alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### FREDERIC A. THIBAULT *vs.*ROBERT R. RUSSELL.

Freight is earned only on delivery of the goods at. the port of consignment.

This was an action of assumpsit, under the following circumstances.

The defendant being the owner of a vessel, the schooner Martha, which was libelled in Philadelphia, for a debt to plaintiff for materials, entered into an agreement with Thibault, as follows:—

*294“Terms of transfer of the schooner Martha, by Mr. Robert R. Russel, to Frederic A. Thibault:—Mr. Russel to give a bill of sale and possession of the vessel to Mr. Thibault, that the latter may put a captain and run her, and keep her until her earnings pay him the debt due him, with interest and costs. Mr. Thibault not to be responsible for loss or injury received by the vessel during the said possession of her; nor responsible for debts now due upon the vessel, &c., &c. The vessel being collateral security to said Thibault, and if lost or rendered of no use to him, the debt of Russel still to remain due. Thibault to keep an account of freights and profits, and credit the judgment,” &c. Amount of judgment $226 47.

Thibault put a captain on board the vessel and she made one trip, and was lost on the second trip. He credited the. judgment with the freights and balance of sales of wreck, deducting expenses, and claimed a balance due of $144 06, with interest.

The defence rested first, that the captain could and ought to have forwarded the coal with which the vessel was loaded to New York or Boston; and the sails, tackle, &c., where freight might have been secured on the former, and a better price obtained for the latter, both of which were sacrificed by a sale"on the beach. Second, that the charges of salvage, &c., were extravagant.

To this it was answered that when the vessel was stranded, the captain duly entered his *protest*before a notary public, who appointed three surveyors to survey her, at the captain’s request. The surveyors reported that the cargo be taken out, the vessel stripped and abandoned; and that no expense be incurred in attempting to get her afloat. The bills paid for stripping the vessel were, therefore, necessarily incurred, and Russel was- liable for them under this contract.

Layton, for plaintiff.

*Cullen*and *MeFee,*for defendant.

*The Court*

charged with the plaintiff; that if Thibault, or his agent, acting in good faith under the report of the surveyors, stripped and sold the wreck, instead of attempting to put her afloat again, he was protected by his contract, and Russel was bound to allow the expenses. That as to the freight none could be recovered, either general or average, as the coal was never delivered to the consigneee, or accepted by him at a port short of delivery. The freight was only due on the performance of the undertaking to deliver the coal at Boston. Verdict for plaintiff.
# C_2021088EN.01002001.xml

| 15.3.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 88/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.3.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 88/20

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 8 January 2021 — Germanwings GmbH v KV

(Case C-8/21)

(2021/C 88/26)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Germanwings GmbH

Defendant: KV

Question referred

Does a strike by the air carrier’s own employees that is called by a trade union constitute an extraordinary circumstance within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004? (1)

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).

---
#### Rigoberto ANDRADE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED FRUIT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 228, Docket 27812.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Jan. 25, 1963.

Decided Jan. 25, 1963.

Leon Segan, New York City (Bernard Rolnick, Benjamin H. Siff, New York City, on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

Eugene Underwood, New York City (Burlingham, Underwood, Barron, Wright & White, John J. Crowley, New York City, of counsel), for defendant.

Before FRIENDLY, KAUFMAN and MARSHALL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm in open court Judge Fein-berg’s denial of plaintiff’s motion, F.R. Civ.Proc. 60(b), to set aside a verdict for defendant in a seaman’s action, on the ground that a juror allegedly failed to disclose a fact relating to his employment which made him incapable of being a disinterested juror. There was no reason why the juror should have supposed his employment so disqualified him; if plaintiff’s trial counsel desired further information concerning this, it was for him to obtain it on the *voir dire.*
#### In re ESTATE of S. W. GRANBERRY.

No. 38293.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 224 So.2d 724.
# Official Journal L 44/2017

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 44 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6022 February 2017 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 44

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6022 February 2017

---

| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/307 of 21 February 2017 concerning the authorisation of dry grape extract of Vitis vinifera spp. vinifera as a feed additive for all animal species except for dogs (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| | | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/308 of 21 February 2017 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables | 6 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/307 of 21 February 2017 concerning the authorisation of dry grape extract of Vitis vinifera spp. vinifera as a feed additive for all animal species except for dogs (
  1
  )

Vitis vinifera

vinifera

1

1

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/308 of 21 February 2017 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

6

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.
#### BENTON *v.*STATE

[No. 219,

September Term, 1961.]

*Decided April 12, 1962.*

*310The cause was argued before Henderson, Hammond, Prescott, Horney and Sybert, JJ.

*Edward A. Palamara*and *Charles W.*Bell, with whom were *Bell & Palamara*on the brief, for appellant.

*Robert P. Sweeney, Assistant Attorney General,*with whom were *Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General,*and *William L. Kahler*and *Frank P. Plury, State’s Attorney*and *Deputy State’s Attorney*respectively, *for Prince George’s County,*on the brief, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

The defendant-appellant was convicted by the trial court, sitting without a jury, of grand larceny. He contends in this Court that the evidence produced by the State was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the property stolen had a fair market value of $100.00 or more at the time of its theft.

To establish the fair market value of the goods stolen, twenty-four used radiators, the State called as its witness Mr. Herbert T. Bergner, from whom the radiators had been taken. .Mr. Bergner testified, after an objection by the defendant regarding his qualification as an expert witness was overruled, that the fair market value of the radiators was “about six dollars apiece.” Subsequently he testified that he bought “junked ■cars” and said, referring to radiators, that “lots of them come off junked cars that I buy * * He then said that he had sold several used radiators similar to those stolen “for eight dollars apiece” about a year before.

The State also called as its witness Mr. Warren Gross, a scrap-yard manager. Mr. Gross testified that he purchased twenty-four radiators from the defendant for $67.50 two days after the theft from Mr. Bergner.

*311This Court has in the past held in civil cases that the owner of property can testify as to its value as owner, without expert qualification. *State Roads Comm. of Md. v. Novosel,*203 Md. 619, 624-625; *Jackson v. Linthicum,*192 Md. 272, 276; *Pa. Threshermen, etc., Cas. Ins. Co. v. Messenger,*181 Md. 295, 302. See also 3 *Wigmore, Evidence*(3d ed.), Sec. 716; Annotation, 37 A.L.R. 2d 967. This Court has indicated, moreover, that a similar rule applies in criminal cases, *Jewell v. State,*216 Md. 110, 112-113, and the cases in this country are generally in accord with this view. See Annotation, 37 A.L.R. 2d 967, 1000.

The defendant contends that Mr. Bergner’s statement regarding the value of the radiators stolen from him was “speculative and conjecture” because he used the word “about” preceding the words “six dollars.” No objection to his testimony was made on this ground, and, in any event, we think it clear from a reading of his entire testimony that Mr. Bergner was stating an estimate of the fair market value of the radiators, from which the trier of fact properly could conclude that their value was $100.00 or more.

*Judgment affirmed, with costs.*
#### A. T. EUSTER FURNITURE CO., INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellee.

No. 73-308.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 5, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1974.

Levine, Helman & Reckson and Lewis W. Miles, II, Miami, for appellant.

Carey, Dwyer, Austin, Cole & Selwood and Steven R. Berger, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On this appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment in its favor entered on a verdict of $1,600, the appellant contends the court erred in denying its motion for new trial on the grounds that the amount of the verdict was inadequate on the evidence, and that the plaintiff was denied a fair trial because of certain matters occurring therein. On consideration thereof in the light of the record and briefs and argument, we hold those contentions are without merit.

The appellant, in its wholesale furniture business, lost some merchandise by theft, and filed this action against its insurer to recover the value thereof. The evidence did not show with any certainty or definitely what items of merchandise were lost. There was evidence from which the jury properly could have found the appellant sustained a loss of merchandise of the value of approximately $1,700. The jury was faced with the necessity to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and the verdict rendered was not shown to be contrary to the weight of the evidence. On review of the record we are impelled to hold against the contention of the appellant that it was denied a fair trial.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### Charley Curtis WHITE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 41704.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 30, 1971.

Certiorari denied. 252 So.2d 375.

CARLTON, Acting C. J., ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
# C_2023104EN.01001001.xml

| 20.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 104/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 104/10

---

Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 15 November 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Okrazhen sad — Vidin — Bulgaria) — Corporate Commercial Bank, in liquidation v Elit Petrol AD

(Case C-260/21, (1) Corporate Commercial Bank)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 53(2) and Articles 94 and 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Insolvency proceedings - Mutual set-offs with an insolvent credit institution - Retroactive amendment to the conditions for the enforcement of those set-offs - National legislation declared unconstitutional - Purely internal situation - Manifest inadmissibility)

(2023/C 104/11)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Okrazhen sad — Vidin

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Corporate Commercial Bank, in liquidation

Defendant: Elit Petrol AD

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU must be interpreted as not precluding the adoption by a Member State of general rules on set-off in the context of the insolvency of a bank, even if they are retroactive. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU must be interpreted as not precluding the adoption by a Member State of general rules on set-off in the context of the insolvency of a bank, even if they are retroactive.

| 2. | The first to fourth and sixth questions submitted by the Okrazhen sad Vidin (Regional Court, Vidin, Bulgaria) are manifestly inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The first to fourth and sixth questions submitted by the Okrazhen sad Vidin (Regional Court, Vidin, Bulgaria) are manifestly inadmissible.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 252, 28.6.2021.

---
#### Jeff DAVIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-484.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 2, 1971.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Lewis S. Kimler, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Joel D. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

*222Before PEARSON and CHARLES CARROLL, JJ., and LESTER, M. IGNATIUS, Associate Judge.

PEARSON, Judge.

The appellant was charged with robbery and found guilty by a jiiry. He was sentenced to a ten year term in the state prison. On this appeal appellant’s first point urges error upon the refusal of the trial court to give his requested instruction upon the defense of alibi. We hold that the instruction should have been given and that the error was prejudicial. Therefore, we reverse.

Appellant’s only defense in the trial court was predicated upon the claim of alibi. In support of his claimed alibi, appellant presented four witnesses. Only one of these, his girlfriend, testified that she was with him at the time that the crime was said to have been committed. Based upon this testimony, appellant requested the court to give the standard jury instruction, Criminal S.J.I. 2.10(a), upon the defense of alibi. The trial judge refused to give the instruction. Error has been assigned and properly argued.

The trial judge should have given the instruction because it is not his function to weigh the evidence and decide whether the charge shall be given in some cases and not in others. The instruction should be given in every case where there is sufficient evidence to take the issue to the jury. Long v. State, 42 Fla. 509, 28 So. 775 (1900); Watson v. State, Fla.App.1967, 200 So.2d 270. Having held that reversible error appears, we do not consider appellant’s second point. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of granting appellant a new trial.

Reversed and remanded for new trial.
# C_2022463EN.01001101.xml

| 5.12.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 463/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.12.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 463/11

---

Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 13 October 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Višje sodišče v Mariboru — Slovenia) — FV v NOVA KREDITNA BANKA MARIBOR d.d.

(Case C-405/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Consumer protection - Directive 93/13/EEC - Unfair terms in consumer contracts - Article 3(1) and Article 8 - Criteria for assessing the unfairness of a contractual term - Significant imbalance between the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract - Requirement of good faith on the part of the seller or supplier - Possibility of ensuring a higher level of protection than that provided for in the directive)

(2022/C 463/13)

Language of the case: Slovenian

Referring court

Višje sodišče v Mariboru

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: FV

Defendant: NOVA KREDITNA BANKA MARIBOR d.d.

Operative part of the judgment

Article 3(1) and Article 8 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts

must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which permits a finding that a contractual term is unfair where it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer, without, however, carrying out an examination, in such a case, of the requirement of ‘good faith’ within the meaning of Article 3(1).

---

(1)  OJ C 349, 30.8.2021.

---
# C_2020320EN.01002601.xml

| 28.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 320/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 320/26

---

Action brought on 5 August 2020 — Guerlain v EUIPO (Shape of an oblong, tapered and cylindrical lipstick)

(Case T-488/20)

(2020/C 320/57)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Guerlain (Paris, France) (represented by: T. de Haan, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU tridimensional mark (Shape of an oblong, tapered and cylindrical lipstick) — Application for registration No 17 958 667

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 June 2020 in Case R 2292/2019-1

Forms of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred by the applicant for the purposes of the proceedings before the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred by the applicant for the purposes of the proceedings before the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1



               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS



    We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-3 Nos. 333-92119, 333-32586, 333-38560) of HomeSeekers.com, Incorporated
and in the related Prospectuses and the Registration Statement (Form S-8
No. 333-44786) pertaining to the Amended and Restated 1996 Stock Option Plan of
HomeSeekers.com, Incorporated of our report dated September 11, 2000, with
respect to the consolidated financial statements of HomeSeekers.com,
Incorporated included in this Annual Report (Form 10-KSB and Form 10-KSB/A
(Amendment No. 1)) for the year ended June 30, 2000.



                                                               ERNST & YOUNG LLP



Reno, Nevada
October 25, 2000
#### Benjamin HOLLAND, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-797.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 16, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated balance sheet and statement of earnings of Gerber Scinetific, Inc.
as of and for the six-month period ended October 31, 1996 and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financail statements.
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<S>                             <C>
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</TABLE>
#### Albert PALMER, a/k/a James Patterson, a/k/a James Wilson, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-607.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 22, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.