IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-20676

Summary Calendar

DORETHA WEBB YORK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HOUSTON COMMUNITY

COLLEGE SYSTEM; CHARLES GREEN, Dr;

JAMES ENGLE, Dr; ROBERT ANDERSON Dr;

KAY KING, Dr,

Defendants-Appellees.

CHARLES H. HEBERT, Jr.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HOUSTON COMMUNITY

COLLEGE SYSTEM; CHARLES GREEN, Dr;

JAMES ENGLE,Dr; ROBERT ANDERSON, Dr;

KAY KING, Dr,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

No. H-95-CV-1175

No. H-95-CV-688

September 11, 1998
 

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not

precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR R. 47.5.4.

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Before JONES, SMITH, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This is an appeal of an order ofsummary judgment entered by the district court. The district

court held that appellants failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Appellants Dr. Doretha Webb York and Dr. Charles Hebert,Jr., both African-Americans, are

employed by the Houston Community College System (“HCCS”), a Texas public junior college.

When this lawsuit was filed, York served as Supervisor of the Office Occupations Department,

Business Careers Division, Central Campus. Hebert served as Coordinator for the Barbara Jordan

Center and Director of Technical Education Special Projects for Northeast College.

In 1990, the HCCS was decentralized and reorganized into six separate colleges. At this time,

Hebert applied for college president and dean positions and York applied for dean and assistant dean

positions. After they were denied these promotions, Hebert and York discussed with HCCS trustees

their concerns about perceived discriminatory bias in the selection process.

In 1993, the Dean of Instruction at the HCCS’s Central College died and the HCCS

advertised for applicants for his po sition in March 1993. The applications received by the HCCS

were screened by a committee, which interviewed the top candidates in June and July. In August of

1993, the position wasreposted. Both of the appellees applied for the position once it was reposted.

On February 16, 1994, the appellees were interviewed for the deanship. Neither of them received an

offer for the position. The individual who received the position is not a member of appellants’

protected class.

In March 1995, York filed suit in the district court alleging that appellees were liable for

violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, for race and gender discrimination in violation

of 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., and conspiracy to deprive her of her civil rights. The following month,
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Hebert filed a complaint in the district court wherein he alleged the same causes of action as did

York. The district court consolidated the cases.

Appellees moved for summary judgment. The district court granted partial summary

judgment in favor of appellees on appellants’ due process, First Amendment, and conspiracy claims.

Following a hearing to determine whether the Dean ofInstruction position was an appointed position

on the policy-making level, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees on

appellants’ remaining claims and entered a final judgment. 

This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. Guillory v. Domtar Industries,

Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996). The same summary judgment standard that applies to the

district court appliesto this Court. Texas Commerce Bank-Fort Worth, N.A. v. United States, 896

F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is warranted when the record, as a whole—“the

pleadings, depositions, answersto interrogatories, and admissions on file, together withthe affidavits,

if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Thomas v. Harris County, 784 F.2d 648, 651 (5th Cir. 1986).

The record isto be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary

judgment. Daly v. Sprague, 675 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1982, cert. denied).

Having reviewed the briefs and the record pursuant to this standard, we AFFIRM the

judgment essentially for the reasonsstated in the district court’s order, York v. Houston Community

College System, No. H-95-688 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 9, 1997) consolidated with Hebert v. Houston

Community College System, No. H-95-1175 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 9, 1997). 

The judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.