UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, DC 

WILLIAM ALFRED HICKS, JR. 

a/k/a BILLY HICKS 

Complainant, 

VS. 

CITY OF MOUNT AIRY, NORTH 

CAROLINA; and the COUNTY OF SURRY, 

NORTH CAROLINA; through the MOUNT 

AIRY/SURRY COUNTY AIRPORT 

AUTHORITY 

Respondent. 

Submitted By: 

Howard C. Jones II, Attorney At Law 

105 West Fourth Street, Suite 400-E 

Winston-Salem, NC 27101 

Phone: 336 750-0860; Cell: 336-816-1716 

Fax: (336) 727-1085 

Email: howardcjonesii@gmail.com 

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FAA Docket No. 16-15-07 

MOTION TO FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT OF THE 

UNITIED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MDDLE DISTRICT OF 

NORTH CAROLINA IN HICKS V. 

AUTHOTIRY ET AL, MDNC CASE NO. 

1:15-CV-38 AND REQUEST FOR 

JUDI CAL NOTICE OF THE SAM_E. 

Attorney for Mount Airy/Surry County Airport Authority 

Pursuant to 14 CFR 16.13, 16.19, and 16.23UJ and the inherent power of this 

tribunal to take judicial notice, respondent Mount Airy/Surry County Airport Authority 

("Authority") moves this tribunal for leave to file the order and judgment of the United 

States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in Hicks v. Mount AirySurry County Airport Authority et a!, Case No. 1: 15-cv-38 and that this tribunal take 

judicial notice of the same, and grounds therefore states as follows: 
l. In their pleadings in this Part 16 proceeding, the complainant and the 

respondent have both previously referred to the complaint and amended complaint which 

Mr. Hicks filed against the Authority in a lawsuit pending in the United Sates District 

Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. Respondent also previously filed copies 

of the complaint and amended complaint as exhibits to respondent's motion to dismiss 

and for summary judgment. Respondent also cited the amended complaint in support of 

its affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estopple and lack of jurisdiction. 

2. Thereafter, on December 9, 2015, the District Court entered an opinion 

and a judgment in I: 15-CV -38, dismissing Mr. Hicks' complaint in its entirety. A true 

and accurate copy of the opinion is attached as Exhibit "1" to this motion; a true and 

correct copy of the judgment is attached as Exhibit "2" to this motion. 

3. This tribunal has the inherent power to take judicial notice of these 

documents. 

4. These documents are relevant to the consideration of the matter currently 

pending before this tribunal. 

5. Granting this motion and permitting the filing of these documents and 

taking judicial notice of the same would be in the interest of justice and promote the 

mandate of this tribunal to fairly adjudicate Part 16 proceedings. 

Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, respondent Authority respectfully requests 

that this tribunal permit the filing of the United States District Court's opinion and 

judgment in MDNC Case NO. I: 15-cv-38 and take the judicial notice of the same, and 

for such further relief as this tribunal deems appropriate. 

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Respectfully submitted, this the 21 ''day of December 2015. 

est Fourth Street, Suite 400-E 

w· stan-Salem, NC 27101 

Telephone: (336) 750-0860 

Fax: (336) 727-1085 

Email: howardcjonesii@gmail.com 

Attorney for Mount Airy/Surry County Airport Authority 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Howard C. Jones II, certifY that on December 21, 2015 I filed and served this 

Motion for Leave to File (together with all attachments and exhibits thereto) by placing 

the original thereof and three copies to the FAA, in prepaid first class or better envelopes 

in the custody of the United States Mail and by mailing a copy to counsel of record 

addressed as follows: 

Mailed To: 

FAA Part 16 Docket Clerk 

AGC-600 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence A venue SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

Mailed To: 

Randolph M. James 

Randolph M. James, P.C. 

P.O. Box 20069 

Winston-Salem, NC 27120 

Attorney For Complainant 

Mailed to: 

Edwin M. Woltz 

119 Rawley A venue 

Mount Airy, NC 27030 

Attorney for the County of Surry, North Carolina 

Mailed to: 

Hugh B. Campbell, III 

235 E. Independence Blvd. 

PO Box 1846 

Mount Airy, North Carolina 27030 

Attorney for the City of Mount Airy, North Carolina 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 

WILLIAM ALFRED HICKS, JR., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MOUNT AIRY-SURRY COUNTY 

AIRPORT AUTHORITY, eta!., 

Defendants. 

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1:15-CV-38 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. 

This case arose out of a dispute over a lease for an airplane hangar at an airport in 

Surry County. The plaintiff, Billy Hicks, was both a tenant and a member of the airport's 

governing body when other board members voted to terminate his hangar lease because 

of fire code violations. After failing to obtain relief in state court proceedings, Mr. Hicks 

sued the Airport Authority, its seven board members, its attorney, and the Surry County 

fire marshal in this Court, claiming they violated his constitutional rights. He contends 

that the tire code violations were a pretext for the lease tennination and other adverse 

actions, which were in fact motivated by personal animus towards Mr. Hicks for 

positions he had taken as a board member on unrelated airport business in the past. For 

the reasons more fully set forth below, all claims against all defendants will be dismissed. 

I. FACTS ALLEGED IN COMPLAINT 

The Mount Airy-Surry County Airport Authority (the "Authority") is a 

governmental entity jointly fonned by the City of Mount Airy and the County of Surry 

EXHIBIT 

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pursuant to North Carolina law to operate the Mount Airy-Surry County Airport. (Doc. 

18 at~ 7.) Plaintiff Billy Hicks was appointed as an Authority board member by the City 

of Mount Airy in 2010 and served in that position through 2013. (Doc. 18 at~~ 19-20.) 

He also owns two planes he has kept at the airport since 2008. (Doc. 18 at~ 2.) 

After Mr. Hicks voiced opposition to other board members on two separate 

matters, (see Doc. 18 at~~ 25, 59), he began receiving "pressure" to resign his board 

position. (Doc. 18 at ~ 62.) The defendants later took a series of actions resulting in a 

"constructive ban" on Mr. Hicks's personal use of the airport. (Doc. 18 at ~ 109.) 

Following an incident in which Mr. Hicks used spray paint inside the hangar he rented 

from the Authority, the defendant board members voted to terminate Mr. Hicks's lease if 

it were found he had violated any laws. (Doc. 18 at~~ 65, 67, 71, 103.) The Authority's 

attorney, defendant Joseph Williams, described the incident to the Surry County Fire 

Marshal, defendant Roger Jones, who, without further investigation, generated a report 

listing fire code violations. (Doc. 18 at~~ 73-75.) 

A number of other tenants had lease and fire code violations that the board and fire 

marshal did not investigate. (See Doc. 18 at~~ 42, 88.) Other tenants have been given 

time to fix violations discovered during fire marshal inspections. (Doc. 18 at~ 82.) 

However, after Mr. Hicks's violation, Mr. Williams sent a letter terminating Mr. Hicks's 

hangar lease and removing his name from the waiting list for an additional hangar, citing 

ten tire code violations and possible OSHA violations. (Doc. 18 at~ 85; see also Doc. 

32-1 at 10.) Mr. Hicks asserts he was treated differently than similarly-situated tenants 

because of his opposition to other board members in matters of Authority business. (Doc. 

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18 at~ 90.) Around this time, Mr. Hicks also resigned his position as an Authority board 

member. (E.g., Doc. 18 at~ 22.) The actions of all defendants "forc[ed] his resignation." 

(Doc. 18 at~ 130.) 

II. OVERVIEW OF CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 

Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). "The first inquiry in any§ 1983 suit, 

therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right 'secured by the 

Constitution and laws."' Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979) (quoting 42 

u.s.c. § 1983). 

Mr. Hicks framed his complaint as three claims against all defendants under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983: violations of equal protection, violations of due process, and conspiracy to 

violate his equal protection and due process rights. (See Doc. IS at 21, 25, 27.) 

Underlying these claims are his contentions that the defendants retaliated against him for 

exercising his First Amendment rights, (see Doc. 18 at~~ 101, 137, 141), and that the 

defendants unconstitutionally deprived him of liberty and property rights. (See Doc. 18 

at~~ 108, 136.) Mr. Hicks seeks damages, a renewed hangar lease, and reinstatement on 

the waiting list for an additional hangar lease in the same wait-list position he held in 

May 2013. (Doc. 18 at pp. 29-30 ~~I, 5.) 

All defendants have moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted and, alternatively, 

because the claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. (Docs. 32, 38, 40.) 

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All defendants additionally assert that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars the 

conspiracy claim. (Docs. 33 at 15; 39 at 15; 41 at 12.) 

The board member defendants additionally maintain the claims are barred because 

of absolute and qualified immunity, (Doc. 33 at 20), and defendant Mr. Jones, the fire 

marshal, asserts qualified immunity. (Doc. 41 at 15.) The Authority and Mr. Jones also 

contend the claims should be dismissed because Mr. Hicks has not adequately alleged 

that his injuries t1owed from a governmental policy or custom. (Docs. 33 at 24; 41 at 16.) 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Issue and Claim Preclusion 

This is not the first lawsuit Mr. Hicks brought concerning these factual allegations. 

In June 2013 Mr. Hicks filed a declaratory judgment action in state superior court seeking 

an order enjoining the Authority from evicting him. (Doc. 32-1 at 2 ~ 12.) Mr. Hicks 

voluntarily dismissed that suit in September 2014, (Doc. 32-2), without having vacated 

the hangar. (See Doc. 18 at~ 86.) Meanwhile, in August 2014 the Authority brought a 

state court summary ejectment action against Mr. Hicks, alleging his written lease had 

ended that May. (Doc. 32-3.) In defense, Mr. Hicks asserted that the Authority violated 

his constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, (Doc. 32-4 at~ 2), but he did not file any counterclaims, and it does not 

appear that the state court judge addressed these constitutional defenses in her decision. 

(See Doc. 32-6.) The state court ruled in favor of the Authority, holding that the lease 

had expired without being renewed. (Doc. 32-6 at ,[6.) Mr. Hicks filed a notice of 

appeal but later vacated the hangar space, and the appeal was dismissed as moot. (Docs. 

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32-7; 32-8 at~ 3(c); 32-9.) 1 

The defendants contend that Mr. Hicks's claims in this lawsuit are barred by issue 

and claim preclusion. (Docs. 33 at 17-20; 39 at 20-22; 41 at 16-19.) "Federal courts 

must give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as the forum that rendered 

the judgment would have given it." Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d 284,287 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Therefore, the Court must apply North Carolina law to determine the preclusive effect of 

the ejectment judgment. 

1. Claim Preclusion 

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of claims and counterclaims 

that were or could have been raised in a prior proceeding between the same parties. 

Sartin, 535 F.3d at 287. A litigant who fails to raise a compulsory counterclaim risks 

being precluded from asserting that claim in a separate action. Fickley v. Grey stone 

Enters., Inc., 140 N.C. App. 258,261,536 S.E.2d 331,334 (2000)). "Generally, a 

counterclaim is compulsory if 'it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 

subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the 

presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.'" !d. at 260, 536 

S.E.2d at 333 (quoting N.C. R. Civ. P. 13(a)). In contrast, where a plaintiff seeks a 

remedy for a separate and distinct act leading to a separate and distinct injury, the claim 

is not barred even if both acts arose from a single core of operative facts. Tong v. Dunn, 

1 While the state court action was still pending, Mr. Hicks filed the complaint in this Court. 

(See Doc. 16-7 at I, 18.) 

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752 S.E.2d 669, 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 

428 S.E.2d !57 (1993)). 

If Mr. Hicks were making a claim that his First Amendment rights were violated 

by the board's actions, such a claim would be barred by res judicata. Under applicable 

North Carolina law, retaliatory lease termination claims are compulsory counterclaims in 

summary ejectment if they are based on the same factual claims and involve the same 

determinative questions. Fickley, 140 N.C. App. at 261-62, 536 S.E.2d at 334. 

Here, however, Mr. Hicks is not basing his § 1983 claims on his First Amendment 

rights; rather, he relies on his equal protection and due process rights. 2 The defendants 

have not cited authority to support their contention that all of the claims in this suit were 

compulsory counterclaims to the summary ejectment action. (Doc. 33 at 18-19.) The 

Court will deny the motion to dismiss based on res judicata. 

2. Issue Preclusion 

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of specific issues that 

were actually determined in a prior action that resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 

Sartin, 535 F.3d at 287-88. It applies when (I) the issues are the same as those involved 

in the prior action; (2) the issues were raised and actually litigated in the prior action; (3) 

the issues were material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action; and (4) the 

determination of those issues in the prior action was necessary and essential to the 

2 Though Mr. Hicks mentions free speech rights several times, (see, e.g., Doc. 18 at~~ 96, 

I 0 I, I 06, I 41, 147), he does not appear to assert a § 1983 claim based on violation of his First 

Amendment rights and, rather, explicitly bases his claims only on equal protection and due 

process. (See Doc. 18 at 21, 27.) 

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resulting judgment. Beckwith v. Llewellyn, 326 N.C. 569, 574,391 S.E.2d 189, 191 

(1990). "A very close examination of matters actually litigated must be made in order to 

determine if the underlying issues are in fact identical. If they are not identical, then the 

doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply." /d. 

As discussed supra, the only issues squarely before the state court were whether 

the lease contained a renewal provision that allowed Mr. Hicks to renew at his option and 

whether there had previously been an agreement to renew between the parties. (See also 

Doc. 16-7.) The state court expressly found that no renewal agreement was made and did 

not address Mr. Hicks's constitutional defense. (Doc. 32-6 at~ 6.) 

Accordingly, to the extent that Mr. Hicks claims he is entitled to renewal of the 

lease, that claim is precluded by the state court decision. All other claims are not 

precluded and will be considered. 

B. Absolute Immunity 

The board members contend they are entitled to absolute immunity because they 

are equivalent to a legislature. Local legislators are absolutely immune from suit under § 

1983 for legislative activities. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998). This 

immunity extends to "[ o ]fficials outside the legislative branch ... when they perform 

legislative functions" and attaches to "all actions taken in the sphere of legitimate 

legislative activity." /d. at 55, 54 (internal quotations omitted). Actions that are 

administrative rather than legislative in nature are not protected by absolute immunity. 

See id. at 55. 

The board actions complained of here were not legislative in nature. Even if the 

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board members perform some legislative functions in their oversight of the Authority, 

termination and non-renewal of leases "affect specific individuals rather than formulate 

broad public policy" and do not involve "the adoption of prospective, legislative-type 

rules ... that establish a general policy affecting the larger population." EEOC v. Wash. 

Suburban Sanitary Comm 'n, 631 F.3d 174, 184 (4th Cir. 20 II) (citations and internal 

quotations omitted); see also Alexander v. Holden, 66 F.3d 62, 67 (4th Cir. 1995). 

Defendant board members have cited no authority to support their conclusory 

argument that termination of the lease was a legislative activity. (See Doc. 33 at 20-21.) 

They are not entitled to absolute immunity. 

C. Equal Protection Claims 

Mr. Hicks alleges an equal protection violation because he was treated differently 

than other hangar tenants with tire code violations. (Doc. 18 at~~ 87-90, 100.) He 

alleges that this disparate treatment occurred because he voiced opposition to other board 

members on two separate matters. (See Doc. 18 at~~ 21-25, 59.)3 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o 

State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I. The equal protection mandate "does not take from the 

States all power of classification," Pers. Adm 'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,271 (1979), but 

"keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all 

3 As noted supra, to the extent this claim is based on retaliatory termination, it is barred by 

res judicata. 

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relevant respects alike." Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. I, 10 (1992). 

Equal protection claims usually arise when plaintiffs allege arbitrary classification 

as members of an identifiable group. Engquist v. Or. Dep 't of Agric ., 553 U.S. 591, 601 

(2008). In some circumstances, equal protection plaintitis may prevail without invoking 

membership in a protected class by showing they were "intentionally treated differently 

from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in 

treatment." Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam); see 

also Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631,633 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The paradigmatic 'class of 

one' case, [ ] sensibly conceived, is one in which a public official, with no conceivable 

basis for his action other than spite or some other improper motive (improper because 

unrelated to his public duties), comes down hard on a hapless private citizen."). 

While the parameters of a "class of one" cause of action in the context of 

discretionary decisionmaking are in flux, 4 "it is not sufficient for a plaintiff simply to 

show that the defendants' actual motive for their disparate treatment was irrational; rather 

4 In Engquist, the Supreme Court limited the availability of the "class of one" theory, 

concluding it does not apply in the context of public employment because the state action 

involved "discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized 

assessments" and "allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a particular person 

would undermine the very discretion that such state officials are entrusted to exercise." 553 U.S. 

at 603. Several courts have questioned whether "class of one" claims in the context of 

discretionary decisionmaking remain viable after Engquist. See, e.g., Rapp v. Dutcher, 557 F. 

App'x 444,449 (6th Cir. 2014); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794,799-800 (8th Cir. 

2009); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir. 2008); Uzoukwu v. Prince 

George's Cmty. Coli., No. DKC 12-3228,2013 WL 4442289, at *9-10 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 2013); 

Mathis v. McDonough, No. ELH-13-2597, 2014 WL 3894133, at *28 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2014). 

The Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed the post-Engquist viability of class-of-one equal 

protection claims. See Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533,542 n.l3 (4th Cir. 2013) 

(observing that other circuits have discussed the impact of Engquist on "class of one" claims, but 

concluding that "such discussion is not necessary to resolving the claim before us."). 

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he must negate 'any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational 

basis for the classification."' Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440,447 (4th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Bd. ojTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)); see also Herman v. 

Lackey, 309 F. App'x 778 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per curiam) (applying Kirby in 

the Rule 12(b)(6) context). 

l. Board Members 

a. Alleged Constitutional Violation 

Mr. Hicks alleges that board members treated him differently than similarlysituated tenants when they voted to terminate his lease. 

In June 2011, Mr. Hicks entered into a three-year lease with the Authority for a 

hangar. (Doc. 18-1 at 40.) Around that time, in his capacity as a board member, Mr. 

Hicks argued for a fuel audit that the chairman of the board, John Springthorpe, opposed. 

(Doc. 18 at~~ 21-22.) Thereafter, Mr. Springthorpe "resented" him and "treated [him] 

differently" in unspecified ways. (Doc. 18 at~ 25.) In April2012, Mr. Hicks again 

disagreed with Mr. Springthorpe and other board members about whether a particular 

flight instructor should be allowed to use the airport. (Doc. 18 at~~ 44, 59.) Mr. Hicks 

alleges that his support of this flight instructor caused board members to retaliate against 

him. (Doc. 18 at~~ 59-62.) 

In March 2013 Mr. Hicks spray-painted his aircraft inside his hangar, and 

"overspray" resulted "in a mist of paint adhering to ... other aircraft." (Doc. 18 at ,[,[65, 

67.) Three other tenants contacted the Authority about damage to their aircraft and 

personal property stored in the hangars. (Doc. 18 at ~ 68.) Mr. Hicks's insurance 

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company paid for the damage, and he maintains there were no further complaints from 

the other tenants after they were compensated. (Doc. 18 at~~ 69-70.) On May 17, 2013, 

Mr. Williams sent Mr. Hicks a letter on behalf of the Authority terminating his lease, 

citing this incident. (Doc. 18 at~ 85.) 

Mr. Hicks contends that the defendant board members used the overspray incident 

as a pretext for terminating his lease, not renewing his lease, and not granting him an 

additional lease for a second hangar. (Doc. 18 at ~~ 71-87.) He alleges that other hangar 

tenants had fire code violations "equal to" his own violation, (Doc. 18 at~~ 88-89), that 

his own violation was minor, (see Doc. 18 at~ 82 ("paint spraying as a fire code violation 

only lasts as long as the paint spraying does")), and that he was treated differently than 

similarly situated tenants because of his opposition to other board members in the matter 

of the flight instructor. (Doc. 18 at~ 90.) 

Relying on Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995), and Jetstream Aero 

Servs., Inc. v. New Hanover Cty., No. 88-1748, 1989 WL 100644 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 

1989) (unpublished), Mr. Hicks contends that "[ s ]elective prosecution is actionable under 

the federal Constitution when the prosecution or enforcement arises from retaliation 

against the plaintiff for the exercise of a constitutional right, like free speech." (Doc. 45 

at I 0.) 

There are several problems with this contention. First, it is highly doubtful that 

Mr. Hicks has a constitutional right as a board member to disagree with other 

governmental board members. See Nev. Comm 'non Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 

2350 (2011) (holding that a legislator's vote is not First Amendment speech); Garcetti v. 

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Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) ("[W]hen public employees make statements 

pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 

Amendment purposes."). Second, the complaint itself shows a rational basis for treating 

Mr. Hicks differently from other tenants with lease violations: he was the only tenant 

whose violations caused serious property damage to other tenants' airplanes. (Doc. 18 at 

~~ 42, 88.) 

A plaintiff proceeding on an equal protection claim subject to rational basis review 

"must negate 'any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis 

for the classification."' Kirby, 388 F.3d at 448 (quoting Garrett, 53! U.S. at 367). "[A] 

discriminatory purpose is not presumed." Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. I, 8 (1944). 

Accepting as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, as this Court must do on a 

motion to dismiss, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555~56 (2007), Mr. Hicks's 

allegations are likely insufficient to support his claim that the defendants' actions here 

were irrational. See Lackey, 309 F. App'x at 785 (finding that the complaint failed to 

negate the hypothetical rational basis); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 (4th 

Cir. 2008) (same); Ruttenberg v. Jones, 283 F. App'x 121, 131 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(unpublished) (per curiam) (same); McWaters v. Cosby, 54 F. App'x 379, 383 (4th Cir. 

2002) (unpublished) (per curiam) (same). 

b. Qualified Immunity 

Assuming without deciding that Mr. Hicks stated a claim for an equal protection 

violation, the board member defendants are entitled to qualitled immunity. Public 

officials perfonning discretionary functions are generally granted qnalitled immunity and 

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shielded from civil damages unless their "conduct violates clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Simmons v. Poe, 

47 F.3d 1370, 1385 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 

(1982)). Analysis of a qualified immunity defense "requires three distinct steps: ( 1) 

identification of the specific right allegedly violated; (2) determining whether at the time 

of the alleged violation the right was clearly established; and (3) if so, then determining 

whether a reasonable person in the [official's] position would have known that doing 

what he did would violate that right." Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1385. 

Mr. Hicks's allegations are insufficient to establish that board members would 

have known their actions violated a clearly established right. As noted, First Amendment 

protections are not clearly established for speech by a member of a governmental board 

about and in connection with decisions made by that board. Moreover, the application of 

the class-of-one theory of liability to situations involving discretionary decisionmaking is 

quite "murky." Jetstream, 1989 WL 100644, at* 1; see supra note 4. 

Mr. Hicks contends that his constitutional right to equal protection, including the 

right against selective enforcement, was well established. (Doc. 45 at 23.) It is not, of 

course, enough that the general, abstract right to equal protection is well established; the 

right must be well established "at a high level of particularity." Campbell v. Galloway, 

483 F.3d 258,271 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,639-40 

( 1987). To this end, Mr. Hicks relies on one unpublished Fourth Circuit case and several 

cases from other jurisdictions to support his selective enforcement argument. (Doc. 45 at 

10-13.) None constitute the kind of authority that results in a clearly established right, ' 

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and all are distinguishable in meaningful ways. 

In Jetstream, the unpublished Fourth Circuit case, the plaintiff was not a 

government official, and there was evidence of a reasonable temporal connection 

between the expressed animosity and the discriminatory conduct that could not otherwise 

be explained. 1989 WL 100644, at *3. Here, the alleged animosity arose at least a year 

before the alleged discriminatory act, which was otherwise based on a firm factual 

footing: a lease violation about which caused property damage and about which other 

tenants had complained. As noted, "a discriminatory purpose is not presumed; there must 

be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination." Snowden, 321 U.S. at 8 (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

The Esmail case from the Seventh Circuit involved an "orchestrated campaign of 

official harassment" against the plaintiff, including police harassment, intrusive 

surveillance, repeated and unjustified police stops, and false criminal charges. 53 F.3d at 

178-79. This ongoing harassment describes conduct of a different kind and degree than 

what Mr. Hicks alleges-namely, that board members initiated a one-off investigation 

into alleged fire code violations that resulted in the termination and non-renewal of his 

lease and his removal from a waiting list for future leases. 

Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has questioned Esmail's ongoing validity, see 

Lauth, 424 F.3d at 633, and other courts have raised serious questions about "class of 

one" cases like this one. See supra note 4. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has called the 

Seventh Circuit's selective enforcement holding in Esmail "a novel theory." Edwards v. 

City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250 (4th Cir. 1999). Novel claims are precisely what 

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qualified immunity doctrine evolved to protect against. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 

335, 341 (1986) (Qualified immunity "provides ample protection to all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."); Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640 ("[I]n 

the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent."). 

In any case, for "clearly established" purposes, existing precedent is limited to 

"the decisions of the Supreme Court, this [Fourth Circuit] court of appeals, and the 

highest court of the state in which the case arose." City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d at 251 

(internal quotations omitted). None of the cases Mr. Hicks cites fall into any of these 

categories. 

The equal protection claims against the board member defendants are dismissed 

on qualified immunity grounds. 

2. The Airport Authority 

"Unless a government entity has a policy or custom of discrimination, a court will 

not attribute an individual's constitutional violations to the government entity." Lefemine 

v. Wideman, 758 F.3d 551, 557 (4th Cir. 2014 ). Because the Authority is a "unit of local 

government" under North Carolina law, (Doc. 18 at~ 7(b)), Mr. Hicks must allege that 

his deprivation was caused by a "constitutionally forbidden rule or procedure." Polk Cty. 

v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,326 (1981). To hold the Authority liable, official policy must 

be "the moving force of the constitutional violation." Monell v. New York City Dep 't of 

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,694 (1978). 

Here, Mr. Hicks has not alleged any such policy, rule, or procedure and indeed has 

alleged facts to the contrary. (See Doc. 18 at~~ 61, 113; see also Doc. 45 at 6 (The 

15 
Authority had "an almost automatic renewal policy" for leases that the board members 

ignored in terminating his lease.)) Elsewhere, Mr. Hicks alleges that the board members' 

vote to terminate his lease amounted to "approving new policy." (Doc. 18 at~ 107.) 

"An official policy often refers to 'formal rules orunderstandings ... that are 

intended to, and do, establish t1xed plans of action to be followed under similar 

circumstances consistently and over time,' and must be contrasted with 'episodic 

exercises of discretion in the operational details of government."' Semple v. City of 

Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708,712 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (quoting Pembaur v. 

City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986) and Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 

1386 (4th Cir. 1987)). A decision to terminate one particular lease is not ordinarily a 

formulation of a new policy. Rather, it represents the exercise of "discretionary authority 

in purely operational aspects of government." Spell, 824 F.2d at 1386. A conclusory 

allegation that the termination of the lease was "policy" is not sufficient to state a claim. 

In the absence of any factual allegations indicating that the board had an 

unconstitutional official policy that was the moving force behind the termination of the 

lease and other disputed actions, the equal protection claims against the Authority are 

dismissed. 

3. Mr. Williams 

Mr. Hicks alleges that Mr. Williams, a private lawyer who represented the 

Authority during the relevant time period, violated his right to equal protection through 

the investigation of the alleged tire code violations and later selective enforcement of 

lease provisions. (Doc. 18 at~~ 15, 112, 121.) Mr. Williams is entitled to qualified 

16 
immunity for the same reasons as the board members. See Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 

1657 (20 12) (holding that a private attorney retained to carry out the work of the 

government is entitled to qualified immunity). The equal protection claims against Mr. 

Williams are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. 

4. Mr.Jones 

Mr. Hicks alleges that the fire marshal, Mr. Jones, violated his right to equal 

protection by preparing an inspection report at the Authority's request without physically 

inspecting Mr. Hicks's hangar. (Doc. 18 at~~ 112, 118.) As noted supra, to adequately 

state a class-of-one equal protection claim, Mr. Hicks must allege facts indicating he "has 

been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no 

rational basis for the difference in treatment." Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. 

Mr. Hicks alleges that the tire marshal had "a duty to inspect all buildings [sic] 

structures or premises for the purpose of ascertaining any code violations and ensuring 

those violations are corrected," (Doc. 18 at~ 7 4 ), and that the fire marshal had performed 

"actual physical inspections" at unspecified other occasions. (Doc. 18 at~ 82.) This 

statement of an alleged duty, plus a vague reference to other physical inspections, is not 

sufficient to allege that Mr. Jones treated Mr. Hicks differently than similarly situated 

individuals. It does not allege that Mr. Jones's regular practice was to inspect premises 

before issuing a report and that he intentionally treated Mr. Hicks differently. It does not 

allege that Mr. Jones knew about fire code violations by other tenants and responded 

differently to them. In the absence of any allegation that Mr. Jones was aware of 

violations in other hangars, the fact that Mr. Jones did not investigate whether other 

17 
tenants had engaged in violations similar to Mr. Hicks's spray painting violation, (see 

Doc. 18 at~ 78), fails to state a claim that Mr. Jones intentionally treated similarly 

situated tenants differently. Allegations that the Authority treated other tenants with 

violations differently does not translate into a claim against the Fire Marshal. 

Though a court reviewing factual allegations on a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6) takes the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it need not accept as 

true "unwarranted inferences." Wag More Dogs, Ltd. Liab. Corp. v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 

359,365 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Nor is it required to accept conclusory and 

speculative allegations. Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 

2013). Mr. Hicks's complaint is devoid of facts supporting his equal protection violation 

claim against Mr. Jones, and this claim is dismissed. 

D. Due Process Claims 

Mr. Hicks claims a property interest in the use of the public airport. (Doc. 18 at~ 

I 08.) He alleges all defendants violated his property rights "in forcing his resignation 

from the Board of the Airport Authority, terminating Plaintiffs lease for the hangar, 

prohibiting tie-down on the ramp, removing Plaintiffs name from the waiting list, 

removing individuals involved with Plaintiff from the waiting list, and denying access to 

a public airport." (Doc. 18 at~ 130.) He contends these actions deprived him of property 

interests in the use of the airport without adequate due process of law. All defendants 

have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Docs. 32, 38, 40.) Because Mr. 

Hicks has not adequately alleged a constitutionally protected property right, this claim 

will be dismissed as to all defendants. 

18 
To the extent the claim is based on the termination of the lease and the refusal to 

renew the lease, Mr. Hicks has already received due process of law via the state court 

summary ejectment proceedings. Moreover, the state court previously ruled that Mr. 

Hicks did not have a contractual right to renewal of his lease, (Doc. 32-6 at~ 6), and Mr. 

Hicks has not explained how a non-existent contractual right can morph into a property 

right subject to constitutional protections. His passing references to "tie-down" rights, 

(Doc. 18 at~~ 130, 136), do not state a claim. He has pleaded no facts to support his 

conclusory allegations that he has a liberty interest in the use of the airport, (Doc. 18 at ~~ 

136, 148), or that he has been "constructively banned" from the airport. (Doc. 18 at~ 

136.) Indeed, he has not alleged even one instance when he tried to access the airport and 

was prevented from doing so. 

To the extent he bases his claim on the allegations that he "received pressure from 

the Mount Airy commissioners to resign his appointment as an Airport Authority Board 

member," (Doc. 18 at~ 62), and that all defendants "fore[ ed] his resignation," (Doc. 18 at 

~ 130), those allegations are either levied against persons other than the defendants to this 

action or are entirely conclusory. To the extent the claim is based on allegations that his 

friends have also been removed from the hangar waiting list because of association with 

him, (Doc. 18 at~~ 94, 117, 136, 145), Mr. Hicks does not have standing to assert the 

claims of others. Finally, he alleged no facts that would support his conclusory allegation 

that he had a property or liberty interest in being on the waiting list for a second hangar. 

(Doc. 18 at~ 130); see Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that to 

have a property interest in a govemment benefit, a person must "have a legitimate claim 

19 
of entitlement to it"). 

E. Conspiracy Claims 

Mr. Hicks alleges a conspiracy between and among all defendants to deprive him 

of his constitutional rights by acting together "to falsify a Fire Marshal's Inspection 

Report, a vote or agreement to terminate Plaintiffs lease and remove his name from the 

waiting list for future hangar space, remove Plaintiffs friends [sic] name from the 

waiting list; and deprive Plaintiff of fair and reasonable use of a public airport." (Doc. 18 

at~ 126.) The Court construes the amended complaint to assert a conspiracy to deprive 

Mr. Hicks of his constitutional rights to equal protection and to due process. 

A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is established by evidence that the defendants 

acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy 

that resulted in the deprivation of a plaintiffs constitutional right. Hinkle v. City of 

Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416,421 (4th Cir. 1996). Other courts also have emphasized the 

need to prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege. See, e.g., Askew v. 

Millerd, 191 F.3d 953,957 (8th Cir. 1999); Villanueva v. Mcinnis, 723 F.2d414, 418 

(5th Cir. 1984) ("[I]t remains necessary to prove an actual deprivation of a constitutional 

right; a conspiracy to deprive is insufficient."); accord Byrd v. Hopson, 265 F. Supp. 2d 

594, 599 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (Under North Carolina state law, "there is no independent 

cause of action for [common law] civil conspiracy; the claim can arise only where there 

is an underlying claim for unlawful conduct."), aff'd in part and rev 'din part on other 

grounds, 108 F. App'x 749 (4th Cir. 2004). 

l. Due Process 

20 
As noted supra, Mr. Hicks's claim for due process violations is being dismissed in 

absence of a property or liberty interest. See discussion pp. 18-19. A liberty or property 

interest is also required for a claim of conspiracy to violate due process rights. See 

Hinkle, 81 F.3d 421 (noting that a deprivation of a constitutional right is required); 

Millerd, 191 F.3d at 957 (same); Villanueva, 723 F.2d at 418 (same). The claim that 

there was a conspiracy to violate his due process rights fails in the absence of any such 

due process rights. 5 

2. Equal Protection 

Mr. Hicks's claim based on a conspiracy to violate his equal protection rights also 

fails. As to the fire marshal, Mr. Hicks has not made the required factual showing to 

support conspiracy claims. He has made only a "bare assertion of a conspiracy" between 

Mr. Jones and any of the Authority defendants. Hardrick v. Canter, No. DKC 11-3032, 

2012 WL 5409739, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2012) (internal quotations omitted). The 

allegations of conspiracy between and among the Authority defendants fail because 

persons acting on behalf of the same entity generally cannot be in a conspiracy with each 

other. Accordingly, the conspiracy claims are dismissed against all defendants. 

a. Mr. Jones 

5 The Fourth Circuit has noted it is possible that a claim of civil conspiracy can survive after 

an officer was found not liable on a related but distinct constitutional claim. See Hinkle, 81 F.3d 

at 421 (noting that the claim of a civil conspiracy to deny appellants access to the courts "is not 

mooted by the mere fact Officer Lake was found not liable for using excessive force against 

Wilson"). That is not the situation here, because Mr. Hicks alleges that the conspiracy 

constituted the same factual conduct, no less and no more, that he alleges in support of his other 

§ 1983 claims. Nor is this a case involving an unsuccessful attempt to violate someone's 

constitutional rights, which might support a separate claim for conspiracy. 

21 
"Where the complaint makes only conclusory allegations of a conspiracy under § 

1983 or § 1985 and fails to allege facts suggesting an agreement or meeting of the minds 

among the defendants, the court may properly dismiss the complaint." Sales v. Murray, 

862 F. Supp. 1511, 1517 (W.D. Va. 1994). "[T]he factual allegations must amount 'to 

more than rank speculation and conjecture' and must 'give rise to an inference that each 

alleged conspirator shared the same conspiratorial objective."' Jones v. Clarke, No. 

7:14CV00422, 2015 WL 5254938, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2015) (quoting Hinkle, 81 

F.3d at 422). 

Mr. Hicks alleges no facts indicating that any of the board members were in a 

conspiracy with the fire marshal. No discussions or communications between Mr. Jones 

and any board member are set forth. (See Doc. 18 at~~ 71-85.) In the absence of some 

sort of communication, it is difficult to see how there could be a meeting of the minds. 

The facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim that the board members were in a 

conspiracy with the fire marshal to deprive Mr. Hicks of his constitutional rights. 

The complaint alleges more interaction between the fire marshal and Mr. 

Williams, the attorney for the Authority. Mr. Hicks alleges that Mr. Williams took part 

in the investigation of the over-spray incident, including contacting the fire marshal's 

office and describing the incident to Mr. Jones, (Doc. 18 at~~ 72-73); that Mr. Williams 

"relied on information procured from third parties as opposed to firsthand knowledge of 

the paint incident" in speaking with Mr. Jones, (Doc. 18 at~ 73); and that he "knowingly 

helped [Mr. Jones] concoct" a report that Mr. Williams could then use to terminate the 

plaintiffs lease. (Doc. 18 at~~ 79, 81.) Mr. Hicks also alleges that Mr. Jones did not 

22 
perform an inspection before issuing a "Fire Prevention Inspection Report" and that the 

fire code violations were "tmmped up" by Mr. Williams and Mr. Jones "to ensure the 

pretext for the [lease termination]." (Doc. 18 at~~ 143, 103.) Mr. Williams "acted, alone 

and in concert with Defendant Jones, to produce an [sic l Fire Prevention Inspection 

Report ... that would give Board Members a pretext to terminate Plaintiffs lease." 

(Doc. 18 at ~ 118.) 

These facts do not "give rise to an inference" that Mr. Jones and Mr. Williams 

"shared the same conspiratorial objective," Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 422, or otherwise had a 

meeting of the minds to violate Mr. Hicks's equal protection rights. The allegation that 

Mr. Williams and Mr. Jones concocted a report, (Doc. 18 at~ 81 ), is contradicted 

elsewhere in the complaint when Mr. Hicks acknowledges he violated the fire code. 

(Doc. 18 at~ 82.) The allegation that the fire code violations were "trumped up," (Doc. 

18 at~ 1 03), suffers from the same deficiency. The allegation that the purpose of the 

report was "to ensure the pretext" for the lease termination, (Doc. 18 at~ 1 03), concerns a 

purported agreement between Mr. Williams and the board members, not any agreement 

with Mr. Jones. 

The mere fact that Mr. Williams and Mr. Jones talked is insufficient to support a 

conspiracy claim. See Smith v. McCarthy, 349 F. App'x 851, 858 (4th Cir. 2009) 

(unpublished) (per curiam) ("The allegations in the Smiths' complaint describe that, at 

the time of arrest, these Defendants 'conferred at times as an entire group and at times in 

smaller groups out of earshot of plaintiffs and appeared at times to be talking on cell 

phones.' These facts, taken as tme, do not establish a meeting of the minds among the 

23 
officers to violate the rights of the Smiths."); Sherwin v. Piner, No: 5:03 CV 275 H(3), 

2003 WL 24051574, at *3 (E.D.N.C. July 22, 2003) ("The fact that plaintiff received an 

unfavorable determination in his workers compensation proceedings does not raise an 

inference of a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights."), ajf'd, 91 F. App'x 

312 (4th Cir. 2004 ). 

A "mere speculation" and a "reliance on labels and conclusions" is insufficient to 

state a conspiracy claim. Clarke, 2015 WL 5254938, at *4 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555, 557); Davis v. Hudgins, 896 F. Supp. 561,571 (E.D. Va. 1995) (granting a motion 

to dismiss "[b ]ecause Plaintiff has only put forward broad allegations that do not indicate 

any actual violation of Plaintiffs civil rights, nor the existence of any [§ 1985] 

conspiracy"), ajf'd, 87 F .3d 1308 (4th Cir. 1996). The equal protection conspiracy claims 

against Mr. Jones are dismissed. 

b. The Authority Defendants and Mr. Williams 

The Authority and the board member defendants have moved to dismiss the 

conspiracy claim on the grounds that it is barred by the intracorporate conspiracy 

doctrine. (Doc. 33 at 15.) Mr. Williams makes a similar argument. (Doc. 39 at 14-15.) 

"The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine recognizes that a corporation cannot conspire 

with its agents because the agents' acts are the corporation's own." Painter's Mill Grille, 

716 F.3d at 352. The doctrine applies to municipalities and in civil rights cases. See Fox 

v. City of Greensboro, 807 F. Supp. 2d 476, 499 (M.D.N.C. 2011). Mr. Hicks alleged 

that all board members and Mr. Williams acted as agents of the Authority. (Doc. 18 at ~,1 

8-15.) On its face, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to protect the board 

24 
members and Mr. Williams from a conspiracy claim. 

Mr. Hicks maintains that the board members are not all agents of the same 

corporation, because some are appointed by Surry County and some by the City of Mount 

Airy. (Doc. 45 at 15-16; see also Doc. 18 at~~ 8-14.) He also alleges that the defendant 

board members participated in the conspiracy "as authorized representatives of Surry 

County and/or Mount Airy." (Doc 18 at~ 127.) However, the Authority is a "unit of 

local government" under North Carolina law. (See Doc. 18 at~ 7(b).) Mr. Hicks alleges 

no facts indicating that the board members acted as agents of the respective local 

governments that appointed them to the board as opposed on behalf of the Authority. 

Likewise, Mr. Hicks alleges that at all relevant times Mr. Williams acted as an agent for 

the Authority. (Doc. 18 at~ 15.) Because the individual board members and Mr. 

Williams were all agents of the Authority, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine 

precludes them from being in a conspiracy with each other. 

Mr. Hicks next contends that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply 

when the alleged co-conspirators had a personal stake in achieving the object of the 

conspiracy, but he does not say what this personal stake might be. (Doc. 45 at 16.) To 

the extent he means that the board members were motivated by a personal bias against 

him, the "intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is not avoided simply by showing that 

corporate employees were motivated in part by personal bias." Painter's Mill Grille, 716 

F.3d at 353 (internal quotation omitted). The personal interest must be "wholly 

separable" from the interests of the corporation for the exception to apply. Mitchell 

Tracey v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 826, 846 (D. Md. 2013). 

25 
Mr. Hicks finally asserts that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply 

because the acts of the board members and the attorney were not authorized by the 

Authority. (Doc. 45 at 16.) As to the attorney, the allegations of the complaint are 

directly in conflict with this argument, as Mr. Hicks alleges Mr. Williams at all times 

acted at the direction of the board. (See Doc. 18 at~~ 15, 71-72.) As to the board 

member defendants, they could not as individuals terminate or decline to renew the lease; 

they could only do so by causing the Authority to so act, which they did by virtue of their 

authorized role as board members. (Doc. 18 at~ 29.) To the extent Mr. Hicks contends 

the members were acting outside their authority because their authority would never 

permit them to act "maliciously" or in violation of the Constitution, (Doc. 45 at 17), the 

Court does not find the unauthorized acts exception to go so far; if it did, it would 

swallow the rule.6 

The conspiracy claims against all defendants are dismissed. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

It may well be the case that some of the defendants disliked Mr. Hicks resented his 

disagreements over board policy in 20 II and 2012 and that this affected their decisions 

about his lease. This does not rise to the level of a violation of constitutional rights. 

Mr. Hicks has not nudged his claims of constitutional violations "across the line from 

6 The unauthorized acts exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is less well 

recognized than the personal bias exception, Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1253 n.4 (4th Cir. 

1985.) Courts typically require more than Mr. Hicks alleged here to show that the acts were 

unauthorized, such as that the agent ignored the corporation's stated policies. Hodgin v. 

Jefferson, 447 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Md. 1978); see also Chavez v. Mclntyre, 424 F. Supp. 2d 

858, 861 (W.O. Va. 2006) (following Hodgin); Fox, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 499. 

26 
conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the motions to dismiss by the defendant board 

members and Mount Airy-Surry County Airport Authority, (Doc. 32), by defendant 

Joseph Williams, (Doc. 38), and by defendant Roger Jones, (Doc. 40), are GRANTED 

and the case will be dismissed. Judgment will be entered concomitantly with this Order. 

This the 9th day of December, 2015. 

27 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 

WILLIAM ALFRED HICKS, JR., ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

V. ) 

) 

MOUNT AIRY-SURRY COUNTY ) 

AIRPORT AUTHORITY, et al., ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

JUDGMENT 

1: 15-CV-38 

For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion and Order filed 

contemporaneously with this Judgment, 

It is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the defendants' motions to 

dismiss, (Docs. 32, 38, 40), are GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED. 

This the 9th day ofDecember, 2015. 

UNITED STATES DIS