alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2021009EN.01002401.xml

| 11.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 9/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 9/24

---

Action brought on 14 October 2020 — MW v Parliament

(Case T-630/20)

(2021/C 9/35)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: MW (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

| — | declare the present application admissible and well founded;
  and, consequently, |
| --- | --- |

—

declare the present application admissible and well founded;

and, consequently,

| — | annul the contested decision of 11 December 2019 by which the applicant’s temporary contract for an indefinite period was terminated and her activities were suspended; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision of 11 December 2019 by which the applicant’s temporary contract for an indefinite period was terminated and her activities were suspended;

| — | order the payment of compensation in respect of the material damage suffered, which amounts to EUR 10 000, in addition to the amounts to be calculated for school fees and compensation in respect of the non-material damage, estimated in the amount of EUR 30 000; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the payment of compensation in respect of the material damage suffered, which amounts to EUR 10 000, in addition to the amounts to be calculated for school fees and compensation in respect of the non-material damage, estimated in the amount of EUR 30 000;

| — | order the defendant to pay all the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 80 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union leading to an error of assessment and misuse of powers. The applicant argues, inter alia, that the defendant failed to take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 80 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union leading to an error of assessment and misuse of powers. The applicant argues, inter alia, that the defendant failed to take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging a violation of the right to fair and just working conditions, misuse of powers and violation of the prohibition on any form of psychological harassment provided for in Articles 12 and 12a of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a violation of the right to fair and just working conditions, misuse of powers and violation of the prohibition on any form of psychological harassment provided for in Articles 12 and 12a of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.

---
#### BEHR *v.*BAKER.

Costs — Court Rules — Premium of Bond to Stay Proceedings Taxable.

Court Rule No. 5, § 7, providing that reasonable cost of procuring bond required by law in any action or proceeding shall be part of taxable costs of same, is valid, and therefore premium paid for bond to stay proceedings pending appeal was properly taxed as part of Costs (Constitution, art. 7, § 5; 3 Comp. Laws 1929, §13540). Wiest, J., dissenting.

Assumpsit by Fred A. Behr and Frank W. Coolidge, copartners, doing business as Behr *&*Coolidge, against Erie K. Baker and Universal Rim Company, an Illinois corporation, for legal services. (See 255 Mich. 607.) On motion for retaxation of costs.

Submitted December 18, 1931. (June, 1931,

Docket No. 67, Calendar No. 35,662.)

Denied March 2, 1932.

*Oxtoby, Robison & Hull,*for plaintiffs.

*Milburn & Semmes,*for defendants.

Retaxation oe Costs.

Wiest, J.

(dissenting). This is an appeal by plaintiffs from taxation of costs by the clerk, and questions the items for printing the record and the brief, inclusive of an abstract .of the testimony,, also fee for bond on stay of proceedings.

Defendants contend that the rules do not provide for an appeal, and, therefore, it should not be *488entertained. The power is inherent in the court and needs no rule.

Plaintiffs claim that the amounts taxed for printing the record and brief are in excess of a reasonable amount.

The record is somewhat prolix, and the abstract of testimony lengthy, but comply with the rules, and the cost thereof is established by the printer.

Plaintiffs make the following objection:

> “They object to the item of $500 for the premium on bond to stay proceedings, on the ground that there is no rule or statute authorizing the taxing of such sum, or any sum, paid as premium on bond to stay proceedings; that a bond to stay proceedings is not a bond required by law, and the cost thereof is not, therefore, taxable as costs.”

Court Rule No. 5, § 7, provides:

> “Whenever a bond is required by law in any action or proceeding, the reasonable cost of procuring such bond shall be part of the taxable costs of the case, unless otherwise ordered by the court.”

Under this rule the clerk taxed the item for premium on the bond given to stay proceedings. I think the rule beyond judicial power, and, therefore, void, and hold that the expense of the bond to stay proceeding’s, pending the appeal, cannot be taxed as costs.

With such item eliminated, the costs should stand as taxed by the clerk.

North, J. I think the rule (Court Rule No. 5, § 7) is valid under which the premium paid for the stay bond was taxed. General rule making power is conferred upon this court by the Constitution (article 7, §5); and, further, by legislative enactment “the *489regulation of costs” by rule is specifically left with the court. 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13540.

.The amount of the taxable costs will remain as determined by the clerk.

Clark, C. J., and McDonald, Potter, Sharpe, Bead, and Btjtzel, JJ., concurred with North, J.
#### Pearl Hornstein, by Bertha Hornstein, her Guardian ad litem, Respondent, *v.*The Southern Boulevard Railway Company, Defendant, and David Dreyfuss, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

January, 1913.)

Negligence—automobile — injury to third person — when owner of car not liable for injury.

Where personal injury is caused to a third person by a collision between a street car and a rented automobile, operated by a chauffeur in no way connected with its owner, but who at the 'time of the accident was under the control and subject to the order of the person to whom was rented the car, the owner is not liable for said injury.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of Mew York, borough of the Bronx, second district, rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

Walter G. Evans, for appellant.

Prank M. Franklin, for respondent.

*35Guy, J.

The defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff entered on the verdict of a jury in an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused by a collision between a street railway car and an auto belonging to defendant, which was being operated on one of the public highways at the time.

The evidence discloses that the auto in question had been rented by defendant for the day, without a chauffeur, to one Christie, and that the chauffeur who was operating the auto at the time of the accident was in no way connected with defendant’s establishment; was not generally or specifically in his employ, but was obtained by Christie from another garage; was employed by him, and was under his control and subject to his orders at the time of the accident.

The plaintiff-respondent contends that, as matter of law, the chauffeur who operated the auto at the time of the accident was presumptively in the employ of the owner of the car; but this presumption has been entirely overcome by the uncontradicted evidence in the case showing that, as matter of fact, the chauffeur was in the employ of Christie.

The judgment must, therefore, be reversed with costs, and the complaint dismissed, with costs.

Seabury and Gerard, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed, with costs, and complaint dismissed, with costs.
259 La. 706

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. LeRoy RICHARDSON v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 51706.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 21, 1971.

In re: LeRoy Richardson applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and habeas corpus.

Writ refused. The showing made is insufficient to warrant the exercise of our original or supervisory jurisdiction.
# C_2020443EN.01002602.xml

| 21.12.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 443/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.12.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 443/26

---

Action brought on 21 October 2020 — Dermavita Company v EUIPO — Allergan Holdings France (JUVÉDERM VOLITE)

(Case T-637/20)

(2020/C 443/31)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Dermavita Company SARL (Beirut, Lebanon) (represented by: D. Todorov, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Allergan Holdings France SAS (Courbevoie, France)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark JUVÉDERM VOLITE –European Union trade mark No 13 413 406

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 August 2020 in Case R 1015/2020-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | ask EUIPO to deem the appeal filed; |
| --- | --- |

—

ask EUIPO to deem the appeal filed;

| — | order EUIPO and the other party to bear their own costs and pay those of the Applicant before the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the other party to bear their own costs and pay those of the Applicant before the General Court.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Articles 101(4), 104, 106 and 107 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Articles 101(4), 104, 106 and 107 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>               5
<MULTIPLIER>            1,000
       
<S>
                                 <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              MAY-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   JAN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          6,358
<SECURITIES>                                    8,092
<RECEIVABLES>                                  10,210
<ALLOWANCES>                                      520
<INVENTORY>                                    17,309
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               44,248
<PP&E>                                        124,275
<DEPRECIATION>                                 88,113
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                147,124
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          24,533
<BONDS>                                             0
<COMMON>                                          858
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<OTHER-SE>                                     96,282
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  147,124
<SALES>                                       136,291
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              136,291
<CGS>                                          86,833
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  27,692
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               22,290
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 3,972
<INCOME-TAX>                                    1,675
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             2,297
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                    2,297
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       1.42
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       0
                                                    

</TABLE>
#### Grubbs vs. Ellyson.

A homestead is not subject to attachment any more than it is to an execution.

*Appeal from Ashley Circuit Court.*

Hon. John C. Mueeay, Circuit Judge.

Johnston & Bolling, for the appellant.

Waddell for the appellee.

Mr. Justice Fairchild

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error sued Ellyson on a note, and obtained a writ of attachment against his property, which, among other things, was levied on twelve and a half acres of land on the south side of the north half of the south-east quarter of section fifteen, in township seventeen south, of range seven west. Ellyson moved to quash so much of the return of the sheriff as showed the levy of the writ upon the piece of land referred to, because he was a free white citizen of the state, a house-holder, the head of a family, and because the land was his homestead, *288and actual family residence, and because the demand of the plaintiff had not arisen before the 8th of December, 1852. The plaintiffs filed their response, stated in the record to be in’ the nature of a demurrer to the motion. Giving to the response the effect of a demurrer, it was an admission of the facts alleged in the motion, and no affidavit of their truth was necessary. We need not, therefore, decide any thing upon Mrs. Ellyson’s affidavit accompanying the motion; but the legal effect of the allegations of the motion is alone to be considered. These show that Ellyson was entitled to a homestead, under the *29th section of chap.*68, *Gould’s*Dig., as a free white citizen of the State, and householder, and that the land levied on was his family residence. An attachment is but a preliminary execution, so that a homestead is not subject to attachment any more than it is to an execution, that is final process. The motion being taken as true, establishes the right of Ellyson to hold his homestead exempt from attachment. *Tumlinson vs. Swinney,*22 *Ark.*The motion was not an attempt, nor does it have the effect, to question the truth of the affidavit upon which the writ of attachment issued. It admits the right of issuance of the attachment, but contests its levy upon the homestead. The Circuit Court overruled the demurrer to the motion, and its ruling is approved.
EXHIBIT 21.1Subsidiaries of Borders Group, Inc.   **SUBSIDIARY** **STATE OF INCORPORATION**Borders, Inc.      ColoradoBorders Direct, LLC      VirginiaBorders Fulfillment, Inc.      DelawareBorders Online, LLC      DelawareBorders Online, Inc.      ColoradoBorders Outlet, Inc.      ColoradoBorders Properties, Inc.       DelawareWalden Book Company, Inc.      ColoradoWalden Online, Inc.      ColoradoBorders New Zealand Limited      New ZealandBorders PTE. Limited      SingaporeBorders Australia PTY, Limited       AustraliaBGI (UK) Limited      U.K.BGP (UK) Limited      U.K.Evermatch Limited      U.K.Books Etc Properties Limited      U.K.Meridian Books Limited      U.K.Borders Superstores (UK) Limited      U.K.Charing Cross Properties Limited      U.K.Borders Development, Inc.      MichiganBorders Bookstore (M) SDN.BHD      MalaysiaBorders International Services, Inc.      MichiganPaperchase Products Limited      U.K.Paperchase Limited UK      U.K.Paperchase Designs Limited      U.K.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

umn~titutiimal 3ct ragulaititq the oollootlon of dabte protactad clerks c,r courts actlni; uncor it.1 
‘=tu oorraat rule la sucolnotly atst3d ba ,53x. 

hi?. : 

*iii otllcar rb, withaat authority of 

law. aoU3ata taasm or oxeos8ivr 138s .tiy 

5s oompsllrd’ to raimburso th parrron rxm 

whom the money MI raoeivrd. Zut iesa poti 

volunur’l3.y 4nd rrith full xnowl~ribr of the 

facts, though w&r a slataka oi law, canaat 

under aottlod ~:rinol~lre, be rocavsr~C.* 

(3A :sr. Jur. L76; 32 :3x. Jur. ) 739; .d,rshllsld vs. z-t. .sorth :iatl. :lzmk. 83 :0x. 452, 

18 t:i 743; County of Gdvo3tm Tn. Cortim, 

L9 hr. 279, 303; at’ Of iiaurton '13. i'lOEUI?, 

76 Tax. 365, 13 2% 266. )
-79.0 -78.5 -78.0 -77.5 -77.0 -76.5

 38.0

 38.5

 39.0

 39.5

★

▲

▲

▲ ▲

★ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲

 500

 1000

 1500

 100

18 12 06 00

05/26

NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL

 Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 26 May 07

 EDAS Meteorological Data

Source

★ at 38.77 N 77.11 W Meters AGL
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          19,080
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 6,500
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    125,627
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          65,509
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            65,581
<LOANS>                                        298,257<F1>
<ALLOWANCE>                                      5,279
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 537,373
<DEPOSITS>                                     409,898
<SHORT-TERM>                                    49,963
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              6,805
<LONG-TERM>                                     10,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            55
<OTHER-SE>                                      60,652
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 537,373
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 27,495
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                9,574
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   945
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                38,014
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              15,988
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              18,962
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           19,052
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      535
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                  60
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 14,457
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  8,995
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       8,995
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,074
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.09
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.84
<LOANS-NON>                                      1,126
<LOANS-PAST>                                       415
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   121
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 5,306
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      811
<RECOVERIES>                                       249
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                5,279
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             5,279
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
<FN>
<F1>New of allowance for loan losses of $5,279.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
# C_2020175EN.01003301.xml

| 25.5.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 175/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.5.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 175/33

---

Action brought on 27 March 2020 — Ighoga Region 10 v Commission

(Case T-161/20)

(2020/C 175/43)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Ighoga Region 10 eV (Ingolstadt, Germany) (represented by: A. Bartosch, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should declare that the defendant infringed its obligations under the TFEU in that, even after almost 2 3⁄4 years have elapsed since the complaint has been lodged and, following the request to adopt a final decision to close the procedure, the defendant did not take a formal decision in accordance with one of the possible alternatives set out in Article 4 of the Rules of Procedure in State aid cases, but rather failed to act.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The action is brought against the Commission’s failure to act in connection with the adoption of a decision concerning the applicant’s complaint of 4 July 2017 on EU State aid in case SA.48582 — presumed State aid for Maritim-Gruppe and KHI Immobilien GmbH.

---
# C_2020255EN.01003301.xml

| 3.8.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 255/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 255/33

---

Action brought on 13 June 2020 — EFFAS v EUIPO — CFA Institute

(CEFA Certified European Financial Analyst)

(Case T-369/20)

(2020/C 255/43)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Federation of Financial Analysts'Societies (EFFAS) (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) (represented by: S. Merico and G. Macías Bonilla, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: CFA Institute (Charlottesville, Virginia, United States)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark CEFA Certified European Financial Analyst — Application for registration No 14 902 341

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 31 March 2020 in Case R 1082/2019-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---