alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

ANTHONY ANTONIO MARTIN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. Civil Action No. 10-1957 

D.C. JAIL, et ai., 

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

FILED 

MAY 1 6 20U 

t,ltrk, u.s. District & Bankruptcy 

urts for the District of ColumbIa 

The Court dismissed this action without prejudice because plaintiff did not submit a 

certified copy of his trust fund account statement, including the supporting ledger sheets, for the 

six-month period immediately proceeding the filing of his complaint, as is required under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Plaintiff since has submitted the required financial information, and this 

matter is before the Court on plaintiffs "Motion [to] Keep Case Open." The Court will grant 

this motion, grant plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss this 

action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff, who currently is detained at the D.C. Jail, brings this action against the 

institution, the District of Columbia Department of Corrections and Sgt. Hazel Lee. He appears 

to allege that Sgt. Lee misconstrued an inmate grievance he submitted, and now demands 

compensation of $250,000.00. 

Federal district courts have jurisdiction in civil actions arising under the Constitution, 

laws or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In addition, federal district courts 

have jurisdiction over civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000, and the suit 

is between citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This complaint neither states a 
federal claim nor establishes diversity of citizenship of the parties. Accordingly, the Court will 

dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

United States District Judge
#### JONATHAN MORRIS *vs.*ENOCH HOLLIS.

Under circumstances the Court will direct a set-off of judgments in cross actions between the same parties, even after an assignment made with a view to defeat the right of set-off.

Trover for a gig and harness. — Plea, Not guilty.

This case came on immediately after the verdict was rendered in the case of *Hollis*vs. *Morris,*(ante p. 3,) and was in relation to a part of the same property; the gig and harness.

The defendant called a witness, who was objected to on the ground of interest in the event of the suit, as the amount of the verdict in the other case had been assigned to him on the record. It was said that the plaintiff would be entitled to set-off any judgment which might be recovered in this suit, against the judgment recovered by Hollis against him in the other suit, notwithstanding this assignment, which, under the circumstances in which it has been made, is a fraud upon him.

*Cullen*and *Frame*for plaintiff.

*Layton*for defendant.

*The Court*

sustained the objection and excluded the witness.,

The plaintiff had a verdict for $150 00 and a rule was granted, on his application, to show cause why this verdict should not be set-off against the verdict just recovered in the case of *Hollis*vs. *Morri*s; which, upon hearing, was made absolute. It appeared that the defendant in this case was insolvent, and the assignment of his verdict against the present plaintiff, had been made with a view to defeat the right of set-off, and with full knowledge, on the part of the assignee, of all the circumstances.
#### Fuqua *v.*Joudon *et al.*

(Division B.

January 28, 1935.)

[158 So. 795.

No. 31539.]

M. C. Young, of Aberdeen, for appellant.

*12Leftwicih & Tubb', of Aberdeen, for appellees.

*14Griffith, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellant and appellees made a trade by which appellant was to convey to appellees certain standing timber for a cash consideration of two hundred fifty dollars. The money was paid by appellees to appellant, who thereupon executed an instrument of writing purporting to convey the timber, but the document was drawn in such an imperfect manner as to have no operative effect. Later appellant declined to allow appellees to cut the timber, whereupon appellees filed their bill to reform the conveyance, or, in the alternative, to recover the money paid. Appellant defended on the ground, among other defenses, that the timber in question was a part of his homestead and that the instrument sought to be reformed was not signed by his wife. The court declined to allow the reformation, but decreed under the alternate prayer that appellees should recover from appellant the money paid with interest.

It *is a rule almost as ancient as the common law, and with but few exceptions, that where a party has paid money to another as the consideration for a contract and the contract so máde is void and unenforceable, so that the consideration wholly fails, the payor may recover the money back in an action of assumpsit for money had and received. Milam v. Paxton, 160 Miss. 562, 570, *15134 So. 171. To quote the ornate language of a distinguished jurist of the earlier days (Nisbet, J., in Culbreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64, 50 Am. Dec. 375), the rule has its foundations in “that naked and changeless equity which forbids that one man should retain the money of his neighbor, for which he paid nothing, and for which his neighbor received nothing; an equity which is natural — which savages understand — which cultivated reason approves, and which Christianity not only sanctions, but in a thousand forms has ordained.”

Appellant contends that the general rule does not apply when the money has been paid upon a contract void under the homestead exemption laws; and he cites Young v. Ashley, 123 Miss. 693, 86 So. 458. That case holds that had appellant, joined by his wife, sued to cancel the void conveyance, or to enjoin appellees from entering thereunder, it would not be necessary first to repay or tender the money received; but none of the considerations upon which the opinion in Young v. Ashley rests will prevent a strictly personal judgment against .the husband who received the money, for the reason that the judgment so obtained cannot be in any way enforced against the homestead.

Affirmed.
#### In the Matter of Carolyn K. Rosof, Respondent, v Leonard Bailin et al., Appellants.

[655 NYS2d 1003]

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Great Neck Estates dated April 27, 1995, which, after a hearing, denied the petitioner’s application for six area variances, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Great Neck Estates appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Winick, J.), dated Februáry 26, 1996, which remitted the matter to it for reconsideration.

Ordered that on the Court’s own motion, the appellant’s notice of appeal is treated as an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted *(see,*CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the determination is confirmed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits.

The petitioner applied to the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Great Neck Estates (hereinafter the Zoning Board) for six area variances to allow her to subdivide a single parcel of land consisting of two adjacent lots and construct a single family residence on one of them. The Zoning Board denied the requested variances, and the petitioner commenced the instant CPLR article 78 proceeding, *inter alia,*to annul that determination. The Supreme Court granted the petition and remitted the matter to the Zoning Board for reconsideration. We reverse.

It is well settled that local zoning boards have broad discretion in considering variance applications, and judicial review is limited to ascertaining whether the action taken by the board is illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion *(see, Matter of Fuhst v Foley,*45 NY2d 441, 444; *Matter of Cowan v Kern,*41 NY2d 591, 599). "Absent arbitrariness, it is for locally selected and locally responsible officials to determine where the public interest in zoning lies” *(Matter of Cowan v Kern, supra,*at 599).

In determining whether to grant an application for an area variance, Village Law § 7-712-b (3) (b) requires a zoning board of appeals to engage in a balancing test, weighing "the benefit to the applicant if the variance is granted” against "the detriment to the health, safety and welfare of the neighborhood or community by such grant” *(Matter of Sasso v Osgood,*86 NY2d 374, 384; *Matter of Eccles v Zoning Bd. of Appeals,*224 AD2d *613525). Applying this test, we find that the Zoning Board’s determination had a rational basis and was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the matter should not have been remitted for further consideration *(see, Sasso v Osgood, supra; Matter of Doyle v Amster,*79 NY2d 592, 597; *Matter of Cowan v Kern, supra; Matter of Bari Homes v Zoning Bd. of Appeals,*226 AD2d 368; *Matter of Four M. Constr. Corp. v Fritts,*151 AD2d 938; *Matter of Scarsdale Ave. Equities Assocs. v Board of Appeals,*199 AD2d 397, 399). Pizzuto, J. P., Altman, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.
#### Ronald Eugene REWIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-618.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 9, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
INDEX TO EXHIBITS


3(ii).1   Amendment of By-laws of Global Marine Inc., effective
          August 5, 1998.

3(ii).2   By-laws of Global Marine Inc. as amended through August
          5, 1998.

    4.1   Section II-7 of the By-laws of Global Marine Inc. as
          amended August 5, 1998.

   10.1   Form of Letter Severance Agreement dated August 5,
          1998, between the Company and nine executive officers,
          respectively.

   15.1   Letter of Independent Accountants regarding Awareness
          of Incorporation by Reference.

   27.1   Financial Data Schedule.  (Exhibit 27.1 is being submitted
          as an exhibit only in the electronic format of this
          Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q being submitted to the
          Securities and Exchange Commission.  Exhibit 27.1 shall
          not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 11 of the
          Securities Act of 1933, Section 18 of the Securities
          Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 323 of the Trust Indenture
          Act, or otherwise be subject to the liabilities of such
          sections, nor shall it be deemed a part of any registration
          statement to which it relates.)
#### THE STATE *vs.*SAMUEL TOOTLE, n.

Evidence of stealing a *lamb*will support an indictment for stealing a *sheep.*

Tlje court will judicially take notice that *Camden*is in *Kent*county.

Kent,

October Sessions, 1837.

Indictment for stealing *a*sheep. Proof that the thing stolen was *a lamb;*and that the property was found near *Camden branch.*

It was objected — 1st. That the proof did not sustain the indictment, as there was a clear distinction between a *lamb*and a *sheep;*and 2d. That there was no proof of the offence having been committed within Kent county.

*Per Curiam.*

The English statutes 7 and 8, *Geo.*4, *ch.*29, makes it a felony of death to steal “ any ram, ewe, sheep or lamband it has been decided *under this statute,*that proof of stealing a *lamb*did not support an indictment for stealing a *sheep.*But the reason of the decision is that the statute itself distinguishes between a sheep and a lamb. If our act were the same, the decision would be the same; but it makes no such distinction, and we think the proof sustains the indictment.

2d. As to the venue, it is incumbent on the state to prove that the offence was committed within the county of Kent; but it has been decided that where the offence was charged to have been committed in Sussex county, and proved to have b.een done at Lewesiown, the court would judicially take notice that Lewestown is in Sussex county. (1 *Harr. 326*— note.) The jury must judge as to the proof. *542If it shows the offence to have been committed at *Camden*or near Camden, we think they ought to take notice that Camden is in Kent county.

*Wm. H. Rogers, attorney general,*for state.

*Frame,*for defendant.

The defendant was convicted.
#### In re ESTATE of John F. WEIHE, Deceased.

No. 70-124.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 25, 1970.

Appeal from County Judge’s Court, Palm Beach County; Paul T. Douglas, County Judge.

Dismissed by Appellants-Virginia Montgomery and Hugh D. Proctor, Sr.
### On **- board	Circulation	and	Seating	Subcommittee**  **(Meeting	#4)** U.S.	Access	Board:	Rail	Vehicles Access	Advisory	Committee Subcommittee	on	O n - board	Circulation	and	Seating

April	11,	2014 9:30

– 12:00	Eastern 1.		Introductions 2.		Approval	of	the	Agenda (continued	from	March	26 th call) 3.		Review	of	major	points	from	March	20	meeting 3.1		Revised	Draft	vertical	access	document 4.		Vertical	Access	Discussion: The	goal	for	this	part	of	the	meeting	is	to	establish	proposed	physical requirements	that	will allow	for	the	creation	of	basic	floor	plans	and	options	that	will	facilitate more	concrete	discussion	and	help	us	formulate	recommendations. 4.1		Determine	Car	types	to	be	addressed 4.2		Lift	platform	size		X”	x	Y” 4.3		Seating	requirements
- scoping 4.3.1		Upper	level 4.3.2		Lower	level 4.4		Restroom	requirements
- scoping 4.4.1		Upper	level 4.4.2		Lower	level 4.5		Other	spatial	considerations 5.		On

- Board	Circulation: We	should	gather	all	the	known	shortcomings	of	what	has	been	done	under the	current	requirements.	Assume	that	we	have	arrived	through	the	side	door	and	are	moving	to the	accessible	area	of	the	vehicle.	Obviously	some	elements	listed	are	not	relevant	to	all modes while	others	are	basic	regardless	of	mode.	The	goal	of	this	exercise	is	to	create	a	list	of	known issues	including	mode	first	and	then	go	back	through	and	propose	recommendations	by	mode. With	these	proposals,	dimensional	plans	should	be	developed	so	impact	and	benefit	can	be discussed 5.1		Discuss	known	shortcomings	of	the	current	requirements

- technical	specifics 5.1.1		Car	entrance 5.1.2		Vestibule,	including	thresholds 5.1.3		Inter

- car	passage 5.1.4		Path	to	accessible	seating	area 5 .1.5		Wheelchair	Space 5.1.6		Wheelchair	storage 5.1.7		Priority	Seating 5.1.8		Seating	area	amenities	(window,	surfaces,	lighting,	power,	controls	etc) 5.1.9		Path	from	seating	area	to	the	restroom5.1.10		Doors	and	doorways,	including	operation

5.2		Identify	circulation	and	seating	issues	new	to	the	requirements 5.2.1		Space	for	service	animals	including	size	and	placement	relative	to	the	owner 5.2.2		Securement	devices 5.2.3		Emergency	Egress 5.2.3	Other 6.		Next	Steps 7.		Action	I tems 8.		Assignments 9.		Deadlines 10.		Next	Meeting
**Meeting	material	in	two	attachments**
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Treasury

###### Internal Revenue Service

# AGENCY:

Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

# ACTION:

Notice of meeting.

# SUMMARY:

An open meeting of the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Toll-Free Phone Line Project Committee will be conducted. The Taxpayer Advocacy Panel is soliciting public comments, ideas, and suggestions on improving customer service at the Internal Revenue Service.

# DATES:

The meeting will be held Tuesday, August 14, 2018.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Rosalind Matherne at 1-888-912-1227 or 202-317-4115.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    Notice is hereby given pursuant to Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. (1988) that an open meeting of the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Toll-Free Phone Line Project Committee will be held Tuesday, August 14, 2018, at 3:00 p.m. Eastern Time via teleconference. The public is invited to make oral comments or submit written statements for consideration. Due to limited conference lines, notification of intent to participate must be made with Rosalind Matherne. For more information please contact Rosalind Matherne at 1-888-912-1227 or 202-317-4115, or write TAP Office, 1111 Constitution Ave. NW, Room 1509, Washington, DC 20224 or contact us at the website:                     *http://www.improveirs.org.*                     The agenda will include various IRS issues.                

The committee will be discussing toll-free issues and public input is welcomed.

Dated: July 2, 2018.

Terrie English,

Director, Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.

[FR Doc. 2018-14640 Filed 7-6-18; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
#### Tony’s Ornamental Iron Works, Inc., Respondent, v National Building & Restoration Corp., Appellant, et al., Defendants.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[656 NYS2d 996]

Judgment unanimously reversed in the exercise of discretion with costs to plaintiff, motion denied in part, answer and counterclaim reinstated and judgment ordered imposing penalty in accordance with the following Memorandum: National Building & Restoration Corp. (defendant) appeals from an order and judgment striking its answer and counterclaim and granting plaintiff judgment in the amount of $178,136.36, as a penalty for defendant’s failure to comply with an order compelling discovery *(see,*CPLR 3126 [3]). Although characterized as a default judgment, the judgment granting relief under CPLR 3126 (3) is directly appealable because the relief sought thereunder was obtained on notice *(see, Banner Serv. Corp. v Hall,*185 AD2d 613). Defendant moved by order to show cause to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015. Because defendant did not appeal from the order denying its motion to vacate, the papers submitted by defendant on that motion are not before us and we do not consider them *(see generally,*10 Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac § 70:316).

A court may impose various penalties for a party’s willful failure to comply with an order compelling discovery, the harshest of which is "dismissing the action or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party” (CPLR 3126 [3]; *see, Corsini v U-Haul Intl.,*212 AD2d 288, 291, *lv dismissed in part and denied in part*87 NY2d 964; *see generally, Zletz v Wetanson,*67 NY2d 711). In view of defendant’s conduct during the course of discovery in this action, the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a penalty pursuant to CPLR 3126. We conclude, however, in the exercise of our discretion that the penalty imposed is too harsh *(see, Matter of Attorney-General of State of N. Y. v Katz,*55 NY2d 1015, 1017; *Kahn v Kahn,*43 NY2d 203, 210-211; *Kover v Kover,*29 NY2d 408, 415, n 2).

We therefore reverse the judgment, deny in part plaintiff’s motion, reinstate defendant’s answer and counterclaim and order that judgment be entered imposing a penalty of $5,000, plus costs and attorney’s fees, payable to plaintiff by the attorney who represented defendant prior to and at the time the order compelling discovery was obtained. (Appeal from Judg*910ment of Supreme Court, Oneida County, Grow, J.—Penalty.) Present—Denman, P. J., Green, Balio, Boehm and Fallon, JJ.
N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential.


# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

BRIAN C. DANAHA, Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTEC TION BOARD, Respondent

______________________

2017

- 2309

______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in No. CH

- 0841

- 17

- 0199 -I- 1.

______________________

JUDGMENT

______________________

N ORMAN J ACKMAN , Jackman & Roth, LLP, Lincoln, NH, argued for petitioner.

S ARA B. R EARDEN , Office of the General Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by K ATHERINE M. S MITH

.

______________________

T HIS C AUSE having been heard and c onsidered, it isO RDERED and A DJUDGED :

P ER C URIAM (R EYNA
, L INN
, and C HEN
, Circuit Judges ).

AFFIRMED

. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

E NTERED BY O RDER OF THE C OURT

May 7, 2018 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner Date Peter R. Marksteiner Clerk of Court
#### DORY AUERBACH REALTY CORP., a Florida corporation and Flamingo Realty Corp., a Florida corp., Appellants, v. SPRINGFIELD EQUITIES, LTD., a New York corporation, Appellee.

No. 70-950.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 4, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
FAA-110930-023

U.S. Department 

of Transportation 

Federal Aviation 

Administration 

OCT 2 0.2011 

Ms. Gale A. Brewer 

Council Member, District 6 

The Council of The City ofNew York 

563 Columbus A venue at 87th Street 

New York, NY 10024 

Dear Ms. Brewer: 

800 Independence Ave., SW. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Administrator Babbitt asked me to respond to your letter of September 26 concerning your 

petition for rulemaking regarding the placement of registration numbers on helicopters. 

We appreciate your effort to submit a petition for rulemaking, however, the petition is 

incomplete. To consider the petition we need a more complete explanation of your proposed 

action and its purpose. You should propose the language for a new or amended rule, or the 

language you would remove from the current rule. Most important, as the proponent for a 

change in the regulations, you need to provide an explanation of why your proposed action 

would be in the public interest, along with information and arguments that support your 

proposed action, including relevant technical and scientific data. 

These requirements are set out in our rules and we have also enclosed a copy of 14 CFR 

§ 11.71 for your information. 

Your letter has been added to Docket No. FAA-2011-1030. Please provide the additional 

information within 30 days of receipt of this letter so that we can process your petition as 

quickly as possible. If you have any questions or concerns or need additional time, please 

contact Frances Shaver, Office ofRulemaking, at 202-267-4059. 

Sincerely, 

~~~ 

Margaret Gilligan 

Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety 

Enclosure
#### Willie James BARNES, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-247.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

May 9, 1969.

Appeal from Criminal - Court of Record, Orange County; Edward J. Hanlon, Jr., Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.2


                             AMENDMENT NUMBER ONE TO
                        HAVERTY FURNITURE COMPANIES, INC.
                             1998 STOCK OPTION PLAN

         The 1998 Stock Option Plan of Haverty Companies, Inc. is hereby amended
as follows:

                  Section 4 of the Plan, entitled "Shares Reserved for the
Plan," shall be amended by deleting the second sentence of such Section 4 and
substituting the following new sentence therefor:

                           `The maximum number of Shares which shall be reserved
                  and made available for sale under the Plan shall be 4,000,000
                  (giving effect to the August 25, 1999 stock split); provided,
                  however, that such shares shall be subject to the adjustments
                  provided in Section 8(h).'

         All other provisions of the Plan shall continue in full force and
effect, and the foregoing amendment shall be effective on the date that such
amendment is approved by the Company's stockholders.