DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

PRECISION DIAGNOSTIC, INC.,

Appellant,

v.

PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE CO.,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-48 

[October 20, 2021]

Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; John D. Fry, Judge; L.T. Case No. CONO 19-4886 and

CACE 20-8282.

Chad A. Barr and Virginia E. Davis Horton of Chad Barr Law, Altamonte 

Springs, for appellant.

Kenneth P. Hazouri of deBeaubien, Simmons, Knight, Mantzaris & 

Neal, LLP, Orlando, for appellee.

LEVINE, J.

Precision Diagnostic, Inc., appeals a final judgment in favor of 

Progressive American Insurance Co., in which the trial court determined 

that Progressive properly paid interest owed on an overdue personal injury 

protection benefit payment. We find that the trial court erred in its 

interpretation of sections 627.736 and 55.03, Florida Statutes (2020), for 

purposes of calculating interest, but we agree with the trial court that the 

amount in controversy—$4.17—was de minimis. We affirm. 

After receiving an assignment of benefits, Precision billed Progressive 

for benefits provided to the insured. Progressive paid $1,373.04 within 

the thirty-day timeframe required by section 627.736(4)(b). Due to a 

miscalculation, Progressive owed an additional $400 to Precision in benefit 

payments. It is undisputed that Progressive erred in the original amount 

owed to Precision. Progressive re-adjusted the bill and issued an 

additional payment to Precision on the 1,234th day after the bill was 

received. Progressive also included a payment of $64.50 in interest on the 
2

overdue benefit payment.1 

Precision sued, alleging that Progressive underpaid the interest due 

under section 627.736(4)(d) by $6.31. Precision argued that sections

627.736(4)(d) and 55.03 required a quarterly fluctuating interest rate. 

Progressive countered that the language “for the quarter in which the 

payment became overdue” in section 627.736(4)(d) provided for a fixed 

interest rate. 

At trial, Progressive stated that Precision’s math of $6.31 was incorrect 

and that the amount of unpaid overdue interest according to a fluctuating 

interest rate was actually $4.17. Progressive still disputed the fluctuating 

interest rate, claiming interest was to be calculated at a set rate “for the 

quarter in which the payment became overdue.” § 627.736(4)(d), Fla. Stat. 

The trial court found that Progressive properly paid the interest and that 

requiring an insurer to recalculate interest every three months would lead 

to an absurd result. The trial court also found that the doctrine of “de 

minimis non curat lex” precluded this lawsuit over a purported $4.17 of 

miscalculated interest. Precision appealed, claiming that the trial court 

erred by agreeing with Progressive that a fixed interest rate applied to the 

overdue insurance benefit payment and by applying the doctrine of de 

minimis non curat lex. 

“We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.” Therlonge v. 

State, 184 So. 3d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). 

Calculating Interest Rate

Section 627.736(4)(d) states: 

All overdue payments bear simple interest at the rate established 

under s. 55.03 or the rate established in the insurance contract, 

whichever is greater, for the quarter in which the payment became 

overdue, calculated from the date the insurer was furnished with 

written notice of the amount of covered loss. Interest is due at the 

time payment of the overdue claim is made. 

(emphasis added). 

1 Precision submitted a demand letter to Progressive only for the unpaid $400. 

More than thirty days after receiving the demand letter, Progressive paid the 

additional benefits, interest, a statutory 10% penalty of $40, and postage. The 

only dispute between the parties that remained was the calculation of interest. 
3

Section 55.03, in turn, provides: 

(1) On December 1, March 1, June 1, and September 1 of each year, 

the Chief Financial Officer shall set the rate of interest that shall be 

payable on judgments or decrees for the calendar quarter beginning 

January 1 and adjust the rate quarterly on April 1, July 1, and 

October 1 . . . . The interest rate established by the Chief Financial 

Officer shall take effect on the first day of each following calendar 

quarter. . . .

. . . . 

(3) The interest rate is established at the time a judgment is obtained 

and such interest rate shall be adjusted annually on January 1 of 

each year in accordance with the interest rate in effect on that date

as set by the Chief Financial Officer until the judgment is paid, 

except for judgments entered by the clerk of the court pursuant to 

ss. 55.141, 61.14, 938.29, and 938.30, which shall not be adjusted 

annually. 

(emphasis added). 

“When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and 

conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to 

the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be 

given its plain and obvious meaning.” A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 

So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931). “The doctrine of in pari materia is a principle of 

statutory construction that requires that statutes relating to the same 

subject or object be construed together to harmonize the statutes and to 

give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. of Elections 

v. Martin, 916 So. 2d 763, 768 (Fla. 2005). 

We examine the plain language of both statutes in pari materia, to 

determine the interplay between the two statutes. Section 627.736(4)(d) 

requires that the interest rate be established by section 55.03 for the 

quarter in which payment became overdue. Section 55.03(1) requires that 

the Chief Financial Officer set the rate of interest quarterly. Subsection 

55.03(3) then requires that the interest rate adjust annually on January 1 

of each year until the judgment is paid. Therefore, according to an 

annually adjusting interest rate, the correct total amount of interest due 

to Precision was $68.67, with an underpayment by Progressive of $4.17. 
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Precision is incorrect that the interest rate adjusts quarterly. While the 

Chief Financial Officer sets the interest rate quarterly, section 55.03 only 

provides for an already established interest rate to adjust annually, not 

quarterly. 

Progressive’s argument that the language in section 627.736(4)(d) “for 

the quarter in which the payment became overdue” requires a fixed and 

non-fluctuating interest rate is also incorrect. This language mandates

the initial rate at which the interest is set, which is then adjusted on 

January 1 of every year. The interest rate begins at the rate present “for 

the quarter in which the payment became overdue” instead of, for example, 

the quarter in which the accident occurred, or the quarter in which the 

insurer was billed. 

As an example, if an insurer was billed in September, payment would 

not be due until October. If the payment became overdue, interest would 

begin accruing at the rate present in the “October quarter,” not the 

preceding quarter. If the payment was still due as of January 1, the rate 

would be adjusted to the rate in effect as of January 1. That rate would 

remain in effect for the rest of the year, only to be readjusted again the 

following January 1 if still due and owing. Other courts have calculated 

interest due under section 55.03 using this methodology. See, e.g., 

Endurance Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 8:17-cv-2832-

T-33CPT, 2020 WL 9597125, at *12 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2020) (“As for the 

amount of such interest, the prejudgment interest rate is controlled by 

Florida statute and is set quarterly by Florida’s Chief Financial Officer. 

The applicable prejudgment interest is the rate effective at the time of 

entitlement and is adjusted annually on January 1 of each year.”) 

(citations omitted). 

De Minimis

However, regardless of the incorrect interpretation of how to calculate 

interest, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the amount in controversy 

is de minimis. “The legal maxim ‘de minimis non curat lex,’ simply means 

that the law does not care for small things.” Loeffler v. Roe, 69 So. 2d 331, 

338 (Fla. 1953). The amount in controversy here, $4.17, is de minimis

and is a trifling amount. 

The principle of de minimis “is a hallowed, long established and long 

recognized principle of law, and a party is entitled to call it in aid.” Alec 

Samuels, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 1985 Statute L. Rev. 167, 167 (1985). 

Seeking trifling amounts of money involving the courts is a “waste of time 
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and money, and impairing the dignity of the court and the judge.” Id. at 

168. 

The principle of de minimis has been upheld in this court and other 

courts. See L.H. v. State, 803 So. 2d 862, 864 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)

(finding a $4 discrepancy in the calculation of restitution was de minimis); 

Winter Garden Citrus v. Parrish, 438 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) 

(denying attorney’s fees because a loss of supplemental benefits for a 

period of five days was de minimis); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 717 So. 2d 

1118, 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (affirming child support obligation that 

exceeded support guidelines by $1.50, finding that the “negligible amount 

. . . does not warrant remand for justification, recalculation or other 

proceedings”); Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 

U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (“[A] technical victory may be so insignificant . . . as 

to be insufficient to support prevailing party status” for the purposes of an 

award of attorney’s fees.). 

A de minimis amount in controversy does not warrant reversal. See 

Eureka Corp. v. Guardian Tr. Co., 139 So. 198, 199 (Fla. 1932) (“[B]y the 

well-settled rule of this court under the facts of this case such an 

allowance was de minimis no curat lex, for which reversal does not lie.”). 

In United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Alfonso, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 

887a (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. July 1, 2010), the court applied the doctrine of 

“de minimis non curat lex” to a suit for a purported interest miscalculation 

of $2.53 “brought painfully for no other justification than the award of 

attorney’s fees.” Id. Similarly, it appears that the present case was 

brought not for the de minimis interest, but rather for the award of 

attorney’s fees. 

In summary, we affirm the trial court’s determination that the 

accumulated interest of $4.17 was de minimis, and clarify the proper 

computation of interest pursuant to these statutes. 

Affirmed. 

KLINGENSMITH and KUNTZ, JJ., concur. 

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.