J-S53008-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARCUS JONES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3020 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 21, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001100-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2019

Appellant, Marcus Jones, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on August 21, 2017, following his bench trial convictions for 

attempted murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and theft by unlawful 

taking.1 Upon review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

On August 18, 2015, around 1[:00] p.m., Appellant brutally 

assaulted [a transgender person (a biological male who identified 

as a female)] on the 900 block of North Watts Street in the city 

and county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The assault was 

recorded by a video camera mounted to a nearby wall. The video 

shows that Appellant punched the victim until she was 

unconscious and then repeatedly stomped on her head. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/2018, at 2 (footnotes and record citations omitted). 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502/901, 2702(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 3921(a), 

respectively.
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Thereafter,

Officer [Patrick] Saba [of the Philadelphia Police Department] was 

on patrol and received a radio call regarding an assault at 900 

North Watts Street. Officer Saba responded to the location within 

three (3) to four (4) minutes and discovered the victim laying on 

the ground between two sets of exterior steps. Officer Saba 

initially thought the victim was a woman because “there was a wig 

... by the top of the head,” but upon approaching he observed male 

genitalia “sticking out of” the victim’s jeans. The victim was 

unconscious and had “extremely swollen” eyes. Her “left eyelid 

was slightly hanging off” and she bled profusely from her face. 

Emergency responders arrived shortly after Officer Saba and 

transported the victim to Hahnemann Hospital. 

[... T]he victim was unconscious for about two and one-half (2 1⁄2) 

weeks following the assault and remained hospitalized for about 

one (1) month. After her hospitalization, the victim was taken to 

Moss Rehabilitation and then to Hopkins Nursing Home, where she 

resided at the time of trial. [... T]he victim is “wheelchair bound,” 

has not “been able to walk since the day of the accident,” now 

functions as a 16[-] or 17[-]year[-]old, and can no longer care for 

herself.

[...] Benjamin Levin (Mr. Levin), [] “a forensic scientist and [] 

expert [] in the field of DNA processing and analysis[,]” [] 

analyzed DNA taken from the inside of the victim’s wig and 

dentures, as well as DNA taken from Appellant’s bloody shoe. The 

DNA recovered from Appellant’s bloody shoe was consistent with 

the DNA recovered from the victim’s wig and dentures, and the 

DNA recovered from the victim’s dentures was consistent with 

Appellant’s DNA profile. 

Id. at 6-7 (record citations omitted). 

The trial court also recounted:

[On] August 19, 2015, Detective Ralph Domenic (“Detective 

Domenic”) and his partner, Detective Waring, searched the crime 

scene for evidence and visited a homeless shelter about one block 

from where the assault occurred. There, a civilian, James 

Holloman (“Mr. Holloman”) told them Appellant was “around the 

corner.” Based on information received from Mr. Holloman, the 
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detectives arrested Appellant about one block from the homeless 

shelter. 

The detectives transported Appellant to [the police station] and 

read him his Miranda[2] rights. Appellant thereafter waived his 

Miranda rights and consented to an interview, during which he 

confessed to assaulting and robbing the victim during a sexual 

encounter [after Appellant realized the victim had male genitalia]. 

Id. at 2.

Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress his statements to 

police, arguing that he did not make them voluntarily or intelligently. More 

specifically, Appellant argued that he suffered from mental illness and lacked 

the intellectual capacity to understand the rights he was waiving. On May 8, 

2017, the trial court held a suppression hearing immediately prior to holding 

a bench trial. Therein, the Commonwealth presented the report of Dr. Jillian 

Blair, who conducted a mental health evaluation of Appellant on February 17, 

2017. N.T., 5/8/2017, at 48. Dr. Blair opined that although Appellant had an 

intelligence quotient (IQ) of 69, he presented as having “borderline intellect” 

rather than “moderate mental retardation.” Id. at 76. Dr. Blair opined that 

Appellant was lucid, did not display psychotic symptoms, communicated

adequately, answered questions directly and with detail, was able to 

appreciate his legal rights, and had the cognitive ability to work with his 

attorney to prepare his defense. Id. at 57. 

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
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Moreover, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective 

Ralph Domenic, who interviewed Appellant at the police station. The trial 

court summarized Detective Domenic’s testimony as follows:

At the suppression hearing, Detective Domenic testified that 

Appellant signed [an acknowledgment that he received] Miranda

warnings after having twice reviewed them; that Appellant had no 

questions regarding the warnings; that Appellant never requested 

to speak to a lawyer; that Detective Domenic applied no physical 

or psychological pressure on Appellant; that Appellant did not 

appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol; that 

Appellant was attentive and “looking at” Detective Domenic while 

being advised of his Miranda rights; and that Appellant was 

cooperative, responsive, and “very willing” to answer questions. 

Although Appellant advised the detectives that he was bipolar and 

received therapy and medications (including Klonopin) for his 

disorder, he assured [the detective] that neither his bipolar 

disorder nor his medications affected his ability to understand his 

situation or make decisions on his own behalf. According to 

Detective Domenic, Appellant exhibited no behavior indicating 

that he lacked the capacity to knowingly and voluntarily waive his 

Miranda rights. At the conclusion of the interview, moreover, 

Appellant read his entire statement and again reviewed the 

Miranda warnings. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/2018, at 4-5, citing N.T., 5/8/2017, at 9-26 and 41.

Following the presentation of evidence regarding suppression, the trial 

court ultimately concluded:

Based on [Appellant’s] verbal responses [to the police], 

[Appellant’s] demeanor, [Appellant’s] ability to answer directly 

and in detail, there was no testimony about [Appellant] acting in 

any [] way that would [constitute] bizarre [] or unusual behavior. 

[Appellant] seemed cooperative, and there’s just no testimony or 

evidence that was elicited that would contradict that.

So under the totality of the circumstances, and for all of the factors 

[] outlined, [the trial court found] that [Appellant] gave a 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to remain 
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silent [and] that the statement [to police] was voluntarily and 

knowingly given.

So [Appellant’s suppression] motion [was] denied.

N.T., 5/8/2017, at 80-81.

Following the suppression ruling, the parties agreed to proceed 

immediately to a bench trial. The trial court colloquied Appellant regarding 

his right to a jury trial, the charges he was facing, and the maximum penalties 

involved. Id. at 88-94. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial. Id. at 94. 

The Commonwealth called Officer Saba, the investigating Philadelphia police 

officer, to testify. Id. at 97-111. The trial court held a second day of trial on 

May 19, 2017, wherein the victim’s sister, two detectives, and a DNA expert 

testified. N.T., 5/19/2017, at 1-111. The Commonwealth also presented the 

trial court with a video surveillance recording of the incident. Id. at 103-110. 

The trial court rendered a verdict on May 22, 2017, finding Appellant guilty of 

the aforementioned charges.

On August 21, 2017, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial 

court sentenced Appellant to 13 to 26 years of imprisonment for attempted 

murder. The trial court further sentenced Appellant to a 10-year consecutive 

term of probation for robbery. The convictions for aggravated assault and 

theft by unlawful taking merged for sentencing purposes. Defense counsel 

advised Appellant of his appellate rights. Thereafter, upon Appellant’s 
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request, the trial court allowed counsel to withdraw.3 This timely appeal 

resulted.4

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3

 Before allowing Appellant to proceed pro se, the trial court colloquied

Appellant, with applicable questions pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, to ensure 

that his waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 

N.T., 8/21/2017, at 30-33. Appellant was told that he had the right to counsel, 

that he would be bound by rules of court, including the specifically delineated 

timing deadlines for filing post-sentence motions and a notice of appeal, that 

he could permanently lose his rights if he failed to assert them in a timely 

fashion, and that counsel would be familiar with the rules. Id.

4

 Appellant did not file pro se post-sentence motions, but filed a pro se notice 

of appeal on August 31, 2017. Although the filing date of Appellant’s

subsequent pro se request for counsel is not entirely clear from the record, 

the trial court entered an order on September 27, 2017 appointing Lee 

Mandel, Esquire as counsel to represent Appellant on appeal. On January 18, 

2018, the trial court directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Attorney Mandel 

complied on behalf of Appellant on February 2, 2018. The trial court issued an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on August 7, 2018. 

Additionally, we note that while represented by counsel, Appellant inundated 

the trial court and this Court with a multitude of pro se filings and 

correspondence. Most notably, on November 20, 2017, Appellant filed a 

“Motion of New Counsel” with this Court requesting, once again, to proceed 

pro se. On December 13, 2017, this Court entered an order directing the trial 

court to conduct an on-the-record waiver of counsel determination pursuant 

to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). Before the trial 

court could conduct a Grazier hearing, however, Appellant filed another pro 

se motion with this Court on February 8, 2019, seeking the appointment of 

counsel. The trial court held a Grazier hearing on March 12, 2018. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court permitted Appellant to proceed pro 

se and allowed Attorney Mandell to withdraw. See N.T., 3/12/2018, at 9-10. 

On the same day as the Grazier hearing, this Court entered an order granting 

Appellant’s February 8, 2019 request for the appointment of counsel. As such, 

on March 18, the trial court appointed John Belli, Esquire to represent 

Appellant on appeal. On May 7, 2019, Attorney Belli filed an appellate brief 

with this Court on behalf of Appellant. Appellant has not objected. Thus, we 

will no longer allow Appellant to proceed pro se on appeal. While it is true 
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On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [trial] court err by denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress his statement [to police]?

2. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain [Appellant’s] 

attempted murder conviction?

3. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain [Appellant’s] robbery 

conviction?

Appellant’s Brief at 35 (complete capitalization omitted; issue numbers 

supplied).

____________________________________________

that an “appellant has the right to proceed pro se at trial and through appellate 

proceedings[,]” our Supreme Court has determined “that when an appellant 

requests pro se status after his counsel has filed an appellate brief, the request 

is untimely.” Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998); see 

also Commonwealth v. Rogers, 645 A.2d 223, 224 (Pa. 1994) (“Allowing 

[an appellant] to terminate counsel and proceed pro se on amended and 

supplemented briefs would [] result in confusion and overburdening of the 

court[.] [Our Supreme Court,] therefore [found] that it [was] appropriate to 

prohibit such a tactic and to require an appellant to remain with counsel 

through the appeal, once counsel has filed briefs.”).

Finally, we note that during the pendency of this direct appeal, on April 10, 

2018, Appellant filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On July 17, 2018, the PCRA petition 

was denied. On August 10, 2018, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal 

that was docketed with this Court at 2512 EDA 2018. However, because 

Appellant filed his pro se PCRA petition during the pendency of his direct 

appeal, we are constrained to quash the appeal at 2512 EDA 2018. See 

Commonwealth v. Leslie, 757 A.2d 984, 985 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“A PCRA 

petition may only be filed after an appellant has waived or exhausted his direct 

appeal rights.”). 

5

 We have reordered Appellant’s issues for clarity and ease of discussion. 
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In the first issue we review, Appellant claims that the trial court erred 

by denying suppression because he “established that he suffered from mental 

illness and intellectual deficits that rendered him incapable of voluntarily and 

intelligently waiving his Miranda rights” before he made statements to the 

police. Appellant’s Brief at 17. More specifically, Appellant contends that the 

following factors, when considered together, rendered his waiver of Miranda

rights and his statements to the police involuntary:

 Appellant’s IQ of 69.

 Appellant suffered from depression, bi-polar disorder, schizoaffective 

disorder, schizophrenia, personality disorders, substance abuse, and 

mild mental retardation.

 [A]ppellant was not asked what he thought the right to remain silent or 

have counsel meant.

 Appellant was placed in an isolated room and handcuffed to a chair.[6]

 [A]lthough [A]ppellant said he had a mental illness during the interview, 

he was not asked when he last took his medication or underwent therapy 

or counseling for his various mental illnesses.

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6 While Appellant currently suggests that his waiver of Miranda rights was 

the product of police coercion or undue government pressure, he did not raise 

this contention in his Rule 1925(b) statement. In that statement, Appellant 

merely asserted that his mental illness, diagnosed as mild mental retardation, 

prevented him from understanding his Miranda rights. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b), 2/7/ 2018, at ¶ 1. Generally, issues not raised in a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal are waived for purposes of appellate review. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised 

in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 

appeal.”); see also Commonwealth v. Cline, 117 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa. Super. 

2017) (“A new and different theory of relief may not be successfully advanced 

for the first time on appeal.”). As such, we will not entertain Appellant’s 

suggestion that his waiver of Miranda rights was coerced or subject to police 

pressure.
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Id. at 23 (record citations omitted).

We adhere to the following standard:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's 

denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of a 

suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the 

prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record.... 

Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, 

we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. It is within the 

suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass on the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Cephus, 208 A.3d 1096, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(internal citations omitted).

This Court recently stated:

When determining the validity of a Miranda waiver, we employ a 

two-step inquiry. We first ask whether the waiver was voluntary 

in the sense of being the result of an intentional choice on the part 

of a defendant who was not subject to undue government 

pressure. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1268 (Pa. 

2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Logan, 549 A.2d 531, 537 (Pa. 

1988) (opinion announcing the judgment of the Court)). If we 

conclude the waiver was voluntary, we then ask if the defendant 

was aware of the nature of the choice that he made by giving up 

his Miranda rights, i.e., whether it was knowing and intelligent.[7]

Id.

* * *

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7

 Here, as mentioned previously, Appellant waived his challenge to the 

voluntariness of his statement to police. Thus, we need only consider whether 

his statement was knowing and intelligent.
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The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that a Miranda waiver was knowing and 

intelligent. See Commonwealth v. Lukach, 163 A.3d 1003, 

1011 (Pa. Super. 2017). There is no per se rule that a defendant 

is incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his rights 

whenever he asserts a mental disability. See Commonwealth v. 

Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1136 (Pa. 2012) (citing Logan, 549 

A.2d at 537).

Our Supreme Court's decision in Logan is instructive. In Logan, 

the Court concluded that regardless of the appellant's mental 

illness, the circumstances surrounding his confession showed that 

the waiver was “the product of a free, unconstrained, and rational 

choice of its maker.” Logan, 549 A.2d at 537. The circumstances 

in Logan included that Logan was advised of his Miranda rights 

twice, he gave a full statement, which he reviewed and signed, 

and there was no evidence of police coercion. Id. at 536-537. 

Logan was able to do all of this even though he had a mental 

illness.

Commonwealth v. Knox, 2019 WL 4316128, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed 

September 12, 2019).

In denying suppression in the case sub judice, the trial court concluded:

Here, the testimony of Detective Domenic, and the report of 

Appellant’s own medical expert, demonstrate that Appellant was 

sufficiently competent to waive his Miranda rights. Detective 

Domenic interviewed Appellant and testified that Appellant was 

cooperative and ‘very willing’ to give the interview. Appellant did 

not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and 

Detective Domenic applied no physical or psychological pressure 

to induce Appellant’s statement. Moreover, Appellant assured 

Detective Domenic that neither his bipolar disorder nor his 

medications affected his ability to understand his situation or 

make decisions on his own behalf. Appellant’s overall behavior 

gave no indication that he lacked the capacity to knowingly and 

voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.

Detective Domenic’s testimony is corroborated by Appellant’s 

statement itself, which Appellant read and signed. The verbatim 

statement confirms that Appellant voluntarily gave the interview, 

that he understood why he was in custody, that he was advised 

of his rights to counsel, that he was not under the influence of 
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drugs or alcohol, and that he was capable of making decisions for 

himself. 

Beyond that, Appellant’s expert, Dr. Blair, noted that Appellant 

demonstrated ample ability to comprehend his legal situation. Dr. 

Blair noted that during her evaluation, Appellant’s presentation 

did not suggest significant cognitive impairment. To the contrary, 

Appellant was able to articulate his thoughts clearly and process 

clearly and respond appropriately.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/2018, at 9-10 (record citations and quotations 

omitted).

Based upon our standard of review and the record before us, we discern 

no trial court error in denying Appellant’s motion for suppression. We reject 

Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling based solely on his I.Q. Our 

Supreme Court has held there is no per se rule that a defendant is incapable 

of knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights whenever he asserts 

a mental disability. See Sepulveda, 55 A.3d at 1136. Here, the 

circumstances surrounding Appellant’s confession show that his waiver was 

the product of a free, unconstrained, and rational choice. Similar to our 

Supreme Court’s decision in Logan, in this case, police advised Appellant 

twice of his Miranda rights, he gave a statement that he reviewed and signed, 

and there is no evidence that his mental illness prevented him from knowingly 

waiving his rights. As such, Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in 

denying suppression lacks merit.

In his next two issues, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth failed 

to produce sufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted murder 

and robbery, respectively. Whether evidence is sufficient to support a 
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conviction presents this Court with a question of law and, thus, our standard 

of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. 

Mikitiuk, 213 A.3d 290, 300 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). This Court 

examines:

whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences 

derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict-winner, is sufficient to establish all 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We may not 

weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the 

fact-finder. Additionally, the evidence at trial need not preclude 

every possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve 

any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of 

fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. When 

evaluating the credibility and weight of the evidence, the 

fact-finder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. For 

purposes of our review under these principles, we must review the 

entire record and consider all of the evidence introduced.

Id. at 300–301.

With regard to his attempted murder conviction, Appellant contends that 

he could not form the specific intent to kill because he has “an I.Q. of 69 and 

suffered from many mental illnesses.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. Moreover, 

Appellant argues that “his actions were not deliberate or well-reasoned and 

stemmed from rage and anger caused by the fact that the victim was not a 

woman[,] but a man.” Id. As such, Appellant contends that, “it is clear that 

he snapped and lost control of his faculties rather than coldly and calculatingly 

deciding to kill the victim.” Id. 

We have stated:
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Under the Crimes Code, “[a] person commits an attempt when 

with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which 

constitutes a substantial step towards the commission of the

crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). “A person may be convicted of 

attempted murder ‘if he takes a substantial step toward the 

commission of a killing, with the specific intent in mind to commit 

such an act.’” Commonwealth v. Dale, 836 A.2d 150, 152 (Pa.

Super. 2003) (citation omitted). See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2502. 

“The substantial step test broadens the scope of attempt liability 

by concentrating on the acts the defendant has done and does not 

any longer focus on the acts remaining to be done before the 

actual commission of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 

417 A.2d 1203, 1205 (Pa. Super. 1980). “The mens rea required 

for first-degree murder, specific intent to kill, may be established 

solely from circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Schoff, 

911 A.2d 147, 160 (Pa. Super. 2006). “[T]he law permits the fact 

finder to infer that one intends the natural and probable 

consequences of his acts[.]” Commonwealth v. Gease, 696 A.2d 

130, 133 (Pa. 1997).

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Moreover, we recognize that the “law does not require a lengthy period 

of premeditation; indeed, the design to kill can be formulated in a fraction of 

a second.” Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 463 (Pa. 2019)

(citation omitted).

In this case, the trial court determined:

Here, the Commonwealth’s video shows that Appellant repeatedly 

punched and kicked the victim in the head while she struggled to 

rise from the ground and escape. After enduring multiple strikes, 

the victim finally lost consciousness and laid motionless on the 

concrete. While [the victim] was unconscious, motionless, and 

defenseless, Appellant violently stomped on her head several 

times. Appellant was not acting in self-defense and had already 

beaten the victim into bloody unconsciousness by the time that he 

repeatedly bludgeoned her head with his foot. These acts 

themselves – i.e., Appellant’s vicious pounding on the head of the 

unconscious victim – establish a compelling inference that 
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Appellant intended to kill the victim and thus sustain Appellant’s 

conviction of attempted murder.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/2018, at 12 (emphasis in original).

Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that there was 

sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s conviction for attempted murder. 

Initially we reject Appellant’s argument there was no evidence of 

premeditation. Appellant concedes that “he snapped” when he recognized 

that the victim had male genitalia. It was in that fraction of a second that 

Appellant formulated an intent to kill the victim. Appellant’s subsequent 

actions of beating the victim unconscious with his fists and then continually 

stomping on her head while she was defenseless on the ground showed an 

intent to kill the victim. The trial court properly inferred that Appellant 

intended the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Accordingly, we 

conclude there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s attempted 

murder conviction.

Regarding his robbery conviction, Appellant contends that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove that Appellant intended to commit a theft while 

the assault was taking place and that the evidence established that the taking 

of the victim’s purse was “an afterthought.” Id. at 14. He further argues 

“when [A]ppellant took the purse, the victim was already unconscious and 

thus, the taking was not committed with force or the threat of violence.” Id.

at 16, citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 771 A.2d 796, 799 (Pa. Super. 2001). 
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Before examining the merits of this issue, we note that Appellant 

provided a different legal theory to the trial court in support of his contention 

that his robbery conviction lacked sufficient evidentiary support. In his Rule 

1925(b) statement, Appellant asserted:

The trial court erred in finding [] Appellant guilty of robbery in that 

the [Commonwealth] failed to establish the existence of a specific 

complainant (victim). Further, the [Commonwealth] failed to 

introduce any evidence as to the existence of the subject of the 

theft requisite to the proof required to establish that a robbery 

had occurred. 

Rule 1925(b) Statement, 2/7/2018, at ¶ 3. In response, the trial court 

recognized that although the victim did not testify because her head injuries 

prevented her from doing do, the video surveillance and testimony from 

Officer Saba and the victim’s sister established the victim’s identity and proved 

it “was the same person shown being mercilessly beaten in the video and 

referenced by Appellant in his confession.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/2018, at 

13. Moreover, the trial court noted that it saw, on the video surveillance, the 

victim carrying her purse prior to the attack and Appellant reaching down, 

taking a dark colored item from the vicinity and leaving after rendering the 

victim unconscious. Id. at 14. 

For the first time on appeal, Appellant asserts that because the victim 

was unconscious at the time her purse was taken, the taking was not 

committed with force or the threat of violence. Appellant has waived this 

aspect of his appellate claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

Cline, 117 A.3d at 927. 
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Regardless, we find Appellant’s sufficiency argument unavailing. Here, 

Appellant was charged and convicted of robbery while inflicting serious bodily 

injury upon the victim pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i). Appellant 

cites inapplicable case law dealing with a different subsection of the robbery 

statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(v), which pertains to “physically tak[ing] 

or remov[ing] property from the person of another by force however slight.” 

This subsection of the robbery statute, however, pertains to pickpockets and 

purse-snatchers and as we have explained:

a taking by stealth alone is not as likely to result in injury to the 

victim as a taking by ‘force’; for ‘however slight’ the force may be, 

the victim may be prompted by it to resist, and injury may ensue. 

In recognition of this possibility, § 3701(a)(1)(v) has as its special 

purpose that greater punishment should be inflicted on those who 

use ‘force however slight’ than on those who by resort to stealth 

void of the use of force.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 550 A.2d 579, 582 (Pa. Super. 1988). Here, 

Appellant completed the robbery after inflicting serious bodily injury upon the 

victim. This was simply not a case where a defendant preyed upon an already 

unconscious victim and surreptitiously took property. As such, Appellant was 

convicted properly under § 3701(a)(1)(i). Accordingly, his last issue, 

although waived, is otherwise without merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/2019