J-A32012-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. JOSEPH THOMAS GAINER, Appellant No. 1673 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 4, 2 014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0017534-2009

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OTT, and STABILE, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2016 Appellant, Joseph Thomas Gainer, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his conviction of crimin al homicide, robbery and criminal conspiracy. We affirm. The trial court summarized the procedural and fact ual history of this

case as follows:

[Appellant] was charged with Criminal Homicide, 1 Robbery, 2 Carrying a Firearm Without a License 3 and Criminal Conspiracy 4 in relations [sic] to events that occurred when he was 17 years old. Prior to trial, the firearms cha rge was dismissed. Following a jury trial held before [the trial court] from April 11-14, 2011, [Appellant] was convicted o f SecondDegree Murder and all remaining charges. On April 20, 2011, [Appellant] appeared before [the trial court] and w as sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Timely P ost-Sentence Motions were filed and were denied by operation of law on September 26, 2011. [Appellant] appealed, raising a Miller claim, among other issues. [The trial court] conce ded that the sentence was illegal and the Superior Court remande d the caseJ-A32012-15

- 2 -

for re-sentencing. [Appellant] was re-sentenced on September 4, 2014 to a term of imprisonment of 35 years to li fe. Timely Post-Sentence Motions were filed and were denied on September [18], 2014. This appeal followed. [1]

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2501(a) 2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3701(a)(1)-4 counts 3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §6106(a)(1) 4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §903(a)(1) Briefly, the evidence presented that on the evening of October 16, 2009, Albert Bock was working as a bart ender at the K & M Pub in Mt. Oliver. His girlfriend, Samantha Snelsire and his friends Paul Malloy and Michael Plish were hang ing out at the bar while Bock worked. After closing the bar in th e early morning hours of October 17, 2009, Bock and his fri ends left the bar and went to Bock’s house at 310 Beltzhoover Ave nue in the Beltzhoover section of the City of Pittsburgh, wher e they sat on the porch and talked. Inside the house were Bock’s brother, Tony and Tony’s son, DJ. Bock and his friends were on the porch for a few mi nutes when [Appellant] and two other men came onto [the] porch and pointed guns at Bock and his friends. [Appellant] and the other two men went to each of the victims and forcibly to ok money, keys and cell phones out of their pockets. When [A ppellant] determined that was not enough, he demanded that Bo ck bring him into the house so he could take more things. W hen Bock refused, saying that his young nephew was in the ho use, [Appellant] tried to enter the house on his own. H e was stopped by Bock’s dog who ran at him. [Appellant] put the gun to Bock’s head and demanded that he tie up the dog and let hi m in the house. When Bock again refused, saying that his yo ung nephew was inside the house, [Appellant] shot Bock in the head, killing him instantly. [Appellant] and his friends fled the scene. Howeve r, [Appellant] returned to Bock’s house at approximate ly 5:00 a.m. By that time, the police and crime scene technician s were

____________________________________________

1 Appellant and the trial court complied with the re quirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.J-A32012-15

- 3 -

processing the crime scene. [Appellant] spoke brie fly to the homicide detectives and told them he was going to h is grandfather’s house to get some stereo equipment. The Detectives took his contact information and also so me pictures because they thought his behavior was odd. Later, they included [Appellant’s] picture in a photo array, wh ere he was identified by Snelsire, Malloy and Plish. [Appella nt] was arrested and confessed to the crime. Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 1-3. Appellant presents the following issues for our re view: 1. Whether the Trial Court erred making the determi nation not to suppress Appellant’s statement and found tha t Appellant knowingly waived his Miranda [2] rights and made a voluntary confession where the police knew at the time of arr est for criminal homicide that Appellant was 17 years old w hen he asked for his parent and a lawyer? 2. Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Ap pellant “opened the door” regarding the inventory list from the search that was conducted of Appellant’s parents[’] home s uch as to allow the Commonwealth to present rebuttal witness testimony indicating the presence of a gun when Appellant’s m other on cross-examination by the prosecutor stated that she did not see a warrant and only “got a piece of paper that said what they were removing from my house”? 3. Whether the Appellant, as an indigent defendant, was prejudiced by the denial of the Trial Court to allo w him to use the same sophisticated audio system consisting of B luetooth headsets for each juror to play the Commonwealth’s eyewitness taped statements when that equipment was used for t he playing of his taped statement? Appellant’s Brief at 5.

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).J-A32012-15

- 4 -

Appellant first argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to suppress Appellant’s statement confessin g to the murder. Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant maintains that “[t]he evidence presented at the suppression hearing viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth did not establish by a preponderance o f the evidence that Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his ri ght to a parent/counsel and knowingly and intelligently confessed to the cr ime.” Id. The standard of review an appellate court applies w hen considering an order denying a suppression motion is well establis hed. An appellate court may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and s o much of the

evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the

context of the record as a whole. Commonwealth v. Russo , 934 A.2d 1199, 1203 (Pa. 2007). Where the record supports t he factual findings of the trial court, the appellate court is bound by th ose facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are i n error. Id . However, it is also well settled that the appellate court is no t bound by the suppression

court’s conclusions of law. Id

.

With respect to factual findings, we are mindful th at it is the sole province of the suppression court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Further, the suppression court j udge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presen ted. However, where the factual determinations made by the suppre ssion court are not supported by the evidence, we may reject th ose findings. Only factual findings which are supported by the re cord are binding upon this [C]ourt.J-A32012-15

- 5 -

Commonwealth v. Caple , 121 A.3d 511, 517 (Pa. Super. 2015). In addition, we are aware that questions of the admiss ion and exclusion of

evidence are within the sound discretion of the tri al court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.

Freidl , 834 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. Super. 2003). 3

Miranda warnings are required where a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation. Commonwealth v. Ingram , 814 A.2d 264, 271 (Pa. Super. 2002). Custodial interrogation is defi ned as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a perso n has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of act ion in any significant way” and is confined to interactions in which the “ police should know that their words or actions are reasonably likely to eli cit an incriminating response.” Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444; Ingram , 814 A.2d at 271. With regard to waiver of Miranda rights, this Court has explained:

Miranda holds that “[t]he defendant may waive effectuation ” of the rights conveyed in the warnings “provided the w aiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Th e inquiry has two distinct dimensions. First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was t he product of

____________________________________________

3 On October 30, 2013, our Supreme Court held that t he scope of review of a suppression court’s decision is limited to the ev idence produced at the suppression hearing, and not the whole record. In the Interest of L.J. , 79 A.3d 1073, 1076 (Pa. 2013). That case does not app ly here, however, because the ruling is prospective and was decided a fter this case had commenced. Id. at 1089 (stating that the ruling applies to “all l itigation commenced Commonwealth-wide after the filing of thi s decision.”).J-A32012-15

- 6 -

a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidati on, coercion or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being aba ndoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. On ly if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the inte rrogation” reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite l evel of comprehension may a court properly conclude that Miranda rights have been waived. In Re: T.B., 11 A.3d 500, 505-506 (Pa. Super. 2010). Furthermore, this Court has stated the following i n assessing whether

a juvenile knowingly waived his Miranda rights: A determination of whether a juvenile knowingly wai ved his Miranda rights and made a voluntary confession is to be ba sed on a consideration of the totality of the circumsta nces, including a consideration of the juvenile’s age, experience, comprehension, and the presence or absence of an in terested adult. In examining the totality of circumstances, we also consider: (1) the duration and means of an interro gation; (2) the defendant’s physical and psychological state; ( 3) the conditions attendant to the detention; (4) the atti tude of the interrogator; and (5) “any and all other factors th at could drain a person’s ability to withstand suggestion and coerci on.” “[W]e acknowledge that the per se requirement of the presence of an interested adult during a police interview of a juv enile is no longer required. Nevertheless, it remains one fact or in determining the voluntariness of a juvenile’s waive r of his Miranda rights.”

Commonwealth v. Knox , 50 A.3d 732, 746-747 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal citations omitted). A confession obtained during a custodial interrogat ion is admissible where the accused’s right to remain sile nt and right to counsel have been explained and the accused has knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights. The test for determining the voluntariness of a confession and whether an accuse d knowingly waived his or her rights looks to the totality of t he circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession. The Comm onwealthJ-A32012-15

- 7 -

bears the burden of establishing whether a defendan t knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

Commonwealth v. Parker , 847 A.2d 745, 748 (Pa. Super. 2004) The trial court provided the following explanation for its ruling on this

issue: At the time of his arrest, [Appellant] was 17 years and 10 months old. He had an extensive history with the j uvenile justice system, including arrests for burglary, gun s and auto theft. He was arrested in the presence of his moth er and the arresting Detective, Detective James McGee, waited at [Appellant’s] home with his mother until his stepfa ther arrived and he could explain the situation. Detective McGe e told [Appellant’s] mother and stepfather what the charge s were and asked them to come to the homicide office. [Appell ant’s] interrogation was delayed for two and a half hours while waiting for his parents to arrive. When they did not arriv e, Detective McGee spoke to [Appellant’s] stepfather on the tele phone and was advised that they were not coming. At that poi nt, the Miranda rights waiver form was read and explained t o [Appellant]. He signed the waiver form indicating he understood his rights and agreed to speak with the detectives. He did not request an attorney or his parents at any time. At the suppression hearing, [Appellant] stated that several detectives wearing suits stormed his porch with gun s drawn, and, without speaking, threw him to the ground and took him away while his mother screamed. He claimed that th e detectives told him he “wouldn’t never come home” unless he sa id what they wanted, in which case he would get “juvenile l ife”. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, [the trial court] made findings of fact before ruling on the M otion. It stated: THE COURT: As to the issue of the statement given by [Appellant], the issue of credibility will be resolved in favor of the Commonwealth. [Appellant] wishes for me to believe that he stated that he shot someone for juvenile life. I’m not su reJ-A32012-15

- 8 - what that’s about. But I found the statement of th e officer to be consistent and clear, and therefore I will deny the motion to suppress. Your objection, [counsel], is noted for the record. The totality of circumstances clearly supports [the trial court’s] finding that [Appellant] knowingly, volunt arily and intelligently waived his Miranda rights before conf essing to the crime. [Appellant] was just months away from his 1 8 th birthday and had an extensive history in the juvenile justic e system. His parents were advised of the charges and chose not t o attend the interrogation. [Appellant] did not ask for his par ents or a lawyer at any time. His testimony that he only confessed to the crime because the detectives told him he would get “juven ile life” is both confounding and incredible. Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 3-5 (internal cita tions omitted). Likewise, our review of the record indicates the to tality of the facts support the trial court’s decision to deny Appellan t’s motion to suppress. Appellant was seventeen years and ten months old at the time of his arrest and interview by the police. N.T., 4/11/11, at 18. Appellant had previous exposure to the legal system. As reflected by the “rap sheet” presented by the Commonwealth at the suppression hearing, Appell ant had a criminal history consisting of seven previous arrests, for a variety of offenses, most

of which were felonies. Id. at 38. Appellant did not display any trouble understanding the questions on the Miranda forms. Id. at 20-21. Appellant provided responses which Officer McGee wr ote on the form. Id. at 20. Appellant placed his signature at the bottom o f the form. Id. Appellant did not appear to be under the influence of any dru gs or alcohol at the time.

Id. at 21.J-A32012-15

- 9 -

Regarding the lack of presence of Appellant’s paren ts at the police station, the record reflects that Appellant’s mothe r was notified by the police that Appellant was being arrested and would be inte rviewed. N.T., 4/11/11, at 15. Appellant’s mother asked if she could call Appellant’s stepfather, to

advise him of the situation. Id. at 15-16. Officers permitted Appellant’s mother to contact Appellant’s stepfather, and Offic er James McGee waited at Appellant’s house until Appellant’s stepfather arri ved. Id. at 16. Officer McGee provided the information regarding where Appe llant would be taken and advised Appellant’s parents to come to the stat ion. Id. at 16. Appellant’s mother and stepfather indicated that th ey would be present at the police station during questioning. Id. at 29-31, 35. When Officer McGee arrived at the station and met with Appellant there , he indicated to Appellant that he believed that Appellant’s parents were “on their way” and advised Appellant that they would wait to proceed with ques tioning until Appellant’s parents arrived. Id. at 17. The police delayed questioning of Appellant due to their expectation that Appellant’s parents were on their way to the

station. Id. at 31, 33. After two-and-one-half hours had elaps ed, Appellant’s parents were contacted regarding their whereabouts and Officer McGee was then informed that Appellant’s mother and stepfather would not be coming to the station. Id. at 17, 23, 33-34. After Appellant was informed that his mother and stepfather would not b e coming, he responded “okay.” Id. at 18. When asked if Appellant would speak to the policeJ-A32012-15

- 10 -

without his mother or stepfather being there, Appel lant indicated that he

would. Id. at 19. During the course of the interview, Appell ant never requested that an attorney, a parent, or other adul t be present during questioning. Id. at 21-22. The interview of Appellant following is suance of

the Miranda warnings lasted approximately three hours. Id. at 34. In summary, Appellant was seventeen, had previous e xposure to the legal system, was only briefly questioned by police , and understood the questioning and his rights. Officers made signific ant effort to inform Appellant’s parents of the procedure involving Appe llant and to enable Appellant’s parents to be present during questionin g. Despite being informed of his right to such, Appellant did not re quest that an attorney or his parents be present during questioning. Consequ ently, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress his statement to police. Appellant next argues that the trial court erred i n allowing the Commonwealth to introduce impeachment testimony on a collateral matter. Appellant’s Brief at 23. Specifically, Appellant a sserts that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to present testi mony in rebuttal to Appellant’s mother’s testimony regarding items foun d in and removed from Appellant’s home pursuant to the search warrant. Id. at 23. Appellant’s mother testified that only letters and mail had bee n taken from Appellant’s room, and such was indicated on an inventory sheet. Id. at 24. TheJ-A32012-15

- 11 -

Commonwealth presented testimony that a large calib er handgun was also taken out of the house pursuant to the search and a s such, was indicated on the inventory sheet. Id. at 25. Additionally, Appellant argues that his mother did not have personal knowledge of the inven tory because Appellant’s father, and not his mother, received th e inventory receipt. Id. at 26. Appellant maintains that he was severely preju diced by admission of the rebuttal testimony regarding the handgun, and accor dingly, should be granted a new trial. Id. at 27-28. Our Supreme Court has provided the following guida nce in addressing admission of rebuttal testimony:

It is clear that a defendant may present any admiss ible evidence relevant to any mitigating circumstance, i ncluding any evidence regarding the character and record of the defendant ... [but] the defendant is not entitled to present, wit hout challenge or rebuttal by the Commonwealth, false or misleadin g evidence or to create a false impression of his character or record. Furthermore, “the admission of rebuttal testimony i s within the sound discretion of the trial court,” and the appro priate scope of rebuttal evidence is defined by the evidence that i t is intended to rebut. Where the evidence proposed goes to the imp eachment of the testimony of his opponent’s witnesses, it is admissible as a matter of right. Rebuttal is proper where facts discrediting the proponent’s witnesses have been offered.

Commonwealth v. Ballard , 80 A.3d 380, 401-402 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Appellant’s mother, Starlet Lellock, testified at trial and during crossexamination admitted to receiving an inventory of t he items removed from her home during the search. N.T., 4/14/11, at 389- 390. On re-direct, sheJ-A32012-15

- 12 -

provided the following testimony regarding the item s removed from her home and listed on the inventory: [Appellant’s counsel]: And the form that you refer red to, the inventory sheet, what was on there? [Ms. Lellock]: The first thing that it had, they h ad taken letters from my son’s room, like mail, and I believ e that’s all that was on there, the first-yeah.

Id. at 392-393. After the defense rested, the Commonwealth sought to introduce the testimony of Detective Scott Evans in rebuttal to M s. Lellock’s testimony. The following exchange took place between the Commo nwealth, Appellant’s

counsel and the trial court: [The trial court]: [Commonwealth], rebuttal? [Commonwealth]: Yes, Your Honor. May we approach? (Thereupon, the following discussion was held at si debar.) [Commonwealth]: Your Honor, I just didn’t know if t his was going to be – you know, the issue about - when Mrs. Lellock testified about what was in the inventory, taken ou t of her house, she said that’s all. [Appellant’s Counsel]: She did not say that’s all. [Commonwealth]: She did. [The trial court]: She said letters, mail, that’s it. [Appellant’s counsel]: Then I asked her whether sh e read the whole thing. She said I didn’t pay any attention t o that. [The trial court]: But it’s still opening the door

.J-A32012-15

- 13 -

[Commonwealth]: They took a large caliber handgun out of the house. And the detective who gave her a copy of th e search warrant and gave the father a receipt is present to testify to all of that. Can he testify to that? [The trial court]: Yes. N.T., 11/14/11, at 413-414. On the stand, Detective Scott Evans provided the fo llowing testimony: [Commonwealth]: Now, did you author a report regar ding the execution of the search and arrest warrants? [Detective Evans]: Yes. [Commonwealth]: Did you give a copy of the search warrant application to [Appellant’s] mother, Starlet Lelloc k? [Detective Evans]: Yes, I did. [Commonwealth]: Okay. And is that documented in y our report? [Detective Evans]: Yes, it is. [Commonwealth]: Okay. Did you give a copy of the r eceipt or the inventory to [Appellant’s] father, George Lello ck? [Detective Evans]: Yes. [Commonwealth]: And again, is that documented in y our report? [Detective Evans]: Yes, it is. [Commonwealth]: The items that were authorized to search for, do they include any revolver type of firearm? [Detective Evans]: Yes.

* * *J-A32012-15

- 14 -

[Commonwealth]: And during your search of the resi dence, can you tell me what you found and what you listed on t he inventory when you gave that to Starlet Lellock? [Detective Evans]: Can I review it? I haven’t - I know we got a gun out of the house. [Commonwealth]: Okay. Specifically, there was a f irearm that you took out of the house? [Detective Evans]: Dessert [sic] Eagle. I believe it was a Dessert [sic] Eagle. I’m fairly certain. [Commonwealth]: Okay. Is that a handgun? [Detective Evans]: Yes, it is. [Commonwealth]: Okay. Also indicia and that kind of thing? [Detective Evans]: Yes. [Commonwealth]: Okay. Would it be fair to say that the handgun that you took out of the house ultimately t urned out not to be the weapon that was used to kill Albert B ock? [Detective Evans]: That’s correct. N.T., 11/14/11, at 426-428. The trial court provided the following analysis on this issue:

It is clear from the record . . . that Ms. Lellock opened the door to testimony about the gun removed from her ho me when she was asked on re-direct what was on the inventor y sheet. By stating that the inventory sheet listed letters and mail and “that’s all that was on there”, Ms. Lellock clearly opened the door to testimony that a gun had been recovered from her residence, and so the Commonwealth was entitled to walk throug h it. Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 9. We agree. Ms. Lellock testified as to the contents of the inventory list. As a result, she opened the door to questioning reg arding the contents ofJ-A32012-15

- 15 -

that inventory list. See Commonwealth v. Weiss , 81 A.3d 767, 800 (Pa. 2013) (where appellant testified that he was not ca pable of hitting someone with a tire iron, appellant opened the door to rebu ttal testimony of a witness who observed appellant hit an individual with a tir e iron in a separate incident.). The trial court did not abuse its disc retion in permitting the Commonwealth to offer testimony to rebut the false and misleading testimony presented by Ms. Lellock. Ballard , 80 A.3d at 401-402. Accordingly, Appellant’s second claim fails. In his final claim, Appellant contends that he was prejudiced by the means of presentation of evidence at trial. Appell ant’s Brief at 30. Specifically, Appellant represents:

The Commonwealth utilized a sophisticated audio sys tem consisting of Bluetooth headsets for each juror to play the Appellant’s taped statement in court. This system allows each juror to have individual control over the volume of their respective ear pieces thus, creating an ideal indiv idual experience for listening to audio evidence. In sha rp contrast, Appellant’s counsel was forced to use a “boombox” t o play the audio tape to the jury. The “boombox” had to be pl ayed very loudly so that all jurors could hear but in doing s o the audio tape sounded garbled and lost its audibility.

Id. at 30-31. Appellant argues that, as an indigent d efendant, he was unfairly prejudiced by presentment of the evidence in this manner, and as a result, should be granted a new trial. Id. at 36. Our standard of review regarding evidentiary issues is well-settled: The admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of the trial court and only a showing of an abuse of that discretion, and resulting prejudice, constitutes reversible error. An abuse of discretion isJ-A32012-15

- 16 -

not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgm ent that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, pre judice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.

Commonwealth v. Glass , 50 A.3d 720, 724-725 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The trial court provided the following explanation in support of its denial of Appellant’s request to replay the two wit nesses’ recorded statements on the Commonwealth’s audio equipment:

At trial, [Appellant] introduced the recorded state ments of eyewitnesses Michael Plish and Samantha Snelsire du ring their cross-examinations. The statements were played thr ough defense counsel’s computer and the jury was given t ranscripts of the recording so they could follow along. [The tri al court] was able to hear the statements and confirmed with the jury that they were also able to hear the statements. Later in the trial, the Commonwealth introduced [Appellant’s] confessio n and played the audio recording for the jury. The Commo nwealth used audio equipment with headsets for the jurors. Immediately thereafter, [Appellant] began to argue [and asserte d that it was not a fair trial if the witness’s statement were no t played on the same audio equipment]. [The trial court] does not own audio equipment use d by the Commonwealth and cannot force the Commonwealth to allow [Appellant] to use its audio equipment. The audio recordings presented by defense counsel were audible to both [ the trial court] and the jury and the jury was also given a t ranscript of the recordings so they were able to follow along wi th the audio. [Appellant] was not prejudiced in any way by the Commonwealth’s refusal to share its audio equipment and [Appellant] was not discriminated against in any wa y due to his indigent status. This claim is meritless. Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 9-10.J-A32012-15

- 17 -

The record reflects that the audio statements made by Mr. Plish and Ms. Snelsire were played by the defense during cros s-examination of each witness. N.T., 4/13/11, at 155, 211. As noted by the trial court, these statements were played by defense counsel through h er laptop. Id. Of particular relevance is the fact that nobody object ed to the clearness or audibility of these statements when they were playe d. 4 Id. 157-168, 211- 227. Additionally, a transcript of the recorded st atement was provided simultaneously with the audio statement for the jur ors’ benefit. Id. at 156- 157, 326. Subsequently, during the testimony of Detective Ja mes McGee, the Commonwealth played the audiotaped statement Appell ant had given to homicide detectives following his arrest. N.T., 4/ 13/11, at 328. Based on the record, it appears that this audio equipment in volved individual headsets for the jurors. 5 Id. at 325-328. At that point, defense counsel reques ted that she be permitted to use this particular equipm ent to replay Mr. Plish’s

and Ms. Snelshire’s statements. Id. at 325-326. The trial judge denied this

____________________________________________

4 We note that when Appellant’s counsel initially be gan to play Ms. Snelsire’s statement, the court and jury indicated they were h aving difficulty hearing the statement. The volume was adjusted and there w as no subsequent indication that the court or the jury was having di fficulty hearing the audio statement.

5 The Commonwealth asserts that the equipment used t o play Appellant’s statement belonged to the Allegheny County Office o f the District Attorney. Commonwealth’s Brief at 34.J-A32012-15

- 18 -

request on the basis that the statements when origi nally played were audible and that she did not want that evidence presented a second time. Id. at 325-326. The trial judge also noted that the juror s indicated that they could

hear the statements. Id. at 326-327. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Appellant was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his request to utilize the Commonwealth’s audio equipment to replay the statements of witnesses Pli sh and Snelsire. As noted, there is no evidence that the jurors or cour t were unable to hear the statements, nor was there an objection made that th e statements were inaudible. Transcripts of the statements were prov ided along with the statements, thus ensuring that the jurors understoo d the statements. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discret ion in refusing to allow Appellant to play the statements for the jury a second time. Replaying those statements may have resulted in undue emphasi s being placed on that testimony and prejudice to the Commonwealth’s case. Commonwealth v. Taylor , 596 A.2d 222, 223 (Pa. Super. 1991) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the rep laying of an audio statement based on its conclusion that replaying th e statement would tend to emphasize the recorded statements over the other evidence admitted at trial and, therefore, would be improper.). Accordi ngly, Appellant’s final

claim lacks merit. Judgment of sentence affirmed.J-A32012-15

- 19 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 1/25/2016