### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MAY 30 , 2 003 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 02- 1414 5

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ D. C . Do ck et No s . 0 0 -3 6 4 6 CV -N -W & 00-0364 7-CV -N -W PA MEL A S UE JON ES , Plaintiff, ve rs us DILLARD’ S, INC., D ef en dant. SARAH CROCKER, LANA HOUSE, JAMES THOMPS ON, DE BOR AH T. GI BBO NS , Pl ai nti ff s, GERDA BYRD, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us DILLARD’ S, INC., De fendant-Appellee.Honora ble David D. D owd, J r., United States District Judge f or the Nor

thern District of * Ohio, sitti ngby

desig nation. 2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e N o rth e rn D i s tr i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (M ay 3 0, 200 3) Before DU BIN A and FAY , C ircuit Judg es, and DO W D , D istrict Judg e. * DO W D, District Judge: The a bove-captioned app eal fr om the Norther

n District of A labam a involv es the discrim ination claim s asserted by Plaintiff-Appellant Gerda B yrd. By rd wa s one of six pla int if

fs w ho a lle ge d th at

D ef en dant- Appe lle e D ill ar d’ s, I nc . , too k s o me a d v e r s e a c t i o n a g a i n s tth e m i n th e i r j o b s b e c au s e o f

th e i r a g e . B yr d ’s c l a i ms ar e g r o u n d e di n th e f

e d e r a l A g e D i s c r i mi n a t i o n i n E mp l o yme n tA c t , th e A l ab a ma Age D iscrim ination in Em ploym ent Act, and Alabam a statutory fra ud. T he district co urt gr an te d D ill ar d’ s m oti on f or sum m ar y j udgm en t a s to a ll de fe ndants on a ll cl ai m s. Byrd was th e o nl y pl ai nt iff to ap pe al ; t hu s, o nl y

he r cl ai m s ar e atis su e.3 I. BACKG ROUND Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant G er daBy

rd be gan w orkin g f

or G ay fe r’ s D ep ar

tm en t Store in T uscaloosa, Ala

bam a, in 197 5. I n August 19 98, D illard’ s, I nc. (“ D ill ar d’ s” or

the “ Co m

pany ”) , pur ch as ed

the T usc al oosa

sto re , but

c ont inu ed

to em plo y it s e xis tin g w orkf

or ce . F or the f ive y ears pr ec ed ing the buy out , By rd he ld the pos iti on o f of

fi ce and c re dit

m an ag er . D ill ar d’ s of

fe re d no suc h po sit ion within its organization al structure, but placed her in an assistant area sales m an ag er ( “ A A SM ”) pos iti on i n or de r to k ee p he r at the sam e rate of

pay . S hortly the re af te r, how ev er , By

rd le ar ne d f ro m Ri ch ar d L uc as , a lso an A A SM , that the store wa s elim inating AA SM position s and that the sto re had no intentio n of ever em plo y ing A A SM s a ga in. In May 1999 , a s part of its restructuring, D illard’ s offere d Byrd an oppo rt uni ty to se ll co sm et ic s onthe sa le s f loo r. S he de cl ine d, how ev er , be ca use sh e sa w lag gi ng st or e sa le s as a ba d s ig n fo r co m m is si on s i n t ha t d ep art m en t. Moreover, By

rd feared that she would eventually be term inated for fa iling to reac h sales-per- hour (“ SPH ”) goals. Rather than risk term ination , B yrd considered her other optio ns. A s a m anager w ith her posit ion bein g elim inated, she w as entitled to fill another m anagerial position in the store or take severance pay . She opted4

for the latter . Dillard’ s approved her severance r equest in May 1999 , and she left in th e sa m e m on th . In al l, Byrd rec ei ve d fo rty-sev en week s o f se ve ran ce p ay . On June 8, 1999, By

rd spoke to Andy

Poole, operations m anager at Dil la rd ’s, who to ldhe r th atth e co m pa ny ins tru ct edhi m

to hi re t wo n ew AASMs . (B yrd D ep . T r. a t 55 , E x. 2 at 5 (D . Ct . D oc . N o. 15) . ) By rd r ec or de d he r re ac tio n to this ne w s insom e ty

pe w ri tte n no te s: T his ha ppe ns a ft er

I w as tol d [ that] the sto re c oul d no t a ff or d any A A SM [] s . . . be ca

use the y w er e not m ak ing the ir

f igure s. S ee m s to m e [that] I w as lied to!!! A s soon as I f ind ou t there ar e tw o new A A SM [s ] in pla ce [, ] I w ill f ile alaw sui t a ga ins t D ill ar d[ ’ ] s. T his la wsu itwil l b e fo r [a]ge d is cri m in at io n a nd[w]age d is cri m in at io n. Se em s to m e [tha t] the y

w an te d to ge t r id o f m e . . . by de m oti ng m e to th e f l o o r , an d [ , ] a f

t e r s e v e r a l p ayc u t s [ ] b e c au s e I c o u l dn o tme e tmy SPH [, ] fire m e. (Byrd Dep . Tr. at 4 5, Ex . 2 at5.) InS ep te m

be r 1999 , T if

fany W int er s a

ppl ie d f or an A A SM pos iti on at the T usc al oosa

sto re , and w as hir ed

am onth late r. B yrd

te sti fi ed that sh e he ar d P ool e say that W int er s w as “ y oung and p re tty , ” an d th at he “ ha d to hir e he r. ” ( By rd D ep . Tr . at 67, 70.) A t the ti m e By

rd le ft the c om pany , she w as onl y

aw ar e of poo r sa le s a s th e Co m pany ’ s r ea son fo r el im inatin g th e A A SM pos iti on. S he a dm itt ed havin g no ev ide nc e that the sto re m an ag er kne wa t the ti m e that the pos iti on w oul d be5

re ins ta te d late r that y ear. B yrd te sti fi ed that, de spi te the la ck

of e vid en ce , she f

el t ce rt ai n so m eo ne in the c om pany kne whe r fo rm er

pos iti on w as not

r ea lly el im inate d be ca

use W int er s w as hir ed

in that po sit ionso s oon af te r she le ft . II . PROCEDURAL POSTURE By rd f ile d he r adm ini str at ive c harg e w iththe E qua l E m plo ym en t O ppor tun ity Co m m iss ion( “ E E O C” ) on F eb ru ar y 24, 200 0. I n D ec em

be r 2000 , B yr dan dth e o th e r

p l a i n t i f f s f i l e dac o mp l a i n ti n f

e d e r a l c o u rt , a l l e g i n g c l a i ms u n d e r th e f e d e r a l A g e D i s c r i mi n a t i o n i n E mp l o yme n tA c t( “A D E A ” ) , th e A l ab a ma A ge D isc ri m inatio n inE m plo ym en t A ct

( “ A A D E A ”) , and an A la bam a fr au d statute. D ill ar d’ s f

ile d am oti on f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t a s to the c la im s of By rd and the other plaintiffs. T he Com pany argued that By

rd’ s claim

wa s tim e-barr ed be ca use By rd f ai le d to f ile he r E E O C c harg e w ith in 1 80 d ay s of any a lle ge d a ct

of discrim ination . Dillard’ s argued that her state discrim ination claim wa s also tim eba rredbe cau se th e AADEA sim pl y ad op te d t he ADEA’ s l im it at io ns pe rio d. A lte rn at ive ly , it

arg ue d th at

By rd ha d no dir ec t or

c ir cum stanti al e vid en ce of a ge dis cr im inatio n, w hic h r equir ed j udgm en t i n it s f

av or on the m er its . W ithr es pe ct to By rd ’ s f ra ud c la im , D ill ar d’ s arg ue d init s m oti on tha t no e vid en ce sho w ed it m ad e a fa lse repre sentation to her, but that on ly another store em

ploy ee indicated that6

the A A SM pos iti on w as be ing pe rm an en tly e lim inate d. F urthe r, she did not ac tua lly r el y on any suc h st at em en ts, that any r el ianc e w as unr ea sona

ble , that sh e ha d no e vid en ce of

an in te nt t o de ce ive , and tha t sh e did not suf fe r co gni za

ble dam ag es . The district court granted the Com pany ’ s m otion for sum

m ary j udgm ent as to all of By

rd’ s claim s. I t found th at By rd had reason to believe she had suffered a g e d i s c r i mi n a t i o n b e f

o r e th e 1 8 0 d ays p r e c e d i n g h e r EE O C c h ar g e . S p e c i f

i c a l l y, the dis tr ic t c ourt f

ound that he r pr e- re sig na tio n di sc uss ion s w ithc o- w orke rs and her June 8, 1999, discovery of the reinstatem ent of the AA SM position we re sufficient to start the running of the statute of lim itations . In addition , the c ourt fo und that the A A D E A ’ s st at ute of li m itatio ns w as , a t m ost , 180 day s be ca use the language of the statute m irrored that of the A DE A. T hus, the court held that By rd’ s AA DE A c laim

wa s also tim e-barr ed. Finally , the district court found that the re w as no e vid en ce the Co m pany ’ s a lle ge dly

f al se state m en t c au se d he r any inj ur y . I nst ea d, the c ourt f

ound that B yrd

r es ign ed be ca use she w as be ing tr an sf er re d to c osm et ic s and d id n ot w an t t o w ork inthat de partm en t, not be ca use of th e el im in at io n o f th e AASM p os it io n. The c ourt also denied Byrd’ s m otion to alter or am end its judgm ent. ( Or der da te d J un e 2 5, 2 00 2, at 3 (D. Ct . Doc. No . 31 ).)7 III . A N A LY SI S T he Co urt r ev ie w s de novo a lowe r court’ s decision to grant summ ary j udgm ent. P enning ton v. City of H untsv ille, 261 F. 3d 12 62, 1265 (11t h Cir. 20 01 ); P at ric k v . Flo y d M ed . Ctr ., 20 1 F .3d13 13 , 13 15 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ). A dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e ntr

y of sum m ar y j udgm en t sh oul d be a ff

irm ed if , a ft er c onstru ing the e vid en ce in a lig ht m ost f av or ab le to the non -m ovant, the r ev ie w ing c ourt f ind s that no ge nui ne iss ue of

m at er ia l f

ac t e xis ts and the m ovi ng p ar ty is en tit le d to j udgm en t a s am atte r of

law . F ed . R. Ci v. P . 56( c) ; W ill iam P enn L if e In s. Co . of New Yorkv. Sa nd s, 9 12 F.2d13 59 , 13 61 (11 th Cir . 19 90 ). We n o wtu rn t o e x a mi n e th e d i s tr i c tc o u rt ’s r u l i n g s o n e a c h o f

B yr d ’s c l a i ms u n d e r th i s l e g a l s t a n d a r d . A s d i s c u s s e dh e r e i n , w e r e v e r s e o n th e A D E Ac l a i m, certify a question to the Ala

bam a Suprem e Court on the AA DE A c laim , and affirm o n th e f r au dc l a i m. A . T he A D E ACl ai m T he pe ri od i n w hic h ape rs on m ust f ile ac om pla int w iththe E E O C d ep en ds on whe the r a state is a “ de fe rr al state ” unde r the A D E A . D ef er ra l st at es are tho se that have astate a ge nc y

e qui va le nt t o th e E E O C. S ee 29 U . S. C. §§ 6 26( d) , 633 (1 999) ; se e al so Am er ic anA ir lin es , I nc . v. Card oz a- Ro dr igu ez , 133 F . 3d 1 11 ( 1st Cir. 1998 ); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div., 927 F.2d 876, 878 (5th Cir.8

1991 ). I n th es e state s, ape rs on m ust f ile an a ge dis cr im inatio n c la im w iththe EEOC with in 30 0 d ay s af te r th e al le ge d u nl awfu l p ract ic e o ccu rred . 29 U.S.C. § 626( d) (2 ). I n st at es w ith out astate e qui va le nt t o th e E E O C, the A D E Ar equir es a ch ar ge to be f

ile d w ith in 1 80 d ay s. 29 U . S. C. § 62 6( d) (1 ). A la bam a ha s astate dis cr im inatio n st at

ute , the A A D E A , but

doe s no t have an E E O C e qui va le nt. T hus, the Co urt e xam ine s th e tim el ine ss o f By rd ’ s A D E Ac la im

in the c ont ex t of

the 180- day r ule . T he part ie s do not

dis put e that the appl ic ab le c harg ing pe ri od i s 18 0 day s. Wha t the part ie s di sput e, how ev er , is w he n th at pe ri od s tart s to r

un. T he pr ope r fo cu s f

or w he n astatut e of

li m itatio ns b eg ins to run is the ti m e of the dis cr im inator

y a ct . C hard on v . F er

nande z, 454 U . S. 6, 8 ( 1981 ); N an ce v. Ma xw el l F ed . Cr ed it U nio n, 186 F . 3d 1 338, 134 1 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) . T hr ee pos sib le da te s c anbe c onstru ed

a s th e unl aw fu l pr ac tic e that tri gge re d th e lim itatio ns pe ri od: ( 1) Apr il or

May 199 9, w he n B yrd

w as tol d th at

he r posi tio n w as be ing el im in at ed ; (2 ) Ju ne 12 , 19 99 , when sh e to okno te s ab ou t h er d is co ve ry of t wo ne wA A SM s to be hir ed

and h er plans t o su e fo r ag e dis cr im inatio n; o r (3 ) N ove m be r 1, 199 9, w he n sh e le ar ne d th at a28- y ear- old

w om anha d be enhir ed

to fi ll he r fo rm er

A A SM pos iti on.9

By rd argues in suppo rt of the third date. She say s that, at the tim e her posi tio n w as e lim inate d, she w as onl y aw ar e of pur porte d f inanc ia l r ea sons f

or the el im inatio n of

he r j ob. B yrd

a sse rt s th at

she c oul d no t f

ile ac om pla int unt il she becam e aw are of the Com pany ’ s discrim inatory

intent. O n this d ate, she learned fr om P ool e that W int er s ha d be enhir ed in he r pla ce . T hus, By

rd c ont en ds, the lim itations period did no t begin to run until Novem ber 1, 1999 , bringing her E E O C c harg e fi le d onF eb ru ar y 24, 200 0, w ith in the li m itatio ns p er iod . Alter natively , B yrd argues that, even if the Com pany ’ s discrim inatory

act oc curr ed e ar lie r, the li m itatio n pe ri od s houl d be e qui ta bly tol le d ba se d onthe ev id en ce t ha t was av ai labl e to he r. Rel y in g o n S tu rn io lo v. Sh eaff er, Eat on , Inc ., 15 F . 3d 1 023 (1 1thCi r. 199 4) , By rd str es se s th at

m er e sus pic ionof

a ge dis cr im inatio n, abse nt p er sona l kn ow le dge of dis cr im inatio n, w ill not

c onst itu te pr et ex t. S he say s th at , li ke the pla int if f in S tur nio lo, she did

not kno wshe w as a victim of discrim ination until sh e confirm ed that Dillard’ s had hired a y oung er pe rs on t o f

ill he r fo rm er

pos iti on. B ec au se she c oul d no t have ba se d ac la im on rum or , she ne ed ed

to w ai t un til she kne wthat di sc ri m inatio n oc curr ed . T hus, she ar g u e s , s u mmary j u d g me n tw a s i mp r o p e r a s t o h e r A D E Ac l a i m. D ill ar d’ s arg ue s insup port of the se co nd d at e, or

w he n sh e too k no te s a

bout her suspicion s of age discrim ination . He r notes are dated June 12 , 1999, in w hich10

s h e d es cr i b edh ea ri n g fr o m Po o l e t h at two AAS M s we re t o b e h i re d . Di l l ar d ’s al so a sse rt s th at , unl ike S tur nio lo, w he re the pla int if

f ha d no r ea son to d oubt

the em plo y er ’ s e xpl an at ionf

or se ve ra l m onths, By

rd ha d c au se to doub t the r ea sons gi ve n fo r he r tr an sf

er t o c os m et ic s l on g b efo re t he 18 0 d ay s l ead in g t o h er EEOC ch arg e. Re vie w ing the c as e lawin thi s are a, w e obse rv e that so m e em plo y er s w ill se ek to av oid li ab ili ty by obs er vin g th e le tte r of

the law , w hil e tr

uly ign or ing it s sp iri t. See Kol st adv. Am . Dent al Ass oc ., 52 7 U.S. 5 26 , 55 1 (1 99 9) (“ An em plo y er [] m ay , f

or e xam ple , e xpr es s ho sti lity

tow ar d e m

plo ym en t di sc ri m inatio n law s or c onc ea l e vid en ce r eg ar din g it s “ tr ue ” se le ct ionpr oc ed

ur es be ca use it know s th ey

vio la te f ed er al law . ”) ; se e al so R oll ins v. T ec hS outh, I nc . , 833 F . 2d 1525 , 152 8 ( 11th C ir . 198 7) ( not ing that di re ct e vid en ce of

dis cr im inatio n is r ar el y available to the plaintiff, which, presum ably , is beca use m alicious em

ploy ers di sg ui se th ei r co nd uc t). Th e m al ic io us em pl oyer can att em

pt to cir cu m

ve nt ADEA lia bil ity by ti m ing it s di sc ri m inator

y a ct s. F ir ing an e m

plo y ee f or “ fi nanc ia l” reasons, c oncealing the true m otivatio n (i.e ., age), and then replacing that em ploy ee w ith som eone outsid e of the protected c lass six m onth s later is all that m ay be necessary

to discrim inate illegally , y et escape liability . If the e m ploy ee ac ts o n am er e sus pic ion , he ha s a ct ed pr em at ur el y : the e m

plo y ee ’ s c la im

w illTh is C ourt a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll d e c isi on s o f t he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit 1 ha nd e d d own p ri or

to O c tob e r 1 , 1 98 1, B onne r v . Ci ty of Pr ic ha rd , 6 61 F .2 d 1 20 6, 12 09 (1 1th Cir. 1981) (en ba

nc), which would include Ree b. Th e a pp lic a ble c ha rg ingpe ri od

re qu ir e d a

n a dmi nis tr ativ e c omp la int to b e fi le d w ith in 2 90 da y s. 11 lik el y f ai l be ca use the tr uly dam nin g e vid en ce ha s no t y et e m er ge d–and w ill not em er ge giv enthe de fe ndant’ s r ev el at ionof the sui t. I f, on the oth er

hand, the em ploy ee lies in w ait for the surfa cing of telltale evidence, i.e. , the hiring of a y oung er e m plo y ee , the c unni ng e m

plo y er w ill e sc ap e lia

bil ity by pos tpo nin g th e hir ing of ar ep la ce m en t f

or a t l ea st s ix m onths. T hus, an e m plo y ee thr

ust int o th is s i tu at i o n fa ce s two eq u al l y u n at tra ct i v e o p t i o n s , n ei th erfu rt h er i n g th e A DEA ’s purpos e. Disputes of this so rt can be tr aced back a s early as 1975 in the case of Reeb v. E co nom ic O ppor

tun ity A tlanta , I nc . , 516 F . 2d 9 24 ( 5thCi r. 197 5) . I n R ee b, 1 the defendant-em

ploy er wrote a letter

to the plainti ff- em

ploy ee indicating that her m onthly c ontra ct of e m plo ym en t w oul d no t be r en ew ed f or f inanc ia l r ea sons . T he le tte r al so i ndi cate d th at

she w oul d be te rm inate d e ff ec tiv e im m ed ia te ly . T he pla int if f’ s po sit ionw as r ef

ill ed onl y tw o m onths l at er , but

she did not le ar n th is unt il se ve ra l m onths l at er . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed the c as e be ca

use the pla int if f ha d no t f

ile d he r adm ini str at ive c om pla int w ith in the appl ic ab le c harg ing pe ri od. 212

T he pla int if

f pr ev ai le d onappe al . I n apr onounc em en t tha t w oul d be echoed by

various circuits across the country , the F ifth Circuit held that, under equit ab le m odi fi catio n, the appl ic ab le li m itatio ns p er iod did not be ginto run “ unt il the f ac ts whic h w oul d su

ppor t a c au se of a ct ionare appare nt o r shou ld b e ap pare nt to a pe rs on wit h areas on ab ly pru de nt reg ardforhi s [o r he r] rig ht s,” i d. at 93 0. Se e, e . g. , O shi ve r v. L ev in, F ishbe in, S edran & Be rm an , 38 F . 3d 1 380, 138 9 ( 3d Ci r. 199 4) ; M ir an dav. B& B C as h G ro ce ry S tor e, I nc . , 975 F . 2d 1 518, 153 1- 32 (1 1thCi r. 199 2) ; V au ght

v. R. R. D onne lle y

& So ns C o. , 745 F . 2d 4 07, 410 -1 2 (7 th C ir . 198 4) ; W ilk er son v. S ie gf ri ed I ns. A ge nc y , I nc . , 683 F . 2d 3 44, 345 -4 6 (1 0t h C ir. 1 98 2) . T he e ff ec t of Re eb w as to cl ose the loo phol e use d by the m al ic iou s em plo y er to av oid a ge dis cr im inatio n li ab ili ty . “ [W ] he re w ro ngf ul c onc ea lm en t of facts is alleged, .. . a

party responsibl e for such wrongful concealm ent is estopp ed fro m ass ert in g t he st atut e o f li m it at io ns as ade fen se .” Reeb , 51 6 F .2dat 9 30 .

“ ‘ [N ] o [ pe rs on] m ay

take a dvanta ge of

his [ or he r] ow n w ro ng. ” I d. ( quot ing G lus v. Br ookl yn E . D ist . T er

m ina l, 359 U . S. 231 , 232 -3 3 ( 1959 )) . T he se e qui ta ble co nsi de ratio ns h av e be enr ep eate d num er ous tim es in subs eque nt d ec isi ons of se ve ra l c ourts. S ee , e . g. , O shi ve r, 38 F . 3d at 13 88- 89; E ngl ishv. P ab st B re w ing Co., 828 F.2d 1047 , 1049 (4th Cir. 1987).The e lements it looked to were : “the plaintiff is in the protec ted g roup; (2) the plaintiff 3 applied and w as qualified f or a job for

which the e mploy er w as see king a pplicants; (3) the plaintiff was r ejec ted or de moted; and (4) f ollowing the pla intiff’s dischar g e, the e mploy er repla ced him with someone of compar able qua lifications outside the protec ted class.” Sturniolo, 15 F.3d at 1025. 13 Buildin g on Reeb is the case of S turniolo , where the plaintiff-e m ploy ee w as a sa le s m an ag er

w ho w as f

ir ed a s part of , he w as tol d, ar eo rg an iz at ionand consoli dation o f positio ns in th e com pany . The plaintiff discovered, however, that the com pany replace d him

within three m onth s with a significantly y oung er em plo y ee . T he dis tr ic t c ourt, r ef usi ng t o a ppl y any e qui ta ble m odi fi catio n, gr an te d sum

m ar y j udgm en t t o th e em

plo y er f or the pla int if

f’ s f ai lur e to b ri ng a ch arg e to th e EEOC wit hi n 1 80 da y s o f hi s t erm in at io n. This Court rever sed, holding that a genuine issu e of m aterial f act prec luded su m m ary jud gm en t o n wh et he r eq ui tabl e m od ifi cat io n app li ed . Id. at10 25 -2 6. To reac h its decisio n, the Court looked to th e elem ents of a pri m a fa ci e c as e fo r ag e dis cr im inatio n, id. a t 10 25, and m ad e the f oll ow ing obs er

va tio ns a bout the 3 ev ide nc e: “ A t the ti m e of his dis ch ar ge , [ the pla int if f] be lie ve d [ his e m

plo y er ’ s] re as ons fo r te rm inatin g hi m w er e busi ne ss r el at ed

and [ he ] w as not

aw ar e of the [com pany ’ s] intent to h ire a y oung er individu al to replace him .” Id. T he plaintiff wa s told th at the region he m anaged wa s being con solid ated as part of another region. Id. at 1026. A lthou gh the evidence sug gested that the plain tiff14

“ susp ected” a ge discrim ination at the tim e of his discharge, “ a discharged em ploy ee’ s m ere susp icion of age discrim ination , unsuppo rted by personal know le dge of

dis cr im inatio n, w ill not

c onst itu te pr et ex t. ” I d. I t w as not unt il se ve ral m on th s l at er t ha t t he pl ai nt iff lea rn edof h is y ou ng er re pl acement. Id .

“ [A ] t tha t po int [, ] [ the pla int if f] ha d kn ow le dge of

f ac ts s uf fi ci en t t o su

ppor t a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

a ge dis cr im inatio n. ” I d. In li gh t o f th e te ach in gs of S tu rn io lo an d t he ot he r cas es we ha ve cit ed , we ex am ine the e vid en ce in the ins tant c as e. F ir st, By rd te sti fi ed a t he r de posi tio n that she learned the A AS M positio ns were being dis continu ed for f inancial re as ons. ( By

rd D ep . T r. a t 13 , 22- 23. ) I nde ed , she ha d se enc om pany docum entation in dicating th at store sales w ere low. (By rd De p. T r. at 76.) By

rd al so t es tif ie d th at she w as appr eh en siv e ab out takin g ac osm et ic s j ob b ec au se of her concer

n for m eeting sales goals in light o f overall store sales. (By rd De p. T r. at 12. ) T his e vid en ce sug ge sts that the r ea son giv enby D ill ar d’ s f

or the el im inatio n of

By rd ’ s po sit ionnot

onl y appe ar ed bus ine ss- re la te d, but

a lso be lie vable . Ape rs on w ithr ea sona bly pr ude nt r eg ar d f

or he r ri ght s w oul d no t sus pe ct ac au se of

a ct ionf or a ge dis cr im inatio n a t this poi nt. Second, B yrd testified that, on June 8, 1999, the operations m anager told her he would be hiring two new A AS Ms. ( By rd De p. T r. at 55-57.) T his prom pted15

By rd to take notes about her buddin g susp icions and in tent to file suit on ce her fo rm er p os it io n was fil le d b y a y ou ng er em

pl oyee. (ByrdDep. Tr. at45 -4 6.) At thi s po int , the e vid en ce a va ila ble to By rd is thi n. S he ha s no e vid en ce of the Co m pany ’ s in te nt t o hi re ay oung er e m plo y ee . About

a ll she kno w s is that the A A SM pos iti on i s be ing r ei nst at ed c ontrary to w ha t sh e pr ev iou sly

he ar d. Whil e By rd ha s no oth er

e vid en ce , she sus pe ct s th at he r j ob w as e lim inate d be ca use of he r ag e. N ev er

the le ss, S tur

nio lo t ea ch es that B yrd ’ s su spi ci on, w ith out m or e, is ins uf fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh p re te xt. N ot unti l N ove m be r 1999 is he r sus pic ion co nf irm ed by the hir ing of

W int er s. A t this ti m e, she ha s su ff ic ie nt e vid en ce to supp or t h er ag e d is cri m in at io n c la im . A ga in, the pr ope r fo cu s f or w he n astatut e of

li m itatio ns b eg ins to run is the ti m e o f th e d is cri m in at ory act . Cha rd on , 45 4 U.S. at8; Nanc e, 18 6 F .3dat 1 34 1. T his r ule w oul d su gge st tha t, a m ong the thr ee above da te s, the f ir st c hoi ce , Apr il o r M ay 1 9 9 9 , wa s th e ap p ro p ri at e s t ar t i n g d at e o f t h e l i m i t at i o n s p er i o dfo r B yrd ’s cl ai m s. T he Co urt f

ind s, how ev er , that this c as e be ar s su ff ic ie nt s im ilari ty

to St ur nio lo t o a ppl y e qui ta ble tol lin g. A s su ch , the c harg ing pe ri od d id n ot b eg in un ti l Byrd l earn edof t he Co m pa ny’ s h iri ng of Win te rs , or No ve m be r 1, 1 99 9. Moreover, cases decided by this Court after S turniolo suggest that Novem ber 1, 1999 , is the cor

rect star ting d ate. In H argett v. Va lley Feder al16

Savin gs B an k, 60 F . 3d 7 54 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) , the pla int if f- em plo y ee w orke d a s a pr obatio nary

e m plo y ee f or the de fe ndant- bank f

or j ust ove r fi ve m onths, f

ro m Jun e 1990 to Novem

ber 1990. T hen, the defe ndant di scharged plaintiff, c iting m arket co ndi tio ns a s it s r ea son. I n e ar ly 199 1, how ev er , dur ing avis it to the bank, the pl ai nt iff lea rn edof a y ou ng er em pl oyee pu rp or ti ng to pe rfo rm hi s fo rm er dut ie s. On N ovem

ber 15, 1991, the plaintiff filed an E EO C question naire, alleging that the bank h ad

dis cr im inate d a ga ins t hi m on the ba sis of

his a ge . O n F eb ru ar

y 11, 1992 , he f ile d asw or

n c harg e of

dis cr im inatio n w iththe E E O C a lle gin g, a m ong oth er thi ngs, a ge dis cr im inatio n. O n S ep te m be r 25, 199 2, he f

ile d su it fo r ag e dis cr im inatio n inf

ed er al dis tr ic t c ourt. T he c ourt gr an te d sum m ar y j udgm en t t o th e b an ko n th e b a s i s th a tth e p l a i n t i f f ’s EE O C c h ar g e wa s u n t i mel y. A ff irm ing the dis tr ic t c ourt, thi s C ourt l ooke d to the N ove m be r 15, 199 0, da te th atwas c it edby the pl ai nt iff to de te rm in e th athi s No ve m be r 19 91 EEOC questio nnaire and Februar y 1992 EE OC charge w ere filed outsid e the 180-day ch ar gin g pe ri od. I d. a t 76 0- 61. “ Apla int if f, w ho i s aw ar e that he is be ing re pla ce d inapos iti on, w hic h he be lie ve s he is ab le to pe rf orm , by ape rs on o uts ide th e p ro te ct edag e gr ou p, k no ws en ou gh to supp or t fi li ng a cl ai m .” Id . As lib er al ly a s th e Co urt c oul d c onstru e the f ili ng d at e of

pla int if f’ s c harg e, his excessive delay , which exceeded the applicable lim itations period, w as17

u n m i s t ak ab l e. As a c o n s eq u en ce , t h i s Co u rtup h el dth e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s c h ar a c t e r i z a t i o n o f

th e p l a i n t i f

f ’s a g e d i s c r i mi n a t i o n c l a i m as u n t i mel y. Inanothe r ca se , T ur lin gto n v. A tlanta G as L igh t C o. , 135 F . 3d 1 428 (1 1th Ci r. 199 8) , the pla int if

f w as alon gst an din g e m

plo y ee of the de fe ndant, ac cum ulatin g a lm ost

thi rty y ears of se rv ic e at

the ti m e he le ft

the de fe ndant- uti lity co m pany . I n F eb ru ar

y 199 0, he w as de m ote d f

or f ai lin g to de m onstrate j ob im pr ove m en t duri ng the pr ior y ear. T he pla int if

f pr es en te d e vid en ce that, be gin nin g a t the ti m e of

his de m oti on, the uti lity

de nie d hi m

the sam e tr ai nin g of fe re d to his y oung er

c oll ea gue s. H e w as tol d th at he w as inc ap ab le of

le ar nin g ne w sk il ls . By

Ju ly 199 3, h e h adaccu m ul at edfou r co ns ecu ti ve an nu al rev ie ws that rated his perform ance “below acc eptable.” He wa s transferr ed to another de partm en t. T he pla int if f the n ob ta ine d c ouns el , w ho p re pare d aw ri tte n pr ote st ag ai nst the tr an sf

er , but did not y et f ile an a dm ini str at ive c harg e. T he n, on Oc tober 12, 1994, the utilityinform ed the plaintiff that he would not be cons idered fo r a p os it io n fo r whi ch he rece nt ly app li ed . O n D ec em

be r 16, 199 4, the pla int if f fi le d ac harg e w iththe E E O C, and subs eque ntl y

f ile d su it in f

ed er al c ourt. T he uti lity

f ile d f or sum m ar y j udgm en t, arguing am ong o ther things that the plaintiff’ s claim s wer e untim ely . The district co urt a gr ee d, and g rante d sum m ar y j udgm en t t o th e uti lity . T he pla int if f ap pe al ed ,18

bu t o nl y as t o h is ADEA clai m

forth e Oct ob er 1 99 4 d en ia l o f an ot he r po si ti on . H e co nte nde d th at

the de ci sio n to tur

n hi m down w as ba se d onpoo r ev al ua tio ns, w hic h, in tur

n, w er e ba se d onthe uti lity ’ s im pr ope r de nia l of

tr ai nin g. T his Co urt a ff

irm ed the de ci sio n of

the dis tr ic t c ourt. I t he ld tha t the utility ’ s allegedly

discrim inatory

act of deny ing th e plaintiff a newpositi on was tim e barr ed . I d. a t 14 35. T he pla int if f co nc ed ed

that the O ct obe r 1994 de nia l of the pos iti on h e ap pli ed

f or w as not dis cr im inator

y on i ts f ac e, but arg ue d th at

the fa ilure to tr ai n f

ro m F eb ru ar y 199 0 to Jul y

199 3 gave r ise to the uti lity ’ s de ny ing him the pos iti on. Apla int if

f, how ev er , m ay

not use ti m e- barr ed

e vid en ce to he lp establish a pri m a fa ci e c as e of dis cr im inatio n. I d. “ [E ] vid en ce of [ the uti lity ’ s] pr ior tr ai nin g pr ac tic es c annot r en de r dis cr im inator

y [ its ] f ac ia lly ne utr al de ci sio n to d ee m [ the pla int if

f] unqua lif

ie d f or the [ posi tio n] . ” I d. S inc e the de nia l of tr ai nin g oc curr ed

y ears a go, pla inl y

out sid e the appl ic ab le statut e of li m itatio ns, th e Co ur t re fu se d t o c on si de r itas p artof t he pl ai nt iff’s cla im of r efu sa l t o h ire . T he pane l a lso r ej ec te d th e ap pli catio n of e qui ta ble tol lin g. I d. a t 14 35. T he c h ar g i n g p e r i o d“ mi g h th a v e b e e n t o l l e di f , i n th e p e r i o dp r i o r

t o th e 1 8 0 d ays be fo re f ili ng the ini tia l E E O C c harg e, [ the pla int if f] ha d no r ea son to b el ie ve he w a s av i c t i m o f

u n l a w f u l d i s c r i mi n a t i o n . ” I d . ( r e l yi n g o n R o s s v . B u c k e ye Cellulose Corp., 980 F.2d 648, 660 (11t h Cir. 1993 )). See ing evid ence, however,19

that the plainti ff protested vigorousl y against the utili ty ’ s failure to provide equal tr ai nin g op portun iti es , the Co urt r ef use d to appl y

e qui ta ble tol lin g to pr es er

ve his ri ght s. I d. T hus, the li m itatio ns p er iod barr ed the pla int if

f’ s c la im s. Inboth H ar ge tt an d T ur lin gto n, the pla int if fs ha d su ff

ic ie nt e vid en ce of

the ir age discrim ination claim s to file an E EO C charge within the lim itations period. I n Hargett, the plaintiff le arned of his y oung er r eplacem ent, but still waited eleven m onths t o c om

ple te an E E O C que sti onna ir e an d anothe r thr ee m onths b ef or e fi lin g anE E O C c harg e. I n T ur lin gto n, the pla int if f ha d su ff ic ie nt e vid en ce of

a ge dis cr im inatio n w he n he w as e xc lud ed f ro m tr ai nin g pr ogr am s ava ila ble to his y oung er c oll ea gue s. H is k

now le dge of

thi s e vid en ce w as de m onstrate d by his v i g o ro u s p ro t es tan ds o l i ci t i n g th e h el p o f al aw yer t o co m b at h i s empl o yer’s pr ac tic es . T he se de ci sio ns are w hol ly c onsi ste nt w iththe r at ion al e of the e ar ly ca se of Re eb : T he appl ic ab le li m itatio ns p er iod did not be ginto run un til the f

ac ts supp ortin g ac au se of

a ct ionbe cam e ap pare nt o r shou ld h av e be cam e ap pare nt t o a re as ona bly pr ude nt p er son w ithc onc er n f or his or he r ri ght s. Unlike the plaintiffs in Har gett or Turlington, By rd had onlya m ere sus pic ionof

a ge dis cr im inatio n un til D ill ar d’ s hi re d W int er s inhe r ste ad . U nti l the n, the r ec or d m ak es c le ar that sh e onl y

kne whe r posi tio n w as be ing e lim inate d, that the Co m

pany ’ s r ea sons f

or the e lim inatio n se em ed

le git im at e fr om

w ha t sh eDillard’s a lso argues that it is entitled to sum mary judgme nt on the merits of B y rd’s 4 ADEA c laim. The district court, howe ver, did not addr ess that issue. Althoug h we have the authority to affir m an entry

of summary

judgme nt on other g rounds, Robert Suris Gen. Contractor Corp. v. N ew Me tro. Fe d Sav. & L oan Ass’n, 873 F .2d 1401, 1406 n.8 (11th Cir. 1989), we make no r

uling a s to the merits of B y rd’s AD EA cla im, leavingthat issue for the district court to addre ss in the first instance. See , e.g ., Wil kerson, 270 F .3d at 1322; Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1007 ( 11th Cir. 1998). 20 knew about store sales, and that Dillard’ s had susp iciouslyreinstated the AA SM po si ti on in th e st or e. As wi th th e p l ai n t i ff

i n St u rn i o l o , e qu i t ab l e t o l l i n g o p er at es t o s av e B yrd ’s cl ai m s. A ga in, w ithno e vid en ce sup portin g ac au se of a ct ionf or a ge dis cr im inatio n un til D ill ar d’ s hi re d W int er s, the thi rd opt ionis the onl y

one consist ent with our prece dent and the facts of this case. Moreover, we are unw ill ing to cl ose the doo r on h er c la im s ba se d si m

ply on h er handwri tte n no te that sh e sus pe ct ed

a ge dis cr im inatio n. A cc or din gly , the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in g r an t i n g s u mmary j u d g me n to n B yr d ’s A D E Ac l a i m. 4 B. T he A A D E ACl ai m Su bst an tia l do ubt

about aque sti on o f state lawupo n w hic h apart ic ular ca se tu rn s s ho ul d b e res ol ve d b y cert ifyin g t he qu es ti on to th e st at e su pr em e co ur t. Mor en o v. N at ion w ide I nsur . Co . , 105 F . 3d 1 358, 136 0 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ( ci tin g Fo rg io ne v. Den ni s Pi rtl e Age nc y , Inc ., 93 F.3d75 8, 7 61 (11 th Cir . 19 96 )). R e s o l u t i o n i n th i s w a y a v o i d s th e u n n e c e s s ary p r a c t i c e o f g u e s s i n g th e o u t c o meWe note that, since the pa rties have filed their br iefs, anothe r fe dera l district court has 5 come up with a solution for inter pretingthe AADE A’s statute of limitations, Robins on v. Reg ions Fin. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1076-77 ( M.D. Ala. 2003). T his court proposed a va ri a ble ru le , whe re a

c la im w ou ld b e de e me d ti me ly if fi le d w ith in t

he lon g e r o f ( a ) t

he tim e presc ribed for

filing a fede ral AD EA cla im or (b) 450 da y s of the discriminatory

act. I d. 21 un de r st at e la w andoff

ers th e st at e co ur t an op po rtu ni ty to ex pl ic at e st at e la w. Id. I n th i s c a s e , w e f

i n ds u f f i c i e n tc au s e t o c e rt i f

y aqu e s t i o n t o th e A l ab a maS up r e me Co urt w ithr es pe ct

to the li m itatio ns p er iod

und er the A la bam a A ge D isc ri m inatio n inE m

plo y m en t A ct . CERTIFI CATION FROM THE UNITED STAT ES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T T O T HE SU PRE ME COU RT OF AL ABA MA PURSUANT TO RULE 18 OF THE ALABAMA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA AND THE HON ORABLE JUST ICE S T HE RE OF : By rd arg ue s th at

he r A A D E Ac la im

is not ti m e- barr ed

be ca use the A A D E A ’ s st at

ute of li m itatio ns i s tw o y ears and tha t sh e fi le d he r cl ai m w ith in that pe ri od. B yrd

c ont en ds tha t the 180 - an d 90 -d ay A D E Ali m itatio ns p er iod s refe rred to in the Ala

bam a statute can only

be interpreted as r efer

ring to the federal adm inistrative requirem ents. By rd also notes that at least one federal district court has held that the AAD EA ’ s statute of lim itations is two y ears. (Appellant’s Br . at 522

18 (ci ti ng Doo le y

v. Au to Nati on USA Cor p., 2 18 F. Sup p. 2 d 1 27 0, 1 27 6 (N.D. Ala. 2002 ). ) A lternatively , B yrd argues that if this Court finds that a 180 -day lim itation p eriod shou ld apply , the per iod di d not b egin to run un til Byrd discovered that Dillard’ s hired the 28-y ear- old W inters, or the tim e period wa s equit ab ly tol le d un til she f

ound out about the hir ing . Dillard’ s responds that By rd’ s contentio n that the AA DE A has a two-y ear statut e of li m itatio ns i gnor es the pla in m eanin g of the statut e. I t c ont en ds tha t the AAD EA s i m

p l y i n co rp o ra t es th e s t at u t e o f l i m i t at i o n s o f t h e A DEA . Di l l ar d ’s al so co nt en ds th atth e Alaba m a fed eral co ur t i nc orrect ly deci de d t ha t t he AADEA had a two-y ear statute of lim itations and refe rs to an Alabam a state ca se which held that, like the AD EA , plaintiffs have 90 day s to file suit after the E EO C issues it s n ot ic e o f th e ri gh t t o s ue . (App el le e’s Br. at23 (ci ti ng Herb stv. Ra yth eo n C o., Inc. , N o. CV -00-485, slip. op. at 2 ( Ala. Cir. Ct. De c. 12, 2000).) Ther efore, Dillard’ s contends , B yrd’ s AA DE A c laim is tim e-barr ed because she filed her claim outsid e the statute of lim itations period. B yrd reiter ates her a ssertions in her reply brief and adds th at the A labam a state ca se on which Dillar d’ s relies w as inc or re ct ly de ci de d.23

T he A A D E Apr ovi de s inr el ev an t part : A ny e m plo ym en t pr ac tic e au tho ri ze d by the f ed er al A ge D isc ri m inatio n inE m

plo ym en t A ct

sha ll al so b e au tho ri ze d by thi s article and the rem edies, def enses, and statute of lim itations , under th is art ic le sh al l b e th e sa m e as th os e au th or iz edby the [ADEA] ex ce pt tha t a

pla int if f sha ll not

be r equir ed

to pur sue any adm inistrative action or rem edy prior to filing su it und er this article. A la . Co de § 25 -1 -2 9 ( 1997 ). T he A la bam a Co de a lso pr ovi de s atw o- y ear de fa ult statute of lim itations wher e the appropriate lim itation p eriod is not enu m erate d specifically

in the code. A la. Code. § 6-2-38(l) ( 1984 ). O n it s f ac e, the A A D E Apr ovi de s th at it ha s th e sam e statut e of

li m itatio ns as the A D E A . T he A D E A , how ev er , ha s tw o su chli m iti ng p er iod s: 1 80 d ay s and 90 d ay s. U nde r the A D E A , apla int if f ha s 18 0 day s f

ro m the oc curr en ce of

the al le ge dl y un la wfu l p ract ic e to fil e a ch arg e o f ag e d is cri m in at io n wi th th e EEOC. O nc e a pla int if

f ha s r ec ei ve d no tic e that the E E O C h as dis m iss ed the c harg e, she h as 9 0 d ays t o fi l e h ers u i t . 2 9 U.S .C . § 6 2 6 (d )( 1 ) a n d(e ). Th u s , t h e A DEA ’s statut es of

li m itatio ns are int er

tw ine d w ithit s a dm ini str at ive r equir em en ts. Be ca use of howthe li m itatio ns o pe rate in the A D E A , it is dif fi cu lt, if not im poss ibl e, to tr an sf

er the m to the A A D E A . F or

e xam ple , doe s apla int if

f have to fi le sui t un de r the A A D E Aw ith in 9 0 or 180 day s of

the a lle ge dly

unl aw fu l conduct, or does a plaintiff rec eive a com bined to tal of 270 day s to file suit? E ven24

i f ap l a i n t i f f w e r e g i v e n 2 7 0 d a ys , th i s w o u l ds t i l l n o tb e th e s a me a mo u n to f t i me giv enapla int if

f unde r the A D E Abe ca

use , und er

the A D E A , the 90 d ay s do not begin to run until th e plaintiff has rec eived notice from the EE OC that a claim

has be endis m iss ed , 29 U . S. C. § 62 6( e) ; S an tin i v. Cl ev el an d C lin ic F lor ida , 232 F . 3d 82 3, 8 25 (11 th Cir . 20 03 ). Alt ern at iv el y , do es th e st at e d efau ltrul e ap pl y ? As shown here, we can only

guess as to whether the statute of lim itations precludes Byrd ’s AADEAcla im . T he A la bam a Su pr em e Co urt ha s no t answ er ed thi s qu es tio n. T he state ap pe llate c ourts o ff

er no d ef ini tiv e gui danc e. T he re fo re , w e ce rt if y the que sti on t o th e Alaba m a Supr em e Co ur t as fol lo ws: W HAT IS THE A PPLICAB LE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR A CLAIM BROUGHT UNDER THE AADEA? T o f ac ili ta te the r es olu tio n of thi s qu es tio n, w e dir ec t the Cl er k to tr an sm it the e nti re r ec or d of

thi s c as e, tog ethe r w ithc opi es of the part ie s’ br ie fs , to the A la bam a Su pr em e Co urt. C. T he S ta te -l awF ra ud C la im By rd asserts A labam a courts have consistentlyheld that em ploy ees can m ai nta in a ct ion s a ga ins t the ir f orm er e m plo y er s f or f ra ud i n c onne ct ionw ith ac ce p t an ce , t er m i n at i o n , o r c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o ym en t . B yrdal l eg es th at Di l l ar d ’s com m itted fraud when it m isrepresented to her the m aterial f act that the A AS M25

posi tio n w as be ing pe rm an en tly e lim inate d, int en din g to de ce ive he r ab out the poss ibilityof reinstating the AA SM position . By rd contends th at her r eliance w as re as ona ble be ca use she obs er

ve d ade cr ea se in busi ne ss and f ound pla usi ble the story about elim inating the positi on. Finally , B yrd contends th at she wa s injured by the Com pany ’ s m isrepresentations because she resigned und er the belief her posi tio n w as be ing e lim inate d and w as f or ce d to w ork a t a

sig nif ic an tly low er r at e of pay and s uf fe re d gr eat e m oti ona l di str es s. Dillard’ s responds that it did n ot comm it fraud because it m ade no m aterial m isrepresentation to Byrd, a s her positio n was e lim inated because of budget co nstra int s. D ill ar d’ s a sse rt s th at By rd ha s no t sh ow n any

e vid en ce of

an in te nt t o de ce ive a t the ti m e D ill ar d’ s to ld h er that he r posi tio n w as be ing e lim inate d. T he Com pany notes that Byrd’ s reliance on its alleged m isrepresentation was unr ea sona

ble be ca use she j um

pe d to the c onc lus ionthat sh e w oul d no t be successful in the cosm etics are a, did no t talk to any one working in the cosm etics area , and didnot attem

pt to work in that area bef ore re signi ng. D illard’ s further as se rt s th at

By rd suf fe re d no dam ag es be ca

use she m ad e m or e m one y w iththe co m bin at ionof

he r se ve ranc e an d he r St ei n M ar t pay than sh e w oul d have re ce ive d inhe r A A SM pos iti on. I n he r re ply , By rd r ei te rate s he r fr au d c la im and26

adds that the sto re m anager told her and another em ploy ee that D illard’ s was pe rm an en tly

e lim inatin g th e A A SM pos iti on. Under A labam a law , the e lem ents of fraudulent m isrepresentation are: “ (1) a mi s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f

mat e r i a l f

a c t ; ( 2 ) mad e wi l l f

u l l y t o d e c e i v e , r e c k l e s s l y, w ith out kno w le dge , or

m ist ak en ly , ( 3) that w as r ea sona bly r el ie d up on b y

the pla int if f unde r the c ir cum stanc es , and ( 4) that c au se d dam ag e as apr oxi m at e consequence.” B rushwitz v. Ez ell, 757 So. 2d 42 3, 429 (Ala . 2000); Ala. Code § 6-5-101 (197 5). Even construing th e evidence in a light m ost favorable to Byrd, the district co urt c or re ct ly gr an te d sum

m ar y j udgm en t onhe r fr au d c la im be ca use she did

not m ee t a ll of

the r equir ed

e le m en ts. S pe ci fi ca lly , a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt po int ed out , By rd did not present evidence that provided any genuine iss ue of m aterial f act as to the f ourth p ro ng o f the f

ra ud c la im , i. e. , that dam ag e w as c au se d a s apr oxi m at e co n s eq u en ce o f t h e a l l eg edm i s re p re s en t at i o n . B yrdd i dn o tre s i g n fr o m Di l l ar d ’s be ca use she w as tol d th at

the A A SM pos iti on w as be ing e lim inate d. S he did not w an t t o w ork inc osm et ic s be ca use she did

not thi nk tha t sh e co uld

se ll en ough pr oduc ts t o e qua l he r pr ev iou s sa lary . T he e vid en ce doe s no t su ppor t tha t sh e m ad e any e ff ort t o in ve sti ga te w he the r she a ct ua lly c oul d m at chhe r pr ev iou s salary if she chose to sell cosm etics. Ther efore, given the reasons for her27

re sig na tio n, he r re duc ed

inc om e af

te r she le ft

D ill ar d’ s w as not

apr oxi m at e co nse que nc e of

the Co m pany ’ s a lle ge d m isr ep re se ntatio n. A cc or din gly , be ca use By rd c annot sa tis fy a ll the e le m en ts o f a fr au d c la im , thi s C ourt sh oul d a ff irm the d i s tr i c tc o u rt ’s d i s mi s s a l o f th a tc l a i m. IV. C ONC LUS ION T he dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in gr an tin g sum

m ar y j udgm en t t o D ill ar d’ s on B yr d ’s A D E Ac l a i m. T h e r e f o r e , w e r e v e r s e th e d i s tr i c tc o u rto n th e A D E Ac l a i m, an d va cate the e ntr

y of sum m ar y j udgm en t t o D ill ar d’ s. W e de lay r em an d, how ev er , unt il the A la

bam a Su pr em e Co urt ha s an op portun ity to de fi ne the applicable lim itations period to Byrd’ s claim under the AA DE A. T he entire re co rd in thi s c as e, tog ethe r w ithc opi es of the br ie fs of

the part ie s, sha ll be transm itted herew ith. Further , the district court properly granted summ ary j udgm en t t o D ill ar d’ s onBy rd ’ s st at e- lawf

ra ud c la im . T he re fo re , w e af fi rm the d i s tr i c tc o u rt ’s j u d g me n to n th i s c l a i m. AFFIR MED IN PART, REVERSED AND VACATE D IN PART, AND QUESTION CERTIFIED.