J-S19019-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JOCELYN CHANDLER, RICHARD 

JENNINGS

v.

COREY BRACEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2027 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered April 10, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): May Term, 2006, No. 060502517

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED MAY 22, 2020

Corey Bracey (Appellant) appeals pro se1from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas denying his petition to strike a default 

judgment entered against him and in favor of Jocelyn Chandler and Richard 

Jennings (Appellees).2 On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court erred by: 

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1 Appellant is currently incarcerated, and we infer that he has been in prison

since at least January of 2018. Although the certified record includes no 

information concerning the reason for, or length of, his incarceration, 

Appellant listed the Greene and Rockview State Correctional Institutions as 

his addresses on various filings, including his original petition to strike the 

judgment, and stated his only asset was a prison inmate account. See

Appellant’s Petition to Strike Default Judgment, 1/31/18; Appellant’s Petition 

for Reconsideration, 6/26/18; Appellant’s Petition to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis & Without Payment of Bond, 2/8/19, at 2. Appellant likewise 

provides his address as the Rockview State Correctional Institution on his 

filings in this Court. See Appellant’s Brief at 7. 

2 Appellees did not file a responsive brief.
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(1) finding all his claims waived based upon his purported failure to file a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement; (2) failing to inform him he could appear at the 

petition to strike hearing by writ of habeas corpus, and (3) accepting personal 

jurisdiction when he was not properly served with Appellees’ complaint. For 

the reasons below, we remand this case to the trial court to determine whether 

Appellant is entitled to file a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc. 

The relevant facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are as 

follows. On June 14, 2004, Appellant was involved in motor vehicle accident

with Appellees in Philadelphia. On May 18, 2006, one month before the 

expiration of the two-year statute of limitations period,3 Appellees filed a 

complaint asserting the accident was caused solely by Appellant’s negligence, 

and seeking damages for personal injuries (Chandler) and property damage

(Jennings). Appellees’ affidavit of service was docketed on June 30, 2006. 

The form indicated that, on June 22, 2006, service of process was provided to 

an “[a]dult in charge of [Appellant’s] residence who refused to give name or 

relationship.” Affidavit of Service, 6/20/06. Appellant did not file an answer 

or otherwise respond to the complaint.

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3 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(a)(7) (statute of limitations for cause of action in 

negligence is two years); Varner-Mort v. Kapfhammer, 109 A.3d 244, 248 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (“[T]he general rule in Pennsylvania regarding car accident 

cases is that the statute of limitations begins to run for an injured plaintiff on 

the day of the accident.”).
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On August 18, 2006, Appellees filed a praecipe for entry of default 

judgment based upon Appellant’s failure to respond to the complaint.4 

Judgment was entered on the docket, and on January 16, 2007, Appellees 

appeared at an arbitration hearing to determine damages. Appellant did not 

appear for the hearing. The panel awarded Chandler $35,000 in damages and 

no damages to Jennings. No appeal was filed.

The docket reveals no activity for 11 years. Thereafter, on January 31, 

2018, Appellant, who was by then incarcerated, filed both a pro se petition to 

strike the judgment, with accompanying brief, and a petition to proceed in 

forma pauperis (IFP). In his petition to strike, Appellant averred he never 

received the complaint and the affidavit of service form was patently defective, 

and thus the trial court had no personal jurisdiction to enter a judgment

against him. Appellant’s Petition to Strike Judgment, 1/31/18, at 1-2. In his 

brief, Appellant explained the affidavit indicated service was made on June 22, 

2006, after the 30-day period for service provided in the Pennsylvania Rules 

of Civil Procedure, and Appellees failed to reinstate the complaint.5 Appellant’s 

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4 The praecipe stated that a 10-day notice of intent to enter default judgment 

was provided to Appellant on July 18, 2006. See Order for Judgment, 

8/18/06.

5 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 401 provides, in relevant part:

(a) Original process shall be served within the 

Commonwealth within 30 days after the issuance of the writ or 

the filing of the complaint.
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Brief in Support of Petition to Strike Judgment, 1/31/18, at 3. Because service 

was made after the two-year statute of limitations expired Appellant insisted

the judgment should be stricken from the record. Id. Additionally, Appellant 

claimed the affidavit did “not indicate the place of service[,]” as required by 

the Rules of Civil Procedure, so that “it is impossible to ascertain if [he] was 

served in this matter, which [he] avers he was not.”6 Id. at 4.

On February 2, 2018, the trial court entered an order denying, without 

prejudice, Appellant’s petition to proceed IFP because he had failed to provide 

the requisite information to determine his indigency status. Order, 2/2/18. 

The order further stated, “[Appellant] shall pay the requisite filing fees or file 

a new Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis within twenty (20) days of the 

docketing of this Order.” Id. Appellant did neither. 

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(b)(1) If service within the Commonwealth is not made 

within the time prescribed by subdivision (a) of this rule . . . the 

prothonotary upon praecipe and upon presentation of the original 

process, shall continue its validity by reissuing the writ or 

reinstating the complaint, by writing thereon “reissued” in the 

case of a writ or “reinstated” in the case of a complaint.

(2) A writ may be reissued or a complaint reinstated 

at any time and any number of times. . . . 

Pa.R.C.P. 401(a), (b)(1).

6 The Affidavit of Service form, which is included in the record, directs the 

process server to serve the complaint to Appellant at “323 N. 56th St. Phila., 

PA 19139.” Affidavit of Service — Philadelphia Co., 6/30/06. However, the 

section of the form to be completed by the process server, indicating where 

service was made, was left blank. Id.
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In the meantime, on February 21, 2018, Appellees filed an answer and 

memorandum of law in response to Appellant’s motion to strike. Appellees 

acknowledged “the Affidavit of Service appears defective[,]” however,

asserted the writ server properly served the complaint within 30 days but

simply “filled out the Affidavit wrong.” Appellees’ Memorandum of Law, 

2/21/18, at 1. Appellees further stated that, although the writ server “does 

not remember what occurred” ten years ago, they would be “severely 

prejudiced by allowing this matter to be completely dismissed with prejudice.” 

Id. Nevertheless, Appellees requested the trial court “enter an Order vacating 

the judgment and requiring [Appellant] to file an Answer to the Complaint[,]”

thus, agreeing Appellant was entitled to some relief. Id.

On March 1, 2018, Appellant was notified his petition to strike the 

judgment was stricken by the Office of Judicial Records because he failed to 

pay the appropriate filing fee.7 Notice, 3/1/18. Appellant filed an untimely 

motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court, and then 

appealed to this Court. On September 25, 2018, this Court quashed the 

appeal per curiam because it was taken from an interlocutory order. See

Docket No. 2152 EDA 2018, Order, 9/25/18.

On February 8, 2019, Appellant filed a second petition to strike the 

January 2007 default judgment — identical to the one he filed the prior year 

— as well as a petition to proceed IFP. On February 12th, the supervising 

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7 Appellant did not file a new petition for IFP. 
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judge granted Appellant IFP status. The petition to strike was assigned to the 

Honorable Paula Patrick. On March 7, 2019, the court issued a rule to show 

cause why Appellant’s petition should not be granted, and scheduled a hearing 

for April 10, 2019. Appellant failed to appear at the show cause hearing and, 

that same day, the court denied the petition to strike. Order, 4/10/19.8 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal that was docketed on May 17, 2019. On July 

25, 2019, the trial court directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On September 9th, 

the court issued an opinion suggesting that this Court dismiss the appeal 

because Appellant failed to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. Trial Ct. Op., 

9/9/19, at 1-2. The court also stated Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed 

late. Id. at 1. The trial court did not address any substantive issues. On 

April 13, 2019, this Court issued a per curiam rule to show cause why the 

appeal should not be quashed as untimely. Order, 8/13/19. After Appellant 

filed a timely response, this Court discharged the rule and referred the issue 

to the merits panel. Order, 9/23/19. 

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal, which we have reordered 

for ease of disposition:

1. Did the lower court err by not finding Appellant’s statement of 

errors complained on appeal as timely, when he did file timely and 

multiple times thereafter (nunc pro tunc)?

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8 Notice of the order was sent the following day, April 11, 2019.
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2. Did the lower court err by not stating Appellant’s right to 

effectuate his appearance at the petition to strike hearing by writ 

of habeas corpus? 

3. Did the lower court err accepting in personam jurisdiction of 

challenged judgment without proper service of original process 

upon Appellant?

Appellant’s Brief at 1.

Before we address Appellant’s claims on appeal, we must first consider 

whether this appeal was timely filed. Because “an untimely appeal divests 

this Court of jurisdiction[,]” we may consider the timeliness of an appeal sua 

sponte. Valley Forge Ctr. Assocs. v. Rib-It/K.P., Inc., 693 A.2d 242, 243, 

245 (Pa. Super. 1997). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 903(a) mandates that “the 

notice of appeal . . . shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order 

from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). In a civil case, the date 

of entry of an order is “the day on which the clerk makes the notation in the 

docket that notice of entry of the order has been given as required by 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b).” Pa.R.A.P. 108(b). See Pa.R.C.P. 236(b) (“The 

prothonotary shall note in the docket the giving of the notice[.]]”). Here, the 

underlying order was entered on April 10, 2019, and notice was sent on April 

11, 2019. Appellant’s notice of appeal was date-stamped and docketed on 

May 17, 2019. See Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, 5/17/19. Thus, on its face, 

it appears Appellant’s appeal was untimely filed.

However, Appellant claims he originally filed a notice of appeal in the 

trial court on April 19th, but the clerk refused the filing and returned the 
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documents to him because he used the wrong form. Appellant’s Response to 

Order to Show Cause Why Appeal is Timely, 8/26/19, at 2. Appellant attached 

to his show cause response a copy of a “Notice of Rejected/Returned 

Documents” from the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, dated May 2, 2019, 

which states his “documents are unacceptable for filing” and requests he 

“please complete on notice of appeal forms provided.” Id., Exhibit 2. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held “[t]he clerk of courts . . . 

lacks the authority to reject, as defective, a timely notice of appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 588 (Pa. 2014).

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 Rather, 

Pennsylvania Rule of Procedure 905(a)(3) “unequivocally requires the clerk 

for the lower court to time-stamp a notice of appeal immediately upon 

receipt.” Id., citing Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(3) (“Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, 

the clerk shall immediately stamp it with the date of receipt, and that date 

shall constitute the date when the appeal was taken, which date shall be 

shown on the docket.”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we will consider 

Appellant’s notice of appeal as filed on May 2, 2019, the date it was rejected 

by the trial court; thus, this appeal is timely filed.

Next, we must determine whether Appellant has waived all of his claims 

based upon his failure to comply with the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) order. 

See Trial Ct. Op., 9/9/19, at 1-2.

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9 “Since the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to criminal and civil cases 

alike, the principles enunciated in criminal cases construing those rules are 

equally applicable in civil cases.” Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 n.6 

(Pa. Super. 2004)
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It is axiomatic that a litigant must file a timely Rule 1925(b) statement 

when ordered to do so by the trial court. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In 

Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484 (Pa. 2011), the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court summarized the law concerning compliance with the Rule:

Our jurisprudence is clear and well-settled, and firmly 

establishes that: Rule 1925(b) sets out a simple bright-line rule, 

which obligates an appellant to file and serve a Rule 1925(b) 

statement, when so ordered; any issues not raised in a Rule 

1925(b) statement will be deemed waived; the courts lack the 

authority to countenance deviations from the Rule’s terms; the 

Rule’s provisions are not subject to ad hoc exceptions or selective 

enforcement; appellants and their counsel are responsible for 

complying with the Rule’s requirements; Rule 1925 violations may 

be raised by the appellate court sua sponte, and the Rule applies 

notwithstanding an appellee’s request not to enforce it; and, if 

Rule 1925 is not clear as to what is required of an appellant, onthe-record actions taken by the appellant aimed at compliance 

may satisfy the Rule. We yet again repeat the principle first stated 

in [Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 30, 309 (Pa. 1998),] that 

must be applied here: “[I]n order to preserve their claims for 

appellate review, [a]ppellants must comply whenever the trial 

court orders them to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Any issues not raised in a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” 

Id. at 494. Hill, however, considered the language of Rule 1925 prior to the 

2007 amendments, which “made sweeping changes [to the Rule, including] a 

longer period for filing, explicit provisions for extensions of time to file, and 

detailed direction on the information a Statement should include.” 

Commonwealth v. Gravely, 970 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Pa. 2009). 

Relevant herein, the Rule now provides a trial court with the discretion 

to extend the original filing period:
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The judge shall allow the appellant at least 21 days from the date 

of the order’s entry on the docket for the filing and service of the 

Statement. Upon application of the appellant and for good 

cause shown, the judge may enlarge the time period 

initially specified or permit an amended or supplemental 

Statement to be filed. Good cause includes, but is not limited 

to, delay in the production of a transcript necessary to develop 

the Statement so long as the delay is not attributable to a lack of 

diligence in ordering or paying for such transcript by the party or 

counsel on appeal. In extraordinary circumstances, the 

judge may allow for the filing of a Statement or amended 

or supplemental Statement nunc pro tunc.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2) (2014)10 (emphases added). Furthermore, the 2007 

Amendments added subsection (c), which permits an appellate court to 

remand a civil case in the following circumstances:

(1) An appellate court may remand in either a civil or 

criminal case for a determination as to whether a Statement had 

been filed and/or served or timely filed and/or served.

(2) Upon application of the appellant and for good cause 

shown, an appellate court may remand in a civil case for the filing 

nunc pro tunc of a Statement or for amendment or 

supplementation of a timely filed and served Statement and for a 

concurrent supplemental opinion. 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(1)-(2) (2014).

Here, the record reveals the trial court entered an order on July 25, 

2019, directing Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement “no later than 

twenty-one (21) days after entry of [the] Order.” Order, 7/25/19. Notice of 

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10 We note Rule 1925 was amended on June 24, 2019, with an effective date 

of October 1, 2019. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925, Credits. The language cited above 

now appears in Subsection (b)(2)(i) of the Rule. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2)(i). 

Because the Rule 1925(b) order entered herein was filed on July 26, 2019 —

before the new amendments took effect — all references are to the prior 

language of the Rule.
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the order was provided on July 26, 2019. See Docket Entry, 7/26/19. 

Therefore, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was due on August 16, 2019. 

Appellant avers in his brief that he mailed his Rule 1925(b) statement “at his 

first available opportunity” on August 21, 2019. Appellant’s Brief at 5. He 

claims he was confined to his cell prior to that time and “[t]he guards would 

not deposit the mailpiece (sic) themselves nor were they trusted to do so.” 

Id. at 5 n.1. Accordingly, Appellant insists he “has shown good cause why 

the statement should be accepted as timely.” Id. at 5.

In its opinion, the trial court stated it directed Appellant to file a Rule 

1925(b) statement “by August 26, 2019.” Trial Ct. Op. at 1. If this were so, 

Appellant’s statement, purportedly filed on August 21, 2019, would have been 

timely.11 As noted above, however, the court’s order directed Appellant to file 

a statement within 21 days, or by August 16, 2019. See Order, 7/25/19.

 The court also indicated in its opinion that, “[t]o date, Appellant has not 

filed a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 1. 

However, we note that the court’s Rule 1925 order did not comply with the 

requirements of the Rule. Indeed, at the time the court entered its Rule 

1925(b) order, subsection (b)(3) mandated:

(3) Contents of order.--The judge’s order directing the filing 

and service of a Statement shall specify[, inter alia,]: . . . 

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11 See Thomas v. Elash, 781 A.2d 170, 176 (Pa. Super. 2001) (extending 

prisoner mailbox rule to pro se incarcerated litigants in civil matters; under 

this rule, “a legal document is deemed filed . . . on the date it is delivered to 

the proper prison authority or deposited in the prison mailbox.”).
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(ii) that the Statement shall be filed of record;

(iii) that the Statement shall be served on the judge 

pursuant to paragraph (b)(1) . . . .

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(ii)-(iii) (2014) (emphasis added). Although the order 

herein directed Appellant to “file[ ]” the statement within 21 days, it did not 

instruct him to serve the statement on the trial court pursuant to Subsection 

(b)(1).12 See Order, 7/25/19. See also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1) (2014) 

(directing appellants to concurrently file of record and serve statement on 

judge either in person for by mail).

Accordingly, based upon the circumstances presented herein — a pro 

se, incarcerated appellant, who avers he attempted to comply with the court’s 

order, but was unable to do so based upon circumstances allegedly beyond 

his control — we remand this case to the trial court to conduct a hearing to 

determine if Appellant did comply with the court’s Rule 1925 order, or, 

alternatively, if Appellant demonstrated good cause or extraordinary 

circumstances warranting the filing of a statement nunc pro tunc.

13

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12 Pursuant to the 2019 amendments, Subsection (b)(3)(iii) now requires the 

trial court to specify in its Rule 1925(b) order “both the place the appellant 

can serve the Statement in person and the address to which the appellant can 

mail the Statement.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii). The subsection also notes the 

trial court may provide an email or fax number to effectuate alternative 

service. Id. However, as noted above, this amendment was not in effect at 

the time the trial court herein entered its Rule 1925(b) order.

13 We note, too, that this case involves a $35,000 judgment entered 13 years 

ago, without any record evidence that Appellant was properly served with the 

complaint, or had any knowledge of the judgment against him prior to January 

of 2018. Further, Appellees admitted in their response to Appellant’s motion 
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Case remanded. Panel jurisdiction retained. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/22/20

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to strike that the Affidavit of Service “appears defective,” and conceded the 

proper remedy would be “to vacate the judgment and allow [Appellant] to file 

an Answer.” Appellees’ Response to Appellant’s Petition to Strike Judgement, 

2/21/18, at 1.