alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                           UT
<CIK> 0000077227
<NAME> PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
<MULTIPLIER>                                     1,000
<CURRENCY>                                  US DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                    1,673,268
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                     80,824
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                         238,147
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                     2,510,766
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,503,005
<COMMON>                                       105,812
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                      285,486
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                            385,635    <F1>
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                 776,933
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          105,000    <F2>
<PREFERRED>                                     16,681
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                           626,434
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                              79,600
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                       0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                   50,012
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                      2,005
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                14,269
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>               2,832,071
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                4,503,005
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                      773,364
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                            24,007
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     653,179
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                     677,186
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                         96,178
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                              (7,799)
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  88,379
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        47,843    <F3>
<NET-INCOME>                                    21,586    <F4>
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        521
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                   21,065
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        35,000    <F5>
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                       48,375
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                         142,514
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1> INCLUDES ACCUMULATED OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME OF $5,862.
<F2> REPRESENTS COMPANY-OBLIGATED MANDATORILY REDEEMABLE PREFERRED
<F2> SECURITIES.
<F3> INCLUDES AMOUNT FOR COMPANY-OBLIGATED MANDATORILY REDEEMABLE
<F3> PREFERRED SECURITIES OF $6,891.
<F4> INCLUDES AN AFTER-TAX CHARGE FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY ITEM OF $18,950.
<F5> REPRESENTS COMMON STOCK DIVIDENDS PAID TO PARENT CORPORATION.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE>       5
                
<S>                                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                             12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         Jul-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                            Aug-01-1996  
<PERIOD-END>                              Jul-31-1997
<CASH>                                     1,688,000                          
<SECURITIES>                                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      0
<ALLOWANCES>                                       0
<INVENTORY>                                   78,000 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           1,786,000
<PP&E>                                       180,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               132,000 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             1,898,000 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        374,000
<BONDS>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                    1,000
<COMMON>                                      19,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 1,504,000   
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               1,898,000
<SALES>                                      348,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             350,000
<CGS>                                        314,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              4,566,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             (80,000)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (4,450,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (4,450,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                              (4,450,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (.25)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (.25)
        

</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOHN LYNCH

PETITION OF: D. WESLEY CORNISH, 

ESQUIRE

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Nos. 53 and 54 EM 2021

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of November, 2021, in consideration of the Motion to 

Withdraw, this matter is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 

County for that court to determine whether Attorney D. Wesley Cornish should be granted 

leave to withdraw. 

Court-appointed counsel’s duty of representation continues through allocatur 

review in this Court. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 122 (instructing that court-appointed counsel’s 

representation continues on direct appeal through allocatur review). Additionally, counsel

may not unilaterally refuse to continue representation of his or her client. Rather, counsel 

must seek leave from a court to withdraw. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 120(B) (providing that an 

attorney may not unilaterally withdraw his or her appearance with respect to a criminal 

defendant; rather, a court must determine whether leave to withdraw is warranted). In 

the event the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County permits Attorney Cornish 

to withdraw, the court shall determine whether to appoint new counsel or to permit John 

Lynch to proceed pro se. 

The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is ORDERED to enter its order 

regarding this remand within 90 days and to notify this Court promptly of its determination.
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/aassem01/Desktop/For%20Rendering/EPA-HQ-OAR-2008-0708-DRAFT-0327.txt

-----Forwarded by Melanie King/RTP/USEPA/US on 02/15/2010 09:28PM -----

To: "Higgins, Cortney" <Cortney_Higgins@omb.eop.gov> 

From: Melanie King/RTP/USEPA/US 

Date: 02/03/2010 09:22PM 

cc: wayland.robertj@epa.gov 

Subject: engine distribution by age

Cortney,

Regarding your question about engine distribution by age, see Table 5 in the attached 

memo. This memo is from the proposal but we haven't changed our population estimates, 

other than to remove the residential/institutional/commercial engines from the affected 

population. You asked about whether people with older engines would choose to replace the 

engine - my guess is that there would be instances where that could happen, but the cost of 

retrofitting with a catalyst should be significantly less than the cost of a new engine, 

especially if you are talking new engines in the 2013 timeframe, because those engines will 

have to meet the Tier 4 emission standards under the NSPS and will have exhaust controls 

such as diesel particulate filter already installed in the engine, so they will be more costly 

than an engine you could purchase today.

Melanie King 

Energy Strategies Group 

Sector Policies and Programs Division 

Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Mail Code D243-01 

RTP, NC 27711 

Phone: (919) 541-2469 

Fax: (919) 541-5450 

king.melanie@epa.gov

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/aassem01/Desktop/For%20Rendering/EPA-HQ-OAR-2008-0708-DRAFT-0327.txt2/19/2010 12:50:38 PM
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-6153

GARY SLEZAK, Plaintiff - Appellant, versusWILLIAM D. CATOE, Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, in his official and individual capacities, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenwood. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge. (CA-99-1798-22RB) Submitted: May 31, 2001 Decided: June 8, 2001 Before WILKINS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Gary Slezak, Appellant Pro Se. Steven Michael Pruitt, MCDONALD, PATRICK, TINSLEY, BAGGETT & POSTON, Greenwood, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the district court states in its November 2000 order that Slezak retained the right to pursue claims other than his First Amendment claim, its September 2000 order states that summary judgment was entered against Slezak with prejudice as to all other claims. Therefore, the statement in the court’s November 2000 order is erroneous. 2 PER CURIAM: Gary R. Slezak appeals from the denial of relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. * Slezak v. Catoe , No. CA-99-1798-22RB (D.S.C. Sept. 7, 2000; filed Nov. 14, 2000, entered Nov. 17, 2000; Dec. 19, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
EX-10.20





 Exhibit 10.20 

AMENDMENT NO. 1 
 TO
CONSULTING AGREEMENT 
 This Amendment No. 1 to the Consulting Agreement, dated as of June 18, 2020 (this
“Amendment”), is entered into by and between Chloe Ox Holdings, LLC, now known as Cure TopCo, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the “Company”) and Eir Partners, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company
(“Consultant”). Capitalized terms used but not defined elsewhere in this Amendment shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Consulting Agreement, dated as of March 7, 2019, by and between the Company and Consultant (the
“Agreement”). 
 WHEREAS, the Company and Consultant wish to amend the Agreement. 

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, and
intending to be legally bound, the Company and Consultant agree as follows: 
 1. Amendment to Section 4.1(a). The reference to
“$10,000” in Section 4.1(a) of the Agreement hereby is amended to be “$15,000”. 
 2. No Further Amendment. Except
as amended hereby, the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
 [signature page follows] 












 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be duly executed and
delivered as of the date first above written. 
  

							
	“THE COMPANY”:	 		 	 CURE TOPCO, LLC
 (f/k/a
CHLOE OX HOLDINGS, LLC

				
		 		 	By:	 	 /s/ Kyle Armbrester

		 		 	Name:	 	Kyle Armbrester
		 		 	Title:	 	Chief Executive Officer
			
	“CONSULTANT”	 		 	EIR PARTNERS, LLC
			
		 		 	 /s/ Bret S. Carlson

		 		 	 Bret S. Carlson

		 		 	 Founder & CEO

			
		 		 	 Address:

			
		 		 	 Eir Partners, LLC
 37 W. 57th Street 5th Floor
 New York, NY 10013

Attention: Bret Carlson
 Email:
No. 00-943.

#### Harris *v.*Ladner et al.

C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Rodney G. SANTIAGO v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 53996.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 14, 1973.

In re: Rodney G. Santiago applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and habeas corpus.

Writ refused. The showing made is insufficient to warrant the exercise of our jurisdiction especially since it appears that the plea was entered as a result of a plea bargain, which was complied with.

BARHAM, J.,

is of the opinion the writ must be granted. Minutes fail to reflect a knowing and voluntary plea. At the evi-dentiary hearing defendant testified no one including his lawyer informed him of his constitutional rights waived by a plea. Only his court appointed lawyer testified. Neither the judge nor the assistant district attorney testified. The lawyer had no independent knowledge of the plea. His testimony of “usual” procedures is deficient.

DIXON and CALOGERO, JJ.,

concur in the denial, being of the opinion that Boykin was not complied with, but that there was a plea bargain.
From: Baldyga, Lyndsey [LBaldyga@tecoenergy.com]

Sent: Friday, July 19, 2013 2:23 PM

To: Hofmeister, Art

Cc: Burrows, Byron T.; Tom Davis (tdavis@ectinc.com)

Subject: RE: Site Certification

Art,

Yes, this process has been initiated. The SZMA has been addressed in the FDEP Conditions of

Certification which are currently in draft form. FDEP Conditions of Certification Section A General

Conditions, XXIV Costal Zone Consistency states “...that certific ation of the facility constitutes the States

concurrence that the licensed activity or use is consistent with the federally approved program under

the Florida Costal Management Act. “

We have proceeded through the certification hearing and are waiting for the ALJ’s Recommended Order

which we expect to have by August 26 th

. We anticipate going before the Florida Power Plant Siting

Board during the October 15 th Governors Cabinet meeting for final approval.

Let me know if there are any additional questions

,

Lyndsey Baldyga

Environmental Health & Safety

Air Programs: Engineer I

Phone: 813

- 228

- 4740

Ext. 34740

Mobile: 813

- 309

- 0376

Lbaldyga@tecoenergy.com

From: Hofmeister, Art [ mailto:Hofmeister.Art@epa.gov ]

Sent: Friday, July 19, 2013 1:38 PM

To: Baldyga, Lyndsey

Cc: Burrows, Byron T.; Tom Davis ( tdavis@ectinc.com )

Subject: Site Certification

Hi, Lyndsey:

One of the past submittals stated that CZMA would be addressed during the site certification process.

Has that been initia ted yet?

Thanks.

Art Hofmeister

Environment Engineer

Air Permits Section

EPA Region 4(404) 562

- 9115



### ***** This email is from an external sender. Be cautious about clicking links or opening

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EXHIBIT 32.1



STATEMENT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

OF DATASTREAM SYSTEMS, INC.

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

§ 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Datastream
Systems, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Larry G. Blackwell, Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/S/ LARRY G. BLACKWELLLarry G. BlackwellChief Executive OfficerDatastream Systems, Inc.September 15, 2005
#### The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Thelma PHILLIPS, also known as Thelma Watkins, and Walter Peoples, Appellees.

No. 71-735.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 28, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 129 (Thursday, July 5, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Page 31382]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-14400]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Air Force

[ARH-180613D-PL]


Notice of Intent To Grant an Exclusive Patent License

    Authority:  35 U.S.C. 209; 37 CFR 404.

AGENCY: Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Notice of Intent

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Bayh-Dole Act and implementing regulations, 
the Department of the Air Force hereby gives notice of its intent to 
grant an exclusive patent license agreement to Elke Therapeutics, Inc., 
a domestic business corporation of the State of New York, having a 
place of business at 105 E 34th Street, Unit 198, New York, New York 
10016.

DATES: Written objections must be filed no later than fifteen (15) 
calendar days after the date of publication of this Notice.

ADDRESSES: Submit written objections to the Air Force Materiel Command 
Law Office, AFMCLO/JAZ, 2240 B Street, Room 260, Wright-Patterson AFB, 
OH 45433-7109; Facsimile: (937) 255-3733; or Email: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f796919a949b98d99d968dd98392949fb78284d99691d99a9e9b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="2647404b454a49084c475c085243454e665355084740084b4f4a">[email protected]</span></a>. Include Docket No. ARH-180613D-PL in the 
subject line of the message.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Air Force Materiel Command Law Office, 
AFMCLO/JAZ, 2240 B Street, Rm 260, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7109; 
Facsimile: (937) 255-3733; Email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#3554535856595a1b5f544f1b4150565d7540461b54531b585c59"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a7c6c1cac4cbc889cdc6dd89d3c2c4cfe7d2d489c6c189cacecb">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Department of the Air Force intends to 
grant the exclusive patent license agreement for the invention 
described in:

--U.S. Patent No. 8,575,069, entitled, ``HUMAN PERFORMANCE BIOMARKER 
BINDING PEPTIDES FOR NEUROPEPTIDE Y AND METHODS OF USING THE SAME,'' 
filed 15 January 2013, and issued 5 November 2013.

    The Department of the Air Force may grant the prospective license 
unless a timely objection is received that sufficiently shows the grant 
of the license would be inconsistent with the Bayh-Dole Act or 
implementing regulations. A competing application for a patent license 
agreement, completed in compliance with 37 CFR 404.8 and received by 
the Air Force within the period for timely objections, will be treated 
as an objection and may be considered as an alternative to the proposed 
license.

Henry Williams,
Acting Air Force Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 2018-14400 Filed 7-3-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 5001-10-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### LEVIN PETTIJOHN, appellant, d. b. *vs.*DANIEL HUDSON, respondent, p b.

Jf one constable having an execution in his hands, deliver it to another who collects the money, the second constable is not liable to the plaintiff on his official bond; but may be sued in assumpsit for money had and received to the plaintiff’s use.

Daniel Hudson, the respondent, recovered a judgment before Justice Tindal, against John Lynch, for $21 90; and issued an execution thereon, which was delivered to constable Isaac Jefferson. Jefferson placed the execution in the hands of constable Pettijohn, who collected the money from the defendant Lynch. The execution was not returned by either.

The present action was in assumpsit against Pettijohn, for money ‘had and received to Hudson’s use. There was also a special count •setting out alii the-facts.

*Mr. Cullen,*for plaintiff,

contended that the action of assumpsit would Be, and cited, 1 *Wend. Rep.*534; 9 *Johns. Rep.*96; *Chitty Cont.*607, 641; 2 *Johns. Rep.*183; 2 *Saund. Pl. & Ev.*212, [673;] 1 *Com. L. Rep.*277; 1 *Harr. Rep.*446; 7 *Johns. Rep.*470; 1 *Ibid*130; A paroi promise to one for the benefit of another, will be sufficient as a ground of suit by that other.

*Houston*and Layton, contra,

relied that assumpsit would not lie because the remedy was against the defendant on his bond, or for a breach of official duty; nor would it lie against him as the deputy

*179
      *Cullen,*for plaintiff.

*Houston*and Layton, for defendant.

of Jefferson,- nor individually, as there was no privity between him and Hudson.

*The Court*

sustained the action.. Mr. Pettijohn was not the officer to whom this execution was directed or delivered. He was not accountable on his bond, or in the summary remedy under the act of 1833, for money received undercolor of this execution. If he is not responsible to Hudson, under- the count for money had and received, he is not liable at all, though he actually received the money for the use of Hudson, and to which he was lawfully entitled. He received the money as the agent of Jefferson, and not by any deputation.

It was proved in the case that Pettijohn forwarded to- Jefferson his note for the amount which he had collected on this execution, which Jefferson refused to receive in payment, but retained as an evidence of the debt; and the defendant relied on this as dischargeing him from any liability to Hudson; but the court held otherwise, unless Jefferson had accepted the note in payment to himand this-before suit was brought by Hudson. Pettijohn received this money as the agent for Jefferson; it belonged to Hudson ;• and Hudson liadlas action against him; for money had and received to his use, if he pursued his remedy against the agent before settlement with his. principal. (1 *Selw. N. P.*79, *n.).*

Judgment for plaintiff.
#### Gordon AKELEY, Petitioner, v. Elliot L. MILLER, Respondent.

No. 42749.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 14, 1972.

Certiorari denied. 264 So.2d 473.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
#### Willie WALTERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-336.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 4, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Sandra Moore, Appellant.

[721 NYS2d 513]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Renee White, J.), rendered February 23, 1999, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of grand larceny in the fourth degree, and sentencing her, as a second felony offender, to a term of 2 to 4 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court’s *Sandoval*ruling balanced the appropriate factors and was a proper exercise of discretion *(see, People v Walker,*83 NY2d 455, 458-459). While the court permitted the People to elicit that defendant had ten prior misdemeanors and two prior felonies within the previous ten years, it precluded them from identifying any of the convictions or eliciting any of their underlying facts.

We perceive no basis for reduction of sentence. Concur— Rosenberger, J. P., Andrias, Wallach, Rubin and Buckley, JJ.