2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-13-2012

Hitham Abuhouran v. J. Grondolsky

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-3081

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Hitham Abuhouran v. J. Grondolsky" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 1297.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1297
1

ALD-122 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-3081

___________

HITHAM ABUHOURAN, Appellant

v.

WARDEN J. GRONDOLSKY

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 08-4379)

District Judge: Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise

____________________________________

Submitted on Appellant’s Motion to Reopen, Appellant’s Application 

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, and for Possible Summary Action 

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

March 1, 2012

Before: SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 13, 2012)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM.

Pro se appellant Hitham Abuhouran appeals the District Court’s order dismissing 

his motion under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons 

set forth below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
2

In 1995, Abuhouran pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania to numerous charges, including bank fraud in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 

and he was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment. Abuhouran appealed, and we 

affirmed the District Court’s judgment. United States v. Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206 (3d 

Cir. 1998).

Abuhouran has since filed a flurry of post-judgment motions, including two 

motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and several requests to this Court for permission to file 

successive § 2255 motions. All of these motions have been denied. 

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 

(2008), in which the Court, in a split opinion, interpreted the word “proceeds” as used in 

the money-laundering statute,1 Abuhouran sought permission to file a successive motion 

pursuant to § 2255 to challenge his convictions for money laundering. We denied the 

request but concluded that, because Abuhouran claimed that he was being detained for 

conduct that had subsequently been rendered non-criminal by an intervening Supreme 

Court decision, he could file a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district 

in which he was confined, the District of New Jersey. Abuhouran then filed a § 2241 

 

1

The relevant provision states as follows: “Whoever, knowing that the property involved 

in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, 

conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the 

proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . with the intent to promote the carrying on of 

specified unlawful activity . . . shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or 

twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or 

imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). 
3

petition, arguing that the transactions charged as money laundering in his case did not 

qualify as “proceeds” as defined by Santos. The District Court rejected this argument, 

holding that the transactions at issue were a proper basis for the money-laundering 

charges. Abuhouran appealed, and we affirmed. Abuhouran v. Grondolsky, 392 F. 

App’x 78 (3d Cir. 2010).2 

Abuhouran thereafter filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) in the District Court, 

arguing that the District Court’s denial of his § 2241 petition was “erroneous[] and 

mistaken[] because it misstated pertinent facts and failed to consider the totality of the 

claims disputing the accurate amount of money alleged to be laundered by the 

government.” More specifically, Abuhouran claimed that because he had used some of 

the money that he had obtained via bank fraud to fund construction, that money did not 

qualify as “proceeds” under Santos. As a consequence, he argued, his money-laundering 

convictions should be vacated or, at the least, he should be resentenced. The District 

Court dismissed Abuhouran’s motion, holding that there were “no extraordinary 

circumstances in this case that justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief.” Abuhouran also filed a 

motion to be released on bail, which the District Court denied. Abuhouran then filed a 

timely notice of appeal to this Court.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the District 

Court’s order for abuse of discretion. See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 

 

2 We discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in Santos in some detail in our previous 

opinion in this case, and need not repeat that discussion here. 
4

251 (3d Cir. 2008). As an initial matter, we will dispose of two preliminary issues. 

While Abuhouran’s appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the filing fees, he soon 

thereafter filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and a motion to reopen. 

We are satisfied that Abuhouran has established good cause to reopen his case, see 3d 

Cir. L.A.R. 107.2(a), and that he is entitled to proceed IFP, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

Accordingly, we will grant his motion to reopen and his IFP application.

Nevertheless, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. In his Rule 60(b)(6) 

motion, Abuhouran has argued that the District Court erred in applying the rule of Santos

to the facts of his case. However, this argument is indistinguishable from the arguments 

that he presented in support of his § 2241 petition, which both this Court and the District 

Court rejected. It is well established that “a Rule 60(b) motion may not be used as a 

substitute for appeal, and that legal error, without more, cannot justify granting a Rule 

60(b) motion.” Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1988); see also MartinezMcBean v. Gov’t of V.I., 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[I]t is improper to grant 

relief under Rule 60(b)(6) if the aggrieved party could have reasonably sought the same 

relief by means of appeal.”). Nor can Abuhouran use a Rule 60(b)(6) motion as a means 

of seeking review of our previous opinion in this case. See Reform Party v. Allegheny 

Cnty. Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 1999). The District Court therefore 

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Abuhouran was entitled to no relief under 
5

Rule 60(b)(6).3 

Accordingly, we grant Abuhouran’s motion to reopen and his IFP application, and 

will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 

 

3

To the extent that Abuhouran appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to be 

released on bail pending disposition of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, we will likewise affirm 

the District Court’s order. See Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3d Cir. 1992) 

(explaining that such a motion may be granted in only “extraordinary circumstances,” 

which are presented in “[v]ery few cases”).