NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

JORDAN ROSS HALL, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 21-0119 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-103974-001

The Honorable Karen A. Mullins, Judge Retired

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Amanda M. Parker

Counsel for Respondent

Jordan Ross Hall, Kingman

Petitioner

FILED 1-11-2022
STATE v. HALL

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

C A T T A N I, Chief Judge:

¶1 Jordan Ross Hall petitions for review from the superior 

court’s dismissal of his first notice of post-conviction relief under Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1. For reasons that follow, we grant review 

but deny relief.

¶2 In January 2014, Hall pleaded guilty to child molestation, 

attempted sexual conduct with a minor, and attempted child molestation,

all committed against a victim less than 15 years old and all expressly 

designated as dangerous crimes against children. In April 2014, the 

superior court sentenced Hall as stipulated in the plea agreement to a term 

of 20 years’ imprisonment for the first count, to be followed by concurrent 

terms of lifetime probation for the other counts. At sentencing, Hall 

received and signed a notice of rights of review after conviction, which 

included notice of his right to seek post-conviction relief and the 

requirement that he file a notice of post-conviction relief “within 90 days 

of the entry of judgment and sentence” should he wish to do so.

¶3 In August 2020, Hall filed his first notice of post-conviction 

relief. The notice requested that counsel be appointed and cited grounds 

for relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1(a) (constitutional 

violations), (c) (illegal sentence), (d) (in custody after sentence expired), (e) 

(newly discovered evidence), (f) (no fault for untimely filing), and (h) 

(actual innocence). Hall’s core contention was that he should not have been 

sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-705, the dangerous-crimes-against-children

sentencing statute that he described as “the statute meant for repeat sexual 

predators who pose a direct and continuing threat to the children of 

Arizona,” arguing that the statute was unconstitutional and that, because 

his offenses were designated as non-dangerous and non-repetitive, he 

should have been sentenced to a shorter term of imprisonment under A.R.S. 

§ 13-702(A) as a first-time felony offender. Hall acknowledged that his 

notice was untimely but asserted that the late filing was not his fault, citing 

lack of access to pre-2010 statutes and related authorities due to inadequate 
STATE v. HALL

Decision of the Court

3

legal resources in prison and ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing

as reasons for the delay.

¶4 The superior court summarily dismissed Hall’s postconviction proceeding without first appointing counsel. The court found

that Hall’s stated excuses for late filing did not justify a delay of more than

six years, that his guilty plea had waived several asserted bases for relief, 

and that all his arguments failed on the merits. The superior court granted 

Hall’s subsequent request for an extension of time to seek review, and this 

petition for review followed. We review the superior court’s denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 

538, ¶ 1 (App. 2011).

¶5 Here, the superior court did not err by dismissing all claims

in Hall’s notice—filed more than six years after judgment and sentence—as 

untimely. Any claim under Rule 33.1(a) asserting constitutional violations 

must be filed within 90 days after sentencing, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.4(b)(3)(A),

and untimely Rule 33.1(a) claims are subject to summary dismissal unless 

the defendant “adequately explains why the failure to timely file a notice 

was not the defendant’s fault.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.4(b)(3)(D); State v. 

Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, ¶ 7 (App. 1999). Similarly, claims under Rule 

33.1(b)–(h) must be filed “within a reasonable time after discovering the 

basis for the claim,” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.4(b)(3)(B), and such claims raised 

in an untimely notice are subject to summary dismissal unless the 

defendant “provide[s] sufficient reasons why the defendant did not raise

the claim . . . in a timely manner.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.2(b)(1).

¶6 Hall’s petition for review “contests” the superior court’s 

determination that he failed to offer an adequate explanation for untimely 

filing, but he offers no substantive argument to support his position, 

instead—and impermissibly—attempting to incorporate by reference 

assertions from his notice of post-conviction relief. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

33.16(c)(2)(D) (requiring the petition for review to include developed 

arguments supporting the relief requested), 33.16(d) (prohibiting 

incorporation by reference); State v. Hess, 231 Ariz. 80, 83–84, ¶ 13 (App. 

2012) (disapproving incorporating arguments by reference); State v. 

Stefanovich, 232 Ariz. 154, 158, ¶ 16 (App. 2013) (requiring a petition for 

review to cite relevant authority and meaningfully develop the supporting 

argument); see also State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 146 (1984) (requiring strict 

compliance with procedural rules for post-conviction relief).

¶7 Moreover, even considering the assertions Hall presented in

superior court, Hall failed to provide an adequate explanation for his over-
STATE v. HALL

Decision of the Court

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six-year delay in filing a first notice of post-conviction relief. As the 

superior court observed, Hall received and signed a “notice of rights of 

review after conviction” at his sentencing, a document that specifically 

included a warning—in bold lettering—that a notice of post-conviction 

relief must be filed within 90 days. The notice also informed Hall, who was 

represented at the time, that he could ask his attorney to seek postconviction relief and could even file the notice “before you leave the 

courtroom on the day you are sentenced if you wish.” Hall did not and 

does not allege that this written warning was inadequate to inform him of 

the time to file for post-conviction relief or that counsel failed to file a notice

on his behalf despite a timely request. Cf. Poblete, 227 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 6.

¶8 Further, Hall’s explanation for not filing for post-conviction 

relief sooner—that the prison law library did not have and his counsel at 

sentencing did not provide him pre-2010 statutes and related authorities—

does not excuse his six-year delay, particularly given that, by his own 

account, he had access to the relevant statutes and case law applicable to 

his offenses (committed in 2012). See, e.g., State v. Harden, 228 Ariz. 131, 132, 

¶ 4 (App. 2011). Absent any adequate explanation for why Hall was unable 

to raise his claims in a timely manner, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.2(b)(1), 

33.4(b)(3)(B), (D), the superior court did not abuse its discretion by

summarily dismissing Hall’s notice of post-conviction relief in its entirety. 

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.11(a).

¶9 Because Hall’s notice was untimely, the superior court was 

not required to appoint counsel for Hall before dismissing the proceeding. 

Rule 33.5(a) requires appointment of counsel on request only if an indigent 

defendant timely files a first notice of post-conviction relief. See also Harden, 

228 Ariz. at 134, ¶ 11. Although Hall asserts that his right to post-conviction 

counsel is “absolute” under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), that case 

simply held that federal habeas corpus review remains available for 

procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel when 

the defendant had no post-conviction counsel (or ineffective assistance of 

post-conviction counsel). Id. at 17. Martinez did not alter established 

Arizona law regarding appointment of post-conviction counsel. Cf. State v. 

Escareno-Meraz, 232 Ariz. 586, 587, ¶ 6 (App. 2013).

¶10 Finally, Hall raises a new argument challenging the superior 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction based on the notion that the Arizona 

Supreme Court ruled § 13-705 unconstitutional and thereby deprived the 

superior court of subject matter jurisdiction to impose a sentence under that 

provision. But Hall did not raise this contention in his notice of postconviction relief, and a petition for review may not raise new issues not first 
STATE v. HALL

Decision of the Court

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presented to the superior court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.16(c)(2)(B); State v. 

Bortz, 169 Ariz. 575, 577–78 (App. 1991); see also State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 403, ¶ 42 (App. 2007) (noting that there is no review for fundamental 

error in a post-conviction relief proceeding). Moreover, § 13-705 has not 

been held unconstitutional. The cases Hall cites did not hold the 

dangerous-crimes-against-children sentencing provision facially 

unconstitutional and instead invalidated sentences rendered under a prior 

version of the statute as unduly harsh as applied under the “specific facts

and circumstances” of those cases. See State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377, 381, 388, 

¶¶ 11, 48–49 (2003); State v. Bartlett, 171 Ariz. 302, 306–11 (1992).

¶11 Accordingly, we grant review but deny relief.