alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Floyd POTTER, Appellant, v. Dan ROWAN, Appellee.

No. 71-769.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 18, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1972.

Carrol F. Dillon, Sarasota, for appellant.

William R. Korp, of Nelson, Stinnett, Surfus, Korp & Payne, Venice, for appel-lee.

MANN, Judge.

Dan Rowan wanted a beach house like the one a friend had paid Potter $25,-000 to build. He wanted a few things changed, and asked Potter for a bid. “$41,-500,” said Potter. “Too much,” replied Rowan. Potter then suggested that Rowan might save a couple of thousand dollars if Potter did the job on a cost-plus basis. They signed a contract on a standard form, after striking through a clause which read: “Verbal agreement will definitely not be binding on either the Owner or Contractor.” Both Potter and Rowan initialed this deletion. That deletion from the standard contract is the only fact differentiating this case from Petrus v. Bunnell, Fla.App.2d 1961, 129 So.2d 702, and it strengthens Rowan’s side of this case. In *Petrus*this court held that while parol evidence is inadmissible to *vary*the terms of a written agreement, it is admissible to *supply*a missing term. Judge Culver Smith’s opinion for this court in *Petrus*collects all the au*122thority needed to explain why the trial judge correctly allowed testimony to prove that there was in fact a ceiling price of $41,500 agreed to by the parties. *Petrus*is also reported at 84 A.L.R.2d 132, and a pertinent annotation follows. The trial judge’s admission of parol evidence and his finding that there was in fact a ceiling of $41,500 on the cost-plus contract is affirmed.

The trial judge erroneously determined that there was no “prevailing party” in the Circuit Court, which had the effect of denying attorney’s fees pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 713.29, F.S.A. The Third District Court of Appeal said in Sharpe v. Ceco Corp., *1970, 242*So.2d 464, that the prevailing party is the one “who has affirmative judgment rendered in his favor at the conclusion of the entire case.” That case was rightly decided, and allowed fees to a subcontractor which recovered less than it claimed. What the opinion doesn’t emphasize is that Ceco recovered more than the owner and general contractor admitted to be due. Thus Ceco *was*a prevailing party. Here Rowan initiated the action, conceded about $3700 in extras that he might have quibbled about but was at least morally responsible for, and paid into the registry of the court exactly the sum the trial court found due to Potter. Unlike the owner in *Sharpe*and Emery v. International Glass & Mfg., Inc., Fla.App.2d 1971, 249 So.2d 496, Rowan from the very outset tendered the amount technically adjudged to be due Potter. He “prevailed” in every sense of the word. As Judge Walden said in H. D. McPherson, Inc. v. Metro Electric of Orlando, Inc., Fla.App.4th 1971, 253 So.2d 878, “we interpret ‘prevailing party’ to be just that — the party who prevails.” This aspect of the judgment is erroneous.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

LILES, Acting C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
# C_2021053EN.01004701.xml

| 15.2.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 53/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.2.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 53/47

---

Action brought on 14 December 2020 — OM v Commission

(Case T-728/20)

(2021/C 53/63)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: OM (represented by: N. de Montigny, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should

| — | annul the decision rejecting requests for reimbursement 247-251 and 252-256; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision rejecting requests for reimbursement 247-251 and 252-256;

| — | annul the decision of 23 March 2020 rejecting the complaint; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of 23 March 2020 rejecting the complaint;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant invokes first of all the admissibility of her action against a decision notified through the rejection, dated 23 March 2020, of her complaint made on 5 December 2019, which the applicant considers to be a new decision, adopted on the basis of a new examination of her situation, after the administration accepted the main argument developed through her first complaint. As regards the substance, the applicant relies on four pleas in law:

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the decisions are contradictory in relation to the change in reasoning following the previous reimbursement of similar expenses. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the decisions are contradictory in relation to the change in reasoning following the previous reimbursement of similar expenses.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging the lack of a specific and thorough examination of the requests for reimbursement of the medical expenses at issue. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the lack of a specific and thorough examination of the requests for reimbursement of the medical expenses at issue.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the right to be heard. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging failure to comply with the right to be heard.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment of the file. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment of the file.

---
##### 



EXHIBIT 32
 
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the
dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.
 Date: November 3, 2006
    
    /s/Jeffrey S. GormanJeffrey S. GormanPresident and Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)/s/Robert E. KirkendallRobert E. KirkendallSenior Vice President andChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
  20
# C_2023024EN.01001001.xml

| 23.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 24/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 24/10

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 24 November 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation — Belgium) — Tilman SA v Unilever Supply Chain Company AG

(Case C-358/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Judicial cooperation in civil matters - Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters - Lugano II Convention - Jurisdiction clause - Formal requirements - Clause included in the general terms and conditions - General terms and conditions which may be viewed and printed from a hypertext link mentioned in a contract concluded in writing - Consent of the parties)

(2023/C 24/13)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Tilman SA

Respondent: Unilever Supply Chain Company AG

Operative part of the judgment

Article 23(1) and (2) of the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed on 30 October 2007, the conclusion of which was approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2009/430/EC of 27 November 2008,

must be interpreted as meaning that

a jurisdiction clause is validly concluded where it is contained in the general terms and conditions to which the contract concluded in writing refers by the inclusion of a hypertext link to a website, access to which allows those general terms and conditions to be viewed, downloaded and printed prior to that contract being signed, without the party against whom that clause operates having been formally asked to accept those general terms and conditions by ticking a box on that website.

---

(1)  OJ C 338, 23.8.2021.

---
# C_2015331EN.01000101.xml

| 8.10.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 331/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.10.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 331/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7705 — Benson Elliot/Walton Street/Starwood/Hotel Portfolio)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2015/C 331/01)

On 2 October 2015, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

1

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32015M7705. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32015M7705. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

1

---
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 289 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 289

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                      November 3, 1993.
    Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker 
may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 2151) to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, to establish the 
Maritime Security Fleet program, and for other purposes. The first reading of 
the bill shall be dispensed with. General debate shall be confined to the bill 
and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
ranking minority member of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. After 
general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute 
rule. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of 
amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
recommended by the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries now printed in the 
bill. Each section of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute 
shall be considered as read. Points of order against the committee amendment in 
the nature of a substitute for failure to comply with clause 5(a) of rule XXI 
are waived. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the 
Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as 
may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any 
amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be 
considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage 
without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without 
instructions.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
#### ROBINSON & PONDER *vs.*HOLLAND.

After issue joined, the court will not permit the defendant to withdraw his pleadings for the purpose of demurring *specially.*

Capias case. .Narr. Pleas. Issue.

This case was continued on the plaintiff’s application, on account of the absence of material witnesses; and, after the continuance, *Frame*for defendant, moved for leave to withdraw his pleadings and demur.

*Robinson*and *fVootten,*for plaintiffs.

*Frame*and *Ridgely,*for defendant.

The court granted him the leave, restricting him to a *general*demurrer, on the same principle with the case of Waples vs. *M‘Gee & Salmons,*(ante 444.)
##### 



AMENDMENT NUMBER THREE
TO THE GOODRICH CORPORATION OUTSIDE DIRECTOR
PHANTOM SHARE PLAN
  th
      (b)
    
    Phantom Share Awards.On each Board Service Anniversary Date,
each Outside Director shall receive an annual grant of Phantom Shares (each, a
Phantom Share Award), equal in number to (i) $90,000, divided by (ii) the
Fair Market Value of a Share of Common Stock on such date. On July 1, 2007,
each Outside Director shall receive a one time annual grant of Phantom Shares
(each, a Phantom Share Award) equal in number to (i) $15,000, divided by (ii)
the Fair Market Value of a Share of Common Stock on August 1, 2007. All
Phantom Shares awarded under the Plan shall be fully vested on the date of
grant.




---



##### 



GOODRICH CORPORATIONBy:Title: 2
# Official Journal C 15/2007

| | ISSN 1725-2423 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 15 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5023 January 2007 |

ISSN 1725-2423

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 15

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5023 January 2007

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
| | Commission |
| 2007/C 015/01 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4461 — Accor Services France/Groupe Caisse d'Épargne/ACE) (1) | 1 |
| 2007/C 015/02 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3958 — Arcadis/Dura Vermeer/Imtech/Asset Rail/JV) (1) | 1 |
| 2007/C 015/03 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4146 — GE/BAYER/OSi Europe Business) (1) | 2 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

2007/C 015/01

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4461 — Accor Services France/Groupe Caisse d'Épargne/ACE) (1)

1

2007/C 015/02

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3958 — Arcadis/Dura Vermeer/Imtech/Asset Rail/JV) (1)

1

2007/C 015/03

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4146 — GE/BAYER/OSi Europe Business) (1)

2

---

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
| | Commission |
| 2007/C 015/04 | Euro exchange rates | 3 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

2007/C 015/04

Euro exchange rates

3

---

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL AND COMPETITION POLICY |
| | Commission |
| 2007/C 015/05 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.4526 — PAI/Lafarge) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (1) | 4 |

V   Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL AND COMPETITION POLICY

Commission

2007/C 015/05

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.4526 — PAI/Lafarge) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (1)

4

---

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
#### Joe Randle CURRAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. O-5.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Dec. 22, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 June 10, 2016

d0607

Order 

Clerk

June 10, 2016

152905(93)

In re STURGIS, Minors. SC: 152905

COA: 324127

Wayne CC Family Division:

13-514853-NA

_______________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s February 19, 

2016 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
# Official Journal C 48A/2014

| | ISSN 1977-091X
  doi:10.3000/1977091X.CA2014.048.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 48A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5720 February 2014 |

ISSN 1977-091X

doi:10.3000/1977091X.CA2014.048.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 48A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5720 February 2014

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | Corrigenda |
| 2014/C 048A/01 | Corrigendum to notice of open competitions — EPSO/AD/252/13 (AD 9) and EPSO/AD/253/13 (AD 12) (OJ C 118 A, 25.4.2013) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

Corrigenda

2014/C 048A/01

Corrigendum to notice of open competitions — EPSO/AD/252/13 (AD 9) and EPSO/AD/253/13 (AD 12) (OJ C 118 A, 25.4.2013)

(OJ C 118 A, 25.4.2013)

1

---

REVIEW OF COMPETITION C A OJs

Please find below the list of C A published during the present year.

Unless otherwise indicated, OJs are published in all language versions.

| 5 | |
| --- | --- |
| 6 | |
| 11 | |
| 19 | |
| 21 | |
| 26 | |
| 27 | |
| 30 | (PL) |
| 35 | |
| 41 | (DE/EN/FR) |
| 42 | |
| 43 | |
| 46 | |
| 47 | |
| 48 | |

5

6

11

19

21

26

27

30

(PL)

35

41

(DE/EN/FR)

42

43

46

47

48

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 11.3

                                     PSINet Inc.

                 Calculation of Pro Forma Loss per Share and Weighted
                       Average Shares Used in Calculation (1)




                                                         YEAR ENDED
                                                     DECEMBER 31, 1994
                                                     -----------------
Weighted average shares outstanding:
Common stock:
Shares outstanding at beginning of
  year............................................    12,309,283
19,803 shares issued from January 1,
1994 through March 7, 1994........................        14,117
712,180 shares issued from March 8, 1994
  through December 31, 1994, subject to
  SAB 83 using the treasury stock
  method..........................................       694,134
Shares from conversion of redeemable
  preferred stock, assuming conversion
  as of beginning of year.........................     6,852,125
Common stock equivalents:
Options and warrants to purchase 649,450
  shares of common stock granted from
  March 8, 1994 through December 31,
  1994, subject to SAB 83 using the
  treasury stock method...........................       525,231

                                                      20,394,890
                                                      ----------
                                                      ----------
Net loss..........................................   $(5,342,000)
                                                      -----------
                                                      -----------
Pro forma loss per share (unaudited)..............        $(0.26)
                                                      -----------
                                                      -----------

-----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------


(1) For a description of pro forma loss per share, see Note 1 of the Notes to
    the Consolidated Financial Statements incorporated by reference in Part II,
    Item 8 of this Form 10-K.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-21-00011-CV

Amanda WOOD and C.E.W., Jr.,

Appellants

v.

Kenneth VERNON, Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Katrina Fuller, 

Family Endeavors, Inc.,

Appellees

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CI10235

Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 24, 2021

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION

On February 22, 2021, the trial court clerk notified this court that the clerk’s record was 

not filed when it was originally due because appellants had failed to pay or make arrangements to 

pay the clerk’s fee for preparing the record and appellants were not entitled to appeal without 

paying the fee. On February 24, 2021, this court ordered appellants to show cause in writing by 

March 5, 2021, why this appeal should not be dismissed for want of prosecution. Appellants did 
04-21-00011-CV

- 2 -

not respond. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P.

37.3(b), 42.3(b). Costs of the appeal are taxed against appellants.

PER CURIAM
UN PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20

- 2079

DAVE HENRI R. MEERVIS , Petitioner ,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General , Respondent

.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted : June 30, 2021 Decided: August 11, 2021

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING , Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by un published per curiam opinion

.

Dave Henri R. Meervis, Petitioner Pro Se. Karen L. Melnik, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Dave Henri R. Meervis, a native and citizen of Belgium, has filed a pro se petition for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals a ffirming without opinion the

i mmigration judge’s written decision denying Meervis’ application for asylum and ordering Meervis removed to Belgium. On appeal, we confine our review to the issues

raised in the informal brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b) ( directing appealing parties to present specific arguments , issues, and supporting facts in an informal brief and observing that this

court “limi t[s] its review to the issues raised in the in formal brief ” ) . Affording Meervis’ pro se informal brief a liberal construction, see Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (instructing courts to liberally construe pro se documents), we conclude that Meervis has failed to challenge the immigration j udge’s dispositive rationale, which became the final agency determination, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2021). We therefore hold that Meervis has forfeited appellate review of the Board’s order

. See Jackson v. Lightsey , 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that brief.”). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. W e deny as unnecessary the Attorney General’s motion to remand and deny as moot Meervis’ motion for injunctive relief pending appeal . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENI ED