IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
Opinion Number:

__________________ 2

F iling Date: July 13, 2023 3

NO. S-1- SC

- 38934 4

MCFARLAND LAND AND CATTLE INC., 5

Plaintiff

- Respondent, 6

v. 7

CAPROCK SOLAR 1, LLC, a Delaware 8 limited liability company, and SWINERTON 9 BUILDERS, a California corporation, 10

Defendants, 11

and 12

COUNTY OF QUAY, 13

Intervenor

- Petitioner. 14

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI 15 Matthew E. Chandler, District Judge 16

Warren F. Frost, P.C. 17 Warren F. Frost 18 Logan, NM 19

for Petitioner 20

Hinkle Shanor LLP 21 Richard E. Olson 22 The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23-112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion.Jeremy D. Angenend 1 Roswell, NM 2
for Respondent 3

Moses, Dunn, Farmer & Tuthill, P.C. 4 Joseph Lee We r ntz 5 Albuquerque, NM 6

for Defendants 7OPINION 1

THOMSON , Justice. 2

{1} This case involves a dispute about whether a public prescriptive easement 3
existed over a road in Quay County. Defendants Caprock Solar 1 (Caprock ) and 4

Swinerton Builders (collectively, Defendants) and Inte rvenor Quay County (the 5

County ) contend that the Court of App eals erred by reversing the district court and 6
creating an additional requirement to establish a public prescriptive easement 7

claim

— namely, that a claimant must prove frequency of use by the public and a 8

minimum number of public users. We agree that the Co urt of Appeals’ stricter proof 9
requirement was improper and take this opportunity to clarify what is required to 10
prove a public prescri ptive easement claim. In doing so, we adopt the holding in 11
Trigg v. Allemand , 1980

- NMCA

- 151, ¶ 9, 95 N.M. 128, 619 P.2d 573
, that 12
“[f]requency of use or number of users is unimportant, it being enough if use of the 13
road in question was free and common to all who had occasion to use it as a public 14
highway” ( i nternal quotation marks and citation omitted)

. We also adopt t he 15
principle articulated in Luevano v. Maestas , 1994

- NMCA

- 051, ¶¶ 23, 25, 117 N.M. 16

580, 874 P.2d 788, that the public character of the road is key to establishing a public 17
prescriptive easement claim. In this case, there is substantial evidence to support the 182 district court’s finding of a public prescriptive easement over the disputed road. 1
Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court. 2

I. BACKGROUND 3

{2} Quay Road AI ( QR AI ) begins on State R oad 278 and runs south along tracts 4
owned by R obert and Billie Abercrombie ( the Abercrombie s ) and Plaintiff 5
McFarland Land & Cattle Inc. (McFarland), eventually reach ing s tate

- owned land. 6
Sometime in 1954, a flood washed out a wooden bridge on QR AI that crossed an 7
arroyo near the southeast corner of McF arland ’s property

. After the flood, QR AI 8

was rerouted one hundred feet west onto McFarland ’s property . This area became 9
known as the “low water crossing.” The low water crossing , which is located on 10
McFarland’s property, is the subject of this dispute. 11

{3} In 2015, Caprock entered into a lease with the Abercrombies for the 12
construction and operation of a solar energy farm on the Abercrombie s ’ property. 13
Caprock hired Swinerton Builders as its general contractor and entered int o a 14
sublease with the County in order to acquire industrial revenue bonds to assist in 15
financing the solar farm. QR AI, including the low water crossing, is the only means 16
of vehicular access to lands owned by the Abercrombie s that were leased to Caprock
, 17

s tate lease land, and lands owned by the Dean Hodges family. Consequently, 183 Caprock and Swinerton Builders used the low water crossing on QR AI to reach the 1

leased land on the Abercrombies’ property for construction of the solar farm. 2

{4} When construction of t he solar farm began, McFarland demanded that certain 3
conditions be met, including payment from Caprock
, to use the crossing

. Up to that 4
point, McFarland made no effort to keep others from using QR AI. Negotiations 5
between McFarland and Caprock regarding us e of the crossing failed
, driving 6

McFarland to file a petition for a permanent injunction seeking to enjoin Defendants 7
from using the low water crossing. In their answer, Defendants asserted, among 8

others, the affirmative defenses of implied easement, prescriptive easement, and 9
easement by necessity. The district court allowed the County to intervene, and the 10
County filed a complaint seeking a declaration that QR AI ’s low water crossing is 11
within a public p rescriptive easement and that McFarland had no right to interfere 12

with the public’s use of QR AI and the low water crossing. Prior to trial, Defendants 13
and the County filed a joint trial brief, contending that “a right of access exists across 14

QR AI, includ ing ‘the low water crossing’ [] where it crosses the McFarland land
, ” 15
under the theories of easement by prescription, implied dedication, and easement by 16
estoppel. 17

{5} After a bench trial, t he district court ente red judgment in favor of Defendants 18

and the Count y. The district court did not make any findings or conclusions on the 194 implied dedication or easement by estoppel theories. Instead, it focused its findings 1
on the existence of a public prescriptiv e easement, concluding that Defendants and 2
the County “prove [d] the elements of a public prescriptive easement on QR AI, 3

where it crosses [McFarland’s property] by clear and convincing evidence.” 4

{6} T he conclusion that a public prescriptive easement exist ed over QR AI was 5

based on evidence of records, certifications, and maps showing QR AI as a County 6

road. The district court made additional findings regarding QR AI’s reputation as a 7
public road . It found that McFarland’s neighbors used QR AI and never felt the need 8
to ask for permission to use it
, that McFarland never prevented others from using 9

QR AI
, and that the local title company that issued the title insurance policy for the 10

solar farm identified QR AI as a public road. 11

{7} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, concluding that the County 12

an d Defendants did not prove the public use element of their publ ic prescriptive 13

easement claim by clear and convincing evidence. McFarland Land & Cattle Inc. v. 14
Caprock Solar 1, LLC , 2021

- NMCA

- 057, ¶ 16 , 497 P.3d 665

. Acknowledging its 15
holding in Trigg that “ ‘ [f]requency of use or number of users is unimportant, it being 16
enough if use of the road in question was free and common to all who had occasio n 17
to use it as a public h ighway, ’ ” the Court of Appeals , in its substantial evidence 18

review, nonetheless concluded that public use of the road “might have amounted to 195 five to ten times over an approximate thirty

- year period ” and that “[ t ] here was no 1

other evidence of actual use of the road by the general public

. ” McFarland Land & 2

Cattle Inc. , 2021

- NMCA

- 057, ¶ ¶ 10 , 16 (quoting Trigg , 1980

- NMCA

- 151, ¶ 9 (first 3
alteration in original) )

. The C ourt read Luevano to require the d istrict c ourt to 4
disregard evidence of QR AI’s reputation as a public road because
, in its view
, that 5

evidence relied exclusively on the use made by McFarland’s neighbors and invitees

. 6

See McFarland Land & Cattle Inc. , 2021

- NMCA

- 057 , ¶¶ 12, 16. The Court of 7
Appeals remanded the case to th e district court to consider the unresolved theories 8
of implied dedication and easement by estoppel advanced by the County and 9

Defendants

. Id. ¶ 17. The County filed a petition for writ of certiorari , which we 10
granted, and Defendants joined the County in the briefing. Our review on appeal is 11
limited to the public prescriptive easeme nt claim as this is the only question 12
presented by the parties

. See Rule 12

- 502(C)(2)( b ) NMRA (“[T]he Court will 13
consider only the questio ns set forth in the petition.”). W e conclude that the Court 14
of Appeals erred in requiring evidence establishing frequency of use or a minimum 15

number of users
, given the other evidence presented at trial and findings of the 16

district court that sufficient evidence proved a public prescriptive easement existed 17
for the low water crossing on QR AI . We revers e the Court of Appeals and affirm 18

the dist rict court’s original judgment. 196 II. DISCUSSION 1

A. Standard of Review 2

{8} We begin by reviewing the Court of Appeals’ legal conclusion on prescriptive 3

easements de novo. Amethyst Land Co., Inc. v. Terhune , 2014

- NMSC

- 015, ¶ 9, 326 4

P.3d 12. We then determine “ whether substantial evidence supports the district 5

court’s findings and whether these findings support the conclusion s that the elements 6
required to establish a public easement by prescription were .

. . proved by clear and 7
convincing evidence

. ” Algermissen v. Sutin
, 2003

- NMSC

- 001 , ¶ 9 , 133 N.M. 50, 61 8

P.3d 176 . Review for substantial evidence is a deferential standard
, and 9
[e]ven in a case involving issues that must be established by clear and 10 convincing evidence, it is for the finder of fact, and not for reviewing 11 courts, to weigh conflicting evidence and decide where the truth lies. 12 We defer to the trial court, not because it is convenient, but because the 13 trial court is in a better position than we are to make findings of fact 14 and also because that is one of the responsibilities given to trial courts 15 rather than appellate courts. 16
State ex. rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Williams , 1989

- NMCA

- 008, ¶ 7, 108 N.M. 17

332, 772 P.2d 366. 18

B. Frequency of Use or Minimum Number of Users Is Not Required t o 19 Establish a Public Prescriptive Easement Claim 20

{9} The County and Defendants challenge the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that 21
they did not present sufficient evidence to establish a public prescriptive easement. 22

See McFarland Land & Cattle I nc. , 2021

- NMCA

- 057, ¶ 16

. Specifically, the y argue 237 that if a road has a public character, they need not prove a “ minim [um] number of 1

uses by the public
, ” a nd t herefore the Court of Appeals’ additional proof requirement 2
is inconsistent with our law on public prescriptive easements

. 3

{10} In order to establish a public prescriptive easement claim, the claiming party 4
must prove that the public used the property and that there wa s “ an adverse use of 5
land, that is open or notorious, and continued without effective interruption for the 6
prescriptive period ( of ten years ) .” Algermissen , 2003

- NMSC

- 001, ¶ ¶ 9, 10

. At issue 7

in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding tha t a minimum number 8

of users or amount o f use by the public is require d to support a district court ’s 9

conclusion that a publi c prescriptive easement exists. 10

{11} O ur analysis starts with a discussion of the public use element of a public 11
prescriptive easement claim. In Trigg , the district court concluded that the defendant, 12
a neighboring landowner, established a public prescriptive ea sement over a road that 13

crossed the plaintiff’s la nd. 1980

- NMCA

- 151, ¶ ¶ 4

- 5

. The Court of Appeals held 14
that there was substantial evidence to support the district court’s conclusion because 15
although the road was not formally listed as a county road, “ [a]ll of the witnesses 16
testified that [it] was a public road, freely used by the public” for more than fifty 17

years , the county maintained and graded the road, and on one occasion, the plaintiff 18

landowner told the defendant neighbor that he believed the road was a public road

. 198 Id. ¶ ¶ 6

- 7, 14. Noting that “[a] public highway can be established by use alone ,” the 1

Trigg Court highlighted that the character of the road is critical, stating, “ F requency 2
of use or number of users is unimportant, it being enough if use of the road in 3
question was free and common to all who had occasion to use it as a public 4
highway.” Id. ¶ ¶ 8

- 9 (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted) ; see also Koch 5

v. Mraz , 165 N.E. 343, 346 ( Ill. 1929) (“ The test whether a strip of ground has 6
become a public highway by user is, not the number of persons actually using it, but 7
the character of the use; that is, whether the publi c generally had free and unrestricted 8
right to use the road. ”). The Court also concluded that “[o]nce a road is found to be 9
open to the public and free and common to all citizens, [it] should be open for all 10
uses reasonably foreseeable
, ” thus setting out the boundaries of a public prescriptive 11

easement. Trigg , 1980

- NMCA

- 151, ¶ 9. 12

{12} The importance of a road’s character as public was later clarified in Luevano , 13
where the Court of Appeals reviewed a district court’s grant of a motion for summary 14
judgment in favor of a public prescriptive easement claim. 1994

- NMCA

- 051, ¶¶ 1, 15

8

- 9. “ Having determined there were no material issues of fact in dispute
, ” the d istrict 16

c ourt granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8. T he 17
defendants argued that a road on the plaintiffs’ pr operty was a public prescriptive 18

easement , presenting evidence that neighbors used the road, the county maintained 199 the road, public records show ed the road as a public road, and neighbors believed 1
the road was public

. See i d. ¶¶ 8

- 9 , 18

- 19, 22

. The Court of Appeals held that “ the 2
evidence of prescription was [not] suff icient to support judgment for [the 3

d] efendants as a matter of law. ” Id. ¶ 24. The Court first explained that , as a matter 4

of law, use by a landowner’s business invite es and neighbors is insufficient on its 5

own to establis h the public character of a road

. Id. ¶ 21 (“ We agree with [the 6

p] laintiffs that the evidence of use by their business invitees is not sufficient to 7
establish the public character of the road as a matter of law, and thus to support 8

s ummary judgment. ”). “ That is because their invitees’ use was use in effect by them. 9
No adverse public use result ed when the public utilized an access drive to reach a 10
specific business adjacent to it .” Id. (text only) 1 (citation omitted)

. However, the 11

Court of Appeals later explained that there was additional evidence that the road had 12
a reputation as public

. Id. ¶ 21 (“[ T] here is more here than use by [the p]laintiffs’ 13
invitees and by [the d]efendant neighbors .” ). The Luevano Court focused on 14

evidence that the road was shown as a public road in public records and testimony 15
from neighbors that they and their predecessors in interest believed the road was a 16

1 The “text only” parenthetical as used in this opinion indicates the omission

— for enhanced readability

— of all of the following nontextual marks that may be present in the source text: brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks.10 public road and that the road was referred to as a public road when they purchased 1
their properties. Id. ¶¶ 22

- 23. Notably, t he Court held that evidence of a road’s 2
reputation as public support s an inference that the road is “ ‘ open to the public ’ ” and 3

clarified that “ Trigg emphasizes chara cter rather than amount of use.” Id. ¶¶ 23, 25

- 4

26 (citation omitted)

. Explaining that “[ u ] nder Trigg , the evidence of the road’s 5
reputation certainly would support an inference of public use,” the Court ultimate ly 6

concluded that there was a triable issue as to whether evidence of the road’s 7
reputation as public “might have arisen at least in part as a result of [the p] laintiffs’ 8
business and the use made by their invitees.” Id. ¶ ¶ 24

- 26. 9

{13} T hus, Trigg and Luevano make clear that a claimant does not need to prove 10
frequency of use or a minimum number of users to establish public use . Altho ugh 11
public use can be proven with evidence of actual use by the pu blic, ultimately, a 12
claimant must prove that the road has a character or reputati on as public that does 13
not arise as a result of use by the landowner’s business and invitees

. 14

{14} In this case, t he Court of Appeals acknowledged that there was evidence to 15

support QR AI’s reputation as public, such as the County considering QR AI as a 16
public road for decades and the County expending funds on maintaining QR AI. 17

McFarland Land & Cattle Inc. , 2021

- NMCA

- 057, ¶ 9. However, the Court of 18
Appeals disregarded t his reputation evidence because the County and Defendants 1911 did not additionally show a suffic ient amount of actual use by the general public. Id. 1

¶ ¶ 10

- 12, 16 ( “ From the testimony elicited at trial, p ublic use of QR AI might have 2
amounted to five to ten times over an approximate thirty

- year period

. There was no 3

other evidence of actual use of the road by the general public .” )

. Moreover , the Court 4
of Appeals declined to consider the use by McFarlan d’s neighbors and invitees, 5
stating that “ use by neighbors and their invitees does not constitute use by the general 6
public

. ” Id. ¶ 16 (citing Luevano , 1994

- NMCA

- 051, ¶¶ 20

- 21 )

. As a re sult, the Court 7
of Appeals concluded that Defendants and the County failed to present clear and 8
convincing evidence of public use of QR AI necessary to establish a public 9
prescriptive easement

. Id. 10

{15} The Court of Appeals’ requirement in this case that a claimant prove a 11

minimum number of users or amount of use by the public is in direct conflict with 12
and is unworkable in light of the guideline s provided in Trigg and Luevano

. See 13

Trigg , 1980

- NMCA

- 151, ¶ 9 (“Frequency of use or number of users is unimportant, 14
it being enough if use of the road in question was free and common to all who had 15

occasion t o use it as a public highway.” ( text only) ( cit ation omitted) ) ; Luevano , 16

1994

- NMCA

- 051, ¶ 25 (“ Trigg emphasizes character rather than amount of use. ”)

. 17
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals over

- read Luevano as creating a per se rule that 18
evidence of use by neighbors or invitees cannot ever be considered to establish 1912 public use. See McFarland Land & Cattle Inc. , 202 1

- NMCA

- 057, ¶ 10

. However, 1

the Court in Luevano explained that neighbor and invitee use cannot, by itself
, 2
establish the public character of the road as a matter of la w. Luevano , 1994

- NMCA

3

051, ¶ 21. Rather, a claimant must present additional evidence demonstrating that a 4
road has a public character and that the character di d not arise as a result of a 5

landowner ’s business or use made by the landowner’s invitees. See i d. ¶ ¶ 21

- 23, 26. 6

{16} We adopt the principles set out in Trigg and Luevano and hold that when 7
proving a public prescriptive easement claim, one does not need to prove a minimum 8

number of users or frequency of use. Rather, a claimant only needs t o prove that “use 9
of the road in question was free and common to all who had occasion to use it as a 10
public highway.” Trigg , 1980

- NMCA

- 151, ¶ 9 (internal quotation marks and citation 11
omitted)

. Th us, when proving the public use element
, there must be eviden ce that 12

the road has a public character. See id. ; Luevano , 1994

- NMCA

- 051, ¶ 25. The public 13

character of a road must arise independently from the landowner’s business and 14

invitees

. See Luevano , 1994

- NMCA

- 051, ¶ 26. However, evidence of use by 15
neighbors and their invitees , though not dispositive, can be used to support a road’s 16
public character. See id. ¶ ¶ 21

- 23, 26 ; Trigg , 1980

- NMCA

- 151, ¶¶ 6

- 7

. It does not 17
make sense to conclude that a road with a clear reput ation as public is made less so 18

because neighbors use the road or because a claimant does not show a minimum 1913 amount of u se by other members of the public

. See Smith v. Bixby , 242 N.W. 2d 115, 1
118 ( Neb. 1976) ( “ The defendant cites no authority, nor do we find any, to support 2

the contention that when only a few members of the public use a road regularly, the 3
road may be deemed abandoned. Neither is there any authority to support the 4
proposition that public rights acquired by prescription are lost or abandoned because 5

of a substanti al reduction in the number of members of the public who continue to 6

make use of the rights previously acquired .”). Neighbors and their invitees are a class 7
of the public
, and evidence of their use can be considered along with other evidence 8

of a road ’s pub lic character. 9

{17} Therefore, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring the 10
County and Defendants to prove a minimum amount of use by the public in 11
establishing their public prescriptive easement claim and erred in holding that 12
evidence of neighbor or invitee use can never be considered to prove public use

. 13

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the District Court’s Conclusion of a 14 Public Prescriptive Easement 15

{18} Applying the principles articulated above, we determ ine that the Court of 16
Appeals ’ erred in holding that there was not substantial evidence to support the 17

district court’s conclusion s that the public used QR AI and that a public prescript ive 18

easement existed over it at the low water crossing

. S ee id. ¶¶ 16

- 17. 1914 {19} T he County and Defendants presented evidence of QR AI’s reputation as 1
public , including evidence that QR AI (1) appears on the 1956 Quay County General 2
Highway Map which the State Highway Department prepared
, (2) appears on the 3

1970 Quay County Roadmap which identifies it as a County

- maintained road
, and 4
(3) appears on County annual road certification maps from 1993 to 2017 a s a 5

County

- maintained road. Additionally, there was evidence that a connecting road, 6

QR 51, was also listed as a C ounty roa d in public records
, but the County decertified 7

QR 51 as a public road in a formal process and deleted it from the County’s 8
certification maps in 2018 . There is no evidence that QR AI was subject to that same 9
decertification process , which indicates that Q R AI still had a reputation as public 10
even though a connecting road did not

. Moreover, current and former C ounty 11
employees testified that they maintained and bladed QR AI, including the low water 12
crossing, for decades and that the County has made specific repairs to segments of 13
QR AI when needed and when requested b y property owners who use QR AI. 14
Finally, a title producer testified that the title company issued the ti tle insurance 15
policy to Caprock for the solar farm unde r the belief that QR AI was a public road. 16

{20} In addition , there was evidence that McFarland’s neighbors and their invitees 17

had used QR AI
, believing it was a public road, and that other members of the public 18

also used QR AI

. McFarland’s neighbors, Robert Abe rcrombie and Dean Hodges
, 1915 provided affidavit testimony that for more than forty ye ars, users of QR AI, 1
including the low water crossing, believed it was an open road for all to use, and the 2

users did not ask McFarland or its predecessors in title for permi ssion to use QR AI. 3

In their aff i davits, Abercrombie and Hodges also stated that McFarland never 4
attempted to stop them from using QR AI, and, although McFarland tried to block 5
the use of QR AI during construction of the solar farm
, the neighbors’ crossing s w ere 6
never interrupted. McFarland’s ran ch manager, Ted Quintana, also testified that he 7
observed neighboring landowners us ing the low water crossing. Additionally, 8
Hodges testified that he observed unknown members of the public traveling on QR 9

AI on a few occasions. This evidence of QR AI’s reputation as public as well as the 10

use made by McFarland’s neighbors pursuant to that reputation and the use made by 11

other members of the public substantially supports a determination that QR AI has 12
a public character

. 13

{21} Here and unlike the disputed portion of the road in Luevan o , th ere was no 14
evidence that the road’s character as public arose as a result of McFarland’s business 15

and the us e made by its invitees. See Luevano , 1994

- NMCA

- 051, ¶ 26. Instead , there 16
is evidence that QR AI had a reputation as a public road because Q R AI was listed 17
as a County road in public records for more than twenty years, QR AI was 18
maintained by the County for decades
, and McFarland’s neighbors as well as a local 1916 title co mpany believed that QR AI was an open road for all to use. From the record, 1
it appears that the neighbors’ and invitees’ use of QR AI arose from its reputation as 2
a public road, not that th e reputation as a public road arose as a result of the 3
neighbors’ and invitees’ use of the road. In addition, there was evidence that 4
unknown members of the public travelled on QR AI on a few occasions. 5

{22} The district court focused its findings and conclusio ns regarding the public 6
prescriptive easement mostly on the evidence of County ownership through maps, 7

certifications, and County maintenance. The district court also found that 8
McFarland’s neighbors used QR AI without McFarland’s express permission and 9

th at they never felt the need to ask McFarland for permission. Additionally, 10

McFarland never attempted to sto p its neighbors or others from using QR AI

. In fact, 11
McFarland made no effort to block the use of QR AI until after construction began 12

on the solar e nergy farm

. Moreover, to the extent that McFarland placed gates near 13
the low water crossing, the presence of gates did not interrupt the use by neighbors 14

or County maintenance. Finally, the district court fo und that a local title company 15

identified QR AI a s a public road based on County road maps and issued a title 16
insurance policy to Caprock for the solar farm under that belief. W e hold that the 17
evidence mentioned above substantially supports the district court’s finding s and its 18
conclusion that the public used QR AI. 1917 {23} B y reweighing the evidence presented to the district court described herein
, 1
the Court of Appeals disregarded its obligation to “not reweigh the e vidence n or 2

substitute [its ] judgment for that of the fact finder. ” Las Cruces Pro. Fire Fighters 3
v. City of Las Cruces , 1997

- NMCA

- 044, ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 329, 940 P.2d 177. “ T he 4
question is not whether substantial evidence would have supported an opposite 5

result ; it is whether such evid ence supports the result reached. ” Hernandez v. Mead 6

Foods, Inc. , 1986

- NMCA

- 020, ¶ 16, 104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645. Specifically, the 7
Court of Appeals relied on testimony from McFarland ’s president, Kelly McFarland, 8
about not seeing people crossing the prope rty “ willy

- nilly,” and from Quintana
, who 9
said he never saw strangers on the property, just neighbors. McFarland Land & 10

Cattle Inc. , 2021

- NMCA

- 057, ¶¶ 12

- 13. The Court of Appeals also gave more 11
weight to Hodges’ testimony that public users of the road woul d get permission
, and 12

to testimony from County employees that they never observed members of the public 13
using the road. Id. ¶ ¶ 14

- 15. While an appellate court may consider all the evidence 14
in its review for substantial evidence, the court may not reweigh e vidence and 15

reverse the district court because it would have come to a different conclusion

. See 16

Williams , 1989

- NMCA

- 008, ¶ ¶ 7

- 8 . Because there is substantial evidence to support 17

the district court’s determination , we affirm the district court’s conclusion that a 18
public prescriptive easement existed on QR AI at the low water crossing

. 1918 III. CONCLUSION 1

{24} The law of public prescriptive easem ents in New Mexico does not require a 2
showing of a minimum amount of use or number of users , as it is the public character 3
of the road that guides a fact finder’s determination of a public prescriptive 4

easement. Here, there is substantial evidence to suppo rt the district court’s 5
conclusion that the public used the low water crossing and that a public prescriptive 6

easement exist s over this portion of QR AI. As a result, we reverse the judgment of 7
the Court of Appeals and affirm the findings and conclusions o f the district court. 8

We remand to the district court to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and the 9
County on their public prescriptive easement claim. 10

{25} IT IS SO ORDERED. 11

12 DAVID K. THOMSON , Justice 13

WE CONCUR: 14

15 C. SHANNON BACON , Chief Justice 16

17 MICHAEL E. VIGIL , Justice 1819 1 BRIANA H. ZAMORA , Justice 2

3 LISA CHAVEZ ORTEGA , Ju dg e 4 Sitting by designation 5