IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 18–1427

Filed October 18, 2019

HEATHER YOUNG, DEL HOLLAND, and BLAKE HENDRICKSON, 

Appellants/Cross-Appellees, 

vs. 

THE IOWA CITY COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT; CHRIS LYNCH, 

Individually and in His Capacity as President of the Board of Directors and 

Director; LaTASHA DeLOACH, Individually and in Her Capacity as 

Director of the Iowa City Community School District; BRIAN 

KIRSCHLING, Individually and in His Capacity as Director of the Iowa City 

Community School District; and PAUL ROESLER, Individually and in His 

Capacity as Director of the Iowa City Community School District, 

Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Sean 

McPartland, Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal, and defendants cross-appeal, from portions of a 

district court order granting a summary judgment in plaintiffs’ action for 

injunctive relief and damages arising from defendants’ decision not to 

submit to the county election commissioner plaintiffs’ ballot proposal 

regarding the demolition of a local elementary school. AFFIRMED IN 

PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Gregg Geerdes, Iowa City, for appellants/cross-appellees.

Andrew J. Bracken, Kristy M. Latta, and Emily A. Kolbe of Ahlers & 

Cooney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees/cross-appellants.
2

APPEL, Justice. 

In this case, we consider a series of claims arising out of the refusal 

of the Iowa City Community School District (school district or Board) to 

authorize the placement of a ballot issue at an election to be held on 

September 12, 2017, after a petition bearing over 2000 signatures had 

been timely filed with the Board. The ballot measure would have asked 

the voters whether they approved the demolition of Hoover Elementary 

School and the use of the proceeds for school district purposes.

After the Board refused to direct the county auditor to place the 

matter on the ballot in the upcoming election, the plaintiffs filed suit in 

district court. The plaintiffs sought a writ of certiorari, a writ of 

mandamus, injunctive relief, and damages against the school district and 

individual board members who voted against placing the measure on the 

ballot. The defendants answered and filed a counterclaim seeking 

declaratory relief.

The district court entered an injunction directing the defendants to 

place the matter on the ballot. Because absentee ballots had already been 

issued, the district court directed that the matter be placed on the next 

general election ballot following September 12. The district court granted 

the defendants summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims for damages 

and any other relief. 

The plaintiffs appealed. The plaintiffs seek reversal of the district 

court order declining to award damages for alleged violations of the United 

States Constitution.

The defendants cross-appealed. In their cross-appeal, the 

defendants claim that the district court erred in determining that, under 

state law, the school district was required to place the ballot measure 

supported by the petitioners on the ballot. 
3

For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that the district court 

erred in granting the plaintiffs injunctive relief. We conclude that the 

defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all claims. As a result, 

we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the order of the district court. We 

remand the case to the district court for dismissal.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

A. Factual Background. In 2013, the board of directors of the Iowa 

City Community School District adopted a “Facilities Master Plan” (FMP). 

The demolition of Hoover Elementary School and the construction of a 

structure to become part of Iowa City High School on the former Hoover 

Elementary site was part of the FMP. 

The school district sought voter approval of a $191 million bond 

issue to finance the execution of the FMP. The election was set for 

September 12, 2017. The school district intended to keep Hoover 

Elementary School open through the 2018–2019 school year after which 

it would be closed, the building demolished, and the site used for other 

purposes by Iowa City High School. 

On June 29, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a petition with the school 

district seeking to require the district to also place on the September 12 

ballot a narrow question. Specifically, the petition asked that the following 

question be placed on the September 12 ballot:

Shall the Iowa City Community School District . . . demolish 

the building known as Hoover Elementary School . . . after the 

2018-2019 school year, with the proceeds of any resulting 

salvage to be applied as specified in Iowa Code section 

297.22(b)?

Prior to receipt of the petition, the school district sought the advice 

of counsel regarding the legality of the proposed ballot measure. In a letter 

dated June 22, 2017, the Board’s counsel advised that the question the 
4

petitioners sought to place on the ballot was not “authorized by law” under 

Iowa Code section 278.2(1) (2017). According to the June 22 opinion, the 

demolition of Hoover Elementary School was not a “sale, lease, or other 

disposition” of a schoolhouse subject to submission to the voters under 

Iowa Code section 278.1(1)(b). The opinion emphasized that while in 2008

the Iowa legislature amended the Code to define “dispose” or “disposition” 

to “include[] the exchange, transfer, demolition, or destruction of any real 

or other property of the corporation,” the legislature deleted that provision 

the next year. According to the legal opinion, the legislative history 

“expresses a clear legislative intent to remove from the voters decision 

making authority over demolition of school district owned structures.” 

After receipt of the petition on June 29, the Board requested a 

supplemental and expanded opinion from counsel, which was provided in 

a letter dated July 6, 2017. The July 6 opinion repeated the legislative 

history cited in the original June 22 opinion but further cited definitions 

of dispose and disposition found in Merriam Webster Law Dictionary and 

Black’s Law Dictionary as having the common denominator of “the transfer 

of ownership and control of property to another person or entity.” 

Further, the July 6 legal opinion noted that under Iowa Code section 

278.1(1)(b), the voters must vote on the “application to be made of the 

proceeds.” As a result, according to the opinion, a disposition involves a 

transaction for monetary gain. The FMP, however, included an estimated 

cost of demolition at $500,000. The July 6 legal opinion additionally noted 

that the possibility of placing any demolition before the voters would 

“hamstring a district’s ability to properly manage and utilize its properties 

for the benefit of the school community.”

Regarding proposed next steps for the Board, the July 6 legal 

opinion stated that it was “not wholly clear” how the Board should proceed 
5

with the petition and recommended that the Board reject the petition as 

not “authorized by law,” notify the county commissioner of elections of the 

filing of the petition and the Board’s action, and direct that the measure 

not be on the ballot in September. In the alternative, the legal opinion 

stated that a member of the Board could file an objection to the petition 

under Iowa Code section 277.7. 

After receiving the advice of counsel, the Board voted against placing 

the plaintiffs’ narrow question on the September 12 ballot.

B. Proceedings Before District Court.

1. The plaintiffs’ petition and the defendants’ answer and 

counterclaim. On July 17, 2017, the plaintiffs brought an action in district 

court seeking a writ of certiorari, a writ of mandamus, temporary and 

permanent injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs also 

prayed for damages, attorneys’ fees, interest, and court costs. The gist of 

the petition was that the defendants refused to submit a legally sufficient 

petition to the Johnson County Commissioner of Elections, thereby 

depriving the plaintiffs and voters of the opportunity to vote on the ballot 

measure. The defendants filed an answer generally denying the material 

allegations of the plaintiffs’ petition. 

The plaintiffs amended their petition on September 8 to include a 

claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The defendants 

answered the amended petition and filed a counterclaim seeking 

declaratory relief. The defendants asserted in their counterclaim that the 

demolition of the school was not a disposition under Iowa Code sections

297.22(1) or 278.1(1)(b). Further, the defendants suggested that a vote 

rejecting the demolition of a school building at the direction of the voters 

would not constrain the Board from exercising its independent power to 

do so. 
6

2. Issuance of temporary injunction. The district court held a 

hearing on the plaintiffs’ application for temporary injunction on 

August 24, 2017. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that they had 

established a likelihood of success on the merits, that the right to vote was 

threatened by the Board’s actions and inactions, and that the balance of 

harms favored the entry of a temporary injunction placing the matter on 

the September 12 ballot and enjoining the defendants from demolishing 

Hoover until the referendum is held. The plaintiffs further asked that all 

early ballots filed for the September 12 ballot be invalidated as they did 

not present the ballot measure sought by the plaintiffs. The defendants

responded that there was little likelihood that the plaintiffs would prevail 

on the merits, that they lacked standing to bring the action, that no right 

of action existed under applicable statutes, and that the public would be 

harmed if the Board was not allowed to conduct its business as planned. 

On September 6, 2017, the district court entered its order on the 

temporary injunction matter. At the outset, the district court found that 

the plaintiffs had standing to seek enforcement of applicable statutes and 

that the plaintiffs had a private right of action to enforce them. The district 

court further concluded that the Board was legally constrained in its

challenge to the petition by its failure to file an objection under Iowa Code 

section 277.7 and that it lacked authority to unilaterally determine the 

petition was unauthorized by law. 

Turning to the question of whether a temporary injunction should 

be granted, the district court found that the plaintiffs demonstrated 

substantial injury or damages would result if an injunction was not 

granted. The district court granted the plaintiffs a temporary injunction 

requiring the Board to direct the Johnson County Commissioner of 

Elections to place the plaintiffs’ ballot measure before the voters at the 
7

next regular election. Further, the district court denied the plaintiffs’

request to invalidate early ballots cast in connection with the 

September 12, 2017 election; to place the referendum on the 

September 12 ballot; or, in the alternative, to schedule a special election 

on the matter. Additionally, the district court declined to enter an 

injunction preventing the Board from demolishing Hoover, noting that 

there were no immediate plans to do so. Following the district court’s 

temporary injunction, the voters in Johnson County approved the FMP at 

the September 2017 general election.

3. Ruling on motions for summary judgment. The parties filed 

comprehensive competing motions for summary judgment. In their 

summary judgment papers, the plaintiffs sought rulings from the district 

court that (a) the defendants violated state election laws; (b) the defendants 

violated both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985; (c) no defendant has qualified 

immunity; (d) no defendant has absolute immunity; (e) the plaintiffs are 

entitled to damages that the court should calculate and assess against the 

defendants, jointly and severally, including actual, nominal, presumed

substantial, and punitive, as well as attorneys’ fees, interest, expenses, 

and court costs, or, in the alternative, schedule a hearing on damages; (f)

demolition of a schoolhouse is a disposition of the same under all 

applicable statutes; (g) if a majority vote against the ballot measure, 

preservation is binding on the defendants; (h) the temporary injunction 

previously entered should be expanded and made permanent, the bond 

exonerated, and the plaintiffs given other appropriate relief to protect 

against further deprivation and dissipation of their constitutional rights;

and (i) the affirmative defenses asserted by the defendants are without 

merit as a matter of law.
8

In turn, the defendants filed a generally mirror-image motion 

seeking summary judgment in the defendants favor on all issues raised by 

the plaintiffs. In addition, the defendants sought rulings from the district 

court that (a) the plaintiffs lack standing to litigate; (b) the plaintiffs do not 

have a private right of action under Iowa Code sections 278.1 or 297.22 to 

bring the action; (c) the term “disposition” does not include demolition of 

a school building; (d) the plaintiffs’ claims are moot; (e) the plaintiffs’

claims are time barred as the Board has approved the FMP; and (f) it is the 

role of the Board, and not the plaintiffs, to make decisions regarding 

demolition of a school building.

After a hearing, the district court entered an order on the motions 

for summary judgment on April 26, 2018. At the outset, the district court 

found that the plaintiffs were entitled to the remedy already provided 

under Iowa election law directing the Board to place the matter on the next 

general election ballot but denied any relief beyond that already ordered. 

As part of its order, the district court repeated its earlier conclusion that 

the term “disposition” within the scope of Iowa Code section 278.1(1)(b)

encompasses demolition. Further, the district court extended its previous 

injunction to prohibit the Board from taking any steps to demolish or 

otherwise dispose of Hoover Elementary School prior to the vote. 

The district court denied the plaintiffs summary judgment on their 

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims. The district court held that there was 

no evidence in the record to support the plaintiffs’ claims of violation of 

their right to vote or First Amendment rights. On their due process claims, 

the district court found that procedural due process was satisfied through 

the court hearing and action, as the plaintiffs have obtained the requested 

relief of having the proposition placed on the ballot. With respect to 

substantive due process, the district court concluded that nothing in the 
9

record shocks the conscience of the court or interferes with rights implicit 

in ordered liberty. The district court further found no conspiracy to violate 

constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, noting that all the actions of the 

defendants were taken in connection with regularly held Board meetings 

and discussions were part of the Board’s responsibilities.

The district court also considered the question of whether the 

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court 

concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as a 

matter of law because they were not acting outside the clearly established 

scope of their discretionary authority. 

The district court considered whether the vote on the ballot 

proposition submitted to the voters would be binding on the Board. In its 

narrative, the district court stated that a “yes” vote on the proposition 

would require the school district to proceed with demolition. Meanwhile, 

the district court indicated that if “no” prevailed, nothing in the language 

of the proposition would require preservation of the Hoover building. Yet, 

the district court ended its discussion by concluding that the binding 

nature and effect of an eventual vote was not ripe for adjudication.

4. Additional ruling of the district court. In its ruling on the motions 

for summary judgment, the district court asked the parties to make written 

submissions to the court regarding whether any issues remain open for 

resolution now and identifying what specific issues remain going forward

for trial. The plaintiffs responded that the district court should make the 

injunction permanent and exonerate the cash bond posted by the 

plaintiffs, clarify its ruling regarding the impact of a no vote on the Board, 

and award the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and the costs of the action. The 

defendants responded that no further issues remained for trial and the 
10

case could be closed. In response, the district court released the bond but 

denied further relief.

5. Appeals. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal of all 

adverse rulings. The defendants cross-appealed. 

II. Standard of Review.

We review rulings on motions for summary judgment for correction 

of errors at law. Winger Contracting Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 926 N.W.2d 526, 

535 (Iowa 2019); Morris v. Steffes Grp., Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 

2019). Where constitutional issues are involved, however, review is de 

novo. Weizberg v. City of Des Moines, 923 N.W.2d 200, 211 (Iowa 2018); 

Rolfe State Bank v. Gunderson, 794 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 2011).

III. Discussion.

A. Meaning of “Disposition” Under Iowa Code Section 278.1.

1. Introduction. A threshold issue in this litigation is whether the 

district court was required to instruct the county auditor to place the 

plaintiffs’ question raised in its petition on the November 2017 general 

election ballot. Two key provisions in the Iowa Code are controlling. 

Iowa Code section 278.1 empowers voters of a school district to 

decide certain issues. Iowa Code section 278.1(1)(b) provides,

The voters at the regular election shall have the power to [] 

. . . .

. . . direct the sale, lease, or other disposition of any 

schoolhouse or school site . . . and the application to be made 

of the proceeds thereof. 

Iowa Code section 278.2 provides the manner in which citizens may 

place questions within the scope of Iowa Code section 278.1 on the ballot. 

In order for citizens to require the school board to place a question on the 

ballot under Iowa Code section 278.1, a petition conforming to the 
11

standards outlined in Iowa Code section 278.2 must be presented to the 

school board with the signatures of the requisite number of voters. If such 

a provision is presented to the board, Iowa Code section 278.2 states that 

“[t]he board . . . shall[] direct the county commissioner of elections to 

provide in the notice of the regular election for the submission of any 

proposition authorized by law to the voters.”

There is no dispute that the petition presented by the plaintiffs in 

this case has the requisite number of signatures. The fighting issue, 

however, is whether the plaintiffs’ proposed ballot question concerns a 

disposition of property entitling them to present the issue to the voters.

2. Preservation of statutory interpretation question in the district 

court. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants failed to preserve in the 

district court the question of whether a demolition is a disposition under 

Iowa Code section 278.1(1)(b). The defendants raised the issue in their

brief resisting the motion for injunction and again in their brief in support 

of summary judgment. The district court also explicitly ruled upon the 

issue in its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and ruling on application 

for temporary injunction and incorporated the ruling in its ruling on 

motions for summary judgment. We find the issue has been adequately 

preserved. Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012) (“Where 

the trial court’s ruling, as here, expressly acknowledges that an issue is 

before the court and then the ruling necessarily decides that issue, that is 

sufficient to preserve error.”); see also Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 

540 (Iowa 2002) (“The claim or issue raised does not actually need to be 

used as the basis for the decision to be preserved, but the record must at 

least reveal the court was aware of the claim or issue and litigated it.”);

Metz v. Amoco Oil Co., 581 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1998) (“Our preservation 
12

rule requires that issues must be presented to and passed upon by the 

district court before they can be raised and decided on appeal.”).

The plaintiffs also assert that the defendants are not entitled to relief 

because they failed to file objections to the petition with the objections

committee or failed to bring a declaratory action in district court after the 

plaintiffs presented their petition. See Berent v. City of Iowa City, 738 

N.W.2d 193, 197–201 (Iowa 2007). This procedural question—akin to an 

exhaustion requirement—is separately considered in division III.B below.

3. Positions of the parties. The plaintiffs maintain that the term 

“other disposition” includes demolition of an existing school building. The 

plaintiffs point to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, which 

states that “disposition” includes “the act or the power of disposing” and 

“dispose of” means “to get rid of, throw away, discard.” According to the 

plaintiffs, disposition in Iowa Code section 278.1(1)(b) includes action “to 

get rid of” of a building and “to get rid of” a building includes demolition.

The plaintiffs assert they are using an ordinary rather technical approach 

to interpretation of the statute and cite State v. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d 850, 

853–54 (Iowa 2007) for that proposition. 

The plaintiffs further note that under Iowa Code section 278.1(1)(b), 

the voters may direct the disposition of a “schoolhouse or school site.” By 

including separate terms for schoolhouse and school site in the statute, 

the plaintiffs maintain that the legislature must have intended that the 

term “disposition” applies to disposition of a schoolhouse that does not 

involve disposition of the site; in other words, demolition of a schoolhouse 

absent sale of the underlying site. 

The plaintiffs additionally assert that the school district is 

inconsistent in its treatment of the term “other disposition” (and “dispose 

of”) in related statutes. The plaintiffs claim that the school district 
13

interprets the term “dispose of” in Iowa Code section 297.22 (describing 

the power of the school board to “dispose of, in whole or in part, a 

schoolhouse, school site, or other property belonging to the district”) to 

include demolition, but then interprets the term “other disposition” in Iowa 

Code section 278.1(1)(b) (describing the power of voters to “direct the sale, 

lease, or other disposition of any schoolhouse or school site or other 

property belonging to the corporation”) to not include demolition. 

Finally, the plaintiffs assert that to the extent the statute is 

ambiguous, it should be liberally interpreted to promote citizen access to 

the ballot. In support of their argument, the plaintiffs cite Devine v. 

Wonderlich, 268 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa 1978) (en banc). In Devine, this court 

emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to vote in elections for 

officeholders such as county supervisor. Id. at 623.

In contrast, the defendants claim that the demolition of a building 

is not an “other disposition” of property under Iowa Code section 

278.1(1)(b). In support of their argument, the defendants argue that “other 

disposition” does not include demolition because the statute gives voters 

the power not simply to direct disposition of the property but also to direct 

“the application to be made of the proceeds thereof.” Iowa 

Code § 278.1(1)(b). Demolition, the defendants note, is not a process that 

leads to proceeds.

The defendants do not shy away from a battle of dictionaries. The 

defendants point out that the Merriam Webster Law Dictionary defines 

“disposition” as “transfer to the care or possession of another” and “dispose 

of” as “to transfer to the control or ownership of another.” Further, the 

defendants note that Black’s Law Dictionary defines “disposition” as “[the]

act of disposing; transferring to the care or possession of another” and 

“dispose of” as “to alienate or direct the ownership of property, as 
14

disposition by will . . . to exercise finally, in any manner, one’s power of 

control over; to pass into control of someone else; to alienate, relinquish, 

part with, or get rid of; to put out of the way; to finish with; to bargain 

away.” 

The defendants further note that the Iowa legislature in 2008 

enacted legislation providing a definition of “other disposition” and 

“dispose of” for purposes of Iowa Code sections 278.1 and 297.22 that 

included “demolition.” See 2008 Iowa Acts ch. 1148, §§ 1–2 (codififed at 

Iowa Code § 278.1(1)(b) and § 297.22 (2009)). This legislation, however, 

was repealed the following session. See 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 10, §§ 1–2, 4

(codified at Iowa Code § 278.1(1)(b) and § 297.22 (Supp. 2009)). According 

to the defendants, the history of the adoption and then rejection of a 

legislative definition of the term “disposition” that included demolition 

demonstrates a legislative intent not to include demolition within the scope 

of the statutes. See Summerhays v. Clark, 509 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Iowa 

1993) (en banc) (finding that removal of a word from a statute indicates 

desire to narrow its scope). 

The defendants note that the Board has broad and exclusive power 

to determine the location of a schoolhouse under Iowa Code sections 297.1 

and 279.11. See Kinney v. Howard, 133 Iowa 94, 96, 110 N.W. 282, 283

(1907) (holding the relocation of the schoolhouse site “was a matter for the 

school board of the township” pursuant to Iowa Code sections 2773 (now 

section 297.1) and 2801 (1897) and could not be questioned by 

injunction). According to the defendants, the ability to determine that 

Hoover Elementary should be located at another location implies the 

ability to use its current location for other purposes, including demolition 

and use of the site for other school purposes. 
15

Finally, the defendants assert that Iowa Code section 278.1(1)(b)

should not be interpreted to vest the voters with the power of referendum 

for every demolition of school property. According to the defendants, 

under the plaintiffs’ theory, any demolition of, say, a wall or a part of a 

building (as happens with renovations and routine maintenance) could 

trigger a voting process.

4. Discussion. If a statute is unambiguous, we look no further than 

the express language of the statute. See State v. Howse, 875 N.W.2d 684, 

691 (Iowa 2016); State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2005). If the 

statute is ambiguous, however, we use a variety of methods, including 

traditional tools of statutory construction, to determine the meaning of the 

statute. State v. Doe, 903 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Iowa 2017); State v. Nall, 894 

N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2017). 

A statute is ambiguous if “reasonable minds could differ or be 

uncertain as to the meaning of a statute.” Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. 

Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995); see also State v. McIver, 858 

N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa 2015). Further, we have stated that “[w]ords are 

often chameleons, drawing their color from the context in which they are 

found.” Rolfe State Bank, 794 N.W.2d at 564. Ambiguity may arise not 

only from words themselves but “from the general scope and meaning of a 

statute when all its provisions are examined.” Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 

882, 887 (Iowa 1996).

Upon our review of Iowa Code section 278.1(1)(b), we conclude the 

term “other disposition” is ambiguous. It certainly could reasonably be 

interpreted to include demolition of buildings. On the other hand, in 

context, it could also reasonably be interpreted to include transactions 

involving only the transfer or exchange of ownership of schoolhouses, 

school sites, and other school district property, but not mere demolition. 
16

We do not find a number of the arguments advanced by the parties

regarding this question to be very persuasive. For example, we do not find 

that the amendments to Iowa Code sections 278.1 and 297.22 definitions

that occurred in 2008 and 2009 are dispositive regarding legislative intent. 

In 2008, the legislature amended language in the Iowa Code to authorize 

the board of directors of a school district to dispose of school property and 

prohibited voters from taking action contrary to the board for a one year 

period. See 2008 Iowa Acts ch. 1148, §§ 1–3 (codified at Iowa Code 

§ 278.1, § 297.22, and § 297.25 (2009)). Among other things, the 

legislation specifically defined “dispose” and “disposition” to include “the 

exchange, transfer, demolition, or destruction of any real or other property 

of the corporation.” Id. § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 278.1(1)(b) (2009))

(emphasis added).

If this definition remained in the Code today, this litigation would 

not have arisen. But in 2009, the legislature repealed the changes made 

in 2008, including the definition of dispose and disposition that specifically 

included demolition. 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 10, §§ 1–4 (codified at Iowa Code 

§ 278.1(1)(b), § 297.22, and § 297.25). The repeal did not simply remove 

a term from a legislative definition, but repealed the entire legislative 

definition along with other provisions of the statute. Id. The end result 

was that the law was returned to its pre-2008 position, not only on 

definitional issues, but on issues related to the power of voters and school 

boards that were also addressed in the 2008 legislation. 

While the school district argues that the repeal demonstrates that 

the legislature intended to exclude demolition, we think this conclusion 

does not necessarily follow. The legislature certainly decided that it was 

unsatisfied with the changes enacted in 2008, but the changes in 2008, 

however, included an expansion of the power of school boards and a 
17

limitation on the power of voters in connection with disposition of all 

manner of school property. The legislature apparently decided to return 

the law to its prior state which, as we have observed, is ambiguous. It is 

not clear whether the 2008 legislative definition of dispose and disposition

was designed to clarify or modify preexisting law. 

We also do not believe the scope of the statute authorizing voter 

referenda should be broadly construed in favor of voters is a helpful or 

persuasive concept. The plaintiffs rely upon Devine, 268 N.W.2d 620. 

Devine involved the elections of representatives in our government, a 

process that the Supreme Court has identified as essential to our 

democracy. Id. at 623; see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 

S. Ct. 526, 535 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free country than 

that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under 

which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, 

are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”). The Devine case dealt 

with regulation of the election process itself, namely, how challenged 

ballots should be treated in an election contest. 268 N.W.2d at 624. In 

that context, we emphasized that statutes regulating the process of 

election of representatives of government should be “construed liberally in 

favor of giving effect to the voter’s choice.” Id. at 623.

We do not in any way retreat from Devine. But the context of this 

case before us is different. Here, we are not dealing with regulation of the

voting process in an election of our governmental representatives. Instead, 

we are trying to divine the boundary between the power our legislature has 

allocated to the voters on the one hand and school boards on the other. 

While democratic values may be promoted in referenda, the school 

board is comprised of democratically elected officials empowered to 

conduct the school district’s business through the deliberative process.
18

Both the actions of the voters through the referendum process and 

decisions of elected officials in a deliberative setting have been established 

by the legislature and are entitled to respect. We are not inclined to 

expansively read the power of the voters at the expense of the deliberative 

processes of the elected school board through a rule of construction. We 

think a straight up interpretation of the applicable statutes is a better

approach than one that puts a thumb on the scale in favor of the voters 

acting through referenda. After all, the voters have elected the school 

board members too. 

Upon our review of the applicable statutes and briefings of the 

parties, we conclude that the defendants have the better argument. The 

precise unit of language to be examined is not “disposition” or even “other 

disposition,” but rather “sale, lease, or other disposition.” Iowa Code 

§ 278.1(1)(b) (2017). A sale or lease involves the transfer of an interest in 

property to a third party. Applying the rule of ejusdem generis, any other 

disposition must also involve a transfer of an interest to a third party, as 

in a gift. See generally In re Estate of Sampson, 838 N.W.2d 663, 670 (Iowa 

2013) (finding that statutory interpretation required analysis of a term 

“with reference to the other items in the list”); Sallee v. Stewart, 827 

N.W.2d 128, 153 (Iowa 2013) (“[W]hen a phrase . . . is added to a laundry 

list of terms all of which relate to [a larger theme], we interpret [the phrase 

in question] to be similar in character to the other [listed terms], all of 

which relate to [the larger theme]. The fancy term for this is ejusdem 

generis.” (Citation omitted.)); Iowa Comprehensive Petrol. Underground 

Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Iowa 2000)

(“Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, general words which follow 

specific words are tied to the meaning and purpose of the specific words.”). 
19

A trial court in Florida recently struggled with the question of 

whether the demolition of a pier building provided the basis for a 

referendum under a city charter provision that required voter approval 

when waterfront property owned by the city was “sold, donated, or leased.” 

See Ford v. City of St. Petersburg, No. 522012CA010312, 2013 

WL 9668711, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 2013). The charter provision 

defined “sale” to include “any ‘permanent disposition of an interest in real 

property other than a utility easement.’ ” Id. The district court held that 

the purpose of the provision was to protect waterfront property from being 

alienated to third parties without the consent of the electorate and did not 

include demolition and repurposing of property. Id. The trial court holding 

was affirmed on appeal in an unpublished opinion. See Ford v. City of 

St. Petersburg, No. 2D13–2118, 2013 WL 6283709, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 

App. 2013).

Further, as argued by the defendants, the provision of the statute 

also authorizes the voters to direct “the application to be made of the 

proceeds thereof.” Iowa Code § 278.1(1)(b). Directing application of 

proceeds would fit awkwardly if the statute was interpreted to include 

demolition of property where no sale or transfer is involved and no 

proceeds are generated. Although perhaps it could be argued that the 

voters would have an interest directing the disposition of the salvage or 

rubble, “[w]e look for a reasonable interpretation that best achieves the 

statute’s purpose and avoids absurd results.” State v. Gonzalez, 718 

N.W.2d 304, 308 (Iowa 2006). 

Another factor that tips us toward the position of the defendants is 

the definitions found in the Meriam Webster Law Dictionary and Black’s 

Law Dictionary. These sources, of course, are designed to be used in a 

legal context, but that is hardly a disqualifying notion when the key issue 
20

is whether the power to direct disposition of certain property rests with the 

school district or the voters. 

These legal definitions are consistent, for example, with the Uniform 

Probate Code, which generally provides personal representatives and 

conservators with the authority “acquire or dispose of an asset” but under

a separate section authorizes trustees and personal representatives to 

“raze . . . buildings.” See Unif. Probate Code § 3–715(6)–(7) (amended 

2010), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 208–09 (2013); id. § 5–425(7)–(8), 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. 116–

17. Apparently, the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code believe the 

authority to “dispose of an asset” is distinct as a concept, and is not 

inclusive of the authority to “raze . . . buildings.” 

We recognize that Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, cited 

by the plaintiffs, is a widely used dictionary. But it often contains multiple 

definitions. This case is no exception. One of the definitions for 

disposition in this dictionary is “the transfer of property from one to 

another (as by gift, barter, or sale, or by will).” Disposition, Webster’s Third 

New International Dictionary (unabr. ed. 2002). 

We also note that the Board is vested with nondelegable authority 

under the Iowa Code to determine the site of schools. See Kinney, 133 

Iowa at 96, 104, 110 N.W. at 283, 286; James v. Gettinger, 123 Iowa 199, 

203, 98 N.W. 723, 724 (Iowa 1904). Here, the Board has determined that 

the site of an elementary school, Hoover Elementary, should be changed, 

that the current Hoover facility be demolished at its current site, and that 

the Hoover site should be repurposed and used in connection with the 

development of Iowa City High. In our view, while the voters under Iowa 

Code section 278.1(1)(b) could direct that the property be sold, leased, or 

even given away, they cannot use the referendum mechanism as a vehicle 
21

to control the use of property within the district by the Board for various 

school purposes. 

We are also influenced by the apparent purpose of the statute. The 

parties have not provided, nor have we found, pertinent legislative history

for the original statutory language. Yet, from the language and structure 

of Iowa Code section 278.1(1)(b) and 278.2, we think it clear that the 

purpose of the statute is to give voters an avenue to regulate the 

relationship between school districts and third parties. By giving voters 

the potential to direct the disposition of school property, the legislature 

has provided a check on potential abuse by elected school officials in their 

real estate relationships with third parties. When no third party is 

involved, however, the risk of abuse related to the management of the 

district’s real property is not present. 

Finally, we address arguments to the contrary raised by the 

plaintiffs. We do not think the use of the terms “schoolhouse” and “school 

site” in Iowa Code section 278.1(1)(b) cuts in favor of the plaintiffs’ 

approach. The use of two terms make it clear, for instance, that a lease of 

a schoolhouse and a sale of unimproved property both fall within the scope 

of the statute. 

We also do not see our approach as inconsistent with Iowa Code 

section 297.22. Under our approach, the term “disposition” in both Iowa 

Code section 278.1(1)(b) and Iowa Code section 297.22 do not include 

demolition. Authority for the school boards to demolish buildings may be 

found in other statutory provisions. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 274.1

(empowering school districts to “hold property”); id. § 279.8 (requiring 

rules “for the care of schoolhouse, grounds, and property”); id. § 279.39

(empowering school boards to provide suitable buildings for each school). 
22

For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the defendants were 

entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether a “disposition” 

included demolition of a building without the transfer of property to a third 

party. 

B. Procedural Mechanisms Related to Challenges to the 

Referendum Process. 

1. Introduction. Even assuming that the term “other disposition” 

does not include demolition, the question arises as to whether the school 

district is nonetheless prohibited from refusing to direct the county auditor 

to place the matter on the ballot. The petition in this case had the requisite 

number of signatures, addresses, and dates under Iowa Code sections

277.4, 277.7, and 278.2, and no objections were filed challenging the 

petition under Iowa Code sections 277.5 and 277.7. See id. §§ 277.4, .5, 

.7; id. § 278.2. The question arises regarding whether a governmental

entity may launch a substantive challenge to the lawfulness of a petition 

that contains the requisite number of signatures. Specifically, may a 

governmental entity refuse to place a referendum measure on the ballot 

based on substantive illegality, or must the government entity file a 

preelection declaratory action challenging the validity of the referendum? 

In considering these issues, the parties dispute the meaning and 

applicability of this court’s ruling in Berent, 738 N.W.2d 193. Berent 

involved the intersection of three statutes: Iowa Code section 362.4, 

section 364.2, and section 372.11. Id. at 199–201. The gist of the 

plaintiff’s claim was that the city council unlawfully refused to place on 

the ballot certain amendments to the city charter on the grounds that the 

proposed charter provisions were illegal. Id. at 196.

In Berent, three petitions were submitted to the city clerk pursuant 

to Iowa Code section 362.4 asking that three amendments to the city 
23

charter be placed on the ballot. Id. at 197–98. The city clerk determined 

that the requisite number of electors had signed the petition and accepted 

them for filing. Id. at 198. Seven individuals and the League of Women 

Voters filed timely objections to the petitions. Id. As a result, an objections 

committee was formed to consider the three petitions. Id.

The objections committee in Berent sustained at least one objection 

to each proposed charter amendment. Id. One was found to be 

misleading, and two others were found to be “legally insufficient” because 

the substance of the proposals did not deal with general structure of 

governance and thus were not the proper subject for a city charter. Id. at 

198–99. The district court found that the objections committee had 

exceeded its authority. Id. at 199. The city appealed. Id.

We affirmed. We noted that under Iowa Code section 362.4, a 

petition to amend a city charter is “valid” if it has the requisite number of 

signatures of eligible electors including their place of residence and the 

date upon which the petition was signed. Id. at 200. Further, under Iowa 

Code section 372.11, the legislature directed that the city council “must” 

submit “valid” proposed charter amendments to the voters. Id. We 

concluded that the objections committee thus exceeded its statutory 

authority when it sustained objections to the charter proposals based on 

grounds other than “validity” under Iowa Code section 362.4. Id. at 200–

01.

We then considered whether the city could launch a preelection 

challenge to the substantive legality of the proposed charter amendments. 

Id. at 201. In concluding that it could launch such an action, we noted 

that the city had a pecuniary interest in avoiding the cost of a special 

election. Id. at 202–03. We also determined that the question of the 

validity of the proposed charter amendments was ripe for judicial 
24

resolution. Id. at 203–06. On the merits, we concluded that two of the 

proposed charter amendments were inconsistent with Iowa law, and as a 

result, the city was under no obligation to place the questions on the ballot. 

Id. at 206–13. One of the proposals, however, was not substantively 

invalid and the voters were entitled to be heard on the question. Id. at 

210–13.

2. Positions of the parties. Relying upon Berent, the plaintiffs 

contend that once a referendum petition is timely filed with the requisite 

number of signatures, addresses and dates under Iowa Code sections

277.4 and 278.2, the defendants had no choice but to direct the county 

auditor to place the matter on the general election ballot. 

The defendants find Berent inapposite. They focus our attention on 

the language of Iowa Code section 278.2 which directs the school board to 

place on the ballot petitions “authorized by law.” Unlike the restrictive 

language in the statutes in Berent, the defendants assert that the 

legislative directive (that the board shall place measures arising from 

citizen petitions on the ballot) is thus qualified by the requirement that the 

proposed ballot measure first be authorized by law. According to the 

defendants, the school district, consistent with the statute, declined to 

direct the county commissioner to place the matter on the ballot because 

the question posed did not involve a disposition of school property as 

required by the statute.

3. Discussion. In deciding whether the defendants have failed to 

preserve their claim under Berent, the starting point is examination of the 

statutes involved. In Berent, the statutory language was quite limited and 

did not give the city the authority to engage in substantive review of a 

proposed charter revision. Id. at 200–01, 205–06.
25

The language in Iowa Code section 278.2, however, is markedly 

different. The school district is directed to forward to the county auditor 

only those petitions that are “authorized by law.” Iowa Code § 278.2. No 

such limitation appeared in the language of the statutes involved in Berent, 

which mandated that the city council place “valid” petitions, i.e., petitions 

with sufficient valid signatures, on the ballot. 738 N.W.2d at 201. 

As a result, we conclude that Berent does not control in the very 

different statutory environment presented by Iowa Code section 

278.1(1)(b). We conclude that the school district properly determined that 

the proposed ballot measure was not authorized by law because it did not 

direct the sale, lease, or other disposition of school property. 

IV. Conclusion.

We conclude that the demolition of a school building is not a 

disposition under Iowa Code section 278.1(1)(b) and that the school 

district properly determined that because the ballot measure was not 

“authorized by law,” it was under no legal obligation to require the county 

auditor to place the matter on the ballot. In light of our holding, all other 

issues raised in the plaintiffs’ petition are either moot or resolved against 

the plaintiffs on the merits. As a result, the district court judgment in this 

case is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter remanded to the 

district court for dismissal of the action.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED 

WITH DIRECTIONS.