alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Edna NELSON v. John DOE and Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets, Inc.

No. 8360.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Oct. 12, 1977.

Beard, Blue, Schmitt, Mathes, Koch & Williams, Madison C. Moseley, New Orleans, for John Doe and Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets, Inc., defendants-appellants.

Edward P. Comeaux, Metairie, for Edna Nelson, plaintiff-appellee.

Before STOULIG, BOUTALL and SCHOTT, JJ.

*1234BOUTALL, Judge.

Customer Edna Nelson sued Schweg-mann Bros. Giant Super Markets, Inc. for personal injuries which occurred while shopping in the St. Bernard store. Defendant appeals from a judgment awarding damages.

Plaintiff was proceeding to the meat counter and, when she reached the end of the aisle in which she was walking, she was struck on the left leg by a large flat-bed cart loaded with merchandise, being pushed along the intersecting passageway. She produced evidence that the cart could not be seen because of the merchandise stacked at the end of the aisle, and that the boxes stacked on the cart were so high that the person pushing the cart could not see that the way was not clear. The defense offered evidence that the accident was never reported, and that the identity of the cart pusher was unknown and was not an employee of Schwegmann. The trial judge obviously resolved the question of credibility of witnesses in favor of plaintiff in finding that plaintiff was injured at that time. The court found that the cart was being pushed by a person who could not see what was ahead of him and although it made no specific determination that the cart pusher was an employee of Schwegmann rather than an employee of some merchandise jobber, it found a violation of the safety rules testified to by the store’s manager. That testimony was to the effect that each person who brought merchandise into the store to stock on Schwegmann’s shelves was supposed to be given instructions with respect to safety. The trial judge found neglect of these rules and imposed liability upon the store owner. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support his findings.

While the record could also support an inference that the cart pusher was not an employee of Schwegmann’s, we are not permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court when there is ample evidence to support the trial judge’s conclusion. We affirm.

Similarly, on the question of damages, the trial judge has discretion in ascertaining the amount thereof and we find no abuse of his discretion.

*AFFIRMED AT APPELLANT’S COST.*
Page 1 of 3

Disposition Comments

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required.

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list latest revision and attach a copy. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously 

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each issue. All comments relating to the same issue should be discussed together. Do not list all of the issues 

from one commenter together. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and 

describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA-IR-M-8040.1C Chapter 9.

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IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 284

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Third College

at the University of California at San Diego should be renamed the

‘‘Thurgood Marshall College’’ in honor of Justice Thurgood Marshall.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 26, 1993

Mr. BLACKWELL submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Education and Labor

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that

the Third College at the University of California at San

Diego should be renamed the ‘‘Thurgood Marshall College’’ in honor of Justice Thurgood Marshall.

Whereas the University of California through the authority of

the Master Plan for Higher Education is charged with

educating the citizens of the State of California;

Whereas the University of California maintains 8 campuses

for the purpose of offering Baccalaureate, Masters, Doctoral, as well as Professional degrees;

Whereas the San Diego campus of the University of California System was created in the early 1960s as the southern-most site for State-sponsored higher education;
2

•HRES 284 IH

Whereas Third College on the University of California, San

Diego, campus was founded in 1970 to represent the

higher academic achievement and the best aspirations of

the civil rights movement in this country;

Whereas Third College fulfills its charter philosophy to challenge students both as scholars and citizens in a growing

multicultural State and world;

Whereas the students of Third College take a set of general

education requirements that include mathematics, a social science sequence called Dimensions of Culture, a

course in the physical sciences, humanities, and the arts;

Whereas Third College students receive academic credit for

training and placement as tutors and mentors in local

inner-city elementary schools;

Whereas supporters of Third College have continually sought

to find a more meaningful name;

Whereas Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall’s passing in

January 1993, led to enormous support for the University of California, San Diego, campus to rename the

Third College;

Whereas Thurgood Marshall will forever be known by the

celebrated victory in Brown v. Board of Education in

1954;

Whereas Thurgood Marshall’s most important impact was

initially in the area of access to quality education; and

Whereas Thurgood Marshall is an icon which the University

of California wishes to have its students emulate: Now,

therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that the Third College at the University of
3

•HRES 284 IH

1 California, San Diego, should be renamed as the

2 ‘‘Thurgood Marshall College’’.

Æ
# Self-Identification of Handicap

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[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 299 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 299

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                      November 9, 1993.
    Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker 
may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 1036) to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to 
provide that such Act does not preempt certain State laws. The first reading of 
the bill shall be dispensed with. General debate shall be confined to the bill 
and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
ranking minority member of the Committee on Education and Labor. After general 
debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule for 
a period not to exceed four hours. It shall be in order to consider as an 
original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the 
amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on 
Education and Labor now printed in the bill. The committee amendment in the 
nature of a substitute shall be considered as read. At the conclusion of 
consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the 
bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may 
demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of 
the Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and 
amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion 
to recommit with or without instructions.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
260 La. 299

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Andrew MOORE.

Nos. 51918, 51919.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 21, 1971.

Cunningham & Cunningham, W. Peyton Cunningham, Jr., Natchitoches, for defendant-appellant.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald C. Martin, Dist. Atty., Charles R. Whitehead, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Andrew Moore, was tried by jury and convicted of two (2) separate charges of simple burglary. LSA-R.S. 14:62. He was sentenced to five (5) years on each conviction; sentences to run consecutively.

As he was not informed of his right to appeal, through habeas corpus procedures the defendant was granted an out-of-time appeal. In the order granting the appeal the trial judge “recalled, set aside, annulled and vacated” the sentences imposed upon the defendant. The minutes do not show that the defendant was re-sentenced. Therefore, we note, ex proprio motu, that the defendant is not presently under sentence for his convictions. - The defendant can only appeal from final judgments, such as one which imposes sentence after conviction. La.C.Cr.P. Art. 912.

For the reasons assigned, the appeals are dismissed, and these cases are remanded to the Tenth Judicial District Court for sentencing in conformity with law.
#### Kenneth DEICKE, Appellant, v. BELFORD TRUCKING COMPANY, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 71-524.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 22, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### CHARLES FITZGIBBINS v. MILTON YENNIE.1

April 7, 1916.

Nos. 19,767—(167).

Order not appealable.

A motion to “vacate and set aside the action” is in effect a motion to dismiss the action. An order denying such motion is not appealable. [Reporter.]

Action in the district court for Dodge county. Prom an order, Childress, L, denying his motion for an order vacating the summons, complaint, affidavit in replevin and all other files in the action on the ground that the action was prohibited by law and would not lie under the allegations set forth in the affidavit and complaint, defendant appealed.

Dismissed.

H. *J. Edison,*for appellant.

D. C. *Sheldon,*for respondent.

1

 Reported in 157 N. W. 114.

Per Curiam.

Action in claim and delivery for the possession of certain personal property. The property was taken by the sheriff, but was rebonded by and returned to defendant. Whereupon defendant moved to “set aside and vacate” the action on the ground that it could not be maintained since by the complaint it appears that the parties to the action are owners of the property as tenants in common. The motion was denied and defendant appealed. Plaintiff moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order is not appealable. *474The motion is granted. The motion, below to “vacate -and set aside the action” was in effect a motion to dismiss the action and the order denying the same is clearly not appealable. Pillsbury v. Foley, 61 Minn. 434, 63 N. W. 1027.

Appeal dismissed.

2

 October, 1915, term calendar.
#### Fundador Rodriquez RIVERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-727.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 16, 1972.

Rehearing Denied July 31, 1972.

Larry A. Echols, Fort Myers Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and David Luther Woodward, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

*74PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on authority of State v. Jones, Fla.1967, 204 So.2d 515. Cf. Sherman v. State, Fla.1971, 255 So.2d 263.

PIERCE, C. J., and MANN and Mc-NULTY, JJ., concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

NATALI S. RAY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS

THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF RIVER RUSSELL, DECEASED AND JOSEPH B. RUSSELL, INDIVIDUALLY AND

AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF RIVER RUSSELL, DECEASED,

Petitioners

v.

PENSKE LOGISTICS LLC AND PHILLIP JAMES ANTOINE,

Respondents :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 186 EAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 14th day of December, 2022

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
#### Milford E. BOX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jack KARAM et al., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4028.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Dec. 13, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 1973.

Gahagan & Kelly by Russell E. Gaha-gan, Natchitoches, for plaintiff-appellant.

Navarre & Fuselier by John P. Navarre, Oakdale, for defendant-appellee.

Before SAVOY, CULPEPPER and DOMENGEAUX, JJ.

SAVOY, Judge.

Plaintiff filed this suit against Jack C. Karam and John P. Navarre. For a cause of action plaintiff alleged that on September 14, 1967, Karam executed an act of sale of real estate in favor of Charles DeRouen before Navarre who prepared the deed and acted as Notary Public; that on September 18, 1967, Navarre, as attorney, rendered a title opinion to plaintiff, stating that DeRouen had a mercantable title to said property. Plaintiff also alleged that shortly thereafter he purchased said real property from DeRouen by deed also pre*290pared by Navarre; that m March, 1969, it came to his attention that neither the deed from Karam to DeRouen nor from DeRouen to him had been recorded, and that in the meantime, Karam had sold this land to a third party; that DeRouen is insolvent; and, that plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $10,000.00. Plaintiff prayed for an insólido judgment against Karam and Navarre for the above sum.

Navarre filed a plea of one year libera-tive prescription. This is based on LSA-C.C. Article 3536 which provides:

> “The following actions are also prescribed by one year:

> “That for injurious words, whether verbal or written, and that for damages caused by animals, or resulting from offenses or quasi offenses.

> “That which a possessor may institute, to have himself maintained or restored to his possession, when he has been disturbed or evicted.

> “That for the delivery of merchandise or other effects, shipped on board any kind of vessels.

> “That for damage sustained by merchandise on board ships, or which may have happened by ships running foul of each other.”

The district judge maintained this exception and dismissed the suit as to Navarre. Plaintiff has appealed.

It is the contention of counsel for appellant that this is an action for breach of contract and is prescribed in ten years under the provisions of LSA-C.C. Article 3544 dealing with personal actions.

The prescriptive period which should be used in this type case has caused some concern to the courts of this state. For an excellent discussion on the subject, see Brooks v. Robinson, 163 So.2d 186 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1964), writ refused.

In Phelps v. Donaldson, 243 La. 1118, 150 So.2d 35, the Supreme Court held that malpractice actions are'tortious m nature and prescribe in one year. In the instant case more than one year has elapsed between the time the negligent act complained of became known to plaintiff in March of 1969, and the filing of the suit in January of 1972. There is no alternative allegation in the petition alleging damages for breach of contract.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court is affirmed at appellant’s costs.

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 321 Reported in House (RH)]

                                                 House Calendar No. 130

103d CONGRESS

  1st Session

                              H. RES. 321

                          [Report No. 103-405]

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

Waiving points of order against the conference report to accompany the 
  bill (H.R. 3167) to extend the emergency unemployment compensation 
   program, to establish a system of worker profiling, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                           November 21, 1993

        Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

                                                 House Calendar No. 130
103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 321

                          [Report No. 103-405]

Waiving points of order against the conference report to accompany the 
  bill (H.R. 3167) to extend the emergency unemployment compensation 
   program, to establish a system of worker profiling, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 21, 1993

   Mr. Moakley, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following 
resolution; which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Waiving points of order against the conference report to accompany the 
  bill (H.R. 3167) to extend the emergency unemployment compensation 
   program, to establish a system of worker profiling, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in 
order to consider the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 
3167) to extend the emergency unemployment compensation program, to 
establish a system of worker profiling, and for other purposes. All 
points of order against the conference report and against its 
consideration are waived. The conference report shall be considered as 
read.
```
# L_2005278EN.01000101.xml

| 21.10.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 278/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.10.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 278/1

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 20 September 2005

on the conclusion of the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union

(2005/720/EC)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 310 in conjunction with the second sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 300(2) and the second subparagraph of Article 300(3) thereof,

Having regard to the 2003 Act of Accession and in particular Article 6(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Having regard to the assent of the European Parliament (1),

Whereas:

| (1) | The Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, was signed on behalf of the European Community and its Member States on 8 June 2005. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, was signed on behalf of the European Community and its Member States on 8 June 2005.

| (2) | The Protocol should be approved, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Protocol should be approved,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Sole Article

The Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, is hereby approved on behalf of the European Community and its Member States.

The text of the Protocol is attached to this Decision (2).

Done at Brussels, 20 September 2005.

For the Council

The President

M. BECKETT

---

(1)  Assent delivered on 6 September 2005 (not yet published in the Official Journal).

1

(2)  See page 2 of this Official Journal.

2

---