alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1







Exhibit 12

                     GTE NORTH INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARY
        Statement of the Consolidated Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
                                  (Unaudited)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

(Dollars in Millions)                                Three Months Ended
                                                       March 31, 1999
                                                    --------------------
<S>                                                 <C>                 
Net earnings available for fixed charges:
  Income from continuing operations                 $              130.6
  Add  - Income taxes                                               79.6
       - Fixed charges                                              45.3
                                                    --------------------

Adjusted earnings                                   $              255.5
                                                    ====================

Fixed charges:
  Interest expense                                  $               41.0
  Portion of rent expense representing interest                      4.3
                                                    --------------------
Adjusted fixed charges                              $               45.3
                                                    ====================


RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES                                  5.64
</TABLE>
Fiberight LLC 

2154 78th Street

Blairstown, IA 52209

RE:	Fiberight	LLC	Separation	plan	- Textiles

Fiberight	uses	conventional	material	recovery	facility	(MRF)	technology	to	perform	initial	sorting	of	

municipal	solid	waste	(MSW) that includes	post-consumer	textiles,	estimated	to	be	approximately	4%	of	

the	total	volume.		Fiberight’s	processing	will	increase	the	recovery	of	textiles	for	recycling.		

Mixed	MSW	is	introduced	into	the	process	following	an	initial	manual	sort	for	large	unprocessable	

materials,	such	as	appliances,	automotive	batteries,	tires,	etc.		The	remaining	material	is	then	conveyed	

through	a	trommel	that	removes	the	small	particles	including,	grit,	gravel,	dirt,	glass	particles,	etc from	

the	desired	waste	stream	for	further	processing.		

The	material	remaining	is	conveyed	into	an	autoclave	that	solubulizes	the	organic	fraction	of	the	MSW	

and	retains	the	integrity	of	the	recyclable	components	including	textiles	while	at	the	same	time	

eliminating	offensive	odors and	minimizing	bacteriological	activity.		Following	the	autoclave	the	material	

is	once	again	subjected	to	a	trommel	unit	where	the	organics	and	pulp	are	separated	from	the	textiles	

and	other	recyclables.

The	recyclables,	including	textiles	are	conveyed	through	a	manual	sort	line	where	each	recyclable	is	

removed	and	fed	to	a	storage	bunker	and	prepared	for	shipment	off-site	to	either	a	recycling	broker	or	a	

company	using	the	recycled	material	to	produce	a	product.		

Once	the	organics	have	been	separated	from	the	textiles	and	been	autoclaved,	they	are	acceptable	raw	

material	for	a	variety	of	recycled	products,	including	cushioning	and	acoustic	flooring	underlayment,	

building	insulation,	stuffing,	padding,	wiping	cloths,	etc.			

Steve	Gerber

Vice	President	- Operations
<PAGE>   1


EXHIBIT 23.3

Consent of Independent Certified Public Accountants


              CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

As independent certified public accountants, we hereby consent to the
incorporation by reference in the Prospectus constituting a part of the Form S-4
Registration Statement of our report dated January 31, 1997, on the combined
financial statements and schedule of Eagle Window & Door, Inc. and Subsidiaries
and Taylor Building Products Company (wholly-owned subsidiaries) for the eight
month period ended August 29, 1996 appearing in the Company's Annual Report on
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1998.

We also consent to the reference to us under the caption "Independent Auditors"
and "Changes In and Disagreements with Accountants on Accounting and Financial
Disclosure" in the Prospectus.


Certified Public Accountants                               Semple & Cooper, LLP
Phoenix, Arizona

March 26, 1999
# C_2020068EN.01006101.xml

| 2.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 68/61 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 68/61

---

Action brought on 11 January 2020 – adp Gauselmann v EUIPO – Gameloft (GAMELAND)

(Case T-17/20)

(2020/C 68/69)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: adp Gauselmann GmbH (Espelkamp, Germany) (represented by: K. Mandel, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Gameloft SE (Paris, France)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark GAMELAND – Application for registration No 15 722 648

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5th November 2019 in Case R 2502/2018-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | admit the claim; |
| --- | --- |

—

admit the claim;

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order to accept the European Union Trademark Application No. 15 722 648; |
| --- | --- |

—

order to accept the European Union Trademark Application No. 15 722 648;

| — | order EUIPO and the opposing party to bear the fees and costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the opposing party to bear the fees and costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 400 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 400

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                        April 12, 1994.
    Resolved, That the House has heard with profound sorrow of the death of the 
Honorable William H. Natcher, a Representative from the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky; be it further
    Resolved, That the Clerk communicate these resolutions to the Senate and 
transmit a copy thereof to the family of the deceased; and be it further
    Resolved, That when the House adjourns today, it adjourn as a further mark 
of respect to the memory of the deceased.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk November 21, 2011

p1114 

# Order

November 21, 2011

143504

RONALD H. LONG, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 14 3504 COA: 296698 Wayne CC: 05-524009-AV DETROIT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 23, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented s hould be reviewed by this Court.
256 La. 865

#### READCO INDUSTRIES, INC. v. MYRMAX SPECIALTIES, INC. and Lyall Rosenfield.

No. 50782.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 30, 1970.

In re: Readco Industries, Inc. applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 236 So.2d 573.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal we find no error of law in its judgment.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000042872
<NAME> FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE HOLDINGS, INC. 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           8,797
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  189,882
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    172,677
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               782,471
<PP&E>                                         501,859
<DEPRECIATION>                                  66,524
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,629,480
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          437,037
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     16,318
<COMMON>                                        90,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,843,650
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,629,480
<SALES>                                        114,600
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               655,652
<CGS>                                           76,539
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  411,973
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               139,454
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                16,308
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              54,880
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 33,037
<INCOME-TAX>                                    18,872
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             14,165
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    14,165
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.16
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 186 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 186

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                          May 27, 1993.
    Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker 
may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 2264) to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 7 of the 
concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1994. The first reading of 
the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of order against consideration of 
the bill are waived. General debate shall be confined to the bill and the 
amendments made in order by this resolution and shall not exceed two hours 
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of 
the Committee on the Budget. After general debate the bill shall be considered 
for amendment under the five-minute rule and shall be considered as read. The 
modifications to the bill printed in part 1 of the report of the Committee on 
Rules accompanying this resolution shall be considered as adopted in the House 
and in the Committee of the Whole. All points of order against the bill, as 
modified, are waived. No amendment to the bill, as modified, shall be in order 
except the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in part 2 of the 
report. The amendment in the nature of a substitute may be offered only by 
Representative Kasich of Ohio or his designee, shall be considered as read, 
shall be debatable for one hour equally divided and controlled by the proponent 
and an opponent, and shall not be subject to amendment. All points of order 
against the amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived. At the 
conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise 
and report the bill, as modified, to the House with such amendment as may have 
been adopted. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill 
and amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one 
motion to recommit, which may not include instructions.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
EXHIBIT 15


November 13, 1998



To Mirage Resorts, Incorporated

We  are  aware  that  Mirage  Resorts,  Incorporated  has  incorporated  by
reference  in its Registration Statements on Form S-8 (File No.  33-16037),
on  Form S-8 (File No. 33-48394),  on Form S-8 (File No. 33-63804), on Form
S-8 (File  No. 33-60183), on Form S-8 (File No. 333-59455) and on  Form S-3
(File No. 333-39029) its Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 1998
which includes our  report dated  November 13, 1998 covering the  unaudited
interim financial information contained therein.  Pursuant to Regulation  C
of  the  Securities Act of 1933, that report is not considered  a  part  of
these  registration statements or a report  prepared or  certified  by  our
firm within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of the Act.

Very truly yours,



ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP
#### B. E. WELCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWN ZELLERBACH CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11483.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Oct. 17, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 1977.

Charles B. W. Palmer, Amite, for B. E. Welch, plaintiff appellant.

Charles M. Hughes, Bogalusa, for Crown Zellerbach Corp., defendant appellee.

L. H. Coltharp, Jr., Deridder, for Robert Campbell, Inc. and Southern Cas. Ins. Co., third party defendants.

Before LANDRY, SARTAIN and ELLIS, JJ.

SARTAIN, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment maintaining exceptions of prescription, peremption, and res judicata and dismissing plaintiff’s suit against defendant. This workmen’s compensation action alleging an injury sustained by plaintiff on May 20, 1970, was filed on October 11, 1973.

It is undisputed that this suit is barred by either the one year or the two year peremptions found in R.S. 23:1209 unless there has been an interruption. Plaintiff contends that his suit filed in April, 1971 against Robert Campbell, Inc. was such an interruption. It is argued that Campbell is a solidary co-debtor with defendant, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, and that, therefore, under Art. 2097 of the Civil Code, the first suit interrupted prescription against Crown Zellerbach.

*1256However, this contention is without merit. In the *Campbell*suit this court held that Campbell was not plaintiff Welch’s employer and therefore was not liable for workmen’s compensation benefits. *Welch v. Robert Campbell, Inc.,*316 So.2d 822 (La.App. 1st Cir.) writ denied 321 So.2d 523 (La.1975). Suit against Campbell could not have interrupted prescription against Crown. Art. 2097 has no application in such a situation. In the similar case of *Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,*314 So.2d 350 (La.1975), the Louisiana Supreme Court held to this effect. There the first suit was brought against certain executive officers of a company and their insurers. They were exonerated from liability. More than one year after the accident a second suit was brought against other executive officers and the same insurer. The second suit was held to be barred. Since the officers in the first suit were not liable at all they could not be liable in solido with the officers sued in the second suit — prescription was not interrupted.

In the *Campbell*suit, Austin Carpenter was joined as a defendant on August 19, 1971. Carpenter was held liable to plaintiff for workmen’s compensation. But the suit against Carpenter could not have interrupted prescription since it was filed more than one year after the accident and it is not alleged that plaintiff was unaware of the injury when it occurred. R.S. 23:1209.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment sustaining the peremptory exception of per-emption. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider the exception of res judicata. All costs are assessed against plaintiff-appellant.

AFFIRMED.
#### THE FLORIDA BAR, Petitioner, v. Sidney G. BEAVER, Respondent.

No. 41627.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 25, 1972.

*144Norman A. Faulkner, Tallahassee, for The Florida Bar, petitioner.

Sidney G. Beaver, in pro. per.

PER CURIAM.

On March 9, 1971, Sidney G. Beaver, a member of The Florida Bar, was adjudged guilty of the offense of grand larceny by the Court of Record of Sarasota County and placed on probation for five years. This offense constitutes a felony under Fla.Stat. § 811.021, F.S.A. The time for appeal has expired.1

Accordingly, pursuant to Article XI, Rule 11.07(4) of the Integration Rule of The Florida Bar, 32 F.S.A., which provides that final judgments shall be considered as conclusive proof of guilt of the offense charged, The Bar on November 6, 1971, petitioned this Court for notice to show cause why appropriate disciplinary judgment should not be entered against respondent. We granted the petition and issued notice to respondent to show cause on or before December 20, 1971. Although the notice was mailed to respondent’s latest mailing address registered with The Florida Bar, in accord with the provisions of Article XI, Rule 11.01(2) of the Integration Rule, he has failed to make any response.

In determining the discipline to which respondent should be subjected, we must be primarily guided by the welfare of the public and the legal profession. Respondent has been convicted of a serious crime under the laws of this state. He is also presently under suspension for misconduct in representing his client’s interests in a divorce case. Therefore, it is the judgment of this Court that respondent, Sidney G. Beaver, should be, and hereby is, disbarred from the practice of law in the State of Florida. Execution is hereby directed to issue for costs against Respondent.

It is so ordered.

ERVIN, Acting C. J., and CARLTON, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.

1

. We note in passing that on May 19, 1971, respondent Beaver was suspended by this Court from the practice of law for one year and thereafter until demonstration of his entitlement to reinstatement. The Florida Bar v. Beaver, 248 So.2d 477 (Fla.1971). This suspension was imposed on respondent for his conduct in counseling his client to secrete assets in a pending divorce action and to misrepresent his financial condition. This offense does not appear to be related to respondent’s current ethical entanglement.
# C_2020191EN.01002502.xml

| 8.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 191/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 191/25

---

Action brought on 23 March 2020 — Marina Yachting Brand Management Company v EUIPO — Industries Sportswear Company (MARINA YACHTING)

(Case T-169/20)

(2020/C 191/34)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Marina Yachting Brand Management Company Ltd (Dublin, Ireland) (represented by: A. von Mühlendahl, C. Eckhartt and P. Böhner, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Industries Sportswear Company SRL (Venice, Italy)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark MARINA YACHTING — European Union trade mark No 11 111 317

Procedure before EUIPO: Revocation of register entry

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 10 February 2020 in Joined Cases R 252/2019-2 and R 253/2019-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO and the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, if it should intervene in these proceedings, to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, if it should intervene in these proceedings, to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 103(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 103(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### Wilmer J. HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-732.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 30, 1973.

*307Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Evelyn R. Flack and Bruce J. Daniels, Asst. Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Andrew I. Friedrich and Stephen R. Koons, Asst. Attys. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a denial of a Rule 3.850, R.C.Proc., 33 F.S.A., petition without an evidentiary hearing. We have considered its content and the presentation of counsel with care and find no merit or basis for reversal. Primarily, this is true because the points raised have been previously determined by this court.

There is question as to the adequacy of the petition to complain about a new point, i. e., the trial court’s action in imposing probation, following and in addition to the imposition of a prison sentence for another crime. Nonetheless, we have determined to consider the question as though properly and fully raised, and this at the behest of appellant’s counsel.

Appellant was charged in four separate informations with four separate ingredients of forgery. Being found guilty as to all, four separate judgments were entered by the court. On two cases, 69-609 and 69-610, the trial court sentenced appellant to fifteen years in prison. On two cases, 69-608 and 69-611, appellant was placed on probation for ten years to commence at the conclusion of the fifteen year prison sentence.

Appellant’s grievance is with what he chooses to call the “delayed probation”. We have neither found, nor been shown, any case law or statute that proscribes such trial court approach and action. When one realizes, as counsel concedes, that the trial court could have legally imposed the maximum prison sentence upon each charge, any onerousness of this procedure disappears. Further, while Roy v. State, Fla.App.1967, 207 So.2d 52, is not precisely the same, its sentiments afford light and support to our view that the trial judge acted within the bounds of law and discretion, and in the interest of appellant’s rehabilitation.

Affirmed.

WALDEN and OWEN, JJ., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Associate Judge, concur.
#### James COBURN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2647.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 25, 1970.

Appeal from Criminal Court of Record, Orange County; Warren H. Edwards, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### David SMITH, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. T-321.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 20, 1973.

Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and Robert C. Parker, Jr., Special Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction and sentence after being found guilty by a jury of assault with intent to commit rape.

*440We have given full consideration to the record on appeal and the briefs filed by the parties. It appearing therefrom that appellant has failed to demonstrate that reversible error was committed in the proceedings below, the judgment appealed herein is affirmed.

WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and JOHNSON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.