alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### JOHN JANVIER Jr. *vs.*THOMAS MULFORD.

On the guarantee of a bond, the party guarantied is bound to use due diligence.

He should bring suit to the first term after the bond falls due, unless the defendant is insolvent.

Debt on bond. Narr; plea ; replication suggesting breaches.

The bond was given to guarantee the payment of a bond assigned by defendant to plaintiff, on a third person. The question was, whether due diligence had been used. The bond guarantied fell due on 13th September 1832, and action was brought upon it 4th February 1833, to March term 1833. The court sat a few days after the bond fell due, and too late, considering the distance of defendant’s residence, for plaintiff to have process returnable to the fall term. Defendant lived in Maryland.; after suit brought, he came in and confessed judgment with a stay of six months which, by the rules _ and practice of the Maryland court he was entitled to have, on a confession of judgment. At the expiration of the stay a fi. fa. was issued, whi'-' was returned nulla bona.

*29
      *Rodney*for the defendant,

contended that the question of diligence ■was to be settled in reference to the utmost promptness. Bills of exchange and promissary notes must be proceeded on immediately; and, on a bond guarantied, the writ should be sued out to the next term after it falls due. Here a term was permitted to pass by, and a stay was afterwards granted.

*Booth*for plaintiff.

*Rodney*for defendant.

The *Chief Justice*

said it had frequently been decided in the late courts, that the party guarantied must not permit the first term of the two courts then existing to pass, after the debt became due, without suit. Thus, if the bond fell due in August, the party might suffer the Supreme Court to pass, and bring his suit in the Common Pleas. But it has further been decided, that where insolvency was proved at the time the bond fell due, it was not obligatory on the party to sue at all; for the couit said it would be a fruitless suit and an unnecessary expense.

The plaintiff had a verdict.
<PAGE>   1
Exhibit 12

GTE California Incorporated and Subsidiary

STATEMENT OF THE CONSOLIDATED RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
(Thousands of Dollars)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                  Three Months
                                                      Ended
                                                    March 31,
                                                       1997
                                                    ---------
<S>                                                  <C>
Net earnings available for fixed charges:
  Income from continuing operations                  $128,297
  Add - Income taxes                                   87,849
      - Fixed charges                                  29,295
                                                     --------
Adjusted earnings                                    $245,441
                                                     ========

Fixed charges:
  Interest expense                                    $26,120
  Portion of rent expense
     representing interest                              3,175
                                                     --------
Adjusted fixed charges                                $29,295
                                                     ========
RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES                       8.38
</TABLE>
#### Harold RIGGSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. P-191.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Nov. 16, 1971.

Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and John W. Watson, III, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on authority of Lockwood v. State, 107 So.2d 770 (Fla.App.1959).

SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON and CARROLL, DONALD K., JJ., concur.
#### John G. FATOLITIS, Appellant, v. Mary FATOLITIS, Appellee.

No. 70-566.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 16, 1971.

Rehearing Denied May 26, 1971.

Harold S. Wilson, Clearwater, for appellant.

Luke R. Kaleel of Kaleel, Kaleel & Ka-leel, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

LILES, Judge.

On April 9, 1970, the trial court entered its order dismissing with prejudice plaintiff-appellant’s complaint for divorce and dismissing without prejudice the defendant-appellee’s counterclaim for separate maintenance. The court in preparing this order did not include a reservation of jurisdiction over the parties and the matter of attorney’s fees and costs for defendant’s attorney.

On June 9, 1970, defendant gave notice of hearing on her application for attorney’s fees and motion to tax costs. Plaintiff filed his motion to strike defendant’s notice and dismiss the hearing on the grounds that the court’s order failed to retain jurisdiction, and the court had therefore lost jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. The court denied plaintiff’s motion to strike and entered an order on July 17, 1970, correcting the order of April 9, 1970. The corrected order said:

> “The court finds that it committed an error itself by mistakenly signing and entering an Order dismissing the above matter without reserving jurisdiction over the parties for the matter of attorneys’ fees and costs for the defendant’s attorneys, which the court had fully intended to do at the time of, and after the final hearing of this matter, and further the court finds that this was discussed between the attorneys for the parties in the court’s presence and it was understood that this matter would be taken up at a later date.”

Plaintiff appeals from this order.

We believe F.R.C.P. 1.540, 31 F.S.A. offers relief in situations such as this where the court itself makes a mistake or omission. This was not a mistake of law as occurred in Constant v. Tillitson, Fla.App. *5261968, 214 So.2d 91. If it were, Rule 1.540 would not provide relief.

The trial judge committed no error in correcting his order, and we therefore affirm.

PIERCE, C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
# Official Journal C 23A/29 J

| | ISSN 1725-2423 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 23A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5229 January 2009 |

ISSN 1725-2423

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 23A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5229 January 2009

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | V   Announcements |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| 2009/C 023A/01 | Vacancy Notice concerning a post of Director at the Directorate for Finance, Budget and Accounting — Publication under Article 29(1) and (2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Economic and Social Committee

2009/C 023A/01

Vacancy Notice concerning a post of Director at the Directorate for Finance, Budget and Accounting — Publication under Article 29(1) and (2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
# Official Journal C 43A/2014

| | ISSN 1977-091X
  doi:10.3000/1977091X.CA2014.043.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 43A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5714 February 2014 |

ISSN 1977-091X

doi:10.3000/1977091X.CA2014.043.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 43A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5714 February 2014

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | V   Announcements |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | European Commission |
| 2014/C 043A/01 | Publication of a vacancy for a Principal Adviser function at grade AD 14 in the Directorate-General of Economic and Financial Affairs — London (United Kingdom) — COM/2014/10350 | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Commission

2014/C 043A/01

Publication of a vacancy for a Principal Adviser function at grade AD 14 in the Directorate-General of Economic and Financial Affairs — London (United Kingdom) — COM/2014/10350

1

---

REVIEW OF COMPETITION C A OJs

Please find below the list of C A published during the present year.

Unless otherwise indicated, OJs are published in all language versions.

| 5 | |
| --- | --- |
| 6 | |
| 11 | |
| 19 | |
| 21 | |
| 26 | |
| 27 | |
| 30 | (PL) |
| 35 | |
| 41 | (DE/EN/FR) |
| 42 | |
| 43 | |

5

6

11

19

21

26

27

30

(PL)

35

41

(DE/EN/FR)

42

43

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
Exhibit 10.34









PROMISSORY NOTE (“NOTE”) - 0% SIMPLE
INTEREST


 


 


$1,850


10/21/2020


 


 


For VALUE RECEIVED, SYBLEU INC. (“Borrower”)
promises to pay to David R. Koos (“Lender”) the principal sum of $1,850 with no interest to accrue on the balance.
The said principal shall be payable in lawful money of the United States of America at the demand of the Lender. This Note may
be prepaid in whole or in part at any time without premium or penalty. The Borrower hereby waives any notice of the transfer of
this Note by the Lender or by any subsequent holder of this Note, agrees to remain bound by the terms of this Note subsequent to
any transfer, and agrees that the terms of this Note may be fully enforced by any subsequent holder of this Note. All terms and
conditions of this Note shall be interpreted under the laws of the state of California and venue shall be the state of California.


 


 


SYBLEU INC.( Borrower)


 


By:/s/David Koos


CHAIRMAN AND CEO


 


Accepted By:


 


DAVID R KOOS (Lender)


 


By:/s/David Koos


 


DAVID R. KOOS
<PAGE>
                                                                      EXHIBIT 11
 
                      METROMEDIA INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.
 
                       COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
 
                    (IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE AMOUNTS)
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                               1999        1998
                                                                                            ----------  ----------
<S>                                                                                         <C>         <C>
Loss per common share--Basic (A):
  Net loss................................................................................  $  (11,270) $  (22,963)
  Cumulative convertible preferred stock dividend requirement.............................      (3,752)     (3,752)
                                                                                            ----------  ----------
  Net loss attributable to common stock shareholders......................................  $  (15,022) $  (26,715)
                                                                                            ----------  ----------
                                                                                            ----------  ----------
Weighted average common stock shares outstanding during the period........................      69,123      68,572
                                                                                            ----------  ----------
                                                                                            ----------  ----------
Loss per common share--Basic:
  Net loss attributable to common stock shareholders......................................  $    (0.22) $    (0.39)
                                                                                            ----------  ----------
                                                                                            ----------  ----------
</TABLE>
 
------------------------------
 
(A) In calculating diluted earnings per share, no potential shares of common
    stock are to be included in the computation of diluted earnings per share
    when a loss from continuing operations available to common stockholders
    exists. For the three months ended March 31, 1999 and 1998, the Company had
    a loss from continuing operations.
 
                                       68
|             |  |             
|------------ |  | ------------
|Subsidiaries |  | EXHIBIT 21.1

ACMI Asia Inc. (Washington)

Adventure Vending Inc. (Washington)

Bellword GmbH (Austria)

Coinstar Entertainment Services, Inc. (Delaware)

4th Wall Management LLC (Minnesota)

CellCards LLC (Delaware)

CellCards of Delaware, LLC (Delaware)

CellCards of Illinois, LLC (Illinois)

Coin-Op Factory Inc. (California)

Coinstar E-Payment Services Inc. (Kansas)

Coinstar E-Payment
Services Limited (United Kingdom)

Coinstar International, Inc. (Delaware)

Coinstar Limited (United Kingdom)

Coinstar Money Transfer (Holdings) Limited (United Kingdom)

Coinstar Money Transfer Limited (United Kingdom)

Coinstar Money Transfer SA
(Belgium)

Coinstar UK Holdings Limited (United Kingdom)

El
Toro Prepaid Inc. (Kansas)

Entertainment Vending Management, LLC (Delaware)

First Remit Limited (Ireland)

Folz Vending, Inc. (Delaware)

Sesame Holdings, Inc. (Delaware)

Southwest Entertainment Vending Inc. (Washington)

Sugarloaf Amusement Vending, S. de R.L. de C.V. (Mexico)

Telepay S.A.
(Spain)

Travelex Money Transfer (Hong Kong) Limited

Travelex
Money Transfer LLC (Delaware)
EXHIBIT 99.17




CONSENT OF KARLIS JANSONS




March 31, 2011





Brigus Gold Corp.


United States Securities and Exchange Commission





Re: Brigus Gold Corp.





Ladies and Gentlemen:





I hereby consent to (i) the use of my name in connection with the following documents and reports, which are either referenced in or filed as exhibits with the Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2010 (the “Form 40-F”) of Brigus Gold Corp. (the “Company”) to which this consent relates: (A) the technical report entitled “Black Fox Project National Instrument 43-101 Technical Report” dated January 6, 2011 (the “Report”), (B) the Company’s Annual Information Form for the year ended December 31, 2010 and (C) the Company’s Management’s Discussion and Analysis for the year ended December 31, 2010, (ii) the inclusion or incorporation by reference of information derived from the Report in the Registration Statements on Forms S-8 (File Nos. 333-113889 and 333-162558), as amended, or any related abbreviated registration statement filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Rule 462(b) under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or in any amendment to any of the foregoing, or to any prospectuses or amendments or supplements thereto and (iii) all other references to the undersigned included or incorporated by reference in the above-referenced Registration Statements and in any prospectuses or amendments or supplements thereto.





Sincerely,




/s/ Karlis JansonsName: Karlis Jansons
#### BUFFINGTON *v.*STATE

[No. 109,

September Term, 1962.]

*424
      *Decided January 18, 1963.*

The cause was argued before Bruñe, C. J., and Hammond, Prescott, Marbury and Sybert, JJ.

*R. Duncan Clark*for the appellant.

*Gerard Wm. Wittstadt, Assistant Attorney General,*with whom were *Thomas B. Binan, Attorney General, Leonard T. Kardy, State’s Attorney for Montgomery County,*and *Stewart Sweeney, Assistant State’s Attorney,*on the brief, for the appellee.

Per Curiam.

Appellant was indicted on five counts charging rape, assault with intent to rape, carnal knowledge of a child under 14, assault with intent to carnally know, and assault and battery. Appellant entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, which pleas were withdrawn when the case was called for trial. The State thereupon abandoned all counts except the one charging carnal knowledge of a child under 14, to which appellant pleaded guilty. After the court explained to appellant the significance of this charge and the penalty therefor, extensive testimony was heard from prosecution and defense witnesses on the question of sentence, whereupon appellant was sentenced to 21 years in the Maryland Penitentiary. We are asked to review both the verdict and sentence.

The State has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging appellant’s non-compliance with Maryland Rule 828 in that he did not print the material testimony and the judgment in his brief, both being stated to be necessary for the determina*425tion of the questions presented. Non-compliance with Rule 828 is ordinarily sufficient ground for dismissal. In this case we find that the brief provides sufficient material for us to decide the questions raised. Therefore the motion to dismiss is denied. *Brown v. Fraley,*222 Md. 480.

The contention that the trial court committed error in finding appellant guilty is without weight since appellant, who was represented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty. Therefore evidence to prove guilt was unnecessary and no error was committed; hence the conviction will not be reviewed on appeal. *Moyer v. State,*225 Md. 156, 158.

Appellant’s other contention, that the sentence was excessive, is also without merit. The sentence imposed was one of the sentences provided in the statute (Code (1957), Art. 27, sec. 462), and in this State such a sentence will not be reviewed on appeal unless it comes within the narrow exception recognized in *Reid v. State,*200 Md. 89, 92-93, and this is not that case.
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This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 32,776 4 MARCIE MATTHEWS, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY 7 Donna J. Mowrer, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 12 Nicole Murray, Assistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 GARCIA, Judge. 172 { 1} Defendant has appealed from a conviction for DWI. We issued a second notice 1 of proposed summary disposition on November 14, 2013, proposing to reverse and 2 remand for consideration of Defendant’s arguments concerning the ignition interlock 3 feature of her sentence. The State has filed a response with this Court indicating that 4 it does not oppose our proposed summary disposition. 5

{2} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the second notice of proposed summary 6 disposition, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 7

{3} IT IS SO ORDERED. 8

___________________________ 9 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 10 WE CONCUR: 11

12 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge 13

14 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 15
#### TATE *v.*STATE

[No. 14,

September Term, 1962.]

*455
      *Decided October 15, 1962.*

The cause was argued before Bruñe, C. J., and Henderson, Hammond, Prescott, Horney, Marbury and Sybert, JJ.

*L. Robert Evans,*for appellant.

*Gerard Wm. Wittstadt, Assistant Attorney General,*with whom were *Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, Frank H. Newell*and *Paul J. Feeley, State’s Attorney*and *Assistant State’s Attorney,*respectively, for Baltimore County, on the brief, for appellee.

PER Curiam.

Appellant was convicted of robbery by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. His only complaint on this appeal is that the trial judge, over his objection, permitted one of the police officers to testify that the prosecuting witness had identified appellant when he was first taken to the Dundalk Police Station. He contends the State failed to prove the prior-to-trial identification was made under circumstances which established its fairness, integrity and reliability. This Court has had occasion to deal with this proposition, in, at least, four recent cases: *Basoff v. State,*208 Md. 643, 119 A. 2d 917; *Judy v. State,*218 Md. 168, 146 A. 2d 29; *Bulluck v. State,*219 Md. 67, 148 A. 2d 433; and *Proctor v. State,*223 Md. 394, 164 A. 2d 708.

However, in the view that we take of the instant case, we find it unnecessary to discuss the proposition; because, if we assume, without deciding, that the trial judge erroneously admitted the testimony, the error was, we think, harmless. The prosecuting witness testified that he had known appellant and his co-defendant for some time (and knew his name) prior to *456the robbery. The appellant admitted this acquaintanceship between him and his accuser. The prosecuting witness testified further that he had informed the officers before appellant's arrest that he would be able to identify appellant, and he had made a positive identification of the accused at the trial. Under these circumstances, the testimony objected to was merely cumulative, and, in our judgment, not prejudicial.

*Judgment affirmed.*
263 La. 99

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Jesse HARVEY v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 52856.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 17, 1972.

In re: Jesse Harvey applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

Writ denied. The assignment of error raied in this Court is without merit as a matter of law.
Exhibit 32.2
 Certification Required by 18 U.S.C. Section 1350  (as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)
  (1)
    
    the accompanying Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 (the
Report), filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
 (2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/  Randy L. KotlerRandy L. KotlerExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
259 La. 749

#### RECREATION AND PARK COMMISSION FOR the PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE v. Vincent DRAGO et al.

No. 51571.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 23, 1971.

In re: Vincent Drago et al. applying, for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 247 So.2d 908.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal we find no error of law in its judgment.

SANDERS, J., is of the opinion that a writ should be granted as to assignment of error No. 4.

SUMMERS, J., is of the opinion a writ should be granted.
#### In the Matter of Brooklyn Center for Psychotherapy et al., Respondents-Appellants, v Dennis P. Whalen, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, Appellant-Respondent.

[721 NYS2d 575]

—Cross appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Sheridan, J.), entered December 21, 1999 in Albany County, which, *inter alia,*partially granted petitioners’ application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul a determination of respondent to recoup Medicaid overpayments made to petitioners.

Judgment affirmed, upon the opinion of Justice Edward A. Sheridan.

Mercure, J. P., Peters, Spain, Carpinello and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.