alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements included in the Form 10-K of American Safety Razor Company
for the year ended December 31, 1998, and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000750339
<NAME> AMERICAN SAFETY RAZOR COMPANY
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
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<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                            3453
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  262897
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            38089
<BONDS>                                         123481
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                           121
<OTHER-SE>                                       69433
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    262897
<SALES>                                         297488
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                297488
<CGS>                                           201978
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   201978
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  3003
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               12270
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## THE 

# ATTORNEY GENERAL OFTEXAS

February 7, 1951

Hon Gibb Gilchrist, Chancellor Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas College Station, Texas Opinion No. V-l 148

Dear Sir: Re: Legality of considering and accepting written bids without the bidder being personally present atthe statutory “public auction” ofmineral leases.

‘You have requested the opinion ofthe Attorney General as to whether the Board of Directors ofthe Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas may consider and accept written bids on mineral leases offered for sale under the provisions of Article 2613a-3, V.C.S., the bidder or an authorized representative not being personally present at the public auction.

Section 1of Article 2613a-3 authorizes the Board ofDirectors ofthe Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas to lease certain lands for **mineral** development “to the highest bidder atpublic auction.” Section 3thereof provides in part that: “The Board may sell the lease or leases to the highest bidder atpublic auction **at** the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, College Station, Texas, at any hour between 10:00 a.mr and 5:OOp.m. . . . .‘I Article 2613a-3 does not prescribe the manner or form inwhich bids must be submitted.

A public auction is nothing more than the public sale ofproperty to the highest bidder. 5Tex. Jur. 554, Auctions, Sec. 2; 7C.J.S. 1239, Auctions, Sec. la; 5Am. Jur. 446, Auctions, Sec. 2. Inthe absence ofprescribed methods for submitting bidsHon. Gibb Gilchrist, Page 2, V-1148

in the notice of holding the public auction, bids may be submitted in any manner or form by which the bidder signifies his willingness and intention to give a certain sum for the property offered for sale. 7 C.J.S. 1253, Auctions, Sec. 7e (2). They may be submitted in writing, and it is not necessary that the bidder be personally present atthe auction and make his bid then and there. State vs. State Board ofSchool Land Commissioners, 27 Wyo. 54, 191 Pac. 1073, 11 A.L.R.

‘~539(1920); 7C.J.S. 1254, Auctions, Sec. 7e (2). See also Annotation,;, l,l A.L.R. 543-546, and cases there cited.

You are accordingly advised that inthe absence of aprohibition against the submission ofwritten bids inthe notice ofholding apublic auction under the provisions of Article 2613a-3, the Board of Directors of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas should consider bids submitted inwriting at such auction, even though the bidder or an authorized representative is not personally present. SUMMARY Inthe absence of aprohibition against the submission ofwritten bids in the notice ofholding apublic auction under the provisions ofArticle 2613a-3, V.C.S., the Board ofDirectors ofthe Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas should consider bids submitted in writing at such auction, even though the bidder or an authorized representative is not personally present. APPROVED: Yours very truly, Charles E. Crenshaw PRICE DANIEL Oil &Gas Division Attorney General Jesse P. Luton, Jr. Reviewing Assistant Charles D. Mathews First Assistant DMG:mf BY Assistant
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Omar Rivera, Appellant.

[721 NYS2d 54]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Solomon, J.), rendered March 28, 1997, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of twelve counts of robbery in the first degree and two counts of attempted robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to twelve concurrent terms of I2V2 to 25 years concurrent with two concurrent terms of 7/2 to 15 years, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of reducing the convictions under the sixth and eighth counts of the indictment to attempted robbery in the first degree and reducing the sentences on those convictions to terms of 7V2 to 15 years, and otherwise affirmed.

Defendant’s claim that the court improperly precluded him from giving testimony explaining why he had confessed is unpreserved since defendant failed to make an offer of proof after the prosecutor’s objections were sustained *(People v George,*67 NY2d 817). Were we to review this claim, we would find that the objections were properly sustained because the questions, as framed by defense counsel, did not seek to elicit an explanation for defendant’s confession. Instead, the inquiry essentially sought an expression by defendant of his expectations as to what another person intended to do. The court’s preclusion of this testimony was a proper exercise of discretion and did not violate defendant’s right to testify on his behalf.

There was no violation of the unsworn witness rule when the trial prosecutor elicited minimal evidence of his personal involvement with a lineup. The court sustained objections to anything that went beyond an innocuous reference to the prosecutor’s participation, and there was no testimony carrying any suggestion that the prosecutor’s judgment influenced the investigating detective’s decisions concerning the lineups or any other aspect of the investigation. Accordingly, there was no prejudice to defendant *(compare, People v Ortiz,*54 NY2d 288, *with People v Paperno,*54 NY2d 294).

The evidence was legally insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant stole property from the victims involved in counts six and eight of the indictment, but was legally sufficient to establish attempted robbery in the first degree as to those two incidents, and we reduce the convictions and sentences accordingly. There is no purpose to be served by remanding for sentencing.

Defendant failed to preserve his claims regarding the court’s *156use in sentencing of its conclusion that defendant gave perjurious testimony, and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find that the court properly considered defendant’s patently perjurious testimony in sentencing *(see, People v Harris,*272 AD2d 225, *lv denied*95 NY2d 935; *People v Malcolm,*216 AD2d 118). Concur—Sullivan, P. J., Nardelli, Williams, Saxe and Friedman, JJ.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.1


CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
Forms S-3 (Nos. 333-84051 and 333-38240), as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 29, 1999 pertaining to the shares issued in
conjunction with the acquisition of Knowledge Well Limited and Knowledge Well
Group Limited and on May 31, 2000 pertaining to the shares issued in conjunction
with the acquisitions of Learning Productions LLC and the net assets of AES, on
Forms S-8 (Nos. 333-06409, 333-25245, 333-35745, 333-57031, 333-68499,
333-83927, 333-86861, 333-32380 and 333-46640), as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on June 20, 1996 pertaining to the 1994 Share Option Plan,
on April 16, 1997 pertaining to the 1996 Supplemental Stock Plan and Applied
Learning Limited Executive Stock Plan, on September 16, 1997 pertaining to the
1994 Share Option Plan, on June 17, 1998 pertaining to The Forefront Group, Inc.
Amended and Restated 1992 Stock Option Plan, The Forefront Group, Inc. Amended
and Restated 1996 Stock Option Plan and The Forefront Group, Inc. 1996
Non-Employee Directors' Stock Option Plan, on December 7, 1998 pertaining to the
Amended and Restated 1994 Share Option Plan, on July 28, 1999 pertaining to the
Knowledge Well Limited 1998 Share Option Plan and the Knowledge Well Group
Limited 1998 Share Option Plan, on September 10, 1999 pertaining to the 1994
Share Option Plan and the 1995 Employee Share Purchase Plan, on March 14, 2000
pertaining to the 1996 Supplemental Stock Plan, on March 14, 2000 pertaining to
the 1996 Supplemental Stock Plan and on September 29, 2000 pertaining to the
1994 Share Option Plan and the 1996 Supplemental Stock Plan, of our reports
dated January 18, 2001, with respect to the consolidated financial statements
and schedule included in this annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2000.



/s/ Ernst & Young
Ernst & Young

Dublin, Ireland
Date: March 30, 2001
MONTHLY MAINTENANCE LOG

month: year:

UAS #: Date Issue

Discovere

d Date Issue

Addressed Issue Description & Maintenance Conducted Maintenance Performed by:

Print & Sign

Software Updates

Airframe

Engines

Propellers

Camera Gimbal

Landing Gear

Vibration Dampening

Other:
#### Martin Ellis BRUMIT v. STATE.

No. 38541.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 1969.

Appeals dismissed without opinion. 220 So.2d 659.
#### William P. SCHERER, M.D., Petitioner, v. Sara B. LIBERTO, Respondent (two cases). William P. SCHERER, M.D., Appellant, v. Sara B. LIBERTO, Appellee. STATE of Florida on the relation of William P. SCHERER, M.D., Relator, v. The Honorable Judge John G. FERRIS, Judge of the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, and Sara B. Liberto, Respondents.

Nos. 76-2633, 77-46, 76-2631 and 76-2632.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 28, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 2, 1978.

*1225Richard M. Gale, Alan R. Dakan and Stephens & Schwartz, Miami, for appellant/relator/petitioner.

Alan C. Brandt, Jr., and E. Hugh Chap-pell, Jr., of McCrory, Chappell, Brandt & Gore, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appel-lee/respondents.

DAUKSCH, Judge.

The question on appeal is whether the requirement of Section 768.133(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1975) (now Section 768.-44(l)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976)), is jurisdictional. That is, if a defendant fails to file an answer to a medical malpractice claim within 20 days of service of the claim does the medical mediation panel ever gain jurisdiction. We answer that the clear wording of the statute indicates the filing of the answer is jurisdictional and the failure of the Appellant-Petitioner to file his answer timely disallows him from receiving the benefits of the medical liability mediation proceedings. The fact that he mailed the answer on the last day matters not. Just as in notices of appeal to this court, the document must be filed with the court on or before the last day or no jurisdiction is obtained. *Knee v. Smith,*313 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Of course, in medical mediation matters, jurisdiction begins when the claim is filed but is terminated when 20 days passes and no answer is filed, Section 768.44(l)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), or ten months after the claim is filed if an answer is filed and no hearing is held. Section 768.44(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976). *Cole v. Wallace,*354 So.2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

The Order terminating the jurisdiction of the medical mediation panel is affirmed. The Order denying the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at Law is affirmed. The Petition for Writ of Mandamus is denied. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is denied. The trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

DOWNEY and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
# C_2022237EN.01002201.xml

| 20.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 237/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 237/22

---

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 26 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social No 3 de Barcelona — Spain) — QL v Universitat de Barcelona

(Case C-464/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Social policy - Directive 1999/70/EC - Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP - Successive fixed-term contracts in the public sector - Clause 2 and Clause 3(1) - Scope - Concept of ‘fixed-term worker’)

(2022/C 237/27)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Social No 3 de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: QL

Defendant: Universitat de Barcelona

Operative part of the order

Clause 2 and Clause 3(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP must be interpreted as meaning that a worker bound to his or her public sector employer by successive fixed-term contracts and whose employment relationship may be reclassified, as a penalty, as a ‘non-permanent contract of indefinite duration’, falls within the scope of that framework agreement.

---

(1)  Date lodged: 29.7.2021.

---
#### Daniel O. O’CONNELL and Frances H. O’Connell, Appellants, v. CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK OF HOLLYWOOD, a national banking association, Appellee.

No. 71-143.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 4, 1971.

Thomas J. Davis, Jr., of Davis & Kur-land, North Miami, for appellants.

Jerome F. Pollock, of Hulmes, Dreiling & Pollock, Hollywood, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants, as makers of a promissory note, suffered an adverse summary judgment in an action against them on the note.

The original complaint had attached to it a copy of the note which was incomplete on its face. The court granted a motion to dismiss the original complaint on the grounds that the instrument was unenforceable under F.S. Section 673.3-115(1), F.S.A. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging its authority to complete the instrument and attaching a copy of the note as completed in accordance with the alleged authority. It is on the basis of the issues made by the amended complaint that the court determined plaintiff’s entitlement to summary judgment.

Appellants’ sole point on appeal is that allowing the amended complaint to stand violates established principles of law to the effect that the plaintiff’s right of action must be measured by the facts as they existed when the suit was instituted, Voges v. Ward, 1929, 98 Fla. 304, 123 So. 785; City of Coral Gables v. Sakolsky, Fla.App.1968, 215 So.2d 329, and that where there is no valid cause of action at the time of filing suit, the defect cannot be remedied by the accrual of one while the suit is pending. Meredith v. Long, 1928, 96 Fla. 719, 119 So. 114 and Hasam Realty Corp. v. Dade County, Fla.App.1965, 178 So.2d 747.

*237It seems clear to us that appellants are in no different position than they would have been had appellee voluntarily dismissed the original action, completed the instrument in accordance with its alleged authority, and thereafter filed a new and separate action on the completed note. Thus, without deciding whether the court erred in allowing the amended complaint to stand, it seems clear that appellants sustained no harm or prejudice, nor has such action resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and hence the judgment from which the appeal is taken should be affirmed. F.S. Section 59.041, F.S.A.

Affirmed.

REED, C. J., and OWEN and MAGER, JJ., concur.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

July Term 2014

PUBLIX SUPER MARKETS, INC.,

d/b/a PUBLIX SUPER MARKET,

Petitioner,

v.

SYLVIA JOHN,

Respondent.

No. 4D14-1892

[November 19, 2014]

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie 

County; Dwight L. Geiger, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562013CA000421.

Katherine E. Giddings and Kristen M. Fiore of Akerman LLP, 

Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Kathryn D. Anderson of Reich & Mancini, P.A., Port St. Lucie, for 

respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the April 24, 2014 

order granting respondent’s motion to compel production. On remand, 

the circuit court shall conduct an in camera review to determine whether 

the October 11, 2009 incident report is protected by the work product 

privilege. If the court determines that the document is so protected, it 

shall not order production unless respondent makes a “showing that 

[respondent] has need of the materials in the preparation of the case and 

is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of 

the materials by other means.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4); see also Publix 

Super Mkts., Inc. v. Anderson, 92 So. 3d 922, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); 

Lloyd’s Underwriters at London v. El-Ad Villagio Cond. Ass’n, 976 So. 2d 

28, 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

STEVENSON, GROSS and GERBER, JJ., concur.
- 2 -

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 32,362

#### Christina Howell, *Appellee,*v. J. D. Howell, *Appellant.*

(46 P. 2d 866)

Opinion filed July 6, 1935.

*E. B. Skinner,*of Junction City, for the appellant.

*James V. Humphrey*and *Arthur S. Humphrey,*both of Junction City, for the appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Johnston, C. J.:

This was an action by Christina Howell against her husband, J. D. Howell, for separate maintenance and alimony. She charged the appellant with adultery and extreme cruelty. The trial court decided in her favor, awarding her alimony. It is claimed the award was excessive.

It was shown that she had contributed to the family treasury a gift from her father of $1,700 and her earnings from sewing of $300 to $480 per year, amounting in all to about $9,600. She was given the residence, the household goods, an automobile and a life estate in a garage building, subject to a $1,500 mortgage and taxes. Appellant was given two automobiles and all other property owned by him, including the Pierce note for $6,000, of doubtful value, and other notes aggregating $570, and the remainder in the property after appellee’s death.

*324After the judgment was rendered against appellant, he voluntarily paid the costs in the case. Plaintiff has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds of voluntary payment of the costs by the appellant. It is stated that payment of the costs is an acquiescence in the judgment which under the authorities waives the right to an appeal and leaves nothing for us to consider. The plaintiff cites the following cases, and many others might be cited: *Waters v. Garvin,*67 Kan. 855, 73 Pac. 902; *State v. Massa,*90 Kan. 129, 132 Pac. 1182; *Round v. Power Co.,*92 Kan. 894, 142 Pac. 292; *Bank v. Bracey,*112 Kan. 677, 212 Pac. 675; *Highland v. Hogue,*131 Kan. 512, 292 Pac. 750; *Paulsen v. McCormack,*133 Kan. 523, 1 P. 2d 259; *Buchan v. Boyns,*141 Kan. 901, 44 P. 2d 268.

Following these authorities, and the showing of the voluntary payment of costs by the appellant, it must be held he thereby acquiesced in the judgment, and hence this appeal is dismissed.
IV

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 358

Providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House for expenses

of investigations and studies by the Committee on the Judiciary in

the second session of the One Hundred Third Congress.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 10, 1994

Mr. BROOKS submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on House Administration

RESOLUTION

Providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House

for expenses of investigations and studies by the Committee on the Judiciary in the second session of the One

Hundred Third Congress.

1 Resolved, That (a) for expenses of investigations and

2 studies by the Committee on the Judiciary (hereinafter in

3 this resolution referred to as the ‘‘Committee’’), including

4 expenses for provision of assistance for members of profes5 sional staff in obtaining specialized training under section

6 202(j) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,

7 there shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the House

8 not more than $2,734,853.
2

•HRES 358 IH

1 (b) Not more than $5,000 of the amount specified

2 in subsection (a) may be used for specialized training re3 ferred to in such subsection.

4 SEC. 2. Payments under this resolution shall be made

5 on vouchers authorized by the Committee, signed by the

6 chairman of the Committee, and approved by the Commit7 tee on House Administration.

8 SEC. 3. Amounts shall be available under this resolu9 tion for investigations and studies carried out during the

10 period beginning at noon on January 3, 1994, and ending

11 immediately before noon on January 3, 1995.

12 SEC. 4. Amounts made available under this resolution

13 shall be expended in accordance with regulations pre14 scribed by the Committee on House Administration.

Æ
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 51 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 51

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                    January 27, 1993.  
    Resolved, That the following named Members, Resident Commissioner, and 
Delegates, be, and they are hereby, elected as Chairmen and Members as the case 
may be, to the following standing committees of the House of Representatives:
    Committee on Armed Services: Ronald V. Dellums, California, Chairman; Pete 
Geren, Texas; Elizabeth Furse, Oregon; and [vacancy].
    Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries: Gary L. Ackerman, New York.
    Committee on Post Office and Civil Service: Greg Laughlin, Texas; Sanford D. 
Bishop, Jr., Georgia; Sherrod Brown, Ohio; and Alcee L. Hastings, Florida.
    Committee on the District of Columbia: Fortney Pete Stark, California, 
Chairman.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```