PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-6319

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

HARRY NOLAN MOODY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:02−cr−00004−MR−4)

Argued: May 7, 2024 Decided: August 21, 2024

Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge 

Wilkinson and Judge King joined.

ARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH 

CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, FEDERAL 

DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 1 of 19
2

DIAZ, Chief Judge:

Harry Nolan Moody was convicted in 2002 for conspiring to manufacture and 

distribute methamphetamine. He was sentenced as a career offender to 360 months’ 

imprisonment, the mandatory minimum. If sentenced today, though, Moody would no 

longer qualify as a career offender and the advisory minimum would be 210 months. 

Moody moved for compassionate release based on this disparity.

The district court denied relief. It held that the sentencing disparity, considering

Moody’s individual circumstances, didn’t constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” 

reason for release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors weighed against a reduced sentence. Finding no error, we affirm. 

I.

A.

Moody and his coconspirators operated two methamphetamine labs in North 

Carolina. In 2002, a federal jury convicted Moody of conspiring to manufacture and 

distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. It found that the offense 

involved “more than 50 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of 

methamphetamine.” J.A. 24. 

The presentence report found that Moody was responsible for 2,151.44 grams of a 

methamphetamine mixture, which equated to a base offense level of 34. That drug

quantity, the report explained, was the “potential methamphetamine yield” of the supplies 

seized from the two labs. J.A. 170. The report also applied a two-point enhancement for 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 2 of 19
3

discharging a hazardous substance into the environment, resulting in a total offense level 

of 36. It assigned Moody a criminal history category of VI.

But the report determined that Moody was a career offender, based on his instant 

§ 846 conviction and three prior North Carolina assault convictions. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 4B1.1(a) (2002) (requiring the career-offender designation when the defendant’s instant 

conviction is a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense,” and he has two prior 

convictions of either a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense”). That 

designation mandated an offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of VI,

1

resulting in a guidelines range of 360 months to life. 

Moody objected to the presentence report’s drug quantity finding, arguing that it 

was based on how the supplies were labeled—not their actual contents—and included 

supplies from a lab that he wasn’t involved with. The district court sustained Moody’s 

objection and, relying on the jury’s verdict, limited the drug quantity for which Moody was 

responsible to 50 grams or more of a methamphetamine mixture. 

The government argued, though, that the court should find Moody responsible for 

50 grams of actual methamphetamine. It cited evidence about the labs’ supplies and 

production and contrasted the actual methamphetamine produced to that of a mixture 

bearing “evidence of adulterants.” J.A. 33. Moody didn’t object. 

1 The career-offender offense table prescribes offense levels based on the statutory 

maximum of the defendant’s instant conviction. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) (2002). The offense 

level from the table applies if it’s greater than the otherwise applicable offense level. Id. 

In every case, though, a criminal history category of VI applies. Id. 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 3 of 19
4

The court agreed and found that a drug quantity of 50 grams of actual 

methamphetamine equated to a base offense level of 32. With the environmental 

enhancement, the court calculated a total offense level of 34.

But the court also found that Moody was a career offender, and that the 

designation’s offense level of 37 governed. So it adopted the report’s guidelines range and 

sentenced Moody to 360 months’ imprisonment, the lowest possible sentence.2

B.

Twenty years later, Moody moved for compassionate release. He argued that the 

disparity between his original sentence and what he would face today constituted an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for release. He explained that today, he wouldn’t be 

designated as a career offender because under United States v. Simmons, 917 F.3d 312 (4th 

Cir. 2019), his prior assault convictions no longer qualify as predicate offenses.3

The district court denied the motion. It found that Moody failed to show an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for release because the career-offender designation 

“only increased his offense level by one level”—from 36 to 37—and didn’t impact his 

2 Moody was sentenced before United States v. Booker, which effectively held that 

the sentencing guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. See 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 

3 We held in Simmons that the North Carolina offense of assault with a deadly 

weapon on a government official doesn’t satisfy the career-offender designation’s 

definition of “crime of violence.” 917 F.3d at 320–21. As relevant to Moody, we explained 

that because the element of “assault” can be satisfied with a mens rea of “culpable 

negligence” under North Carolina law, such an offense is categorically disqualified as a

“crime of violence.” Id.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 4 of 19
5

criminal history category. See United States v. Moody, No. 1:02-cr-00004, 2021 WL 

4978655, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 26, 2021).

Moody appealed, and we reversed. We found that the district court clearly erred in 

finding that the designation only affected Moody’s offense level by one. The court, we 

explained, mistakenly relied on the presentence report’s drug quantity finding instead of 

the sentencing court’s. And because it used this erroneous finding to assess the relative 

effect of Moody’s career-offender designation, we held that it abused its discretion.

We directed the court to (1) revisit “the sentencing court’s determination as to the 

drug type and quantity attributable to Moody, particularly as that relates to the jury’s 

finding as reflected in its verdict sheet,” and (2) reevaluate the effect of the career-offender 

designation on the guidelines range. United States v. Moody, No. 21-7530, 2022 WL 

2901737, at *2 (4th Cir. July 22, 2022) (per curiam).

C.

On remand, Moody supplemented his motion. First, he argued that he was only 

responsible for 50 grams or more of a methamphetamine mixture. Second, he argued that 

he wouldn’t be designated as a career offender today not only because his prior assault 

convictions no longer qualify as predicate offenses, but also because under United States 

v. Norman, 935 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2019), his § 846 conviction no longer qualifies.4

 

4 Norman held that a § 846 conspiracy doesn’t satisfy the career-offender 

designation’s definition of “controlled substance offense.” 935 F.3d at 239.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 5 of 19
6

Without that designation, the drug quantity finding would dictate the base offense level, 

which Amendment 782 reduced by two points.

5

Using a drug quantity of 50 grams of a methamphetamine mixture, Moody 

calculated the guidelines range today as 120 to 150 months, which he argued is a “dramatic 

disparity” from his original sentence. J.A. 107. But even with a drug quantity of 50 grams 

of actual methamphetamine, the guidelines range would be 210 to 262 months, which he 

noted is “still remarkable.” J.A. 107. Moody contended that either disparity alone or

“combined with . . . other factors”—such as his rehabilitation, time served, and age—

constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. J.A. 110.

The district court again denied the motion. First, the court found that Moody was 

responsible for at least 50 grams of actual methamphetamine. It explained that while the 

jury made a finding about the statutory sentencing range, the sentencing court made one 

about the guidelines range, which requires a lower standard of proof. But in any event, the 

district court said that any error in the sentencing court’s calculation wasn’t “cognizable” 

in a compassionate release motion. See United States v. Moody, No. 1:02-cr-00004, 2023 

WL 2582620, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 20, 2023). 

Second, it found that any sentencing disparity didn’t amount to an extraordinary and 

compelling reason for release. The court doubted that it could consider Amendment 782’s 

two-point reduction. So it calculated the guidelines range today as 262 to 327 months and 

5 Amendment 782—adopted by the Sentencing Commission in 2014—revised the 

guidelines applicable to drug offenses, including Moody’s § 846 conspiracy, by lowering 

the base offense levels prescribed by the drug quantity table in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. See 

U.S.S.G. app. C at 59–69 (Supp. 2023).

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 6 of 19
7

concluded that the low-end differential of 98 months wasn’t “so significant.” Id. at *6. 

But alternatively, the court found that even if it accounted for Amendment 782’s reduction,

meaning the guidelines range today were 210 to 262 months, the low-end differential of 

150 months also wasn’t “so significant.” See id.

The court explained that a “simple comparison” of the ranges wasn’t sufficient, and

that it needed to consider “how [Moody] would likely be sentenced today.” Id. And today, 

the court concluded, Moody’s sentence would likely be similar to the one he received.

The court reasoned that although Moody’s § 846 conviction no longer qualifies as 

a career-offender predicate, his conduct “fall[s] squarely” within the enhancement’s 

wheelhouse. Id. And given his criminal history and risk of recidivism, the court concluded

that Moody would likely receive an upward variance sentence today.

The court considered that Moody (1) was 69 years old, (2) had a one-infraction 

disciplinary record, (3) had served almost 24 years in prison, (4) had completed 30 

programs while incarcerated, and (5) had earned his GED. But it found that neither these 

factors nor the sentencing disparity—whether “singly or in combination”—constituted an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Id. at *7. And, said the court, the 

§ 3553(a) factors weighed against release.

This appeal followed. 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 7 of 19
8

II.

A.

We review a district court’s denial of compassionate release for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 185 (4th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its 

discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized 

factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, 

or commits an error of law.” United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018)

(quoting United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 2007)).

B.

Generally, a district court can’t modify a sentence once imposed. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c). But the district court may reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which is 

commonly known as the “compassionate-release exception.” See United States v. 

Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189, 194 (4th Cir. 2022).

A district court analyzes a compassionate release motion in two steps. First, it

determines whether the defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction. See United States v. 

Bond, 56 F.4th 381, 383 (4th Cir. 2023). To be eligible, the court must find that relief is 

warranted because of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and “consistent with 

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” High, 997 F.3d at 

186; see § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Second, the court considers whether the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors support relief. Bond, 56 F.4th at 384; § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 

The Sentencing Commission issues policy statements that describe what qualifies 

as an extraordinary and compelling reason. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). But when the district court 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 8 of 19
9

decided Moody’s motion, no such statements applied to defendant-filed motions for 

compassionate release. Cf. United States v. Davis, 99 F.4th 647, 654 (4th Cir. 2024). In 

that vacuum, we had said that district courts could make “their own independent 

determinations” about what reasons qualify as extraordinary or compelling. See United 

States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020). 

III.

Moody argues that in denying his motion for compassionate release, the district 

court abused its discretion in three ways: (1) by refusing to consider a sentencing disparity 

in its analysis of extraordinary and compelling reasons; (2) by applying an erroneous base 

offense level to calculate the guidelines range; and (3) by discounting the reasons that the

career-offender designation no longer applies. We address each contention in turn. 

A. 

We begin with Moody’s claim that the district court refused to consider his 

sentencing disparity argument.

Absent the Sentencing Commission’s guidance, a district court faced with a 

compassionate release motion may consider the disparity between the defendant’s sentence 

and what he would receive today due to changes in sentencing law. McCoy, 981 F.3d at 

286. 

In McCoy, we reviewed in a consolidated appeal several grants of compassionate 

release to defendants subjected to sentence stacking under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which 

mandated consecutive sentences for multiple convictions of using firearms in connection 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 9 of 19
10

with certain offenses. McCoy, 981 F.3d at 277–79. The defendants had received sentences

ranging from 35 to 53 years. Id. at 274. But Congress later eliminated this sentence

stacking, such that if sentenced today, the defendants’ sentences would be 16 to 30 years 

shorter. See id. at 277–79. Each district court held that these sentencing disparities were 

extraordinary and compelling enough to qualify for relief. Id. 

We agreed, finding that the courts “appropriately considered” two features of the 

defendants’ sentences: (1) their “sheer and unusual length[s],” and (2) the “gross disparity” 

between them and the ones imposed today. Id. at 285. As to the former, we found it 

relevant that the defendants’ sentences were about twice as long as those imposed for 

offenses like murder and kidnapping. Id. As to the latter, we found it relevant that the 

disparities were “exceptionally dramatic” and a product of Congress’s view that the 

original sentences were “longer than necessary or fair.” Id. at 285–86. 

Moody contends that these same features apply in his case, yet the district court 

refused to consider the sentencing disparity. He argues that his 360-month sentence is 

unusually long, especially compared to the sentences for more serious and violent crimes

like murder and kidnapping, which in 2023, averaged 285 months and 199 months, 

respectively. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Statistical Information Packet: Fiscal Year 2023—

Fourth Circuit 11 (2024). 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 10 of 19
11

Moody claims that he would receive a much shorter sentence today due to changes 

in law. His guidelines range today would be 210 to 262 months,

6 see U.S.S.G. § 5A, 

meaning that Congress now believes that the appropriate sentence for Moody’s offense is 

up to 150 months shorter than what he received. According to Moody, many district courts 

within this circuit have found that a 150-month disparity satisfies the extraordinary and 

compelling reasons test. See Appellant’s Br. at 10–11 (cataloging cases).

Even so, we made clear in McCoy that a sentencing disparity alone can’t dictate the 

court’s analysis. See 981 F.3d at 286. Rather, the court must make an “individualized 

assessment[] of [the] defendant’s sentence” and give “full consideration [to] the 

defendant[’s] individual circumstances.” Id. (considering the defendants’ relative ages at 

the time of their offenses, time served, and rehabilitative efforts).

The district court did just that here. It recognized that solely considering the 

sentencing disparity would be an “unpardonably sophomoric approach,” and that it needed 

to conduct an individualized assessment of Moody’s sentence and circumstances. See 

Moody, 2023 WL 2582620, at *6. It then reviewed Moody’s extensive criminal history, 

risk of recidivism, and offense conduct, and found that Moody would likely receive a 

sentence today “not too dissimilar” to the one imposed. Id. 

The court also considered Moody’s time served, advanced age, and rehabilitative 

efforts. It found that while his rehabilitative efforts were “commendable,” they weren’t 

6 This guidelines range accounts for Amendment 782’s two-point reduction to the 

base offense level for a drug quantity of 50 grams of actual methamphetamine. See Supra 

Part III.B.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 11 of 19
12

“particularly remarkable” given the length of his incarceration. Id. at *7. And it found that

Moody’s “relatively advanced age” didn’t necessarily reduce the risk of recidivism given 

his decades-long criminal history. Id.

That we or other courts may have reached a different conclusion is immaterial. Our 

review is limited to whether the district court abused its discretion. It did not. 

B.

Moody next complains that the district court’s analysis of the sentencing disparity 

was flawed because it miscalculated today’s guidelines range. According to Moody, the 

district court (1) ignored Amendment 782’s two-point reduction, and (2) relied on an 

erroneous drug quantity. We disagree.

1.

Start with Moody’s claim that the district court overlooked Amendment 782’s effect

on the guidelines range. 

Amendment 782 (which is retroactive) lowered the base offense level for Moody’s 

§ 846 conviction by two points under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. See Davis, 99 F.4th at 656. 

Moody, though, wasn’t eligible for the reduction because he was sentenced as a career 

offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Cf. Davis, 99 F.4th at 656. But today, without the careeroffender designation, Moody would be eligible. Id.

The district court questioned whether calculating the guidelines range in this way 

amounted to “a challenge to a sentencing determination . . . in a compassionate release 

motion,” which United States v. Ferguson, 55 F.4th 262 (4th Cir. 2022), prohibits. See 

Moody, 2023 WL 2582620, at *6. Its doubts were misplaced.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 12 of 19
13

A defendant can’t challenge the validity of a sentence in a compassionate release 

motion. See Ferguson, 55 F.4th at 270. The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, is 

the “exclusive method” for doing so. Id. But in Ferguson, we said that the arguments in 

McCoy—which claimed that a nonretroactive change in the sentencing law merited relief—

didn’t impermissibly challenge the validity of a sentence. See id. at 271.

The same is true of Moody’s sentencing disparity argument. Moody doesn’t claim 

that his sentence was improper because a mistake occurred at his trial. Rather, he argues 

that his sentence today would be much shorter because of changes in law. 

It’s true that when the district court decided Moody’s motion, we hadn’t yet 

considered a disparity argument that involved the effect of Amendment 782 after removing

a career-offender designation. But our precedent made clear that such an argument was 

permissible. See Davis, 99 F.4th at 656–58 (relying on Ferguson and McCoy to hold that 

the same changes in sentencing law alleged by Moody are permissible arguments for a 

compassionate-release motion). 

Thus, the district court’s contrary suggestion and its analysis of a 98-month 

disparity—which was based on a guidelines range that didn’t include Amendment 782’s 

two-point reduction—was incorrect. 

Yet we need not reverse. The district court alternatively considered a 150-month 

disparity, which was based on a guidelinesrange that included the Amendment’s reduction. 

And it held that even if Moody were granted the benefit of Amendment 782, “neither the 

analysis nor the result would be any different.” Moody, 2023 WL 2582620, at *6 & n.11. 

So Moody’s claim that the court ignored the Amendment’s effect is meritless.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 13 of 19
14

2.

Moody also argues that the district court erred in calculating the guidelines range 

because it relied on an incorrect drug quantity to establish the base offense level.

Following this court’s mandate, the district court reviewed the sentencing transcript 

and determined that the sentencing court found Moody responsible for 50 grams of actual 

methamphetamine. We agree. The sentencing court expressly found, “[T]he evidence is 

clear in my mind as to the 50 plus grams of actual methamphetamine, which brings the 

base offense level to 32.” J.A. 36.

Moody insists, though, that the sentencing court intended to adopt the jury’s verdict, 

which found him responsible for 50 grams of a methamphetamine mixture. The court, for 

example, questioned the presentence report’s drug weight finding, given its divergence 

from the jury’s verdict, and expressed that it wanted to determine the base offense level 

“solely related to what the jury found of 50 grams.” J.A. 33.

But even accepting that portions of the transcript may support Moody’s contention, 

these don’t trump the sentencing court’s unambiguous finding that Moody was responsible 

for 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine. Cf. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 

287 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that the sentencing court didn’t punish the defendant for 

exercising his right to go to trial based on “the entirety of the sentencing transcript,” even 

though “several portions” suggested otherwise when read in isolation).

And given the sentencing court’s express finding, the district court’s hands were 

tied for purposes of Moody’s compassionate release motion. Cf. United States v. Shields, 

48 F.4th 183, 191–92, 192 n.7 (3d Cir. 2022) (holding that the defendant could object to 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 14 of 19
15

the presentence report’s drug quantity in his compassionate release motion only because 

the sentencing court expressly declined to make a drug quantity finding before applying 

the career-offender designation). Moody’s only avenue to attack the drug quantity finding 

is through § 2255.7

 See Ferguson, 55 F.4th at 270.

C.

Finally, Moody contends that the district court’s explanation for rejecting his 

sentencing disparity argument was insufficient. Although the court accepted that his § 846 

conviction no longer qualifies as a career-offender predicate, Moody claims that the court 

ignored his “principal argument” that his prior assault convictions also no longer qualify. 

Appellant’s Br. at 16.

But there’s “no ‘categorical requirement’ that a court acknowledge and address each 

of the defendant’s arguments [for a reduced sentence] on the record.” United States v. 

Jenkins, 22 F.4th 162, 171 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Chavez-Meza v United States, 585 U.S. 

109, 115–16 (2018)). Rather, the district court must “set forth enough to satisfy this court 

that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own 

legal decisionmaking authority.” Id. (cleaned up). The district court did so here. 

Far from ignoring Moody’s argument, the court thoroughly considered—and 

agreed—that Moody wouldn’t qualify as a career offender if sentenced today. Yet the 

court provided a reasoned basis for concluding that the disparity “does not rise to the level 

7 In a string cite in his reply brief, Moody cites Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 

466 (2000), for the proposition that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 

the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt. But Moody doesn’t engage with this argument further, so neither do we.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 15 of 19
16

of being an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.” Moody, 2023 

WL 2582620, at *6.

First, it found that the guidelines range didn’t reflect “the seriousness” of Moody’s 

“30-year history of criminal conduct” and “likelihood of recidivism.” Id. It noted that 

Moody’s criminal history points were well-above the threshold needed for the highest 

criminal history category, and that several of Moody’s “most serious offenses, including 

three breaking and entering offenses,” weren’t even assigned points. Id.

Second, although Moody’s § 846 conviction didn’t qualify as a career-offender 

predicate, the offense conduct included activities that would qualify as a valid predicate. 

As a result, the court determined that the career-offender range was of “some significance” 

in arriving at an “appropriate sentence.” Id.

As Moody conceded at oral argument, the district court’s analysis wasn’t wrong. 

Oral Argument at 10:05–10:16. And even if its analysis were incomplete because it didn’t 

separately address Moody’s argument about his prior assault convictions, the district 

court’s prior denial of Moody’s motion for compassionate release fills in the gaps. Cf.

United States v. Malone, 57 F.4th 167, 174 (4th Cir. 2023) (considering the district court’s

extraordinary and compelling reasons analysis from its first denial of the defendant’s 

motion when the court’s second denial omitted an analysis).

In denying Moody relief the first time, the district court expressly considered that 

Moody’s prior assault convictions no longer qualify as career-offender predicates. And it

reached the same conclusion then as now: Any sentencing disparity was not an 

extraordinary and compelling reason to grant relief given Moody’s criminal history, and 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 16 of 19
17

specifically his other prior offenses—such as “drug possession, assault, breaking [and] 

entering/burglary-type offenses, escaping from jail or prison, and revocations of 

probation.” United States v. Moody, No. 1:02-cr-00004, 2021 WL 4978655, at *3 

(W.D.N.C. Oct. 26, 2021). We find no abuse of discretion in this analysis. 

Moody also complains that the court didn’t address several of his “key mitigating 

arguments.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. He contends that the court ignored (1) “readily 

available statistics” that similarly situated offenders receive lower sentences on average, 

Appellant’s Br. at 18, and (2) that received the lowest possible sentence under the thenmandatory guidelines. Without consideration of these facts, he says, the court’s analysis

of the sentence he would likely receive today wasn’t sound.

While the district court must address the “central thesis” of a defendant’s mitigating 

arguments, it needn’t “address separately each supporting data point marshalled on [their] 

behalf.” See United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2020); cf. High, 997 F.3d 

at 187–89. The arguments that Moody claims were ignored fall into the latter bucket. 

At bottom, the court thoroughly considered Moody’s central argument that a lower 

sentence was appropriate. And the court, after assessing Moody’s individual 

circumstances, explained why it disagreed. That’s all the law requires.

D.

As we’ve explained, the court acted well within its discretion in finding that Moody 

failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. Yet, even if we 

thought otherwise, we would still affirm based on the court’s determination that the 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors weigh against relief. See Davis, 99 F.4th at 659 (“Even if a 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 17 of 19
18

district court abuses its discretion in assessing whether the defendant presents extraordinary 

and compelling reasons for release, this Court may still affirm if the district court’s 

consideration of the § 3553(a) factors was sound.”).

The § 3553(a) factors that the district court must consider include the nature and 

circumstances of the offense; the defendant’s history and characteristics; the need to 

provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and support 

rehabilitation; the kinds of sentences available; and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 

disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also High, 997 F.3d at 186. 

The district court enjoys “broad discretion” in analyzing these factors. United States 

v. Bethea, 54 F.4th 826, 834 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 

330 (4th Cir. 2021)). While it should consider the “circumstances at the time of the original 

offense” and “significant post-sentencing developments,” it needn’t address each of the 

defendant’s arguments under § 3553(a). United States v. Mangarella, 57 F.4th 197, 203–

04 (4th Cir. 2023).

In reviewing the court’s analysis, we consider “the record as a whole.” Jenkins, 22 

F.4th at 171. And we generally assume that the court’s § 3553(a) analysis incorporates any 

relevant circumstances considered in the court’s extraordinary and compelling reasons 

inquiry. See Mangarella, 57 F.4th at 204.

The district court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) factors was sound. It considered the 

“serious” nature of Moody’s instant offense, the “large quantity of methamphetamine” it 

involved, and the danger the drugs posed to the public and the environment. Moody, 2023 

WL 2582620, at *7. And it considered Moody’s “extensive” criminal history, marked by 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 18 of 19
19

recidivism, and his “serious” convictions, to include assault on a law enforcement officer 

and assault inflicting serious injury. Id. at *1, *6.

The court also weighed the factors that favored Moody and explained why they 

didn’t tip the scale. The court accounted for Moody’s rehabilitative efforts and advanced

age but found that neither outweighed the risk of recidivism suggested by his thirty-year 

criminal history. The court also considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 

disparities. It recognized the lower sentence imposed on the conspiracy’s ringleader but

found that his criminal history didn’t warrant “the kind of lengthy sentence” that Moody’s 

extensive one demanded. Id. at *7. 

This analysis was more than “adequate to allow for meaningful appellate review.” 

High, 997 F.3d at 189. And the court’s determination that these factors disfavored release 

is both “rational and legitimate” under the statute. See id.

IV.

The district court didn’t abuse its discretion in holding that Moody failed to establish 

extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, and that (in any event) the § 3553(a) 

factors weighed against it. The district court’s order is therefore 

AFFIRMED.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6319 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/21/2024 Pg: 19 of 19