### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 6, 200 6
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . ANTHONY M. BOND

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 00-03095 Joseph B. Dailey, Jud ge

No. W2005-01392-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Septem ber 20, 2006

The de fenda nt, Anthony M

. Bond, w as convic ted of fir st deg ree felony murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a)( 2) (1997) . The jury returne d a ver dict of life without par ole. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (1997). I n this appeal a s of rig ht, the defe ndant ar g ues that (1) the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support a c onviction for fe lony murder be cause the fa cts and c ircumstance s of the underlying r obbery

wer e not the proximate cause of the victim' s dea t h ; (2 ) t h e trial c ourt err ed by deny ing the defe ndant' s reque st for a c urative instruc tion after theprosec ution stated in its closi ng arg ument that the jury

had bee n sequester ed b eca use of the de fendant; (3) the trial c ourt err ed by allowing the introduction of testimony conce rning the defe ndant' s teeth; and ( 4) the trial c ourt err ed by allowing the prosec ution to bolster an expert witness' s cre dibilit y

. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirme d.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court , in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES a ndJ.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

J ames E. Thoma s, Memphis, Tenne ssee (on appea l), and How ard B . Manis, Memphis, Tennesse e (at trial) , for the a

ppellant, Anthony

M. Bond.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rney Gen eral & Re po rt e r; Ra c he l E . Wil lis , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L

. Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Amy Weirich and Nicole Germain, As sistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION On April 21, 1997, the def endant a nd a co- defe ndant, Andre w Thomas, robbe d an armored truck g uard outside of

a Walg ree ns in Memphis. Thomas s hot the vi ctim, J ames Day , in the back of the he ad and gra b b ed t h e m o n ey bag . Both men f

led in a stolen ca

r. Afte r being tried and convicted f

or fe lony murder, the defe ndant appea led and this c ourt conclude d that the fa ilure of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the lesser

included off

enses of felony m u rd er qualified asT his co urt af f i rm ed t he f

i rst d eg ree m urd er c o nv i cti o n a n d d ea t h sen t en ce o f t he co

- d efen d an t T ho m as. 1
B ec au s e t h e t r i al c ou r t f ai l ed t o pr oper l y i n s t r u ct t h e j u r y on l es s er i n cl u ded of fen s es , t h i s c ou r t g r an t ed a n ew t r i al for t he d efend ant i n Stat e v. B o nd , N o

. W 2 0 0 1

- 0 2 7 1 0

- SC

- R 1 1

- D D (T enn. , at Jackso n, A ug. 3 0 , 2 0 0 4 ); our suprem e co urt d eni ed ap p l i cat i o n fo r perm i ss i o n t o ap p eal

. I n S ta te v . T h o m a s, 15 8 S.W

. 3 d 36 1 (T enn. 20 0 5 ), our suprem e co urt
a ff irm e d the c o n v ic tio n a n d se n te n c e o f t h e c o -d e fen d a n t.
-2- reve rsible er

ror a nd war

rante d a new trial. The de fendant was convic ted of fir st deg ree felony 1

mur de r at hi s se c on d tria l, w hic h is the su bj ect of th is a pp e a l. H e ha d p re vio us ly ple d g uil ty

to
ro bb e ry in the Un ite d St a te s D ist ri c t Co urt.

Be tty Gay , the head cashie r and six teen- y ear employ ee at the Walg ree ns, testified that as she returne d from her

lunch bre ak at e x actly

12:37 p.m., she saw t h e v ictim, a L oomis Farg o courie r, waiting to pick up a deposit. She explained that she knew the victim because he had r eg ularly picked up deposits from her

store and r ec al l ed saying, " Have a nice day ," a s he left. Ms. Gay hear d a g unshot and then saw an Afric an American male , wea ring a blue jac ket and khaki pants or shorts and in possession of the money bag , run fr om the scene toward N ovare se Road.

Charles Young , an assistant manag er at the Walgr eens, te stified that the shooting oc curr ed
on a Monday , the bigg est deposit day of the wee k. He rec alled that he ha d g iven the victim about $19,000 in cash a nd another $9,000 in food stamps and che cks j ust befor e the shooting . Acc ording to Young , a ca shier y elled for someone to ca ll the police and whe n he ran outside, the vic tim, who was ly ing in a

pool of blood, "just kept re peating , I need to c all m y wi fe , I

need to c all my

wife." Young testified that Walgr eens ha d a surveillance came ra on a twenty -four hour lea d that rec orded the victim being shot.

Th e vid e ota

pe wa s p la y e d f

or the jury . M e mph is Po lice L ieu tenan t D arr e n G oo ds , w ho se primary role in the investig ation was to ana ly ze the tape, slowe d i t s speed so that he could view ind ivi du a l f

rame s, wh ic h h e the n p ri nte d o ut a s p ho tog ra ph s.
Christ op he r S a ins wo rk e d f or a c omm e rc ial dri vi ng c omp a ny a ndde liv e re d Co c a -C ola products to the Walg ree ns on the afte rnoon of the shooting . Whil e he was unl oading the shipment fr om h is t ru c k, wh ic h w a s par

ke d be hin d the Wal g re e ns , he he ard sq ue a lin g tir e s and sa w a wh ite four- door ca

r occ upied by

two men spee d out of the par king lot. The car cameto a halt behind a r ed
car that had bee n parke d along the stree t and two men eme rg ed fr om the vehicle, e ntere d the re d car , and ag ain sped off

. Gary Craig , who lived direc tly behind the Walg ree n s , t es t i fied that whe n he hea rd tires
scre ech, he ran outside and saw an African American man get out of the drive r' s seat of the white ca r a ndint o th e fr on t pa sse ng e r s e a t of the re d c ar. Cr a ig te sti fi e d th a t th e re wa s o nly on e oc c up a nt i n the wh ite c ar wh e n it c a me to a sto p a nd re c a lle d that the wi nd ow s o f the re d c ar w e re too tin te d to see inside.

L ater , on the s ame day

of the shooting , the def

endant' s g irlfriend, Tany a Mong er, pur chase d a 1990 Chevrole t Caprice f or $4,500. She paid c ash.-3-

Ang ela Jackson, the ex-wife of the co-defe ndant Thomas, testified f or the state. She r eca lled that at the time of the shooting , Thomas typically spent his nig hts at he r apartment and used her r ed Suz uki Swift for transportation. She stated that on the morning of the shooting , Thomas left in her
car , explaining t h at h e wa s go i ng to meet the def endant. She testified that shortly afte r noon, Thomas and the de fenda nt bang ed on her door and a

ppear ed t o b e "h y ped" as they enter ed her residenc e. She stated that the defe ndant threw "e nvelopes and stuff" on the floor and that the two men counted the money , chec ks, and food stamps that w ere in the envelope s. Ms. J ackson r eca lled that the de fe nd a nt tol d he r that the y ne e de d to "k e e p it a se c re t" a ndre me mbe re d th a t T ho ma s to ld the de fe nd a nt t o get ri d of a sil ve r g un . Sh e te sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt l e ft wi th the g un a ndhis share of the money

and that Thomas a nd her two daug hters trave led to a ca r dea lership wher e they purcha sed a pink Chevr olet for him. She stated that he insisted that she a nd her two daug hters stay with him at a hotel that night a nd rec alled that while at the hotel, she saw the television report on a sh oo tin g a t a loc a l Walg re e ns

. Ms. Jac ks on te sti fi e d th a t w he n th e re po rt su g g e ste d th a t th e vic tim had strug g led for his life, T homas rema rked that "the ne ws thing w as ly ing, that he [just ] gra bbed the n--- -- by

his head a nd shot him." When questioned as to why she coope rate d with the defe ndant
an dc o

- d e f

e n d a n t, M s

. Ja c k s o n s a id , " I w a s a f r a id , s o I d idw h a te v e r

I th o u g h t I c o u ldto b e s afe ." She also reme mbere d that prior to the shooting , when Thomas saw armored trucks on the roa d, he would fre quentely

comment, " I g ot to ge t that money ." Ms. Jackson identified Thomas a s the man in the photogr aph stills captured by the Walgr eens sur veillance came ra. She r eca lled that Thomas described the def

endant a s "sha

ky " and pointed out that he " wasn' t a killer."

Carol Wils on reported her fathe r-in-la w' s car

as stolen on the morning of the shooting . She testified that a white Pontiac B onneville, which had been parke d at his apartment c omplex at 8:00 p

. m

. o n t h e n i g h t

p r i o r t o t h e s h o o t i n g , w a s d i s c o v e r e d a s m i s s i n g a t7 : 0 0 a

. m

. o n t h e n e x td a y. Memphis Poli ce Ser g eant Robin Hulley dusted the P ontiac Bonneville for fing erprints. S he lifted a late nt fing erprint from the passeng er side r ear door just be neath the door handle. The parties stipulated that "the fing erprint lifted from the white P ontiac Bonneville by Sgt. Robin Hulley

. . . and fo rw ard e d to la te nt p ri nt e xami ne r, Jerry S im s, wa s e xami ne d b y [Jer ry Sims ] an d d oe s b e lon g to [t he def endant]."
Richard Roleson, a r etired Memphis police officer , investigated t he robbe ry and shooting of the victim. He testified that a bout six months after the crimes, he inte rv i ew ed the defendant and fo un d h im t o b e c oo pe rativ e

. Th e of fi c e r de nie d makin g a ny thr e a ts o r c oe rc ing the de fe nd a nt i nto g iving a statement. Offic er Roleson took the following state ment wher ein the def endant a dmitted h i s p ar t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e r o b b e r y:

Me a nd[Th oma s] w a s ta lki ng the da y be fo re the rob bery , Su nd a y . H e sa id something a

bout armore d trucks and said, "Do y ou want to rob one? " I said. " Yeah." Then me and [Thomas] [were] talking about wher e to do i t at, wher e they be at. And we just said either

on Summer or J ackson w here we a lway s see them. So then we g ot a stolen ca

r, I g ot the car from Poplar Plaza. The n parke d it. Then the next day

. . . [Thomas] came to pick me up from my mama' s house in a littl e re d car , that belong ed-4-

t o h i s g i r l f

r i e n d , [M s

. Ja c k s o n ]. T h e n I g o tt h e s t o l e n c ar

. . . a n d I

d r o v e i tto Walgr eens. We both g ot in the stolen car and we lef t the red car around the corner fr om Wal g re e ns

. Th e n a[n] ar mor e d tru c k pull e d up in fr on t of Wal g re e ns , [T ho ma s] g ot out and shot him, the guar d. [Thomas] g ot the m oney and g ot back in the c ar and we dr ove ar ound the corner and switched cars. We drove to his girlfrie nd' s house .

. . . a ndsp lit

the mon e y

up . I c a lle d a ri de a ndle ft

.
Acc ording to the office r, the de fenda nt claimed that he did not know that Thoma s was g oing to shoot the g uard, that Thomas had told him that "he w as just going to pull [ a g un] on hi m and take his g un and g et the money ." While admitting to Of fice r Roleson that he had possession of a wea pon when he lef t the J ackson r esidenc e, t h e d ef endant claimed that he immediately g ave it to Thomas and
asserted that the che cks and f ood stamps that were in the stolen money bag wer e thrown aw ay along with the clothes they

wore during the robbe ry . The de fendant stated to the offic er that he re ceive d
abo ut $ 6, 00 0 o r $ 7, 00 0 a s h is s ha re fr om th e rob bery . H e inf orme d h im that he us e d $ 4, 80 0 to p u r c h a s e a w h i t e 1 9 9 0 C h e v r o l e tC ap r i c e a n d t i t l e dt h e v e h i c l e i n t h e n a m e o f h i s g i r l f r i e n d , T a n ya Mong er.

Treve ous Gar

rett, who had bee n introduced to the de fendant throug h Ms. Monge r, testified that th e de fe ndant a nda

ma n b y the na me of

Ke ith Ec ho ls p ic ke d h e r u p a nddr ov e he r andMs. Mong er to the ma ll, wh er e t h e d efendant purc hased a neckla ce, a

ring , and a pair of shoes. She
re c a lle d th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a d g ive n he r $60 0 or $70 0 ca sh a nd ha d als o ha nd e d Ms. Mon g e r s ome cash. Ms. Ga

rre tt stated that the four of them then drove to a ca

r lot where the def

endant pur chase d a white c ar in the na me of Ms. Mong er. She rec alled that on the next morning, she a ccompa nied the defe ndant to a dentist' s office , wher e his teeth we re f iled in prepa

ration for g old caps.

Fay e Day , the wife of the victim, an a rmored c ar c ourier f

or L oomis Farg o, testified that at 5:00 a.m. on the morning of the shooting , the victim left for w ork " healthy as a hor se." She rec alled that just a fter noon, someone at the hospital telephone d and informe d her that her husband ha d been shot. Ms. Day

testified that the victim had s urg ery to relea se fluids from his hea d but suffer ed a stroke and a fterw ards wa s unable to use his a rms or leg s. Doctors pe rformed seve ral surg erie s on the victim, who eventua lly was moved to a reha

bilitation ce nter. Whil e at the re habilitation center , the vic tim ha d a fe e din g tub e ins e rt e d. Hi s h ome wa s r e no vate d in or de r t o a c c omm od a te his ne e ds

. The victim neve r reg ained c ontrol of his bowels, re quired c onstant attention, was depr essed, a nd was alway s in pain. Some two y ear s afte r t he shooting , a phy sician inserte d a " leave in" c atheter in an
a tte mpt to r e lie ve so me of

the wo rkloa d r e qu ir e d o f M s. Day , w ho wa s a c e rt if ie d n ur sin g a ssi sta nt. I n September of

1999, Ms. Day

noticed some blood in her husband' s ca t h et er bag and hours late r do c tor s d isc ov e re d th a t hi s b la dd e r h a d b ur st a nd that he ha d d e ve lop e d a n in fe c tio n kno wn a s se ps is. The victim died two day s later.
Assistant United States Attorney Tony Arvin testified for

the state that t h e d ef

en d ant pled g uiltyto ro b bery

in the United States District Court and had a cknowledg ed " being there and pa rt ic ipatin g in the e ve nts " inv olv ing the vic tim

.-5-

Tany a Mong er te stified that the she wa s at Ms. Garr ett' s residenc e on the day of the shooting and t h at t h e defenda nt and Keith Ec hols drove them to the mall wher e the de fendant purcha sed a $1,500 herri n gb o n e necklace and a pair of shoes. She r eca lled that they then trave led to a ca

r deale rsh ip w h e r e th e d e f e n d a n t p a id $ 4 , 8 0 0 in c a s h f o r a c ar , w h ic h h e p u t in h e r n a me. She
reme mbere d that she we nt twice to the dentist' s office with the defe ndant, the first time so that he could g et his teeth filed a nd the s econd time to g et four g old teeth put i n. One g old tooth had a dollar sign on it, anothe r had the letter " A," and another had the letter

"B ." A ccor ding to Ms. Mong er, she and the defe ndant were watching the television show " Cops" whe n he admitted that he ha d robbed
an armored truck. She rec alled that when she asked him to "quit playing" beca use she would ha ve to inform the police, he claimed to have just been joking

.
Dr . O .C. Smith, theShe lby Cou nty Me dic a l Ex amin e r, te sti fi e d th a t th e vic tim die d " a s a result of sepsis, sec ondary to a rupture d neurog enic bladder, and g unshot wound to the head." He described sepsis as " an over whelming body infec tion that is caused by a bac teria that esca pes fr om a loc a lize d a

re a , a ndg e ts i n the blo od str e a m, a nd inf e c ts ma ny of the bo dy ' s tis su e s. " Ac c or din g to Dr . Sm ith , th e vic tim ' s g un sh ot w ou ndc a us e d b le e din g a nd bl oo d clots th a t r e su lte d in pa ra ly sis , which, in turn, caused his bladder to become " very

fra g ile" and rupture. D urin g t h e autopsy , Dr. Smit h did discover that the vic tim had ninety perc ent blockag e in one of his arteries, a fatty

liver, and damag ed kidney s, but it was his opinion that none of these conditions caused the victim's de ath. The do c tor wa s a lso of

the op ini on that th e vic tim 's de a th w a s n ot the re su lt o f M s. Day ' s f a ilu re to proper ly clea n his cathete r. He testified that the vict i m h ad bee n very well ca red f or base d on the lack of bed sore s on his body

. On cross-examination, Dr. S mith acknow ledg ed that af ter the shooting , the victim's doc tors
wer e c o n c e r n e d w ith b lo o d c lo ts a n d th a t o n e o f th e m p r e s c r ib e d Co u ma d in , a b lo o d th inner. He also confirmed that althoug h the victim had bee n para ly zed from hi s chest down, he had re g ained use of his arms. Medical r ecor ds indicated that the victim wa s able to w alk with the aid of a rolling
w a l k e r a n d " s t a n d b y a s s i s t a n c e " f o r d i s t a n c e s o f

u p t o f o r t y f e e t b y t h e e n d o f h i s p h ys i c a l t h e r ap y. Re cord s s uggest ed t hat th e vi cti m m ight be cap abl e of r etu rni ng to wor k at a "sed ent ary lev el. "
Dr. Smith confirmed that the hospital had issued a death summary

identify ing the final diag nosis as urosepsis, which is sepsis that orig inates i n the urinary trac t; that a second dia g nosis on the s u mm ar y

w a s " in tr a

- ab d o mi n a l b la d d e r ru p tu r e " ; th a t th e th ir d w a s " N e w O n s e t D ia b e tes Me lli tus ," or

hig h b loo d s ug ar; a nd a fo urth dia g no sis wa s lis te d a s " Cou ma din toxic ity ." Dr . Sm ith explained that Coumadin tox icity can result in making a person' s body "muc h more prone to bleed internally

. " I t wa s his view, howeve r, that Coumadin did not cause se psis. Also li sted in the summary was a fifth diag nosis of "pa

raple g ia sec ondary

to g unshot wound." Dr. Smith diagnose d the victim as having died as a result of sepsis, ruptured neurog enic bladder , g unshot wound to the head, " remote," vis ce ra l co n gest ion, and viscer al petec hiae. He explained that he used the te rm remote be cause "the g unshot wound occur red at some time sufficient in the pa st, and it ha[d] heale d, and that the immediate effe ct of being shot ha[d] passed." He concede d that determining a c ause of death is not an " exact scienc e" b u t maintained his opinion that the death " related bac k to . . . the del ay ed ef

fect s o f t he gun sh otwou nd ."-6-

The de fense did not offer any evidenc e.

I. The defe n d a n t f

ir s t a r g u e s th a t th e e v id e n c e w a s in s u f f ic ie n t t o s u p p o r t h is c o n v ic tion beca use the state f

ailed to establish that his a ctions wer e the proxi mate cause of the victim's de ath. Specifica lly , he contends that the vi ctim's death was due to an intervening medical c ondition. The state su bmi ts that th e e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt. On appe al, of c ourse, the state i s entitled to the s trong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e and all rea sonable infere nces which might be draw n there from. State v. Cabbag e, 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978) . The c redibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht to be g iven thei r t es timony , and the
rec onciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entr

usted to the jury as the trier of fac t. By rg e v. Sta te , 5 75 S.W. 2d

29 2, 29 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 78 ). Whe n th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e is
c ha lle ng e d, the re le va nt qu e sti on is wh e the r, a ft e r re vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t f a vo ra ble to the state, any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found t he essential elements of the c rime bey ond a
rea sonable doubt. Tenn. R . App. P. 13(e); State v. Williams, 657 S .W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). B e c a us e a ve rd ict of guil t a g a ins t a de fe nd a nt r e mov e s th e pr e su mpt ion of inn oc e nc e a ndraise s a presumption of g uilt, the convicted criminal defe ndant bears t he burden of showing that the evidenc e was leg ally

insufficient t o s u s t ai n a g uiltyverdic t. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992).
First deg ree felony murder is de fined a s "[a] killing of another committed in the per petration
o f o r a t t em p tt o p erp et ra t e a n y fi rs td egr ee m u rd er , ar s o n , ra p e, ro b b er y , b u rgl ar y , t h ef t , k i d n ap p i n g, a g g ra vate d c hil d a

bu se or a ir c ra ft pir a c y ." Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -2 02 (a )( 2) (1 99 7) . In o rd e r t o sustain a criminal conviction for homicide, the evidenc e must establish that the defe ndant' s actions
o r c o n d u ct ca u s ed t h e r eq u i s i t e h a r m

. Ge n er al l y , th i s i s es t ab l i s h ed b y s h o wi n g t h at t h e v i ct i m 's death wa s the natura l and proba ble re sult of t he defenda nt's unlawful ac t. See State v. B arne s, 703 S.W .2d 611, 614-15 (Ten n

. 1985), ce rt. denied, 476 U .S. 1153 (1986); State v. Randolph, 676 S.W .2d 943, 948 (Tenn. 1984) ; L etner v. State, 299 S.W . 1049, 1051 (1927); Copeland v. State, 285 S.W . 565, 566 (1926); Ode neal v. State, 157 S.W. 419, 421 (1913). I n Odene al, our supre me court established the g ener al rule on the issue of causation:

One who unla wfully

inflicts a dang erous wound upon another is held f or the
co n s eq u en ce s fl o wi n g fr o ms u ch i n j u ry , wh et h ert h e se q u en ce b e di re ct o r t h ro u gh the oper ation of intermediate ag encie s depende nt upon and arising out of the orig inal
cause

.
1 5 7 S

. W

. a t4 2 1 ; s e e a l s o B a r n e s , 7 0 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t6 1 5 ( q u o t i n g O d e n e a l )

. T h i s c a u s a l c h a i n m a y, howeve r, be br oken. I n L etner , our supre me cou rt discussed the r eleva nce of intervening or su pe rs e din g a c ts:

"Wher e it a

ppear s that the act of the acc used was not the proxi mate ca use of th e d e a th o f th e p e r s o n f

o r w h o s e mu r d e r h e is b e in g p r o s e c u te d , b u t tha t another-7-

c a us e int e rv e ne d, wi th w hic h h e wa s in no way c on ne c te d, a nd bu t for wh ic h d e a th would not have oc curr ed, such supervening cause is a g ood defe nse to the cha rg e of homicide." [13 R .C.L . 750.]
[B ut] .

. . " wh e ne ve r an ind e pe nd e nt r e sp on sib le pe rs on , d isc on ne c te d w ith the def endant, c auses some i n t erve ning a ct to be done, the defe ndant is relieve d of responsi b i lity

for the c onsequenc es there of, unless the a ct of interve ntion is t he natura l result of the de fenda nt's a ct."

. . . . " T h e u n l a w f

u l a c t o r o m i s s i o n n e e d n o t b e t h e s o l e c a u s e o f d e a th. Th us if defe ndant' s neg lige nce w as a c ause of the death, it is immaterial that the neg lige nce of the de cea sed himself or of others also c ontributed there to. If an injury cause d by defe ndant contributed to the death, defe ndant is responsible, althoug h a subseque nt mortal wound inflicted independe ntly by another also contributed t h ere to. De fe nd a nt' s a c t or

omiss io n ne e d n ot b e the imm e diate c a us e of de a th; he is
re sp on sib le if

the dir e c t c a us e re su lts natur a lly fr om h is c on du c t. T hesa me is t ru e if t h e d i re ct ca u s e i s an ac to f t h e d ec ea s e d h i m s el f r ea s o n ab l y d u e t o t h e d ef

en d an t 's unlawful c onduct."

. . . . I n other wor ds, the defe ndant ca nnot esca pe the c onsequenc es of his wrong ful
a c t by re ly ing up on a su pe rv e nin g c a us e wh e n s uc h c a us e natur a lly re su lte d f ro m hi s wr on g fu l a c t.

299 S.W . at 1050-51 (e mphasis added) (quoting Corpus J uris).

I n o rd e r f or the de fe nd a nt t o b e ins ulate d f ro m c ri min a l re sp on sib ili ty , the de a th mus t be s o "une x pecte d, unfore seea

ble or re mote" that the defendant' s actions could not l eg ally be the c ause of the death. See Randolph, 676 S.W .2d at 948. Gene rally , our courts hav e held this to be a fa ctual issue to be determined by

the trier of

fac t based upon the e vidence introduced at trial. I d. Her e, that would clea

rly support the position of the state.

The de fenda nt does not dispute that he participated in the robbery or that the victim wa s shot du ri ng the ro bb e ry . Ind e e d, he ple d g uil ty to the ro bb e ry

in f e de ra l cour t. Th e de fe nd a nt, in this appea l, simpl y

arg u es "that the fac ts and circ umstances of the under ly ing r obbery

wer e not the pro x im ate caus e of [ th e vi cti m] 's deat h. "

I nitially , the def

endant ha s failed to cite any authority in support of his arg ument. The failure to c ite authority in suppor t of an issue may

constitute a wa iver. Te nn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7) . I n any e ve nt, the de fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f. Dr . Sm ith te sti fi e d th a t th e vic tim ' s g un sh ot c a us e d h is para ly sis which cause d his bladder to bec ome fra g ile and rupture . Wh i l e ac k n o wledg ing that he could not state with ce rtainty whether the victim developed se psis before or af ter his bladder ruptured, he steadfa stlymaintained that the victim' s death "re lated back t o

. . . the delay ed ef fec ts of-8-

the g unshot wound." There was no evidenc e to the contr ary . Under these c ircumstance s, it is our view that the e vidence was suff icient to support the conviction.

II. The de fenda nt next contends that the pr osecutor ma de an improper remark during he r closing
ar g u m e n tw h i c h r e q u i r e d a c u r a t i v e i n s tru c t i o n t o t h e j u r y:
None of us would be her e, none of y ou fin e people would ha ve bee n sequester ed this wee k and aw ay fr o m y o ur friends and families, away from the
c omf orts o f y ou r h ome , th a t [e vid e nc e ] ca rt wo uld n' t b e the re , a ll the se bo ard s, a ll these piec es of pa

per, a ll these peop l e, t h i s machinery , none of it would [be] here
e xc e p t f o r [t h e d e f e n d a n t]

. The state arg ues otherwise and contends that the de fendant failed to demonstrate that the stateme nt
c ou ld h a ve a ff

e c te d th e ve rd ic t to the pr e jud ic e of the de fe nd a nt.

Trial c o u r ts h a v e s u b s tan ti a l d is c r e ti o n ar y au th o r it y in d e te r mi n in g th e p r o p r ie ty o f f ina l arg ument. Although c ounsel is ge nera lly g iven wide latitude, c ourts mu s t restric t any improper
ar gu m en t

. S p ar k s v

. S t at e, 5 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d 5 6 4 , 5 6 9 -7 0 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 7 8 ). Ge n er al l y s p ea k i n g, closing arg ument "must be te mperate, must be predic ated on evidenc e introduced during the trial of the ca se, and must be pe rtinent to the issues being tried." State v

. S u t ton, 562 S.W .2d 820, 823 (Tenn. 1978) . To merit a ne w trial, howe ver, the arg ument must be so inflammatory or improper as to affe ct t he verdict. Har

ring ton v. State, 385 S.W .2d 758, 759 (Tenn. 1965). I n J udg e v. State, 539 S.W .2d 340 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976), this c ourt articulated the following fac tors to be consider ed in making that determination:
(1) The conduct c omplained of view ed in the conte x t and in light of the facts and circ umstances of

the ca se; (2) the c urative me asure s undertake n by the court and the prose cution; (3 ) the int e nt o f the pr os e c uto r i n ma kin g the imp ro pe r s ta te me nts ; (4) the c umulative eff

ect of the improper conduct and any other err ors in the re cord; and (5) the r elative stre ng th or wea kness of the c ase.
539 S.W .2d at 344.
Most restrictions during final ar g ument are place d up o n the state. That is based in g reat
me a su re up on the ro le of

the pr os e c uto r i n th e c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m: The [prosecutor ] i s the repr esentative not of an o rd i n ary party to a contr o v e r s y , b u t o f a s o v e r e ig n ty w h o s e o b li g a ti o n to g o v e r n imp ar ti a ll y is a s compelling as its obligation to g overn at al l ; and whose inter est, there fore , in a criminal prose cution is not that it shall win a case , but that justi ce sha ll be done. As-9-

su c h, he is i n a

pe c uli ar andve ry

de fi nit e se ns e the se rv a nt o f the la w, the tw of old
a i m o f w h i c h i s t h a t g u i l t s h a l l n o t e s c ap e o r i n n o c e n c e s u f f e r

. H e m a y

pr os e c ute with earnestness and vig or -- indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike har d blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. I t is as much his dutyto refr ain from improper methods calc ulated to pr oduce a wrong ful conviction as it is to use every leg itimate means to bring about a just one.

I t is fair to say that the averag e jury , in a g reater or le ss deg ree , has conf idence that these oblig ati o ns, which so plainly rest upon the pr osecuting attorney , will be faithfully observe d. Consequentl y , improper sug g estions, insinuations and, espec ially , assertions of pe rsonal knowledg e are apt to c arry much weig ht ag ainst the
acc used whe n they

should properly

car ry none.

Be rg er v. U nited States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also J udg e, 539 S.W .2d at 344-45. Thus, the state mus t r e fr a in f

ro m arg ume nt d e sig ne d to inf la me the jury

a ndsh ou ld r e stric t it s c omm e nta ry to
ma tte rs in e vid e nc e or

iss ue s a t tria l.

Thi s c o u r t h a s o b s e r v e d th a t th e r e ar e f iv e g e n e r a ll y

r e c o g n iz e d ar e a s o f

p r o s e c u torial mis c on du c t r e la te d to c los ing arg ume nt:

1. I t is unprofe ssional conduct for the prosec utor intentionally to misst ate the evidenc e or mislead the jury as to the infer ence s it may draw

. 2. I t is unprofessional conduc t for the pr osecutor to e x press his personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony

or evide nce or

the g uilt of the de fe nd a nt. 3. The prose cutor should not use ar gu m en t s calc ulated to inflame the passions or p r e j u d i c e s o f t h e j u r y. 4

. T h e prosec utor should refr ain from a rg ument which would diver t the jury from its du ty to d e c ide the c a se on the e vid e nc e , b y inj e c tin g iss ue s b ro a de r tha n th e g uil t or innoce nce of

the ac cused under the controlling law, or by making predic tions of the c on se qu e nc e s o f the jury ' s v e rd ic t. 5. I t is un pr of

e ssi on a l c on du c t fo r a pr os e c uto r to int e nti on a lly re fe r t o o r a

rg ue fa c ts outside the rec ord unless the fa cts are matters of c ommon public knowledg e. State v. Goltz, 111 S .W.3d 1, 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (c itations omi tted).

Du ri ng he r r e bu tta l arg ume nt, the a ssi stant dis tr ic t a tto rn e y apo log ize d to the jury

fo r the ir sequestration duri n g t h e t ri al an d arg ued that none of the time and trouble of

the trial would have been ne cessa

ry excep t for the de fendant. I n a benc h confe renc e, def ense c ounsel objecte d, submitt ing that the statement wa s "c ompl e te ly in a c c u r ate " an d

p ointing out that the seque stration was at the insistence of

the state. The trial court f ound that the statement, in conte x t, was made as " part of a larg e r s ta te me nt that no ne of us in the c ou rt

ro om, no ne of the e xhibi ts, no ne of the pr oc e sse s, would be in motion ex cept f or him." Areque st for a c urative instruc tion was denied.D o nal d F

. P ai ne, ad junct pro fess o r at t he U ni vers i t y of T enness ee C o l l ege o f Law and repo rt er t o t he 2
T en n es s ee Su pr eme Co u r t Adv i s or y Commi s s i on on Rul es of Pr ac t i ce a n d Pr oce du r e, h as c r i t i ci ze d t h e "s ou n d di s cr et i on of t h e t r i al c ou r t " s t an dar d, a r g u i n g t h at t h e admi s s i o n o f e vi d en ce i s s t r i ct l y g ov er n ed by t h e T en n es s ee Rul es of Evi den ce

. D on al d F. Pai n e, Evi den t i ar y N on s en s e, T en n

. B ar J ou r n al , J u n e 2005, a t 15.
-10- I t is our view that the arg ument, when take n in context, di d not place upon thedefe ndant the full responsibilityfor the sequestration. I nstead, the state appea rs to be blaming the def

endant f or the criminal acts which led to the "time and trouble" of trial. Our constitution, of course , g uara ntees
every individual the rig ht to a trial by jury . Tenn. Const. art. I , § 6. A jury should ne ver be asked to place the acc used in a less fa vorable light simply beca use the ri gh t was e x erc ised. Cf. State v. Hale, 672 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tenn. 1984) (holding that "any adver se comment upon the fa ilure of a d e f e n d a n tt o t e s t i f

y i n h i s o w n b e h a l f, m a d e b y t h e s t a t e ' s a t t o r n e y i n h i s ar g u m e n tb e f o r e t h e j u r y, c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r " i f a c u r a t i v e i n s tru c t i o n i s n o tg i v e n )

. T h e r e m ark w a s i m p r o p e r

. In
re s p o n s e to th e r e q u e s t f

o r a c u r a ti v e in s tr

u c ti o n , th e a s s is tan t d is tric t a tt o r n e y c o n c lu d e d th at the de fe nd a nt w a s n ot the c a us e of the se qu e str a tio n a nd e xplaine d that sh e ha d ma de the state me nt o nly in the context of the entire trial. Either way , the comment should not have be en made . Prosecutors sh ou ld r e fr a in f

ro m any arg ume nt wh ic h mig ht div e rt the jury fr om i ts d uty

to d e c ide the c a se on ly on the evidenc e. See Go l t z , 1 11 S.W .3d at 6. I n our view, the trial court should have provided
curative instructions. Nevert h el es s , t he state pr esente d a particularly compelling case ag ainst the defe ndant. The de fenda nt pled to the underlying r obbery and questio ned only

the cause of de ath, which wa s not challeng ed by the prese ntation of any evidenc e. The streng th of the ca se could ha ve hardly been g reater. No othe r er rors in the re cord compound this error . By the application of all of the fa c tor s se t ou t in Judg e v. Sta te , it is our a sse ssm e nt that the arg ume nt d id n ot a ff e c t th e ve rd ic t.

III

. The de fenda nt next arg ues that the trial c ourt er re d by allowing irrele vant, pre

judicial testimonyconce rning the inscriptions on the defe ndant' s teeth. The state submits that the testimony
was re levant and that an yerr or would have been ha rmless bec ause the defe ndant had a lrea dy d i s p l a ye d h i s t e e t h t o t h e j u r y.
Gene rally , the admission of evidenc e is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, a nd a trial c ourt' s ruling on an evidentiary matter will n o t be re verse d absent a buse of that discretion. State v. Robinson, 146 S .W.3d 469, 490 (Tenn. 2004) (c iting State v. Dubose , 953

2 S.W .2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997) ). On a ppeal, " [t ]he abuse of discr etion standard c ontemplates that befor e re versa l the rec ord must show that a judg e ' applied an inc orre ct leg al standard, or rea ched a de c isi on wh ic h is a g a ins t log ic or re a so nin g that c a us e d a n in jus tic e to the pa

rt y c omp la ini ng .' " State v. Coley , 32 S.W .3d 831, 8 3 3 (T en n

. 2 0 00) (quoting State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999)); see also State v. Shuck, 953 S.W .2d 662, 669 (Tenn. 1997)

. "Re levant evidenc e" is e vidence "ha ving any tendenc y to ma ke the exis tence of any

fac t that i s o f c o n s e q u e n c e t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n m o r e p r o b ab l e o r l e s s p r o b ab l e t h a n it w ou ld be wi tho ut the e vid e nc e ." Te nn . R

. Ev id

. 40 1. I n St a te v. F or be s, 91 8 S. W.2 d 4 31 (T e nn . Crim.-11-

A p p

. 1 9 9 5 ) , t h i s c o u r td i s c u s s e d t h e s t a n d ar d o f r e v i e w o n ap p e a l a f t e r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f

r e l e v a n c y:

"B eca use an a ssessment of whe ther a piece of evide nce is re levant requires a n understanding of the case ' s theory and other evidenc e as w ell as a f amiliarity with the evidenc e in question, appe llate courts give g reat defe renc e to a tria l judge ' s decision on rele vance issues. Often it is stated t hat a trial court' s decision on re levanc e will be
reve rsed only

for a n abuse of

discretion. . . ."

918 S.W .2d at 449 (quoting Neil P. Cohen et. al., Tennes s ee L aw of Evidence § 401.5 (2d ed. 1990)).

Te nn e sse e Rul e of Ev ide nc e 40 3 p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:
Al tho ug h r e le va nt, e vid e nc e ma y be e xclu de d if

its pr ob a tiv e va lue is
su bs ta nti a lly

ou tw e ig he d by

the da ng e r o f u nf

a ir pr e jud ic e , c on fu sio n o f the iss ue s, or misleadin g t h e j u ry , or by considerations of undue delay , waste of time, or needle ss presentation of cumulative evide nce.
Tenn. R. Evid. 403.

He re , M s. Ga

rr e tt t e sti fi e d t hat th e de fe nd a nt h a d h is t e e th f ile d in pr e pa

ratio n to g e t g old te e th. Ms. Mo ng e r, the de fe nd a nt' s g ir lf ri e nd , c on fi rm e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a d in sc ri pti on s o n h is new g old teeth, namely

his init ials "A " an d "B " and a dollar sig n. The de fendant conce des the rele vance of the defe ndant' s use of the stolen funds for dental work but a rg ues that the t estimony reg arding the inscriptions on the teeth is not rele vant. The tria l court held that the t estimony was rel evan t t o s ho w t he d efen dan t's "fu ll , k no wi ng, an d wi ll in g part ici pat io n i n [ th e cri me] ."

That the defe ndant went to a dentist within t wenty -four hours af ter the r obbery

and obtained g old f illings is r eleva nt to show that the proce eds of the robbery wer e used to fina nce his tee th. The
e vid e nc e ma y

ha ve b een mar gina lly

re le va nt t o f

ull y de mon str a te the de fe nd a nt' s in te nt f or his pa r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e f

e l o n y m u r d e r

. T h e d e f

e n d a n t ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y w a s c u mul a tiv e is inacc urate beca

use Ms. Mong er pr ovided the only testimony on this subject. Furthe r, eve n if the admission of t he evidence was error, it was harmless in light of the fa ct that the def endant ha d earlier in the trial display ed his teeth to the jury . Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).

I V. The de fenda nt's f

inal arg ument is that the trial court erre d by allowing the state to bolster the medical e x aminer' s cre dibilit y by testify ing a

bout his n aval ex perie nce w ith reg ard to a ircra ft mishaps. The state c ontends that the trial court properly exercised i t s d i s cretion in ruling that the d o c t o r ' s m i l i t ar y s e r v i c e w a s p ar to f h i s b a c k g r o u n d t h a tc o u l d b e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y.
The ne ed for

expert testimonyand the qualifications of t he ex pert are gove rned by Rule 702 of the Te nnessee Rules of Evidence . McDa niel v. CSX Transp., I nc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Tenn.-12-

19 97 ). Rul e 70 2 p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:

I f s c ie nti fi c , te c hn ic a l, o r o the r s pe c ia lize d kno wl e dg ew i l l s u b s t a n ti a l l y a ssi st the tr ie r o f f

a c t to un de rs ta ndthe e vid e nc e or to de te rm ine a fa c t in iss ue , a wi tne ss qualified a s an ex p er t b y knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining , or educ ation may testify in the form of a n opinion or otherwise.

Tenn. R. Evid. 702. The c ourts of this state have repe atedly h el d that "[q]uestions reg arding the admissibili ty , qualifications, relevanc y and compe tency

of expert testimony are left to the discretion of the tr ia l c ou rt , w ho se ru lin g wi ll n ot b e ov e rturne d in the abs e nc e of abu se or arb itr ary e xer c ise of discre tion." State v. Be g ley , 956 S.W .2d 471, 475 (Tenn. 1997) ; see State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 415 (Tenn. 2005) ; State v. Ba llard, 855 S.W.2d 557 , 5 6 2 (Tenn. 1993) ; State v. Spratt, 31 S.W .3d 587, 603 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)

.
Du ri ng his te sti mon y

ou tli nin g his qu a lif

ica tio ns a s a n e xpe rt

in the fi e lds of

fo re ns ic patholog y , anatomica l pathology , clinical patholog y , and fore nsic firea rms, Dr. Smith stated that he
was a capta in in the medical cor ps of the U.S. Navy

. He explained that most of his w ork in the Na vy wa s r e la te d to a ir c ra ft

mis ha ps a ndthat he wo uldtry

to " [co rr e la te ] the inj ury

patte rnthat is se e n in either the dead individual or the living individual with the chang es to the airc raf t a s a result of the
c ra sh ." Th e state arg ue d a t tr ia l that the te sti mon y wa s re le va nt t o s ho w the do c tor ' s e xpe ri e nc e wi th making determinations of death. The defe ndant objecte d to the testimony and asserted that it was irrele vant. The tria l court held that the doctor' s "e ntire prof essional training and bac kg round [were ]
re le va nt i n e sta

bli sh ing his le ve l of

e xpe rt ise , an d tha t tra ini ng a nd ba c kg ro un d wou ld, a ndpr op e rl y sh ou ld, inc lud e the tr a ini ng a nd ba c kg ro un d, a nd e xpe ri e nc e he ha s h a d w or kin g a s a c aptain w ith the U.S. Navy ." T he experienc es we re releva nt to his deg ree of ex pertise in determining ca uses of death. I n our view, the trial court did not abuse its discr etion by allowing the doctor t o testify reg arding his mil itary

experience as a phy sician.

Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE