2 2

- 2095 Global Leadership Found. v. City of New York UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“ SUMMARY ORDER ” ). A PARTY CIT ING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 28 th da y of April, two thousand twenty

- t hree

. PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER , DENNY CHIN , RICHARD J. SULLIVAN , Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ __________________________ G LOBAL L EADERSHIP F OUNDATION , Plaintiff

- Appell ant ,
v. No. 2 2

- 2095 C ITY OF N EW Y ORK , M AYOR E RIC L. A DAMS , N EW Y ORK C ITY D EPARTMENT OF F INANCE , S HERIF S OLIMAN , M ICHAEL H YMAN , T IMOTHY S HEARES , P IERRE D EJEAN , T AX C OMMISSION OF C ITY OF N EW Y ORK , F RANCES H ENN , D OES 1

– 10, C ARMELA Q UINTOS , Defendant s - Appell ees . ∗

_____________________________________ __________________________

∗ The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.2 For Plaintiff
- Appellant : V IOLET E LIZABETH G RAYSON , New York , NY

. F or Defendants
- Appellee s : E DAN B URKETT , Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Sylvia O. Hinds

- Radix , Corporation Counsel of the City of New York , New York , NY

. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York ( Denise Cote , J udge ). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED

. Global Leadership Foundation (“ GLF ”)

– a “secular charity” established by Hee Nam Bae and his family to promote educational and cultural enrichment opportunities for studen ts and interns in New York City , J. App’x at 44

– 45, 71

– appeals from the district court’s order dismissing GLF’s first

- amended complaint against the City of New York and other associated entities and individuals (collectively, “Defendants”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
GLF’s operative complaint was filed in May 202 2 and alleged that
Defendants violated GLF’s First Amendment rights by den ying it property

- tax3 exemption s and significantly increas ing the assessed value of its property in Queens in retaliation for the Bae family’s public opposition to a n East Harlem development plan ; GLF also alleged that Defendants discriminat ed against GLF by favoring religious organizations over secular charities

. I n July 2022 , the
district court dismiss ed GLF’s complaint , concluding that it lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction to entertain GLF’s claims seeking declaratory relief under the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) , which pro hibits district courts from “ enjoin [ing] , suspend [ing , ] or restrain [ing] the assessment, levy [,] or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy [,] and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. T he district court further declined to exercise jurisdiction over GLF’s claims for damages under the relate d doctrine of comity , which “restrains federal courts from entertaining claims for relief that risk disrupting state tax administration,” including claims for damages, Levin v. Com

. Energy, Inc. , 560 U.S. 413, 417 (2010) , where plaintiffs can access “state remedies that are plain, adequate, and complete , ” Abuzaid v. Mattox , 726 F.3d 311, 315 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. We review a district court ’ s decision to dismiss claims for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction based on the TIA de novo and a decision to abstain from4 exercising jurisdiction over claims based on the comity doctrine for abuse of
discretion. See Dorce v. City of New York , 2 F.4th 82 , 9 3

– 9 4 (2d Cir. 20 21 ). That said, “ when we rev iew a court ’ s decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction,
the abuse [

- ] of [

- ] discretion standard is more rigorous than that which is generally employed such that there is little practical distinction from de [

- ] novo review. ” Id.
at 94 (internal quotati on marks omitted). Applying these standards, we reject GLF’s two challenges to the district court’s orders

. First , GLF contends that neither the TIA nor the comity doctrine bar s its
claims b ecause New York’s state courts do not provide a sufficiently “speedy ” remedy

. 28 U.S.C. § 1341; see also Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary , 454 U.S. 100, 116 n.8 (1981) (equating the TIA and comity

- doctrine standards regarding the adequacy of state

- court remedies)

. As proof of this deficiency in the state’s procedures, GLF point s to its own ongoing Article 78 proceeding , see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 et seq ., in which it seeks to reverse Defendants’ tax

- exemption
determination

. This argument is easily dispatched. As a general matter, w e have repeatedly h eld that “ New York does provide ‘ plain, speedy [,] and efficient ’ forums for individuals to bring constitutional challenges to its tax laws .” Abuzaid , 726 F.3d at 31 6 (emphasis added) ; see also Long Island Lighting Co. v . Town of5 Brookhaven , 889 F.2d 428, 4 31

– 33 (2d Cir. 1989) . And to the extent that a further
individual ized inquiry into the speediness of GLF’s pending state

- court litigation is required , the fact that the proceeding took four years

– and that an y appeal will
take additional time

– does not establish procedural inadequacy , s ee Long Island Lighting Co. , 889 F.2d at 433 (holding that a New York state

- court action that “lingered [for] over ten years in pretrial proceedings” w as nevertheless sufficiently speedy )

. 1 As a result, we decline to disturb the district court’s application of the
TIA and the comity doctrine to GLF’s claims on the basis of the alleged slown ess of the New York court system. Cf. Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank , 450 U.S. 503, 51 8

– 21 (1981) (“Nowhere in the [TIA] did Congress suggest that the remedy [ m ] ust be the speediest. ”).
Second , GLF contends that even if the New York state courts do provide an adequately speedy remedy, the comity doctrine should not bar its claims for damages because they involve core First Amendment rights. Again, we are
unconvinced

.

1 W e take judicial notice of the publicly available docket for GLF’s Article 78 petition filed in September 2018 , which s hows that GLF amended its petition in late 2020, that the Supreme Court of the State of New York denied the petition in September 2022 , and that GLF filed a notice of appeal that same month. See Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co. , 72 F.3d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir. 1995) ; Mangiafico v. Blumenthal , 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006)

.6 In general, the c omity doctrine bar s damages claims like GLF’s that “ risk disrupting state tax administration ” if “plain, adequate, and complete” remed ies
exist in state court. Abuzaid , 726 F.3d at 315

– 16 (quoting Fair Assessment , 454 U.S. at 116) (also noting that New York courts so provide) ; see also Joseph v. Hyman , 659 F.3d 215, 219

– 2 1 (2d Cir. 2011)

. To be sure, t he Supreme Court has identified three
factors that “counsel[] in favor of federal court adjudication despite the general rule of comity

. ” Joseph , 659 F.3d at 219. O ne of those factors is whether the case
involve s “ classifications subject to heightened scrutiny or fundamental rights ”
rather than “an issue of economic discrimination

. ” Dorce , 2 F.4th at 100 (quoting
Levin , 560 U.S. at 426 ) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted)

. But here, t he district court properly acknowledged that GLF’s claims “implicate [ d ] fundamental rights under the Free Speech and Establishment C lauses , ” J. App’x
at 99 , before also f i nd ing that the other two Dorce factors

– whether “federal and state courts [are] equally well suited” to choose among possible remedies and
whe ther the p laintiff ’s “ own tax liability ” is at issue, Dorce , 2 F.4th at 100 (quoting
Levin , 560 U.S. at 43 1 )

– weigh ed heavily against exercis ing jurisdiction . As GLF
has presented no argument on appeal disputing the district court’s determinations7 on these latter two factors, we cannot say that the district court exceeded its
discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction based on the comity doctrine

. We have considered GLF ’ s remaining arguments and f ind them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O = Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court