NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 22-3451

___________

SHAWN T. WALKER,

Appellant

v.

GEORGE LITTLE, Acting Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections;

MR. J. HALL; KELLY LONG; MR. WILLIAMS, III; MR. B.A. GAY; MR. J. 

FREEMAN; MR. D.K. SMITH; MR. N. MACCAIN; MR. S. SWARY; MR. J. BLUME;

MR. C. FOREMAN; MR. M. SOMPEL; MR. W.L. JAMES; JOHN DOE; JANE ROE

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-04460)

District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

March 16, 2023

Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: March 20, 2023)

_________

OPINION*

_________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

PER CURIAM

Shawn T. Walker appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint for 

failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. For the reasons that follow, we will 

summarily affirm the District Court’s order.

Walker, a Pennsylvania prisoner, filed a civil rights complaint alleging that prison 

officials violated his rights in several instances when they gave him photocopies of his 

legal mail and kept the originals.1 He also alleged that on a few occasions prison officials 

returned his legal mail to the sender when Walker refused to sign the legal mail log to 

acknowledge that he had received his legal mail. Before service, the District Court 

dismissed Walker’s claims that Appellees’ actions violated due process, the Eighth 

Amendment, and his First Amendment right to access the courts. It also dismissed his 

claims for declaratory relief. Only Walker’s claims that his First Amendment right to 

free speech was violated remained. The Appellees then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing 

that Walker had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The District Court agreed 

and dismissed Walker’s complaint. Walker filed a timely notice of appeal.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A prisoner may not file a 

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until he has exhausted available administrative 

remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In order to properly exhaust a claim, a prisoner 

must comply with the prison’s deadlines and procedural rules. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the [Prison Litigation 

1 The prison officials were acting pursuant to a policy that has since been discontinued.
3

Reform Act], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 

199, 218 (2007). Appellees argued, and the District Court agreed, that Walker did not 

exhaust his claim for monetary relief because he did not request money damages in his 

grievance as required by the prison’s grievance policy. We exercise de novo review over 

the District Court’s determination that Walker failed to properly exhaust his 

administrative remedies. Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153 

(3d Cir. 2016). 

In Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004), we concluded that an inmate 

did not default his claim for money damages when he failed to request such damages in 

his grievance. The prison’s grievance policy at the time did not require an inmate to 

request specific relief in a grievance. See id. (examining prior exhaustion policy and 

noting that “[n]othing in the Grievance System Policy would have put Spruill on notice 

that he had to ask for money damages–or any particular form of relief at all.”). We noted 

that prison officials could amend the grievance policy to require more of inmates in order 

to exhaust a claim. Id. at 235. The prison officials in Pennsylvania did, in fact, amend 

the grievance policy to require that if an inmate seeks compensation, the inmate must 

request that relief in the grievance. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of 

Corrections, Inmate Grievance System, Policy No. DC-ADM 804(1)(A)(11)(d) (“If the 

inmate desires compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court, the 

inmate shall request the relief with specificity in his/her initial grievance.”); cf. Spruill, 

372 F.3d at 234 (contrasting language in prior policy with a potential amendment); Byrd

v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 2013) (concluding that prisoner failed to exhaust 
4

when he did not name defendant in his grievance as required by the prison grievance 

procedure).

In response to Appellees’ arguments in the District Court, Walker did not dispute 

that he did not request monetary relief in any of his grievances. Rather, he argued that 

the Inmate Handbook that he was given did not instruct inmates that they must request 

compensation in their grievances or refer them to any additional instructions or 

requirements. He is correct that the section of the handbook describing the grievance 

process does not include the requirement that specific relief such as monetary damages be 

requested. However, at the beginning of the handbook, the inmate is advised that any 

changes to the prison’s policies will be effective regardless of whether they are in the 

handbook. The inmate is informed that copies of the policies are available in his housing 

unit. Thus, Walker had notice that the inmate handbook may not include all the details of 

the grievance procedure. And as noted by the District Court, the inmate grievance form 

refers the inmate to DC-ADM 804 for the relevant procedures. Moreover, the 

instructions on the grievance form advise the inmate to “[s]tate all relief that you are 

seeking.” The Chief Grievance Officer in her Final Appeal Decisions for several 

grievances noted that Walker had sought no relief in his initial grievances. There was no 

misrepresentation by prison staff that rendered the grievance process unavailable to 

Walker. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644 (2016) (holding that there is an exception 

to the exhaustion requirement if the process is made unavailable by prison officials 

thwarting its use through “machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”); Hardy v. 

Shaikh, 959 F.3d 578, 588 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that inmate must show, inter alia, 
5

that the “misrepresentation is one which a reasonable inmate would be entitled to rely on 

and sufficiently misleading to interfere with a reasonable inmate’s use of the grievance 

process”).

The District Court did not err in determining that Walker had failed to properly 

exhaust his claim for money damages and dismissing his complaint. Summary action is 

appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the appeal. See 3d Cir. LAR 

27.4. For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will 

summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.2 Appellant’s 

motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.

2 We find no error in the District Court’s dismissal before service of Walker’s due 

process, legal access, and Eighth Amendment claims as well as his request for 

declaratory relief. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that in 

order to allege a claim of the denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must allege that he 

was hindered in his efforts to litigate a nonfrivolous or arguable claim); Hudson v. 

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that post-deprivation remedies provide 

sufficient due process for deprivations of property).