* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

.

R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-60791

Summary Calendar

JANITA WEST,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

(No. 3:00-CV-437-WS)

________________________________________________ May 22, 2002

Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff-appellant Janita West appeals from an adverse

summary judgment dismissing her Title VII c laim as time-barred.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

West is employed by defendant-appellee Mississippi Department

of Public Safety (the “Department”) as a state trooper. She claims1 On appeal, West does not challenge the district court’s

summary dismissal of her claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress; she only contests the dismissal of her Title

VII claim.

2 that from 1987 until April 1998, she was sexually harassed and

discriminated against by her supervisor. Importantly, in her

deposition testimony and in discovery responses, West admitted that

no incidents of alleged harassment occurred after April 1998, when

she initiated an internal grievance procedure. When the internal

grievance procedure did not yield the relief she sought, West filed

a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

C ommission (“EEOC”) in late February or early March of 2000.

Thereafter, West filed this suit, asserting claims for gender

discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and for

intentional inflict ion of emotional distress in violation of

Mississippi law. On the Department’s motion for summary judgment,

the district court dismissed West’s complaint with prejudice. West

timely appealed. 1

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s grant of summar y judgment de

novo, applying the same standard as the district court. M orris v.

Covan World Wide Moving, Inc. , 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); C elotex Corp. v. Catrett

,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists only “if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict3

for the non-moving party.” A nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.

, 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In this case, we find that the district court properly

dismissed West’s Title VII claim as untimely. A Title VII claimant

must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days

of the alleged unlawful event. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Timely

filing of a charge with the EEOC is a prerequisite to maintaining

a Title VII action. U nited Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans

, 431 U.S. 553,

555 n.4 (1977). Although she admitted that she was not subjected

to any alleged unlawful conduct after April 1998, West waited

almost two years before filing her charge with the EEOC.

Accordingly, West’s Title VII claim is barred as she failed to file

her EEOC charge within Title VII’s 180-day window.

West argued to the district court that the limitations period

should be equitably tol led because state law required her to

exhaust internal grievan ce procedures before filing a complaint

with the EEOC. The district court properly rejected this

contention, as “the pendency of a grievance, or some other method

of collateral review of an employment decision, does not toll the

running of the limitations period.” D elaware State College v.

Ricks

, 449 U.S . 250, 261 (1980); s ee also Holmes v. Texas A&M

Univ. , 145 F.3d 681, 684-85 (5th Cir. 1998).

West attempts to avoid the district court’s correct

disposition of her Title VII claim by presenting two new arguments

that she ad mits were not presented to the district court. We4

decline to consider these arguments as they were raised for the

f irst time on appeal. S ee Little v. Liquid Air Corp.

, 37 F.3d

1069, 1071 n.1 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[T]he plaintiffs may not

advance on appeal new theories or raise new issues not properly

before the district court to obtain reversal of the summary

judgment.”).

III. CONCLUSION

The district court prope rly granted summary judgment on the

record before it. The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.