alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2022418EN.01001001.xml

| 31.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 418/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 418/10

---

Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 15 September 2022 — PNB Banka AS v European Central Bank

(Case C-326/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Economic and monetary policy - Prudential supervision of credit institutions - Insolvency proceedings - Refusal by the European Central Bank (ECB) to grant the request of the board of directors of a credit institution seeking an order instructing the insolvency administrator of that institution to grant the lawyer authorised by that board access to the premises, information, staff and resources of that institution - Competence of the author of the measure - Article 263 TFEU - Measure open to an annulment action - Inadmissibility)

(2022/C 418/12)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: PNB Banka AS (represented by: O. Behrends, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Central Bank (represented by: F. Bonnard, V. Hümpfner and E. Koupepidou, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant: Republic of Latvia (represented by: J. Davidoviča, I. Hūna and K. Pommere)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders PNB Banka AS to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Central Bank (ECB). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders PNB Banka AS to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Central Bank (ECB).

---

(1)  OJ C 382, 20.9.2021.

---
#### Jose A. OCHOA, Appellant, v. Concepcion OCHOA, Appellee.

Nos. 72-866, 72-919.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 27, 1973.

Rehearing Denied April 18, 1973.

*268James R. Sabatino, Miami, for appellant.

Salley, Barns & Pajón and James F. Dougherty, II, Miami, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant husband seeks review of a final judgment awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to appellee.

In September 1971, appellee, Concepcion Ochoa, filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and was represented originally by Paul Steinberg who was replaced by James Dougherty, II. Good faith attempts were made by appellee’s counsel to obtain information concerning the nature and extent of appellant husband’s assets and income. However, appellant took evasive actions in response to these attempts. Appellee was awarded temporary alimony and child support. After trial commenced, appellee moved the court for temporary costs resulting from the failure of her husband to disclose truthfully the nature and extent of his assets and income. On March 14, 1972 the court granted the motion and required appellant to reimburse appellee’s counsel $1,482.51, which he finally paid after an adjudication of contempt. After extensive negotiation, on June 9, 1972 a property settlement was agreed upon, executed between the parties and made a part of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage on June 28, 1972. This settlement included a provision whereby appellant agreed to pay the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of her proceeding by the trial judge. After a hearing as to'the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, the lower court granted an award of $12,200 to James Dougherty, II and $700 to Paul Steinberg. Thereafter, upon motion of Mr. Dougherty, an additional $471.25 was awarded to him as costs which the court found to be directly attributable to the appellant’s false testimony throughout the entirety of the contested proceedings prior to acceptance of the settlement.

On appeal, the appellant is contesting the reasonableness of the award of attorneys’ fees and costs.

However, in oral argument the appellant did not contest the award of attorneys’ fees and costs as being unreasonable insofar as the value of the legal services were concerned, but rather he contested the amount based on his ability to pay. He alleged that the attorneys’ fees represented approximately 23-36% of his net worth. Nevertheless, he produced no witnesses in the court below to support this contention.

The issue of attorneys’ fees and costs was submitted to the trial court on stipulation of the parties and it follows where, as in the case sub judice, there appears to be no abuse of discretion, the judgment of the lower court must be and hereby is affirmed. See Lee v. Lee, Fla.App.1972, 262 So.2d 6; Lodding v. Dunn, Fla.App.1971, 251 So.2d 560; Johnson v. Kruglak, *269Fla.App.1971, 246 So.2d 617; Zohlman v. Zohlman, Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 532; and Pross v. Pross, Fla.1954, 72 So.2d 671.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.2.1

                       AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

     THIS AMENDMENT TO THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT DATED February 5, 1996 ("the
Amendment") is made and entered into this 1st day of February 2001 by and
between SeraCare, Inc., a Delaware Corporation  (referred herein as the
"Corporation") and Barry D. Plost  (the "Employee").

WHEREAS, the Corporation previously entered into an employment agreement on
February 5, 1996, (the "Employment Agreement");

AND WHEREAS the term of the Employment Agreement was previously extended  by the
Board of Directors  through February 5, 2002;

AND WHEREAS, the Corporation hereby wishes to amend the employment again;

AND WHEREAS the Employee wishes to have the employment agreement amended as
specified herein;

Now Therefore, the following extension and amendments are hereby agreed to by
both the Corporation and the Employee:

1.   The Term of the agreement has been extended through February 5, 2002.
2.   Effective February 1, 2001, the base annual compensation is hereby adjusted
     to be $300,000 per year plus an auto allowance of $750.00 per month.
3.   Employee shall receive 200,000 options with an exercise price of $3.25.
     Such options shall all have 7 year cliff vesting with accelerated vesting
     as follows:
          100,000 options will have accelerated vesting over two years beginning
               with satisfactory achievement of the fiscal year 2002 business
               plan, half upon achievement of plan, other half 1 year later.

          100,000 options will have accelerated vesting on the following
          schedule;
               10,000 options will vest immediately at the end of each month
               that the closing price of the Company's stock is $6.50 or greater
               for at least 10 trading days during the month.

     All 200,000 options shall be accelerated in the event of a change of
     control.

All other terms, conditions and provisions of the Employment Agreement shall
remain effective throughout the term of this Amendment.

I hereby certify that the above amendment was adopted by unanimous vote of the
Board of Directors on January 12, 2001.

                                         Hereby certified

                                         ____________________
                                         Jerry L. Burdick
                                         Corporate Secretary
#### Carolyn Palmieri et al., Appellants, v Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Combined Shows Inc. et al., Respondents.

[655 NYS2d 646]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vinik, J.), dated March 6, 1996, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiffs contend that the Supreme Court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because issues of fact exist as to whether the defendants breached their duty to take adequate crowd control measures to protect patrons exiting Madison Square Garden after a circus performance. We disagree. Where a plaintiff’s negligence claim is premised on the theory that his or her injuries were caused by overcrowding and inadequate crowd control, the plaintiff must establish that "he was unable to find a place of safety or that his free movement was restricted due to the alleged overcrowding conditions” *(Benanti v Port Auth.,*176 AD2d 549; *see also, Hsieh v New York City Tr. Auth.,*216 AD2d 531; *Palermo v New York City Tr. Auth.,*141 AD2d 809). Here, the injured plaintiff was allegedly pushed from behind by an unidentified person or persons while descending a crowded *590stairway leading to the exit doors. However, the injured plaintiffs examination before trial testimony indicates that a distance of three or four steps separated her from her daughter Susan, who was descending the stairway ahead of her mother. Moreover, while the injured plaintiffs daughter Mary Jo, who was standing at the injured plaintiffs side when the accident occurred, testified that people were "bumping into” her as she exited the building, Mary Jo was not pushed hard or caused to lose her balance. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly found that there is no evidence that the injured plaintiff’s freedom of movement was unduly restricted, or that she was unable to find a place of safety. O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 December 23, 2013

p1216

Order 

Clerk

December 23, 2013

147679 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 147679

COA: 306951

Wayne CC: 11-004605-FC

ELIJAH DUJAUN KEY,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 16, 2013 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the 

case of People v Eliason (Docket No. 147428) is pending on appeal before this Court and 

that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in the present application for 

leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the 

decision in that case.
# C_2020137EN.01005401.xml

| 27.4.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 137/54 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.4.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 137/54

---

Action brought on 20 February 2020 — Intis v EUIPO — Televes (TELEVEND)

(Case T-112/20)

(2020/C 137/84)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Intis d.o.o. (Zagreb, Croatia) (represented by: T. Nagy, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Televes, SA (Santiago de Compostela, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark TELEVEND — European Union trade mark No 15 547 871

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 December 2019 in Case R 1923/2019-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 60(1)(a) in connection with Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 60(1)(a) in connection with Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 98-48
M A CK A. M C C O RM I CK , A PP EL L ANT ,
V
. T OGO D. W EST , J R ., S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

Be fore KRAMER, I VERS, and STEI NB ERG, Judges

. O R D E R On May 3, 2000, the Court order ed that this case be sche duled for or al ar g ument. On that sa me da y , th e a pp e lla nt f ile d th ro ug h c ouns e l a

mot ion tha t th is c a se be c on so lid a te d wi th the c a se of Ro c hm an v . W

e st , U. S. Ve t. Ap p. No

. 99 -1 28 2 (N oti c e of Ap pe a l fi le d July 26 , 1 99 9) , c ur

re ntl y assig ned to a sing le judg e of t h is Court. As the basis for his motion, the appellant asse rts that c ou ns e l f or the a pp e lla nt i s th e same in e a c h c a se a nd that bo th c a se s " c on c e rn

wh e the r t he du ty to assist pursuant to the ' Fire -r el at ed provisions ' of the [Depar tment of Vete rans Af

fairs ( VA) Adjudication Proce dure Ma nual,] M21-1 [ here inafter Manual M21-1], require s the submission of a we ll[- ]g ro un de d c la im b e fo re be ingtr ig g e re d" a nd c on c lud e s that c on sid e ratio n of the tw o a pp e a ls toge ther will prese rve judicia l resourc es. Motion at 2.
On May 12, 2000, the Secre tary filed a motion in opposition to the appellant' s motion. The Se c r e t a r y a s s e rt s t h a t ( 1 ) t h e a

p p e l l a n t " h a s n o t p r e s e n t e d a n y c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s a s t o w hy the se case s should be joined"; ( 2) the two " case s are not at the same pr ocedur al posture" beca use the instant appea l is be ing sc heduled f or ora l arg ument and Rochman is stil l at the brief ing sta g e; and (3 ) " the me re fact th at the [a]p pe lla nts in b oth

c a se s a re ra isi ng du ty [-]to [-]a ssi st a rgume nts conce rning the [ Manual M21-1] . . . is not compelling" beca use Rochman may

be disposed of on a

n alternative g round. Motion a t 1- 2. The Court a lso note s that the two ca ses do not share a common nu c le us of

fa c t and tha t c on so lid a tio n w ou ld t

hu s u nn e c e ssa

ri ly re qu ir e thr e e jud g e s of thi s Co ur t to revie w the rec ord involved in the Rochman appea l; thus, contra ry to the appellant' s assertion, it does not appea r to be in the intere st of judicial economy for this pane l to review the Rochman a pp e a l.
On c on sid e ratio n o f t

he fo re g oin g , it

is ORDERED that the appe llant's Ma y 3, 2000, motion is denied and the Secre tary ' s May 12, 20 00 , mo tio n is g ra

nte d. Th e Court wi ll pr oc e e d to sch e du le or a l ar g ume nt i n th is c a se a t th e e a rl ie st tim e that th e bu sin e ss o f t his Court pe rm its

. DA TE D: June 16 , 2 00 0 PER CU RI AM

.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS  SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S  CONDENSED  CONSOLIDATED  BALANCE  SHEET AS OF  SEPTEMBER 30, 
1996 AND THE RELATED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS  OF INCOME AND CASH 
FLOWS FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS 
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          73,679
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  126,101
<ALLOWANCES>                                    60,604
<INVENTORY>                                     26,393
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               218,071
<PP&E>                                       2,111,794
<DEPRECIATION>                                 532,957
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,963,789
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          163,796
<BONDS>                                        328,454
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           940
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,313,340
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,963,789
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,025,412
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  574,855
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                66,507
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                14,399
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,388
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                240,553
<INCOME-TAX>                                    86,631
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            153,922
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   153,922
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.79
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        


</TABLE>
#### SALLY BETTS, widow *vs.*HEZEKIAH MATTHEWS.

A suit of dower *abates*by the death of the demandant, and cannot be prosecuted even for *damages*for detention of dower.

Summons in dower. Death of plaintiff suggested, and her administrator made a party; who prosecuted the suit for arrears.

*Houston,*for plaintiff.

*Wootten*and *Layton,*for defendant.

*Layton,*for defendant,

contended that the suit was abated by the death of the widow; not only as to dower, but as to arrears. By the death of a party, no suit *where the cause of action survives,*shall abate, &c. *(Const., art.*6, § 18.) Actions of tort are not within this saving, but fall under the common law principle, actio personalis moritur, &c. *(Parke on Dower*308-9; 1 *Cruise’s Dig.*17; *Tit. Dower, ch.*4, § 41; 1 *Lev.*38; 1 *Salk. Rep.*252; 1 *Show. Rep.*97, S. *C.;*3 *Mod.*282; 3 *Lev.*275, *S. C.)*

The action of dower sounds in damages; it is for a tort; ex delicto, not ex contractu; goes for damages for wrongful detention. If the tenant die, pending the action for dower, the action abates; if the demandant die, pending action, the suit cannot proceed; and, even after judgment for dower, if she die, no remedy survives for the damages. Damages are no ¿luty until assessed. (3 *Mod. 282; 2 Brown Ch. Cases*629-32.)

Houston.

—Damages for arrears of dower are recoverable only under the statute of Merton, which gives the action of scire facias for damages, after recovery of dower. Our own act, *Dig.*164, gives damages for detention of dower, “ in satisfaction of any demand on account of rents and profits,” treating this as as a debt, and indeed, a favored demand in law. I see not why it should abate.

Wootten.

—The right to damages for arrears of dower, is given *by*our act as expressly in the name and character of damages, as by the statute of Merton. It is a remedy for a tort sounding in damages, and as distinctly apart from any contract, as any other personal action which dies with the person. This is not a suit for rent, but for *damages*for a wrongful detention of dower.

*By the*Court.

—This is a real action. It is a demand of the land; and the damages are a mere accident given by the act of assembly. It is not even a mixed action. It is purely a claim for the land. The damages for demotion can in no case be recovered without recovery of the dower; and as this is impossible after the death of the dowress, the damages fall with her death. Nonsuit granted.
EXHIBIT 32
 
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the
dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.
 Date:  April 28, 2009
    /s/ Jeffrey S. GormanJeffrey S. GormanPresident and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)/s/ Wayne L. KnabelWayne L. KnabelVice President Finance
(Principal Financial Officer)  19
#### Ex parte Kenneth Lee RHINE.

77-519.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

July 28, 1978.

MADDOX, Justice.

WRIT DENIED.

TORBERT, C. J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 99.1(a)


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss.1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


 In connection with the Annual Report of  Homeseekers.com,  Inc, (the "Company")
 on Form  10-K  for the  period  ended  December  31,  2002 as  filed  with  the
 Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"). I, Thomas
 Chaffee,  Chairman  of the Board and Chief  Executive  Officer of the  Company,
 certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
                or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)    The information  contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
                material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results  of
                operations of the Company.




 /S/ Thomas Chaffee
 -------------------------
 Thomas Chaffee
 Chairman of the Board and
 Chief Executive Officer
 May 22, 2003


<PAGE>
November 2012 page 1 of 1 

# PACKAGING AND

CONVERTING



# AQUA

- LAMTM 3001 AQUEOUS DISPERSION

Laminating Adhesive

Description Aqua

- Lam 3001 aqueous dispersion is a waterborne laminating adhesive designed for metallized

- to

polyolefin insulation facing. It is designed for use with fire retardant additives. Aqua

- Lam 3001 aqueous dispersion adheres to a wide variety of substrates.

Typical Properties*

Solids 55 ± 1% Viscosity 100 cps, Brookfield RVT, #2 spindle, 50 rpm @ 25°C Weight/Gallon 8.6 lbs Polymer Type Acrylic Appearance Milky

- white

Shelf Li fe 240 days

*These items are provided for general information only. They are approximate values and are not considered part of a product specification.

Application Desired coating weight is 2.0

- 3.5 dry lbs/ream, depending on end use. This material i s effective when loaded with fire retardant powders. Desired coat weight when filled with fire retardant powders is 10 dry lbs/ream, including filler.

Drying and Combining Conditions Adequate drying is typically realized with a web exit temperature of 18 0°F or above. Evaluate completeness of drying based on your oven conditions and line speed.

Safety, Handling and Storage

 Store in cool, dry, well

- ventilated area.

 Follow good manufacturing and handling practices.

 Wash thoroughly after handling. Wash con taminated goggles, face shield, and gloves. Professionally launder contaminated clothing before re

- use.

 Follow label warnings even after container is empty. Contact the US EPA RCRA Hotline at

800

- 424

- 9346, or your local/state regulatory authorities, for proper disposal of empty containers.

 Refer to Material Safety Data Sheet for more information.

Aqua

- Lam is a registered trademark of Rohm and Haas Company.

These suggestions and data are based on information we believe to be reliable. They are offered in good faith, but without guarantee, as conditions and method of use of our products are beyond our control. We recommend that the prospective user determine the suitability of our materials and suggestions before adopting them on a commercial scale.

S uggestions for uses of our products or the inclusion of descriptive material from patents and the citation of specific patent s in this publication should not be understood as recommending the use of our products in violation of any patent or as permission or license to use any patents of the Rohm and Haas Company.

Visit us at http://www.rohmhaas.com/AdhesivesSealants Rohm and Haas Company, Midwest Technical Center, 2531 Technology Drive, Suite 301, Elgin, IL 60123

Phone: 847

- 649

- 3800 Fax: 847

- 649

- 3760
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Billy S. MONROE v. Charles FOTI, Jr., Sheriff, Orleans Parish, State of Louisiana.

No. 61999.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 5, 1978.

In re: Billy S. Monroe, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans.

Writ denied.