Filed 11/18/21 In re B.D. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re B.D. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B311000

 (Los Angeles County Super. 

 Ct. No. 20CCJP01715 A & 

 B)

 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E. D.,

Defendant and Appellant.
2

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Annabelle G. Cortez, Judge. Affirmed.

Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

* * * * * *

E.D. (mother) appeals the finding of the juvenile court that 

the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services 

(the Department) made reasonable efforts to provide her 

reunification services during the first six months after her two 

children were removed from her custody as dependents of the 

juvenile court. Because the court’s finding was supported by 

substantial evidence, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

Mother and Martin W. (father) have two sons—B.D. (born 

September 2017) and K.D. (born July 2019). 

In late February 2020, mother left B.D. in the care of her 

sister and her sister’s friend; while under their care, B.D. fell into 

an ungated swimming pool. Although B.D. was floating in the 

pool, unconscious, when the sister and friend discovered him, 

they managed to revive him. Both mother’s sister and the friend 

were under the influence of marijuana. Mother was upstairs 

napping the whole time. Mother and father later admitted to 

using marijuana, and marijuana paraphernalia was strewn 
3

across the home where mother, her sister, father, and two of 

father’s friends all lived.1

II. Procedural Background

In late March 2020, the Department filed a petition asking 

the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over B.D. and 

K.D. on eight different grounds. In August 2020, mother entered 

a no contest plea agreeing that dependency jurisdiction was 

appropriate because (1) mother allowed her sister and the friend, 

both “known abusers of marijuana[,] to supervise [B.D.] while 

under the influence of marijuana,” (2) mother is a “current abuser 

of marijuana,” (3) father is a “current abuser of marijuana,” and 

(4) mother “has mental and emotional problems including anxiety 

which renders [her] incapable of providing the children 

appropriate parental care and supervision.”2 Mother agreed that 

each allegation places the children at substantial risk of serious 

physical harm, thereby warranting the exercise of dependency 

jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 300.3 The juvenile court removed the children from 

mother and father, and ordered the Department to provide 

mother with the following reunification services as part of her 

case plan: (1) drug and alcohol services, including (a) a full drug 

1 These facts are taken from our prior, unpublished opinion 

in B.D. v. Martin W. (Mar. 11, 2021, B307250).

2 The juvenile court dismissed the remaining four grounds 

alleged in support of jurisdiction. The Department also alleged 

that jurisdiction was appropriate due to father’s conduct, but 

because father is not a party to this appeal, we do not discuss him 

further.

3 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
4

and alcohol program with aftercare, (b) random and on-demand 

drug testing, and (c) a 12-step program; (2) individual counseling 

to address her case issues and parenting; and (3) monitored 

visitation. The court set a six-month review hearing for February 

2021.

Over the next six months, mother had in-person visits with 

the children three times a week through December 2020, when 

mother asked for the visits to become “virtual” to protect the 

children from exposure during the fall 2020/winter 2021 COVID 

“surge.” Mother also enrolled in and attended five individual 

counseling sessions. And mother participated in random drug 

testing, but was still testing positive for marijuana, albeit at

decreasing levels. By the end of the six-month period, mother 

had not yet enrolled in a full drug and alcohol program or started 

a 12-step program. 

The juvenile court held its six-month review hearing on 

February 8, 2021. The Department filed a report before the 

hearing outlining the above facts and indicating that it made 

“monthly face to face contact with the children” and “[m]ade 

efforts to make monthly face to face and telephone contact with 

mother.” The Department concluded that mother was in “partial 

compliance” with her case plan.

At the hearing held on February 8, 2021, mother argued 

that the Department had not made reasonable efforts to provide 

mother with reunification services because (1) the Department’s 

report did not expressly state that it gave mother any referrals 

for services, (2) the Department’s service logs did not document 

any contact with mother in November 2020, December 2020, or 

January 2021, and (3) the Department did not meet every month 

with mother. The juvenile court rejected mother’s argument, 
5

finding “by clear and convincing evidence that the Department 

has complied with the case plan in making reasonable efforts” to 

provide reunification services. The court found mother to be in 

partial compliance with her case plan, commended mother on her 

progress, ordered another six months of reunification services for 

mother, and set a 12-month status hearing for May 2021. 

Mother filed this timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that 

the Department had made reasonable efforts to provide her with 

reunification services during the first six months after the 

children were removed from her custody. 

As a threshold matter, we note that our standard of review 

is unclear. To be sure, it is clear that we are to review a juvenile 

court’s reasonable efforts finding for substantial evidence. (T.J. 

v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238 (T.J.).) This 

means we view the record in the light most favorable to the 

juvenile court’s finding, which includes drawing all reasonable 

inferences in favor of that finding. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 

Cal.App.4th 538, 545; In re Monica C. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 

306 (Monica C.).) What is unclear is whether the juvenile court

must make its reasonable efforts finding by clear and convincing 

evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence. This matters 

because the applicable standard of proof affects our substantial 

evidence review. (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 155.) On 

the one hand, many opinions have used language suggesting that 

a reasonable efforts finding must always be made by clear and 

convincing evidence. (E.g., Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 

Cal.App.4th 586, 594; In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 
6

1463, 1472-1473; Monica C., at p. 306.)4 On the other hand, the 

pertinent statute requires a reasonable efforts finding at each 

status review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(8); Serena M. v. 

Superior Court (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 674), but only requires 

that the finding be made by clear and convincing evidence if (1) 

the period of reunification services offered “has met or exceeded 

the time period” set forth in section 361.5 and the child is still 

removed from his parent, and (2) the court orders a permanency 

planning hearing while a child is still removed from his parent (§ 

366.21, subds. (g) & (g)(1)(C)(ii)). Here, the elevated standard of 

proof would not seem to apply because (1) the juvenile court 

finding at issue is from the six-month review hearing and, for 

children under age three at the time of detention, the time period 

in section 361.5 is 12 months (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B)), and (2) the 

juvenile court did not set a permanency planning hearing. We 

will nonetheless sidestep this potential controversy by applying 

the substantial evidence standard through the prism of a clear 

and convincing evidence standard of proof.

An agency makes “reasonable efforts” to provide 

reunification services when it “offer[s] services designed to 

remedy” the problems identified in the parent’s case plan, 

“maintain[s] reasonable contact with the parents during the 

course of the . . . plan,” and makes “reasonable efforts to assist 

the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.” (In re 

Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, italics in original; In re 

Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) “Reasonable” efforts 

are “good faith” efforts that are “reasonable under the 

4 Many of these cases cite what appears to be a former 

version of section 366.21, subdivision (g)(3) in support of their 

holdings.
7

circumstances”; to be reasonable, the efforts need not be ideal or 

perfect. (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 

1164, 1166 (Robin V.); In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 

234, 254; T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1240; Misako R.,

supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

the Department made reasonable efforts to provide reunification 

services. It is undisputed that the Department’s efforts resulted 

in mother having face-to-face visits with the children three times 

a week until mother asked that the visitations become virtual. 

Because the “key element of reunification” is visitation (In re 

Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50; Monica C., supra, 31 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 306-307), the Department’s successful efforts 

in assuring visitation are substantial evidence of its reasonable 

efforts. What is more, the Department provided mother with the 

information necessary for her to enroll in—and participate in—

individual counseling. The Department also ensured that mother 

had regular drug tests. The Department also had face-to-face 

contact with the children every month, and spoke with mother 

regularly during the six month period regarding the progress she 

was making on her case plan, including in September 2020, 

November 2020, and January 2021. To be sure, mother was not 

able to enroll in the full drug and alcohol program or the 12-step 

program, but the Department’s efforts along every other aspect of 

mother’s case plan constitutes clear and convincing evidence of 

its reasonable efforts to assist mother in complying with her case 

plan. What is more, there is no evidence in the record that 

mother’s failure to enroll in the full program or the 12-step 

program were due to the Department’s failings or the COVID-19 
8

pandemic rather than mother’s decision to focus on certain 

aspects of her case plan first. Given the absence of any evidence 

which suggested that “compliance” with these two aspects of her 

case plan was “prov[ing] difficult” due to causes external to 

mother, the Department was not obligated to “ma[k]e reasonable 

efforts” to overcome those unsubstantiated difficulties. (Riva M.,

supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414; cf. In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 

Cal.App.4th 1352, 1365 [parent’s decision not to comply does not 

mean the Department did not make reasonable efforts].) 

Mother responds with what boils down to two arguments. 

First, mother argues that the Department did not 

document precisely what it did to assist mother to enroll in the 

full drug/alcohol program and the 12-step program; that there is 

no evidence that the Department provided mother any referrals; 

and that the Department’s “service log” did not show any contact 

between mother and the Department in October 2020, November 

2020, or December 2020. This argument misunderstands the 

pertinent standard and the standard of review. Mother urges a 

“divide and conquer” approach, encouraging us to ignore the 

Department’s efforts with regard to other portions of her case 

plan (such as visitation, counseling and drug testing), and to 

focus solely on the aspects of her case plan where the 

Department’s efforts did not bear fruit (such as the full 

drug/alcohol program and the 12-step program). If courts 

reviewing the Department’s efforts always focused on where the 

Department’s efforts were unsuccessful, courts would be hard 

pressed to ever find that the Department’s efforts were 

“reasonable,” but that is not the pertinent standard. Mother’s 

remaining arguments ignore our deferential standard of review. 

While the Department did not detail the specific referrals it 
9

provided mother, we can reasonably infer that it was providing 

referrals because mother enrolled in individual counseling. And 

although the Department’s service log said there were no 

interactions with mother in October, November and December 

2020, other evidence in the record documents the conversations 

the Department had with mother in October and December 2020; 

we must resolve this conflict in favor of the juvenile court’s 

finding. 

Second, mother urges that the COVID-19 pandemic—

rather than constituting a mitigating circumstance to be 

considered in assessing whether an agency’s efforts were 

reasonable “under the circumstances”—should be viewed as 

mandating greater effort from agencies to ensure that every 

parent is given the in-person services that might be available. 

For support, mother cites a bulletin authored by a federal agency 

opining that the “[l]ack of, or inability to access, treatment or 

services due to provider closures during the pandemic should not 

be interpreted as a lack of parental compliance, and might 

indicate an agency’s failure to make reasonable efforts to 

reunify.” We reject mother’s argument. The pandemic is to be 

considered in assessing what efforts are reasonable, but not in a 

way that always places a lesser or greater burden on the 

Department. Instead, we examine the circumstances and efforts 

as they apply in each case. Here, as noted above, the 

Department’s efforts were reasonable under the circumstances. 

The federal agency bulletin adds nothing to our analysis. 

Although we can take judicial notice that the agency has so 

opined, it is inadmissible hearsay to the extent it is offered for 

the truth of that opinion offered. What is more, that opinion 

indicates that the inability to access services “might indicate” a 
10

lack of reasonable efforts—not that it inevitably does. Here, 

mother’s inability to start her full drug and alcohol program and 

her 12-step program did not.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

CHAVEZ