### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE D ec em be r 7, 200 4 S es sio n

AU STA LA VIST A, LLC and TA KE IT EA SY , L LC, and BO AR DWA LK PR OPE RTY OWN ERS AS SOC IATION , v. MA RIN ER’ S P OINTE INTE RV AL OWNE RS AS SOC IATION , IN C. , and HEN RY PH ILLIPS , in di vid ua lly

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Cum berland Coun ty No. 8339-899 Hon. Ver non Neal, Chan cellor

No. E2004-00184-COA- R3-CV - F ILED MARCH 17, 2005

I n this disput e, plaintiffs soug ht declar atory judgme nt as to use of their la ke by defe ndant, pay ment of fe es and injunctive r elief. D efe ndant counter -cla imed for a decla ratory judgme nt a s to its use of the lake
, d isputed any

obliga tion to pay

fee s to the plaintiff, and soug ht monetary damag es and attorney ’s fe es. The T rial Court he ld tha t plaintiffs’ owned the lake a nd the master de ed provide d fo r m a int e na nc e fe e a ndme mbe rs hip fe e s, that de fe nd a nt’ s membe rs we re re qu ir e d to pay . Bu t if the de fe nd a nts ’ m e mbe rs didno t us e the lake the y wo uldno t be re qu ir e d to pa y the fe e s. On app e a l, we hold the C ourt corr ectly found that the lake was a n amenity and that a la

ke use f ee w as re quired to be paid to plaintiffs pursua nt to the master de ed and e x hibits. But the Court erre d in holding that defe n d an t owner s could choose not to use the lake a nd not pay the fe es. We otherwise aff irm the Cou rt ’s ru lin g s o n th e iss ue s r a ise d o n a pp e a l.

T en n . R. App. P.3 A ppeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed in Par t, Re ve r se d in P ar t, and R e m ande d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which S HAR ON G. LEE , J
., and W I L L I AM H. I NMAN , Sp. J ., joined.

Ga ry R. Patr ic k, Chatta no og a , T e nn e sse e , f or app e lla nt.

M. Tay lor H arris, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or appe llee, Mariner’s Pointe I nterva l Owner s Association, I nc.-2- OP IN ION

Plaintiffs’ action ag ainst Mariner ’s Pointe I nterv al Owners Association, I nc., (MPI OA) a sked injunctive re lief, quiet title, decla ratory judgme nt, and pay ment of fe es. Plaintiffs alleg ed that they owned L ake Holiday
, which borde red a 25 acr e tra ct of prope rty

owned by MPI OA,

as we l l as sever al hundre d adjoining a cre s of prope rty . They claim that their pre dece ssor in titl e, Boa rdwa lk, had owned pla intiffs’ and de fenda nt’s p ro perties, a nd a re g istered doc ument titled “De clar ation of Horizontal Prope rty Reg ime and Master Dee d” (“ma ster deed” ) on Marc h 31, 1981,

a llo we d the sa le of tim e -s ha re int e re sts in pr op e rt y no w ow ne d by de fe nd a nt. Am e nd me nts to this document we re f

iled over the ensuing y ear s by Boa rdwa lk and it s succe ssor, L ake Prope rties, I nc.

The Complaint alleg ed that MPI OA boug ht the 25 acr e t ract known as Mar iner’s Pointe after it wa s seized by the I RS i n 1993, and that MPI OA then f il ed a d o cu m ent which purported to be an ame ndment to the above- ref ere nced doc ument, which s ignif icantly chang ed rele vant portions of the doc ument, namely the right of B oardw alk or its succe ssors to control the lake

or re c e ive fe e s f

ro m sa me . Pl a int if

fs a ve rr e d th a t MPI OA wa s se lli ng we e kly tim e -s ha re s o n it s property , but telling purcha sers that they had the rig ht to use the lake y ear round, and a

decla ratory judgme nt was soug ht to the effe ct t hat M PI OA had no rig ht to use t he lake, or i f they did have a

rig ht to i ts u se , it

wa s o nly fo r tho se we e ks wh ic h ha d be e n pu rc ha se d a s a tim e -s ha re int e re st, a ndon ly afte r paying the appropriate fe e.

Plaintiffs also sought a n injunction preventing people f rom using the lake who ha d no rig ht, sought c lear

title to the lake, and asked for damag es for non-payment of fees for the us e of the lake.

MPI OA Answered and fil ed a Counterclaim for Dec lara tory J udg ments, I njunctions

a ndDa ma g e s. I t a dmi tte d th a t it wa s a “ no t- fo r- pr of

it c on domi ni um a sso c ia tio n w ho se approximately

2,000 members own a n equal sha re of Mariner ’s Pointe Re sort, consisting of 25.25 improved ac res, a n appurte nant ea sement for nonexclusive use of L ake Holiday , and buildings a nd other improveme nts ex tending into L ake H oliday which have been use d continuously by Def endant

s i n c e 1 9 8 1

. ” D e f

e n d a n ta v e rr e d t h a tp l a i n t i f f s h a v e n o r i g h tt o c l a i m c o n t r o l o f L a k e H o l i d a y, beca use the l ak e i s an impoundment of the Obed River , is reg ulated by the Tenne ssee Wildlife Resource s Ag ency (“TWRA”) and t he C ity of C rossville, and C rossville has t he right t o take water from L ake H oliday

by use of the da m. Defe n d ant also asserted that the or igina l Decla ration of Ho ri zon ta l Pr op e rt y Re g ime a nd Ma ste r De e d g a ve thec on do min ium pr op e rt y ow ne rs “ e a se me nts and rig hts appurtena nt thereto” including the use of r ecr eational a menities, such as the lake.

De fe nd a nt a lso a ve rr e d th a t th e mari na bu ild ing e xten de d f

ro m de fe nd a nt’ s p ro pe rt y into and o v er t h e l ak e, and w as shown as a n improvement to defe ndant’s tax parce l in the tax assessor’ s office . I t claimed that in addition there was a fishing pie r, boat ramp, beac h are a, lake side boardw alk, and boa t slips, which it owned and which we re attached to its land/buildings, and f or which it maintained, oper ated, a nd paid utiliti es, taxes and i nsuranc e. Defendant claimed that it was-3-

a succ essor in intere st to B oardw alk, and that it owne d all “ea sements and r ights a ppurtena nt thereto, intended for use in c onnection with the Condomini um”, which g ave it the r ight to use the lake a nd to collect fe es for

the use fr om its m ember s.

Def endant a lso raised the a ffirma tive defe nse of estoppel, claiming its members had relied on repr esenta tions made by plaintiffs’ prede cessor , L ake Prope rties, I nc., whe rein they wer e told that they

had per petual rig hts to use the lake a nd rela ted re cre ational fa cilities. That plaintiffs had allowe d defe ndant’s member s to use the lake f or 3 1⁄2 y ear s after

plainti ff s ’ purchased the
property

. I t also raised the defe nse of res judicata based on a prior la wsuit betwee n defe ndant and L ake Prope rties, I nc., and its Chapter 11 bankruptc y , as well as lache s, unclea n hands, and statutes of limitation.

De fe nd ant ask ed the C ou rt to d e c lare that it s me mbe rs c ou ld u se the lake , th a t it s members did not have to pay fee s to plaintiffs, and that pl aintiffs be e njoined from tre spassing on defe ndant’s prope rty , and for monetary damag es and attorney s fee s. Ultimate ly
, the Court conducte d an evide ntiary

hearing in Aug ust of 2003. Following the hea ring , the Court took the matter unde r advisement a nd delivere d a benc h ruling on November 21, 2003. The Court held that the lake wa s clea rly an ame nity , and that MPI OA admitted as m u ch in i ts Answer. The Court found there was no dispute that Austa owned the lake, and that the master deed provided for a maintena nce f ee a nd a member ship fee, a nd that the member ship fee w as for the use of a menities owned by Boa rdwa lk. Further, the Court sa id the master deed stated that failure to pay a fee would prec lude the owne r fr om using the amenities, and tha t the public offe ring filed the same date as the master deed also said the membership fe e wa s for t h e use of Boa rdwa lk-owned a menities, and that the Purcha ser/Seller Ve ri fi c a tio n li ste d th e lake a s a n a me nit y

. Th e Cou rt fo un d th a t MPI OA re lie d o n th e se do c ume nts in its Answer, and was judi cially estopped from taking a contrary position. The Court also held that the ma ste r d e e d prov ide d th a t a ll p ro vis ion s w e re c ov e na nts ru nn ing wi th the la nda nda ll u nit

owner s and their a ssigns we re bound by these c ovenants.

Th e Cou rt

sa id tha t w hile Board wa lk o wn e d th e de ve lop me nt, a ll f e e s w e nt t o Boa rdwa lk, and that L PI collecte d fee s from int erva l owner s in the form of a sing le maintenanc e fe e. The Court found that afte r MPI OA soug ht to amend the master deed, it then a sked the ba nkruptcy court to rule that res judicata would bar the plaintiffs’ c laims, but the bankruptcy court re fused. The Court noted that Austa did not own the prope rty when MP I OA went into bankruptc y , and Mary L ou Wibel, principal owner a nd manag er of Austa, testified that she ne ver kne w that MPI OA had tr ied to amend the master deed. The Court f ound that no one g ave MPI OA conse nt to amend the master deed.

T h e C o u rt fo u n d t h at L P I s o l d t o Au s t a i n 1 9 9 5
, an d t h at Au s t a t h en s o u gh tt o ch ar ge int e rv a l ow ne rs a

fe e fo r the us e of

Au sta ’s a me nit ie s, a nd that othe r pr op e rt y ow ne rs pa id s uc h f e e s. The Court found that MPI OA cha rg ed a ma intenance fe e t o t he interva l owners, a nd one owne r te sti fi e d th a t sh e tho ug ht the lake us e fe e wa s in c lud e d. Th e Co urt fo un d th a t MPI OA too k th os e fee s and used them to pay

expenses for its property , and paid nothing to Austa, and that if the inter val

owner s wished to use Austa’ s lake, they had to pay a fe e of $3.00 f or their we ek, or $156.00 if the y-4-

wa nte d to us e it f

or the wh ole y e ar. B ut i f the int e rv a l ow ne r d id no t wi sh to u se the lake , th e y did not have to pay

a fe e.

The Court held that Austa or i t s succe ssors could not raise the se fe es until they de mon str a te d th a t th e c os t of ma int a ini ng the lake e xce e de d th e fe e s col le c te d, a ndthat r e s ju dic a ta didno t ari se fr om the pr e vio us Sta te c ou rt pr oc e e din g s. Al so the re ha d b e e n n o w a ive r b y Au sta to collect suc h fee s. The Court found no lac hes or a bandonment, and tha t Austa had the right to make

rea sonable rule s with respec t to the use of the lake
, but could not prohibit paddle boats. The Court fo un d th a t MPI OA ha d th e ri g ht t o mak e re a so na ble ru le s f

or the wate r w ith in 3 00 fe e t of its dock/marina

.

Plaintiffs and defe ndant have appea led, and these issues are prese nted for r eview:

1. Whe the r the tr ia l c ourt err e d in de te rm ini ng tha t MPI OA ha s th e ri g ht t o make r e a s o n ab le ru le s a n d r e g u lati o n s o f th e ar e a o f la k e w ith in thr ee hundred f eet of its marina, dock a nd shoreline?

2. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in determining t h at an inter val owner is not limit ed to the we ek of inter val owner ship in using the lake ?

3. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in det erm in in g that ne ith e r A us ta no r i ts

succe ssors could incre as e the fe e cha rg ed for use of the la

ke until its was shown that the expenses of stocking and maintaining the lake e x cee ded the fee s collecte d from all sourc es for its use?

4

. Whe th e r th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d in d e te r mi n in g th a t n o f e e w a s r e q uired if the interval owne r did not wish to use the lake?

5. Whether the trial court err ed in finding that the 1981 Master Dee d contains

a restric tive covena nt r equiring timeshare owner s to pay a fe e to use the lake?

6. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in holding tha t MPI OA could not amend the Master D eed w ithout approval of Austa ?

7. Whether plaintiffs’ c laims are ba rre d by waiver , est oppel and/or unc lean ha nd s?

The rig ht to use the lake a nd fee s relate d to its use, are esse ntially controlled by

the do c ume nts wh ic h w e re int ro du c e d a s e xhibi ts at tr ia l, i .e ., the ma ste r d e e d a nd its re la te d e xhibi ts and ame ndments. The Tria l Court found t hat t he lake was clearly intended to be an a menity pursuant to the ma ste r d e e d a nd

its re la te d d oc ume nts , a ndwa s a lso int e nd e d f or us e by the int e rv a l ow ne rs , su bje c t to the pa y me nt o f a ny re qu ir e d f

e e s. MPI OA argues th at th e tr a ns fe r o f M ari ne r’ s Po int e pr op e rt y c arrie s w ith it a n in he re nt rig ht t o u se the lake , b e c a us e the Ma ri ne r’ s Po int e pr op e rt y-5-

adjoins the lake, and defe ndant re lies upon the ca se of The Pointe, LLC v. L ake M anageme nt Ass’n., Inc., 5 0 S. W. 3 d 4 7 1 ( T e n n

. Ct

. A p p

. 2 0 0 0 ). Po int e dealt with the sale of lake front prope rty to a develope r, whe rein the de ed stated tha t the land was convey ed tog ether with “all of the appurte nance s and her editaments th ere unto belong ing.” The Pointe C o u rt h el d t h at t h i s l an gu age g rante d the deve loper the right to use a nd enjoy the lake, because riparian rig hts were an

app urte na nc e to the pr op e rt y , a ndthe Cou rt sa id tha t “ the c on ve y a nc e of up la ndby

the ow ne r of

bo th the upland and the adjac ent wate r transf ers t h e ri paria n rig hts absent an e x press provision to the
contra ry .” Id. at 477.

The Trial C o u rt d istinguished Po int e , a ndwe a g re e . T he ma ste r d e e d in thi s c a se provides for

a timeshare transfe r, which w ould not be selling the land and a ll appurtena nces, but selling the rig ht to occupy a condominium unit for a c erta in week of the y ear . Moreove r, the master de e d a nde xhibi ts r e stric t us e of the lake by pr ov idi ng that it , li ke oth e r a me nit ie s, c a n b e us e d o nly if the int e rv a l ow ne r pa y s a ny app lic able fe e s. Th e se fe e s are de sc ri be d in the ma ste r d e e d a s w e ll as the public off

ering statement. Thus, it is cle ar f rom the docume nts that the timeshare ow ners we re intended to use the lake, but it is also clear that this right ca

rries w ith it t h e b u rd en of paying the

app ro pr ia te fe e s.

Whil e MPI OA po int s o ut, that r e stric tiv e c ov e na nts “ wi ll b e e nf or c e d ac c or din g to the c le arl y e xpre sse d int e nti on of the pa rt ie s; bu t be ing in d e ro g a tio n o f the ri g ht o f u nr e stric te d u se of pr op e rt y wi ll b e stric tly

c on str ue d, a ndwi ll n ot b e e xten de d b y imp lic a tio n to a nythi ng no t c le arl y and expressly

prohibited by their pl ain t erms”, ( see Beac on Hills Homeowners Ass’n, Inc . v. Palme r Properties, Inc

. , 9 11 S.W. 2d73 6 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 5) ), the do c ume nts in this c a se c on ta in p la in
te rm s w hic h e xpre ssl y li mi t us e of th e lake to tho se ow ne rs wh o p a y the app ro pr ia te fe e . Wh ile de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e ma ste r d e e d itse lf do e s not me nti on the lake , all of the re la te d d oc ume nts must be construed tog ether to determine the intent of the parties. See McCall v. Towne Square, Inc
., 503 S.W .2d 180 (Tenn. 1973)

. Considering all of t he related doc uments, it is clear that the inter val

owner s wer e intended to ha ve use of the lake upon pay ment of the appropriate fee to the owner of the lake , w hic h is no w A us ta . T he Tr ia l Co urt w a s c or re c t in ho ldi ng that a

lake us e fe e mus t be p a id to A us ta by the int e rv a l ow ne rs

.
Thus, the issue becomes whether the Trial Court corr ectly held t hat an interval owne r wh o d id n ot w ish to u se the lake didno t ha ve to p a y thefe e . T he Tr ia l Co urt st a te d n o b a sis fo r this ho ldi ng , a nda s w e state d, the do c ume nts are c le ar that a fe e wa s r e qu ir e d f

or the us e of

a ny a nda ll of the a menities, and there is no basis to make a distinction betwee n the l ake a nd other fa cilities, nor is the re a ny pr ov isi on in the do c ume nts fo r a llo wi ng a n in te rv a l ow ne r t o e sc ape pa y ing a n a me nit y fe e be c a us e the y c ho os e no t to us e on e or a ll o f the fa c ili tie s. Th e do c ume nts se t f orth tha t f e e s w ill be d u e , a n d a n y p u r c h a s e r w o u ld h a v e b e e n a w ar e o f th o s e f e e s f r o m th e d o c u me n ts that wer e contained in the public of

fering and purchaser

/seller verification, which the witnesses testified we re g iven to every

purcha ser. Ac cording ly , we r ever se the Tr ial Court’s holding on this issue.

Next, Austa arg ues that the Trial Court e rre d in de termining that an interva l owner was not limited to his/ her wee k of owner ship w hen using the lake. Austa arg ues that the master de ed-6-

states in Article X XI V t hat owner s can only use the c ommon elements during their owne rship wee k, bu t th e ma ste r de e d als o de fi ne s com mon e le me nts a s “th e po rt ion s of the Con do min ium pr op e rt y not included in the Units”. B y i t s t erms, it does not apply to the lake, whic h is not a part of the condominium pr operty

. Austa next ar g ues that Article XXI I I of the master deed states that no owner shall occupy

his unit or ex erc ise any

other rig hts during a ny

other wee ks unless expressly authorized to do so. This provision is embedde d in the s ection dealing with “Termination”, w hich is pref ace d by “I f all Unit Owne rs and hol d er s o f al l liens and mortg ag es af fec ting a ny

of the Condominium Parce ls ex ecute and duly rec ord an instrument termi n ati ng the Condominium property ”. Such termination has not taken pla ce. Re liance on this provision by Austa is misplaced.

Finally , Austa ar g ues that Exhibi t 4 to the master dee d, which is titled “Manag ement Ag ree ment”, states in par ag raph 28 tha t use of rec reational fac iliti es i s limit ed to t he owne r during the owner ship week. H oweve r, this pa rag raph then provides that B oardw alk “sha ll have the r ight to g ra nt u se of

the fa c ili ties to su ch ot her pe rs on s a ndun de r s uc h te rm s a ndc on dit ion s a s it sh a ll deter mine advisable in its sole discre t i o n pursuant to the provisions of the De clar ation” (ma ster deed) . The e vidence at trial showed that Boa rdwa lk’s succe ssor, L PI , g rante d use of the r ecr eational fa c ili tie s y e ar- ro un d to loc a l re sid e nts , in exch a ng e fo r the ir pu rc ha se of of f- se a so n ti me sh are we e ks

. Substantial testim ony

at trial established tha t the purcha sers we re pr omised y ear -round use of the lake a nd other a menities.

Sin c e y e ar- ro un d use of the re c re a tio na l fa c ili tie s, inc lud ing the lake , w a s g ra nte d to the interva l o wn er s b y Aus ta’s pre dece ssor, as it was so empowe red by the documents, the Trial Cou rt pr op e rl y fo un d that int e rv a l ow ne rs c ou ld us e the lake a ll y e ar u po n p a y me nt o f the app ro pr ia te

we e kly fe e . We fi ndthi s is su e to b e wi tho ut m e ri t.

As to the amount of the we ekly fee , Austa ar g ues that it was improper for the Court to require a showing that the expenses of stocking and maintaining the lake exceed the f ees c ollected befor e the use fee can be incre ased, be cause this requireme nt doe s not appea r in the master

deed a nd

re la te d d oc ume nts . O ur

re vie w o f the do c ume nts su pp orts this c on te nti on , a s th e y do no t app e ar t o place a limit upon the fee that can be collecte d. As this Court has previously rec og nized, however :

Ev e ry c on tr a c t impo se s u po n e a c h p art y a du ty of g oo d f ait h and fai r d e a lin g in i ts perf ormanc e and enf

orce ment. Covington v. Robinson , 723 S.W .2d 643, 645 (Tenn. App.1986) (c iting Restateme nt (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979) ; 17 Am. J ur. 2d Contracts § 256 (1964) ); see also 17A C .J .S. Contracts § 328 (1963). Sec tion 256 of Am e ri c a n Jur isp ru de nc e , Se c on d E dit ion , o n Co ntr a c ts, fu rthe r p ro vid e s:

[T]he re is a n impli e d u nd e rt a kin g in e ve ry c on tr a c t on the pa rt of e a c h p art y that he will not intentionallyor purposely do anything ... which will have the

e ff e c t of de str oy ing or

inj ur ing the ri g ht o f the oth e r p art y to r e c e ive the fr

uit s of t he contract. Ordinarily if one ex acts a promise from another to perform

a n a c t, the la w i mpl ie s a

c ou nte r p ro mis e a g a ins t arb itr ary or un re a so na

ble conduct on the part of the promissee. H oweve r, esse ntial terms of a c ontrac t-7- on which the minds of the pa rties have not met cannot be supplied by the implication of g ood faith and f air de aling . (footnotes omitted).

W infree v. Educ ators Credit Union , 900 S.W .2d 285, 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

We hold that the Trial Court pr operly imposed a re asonable ness re quirement on the lake use fee that can be levied by Austa. The Chance llor did not require tha t Austa had to bring the

ma tte r b e fo re the Cou rt

be fo re the fe e c ou ld b e inc re a se d, ho we ve r, he simply sa id that Au sta c ou ld not raise the f

ee until it could demonstrate tha t such was ne cessa ry

.

Au sta arg ue s th e Tr ia l Cou rt e rr e d in ho ldi ng that de fe nd a nt c ou ld m a ke re a so na ble rules and r eg ulations for that ar ea of the lake within 300 fee t of its doc k, shoreline, a nd marina. The

e vid e nc e be fo re the Tr ial Cou rt wa s th a t th e lake us e ru le s p ro po se d b y Au sta wo uldlik e ly

c a us e damag e to def

endant’ s marina and other struc tures, and a ny vessels loca ted in the are a. The Trial Court also had before it boating rules promulgate d by the TW RA, which st ate that all boats being
operated within 300 fee t of a commerc ial dock or marina shall be oper ated a t a slow, no-wa ke spee d, which wa s not provided for by Austa’s proposed rules. The Trial Court’s ruling simplyrec og nizes that th e 30 0 f

oo t r e stric tio n impo se d b y TWRA a ndse e ks to p ro te c t de fe nd a nt’ s p ro pe rt y int e re sts

. This is an equitable ruling , and we aff irm the Chance llor.

Def endant arg ues that it should have bee n allowed to ame nd the master de ed without Austa’s a pproval, be cause it i s a s u cc es sor to Boa rdwa lk as “B oardw alk” is def ined in the master deed. B oth defe ndant and Austa are succe ssors to B oardw alk in dif fer ent piece s of prope rty , which

wa s ori g ina lly pa

rt of a larg e r de ve lop me nt unt il the ta x sa le

. De fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t A us ta

is n ot a

suc c e s s o r to B o ar d w a lk

a s to th e M ar in e r ’ s Po in te p r o p e r ty , a n d th u s A u s ta d o e s n o t h a v e to g ive
approva l. The master

deed, how ever , rec og nizes that Boar dwa l k owned not only the timeshare
property , but the surrounding developmen t as we l l , and expressly set forth the ma nner in whic h amendments c ould be adopted by timeshare ow ners, a nd specific ally provided that “ No amendme nt sh a ll c ha ng e the ri g hts a ndpr ivi le g e s o f B oa rd wa lk w ith ou t its w ri tte n a pp ro va l.” I n th is c on te xt, B oa rd wa lk i nte nd ed that

c e rt a in c ha ng e s c ou ld b e a do pte d b y the vo tin g ow ne rs so lon g a s th os e

c h a n g e s d i d n o ta f

f e c ti t s r i g h t s

. D e f

e n d a n t i s a s u c c e s s o r t o B o ar d w a l k a s t o t h e t i m e s h ar e p r o p e r t y, and Austa is a suc cessor to B oardw alk as to the rest of the prope rty , including the lake. Thus, the int e rv a l o w n e r s c a n n o t , a s t h e T r i a l C o u r tf o u n d
, a d o p tc h a n g e s w h i c h m o d i f y o r d e s t r o y ri g hts belong ing to Austa

as succ essor to the re mainder of the B oar d wa l k p ro perty . We affir m the Trial Court’s ruling on this iss ue.

Finally , defe ndant ar g ues that Austa’ s claims sho u l d b e barr ed by the doctrine s of waive r , e s to p p e l, a n d/o r u n c le a n h a n d s

. I t ar g u e s th a t th e la k e u s e f e e s w e r e w a iv e d b y L PI

for failing to char g e the same, but this is not established by the proof, as the testimony was that the lake use fe es we re inc luded in the maintenan ce fe e by L PI . Def

endant a rg ues that a f

urther w aiver

occurred when L PI

f a il e d to c o u n te r c la im

f o r la k e u s e f e e s in th e 1 9 9 3 la w s u it

b e tw e e n L PI

a nd defe ndant. This w as, howe ver, prior to the amendme nts which purporte d to delete the r equire ment t h a ts u c h f

e e s b e p a i d
, w h i c h w e r e n o t a d o p t e d u n t i l 1 9 9 5
, a f t e r L P I n o l o n g e r

o w n e d t h e p r o p e r t y.MPI OA arg ues that Austa waited too long to f ile suit a nd should be barr ed, but Ms. Wibel 1 didte sti fy that sh e ha d be e n try ing to g e t a list o f M PI OA me mbe rs ’ n a me s f ro m D a ve B ur g e ss s o that sh e c ou ld s e ndthe m bi lls , a ndwa s u na ble to o bta in s a me . A s th e tr ia l c ou rt found, wa ive r i s the vo lun tary re lin qu ish me nt of a kn ow n r ig ht, a ndthe re wa s n o p ro of of su c h r e lin qu ish me nt i n th is

case

.
-8- I t does not appea

r that L PI has ever claimed that it was owed lake use fee s that were not paid. The dis pu te aro se a ft e r A us ta bo ug ht t he pro pert y a ndlake a ndso ug ht t o c ha rg e lake us e fe e s to de fe nd a nt’ s me mbe rs . It w as est abl is hed that w he n d e fe nd a nt f a ile d to c oo pe rate wi th A us ta in collecting those fee s, this lawsuit was filed. 1

De fe nd a nt a lso arg ue s th a t A us ta ’s c la ims are ba rr e d b y the un c le a n ha nd s o f LPI in that L PI c oll e c te d pr op e rt y ta xes a nd su c h fr om MPI OA me mbe rs bu t di d n ot s ub mit tho se fu nd s to the pr op e r t a xing a uth or ity . A s w e ha ve no te d, thi s is a lso c on du c t of L PI a ndno t A us ta , a ndAu sta is not responsible for that be havior a nd cannot be held ac countable f or its prede cessor ’s ac tions over which it had no contr ol.

For the fore g oing r easons, we affi rm the Judgment of the Trial Court in part and

r e v er s e in p ar t an d re m an d
, an d as s es s o n e- h al f of t h e co s t o f t h e ap p ea l t o ap p el l an t s , Au s t a La Vista, LL C and Take it Easy , LL C, and one-half of the cost of appeal t o Mariner ’s Pointe I nterva l O w n e r s A s s o c i a t i o n , In c

. , a n d H e n r y P h i l l i p s , i n d i v i d u a l l y.

______________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.