alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### S. T. PATRICK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 66-1020.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Oct. 17, 1967.

S.T. Patrick, in pro. per.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Arden M. Siegendorf, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

BARKDULL, Judge.

The appellant appeals from a judgment of conviction of larceny of an automobile, and sentence thereon. He has, at his own request, conducted these proceedings in pro-pria persona. Compare: Swarthout v. State, Fla.App.1964, 165 So.2d 773; Cook v. State, Fla.App.1964, 167 So.2d 793.

A review of the appellant’s brief indicates that he raises the following issues: That he was not adequately advised of his constitutional right to counsel. That he was denied the right to subpoena witnesses. That he was prejudiced by the failure to have a preliminary hearing.

*63As to the first issue, the arresting officer testified as follows:

> 

> “Q. Did you advise him specifically of any of his constitutional rights?

> “A. Yes, sir, I 'did.

> “Q. What did you advise him?

> “A. I advised him that anything that he said might be held against him, that he had the right to an attorney present at the time of the questioning or the State would furnish him with an attorney if he didn’t have the money.

> 

> “Q. What did he say in regards to your advising him of his rights ?

> “A. He said that he didn’t need a lawyer. He said that he had bought the car.”

> JjC 5JÍ

Thereafter, the officer testified that the appellant gave conflicting statements as to where he obtained the automobile which was in his possession. The appellant took the stand in his own defense, but did not deny the testimony given by the arresting officer in regard to the advice he received in reference to his constitutional rights, but contended that he “bought” the stolen automobile. Neither did he deny that he told the arresting officer that he did not need a lawyer. We find that the appellant was duly advised of his constitutional rights and, by his actions, declined his right to counsel. Brisbon v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 201 So.2d 832.

The record fails to demonstrate that the appellant ever requested the trial court or the State attorney’s office to subpoena witnesses on his behalf. Therefore, no error is found in this regard. No opportunity was presented to the trial court to comply with what appears to be a belated thought by the appellant. Shea v. State, Fla.App.1964, 167 So.2d 767; Silver v. State, Fla. 1966, 188 So.2d 300.

The record fails to indicate whether or not the appellant was granted a preliminary hearing, but even if he did not have one this would not be reversible error. The holding of a preliminary hearing is not a prerequisite to a criminal prosecution. Baugus v. State, Fla.1962, 141 So.2d 264; Hoffman v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 169 So.2d 38.

Therefore, following a review of the record on appeal and briefs of the respective parties, the judgment of conviction and sentence here under, review is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 23
- 0142 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. CHEYENE LEILANI

– AMBER ZIELIE,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including January 5, 2024 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

November 28 2023

11/28/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0142
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-20038

Conference Calendar

 

RAY LEE MORGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BROWN & wILLIAMSON; RJ REYNOLDS 

TOBACCO CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-00-CV-2116

--------------------

April 11, 2001

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ray Lee Morgan, Texas prisoner # 299341, challenges the

district court’s dismissal as frivolous of his civil lawsuit

against two tobacco companies, alleging that they had caused him

to become addicted to tobacco, which he has smoked for 35 years,

injuring his respiratory system.

Morgan has not alleged any basis for federal jurisdiction,

and the district court’s dismissal of his complaint was thus

proper. See Bickford v. Int’l Speedway Corp., 654 F.2d 1028,
No. 01-20038

-2-

1031 (5th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, the district court’s judgment

is AFFIRMED.
#### MOORE *v.*EPSTEIN.

1. Venue — Torts—Change of Residence — Statutes.

Married man living in his own home with his family in county of Wayne continued to be resident of said county within meaning of 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13997, requiring actions founded on wrongs to be commenced and tried in county where one of parties resides, although his employer gave him temporary employment in another county, where his family continued to live in home, he returned home two or three times a week, and there is no evidence of intention to reside elsewhere.

2. Same — Jurisdiction—Nonresidents.

Motion to dismiss action for personal injuries on ground .of lack of jurisdiction should have been granted, where neither party resided in county where action was commenced (3 Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 13997, 15504).

*426Appeal from Genesee; Black (Edward D.), J.

Submitted April 21, 1932.

(Docket No. 87, Calendar No. 36,016.)

Decided June 6, 1932.

Case by Clarence C. Moore, by next friend, against Ben Epstein for personal injuries. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Reversed.

*Bernstein & Bernstein*(Carton, *Gault & Parker,*of counsel), for plaintiff.

*Roivard D. Brown (George R. Gary,*of counsel), for defendant.

Clark, C. J.

Plaintiff, a minor, riding a bicycle, suffered personal injuries in a collision with defendant’s automobile, driven by him on a street in Detroit, Wayne county. Plaintiff, a resident of the county, brought suit in the circuit court thereof, as did also his father. Service was obtained on defendant without difficulty appearing of record. The father’s suit went to trial and defendant prevailed. Defendant’s assertion that his consent to discontinuance of the son’s case was obtained by trick is not denied on this record.

Immediately, the suit of the minor, plaintiff here, was commenced again in the county of Genesee. Defendant moved to quash and to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13997:

> “All actions founded upon wrongs, and contracts, except as hereiji otherwise provided, shall be commenced and tried in the county where one of the parties shall reside at the time of commencing such action. ’ ’ ’

*427The motion was denied and the question has been saved for review. 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 15504. Plaintiff had verdict and judgment. Defendant has appealed.

The plaintiff resided in "Wayne county. The accident happened there. If defendant was also a resident of Wayne, the action should have been commenced there under the statute.

Defendant’s employer had given him temporary employment in Genesee. Defendant owned his home in Wayne, where he, his wife, and children resided. During the temporary employment, he returned to his home and family two or three times a week. There is no evidence of intention to reside elsewhere. Within the meaning of the statute, defendant was not a resident of Genesee. *Loder*v. Littlefield, 39 Mich. 512; note 26 A. L. R. 180; *Jacobson*v. *Wayne Circuit Judge,*76 Mich. 234; *Haywood*v. *Johnson,*41 Mich. 598.

Reversed, with costs, and remanded for dismissal.

McDonald, Potter, Sharpe, North, Fead, Wiest, and Butzel, JJ., concurred.
#### RENUART-BAILEY-CHEELY LUMBER AND SUPPLY COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Richard Allen HALL, Appellee.

No. 72-480.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 11, 1972.

*85Gong & Storace, Miami, for appellant.

Podhurst, Orseck & Parks, Fuller, Bru-mer, Moss & Cohen, Miami, for appellee.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Renuart-Bailey-Cheely Lumber and Supply Company, brings this interlocutory appeal from an order of the lower court denying its motion to set aside default.

A review of the record on appeal reveals that a default was entered against defendant-appellant when no answer or other response was filed following the receipt of plaintiff-appellee’s complaint. After entry of the default, neither a motion for final judgment nor any other pleading, order or notice was filed nor any hearing held on this cause until defendant-appellant moved to set aside the default. In affidavits filed subsequent to the default, defendant-appellant stated that when the complaint was received it was transmitted to the appropriate insurance department office within the Renuart-Bailey-Cheely organization. This office was in the process of moving and the complaint was temporarily lost. When the complaint was eventually found, it was forwarded to the insurance company who refused to defend the suit because the subject default was already entered. Defendant-appellant then turned the matter over to their attorneys who did everything possible to vacate the default.

On these facts we find that the lower court should have vacated the default based upon the defense of excusable neglect. North Shore Hospital, Inc. v. Barber, Fla.1962, 143 So.2d 849; Imperial Industries, Inc. v. Moore Pipe and Sprinkler Co., Fla.App.1972, 261 So.2d 540; General Finance Corp. v. Northside Bank of Miami, Fla.App.1968, 212 So.2d 917. By this action no prejudice will be worked against any party.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Paula Fletcher CADIERE v. WEST GIBSON PRODUCTS CO., INC., etc., et al.

No. 62050.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 5, 1978.

In re: Paula Fletcher Cadiere applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of Terrebonne.

Writ granted.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.
#### Hyde, *et al., v.*Pinkard, *surv.*

It is error to render a final decree on default of appearance at the return term.

*Appeal from Desha Circuit Court in Chancery.*

Hon. William M. Harrison, Circuit Judge..

English & Wilsiiire, for appellants. •

Garland & Nash, for appellee.

Compton, J.

The defendants in the court below procured an order of this court, at December term-, 1866, grafting them an appeal in this cause.

*164The bill was filed to enforce a vendor’s lien. The defendants having been served with process of subpoena thirty days before the return thereof, failed to appear; and a final decree was entered against them, at. the return term. This was error. According to section 19, of chapter 28, Gould’s Digest, the decree should have been interlocutory,.not final. See *Gordon v. Church, 11 Ark., 118,*where sections 19, 20 and 21 of this chapter of the Digest, in reference to interlocutory and final decrees, are remarked upon and construed.

Let the decree be reversed and the cause remanded, with leave to the defendants to enter their appearance in the court below and to make such defense as they may choose.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000042872
<NAME> FRESNIUS MEDICAL CARE HOLDINGS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
<CURRENCY> U.S. Dollars
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           8,797
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  189,882
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    172,677
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               782,471
<PP&E>                                         501,859
<DEPRECIATION>                                  66,524
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,629,480
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          437,037
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     16,318
<COMMON>                                        90,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,843,650
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,629,480
<SALES>                                        353,291
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,903,980
<CGS>                                          238,898
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,197,731
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               417,872
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                50,187
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             155,059
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 83,131
<INCOME-TAX>                                    46,416
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             36,715
<DISCONTINUED>                               (105,897)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (69,182)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.77)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
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<PAGE>
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<PP&E>                                         244,258
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<CGS>                                            5,582
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  144,738
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (503)
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,268
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 23,245
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</TABLE>
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order
Lansing, Michigan
April 2, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 135052(75) Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices
ALLEN M. HARTMAN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Lou Hartman, Plaintiff-Appellant, SC: 135052

v COA: 257536 St. Clair CC: 02-000445-NH PORT HURON HOSP ITAL, FORREST BRYAN FERNANDEZ,M.D., and JALAL UD-DIN AKBAR, M.D., Defendants-Appellees.

___________________ _________________
On order of the Chief Jus tice, the motion by defendant- appellee to allow late filing of their motion for review of the ta xation of costs is considered and it is GRANTED and the Clerk is directed to file the motion today. Plaintiff-appellant may respond to the moti on by April 15, 2008.

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
April 2, 2008
Clerk
##### 



Exhibit 32.2
 Certification Required by 18 U.S.C. Section 1350  (as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)
  (1)
    
    the accompanying Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2007
(the Report), filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
and
 (2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/  Randy L. KotlerRandy L. KotlerExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
October 2, 2015

Mr. Clark Hymas

ConAgra Foods, Inc.

230514 South 100 Circles PRSW

Paterson, WA 99345

Dear Mr. Hymas :

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your petition for an exemption from

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we cannot process your

request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can n o t Process Your Request

We received your June 8, 2015

, exemption request on behalf of ConAgra Foods, Inc. filed in

D ocket No

. FAA− 20 15

− 2782 , but we are unable to process your request any further. Your

petition does no t comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider

the request any further, you must send us all of the following:

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief.

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would

benefit the public as a whole.

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you

seek an exemptio n.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

For more detailed information relating to submitting petitions for exemption, please visit

http://aes.faa.gov/petition/index.html . This website helps the petitioner to meet Federal

Aviation A dministration (FAA) requirement outlines in § 11.81 and helps answer any

questions you may have.2

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must submit the requested information

within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your petition for exemption

at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further.

If you have any questions you may call the 333 Information Line (202) 267

- 2999.

Sincerely,

/ s/

Brittany Newton

Program Analyst, Airmen and

Airspace Rules Div ision

Enclosure s34
#### BILL CURRIE FORD, INC., Appellant, v. Joyce CASH, Appellee, and William Wesley Thomas and Tampa Sand and Material Co., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 70-575.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Sept. 8, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 8, 1971.

David J. Kadylc, and Charles W. Pittman, of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellant.

Mixon & Bonner, and Ben Sidwell of Sidwell, Cheatwood & Smith, Tampa, for appellee, Joyce Cash.

Edward M. Waller, Jr., of Fowler, White, Gillen, Humkey, Kinney & Boggs, Tampa, for appellees, William Wesley Thomas and Tampa Sand and Material Co.

MANN, Judge.

In Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., Fla.App.2d 1967, 202 So.2d 8, this court upheld a settlement agreement between a plaintiff and one of two independently acting tort-feasors, both of which participate in the trial and the liability of one of which is variable according to the outcome. Here we affirm a trial judge’s sound refusal to allow the non-settling defendant to introduce before the jury the contents of such an agreement. We are not impressed by the argument that cross-examination of medical witnesses was not carried out by the settling defendant’s attorney. Even if that defendant hadn’t settled it could have foregone cross-examination, and the non-*408settling defendant was not restricted in its efforts to keep the verdict to a minimum through cross-examination of the plaintiff’s medical witnesses.

The jury’s function is to determine damages and to do so without the introduction of prejudicial elements. Admission of the settlement agreement would perhaps have aided the non-settling defendant, but would have prejudiced the settling defendant, and was properly excluded. Our law favors the settlement of disputes out of court. Jordan v. Coral Gables, Fla.1966, 191 So.2d 38, affirming Coral Gables v. Jordan, Fla.App.3d 1966, 186 So.2d 60.

Affirmed.

PIERCE, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
EXHIBIT 10.2

                                                              Deloitte &
                                                              Touche


Accountants
Pastor Petersstraat 162
5612 LV Eindhoven
P.O. Box 782
5600 AT Eindhoven
The Netherlands

Tel:  +31(40)8802400
Fax:  +31(40)8802424
www.deloitte.nl



ASML Holding N.V.
DeRun 1110
5503 LA Veldhoven


Date                         From                             Reference
March 14, 2003               J.G.C.M. Bune RA                 asml/2002-3




CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference, in the Registration Statement on
Form S-8 (No. 333-13332), filed with the Commission on March 30, 2001 and the
Registration Statement on Form F-3 (No. 333-83266), filed with the Commission
on February 20, 2002, of ASML Holding N.V. (the "Company") and in the related
Prospectuses, of our report dated January 30, 2003 included in the Annual
Report on Form 20-F of ASML Holding N.V. for the year ended December 31, 2002.



/s/ Deloitte & Touche Accountants
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of SkillSoft Public
Limited Company (the "Company") for the period ended January 31, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
the undersigned, Thomas J. McDonald, Chief Financial Officer of the Company
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

      (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Date: April 15, 2005                     /s/ Thomas J. McDonald
                                         --------------------------------
                                         Thomas J. McDonald
                                         Chief Financial Officer