criminal cases, the defendant 

must file the notice of appeal within ten days after the entry 

of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A); see United States v. 

Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 3582 

proceeding is criminal in nature and ten-day appeal period 

applies). With or without a motion, upon a showing of excusable 

neglect or good cause, the district court may grant an extension 

of up to thirty days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. 

P. 4(b)(4); United States v. Reyes, 759 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 

1985). 

The district court entered its order granting the 

motion for reduction of sentence on June 27, 2008. The notice 

of appeal was filed on August 22, 2008.* Because Muse failed to 

file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension of the 

appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED

 * See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).
#### MILKS *v.*TRITTEN.

1. Damages — Future Pain and Suffering — Trial—Instructions.

In action for personal injuries it was not error to permit jury to consider compensation for future pain and suffering, where plaintiff testified that he still suffered aches and pains from Ms injuries, which included broken leg, broken nose, broken and misplaced upper jaw bone, loosened teeth, and other severe injuries.

2. Appeal and Error — Pleading—Objection Raised for First Time on Appeal Comes Too Late.

Objection on appeal that trial court submitted to jury some elements of compensation not covered by declaration comes too late, where charge was within evidence which was admitted without objection.

As to damages for future pain and suffering, see annotation in 8 L. R. A. 765.

*2373. Same — Great Weight of Evidence.

Where testimony was in sharp eonfliet, with both plaintiff and defendant corroborated by witnesses, so that their credibility was important consideration, Supreme Court cannot say that verdict was against great weight of evidence.

Appeal from Manistee; Cutler (Hal L.), J.

Submitted January 15, 1932.

(Docket No. 150, Calendar No. 36,110.)

Decided April 4, 1932.

Case by Loren Milks, by next friend, against William Tritten for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident alleged to be due to defendant’s negligence. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

*Campbell é Campbell,*for plaintiff.

*W. P. Crot-ser*(J. *W. Patchin,*of counsel), for defendant.

Fead, J.

As plaintiff and defendant were driving in the same direction and defendant was passing plaintiff, the latter’s car ran off the road, turned over, and he was injured. Each blames the other for the accident. Plaintiff had judgment for $3,500.

Plaintiff suffered a broken leg, a broken nose, a broken and misplaced upper jaw bone, loosened teeth, and other severe injuries. He testified his leg pains him, especially when he walks, his head aches, and his jaw hurts when he eats. In view of this testimony, it was not error to permit the jury to consider compensation for future pain and suffering. Pains from broken bones do not cease in an instant. The verdict demonstrates that the jury did not misuse the instruction of the court.

Defendant’s contention that the court submitted to the jury some elements of compensation which *238were not covered by the declaration comes too late. The charge was within the evidence. The testimony was taken without objection. No request to limit recovery was made. There is nothing to review.

The testimony as to the cause of the accident was in sharp conflict, with both plaintiff and defendant-corroborated by witnesses, so that their credibility was an important consideration. We cannot - say the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.

Defendant’s other contentions have no merit and need no discussion.

__ Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Clark, C. J., and- McDonald, Potter, Sharpe, North, Wiest, and Butzel, JJ., concurred.