Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DANIELLE L. GREGORY GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ROBERT J. HENKE

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

CHRISTINA D. PACE

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF )

THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF R.A., )

)

R.A., )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1403-JT-196

)

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores, Judge

The Honorable Larry E. Bradley, Magistrate

Cause No. 49D09-1308-JT-16200

November 17, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

R.A., Sr. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights over 

his minor child R.A., Jr. (“Child”). Father raises a single issue for our review, namely, 

whether the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) presented sufficient evidence 

to support the termination of his parental rights.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 2011, Child was born to T.G. (“Mother”), and Father signed a paternity 

affidavit at the hospital. At that time, Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) were 

unmarried and nineteen- and eighteen-years-old, respectively. The three lived with 

Father’s parents (“Paternal Grandfather” and “Paternal Grandmother,” collectively, 

“Paternal Grandparents”)

1 at Father’s parents’ home. At some point between April 2011 

and August 2012, Mother and Father had an argument and ended their relationship. 

Mother took Child to live with her at the home of her mother (“Maternal Grandmother”). 

Father continued to live with Paternal Grandparents at their home. Parents arranged 

custody, visitation, and support without court intervention. 

On August 29, 2012, while in Mother’s care, Child was admitted to a hospital in 

Indianapolis with “severe bruising to his head, arm, groin, and legs, blistering on his 

 

1

 We note that, throughout the termination hearing, when counsel for DCS referred to Father’s 

relationship with Paternal Grandmother, counsel repeatedly referred to Paternal Grandmother as Father’s 

“mommy.” Non-exhaustive examples include: “So, he lives with his mommy . . . ?” Tr. at 16. “His 

mommy was contacting you?” Id. at 22. “Father also uses his mommy’s email account . . . ?” Id. 

“[Y]ou’re [Child’s] parent and you’re responsible for him . . . . Not your mommy, you.” Id. at 67. “Oh, 

so this was his mommy’s input rather than his?” Id. at 84. Counsel continued to do so after Father 

corrected her. See id. at 67. Counsel’s terminology comes across to this court as condescending,

disrespectful, and unprofessional. Counsel had strong evidence in support of DCS’s petition to terminate 

Father’s parental rights, and she should have relied on that evidence alone, without disparaging Father

through her editorial remarks.
3

thighs and foot, dangerously high blood sugar, and compartment syndrome in his leg that 

required immediate emergency surgery.” Exh. 1. Child’s injuries placed him in danger 

of kidney failure and amputation of his leg. Further, physicians determined that Child’s 

injuries did not result from an accident but from abuse or neglect. Father did not 

contribute to Child’s injuries.

On August 31, 2012, as a consequence of Child’s injuries, DCS filed a petition 

alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”), and, at a detention hearing 

conducted that same day, the juvenile court removed Child from Parents’ care. In doing 

so, the court authorized placement of Child in either foster or relative care after Child’s 

future release from the hospital, where he remained for some time. Despite the approval 

of relative care, however, DCS advised the court that Child could not be placed in either 

Maternal Grandmother’s or Paternal Grandparents’ home. Maternal Grandmother was 

disqualified from placement because of a history with child protective services, and 

Paternal Grandparents’ home was disqualified due to Paternal Grandfather’s “extensive 

criminal history.”2 Exh. 4. Thus, after his release from the hospital, on September 26, 

Child received a temporary placement in therapeutic foster care, but, at some point, DCS 

revoked the disqualification of Maternal Grandmother and subsequently placed Child in 

her temporary care.

3

 

2

 Korina Galang, a family case manager with DCS, testified, albeit from an insecure memory, 

that Paternal Grandfather’s criminal history included public intoxication, domestic violence, threatening a 

police officer, prostitution, and theft. She stated his record did include felony convictions, but Father and 

Paternal Grandmother disputed this. In this regard, we consider only Galang’s testimony because it is the 

most favorable to the trial court’s judgment. See Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In 

re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

3

 Child was placed in Maternal Grandmother’s care on January 22, 2013. The record does not 

disclose the reasons for DCS’s reversal regarding the placement of Child with Maternal Grandmother.
4

On October 23, 2012, the court held a hearing and adjudicated Child a CHINS 

after Father waived a fact-finding hearing and after Mother conceded that Child was a 

CHINS. While the court ordered that Child stay in his foster-care placement, it cited 

reunification with Parents as Child’s permanency plan. In pursuit of this plan, the court 

issued a Parental Participation Order on November 13, which, in relevant part, required 

Father to stay in touch with DCS and to:

 KEEP ALL APPOINTMENTS: [Father] agrees that all appointments 

with any service provider, DCS, or CASA/GAL will be kept or advance 

notice and good cause will be given to the service provider, CASA/GAL 

and the Family Case Manager for the missed appointment.

* * *

 HOME[-]BASED COUNSELING: [Father] will become engaged in a 

home-based counseling program referred by the Family Case Manager. 

All members of the family are to actively participate to the extent 

recommended by the provider and DCS.

 VISITATION: [Father] will attend all scheduled visitations with the 

child[] and comply with all visitation rules and procedures set forth by 

DCS or the service provider coordinating and/or supervising the visit(s).

 ADDITIONAL: [Father] shall participate in a parenting education 

program.

Exh. 7 (emphasis in original). Home-based counseling included referrals for Father to 

complete home-based management and therapy. Father’s treatment plan set goals for 

him to obtain his G.E.D., obtain employment, and secure housing independent of his 

parents. Father was reminded that, as a result of Paternal Grandfather’s criminal record, 

Father would have to obtain his own home before he could receive custody of Child. 

Father testified to his awareness of this restriction.
5

By all accounts, at the beginning of Father’s involvement with DCS, he engaged 

with his providers and the services offered to him. He attended supervised visitations 

with Child, sought employment, and maintained contact with DCS. However, the 

relationship between Father and DCS soured and Father disengaged. 

At least in part, this deterioration resulted from conflicts between Paternal 

Grandmother and DCS service providers. For example, DCS initially conducted 

supervised visitations in Paternal Grandparents’ home, where Father continued to reside. 

However, Paternal Grandmother would “bicker[]” with the supervising provider during 

visits, as well as send quarrelsome emails in the interim, which resulted in subsequent 

supervised visitations being conducted at a nearby fast-food restaurant. Tr. at 80. 

Mother testified that she was frustrated with DCS because Father did not injure Child and 

because DCS previously had placed another of Father’s children with Father in Paternal 

Grandparents’ home. Consequently, Paternal Grandmother could not understand why 

DCS now refused to place Child with Father based on Paternal Grandfather’s criminal 

history.

4

Father’s issues with visitation extended beyond Maternal Grandmother, however. 

DCS also reported that Father did not engage with Child during visits. If Mother also 

attended, Father deferred parenting to Mother, and if Paternal Grandmother attended, 

Father mostly deferred parenting to Paternal Grandmother. Father’s problems with 

visitation culminated on December 5, 2012. Father arrived late to that visit, which took 

 

4

 The record discloses that, when DCS placed Father’s other child with him in Paternal 

Grandparents’ home, Father told DCS that Paternal Grandfather did not live in the home. Again, we note 

that Father and Paternal Grandmother disputed this, but we consider only the evidence most favorable to 

the judgment.
6

place at the restaurant, and Father brought his brother, his brother’s girlfriend, and 

Maternal Grandmother with him. Although these individuals did not participate in the 

visitation, according to DCS providers, their mere presence made the visitation 

“awkward,” “uncomfortable,” and “hostile.” Tr. at 81-82, 96. As a result, DCS ended 

the visitation early, and, when the providers attempted to discuss the visitation with 

Father, he placed his earbud headphones into his ears, refused to participate, and walked 

out on the discussion. 

After this incident, DCS again moved the visitations, this time to Damar Services, 

located in Decatur, and informed Paternal Grandmother that she could no longer attend. 

Father, who did not have a car, relied on Paternal Grandmother for transportation, and 

Paternal Grandmother informed DCS that, if the visits were moved to Damar, Father 

would not attend. Paternal Grandmother stated that the visits were too far away. Father 

also indicated to DCS that he had no means of transportation to Damar. In turn, DCS 

recommended that Father obtain a bus pass, which DCS could help Father attain, to 

attend visitations. Father did not do so. Instead, he told his case manager, “I’m not doing 

anything anymore.” Tr. at 15. Father did not visit Child after December 5.

DCS also issued unsuccessful discharges to Father for all other services—homebased therapy, home-based case management, and parenting education classes—because 

Father did not engage his service providers and did not achieve his treatment goals. 

Father did not obtain his G.E.D.,5failed to obtain employment,6 and did not acquire 

 

5

 Father testified that he had “been thinking about” enrolling in a G.E.D. program, but “ain’t got 

to it yet.” Tr. at 60.
7

independent housing.7 Father applied for only four jobs, which his case manager 

regarded as insufficient. And Father attended only one of eight parenting education 

classes because “not[h]ing was different” from the parenting education classes that he 

took in high school. Id. at 65. Despite this, DCS either re-issued, renewed, or kept open 

Father’s referrals for services, but Father never reengaged. Finally, Father failed to 

appear at several court hearings in 2013. Consequently, on August 27, 2013, DCS 

changed Child’s permanency plan from reunification with Parents to adoption by 

Maternal Grandmother, with whom, during his placement in her care, Child had thrived. 

Mother consented to the adoption,8 but Father did not. Father stated that he would 

consent, however, if Paternal Grandmother could adopt Child, but, due to Paternal 

Grandfather’s criminal record, this was not an option.

The juvenile court held a parental rights termination hearing on February 20, 2014, 

at which all DCS providers recommended severance of Father’s parent-child relationship 

with Child, and, after the hearing, the court terminated Father’s parental rights. In so 

holding, the court entered several findings and conclusions:

8. [Father] resided with his mother, father, and [other] son through the 

[CHINS] case.

 

6

 Father testified that he had worked side jobs but got paid under the table and had not paid taxes. 

Further, at the time of the termination hearing, he had been unemployed for several months. And Father 

stated that, to support Child, he “would have to go out and find an actual job.” Tr. at 67.

7

 Father testified that he did not acquire independent housing because he “can’t get stable enough 

to actually move out of [his parents’] house and keep money in [his] pocket to take care of [his] kids and 

pay bills and all that.” Tr. at 58. It appears that Paternal Grandmother supported Child through her food 

stamps; Father did not receive public assistance, but testified that he and Child were included under 

Paternal Grandmother’s assistance. In addition, Father testified that he had no current income other than 

the support he received from his Parents.

8

 Mother was, therefore, dismissed from the action.
8

9. [Father] needed independent housing as a condition to having 

[Child] placed with him since the paternal grandfather’s criminal history 

precluded placement in the home.

10. [Father’s] employment is inconsistent with him not having money to 

get to visitation. He does “side jobs” but has not worked for two months.

11. Services ordered and referred included home[-]based case 

management and therapy. Home[-]based services goals included obtaining 

a GED, employment and housing, budgeting[,] and working on parenting 

skills.

12. Because of [Child’s] severe injuries sustained while in his mother’s 

care, it was thought that reunification would move toward [Father] at the 

beginning of the [CHINS] case.

13. [Father] initially engaged, and appeared motivated, in services. 

However, by late 2012, he had stopped participation and informed the 

family case manager that he would not do anything else”. [sic]

14. [Father] does not feel he needs services to appropriately raise [Child]

and provide for him.

15. [Father] did not make progress on established goals. He failed to 

follow up on job applications and “has not gotten to his GED yet.”

16. [Father] attended one of eight parenting education sessions. His 

behavior at visits was described as uncomfortable and non-engaged.

17. As a result of what appeared to be intermeddling by [Father’s] 

family members, his visitation was moved to Damar. [Father] failed to 

follow up with visitation after that and last saw his son in December of 

2012. He has not contacted the family case manager to inquire as to 

[Child].

18. [Father] failed to attend almost all [CHINS] Court hearings after 

2012.

19. [Child] is in pre-adoptive care with his maternal grandmother with 

whom [Child] has spent most of life. He has been observed as being very 

bonded with his grandmother.

20. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in 

[Child’s] removal and continued placement outside the home will not be 
9

remedied by his father. While in services, [Father] failed to make progress, 

due to lack of follow through. He then quit services, including visitation 

and did not show an interest in his child. [Father] has wasted the 

opportunity extended to him to be an appropriate parent to [Child].

21. Continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to 

[Child’s] well-being in that it would pose as a barrier in obtaining 

permanency for him through an adoption.

22. [Child’s] Guardian ad Litem, Lindsay Hakes, recommends adoption 

as being in the best interests of [Child]. She bas[e]s this on [Father’s] lack 

of participation in services, his lack of knowing [Child], and [Child] being 

bonded now into his current home.

23. There exists a satisfactory plan for the future care and treatment of 

[Child], that being adoption.

24. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interests of 

[Child]. Termination would allow for [Child] to be adopted into a stable 

and permanent home where his needs will continue to be met.

Appellant’s App. at 11-12. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Father contends that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the 

termination of his parental rights under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2). He 

challenges the court’s conclusions that “[t]here is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the 

home of the parents will not be remedied,” I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), and that “[t]here 

is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child,” I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii). “Because that 

provision is written in the disjunctive, we address only the dispositive issue of whether 

sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that “[c]ontinuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to [Child’s] well-being in that it would pose as a 
10

barrier in obtaining permanency for him through an adoption.” Father also challenges the 

juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child’s 

best interests because it would provide a “stable and permanent home where his needs 

will continue to be met.” Appellant’s App. at 12. We address each of Father’s 

contentions in turn.

We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of 

parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Div. of Family & 

Children (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a 

trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when 

evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Ofc. of 

Family & Children (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination 

of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and physical 

development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be 

terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights 

may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental 

responsibilities. Id. at 836.

Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, in 

relevant part, DCS is required to allege and prove:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least 

six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

* * *
11

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted 

in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home 

of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being 

of the child.

* * *

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2014). That statute provides that DCS need establish only 

one of the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) before the trial court may terminate 

parental rights. DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of 

‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 

N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2).

When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence 

or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Ofc. of Family & 

Children (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, 

we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the 

judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the 

evidence, we will set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship 

only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re 

L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). trans. denied.
12

Here, in terminating Father’s parental rights, the trial court entered specific

findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment contains special

findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. 

Ofc. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine 

whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the 

findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record 

contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 

N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s 

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

Father concedes that Child had been removed from his care for a period of at least 

six months and that the adoption plan was satisfactory. See I.C. §§ 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(A)(i), (D). However, Father challenges the juvenile court’s findings, numbered

nine, ten, thirteen, and fifteen—“that Father needed independent housing, his 

employment was inconsistent with his having money to visit [Child], [Father] stopped 

participating in services, and [Father] did not make progress on established goals . . . .” 

In addition, Father asserts that these findings fail to support the court’s conclusions.

Findings of Fact

Father first argues that the juvenile court’s finding that he needed independent 

housing is clearly erroneous because his housing with Paternal Grandparents was stable, 

as evidenced by the prior placement by DCS of his other child in that home and by 

Paternal Grandmother’s testimony that the home contained everything to meet Child’s 
13

needs. He concludes that “[t]here was no testimony by any witness that the condition of 

Father’s home was inappropriate in anyway [sic].” Appellant’s Br. at 17.

However, Father’s argument amounts to a request for us to reweigh the evidence, 

which we will not do. And Father misstates the evidence. Korina Galang, a Family 

Case Manager with DCS, testified that she had discussed at length with Father that 

Paternal Grandfather’s criminal history precluded Child’s placement into Paternal 

Grandparents’ home. Father testified that he knew about this restriction but did not 

understand it because he did not harm Child and because of the placement of his other 

child into his care while he lived in that home.9 However, the evidence most favorable to 

the termination demonstrates that DCS only placed that child into Father’s care because 

Father and his family had told DCS that Paternal Grandfather did not live in the home. It 

does not matter that Father did not harm Child or that the home could provide other 

necessities; DCS could not place Child with Father while he lived in Paternal 

Grandparents’ home, and Father failed to obtain independent housing. This finding is not 

clearly erroneous.

Next, Father contends that he received sufficient income, “under the 

circumstances,” to provide a stable home for Child, which, he argues, makes finding 10 

clearly erroneous. Id. at 22. Moreover, he asserts that his income was irrelevant to his 

ability to visit with Child. But the evidence indicates the opposite. Father never held or 

obtained steady, established employment throughout the pendency of the termination 

proceedings. He lacked a G.E.D., which, he acknowledges, hindered his employment 

 

9

 Father also disputes the severity of Paternal Grandfather’s criminal history, based on Father’s

and Paternal Grandmother’s testimony. But this argument would require us to reweigh the evidence and 

judge the credibility of witnesses.
14

prospects, but he never enrolled in a G.E.D. program. Consequently, Father worked only 

odd jobs for under-the-table pay. Indeed, far from having a sufficient income, Father 

testified that both he and Child relied on Paternal Grandparents for support; he 

acknowledged his own instability and inability to appropriately manage his money. 

Father did not have a car, and he did not exercise visitation after December 2012. 

Finally, Father testified that, in order for him to independently care for Child, he would 

have to “find an actual job.” Tr. at 67. Thus, the trial court could fairly infer that 

Father’s lack of employment and income contributed to Father’s nonparticipation in 

visitation. Had Father obtained a job, he would have reduced his dependence on Paternal 

Grandmother. Further, with an income, he could have purchased a car or bus passes to 

get to visitations. Father’s argument on this finding does not persuade us that the juvenile 

court’s finding is clearly erroneous.

Father also asserts that finding thirteen, which states that Father stopped 

participating in services and would not pursue DCS services further, is clearly erroneous. 

But Father concedes that he failed to complete all DCS-provided services. And, rather 

than present a cogent explanation about why this finding is clearly erroneous, Father 

instead attempts to offer excuses for failing to complete the court-ordered services. See

Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). He states that he “did not find it necessary to complete 

the same [parenting] class again,” that he “did not voluntarily stop participating in 

visitation,” and that DCS “has failed to show how these services were necessary for the 

successful reunification of [Child] in Father’s care.” Appellant’s Br. at 23-24. As an 

initial matter, the court ordered father to complete the DCS services, and it could have 
15

logically concluded that these services were necessary. Father conceived two children as 

a minor, both of whom required DCS services. Moreover, Father lived with his parents, 

lacked a high-school education, had no job, and relied entirely on his parents for his 

support. Moreover, Father’s providers testified that he did not parent during the early 

visitations that he did attend but, instead, deferred to others. And the evidence shows that 

Father told his care providers that he would not do “anything anymore.” Tr. at 15. Thus, 

we decline to hold that this finding is clearly erroneous.

Finally, Father contends that finding fifteen, which states that Father failed to 

make progress on his established goals, is clearly erroneous. But, again, Father does not 

dispute that he did not get his G.E.D., did not secure stable employment, and did not 

obtain independent housing. For all the reasons above, we again hold that this finding is 

supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm on this issue.

Well-Being of Child

Father also contends that the juvenile court’s findings of fact do not support its 

conclusions under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2). We again note that Indiana 

Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. Thus, with regards to 

subsection (B), we consider only the dispositive issue of whether the court’s findings 

support the conclusion that “[t]here is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.” I.C. § 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B)(ii). In this regard, continued custody by the parent need not be “wholly 

inadequate for the children’s very survival. Rather, it is sufficient to show that the 

children’s emotional and physical development are threatened by the parent’s custody.” 
16

C.A. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “The court 

need not wait until a child is harmed irreversibly before terminating the parent-child 

relationship.” Id. at 94 (quoting In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)). 

In C.A., we held that evidence was sufficient to terminate the parent-child 

relationship where the parent failed to meet with her service providers, did not complete 

therapy, resided with a person who had a substantial criminal history, had long-term 

stability issues, lacked motivation to visit the children, missed several weeks of visitation, 

and was disengaged during the visitations that she did attend. Id. We agree with the 

analysis in C.A. Thus, we hold that the court’s findings here support its conclusion that a 

continued parent-child relationship threated the well-being of Child. 

Child’s Best Interests

Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) also requires that termination of the parent-child 

relationship be in the best interests of the child, and Father contends the evidence does 

not support this determination. Here, “the trial court [was] required to look beyond the 

factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. In so doing, the trial 

court must [have] subordinated the interests of the parent to those of the child.” C.A., 15 

N.E.3d at 94. A juvenile court should consider the recommendations of the case manager 

and court-appointed advocate when it determines whether termination is in a child’s best 

interest. See J.C., 994 N.E.2d at 290. “A parent’s historical inability to provide a 

suitable environment, along with the parent’s current inability to do the same, supports 

finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” Id.
17

We hold that termination was in Child’s best interests. All DCS providers who 

testified and Child’s guardian ad litem recommended termination of the parent-child 

relationship between Father and Child. Further, Father was wholly unable, both 

historically and at the time of the termination hearing, to support Child. Again, Father 

was unemployed, undereducated, and noncompliant with his court-ordered parenting 

plan. Father relied on Paternal Grandparents for sustenance and testified that he could 

not support himself or maintain an independent residence. Father, therefore, could not 

provide a suitable environment for child or fulfill his parental responsibilities. The 

evidence was sufficient to conclude that the child’s best interests supported termination 

of the parent-child relationship, and we affirm on this issue.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.