If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

March 24, 2022

v No. 354247

Saginaw Circuit Court

TROY LEE WRIGHT, LC No. 18-045313-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and STEPHENS and LETICA, JJ.

STEPHENS, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I concur, but disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting the exhibit depicting the “Power and Control Wheel” and respectfully 

dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion. Even so, I do not believe the error warrants 

reversal.

“Demonstrative evidence is admissible when it aids the fact-finder in reaching a conclusion 

on a matter that is material to the case.” People v Bulmer, 256 Mich App 33, 35; 662 NW2d 117 

(2003). As with all evidence, demonstrative evidence must satisfy MRE 401 through 403. People 

v Unger, 278 Mich App 210; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Evidence is relevant when it has “any 

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 

more probable or less probable.” MRE 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible, MRE 402, 

but “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” MRE 403. “Evidence is unfairly 

prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or 

preemptive weight by the jury.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).

The trial court allowed admission of the “Power and Control Wheel” during the expert’s

testimony, over a defense relevance objection. The expert described how power and control lies 

at the center of the wheel, and how the spokes—including economic abuse, emotional abuse, using 

children, and coercion and threats—are common ways batterers maintain power and control over 

their victims. The expert testified that she had “never” worked with a batterer-victim relationship 

in which the tactics described in the wheel were not present.
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The use of the “Power and Control Wheel” did not have probative value in this case because 

there was no evidence presented that defendant engaged in economic abuse, emotional abuse, use 

of any children, or coercion and threats against Valarie Wright,

1

defendant’s then-wife. The 

domestic violence expert never interviewed defendant or Wright, and most of the tactics the expert

described to the jury lacked any evidentiary support in the record. The majority identifies several 

instances it believes show intimidation by defendant against Wright. The majority also notes that 

the expert witness “never testified that all of the wheel’s spokes and elements were necessary 

components” and that the diagram was simply a “visual aid the expert employed to educate the 

jury regarding the general dynamics of an abusive relationship.” Intimidation is, however, but one 

spoke of the “Power and Control Wheel,” and as the majority recognizes, several of the spokes of 

the “Power and Control Wheel” do not apply here. I believe the risk of unfair prejudice from the 

expert’s testimony and diagram was high because her testimony about the wheel could have led 

the jury to infer that defendant had used all of the tactics described there. Therefore, I believe not 

only was the evidence irrelevant, but the danger of unfair prejudice from admission of the “Power 

and Control Wheel” substantially outweighed any probative value. Accordingly, I would conclude 

that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting this evidence.

This error was harmless, however, because it was not outcome-determinative. People v 

Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). There was overwhelming evidence presented 

at trial that defendant murdered Wright and compelling proof to refute his heat of passion claim. 

Two weeks before the murder, defendant set up GPS tracking on Wright’s car and began searching 

for the name of the man he suspected she was seeing. Most significantly, about two hours passed 

between defendant discovering Wright at the motel and returning to the motel to shoot into her 

room, a significant “cooling off period” that included defendant being pulled over by police 

officers, who told defendant to leave Wright alone. The strength of this evidence greatly 

overshadowed the error related to the “Power and Control Wheel.” Accordingly, because the error 

was not outcome determinative, it does not warrant reversal of defendant’s convictions.

Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his 

past infidelity, because the evidence was irrelevant in violation of MRE 401 and misled the jury 

in violation of MRE 403. I agree .2

 

1 Defendant and Valarie Wright share the same last name. Wright will refer to Valarie Wright in 

this opinion.

2 Defendant objected to the introduction of evidence of his infidelity in a motion in limine. 

However, the prosecution suggests that defendant abandoned this issue because his brief failed to 

identify any infidelity evidence presented at trial. See People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 131 n 

36; 771 NW2d 655 (2009) (“Failure to brief an issue on appeal constitutes abandonment.”). As 

defendant noted in his reply brief, defendant’s initial brief cited specific testimony about 

defendant’s infidelity in the facts section, but did not repeat the quotation in the argument section. 

We do not believe that defendant’s citation to testimony in the facts section, coupled with an 

argument section dedicated to the infidelity evidence, constitutes a “failure to brief” the issue. 

Therefore, defendant did not abandon this issue.
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Evidence is relevant when it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable.” MRE 401. 

Relevant evidence is generally admissible, MRE 402, but “may be excluded if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 

misleading the jury . . . .” MRE 403. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger 

that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” People 

v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).

The principle dispute in this case was the defendant’s state of mind when he fired the shots 

into the hotel room window. The prosecution argued that his conduct was second degree murder. 

The defense theory of the case was that the defendant was guilty lesser offense of voluntary 

manslaughter. “[T]o show voluntary manslaughter, one must show that the defendant killed in the 

heat of passion, the passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not a lapse of time 

during which a reasonable person could control his passions.” People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 

535; 664 NW2d 685 (2003).

I, also depart from the majority as to the admission of evidence of infidelity. The trial court 

admitted evidence of defendant’s infidelity on the theory that it was relevant to whether there was 

adequate provocation for defendant’s actions. Defendant’s argument at trial was that he was so 

overwhelmed by passion upon finding his wife at the motel that he “couldn’t control himself” 

when he shot into her room. At best, evidence that defendant had previously cheated on Wright 

was nominally probative on the issue of provocation. Any such relevancy requires a finding that 

previous infidelity negates the probability of inflamed passions upon encounter with an unfaithful 

partner. However, because the reviewing standard is an abuse of discretion, we cannot find that 

the court erred in finding some probative value in the admission of such evidence. 

The error here, however, is the admission of this evidence in light of MRE 403. The

evidence of defendant’s s infidelity had little to no probative value on his state of mind and risked 

misleading the jury to disregard the manslaughter defense because of his past behavior. The 

probative value of the testimony about defendant’s infidelity was substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury. We note that the prosecution discussed the issue 

of the defendant’s infidelity in both opening statement and closing argument. The only other 

mention of it was from the detective to whom the defendant admitted his infidelity in a discussion 

of the defendant’s state of mind on the night of the murder. The admission was erroneous. 

However, this error was not outcome determinative. Given the substantial untainted evidence in 

this case. Applying the People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999), it was not 

outcome determinative. The untainted evidence was that the defendant was aware of Wright’s 

relationship with Moten prior to the shooting, followed her for hours after encountering Wright 

and Moten at the hotel, went to his home to find a gun and returned hours after the initial encounter 

and fired shots into the window. At the very least, the element of having no lapse of time between 

the alleged adequate provocation the shots was negated by uncontested evidence. Accordingly, 

because the error was not outcome determinative, it does not warrant reversal of defendant’s 

convictions.

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens