### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 060 -CV

Na de au P ain ti ng Spe c ial ist , Lt d. , A ppe lla nt

v. Dalcor P ropert y Managem ent, Inc. , Appellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 2864 55 , HO NORAB LE ORLI NDA NARAN JO , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N This appea l presents e vident i ary and proc edura l issues controlling whe ther a n apar tment manag ement compa ny is liable to pa

y a painting company for service s that manag ement company had obtained on be half of the apar tment’s owner s. Finding no err or, we will affirm the tria l
c ourt ’s jud g me nt t

hat th e pa int ingc omp any take no thi ngon

its c la ims
. BACK GR OUND This case was tried to the c ourt, which h ea rd the following pertinent e vidence
. Appellee Dalcor

Property Manag ement, I nc., is in the bus iness of m anag ing a partment c ommuniti es for va rious owner s and lende rs i n the Aust in and Houston are as. At rele vant t imes, Dalcor manag ed four a partment properties in the Austin are a that we re e ach ow ned by a diffe rent limited partner ship. Three of the prope rties ar e important to this c ase: Grey stone Park Apa rtments, owned by DA Residential No. One , L td.; The Pointe at Woodhol low Apar tments, owned by

DA Residential2

No . T wo , L td. ; and

I nd ian Cr e e k Apa

rtme nts , o wn e d b y

DARe sid e nti a l N o. Th re e , L td. Th e fo ur th
a pa rtme nt p ro pe rt

y , o wn e d b y a fo ur

th limi te d part

ne rs hip , wa s kno wn

a s A ub re y

Hi lls Ap artme nts
. J iga r Parikh, a D alcor

employ ee w ho handled his compa ny ’s ac co u n t s pay able, testified that he telephone d appellant Na deau Painting Specialist s , L t d
. , reg ardinghiring Nade au to per form work at the four Austin prope rties it manag ed. Parikh spoke to De nnis Nadea u, Nade au’s owne r
and pr e sid e nt. Acc ording to Parikh, he tol d Mr. Nadeau that Da lcor “ manag ed four proper ties in the Austin area . And that we w ere looking f or a painter to provide ser

vices for those proper

ties.” Parikh further testified that he e x plained “w e have four pr operties in Austin, three o f t h em we re i n one partne rship and the fourth was in a differ ent partne rship from the other three .” Whil e b i l l s wer e being paid timely

by one of th e partne rships, Parikh explained, “the other three proper

ties, which
wer e owne d b y d i ff

er en t partne rships, they

wer e strug g ling a

nd trying to g et the invoices pa id on those proper

ties rig ht away . And we wo u l d t ry to ge t them paid as soon as possible.” Par ikh stated that Mr. Na deau “ understood . . . the diff ere n ce in those three pr operties ve rsus the one.” Mr. Nade au also testified at trial. When asked whe ther he was a war e duringthis conversation that Da lc or mana g e d, bu t di d n ot o wn , e a c h o f t he fo ur pr op e rt ie s, he re sp on de d, “ No t ne c e ssa ri ly . I did not know that they

wer e just a mana g ement compa ny .” Mr. Nade au and Ra

ndy Plit t, as “DA L COR repre sentative,” subsequently executed an ag ree ment titled, “Austin Painti ng Contract.” It provided:

This contrac t is between D AL COR Property Manag ement and N adea u Pa in ti n g Sp e c ia li s ts , L td
. , a s a g r e e d b y D e n n is N a d e a

uan d Ra n dy Pl itt, o wner ’s rep r e s e n tati v e . T h is c o n tr a c t is e xc lu s iv e f o r D A L CO R p r o p e rti e s th at ar e listed below. I f any

price chang es ar e made , a 30-da y written not ification is require d befor e pric es will g o into effe ct. Either pa rty may canc el this contrac t with a 30-day written notice.The pric es were $ 9 5
. 0 0 for “ full paint-ac ross the boar d (prope rties provide the paint)”; 1 “$60.00 for

‘touch up’ paint”; and “45.00 extra for color c hang e”; a nd specifie d that “[t] hese pr ices include swe eping ceiling and base boards, f ix ing minor r epair s (nail holes and m inor cra cks throug hout unit), and kilz ink and/or water stains.” Kilz i s appar ently

a ty pe of pr imer or surf

ace prepa ration. 2 I f Nade au noticed any discrepa ncies betwee n its proposa l a nd the amount approve d, it was 3 to contact Par ikh “bef

ore pe rfor ming a ny service s.” 3 The doc ument then listed the four pr operties—“ Aubre y Hills,” “Indian Cree k,” “G rey stone Park,” and “Pointe @ Woodhollow”—and stated pe r-unit price s, eff ect i v e J u n e 15, 2004, for spe cified painting w ork. The a g ree ment further stated that “[t] hese pr ices will also be in effec t for a ny future 1 complexes we ac quire in the Austin ar ea.” The a g re em en t als o require d Nade au to obtain prior approva l from Dalc or for “any sheetroc k repa irs, kilz ,[ ] color chang es, wa llpaper r emoval or 2 t ex tu ri n g, ce i l i n g p ai n t , o cc u p i edp ai n t , o r a n y

t h i n g el s e o t h er

t h an re gu l ar

p ai n t ” b y s u b m i t t i n g a written bid or proposal, which Dalcor would approve by a purc hase or der. I t further provided that 3

“ [i]nv oic e s th a t c ha

rg e pr ic e s hig he r tha

n thi s c on tr a c t or sp e c if

ic purc ha se or de r w ill no t be pa id i f y ou failed to g et prior a

pproval on the hig her pr ice.” Nade au per formed work at eac h of t he three properties. I n evidenc e were a serie s of Nade au i n v o i ces c harg ing f or work it per formed at eac h proper ty . The e arliest of the se we re f or
se rv ic e s at G re y sto ne Park and Poi nte a t Woo dh oll ow , e a c h d a te d A ugus t 27 , 2 00 4; t he e a rl ie st invoice for

service s provided at In d i an Creek A partments wa s dated Septembe r 3, 2004. Na deau
a dd re sse d e a c h o f t

he inv oic e s n ot t o D a lc or bu t to the name of

the a pa rtme nt p ro pe rt

y whe re it perf ormed the w ork—“Indian Creek,” “Gr ey stone Park,” or “The Pointe @ W ood Hollow”—at the str e e t a dd re ss f or e a c h pr op e rt

y . Th e e vid e nc e ind ic a te s that N a de a u s e nt a n invo ic e to e a c h p ro pe rt

y on roug hly

a we ekly or biwee kly

basis throug h April 8, 2005.This i n fo rm ation appea red in the uppe r left- hand cor ner of eac h chec k, in the 4 fo llo wi ngfo rm a t: DAL COR Property

Manag ement, Inc. Ag e nt f or I nd ian Cr e e k Apa

rtme nts 5055 W. P ark B lvd., Suit e 700 Plano, Texas 75093 I n Fe bruar

y 2005, for e x ample, che cks from eac h proper ty wer e issued to pay

invoices 5 dating back to August and September 2004, a nd chec ks were i s s u ed i n Marc h to pay October inv oic e s. 4

Mr. Nade au testi fi ed t h at whil e he r ece ived pay ment from Aubr ey

Hills, obtaining pay ment from the other three proper ties “bec ame a problem right away from the star

t.” I n evidenc e
we re c hecks w ritten to Nade au fr om eac h of the a partment prope rties. Eac h of the c hecks w ere sty led “DAL COR Prope rty Manag ement, I nc., Ag ent for [as applicable, “ I ndian Cree k Apar tments,” “Gr ey stone Park Apartments,” or “ Pointe @ W oodhollow Apts”].” Be low this name was listed Da lc or ’s a dd

re ss. The e arliest of the chec ks from ea ch complex w ere eac h dated Oc tober 21, 2004. 4 Se ve ra l of

the c he c ks pa id i nv oic e s a s late a s si x mont hs a ft e r N a de a

u b ill e d th e m. 5 I n late Apr il or ear ly

May 2005 , ac co rdi ng to Parikh, the partne rships that owned I ndian Cree k, Gre y stone Park, and Pointe at Woodhollow deede d the prope rties to their lende r in lieu of for eclosure
. The lender hired a new proper ty manag ement company , which notified Nade au that its contract wa s void as of May 3, that the new ow ners would not pay any debts incurr ed prior to that date , a nd that it sh ou ld c on ta c t D a lc or

fo r p ay me nt o f a ny ou tst and inginv oic e s. Nade au sued D alcor on a sworn a ccount, c laiming that Da lcor owe d it a principal balanc e due of $21,754.74 f or Na deau’ s painting se rvice s. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 185. Nadeau attached
re c or ds purp or

tin g to s ho w unp a id i nv oic e s o n e a c h o f t he thr e e pr op e rt ie s. Th e e arl iest un pa id inv oic e fo r w hic h N a de a

u c la ime d r e c ov e ry

wa s O c tober 22 , 2 00 4, fo r I nd ian Cr e e k Apa

rtme nts ; November 5, 2004, for Gre y stone Park; and October 14, 2004, for Pointe at Woodhol low. Nade au5

also soug ht attorney ’s fee s. Dalcor answe red with a g ener al denial. The case proce eded to a bench tr ia l on tho se ple a din g s. When the case was c alled, Da lcor’s c ounsel announc ed n o t re ady and moved f

or a continuance on the basis that Nade au had sue d the w ro n g p arty —he ar g ued that Da lcor ha d acte d
so le ly in t he c a pa c ity of an a g e nt f

or the thr e e lim ite d p art

ne rs hip s th a t ha d ow ne d th e a pa rtme nts and wa s not liable to Nadea u. Counsel for Na deau r esponde d t h at Da l cor ha d not filed a swor n denial disputing its liability in t h e ca p acity

in which it was sued. He then stated, “ the issue is not befor e the Court and if

the Court d ee m s o therwise, w e’r e pre pare d to go f orwa rd with the name d defe ndant as the c orre ct def endant a nd the one that we had the c ontrac tual relationship with.” Dalc or replied that “I ’m beg g ing f or merc y for the oppor

tunity to put on and have the case —we’ re pr epar ed to go on the mer i t s . An d i f permitted the opportunity to present the e vidence that we have
conce rning the owner ship of the entities and the facts surrounding, y ou know, t he dea lings be tween the par ties, then we’ re not liable. We’r e pre pare d t o go ah ea d.” The trial court then inquire d, “You’ re pr epar ed to g o ahea d today ? ” Dalcor’s counsel responded, “W ith that proviso, y es.” The trial court r eplied, “Well, let’s g o forwa rd then,” and denie d Dalcor ’s motion for continuanc e. Na de a u p ro c e e de d to c a ll M r. Na de a u to te sti fy . T he “ Au sti n Pa int ingCon tr a c t”
was introduced, as wer e the invoices ref lecting the amounts Nade au cla imed it was owed. D uring
cross-e x amination, counsel for Dalcor inquired about Mr. N adea u’s initial conversation with P arikh and h is aw a r e n e s s th a t D a lc o r ma n a g e d , b u t d id n o t o w n , th e p r o p e rti e s . Co u n s e l f or Na deau objected that evidence g oing to D alcor ’s ag ency capa city was not suppor ted by the pleading s and, there fore , irrele vant. Dalcor ’s counsel responde d that Nade au had “opene d the door” by introducing the invoices, whic h “do not mention Dalcor [and] only

mention the names of the prope rty .” The trial
c ourt ov e rr ule d N a de a

u’ s o bje c tio n. Ov e r N a de a u’ s f ur the r o bje c tio n, Dal c or

wa s p e rm itt e d toTo dispel the possibilit y that any pref ere ntial pay

ments were made to Da lcor, Parikh 6 testified that the thre e par tnerships had owe d it approxi mately $787,000. 6 prese nt ev i dence rele vant to Mr. Nade au’s a war eness that he was c ontrac ting with Da lcor in a
re pr e se ntativ e c a

pa c ity and on be ha lf of the thr e e lim ite d p art ner sh ips that ow ne d th e a pa rtme nts , including the chec ks d es cr i b ed above . Dalcor then soug ht leave to f

ile a trial amendment ra ising its capac ity

defe nse, which the trial court g rante d. During its case- in-chief , Dalc o r pre sented Parikh’s testimony , additional evidenc e re g ardingthe r elationship betwee n Dalcor and the thre e limit ed par

tnerships, and e vidence reg arding the leg al identity of the partne rships and the fore closure of the pr op e rt ie s. 6

At the conc lusion of tr i al , t h e trial court a nnounced that, subject to Dalcor ’s filing its trial amendment, it would rule that Da lcor ha d execu t ed the contrac t in a repr esentative
c a pa c ity a n d

w a s n o tl i a

b l e . I tl a t e r

r e n d e r e d j u d g m e n tt h a tN a d e a

ut a k e n o t h i n g o ni t s c l a i ms ag ainst Dalcor . The trial court subsequently made findings of fac t and conclusions of l aw. The fa ct finding s included:

• “ DARe sid e nti a l N o. On e , L td. ow ne d a nd op e ra te d a n a pa rtme nt p ro pe rt

y . . . d oin g bu sin e ss under the assumed name of Gre y stone Park”; “ DA Residential No. T wo , L td. owned and o p er ated an apar

tment property

. . . doing busine ss under the a ssumed name of P o i n t e @ W oodhollow”; and “D A Residential No. Thre e, L td. owned and ope rate d an apar tment property

. . . doing busine ss under the a ssumed name of I ndian Cree k.”

• Dalcor

was the a g ent and pr operty manag er f

or ea ch of the limi ted par

tnerships with respe ct to the apar

tments it owned.

• Dalcor

had the a ctual author i t y to contrac t for ser vices at the proper

ties on behalf of

the lim ite d p a

rt ne rs hip s.

• “ Da lc or

dis c los e d to Na de a

u Pain tin g that e a c h o f t

he fo ur pr inc ipa ls w ou ld b e re sp on sib le for pa y ment for a

ny painting se rvice s provided by Nade au.”7

• Parikh “testified that he informed N adea u Painting prior to c ontrac t f ormation that three of the identified Principals we re in fina ncial diffic ulty

and that these three Principals may not be able to make timely

pay ments.”

• “The char g es for

Nade au’s pa inting ser

vices a re the obliga t i o n o f Dalcor’s pr incipals, and not debts for whic h Dalcor is responsible to Nade au.”
Ba sed on these f

act f indings, the tria l court conc luded:

• “Da lcor is not liable to Nade au for any painting service s perf

ormed at any

of the prope rties owned by any of Da lcor’s pr incipals bec ause D alcor order ed painting service s from Na deau in Dalcor ’s ca

pacity as a disclose d ag ent for D alcor ’s ade quately identified principa ls.”

• “B efor e any

contra ct was f

ormed or se rvice s were provid ed b y Nade au to any

of Da lcor’s fo ur pr inc ipa ls, Na de a

u ha d ac tua l know le dg e , or sho uld have kn ow n: (a ) t hat D a lc or

wa s, in fac t, acting as the a g ent for e ach of Dalcor ’s four pr incipals; (b) that Da lcor’s true leg al status in the matter wa s as ag ent for e ach of its four principals; and (c) of the identity of the four pr incipals for w hom Dalcor was a cting as ag ent.”

• Nade au shall take nothing on its claims ag ainst Dalcor
.

Nade au filed a

motion for rec onsideration and f or newtrial i n wh i ch it briefe d the l e g a l i s s u e o f

w h e t h e r D a l c o r ’ s d i s c l o s u r e o f i t s a g e n c y s t a tu s h a d b e e n a d e qu a t e t o a v o i d l i a b i l i t y. I t also urg ed the tria l court to rec onsider its ruling on the trial amendment, adding a complaint that Da lc or ha d f a ile d to re sp on d to Na de a u’ s re qu e sts fo r d isc los ur e s, in w hic h it ha d b e e n r e qu ir e d to disclose its capa city

theory
. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 194.2(b), (c)
. The trial court denied the motion by
wr itt e n o rd e r. Na de a

u a pp e a ls. AN AL YSI S Nade au bring s two issues on appea l. I n its first issue, Nadea u chal l en ges the leg al and fa ctual suff

iciency of the e vidence supporting the trial court’s fac t findings unde rlying its leg al conclusion that Da lcor wa s not liable. I n i t s s ec o n d i ssue, Nade au conte nds that the trial cour t abused its discre tion in gra nting Da lcor lea

ve to f ile a trial amendment raising its capac ity defe nse.8

Alternatively , Nade au urg es that “the court should have considere d Nade au’s complaints, post t rial but pre-judg ment, that Dalcor failed to re spond to mult iple reque sts for disclosure w hich would have g iven Nade au notice of

Dalcor ’s def

ense.”
Tr ialam e ndm e nt

We turn first to Nadea

u’s issue re g ardingthe trial ame ndment. Rule 66 of the rule s of c ivi l pr oc e dure g ov e rn s tr ia l ame ndme nts :
I f evide nce is objec ted to at the trial on the g round that it is n o t wi t h i n the issues m ad e b y t h e p l ea d i n g, o r i f du ri n g t h e tr i al an y d ef ec t , fa u l to r o m i s s i o ni na p l ea d i n g, either of form or substanc e, is ca lled to the attention of the c ourt, the cour t may allow the pleading s to be amende d and shall do so free l y when the pr esentation of the merits of the a ction will be subserve d there by and the objec ting pa rty fails to satisfy the cour t that the allowanc e of such amendment would prejudice him in maintaining his a c tio n or de fe ns e up on the me ri ts. Th e c ourt may g ra nt a po stp on e me nt t o e na

ble the objectingparty

to meet such e vidence
. Te x. R. C iv. P. 6 6. A tri a l c ourt may no t r e fu se a

tr ial ame nd men t un le ss ( 1) the op po sin g pa rt y prese nts evide n c e o f s u r

p r is e o r p r e

ju d ic e , o r ( 2 ) th e a me n d me n t a s s e rts a n e w c a u s e o f a c ti o nor defe nse, and thus is prejudicia l on its face, a nd the opposing party

objects to it. S

tate Bar v. Kilpatrick , 8 74 S.W. 2d 65 6, 65 8 ( Te x. 19 94 ); see G reenhalgh v . Servic e Lloyds Ins. Co. , 7 8 7 S
. W
. 2 d

9 3 8 , 9 3 9 ( T e x. 1 9 9 0 ); P er ez v. EmbreeConstr. Group, Inc. , 228 S.W .3d 875, 883 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied ). I n these two situations, the dec ision to allow or deny the amendme nt rests with the sound discretion of the trial court, a nd the trial cour

t’s decision will not be overturne d unless it constitut es a c lear abus e o f d i s cr eti on. Kilpat rick , 874 S.W .2d
a t 65 8; G.R.A.V.I.T.Y

. Enters. v. Re eceSupply Co. , 1 7 7 S
. W.3d 537, 542 (Tex. App.—Dallas 20 05 , n o p e t
. )
. A c o u rt a b u s e s i t s d i s c r e t i o n w h e n i t m a k e s a d e c i s i o n w i t h o u t r e f e r e nc e to any g uidi n g ru les or princ iples. Downer v. Aquam arine Operators, Inc

. , 701 S.W .2d9

238, 241-42 (Te x . 1985); Houston Li ve s t o ck S how & Rodeo, Inc . v. Hamric k , 125 S.W .3d 555, 570 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.).

Whe n th e g ra

nti ngof a tr ia l ame ndme nt w ou ld p re jud ic e a pa rt y in m a int a ini ngits
cause of ac tion or defe ns e, the amendment should be denie d or, alter natively , a motion for c ontinuance should be g rante d to enable the objecting party to respond. Ce lotex Corp. v. Grac y Me adow Owners Ass’n , 847 S.W .2d 384, 388 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, writ denied). He re , N a de a

u n ot o nly

fa ile d to se e k a

c on tin ua nc e a t any

tim e to r e sp on d to Dalcor’ s c a pa c ity de fe ns e , b ut o pp os e d g ra

nti ngDa lc or ’s re qu e st f

or a c on tin ua nc e in ord er to ame nd

its ans we r t o
asser t that defe nse. W ith refe renc e to Dalc or’s c apac ity defe nse, Na deau ma intained that “the issue is not before the Court,” but then expressed w hat the trial c ourt could h av e understood to be Nade au’s acquiesc ence in litigating the i ssue i f the c ourt conc luded diffe rently —“. . . and if t

he Cou rt de e ms oth e rwi

se , we’ re pr epar ed to g o forwa rd with the name d defe ndant as the cor rec t defe ndant
a nd the on e thatw e h a d t h e c o n t r a c tu a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h
. ” I nr e s p o n s e , D a l c o r a d v i s e d t h a tit int e nd e d to pr e se nt e vid e nc e su pp or tin g its c a pa c ity de fe ns e “ if

pe rm itt e d th e op po rt

un ity .” Thus , Nade au proc eede d to trial knowing that Dalcor would be attempting to de fend itself on the g round that it was not liable in the ca pacity in which it was sued. On this record, w e ca nnot conclude that the tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

pe rm itt ingthe tr ia l ame ndme nt. We acknowle dg e Na deau’ s complaint that Dal c o r s h o u ld h a v e d isclosed its defensive t h eo ry that Nade au had sue d the wrongparty in its responses to reque sts for disclosures. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.2(b), (c)
. Dalcor conce des that it did not r espond to these re quests. Howeve r, we must ag ree with Dalcor that Nade au fa iled to preser ve its com p laint reg ardingthe rule 194 disclosures. See Tex. R. App. P . 33.1.

We overrule Nade au’s se cond issue.10

Dalcor’ s liab ility

I n its first issue, Na deau c halleng es the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence supporting the trial court’ s findings of fac ts on which it based its leg al co n clus ion that Dalcor
wa s n ot l ia

ble on Na de a u’ s c la ims
. Th e tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s of fa c t in a be nc h tr ia l ha ve the same forc e and dignity as a jury ’s ver dict upon jury questions, Fl or e

yv . E sta te of M c Con ne ll , 212 S.W .3d 4 3 9 , 4 4 4 -4 5 (T ex . Ap p . — Au s t i n 2 0 0 6 , p et
. fi l e d ) ( c i t i n g An de rso n v . Ci ty of S e v e n P oin ts , 806 S.W .2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991)), and a re similarly

revie wed for leg al and f

actua l sufficienc y

of t h e evidence. Id
. at 4 4 5 (c i t i n g Catali na v. Blasdel , 8 81 S.W. 2d 29 5, 29 7 ( Te x. 19 94 )) ; se e als o BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W .3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002).

When review ing the evidenc e for leg al sufficie ncy , we consider the evidenc e in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he c ha llen ged fi nd ing , c re dit ingfa vo ra ble e vid e nc e if

a re a so na ble fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld a

nd dis re g ard ingc on tr ary

e vid e nce un le ss a

re a so na ble fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld n ot. City of Keller v. W

i lson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is leg ally insufficient if the
rec ord re veals: (a ) the c omplete abse nce of a vit al fact; (b) the court is barr ed by rules of law or of evidenc e fr om givingweig ht to the only eviden ce o ff

ered to prove a

vital fac t; (c) the e vidence offe red to prove a vital fa ct is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the e vidence establishes conclusively

the opposite of the vital fa ct. Id . at 81 0. Ev ide nc e is legal ly su ffi cient if it w ou ld enable fair- minded people to re ach the verdic t under re view. Id . at 827.

When review ing the evidenc e for fac tual sufficie ncy , we must weig h all the evidenc e in the rec ord and ove rturn the f indings only

if they are so contra

ry to the overw helming w eig ht of the evidenc e as to be clea rly wrong and unjust. Ortiz v. Jones , 917 S.W .2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996). We may not pass upon the witnesses’ c redibility or substitute our j u d gm ent for that of the trier of11

fac t, even if the evi d en ce wo uld support a diffe rent re sult. Ma rit im e Ov e rse as Cor p. v . E lli s , 971 S.W .2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998).

We reviewthe trial cour

t’s leg al conc lusions de novo. BM C So ftwa re , 83 S.W .3d at 794. The court’s conclusions will be upheld unless they are err oneous as a matter of la

w. Florey , 21 2 S. W.3 d at 44 5. I nc or

re c t c on c lus ion s wi ll no t re qu ir e re ve rs a l if c on tr oll ing fi nd ing s of fa c t w ill support a cor

rec t leg al theory
. Id
. The c ontext of Nadeau’ s evidentiary -suffic iency challeng es is a set of f amiliar
conce pts of principal-a g en cy l aw . “Unless the pa rties have ag ree d otherwise, a person makingor purp or tin g to make a c on tr a c t wi th ano the r a s a g e nt fo r a dis c los e d pr inc ipa l do e s no t be c ome a pa rt y to the contra ct.” A t o Z R e nta l Ctr . v . B urris , 714 S.W .2d 433, 435 (Tex
. Ap p.—Austin 1986,
wr it r e f’ d n .r .e .) ; see also Burch v . D. L. Hancock , 56 S.W .3d 257, 261 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2001, no pet.); Restatement (Second) of Ag ency § 320 (1957). “I f, howeve r, the principal re mains undisclo s e d , o r if it is kn o w n th a t a p e r s o n is a c ti n g a s an a g e n t b u t th e p r in c ip a l’ s id e n ti ty is not disclosed, t he age nt is a party to the contra ct.” Bu rri s , 71 4 S.W. 2d a t 43 5; see Restatement (Sec ond) of Agenc y

§§ 32 1, 32 2 ( 19 57 ); Bo

y le s v . M c Clu re , 2 4 3 S. W. 1 0 8 0 , 1 0 8 1

- 8 2 ( T e x. Co mm . App. 19 22 , ju dg m’ t a do pte d) ; see also 12 Wil liston on C ontrac ts § 35:43 (4th ed. 1999).

Con se qu e ntl y , “ [i]f a

n a g e nt w o u l d

a v o i d p e r s o n a l li a

bil ity , h e ha s th e du ty

to d isc los e not only that [1] he is acting in a represe ntative capacity but also [2] the identity of his principal.” Bu rri s , 714 S.W .2d at 435. “[T]he party with whom th e age n t d ea l s has no duty to discover the principal.” Id. “The infere nce that the ag ent is a par ty t o the contra ct exist s until t he ag ent g ives
su c h c omp le te inf

or ma tio n c on c e rn ing the pr inc ipa l’ s ide nti ty that the pr inc ipa l c an be read ily distinguished; if the other party has no re asonable means of a scer taining the principal, the infe renc e12

preva ils unless the parties have ag ree d otherwise.” Id .; see also Restatement (Sec ond) of Ag ency § 321 cmt. a (1957) . Uncommunicate d intent wi l l n o t s u ffice
. Se alev . Ni c ho ls , 505 S.W .2d 25 1, 25 5 ( Te x. 19 74 ). “ Th e te st f or dis c los ur e is the other pa rt y ’s kn ow le dg e , o r r e a so na ble g rounds to know, of the pr incipal’s exist en ce o r identity , irrespe ctive of the source from which the other pa

rty obtains it.” Bu rri

s , 7 1 4 S
. W
. 2 d

at 4 3 5 (c i t i n g Jo h n s o n v. Armstrong , 1 8 S. W. 59 4, 59 5 (T ex . 1 89 2) & Carter v. W alton , 4 69 S.W. 2d 46 2, 47 1 (T e x. Civ
. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 1 9 7 1 , w r it r e f

’ d n . r . e . ) )
. “ T h e o th e r p arty ’ s a c tu a l kn o w le d g e o f th e p r in c ip a l, n o t ju s t the other party ’s suspicion, is the test.” I d.

The issue of dis clos ure is a que stion of fac t. Lacqueme nt v. Handy , 876 S.W .2d 93 2 , 9 3 9 (T ex . App.—For t Worth 1994, no writ). W here conflicting evidenc e is prese nted
concern ing disc losure, the issue must be re solved by the trier of

fac t. Id . I n deter

mining whe ther sufficie nt disclosure wa s made, we look to the time that the parties ente red into the c ontrac t. Posey v. Broughton Farm Co. , 997 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, pet. de nied); Lacqueme nt , 876 S.W .2d at 940. Knowledg e ac quired a fter a cause of ac tion has acc rued c annot aff ect the rig ht to rec over from the ag ent persona lly on a contra ct. See Dodson v. Pec k , 75 S.W .2d 461, 463 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1934, writ dism’d w.o.j.).

Na d ea u co n ce d es t h at t h er e is s u ff i ci en t ev i d en ce t o s u

p p o rt t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs t h a t , a t r e l e v an t t i m e s , D a l c o r h a d d i s c l o s e d t o N a d e a ut h a ti tw a s a c t i n g i na

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c a

p a c i t y. Howeve r, Na deau ma intai n s that there is insufficient evidenc e of the second e lement of the disclosure require ment—that Dalcor adequately disclosed the “ide ntity

of its principal.” Se e Bu rri s , 714 S.W .2d at 435. We c onclude that there is le g ally and fa ctually sufficie nt evidence that Dalcor13

had di s cl o s ed t o Nade au that it was a cting as the a g ent of thre e limited partner ships that owned I nd ian Cr e e k, Gr e y sto ne Park , a nd Poi nte a t Woo dh oll ow . T his e vid e nc e inc lud e s:

• Parikh’s t es t i mony that he told Mr. Nade au that Da lcor mana g ed the f our apa rtment proper ties, that the proper

ties were eac h owned by

a diffe rent limited partner ship, that three of the lim ite d p art

ne rs hip s “ we re str

ug g lin g and

tr y ingto g e t th e inv oic e s p a id on tho se proper ties,” and that Mr. Nade au understood “the differ ence in those three pr operties ve rsus the one.”

• Th e “ Au sti n Pa int ing Con tr a c t,” wh ic h, wh ile no t a mode l of cla ri ty re g ard ing the c a

pa c ity in which Dalc or wa s signingit, did refer to Dalcor ’s R andy

Plit t as “owne r’s re prese ntative.”

• Na de a

u invo ic e s f

or wo rk it pe rf

or me d a t e a c h a

pa rtme nt pr op e rt

y , wh ic h we re a dd

re sse d to eac h apar tment property

by its name and a ddress, a

nd do not refe r to Dalc or. The record contains invoices f

rom Aug ust 2004 for Gre y st o n e and Point e at Woodhollow, and September 2004 f

or Indian Cree k. Those invoices pr eda t e the ea rliest service s at ea ch property for whi c h N a d e a us e e k s r e c o v e r

y in it s s u it
. I no th e r

w o r d s , b y

th e ti me the obl i gati ons made the ba sis for Nade au’s suit arose , Nade au alr eady knew to bill the proper ties in this m anner .

• Simi larly , the re cord c ontains copies of c hecks through which Na deau w as paid on some of its invoi ces. The chec ks clea rly identify the pay or as “DAL COR Property Manag ement, Inc., Ag e nt f or I nd ian Cr e e k Apa

rtme nts ,” “
. . . G re y sto ne P ark Ap artme nts ,” or

“
. . . Po int e @ Wo od ho llo w A pts .” Th e c he c ks fo r I

nd ian Cr e ek and Grey sto ne pr e date the e a rl ie st service s at those proper

ties for which Nade au is se eking rec overy , and are further evidenc e that Nade au knew

Dalcor was the “ Ag ent for” the apa rtments’ owne rs bef

ore the obligations made the ba sis for its suit arose . As for Poi nte at Woodholl ow, onl y a si ng le unpaid invoi ce, for $95, pr edate s the first che ck.
Nade au does not see m to dispute that sufficie nt evidence exis ts of its knowledg e that Dalcor was re prese nting the limited par tnerships that own e d

th e a p a r tm e nts
. I n s te ad, Na deau f

ocuses solely on the nar

row c ontention that Dalcor never disclosed the le

ga l na me s of the limited partne rships—i.e., DA Residential No. O ne, L t d
. , the owner of Gre y stone Park; DA Residential No. Two, L td., the owner of Pointe at Woodhollow; a nd DA Residential No. Three , L td., the owner of I nd ian Cr e e k. Na de a

u is c or re c t—t he re is n o e vid e nc e that D a lc or dis c los e d at any

re le va nt t imeDa lc or did pr e se nt e vid e nc e a t tr ia l th a t it wo uld have be e n p os sib le fo r N a de a u to e a sil y 7 a sc e rt a i n t h e l e g a l i d e n t i t y o f i t s p r i n c i p a l s : N a d e a u ’ s r e a l e s t a t e c o u n s e l , b e f o r e w r i t i n g anAp ri l 28 , 2 00 5 d e mand le tte r, wa s a ble to a sc e rt a in t

he tr ue le g a l na

me s o f t he lim ite d p art

ne rs hip s me re ly by consulting Tr avis County Appra isal District Records f or the pr o p er t i es . Howeve r, Da lcor pr e se nte d n o e vid e nc e tha t N a de a u a c tua lly ha d le arn e d th e le g a l id e nti ty of Dalcor ’s pr inc ipa ls be fo re Da lc or

inc ur re d th e ob lig a tio ns ma de the ba sis fo r N a de a u’ s c la ims
. I n Johnson , the president of a colleg e hired arc hitects to desig n buildings for the colleg e, 8 which was an incorpora

ted entity
. Johnson v. Arm strong , 18 S.W . 594, 594-95 (Te x . 1892). The arc hitects soug ht to hold the pr esident, rather than the colleg e, liable f or pay ment. Id . at 595. The supreme c o u rt a c kn o w le d g e d th a t “ [t ]h e e v id e n c e d o e s n o t in s o ma n y w o r d s s h o w tha t they [the arc hit e c ts] k

ne w that th e bu ild ingwa s to be c on st ruct e d b y an e xistin g c or

po ra tio n s o a s to 14 the pr e c ise le g a l na

me s o f t he lim ite d p art

ne rs hip s th a t it repr esent e d. Da lc or do e s n ot a

pp e a r t o contend other

wise. 7 Nade au re lies on a number of court of a

ppeals’ de cisions that, in a varie ty of fac tual contexts, have sug g ested that disclosure only of a principal’s “tra de name” o r a s s u m ed name may

be insuffic ient to relieve an ag ent of liability
. See Burch , 5 6 S. W.3 d at 26 3; Posey v. Broughton Farm Co. , 997 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, pet. de nied); Lacqueme nt , 876 S .W .2 d at 9 39 -4 0; Bu rri s , 7 14 S.W. 2d

a t 43 7; Carter v. W

alton , 469 S.W .2d 46 2, 47 0- 71 (T e x. Civ . App .— Cor pu s Ch ri sti 19 71 , wri t r e f’ d n .r .e .) ; Lachmann , 375 S.W .2d at 785. D a l c o r r e s p o n d s t h a tw h i l e t r a d e o r a s s u m e d n a m e s m ay sometimes constitute inadequate disclosure of a g e n c y u n d e r th e c i r c u m s t an c e s , i t s d i s c l o s u r e s h e r e w e r e a d e qu a t e u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s. Dalcor relies on Johnson v. Arm strong , 18 S.W . 594 (Tex. 1892), in which the Texas Supre me Court held that circ umstances may exis t that are s u fficie nt to put plainti ffs “ upon inquiry ” that they are contra cting with a principa l, or from whic h the plaint i ff s ’ ac t u al knowledge of that fa ct may be inferr ed, despite the ag ent’s not having expli citly disclosed the princ ipal’s leg al identity
. Se e id . at 594-95. Dalcor

also argues that there is sufficient evidence from which the trial cour t could have 8apprise them that J ohnson had a pr incipal ca pable of being bound by

the contra ct.” Id . Non e the le ss, the cour t rea soned that the e vidence : does show that there wa s i n fac t such a c orporation and principal, a nd the circ umstances that we re know n to the plaint i ff s we re sufficie nt to put them upon inquiry . The inquiry

that it was their duty

to make, under

the circ u mstances of

the case , would have developed a responsible principal, and it is difficult to conclude that the plaintiffs did not have a ctual knowledg e tha t t h ey we re de aling with a corpor ation, notwithstanding the f act that the y d i d not at the time of making the c on tr a c t in qu ir e fo r o r g e t th a t in fo rm a tio n f ro m John so n, the a g e nt. Id . The supre me cour t further rea soned that the p l ai n t i ff s k new that the building s were intended for

a public and not fo r a pr ivate purpose and, conse quently , also should have known t h at t h e b u i l d ings w ere for the c olleg e and not f or the pre sident who hired them. Id .; s ee als o A me ric an Ap

prais al C

o. v . Co ns tan tin , 98 S.W. 2d 10 03 (T e x. Civ
. Ap p. —Fort W or th 1 9 3 6 , n o wr it) ; Veazie v . Beac h Plumbing & Heating Co. , 235 S.W . 695, 697-98 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1921, no writ). 15 inferr ed that Na deau a

nd Dalcor had ag ree d that Nade au would look only to the limit ed par

tnerships that ow ne d th e a

pa rtme nts (w hate ve r t

he pa rt ne rs hip s’ pr e c ise name s mi g ht h a ve be e n) fo r p ay me nt. I n addition to its fac t findings reg arding disclosure of Dalcor ’s ag ency status and its principal, the trial court f

ound that “Da lcor disclosed to Na deau Painting that eac h of its four princ ipals would be responsi b le f

o r p ay me n t f o r an y p a in ti n g s e r

v ic e s p r o v id e d

b y N a d e a u , ” an d a d d e d th a t P a rikh “testified that he informed Na deau Painting p ri o r to contra ct formation that three of the ide nti fi e d Pr inc ipa ls w e re in f inanc ial d if

fi c ult y and that th e se thr e e Pr inc ipa ls m ay no t be a ble to make timely

pay ments.” We a g re e , b a se d o n th e e vid e nc e we have a lr e a dy su mma ri zed , th a t th e re is l e g a lly and fa ctually sufficie nt e vidence that Nade au had ag ree d to look solely to the limit ed par tnerships for pa y ment. This evidence , and the tria l court’s fa ct finding s based on that evidenc e, support the trial court’s judgme nt. As the Court observe d in Bu rri s , the i nfer ence that the ag ent is a par ty to theWe observe that, to the ext ent the Lachmann line of cases st and for a categ orica l rule that 9 an ag ent’s disclo s u re of a pr incipal’s assumed or trade name is inade quate to avoid liability , as Nade au urg es, the de cisions have been criticized as rely ing on an err oneous view of Lachmann and as beingout-of-step w ith modern commerc ial rea lities. See Eliz abeth S. Miller, Agents Take He ed: A Principal By Any Other Name Is Not A Disclosed Princ ipal – The Perils of Identifying a Principal By Its Trade Name , 13 Corp. Couns. Rev. 281, 284-302 (1994). 16 contra ct exist s either “ until the ag ent g ives such complete information conc erningthe principa l’s identity that the principa l ca n be re adily distinguished” or

“ unless the parties have agre ed

o th e rwis e .” Bu rris , 7 14 S.W. 2d a t 43 5 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see Restatement (Sec ond) of Ag ency § 321 (“ Unless otherwise agreed , a pe rs on purp or tin g to make a

c on tr a c t w ithano the r f

or a pa rt ia lly disclosed principa l is a par ty to the contra ct.”) (empha sis added). Conseque ntly , we ne ed not re ach any potential implications of the Lachmann line of ca ses or whe ther Da lcor’s disclosure s reg arding the limited partnerships we re a lone ade quate to def eat the inf

ere nce that it would be liable. We 9
overr ule Nade au’s f

irst issue.
CO NC LU SION Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d N a de a

u’ s is su e s, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton; ConcurringOpinion by J ustice Patterson Affir med Filed: Jul y

18, 2008