alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS SUMMARY  FINANCIAL INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED  BALANCE SHEET AS OF MARCH 31, 1998 AND
THE  RELATED CONDENSED  CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME AND CASH FLOWS FOR
THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         139,506
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  122,791
<ALLOWANCES>                                    47,692
<INVENTORY>                                     29,808
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               334,001
<PP&E>                                       3,553,495
<DEPRECIATION>                                 657,433
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,583,835
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          234,959
<BONDS>                                      1,612,011
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           940
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,550,438
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,583,835
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               342,604
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  201,008
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                22,584
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 4,638
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,342
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 65,423
<INCOME-TAX>                                    23,823
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             41,600
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 (3,521)   
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    38,079
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.21
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.20
        




</TABLE>
#### Vallie A. READY and Alma A. Baker, co-administratrices of the Estate of Claude F. Armstrong, deceased, Appellants, v. Glen GLADIEUX and Carl Gladieux, Appellees.

No. 70-8.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 2, 1970.

Appeal dismissed.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-05-00295-CV

Cavalry Hill Cemetery, the Catholic Diocese of Dallas, and the Letot Family Heirs,

Appellants

v.

Attorney General of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. GN403477, HONORABLE SCOTT H. JENKINS, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellants have filed an agreed motion to dismiss their appeal advising this Court

that they no longer desire to pursue their appeal. The appeal is dismissed and costs are assessed

against the party incurring them. See Tex. R. App. P. 42(a)(1)

 

Bea Ann Smith, Justice

Before Justices B. A. Smith, Puryear and Pemberton

Dismissed on Appellants’ Motion

Filed: June 10, 2005
2
#### In the Matter of Nadine N. REED, Petition for Reinstatement to The Florida Bar.

No. 41338.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 23, 1972.

Nadine N. Reed, in pro. per.

Brendan P. O’Sullivan, Tampa, and Norman A. Faulkner, Tallahassee, for respondent.

*142PER CURIAM:

The Board of Governors of The Florida Bar has filed herein its recommendation for reinstatement to The Florida Bar of Petitioner Nadine N. Reed, confirming the Referee’s favorable report and recommendations, pursuant to Integration Rule 11.11(10), 32 F.S.A. The Referee’s findings include the fact that petitioner has complied with all of the terms of her earlier suspension; that she recognizes the recommended need for and has taken positive steps to establish proper administrative and management procedures upon reinstatement, so that her client’s affairs will be properly and expeditiously attended to and managed and will take care for prompt disbursements and the handling of monies and trust funds in her care and give prompt response to clients’ inquiries as to matters entrusted to her; that petitioner has undertaken to compensate the beneficiaries involved in this suspension and to the further end that this be accomplished has deposited $534.61 with The Florida Bar Attorney, Brendan P. O’Sullivan, Esquire, pending determination by him regarding said further amount claimed to be due which shall be fully binding upon her.

Upon the aforesaid Referee’s findings and conditions recited and the reinstatement being recommended, it is

Ordered that Petitioner Nadine N. Reed be and she is hereby reinstated as a member of The Florida Bar upon the aforesaid conditions.

It is further ordered that within 30 days a report be filed with the Clerk of this Court by The Florida Bar regarding the consummation of the condition regarding a beneficiaries’ further disputed claim and thereafter a like report monthly until such condition be satisfied of record in this cause and within a reasonable time.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### Coca-Cola Bottling Company of New York, Inc., Plaintiff, *v.*John Vanneck et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Trial Term, New York County,

July 5, 1951.

*217
      *Harold H. Levin*and *Sidney J. Silberman*for plaintiff.

*Percival E. Jackson*and *Theodore N. Tarlau*for defendants.

Benvenga, J.

Plaintiff brings this action to recover the balance of its share of a condemnation award. The question presented involves the construction of a lease between the parties and of a letter prepared by defendants and signed by plaintiff at the request of the defendants. ■

Under the lease, defendants, as landlords, agreed to erect a building expressly for plaintiff, as tenant, in accordance with plaintiff’s specifications, for its bottling and distributing business ; the cost of construction to be paid by plaintiff in installments over a twenty-year period. The lease provided that, in the event of condemnation, plaintiff was to receive that proportion of the award *“*which the amount theretofore paid by (plaintiff) to (defendants) on account of the cost of construction of said building bears to the total cost of the building.”

Following the execution of the lease, but prior to the erection of the building, the above-mentioned letter was signed by plaintiff. It provides, among other things: *“*If, by reason of any changes or extras requested by (plaintiff), the cost of said construction or erection of said building is increased, then (plaintiff) will pay said increased or extra cost directly to the contractor. ’ ’

*218Pursuant to the lease and the letter, plaintiff paid $55,323.41 in installments to defendants and $64,149.83 directly to the contractor.

In the condemnation proceeding, defendants based their claim upon the total cost of the construction of the building. They asserted that the cost was $210,057.04, which sum admittedly represents $145,907.21 expended by defendants and $64,149.83 which plaintiff paid directly to the contractor. Upon the basis of this testimony, defendants received an award, including interest, of $184,232.32.

Reading the contract in the light of the letter and the circumstances surrounding the transaction between the parties, it would seem to have been their intention to share in the award in proportion to their respective contributions to the total cost of construction of the building. Plaintiff’s share of the award, therefore, should be in proportion to its total contribution — whether made to defendants or to the contractor.. That this was the understanding of the parties is evidenced by the circumstance that defendants requested and, presumably, obtained the award based upon the total cost of construction, including payments made by plaintiff directly to the contractor.

It follows that, since the total cost of the building was $210,057.04 and plaintiff’s contributions thereto amounted to $119,473.24, plaintiff is entitled to 56.876% of the award. In other words, plaintiff is entitled to the difference between the amount already received and the amount represented by 56.876% of the award, or $34,802.22.

Judgment is accordingly directed for plaintiff in the sum of $34,802.22, with interest.
<PAGE>

                                     EXHIBIT 3.1



                                                      I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
                                                      THESE ARE COPIES OF
                                                      DOCUMENTS FILED WITH THE
                                                      REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES ON
                                                      JUL 23 1987
                                                      -------------------------

                                                      -------------------------
                                                      ASSISTANT DEPUTY
                                                      REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES
                                                      FOR THE PROVINCE OF
                                                      BRITISH COLUMBIA

                                        FORM 1

                                     (Section 5)

                                     COMPANY ACT

                                      MEMORANDUM

                                          of

                            NO. 96 SAIL VIEW VENTURES LTD.

         I wish to be formed into a company with limited liability under the
Company Act in pursuance of this Memorandum.

1.       The name of the Company is NO. 96 SAIL VIEW VENTURES LTD.

2.       The authorized capital of the Company consists of Ten Thousand
         (10,000) Common shares without par value.

3.       I agree to take the number and kind and class of shares in the Company
         set opposite my name.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full Name, Resident Address and                  Number (Kind and Class] of
Occupation of Subscriber                         Shares Taken

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


 /s/ James A. Speakman
-----------------------------
JAMES A. SPEAKMAN                                One (1) Common share
                                                 without par value
#205 - 2772 Spruce Street
Vancouver, B.C.
V6H 2R2

Solicitor



TOTAL SHARES TAKEN:                              One (1) Common share
                                                 without par value


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DATED as of the 20th day of July, 1987.
#### WOOLSEY BURTON, Adm’r. of MIERS BURTON, surviving obligee of BENJAMIN BURTON and MIERS BURTON *vs.*JOHNSON W. CANNON, Adm’r. of WILLIAM CANNON, (of Ebe) deceased.

A judgment is presumed to have been paid after twenty years.

The presumption is rebutted by payments or admissions within that time.

Such admissions sufficient, though made to a third party.

Scire Facias on a judgment in the Court of Common Pleas, dated April 18, 1830, for $126. Heal debt $63 46. Pleas, mil Liel record; payment; discount; set-off and release.

The witness proved that in July, 1844, William Cannon said he *14owed the Burtons; -talked about this judgment; or the bond on which it was entered. He talked about the length of time since he had signed the bond. He said he had paid $15, and would pay the balance. The bond was for $63. 46-|, and given about the middle of April, 1820.

*Mr. Houston*

relied—1. That an acknowledgment to remove the presumption of payment arising from length of time, must refer positively to the debt, and not be doubtful.

2. That the plaintiff could not recover more than the penalty in the bond, or sum for which judgment is confessed. *[Steph. N.*P. 1273.]

*Mr. Layton*

replied—1. That he had sufficiently connected the acknowledgment with the judgment; and that it was incumbent on the defendant to show other dealing, or matter to which the acknowledgment could apply. [9 C. *L. Rep.*318; 1 *Bing.*266; 3 *lb.*119.]

2. That the plaintiff could recover beyond the penalty on a money bond, i

*Charge to the*Jury.—The judgment is twenty-eight years old. Ho evidence is offered to support any of the' pleas, except the plea of payment; and to sustain it, defendant relies on the rule of law, that the debt, from lapse of time, is presumed to have been satisfied. The rule is such in relation to a debt, whether due by bond or judgment, if more than twenty years old, and there has been no payment towards it, and no recognition or acknowledgment of it as a debt due, it is presumed to have been paid.

The presumption may be repelled by evidence of an express acknowledgment, recognition or admission on the part of the defendant, within twenty years, of the justness of the claim, and that it is still due; or by evidence of a payment on account of the principal or interest within twenty years; either of which is an implied recognition of the debt.

The acknowledgment or admission of the defendant is sufficient, whether made to the plaintiff or to a third person; but in either case, it ought to be an acknowledgment of the debt that is sued for, or ought expressly to refer to it.

Whether such acknowledgment has been made by the defendant is a question of fact, to be determined by the jury. But it is to be remarked, that where the plaintiff proves a general acknowledgment of indebtedness, the burden of proof lies on the defendant, to show *15that the acknowledgment related to a different demand from the one in controversy. It is for the jury to say, whether the acknowledgments of the defendant referred to this judgment. The jury cannot find a verdict for a larger sum than the p'enalty, $126.
IV

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 378

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to require Members

to sign an oath of secrecy before receiving access to classified information.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 3, 1994

Mr. GOSS (for himself and Mr. HYDE) submitted the following resolution;

which was referred to the Committee on Rules

RESOLUTION

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to

require Members to sign an oath of secrecy before receiving access to classified information.

1 Resolved, That (a) Rule XLVIII of the Rules of the

2 House of Representatives is amended by inserting after

3 clause 12 the following new clause:

4 ‘‘13. A Member (including the Resident Commis5 sioner from Puerto Rico and any Delegate to the House)

6 may not have access to any classified information unless

7 and until a copy of the following oath of secrecy has been

8 signed by that Member and has been published in the Con9 gressional Record:
2

•HRES 378 IH

1 ‘‘I do solemnly swear or affirm that I will not

2 willfully directly or indirectly disclose to any unau3 thorized person any classified information in the

4 course of my duties as a Member of the House of

5 Representatives, except pursuant to the Rules and

6 Procedures of the House.’’.

7 (b) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take

8 effect at the end of the fifth legislative day beginning after

9 the date on which this resolution is adopted. For the pur10 poses of the preceding sentence, the term ‘‘legislative day’’

11 means any day on which the House of Representatives is

12 in session.

Æ
<PAGE>


                               Verizon South Inc.
                                                                      EXHIBIT 12

                COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                             Six Months Ended
(Dollars in Millions)                                                         June 30, 2002
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<S>                                                                          <C>
Income before provision for income taxes and extraordinary item                       $310.0
Interest expense                                                                        39.1
Portion of rent expense representing interest                                            8.8
Amortization of capitalized interest                                                      .1
                                                                          -------------------

Earnings, as adjusted                                                                 $358.0
                                                                          ===================

Fixed charges:
Interest expense                                                                      $ 39.1
Portion of rent expense representing interest                                            8.8
Capitalized interest                                                                      .3
                                                                          -------------------

Fixed Charges                                                                         $ 48.2
                                                                          ===================

Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges                                                      7.43
                                                                          ===================
</TABLE>
#### C. O. COCKRELL, Appellant, v. Audrey R. COCKRELL, Appellee.

No. 69-397.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 4, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
**MEMORANDUM**

DATE: March 24 , 2015 TO: Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Docket I d: OAR

–2013
- 0602 FROM: Ely se Steiner , OAQPS SUBJECT: Meeting with Fuel Cell Energy to discuss the Clean Power Plan **SUMMARY** Meeting with Fuel Cell Energy to discuss the Clean Power Plan

. The Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants was proposed on June 2 , 2014 and published in the Federal Register on June 18, 2014. **ATTENDEES** Attendees: Chip Bottone, FCE Frank Wolak, FCE Bruce Meredi th, Bruce Meredith, Inc. Ely se Steiner, EPA Kevin Culligan, EPA Mark DeFigueiredo, EPA
Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

OFFICE OF POLICY

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Transmittal to Docket: Documents from the March 21, 2011, Public Meeting 

in Boston, Massachusetts, regarding the Environmental Protection Agency’s 

Implementation of Executive Order 13563: Improving Regulation and 

Regulatory Review

FROM: Stuart C. Miles-McLean

Office of Regulatory Policy and Management

TO: Public Docket #EPA-HQ-OA-2011-0156: Improving Regulations: General

As called for by President Obama in Executive Order 13563, "to facilitate the periodic 

review of existing significant regulations," the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 

considering "how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, 

ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal 

them in accordance with what has been learned." 

As part of its retrospective review of regulations, EPA convened public meetings around 

the country to gather input on how we might design the plan we will use to periodically review 

our regulations. This Memo transmits to the docket documents from the public meeting held on

March 21, 2011, in Boston, Massachusetts.
255 La. 338

#### Edwin B. DUNCAN, d/b/a E. B. Duncan Drilling Contractor v. G. Wray GILL et al.

No. 50252.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 23, 1970.

In re: G. Wray Gill applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 227 So.2d 376.

' Writ denied. On the facts found, we find no error of law in the judgment complained of.
#### Emma B. PRINCE, Petitioner, v. JEFFERSON NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI BEACH, a National Banking Association, Respondent.

No. 69-188.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

May 13, 1969.

Rehearing Denied June 11, 1969.

*807Lally, Miller & Hodges, Miami, for petitioner.

Courshon & Courshon, Miami, for respondent.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and PEARSON and BARKDULL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

By petition for certiorari review is sought of a judgment entered by the circuit court on an appeal from the small claims court of Dade County. The petitioner was the appellee in the circuit court, and was the plaintiff in the trial court.

On May 10, 1968, the small claims court entered judgment in favor of the defendant, upon finding the plaintiff had failed to submit sufficient proof to sustain her cause of action. On June 20, 1968, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for new trial, by an order which did not state any ground. The defendant appealed that order to the circuit court on August 15, 1968.

Certain new rules applicable to proceedings in the small claims court became effective at midnight of September 30, 1968, for causes then pending or thereafter filed, including Rule 7.180(c), reading as follows:

> “All orders granting a new-trial shall specify the specific grounds therefor. If such an order is appealed and does not state the specific grounds, 1he appellate court shall relinquish its jurisdiction to the trial court for entry of an order specifying the grounds for granting the new trial.”

On the effective date of Rule 7.180(c) the cause was in an undetermined and pending status in the trial court because a new trial had been ordered, and it was pending also in the circuit court on the appeal to that court.

Thereafter, on January 21, 1969, the circuit court, holding that the order granting new trial was “void and defective” for failure to state the grounds therefor as required by said Rule 7.180(c), reversed the order granting new trial and directed that the final judgment (for the defendant) be reinstated.

The language of the rule was addressed to the appellate court as well as to the trial court, with reference to causes pending on its effective date or filed thereafter. The appellate (circuit) court recognized that Rule 7.180(c) was applicable to the cause, and so applied it as controlling on the trial court, but did not follow the express direction of the rule to the appellate court as to the type of order to be entered in the circumstance presented.

The petitioner argues, and we feel correctly so, that pursuant to the rule in question the order to have been entered on the appeal was one relinquishing jurisdiction to the small claims court to make an order stating the ground or grounds upon which the new trial was granted.

The order entered by the circuit court is quashed and the cause is remanded to that court with direction to enter the appropriate order as called for in such circumstance by Rule 7.180(c).

It is so ordered.
256 La. 867

#### Clinton Grady CLAYTON, Francis Joseph Blanchard, and Harold Watkins LeJeune v. NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT.

No. 50795.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 30, 1970.

In re: Clinton Grady Clayton, Francis Joseph Blanchard and Harold Watkins LeJeune applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 236 So.2d 548.

Writ denied. The result is correct.