1

Filed 12/8/14 In re I.G. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re I. G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN MATEO COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff,

v. T. G. et al.
, Defendant s and Respondents ; I. G., Appellant. A141013
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 82914)

The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over I.G. when she was
15 months old, finding her at risk of harm, primarily due to her mother’s mental health
issues. In a prior appeal, we found the evidence sufficient to support the court’s jurisdiction finding. At a contested status review hearing , the court terminated jurisdiction, find ing that the S an Mateo County Human Services Agency (Agency) had failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conditions justif ying initial assumption of jurisdiction still existed or were likely to recur without continued supervision. Minor’s counsel now appeals the termination order. 1 We affirm.

1 The Agency has declined to participate in this appeal.2 I. B ACKGROUND In February 2013, C.S. , 15

- month

- old I.G.’s mother (Mother), left I.G. home alone within reach of hazardous objects. The Agency alleged I.G. was at a substantial risk of serious physic al harm (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)) 2 due to Mother’s mental
heal th issues and the inability of I.G.’s f ather (T.G. ; Father ) to adequately protect her

. The following June, t he juvenile court overruled a demurrer filed by Mother and Father (Paren ts) and sustained the petition. We affirmed those rulings in a prior appeal.
The juvenile court rejected the Agen c y’s recommendation that I.G. be removed
from Parents’ care , but conditioned I.G. ’s return to their home on an agreement that I.G.

not be left alone with Mother. The July 2013 family maintenance case plan required
Mother to undergo a psychological evaluation; take part in a mental health assessment
and follow the treating therapist’s recommendation s ; regularly meet with her psychiatrist
and follow his medication recommendations ; work with a family care worker on in

- home parenting coaching; comply with public health nursing services; express her anger appropriately ; and refrain from violence in I.G.’s presence. Father was required to tak e part in a mental health assessment and follow any treatment recommendations ; work with the family care worker on parent ing skills; take I.G. to all med ical appointments and follow her physicians’ recommendation s ; ensure that I.G. was never left alone wit h Mother; and immediately report any concerns about Mother to the Agency. August 2013 Ps

ychological Evaluation The Agency referred Mother to a clinical psychologist for the psychological
evaluation required by the case plan (August 2013 evaluation). The August 2013

e valuation was based on the psychologist’s review of the juvenile dependency record
, an interview with Parents, and psychological testing of Mother. Parents minimized
Mother’s mental he alth problems and the incidents that led to the dependency petition

. Moreover, Mother “was a poor historian due to her extreme guardedness and pronounced effort to represent herself favorably. She was so intently focused on defending herself

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3

that she obf

uscated, omitted and denied fundamental information about her history and
circumstances. ” Mother further “made an odd impression because of her forceful style of interaction, obliviousness to her state of disarray and disorganized thinking. .

. . Her stream of speech was pressured, loud, rapid, and difficult to interrupt. Her thought process was digressive, tangential, evasive and contradictory. Her themes were frequently grandiose. Her mood was expansive and her affect appeared flat. [Her] insight and judgment appeared limited. .

. . [H]er thought process and flat affect suggested the possibility of a psy chotic level of functioning.”
Mother’s responses to an Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) symptom checklist did not meet the criteria for an ADHD diagnosis because she did not report that symptoms started before the age of 14 and because othe r disorders better accounted for the symptoms. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory

- 2 test yielded invalid results “because [Mother’s] answers became increasingly illegible as she continued with the test questions. .

. . Instead of filling in the designated spaces, she began making loops which then became increasingly larger, sweeping circles that spanned two or more answer spaces.” Other test results “may have also been skewed by [Mother’s] pronounced efforts to represent herself favorably. ” Nevertheless, the test
results disclosed mild depression and “ multiple hypomanic symptoms including hyperactivity, pressured speech, decreased need for sleep, excessive spending, distractibility, high risk behavior (unsafe driving) ” that reported ly occurr ed during the
same time period

. U nstructured tests less vulnerable to manipulation yielded results that were “positive for the presence of a mood disorder, coping deficit, severe impairment in reality testing and difficulties in her interpersonal relation ships. ” In summary, Mother “ test[ed] as a very expressive, emotionally driven person who has difficulty processing the flood of emotion that overwhelm[s] her functional capacities. She is often at risk for losing control of her thinking and behavior beca use her feelings are so disabling. [¶]

. . . [She ] is lacking in basic functional capacities to manage

even simple tasks of life .

. . [and ] is easily overwhelmed and disorganized by her own emotions and from external challenges. .

. . [However, a] fuller picture of her strengths4

and weaknesses might have been possible with a greater level of cooperation.” Mother

was diagnos ed with “Bipolar I Disorder, Moderate, Most Recent Episode Mixed, With Psychotic Features, ” 3 noting that the disorder is a “ treatable condition that can be managed with psychotherapy, psychotropic medications, psychoeducation, and support

groups, ” which would allow Mother to function as a competent parent. “However, [Mother] remains a safety risk to her child and herself so long as she continues to fight this diagnosis and resist appropriate treatment interventions.”
Mother’s Section 388 Petition and Psychiatrist’s September 2013 Letter
In November 2013, Mother filed a section 388 petition asking the court to rescind
the order that she not care for I.G. alone. S he attached a September 6 , 2013 lett er from
her treating psychiatrist : “I have been working with [Mother] throughout this year, generally on a monthly basis. The service provided is medication management only (i.e., prescribing and monitoring medication), and no formal 1:1 talk therapy is provided. Her most recent appointment and evaluation by me occurred on 8/16/13. At that time, and at no time during her treatment, have there been observable signs of danger where [Mother]

wo uld prove to be a risk for her own or other’s health and/or safety. [¶] Additionally, following my most recent evaluation, I have found a noted improvement in [Mother’s]
mental status and well

- being. Therefore, due to her stability and improvement, it is my professional opinion .

. . that allowing [Mother] to be alone (unsupervised) with [I.G.] is reasonable and poses no foreseeable risk to [I.G.’s] well

- being and safety .” The Agency
and minor’s c ounsel opposed the petition , and a hearing was set for Nove mber 15.
In a report opposing Mother’s section 388 petition , the Agency provided the court
with the August 2013 evaluation and argued that Parents’ continued resistance to

3 The August 2013 evaluation also noted, “There is considerable overlap between the symptoms of ADHD and manic episodes. Both are .

. . characterized by excessive activity, impul sive behavior, poor judgment, restlessness, distractibility, sleep difficulties and denial of problems. ADHD is distinguished from Manic Episodes by its characteristic early onset, chronic rather than episodic course, lack of relatively clear onsets and o ffsets, and the absence of abnormally expansive, elevated or depressed moods or psychotic features.”5

Mother’s bipolar disorder diagnosis was impeding their ability to make progress on resolving the issues that led to the dependency. The Agency further noted that Parents believed that allowing Mother to be with I.G. unsupervised would alleviate their concerns about Father getting I.G. from childcare when he needed to work late

. On Nove mber 15, 2013, the court set both the section 388 petition and the upcoming status review for a contested hearing on February 10, 2014.
November 2013 Status Review Report
Later in November 2013, the Agency filed a status review report. I.G. had been seen by a physician in October , who noted normal growth and development except for
some flea bites. 4 At all unannou nced Agency visits to Parents’ home , Father was present
with I.G. T he family received in

- h ome parenting support from a family care worker a few times a month, and a public health nurse provided support for I.G.’s medical needs. The public health nurse reported that I.G. was clean, happy
, playful and interacting

appr opriately with P arents during a visit in October . The nurse had been unable to
arrange a visit in November. Father had a mental health assessment in November, and
received no psychiatric diagnosis or treatment recommendations

. Mother had ha d two
sessions with a therap ist
, but no progress report was available

. I.G. and Parents were participating in sessions with I.G.’s therapist, Susan Farabee. Farabee recommended Mother engage in dyad therapy with I.G. before be ing allowed to care for I.G. alone

. The Agency opined that I.G. would be at risk if the dependency case was
dismisse d. “[M] other has only recently been assigned to work with a therapist and has not engaged in dyad treatment with the child .

. . . Concerns still exist regarding [M] other’s mental health. Despi te a psychological evaluation, [Parents] feel that the
results are inaccurate. The minimization of the seriousness of [Mother’s] condition could potentially jeopardize the safety of the child if services were not in place .

. . .”

4 On October 23, 2013, the Agency received a referral that I.G. smelled like vomit, suffered from severe diaper rash, had feces on her, and was demonstrating self

stimulating behaviors such as rocking to soothe herself and disassociation. The Agency eventu ally deemed the referral unfounded.6 December 2013 Therapist’s Report In an addendum report filed De cember 9, 2013, the Agency submitted a report by
Farabee based on the 11 therapy sessions she had conducted with I.G. and Parents between July and November

. 5 Farabee wrote that one goal of her therapy was for I.G. to display five healthy attachment skills by June 2014. I.G. had already displayed two such
skills : playing a game with Mother in which they match ed each other’s bright affect and seeking out Father for comfort when she was sick. Another goal of the therapy was for
Parents to sing songs, teach body parts, read books and ver bally reciprocate with I.G.
Farabee had seen Mother te ach I.G. body parts and read her a book, and Mother reported
that she also sang songs with I.G. Both parents were working on reading consistently to I.G. In response to a question on the report form about whether there was a substantial risk to I.G., Farabee wrote, “I am concerned with the emotional well being of [I.G.], as it is difficult to get [M other ] engaged in play with her as well as stay engaged with her. An

exa mple would be, when [I.G.] hands [Mother] a toy to play with, [Mother ] misread[s] the p l ay cue and puts the toy aside.”
J anuary 2014 Psychiatric Evaluation Shortly before the contested hearing, Parents produced a January 22, 2014 “psychiatric diagnostic evaluation and report ” by Mother’s treating psychiatrist (January 2014 evaluation) , in which he offered his opinion on Mother’s capacity to care for and independently control I.G

. 6 The psychiatrist stated he was board certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, worked as an assistant clinical professor at the University of California San Francisco Medical Center, and had previously been qualified as a court expert. He based his opinion on 13 “serial psychiatric eva luations” he
had conducted with Mother between M arch 2013 and January 2014; the August 2013

5 In early December 2013, a new therapist (Geeta Devjani) had been assigned to I.G. after Parents raised concerns that Farabee inappropriately disclosed confidential information.

6 Neither minor’s counsel nor the Agency subpoenaed the psychiatrist to appear at the February status review hearing and neither requested a continuance so he could appear.7

evaluation; and June 2012 medical records reflec ting a bipolar disorder diagnosis for
Mother

. Mother self

- reported experienc ing attention deficit disorder ( ADD ) sy mptoms before becoming a teenager. She claimed she was deemed psychotic at I.G.’s birth in part because she had stopped taking her ADD medication (Dexadrine) when she became pregnant. After she was diagnosed as bipolar in June 2012, s he took Depakote and
Prozac as prescribed but continued to experience distraction and anxiety , and questioned
whether these medications were appropriate for her

. The psychiatrist ’s initial diagnostic impression in March 2013 was of a woman with severe ADD, anxiety
, and possibly brief psychotic episodes who had mildly disorganized thought processes and stared off at times. He saw no history consistent with manic episodes. He taper ed Mother off of Depakote and prescribed her Adderall for ADD, Prozac for depression, and Klonopin for anxiety. He later took her off Klonopin and added Restoril as a sleep aid. Due to “periodic continuing presentations of psychotic symptoms (gross paranoia, likely internal preoccupation),” he started her on Risper d al, an antipsychotic
, i n June 2013

. 7 As of January 2014, she was taking Risperdal, Adderall, Prozac and Restoril. In July 2013, Mother, Father and I.G. were observed together for a 45

- minute session. Mother was generally appropriate with I.G.
, and no signs of negligent or uns afe behavior by Mother were observed e ven though Mother was mildly symptomatic. In January 2014, Mother was able to appropriately describe the responsibilities of a mother
and the basic needs of a child.
Mother scored high on two tests for ADD. Mother’s presentation was described as “[f]air to at times poor eye contact, fleeting and briefly staring off”; “[g]enerally cooperative, but at times minimizing and dismissive of any symptomatology”; “[n]o push

7 We deny Parents’ requests for judicial notice of a Web site and documents that describe the properties of Risperdal. We g enerally do not consider evidence that was not before the trial court when the order under review was issued
, and no unusual circumstances justify doing so in this case. (See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 400.) We further deny Mother’s motion to s trike minor’s counsel’s opposition to the requests for judicial notice as moot.8

of speech”; “[t]hought [p]rocesses: [p]ossible bloc king and period ic internally preoccupied[, ] [g]enerally linear but some mild disorganization [,] overall goal

- directed and coherent”; “[n]o gross delusions”; “[d]enies auditory or visual hallucinations but possible responses to internal stimuli (ie, talking to self)”; “[m]ildly guarded, mildly anxious”; fair insight; fair to good judgment; good impulse control ; alert and oriented ; and able to sleep well and sit still. She denied depression, rapid or pressured speech, manic episodes, manic spending, impulsiv ity, auditory or visual hallucinations, or paranoia. She reported mild symptoms of inattention and distraction.
Mother was diagnosed with ADHD, predominantly inattentive; unspecified schizophrenia spectr um and other psychotic disorder; and adjustment dis order with mixed
disturbance of emotion and conduct. The psychiatrist specifically opined that Mother did

not me et the criteria for a bipolar disorder diagnosis
, indicated t he June 2012 diagnosis was not supported by the medical records , and implicitly rejected the analysis of the August 2013 evaluation

. He opined that Mother was adequately attending to her mental
health needs and could independently provide adequate and safe care for I.G. “ [T]here are aspects to [Mother] which are noteworthy: i.e., h er periodic inconsistencies, her guardedness and minimizing during some interviews, her periodic ‘eccentric’ presentation and some soft symptoms not addressed by the above diagnoses. The severity of these outliers, however, do not reach the level of clini cal rel e vance nor warrant additional diagnoses and/or treatment.” For treatment, he recommende d continued medication, therapeutic support, and full custody of I.G., as well as release of any limitations on Mother’s interactions with I.G

. February 2014 Age ncy Report
In a February 2014 report, the Agency wrote that the family care worker
, Marian Ellette, had reported in December 2013 that she had tried to discuss concerns about Mother’s medications with her and had asked her to sign a release so Ellett e cou ld talk to Mother’s psychiatrist . Mother refused, became defensive, and smiled inappropriately during the discussion . In late January 2014, Ellett e reported that P arents had canceled
their last three appointments and Mother had again refused to sign the release. Ellett e9

opined that Mother continued to have mental health issues even while on medication, and
that Father was ignoring those issues. In January and February 2014, Mother declined Agency request s that she sign a release so the social worker could talk to her therapist

. The Agency argued that Mother continued to pose a risk to I.G. “The refusal to provide consent, the indications of brief psychotic episodes, and the seemingly odd behaviors that have been observed suggest continued concerns w ith [M other’s ] stability. The minimization of the mental health issues by [P arents ] result in potential safety concerns that placed the child at risk if left unsupervised with [M other ] .” The Agency
recommended continued family maintenance with the condit ion that I.G. not be left alone
with Mother. February 2014 Contested Hearing At the February 2014 joint hearing on status review and Mother’s section 388 petition, s ocial worker Daniella Tobey testified there were “still some potentially
unresolved issues that may place the child at risk if unsupervised [ with Mother].” She based this opinion on the August 2013 evaluation
, Parents’ rejection of the bipolar diagnosis, reports by Farabee and Ellett e that Mother was not fully participating in therapy , and Tob ey’s personal observation that during monthly home visits Mother did not consistently interact with I.G. or participate in discussions with Tobey

. Tobey again
noted that she was unable to talk to Mother’s psychiatrist or individual therapist because
Mothe r had not signed releases. 8 Tobey said she had asked I.G.’s new therapist ( Devjani )
for a report on the dyad therapy, but had not heard back.
When t he court asked what the Agency wanted Mother to do before the dependency was terminated , Tobey testified: “I feel the [Parents] are very fixated on this diagnosis of ADD, a lot of the legal aspects of the case, and not so much of progressing forward and saying, okay, how do we resol ve this issue. .

. . [¶]

. . . [Also, t] he fact that [M other ] will stare off o r become par anoid or have

— even as [her psychiatrist ] said

—

8 Tobey acknowledged that she did not know the circumstances of Mother’s declining to sign the release o f information for her therapist; on one occasion when Tobey wanted Mothe r to sign a release, Tobey did not have a form with her.10

moments of psychosis.

. . . This is a two

- year

- old child. If [Mother] has an episode of psychosis where she is not able to care for the child, that puts the child at substantial risk
of harm. ” She disagreed with the January 2014 evaluation that Mother had improved in that respect. Tobey acknowledged, however, that none of the service providers had described a specific situation in which Mother had placed I.G. at risk.
Father testified that he had not seen Mother do anything that put I.G. at risk , and
that he had seen significant improvement in Mother s ince she started treatment with the psychiatrist

. For example, Mother was not spaced out, communicated more, and attended to I.G. by changing her d iapers and feeding her, which Mother had not been doing initially. He had also seen Mother respond to I.G.’s cues that she was hungry or felt sick, and had seen Mother regularly make eye contact with and hug and kiss I.G. Currently, I.G. was probably closer to Mother than to Father. He had also seen Mother actively participate in dyad therapy with both Fa rabee and Devjani. In argument, the Agency acknowledged the case was a close call. It acknowledged that the August 2013 evaluation was nearly seven months old and claimed
that the conflict in diagnoses was not driving the Agency’s recommendation . “The issue is more about the present circumstances and [P arents’ ] ability to recognize and acknowledge the issues that brought them before the Court and to cooperate by signing releases and engaging in open communication with the [Agency]

. . . . ” Minor’s counsel similarly argued that Mother was not fully compl ia nt with her case plan because she did not sign a release to allow the social worker to speak wit h her therapist. When the court
asked for case law requiring a parent to sign a release for psychiatric records , the Agency said it did not believe there was such a legal requirement. However, b ecause the Agency
had not been able to consult with certain providers, it had t o base its recommendation on observations and reports from other providers : Tobey, Ellett e , Farabee and the clinical psychologist had reported that Mother did not seem to be present or engaged. Even Mother’s psychiatrist noted that she still had concerning symptoms , and w hile he determined these symptoms did not j ustify a different diagnosis or specific treatment, the Agency was concerned about whether they rendered Mother unable to safe ly care for I.G.11

The court commented, “It is clea r that [M] other presents oddly. It is clear that she has mental health issues.” However, “[h]aving a mental illness doesn’t of itself mean that the parent cannot be with their child.” The Agency asked for six more months of services
to make sure Mother was actively participating. The court responded, “I’m not sure that is going to help

. . . . She is doing everything you asked her to do from what I can see. [¶] And I understand it is a very difficult and close call, but the burden is on the [Agency].” The Agency said it would be reassured by a report from Devjani that Mother was actively engaging in dyad therapy. The court, however, said it was the Agency’ s burden to produce reports from the service providers and the court was surprised the
social worker had not obtain ed a t least an oral report from Devjani.
The juvenile court expressly found Tobey and Father to be credible witnesses and
ruled: “ [W]hile t he Court understands there are concerns, there certainly are; however,

. . . the [Agency] has failed to establish .

. . by [a] preponderance of the evidence the conditions still exist that would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction or that those
cond itions were likely to occur without continued supervision. Therefore, the Court is going to terminate dependency at this time.” I.G. appealed.
II. D ISCUSSION We previously found that the record in this matter supported assumption of dependency jurisdict ion. T he only issue before us on this appeal is whether the juvenile court’s ruling

— that the Agency failed to meet its burden of proof to continue jurisdiction

— i s supported by the record

. “[W] here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. ( Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 570

– 571; [citation ] .) Specifically, the questio n becomes whether the appellant’ s evidence wa s (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘ of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
ins ufficient to support a finding.’ ( Roesch v. De Mota, supra, at p. 571. ) ” ( In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal. App.4th 1517, 1528 , parallel citation omitted .) As in all cases in which we review a finding for evidentiary support, “ we look to the entire record for substantial12

evidence

. . . . [which] must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it mus t actually be substantial proof o f the essentials that the law requires in a particular case. [Citation.]” ( In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 172.) “ [W] e resolve all conflicts and make reasonable inferences from the evidence to uphold the court’s or ders, if possible. [Citation.]” ( In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 828.) Section 364 go verns a status review hearing when the dependent child is in parental custody. ( In re N.S., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 171

– 172.) Section 364,
subdivision (c) provides in relevant part : “ The court shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the social worker or his or her department establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdic tion under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is
withdrawn. ” (Italics added.) 9 We agree with minor’s c ounsel ’s implicit argument that the relevant evidence is
not limited to devel opments that have taken place since the last hearing (here, the jurisdiction and disposition hearing that took place in June 2013), but also includes the facts that initially supported dependency jurisdiction . Based on the entire record of the dependency case, the court must determine whether “the conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn .” ( § 364, subd. (c), i talics added.)
Mor eover, the Agency need not prove that the child faced a substantial risk of harm since the last hearing, but may satisfy the section 364 standard by demonstrating that at the time of the status review hearing the child would face a subs t antial risk of harm if continuing supervision were withdrawn. Nevertheless, the burden remains on the

9 Section 364, subdivision (c) further provides that “[f]ailure of the parent or guardian to participate regularly in any court ordered treatment program shall constitute prima facie evidence that th e conditions which justified initial assumption of jurisdiction still exist and that continued supervision is necessary.” While some dispute exists in this case about whether Parents completely compli ed with their case plan, there was no contention that e ither parent failed to regularly participate. Therefore, the Agency did not have the benefit of a prima facie showing that jurisdiction should be continued.13

Agency to establish the need for continued supervision. 10 Applying the appropriate
burden and standard of proof to the entire record, we conclude the juvenile court’s
deter mination that the Agency failed to meet its burden of proof is supported by
substantial evidence. The dependency case began when Mother briefly left I.G. home alone near some
hazardous conditio ns or materials when I.G. was 15 months old. S ubsta ntial evid ence that Mother had s erious and ongoing mental health problems included an incid ent of psychosis at I.G.’s birth, multiple (though conflicting) diagnoses of mental illness, multiple observations of her flat affect and distraction, and Father’s admission t hat she
had mental health issues. A s of the date of the jurisdiction hearing
, there was evidence
that Mother was not yet receiving an effective regular treatment regimen and there were incidents as recent as April and June 2013 when Mother lashed out at F ather due to her mental instability
, and Father was unable to calm her down. W e previously up held the court’s jurisdiction finding because the aforementioned evidence clearly demonstrated at that time Mother’s continuing mental instability and resulting propensity to lash out; her inability to care for I.G. alone; I.G.’s heightened risk of injury due to inattention because she was less than two years old; and Father’s inability to reliably protect I.G. from the

conseq uences of Mother’s instability

— facts which constituted substantial evidence that
I .G. faced a substantial risk of serious physical harm. At the February 2014 status review hearing, the Agency failed to demonstrate that
Mother continued to h ave no effective treatment regimen for her mental health problems

. The Agency produced the August 2013 evalua tion that diagnosed Mother with a bipolar
disorder and concluded that she needed to accept this diagnosis and participate in bipolar

-

10 P arents would have the burden of proving that changed conditions justified termination of jurisd iction on a petition under section 388 to modify the court’s prior order. Although Mother filed a section 388 petition here and thus would have borne the burden of proof on that petition had the court considered it prior to the scheduled status review hea ring, the court did not address the petition until the status review hearing itself. Mother’s petition was mooted by termination of jurisdiction. At the review hearing, the section 364 burden of proof fell squarely on the Agency.14

specific trea tment in order to become stable

. However, that evaluation took place six months before the status review hearing, and was based on a single evaluation session. Mother produced a more recent evaluation by a board

- certified psychiatrist who had been
treati ng her regularly for nearly a year , had conducted a n in

- depth evaluation of her less
than one mont h before the hearing, and explained his reasons for disagreement with a bipolar diagnos i s. Minor’s counsel raises reasonable concerns about the reliability o f the January 2014 evaluation : t he psychiatrist was chosen and paid by Mother ; he provided
Mother with medical management only and not talk therapy ; and Mother ’s failure to

consent to r elease of records might have suppressed information unfavorable to her.
Counsel also notes that the January 2014 evaluation acknowledged M other had “periodic continuing pres entation of psychotic symptoms.” Minor’s c ounsel argues that Mother’s continued opposition to the original jurisdictional and dispositional orders d emonstrated
that she was still in denial about the nexus between her mental health and I.G.’s safety
, and that Father’s arguments in the court below showed that he lacked insight into the
seriousness of M other’s psychotic condition and the risks it posed t o I.G.
A ll of these arguments, however, were presented below and we cannot conclude that the record compelled the juvenile court to reject the January 2014 evaluation and accept the August 2013 evaluation

. Importantly, no expert witness testified that th e psychiatrist’s treatment of Mother was inappropriate or that his medical opinion lacked support. Nor did the Agency prove that the treatment was ineffective. It was undisputed that Mother regularly met with the psychiatrist and complied with his prescr ibed medication regimen. N o evidence was presented of gaps in treatment as there had been between I.G.’s birth and the start of the dependency case

. Both the psychiatrist and Father observed marked improvement in Mother’s presentation, providing evidence that
the treatment was effective at least in part

. The Agency also failed to demonstrate that Mother was so unstable that she would
lash out in a w ay that Father could not manage: no reports had been made of Mother’s lashing out or suffering se vere anxiety attacks since the jurisdiction hearing, and there15

had been no further emergency calls by Father or police interventions. Service providers complained of Mother’s inappropriate affect, laughing or smiling inappropriately during
serious convers ations, but the court reasonably could have found that these concerns did

not implicate the safety risks that led to the initial assumption of jurisdiction

. Finally, although a closer call, the court could reasonably find that the A gency failed to demonst rate Mother could not care for I.G. alone. Father testified that Mother was proactive with I.G., feeding, cleaning, comforting and playing with her. The psychiatrist reported appropriate interactions between Mother and I.G. and an appropriate
understandi ng by Mother of the parental ro le. It was undisputed that Mother was participating in individual and dyad therapy, with the only concern being the degree of her engagement. Significantly, there was also evidence that I.G. was happy, clean, healthy and de velopmentally on track. Minor’s counsel characterizes the juvenile court’s finding as “ optimistic speculation .” We agree that the conflicting record evidence here could well have justified contrary findings and a continuing exercise of jurisdiction. We do not, however,

“ reweigh the evidence, evalua te the credibility of witnesses or indulge in inferences contrary to the findings of the trial court. ” ( In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 .) In making its orders, w e presume that t he juvenil e court is always cognizant
of it s “e quitable duty to protect the welfare of the children within its jurisdiction. ” ( In re Christopher I. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 533, 557 .) O n this record, we cannot conclude
that the evidence compelled the juvenile court to conclude that I.G. faced a substantial risk of harm unless dependency jurisdiction was continued.
III. D ISPOSITION The order terminating dependency jurisdiction is affirmed.16 _________________________ BRUINIERS, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ JONES, P. J.

_________________________ SIMONS, J.