* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined t hat

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-20540

Summary Calendar

WILLIAM L. EDMUNDSON, III,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ALLIANCE MINING, INC.; ET AL;

Defendants,

MKD CAPITAL CORPORATION; AVRAM

LEBOR; MICHAEL LEBOR; U.S. BANKCORP,

and operating under the assumed names,

formerly known as FIRST BANK SYSTEMS, INC.,

also known as U.S. BANK TRUST MANAGEMENT

DIVISION, also known as U.S. BANK TRUST;

FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE, doing

business as FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL,

INC.; FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE OF

NEW YORK, INC., doing business as FIDELITY

NATIONAL FINANCE, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H:98-CV-2240)

_________________________________________________________________ December 26, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff-Appellant William L. Edmundson, III (“Edmundson”)

sued numerous individuals and companies under numerous theories of2

responsibility for alleged losses arising from or connect ed with

the failure of two of his real estate development projects to

materialize. Implicated in this appeal, however, is but one of the

original defendants (and the only one remaining in the litigation),

Appellee Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (“Fidelity”),

and but two among several causes of action asserted against

Fidelity by Edmundson

—— fraud and n egligent misrepresentation.

Edmundson’s notice of appeal listed the district court’s grant of

Fidelity’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Edmundson’s

claims as well as the court’s (1) denial of his motion for leave to

file a fourth amended complaint and grant of Fidelity’s motion to

strike that complaint, (2) denial of his motion to alter, amend,

and wi thdraw the judgment, (3) denial of his supplemental brief

with newly discovered evidence, and (4) denial of his motion for

relief from judgment. Edmundson has not, however, raised or

addressed the court’s disposition of his pre- or post-trial

judgment motions, so we do not address anything but the district

court’s summary dismissal of his action.

In conducting our de novo review of the district court’s grant

of summary judgment dismissing Edmundson’s remaining claims against

Fidelity, we have carefully gone over the record on appeal and the

applicable law as presented by counsel for Edmundson and Fidelity

in their respective briefs, as well as by our independent research.

Our plenary review satisfies us that the district court got it

right.

Edmundson’s fraud claim was properly dismissed by the grant of

summary judgment for his failure to adduce sufficient summary3

judgment evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the

intent elemen t, specifically evidence that Fidelity or Lunde

i ntended that the July 19, 1996 letter be relied on by any party

other than the addressee for any purpose. Similarly, Edmundson has

failed to raise a genuine issue of materi al fact that he was a

known party or that his purpose was known, and Texas law requires

that a successful plaintiff in a negligent misrepresentation claim

demonstrat e that the defendant furnished information to a known

party for a known purpose.

For essentially the reasons assigned by the district court,

its grant of summary judgment is, in all respects,

AFFIRMED.