NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

VANESSA ESMERALDA LOPEZ-PENA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0070

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-002531-001

The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Brown & Little PLC, Chandler

By Matthew O. Brown

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 2-20-2020
STATE v. LOPEZ-PENA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

S W A N N, Chief Judge:

¶1 This is an appeal under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), from Vanessa Esmeralda 

Lopez-Pena’s convictions and probation terms. Lopez-Pena’s counsel 

identifies no issues for review, and Lopez-Pena has submitted no pro per 

supplemental brief.

1 We have reviewed the record for fundamental error. 

See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); Anders, 386 U.S. 738; State v. Clark, 

196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999). We find none.

¶2 A grand jury indicted Lopez-Pena for theft of a means of 

transportation and second-degree trafficking in stolen property. Before 

trial, Lopez-Pena moved to suppress her statements to law enforcement. 

She argued that she was not advised of her rights consistent with Miranda 

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and that her statements were involuntary. 

At an evidentiary hearing, the state presented evidence that during the 

relevant encounter,2 two detectives spoke to Lopez-Pena in her garage, 

covertly making an audio recording of the interaction, while other officers 

executed a search warrant at her home. Lopez-Pena was advised of her 

rights under Miranda at the outset, though the recording equipment was 

not turned on at that time. She sat on a folding chair during the 

conversation, which lasted forty-five minutes at most, and during that time 

an adult supervised her minor children inside the home. She indicated that 

1 The postal service returned as undelivered this court’s mailing to 

Lopez-Pena of the order authorizing a pro per brief. But Lopez-Pena’s 

counsel had earlier mailed her a letter explaining his Anders brief, notifying 

her that this court likely would issue an order permitting her to file a pro per 

brief, and promising to advise her of the deadline set forth in that expected 

order. Counsel did not report to us any issues concerning delivery of his 

letter or any later correspondence.

2 Lopez-Pena moved to suppress statements made during two distinct

encounters with law enforcement. At trial, however, the state presented no 

evidence regarding the second encounter.
STATE v. LOPEZ-PENA

Decision of the Court

3

she understood her rights and was willing to talk, and she never asked for 

a break. The court found the state’s evidence credible and therefore denied 

the motion to suppress.

¶3 At trial by jury, the state presented evidence of the following 

facts. In late 2012, Hertz Corporation reported as stolen a 2012 GMC Yukon 

XL that a male customer rented in New York and never returned. 

Approximately one year later, law enforcement saw an online

advertisement offering the Yukon for sale in Arizona. Investigation 

revealed that the advertisement presented a counterfeit Vehicle 

Identification Number (“VIN”) and a license plate associated with a 

fraudulent title history.

¶4 Posing as a potential buyer, law enforcement responded to 

the advertisement and spoke to Lopez-Pena, who set up a meeting between 

the “buyer” and her nephew. At that meeting, law enforcement inspected 

the Yukon and confirmed, via its confidential VIN, that it was the vehicle 

taken from Hertz and that the public VIN displayed on its door and 

dashboard was counterfeit.

¶5 Based on information provided by Lopez-Pena’s nephew, law 

enforcement executed a search warrant at Lopez-Pena’s residence. During 

a simultaneous interview, Lopez-Pena told detectives the following story. 

She had agreed with an acquaintance to sell an unspecified vehicle in 

exchange for a commission. When she complied with the acquaintance’s 

directions to pick up the vehicle at an appointed place and time, a group of 

men she did not know exited the Yukon and one of them handed her the 

key and title before walking away with his companions. Lopez-Pena and 

her nephew later tried to sell the Yukon to an automobile dealer, but the 

dealer’s representative refused the deal because the vehicle’s lack of 

documented history and the fact that it was titled in a third party’s name 

made him nervous that the vehicle might be stolen property. Lopez-Pena 

admitted that she too suspected that the vehicle was stolen, but she claimed 

that her uncle had checked the VIN and told her that it was fine. After the 

dealer refused to buy the Yukon, Lopez-Pena paid for it to be titled in her 

nephew’s name. She then posted the online advertisement offering its sale.

¶6 The court denied Lopez-Pena’s motion for judgments of 

acquittal. The jury found Lopez-Pena guilty as charged, and the court 

imposed concurrent three-year supervised probation terms.

¶7 We detect no fundamental error. Lopez-Pena was present 

and represented at all critical stages. The evidence supported the court’s 
STATE v. LOPEZ-PENA

Decision of the Court

4

denial of Lopez-Pena’s motion to suppress. The jury was properly 

comprised under A.R.S. § 21-102 and was properly instructed.

¶8 A person commits theft of means of transportation “if, 

without lawful authority, [she] knowingly . . . [c]ontrols another person’s 

means of transportation knowing or having reason to know that the 

property is stolen.” A.R.S. § 13-1814(A)(5). A person commits seconddegree trafficking in stolen property if she “recklessly traffics in the 

property of another that has been stolen.” A.R.S. § 13-2307(A). To “traffic” 

means, among other things, to “receive, possess or obtain control of stolen 

property, with the intent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise 

dispose of the property to another person.” A.R.S. § 13-2301(B)(3). Here, 

the state’s evidence established that Lopez-Pena took possession of the 

Yukon for the purpose of selling it and that she had reason to know that the 

Yukon was stolen. The jury’s verdicts therefore were supported by 

sufficient evidence. The court imposed lawful probation terms for the 

convictions. See A.R.S. §§ 13-901(A), -902(A), -1814(D), -2307(C).

¶9 We affirm. Defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to this 

appeal have come to an end. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 

(1984). Unless, upon review, counsel discovers an issue appropriate for 

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, counsel must only 

inform Lopez-Pena of the status of this appeal and her future options. Id. 

Lopez-Pena has 30 days from the date of this decision to file a petition for 

review in propria persona. See Rule 31.21(b)(2)(A). Upon the court’s own 

motion, Lopez-Pena has 30 days from the date of this decision in which to 

file a motion for reconsideration. See Rule 31.20(c).