### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 21

- 00687

- CV

R. C. C. and N. T. , Appellant s

v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services , Appellee

FROM THE 274TH DISTRICT CO URT OF HAYS COUNTY NO. 19,1739 , THE HONORABLE DWIGHT E. P E SCHEL , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

R.C.C. (Father) and N.T. (M other) appeal from the trial court ’ s amended order of
termination. 1 Following a jury trial, the trial cour t termi nated their paren t al rights to T.C. (Child) and ap p o inted the T e xas Department of Family and Protective Services as Child ’ s permanent managing conservator. In his three issues, Father argues tha t th er e was no evidence to support
the jury ’ s pr e dicate

- ground f indings against him. S ee Tex. F am. Code § 161. 0 0 1 (b)( 1)(D) (endangering conditions or surroundings), (E) (endangering conduct), ( N ) ( c onstructively

a

bandoning )

. In her four issues, Mother challenges the trial court ’ s jurisdiction and disc o ver y

san ctions and conten ds that the trial court failed to pro p e r ly apply the law

. F o r the following

reasons , we affirm the trial cour t ’ s amended order of t e rmination.

1 We refer to R.C.C. and N .T. and their child by their i ni t ials or as Father, Mo the r , and Child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109 .002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.2 BACKGROUND In July 2019, t h e Dep artment receiv ed intake s for neglect of te n - month

- old Chil d
based on allegations of viole nce , drug activ i ty , and Moth er using methamphetamine when she

was pregnant with Child and breastfeeding Child

. A Departme nt investigator lo cated Mother and Child at an ap artment , but the investig ator was not allowed entry

. Mother told the
inve stigato r to c a ll her attorney and c lose d the door. The inv estigator called Mother ’ s att orney , who was later determined to b e Mother ’ s mother (Grandmot her) , but Gran dmother “ yelled ” and
then “ h ung up ” on the investigator. The Depart ment filed a p etition i n aid o f i ts i nvestigation , and th e tri al court ordered Mot her to allow the Department access to Child and for Child to be medically examine d

. The investigator returned to the ap ar t ment the next day with the tr ial

court ’ s order , but Moth er and Child were no longer th er e
. The Department p rovid ed a copy of
the order to Grandmother and contact ed Father to try to loc ate Mother and Child

. Within a few days, t h e Department amended its petition to seek , amo ng its requested relief , to t erm inat e the parent

- child relations hi p. The trial cour t signed an order for

pro tection of a child i n an emer gency and ap po int ed the Depart ment as Child ’ s temporary managing conservator

. The trial court also signed an or der for the i ssuance of a wri t of

atta ch m en t with respect to Child

. W it hin a w eek, Mother , still r epresented by Grandmother , filed an original answer an d motion to transfer the case to Dallas County

. Mother also filed an
affid avit of indigency with the trial court , but she stat ed i n the affidavit tha t Grandmo th er was

r epresenting her at “ no cha rge. ” S hortly after Mother filed her answer and motion to transfer , the

t ria l court signed orders for the i ssuance of a writ of habeas cor pu s for Chi ld, requiri ng the3 parents t o produce Child in cour t on Augu st 8

. 2 N e it her p ar ent complied wit h the trial c ourt ’ s
orders , and the Department was not able to locate C h ild until December 31 , when it locate d
Mother and Child at a doctor ’ s office in Dallas

. The Department took custody of Child at the
office , and t he po lice arre s ted Mother for interference with ch i ld cus to d y . Child was examined

at a hospital , drug test ed , and pl ace d wi th f oster parents. In early Janu ary 2020, t he trial court held a perman e ncy hearing tha t both pare nts
attended

. In i ts correspo n ding order, the trial court referenced the Departm e nt ’ s s er vice plan s for the pare nts and found that they had not dem onstrated adequate and appropriate complia nce with the plans

. S hortly after thi s hearing, t he D e partment learned the results of Child ’ s h a ir follicle testing and sought findings of aggrava t ed cir cum stance s because the test results showed very high levels of methamphetamine

. 3 See Tex. Fam. Code § 262.2015(b)( 3 ) (I) ; see al so Tex. Penal
Co d e § 22.0 4 1 ( providing that person commi ts off ense if he or engages in conduct that en danger s child)

. C h i ld a ls o w as diagnosed with amphetamine p ois oning and had symptoms that included not being able to s it upright or interact as would be expected of a one - year - old

. In
F ebruary 2020 , the trial court signed an or d er finding aggravated circums tanc e s and rem ov i ng
the Department ’ s obligat ion to provide services or to m ake reasonable efforts to return Child to the parents

. 4 See Tex. Fam. Code § 262.2015(a).

2 See Tex. Fa m. C ode §§ 15 7 .371

– .376.

3 The results of the Child ’ s h a ir follicl e drug scree n were positive for methamphetamine (26,602 level) and amphetamine (1, 311 level )

.

4 In its order, the tria l court expressly found : Child was end angered by the pare nts ’ usage of drugs and/or havin g drugs in the vi ci nity of the c hil d that allowe d t he child to “ in gest ” said methamphetamine s which resulted in the child ’s positive hair follicle.4 Due in part to the COVID

- 19 pan demic , t he trial c ourt gra nt ed multiple

e xtensio ns o f th e dismissal dat e. T he j ury trial occurred from N o v ember 29 t o December 6, 2021

. At the time of trial, th ere w ere pe nding criminal cha rges against Mother and Grandmother f or
inter ference with child cus tody , and a lthough repr es ented by cou rt

- ap pointed cou nse l and subpoen aed to ap pear as a witness , Father did not per sonally app ear
. The w itnesses included
Mothe r, a former frien d of Moth er ’ s , the D epartment ’ s investig ator and conservatorship worker assigned to Child , the foster pa rents , and the Court Appointed Special Advoc ates ( CAS A ) supervisor and volunte er as signed to Child

. The Department sought to terminat e the parents ’ ri ghts so t hat the foster parents
could ad opt C hild

. The evidenc e show ed that Child tested p ositive at high le vels for

amp hetamine and methamphetamin e in Ja nu ary 2020 and had been delayed in her fine an d gross

m otor skill s but that she was doing well and no longer delayed

. The foster parents wer e tak ing good care of C hild , meeting her needs , bonded with her , and ho ped to ad opt her if the parent s ’

r igh ts were t er minat ed. The D e partment a ls o prese nted eviden ce th at from July t hrough
De cember 2019 , Mot her and Child m oved around to different locatio ns, including staying in
different motel s ; that “ [m ] ultiple Dall a s count y wo rkers ” spo ke to Father in person at a res iden ce
in Dallas “ to encourage him to assist [in] ass uring [Child] was safe ” ; and that Fathe r saw M other
and Child at least monthly during this time period

. Mother testified that during this time period , she was Child ’ s prim ary ca regiver , Father also was a caregiv er an d “ proba bly ” s aw them weekly , and she w as unaware that the Department was lo oking for her

. 5

5 The casework er a lso testified about Mothe r ’ s tes ti mony at the Ja nuary 2020 hearin g , including her testimo ny that s he and Father wer e t he on l y o nes who ha d been wit h Child f or the previous 90 d ays. By the time of the 2021 trial , Mot her testified that she di d not kn ow wher e Father wa s living , that the las t tim e she had contact with him , “he was either at his fr iend’s house5 Mother also de nied that she brea stfe d Chil d when she was using drugs , but
Mo ther ’ s former frie nd testified that sh e observed Mot her smoki ng or “ sho o ting up ”
metham phetamine w ith a sy ringe and then breastfeed in g Chi ld. 6 Mother testified that she stopped using drugs when she found ou t she was pre g n ant and did not use again until Ch ild was about seven or eight months old when she “ ju st like k ind of los t cont rol ag ain

. ” Mother a dmitted

t hat she had had a drug prob lem, including using her oi n and methamphetami ne and int ra v enous drugs , but testified that he r last u se was on January 6, 2020

. 7 In February 2020, Mother had one
visit with C hild but did not ha v e any other visits w ith Ch ild

. Moth er began an inpat ient

re ha bilit ation program which she comple t ed in April 2020 , but she tested positive for amphetamine and methampheta mine in August 202 0 . During the case, M other had ano ther

c hild , and a t th e time of t rial, she and that child w e re liv ing in the Dallas area with Gr andmo ther

. Concerning Father , t he ev idence established th at he did not engage and had
minimal contact with the D epartment during the case. Father att ended only on e court hearing in early Ja n uary 2020 and d i d no t personally appea r for trial

. The evidence also show ed that Father
did not visit o r ask to visit with C hild ; had a c riminal h istory , inc luding being incarcerated after
Child was born ; and was awa re of the Depa rt ment ’ s att e mpts to loc a te Chi ld but d id not provide

or his co usi n’s” or “ more likely” w it h hi s grandmother , and that he was difficult to stay i n touch wit h but that she thought he had his ow n phone and had a bicy cle for transp ort at ion

.
6 Mo ther ’ s friend answ ered , “ Yes, ” w hen asked if she saw Mother “ use meth and then witness her breastfee ding shortly a fter she inge sted meth ” and tes tified tha t it h appened “ a few times. ” She also tes ti fied that from the latter part of 2018 i nto t he sp r i ng of 2019 , it wa s co mmon for Mother to “ shoot up methamp hetamines ” and that Child wa s p res e nt , “ just usu ally in the car r ier, ” when M other was using drugs

.

7 The evidence supported a finding t hat Mother ’ s drug addi ction wa s severe
. Although she te s tified tha t she did no t fill out an intak e f orm for a trea tment progr am in January 2020 and that it wa s filled ou t s o that she “ w ould look like a pr iority , ” the form represent ed that she had
us ed drugs 25 out of 30 days p r ior to admission and that she use d metha mphet amine and h er oi n
.6 ass istanc e
. 8 The caseworker testified that sh e sent letters to Father at the a ddress where he was
incarc erated ; tha t after he wa s released on parole in Augu s t 2019 , she r eceived Father ’ s address and phone number f rom his paro l e officer ; bu t that she only spo ke to Father twice

— by phone on the day of re moval a nd in person at the January 2020 hearin g
. The CASA supervisor also only spo ke with Father twice during the case

. The CASA superviso r testified that i n July 2 021, h e call e d and spo k e to F ather by phone and

pro vid e d the contact information for Fath er ’ s court

- appointed attorney , and that Father told him
that “ it was his hope for [Child ] to be placed back with [Mother ] ” and that he “ didn ’ t believe any
of it ” abou t Mother ’ s dr u g use and expo s ing Child to methamphetamine

. Th e CASA supervisor
also calle d and sp oke to Father by phone during th e jury trial , and Father said that he “ had no idea what was g oing on ” but confirmed that he ha d the c ontact inf ormation for the CASA

superv i sor and his at to rney. Father also told the CASA super visor that he wou ld tr y to a ttend
trial but that “ it was still his goal for [ Child ] to be reunified with [ Mother ]

. ”
The jury found that : (i) Fat her and Mother kno wingly placed or knowin gly
allowed C h ild to rem a in i n cond itio ns or surroundings t hat endangered Child ’ s p hysic al or
emotiona l well

- being, (ii) Father and M other engage d in condu ct or k nowingly placed Child with persons who engag ed in conduct that endan gered Ch ild ’ s physical or emotional wel l

- being , (ii i) Fathe r con structively abando ned Child , and (iv) it was in C hild ’ s bes t i n terest for the
parents ’ r i ght s to be terminated. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E) , ( N ), (2). The trial

court th er eaft er signe d the amended orde r of terminat i on. Th e pa re nts ’ a ppeal s followed.

8 Th e conserva torship caseworker testified that Father “ wa s hard t o communicate w ith,
som et imes his number ’ s working, somet i m es it wasn ’ t. ”7 AN ALYSIS
Father ’ s Appeal
In hi s three i ssue s , Fat her challenges the legal sufficiency of the ev idence to support the jury ’ s predicate

- ground findings against hi m. 9

Stand ard of R evi ew

To termin ate pare ntal rights u n der s ection 1 6 1.001, the Department has th e
burden to prove o ne o f the pre d ic ate grounds in subsection (b)(1) and that termination is in the
best interest of the child. Se e id. § 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re A. V. , 113 S.W .3d 3 55 , 362 (T ex.
2003 ). The appli c abl e standard of proof is clear and conv in cing evid ence. T ex . Fa m. Code § 16 1.206(a); se e In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002) (explaining that “ [d]ue process

requ ires the application of the clear an d convin cin g evi dence stan dar d of proof in pare n tal

t erminati o n cases ” ). The clear and co nvincing evidence s tand ar d is “ t h at measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief o r conviction as to the trut h
of the allegati ons soug ht to be e sta blish ed. ” In re C

. H. , 8 9 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex . 2002) (quotin g
State v. Addingto n , 588 S .W.2d 5 6 9, 570 (Tex. 1 979)); see Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007 (defining

“ clear and convincing evidence ” ).

9 We con strue Father ’ s challenge a s a lega l sufficiency challenge to the evidence because h is reques ted r elie f is to reverse and render and he arg ues that there was no evide nce to s u pport the pr edica te

- ground findings

. See Vista Chevrol e t, Inc. v. Lewis , 709 S.W. 2d 176, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curia m) ( explaining “ bas ic rule ” that “ no evi dence ” point s require r endi tion in favor of appealing party) ; Gr een v. Villas on Town Lake Owners A s s ’ n , No. 03

- 20

- 00 375

- CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 8569, at * 14 , n.2 (Tex. App.

— Austin Oct. 22, 2021, pet. filed) ( mem
. o p.) (const ruin g issue as legal suffi cien cy ch a llenge because a ppell ant only made legal sufficiency argum ents and requested reverse and rend e r); Maynard v. Bo ot h , 421 S.W.3d 182, 183 ( Tex. App.

— S an Antonio 2013, pet. denie d) (re viewing evidence under legal sufficiency st andard because appellant ’ s requ est ed r elief was r evers e and render ).8 “ In conducting a legal

- suf ficiency review, the reviewing cour t cannot ignore undisp u t e d evidence contrary to the finding, but must otherwise assume the factf inder resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding. ” In re A.C. , 560 S.W.3d 624 , 630

– 31 (Te x. 2018). Legal sufficiency r eview of the evid ence to su pport a termination fin ding re q u i re s a court to lo ok at all
th e evidence in t h e light mo st favo r ab le to the find in g and consid er undisputed contrary evidence
to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact cou ld have formed a fir m belief or convi ction that
its fin ding was true. Id.

En d an germent F indings
Alt hough Father challenges each of the j ur y ’ s pre dicate

- ground fin dings again st
him , we limit our review to hi s ch allenge to the legal suffici ency of the evidence to support the jury ’ s findin g s under subsectio ns (D) and (E)

— that (i ) F a t her knowi n gly pla ced or knowingly
allowed C hild to remain in conditio ns or s urroun dings that endanger ed Child ’ s phy si cal or
emotional well

- being, and (ii) Father engaged in conduct or k nowingly placed Ch ild wit h persons who engag ed in conduct that e nda ng e red Chil d ’ s p hys ica l or emotional well

- bei ng. Se e
Tex. Fam . Code § 161.001 (b)(1) (D), (E); I n re N.G. , 577 S. W.3d 2 30 , 232

– 33, 237 (Tex. 20 19) (explaining that o nly one predicate ground is nece ssary to su pport t ermination of paren tal rights
when ther e i s a lso best inte res t f inding but requiring ap pellate court to detail an alysis for ap peal
challe nging sub section (D) or ( E) finding be cause of their collateral consequences in future
termination proceedings ) ; In re A. V. , 113 S.W.3d at 36 2 (explaining that Dep a rtment has b urden
to prove on e predicate ground and that terminat ion is in chil d ’ s b est int er e st)

.

“ ‘ Endanger ’ mea ns ‘ to expose to loss or i njury; to je o pardize. ’ ” In re M

. C. , 91 7 S.W.2d 2 68, 269 (Tex . 1996) (quoting Texas Dep ’ t of Human Servs. v. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d 531 ,9 533 (Tex. 1 9 87)). “ Although ‘ endanger ’ means more tha n a thr eat o f metap hys ical injury or the

poss ible il l effects of a less

- than

- ideal f a mily envir onment, i t is n ot neces sa ry that the conduct be
direc ted at the child or that the child a c tually suff ers injury. ” Id. “ Endangerment does not have
to be esta bli sh ed as an i nd epend ent proposition, but can b e infer red from p arental m isconduct
alo ne, ” the cond uct does not have to oc cur in the p resence of the child, and co urts may look t o
conduc t “ before the child ’ s birth an d both before and after the child has be en re moved by the Depa rtme nt. ” Pruitt v. Texas Dep ’ t of Fam. & P rotective Servs

. , No. 03

- 10

- 00089

- CV,
2010 Tex. App. LE XIS 10272, at * 13

– 14 (Tex. App.

— Aust in De c. 23, 201 0 , no p et.) (me m
. op.). “ Co nduct tha t subjec ts a child to a life of uncertainty and ins ta bility en dangers the child ’ s physical and emotional well

- bei ng. ” Id. at *1 4 (citing In re S.D. , 98 0 S.W.2d 758, 76 3 (Tex. App.

— Sa n Antonio 1998, p et. denie d) ).
Th e r elevant inqu ir y under sub section (E) is wh ether evidenc e exists that the endangerm ent o f the chi ld ’ s wel l

- be ing “ was the direct result of Appellant ’ s conduc t , inc luding

act s, omissions, or failur es to a ct. ” In re M.E

. - M.N. , 342 S.W.3 d 254, 26 2 (Tex. Ap p
. — Fort
W orth 2 0 1 1 , pet deni ed.). “ Additiona ll y, termination under subsection ( E) mu st be based on
more th an a single act or omissio n; the statute re quires a v olun t ary, delib erate, and consciou s

co urse of conduct by the parent. ” Id. I n contras t, the rel e vant inquiry u nd e r subsecti on (D) is
whether t he child ’ s environmen t, including t he chi ld ’ s living conditi ons and conduct by parents
or others in the home, en d ange r ed the chi ld ’ s well

- being. V .P. v. Texa s Dep ’ t of Fam. &
Protective Ser vs. , No. 03

- 19

- 0053 1

- CV, 2020 Tex. A p p. LEXIS 9 38, at *9

– 10 (Tex

. App.

— Austin Feb. 4, 2 020, no pet.) ( me m. op .). “ Ina ppropria te, abusive, or unlawful c onduct by

persons who live in t h e child ’ s home . . . is part of t he ‘ con ditions or surr oundings ’ of the child ’ s
h om e under s ubsection (D). ” Id. at *10 (citing In re M. R. J.M. , 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex.10 App.

— F ort W orth 2009 , no pet .))

. Beca use the evi dence pertaining to subsections (D) a nd ( E) is
interrel at ed, we consol idate our review of th e evidence. See id. at *1 1 (citing In r e M.R.J.M. , 2 8 0 S.W.3d a t 503).
Father concedes that Mother ’ s drug addiction cr eat ed an en vir onment t hat

en da ngered Child ’ s physica l and emot ion al he alth and that s he engaged in endangering conduct
but a r gues that t here was no evidence that he “ himself , engaged in co n duct that endangered [Child ’ s] well

- b e ing ” or “ that [he] knew about Mo th er ’ s envi ronm ent , her drug use, or that he

was ever tune [d]

- in into t he chil d ’ s c i rcumstances

. ” He argues that the “ ju ry simply a scribe d
Mother ’ s drug

- indu ced behavior to [him], n ot b ecause of a ny evid ence, but because of [his]

ass umed ass ociation wi th Mo ther

. ” H e furthe r ar gues that “ there was no evide nce presen ted as

t o the ci rcumstances surrounding [h is] visitation [w ith Child] , or whether [he] was aware of the
pote ntial dangers t o [Child] p osed by Mother ’ s environment

. ” R elying o n Mo ther ’ s testi mon y
that she presentl y wa s not married , Father further argues th at it was the Department ’ s burden to prove that he kn ew he was Child ’ s biologica l father and tha t there was no evi dence “ re l ating to [ his] knowledge of his paternity to [Child] pri or to Decem ber 3 1, 2019. ”
Fa ther , however, did not challenge his patern ity with the trial court at any ti me , and Moth er testi fied that she an d Fathe r “ l ived together f or a lo ng time ” and that they w ere
“co mmon - law mar ried

. ” 10 See Tex. Fam. Cod e § 160.204 (a )(1) ( sta ti ng that m an is pr esumed to
be father of child if married to m other o f child and chi ld is born during marriage ); see also id. § 2.4 01 ( stating proof required to show in for ma l marriages)

. The ord er from the January 2020

10 Mother testified that she had filed a petitio n for di v orce from F at her , and i n her m otion t o transfer the case to Dallas Count y, Mot her represented that the Department ’ s case should b e consolidated with her di vorce suit , “ which in clude s the child, the subject of this suit. ”11 hearing reflects that Father was th e presumed father of Child and that he appea red in pe rson and

ann ounced re ady , and the trial court found that Father was entitl ed to court

- appointed counsel

. See In re K.P. , No. 09

- 13

- 004 0 4

- CV, 2 014 Tex. App. LEXIS 9263, a t * 3 3

– 3 4 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont A ug. 2 1, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted) (concluding that father ’ s
argume nt that there was no evidence establishing patern ity was without merit wher e father did

n ot raise argumen t with t rial court , never challenged paternity , an d filed or sign ed do cuments
that identified him as “ Presumed Fat her ” ). T he evid ence also suppor ted a reasonable inference
that Father w as aware that he was C hild ’ s biological father be fore Child was remove d

. Mother

test ified that she and Fa ther were Child ’ s caregiver s pri or t o Chi ld ’ s removal

. In addition,

“ [m] ultiple Dalla s count y wo rkers ” sp o ke to Father in person at a residen ce in Dallas “ to

encou rage him to assist [in] as suri ng [Child] was safe , ” and h e did not question to them
his pat ernity

. F urther, e v en if there was no dir ect evi de nce that Mo ther used methamphetamine

o r o ther illega l drugs in Father ’ s presence, the j ury could have reasonab l y inferred from the
eviden ce t hat Father was aware of Moth e r ’ s drug use and should have know n that Chil d was being harmed and in danger of f urt he r harm in Mother ’ s care , but that he did not protect Child

. The caseworker te stified that Father had show n tha t he was not able to ke ep C hild saf e because
he w as aware o f Mother ’ s conduct when Child was in her care b ut did not do “anything to

p ro tect [Chi ld]

. ” Evidence also showed that when Child was remov ed, Child had visible symptoms that s omething was wro ng

— C h ild was u nable to sit upr i ght and was n ot interactive

— b ut F ather had not done anyt hing t o address these s ym p toms

. D uring the five

- month perio d that

t h e parents were court

- ordered to allow the Depar tment access to Child, Mother and Father were
Child ’s care take rs , Mother a nd Child w er e moving around to di fferent l o cations , and Fat her was12 wi th M other and Child more than once a month

. 11 See P ruitt , 2010 Te x
. App. LE XIS 10272, at

* 14 ( “ Conduct tha t subje c ts a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endan gers the child ’ s physical an d emotional well

- bein g. ” ). Mo t he r was continuing to u se meth amphetamine while

ta king care of and breast feed ing Ch ild , 12 an d she testified that “ everybody [ she ] hung out w ith ” was using drugs. See id. at *2 0 (considering evidenc e th at parent left childre n with unsuitable

per so n to be r e levant to issue of endangermen t) ; see also In re J.J.W. , No. 14

- 18

- 00985

- CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 3329 , * 19

– 20 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dis t.] Apr. 25, 2019, pet.
deni ed) (mem

. o p
. ) ( “ A p are nt enda nger s her children by acce pting endangering con d u ct o f
oth e r p eopl e
. ” ).
The evid ence further s how ed that F ather had a criminal histo ry , was incarc e rated
afte r Child was bor n , and did not engage with Child or the Department during the case

. See In re
M .D.M. , 579 S.W.3d 744, 765 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1 s t Dist. ] 20 1 9, no pet. ) (ex p laining that
factfinder m ay infer that parent ’ s lack of con tact with chil d and abs en ce fr om child ’ s l ife

“ endangered the child ’ s emotional w el l

- being ” ) ; In re A.W.T. , 61 S.W.3d 87 , 89 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2 001, no pet.) ( “ [I]nt en tional crim i nal activ ity which exposed t he pare nt to
in carceration is relevant evidence tend ing to es t a blish a c ourse of conduct endangering the

emot ional and physical well

- being of the child. ” (citation omi tted)). W hen asked if Fat her could have exposed Chi ld to me t hamphetamine , Mother testifi ed that she “ t hought [Fat her] had quit ”

11 Mother ’ s test imony was inconsi s tent abou t the f requency of Father ’ s contact w ith her and C hild during the p eriod that the Depart ment was trying to locate Child , but she consistently testified t hat h e had in

- person c ontact with them

. When asked how frequently she saw F ather , Mo ther ans w ered “ [p]r obably m ore ” t han monthly but “ [n] ot necessa rily weekly , ” and she testif ied that Child was alw ays with her , al though s he som etimes left Chi ld alone wi t h Fat her in a di ffer en t room fro m where she was

.

12 Mot her denied that sh e was breast feed ing C hild when she wa s using drugs , b ut t he
re sults from C hild ’ s hair follicle test co nflict with her te stim ony
.13 but did not know beca u se “ he ’ s kind o f secret ive to [her] , ” and durin g the case , Fat her did not visit with Child, had limited c ontact wit h the Department , did not provide fina n cial supp or t for Child, and d id not appe ar for tr ial

. 13 Viewing the evidence under the applicable st a ndard o f review, we conclude th at
the evidence was leg ally sufficient to support the jury ’ s findin gs that Father knowingly placed o r knowingly allowe d Chi ld to remai n in conditions or s urroundin gs that end a nger ed Ch ild ’ s physical or emotion al well

- being a nd that he engage d in conduct or k nowingly plac ed Child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangere d Chi ld ’ s p hysic al or e mot ional well

- being

. Se e
Tex . Fam. C o de § 161.001(b) (1)(D), (E) ; In re N .G. , 577 S.W. 3d at 232

– 33, 237 ; In re A.C. , 560 S.W. 3 d at 63 0

– 31. Thu s, we overrule Father ’ s first and second issues and do not reach his
third issue addressi n g the j ury ’ s finding that he constructivel y aba ndo ned Ch ild

. S ee Tex. Fam.
C ode § 161. 001(b)(1 ) ( N ) ; In re N.G. , 577 S. W.3d at 232

– 33.

Mother ’ s Appe a l
Trial Court ’ s Ju risdiction
In her fir st issue , Mother argues that the trial co urt los t jurisd i ction on July 20 , 20 2 0 , be cause it did not com ply w ith the procedura l requirements of secti on 263. 401 of the T exas
Fa mily Code when it ex te nded the init i al dismissal date under section 3 b ( i) of the T exas Supreme Court ’ s Eighteenth Emergency Order Regard ing the COVID

- 19 State of Dis aster

. S ee
609 S.W.3d 1 22 , 122

– 23 (Tex. 2 0 20) (effe ctive date June 29, 2020) ( Eightee n th Emergency
Order )

. In her second issue, Mother a rgues that even if the trial court properly extended the
initial dismissal date , it lost jur isdiction on December 26, 2020 , under section 3 b(ii) of the

13 Mot her tes t ifi e d that during the case, Father sen t he r some money t o g et presents for Child ’ s b irthday in 2020

.14 Eig hteen t h E merge ncy O rder because December 26 , 2020 , was 180 days from the e ffective date
of the or der

. S ectio n 263.401 (a) of the Texas Family Code provides for the automatic dis missal
of a su it filed by the Department request ing termi nation o r conserv atorship u nless the trial court
has commenced the tri al on the mer its or gr an ted an extension “ on the fi rst Mon day after the first
annivers ary of the date the court ren d ered a tem porary orde r ap p o inting the department as

t empo rary managing conser vator

. ” Tex. Fam. C ode § 26 3

. 4 01 (a)

. The statute allow s one

e xtension that do es not e x ceed 180 days fro m the one - year di sm issal d ate if the trial c ourt finds
that “ e xtraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary ma naging conservatorship of the d epartment and that c ontinuing the appoi ntment of the department as temporary managing cons ervator is in the best interest of the child

. ” I d. § 263.401(b).
When the associate judge e xtended the initial one

- ye ar dismissal date on July 15 , 2020 , t he Supre m e Court had author ized trial court s t o modify and extend the dead line s
in s ection 263.40 1 , e x cept that an initial extension sti ll h ad to comply wit h section 263.401 :
3. Subject only to constitutional limitat ion s, all courts in Texas may in any case, civil or criminal

— and must to avoid risk to cour t staff, parties, attor neys, jurors, and the public

— without a participant ’ s consent:

a. except as provided in paragraph (b), modify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures, whether prescribed by statute, r u le , or order, for a stated period ending n o later than September 30, 2020; b. in all proceedi ngs under Subtitle E, Title 5 of t he Family Code: (i) extend the initial dismissal date as calculated under Sectio n 2 63.401(a) only as provided by Section 263.401 ( b) or (b

- 1); (ii) for any case previously retained on the court ’ s docket pursuant to Section 263.401(b) or (b

- 1), or for any ca se whose dismissal date was previously modified under an Emergency Order of this Co urt related to COVID

- 19, extend the15 dismissal fo r an additional period not to exceed 180 days from the date of this Order;

. . . .

See Eigh te enth Eme rgency Order , 609 S.W.3d at 12 2

– 2 3 ; C.C. v. Texas Dep ’ t o f Family &
Pro tective Se rvs. , No. 03

- 21

- 00587

- CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXI S 2477, at * 9 (Tex. App.

— A u st in Apr. 15, 2022, no pet. ) (mem. op.) ( not ing that beginning with Eighteenth Emergency O rder , tria l court s w ere required to c omply with section 263.401(b ) requirements b efore ex ten d i ng
initial dismissal date )

. In the order exten d ing the initial dismis s al date , the a ssociate judge determ i ned
that the init ial dismi ssal date was July 20, 2 020 , exten d ed the dis missal date pursuant to the
Ei g

hteenth Emergency Order , and set January 16, 2 021 , as the new dismissal date

. 14 T he associate judge expressly refere n c ed the “ statewide public health disaster due to the COVI D

- 19

p andemic ” and found that “ extra ord inary ci rcumstances neces sitate extending the dismissal date
in t his case
. . . to avoid r isk to court staff, parti es, attorneys, jurors, and the public

. ” The c ase
had been set for a bench trial in May 2020 , but Mother fil ed a jury demand in A pril 2020 and filed a motion for jury trial in response to the May bench trial se tting

. No jury tria ls were occurring at that time because of the pandemic

. Mother sought a de novo hearing from the associate j udg e ’s order seekin g to h ave the extension of the dismi ssal d ate denied and the case
dismi ssed. F ollowing the de novo hearing, the trial court sig n ed an order den ying Mothe r ’s

r eque sted rel ief

. Mo ther agreed during t he de novo hearing that the pandemic was an

“ extraordinary cir cumstance ” but argues that the trial court ’ s extension of the dis missal date did

14 The order also refere nces the Sevent e enth E mergency Order Regard ing the COVID

- 19 State of Disaster , but the Eighteenth Emergency Order wa s the one in effe ct when the associate judge signed the order ext ending the dismissal date

.16 not c omp ly with section 263. 401 because t he court did not m ake the required secti on 263.401(b ) findings of extra o rdi nary circumstances and best interest

. D uring the de novo h earing, the trial
court stated :
I think the emergency order is ba sically a sup pl em ent to the statutory exemption. In othe r words, you can meet the statutory exemption and get an extension or
u n der the emergency order you can get an extension.

Mother als o asked t he trial court if they were “ g oing to get a finding t hat it ’ s in the best interest
of the child or it ’ s just pe r the Covid

- 19 emergency ord er , ” and t he trial court responded , “ Yes ,

ma ’ am
. That ’ s what I think [the associated judge] based i t on and that ’ s what I thin k your de

no vo is on. ” Although t h e tr ial court did not make express section 263.401 finding s i n its de

novo order or o n the record during the de novo hearing , we cannot co nc l ude that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it extende d the ini tial dismissal date . As an in itial matter, we obser ve t hat

“ t he plain lan guage of section 263.401 does not r equire the t rial court to conduct a hearing before granting an extension , ” In r e T.T.F. , 331 S.W.3d 4 61, 475 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2010, n o pet

. ) , or to mak e express findings in a written order , s ee Tex. Fam. Code § 263. 401(b); In re
G.X.H. , 627 S. W.3d 288 , 299 (Tex. 2021) ( o bservi ng that trial court may make sect ion 263.401
findin gs orally in presence of court reporter ( citing Tex. Fam. Cod e § 101. 026 ) )

. 15 Further, i n the associate judge ’ s order, the re i s an express finding of “ extraordinary circum stance s ” with

15 As support for her position that the trial co urt lost juris diction , Mother cites In re A.W. , 6 23 S.W.3d 519 (Tex. App.

— W aco 2021, no pet.) . In that case, the Waco C ourt of Appe als conclud ed that the order of te rmin ation was void be cause the trial court ’ s order grant ing an ex tension did not in clude r equired s ectio n 263. 4 01 findings and there w as nothing in the record to reflec t that the extension was in child ’ s best i nterest

. Se e id. at 52 2

. That case, however, was decided b efore t he Texas Supreme C o urt made clear i n In r e G.X.H. , 627 S.W.3d 288, 29 9 (Tex. 2 021) , that s ection 263.401 does not require writt en findings in an order extending the dismissal date

. Further, in this ca se, the record su p ports that the e xten sion was in C hild ’ s best interest

.17 reference to the pan d emic , and because b est interest is always a court ’ s p r imary consideration,
we im ply that the associate judge fo und that it was in Child ’ s best interest to grant the ext ensi on
. See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.002 ( “ The best interest of the child shall a l ways be the prim ar y
consider ation of the court in determ ini ng the issues of conservat orsh ip and possession of an d

access to the child. ” ). When the associate judge grant ed t he extension of the dismissal date , the
trial court a lready had found that there were aggra vated circums tanc e s base d on the Child ’ s

e xpos ure t o m ethamphetamine and rem ov ed the Department ’ s ob ligat ion to m ake reasonable
efforts to return Child to the pa ren ts

. See id. § 262.2015(a)

. Moreover , in the trial c ourt ’ s de novo order den yi ng Mother ’ s requeste d relief , the trial court expressly referen c e d “ C OVID

- 1 9 ” :
[Mother ’s] de novo of associate judge ’s July 1 5, 2020 order extending statutory dismissal date based upon COVI D

- 19 is denied. For clari fication p urpos es, th e De Novo hearing was granted an d he ld, but the relief requested by the Respondent
wa s denied a nd the statutory d ismissal date was exten ded

.
Thus, we imp ly tha t the trial court agreed w ith the associa te j udge ’ s express finding of

ext ra ordina ry circum s tances and impl ied finding of best i n terest

. See Tex. Fam. Code § 201.015 (describing s co p e of de n ovo hearing before referring court ); In re A. L.M.

- F. , 593 S.W.3d 271,
277 (Tex. 2019) ( explaining that “ review under se ction 201.015 is not entirely indepe ndent of the proceedings befo re the as sociate judge ” ) ; see also D.J. v. Texas Dep ’ t of Fa m

. & Protect ive
Servs. , No. 03

- 20

- 00454

- CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 1565, at * 2 5 (Tex. A pp.

— Aust in
Mar. 3 , 202 1 , no pet.) (mem. op.) ( implying nece ssar y find ings to suppo rt trial court ’ s denial of18 section 263 .401 motion (citing Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sib le y , 111 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. 2003) )

. 16 As the Department explained during the de novo hearing , an extensio n was required because of Mother ’ s jury deman d and the im possibility of ho lding a jury trial be fore the
initial dismissal date :
Based upon th ese circ um s tances that [ Mother ] has filed a jury demand, and the purpose for the extension is because juries cann ot be held without undue risk at this time. Had this bee n a b ench trial, the Department certai nly would have brought this and had conclusion t o this c as e
. Unfortunately, due to the jury demand, it is not on ly impractical, but it ’ s actually impossible, as you are aware, to have a jury setting in Hays County. Ba sed on this, we have requested an exte nsion for January 16th, 2021. We did secure a j ury tria l d ate in front of Your Honor for November of 2020.
Th e Department plans to continuously

— to proceed onc e jury trials are started in Hays County. If there is an earlier setting, we ’ ll be happy to ma ke those arrangements. Unfortunately, it ’ s throu gh no fa ult o f the Department, nor Hays County. It is a global pandemic that there is such emergency or ders and the need for these extensions.
If [Grandmot her] and her client wish to withdraw the jury dema nd, we can certainly get a bench trial much soon er, and we ’ re r eady to proceed as this Court sees fit

.

Mother ag reed during the do novo hearing that “Coronavirus is an e xtraordinary c i rcumstance , ”
and the t rial court s tated that “we can ’t hold jury trials right now ” and “the law and the C o urt ’s

16 M other refer s to the reporter ’ s record of the de novo he a rin g before the tri al court

. The reporter ’ s record was filed in a related original proceeding that Mother brought from th e underl ying proceeding

. See In r e N. T. , No. 03

- 21

- 00232

- CV, 2021 Tex . App. LEXIS 4561 (T ex. App.

— Aus tin June 9, 2021, orig

. p roceed i ng) ( mem . op.)

. W e take jud icial notice of the reporter ’ s r ecord from the de novo hearing to address Mother ’ s arguments

. See In re Innovation Res. Solution, LLC , No. 12

- 15

- 00254

- CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 3303, at * 8 (Tex. App

. — Tyl er Mar. 31, 2016 , orig. p ro ceeding ) ( mem . op.) (taking j udicial notice of reporter ’ s record filed in related mandamus proceeding ) ; Humphries v. Humphries , 349 S.W.3d 817, 820 n.1 (Tex. App.

— Ty ler 2011, pet. denied) (explai ning that appellate court may take judicial notice o f own
r ec ords in relat ed proceeding involving same parties )

.19 emerge nc y order

— Suprem e Court ’s emerge ncy order allows for t hat extensio n, and so, I ’m extending it

. ” On this record , we conclude that the trial co urt did not los e jurisd iction when it

exte nded the init ial dismissal date

. Concerning the tria l court ’ s orders gra nting ad dition a l extensions of the dismissal
date , the tr ial cou rt rel ied on the Texas Supreme Court ’ s relevant s ubsequent emergency orders

. The trial court last extende d the dismiss al date in an order signe d on August 18, 2021, extending
the dismissal d a te to De cem ber 1, 2021 , a nd the trial on the merits co mmen ced be fore that date

. Havin g concluded t hat the trial court ’ s initial extension o f the statuto ry dea dline compl i ed w ith
the Eighteen th Emergency Orde r and section 263. 401 , it follows th a t the tr ial court ’ s
addit i onal e xtensions were proper
. See C.C. , 2022 Te x. App. LEXI S 2 477, at * 9 . As we

re c ently explaine d,

[A] lthou gh the Eightee nth Emergency Order and subsequ ent orders re quired that the extension of the init ial dismissal date compl y with Secti on 263.40 1, the orders did not require compliance with Section 2 63 .401 for additi onal extensions, providing inste ad tha t “ for any case whos e dismissal date was previously modified und er [an earlier emergency order], ” the trial court could simpl y “ extend th e dismiss al for an additional period not to exceed 180 days from t he date o f ” the order.

Id

. ; see also In re J.

- R.A.M. , No. 1 0

- 20

- 00221

- CV , 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 10403, a t * 6

– 7 (Tex. App.

— Waco Dec. 30, 2 020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ( “ While the [later] emer gency ord ers do expressly require compliance with Section 263.40 1( a) regarding an initial extension, they do no t expressly require complian ce with an extension granted af ter the initi al extension. ” ). Be cause
the tria l on the merits commenced b efore the la st dismis sal da t e of D ecember 1, 2021 , we
conclude that the t ri a l court did not lose jurisdiction ove r this case. We overrule Mother ’ s first
and second issues.20 Dis c over y Sa nc tions
In her thi rd issue, Mother a r gues that the disc ove ry sanctions against her were

e x cessi v e and that the trial court abused i ts discretion when it p rohibited her from present ing
evidence a t trial through exhibits or non - par ty witn esses. During the c ase , t he Department sough t disco very from Mo ther and filed multi ple
motion s to co mpel re s po nse s to its discovery requests . T he tr ial court signed an order granting
the Depart ment ’ s motion to compel and , after Mo ther fail ed to comply with the t rial court ’ s order, sanctioned Mot her by pr o hi biting her from calling witnesses at trial, e xcept fo r na med
part ies ; introducing any evidence opposing the Department ’ s c ase against Fath er ; or intro ducing any document or physic al item into evid ence. See Te x. R. C i v. P . 193.6 (pro viding that pa rty

may not introdu ce evidence that was not timely disc losed wh e n par t y fail ed to respond to discovery unless court finds good cause and that failure to respon d did not unf airly surprise or prejudice o ther parties )

. I n its order sanctioning Mother , the tr ial cou rt found tha t on Decemb er 30, 2020, Mother was served wi t h dis c overy ; on April 21, 202 1, the tri a l court ordered Mother to

t urn over all responsive mater ial by May 5, 2021; as of May 26, 2021, Mother had fai led to turn over any responsive materia ls; the trial court had considered lesser sancti ons ; a nd the Depar tment ’ s requested sanc tions were just.
We review a trial court ’ s sanctions for abuse of di scretion. Se e Koslow ’ s

v. Ma ckie , 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 ( Tex. 19 90); Van Heerden v. Van Heerde n , 321 S

. W.3d 869, 877 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton [14 th D ist.] 201 0, no pet.)

. “ The t est for abuse of discret ion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles , or equivalently, whether under a ll the circums tances of the pa rticular case the trial court ’ s action
was arbitr ary or un reasonable. ” Koslo w ’ s , 796 S.W.2d at 704 (c iting Downer v. Aquamarine21 Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 2 41

– 42 (Tex. 1985) )

. The Texa s Supreme C ourt has created a

tw o - part test for determining whet her a sa n ction for discovery abuses is just. See TransAme rican
Nat

. Ga s Corp

. v. Powell , 811 S.W.2 d 913 , 917 (Tex. 1991) ; Tayl or v. Taylor , 254 S.W.3d 527,
533 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ; In re N.R.C. , 94 S .W.3d 799, 810

– 11 (Tex. App.

— H ous ton [ 14 th Dist.] 20 02, pet. denied)

. The test requires a reviewing court t o consider
whether th ere is a direct relationship between the offensive conduct an d the sanctions impose d
and whet her the sanction was ex cessi ve. T ransAmerican Nat

. Gas Corp. , 8 11 S.W.2 d at 917;
Van Heerden , 321 S.W.3d at 878 ; In re N. R.C. , 94 S.W. 3d at 8 10

– 11.
Mother does not disp ute that she did not comply with t he trial court ’ s order s compelling discovery re sp onses and that there was a d irec t relationsh ip between her failu re to

re spon d to the discovery requests and the t rial cour t ’ s sanction s b ut arg u es that the sanc tion s

w ere excessive and that lesser sanctions sh ould have be en ordered

. She, however, has not provide d a reason able explanation or ex cuse for why she fail ed t o comply with the orders , and
the tria l court in its order stated that it had c o nsidered lesser sanctions and that the Department ’ s requested sanc tions were just

. On th is record , we c annot co nclude tha t the trial court abused its
discretion when it sancti on ed Mot her

. See TransAmerican Nat

. Gas Corp. , 8 11 S.W.2d at 917 ;
K

oslow ’ s , 79 6 S.W.2d at 704 ; see als o Te x. R. C i v. P . 193.6 (pro viding that party may not
introdu ce evidence that was not tim ely disc losed whe n party fail ed to respond to discovery
unless c ourt fin ds good cause and that failure to respon d did not unf airly s urpri se or p rejudice

o ther parties )

. We also cannot conclude that the trial court ’ s sanct ion s again st Mother probably

ca used the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a) (providing tha t no judgment may be rever sed on appeal on gr ound th at tri a l court made error of l aw unless court of22 appeals concludes that complained

- of err or “ probably caused the rend ition o f an improper judgment ” ) ; T ex as De p ’ t of Transp

. v. Abl e , 35 S.W. 3d 608, 617 (Tex. 2000) (describing how

c ourt s determ ine when exclu ded ev i dence pro bably resulted in re ndition of improper judgment) ;
Van Heerden , 32 1 S.W.3d at 877 ( same)

. “ In determ ining if the excluded evidence pro bably
resulted in t he renditio n of an improper judgment, a court must review th e entire rec ord. ” Able , 3 5 S.W

. 3 d at 617

. Mot he r has not direct ed t his Court to evi dence that she was not allowed to
admit at trial that w oul d have changed the outcome of the trial , 17 and she has not challen ged the sufficiency of the evidence to support t he jury ’ s end angerment and best

- i ntere st finding s against
her

. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E) , ( 2). The evidence at trial includ ed the results
of Child ’ s hair foll icle tes ting that showed high l evels o f methamphetamine, Mother ’ s endanger ment of C hild by b reastfeeding Child w hile usi ng ill e gal drugs, and C h ild ’ s diagnosis of amphetamine po is oning and delayed fine an d gross m otor skill s
. R evi ewing the entire record,
we cannot conclude th at the tri al cour t ’ s sanctions ag ainst Mother probably res ulted in the
rendition of an imp r oper j udgmen t. See Able , 35 S.W.3d at 617

. We o verrule her third issue.

Fairness of Trial Court Proceedin g s In her fourth issue, Mother argues that the trial court fa iled to properly apply the
law and h old the Depa rtment “ accou ntable for extrem e gove r nment ove rr each ” and that the

“ cu mulative error was so prejudicial to [M other ] that it cause d the rendition of an improper
verdict. ” She ar gues t hat the trial court ’ s “ pr e - trial proceedi ngs and trial were so fundamenta lly

17 In her rep ly brief, Mother references her “ att em p t to put on P ARTY

- WITNESS t est imony ” of “ 3 Department employees ” a nd “ the files of all 5 wi tness [Departmen t] employees. ” She , h owever , has not shown how t h is ev idence would have impacted the jury ’ s determinations

.23 unf air th at the entire pro cess w a s not anyth ing close to the meaning of American jurisprudence ”
and that “ [ t ] he case should be dismisse d and a ll orders vacated

. ” Among h er complain ts, Mother challenge s the t rial court ’ s order for the protection
of C hild and rem oval , arg u ing that Child w as remove d without due process an d that “ the Depart ment did not have g ood cause for the government intrus ion on N.T. ’ s a nd [Child] ’ s

const it utional rights to priva c y, fa mily in tegrity and 4th Amendment right s against unlawful

sear ch and seizure. ” B ut “ a t emporary order is superseded by e ntry of a final order
of termination, rendering moot any complaint about the temporary order. ” I n re A. K

. , 487 S.W.3d 679, 683 (Tex. Ap p.

— San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (citations omitted ); see In re K.P. , 2014 Tex. App . LEXI S 9263, a t * 3 6

– 37 (holding that pa rent s ’ complaint s about temporary ord er authorizing removal of children w ere moot because trial court had entered final order terminatin g
paren ts ’ rights (citations omitted) )

. Thus, M other ’ s compla in t s about th e tri al cou r t ’ s te mpor ary orders, incl uding i ts order for protection and removal of Child , are moot.
Mother also c ites articles documenting trauma or harm experi enced by children
who a r e removed from their parents , but in this case, Mother has not challenged the su f ficiency
of the evidence to support the endangerment and best interest findings a gainst her. See Tex.
F am. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E) , (2). T he evidence at trial , summariz ed above, sh owed that prior to removal, Mother ’ s conduct was en d angering C hild , a nd that after Child was remo ved
from the parents ’ care , Child was safe and well

- t aken car e of

. The foste r parents tes ti fie d at trial
tha t Child was doing well in their care a nd no longer developmentally delayed

. The evidence
showed t hat the foster paren t s wer e meeting Child ’ s needs , bonded with her , a nd ho ped to ad opt
her if the parent s ’ r ig hts were ter minat ed

. Mother a lso last visited w ith Chi ld in early 2020 , alm o st two ye ars before t rial

.24 Based on our review of the record, we conclude tha t Mo ther h a s not shown that
the tri al court ’ s proceedings w ere funda mentally unfair to her . We overrule her fourth issue.

C ONCL U SION Having overruled the parents ’ issues , we aff irm the tria l court ’ s amended order
of termination.

______ _____________ ________ ______ _

________ Meli ssa Good win , Justice
Before Justices Good w in, Bak er, and T riana
Affirmed
Filed: June 22, 2022