alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### NEHEMIAH REDDEN *vs.*JAMES P. BARKER.

The relation of landlord and tenant must have existed to support the action- of assumpsit for use and acccpation.

A person who enters into possession under a contract of purchase, cannot be held liable for rent; unless perhaps, when the contract of purchase is conditional, and there is an express promise to pay rent if the condition be not performed.

This was an action on the case for the use and occupation of a dwelling house in Georgetown. The defendant entered into possession under a contract of purchase which fie failed to comply with; and the question was whether he could be held liable for rent whilst he occupied. There was some evidence offered of admissions by the defendant that he was liable for rent, or of his payment of taxes which he said he should deduct from the rent.

*180
      *Houston*and *Wootten,*for plaintiff.

*Cullen,*for defendant.

*Cullen,*for defendant.

—Where one enters into the possession of land as a purchaser, he cannot be liable for rent in an action for use and occupation. . There is no promise implied by the law arising from such a relation, to pay the rent. If Barker went into the possession under any contract or agreement express or implied with Redden to pay rent, he is liable in this action; but if he entered as a purchaser and owner, he is not liable for the rent though he never paid the purchase money. (2 *Selw. N. P.*1085-79-80; 2 *Taunt. Rep.*145; *Chit. Cont.*370, *n.*1, 371, *n.*1, *a; Sugd. Vend.*183; 13 *Johns. Rep.*489; 3 *Com. L. R.*411-12; 6 *Johns. Rep.*46; 3 *Stephen’s N. P.*2719.)

The action of use and occupation is-founded on the idea of a contract for the payment of rent, and unless such a contract be proved, or such a relation of the parties exists, from which an agreement to pay rent may be implied, the action will not lie.

*Houston,*in reply,

agreed that where the defendant enters under a contract of purchase, which fails, he is not liable for rent under any implied contract; and an express understanding in reference to the rent must be proved. - But he contended that there was evidence here from which the jury could find that there was such an.agreement.

Booth, *Chief Justice,*

charged the jury.—The action is to recover a compensation for the use and occupation of a house and lot. It proceeds on the idea of a contract of renting, either express or implied. A contract for the payment -of rent may be implied from circumstances. The relation of landlord and tenant must exist. If the defendant enter under an agreement to purchase, he is not Háble for rent; for the character of purchaser excludes that of tenant; except perhaps, in a case similar to the present, where the defendant enters under a conditional contract for the purchase, and there is an express agreement to pay rent in case such purchase should not be carried out; the defendant might be liable on proof of such express agreement. If the jury think this is such a case, and the agreement is sufficiently proved, the plaintiff ought to have a verdict; otherwise, not.

Verdict for defendant
#### James Midd ECHOLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-389.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 3, 1971.

Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, and Edwin T. Mulock, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corees, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on authority of Jones v. State, Fla.App.2d 1961, 128 So.2d 754.

PIERCE, C. J., and LILES and MANN, JJ., concur.
#### Brown Harris Stevens Residential Sales, L. L. C., Respondent, v Safari Development Company Limited, Appellant.

[721 NYS2d 648]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered September 25, 2000, after a nonjury trial, in an action to recover a real estate broker’s commission, in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the principal amount of $400,000, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

While the record shows that the prospective buyer procured by plaintiff was willing to assist defendant in effecting a like-kind exchange of the subject condominium unit, a clear preponderance of the evidence shows that the proposed sale was not contingent upon defendant’s ability to consummate a like-kind exchange. The original, written brokerage agreement between plaintiff and defendant’s predecessor contained no such contingency; the letter of intent prepared by defendant’s attorney and signed by the prospective buyer made no reference to any such contingency; and the draft like-kind exchange agreement also prepared by defendant’s attorney clearly provided that the transaction was to go forward even if a suitable exchange property could not be acquired. We have considered defendant’s other arguments, including that the person procured by plaintiff was not a ready, willing and able buyer, and find them to be without merit. Concur — Nardelli, J. P., Williams, Tom, Lerner and Rubin, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> US DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                       4,901,703
<SECURITIES>                                 3,595,210
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                    34,610
<INVENTORY>                                  4,828,631
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            14,974,236
<PP&E>                                      73,012,818
<DEPRECIATION>                              27,887,241
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              78,006,387
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       11,228,242
<BONDS>                                     76,848,748
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  4,577,000
<COMMON>                                         5,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 (17,955,571)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                78,006,387
<SALES>                                     14,015,995
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            42,407,929
<CGS>                                        4,383,683
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               40,832,260
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               115,723
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,160,717
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (1,585,048)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   967,800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (2,552,848)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (3,033,682)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (606.73)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (606.73)
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTEREDPUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8) pertaining to the Cascade Bancorp 2002 Equity Incentive Plan of our report dated March 5, 2007, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Cascade Bancorp and subsidiary (collectively, Cascade Bancorp), Cascade Bancorp managements assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Cascade Bancorp, included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2006.

/s/ Symonds, Evans & Company, P.C.

Portland, OregonMarch 5, 2007

---
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 120 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 120

   Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives against the 
 enactment of any reduction or delay in cost-of-living adjustments for 
        beneficiaries under title II of the Social Security Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 9, 1993

  Mr. Bilirakis (for himself, Mr. Rahall, Mr. Zimmer, Mr. Johnson of 
South Dakota, Mr. King, Mr. Emerson, Mr. McCandless, Mr. Lightfoot, and 
 Mr. Doolittle) submitted the following resolution; which was referred 
                   to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives against the 
 enactment of any reduction or delay in cost-of-living adjustments for 
        beneficiaries under title II of the Social Security Act.

    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that 
no changes in current law should be enacted that would reduce or delay 
cost-of-living adjustments for beneficiaries under title II of the 
Social Security Act.

                                 <all>
```
# C_2020191EN.01002202.xml

| 8.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 191/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 191/22

---

Action brought on 19 March 2020 — Bachmann v EUIPO (LICHTYOGA)

(Case T-157/20)

(2020/C 191/30)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Gabriele Bachmann (Bad Grönenbach, Germany) (represented by: C. Weil, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU word mark LICHTYOGA — Application for registration No 18 054 208

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 December 2019 in Case R 2317/2019-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | uphold the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

—

uphold the appeal;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
# C_2020240EN.01002902.xml

| 20.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 240/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 240/29

---

Action brought on 26 May 2020 — France Agro v EUIPO — Chafay (Choumicha Saveurs)

(Case T-311/20)

(2020/C 240/37)

Language in which the application was lodged: French

Parties

Applicant: France Agro (Avignon, France) (represented by: C. de Haas, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Choumicha Chafay (Casablanca, Morocco)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark Choumicha Saveurs in the colours red, orange, yellow, burgundy, gold and white — Application for registration No 13 866 553

Procedure before EUIPO: Proceedings for a declaration of invalidity

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 March 2020 in Case R 1621/2019-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs incurred by the applicant in the present proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs incurred by the applicant in the present proceedings.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---