alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### MONSANTO COMPANY, Appellant, v. Tom FUQUA, Appellee.

No. R-470.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 10, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 8, 1973.

Robert P. Gaines, of Beggs, Lane, Daniel, Gaines & Davis, Pensacola, for appellant.

Jon D. White, of Fisher, Hertz & Bell, Pensacola, for appellee.

CARROLL, DONALD, K., Judge.

The defendant in an action for disability benefits under an employment contract, has appealed from a final judgment entered by the Circuit Court for Escambia County, awarding benefits and damages in the amount of $41,968 for benefits and future damages.

The dual question presented for our determination in this appeal is whether, in an action for periodic benefits based upon permanent and total disability, the court should award damages that might accrue subsequent to the filing of the complaint and subsequent to the rendition of the verdict.

In support of its contention that the court should not award such damages, the appellant cites and relies upon the following two Florida cases:

In Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Knight, 130 Fla. 733, 178 So. 898 (1938), *497an action was brought for monthly disability benefits under an insurance policy. The company had paid periodic benefits for several years and then discontinued them effective October 25, 1934. The insured filed his action in March of 1935 seeking benefits to the date of the judgment. A judgment was rendered for benefits up to the date of trial, but the Supreme Court of Florida held that a judgment could be rendered only for the benefits that had accrued at the time of the institution of the action.

In Levenson v. Motor Union (Aviation) Orion Ins. Co., 176 So.2d 125 (Fla.App.1965), a declaratory action was brought for monthly disability benefits under an insurance policy. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the judgment based thereon awarded benefits subsequent to the filing of the action. The Third District Court of Appeal modified the judgment, holding that the trial judge was in error in including benefits after the date of the filing of the action.

In the case at bar the court calculated the future retirement benefits and future insurance, and arrived at a total future loss of $99,749, then reduced that amount to its present value with a 5% discount factor, producing a figure for future losses of $29,533. The court then added to that amount the sums it calculated for past losses and entered the judgment for the total of $41,968.

Upon the authority of the above Knight and Levenson cases, we hold that in the case before us the court erred in including in the judgment appealed from herein amounts for benefits that had not accrued at the time this action was filed.

Therefore, that judgment must be, and it is, reversed and the cause remanded with directions for future proceedings not inconsistent with the views hereinabove set forth.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

RAWLS, C. J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                             509
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   40,016
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (900)
<INVENTORY>                                     39,193
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                81,431
<PP&E>                                          46,322
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (12,413)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 367,471
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           38,697
<BONDS>                                        223,225
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      81,523
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   367,471
<SALES>                                        192,216
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               192,226
<CGS>                                          105,999
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  172,867
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   121
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              17,350
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,009
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,717
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                292
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       292
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.92
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.92
        

</TABLE>
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 17 -1249V Filed: July 27, 2018

UNPUBLISHED

CORRENE JOHNSON

,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent. Special Processing Unit (SPU) ; Rul ing on Entitlement; Concession;

Causation

- In

- Fact; Influenza (Flu)
Vaccine; Sh oulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (SIRVA)

Ann Mayhew Golski, Maglio Christopher & Toale, PA, Washington, DC, for petitioner. Sherry Denise Soanes, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT 1

Dorsey

, Chief Special Master:

On September 13, 2017

, petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.

, 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration ( “ SIRVA ” ) causally related to the influenza vaccination she received on December 1, 2016. Petition at ¶¶ 1, 7. Petitioner further alleges that she received the vaccination in the United States, suffered the residual effects of her injury for more than six month, and that neither she nor any other party has filed a civil action or received an award for her injury, alleged as vaccine caused

. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 8, 11-12. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with

the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for

e ase of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subpara graph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012 ).On July 27, 2018

, respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes that

petitioner is entitled to compensa tion in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at 7

. Specifically, respondent “ has determined that Petitioner ’ s l eft shoulder injury is consistent with SIRVA, and that it was caused- in -fact by the flu vaccine she received on December 1, 2016. ” Id. Respondent further agrees that “ Petitioner has met the statutory requirements entitlement to compensation. ” Id.

In view of respondent’s position and the evidence of record, the undersigned finds that petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nora Beth Dorsey
Nora Beth Dorsey Chief Special Master
IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS

MAY 20, 2014

 WESTERN DISTRICT

THE FOLLOWING CASES WERE AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 84.16(b)

AND ISSUED PER CURIAM

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

WD75429 Roger P. Karl, et al vs. Sylvia Conner, et al

WD75430 Consolidated with WD75429

WD76172 Vincent L. Bell vs. State of Missouri

WD76184 In the Interest of: C.J.T. vs. Juvenile Officer

WD76260 Edward Q. Brown vs. State of Missouri

WD76266 Martha Delores Clark vs. Linda A. Hodges and Jimmie Hodges

WD76449 Arlin VanVoorst vs. Vicky VanVoorst (Modified Pursuant to Rule

84.14)

WD76618 Midwestern Health Management, Inc., D/B/A Northwest

Financial Services vs. Byron G. Gorman and Lelonia Gorman

WD76731 Anissea Beth Lajeunesse vs. Mark Lajenuesse

WD76899 Howard Saunders vs. Steve Bowen D/B/A Steve Custom Builders; 

Treasurer of the State of Missouri, Custodian of The Second Injury 

Fund

THE FOLLOWING CASES WERE AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 30.25(b)

AND ISSUED PER CURIAM

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

WD76333 State of Missouri vs. Eric D. Bratton
#### CARUSO *v.*WEBER.

1. Action — Burden on Plaintiff to Show Cause of Action.

Plaintiff always has burden of showing his cause of action.

2. Money Had and Received — Evidence Insufficient to Show Cause of Action — Receipts—Identification.

In action for money claimed to have been collected by defendant on rent belonging to plaintiff, introduction of receipts purporting to have been given by defendant for rent paid to him was insufficient to sustain judgment for plaintiff, in absence of testimony that defendant received any money, or that said receipts were signed by him.

Appeal from Wayne; Campbell (Allan), J.

Submitted January 5, 1932.

(Docket No. 28, Calendar No. 35,692.)

Decided March 2, 1932.

Assumpsit in common pleas court by Anna Caruso against Joseph P. Weber under the common counts for money had and received. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Reversed, and new trial granted.

*Silberman S Weil,*for plaintiff.

*Henry C. Bogle,*for defendant.

Potter, J.

Plaintiff sued defendant in common pleas court in Detroit in assumpsit and had judgment. Appeal was taken to the circuit court of Wayne county, where plaintiff again had judgment. Defendant appeals. The sole question is whether *334there was evidence to sustain the judgment. The suit was brought to recover rent alleged to have been collected by defendant from tenants of plaintiff’s property. The caretaker of plaintiff’s property was sworn. He testified he collected the rent from tenants for a part of the time and turned it over to Mr. Barton. He produced a receipt purporting to be for rent paid by a tenant to defendant Weber. No one testified Weber received any money for rent of the premises in question. No one identified the receipts as having been signed by Weber, and no one otherwise authenticated such receipts.

‘ *‘*A plaintiff has always the burden of showing his cause of action. Every defendant is entitled to go clear unless made answerable by legal testimony. There are no presumptions against him. If there is no testimony to be found, it is not admissible to make out a case without it. When plaintiff’s case was closed, no cause of action had been made out.” *Lendberg*v. *Brotherton Iron Mining Co.,*75 Mich. 84, 89.

This language applies to this case. There is no sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment, which is reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.

Clark, C. J., and McDonald, Sharpe, North, Fead, Wiest, and Butzel, JJ., concurred.
No. 11133.

#### McKemy, Receiver, et al. *v.*Koehler.

Decided October 6, 1908.

Error to the Circuit Court of Franklin county.

*Mr. Albert Mend els on; Mr. Smith W. Bennett*and *Mr. Patterson A.*Reece, for plaintiffs in error.

*Mr. Joseph T. Harrison; Messrs. Spangenberg & Spangenberg; Messrs. Stewart & Stewart*and *Mr. Joseph M.*Force, for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Price, C. J., Shauck, Crew and Summers, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FILED IN ITEM 1 TO THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE
QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                             885
<SECURITIES>                                    36,667
<RECEIVABLES>                                      653
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                49,255
<PP&E>                                           1,692
<DEPRECIATION>                                     282
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  54,825
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,964
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            73
<OTHER-SE>                                      48,424
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    54,825
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 4,680
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,989
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   2
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,691
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       994
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .31
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .31
        

</TABLE>
### IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 21

- 00329

- CV

IN RE GERMANIA SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY

Original Proceeding

From the County Court at Law

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court No. 13630CV

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator Germania Select Insurance Company ’s “M otion for Voluntary Dismissal”

is granted. Relator’s “Petition for Writ of Mandamus” and “Motion for Emergency Stay”

are dismissed.

MATT JOHNSON

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Johnson , and

Justice Smith

Petition dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed December 15, 2021

[OT06]
259 La. 752

#### CITIZENS FINANCE COMPANY OF AMITE, Louisiana v. Charles BUCHANAN.

No. 51576.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 28, 1971.

In re: Charles Buchanan applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of Tangipahoa. 248 So.2d 72.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.
#### STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Elmus R. SELLERS, Appellee.

No. 73-25.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 17, 1973.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corees, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.

Edward D. Foreman, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

MANN, Chief Judge.

The trial court dismissed for factual insufficiency, under Cr.P.R. 3.190 (c)(4), 3 F.S.A., this charge of carrying a concealed weapon. We consider the question whether a pistol, the butt of which is exposed for about a quarter of an inch, *could have been*— (the jury will decide whether it *was)*— a concealed weapon within the meaning of Fla.Stat. § 790.-01(2), F.S.A. We hold that the charge was improperly dismissed.

The statute has been changed since our Supreme Court decided Sutton v. State, 1868, 12 Fla. 135, but we think the logic of that case still holds good:

> “The statute was not intended to infringe upon the rights of any citizen to bear arms for the ‘common defense.’ It merely directs how they shall be carried, and prevents individuals from carrying concealed weapons of a dangerous and deadly character, on or about the person, for the purpose of committing some malicious crime, or of taking some undue advantage over an unsuspecting adver*398sary. When no such evil intentions possess the mind, men in vexed assemblies or public meetings, conscious of their advantage in possessing a secret and deadly weapon, often become insulting and overbearing in their intercourse, provoking a retort or an assault, which may be considered as an excuse for using the weapon, and a deadly encounter results, which might be avoided where the parties stand on a perfect equality, and where no undue advantage is taken.”

At that time the statute contained a proviso “that this law shall not be so construed as to prevent any person from carrying arms openly outside of all their (sic) clothes.” Th.Dig. 498, § 5. Although the proviso has been repealed, we would think a *completely*revealed weapon would not be a concealed weapon, and dismissal on motion would be proper. But it does not follow that a weapon, in order to be concealed, must be completely concealed. The deputy who made this arrest was responding to a call from one who claimed that a drunk person was waving a gun around. The deputy observed a bulge in Sellers’ pocket. He thought it was a gun. Closer, he observed the butt plate and a small part of the weapon exposed. We think this enough to go to the jury.

An annotation at 43 A.L.R.2d 492 collects the authorities, which reveal some division of opinion. We think that the proper rule is that where the weapon is carried in such a manner that an ordinary citizen viewing the accused would not see the weapon clearly exposed as such the question of concealment should be left to the jury.

Treating the notice of appeal as a petition for certiorari,1 we grant certiorari and quash the order dismissing the information.

LILES and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.

1

. See State v. Redden, Fla.App.2d 1972, 269 So.2d 415, and cases therein cited.
#### The Colonial Bank, Respondent, *v.*George A. K. Sutton, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

February, 1913.)

Assignment — receiver’s fees before earned.

An assignment of a receiver’s fees and allowances before they are earned is against public policy, and the legal effect thereof is properly raised by the denial of an allegation that said fees were duly assigned.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the City Court of the city of ¡New York, rendered in favor of the plaintiff by the court, a jury having been waived, in an action upon an assigned claim for receiver’s fees and allowances.

John E. ¡Roeser, for appellant.

Jesse S. Epstein, for respondent.

Lehman, J.

The plaintiff claims to be entitled to the fees and allowances of one Frederick E. Sutton as receiver of the Van ¡Kannel Revolving Door Company. The basis of plaintiff’s alleged title to these fees is an assignment made by the said Frederick E. Sutton prior to the time when the said fees were earned. This assignment, in my opinion, passed no title to the fees. The receiver, like an executor, occupies a position of trust and the fees earned by him are inseparable from his position. *“*Until ascertained and liquidated at the time and in the manner authorized by law, the commissions are not subject to the executors’s disposal, but the right to them is inchoate and upon grounds of public policy unassignable.” Matter of Worthington, 141 N. Y. 9. The learned trial justice recognized that the assignment was illegal and against public policy but gave judgment nevertheless in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that no such defense was pleaded and that the defense of *245illegality was a personal defense. The conclusion, I think, involves an error. On the ground of public policy the law has made the inchoate right to fees non-assignable. This quality is inherent in the subject matter of the assignment and no title can pass by the assignment. The defense that the assignment is illegal is, therefore, not personal to the receiver, and the issue of the legal effect of the assignment is properly raised by a denial of the allegation that the fees were duly assigned.

Judgment should be reversed and judgment directed for the defendant, with costs in both courts.

Seabury and Page, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed and judgment directed for defendant, with costs in both courts.
gwso_ex103.htm

EXHIBIT 10.3
  
 DEBENTURE ASSIGNMENT 
  
 ASSIGNMENT made as of December 17, 2013 by Valeriy Lobaryev, an individual residing in Ukraine (“Assignor”), to Paul Rosenberg, a Virginia resident (“Assignee”).
  
 Assignor is the holder of a convertible debenture with Global Warming Solutions, Inc., an Oklahoma company, entered into on December 11, 2012 in the amount of $108,000 with an annual 10% interest rate, which may be convertible into stock of Global Warming Solutions, Inc., at the rate of $0.01 per share. Maximum Exercise. The Creditor shall not be entitled to convert the outstanding balance owed, or portion thereof, in connection with that number of shares of Common Stock which would be in excess of the sum of (i) the number of shares of Common Stock beneficially owned by the Creditor and its affiliates on an exercise date, and (ii) the number of shares of Common Stock issuable upon the exercise of the convertible debenture with respect to which the determination of this limitation is being made on an exercise date, which would result in beneficial ownership by the Creditor and its affiliates of more than 4.99% of the outstanding shares of Common Stock on such date. For the purposes of the immediately preceding sentence, beneficial ownership shall be determined in accordance with Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Regulation 13d-3 thereunder. Subject to the foregoing, the Assignee shall not be limited to aggregate exercises which would result in the issuance of more than 4.99%. The restriction described in this paragraph may be revoked upon sixty-one (61) days prior notice from the Company to the Creditor. 
  
 The Assignor is the sole holder of the debenture, and in accordance with Section 4.06 of the debenture desires to assign the debenture and all accrued interest to the Assignee.
  
 The Assignee wishes to acquire ownership and interest in the debenture.
  
 Now therefore, for the good and valuable consideration of $10, and other valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Assignor hereby assigns to the Assignee all of Assignor's interest in said debenture.
  
 In witness whereof the Assignor has executed this instrument.
 	 		
	 	 	 	 
			//Valeriy Lobaryev//	
	  
	  
	 Valeriy Lobaryev