alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Hodges *v.*Crawford and wife.

Assessment of damages. Where an interlocutory judgment by default is rendered, in an action upon an open account, the damages must be assessed by the jury.

*Error to Independence Circuit Court.*

Hon. Richard H. Rowell, Circuit Judge.

*566Byers & Cox and 'Wassell & Moore, for plaintiff.

Gregg, «J.

Hodges complains that the circuit court of Independence county, at the May term, 1868, erroneously rendered judgment in favor of the Crawfords, and against him, for $2521¡5Tro-0-,

The action was in assumpsit, founded upon an open account. The record states that, at the return term, “the plaintiffs appeared, and the defendant, being .duly served with process and three times called, came not.” It was ordered that a judgment by default be entered against him, and upon an account of $250 against him, sworn to and - filed by one of the plaintiffs in their behalf, the court assessed their damages at $250^^, and rendered judgment accordingly.

The only question here presented is, whether or not the circuit court could legally assess the plaintiffs’ damages, upon the defendant making default.

This question has long since been settled by direct legislative enactment.

On page 858, Gould’s Digest, (sec. 81,) declares “that whenever an interlocutory judgment shall be rendered for the plaintiff by default, or upon demurrer, in any suit founded on any instrument in writing, and the demand is ascertained by such instrument, the court shall assess the damages, and final judgment shall be given thereon.”

The next section declares that “in all other eases of sueli interlocutory judgments, the damages shall be assessed by a jury, impaneled in the court for that purpose, and every such inquiry of damages shall be made at the term next after the term at which such interloeutoi’y judgment shall be rendered, unless the court direct it to be made at the same term.” *Evans v.*Parks, 10 *Ark.,*306; *Johnson v. Pearce,*12 *Ark.,*599; *Johnson v. Frank,*16 *Ark.,*199.

The above statute -was not changed by the act of 1866-7, p. 210, so as to authorize the court to hear proof and assess dam*567ages in eases not founded upon an instrument of writing, and on which the demand could be ascertained upon its face. This last statute only provided that a party, upon his own oath, can make a *prima facie*case, upon trial, -when 'the opposing party does not dispute such evidence. That act made statements, on oath, competent evidence for certain purposes, that were not so before that time; and, by still.later ordinance, or acts of legislation, all litigants are competent witnesses. But this does not change the time or mode of trial, nor do those acts extend the powers of the court, or in any manner restrict a defendant’s right to a trial by jury, wherein he does not waive that well established and important right.

The judgment is reversed,the cause remanded, with directions to allow the defendant to plead to the declaration, if he asks so to do, and to proceed to final judgment according to law.
Page 1 of 3

Disposition Comments

Docket No: FAA-2015-1480 These comments are in

Directorate ID: 2014-SW-071-AD response to an SNPRM

Originating Office Tracking No.: 

Next Step: FRAN SNPRM

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required.

No Has the referenced service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? If yes, 

list latest revision and attach a copy. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously 

published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point for guidance.

Instructions: Summarize all comments by issue (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of 

each issue. All comments relating to the same issue should be discussed together. Do not list all of the issues 

from one commenter together. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and 

describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA-IR-M-8040.1C Chapter 9.

ISSUE 1: Select one of the following: 

If other, explain: 

Commenter(s): 

What change to the AD action is requested? 

Why is the change requested or how is it justified? 

Do we agree? 

If YES, we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: 

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ISSUE 2: Select one of the following: 

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Page 2 of 3

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For additional issues, double-click here
Page 3 of 3

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ASE Printed Name: Helene Gandy Date

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# C_2020191EN.01002201.xml

| 8.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 191/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 191/22

---

Action brought on 19 March 2020 — Bachmann v EUIPO (LIGHTYOGA)

(Case T-153/20)

(2020/C 191/29)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Gabriele Bachmann (Bad Grönenbach, Germany) (represented by: C. Weil, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU word mark LIGHTYOGA — Application for registration No 18 054 218

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 December 2019 in Case R 2346/2019-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | uphold the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

—

uphold the appeal;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 887 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 887

    To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for the 
          exclusion of immigrants infected with the HIV virus.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 16, 1993

   Mr. Duncan for himself, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Zeliff, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. 
Santorum, Mr. Sundquist, Mr. Barton of Texas, Mr. Bartlett of Maryland, 
 and Mr. Baker of Louisiana) introduced the following bill; which was 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for the 
          exclusion of immigrants infected with the HIV virus.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXCLUSION OF IMMIGRANTS INFECTED WITH THE HIV VIRUS.

    (a) In General.--Section 212(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(1)(A)(i)), as amended by section 
601(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990, is amended by inserting ``or, in 
the case of an alien who is an immigrant, to be infected with the human 
immunodeficiency virus'' after ``to have a communicable disease of 
public health significance''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to individuals seeking admission as immigrants on or after 
January 1, 1993, or, if later, the date of the enactment of this Act.

                                 <all>
```
Frequently Used GPO Accounting Codes 

Abbreviation Description of Number GPO Number Issued By 

ALC Agency Location Code (ALC) - RF1 (for Printing) 

Agency Location Code (ALC) - RF2 (for SuDocs) 

04000001 

04000002 

Treasury, FMS 

BPN Business Partner Number 07-480-0160 Dun & Bradstreet 

BOAC Billing Office Accounting Code 043030 GSA 

CAGE Commercial and Government Entity 04ZY2 DOD 

UEI Unique Entity Identifier (Formerly DUNS ®) 07-480-0160 Dun & Bradstreet 

EIN/TIN Employer/Taxpayer Identification Number 53-6002509 Treasury, IRS 

FEIN Federal Employer Identification Number 53-6002509 Treasury, IRS 

Tax Exemption Number for GPO 53-6002509 Treasury, IRS 

SIC Standard Industrial Classification 9199 Dept. of Labor 

TAS Treasury Account Symbol 004X4505001 Treasury 

TCC Transmitter Control Code -Tax Code for 1099 

Transmissions 

28 x 10 Treasury, IRS 

TPC Trading Partner Code 040004 Treasury, FMS 

DoDAAC Department of Defense Activity Address Code 043115 DOD 

AAC Activity Address Code 043133 GSA-Personal 

Property Center 

Revised: September 2021
EX-10.18






 Exhibit 10.18 

In 2015, the United States Grand Jury for the North District of Florida began an investigation into alleged corruption by local officials in
Tallahassee, Florida. In June 2017, the grand jury issued subpoenas to the City of Tallahassee and the Community Redevelopment Agency (the “Agency”), for records of communications, bids for proposals, applications, and more from
approximately two dozen business entities and individuals, including Ms. Rivers, the Chief Executive Officer of Trulieve Cannabis Corp. (the “Company”), her husband, J.T. Burnette, and Inkbridge LLC, a business associated with
Ms. Rivers. The grand jury also directly subpoenaed Ms. Rivers for information related to her involvement with the Agency, a specific commissioner of the Agency, and political contributions Ms. Rivers made through an associated
business. Ms. Rivers timely complied with the subpoena. Ms. Rivers has not been charged with any crime. Based on a review by the board of directors of the Company and the advice of counsel, the board of directors of the Company concluded
that Ms. Rivers was not a target of the investigation. The investigation remains ongoing. 
 Ms. Rivers and the Company have
orally agreed that, if Ms. Rivers is indicted in connection with the foregoing investigation, Ms. Rivers will convert any Super Voting Shares controlled by her into Multiple Voting Shares.
Exhibit 32.1  Principal Executive and Financial Officer - Section 906 Certification

** **

** **

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

 

This certification is provided pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, and accompanies the annual report on Form 10-KSB (the "Form 10-KSB") for the year ended December 31, 2004 of Taitron Components Incorporated (the "Issuer").

 

I, Stewart Wang, the Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Issuer, certify that to the best of my knowledge:

 

(i)              the Form 10-KSB fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and:

 

(ii)             the information contained in the Form 10-KSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Issuer.

 

 

| Dated  March  31, 2005 | By: |  /s/ Stewart Wang                                      |
|----------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                  |     | Stewart Wang                                                |
|                                  |     | Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer |
Table 2A. Distribution of TIN Costs and Benchmarks for TINs with 1+ EPs - without EP Adjustment

5% Cost per Capita 137,694 $9,690 $7,778 $52 $1,999 Specialty-Adjusted Benchmark weighted by % EPs 137,694 $10,079 $1,026 $6,381 $7,677 weighted by % Charges 137,694 $10,056 $1,069 $6,381 $7,677 Specialty-Adjusted Cost per Capita weighted by % EPs 137,694 $10,153 $7,890 $53 $2,274 weighted by % Charges 137,694 $10,173 $7,884 $53 $2,277

Table 2B. Distribution of TIN Costs and Benchmarks for TINs with 1+ EPs - with EP Adjustment

5% Cost per Capita 137,694 $9,690 $7,778 $52 $1,999 Specialty-Adjusted Benchmark weighted by % EPs 137,694 $10,105 $841 $7,359 $8,720 weighted by % Charges 137,694 $10,094 $879 $7,359 $8,724 Specialty-Adjusted Cost per Capita weighted by % EPs 137,694 $10,152 $7,933 $52 $2,220 weighted by % Charges 137,694 $10,161 $7,931 $52 $2,221 Percentiles TIN Measure # TINs Mean StDev Min Percentiles TIN Measure # TINs Mean StDev Min10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99%

$3,099 $5,794 $8,860 $11,426 $15,525 $20,153 $37,804$314,472

$8,923 $9,792 $10,435 $10,702 $10,767 $10,993 $12,434 $14,064 $8,658 $9,775 $10,438 $10,716 $10,767 $10,993 $12,506 $14,064

$3,590 $6,437 $9,268 $11,815 $15,949 $20,574 $38,619 $322,778 $3,605 $6,480 $9,288 $11,843 $15,938 $20,562 $38,660$322,778

10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% $3,099 $5,794 $8,860 $11,426 $15,525 $20,153 $37,804$314,472

$8,789 $10,021 $10,202 $10,516 $10,519 $10,710 $13,556 $14,928 $8,789 $10,021 $10,202 $10,516 $10,519 $10,840 $13,556 $14,928

$3,488 $6,326 $9,303 $11,880 $15,969 $20,635 $38,815 $321,528 $3,497 $6,348 $9,314 $11,886 $15,953 $20,639 $38,840$321,528 Percentiles Max Percentiles Max
#### Willie CALHOUN, Petitioner, v. SMITH & SONS, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, and the Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.

No. 38784.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 24, 1969.

Donald Feldman and Feldman & Abram-son, Miami, for petitioner.

Paul Bernardini, of Sands, Smalbein, Eubank, Johnson and Rosier, Daytona Beach, Patrick H. Mears and J. Franklin Garner, Tallahassee, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

By petition for writ of certiorari we have for review an order of the Florida Industrial Commission hearing date May 26, 1969.

We find that oral argument would serve no useful purpose and it is therefore dispensed with pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule 3.10, subd. e, 32 F.S.A.

Our consideration of the petitions, records and briefs leads us to conclude that there has been no deviation from the essential requirements of law.

Accordingly, the petitions for writ of certiorari and attorneys’ fee are hereby denied.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, DREW, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.

ERVIN, C. J., concurs specially with opinion.

ERVIN, Chief Justice

(concurring specially) :

While I concur in the judgment that the full Commission has not departed from the essential requirements of law in affirming the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims, in my opinion because of the posture of this case in this Court our decision should not be construed to prejudice in any way a subsequent attempt by Petitioner to demonstrate a right to additional benefits or relief pursuant to the modification provisions of F.S. Section 440.28, F.S.A.
# Nov 2021
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 406 Agreed to House (ATH)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 406

Providing for the concurrence by the House with amendments in amendment 
                       of the Senate to H.R. 821.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 18, 1994

    Mr. Montgomery (for himself, Mr. Bonilla, and Mr. Sangmeister) 
  submitted the following resolution; which was considered under the 
                 suspension of the rules and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Providing for the concurrence by the House with amendments in amendment 
                       of the Senate to H.R. 821.

    Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution the bill (H.R. 
821), to amend title 38, United States Code, to extend eligibility for 
burial in national cemeteries to persons who have 20 years of service 
creditable for retired pay as members of a reserve component of the 
Armed Forces, with the Senate amendment thereto, shall be considered to 
have been taken from the Speaker's table to the end that the Senate 
amendment thereto be, and the same is hereby, agreed to with amendments 
as follows:
            In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the 
        amendment of the Senate to the text of the bill, insert the 
        following:

SECTION 1. ELIGIBILITY OF CERTAIN RESERVISTS AND DEPENDENTS FOR BURIAL 
              IN NATIONAL CEMETERIES.

    (a) Reservists.--Section 2402 of title 38, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph 
(7):
            ``(7) Any person who at the time of death was entitled to 
        retired pay under chapter 67 of title 10 or would have been 
        entitled to retired pay under that chapter but for the fact 
        that the person was under 60 years of age.''.
    (b) Dependents.--Paragraph (5) of such section is amended by 
inserting ``and paragraph (7)'' after ``paragraphs (1) through (4)''.

            Amend the title so as to read: ``An Act to amend title 38, 
        United States Code, to extend eligibility for burial in 
        national cemeteries to persons who have 20 years of service 
        creditable for retired pay as members of a reserve component of 
        the Armed Forces and to their dependents.''.

                                 <all>
```
#### PEERLESS REALTY COMPANY and Jack Sakson, Petitioners, v. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION ex rel. C. J. FEIDEL and Harold L. Clark, Respondents.

No. 76-1579.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 22, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1978.

David T. Young, Rockledge, for petitioners.

Howard Hadley, Maitland, Charles E. Felix, Orlando, and Joseph A. Doherty, Winter Park, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DENIED.

CROSS, DAUKSCH and MOORE, JJ., concur.
#### Ferguson et al. vs. McCain.

A plea that tlie consideration of the note sued on was an improvement on, and right to land, represented as swamp land belonging to the State, the owner of which improvement would be entitled to a pre-eruption; and that the land was not swamp land, is not good as a ploa of failure of consideration.

*Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court.*

Hon. John J. Clendenin Circuit Judge.

Bertrand, for the appellants.

Williams & Martin,'for appellee.

Mr, Justice Fairchild

delivered the opinion of the Court.

McCain brought an action upon two bonds against Ferguson and another person. As a defense to one of the bonds, Fergu-' son pleaded that it was given in consideration of the settlement and improvement of McCain, upon the north-east quarter of section twenty-three, in township three, north of range fourteen west, and for his right to the land; that McCain represented to Ferguson that the land was swamp land belonging to the State, by which McCain, or any owner of his settlement or improvement, would be entitled to a pre-emption of the land, upon making the proper proof under the laws of the State, whereby Ferguson was induced to purchase the settlement and improvement; that the land was not swamp land, but railroad land, being included in the grant of lands for constructing'the Cairo and Fulton railroad.

Although the plea avers that the consideration for the bond *211was McCain’s right to the land, as well as his settlement and improvement thereon, it also shows that McCain had no title to the land, that his only interest was the privilege of becoming its owner by purchase from the State. All that was sold to Ferguson was McCain’s improvement. The plea does not show but that Ferguson obtained, and keeps possession of all that he bought, although he may be disappointed in his expectation of acquiring title to the land by purchase from the State. If McCain had known that the land was railroad land, and had falsely represented it to be swamp land, and had thereby induced Ferguson to buy it, the plea vrould have presented another case. No fraudulent representation of McCain is alleged; for all we know by the plea, he believed *1*he land on which he had settled was swamp land. Whether it was so or not, -was a matter about which Ferguson might have had as correct information as McCain. The means of knowledge were accessible to both, or to one as much as the other.

The plea is not good as a plea of failure of the consideration of the bond in the first count of the declaration, and the circuit court rightly sustained the demurrer of McCain, quashed the plea and rendered judgment against Ferguson and his co-defendant for the amount of the bond.
#### Pedro CHAMORRA et al. v. N.O.P.S.I. et al. Johnnie JOHNSON v. John P. OWEN and N.O.P.S.I. et al.

No. 62557.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 15, 1978.

In re: Pedro Chamorra et al., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 359 So.2d 272.

Granted.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.
# C_2020247EN.01004801.xml

| 27.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 247/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 247/48

---

Action brought on 5 June 2020 — St. Hippolyt v EUIPO — Elephant (Strong like nature)

(Case T-352/20)

(2020/C 247/66)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: St. Hippolyt Holding GmbH (Dielheim, Germany) (represented by M. Gail, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Elephant Co. Preduzeće za proizvodnju, unutrašnju i spoljnu trgovinu d.o.o. (Belgrade, Serbia)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union trade mark ‘Strong like nature’ — Application No 17 494 071

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 March 2020 in Case R 1909/2019-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Art. 60(1)(a) read in conjunction with Art. 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Art. 60(1)(a) read in conjunction with Art. 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---