NO T F OR P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0392n.06 F iled: July 1, 2008 NO. 06-4309 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT GREGORY D . HAWKIN S,

P etitioner -Appellant, ON AP P EA L F RO M THE v. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE NORT HERN RI CH G AN SHIM ER , W ar de n, DI STRIC T OF OHI O

Respondent-Appellee. __________________________________/ BEF OR E: G UY , SU HR HEI NRIC H an d G IBBO NS, Ci r c uitJudg e s. SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. Gre g ory Hawkins, an Ohio prisoner, appea ls from the district court’s orde r deny ing his petition for a writ of ha beas c orpus. Haw kins raises the issue of whether the state court unrea sonably applied clearly established federa l law in contravention of the Antiterror ism and Effe ctive De ath Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) in ruling that the admission of a ta pe -r e c or de d s tate me nt b y a no nte stify

ingc o- de fe nd ant v iol a te d h is C on fr on tatio n Cl a us e ri g hts

. B e c a us e we c on c lud e that any

e rr or re su lti ngfr om the ta

pe ’s a dmi ssi on

wa s h arm le ss, we AF F I RM. I. Bac kgr ound The followingfac ts are de rived fr om the opinion o f t h e Ohio Court of Appe als. Se e Sta te v. Hawkins , No. 2001-P-0060, 2002 WL 31895118 (Ohio C t. App. Dec. 31, 2002), appeal denied, 787 N. E

. 2 d 1 2 3 1 (Ohio 2003) (No. 2003-0326). A round 6 a.m. on Oc tober 30, 2000, L atasha-2-

Fr anklin awoke in the residenc e she share d with Ronald Hende rson and went to retrie ve a cell phone fr om h e r ca

r. As sh e re tur

ne d, sh e saw a

man a nd wo man, late r i de nti fi e d a s D a vid Cla rk and Rob in Stewart, standingon the sidewa lk. Clark asked if H en d er s o n was home. F ranklin said he w as

a sle e p. Cla

rk p ul led ou t a gun an d to ld F ra nk lin to o pe n th e do or . Wh e n th e y e nte re d, the ho us e alar m sy stem was trig g ere d, wakingHende rson. Hende rson retrieved his g un and hid it under the bedcove rs. Stewar

t and Clark, both a

rmed, forc ed Fr anklin back into the bedroom at gunpoint and bound both Fra

nklin and Hende rson with duct tape. As Ste wa rt and Cla rk se arc he d th e ho us e fo r v a lua ble s, He nd e rs on

mana g e d to re c ov e r h is g un. He shot Stewar

t, causingClark and Stewa rt to flee. H ender son observe d Cla rk an d Stewart run to a blue va

n parke d up the stree t. Hender son also observe d Hawkins wa iting outside the va n. Hende rson re cog nized the van as be longingt o J el l ak et a Jackson, the baby sitter. Hawkins wa s J ackson’ s boy friend at the time. Meanw hile, neig hbors called the pol ice. After speaking with Hende rson and Fra nklin, two office rs wer e sent to Jackson’s apa rtment. Outside they

observe d Hawkins sitting in the dr iver’s se at of Jackson’s van. Jackson allowed the office rs to sear ch her apar tment. J ackson a dmitted that she owned the va

n. Acc ording to the office rs, she beca me uncooper ative when they asked to sea

rch the van. Ha wkins and Jackson told the of fice rs that no one was inside the van. Hawkins a lso ga ve the police thre e diffe rent re asons why he wa s in the car : to take his c hildren to sc hool, to g o to work, and to g o to the store to g et cig are ttes. The off icer s believed someone was hiding in the back of the van bec ause it wa s sitti ng low in the rea r and the windows wer e fog g y from the inside. They sear ched the van and found Stewart-3-

and Clark hiding . They

arr ested a ll four and took Stewar t to the hospital. At the hospital, Stewart confe ssed to the burg lary and stated that Hawkins had dr iven h er and C lark to He nderson’ s and Fr anklin’s re sidence

. Ha wk ins wa s c ha

rg e d w ithc omp lic ity

to c omm it a g g ra

vate d b ur g lary , in viol a tio n o f O hio Rev. Code § 2923.03(A)( 1)-( 3) and § 2911.11( A)(2) , (B ), with a fir ear m specification in viol ation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.14(D) and § 2941.145. Hawkins plea ded not g uilty and wa s tried bef

ore

a jur y . Pr ior to tr ia l, Ste wa

rt ind ic a te d that sh e int e nd e d to inv ok e he r F if th A me ndme nt r ig ht a g a ins t

se lf -i nc ri min a tio n. Pe tit ion e r m ov e d to e xclu de the ta pe d c on fe ssi on

Ste wa rt g a ve in t he ho sp ita l. The trial c ourt denied Petitioner’ s motion. At tr ia l, the State int

ro du c e d Ste wa

rt ’s ta pe d c on fe ssi on , and

the jur y fo un d H awk ins g uil ty of complicity

to commit agg ravated burg lary with a fire arm spec ification. Ha wkins was sente nced to e ig ht ye ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt f or c omp lic ity

to c omm it ag g ra

vate d bur g lary to r

un c on se c uti ve ly

wi th a thre e-y ear

term for the fire arms spec ification. On d ir e c t a

p p e a l, th e O h io Co u rt of Ap p e a ls f o u n d th a t St e w art’ s ta

p e - r e c o r d e d

s tatement did not violate Hawkins’ c onfrontation cla use rig hts since the decla

rant was unable to testify

and the statement bore adequate “indicia of re liability .” In addre ssing the Confr ontation Clause claim, the Ohio Court of Appea ls util ized state evidentiar y rules and the rule in Oh io v . R ob e rts , 448 U.S. 56 (1 98 0) , r e a so nin g that: To be admissible unde r the Confrontation Cl ause, he arsa y evidenc e used to c onvict a def endant must possess indicia of r eliability by virtue of its inhere nt trustworthiness, not by

ref ere nce to other

evidenc e at tria l.” [ Idaho v . ] W right , 497 U.S.[ 805,] 822 (1990). The guarantees of trustworthiness must be shown from the totality of the c ircumstance s. Id

. at 819. I n the case sub judice, we have al rea dy-4-

deter mined that [S tewar

t] was “ unavailable ” to testify ; thus, we must determine w h e t h e r h e r t a p e d s t a t e m e n tp o s s e s s e d

t h e r e qu i r e d

i n d i c i a o f r e l i a b i l i t y. After revie wing the transc ript from her taped s t at em ent, [ Stewart] did not attempt to completely

exonerate he rself a

nd shift the blame to appellant, [Clark], and [J ackson]. I n fac t, she admit ted t hat s he was involved in the i ncident that took pl ace at the re sidence of [Hender son] and [ J ackson] on October 30, 2 0 0 0. Fur

thermore , [S tewar t] was not g iven a pr omise o r an y co n sideration in exchang e for her state me nt. F ina lly , [Ste wa rt ] g a ve he r s tate me nt t o [th e of fi c e rs ] af te r she wa s f

ull y advised of he r rig hts. There fore , it is our view that [S tewar t’s] st atement satisfied the ind ic ia of re lia bil ity pr on g and

did no t vi olate the Con fr on tatio n Cla us e of the Sixth Am e ndme nt t o th e Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit uti on . A c c or din g ly , app ella nt’ s f ir st assig nment of er

ror is over

ruled. Hawkins , 2 0 0 2 WL

3 1 8 9 5 1 1 8 , a t * 6

. T h e O h io Su p r e me Co u rt d e n ie d

H aw k in s le a v e to a

p p e a l. H aw k i n s t h e nf

i l e d a p e t i t i o nf o r w r i to f h a b e a s c o r p u s . A s t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtp o i n t e d o u t, althoug h the state c ourt held that S tewar t’s statement did not fall within a firmly rooted he arsa

y

e xce pti on , it

no ne the le ss “ bo re su ff

ic ie nt i nd ic ia

of re lia bil ity” fo r t

hr e e re a so ns : I nt h e i n s t an tca s e, t h e s t at e ap p el l at e c o u r t fo u n d t h at al t h o u ghS t ew ar t 's state me nt d id n ot f

a ll w ith in a

fi rm ly ro ote d h e ars ay

e xce pti on , it

no net he le ss “satisfied the indicia of rel i ability prong .” State v. Hawkins , 2002 WL 31895118 ¶ 36. The c ourt rea soned that S tewar t’s statement m et t he indi cia of reliability prong sin c e Ste wart “di d not atte mpt to c omp le te ly

e xone rate he rs e lf

and sh if t bl a me to appellant,” she “w as not g iven a pr omise or any considerat i o n i n exchang e for her statement,” and she “g ave he r statement to [the office rs] after she was fully advised of her rig hts.” Id

. Hawkins v. Ganshime r , 2006 WL 2 4 8 1987, at *6. The district c ourt held that these thr ee r easons

wer e inconsistent with and an unr easona ble application of clea

rly established fe dera l law: Fi rs t , t h e S u

p re m e C o u rt h as s t at edt h at “[ t ] h e fa ct t h at a p er s o ni s m ak i n g a broadly self-inc ulpatory

confe ssion does not make m o re cr edible the c onfession’s non-self- inculpatory

parts.” W illiamson v. United States , 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994). Th e re fo re , th e se lf

-i nc ulp a tor

y natur e of

Ste wa rt ' s st a te me nt d oes n ot a de qu a te ly g ua ra nte e the tr us tw or thi ne ss o f h e r s tate me nts a g a ins t H awk ins

.-5- S ec o n d , al t h o u gh S t ew ar tre ce i v edn o p ro m i s es o r co n s i d er at i o ni nex ch an ge for he r statement, the Supre me Court has stated that it i s unnece ssary for the police to make an y promises of lenienc y for a “suspec t to surmise that speaking up, and particula rly placingblame on his cohort may inure to his advanta g e.” Lill y[ Vi rg ini a ], 527 U.S. [ 116,]139 (1999 ). T h er efore, the state court incor rec tly rea soned that the a b s e n c e o f p r o m i s e o r

c o n s i d e r a t i o np r o v i d e d

t h e “ a d e qu a t e i n d i c i a

o f r e l i a b i l i t y” ne e de d to a dmi t th e state me nt. Fin a lly , “ a

su sp e c t’ s c on sc iou sn e ss o f h is Miranda r i g h t s h a s l i t t l e , i f a n y, be ari ngon

the lik e lih oo d o f t

ruthf uln e ss o f h is s tate ment s. W hena su sp e c t is in custody for his obvious involvement in se rious crimes, his knowledg e that any thing he say s may

be used ag ainst him mi litates ag ainst dependingon his verac ity .” Lill y , 527 U.S. at 138. Her e, the s t ate court’s re liance on Stewa rt’s knowledg e of he r Miranda r ights is misplaced a nd is an u n re asonable application of f eder al law. Acc o rd i n gl y , t h e C o u rt fi n d s t h at t h e s t at e c o u rt m i s ap p l i edS u p re m e C o u rt p re ce d ent wh e n d e te rm ini ngthe a dmi ssi bil ity of Ste wa rt ' s st a te me nt. Hawkins v. Ganshime r , 2006 WL 2481987, at *6. The district cour

t nonetheless held that the e rror was harmless, and denied the petit ion. The district court then issued a cer tificate of appea lability as to whether “the tria l court’s a dmission of a sepa rate ly indicted co- defe ndant’s tape-re corde d confe ssion, which was inculpatoryof both the codefe ndant and the Petitioner, violate d the Fif th, Six th, and Four

teenth Amendme nts.” II. Ana lys is Petitioner’s appe al is g overne d by the AEDPA. Unde r the AED PA, a writ will not be g rante d unless the state a djudication resulted in a de cisi o n t h at wa s either ( 1) “c ontrary to, or involved an

unrea sonable a

pplication of, clea

rly established F eder al law, a s determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; o r (2 ) “b as ed on an unrea sonable de termination of the f acts in lig ht of the

e vid ence pres ent ed in th e State c ourt pr oc e e din g .” 28 U. S.C. § 2 25 4( d) ; W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000). The phrase “cle arly es t ab l i s h ed Fe dera l law, as de termined by the-6-

Supreme Court,” “ ref

ers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court' s decisions as of the time of the re levant state- court de cision.” W illiams , 529 U.S. at 412. “[A] fede ral habeas court may not issue the wr it sim ply beca use [it] conclude s in its i ndepende nt judgment that the r eleva nt state-c ourt decision applied clea rly established fe dera l law er roneously or incorr ectly .” Lockye r v. Andrade , 5 3 8 U. S

. 6 3 , 7 5 -7 6 (2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g W illiams , 5 2 9 U. S

. at 4 1 1 ). R at h er , “[ t ] h e s t at e c o u rt 's application of c lear ly

established law must be obje ctively unrea sonable.” Id . at 76. The state c ourt’s factual findings are presumed corr ect unless pr oven to the contr ary by clea r and convinc ing e vidence

. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1). We reviewthe district court’s de nial of habe as relief de novo. Com bs v . Co

y le , 205 F.3d 269, 277 ( 6th Cir. 2000). A. Adm issib ility of

Conf ession The Six th Amendment Confrontation C lause states that “[i] n all criminal prose cutions, the

a c c us e d s ha ll e njo y

the ri g ht .

. . to b e c on fr onted wit h th e wi tne sse s a g a ins t hi m.” U. S. Co ns t. amend. VI . I n Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court held that testimonial out-of-c ourt statements by witnesses ar e bar

red unde r the Confrontation Cl ause unle ss the witnesses

are unavailable , and the de fenda nt had a prior opportunity to c ross-examine them, reg ardle ss of the reliability of the statements. Cra wfo rd overr uled Ro be rts , which held that a n unavailable witness’s statement ag ainst a criminal defe ndant nonetheless may be admissible if the statemen t “b ea rs ‘ade quate indicia of

reliability ,’” w hich the Court def ined as either (1) falling within a “f irmly rooted h ea rs ay ex ce p t i o n , ” o r ( 2 ) s h o wi n g “p ar t i cu l ar i z edgu ar an t ee s o f t ru s t wo rthiness.” Ro be rts , 4 4 8 U .S. at 66.-7-

Stewart’s state ment would be inadmissible under Cra wfo rd be c a us e it i s c le arl y

te sti mon ia l. Se e Cra wfo rd , 54 1 U. S. at 54 ; Stallings v. Bobby , 464 F.3d 576, 581 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Crawf ord does not apply retroa ctively , howeve r. Dorchy v. Jone s , 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) . Thus, it cannot be applied to the fac ts of Petitioner’s case beca use Cra wfo rd

was de cided two y ear s after the final state cour t decision was r ender ed. See B aze v. Park er , 371 F.3d 310, 318 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (noting that “re view is conduc ted in light of the law as it exi sted at the time of the f inal state cour

t decision”). Th e pr op e r q

ue sti on the n is wh e the r t

he state me nt w a s a dmi ssi bl e u n d e r c l e arl y -e sta

bli sh e d Su

pr e me Court prec edent at the time when the Ohio Court of A ppeals re ndere d its decision. I n Stallings , 464 F.3d at 576, this Court addre ssed the issue prese nted in this case–whe ther the admissi o n of a non- testifying w itness’s hear say statements to the police wa s contrar y to the Supreme Court’s holding in Lill y v . V irg ini a , 527 U.S. 116 (1999), and othe r Supreme Court prec edent. I n holding that the state court decision was an unrea sonable application of fede ral law , we re a so ne d a s f

oll ow s: Prior to C

r a w f or d , a hear say

statement wa s considere d admissible for purposes of the Confrontation Clause i f the statement bore “ade quate ‘ indicia of reliability ,’” w hich could be inf err ed if the e vidence fell “within a firmly rooted hear say exception.” Oh io v . R ob e rts , 448 U.S. 56, 6 6 , 1 0 0 S .Ct. 2531, 65 L .Ed.2d 59 7 (1 98 0)

. I n 19 99 , a plu ra lity of the Sup re me Court he ld that “acc omp lic e s' confe ssions that inculpate a c riminal defe ndant ar e not within a firmly rooted exception to the hear say rule as that conce pt has been define d in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudenc e.” Lill yv . V irg ini a , 527 U.S. 116, 134, 119 S.C t. 18 8 7 , 144 L .Ed.2d 117 (1999) ( footnote omitted). In doing so, the Court sa id: “ I t is c lear that our ca ses consistently

have vie wed an acc omplice' s statements that shift or sprea d the blame to a c riminal defe ndant as fa lling outside th e re al m o f t hose ‘he arsa y exception[ s] [t hat are] so trustworthy that adver sarial testingcan be expected to add l i t t l e to [ the statements’] reliability .’” Id

. a t 1 3 3 , 1 1 9 S

. C t . 1 8 8 7 ( a l t e r a t i o nin o ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g W

hite v . I lli no is , 502 U.S. 346, 357, 112 S.Ct . 736, 116 L .Ed.2d 84 8 (1 99 2)) ; see also W

illiamson v. United States , 5 1 2 U

. S

. 5 9 4 , 5 9 9 , 1 1 4 S

. C t.-8-

2431, 129 L .Ed.2d 476 (1994) ( “that a pe rson is making a broa dly self-inc ulpatory confe ssion does not ma

k e mo r e c r e d ib leth e c o n f

e s s io n' s non-self- inculpatory parts”)

.I n Hi ll , we a ddresse d an ana logous situation. The issue th ere was whe ther the state court 1 admission of defe ndant’s custodial c o n fe s s i o n, which inculpate d both the defe ndant and his codefe ndants, was c ontrary

to and an unr easona

ble application of Supreme Court pre cede nt. There , howeve r, the state c ourt dec ision was issued prior to Lill y. I n holding that the state cour t decision wa s an unr e a so na

ble a pp lic a tio n o f c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d Su

pr e me Cou

rt pr e c e de nt at th e tim e the state c ourt ru le d, we re a so ne d a s f

oll ow s: I n Lill y , a p l u r a l i t y u n e q u i v o c a l l y s t a t e d t h a tc o n f

e s s i o n s m a d e b y a c o- de fe nd ant i nc ulp a tin g no t on ly him se lf but hi s c o- c ri min a ls a re “ inh e re ntl y unre lia ble ” and no t w ith in a

“ fi rm ly ro ote d” he ars ay e xce pti on fo r s tate me nts a g a ins t penal inter est. Lill

y , 527 U.S. at 131, 119 S.Ct . 1887. Acc ording ly , the Court ruled that under the framewor

k d is c u ssed in Ro be rts , a co- defe ndant’s custodial c onfession cannot be enter ed into e vidence absent additional “guara ntees of t ru s t worthi ness.” The Court “disting uishe[d] acc omplices’ conf essions that inculpate themselve s and the ac cused a s bey ond a prope r under standing of t he aga inst penal-intere st ex ception beca use an a ccomplice often has a considera ble interest in ‘ confe ssing a nd betra ying his cocriminals.’” Id

. at 131, 119 S.Ct

. 1887 (citing 5 J . Wigmore, Evide nce § 1477, at 358, n. 1 (J

. C h ad b o urn re v. 1974)). The Court further distinguished the c on fe ssi on s o f a c c omp lic e s f ro m th e state me nts of

c o- c on sp ir a tor s ma de in fu rt he ra nc e of a c on sp ir a c y , w hic h h a ve tr a dit ion a lly be e n h e ld t

ru stw or thy , b e c a us e in the ca s e o f custodial conf essions, the g overnme nt is ty pically “involved in the statements’ production.” There fore such statements do not be ar the same indicia of reliability as is prese nt in statements made of the dec lara nt's own acc ord. See id. at 137, 119 S.Ct . 1887. Moreove r, the Supreme Court e xp r e s sly ref ere nced pa st Supreme Court case s in a c h ie v in g it s r e s u lt in Lill y , statin g that “ [i]t is c le ar t hat ou r c a se s c on sis te ntl y have vie wed a

n acc omplice' s statements that shift or sprea d the blame to a c riminal de fe nd ant a s f

a lli ngoutsi de the re a lm o f t ho se ‘he ars ay

e xce pti on [s] [that are ] so trustworthy

that adver sarial testing can be ex pecte d to add li ttle to [ the statements’] reliability .’ ” Id

. at 1 3 3 , 1 1 9 S

. C t . 1 8 8 7 (q u o t i n g W hite v . I lli no is , 502 U.S. 346, 357, 112 S.Ct

. 736, 116 L .Ed.2d 848 (1992)) (empha sis added) ( alterations in original);

. . . Lill y , id

. at 1 3 1 (c i t i n g Douglas v. Alabama , 3 8 0 U. S

. 4 1 5 , 8 5 S.Ct . 1074, 13 L .Ed.2d 934 (1965))

.

. . . . Douglas , Bruton , and Lee indicate that the Supre me C ourt has held statements made -9- Stallings , 46 4 F .3 d a t 57 6; see also Hill v. Hofbauer , 337 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, for the 1to police to closer s cr u tiny . Although Rule 804( b)(3) provides a he arsa y exception fo r s tate me nts a g a ins t th e decl ara nt’ s in te re st, thi s r

ule ha s b e e n c on sis te ntl y disreg arde d by

the Supreme Court in situations wh er e t h e dec lara nt’s custodial c on fe ssi on

at a ll impl ic a te s some bo dy e lse . Suc h state me nts are ne ve r t ru ly a g a ins t the declara

nt’s penal interest beca

use a de fenda

nt in custody

alway s has a motivation to implicate and pass the blame to another , even if in the slightest. See Lee , 4 76 U. S. at 541, 106 S.Ct

. 2056. As the S upreme Court stated in W illiamson v. United States , 512 U.S. 594, 599-600, 114 S.Ct

. 2431, 129 L .Ed.2d 476 (1994), suc h statements ar e inh e re ntl y unre lia ble be c a us e “[ o]ne of

the mos t e ff

e c tiv e wa y s to lie is t o mi x falsehood w ith truth, e s p ec ially truth that seems par

ticularly persua sive bec ause of its self-inculpatory

nature .” Hill, 337 F.3d at 713-14, 717. See also Fulche r v. Motley , 444 F.3d 791, 802 ( 6th Cir. 2006).
-10- rea sons articulate d in Stallings , th e state c ourt de c isi on is a n unr e a so na

ble a pp lic a tio n o f S up re me Court pr e c e de nt a s it

e xiste d w he n th e state c ourt ru le d. F ur

the rm or e , the state c ourt of a pp e a ls i n Stallings prese nted the same three rea sons articulate d by the appe llate co u rt i n this case. See Stallings , 464 F.3d at 579 (quoting O hio Court of Appea ls ruling) . Thus, under Stallings , and for the re asons ar

ticulated by

the district court in this case , the Ohio Court of Appe als’ rulingviolated the standar ds set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

B. Harm less Error Th e re ma ini ngqu e sti on is whe the r i ntr od

uc tio n o f t

he ta pe a t t ri a l w a s h arm le ss. Confrontation Clause e rr ors ar e subjec t to harmless-er ror a naly sis. See, e .g., Delaware v. V an Ar sd all , 4 75 U. S. 6 73 , 6 84 (1 98 6) ; Cha pm an v . Ca lif

or nia , 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967). In Fry v. Pliler , --- U.S. ---, 127 S.Ct. 2321 (2007), the Court he ld that a fede ral habea s court “must assess the prejudicia l impact of consti t u t i o n al error in a state- court c riminal trial under the ‘substantial and injurious effe ct’ standa

rd set for th in Brecht

[ v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619 (1993) ] , whether or not-11-

the state a pp e llate c ourt

re c og nize d th e e rr or and re vie we d it f or ha rm le ssn e ss u

nd e r t he ‘h arm le ss bey ond a re asonable doubt’ s t an dard se t forth in Chapman .” 12 7 S. Ct. a t 23 28 ; see also Vasquez v. Jone s , 496 F.3d 564, 575 ( 6th Cir. 2007). In deter mining whe ther a

Confrontation Clause er

ror was h armless, the court must consider “ the importance of the witness’[s] t estimony in the prosec ution's c ase, whether the testimony

was c umulative, the pre sence o r ab s en ce of evidenc e

corr oboratingor contra dicting the testimony of the witness on mate rial points, ... and, of c ourse, the

overa ll streng th of the prose cution' s case .” Va n A rsd all , 475 U.S. at 684. Petitioner was convic ted of c omplicity to commit agg ravated burg lar y . Oh i o l aw de fines

c omp lic ity

a s f oll ow s: (A) N o person, a cting with the kind of culpability require d for the commission of an o ff en s e, s h al l d o an y

o f t h e f o l l o wi n g: (1) Solicit or procur e anothe r to commit the offe nse; (2) Aid or abet a nother in committing the of fense ; (3) Conspire w ith another to commit the offe nse in violation of section 2923.01of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innoce nt or irre sponsible person to commit the offe nse. Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.03. “[T]he evidence must show that the d ef en d an t supported, assisted,

encour ag ed, coope rate d with, advised, or incited t he princ ipal in the commission of the crime. . . .” State v. Johnson , 754 N.E.2d 796, 80 1 (O h i o 2 0 01). An a ccomplice ’s cr iminal intent may be inferr ed from the circumstances surrounding the cr ime. Id. The mer e pre sence of an a ccuse d at the

scene of the c rime is not sufficient. Id. at 799. The district cour

t concluded that the err or was ha rmless, “find[ing] a suff

icient basis for the jury to conclude, a

bsent Stewart’ s statement, that Haw kins assisted C l ar k an d Stewart with the burg lary .”-12-

O na p p e a l H aw k i n s ar g u e s t h a tt h e d i s t r i c t c o u rtw a s w r o n g b e c a u s e , o f t h e S t a t e ’ s t w e n t ytwo witnesses, only

Stewart, F ranklin, and Hender son offe red te stimony relating to his alleg ed complicity

in the burg lary

independe nt of the tape d statement. Ha wkins contends the testimony of Fr anklin and He nderson r eg ardinghis involvement w as “thoroughly impeache d and re ndere d useless.” H awkins points out that Fra nklin testified that the night be fore the burg lary Hende rson g ot mad and thre atene d to put his t wo g uns “to work” on her for re fusing to take him to a junk y ard to o bta in a

wi nd owfo r a

c ar. Ho we ve r, on

c ro ss- e xami natio n, F ra

nk lin a dmi tte d th a t H e nd e rs on

did not say he would put the guns “to work.” Hawkins a lso challeng ed He nderson’ s testimony that he jumped throug h a seco n d -floor window and obse rved Clar k and Stewar

t run to a blue van parke d on the side of the stre et. Haw kins claims that this conflicted with t h e testimony of seve ral ne ighbor s, who stated that they saw two individuals running f

rom Fr anklin’s house, but did not see a blue van. One of the ne ighbors, Ted Young , testified that he he ard shouting outside around 6:30 a.m. a nd that he sawonly

a re d car

. Another ne ighbor , David B arnw ell, testified that as he was scr apingfrost off his car w indow, he saw Hende rson bre ak throug

h the up s t ai rs wi n d o w a n d t wo Af ri ca n -A m er i ca n s em er ge f romHende rson’s house and r

un up the stree t, and that he did not see any vehicles pa

rked on t h e s t re et at t hat time. Ba rnwe ll added that he is the hea d of neig hborhood watch and he would have c alled the police had he s e e n an u n f

ami li ar c ar . N e ig hb o r , Ra n dy Ru c h o tz e , te s ti f

ie d th a t h e h e ar d g la s s b r e a k ing ; that he sawtwo persons running , one male a nd one fe male; and that there wer e no vehicles parked on the street at that time. L astly , Hawkins notes that on cross-e x amination Hende rson ac knowledg ed that-13-

he identified the g un as belong ing to Jackson only and not to Hawkins, despite his earlier testimony that he re cog nized the gun a s Hawkins’ be cause it jammed. Howeve r , a s th e d is tr ic t c o u rt o b s e r v e d , b a s e d o n th e f

a c ts f o u n d b y th e O h io Court of Appea ls, there wa s other testi mony implicating Hawkins in the burg lary . The off icer s testified that when they

arr ived at the sc ene, H ender son said he knew who committed th e ac t and direc ted the office rs to Hawkins’ a

nd J ackson’ s home. The office rs went to Jackson’s home and found H awkins outside sitti ng in a blue van on the driver’ s side. Hawkins g ave thr ee dif fer ent explanations for being in the van. Jackson stated that nobody was in the van, and she and Hawkins beca me uncoope rative when the of

fice rs aske d if they could s ear ch the van. The officer s found Stewar t and Clark hiding in the van. Vi e we d c oll e c tiv e ly , th is e vid e nc e pr ov ide d in de pe nd e nt c ir c ums tanti a l pr oo f whi le a lso

corr oborating

He n d er s o n ’s an d

J ac k s o n ’s t es t i m o n y

o nm at er i al p o i n t s , t h at Ha wk i n s wa s at tempting to help Clark and Stewa

rt commit the burg lary . As the district court he ld: I n particula

r, the Petitioner’s presenc e in the van, his i nconsistent response s as to why he wa s leaving in the van, the c hang e in his attitude when the of fice rs aske d to searc h the van, a nd the fa ct that the off

icer s ultimately found Clark a nd Stewart at the very location and in the precise vehic le that Hende rson had de scribed to of fice rs provided evidenc e enoug h for the jur y to infer that the Petitioner’ s role in the ag g ravated robber y was more than that of a mere by stander. Stewa rt’s statement suppleme nted the other e vidence at t ri al b u t did not ti p the balanc e of e vidence ag ainst the Petitioner. The Confrontation Cl ause err or, there fore , did not cause a substantial nor an injurious eff

ect or influence on the ver dict and is thus harmless er ror. Hawkins v. Ganshime r , 2006 WL 248198 7 , at *9. In short, for the r easons state d by the district court, we cannot sa

y that the er

roneous a dmission of S tewar t’s stat em en t h ad a substantial a nd injurious effe ct on the ver dict.L astly , Petitioner’s relianc e on Sta te v . Clar k is also m i splace d. Se e Sta te v . Clar k , N os . 2 2004-334, 2004 WL144238 (Ohio Ct. App. J an. 16, 2006). A s the district court noted: [T] he cour

t primarily

based that holding on the f ac t t h at a previous trial of Clark resulted in a hungjury

on the kidnaping char g e. Acc ording ly , the cour t could not find bey ond a re asonable doubt that the evidence ag ainst Clark was so strongthat the jury -14- The c ases Petitioner re lies on do not he lp him. I n eac h, the nontestifying witness’s statement reinfor ced and corroborated t he testi mony of a witness whose testim ony , standing alone, might not have pr ovided a sufficient basis to convict bec ause it had othe rwise be en impeac hed or unde rmined. I n Stallings , this Court held that the Confrontation Clause err or wa s not harm l es s beca use the admission of the non-te stify ing w itness’s statements to police that ce rtain drug s and money belong ed to t he de fe nd ant r e inf

or c e d th e te sti mony

of the de fe nd ant’ s g ir lf

ri e nd that th e c oc a ine be lon g e d to the defendant. The re, how ever , there was no other evidenc e conne cting the def endant to the c ocaine , and the g irlfriend’ s testimony mi gh t not have be en ac cepte d by the fa ct-finde r abse nt the

corr oboratingstatements bec ause the g irlfriend ha d contra dicted her self and admitted at trial that she h ad an inc entive to implicate the de fenda nt. Stallings , 464 F.3d at 583. Sim ilarly , in F u lc h e r v. Motley , 444 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2006), the err or wa s not harmless wher e the inadmissible hea rsay statement of a

nontestifying w itness corr oborate d and therefor e mi g ht have bolstered the testimony of an acc omplice, who had a substantial inter est in shifting the blame to the defe ndant. Id. at 809. I n Sta ple ton v . W

olf e , 288 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 2002), t his Court held t hat because a jury could have found that a nonte stify i n g acc omplice’s tape d statement re inforce d and cor roborated a testify

ing

a c c omp lic e ’s state me nts , o ne state me nt w a s no t me re ly c umu lativ e of the oth e r, and the re fo re c ou ld have had a substantial and inj urious eff ect on the ve rdict. Id. at 868. See also Vasque z , 496 F.3d 2in the second tria l would ha ve convicted Clark even without Stewa rt' s statement. I d. As su c h, that c a se do e s n ot s ig nif ic antl y ill umi nate the c ur

re nt a na ly sis

. State v. Ganshime r , 2006 WL 2481987, at *9 n.3. -15- at 564 (holding that Confrontation Clause er ror in excluding impeac hment evidenc e re lating to a n unavailable prosec ution witness’s testimony at a preliminary hear ing that he saw the defendant fir e a handgun was not harmless because it was the only evidenc e putt ing the g un in the defe ndant’s hand at the ti me of the s hooting, and the unavailable wit ness’s testi mony was the “ tiebrea

ker” beca use the other prose cution witnesses had be en impeac hed). B y c on tr ast , in thi s c a se , a s d isc us se d a bo ve , th e re wa s su ff

ic ie nt i nd e pe nd e nt e vid e nc e to

c or ro bo rate He nd e rs on ’s and Jac ks on ’s ve rs ion

of e ve nts . III. Conclusi on I n s um, the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRMED.