alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2023271EN.01000302.xml

| 31.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 271/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.7.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 271/3

---

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 15 June 2023 — David Price v Council of the European Union

(Case C-502/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Action for annulment - Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community - Decision (EU) 2020/135 - Nationals of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - Consequences of that agreement on the status of citizen of the European Union and the rights attaching to that status for those nationals - Fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU - Locus standi - Conditions - Interest in bringing proceedings)

(2023/C 271/04)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: David Price (represented by: J. Fouchet, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bauer, J. Ciantar and R. Meyer, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders Mr David Price to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr David Price to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 452, 8.11.2021.

---
No. 10737.

#### McMahon., Admr., *v.*D. S. Ambach & Co., et al.

Decided December 1, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court of Franklin county.

*Mr. FI. H. McMahon,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Huggins, Huggins & Johnson; Mr. John*
      *446
      *R. Horst*and *Mr. Charles I. Stouffer,*for defendants in error.

Judgment affirmed on authority of *McMahon, Admr.,*v. *D. S. Ambach & Co., et al., 79*Ohio St., 103.

Price, C. J., Shauck, Crew, Summers, Spear and Davis, JJ., concur.
# C_2020279EN.01005301.xml

| 24.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 279/53 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 279/53

---

Action brought on 3 July 2020 — Esteves Lopes Granja v EUIPO — Instituto dos Vinhos do Douro e do Porto (PORTWO GIN)

(Case T-417/20)

(2020/C 279/67)

Language in which the application was lodged: Portuguese

Parties

Applicant: Joaquim José Esteves Lopes Granja (Vila Nova de Gaia, Portugal) (represented by: O. Santos Costa, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Instituto dos Vinhos do Douro e do Porto, IP (Peso da Régua, Portugal)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark PORTWO GIN — Application for registration No 16 308 462

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 April 2020 in Case R 993/2019-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO and the Instituto dos Vinhos do Douro e do Porto, IP to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the Instituto dos Vinhos do Douro e do Porto, IP to pay the costs.

Plea in law

Infringement of Article 103(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 671).

---
#### George E. BRANT, Appellant, v. Cora A. BROOKS, Appellee.

No. 71-718.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 9, 1972.

Rehearing Denied July 31, 1972.

George E. Brant, in pro per.

Frank McClung, Brooksville, for appel-lee.

PIERCE, Chief Judge.

Appellant Brant appeals an adverse judgment in a suit for ejectment, entitling *77appellee Brooks to the possession of the property involved and awarding certain damages.

Appellant did not include in the record on appeal appellee’s complaint, motion for summary judgment, attached affidavits, or the testimony or a stipulated statement of the evidence produced at the hearing on damages. This Court deferred action on appellee’s motion to quash the appeal until consideration of the appeal on the merits.

The record is insufficient to determine whether or not the trial Court committed error in entering the final judgment appealed. We, therefore, affirm the action of the trial Court. Castaldo v. Singapore, J. F. Inc., Fla.App.1972, 258 So.2d 499; Speight v. Dulimba, Fla.App.1968, 208 So.2d 833; Belfield v. Lochner, Fla.App.1964, 162 So.2d 668; Beyer v. Carey, Fla.1952, 61 So.2d 373.

Affirmed.

MANN and McNULTY, J., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 507 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 507

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                        August 5, 1994.
    Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker 
may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 4217) to reform the Federal crop insurance program, and for other 
purposes. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of 
order against consideration of the bill are waived. General debate shall be 
confined to the bill and the amendments made in order by this resolution and 
shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
ranking minority member of the Committee on Agriculture. After general debate 
the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall 
be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under 
the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by 
the Committee on Agriculture now printed in the bill, modified by the amendments 
printed in part 1 of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this 
resolution. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as modified, 
shall be considered as read. All points of order against the committee amendment 
in the nature of a substitute, as modified, are waived. Before consideration of 
any other amendment it shall be in order to consider the amendments printed in 
part 2 of the report of the Committee on Rules. Each amendment printed in part 2 
of the report may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be 
considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report 
equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, and shall not 
be subject to a demand for division of the question in the House or in the 
Committee of the Whole. All points of order against the amendments printed in 
part 2 of the report are waived. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill 
for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with 
such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote 
in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill 
or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as modified. The 
previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments 
thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to 
recommit with or without instructions.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
EX-10.35.6





 Exhibit 10.35.6 

SIXTH AMENDMENT TO MASTER REPURCHASE AGREEMENT 

Dated as of November 10, 2017 

Between: 
 LOANDEPOT.COM, LLC, as Seller 

and 
 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., as Buyer 

The Parties have agreed to amend (for the sixth time) the Master Repurchase Agreement dated June 3, 2016 between them (the
“Original MRA”, as amended by the First Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated October 19, 2016, the 12/16 Rewarehousing Letter Agreement (defined below), the Second Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated
February 28, 2017, the Third Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated June 2, 2017, the Fourth Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated August 31, 2017 and the Fifth Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated
October 30, 2017, the “Amended MRA” and as amended hereby and as further supplemented, amended or restated from time to time, the “MRA”), to recognize, and adjust for the fact, that the Facility Amount is now
comprised of a Committed Facility Amount and an Uncommitted Facility Amount as provided in the Fourth Amendment to Side Letter of even date herewith, and they hereby amend the Amended MRA as follows. 

All capitalized terms used in the Amended MRA and used, but not defined differently, in this amendment have the same meanings here as there.
The Sections of this Amendment are numbered to correspond to the numbering of the Sections of the Amended MRA amended hereby, and are consequently sometimes nonsequential. 

2. Definitions; Interpretation 
 (a)
Definitions. 
 The following new definition is added to Section 2(a), in alphabetical order: 

“Sixth Amendment to MRA” means the Sixth Amendment to Master Repurchase Agreement dated November 10, 2017
between the parties. 
 3. Initiation; Confirmations; Termination 

(a) Initiation. The following sentence is added as the new third sentence of Section 3(a): 

Each such purchase that is proposed to be funded from the Uncommitted Facility Amount (as defined in the Side Letter) shall be wholly
discretionary to Buyer. 












 7. Conditions Precedent 

(b) Conditions Precedent to Transactions. Section 7(b) is amended by replacing the period at the end of
Section 7(b)(xvii) with “; and” and adding the following new Section 7(b)(xviii) immediately following that: 

(xviii) if the Transaction is proposed to be funded from the Uncommitted Facility Amount, Buyer, in the exercise of its sole and absolute
discretion, shall have made an affirmative election to fund the proposed Transaction; 
 (The remainder of this page is intentionally
blank; counterpart signature pages follow) 

  
 2 













 As amended hereby, the Amended MRA remains in full force and effect, and the Parties hereby
ratify and confirm it. 
  

			
	JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Carolyn Johnson

		 	Carolyn Johnson
		 	Authorized Officer
	
	LOANDEPOT.COM, LLC
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Mike Smith

		 	Mike Smith
		 	Chief Accounting Officer
[No. 651-1.

Division One—Panel 1.

October 26, 1971.]

#### *In the Matter of the Estate of*James R. Boyle, *Deceased.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 196623, Donald L. Gaines, J., entered April 8, 1970. *Reversed*by unpublished opinion pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
#### Alan Berlly, Appellant, v Cynthia Berlly, Respondent.

[655 NYS2d 989]

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff husband appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mc-Caffrey, J.), dated March 14, 1996, as granted the defendant wife’s motion for a pendente lite award of maintenance, child support, and counsel and expert’s fees.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Modifications of pendente lite awards should rarely be made by an appellate court and then only under exigent circumstances such as where a party is unable to meet his or her financial obligations or justice otherwise requires *(see, Raniolo v Raniolo,*185 AD2d 974). Moreover, the general rule continues to be that the proper remedy for any perceived inequity in a pendente lite award is a speedy trial *(see, Gianni v Gianni,*172 AD2d 487). As this Court has repeatedly noted, pendente lite awards should be an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse *(see, Polito v Polito,*168 AD2d 440; *Shapiro v Shapiro,*163 AD2d 294), and are to be determined with due regard for the pre-separation standard of living *(see, Salerno v Salerno,*142 AD2d 670).

*554Based on an assessment of the foregoing considerations, we conclude that the pendente lite award of maintenance and child support was proper under the circumstances presented and should not be disturbed on appeal. In addition, the pendente lite awards of counsel fees and accountant’s fees pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 (a) (3) were proper.

The husband’s remaining contentions are without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Thompson, Altman and Luciano, JJ., concur.
The State of TexasAppellee/s

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 10, 2014

No. 04-14-00188-CR

Mike DAVIS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2011CR0287

Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Appellant Mike Davis’s court-appointed attorney has filed a brief and motion to 

withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts there are no 

meritorious issues to raise on appeal. Counsel provided Davis with copies of the brief and 

motion to withdraw and explained to Davis his rights to review the record and file a pro se brief 

and to file a pro se petition for discretionary review if this court determines the appeal is 

frivolous. See Kelly v. State, No. PD-0702-13, 2014 WL 2865901 (Tex. Crim. App. June 25, 

2014). Counsel’s letter advised Davis to immediately file a motion in this court if he wished to 

review the appellate record and enclosed a form motion for this purpose. See id. No timely 

request for record was filed in this court.

If appellant desires to file a pro se brief, we order that he do so on or before October 10, 

2014. The State has filed a notice waiving its right to file a brief in this case unless appellant files 

a pro se brief. If appellant files a timely pro se brief, the State may file a responsive brief no later 

than thirty days after appellant’s pro se brief is filed in this court.

We further order the motion to withdraw filed by appellant’s counsel is held in abeyance 

pending further order of the court. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80-82 (1988) (holding that 

a motion to withdraw should not be ruled on before appellate court independently reviews the 

record to determine whether counsel’s evaluation that the appeal is frivolous is sound); Schulman 

v. State, 252 S.W.3d 403, 410-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (same); see also Kelly, 2014 WL 

2865901 (appointed counsel’s duties of representation do not cease when he files a motion to 

withdraw; counsel must continue to “act with competence, commitment and dedication to the 

interest of the client” until the court of appeals grants the motion). Accordingly, no new attorney 

will be appointed for appellant at this time.
We further order the clerk of this court to serve a copy of this order on appellant, his 

counsel, the attorney for the State, and the clerk of the trial court. 

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 10th day of September, 2014.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
EXHIBIT NO. 31.1



CERTIFICATION

I, Marc T. Giles, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Gerber Scientific, Inc.;

2.   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.   The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)   Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)   Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;

c)   Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.   The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)   All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b)   Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.

Date:   December 11, 2003

| | /s/ Marc T. Giles                     | 
| | ------------------------------------- | 
| | Marc T. Giles
Chief Executive Officer |
#### M. A. MATHEWS and E. J. MATHEWS, def’ts. below, *vs.*NATHANIEL INGRAM, pl’ff. below.

Certiorari.

Upon the appearance of the parties, the defendants below claimed a trial by referees, who were appointed, and made an award in favor of the plaintiff below, for thirteen dollars and fifty cents; on which judgment was entered. The defendants below demanded a new trial, which was granted. The defendants below again claimed a trial by referees. The persons summoned as referees, after several meetings, reported that they could not agree. The justice then issued an execution on the judgment for thirteen dollars and fifty cents, though it had been opened and a new trial granted.

Proceedings below reversed.
Exhibit 99



Supplemental Segment Information

|                                   | For the fiscal quarter ended
October 31, | For the six months ended 
October 31,
|---------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------
|In thousands                       | 2007                                     | 2006                                 
|Orders Received:                   |                                          |                                      
|Sign Making and Specialty Graphics | $ 91,158                                 | $ 74,659                             
|Apparel and Flexible Materials     | 49,638                                   | 48,297                               
|Ophthalmic Lens Processing         | 19,107                                   | 19,593                               
|                                   | $159,903                                 | $142,549                             







|In thousands                       | October 31,
2007 | April 30,
2007
|---------------------------------- | ---------------- | --------------
|Backlog:                           |                  |               
|Sign Making and Specialty Graphics | $  4,997         | $  1,557      
|Apparel and Flexible Materials     | 42,614           | 43,197        
|Ophthalmic Lens Processing         | 1,200            | 2,600         
|                                   | $48,811          | $47,354
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

May 29, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135540 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 135540 

 COA: 271656 

Allegan CC: 05-014553-FC 

LARRY EUGENE KAHLEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 13, 2007 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

s0521 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

May 29, 2008 

 Clerk
# C_2020359EN.01001102.xml

| 26.10.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 359/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 359/11

---

Action brought on 26 August 2020 — Guasch Pubill v EUIPO — Napkings (Cleaning cloths, Table linen)

(Case T-538/20)

(2020/C 359/16)

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Marcos Guasch Pubill (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: R. Guerras Mazón, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Napkings, SL (Madrid, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the design at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Design at issue: Community design (Cleaning cloths, Table linen) — Community design No 650 627-0003

Contested decision: Decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 June 2020 in Case R 1051/2019-3

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision, upholding the plea of res judicata, and order EUIPO to pay the costs; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision, upholding the plea of res judicata, and order EUIPO to pay the costs;

| — | in the alternative, reject the pleas relied upon, annul the contested decision and give another decision in its place setting aside the declaration of invalidity in its entirety, or refer the case back to EUIPO so that it may examine the ‘additional grounds’ on which it has yet to give a ruling, and in any event order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

in the alternative, reject the pleas relied upon, annul the contested decision and give another decision in its place setting aside the declaration of invalidity in its entirety, or refer the case back to EUIPO so that it may examine the ‘additional grounds’ on which it has yet to give a ruling, and in any event order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 52(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 52(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.

| — | Infringement of Article 25(1)(b), read in conjunction with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 25(1)(b), read in conjunction with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.

---