16Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.No. 98-2003the August 17 order did not substantively alter the May 6judgment in any way. It did not “close the case”; indeed, thedistrict court’s order indicated that the case had already beenclosed. J.A. at 74 (D. Ct. Order 8/17/98) (“[A]lthoughthiscase is closed, plaintiff continues to inundate the court withmotions.” (emphasis added)). Nor did the August 17 ordereliminate the court’s retention of jurisdiction. Futernick maystill file motions in the case, although he must now obtainleave of the district court to do so.Futernick also argues that the order requiring him to obtainthe court’s permission before filing any further motionsviolates his constitutional right to due process and equalprotection. However, we have previously upheld a districtcourt’s issuance of a similar order.See Filipas v. Lemons,835 F.2d 1145, 1146 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[I]t is clear that theplaintiffs are vexatious litigants who have filed manycomplaints concerning the same 1972 automobile accident.The district court entered an order requiring leave of courtbefore the plaintiffs filed any further complaints. Thisrequirement is the proper method for handling the complaintsof prolific litigators, and the procedure does not violate thefirst amendment.”). In light of the fact that Futernick wasinundating the district court with repetitive motions, thedistrict court’s order was not erroneous.III. CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, weDISMISSFuternick’s appealof the district court’s April 14 and May 6 judgments asuntimely andAFFIRMthe district court’s denial of postjudgment relief.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0089P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0089p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________SHELDONFUTERNICK,Plaintiff-Appellant,v.SUMPTERTOWNSHIP;HELENTEALL,BARBARADUDEK,ARNESSCOX, and BARNEYBAN, Sumpter TownshipTrustees; MARVINBANOTAI,Sumpter TownshipSupervisor; GLENNBOWLES,Sumpter TownshipAdministrator; JOANODDY,Sumpter Township Clerk;JOHNMORGAN, TownshipTreasurer, jointly andseverally,Defendants-Appellees.;>1No. 98-2003Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.No. 94-74296—Robert E. DeMascio, District Judge.Argued: February 4, 20002Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.No. 98-2003Decided and Filed: March 13, 2000Before: NELSON, MOORE, and COLE, Circuit Judges._________________COUNSELARGUED:Thomas G. Plunkett, WILLIAMS, WILLIAMS,RUBY & PLUNKETT, Birmingham, Michigan, forAppellant. Christopher T. Koch, ABBOTT, NICHOLSON,QUILTER, ESSHAKI & YOUNGBLOOD, Detroit,Michigan, for Appellees.ON BRIEF:Daniel Noveck,NOVECK & SKLAR, Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellant.Christopher T. Koch, ABBOTT, NICHOLSON, QUILTER,ESSHAKI & YOUNGBLOOD, Detroit, Michigan, JulieMcCann O’Connor, O’CONNOR, DeGRAZIA & TAMM,Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellees._________________OPINION_________________KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This caseinvolves a settlement agreement obligating defendantappellee Sumpter Township to construct sewer lines toplaintiff-appellant Sheldon Futernick’s mobile home park,Holiday Woods. The agreement provided that the lines wouldbe constructed with the proceeds of a bond sale to bescheduled “as quickly as possible.” Although the agreementwas entered on August 25, 1993, the Township has not yetundertaken a bond sale or begun construction of the sewerlines to Holiday Woods.Because of this delay, Futernick filed suit in federal districtcourt against the Township and various of its officials,alleging that the Township had breached the settlementagreement and requesting specific performance. After abench trial, the district court concluded that, although therehad been substantial delays, the Township had not breachedNo. 98-2003Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.15R.CIV.P. 60(b).a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion.See UnitedStates v. Universal Management Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750,757 (6th Cir. 1999) (citingHood v. Hood, 59 F.3d 40, 42 (6thCir. 1995)). “In reviewing an order denying Rule 60(b) relief,we have no occasion to review the underlying judgment . . . .Instead, we merely inquire as to whether one of the specifiedcircumstances exists in which [the appellant] is entitled toreopen the merits of his underlying claims.”Feathers v.Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1998).We conclude that Futernick’s post-judgment motion wasproperly denied because Futernick provided no reason thatwould justify relief from the district court’s judgment. Onlythree months prior to the filing of Futernick’s motion, thedistrict court considered the very same issues and ruled thatthe Township, due in part to its financial difficulties, had notbreached its obligation to proceed as quickly as possible withthe bond sale. In his motion for post-judgment relief,Futernick did not provide any new information regarding theTownship’s financial position. Without additional evidencetending to prove that the Township had the requisite revenueto support a thirteen-million-dollar bond issue, the districtcourt properly refused to alter its judgment. Moreover,Futernick’s claim that the Township’s monthly reports did notcomply with the district court’s directive had been rejectedthe previous month in the court’s order denying Futernick’sfirst post-judgment motion. J.A. at 73 (D. Ct. Order 7/15/98)(“[T]he reports that defendants have prepared and submittedto the court fully comply with the Amended Judgment.”).Finally, Futernick takes issue with the district court’sstatement regarding the case being closed and its order that nofurther motions may be filed without first seeking leave of thecourt. Futernick alleges that the August 17 order “closing thecase” was an improper substantive modification of the May 6amended judgment providing that the court would retainjurisdiction until the sewer had been constructed. However,14Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.No. 98-20036On August 14, 1998, Futernick filed a motion to dismiss withoutprejudice his August 11 motion for enforcement of the settlementagreement. Having denied the August 11 motion, the district court deniedthe August 14 motion as moot.7Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part that “the court may relieve aparty or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, orproceeding” for any one of five enumerated reasons, as well as for “anyother reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” FED.($1,000.00) a day until such monthly report is filed. Thefirst of such reports is due June 1, 1998.J.A. at 70-71 (D. Ct. Amended J. 5/6/98). Futernick claimedin his motion that none of the three reports that the Townshiphad submitted pursuant to the court’s order “has outlined indetail precisely what steps Sumpter Township has takentoward the issuance of bonds for the construction of Phase IIof the sewer, as this Court ordered.” J.A. at 112 (Post-J. Mot.8/11/98).On August 17, 1998, the district court denied Futernick’spost-judgment motion. The district court noted that “althoughthis case is closed, plaintiff continues to inundate the courtwith motions,” and it “ordered that no further motions, or anyother pleading shall be filed without first seeking leave ofcourt.” J.A. at 74 (D. Ct. Order 8/17/98).6It is this order thatFuternick now challenges.Despite the title that Futernick provides, his post-judgmentmotion is not a motion to enforce a settlement agreement inthe ordinary sense. Futernick’s post-judgment motion insteadseeks the same relief that was denied in the April and Mayjudgments — namely, a determination that the Township is inbreach of the settlement agreement and an order compellingthe Township to proceed immediately with the bond sale.Because Futernick’s motion really seeks modification of theApril 14 and May 6 judgments, we will treat Futernick’s postjudgment motion as one brought pursuant to Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 60(b).7We review a district court’s denial ofNo. 98-2003Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.3its obligation under the settlement agreement. Futernick nowappeals that decision, as well as the district court’s denial ofhis post-judgment motion to enforce the settlementagreement. Because Futernick’s appeal of the district court’sjudgment that the Township had not breached the settlementagreement is untimely, weDISMISSthat portion of hisappeal. Concluding that Futernick has presented no reasonjustifying relief from the district court’s judgment, weAFFIRMthe district court’s denial of post-judgment relief.I. BACKGROUNDSheldon Futernick is the owner of Holiday West MobileHome Park and Holiday Woods Mobile Home Park, whichare located in Sumpter Township. In 1993, Futernick suedSumpter Township and Township officials in federal districtcourt alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and variousstate laws. Futernick sought an injunction prohibiting theTownship from constructing a sewer system that did notinclude free hook-up status for his mobile home parks.The parties resolved the suit by way of a settlementagreement, which was never reduced to writing but which wasplaced on the record on August 25, 1993. The agreementprovides:Number one. The Township shall construct sewerlines to Holiday West and Holiday Woods Mobile HomeParks. The line to Holiday West [(hereinafter referred toas “Phase I”)] will be constructed from the proceeds ofthe initial bond sale of $3.6 million. The line to HolidayWoods [(hereinafter referred to as “Phase II”)] will beconstructed from the proceeds of the second scheduledbond sale. Sumpter Township shall obtain the secondbond sale as quickly as possible.Number two. Plaintiff shall pay a total of $625,000toward the construction costs of the sewer lines toHoliday West and Holiday Woods. This payment will bein lieu of any tap fees or connection charges for existing4Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.No. 98-2003units at either Holiday West or Holiday Woods. Paymentof such amount shall be made as follows:(A) The sum of $225,000 shall be paid within sevendays of the date of commencement of flow of sewagefrom Holiday West into the Sumpter sewer system.(B) The remaining $400,000 shall be paid withinseven days of the date of commencement of flow ofsewage from Holiday Woods into the Sumpter sewersystem.Three. The Township agrees that no other mobilehome park will receive more favorable fee on a per-sitebasis with regard to the amount paid for the sewerconstruction, and/or connection than Plaintiff.Number Four. The complaint against the Townshipand its officials will be dismissed with prejudice andwithout costs or attorneys fees to either party at the timethat construction to Holiday Woods is completed.Prosecution of the action will be stayed with the Court’spermission pending that event.Number Five. The foregoing settlement is contingentupon agreement by the Michigan Department of NaturalResources to forego any enforcement action or effort torequire compliance with the facility constructionrequirements of the Holiday Woods permit or the effluentlimits set therein, pending construction of the sewerconnection to Holiday Woods, and to suspend furtherproceedings toward a new permit for . . . Holiday West;pending construction of the sewer connection to HolidayWest.Number Six. Notwithstanding the foregoingparagraphs four and five, Plaintiff agrees to withdraw hisclaim for injunctive relief with regard to the issuance anddelivery of the initial bond issue covering inter aliaconstruction to Holiday West, and a consent order will bepresented to the Court for entry accordingly.No. 98-2003Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.13“Motion for Enforcement of Settlement Agreement.” In hismotion, Futernick asked the district court to order theTownship to begin immediately the process of issuing bondsfor the construction of Phase II.The motion was based on two of the district court’s priorstatements. First, in the court’s April 14 findings of fact andconclusions of law, the district court concluded by stating:We do not, however, mean to imply that the Townshipno longer has an obligation under the settlementagreement. They are obligated to provide sewer serviceto Holiday Woods and to have a bond sale. To this end,the Township must immediately re-evaluate theirfinancial ability to issuebonds for Phase II. There isevidence to indicate that the Township does indeed nowhave sufficient funds for the sale. The design has beencompleted and the project has been bid. While the courtdoes not fault the Township for the delays from Augustof 1994 to the present, the Township is running out ofexcuses for their non-performance.J.A. at 108-09 (D. Ct. Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw 4/14/98). In his motion, Futernick argued: “It is nowmore than 90 days since the entry of those Findings of Factand Conclusions of Law and the Township has not yet reevaluated their financial ability to issue bonds for Phase II.The Township is not acting ‘immediately’ as this Courtmandated.” J.A. at 112 (Post-J. Mot. 8/11/98). Second, inthe district court’s amended judgment providing for thecourt’s retention of jurisdiction until completion of theparties’ obligations under the settlement agreement, thedistrict court stated:It is further ordered that defendant Sumpter Townshipshall submit monthly reports to the court outlining indetail precisely what steps Sumpter Township has takentowards the issuance of bonds for construction of PhaseII of the sewer.It is further ordered that failing to file a timely report,Sumpter Township will be fined One Thousand Dollars12Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.No. 98-20035Although Futernick’s September 8 notice of appeal sought tochallenge both the August 17 and September 1 orders (as well as the July15 order), in his brief Futernick argues only that the August 17 order waserroneous. We therefore direct our attention solely to that order.jurisdiction on a court than a notice never filed.Attempts to resurrect notices of appeal must be treatedthe same as belated notices of appeal. The time limits forfiling an appeal require the losing party to choosebetween accepting the judgment and pursuing appellatereview. The loser may not dither. Filing and dismissingan appeal prevents appellate review, and we do not thinkthat it should place the judgment in limbo — open toreview whenever the losing side changes its mind. Thestructure of the rules is set against such delay anduncertainty.Barrow v. Falck, 977 F.2d 1100, 1103 (7th Cir. 1992)(citations omitted). While exceptions to this rule may lie inextraordinary circumstances,see e.g.,Turker v. Ohio Dep’t ofRehabilitation & Corrections, 157 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir.1998) (explaining that reinstatement had been granted whenan attorney dismissed the appeal without the consent of theclient), Futernick’s misunderstanding of the law does notpresent such a circumstance.Therefore, we dismiss Futernick’s appeal of the districtcourt’s April 14 and May 6 judgments. Because Futernick’sappeal is timely with regard to the August 17 and September1 post-judgment orders, we now proceed to consider themerits of Futernick’s challenge to those orders.5B. Denial of Post-Judgment ReliefFuternick’s final claim is that “the trial court’s order ofAugust 17, 1998, which denied Sheldon Futernick’s postjudgment motion for enforcement of the settlement agreementwas clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion whichwarrants reversal.” Appellant’s Br. at 33. Futernick’smotion, which was filed on August 11, 1998, is styled aNo. 98-2003Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.51The State of Michigan defendants refused to join in the settlementagreement, but in a letter to the district court Futernick waived thecontingency stated in paragraph five.2Futernick appealed the district court’s dismissal to a panel of thiscourt.See Futernick v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir.),cert.denied, 519 U.S. 928 (1996). We affirmed the district court’s dismissalof Futernick’s claims against the Township, rejecting his argument thatthe terms of the settlement agreement required the district court to retainjurisdiction of the case until the Township fulfilled its obligations underthe agreement.See id.at 1054-55. Additionally, we affirmed the districtcourt’s dismissal of Futernick’s claims against the State of Michigandefendants, who had not joined in the settlement agreement, on the basisthat Futernick failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.See id.at 1055, 1060.3The officials named in the complaint are Helen Teall, BarbaraDudek, Arness Cox, and Barney Ban, Sumpter Township Trustees;Marvin Banotai, Sumpter Township Supervisor; Glenn Bowles, SumpterJoint Appendix (hereinafter “J.A.”) at 82-83 (D. Ct. Op.Denying Mots. for Summ. J. 6/17/97) (ellipsis in original).After entry of the settlement agreement,1the district courtdismissed the claims against the Township.2A clean “nonlitigation certificate” was then issued, making possible theclosing of the initial bond sale.Phase I of the Sumpter sewer system providing service toHoliday West was timely constructed with the proceeds ofthat first bond sale, and Holiday West is not at issue in thiscase. Phase I of the sewer system involved the installation ofa sewer trunk line along Rawsonville Road to Willis Road.The Phase I system, however, does not extend far enough toserve Holiday Woods. Futernick believes that the Townshipshould have extended the Willis Road Phase I sewer toHoliday Woods; the Township chose, however, to constructthe Phase II sewer along a different and more complete routethat would serve Holiday Woods.In October of 1994, Futernick filed a diversity action infederal district court naming as defendants Sumpter Townshipand various Township officials.3Futernick alleged that6Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.No. 98-2003Township Administrator; Joan Oddy, Sumpter Township Clerk; and JohnMorgan, Township Treasurer. For purposes of this opinion, we shall referto the officials and Sumpter Township collectively as “the Township.”Sumpter Township had breached the settlement agreementand asked the court to enforce the terms of the agreement.Both Futernick and the Township filed motions for summaryjudgment, and on June 17, 1997, the district court, findingthat genuine issues of material fact existed, entered an opiniondenying both motions. The district court explained that theparties’ dispute focused on the first paragraph of thesettlement agreement. The court reasoned:Plaintiff argues that this paragraph creates an absoluteobligation on the part of the Township to build a sewerline to Holiday Woods, whereas Defendant argues thesecond bond sale is a condition precedent that must occurbefore the sewer line is to be built. The Court concludesthat the second bond sale is a condition precedent.. . . The parties’ settlement agreement provides that“[t]he line to Holiday Woods will be constructed fromthe proceeds of the second scheduled bond sale.” A fairand reasonable interpretation of this language is that theparties’ [sic] intended that the sewer line would beconstructed after the occurrence of a future event — thesecond scheduled bond sale.J.A. at 88-89 (citation omitted) (D. Ct. Op. Denying Mots. forSumm. J. 6/17/97).Trial commenced on February 23, 1998, and the districtcourt issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on April14, 1998. The district court concluded that, although the“Phase II project has been fraught with design delays andfinancing complications,” these delays did not constitute abreach of the Township’s obligation to construct Phase II “asquickly as possible.” J.A. at 107 (D. Ct. Findings of Fact andConclusions of Law 4/14/98). The court explained that theTownship still had an obligation under the agreement toprovide sewer service to Holiday Woods and to have a bondNo. 98-2003Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.11was entered in a previous case. The district court thereforedid not simply retain jurisdiction to protect and enforce itsjudgment, Futernick’s counsel contended, but rather reopenedthe merits of the case. Although the district court’s retentionof jurisdiction over a previously-entered settlement agreementtechnically differentiates this case from aKokkonen-type case,we conclude that there is no meaningful difference betweenthe two for purposes of finality. InKokkonen, the SupremeCourt explained that a district court could retain jurisdictionby making “the parties’ obligation to comply with the termsof the settlement agreement . . . part of the order ofdismissal.”Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381. This is preciselywhat the district court did in its May 6 judgment; the courtretained jurisdiction to ensure that the settlement agreementwould be executed, but it did not in any way qualify its rulingthat the Township had not breached the settlement agreement.We do not interpret the May 6 judgment as reopening themerits of the breach of contract issue. Futernick’s appeal ofthe district court’s April 14 and May 6 judgments is thereforeuntimely.Futernick’s first appeal, which was pending in this courtwhen the district court entered its May 6 amended judgment,would have been timely with regard to the April 14 andMay 6 judgments were it not voluntarily dismissed basedupon an erroneous understanding of the law.SeeFED.R.APP.P. 4(a)(4)(B);supran.4. We decline, however, toreinstate Futernick’s first appeal. If appellants were permittedto dismiss voluntarily a timely appeal and then reopen theappeal at their pleasure, there is no limit to the amount of timethat could pass before a final judgment is reviewed.Appellants would essentially have the ability to make an endrun around Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1).Such a result would completely undermine the purposes of thestatutory time limits for appeal and would compromise thefinality of judgments. As the Seventh Circuit has explained:A timely notice of appeal is essential to appellatejurisdiction. A notice of appeal filed and dismissedvoluntarily is gone, no more effective in conferring10Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.No. 98-2003retention of jurisdiction over a settlement agreement, or itsincorporation of that agreement into its final order, satisfiesany jurisdictional concerns,” and treating the two judgmentsbelow as “final judgments,” despite their express retention of“jurisdiction for purposes of implementing and enforcing thesettlement agreements and final judgment orders”).Furthermore, it is well settled that the fact that a judgment issubject to reservations or conditions does not automaticallydeprive a judgment of finality.See generallyCHARLESALANWRIGHT,ARTHURR.MILLER&EDWARDH.COOPER,FEDERALPRACTICE ANDPROCEDURE§ 3915.3, at 287 (2d ed.1992);cf. Tiboni v. Cleveland Trinidad Paving Co., 36 F.3d533, 534 (6th Cir. 1994) (assuming jurisdiction, withoutdiscussing the issue of finality, over an appeal taken from adistrict court order denying a motion to enforce a settlementagreement and dismissing the action without prejudice subjectto reopening upon motion by either party);Cusumano v.Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 711-12 (1st Cir. 1998)(concluding that a district court order denying a motion tocompelore tenuswhile retaining jurisdiction in order toreview individual itemsin camerafor materiality and “toorder specific material produced upon a showing ofparticularized need” was final, and stating that “[i]t is settledlaw that a court’s retention of jurisdiction in order to facilitatethe consideration of possible future relief does not underminethe finality of an otherwise appealable order”);Pioche MinesConsol., Inc. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 191 F.2d399, 400 (9th Cir. 1951) (“Assuming that the otherrequirements of finality are met, a ‘reservation to makefurther orders does not mean orders inconsistent with thefinality of the judgment.’” (quotation omitted)).At oral argument, Futernick’s counsel did not seriouslycontend that the type of jurisdictional reservationcontemplated inKokkonenwould render a judgment nonfinal. Instead, he contended that the district court’s May 6judgment contained an “extraordinary” retention ofjurisdiction that serves to distinguish the case at bar from aKokkonen-type reservation. He argued that, unlike in aKokkonen-type reservation, the parties’ settlement agreementNo. 98-2003Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.7sale, and it indicated that “[t]here is evidence to indicate thatthe Township does indeed now have sufficient funds for thesale.” J.A. at 108-09 (D. Ct. Findings of Fact andConclusions of Law 4/14/98). The same day, the districtcourt issued a judgment dismissing Futernick’s complaint.J.A. at 69 (D. Ct. J. 4/14/98). On May 6, 1998, uponFuternick’s motion, the district court amended its judgment“to provide for the court’s retention of jurisdiction untilcompletion of the parties’ obligations under the settlementagreement.” J.A. at 70 (D. Ct. Amended J. 5/6/98). AlthoughFuternick had filed a timely appeal of the district court’s April14 judgment, Futernick voluntarily dismissed the appeal onthe belief that the court’s retention of jurisdiction rendered thejudgment non-final.After issuance of the amended judgment, Futernick filedseveral post-judgment motions for enforcement of thesettlement agreement; the district court denied these motionson July 15, 1998, August 17, 1998, and September 1, 1998.In its August 17 order denying Futernick’s second postjudgment motion, the district court ordered that “no furthermotions, or any other pleading shall be filed without firstseeking leave of the court.” J.A. at 74 (D. Ct. Order 8/17/98).Believing this to be the district court’s final judgment,Futernick filed a second notice of appeal on September 8,1998. The September 8 notice of appeal sought to challengenot only the district court’s orders denying post-judgmentrelief, but also the district court’s April 14 and May 6judgments.II. ANALYSISA. JurisdictionBefore proceeding to the merits, we must first addressSumpter Township’s argument that Futernick’s September 8appeal should be dismissed as untimely.Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) provides that “[i]n a civilcase,” “the notice of appeal . . . must be filed with the districtclerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealedfrom is entered.” FED.R.APP.P. 4(a)(1)(A). Futernick’s8Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.No. 98-20034Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A), if aparty timely files in the district court a motion to alter or amend thejudgment under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the timeto file an appeal runs from the entry of the order disposing of that Rule 59motion. FED.R.APP.P. 4(a)(4)(A). Because Futernick timely filed amotion to amend the district court’s April 14 judgment, his thirty-dayappeal period began to run on May 12, which was the date on which thedistrict court’s May 6 amended judgment was entered. Futernick’s appealof the April 14 judgment was, therefore, premature because it was filedprior to entry of the May 6 judgment. However, Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(i) provides: “If a party files a notice ofappeal after the court announces or enters a judgment — but before itdisposes of any motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A) [including a Rule 59motion] — the notice becomes effective to appeal a judgment or order, inwhole or in part, when the order disposing of the last such remainingmotion is entered.” FED.R.APP.P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i).notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of entry of thedistrict court’s August 17 and September 1 post-judgmentorders; it is therefore timely with regard to those orders. Thequestion is therefore whether Futernick’s appeal of theApril 14 and May 6 judgments is timely. This, in turn,depends upon whether the May 6 judgment was final forpurposes of appeal.Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we “have jurisdiction ofappeals from all final decisions of the district courts of theUnited States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Township argues thatthe May 6 judgment constituted a final decision, so that anappeal of the April 14 and May 6 judgments should have beentaken within thirty days of the entry date of the May 6judgment.4Futernick, on the other hand, contends that thedistrict court’s retention of jurisdiction in the May 6 judgmentrendered it non-final so that an appeal from that judgmentwould have been beyond our jurisdiction. Instead, Futernickbelieves that the district court did not issue a final decisionuntil August 17, 1998. In support of this position, Futernickcites the following language from the August 17 postjudgment order: “[A]lthough this case is closed, plaintiffcontinues to inundate the court with motions.” J.A. at 74 (D.Ct. Order 8/17/98). Futernick argues that it was theNo. 98-2003Futernick v. Sumpter Township, et al.9August 17 judgment that “closed the case,” so that hisSeptember 8 appeal of the April and May judgments is timely.We begin our analysis by noting that a district court has theauthority to dismiss pending claims while retainingjurisdiction over the future enforcement of a settlementagreement. InKokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. ofAmerica, 511 U.S. 375 (1994), the Supreme Court held thatin order to have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreementreached in a dismissed action, the district court must make theparties’ obligation to comply with the terms of the settlementagreement “part of the order of dismissal — either by separateprovision (such as a provision ‘retaining jurisdiction’ over thesettlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of thesettlement agreement in the order.”Id.at 381;see also WasteManagement of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 132 F.3d 1142,1144-45 (6th Cir. 1997) (citingKokkonenfor the propositionthat a district court’s retention of jurisdiction over a caseresulting in the entry of a consent decree “clearly provides thedistrict court with continued ancillary jurisdiction over theterms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement andConsent Decree”).We have not previously had occasion to address thequestion whether a district court’s retention of jurisdiction toenforce the terms of a settlement agreement renders anotherwise final judgment non-final. Today we answer thatquestion in the negative. In its April 14 judgment, the districtcourt held that Sumpter Township had not breached itsobligations under the settlement agreement and dismissedFuternick’s complaint. Although the May 6 judgmentreserved jurisdiction so that the district court could monitorthe Township’s financial position and respond to any changes,the judgment resolved all issues on the merits and effectivelyended the litigation.See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S.229, 233 (1945) (“A ‘final decision’ generally is one whichends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for thecourt to do but execute the judgment.”);cf. In reVMS Sec.Litig., 103 F.3d 1317, 1322 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining thattheKokkonenCourt “recognized that a district court’s explicit