F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

M I R S A D H A J R

O ; J A M E S R. M A

Y O C K , Plaintiffs-Appellees

,

v

.

U N I T E D S T A T E S C I T I Z E N S H I P A N D I M M I G R A T I O N S E R

V I C E S ; T

. D I A

N E C E J K A , Director, USCI S National Records Center; R O S E M A R Y M E L V I L L E , USCI S District Director of San F rancisco; J E H J O H N S O N , Secretary , Department of Homeland Security * ; L O R

E T T A E. L Y

N C H , Attorney General, Defendants-Appellants

. N o. 11-17948

D.C. No. 5:08-cv-01350- PSG

OPI NI ON

M I R S A D H A J R

O ; J A M E S R. M A

Y O C K , Plaintiffs-Appellees

,

v

.

U N I T E D S T A T E S C I T I Z E N S H I P A N D I M M I G R A T I O N S E R

V I C E S ; T

. D I A

N E C E J K A , Director, USCI S National Records Center; R O S E M A R Y M E L V I L L E , USCI S District Director of San F rancisco; J E H J O H N S O N , N o. 12-17765

D.C. No. 5:08-cv-01350- PSGH A J R O V

. U SCI S 2

Secretary , Department of Homeland Security ; L O R

E T T A E. L Y

N C H , Attorney General, Defendants-Appellants

.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Paul S. Grewal, Mag istrate J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted F ebruary 3, 2015–San F rancisco, California

F iled October 23, 2015

B efore: Richard C. Tallman and J ohnnie B . Rawlinson, Circuit J u dg es, and Stephen J o seph Murphy

, District

J udg e. * *

O pinion by

J udg e Tallman; Partial Concurrence and P artial Dissent by J udg e Rawlinson

* J e h J o h n s o n i s s u b s t i t u t e d fo r M i c h a e l C h e r t o f f a s S e c r e t a r y , Dep artm en t o f Ho m elan d Secu rity an d L o retta E. L y n ch is su b stitu ted f or Eric H. Ho ld er, J r., as A t to rn ey Gen eral. Fed . R. A

p p . P . 4 3 (c)(2 ).

** T h e Ho n o rab le S t e p h en J osep h Mu rp h y III, Un ited States District J u d g e f o r th e Eastern District o f

Mich ig an , sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 3

SUMMARY * * *

F reedom of

Inf orm a tion Act

The panel vacated the d i s trict court’s p ermanent i njunction; reversed the district court’s summary judg ment order; v a cated the attorney s’ fees award; and remanded for further proceeding s in a F reedom of I nformation Act acti o n brough t ag ainst the United States Citiz enship a nd I mmig r a tion Services (“USCI S”) by permanent resident Misrad Hajro and his attorney J ames May ock.

The district court found that USCI S eng ag ed in a pattern

or practice o f violating the F r eedom of I n formation Act’s time limits, and entered summary judg ment i n favor o f the plaintiffs. The USCI S challeng e d the district court’s jurisdiction to enforce a 1992 Settlement Ag reement entered into b y May ock and USCI S’s predecessor ag enc y , the I mmig r a ti o n a n d N a t u r a l i z a t i o n Service, concerning processing o f F OI A requests. The d istrict c o u r t entered the
summary judg ment order, USCI S filed its notice o f a p p e a l, and then the district court entered a permanent injunction.

The panel held that this c ourt had jurisdiction to r e v i e w the summary judg ment order, but dismissed USCI S’s challeng e to the scope of the permanent injunction order for lack of jurisdiction under F ed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2).

Reviewing the summary judg ment orde r , the panel h eld that the j u r i s dictional rule announced in Kokkonen v

.

*** T h is su

m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f

th e o p in io n

o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 4

Guardian Life Ins. Co. , 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (holding that if

a district court wished to ret a i n j urisdiction to later e nforce the terms of a settlement a g ree m e n t , the order dismissing a

case with prejudice must i ncorporate the terms of the settlement ag reement or ex pressly retai n j u r i s d iction), a

pplied retroactively to the 1992 Settlement Ag reement. The panel hel d that because Kokkonen applied retroactively and the 1992 d istrict court order did not reta i n j u r i sdiction over the prior lawsuit’s Settlement Ag reement, the district court did
not have the inherent power to enforce the terms of the Settlement Ag reement. The pan el also held that while the district court may a ss e rt supplemental jurisdiction o ver the Settlement Ag reement claims, plaintiffs failed to show an “unequivocally ex p ressed” waiver of sovereig n immunity

. The p anel therefore reversed summary judg ment in favor o f plaintiffs as to Claims One and Two.

The panel held that the factual r ecord was not sufficiently developed to determine whether plaintiff May ock h ad standing to b ring a F OI A pattern or practice claim. The panel also h eld that p laintiff Hajro lost standing to brin g a p attern

or practice claim during the pendency of this appeal w hen he

was g ranted h is citiz enship, because the p r o b a bility that USCI S’s delay s w o u ld impair H ajro’s lawful access to in f o r m a tion in the future was now remote. The panel, therefore, re v ersed and remanded for further fact finding a s to May ock’s standing and dismissed Hajro’s claim as moot.

J udg e Rawlinson concurred in part a nd dissented in part. J udg e Rawlinson ag reed with the majority ex cept a s t o t he issue of May ock’s standing

. J u dg e Rawlinson w ould reverse the district c ourt’s ruling that May ock had standing to pursue

a n action in his own rig h t, a nd remand for dismissal of all claims.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 5

COUNSEL

Mark W

. Pennak (arg

u ed), Appellate Staff Attorney ; L e onard Schaitman, Assistant Director; Melinda Haag , United States Attorney ; Stuart F

. Delery

, Assistant Attorney General, Department o f J ustice, W ashing ton, D.C.; I la C. D eiss, Assistant United States Attorney , San F rancisco, California, for Defendants-Appellants.

Kip Evan Steinberg (arg

ued), San Rafael, California; Robert H. Gibbs and Robert Pauw, Gibbs Houston Pauw, S e a t t le, W a shing ton, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Russell A bruty

n, Marshal E. Hy

man & Associates, Troy
, Michig an; Aaron C. Hall, J o seph L aw F irm, P.C., Aurora, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Am e r i c a n I mmig ration L awy ers Association.

OP INION

TAL L MAN, Circuit J u dg e:

United States Citiz enship a n d I mmigr a tion Services a nd federal officer co-defendants (c ollectively “USCI S”) challeng e the d istrict court’s g rant of summary judg ment, a permanent injunction, and a n at torney s’ fees award in favor of Plaintiffs Mirsad Hajro and J ames R. May ock. The district
court found that USCI S eng ag ed in a pattern or practice o f violating the F reedom o f I nformation Act’s ( “F OI A”) time limits, 5 U .S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A )

, ( B), (C) (2012). The statutory t i me limits require an ag ency to determine within twenty day s whether to comply w ith a F OI A request o r , in the

a l t e r n a t i v e , n o t i f

y t h e r e q u e s t e r o f an y “ u n u s u alH A J R O V

. U SCI S 6

c i rcumstances” requiring an ex tension in responding to th e request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A), ( B ). I f the ag ency f ails
to comply with either, a F OI A requester can proceed directly
to district court where t h e ag ency must show “ex ceptional circumstances” justify ing its untimeliness and due dilig e nce in remedy

ing the violatio n

. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C). USCI S also challeng es the district court’s jurisdic t i o n to enforce a 1992 Settlement Ag reeme nt entered into b y attorney J ames May ock and U SCI S’s predecessor ag ency , the I mmig r a tion and Naturaliz ation Service (“I NS”).

W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to r eview the summary judg ment order. W e d ismiss USCI S’s challeng e to the permanent injunction for lack o f jurisd i ction g iven its prematurely filed notice of appeal. W e hold that whil e t h e di s trict court may a ssert supplemental jurisdiction o ver the Settlement Ag reement claims, Plaintiffs have failed to show

an “unequivocally ex pressed” waiver o f sovereig n immunity

. W e clarify the standing requirements to assert a F OI A pattern

or practice c laim. As such, we v acate t h e injunction a nd remand with instructions to conduct furt h e r proceeding s o n an open record to determine in the first instance whether M a y o ck h as standing to b ring a pattern o r p ractice c l a i m under this standard. W e also find Hajro’s pattern o r practice cl aim moot. Therefore, the summary judg ment order is reversed and remanded. W e v acate and remand the attorney s’ fees award for further consideration in lig ht of this opinion.

I

A

J ames May ock has been an immig ration attorney for over thirty y ears. As part o f May ock’s ong oing i m m i grationH A J R O V

. U SCI S 7

c a s e load, he files requests under F OI A to obtain the a lie n reg istration files for his c lients. May ock’s declaration states that USCI S has never p roduced the requested records within F OI A’s statutory twenty

- d ay time limit. See 5 U .S.C. § 5 5 2 (a)(6)(A). Nor has the g overnment provided writ t e n notice setting forth any “unusua l circumstances” for an

ex tension of time b e y o nd the statutory limit. See 5 U .S.C. § 552(a)( 6 ) ( B ). I n support of his pattern o r practice c laim, M ay ock p rovided a recent F OI A response address e d t o

a nother attorney at May o ck’s law firm. USCI S respon d e d almost eig ht months after the i n i t ial request was placed. May ock also provided declarations from twenty -six other immig ration attorney s who have encountered similar, routine delay s. All twenty -six a ttorney s included copies of their o wn delay ed F OI A requests f r o m recent y ears. USCI S did not rebut this evi d ence before the district court. Hajro v. U .S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (“ Hajro I ” )

, 832 F

. Supp. 2d 1095, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

I n additio n to the present lawsuit, May ock previously filed a lawsuit ag ainst the I NS, USCI S’s predecessor ag ency , about twenty -five y ears ag o. May ock similarly alleg ed that I NS had a pattern or practice of violating various provisions of F OI A. May o ck, tog e ther with other im m i gr a tion attorney s, submitted declarations to d emonst r ate that I NS often took months to respond to F OI A requests, far in e x cess of the statutory time limit, then ten day s. S e e 5 U .S.C. § 552(a)(6)(i) (1988). The district court ag reed an d g ranted
summary judg ment in favor of May ock, d i r e c t i n g I NS to issue the appropriate notices for ex tension of time required b y F OI A and enjoining the San F rancisco District Office of the I NS f rom failing to comply with the statutory timing requirements. Mayock v. Nelson

, 714 F

. Supp. 1558 (N.D.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 8

Cal. 19 8 9 )

, r e v’d and remanded

, 938 F .2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1991).

On appeal, we reversed a

nd remanded. W e held that the district court had overlooked the ex istence of g enuine issues of material f

act as to whether increasing workloads a t I N S offices created “ex ceptional circumstances” justify i n g its failur e t o respond within the statutory time limits, a nd whether the ag ency had demonstrated “due dilig ence” in responding to requests for in f o r mation urg ently needed b y aliens who face d pending deportation or ex clusion proceeding s. See Mayock v. Nelson

, 938 F .2d 1006, 1007–08 (9th Cir. 1991).

Upon remand, the parties en t er e d into a settlement
ag reement (“the Settlement Ag re e m ent”), in which I NS
ag reed to implement e x pedited processing of a F OI A request where the requester demonstrates that an individual’s life o r personal safety w ould be jeopardiz ed; or where the requester’s substantial due process rig hts would be impaired by the failure to process a request immediately

. The district

co u rt dismissed the c ase with prejudice but the parties subsequently filed the Settlement A gr e e ment with the court in 1992. The district court’s dismissal order did not ex pressly retain jurisdiction of the Settle m e n t Ag reement n or did it incorporate its terms into the order.

B

Mirsad Hajro w as a permanent resident o f the United States who applied for naturaliz a tion in 2003. I n October 2007, US C I S n o t i f

i e d Hajro that h is naturaliz ation a pplication h a d b ee n denied based o n evidence in his alien reg istration file that a lleg edly reve a l e d false testimony reg arding hisH A J R O V

. U SCI S 9

foreig n military service. As p art of his appeal from the denial of his application for citiz enship, H ajro filed a F OI A request with the USCI S National Records Center in November 2007 seeking a copy of his alien reg istration file. Hajro requested

ex p edited p rocessing of h is F OI A request under the terms o f the 1992 Settlement Ag reement.

Since 2007 USCI S has u s e d a three-track sy stem for processin g FOI A requests: “Track 1” for simple requests, “Track 2” for complex inquiries that require additional time, and “Track 3” for ex pedited processing for in d ividuals subject to removal proceeding s and scheduled fo r a h earing b e f o r e an immig ration judg e. Special F O I A Processing Track, 72 F ed. Reg

. 9017–01 (F e b. 28, 2 007). I n responding
to Hajro’s F OI A r eques t , U S CI S denied Hajro’s ex p edited request and processed his request u n d er Track 2. USCI S’s l e tter did not include notice of a ny “ unusual circumstanc e s ” j u stify ing an ex tension of the current twenty -day time limit. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A), (B )

.

I t is undisputed that USCI S failed to issue Hajro’s F OI A request within the twenty

- day time l imit. Hajro I
, 832 F

. Supp. 2 d at 1101. As a result of the d elay

, Hajro appealed the denial o f h is naturaliz ation application without the evidence relied upon by

USCI S in deny ing it. 1 Id. at 1112.

1 On March 4 , 2 0 08 , th e Natio n al Reco rd s Cen ter id en t if ied 4 42 p ag es resp on s iv e to Haj ro ’ s req u est, an d f o rw ard ed 3 5 6 p ag es in th eir en tirety

an d 8 pag es i n p art. USCIS w ith h eld 7 8 p ag es. A f t e r H a j r o ’s FOIA ad m i n istrativ e ap p eal, o n J u ly 3 1
, 2 0 0 8
, USCIS released an ad d itio n al 1 2
p ag es an d 1 p ag e in p art. T h e d istrict co u rt d eterm in ed th at “ n o n e o f th e d o cu m en ts released [] by USCIS co n tain [ed ] ev en a f actu al ref e r e n c e to h is p u rp o rted ly in c o n sisten t o r m islead in g s t atem en ts.” Ha j ro I
, 8 3 2 F. Su p p . 2 d at 1 11 2

.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 10

W h ile this appeal was pending

, Hajro succ e s sfully challeng ed USCI S’s de n i a l of citiz enship and he has since been n aturaliz ed as a U.S. citiz e n. See Hajro v. Barre tt , 849 F . Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

C

May ock a n d Hajro initiated this action in March 2008. They soug ht declaratory and injunctive relief under F O I A a nd
t h e A d m i n i s trative Procedures Act (“APA”), and e n f o r c e m e n t of the 1992 Settlement Ag reement. Plaintiffs’ F irst Amended Complaint ( “F AC”), filed J une 10, 2008, asserts nine causes of action:

(1) “Track 3” o f Defendants’ c urrent, multi-track policy violates the Settlement Ag reement;

(2 ) D e f endants’ denial of Hajro’s request for

ex p edited proces s i ng also violates the Settlement Ag reement;

(3) The timing by which D efendants provided Hajro with the material responsive to his FO I A r e q u e s t v i o l a t e d FOI A S e c t i o n 552(a)(6)(A) and 6 C.F .R. § 5.6(b);

(4) Defendants’ f

a ilure to notify Hajro of t h e “unusual circumstances” t h at prevented USCI S f rom processing h is FO I A request within the 20-day statutory limit viola t e d 6 C.F

. R. § 5.5(c)(1);H A J R O V

. U SCI S 11

(5) Defendants have a pattern or practice o f f a i l i n g t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e t i m i n g requirements set forth by F OI A S e ctions 552(a)(6)(A), (B ), (C);

(6) Defendants u nlawfully withheld the information requested b y Hajro in violation o f [ ] [ 5 U.S.C.] Section 551 et s eq

. and 555(b),

as w ell as Sectio n s 702, 704, and 706 of the APA;

(7) Such withholding of nonex empt material violated Hajro’s due process rig hts because it interfered with his ability to adequately appeal his naturaliz ation denial a nd v iolated his rig ht to a fair hearing

. . . ;

(8) Defendants’ implementation o f the “Track 3” policy viola t e s the F ifth Amendment
g uarantee of Equal Protection; and

(9) A doption of the “Track 3” policy without notice and comment r

ulemaking procedure violated Section 553 of the APA.

Hajro I
, 832 F . Supp. 2d at 1102–03.

USCI S moved f

or summar y judg ment on the F AC in its entirety

. Plaint i ffs opposed Defendants’ motion a nd themselves moved for summary judg ment.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 12

On October 13, 2011, the district court filed its summary judg ment order. Hajro I

, 832 F

. Supp. 2d 1095. The district court ruled in Plaintiffs’ favor as to all but Claim Eig ht. 2

On December 1 2
, 2011, USCI S filed a notice o f appeal (No. 11-17948) citing the summary judg ment order. After receiving input from both parties in drafting the form of an injunction, the district court issued its final judg ment order and entered a permanent injunction on May 7, 2012. USCI S did not am end its notice of appeal to include the p ermanent injunction.

On October 1 5
, 2 0 12, the district c ourt g ranted in part P l a i n tiffs’ motion for attorney s’ fees and costs. Hajro v. USCIS (“ H ajro I I ”), 9 00 F

. Supp. 2d 1 034 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Defendants f

iled a timely notice o f a ppeal (No. 12-17765) challeng ing that decision on December 14, 2012.

O u r Appellate Commissioner, in an order dated J anuary 4
, 2014, asked both p arties to a ddress whether we have jurisdiction over the summary jud gm e nt and p ermanent injunction a

ppeal (No. 1 1-17948) in l i ght of the fact that USCI S filed its notice o f appeal after the summary judg ment order but before entry

of the actual permanent injunction.

USCI S now challeng es only Claims One and Two r elated
to the 1 9 92 Settlement Ag reement, Claim F ive—the pattern

or practice claim—and the scope of the permanent injunction.

2 It g ran ted su

m m ary j u d g m en t in f

av o r o f f o rm er A tto rn ey Gen eral Eric H o l d er w ith resp ect to all n in e cau ses o f actio n ; an d in f av o r o f f o r m e r Ho m elan d Secu rity Secretary Jan et N ap o l itan o , T

. D ian e Cej k a, an d Ro sem ary Melv ille as to th e th ird

, f o u rth

, f if th

, an d six th cau ses o f actio n

.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 13

II

W e hold that we h ave jurisdiction to review the summary ju d gm ent o rder, but dismiss USCI S’s challeng e to the permanent injunction for l a c k o f jurisdiction u nder F ederal Rule of Appellate Procedure (“F RAP”) 4(a)(2).

The re q uirement to file a notice of appeal is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v

. Di r

. , Dep’t of Corr. o f Ill.

, 434 U.S. 2 57, 264 (1978). T h e g overnment must file a notice of appeal within six ty day s of the d ate of a final judg ment o r

an appealable orde r

. F RAP 4(a)(1)(B ). However, a party may prematurely

appeal under F RAP 4(a)(2):

A notice of appeal f

iled af ter the court

announces a decision or order—but before the entry of the j u d gm ent or order—is treated a s filed on the date of and after the entry

.

The issue here is whet h e r U S CI S’s December 12, 2011, notice of appeal c an b e treated as filed on May 7, 2012—the date the district court filed its final judg ment and permanent injunction—such that US C I S c an challeng e both the
summary judg ment order and the permanent injunction.

Two cases g overn this jurisdictional issue. F irst, the U.S. Supreme Court in FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co.
, held that F RAP 4(a)(2) “permits a notice

o f a p p eal f

rom a nonfinal d ecision to operate as a n otice o f appeal f rom the final judg ment only when a distri c t court

announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the entry o f judg m e nt.” 498 U.S. 2 69, 276 (1991) (emphasis in orig inal). There

, t h e appellant f iled a notice of appeal after the district c o u rt orally ruled from theH A J R O V

. U SCI S 14

bench that it was g ranting respondent’s s u m m ary judg ment motion w hile simultaneously asking the parties for sug g ested finding s of fact and conclusions o f law for i t s f o rmal order. Id. at 270–71. The Supre m e C o u rt concluded that F RAP 4(a)(2) rescued the premature notice o f appeal, stating t h at “Rule 4(a)(2) was intended to protect the unskilled litig ant who files a notice of appeal from a decision that he reasonably but mistakenly b elieves to be a final judg ment . . . .” Id. at 276.

W h ile other circuits have g enerousl y i nterpreted F RAP 4(a)(2) and FirsTier
, the Ninth Circui t h a s narrowly construed both. Compare Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc.

v. Guest Servs., Inc.
, 6 30 F .3d 2 1 7, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2 011) (emphasiz ing objective “ imm e d iately appealable” standard
reg ardless o f counsel’s subjective reasonableness in filing the notice of appeal), with Kendall v. Homestead Dev. Co. ( In re Jack Raley Constr., Inc. ), 17 F .3d 2 91, 294 ( 9 t h C ir. 1 994) (concluding appellants had no reasonable belief that n o tice o f appeal was e ffective e s p e c ially where they requested permission to brief and arg ue remaining issue); Kennedy v

. Applause, Inc.
, 90 F .3d 1477, 148 2

– 8 3 ( 9 t h Cir. 1996). Cf. Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp.
, 664 F .3d 182, 188–89 (7th Cir. 2011) (reading F

i r s T i e r “to hold that Rule 4(a)(2) will

sa v e a p remature n otice if, regarding the claim being appealed

, the e ntry of judg ment is all that is left for the court to do” (emphasis in orig inal)). A s USCI S notes, there a re many similarities between FirsTier and this cas e that may have warranted a different outcome had we decided this case solely on F RAP 4(a)(2) and FirsTier

. However, our case law post- FirsTier is c lear: “a premature notice of appeal is valid under F RAP 4(a)(2) when ‘[ a ] ll that remained was the c lerk’s ministerial task of entering a Rule 58 judg ment.’” Kennedy

,H A J R O V

. U SCI S 15

90 F .3d a t 1483 (quoting In re Jack Raley C o n str., Inc.
, 17 F .3d at 294).

I n Kennedy

, w e addressed the merits o f the summary judg ment order but dismissed the appellant’s challeng e to the district court’s award of a ttorney s’ fees f o r want o f jurisdiction. 9 0 F .3d at 1479. A fter the district court g ranted defendan t Applause’s summary judg ment motion, Kennedy filed a notice of appeal. I

d

. at 1 480. Subsequently

, Applause moved for a ttorney s’ fees and Rule 11 sanctions. Id. The district court denied the Rule 11 motion for sanctions, but
g ranted in part Applause’s motion for attorney s’ fees without determining the a m o u nt of fees and costs. I d. Prior to the determina t i o n of the fees, Kennedy filed a “Notice o f Amended Appeal” from the o rder. Id. B ecause Kennedy filed the notice of appeal b efore the distri c t court calculated the fees and costs, w e addressed t h e merits of Kennedy ’s claim based on the summary judg ment order, but dismissed
t he challeng e to the attorney s’ fees award as prematur e. I d

. at 1482.

W e reasoned that, because the amount of fees had y et to be determined and the c ourt had requested f urther submissions from b oth parties to finaliz e the fee amount, the district court’s o r d e r was n ot o ne “that would be appealable if immediately followed by the e n t r y o f judg ment.” Id. at 1483 (quoting FirsTier
, 498 U.S. at 2 76). I n o ther words,

more than a ministerial task remained. Id. (citing In re J ack Raley Constr., Inc. , 17 F .3d at 294).

Here, the district c ourt’s October 13, 2011, summary j udg ment order a ddressed both cross-motions f or summ a r y judg ment and all of Plaintiffs’ claims. Hajro I
, 832 F

. Supp. 2d at 1099–1100. B ecause the di s t r ict c ourt disposed of allH A J R O V

. U SCI S 16

claims, we f

ind that the summary judg ment o r der “would be” immediately appealable if immediately followed by the entry of judg ment. How e v e r, like Kennedy

, the d istrict court requested proposed forms of i n j u n ction from both p arties in order to craft the permanent injunction. USCI S could not have “reasonably b ut m i s t a kenly believe[ d] ” their notice o f appeal included the p erman en t injunction when the parties continued to debate the final lang uag e and s c o p e of the injunction. FirsTier
, 498 U.S. at 276. The claim USCI S n ow appeals—the scope of the permanent injunction—would not be immediately appealable because the scope and lang uag e o f the injunction were not y et final when the g overnment filed
t h e notice of appeal. The issuance of the perman e n t injunction where the p arties continued to debate the lang uag e was not merely

ministerial.

To be clear, a sig n ificant amount of overlap ex i s t s b etween the summary judg ment order and the permanent injunction. F or ex ample, both orders a sse r t subject matter jurisdiction over the Settlement Ag reement and provide relief for Plaintiffs’ pattern or practice c l a im. 3 However, the

3 Fo r ex am

p le, co m p are p art o f

th e Su m m ary J u d g m en t Ord er w i t

h th e f irst t w o p arag rap h s o f th e P er m a n en t In j u n ctio n

. T h e Su m

m ary J u d g m en t Ord er p ro v id es, in p art:

[P ]artial su m

m ary j u d g m en t is G RA

NT ED in f

av o r o f P lain tif f s o n P l ain tif

f s’ cla i m s f

o r in j u n ctiv e relief
req u i rin g USCIS t o : 1 ) p ro v id e a co p y o f a req u esto r’ s f ile w it h i n t h e tw en ty

- d ay tim e lim i t m an d ated b y 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2 (a)(6 )(A ); an d 2) g iv e th e w ritten n o t i ce

m an dated b y 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2(a)(6 )(B ) if an ex ten sio n of tim e is n eed ed d u e to “ u n u su al circu m s tan ces”. . .

[P ]artial su m

m ary j u d g m en t is GRA

NT ED in f av o r o f P lain tif f s o n P lain tif

f s ’ c laim th at USCIS’ s T rack 3H A J R O V

. U SCI S 17

nationwide scope of the permanent injunction b ecame

F OIA p ro cessin g p o licy an d reg u latio n v io lates th e Settlem en t A g reem en t an d w as p ro m u lg ated in

v io latio n o f th e A P A an d FOIA

. . .

Ha jro I
, 8 3 2 F. Su

p p

. 2d at 1 0 9 9

– 1 0 0. T h e P erm an en t In j u n ctio n p ro v id es, in p art:

Hav in g d eterm in ed [] [USCIS] to be in v io latio n of certain p ro v i s i o n s o f t

h e [FOIA ] f

or th e reaso n s set f o rth in th e c o u r t ’ s o rd er o f Octo b er 1 3
, 2 0 11 on

cro s s- m o tio n s fo r su

m m ary j u d g m en t, in clu d in g FOIA ’ s tim in g p ro v isio n s as set f o rth in 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2(a)(6 ), th e co u rt h ereb y o rd ers th at:

1 ) USCIS sh all co m

p ly w ith th e req u irem en ts set f

orth in 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2(a)(6 )(A ) an d (B ).

a ) USCIS s h all p ro v id e a co p y o f a req u esto r’ s alien
reg istratio n f

ile w ith in th e tw en ty

– b u sin ess– day tim e lim it m an d ated

b y 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2 (a)(6 )(A )(i).

b ) USCIS s h all m ak e a d eterm in atio n w ith resp ect to

an y FOIA ap peal w ith in th e tw en ty

– bu sin ess– d ay tim e lim it m an d ated

b y 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2 (a)(6 )(A )(ii).

c) USCIS s h a l l issu e th e w ritten n o tice m an d ated b y 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2 (a)(6 )(B ) t o a req u esto r if an ex ten sio n of

an ad d itio n a l t e n b u sin ess d ay s is n eed ed du e to

“ u n u su al circu m stan ces.” T h is w ritten n o tice m

u st set f o rth th e u n

u su al circu m s tan ces, as d ef in ed in 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2(a)(6 )(B )(iii) f

o r s u ch ex ten sio n an d settin g a n ew resp o n s e d ate. T h e f

in al resp on se d ate sh all b e w ith in 3 0 b u s in ess d ay s o f

th e o rig in al req u est d ate.

2 ) USCIS sh all f

ollo w , im p l em en t, an d ex ecu t e th e term s o f th e 1 99 2 May o ck

Settlem en t A g reem en t. . . .

Id

. at 1 1 2 0

.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 18

apparent only after the district cour t i s s ued the p ermanent injunction o n M a y 7
, 2012. 4 W hile we do not ex ercise jurisdiction d irectly over the district court’s p ermanent injunction nor opine on its scope, our reversal of the summary judg ment order will inevitably undermine the justification for the permanent injunction. 5

I n sum, w e have jurisd iction to review the summary judg ment o rder, but dismiss USCI S’s challeng e to the scope of the permanent injunctio n f o r lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, because w e reverse and r emand th e s ummary judg ment order, we must vacate the current injunction.

III

I n a F OI A case, instead of determining whether a g enuine issue of material fact ex ists, we employ a speci a l two-step standard to review the g rant of summary judg ment. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.
, 6 26 F .3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2 010). F irst, we ask whether an adequate factual basis supports the d istrict c o u rt’s ruling de

4 T h e p erm an en t in

j u n ctio n ’ s f

i n al parag rap h states: “ 4 ) USCIS sh all issu e a w rit t e n n o tice to th e USCIS Natio n al Reco rd s Cen t er describ in g th e term s o f th is p erm an en t in j u n ctio n an d i n stru ctin g th e Natio n al Reco rd s Cen ter reg ard i n g co m p lian ce w ith th e term s o f

th is in j u n ctio n .” Ha jro I , 8 32 F. Su

p p . 2 d at 1 1 2 0

.

5 In craf tin g a p erm an en t in

j u n ctio n o f n atio n al co n seq u en ce, th e d istrict

co u rt m u st co n sid er th e lik elih o o d o f recu rren ce, th e ef

f ect o n th e p u b l ic

o f d isclo su re o r n o n d isclo su

re, th e ag en cy ’ s g o o d f

aith in ten t to co m

p ly

, an d th e ch aracter o f past v io l atio n s. Lo n g v. I.R.S

. , 6 9 3 F.2 d 9 0 7
, 9 0 9 (9 th Cir. 1 98 2 ) (citin g GS

A v. Ben s o n , 4 15 F.2 d 8 78
, 8 8 0 (9 th Cir. 1 9 6 9) an d Un ited S ta tes v. W

.T. Gra n t Co

. , 3 4 5 U.S. 6 2 9 , 6 3 3 (1 9 5 2 )); see, e.g

. , S

. Yu b a River C i t i

z en s Lea g u e v. Na t’l Ma rin e Fish eries S erv. , No

. CIVS- 06

- 2 8 4 5 L KK/J FM, 20 0 8 W L 2 5 2 3 8 1 9 (E.D. Cal. Ju n e 2 0
, 2 0 0 8 ).H A J R O V

. U SCI S 19

novo. Pac. F

ishe r i e s , Inc. v. United States
, 539 F .3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2008). S e c o nd, “[ i] f we determine that an adequate factual basis ex ists to support the d istrict court’s d e cision, we review the district court’s conclusions u n d e r either the c learly errone o u s o r de novo standard o f review, depending on whether the d istrict court’s conclusions a re primarily factual or leg al.” Id.

The d istrict court’s determinat i o n whether a party has standing

, and whethe r t here is subject matter jurisdiction, is reviewed d e novo. S

ee San Luis & D e l t a -Mendota W ater Auth. v. United States
, 6 72 F .3d 676, 6 99 ( 9th Cir. 2 012); Schnabel v

. Lui
, 302 F

. 3 d 1023, 1029 ( 9th Cir

. 2 0 02). The district court’s factual finding s on jurisdictional issues a re reviewed for clear error. See Schnabel , 302 F .3d at 1029.

IV

Reviewing the summary judg ment order, we h old (1) that the jurisdictional rule a

nnounced in Ko k

k o nen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
, 511 U.S. 375 (1994), applies retroactively to the 1992 Settlement Ag reement; and (2) t h a t w hile the district
court may assert supplem e n tal jurisdiction over the Settlement Ag reement claims, Plaintiffs have failed to show

an “unequivo c a l l y e xp r e s sed” waiver of sovereig n immunity

. 6 As such, we must r everse the summary judg ment order as to C laims One a

nd Two. W hile we recog niz e th e h a r s h

6 USCIS ack

n o w led g es th at it d id n o t r a ise th is j u risd i ctio n al issu e b ef o re t h e d istrict co u rt. H o w ev er, f ailu re to ch allen g e th e d istrict co u rt’ s j u risd ictio n b elo w d o e s n o t o rd i n arily co n stitu te w aiv er. S

ee Atto rn eys Tru st v. Vid

eo ta p e Co mp uter Pro d

s., In c. , 93 F.3 d 5 9 3
, 5 9 4

– 9 5 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 6 )

. A j u risd ictio n al issu e m ay b e raised f o r th e f irst tim e o n ap p eal
reg ard less o f its “ co n stitu t io n al m ag n itu d e.” Clin to n v. City o f New Yo rk

, 5 2 4 U.S. 4 1 7 , 4 2 8 (1 9 9 8 ).H A J R O V

. U SCI S 20

consequence, especia l ly considering the parties relied on Ninth Circuit case law a s it stood in 1992, “we simply cannot waive sovereig n immunity where Cong r e ss has not.” United States v. Park Place Assocs., Ltd.

, 563 F .3d 907, 935 (9th Cir. 2 0 09); United States ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healt h c a r e W

. , 602 F .3d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 2010) (a rule g iven s t r i ct retroactive effect by the Supreme Court must be a pplied to all cases “no matter how inequitable the result”).

A

Under the Supreme Court’s decisi o n in Kokkonen v

. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
, a district court does n ot have the inherent power to enforce the terms of a settlement ag reement under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. 5 11 U.S. 3 75. I f

a district court wishes to r e tain jurisdicti o n t o l ater e nforce the terms of a settlement a g reement, the order d i s m i ssing a

case with prejudice must incorporate the term s of the

s e t t l ement ag reement or ex pressly retain jurisdiction. Id. at 380–81. Here, the parties d o not dispu t e t h at the district court’s 1992 order did neither.

I nstead, Plaintiffs arg ue that Kokkonen

, decided in 1994, should not be applied retroactively to the Set t l e m ent Ag reement, filed in 1992. Plaintiffs c ite C h e v r o n Oil v

. Huson
, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), for the p roposition that whether

a Supreme Court decision applies r etroactively depends on a three-prong

test. 7 Plaintiffs misunderstand the law.

7 T h e t h ree- p ro n g test co n sid ers: (1 ) t h e h i sto ry o f t h e d ecisio n in
q u estio n —i.e., w h eth er it o v erru les p ast p reced en t o r d ecid es an issu e o f f irst im p ressio n ; (2 ) w

h eth er retro activ ity w o u ld ad v an ce o r h in d er th e

n ew ru le’ s ap p licatio n ; an d (3 ) t h e ex ten t o f an y in eq u ity th at w o u ld resu l tH A J R O V

. U SCI S 21

W h en the Supreme Court announces a new r ule a nd retroacti v e l y applies it to the case b efore it, all courts must apply the r

ule retroactively

. H

arper v

. Va. Dep’t of Taxation
, 509 U.S. 8 6, 90 (1993); Catholic Healthcare W

. , 6 02 F

. 3 d at 953; Nitco H

olding Corp. v. Boujikian

, 4 91 F .3d 1 086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Christopher A. Goelz et al

. , N i nth Circuit Civil A

ppellate Pr a c tice ¶8:815 (The Rutter Group 2015). Silence on the issue indicates that the decision is to be
g iven retroactive effect. Harper
, 509 U.S. at 97–98; Gonzales v

. U

.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec

. , 659 F .3d 930, 938–39 ( 9th Cir. 2011). Otherwise, the retroactivity depends on the three-prong

test from Huson

.

F urthermore, where a Supreme Court decision affects our jurisdiction to h ear certain claims, the jurisdictional r u ling has

re t r o active effect. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord

, 449 U.S. 3 68, 379 (1981); A u stin v. City & Cnty of Honolulu

, 840 F

. 2d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 1988) (jurisdictional ruling s “may

never be made prospective o nly ”); see Ca t h olic Healthcare W

. , 602 F .3d at 953. H ere, the Supreme Court’s rule announced in Kokkonen —that a district co u r t d o es not have th e inherent power to enforce the terms of a settlement
ag reeme nt under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction—

ex p licitly deals with the jurisdiction of f ederal courts. Moreover, the Kokkonen c o urt applied this new jurisdictional rule to the parties before it. Therefore, we hold the Kokkonen rule applies retroactively to the 1992 Settlement Ag r eement.

f ro m retro activ e ap p licatio n

. Hu so n , 4 0 4 U.S. at 1 0 6

– 0 7 ; Ho l t v. S h a la la

, 3 5 F.3 d 3 7 6 , 3 8 0 (9 th

Cir. 1 9 9 4 ).H A J R O V

. U SCI S 22

B

Nex t, Plaintiffs contend that, even if Kokkonen ap p l ies, the district court may assert supplem ental jurisdiction under 2 8 U.S.C. § 1367 over two contract claims because the y a r e part of a c ommon nucle u s of operative fact r elated to seven other federal claims. 8 Unlike Kokkonen

, wher e t he parties
assert e d diversity jurisdiction to g et into federal court, here the jurisdictional basis is p r i m arily a federal question under the F OI A statute. This is persuasive, b u t the federal

8 P lain t if f s m ak e tw o ad d iti o n a l c r e ativ e b u t u n p ersu asiv e arg u m en ts. First, Plain tif

f s arg u e th at th e d istrict co u rt h ad s u b j ect m atter j u risd ictio n

u n d er 2 8 U.S.C. § 1 3 3 1 t o rev iew th e S ettlem en t A g reem en t b ecau se th e A g reem en t w a s p a rt o f “ s ep arate g u id an ce” ad op ted b y USCIS u n d er a fed eral reg u latio n

. S

ee F reed o m o f In f

o rm atio n A ct an d P riv ac y A c t P ro ced u res, 68 Fed

. Reg

. 4 0 5 6

- 0 1 (J an

. 2 7
, 2 0 0 3 ). T o f in d j u risd ictio n on th is g ro u n d

, w e w o u ld h av e t o m ak e tw o in f eren tial leap s. First, w e w ou ld h av e to accep t th at th e f

ed eral reg u latio n cited b y P l ain tif f s ref eren cin g

“ s ep arate g u id an ce” ad o p ted b y t h e Dep artm en t o f Ho m elan d Secu rity (“ DHS”) in clu d es th e 1 99 2 Settlem en t A g reem en t. T h en , w e w o u ld h av e to in f er t h at sin ce th e f

ed eral reg u l atio n in co rp o rates th e 1 9 9 2 Settlem en t A g reem en t, it arises u n d er t h e FOIA statu te. Besid es P l ain tif f s’ assertio n th at th e Settlem en t A g reem en t is “ sep arate g u id an ce” ad o p ted b y USCIS, th ere is n o ev id en ce or case law presen ted t ha t D H S’s ref eren ce to

“ s ep arate g u id an ce” i n ten d ed t o i n clu d e all settlem en t ag reem en ts th e ag en cy en tered in to w ith p riv ate p arties. T h e co n n ectio n is to o atten u ated
to serv e as a b asis f

o r j u risd ictio n

.

Seco n d

, P l ain tif

f s p o in t o u t th at th e Settlem en t A g reem en t an d p arties

co n tem p lated t h at t h e d i s t r ict co u rt w ou ld en f o rce th e term s o f th e A g reem en t. Ho w ev er, u n lik e perso n al j u risd i ctio n , “ n o actio n o f th e p arties can co n f

er su b j ect- m atter j u

risd ictio n u p o n a f ed eral co u rt.” In s. Co rp

. o f Irela n d

, Ltd

. v. Co mp a g n ie d es Ba u xites d e Gu in ee , 4 5 6 U .S. 6 9 4
, 7 0 2 (1 9 8 2 ); see a lso Ja na kes v. U.S

. Po sta l S erv. , 7 6 8 F. 2 d 1 0 9 1
, 1 0 9 5 (9 th Cir. 1 9 8 5 ) (“ [P ]arties can n o t b y s tip u latio n o r w aiv er g ran t or d en y f ed eral su b j ect m atter j u risd ictio n .”).H A J R O V

. U SCI S 23

g overnment is not y our ty

pical d efendant—a party also needs permission from Cong ress to sue the g overnment.

Al t h o u gh some Ninth Circuit cases have conflated the two, sovereig n immunity and subject matter jurisdiction present distinct issues. See P a rk Place Assocs., Ltd.

, 563 F .3d at 923 (9th Cir. 2 009) (citing cases c o n f l ating the
two issues); Arford v. United States
, 934 F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Specific Relief v

. Money Damages: Subcontractors Caught in the W eb of Sovereign Immuni t

y , 13 No. 5 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 25. A waiver of sovereig n immunity means the United State s is amenable to suit in a court properly possessing jurisdiction; it does not g uarantee

a forum. See Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria

, 509 F .3d 1008, 1016 (9 t h Cir. 2007) (“To confer subject
matter jurisdiction in an acti on ag ainst a sovereig n, in addition to a waiver of sovereig n im m u nity

, there must be statutory authority vesting a district court with subject matter jurisdiction.”).

Conversely

, if the district court here wished to avail itself of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, it would n eed a cong ressional waiver o f sovereig n immunity to enforce the 1992 Ag reement against the federal g overnment. 9 Park Place Assocs., Ltd.

, 563 F .3d

9 USCIS’ s in v o catio n of th e T u c k e r Ac t i s a red h errin g

. T h e T u ck er A ct do es n o t ap ply to co n tract claim s p rim arily seek in g in

j u n ctiv e relief

. D e p ’t o f th e Army v. Blu e Fo x, In c. , 5 2 5 U.S. 2 5 5 (1 9 9 9 ). P lai n t i ffs th em selv es co n ced e th e S e t tlem en t A g reem en t p rim arily co n tem p lates in j u n ctiv e relief

. T h e T u ck er A ct, 2 8 U .S.C. § 14 9 1 (2 0 0 0), g ran ts su b j ect

m atter j u risd ictio n t o t h e C o u rt o f Fed eral Claim s. T h is j u risd ictio n al
g ran t is lim ited to mo neta ry cla ims b ased o n co n tracts w ith th e Un ited States an d mo n ey-ma n d a tin g co n s titu tio n al p ro v isio n s, statu tes, reg u latio n s, or ex ecu tiv e o rd ers. Un i ted S ta tes v. Mitch ell

, 4 6 3 U.S. 2 0 6
, 2 1 5

– 1 8 (1 9 8 3 ). “ FOIA claim s are n o t w ith in th e su b j ect m atte rH A J R O V

. U SCI S 24

907; see also Dep ’ t o

f t h e A rmy v. B lue Fox, I nc. , 525 U.S. 255 (1999 ). T he issue then b ecomes what Cong ress

c ontemplated by inserting its waiver provision in F OI A a n d whether that waiver ca n i nclude a contract entered into between a p r ivate party and a federal a g ency related to F OI A litig ation.

W e beg in our inquiry with the Supreme Cour t ’s instruction that “a waiver o f s o v ereig n immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in f a v o r o f t he sovereig n.” Blue Fox, Inc.
, 5 2 5 U.S. at 261 (citing Lane v

. Pen Þ a , 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996), and Library of Congress v. Shaw

, 478 U .S. 310, 318 (1986)). The Supreme Court has frequently cautioned ag ainst finding implied waivers o f sovereig n immunity

. Id.

Pl a i ntiffs have the burden of meeting this hig h standard—such a w aiver must be “unequivocally ex pressed” in the statutory tex t. Id. F OI A’s wai v e r o f immunity a nd jurisdictional g rant provides that district cou r ts have “jurisdiction to e njoin the ag ency from withholding ag ency records and to order the p roduction o f an y a g ency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” See 5 U .S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B ).

B e g inning with the plain lang u ag e in § 552(a)(4)(B ), “to enjoin” is defined a s “ [ t] o leg ally prohibit or restrain b y injunction. To p r escribe, mandate, or strong ly encourag e.” Enjoin, B lack’s L aw Dictionar y (10th e d. 2014). The plain lang uag e clearly c ontemplates declaratory a nd injunctive

j u risd ictio n o f t h e C o u rt o f Fed eral Claim s b ecau se FOIA do es n o t

m an d ate m o n ey d am ag es.” Cla rk v. Un ited Sta tes , 1 1 6 F. A p p ’ x 2 7 8
, 2 7 9 (Fed . Cir. 2 0 0 4 ) (ref

eren cin g 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2 (a)(4 )(B ) (2 0 0 0 )).H A J R O V

. U SCI S 25

relief, which is w h a t Plaintiffs seek. However, Plaintiffs’

cause o f action (a c o n tract claim) is not “u n e q u ivocally

ex p ress e d ” i n the statute. May ock is not seeking to e nforce the statutory mandate to provide timely F OI A discl o s ures its e l f, r ather he seeks enforcement o f his own private
ag reement w ith a federal a ge n cy related to F OI A requests. As mentioned above, supra note 8, aside from a citation to a federal r eg ulation that may or may not apply

, M a y o ck provides no support for this arg ument. F u rthermore, a r eview

o f the leg islative history of § 552(a)(4)(B ) does not su p p o r t

a finding that a n ag ency settlement ag reement related to F OI A disclosures was contemplated b y Cong ress as an “improper” withholding

. 1 0 Strictly construing the waiver o f immunity in favor of the s o v e r eig n , we find no waiver o f sovereig n immunity to enforce the terms of the Settlement Ag reement under a theory of supplemental jurisdiction. Blue Fox, Inc. , 525 U.S. at 261.

I n sum, because Kokkonen a pplies retroactively an d the 1992 d istrict court order did not retain jurisdiction o v er t h e prior lawsuit’s Settlement A g reement, the district c ourt does

no t have the inherent power to enforce the terms of the Settlement Ag reement. Even a sserting supplemen t al jurisdiction over the contract cla i m s, Plaintiffs’ suit to e nforce the contract s t i l l f

a ils a s they have not met their burden o f proving an “unequivocally ex p ressed” cong ress i onal w aiver

10 S ee H.R. Rep

. No

. 9 2

- 1 4 19
, at 70

– 7 3 (1 9 7 2 ) (d iscu ssin g co u rt’ s in terp retatio n o f FOIA an d am en d m en ts clarif y in g th a t c o u rts h av e th e

au th ority to rev iew in ca mera d ocu m en ts w h en an ag en cy asserts th e

ex em p tio n b ased o n n atio n al d ef en se o r f o reig n p o licy ); H.R. Rep

. N o

. 93

- 8 7 6
, at 5

– 6 (1 9 7 4 ); S

. Rep

. No

. 93

- 1 2 0 0 (1 9 7 4); H.R. Rep

. No

. 1 0 4

- 7 9 5
, at 7

– 1 1 . (1 9 9 6 ) (d iscu ssin g th e ev o lu tio n o f th e Freed o m

o f In f o rm atio n A ct; n o m en tio n

o f settlem en t

ag reem en ts).H A J R O V

. U SCI S 26

of sovereig n immunity

. Therefore, we reverse summary judg ment in favor of Plaintiffs as to Claims One and Two.

V

USCI S a lso challeng es the distri ct c o urt’s finding that Hajro and May

ock satisfied the standing elements to bring a pattern o r p ractice claim. B ecause USCI S has not a p p e a l ed the district court’s finding w ith respect to Hajro’s specific F OI A request ( C laims Three, F our, a nd Six ), we limit our review to the pattern o r practice claim (Claim F ive). We hold that the factual r ec o rd is not sufficiently developed to determine whether May ock has standing to bring a pattern o r practice claim, satisfy

ing the personal harm and future harm
prong s u nder our c larified standard. May oc k ’s sing le F OI A request addressed to another lawy er at his firm is insufficient
to prove the personal harm he alleg e s—inability to effectively represent his clients’ interests and harm to his leg al practice. H ajro, on the other hand, lost standing to bring a pat t e r n o r practice claim during the p endency of t h i s a p peal when he

was g ranted h is citiz enship, because the p r o bability that USCI S’s delay s “ will impair [ Hajro’s] lawful access to information in the future” is now remote. Payne Enters., Inc.
, 837 F .2d at 491. Therefore, w e reverse and remand for further fact finding a s to May o ck’s standing and dismissH A J R O V

. U SCI S 27

Hajro’s claim as moot. 1 1 See Pac. Fisheries, Inc.
, 539 F .3d at 1149.

***

W e beg in our inquiry with the “ irreducible constitutional minimum” elements o f standing : injury in fact, causation, a nd redressability

. Lujan
, 504 U.S. at 560. Neither party debates causation or redressability

. The c o n tested element here is the showing of injury

in fact in the contex t of injunctive relief.

A p laintiff can establish injury in fact by showing that he suffered “an invasion of a leg a lly protected interest which is (a) concrete and particulariz ed; a n d (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hy

p othetical.” Id. (internal quotations a nd citations omitted). W here a p ar t y seeks injunctive relief, he
must alleg e a sufficient likelihood that he will be subjected in the future to the alle g e d l y illeg al p olicy

. Lyons
, 461 U.S. at 105, 110. At the summary judg ment stag e, “the plaintiff can

no long er rest on [ ] ‘mere a lleg ations’ but must ‘set forth’ b y affidavit or o ther evidence ‘ specific facts,’ F ed. Rule Civ. Pr o c

. 56(e), which for purposes of the summary judg ment motion will be taken to be true.” Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561.

11 A lth o u g h so m e issu es p ertain in g to P lain t i ffs ’ stan d in g in seek in g in j u n ctiv e relief m ay also b e relev an t to th e m erits, w e d o n o t m ean to p rej u d g e th e m erits o f th is p attern or p ractice claim

. T h e st a n d i n g issu e—w h eth er Haj ro an d May o ck h av e alleg ed an in j u ry in f act—is
sep arate bu t related to th e q u estio n of w h eth er P lain tif

f s h av e estab lish ed th at USCIS h as a p attern or p ractice o f u n tim ely resp o n ses to FOIA
req u ests u n d er 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2 (a)(6 ) (A ), (B ), (C). W h ile w e l im i t ou r h o ld in g to th e q u estio n o f stan din g , th e d istrict co u rt’ s s u p p lem en tatio n of th e reco rd m ay w e l l o v erlap w i th th e m erits o f an y p attern o r p ractice claim

.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 28

W e clarify that the Article I I I requirements for a specific F OI A request claim and a pattern o r practice claim differ from each other. We have recog niz ed two separa t e c laims that complainants can b r ing ag ainst an ag ency under F OI A

. The first is a suit where a plaintiff a t tacks a specific ag ency action for (1 ) “improperly ” (2) “withheld” (3) “ ag ency records.” Kissinger v. Reporters Co mm. for Freedom of the Press
, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980). F or specific F OI A request claims, after the a g ency produces all non-ex empt documents and the c ourt confirms the ag ency ’s proper invocation of an

ex e mption, the specific F OI A claim is moot be c a u s e the injury has b een remedied. See, e.g. , Perry v. Block

, 684 F .2d 121, 1 25 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[ I ]f we are convinced that appellees have, however b elatedly

, r eleased all n onex empt material, we have no further judic i a l function to perform under the F OI A.”); see also Papa v. United States , 281 F .3d 1004, 1013 & n.42 (9th Cir. 2002).

A F O I A requester may also assert a F O I A p attern o r practice claim—a “claim that an ag ency p o l i c y or practice will impair the party ’s lawful acces s t o information in the future.” Payne E

nters., Inc.
, 83 7 F .2d at 491 (emphasis in orig inal); accord Newport Aeronautical Sales v. Dep’t of the Air Force
, 684 F .3d 160, 164 ( D.C. Cir. 2012). F or ex ample,

we have r ecog niz ed a patter n or practice claim for unreasonable delay in r es p o n d ing to F OI A requests. See Mayock , 938 F .2d at 1006; Long , 693 F .2d at 909–10.

W e now clarify

, b ased on Lujan and our own precedent, that where a plaintiff alleg es a pattern or practice o f F OI A violations and seeks de claratory or injunctive relief,
reg ardless of whether h is specific F OI A requests have been mooted, t h e p l a intiff has shown injury in fact if he demonstrates the three following prong s: ( 1) the ag e n c y ’sH A J R O V

. U SCI S 29

F OI A violation was n ot merely a n isolated in cident, (2) plaintiff w as personally harmed by the alleg ed policy

, a nd ( 3 ) t he plaintiff himself has a sufficient likelihood of futu r e ha rm b y the policy or p ractice. S ee Lujan
, 504 U .S. at 563; Lyons
, 461 U.S. at 105; L o ng , 693 F .2d at 909–10. I n other words, a pattern or practice c laim is not necessaril y mooted by an a g ency ’s production o f documents. Payne Enters., Inc.
, 837 F .2d at 491 (holding that a pattern or practice claim is viable “ [ s] o long as an ag ency ’s refusal to supply information evidences a p olicy or practice of delay ed disclosure or some other failure t o a b i de by the terms of the F OI A, and not merely isolated mistakes by ag ency officials”).

These three requirements are not novel, but do clarify our pattern or practice jurisprudence. This standard packag es our

own p recedent that recog ni z e s F OI A pattern or practice claims and the availability of injunctive relief w here the “alleg ed illeg al conduct w ill recur,” Long
, 6 93 F .2d a t 9 09, and Supreme Court precedent holding tha t a n injury in fact “requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured,” Sierra Club v

. Morton
, 405 U

. S

. 727, 735 (1972). Morever, because plaintiffs seek inj u n ctive relief, plaintiffs
must show a likelihood of future ha r m caused by the p olicy

or practice. Lyons
, 4 6 1 U .S. at 105. Thus, for the purposes of clarify ing the F OI A pattern or practice c l aim standing requirements, we divide the alleg ed injury in fact into three parts.

A

B o th May ock a

nd Hajro m e et t h e first prong of the test for the p u rp o s e s of Article I I I standing

. Althoug h this first
prong overlaps with the merits of a p attern or practice c laim,

we comment only on the standin g aspect here. F or theH A J R O V

. U SCI S 30

purposes of our standing inquiry , we simply review whether the plain t iff asserted that the federal a g ency has a p attern o r practic e of violating F OI A and if the plaintiff has provided
any ty pe o f “specific facts” bey ond “mere alleg a tions.” Lujan
, 504 U.S. at 561; see also City of Houston v. Dep’t of Housing & Ur b a n Dev.
, 2 4 F

. 3d 1421, 1429–30 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs h ave a number of way s to p rove t h at the
ag ency ’s F OI A violation was not an isolate d event. F o r

ex a mple, a p laintiff can provide evidence that he has been subjected to a F OI A v iolation more than once. Or a p laintiff

can provide the court with aff i d a v its of people similarly situated to the plaintiff who w ere also harmed by the pattern or practice.

Here, May ock and Hajro opted for t he latter. F irst, both Plaintiffs ex pressly alleg e in their complaint “that Defendants have a pattern or practice of failing to comply w ith the time requirement” set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 5 52(a)(6)(A), ( B)

, ( C). To support their alleg ation, Plaintiffs then provided t w enty

six d eclarations by immig ration attorney s detailing USCI S’s delay ed F OI A responses and a ttached an i m m i gr ant c lient’s F OI A request as proof. Ther ef o r e —for the purposes o f standing a

nd without opining on the merits—both plaintiffs have met this prong

.

Nex t, we consider each plaintiff individually to determine whether they

meet the remaining

elements of the test.

B

1

Under p ro n g two, May ock must demonstrate he was personally harmed by the allege d pattern. S e e Lujan
,H A J R O V

. U SCI S 31

504 U.S. a t 563; Payne Enters., Inc.
, 837 F .2d at 491. USCI S attacks May o c k’s standing

, arg u ing he was no t p e rsonally harmed because May ock, as an attorney , is not a requester under F OI A. Additionally

, USCI S arg ues that May ock must meet the third party

standing requirements, which he cannot establish because he is suing on behalf of prospective clients. W e find both arg uments unavailing

.

F irst, a practicing immig ration attorney who routinely files F OI A requests is a requester under F OI A. USCI S’s o wn F OI A request fo r m ( F orm G -639) lists the attorney as the “requester” of informa t i o n

. 1 2 W e have previously accorded M a y o ck “requester” status in h is capacity as an a ttorney to b ring a pattern or practice claim. See Mayock

, 938 F .2d at 1007 n.1. 1 3 F OI A’s tex t and leg isl a t i v e intent also support

our categ oriz ation of May ock as a requester. The s t atute’s
very first section b eg ins w ith “[ e ] ac h ag ency shall make available to the public information as follows

. . . .” 5 U .S.C. § 5 5 2 ( a ) (emphasis a dded). The statute further states that if

an ag e ncy ’ s requesting procedures are followed, the ag ency “shall make the records promptly avai lable to any person

. ” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). “Cong ress clearly intended the F O I A to g ive any member o f the public as much rig ht to disclosure as o ne with a special interest in a particular document

. . . .” U.S. D ep’t of De f e n s e v. Fed. Labor Relations Au th.

, 510 U.S. 487, 4 96 (1994) (internal

1 2 S e e U.S. Citizen sh ip an d Im m ig ratio n Serv ices, G -6 3 9

, Freed o m o f In fo rma tio n Act/Priv a c

y Act Req u est , h ttp ://w

w w .u s cis.g o v /g

- 63 9 (last

v isited Octo b er 1 5 , 2 0 1 5 ).

13 A lth o u g h w e h av e p rev io u sly acco rd ed May o ck s t a nd i n g i n h is
cap acity as an atto rn ey w ith o u t co m m en t, in lig h t o f Lu

ja n an d o u r ref

in ed
stan d ard f o r a p attern o r p ractice claim

, h ere w e n eed m o re in f o rm atio n to d eterm in e stan d in g

.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 32

quotations and citations o mitted); see also H.R. Rep. 1 419 at 3 ( C ong ress, in enacting F OI A, “adopted a policy that ‘a n y person’ should ha v e clear access to identifiable ag ency records”); Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish

, 541 U.S. 157, 171–72 ( 2 004) (Cong ress’s purpose w as to promote transparency across the g overnment); Swan v

. SEC
, 96 F .3d 498, 499 ( D .C. Cir. 1996) (“F OI A does not make distinctions b a s e d o n who is requesting the information.”). Thus, May ock is a requester for the purposes of F OI A.

Nex t, USCI S arg ue s that May o ck c annot establish standing because he is suing on b ehalf of prospective clients, citing to Kowalski v. Tesmer
, 543 U.S. 125, 134 (2004). B ut Kowalski implicates third party standing

, and May ock alleg e s

a personal injury to his leg al practice. 1 4 May o c k claims that delay ed F O I A r equests hinde r h is ability to effectively represent his clien ts. Hajro I
, 832 F

. Supp. 2d at 1106. F o r

an immig ration attorney such as May ock, delay ed F OI A requests inhibit his ability to build a theory of the case o r put forth a defense, and may even ex pose May ock to leg al malpractice claims and loss of reputation. T h us, the district
court c orrectly rejected U SCI S’s a ttempt to char a c t eriz e May ock as a third party

. Id. at 1105–06 (“B ut May ock is no

14 T h e S u p rem e Co u rt h as reco g n ized th e atto rn ey

- clien t relatio n sh ip as

su f f icien t to co n f

er th ird p arty s tan d i n g

. S ee Ca p l in & D r

y s d a le, Ch a r tered v. Un ited S ta tes , 4 9 1 U .S. 6 1 7
, 6 2 3 n .3 (1 9 8 9 ); Dep ’t o f La b o r

v. Trip lett

, 4 9 4 U.S. 7 1 5
, 7 2 0 (1 9 9 0 ). Bu t see Ko w a l s ki

, 5 4 3 U.S. at 1 3 2

– 3 3 (atto rn ey s assertin g f u tu re clien ts’ i n terest in su f f icien t w h ere th e atto rn ey s also so u g h t “ a f ed eral co u rt t o s h o r t circu it th e State’ s ad j u d icatio n o f th [e] co n stitu tio n al q u estio n ”). B ecau se th e f acts b ef ore

u s d o n o t im

p licate th i rd party stan d in g , w e d eclin e to ap p l y th at d o ctrin e h ere.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 33

mere third party to his clients; he represents them as the most intimate of ag ents.”). 1 5

Althoug h an inability t o effectively represent clients,

e x posure to leg al malpractice claims, and loss of reputat i o n may serve as a basis for individual standing , at the summary judg ment stag e, we find g enuine issues of material fact as to May ock ’ s p e r sonal harm. May ock’s declaration avers that

1 5 T h e d i s sen t arg u es May o ck can n o t estab lish s tan d in g b ecau s e

“ May o ck h as asserted ex clu siv ely h arm to h is clien ts.” T h is is w ro n g

. First, May o ck

, in h is o w n rig h t, alleg ed a p att e r n o r p ractice in th e

co m plain t. S ee F AC ¶ 6 6 (“

Pla in tiffs alleg e th at Def en d an ts h av e a p attern o r practice o f f

ailin g to co m

p ly w ith th e t im e req u irem en ts

. . . .”) (em p h asis ad d ed ). T h e d i ssen t m isu n d erstan d s t

h e reco rd

. May o ck is n o t Haj ro ’ s atto rn ey ; h e is an i n d ep en den t p lain tif f to th is l a w s u i t alleg in g a h arm f ro m USCIS’ s p a ttern o f d elay ed FOIA resp o n ses in a d d itio n to a h arm based o n th e Settlem en t A g reem en t. Desp ite d ism issin g May o ck ’ s claim s b ased o n th e Settlem en t A g reem en t, w e are n o t fr e e t o ig n ore May o ck ’ s in d ep en d en t cau se o f actio n alleg in g a p attern o r p ractice claim as th e d issen t su g g ests.

Seco n d

, in h is an sw erin g b rief b ef o re u s May o ck asserts th at “ th e sy stem atic d elay s in FOIA p ro cessin g b y USCIS p rej u d ices bo t h a clien t’ s ab ility t o access p o ten tially critical in f o rm a t i o n a n d an i m

m ig ratio n law y er’ s ab ility t o rep resen t h i s or h er clien t s.” (Em p h asis ad d ed ). T h ird

, if May ock can n o t estab lish s tan d in g f o r a p attern o r p ractice claim ag ain st USCIS delay s u

p o n rem an d, w

h o can ? May o ck

is th e m o d el p lain tif

f to assert a p attern o r p ractice claim b ecau s e h i s leg al p ractice dep en d s u p on th e recu rrin g d elay ed FOIA req u e s t s

— w h ereas im m ig ran ts, lik e Haj ro , r u n t h e risk o f m o o tn ess if th ey n o lo n g er h av e a n eed t o f i le a F O I A
req u est f ro m USCIS af

t er th e pro d u ctio n o f d ocu m en ts. Fo u rth

, n o w h ere d o es th e d issen t ack

n o w led g e th at o u r co u rt h as p r e v i o u sly acco rd ed May o ck —in h is cap acity as a law

y er—stan din g f

or th is exa ct claim

, alb eit

u n d er t h e law as it sto od t

w en ty

- f ou r y ears ag o

. Fin ally

, th e d issen t

erro n eo u sly co n ten d s th at “ n o p ray er f o r relief [is] ref

lected [in ] an y claim d u e to in j u ry to May o ck sep ar ately as an atto rn ey ”—May ock p ray s f or tim ely FOIA req u ests so th at h e can ad eq u ately rep resen t h is clien ts.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 34

the g overnment has never produced the rec o r d s within the statutory time period nor provided written notice setting forth “unusual c ircumstances.” 1 6 T r u e, U SCI S’s delay s produce a concrete and particulariz ed injury f or May ock as it prejudices May ock’s a

bility to effectively represent his clients’ interests. See Lujan
, 504 U.S. at 560. B u t May ock’s sing le F OI A request addressed to a nother attorn e y a t his f irm is insufficient to prove his harm was “actual or imminent.” Id.
at 561 (“[ T] he nature and ex tent of facts that must be a verred (at the su m m ary judg ment stag e)

. . . in order to establish standing d epends c o nsiderably upon w hether the plaintiff is himself the object o f t h e action (or foreg o ne action) at issue.”). W e nee d m o re. Cf. Payne E nters., Inc.
, 837 F .2d 486 (corporation eng ag ed in selling informat i o n and advice about Government c o n tracts to prospective contractors challeng ed more than one F OI A request in pattern or practice claim); Newport Aeronautical Sale s , 6 8 4 F

. 3d 160, 163–64 (company that provided technical d ata to military contractors provided two specific F O I A r equests in a l l e ging pattern o r practice c laim); S. Y

uba River Citizens League v

. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.
, No. CI VS-06-2845 L KK/J F M, 2008 W L 2523819 (E.D. Cal. J une 20, 2 0 0 8 ) (non-profit
org aniz ations provide d three specific F OI A requests in alleg ing p a ttern or practice of F OI A violation).

The twenty

- s i x declarations f rom attorney s around the country that May ock provides as ex amples of delay ed F OI A

16 “ In m y p ractice I h av e so m etim es f iled req u ests u

n d er th e [FOIA ] to

o b tain th e alien reg istratio n f iles f o r m y clien ts w

h o h av e a p rev io u s

reco rd w i t h t h e Im

m ig ratio n Serv ice. In n o n e o f th ese cases h as th e g o v ern m en t ev er p ro d u ced t h e reco rd s I h av e req u ested w ith in t h e

s t atu to ry t im e perio d o f tw en ty d ay s n o r h as th e g o v ern m en t p ro v i d e d

w ritten n o t ice settin g f

o rth an y ‘ u n

u su al circu m stan ces’ f

o r an ex ten sio n

o f tim e b ey o n d th e statu to ry p erio d o f tw en ty d ay s.”H A J R O V

. U SCI S 35

requests g o to the merits of the patt e r n o r practice c laim. They do n ot help May ock establish his person a l h a r m

. I n

some instances—for ex ample, where an immig r a n t himself files a F OI A request seeking h i s o r her alien file—a sing le F OI A request may suffice to prove personal harm. There, the personal harm would be more obvious and direct; thus, demonstrating personal harm under p r o n g two would be easier. F or ex ample, in Ha j r o ’ s case, USCI S’s failure to respond in a timely manner to Hajro’s F OI A r equest forced him to file his b rief addressing the denial of his naturaliz ation applica t i on without ever seeing the evidence ag ainst him on which U S C I S relied. May o ck’s alleg ed harm is distinct. May ock’s leg al practice requires him to file FO I A requests

more tha n o n ce; and the nature of his harm—potential i n e f f e c t i v e l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d l o s s o f reputation—requires more than one delay ed F OI A request to establish the more attenuated personal harm that may accrue to an immig ration lawy er.

The d istrict court’s conclusion that May ock had standing is understandable without the benefit of this opinion. Hajro I
, 8 32 F

. Supp. 2d at 1106. W e also recog niz e t h a t upon remand M a y ock may easily satisfy this element; however, under our refined standard, where the plaintiff alleg es he has been subject to a p atter n o r practice o f F OI A violations on multiple occasions, he must provide sufficient evidence o f this to the court. Lujan
, 504 U .S. at 5 61. T herefore, we

reverse an d remand for the district court to conduct the

r equisite fact-finding a

nd determine, in the first instan c e, whether May ock meets prong s two and three of the pattern o r practice test (e.g

., whethe r M ay ock himself submitted more than one F OI A request t o U SCI S a t the time h e filed this complaint; whether May ock himself will likely file more F OI A requests with USCI S in the future).H A J R O V

. U SCI S 36

2

Hajro’s case under prong two is simpler. H i s s p ecific F OI A request delay ed by U SCI S is sufficient to demonstrate that h e was personally harmed by USCI S’s pattern of d e l a y in c o ntravention of F OI A’s time limits. USCI S responded to H a jro’s November 2007 F OI A request almost four month s later, w e l l b ey o nd the twenty -day limit prescribed b y 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A), and it “did n ot include notice of any ‘unusual circumstances’ justify ing an e x t e nsion o f the statutory twenty -day time limit” per 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B ). Hajro I
, 8 32 F

. Su p p

. 2 d a t 1100–01. As a result, Hajro proceeded to his denial of citiz e n ship appeal without the requested information to rebut USCI S’s allega t ions ag ainst him. Id. This is sufficient to show Hajro w a s p e r sonally harmed b y U SCI S’s alleg ed p a t t e r n or practice o f F OI A violations.

C

The Supreme Court has held that “[ p] ast ex posure to illeg al conduct d oes not in itself show a p r e s e n t c ase o r controversy reg arding injunctive relief

. . . if unaccompanied by any continuing

, p resent adverse effects.” Lyons
, 461 U.S.
at 102 (quoting O ’Shea v. Littleton

, 414 U.S

. 4 8 8
, 495–96 (1974)). B ecause F O I A ’ s prescribed relief is injunctive o r declaratory

, g enerally a plaintiff a lleg ing a pattern or practice cl a i m u n d er F OI A must also meet this future harm requirement. S

ee 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B ).

B e c a u se May ock did not provide sufficient evidence o f his personal harm, we a lso remand to a llow the district court to determine prong three i n t he first instance a fter the requisite fact finding

.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 37

W h ile this case was pending b efore u s, Hajro successfully appealed USCI S’s denial of his app l i ca tion f or citiz enship. Hajro v. Barrett
, No. C 10–01772 MEJ
, 2011 W L 2118602 (N.D. Cal. May 2 7, 2011); Hajro v. Barrett
, 8 49 F

. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Th u s , b a s e d on the record before us, the likelihood that Hajro w ill file another F OI A request from USCI S seeking a ccess to his alien f ile is remot e

. 1 7 See Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California

, 789 F .3d 947, 9 55 ( 9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) ( “A c ase is moot on appeal if no live controversy r e mains at the time the court of appeals hears the case. . . .”) (citation omitted).

Seeking injunctive re l i e f o n a pattern or p ractice claim requires tha t H a

j ro himself will likely suffer future injury from USCI S’s delay e d FO I A r equests or demonstrate his injury would be capable of repetition, y et e v a d i ng review. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw , 528 U.S. 167, 170 (2000) (detailing when a defendant’s voluntar y cessation o f

an alleg edly wrong ful behavior does n ot m o o t a case if the behavior could reasonably be e x pected to recur) ; Lyons
, 461 U.S. at 105; Long
, 693 F .2d at 909. Here, Hajro’s harm

was b ased on U SCI S’s delay ed r esponse in t u r n ing over his alien reg istration fi l e to support his application for naturaliz ation. B ut with citiz enship in hand, it is unlikely USCI S “will impair [ Hajro’s] lawful access to information in the future.” Payne Enters., Inc.
, 837 F .2d at 491. We reverse and remand as to Hajro’s p a t t e r n o r practice claim with instructions to dismiss his claim as moot.

1 7 P lain tif

f s’ ref eren ce to th e Co n tro lled A p p licatio n Rev iew a n d Reso lu tio n P ro g ram (“ CA RRP ”) i s n o t p art o f th e d istrict co u rt reco rd an d

can n o t b e a b asis to su

p p o rt th e lik elih o o d o f

f u tu re h arm

.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 38

VI

I n sum, we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s

s u mmary judg ment o rder under F RAP 4(a)(2), but dis m i s s USCI S’s challeng e to the permanent injunction for lack o f jurisdicti o n

. W e reverse the district court’s summary judg ment order with respect to Claims One a nd Two because it lacked a waiver of sovereig n immunity to enforce the terms of the 1992 Settlement Ag ree m e n t

. B ased on the c larified pattern or p r a ctice test, w e reverse and remand so that the district court can make the requisite factual f i n ding s a nd determine in the first instance whether May ock has standing
to bring this claim. W e also reverse and remand Hajro’s pattern or p ractice c laim with instructions t o d ismiss the claim as moot. I n ligh t o f our reversal, we vacate the permanent injunction and w e a l so vacate and remand the attorney s’ fees award for recomputation.

REVERSED and R EMANDED with instructions.

RAW L I NSON, Circuit J udg e, concurring in part a nd dissenting in part:

I agr ee w ith the majority that we have jurisdiction to review the summary jud g ment order and, althoug h it is an

ex tremely c lose question, I ultimately ag ree t hat the
g overnment’s premature appeal did not preserve its challeng e to entry of the permanent injunction.

I also have no quarrel with the majority ’s conclusion that the jurisd i c t ional rule announced in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life I ns. Co
., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) applies retroactively to theH A J R O V

. U SCI S 39

1992 Settlement Ag r eement. B ecause the district court di d
not r etain jurisdiction over the Settlement Ag reement o r incorporate the ag reement into the final judg ment, the district

co u rt lacked jurisdiction to e nforce the a g reement under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. S ee id

. at 380–81. Having determined the lack of

jurisdiction on that basis, I see no need
to wade into the sovereig n immunity issue. F in a l l y , I ag r ee that Mirsad Hajro lost standing to bring a pattern or practice claim once he was g

ranted citiz enship.

The only issue on which I part c ompany with the majority is the issue of J a m e s May ock’s standing to bring a claim under the F reedom of I nformation Act in his own rig ht. May ock simply failed to alleg e an y i n d i v idual harm to him other than indirectly throug h harm to his clients.

W e a ll ag ree that May ock, Hajro’s at torney , failed to establish standing to b r ing an action un d e r the F reedom o f I nformation Act under the operative complaint. I n addition, there is no indication in this r ecord that o n remand he will be able to p l ausibly alleg e an injury in fact, one of the “irreducible constitutional” elements of standing

. Lujan v

. Defenders of W

ildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

The Supreme Court has d escribed the injury r equirement

as s u f f e r ing “an injury in fact—an invasion of a leg ally protected interest which is (a) c o n crete and particulariz ed, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hy pothetical.” Id

. (citations a

nd internal q u o t a tions marks omitted). I n addition, the party assert ing an injury in fact must plausibly alleg e “ a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly

traceable
to the c halleng ed a ction of the defendant

. . . Id

. (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted).H A J R O V

. U SCI S 40

I n the F irst Amended Complaint, the alleg ations focused

ex c lusively on harm to Plaintiff H aj r o a nd violation of the Settlement Ag reement.

The Fi r s t Cause of Action a lleg ed that the multi-track policy violated the Sett l e ment Ag r eement by allowing

ex p edited processin g only for cases scheduled for a h earing before an immig ration judg e. The F irst Ca u s e o f Action specifically asserted a violation of “essential due process protections for aliens.”

The Second Cause of A ction asser t e d that denial o f

ex p edited processing of Hajro’s F reedom of I nformation A ct request impaired Hajro’s “substantial due proc e s s r i g h ts

. . . to a fair hearing ” under the immig ration statutes.

The Third Cause o f Action alleg ed th a t t h e failure to provide Hajro the requested material within 2 0 day s v iolated the F reedom of I nformat ion Act a nd its implementing
reg ulation.

The F ourth Cause of A ction a l l e g ed a violation of the notification r equirement of “ the unusual c ircumstances which prevented the ag ency from pr o cessing [ Hajro’s] request within the 2 0 d a y statutory limit.” (internal quotation marks omitted).

The F ifth Cause o f Action alleg ed a pattern or p r actice o f noncompliance.

The Six th Cause o f Action characteriz e d the ag e ncy ’s action as arbitrary , capricious, willful and unreasonable.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 41

The Seventh Cause o f Action alleg ed a violation o f Hajro’s “due process rig hts beca u se [ withholding the requested documents] p revented [ Hajro’s] at t o rney from adequately preparing h is b rief o n appeal,” in violatio n o f Hajro’s “rig ht to a fair hearing and fundamental fairness.”

T h e Eig hth Cause of Action alleg e d a violation of th e “F ifth Amendment g uarantee of Equal Protection” by use of a policy that “creates two classes of aliens.”

The Ninth a

nd final Cause o f Action alleg ed that implementation of a new policy for processing docume n t reque s t s without notice and an opportunity for comment violated the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Pray e r F or Relief g ener a l l y tracked the Causes o f Action. Notably

, no p ray er f o r relief reflected any claim d ue to injury to May ock separately as an attorney

. Similarly

, May ock’s declaration, submitted a s part of the
summary judg ment proceeding s, f ocused on F reedom o f I nformation requests made on behalf of his clients. Not one hint of injury to May ock or to his practice was c ontained in his declaration. 1

Cont rary to the majority opinion’s recharacteriz ation o f his claims, May ock has asse r t e d ex clusively harm to his clients, p rimarily from f ailure to adhere to the Settlement

1 T h e m a j o rity esp o u ses th e v iew th at May ock alleg ed a pattern or p ractice claim i n h is o w n rig h t. S

ee M a j ority Op in io n , p

. 3 3 n .1 5

. Ho w ev er, as n o ted ab o v e, n o s u ch claim is asserted in th e First A m en ded Co m p lain t o r May o c k’s d eclaratio n

. T ellin g ly

, th e m aj o rity reso rts to relian ce o n

th e A n sw erin g B rief

f o r su p p ort f o r th is p ro p o sitio n

. S

ee id

.H A J R O V

. U SCI S 42

Ag reement. Curiously

, the majority opini o n acknowledg e s that “May ock is not seeking to enforce the statutory mandate
to provide timely [ F r eedom of I n formation Act] d isclosures itself

. . .” Majority Opinion
, p. 2 5

. R a t h er, the majority
recog niz es, May ock “seeks e nforcement of his own private agreement w i t h a federal a g ency related to [ F reedom o f I nformation Act] requests.

. . .” Id

. B ut the majority has concluded, and I ag ree, that the district court cannot e nforce the Settlemen t A gr e ement. S ee Majority Opinion
, p

. 20. I f the claims May ock seeks to en f o rce are unenforceable, h ow does he have standing ?

I n any e vent , t h e record in the district court does not reflect a ny alleg ed h arm to May ock other than indirectly throug h his clients. T he majority theoriz e s t h a t “delay ed [ F reedom of I nformation Act] r equests inhibit [ May ock’s] ability to b uild a theory of the case or put forth a defense

. . . ” Majority O

pinion
, p. 32. B ut any resulting harm would be to May ock’s clients, not t o M a y o ck. The majority also hy pothesiz es that May ock could be “ex p o se[ d] to leg al malpractice claims and loss of reputation.

. . . ” Id

. B esides the f act that these assertions ap p e a r nowhere in the district
court re cord, the n otion that May ock m ay encounter such harm is the ty

pe of “conjectural or hy

pothetical” interest the Supreme Court has held to b e insufficient to support standing

. Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560.

Speculation that May ock may even t u a lly establish firstparty standing based on unsubstantiated harm to his ability to represent his clients is ent i r e ly contrary to the position May ock advocated before the district court. I n his opposition
to the g overnment’s motion to dismiss, May ock maintained that he had standing as a party to the Settlement Ag r eement,

“ a member of the public,” and “as a lawy er on behalf of h i sH A J R O V

. U SCI S 43

injured clients.” Opposition To M otion To Dismiss
, J anuary 19, 2009, p. 9. May ock further as s e r ted that “a lawy er has standing to sue on b ehalf o f his injured cli e n t s ” and that he had “standing to bring a pattern and practice lawsuit alleg ing that Defendants r outinely ex ceed t h e twenty day leg al
response p e r i od in [ the F reedom o f I nformation Act] on behalf of his injured clients .” Id. at 1 0 (emp h a s e s ad ded). Sig nificantly

, May ock countered the g overnment’s reliance

o n Gilmore v. U.S. D ept. of Energy
, 33 F

. Supp. 2 d 1 1 8 4 (N.D. Cal. 1998), a case involving first-party standing

, b y asserting that he had third-party standing :

Defendants are co r r ect that Gilmore was not asserting a

n y third p a r t y rig hts. He was

ass e rting his own. H owever

. . . the courts have allowed lawy e rs to assert the third party rights of their clients in pattern and practice

cases. Therefore, the t hird party arg u ment is a red herring

.

Id. at 1 0–11 (emphasis added). A d d i tionally

, May o ck emphasiz ed that:

T he Complaint states that Plaintiff May o c k has filed sev eral [ F reedom of I nformation Act] requests on behalf o f his clients seeking copies of their alien reg istration files and it ha s t a ken more than twenty day s for Defendants to produce the records i n those

cases.

. . . A s Plaintiff May ock’s c l i e nts’ [ F reed o m of I nformation Act] requests a re processed in an untime l y manner, they suffer

an injury which can be redressed by an injunction. B ecause Pl a i n tiff May ock is anH A J R O V

. U SCI S 44

attorney , he has standing to seek this r edres s by means of a pattern and practice lawsuit.

Id. at 11 ( emphases add e d ). Be c a use May ock relied on the F irst Amended Complaint in asserting third-party standing to file a pattern and practice claim on b ehalf of his clients, it is inappropriate to sug g est reinvention of his claim to establish standing on remand. See Y a mada v. Snipes
, 7 8 6 F .3d 1182, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2015) (“As with all questions o f s u bject
matter jur i s diction ex c ept mootness, standing is determined

a s o f the date of the filing of the c o mplaint.

. . .”) (citatio n omitted).

Contrary to t h e majority ’s approach, May ock’s i n a d e q u a te assertion o f third-party standing requires d i s m i s s a l of his asserted claim, and precludes a ny further development based on newly minted and speculative theories premised on first-party standing

. S

ee La Asociacion de T

r a b ajadores de Lake Forest v. City of

Lake Forest
, 624 F .3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a p arty “may n o t e f f ectively amend its Complaint by raising a new theory of s tanding ” a t the
summary judg ment stag e) (citation omitted). As the majority concedes, May ock fail ed to present any evidence of the requisite personal harm f or standing

, which is unsurprising because he totally relied on third-party standing in the district
court p roceeding s. See Majority Opinion
, pp. 34–35; see also Opposit i o n To Motion To Dismiss
, p p. 9–10. A remand for

re -pleading purposes is particularly inappropriate g iven the majority ’s recog n i t i o n that the articulated standing “requirements ar e n ot novel” and that “[ t] his standard packag es our own precedent” and that of the Supreme Court. Majority Opinion
, p. 29. See La Asociacion d e TrabajadoresH A J R O V

. U SCI S 45

de L a k e Forest
, 624 F

. 3d at 1089 (disapproving the d elay e d pleading of a new theory

of standing ). 2

I would reverse the d istrict court’s ruling that May ock h ad standing to pursue an action in his own rig ht, and remand for dismissal.

I n c onclusion, I ag ree that we have jurisdiction over this appeal, that the g o vernment’s p r em ature appeal did not preserve its challeng e to e ntry o f the permanent injunction, that the district court did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement ag reement, and that Hajro’s claims a r e m o ot. I respectfully disag r ee t h a t May o ck has standing

. I would reverse and remand for dismissal of all claims.

2 T h e m aj o rity seek s ack

n ow led g m en t th at w e g ran ted May o ck stan d in g in a FOIA case tw en ty

- f

o u r y ears ag o

. S

ee Ma jo rity Op in io n , p. 3 3
, n

. 1 5

. It is n otab le th at th e m aj o rity co n ced es th at May o ck ’ s claim s w ere m ad e i n h is cap acity as a law

y er. S ee id

. Mo re im

p o rtan tly

, p erh ap s tw en ty

f o u r y ears ag o , May o ck ’ s co m p lain t w as ad eq u ate. T o d ay it is n o t. S ee Bell Atla ntic v. Two mb l

y , 55 0 U .S. 5 4 4
, 5 5 6

– 57 (2 0 07 ) (settin g f orth
p lead in g stan d ard s u n d er Ru le 8 ); see a l so Ash cro ft v. Iq b a l

, 5 5 6 U.S. 6 6 2 (2 0 0 9) (ex p lain i n g th at a co m p lain t m u st alleg e p lau sib le claim s an d n o t

co n clu so ry statem en ts). A s th e m aj o rity reco g n izes, May o ck ’ s p ray er f or

r e l ief w as o n b eh alf o f h i s clien ts, n o t h im self

. S ee Ma jo rity Op in i o n , p

. 3 3, n .1 5 (“ May o ck p ray s f o r tim ely FOIA req u ests so th at h e can ad eq u ately

rep resen t h is clien ts.”).