alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Gustav KRATZ and Grange Mutual Casualty Company, Petitioners, v. Garry V. NEWSOM, Respondent.

No. 41585.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 1, 1971.

John T. Allen, Jr. and Harrison, Greene, Mann, Davenport, Rowe & Stanton, St. Petersburg, for petitioners.

Barry B. Forde, of Tanney & Forde, Clearwater, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reported at 251 So.2d 539, a decision certified to this Court as one passing on a question of great public interest, to-wit:

> “Is it reversible error to deny a motion to sever from trial an insurance company joined as party defendant pursuant to Shingleton v. Bussey, Fla. 1969, 223 So.2d 713, where the record does not show any specific reason either for the presence of the insurance company or for excluding it at trial from the jury’s knowledge of its involvement?”

Respondent, in a motion for discharge of the writ of certiorari, points out that the question certified has already been answered by this Court in Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d 421, opinion filed October 20, 1971, wherein this Court stated:

> “There are some instances where there is a question of coverage when a severance would be quite proper to try those issues separately, and the severance would be under this rule, as there pointed out. However, the remainder of that opinion holds, and we hereby reaffirm, that absent a justiciable issue relating to *insurance,*such as a question of coverage or of the applicability or interpretation of the insurance policy or other such valid dispute on the matter of insurance coverage, there is no valid reason for a severance and it should NOT be granted.”

Oral argument is dispensed with pursuant to Rule 3.10, Florida Appellate Rules, 32 F.S.A. The question certified has been answered in the *Stecher*case, supra, and the decision of the District Court is in accord with *Stecher*and should not be disturbed.

Accordingly, writ of certiorari is discharged.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, ADKINS, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Godfrey G. Brown, on Behalf of Tony McClam, Petitioner, v Sheriff Edward O’Reilly, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

[721 NYS2d 842]

—Writ of habeas corpus in the nature of an application for bail reduction upon Nassau County Indictment No. 403N/01.

*573Adjudged that the writ is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

The determination of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, was not an improvident exercise of discretion, and did not violate “constitutional or statutory standards” *(People ex rel. Klein v Krueger, 25*NY2d 497, 499; *see, People ex rel. Rosenthal v Wolfson,*48 NY2d 230). Santucci, J. P., S. Miller, Friedmann and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 99.6





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Miramar Mining Corporation (the Company) on Form 40-F for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Elaine Bennett, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



March 30, 2005

/s/Elaine Bennett



Elaine Bennett

Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Miramar Mining Corporation and will be retained by Miramar Mining Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### In the Matter of United Federation of Teachers, Respondent, v Board of Education of New York City Community School District No. 9 et al., Appellants.

[736 NYS2d 223]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Marcy Friedman, J.), entered November 9, 2000, which, inter alia, confirmed the arbitration award in petitioner’s favor sustaining the grievance of a preparatory provisional teacher and reinstating him with back pay, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The plain language of the subject arbitration award required the grievant’s reinstatement with back pay through the date of reinstatement. In view of the circumstance that the grievant’s term of employment ended more than one year prior to issuance of the arbitrator’s award, it is clear that the arbitrator intended that the grievant be reinstated subsequent to the expiration of his term of employment and thus that the award of back pay through the date of his reinstatement would cover a period not within the grievant’s original employment term. Respondents’ contention that the award of back pay for the period not within the grievant’s original term of employment constitutes a public gift violative of article VIII of the New York Constitution is unpreserved and we decline to reach it. Were we to consider it, however, we would find that the award amounts to no more than a remedy to vindicate the grievant’s rights under the applicable collective bargaining agreement and, as such, does not constitute a constitutionally proscribed gift (see, *Matter of Antonopoulou v Beame,*32 NY2d 126). Concur — Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Buckley, Friedman and Marlow, JJ.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

                           SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY

1.    Mental Health Outcomes, Inc., a Delaware corporation.

2.    Horizon Mental Health Management, Inc., a Texas corporation.

3.    HHMC Partners, Inc., a Delaware corporation.

4.    Geriatric Medical Care, Inc., a Tennessee corporation.

5.    Specialty Rehab Management, Inc., a Delaware corporation.

6.    Horizon Behavioral Services of California, Inc., a California corporation

7.    Horizon Behavioral Services, Inc., a Delaware Corporation.

8.    FPMBH of Texas, Inc., a Delaware Corporation.

9.    Florida Psychiatric Associates, Inc., a Florida corporation.

10.   Florida Psychiatric Management, Inc., a Florida corporation.

11.   HMHM of Tennessee, Inc., a Tennessee corporation

12.   Horizon Behavioral Services - Colorado, Inc., a Colorado corporation.

13.   Occupational Health Consultants of America, Inc., a Tennessee corporation

14.   Resource EAP, Inc., a Florida corporation

15.   Employee Assistance Services, Inc., a Kentucky corporation

16.   Horizon Behavioral Services of New York, Inc., a New York corporation

17.   Horizon Behavioral Services IPA Inc., a New York corporation
November 4`h, -10 10 

To: Lisa P . Jackson 

Administrator 

United States Environment Protection Agency 

2010 NOY -9 AM 8~ 16 

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Fr: Elton Christopherson EXE.,U I 

Familv Farm Owner 

Elk Mound, Wis . 

Dear his . Jackson, 

Today I am contacting you in support of the NRECA petition that was filed in your office in late 

Octk&r regarding the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 

Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines rule. 

I own a small family farm in Dunn County, Wis. I purchased a 125 kW back up generator in 2003 

to ensure I would be able to continue running my farm during power outages. A bonus to this 

purchase was my cooperative's peak shaving program . Participating in this program saves me 

about $3,500 per year. This savings help me grow my farm . Making life a little easier in these 

hard economic times . 

The rules your agency are trying to start will take away that peak alert rate my Cooperative can 

offer . That means a $3,500 increase in my, energy bill! As a self-employed farmer, that's hard to 

swallow . 

I'd like your agency to reconsider not allowing peak shaving controls of generators like mine 

within the proposed 100 hour limits . The request NRECA filed does not ask for more hours of 

operation ; just to include peak shaving use within the 100 hour limit. Since I'm a part of a 

Cooperative I see the savings and revenue from this type of arrangement, not them . Plus, we are 

helping to reduce energy demand during the peak times. This is a significant savings to my small 

business . 

Sincerely . 

S 

Elton J . C 

. L-1r I, rrrr, 

pIstopherson 

Elk Nlound, Wisconsin 
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#### Jean BEATTIE, a single woman, Appellant, v. CITY OF CORAL GABLES, a Municipal Corporate subdivision of Dade County, Florida, Bill Ussery Motors, Inc., a Florida Corp. the Travelers Insurance Company, a Foreign Corporation, and Continental Casualty Company, a Foreign Corporation, Appellees.

No. 77-78.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 9, 1978.

Rehearing Denied June 9, 1978.

*1132Goethel & Garcia-Vidal, Coral Gables, for appellant.

Carey, Dwyer, Cole, Selwood & Bernard and Steven R. Berger, Adams, George, Schulte & Ward and Amy Shield Levine, Miami, for appellees.

Before HENDRY and HUBBART, JJ., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff Jean Beattie appeals from a final summary judgment entered in a slip and fall negligence action in favor of the defendants City of Coral Gables and its insurer Continental Casualty Company, Bill Ussery Motors Inc., and its insurer Travelers Insurance Company, in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. The plaintiff contends on appeal that summary judgment was improper as there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff fell and injured herself on a public sidewalk in the City of Coral Gables due to an alleged negligent defective condition in the said sidewalk, to wit: a crack. We agree and reverse as to the City of Coral Gables and its insurer Continental Casualty Company. *Holl v. Talcott,*191 So.2d 40 (Fla.1966); *Leon v. City of Miami,*312 So.2d 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). We affirm, however, as to the defendant Bill Ussery Motors, Inc. and its insurer Travelers Insurance Company on the ground that Bill Ussery Motors, Inc. owed no duty to the plaintiff to maintain the sidewalk herein in a safe condition. *Woods v. City of Palatka,*63 So.2d 636 (Fla.1953); *Gornto v. Marks,*311 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). We find the other contention raised by the appellant on this appeal to be without merit.

Affirmed as to the defendant Bill Ussery Motors, Inc. and its insurer Travelers Insurance Company; reversed and remanded for further proceedings as to the defendant City of Coral Gables and its insurer Continental Casualty Company.
CERTIFICATION OF
                             CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, R. Andrew  Kingston,  Chief  Executive  Officer of DynaMotive  Energy Systems
Corporation (the "Company"),  hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that, to
the best of my knowledge:

(i)               the Annual  Report on Form 20-F of the  Company for the fiscal
                  year ended  December  31,  2003 (the  "Annual  Report")  fully
                  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
                  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii)              the   information   contained  in  the  Annual  Report  fairly
                  presents,  in all material respects,  the financial  condition
                  and results of operations of the Company.




                    By: /s/ R. Andrew Kingston
                    -----------------------------------------------
                    Name:   R. Andrew Kingston

                    Title:  President and Chief Executive Officer

                    Date:   May 17, 2004



This  written  statement  is being  furnished  to the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission as an exhibit to the  Company's  Annual Report on Form 20-F. A signed
original of this statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its
staff upon request.

This  certification  accompanies  this  Annual  Report on Form 20-F  pursuant to
Section  906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and  shall  not,  except to the
extent  required  by such Act, be deemed  filed by the  Company for  purposes of
Section 18 of the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934,  as amended (the  "Exchange
Act").  Such  certification  will not be deemed to be  incorporated by reference
into any filing under the  Securities  Act of 1933, as amended,  or the Exchange
Act,  except to the extent  that the  Company  specifically  incorporates  it by
reference.
<PAGE>

                              LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES
                              --------------------

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
              NAME OF COMPANY                    STATE OF ORGANIZATION                   PARENT COMPANY
---------------------------------------------    -----------------------    ------------------------------------------
<S>                                              <C>                        <C>
YMLS, Inc.                                               Nevada             Homeseekers.com, Incorporated

XMLS, LLC                                                Nevada             Homeseekers.com, Incorporated

RealEstateForms.com, Inc.                                Nevada             Homeseekers.com, Incorporated

Foreclosureseekers.com, LLC                              Nevada             Homeseekers.com, Incorporated

Home Seekers Magazines, Inc.                             Idaho              Homeseekers.com, Incorporated

Realtyseekers International, LLC                         Nevada             Homeseekers.com, Incorporated

Visual Listings, Inc.                                  California           Homeseekers.com, Incorporated

Holloway Publications, Inc.                             Indiana             Homeseekers.com, Incorporated

Dine Magazine, LLC                                       Nevada             Holloway Publications, Inc.
</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

**(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Hyperdynamics Corporation (Hyperdynamics), on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), Paul Reinbolt, Chief Financial Officer of Hyperdynamics, does hereby certify, pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), that to his knowledge:

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

Date: September 13, 2011

 

 
| By:    | /s/   Paul Reinbolt       |   |   |
|--------|---------------------------|--------|--------|
|   | Paul   Reinbolt           |   |   |
|   | Chief   Financial Officer |   |   |

 

1

----
#### David ARRANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11748.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

Feb. 1, 1972.

Massey & Robinson, by John S. C. Massey, West Monroe, for plaintiff-appellant.

Garrett, Ryland & Downs by James C. Downs, Alexandria, for defendants-appel-lees.

Before AYRES, BOLIN and PRICE, JJ-

PRICE, Judge.

Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment of the district court rejecting his demands for workmen’s compensation benefits. David Arrant contends that on November 2, 1970, while employed by the Louisiana Department of Highways, he was a member of a crew engaged in the planting of shrubbery at a rest area off Interstate-20 near Monroe. He further contends that while engaged in digging a hole with the use of a shovel, he suffered a sudden pain in his back and reported the *187occurrence of his injury to his foreman on the same date. Plaintiff contends that because of the injury to his hack he is totally and permanently disabled from performing any work of a reasonable character and is entitled to benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Statute for this disability.

The issue before us on this appeal is whether or not the plaintiff established by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered an accident while in the course and scope of his employment on November 2nd which caused his present physical condition. The claimant in a workmen’s compensation proceeding must prove his demands by a preponderance of the evidence just as in any ordinary civil action. Carter v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 163 So.2d 855 (La.App.2d cir. 1964). Nor should the appellate court disturb the finding of a trial judge in a workmen’s compensation proceeding unless there is manifest error apparent in the record. Clevinger v. Continental Insurance Companies, 211 So.2d 718 (La.App.2d cir. 1968).

Plaintiff’s testimony describing the manner in which he injured his back on November 2nd is not supported by the testimony of any other members of his work crew. Two of his co-workers testified that when plaintiff reported for work on this date he complained to them that his back was hurting. They further testified plaintiff stated he could have hurt himself doing work at home the preceding week. The testimony of the plaintiff and other members of his immediate family tending to show that the initial onset of the back complaints began on November 2nd after plaintiff returned from work, is not sufficient to overcome the impartial testimony of his co-workers who refute this testimony.

In addition, the testimony of plaintiff’s own physician indicates that at the time he first interviewed plaintiff no history was given of his having received a work connected injury.

We are of the opinion plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained an injury in the course and scope of his employment causing his present disability.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
EX-10.3(b)






 Exhibit 10.3(b) 

SANA BIOTECHNOLOGY, INC. 

2018 EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN 

AMENDMENT 
 Pursuant to
the authority reserved to the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Sana Biotechnologies, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), under Section 10.4 of the Company’s 2018 Equity Incentive
Plan (the “Plan”), the Board hereby amends the Plan as follows. 
 1. The first sentence of Section 4.1 of the
Plan is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows: 
 “Subject to adjustment under Section 8 hereof, Awards
may be made under the Plan covering up to 63,699,641 shares of Common Stock.” 
 2. Except as set forth herein, the Plan shall remain in
full force and effect in accordance with its terms. 
 * * * * * * * * * * 













 I hereby certify that the foregoing Amendment to the Plan was duly adopted by the Board
effective in part as of October 21, 2020 and in part as of November 4, 2020. 
 I hereby further certify that the foregoing
Amendment to the Plan was duly adopted by the Company’s stockholders effective as of November 9, 2020. 
 Executed on this 9th day of November, 2020. 
  

	
	 /s/ James J. MacDonald

	James J. MacDonald, Secretary
#### Henry Bell *vs.*James F. Purvis and others.

Where an answer comes in *before*the injunction is ordered, and so denies the equity of the bill as to authorize a dissolution of the injunction on motion to dissolve, the injunction ought *not*to be granted.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore city.

This appeal is taken from an order of the court below, (Krebs, J.,) granting an injunction upon a bill filed by the appellees against the appellant. The facts under which the injunction was granted, are stated in the opinion of this court.

The cause was argued before Le Grand, C. J., Eccles ton, Tuck and Bartol, J.

*23(Decided February 24th, 1860.)

*Thos. Alexander*for the appellant.

The injunction was not granted till after answer filed, and that answer denies fully all the averments in the bill. The general rule is, that any judgment of a court at any stage of the cause must be upon the *record*as it *then stands.*It must be assumed, therefore, that this injunction was granted on consideration of the bill *and answer.*It is believed that, in point of fact, the court looked only to the averments of the bill. But the answer, for the reason stated, must lie looked to, and as it swears away the whole equity of the bill, the order granting the injunction, *after*such an answer filed, is erroneous and must be reversed.

No counsel appeared for the appellees.

Eccleston, J.,

delivered the opinion of this court.

This bill, praying for an injunction, was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore city, on the 13th of April 1859, by the appellees against the appellant. A subpoena was issued, returnable the second Monday of May following.

The defendant appeared the 15th of April and filed his answer on the 6th of May. Twelve days after, the court passed an order granting an injunction; from which order the present appeal was taken.

The answer denies the equity of the bill; and if the injunction had been granted, and such an answer had been subsequently filed, it would have authorized a dissolution of the injunction, upon a motion to dissolve. If this be true, then, inasmuch as the answer came in before the injunction was ordered, it should not have been granted. *Hall vs. McPherson,*3 *Bland’s Ch. Rep.,529.*3 *Danl. Ch. Pr.,*1813, 1814, *(Ed.*1846.)

*Order reversed and cause remanded,*