### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Fe brua ry 8, 200 5 S es sio n DEN NIS R . S HEP HER D v. IGNA CIO F REG OZ O AND 

### NATIO NWI DE

MU TUA L INS UR AN CE CO. Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 03C-40 Barbara Haynes, Judge

No. M2004- 00245-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Jun e 13, 2005

Ap pe lla nt, a

Me tr op oli ta n N a sh vil le po lic e of fi c e r wa s se ri ou sly

inj ur e d ina n o n- du ty

auto mob ile acc ident when De fendant’s vehicle c rashe d into the rea r of his patrol c ar. Def

endant was uninsured. Me tr op oli ta n Na sh vi lle wa s se lf -i ns ur e d a nddidno t pr ov ide un ins ur e d mo torist c ov e ra g e fo r i ts patrol off icer s. P l ai n t i ff named Nationwide a s a def endant in an e ffort to recove r under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy issued to him insuring his pe rsonal vehic le. Nationwide defe nded under a poli cy

exclusion i nvolving non- insured vehic les made a vailable f or his reg ular use. Th e tr ia l c ou rt g rante d su mma ry jud g me nt to Natio nw ide , a nd we a ff ir m th e a c tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the c ourt, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., joined.
Jonathan L a vo y

Grif fi th, Jef fr e y Sha ne Rob e rt s, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app ell a nt, De nn is Shepherd.
Parks Tedf

ord Chastain, Mi ch ae l K. Smit h, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, N ationwide Mutual I nsuranc e Co.
OP IN ION
There is lit tle fac tual dispute in this case. On F ebrua ry 4, 2002, Dennis R. Shepherd, a patrol office r with the Metropolitan Police Depa rtment since 1996, wa s on duty and driving his patrol car when he was struc k from the r ear by an automobile driven by the def endant, I g nacio Freg ozo, and seriously injured. The patrol car which Shepherd was operating at the time of the a ccide nt was one of a f leet of twelve patrol vehicles maintained by the Department’s Hermitag e substation for use by patrolmen. The se vehic les wer e assig ned at r andom to various patr olmen, and the r ecor ds of Metro for the 33 day s prior to the accident indi cate that Shepherd had used or operated eight of these patrol

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car s. Metropolitan Government of Na shville and Davidson County is self-insured and does not ma int a in u nin su re d o r u nd e ri ns ur e d mo torist c ov e ra g e a s to a ny

of its patr ol v e hic le s.
Natio nw ide Mu tua l I ns ur a nc e Compa ny ha d is su e d a

po lic y of auto mob ile ins ur a nc e to Dennis and Elizabeth Shepher d as to their persona l ve hicles which was in e ffe ct on Fe bruary 4, 2002. Be cause Fr eg ozo was uninsured, Shepher d soug ht rec overy from Nati o n wi de under

the policy ’s uninsured motorist provisions. Nationwide f ile d a motion for summary judgme nt, rely ing on va

rious exclusions i n its poli cy

with p articula

r re liance on the “re g ular use” exclusion of other motor ve hic le s u nd e r i ts u nin su re d mo torist c ov e ra g e . T his e xclu sio n p ro vid e s: USE OF OTHE R M OTOR VE HIC LES:
3. (b) This does not apply to losses involvi ng a motor vehic le: (1) Us ed in the business or oc cupation of y ou or a r elative. Howeve r, it does apply

to a private passeng er auto used by y ou, y our c hauf fe ur , o r y ou r h ou se ho ld e mpl oy e e s; (2) Ow ned, re nted, or lea sed by an employ er or

an insured;

. . . (4) Furnished to y ou or a relative for reg ular use. Furnished for reg ular use doe s not include a motor vehic le re nted from a renta l c omp a ny fo r l e ss tha n tw e nty -e ig ht ( 28 ) d a y s. The trial c ourt gra nted the motion for summary judgme nt based on the “ reg ular use” exclusion. Therea fter, Shephe rd took a de fault judg ment ag ainst Fre g ozo and rec overe d a judg ment ag ainst him for $250,000 compensatory damag es and $100,000 punitive damag es. Fr eg ozo neither appea red nor appea led, and fol lowing the final judg ment, Shepherd a ppeale d as to the summary judgme nt gr anted to Nationwide. Standards governing appellate review on summary judgme nt are familiar a nd well-settled. Since only

issues of law are prese nted and no disputed fac t que stions are involved, re view on appe al is de novo with no presumption a s to the corr ectne ss of any finding s of the trial c ourt. Gonzales v. Alman Const. Co. , 857 S.W .2d 42 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993). The moving party on summary judgme nt has t he burden of showing t o the court that there are no disputed materia l fac ts creating a g enuine iss ue fo r t ri a l a ndthat he is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a ma tte r of la w. Th e c ou rt

mus t ta ke the str on g e st le g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e in fa vo r of the no n- mov ing pa rty , a llo w a ll re a so na

ble inf e re nc e s in favor of that party , discard all counter vailing evidenc e, and, if there is a dispute as to any materia l fac t or if there is any

doubt as to the exist ence of a material fa ct , summary judgme nt cannot be g rante d. By rd

v . H all , 8 47 S.W. 2d20 8 ( Te nn .1 99 8) ; EV CO Cor p. v . R os s , 528 S.W .2d 20 (Tenn.1975) . I ssues as to in ter p r e ta ti o nan d a p p lication of unambig uous contrac ts are likew ise issues

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of law, t he dete rmination of which e njoy s no presumption of cor rec tness on de novo app e llate revie w. Doe v . HCA Health Serv ices of Tenn., Inc

. , 46 S.W .3d 191, 196 (Tenn.2001)

. The sole issue pr esente d on appea l i s “whe ther the N ationwide ‘r eg ular use’ uninsured mot orist e xclu sio n, un de r the c ir c ums ta nc e s o f this pa rt ic ula r c a se un de r c on sid e ratio n, op e rate s to d e p r i v e t h e P l a i n t i f

f o f t h e p r o t e c t i o n s r e q u i r e d u n d e r t h e T e n n e s s e e U n i n s u r e d M o t o r i s t s S t a t u t e ?”
Uninsured motorist insurance cover ag e first appea red in Tenne ssee following the pa ssag e of chapte r 3 7 1 o f t h e P u blic Acts of 1967. In 1974, our supre me court interprete d the uninsured motorist st atute to provide “ limit ed” r ather than “br oad cove rag e”.
Un de r o ur

re se arc h the re app e ars to be tw o the orie s in r e g ardto o ff se t pr ov isi on s in policies containing uninsured motorist cover ag e base d on the leg islative intent in the enac tment of uninsured motorist statutes. The fir st theory is based on a f

inding the le g isl a tiv e pu rp os e of

su c h s ta tut e s is to p ro vid e fu ll co ve ra g e up to the po lic y lim its so lon g a s p a y me nts un der the un ins ur e d mo torist c ov e ra g e , p lus a ny

pay me nts rec eived f rom other sourc es, do not exceed insure d’s ac tual damag e. This is termed br oa d c ov e ra g e a nda ny

of fs e ts i n th e po lic ie s inhi bit ing su c h ful l cov e ra g e are he ld void. The sec ond theory

is based on a f

inding the leg islative purpose of such statutes is to provide insured a rec overy only up to the statutory minimum require d without re g ardto i ns ur e d’ s a c tua l dama g e s, un le ss s uc h be le ss than the statut ory min imu m. This is termed limited cover ag e and under such, by virtue of set-off provisions in a policy , anin s u r e d ’ s s tatutory minimum cover ag e can be re duced by amounts rec eived fr om o the r s ou rc e s.

. . . I t results, and we so hold, b y en ac t m en t of T.C.A. s 56 - - 1152 a s a sec tion of our uninsured motorist s t at u t es , it is t he leg islative purpose to provide an insured motorist a rig h t o f recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of his poli cy on ly up to the statut ory

re qu ir e d mi nimum ( T. C.A . s 56 - - 11 48 ), a ndpr ov isi on s in such policies, appr oved by the C ommissi oner of I nsuranc e, oper ating to reduc e such cover ag e whe re othe r cove rag e or be nefits ar e available to the insured arising fr om acc ident causing the loss, are v alid if such provisions do not operate to deny pay me nts to an in su re d o f l e ss tha n th e statut ory min imu m. Terry v. Ae tna Casualt

y & Surety Co. , 510 S.W 2d 509, 513 (Tenn.1974)

. J ustice Ha

rbison provided further g uidance in Hill v. Nationw ide Mutual Ins. Co. , 5 35 S.W .2d 327 (Tenn.1976)

.

Au t h orities acc epting the rationale of the c ase just cited point out that vehicular liabilityinsurance is ordinarily written upon and f

ollows parti cular

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schedule d vehicles. It is not written upon named indivi d u al s , an d i t is not l ike g e ne ra l he a lthor

acci den t insu ranc e c ov e ra g e . T he lia bil ity po lic y c ov e rs a sc he du le d v e hic le , a nde xten ds its pr ote c tio n, thr ou g h o mni bu s c laus e s, no t on ly to the na me d in su re d b ut t o me mbe rs of his famil y

a ndoth e r p e rs on s u sin g the ve hic le wi th p e rm iss ion , s ub

je c t to pr e sc ri be d c on dit ion s a nde xclu sio ns
. Other authorities, holding that exclusions s uch as that involved in the present case are not va lid, ha ve rea soned that uninsured motorist cove rage s h o u l d be analog ized to broad personal insurance, and that it should not be g ear ed to or limited by cover ag e on par

ticular sche duled vehicles. They emphasize that the statutes spea k in t e rm s o f “ pr ote c tio n o f p e rs on s” rathe r tha n v e hic le s. Both lines of authority

are supported by

cog ent re asons. By

statute, uninsured motorist ins u ra n ce coverag e is appe nded to or made supplemental to vehicula r liabilityinsurance , so that the conc epts of vehic ular c overa g e do have rele vance ; on the oth e r h a nd , th e statut e s r e fe r t o th e pr ote c tio n o f p e rs on s, no t ve hic le s.
Fa ced with the se somewhat mix ed conce pts, the courts have had to construe statut ory la ng ua g e in an atte mpt

to c arry ou t le g isl a tiv e po lic y . E a c h c a se , inthe la st a na ly sis , tu rn s u pon the t e rm s a ndpr ov isi on s o f a pa rt ic ula r s ta te statut e a ndits lang uag e with re spect to uninsured motorist cove rag e.

. . . The uninsure d motorist s t at u t es of most states do not contain provisions simil ar to those c ontained in T.C.A. § 56-1152. [Now Tenn. Cod e An n
. § 56-7- 12 05 .] I n p re vio us c a se s, thi s Co urt ha s note d th e dif fe re nc e in s ta tut ory

pr ov isi on s, and has c onstrued T.C.A. § 56- 1 1 5 2 [ No w Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1205.] as denoting “a le g islative purpose to provide le ss than broad c overa g e. Terry v. Ae tna Casualty and Surety Company , 510 S.W .2d 509, 513 (Tenn.1974)

. I n the latter c ase, the Court susta i n ed a policy provision providing an offse t ag ainst the uninsured motorist covera g e for

any amount rec overe d under w orkmen’s c ompensation.
Hi ll , 535 S.W .2d 327, 330 (Tenn.1976) . (footnotes omitted.) The pre cise issue whic h controls the disposition of this case involves an e x clusion for bodily injury suffe red w hile occupying a motor vehicle: ( a ) o w n e d b y; (b) f urnished to; or (c) available for the r eg ular use of ;

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y ou or a re la tiv e , but not ins ur e d for auto lia bil ity c ov e ra g e un de r thi s poli c y . I t a lso does not apply

to bodilyinjury

from being hit by

any such motor vehicle

. This standard “ reg ular use” exclusion predates the a dvent of uninsured motorist cover ag e, it b e ing bo rna ndma tur e d b y c a se s in te rp re tin g ba sic a lly the sa me e xclu siona

ry la ng ua g e a s to liabilitycover ag e. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals provide s the rea dily appar ent purpose of the exception, which is standard in automobile liabili ty policies an d in policies providing uninsure d motorist covera g e.

Th e g re a t w e ig ht o f a

uth ority is i n a c c or d w iththe int e rp re ta ti on of thi s p ro v i sion by

J udg e Chestnut in Aler v. Tr avele rs I ndemnity Co., D.C.Md., 92 F.Supp. 620, 623, wher e he said:

This case involved the construc tion and application of the socalled “ drive other autom obiles” clause of the pr esent standa rd a u t o m o b i l e l i ab i l i t y p o l i c y
. T h e g e n e r a l p u rp o s e a n d e f f e c tof thi s pr ov ision of the po lic y

is t o g ive c ov e ra g e to the ins ur e d w hil e e ng a g e d inthe on ly

inf re qu e nt o r m e re ly c a su a l us e of a n a uto mob ile oth e r tha n th e on e de sc ri be d inthe po lic y , b ut n ot t o c ov e r h im a g a ins t pe rs on a l li abil ity

wi th r e sp e c t to his us e of

a no the r a uto mob ile which he f

reque ntly uses or ha s the opportunity to do so . . . . Campbell v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. , 211 F.2d 732, 736 ( 4th Circuit 1954).
Further e x positive of the “r eg ular u s e” ex clusion in its applicabilityto the case at bar are those ca ses wher e an em ploy er pr ovides a fle et of ve hicles which may be randomly

assig ned to a particula r employ ee. In City of Jack son v. Free man-Howie, I

nc. , 121 So.2d 120, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held: The proof

clea rly shows that insured’s e mploy er f urnished for

the re g ular use of insured a tr uck, either

one of a bout ten, althoug h insured did not reg ularly use any partic u l ar one of the f

leet of te n trucks. Two or three trips a wee k wer e made by insured as driver of one of t he ten trucks of his employ er, and he made other trips as helper on one of the trucks. I t cannot be said that insured’s use of the e mploy er’ s trucks wa s other than r eg ular use. The que stion narrows to this: Does the term “re g ular use” in the exclusionary clause ref er to one specific automobile? As stated, the obvious purpose of the exclusionary

clause is to li mit the ex tension of medical pay ments cover ag e to ca sual or infre quent use of oc cupanc y of au t o m o b i l es other than the one def ined in the policy , in this case the insure d’s Chevrolet. It is reg ular use of ot her automobiles that bring s th e e xclu sio na

ry c laus e int o ope ratio n, a nd if ins ur e d’ s e mpl oy e r a ssi g ns him one spec ific automobile for reg ular use or

a number of automobiles, any one of w hich

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ma y be a ssi g ne d f

or a pa rt ic ula r t ri p, the re su lt i s th e sa me . A n auto mob ile is furnished insure d “for

reg ular use” in e ither event. We know of no authority holding t o t h e c o n tr ar y.
Moore v . State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. , 121 So.2d 125, 126-27 (Miss.1960).
Whil e Tennessee courts have not dealt spec ifically with a ca se involving the “re g ular use” e xclu sio n a s it

re la tes to un ins ur e d mo torist c ov e ra g e , th is C ou rt

ha s ma de it c le ar a s to lia bil ity cover ag e that the “reg ular use” exclusion i s applicable and enf orce able. In United Servs. Auto Ass’n. v. Couch , 643 S.W .2d 668 (Tenn.Ct.App.1982) U nited Service s Automobile Association had issued a policy of liabilityinsurance to one Rebec ca W. Couch insuring her automobile. Her son, residing in her household, wa s operating a non-owne d vehicle and wa s involved in a collision. The nonowned v e h ic le , s u p p li e d b y th e e mp lo y e r o f th e s o n , w a s a s s e r te d b y th e in s u r a n c e c arr ie r to be a “re g ular use” vehicle w ithin the meaning of the e x clusion. The trial c ourt dec lare d cover ag e, and on appeal , t h i s C o u rt reve rsed f inding that it was c lear

that the automobile driven by the son was used by him in his work on a

reg ular ba sis. This C ourt said:
The issue of r eg ularity

hinge s not so much upon the reg ularity of the wor king time of the oper ator, but upon the re g ularity with w hich the vehic le was f urnished or available

. I n the prese nt c ase, it is uncontrove rted that the ve hicle wa s reg ularly , i.e., constantly , available to the employ ees of Mr. Canterbury , including William Couch, I I I , when he was on duty . I n this sense , the vehicle was reg ularly available to Couch within the meaning of the policy exclusion. The obvious purpose of

the “non- owned ve hicle” co v er ag e is to aff ord pr ote c tio n to the ins ur e d o n o c c a sio ns wh e n th e ins ur e d is te mpo ra ri ly us ing a

ve hic le n o tc o v e r e d b y t h e p o l i c y. The obvious purpose of the exclusion under discussion is to prevent abuse of the “ no n- ow ne d” privi le g e by un ne c e ssa

ri ly bu rd e nin g the ins ur e r w ithlia bil ity which oug ht to be cover ed by other insura nce. United Serv s. Auto. Ass’n v. Couch , 643 S.W .2d 668, 672 (Tenn.Ct.App.1982).
I n s ist e r j urisd ic tio ns , a

bo dy of la w h a s d e ve lop e d u nd e r the “regul ar us e” e xclu sio n a s it relates to police vehicles available for reg ular use to police men. As in other c ases, this body of law sta rt e d w iththe e xclu sio n o f l ia bil ity c ov e ra g e a ndthe n e xpa nd e d in to the un ins ur e d mo tori st cover ag e. In O’ Br ie n v . H ali fax Ins. Co . o

f M as sa c hu se tts , 141 So.2d 307, Pl aintiff wa s a police office r employ ed by

Ormond Be ach, Florida , and was insured as to his persona l a utomobile by

the De fe nd a nt i ns ur a nc e c omp a ny . In h is w or k a s a poli c e of

fi c e r, Pla int if

f wa s expe c te d to a nddidus e whicheve r one of

four c ity -owne d car s was assig ned to him. Whi le driving one of suc h vehicles, he was involved in an a ccide nt and sustained various personal injuries. He sued his private insuranc e company for medical benefits under his policy of i nsuranc e. The trial c ourt, apply ing the “re g ular

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use” e x cl u s i o n , d i rec ted a ve rdict for the def endant, a nd the District Court of Appe als of F lorida, relying on Moore v . State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. , 12 1 So. 2d12 5 ( Mis s. 19 50 ) a ff ir me d th e jud g me nt. Sa id the Cou rt : The holding in the Moore c ase that an exclusionary clause involved in that case , identical to that in the instant c ase, is not a mbiguous whe n rea d in conjunction wi th the g e ne ra l c ov e ra g e c laus e , a pp e ars to r e pr e se nt the ma jo ri ty op ini on in this country , as pointed out by the L ouisiana Court of Appeals in an exhaustive discussion of this area of the law in L etef f v. Mary land Casualty

Co., 91 So.2d 123 (1 95 6)

. Th e on ly

c a se in w hic h a

c ou rt ha s h e ld that su c h a n e xclu sio na ry c laus e is ambig uous seems to be Trave lers I ndemnity Co. v. Pray , 6 Cir., 1953, 204 F.2d 821. Six y ear s after

the last d ec i s i o n was a nnounced, the L ouisiana Court in the L etef f c a se state d th a t “th e int e rp re ta tio n pla c e d upo n the e xclu sio n claus e by the ma jority in the Pr a y

c a se no t on ly

stand s a lon e bu t is in e rr or . T he g re a t w e ig ht o f a uth ority is contra.”
I n the state of the evidence adduced at the t rial i n the instant case , we think that the jury

as re asonable men could o n l y h ave lawfully conclude d there from that the automobile occ upied by the pl aintiff at the t ime of the a ccide nt was furnished for h i s re gu l ar u s e, an d h en ce t h e in j u ri es h e su s t ai n ed we re ex cl u d ed fr o mth e c o v er age of the policy

upon which he is suing. There fore , the Circuit Court properly direc ted a ve rd ic t in fa vo r o f the de fe nd a nt.
O’ Br ie n v . H

ali fax In s. Co. of M

as s. , 141 So.2d 307, 308 (Fla.D ist.Ct .App.1962)
Galvin v. Am ica Mutual Ins. Co. , 4 17 N. E. 2d34 (M a ss. Ap p. 19 80 ) i s a c a se that onits fa c ts c los e ly pa ra lle ls the c a se a t ba

r. Ga lvi n wa s a Bo sto n p oli c e of fi c e r w ho ow ne d a

pe rs on a l ve hic le insured by

Amica Mutual Insuranc e Company . His policy included un i n s ured motorist cove rag e. Whil e on duty

and operating his police cruiser , he wa s involved in a collision with a stolen motor vehicle and sustained serious pe rsonal injuries. He broug ht suit against Amica under his uninsured m o t o r i s tc o v e r a g e , a n d t h e i n s u r e r d e n i e d c o v e r a g e u n d e r

t h e “ r e g u l ar

u s e ” e x c l u s i o n i n t h e p o l i c y. The pa rticular c ruiser that Galvin was driving was one of a pool of twe lve or moreBoston police cruiser s which could have been assig ned to Galvin at r andom on any g iven duty

shift. The exclusion, under the uninsured mot orist clauses of the policy , provided that the insure r would not pay to or for “any one injured w hile occupying an auto owned or reg ularly used by y ou or a house hold member, but which is not an auto shown on the c overa g e sele ctions pag e.”
Th e tr ia l c ou rt e nte re d judg me nt fo r the de fe nd a nt, a ndthe Cou rt of Ap pe a ls a ff

ir me d. Sa id the app e a ls c ou rt :

The que stion of what constitutes “re g ular use” of a ve hicle within the meaning of a motor vehicle liabilit y insurance policy here arises with respec t to the reg ular use e x clusion in the uninsured motorist provision. That cover ag e, howe ver,

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is relatively

new. See 12 Couch, I nsuranc e 2d § 45:619 (2d e d. 1964, here afte r cited as Couch). The prec edents de al with simil ar e x clusion s i n other ty pes of motor vehicle c overa g e. Among these is the so ca lled “d ri v e o t h er c ars” provision, the purpose of

which is to aff

ord cover ag e for “occ asional or incidental use of other . . . [th a n v e hic le s o wn e d b y

the ins ur e d] w ith ou t th e pay me nt o f an a dd iti on a l pr e miu m, but to ex clude the ha

bitual u s e o f o t h er car s, which would incre ase the risk on the insurer w ithout a corr esponding incre ase in the premium. The policy is not int ended to cover the insured a g ainst persona l liabi l i t ywith respec t to his use of another au t o m o b i l e w h i c h h e f

r e q u e n t l y u s e s o r

h a s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o u s e
. M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y, the evident intention of the limit ation with r espec t to other automobiles is to prevent a situation in which the members of one family or household may have two or more automobiles actua lly

or potentially used interchang eably but with onlyone particular automobile insured.” 13 Couch § 45:1052 (1965). The purpose of inserting such an e xclu sio n ( a s th a t now bef or e us ) i n a ny

fo rm of mot or ve hic le c ov e ra g e is su bs ta nti a lly

the sa me . T hu s w e re g ardthe de c isi on s w ithre sp e c t to the re g ula r u se e xclu sio n in “drive oth e r c ars ” pr ov isi on s a ndin o the r type s o f m oto r v e hic le cover age a s applicable to the simil ar r eg ular use e x clusion under the uninsure d mot orist pr ov isi on s.
Th e pr e c ise qu e sti on do e s n ot a pp e ar to ha ve be e n de c ide d in M a ssa c hu se tts

. I t se ems to ha ve been tacitly assumed in Reliance Ins. Co. v. Robertson , 7 Mass App.

-- -- -- , 3 90 N. E. 2d73 9 ( 19 79 ), that the un ins ur e d mo torist c ov e ra g e (i n th e lia

bil ity po lic y the re dis c us se d in s u ri n g the auto mob ile ow ne d b y a State po lic e of

fi c e r) wo uld allow recovery by that office r i n circ umstances c losely simil ar to those now be fore us. That ca se, howe ver, a

rose unde r a policy

form somewhat differ ent from that now befor e us. I n any event, the point now presented was not there raised or consider ed. We thu s mu st s e e k g uid a nc e fr om d e c isi on s in oth e r j urisd ic tio ns
. Galvin’s counsel contends that the lang uag e of the reg ular use exclusion, “an auto . . . re g ularly

used by y ou,” should be take n as re fer ri n g only to a particular vehicle and n o t t o all the vehicle s in a pool of vehicle s reg ularly available to the insured motorist. We do not ag ree and see no ambig uity in the words used. A hea vy majority of the de cision elsewhe re inter p re t s uch wor ds (in closely simil ar policy lang uag e) as treating all motor vehicles in a pool, any one of which is ava ilable to the pe rs on ins ur e d, a s w ith in the re g ula r us e e xclu sio n. Th e auth oriti e s a re c oll e c te d in 13 Couch §§ 45:1050 to 45:1065, es p ecially §§ 45:1055 and 45:1059 (1965 & Supp.1980). See Annot. 86 A.L .R.2d 937, especia lly § 7(b).
On e de cis io n els e wh e re up on the re g ula r u se e xclu sio n is ve ry

c los e on its fac ts to the prese nt case . See Kenney v. Employ ers’ Liab. Assur. Corp. , 5 Ohio St.2d 131, 132, 134-135, 214 N.E.2d 219 (1966). There , as i n this case , a poli cema n was injured in one of sever al cruisers available i n a pool. The poli cema n was not allowe d to rec over unde r his own policy . The opinion (at 134- 135) said, “[O]n the facts of

### -9

-

this case, we do not believe that the w ords ‘a n automobile . . . furnished f or the re g ula r u se ’ o f p la int if

f a re a mbi g uo us or

c a n r e a so na

bly be int e rp re te d s o a s n ot t o d es cr i b e th e cru i s er i n wh i ch p l ai n t i ff wa s ri d i n g at t h e ti m e of h i s i n j u r y
. . . . In order to be excluded under

th i s exclusionary

clause , an automobile nee d not be a sin g le pa rt ic ula r a uto mob ile re g ula

rl y fu rn ish e d to the na me d insu re d. Th us it is w e ll se ttl e d that a n auto mob ile wi ll be e xclu de d un de r su c h po lic y pr ov isi on s a lth ou g h it is o nly on e of a g ro up of

auto mob ile s f

ro m w hic h a n auto mo bil e is r e g ula rl y furnished to the named insured by his e mploy er.” To simil ar eff ect (as to a pool of police vehic les) ar e Commercial Ins. Co. v. G ardner , 233 F.Supp. 884, 886-888 (E.D.S.C . 1964), and O’Brien v . Halifax Ins. Co. , 141 So.2d 307, 308 (F la .A pp .1 96 2) . O the r d e c isi on s r e lat ing to m oto r v e hic le po ols or fl e e ts ( c los e ly a na log ou s to thos e inv olv ing po lic e of fi c e rs ) i nc lud e : Voelke r v. Travelers I ndemn. Co. , 2 60 F.2d 2 75 , 2 77 -2 78 (7 th C ir .1 95 8) ; Farm Bureau M ut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ma rr , 1 28 F .Su pp . 6 7, 68 -7 1( D. N. J. 19 55 ); Bringle v. Ec onomy Fire & Cas. Co. , 169 N. W.2 d 8 79 , 8 81 -8 84 (I ow a 19 79 ); W

interwerp v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 277 Md. 714, 71 6- 72 1, 35 7 A. 2d35 0 ( 19 76 ); Moore v . State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 2 39 Mis s. 13 0, 13 3- 13 5, 12 1 So .2 d 1 25 (1 96 0) ; Davy v. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co. , 97 N.H. 236, 23 8- 23 9, 85 A. 2d38 8 ( 19 52 ); Venters v. Selec ted Risks Ins. Co. , 120 N.J .Super. 549, 55 2, 29 5 A .2 d 3 73 (1 97 2) ; Ruggiero v. Globe Indem. Co. , 66 Misc.2d 948, 951, 323 N. Y. S.2 d 2 92 (C iv. Ct. N. Y. 19 71 ); International Serv. Ins. Co. v, W alther , 463 S.W. 2d77 4, 77 6 ( Te x.Civ .A pp.1 97 1); Qu e se nb e rryv . Ni c ho ls , 208 Va. 667, 669, 672-674, 159 S.E.2d 636 (1968); W esthave r v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. , 15 Was h. Ap p. 40 6, 40 7- 40 9, 54 9 P.2 d 50 7 (1 97 6)

. Compa re a ndc on tr a st Pa c ifi c Au to In s. Co. v . Le wis , 56 Cal .A pp .2 d 5 97 , 6 00 -6 01 , 1 32 P.2 d 8 46 (1 94 3) ; Cotton St ates M u t

. I n s
. C o . v . F

all s , 1 1 4 Ga.App.812, 814, and see 815- 817, 152 S.E.2d 811 (1 96 6) ; Miller v. Farme rs Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 179 Kan. 50, 53, 54 , 2 9 2 P

. 2 d 711 (1 95 6) ; Glisson v. State Farm M ut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 246 S.C. 76, 81, 85, 142 S.E.2d 447 (1965).
Galvin v. Am ica Mut. Ins. Co. , 417 N.E.2d 34, 35-37 ( Mass.App.1981). ( footnotes omitted.)
I n St. Pierre v. Pe rmanent Ge neral Assurance , 829 So.2d 1185 (L a.App.2002) , Plaintiff was a de pu ty sh e ri ff of St. Ma rt in p ari sh wh o o wn e d a

private ve hic le ins ur e d b y F arm B ur e au Ca su a lty I nsuranc e. While on duty , he wa s driving his re g ularly assig ned sheriff’s ve hicle whe n he wa s rea r e nd e d b y a F or d E xplor e r dri ve n by on e B e au B ranc h. He wa s inj ur e d in the c ra sh a ndbr ou g ht s uit ag ainst Br anch and his insurer, Perma nent Gene ral Assurance, a long w ith the L ouisiana Sheriff ’s As so c ia tio n. He joi ne d a s a de fendan t, Farm

B ur e au, se e kin g re c ov e ry of the un ins ur e d mo torist cover ag e under

his private insuranc e policy . The F arm B ureau “re g ular use” exclusion provided:
This i nsuring agreeme nt does not apply: ( 1) to any automobile owned by or furnished for reg u l a r u s e to either the nam ed insured or

a me mbe r o f the sa me ho us e ho ld

.

### -1 0-

St. Pierre v. Pe rmanent Ge neral Assurance , 829 So.2d at 1187. The spec ific uninsured motorist exclusionary clause provided:
Exclusion s. This pol icy doe s not apply under cov erage U :

. . . ( b) to any automobile or trailer owned by or furnished f o r t h e regular use of the named insured

or a re sid e nt o f the ho us e ho ld n ot d e sc ri be d o n th e de c laratio ns
. St. Pierre v. Pe rmanent Ge neral Assurance , 829 So.2d at 1187.
Fa rm Bur eau f

iled a mot ion for summ ary judgme nt, relying on the “re g ular use” exclusion in the policy , which motion was g rante d, and Plaintiff appe aled. On appe al, the Court held:

The plaintiff a sserts that the reg ular use exclusion is in conflict with Ho we ll v. Balboa Insurance Co. , 564 So.2d 298 (L a.1990); and in turn, the plaintiff conte nds that summary

judgme nt was inappropriate. In Ho we ll , the L ouisiana Supreme Court held:
UM cove rag e attac hes to the per son of the i n s u re d , not the vehicle, and that any

provision of UM cove rag e purporting to limi t insured status to i ns tances inv olv ing a re la tio ns hip to an in su re d v e hic le contra venes L SA–R.S . 22:1406(D). In other wor ds, any person who enjoy s the status of insured unde r a L ouis i an a m o tor vehicle policy which includes [UM] cover ag e enjoy s cover ag e protection simplyby rea son of having sustained injury by an inuns ured/unde rinsured motorist vehicle.

Id . at 301-302. The plaintiff ar g ues that the a bove stateme nt rende rs enf orce ment of t h e r e g u l ar

u s e e x c l u s i o n o f

t h e U M p r o v i s i o n a g a i n s tp u b l i c p o l i c y. On the oth e r h a nd , F arm B ur e au a rg ue s in it s brief

that th is c ou rt

sh ou ld follow the first cir cui t ’s re asoning illust rate d in Dardar v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. , 98-1363 (L a.App. 1 Cir. 6/25/99); 739 S o.2d 330, wri t denied , 99-2196 (L a. 11/12/99); 750 So.2d 195. In Dardar , the first circ uit held that an employ er’ s pick-up truc k, available fo r t h e employ ee’ s reg ular use, w as not cover ed by the employ ee’ s persona l automobile insurance policy

. Dardar , 98-1363;

### -1 1-

739 So.2d 330. After be ing struc k by another automobile while driving a pick- up owned by his employ er, an employ ee attempted t o rec over unde r an insurance policy on his pe rsonal automobile providing UM cove rag e. Id

. Howeve r, the c ourt found that the employ er had furnished the pick-up truck for the employ ee’ s reg ular use. Id

. The court also found that the employ ee’ s policy contained a clause t h at excluded c ov e ra g e fo r any

no n- ow nedauto mob ile a va ila ble fo r the re g ula

r andfr e qu e nt u se of the insure d. Id. Al tho ug h th e e mpl oy e e arg ue d th a t su c h a n ex clus ionwa s in co n flict with the holding of Ho we ll , th e c ou rt fo un d th a t Ho we ll w o u l d on lya pp ly when a person e njoy s the status of an insure d. Since the re g ular use of a non-ow ned vehicle w as expressly

excluded from covera g e, the c ourt found that the e mploy ee’ s insured status was ne ver implicate d. Id. Th us , th e fi rs t c ir c uit ru le d th a t Ho we ll

was inapplicable and denied the e mploy ee’ s claim. Id

. Simi larly , the plaintiff in this case is see king to r ecove r UM cover ag e on an insurance policy

held on his persona l automobile. Yet, the F arm B ureau policy lia bil ity a ndUM pr ov isi on s b oth pr ov ide that the po lic y do e s not e xten d c ov e ra g e to the insured’ s reg ular use of a non-ow ned vehic le. Like the first c ircuit in Dardar , we c on c lud e that Ho we ll

is inapplicable to the c ase before us beca use t he plainti ff ne ver enjoy ed the status of an insured under the Farm Bureau policy for the reg ular use of a non-ow ned automobile.
Further, this court ha s examined and ruled that r eg ular use exclusions, s uch as provided in the policy

at issue, do not violate public policy

. Se e Sa nd ozv . S tate Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 620 So.2d 441 (L a.App. 3 Cir.1993). 3

W e a re m i nd f

ul t ha t L a.R .S. 2 2 : 1 4 0 6 (D ) ha s b e e n am en d ed t o , at l ea st i n so m e c i rcu m st an ce s, 3 l egi s l at i vel y over r ul e H o w e ll

. See Sandoz v. St at e Far m M ut

. Aut o. Ins
. Co. , 620 So. 2d 441 ( La

. App. 3 C i r. 1 9 9 3 ).
St. Pi e rre v . P e rm an e nt G e ne ra l A ssu r. , 829 So.2d 1185, 1188-89 (L a.App.3 Cir. 2002).
Cases from other jurisdi ctions appea r to divide on the construc tion and application of va rious uninsured motorist statutes. Gener ally , in those states wher e uninsured motorist statutes provide that su c h c ov e ra g e is m a nd a tory a ndthe nam ed insu re d h a s n o o pti on to r e je c t un ins ur e d mo torist cover ag e, public policy

mandates that the “re g ular use ” exclusion is ineffec tive to deny cover ag e. Roby v . Illinois Founders’ Ins. Co. , 3 72 N. E. 2d10 97 (Ill. Ap p. 19 78 ); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duran , 785 P.2d 570 (Ariz.1989).
The Duran case prese nts an ex cellent discussion of the public policy considerations invol ved wh e n th e un ins ur e d mo torist statut e ma nd a te s cov e ra g e a nd a llo ws the na me d insu re d no o pti on to re je c t th e c ov e ra g e . F oll ow ing ve ry se ri ou s in jurie s in a n auto mob ile wr e c k, c la im wa s mad e a g a ins t se ve ra l pa rt ie s, inc lud ing State F arm un de r i ts “ us e of

oth e r c ars ” un ins ur e d mo torist c ov e ra g e
. Sta te Fa rm defe nded base d on the “reg ular use” ex clusion in its policy

. Both the trial court and the courtT he i nsur ed an d f am i l y m em b ers insure d are co ve red no t o nly wh en o cc up yi ng an i nsur ed ve hicle, bu t also 1 wh en i n a n ot h er a u t omobi l e, w h en on foot , w h en on a bi cy cl e or wh en s i t t i n g on a por ch

. ’ 144 Ar i z. at 296, 697 P. 2d at 689. ” 785 P. 2d a t 572. 

### -1 2- of appe als held that State Fa rm had no cove rag e bec ause of the “r eg ular use” exclusion. I n reve rsing on public policy

g rounds, the Supreme Court of Arizona held:
A tt h e t i m e o f

t h e a c c i d e n t , u n d e r i n s u r e d [ U IM ] c o v e r a g e w a s m a n d a t o r y. L eg islation during 1981- 1982 require d insurers to provide : [C]ove ra g e fo r a pe rs on if the su m of

the lim its of

lia bil ity un de r a ll bodily injury or death liabilit y bonds and liabilityinsurance policies applicable at the time of the acc ident is le ss tha n the total damag es for bodily injury or death resulting from the ac cident. To the e x tent that the tot a l da ma g e s e xce e d the tot a l app lic able lia bil it ylim its , un de ri ns ur a nc e mot orist

cov erag e pr ov ide d in

. . . th is s e c tio n is applicable to the differ ence
. L a ws 19 81 , c h. 22 4, § 1 ; see also State Farm v . W ilson , 162 Ariz. 251, 782 P.2d 727 (A ri z.1 98 9) (d isc us sin g the le g isl a tiv e de ve lop me nt o f U IM) . U nd e r p re se nt l a ws , insur er s m ust make a ma ndatory offe r of UI

M, rather than provide ma ndatory cover ag e. Se e ge ne ra lly A.R.S. § 20-259.01.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Duran , 785 P.2d 570, 572 (Ariz.1989).
After rea sserting previous holdings indicative of Arizona’s status a s a “broad co v er age” jurisdiction, the court held:

1
At the tim e of the a c c ide nt i n q ue sti on , U IM c ov e ra g e wa s mand a tory . Pu bli c policy then and now prec ludes an ins urer from voiding cover ag e by an exclusion not permitted by

the statute. See H

iggins , 160 Ariz. at 21-22, 770 P.2d at 325-26 (“othe r ve hic le ” e xclu sio n vo id a s to U IM) ; McKeon , 159 Ariz. at 112-13, 765 P.2d at 515- 16 (“ na me d d ri ve r” ex clu si on vo id a s to UM ); Cal v e rt , 144 Ariz. at 297, 697 P.2d a t 69 0 ( “ oth e r v e hic le ” e xclu sio n v oida s to UM ); se e als o B ar tni ng v . S tate Fa rm F ire a n d Ca s u a lty Co. , 1 62 Ariz. 3 44 , 3 46 , 7 83 P.2 d 7 90 , 7 92 (A ri z.1 98 9) (p ub lic po lic y manda tes that U M c ov e ra g e be te rrito ri a lly c oe xten siv e wi th l ia

bil ity c ov e ra g e ); Spain v. Valley Forge Ins. Co. , 152 Ariz. 189, 194, 731 P

. 2 d 8 4 , 88 (1 9 8 6 ) ( i n v al i d at i n g an o f

f s e tp r o v i s i o n r e d u c i n g a m o u n tp a y ab l e u n d e r U M c o v er age by amounts paid under liability cover ag e).
There is no statute which permits t he ex clusion of underinsured cove rag e for vehicles f urnished for

an insured’ s re g ular use. A ccor dingly , we hold that the

### -1 3-

“ fu rn ish e d f

or re g ula r u se ” e xclu sio n inthe UIM c ov e ra g e is v oida s a g a ins t pu bli c p o l i c y.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duran , 785 P.2d 570, 572-73 (Ariz.1989).
I n Roby v . Illinois Founders Ins. Co. , 372 N.E.2d 1097 (I ll.App.Ct.1978), the defe ndant maintained that since the uninsured motorist provision of the I llinois statute did not specify that parties c ould not lim it covera g e by ag ree ment, that such limit ations as conta ined in the “r eg ular use” exclusion shoul d be upheld. In reje cting this contention, the court said:

Specifically , section 143a( 1) of t h e Ill i n o i s I n s u ra n ce C o d e ( I l l

. R ev
. S t at .1971, ch. 73, par. 755a(1) ) provides that no automobile liability insurance policy

shall be issued in this State unless cover ag e is provided ther ein in limit s set forth in sec tion 7-203 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (I ll.Rev.St at.1971, ch. 951⁄2, par. 7- 203) ($10,000 pe r p e rs on , $ 20 ,0 00 pe r a c c ide nt) a g a ins t dama ges cau se d b y un ins ur e d mo torist s. Public policy

expressed by this statute is that the i nsured be provided c overa g e which would compensate him in the event of injury by an uninsured motorist, to at least the same e x tent as had he been injure d by a motori s t wh o was insure d, in compliance with the I llinois Safety

Responsibili ty

L aw ( I ll.Rev.St at.1971, ch. 9 5 1⁄2, par. 7- 100 et seq. ), for

me rly Financ ial Responsibili ty L aw (I ll.Rev.St at.1969, ch. 951⁄2, par. 7A101 et seq. ). Ba rn e s v . P owe ll (1971), 49 I ll.2d 449, 452-53, 275 N.E.2d 377, 379; Ullman v. W

olverine I nsurance Co. (1970), 48 I ll.2d 1, 4, 269 N.E.2d 295, 297.
The re cent c ase of Squire v. Ec onomy Fire & Casualty Co. (1977), 69 I ll.2d 167, 13 I ll.Dec.17, 370 N.E. 2 d 1044 ag ain adopted an expansive interpre tation of section 143a and is controlling he rein.

. . . The c ourt, in Sq uire , discussed Do x tat e r v . S tate Fa rm Mu tua l A uto mo bil e Insurance Co. (1972), 8 I ll.App.3d 547, 290 N.E.2d 284, in w hich the insured wa s str uc k by a n un ins ur e d mot orist wh ile ri din g his mot or c y c le wh ic h w a s n ot l ist e d in his po lic y of ins ur a nc e
. Hi s po li cypr ov ide d a n e xclu sio n, sim ila r t o th e on e in Sq uire and the case at bar, which would have bar red r ecove ry . The Doxtater court held that the exclusion conflicted with the unde rly ing pur pose of se ction 143a and was re ndere d unenfor cea ble by the prov isions of section 442. The Sq uire c ou rt , ci t i n g Doxtater , stated: The e x pansive interpr etation a p p l i ed by a majority

of * * * (the supreme c ourt in Ba rn e s v . P owe ll (1971), 49 I ll.2d 449, 275 N.E.2d 377), lea ds u s t o co nclude that, pr esente d with the issue at bar , our Supreme Court would interpr et Section 143a of the I nsuranc e Code as a dire ction to insurance companies to provide uninsured motor vehicle cover ag e for “insureds,” reg ardle ss of whether , at the time ofIt b ear s n ot i n g t h at i n 1995, t h e I l l i n oi s s t at e l eg i s l at u r e ame n ded s ec t i on 143a t o i n cl u de t h e fol l o wi ng 2 l anguage: “U ni nsur ed m o t o r vehi cl e co verage d o es not ap p l y t o bo d i l y i nju ry, si ckness , dis ease, or d eat h res ul t i ng t heref rom , of an i nsur ed w hi l e o ccup y i ng a m o t o r vehi cl e o wned b y , o r f urni shed o r avail ab l e fo r t he regul ar us e o f t he ins u re d , a r e sid e n t sp o u se o r re sid e n t re la tive , if tha t m o to r ve h ic le is n o t d e sc rib e d in the p o licy u n d e r w h ic h a c la im is m a d e
. . . .

1 9 9 5 Ill L e g is S e rv . 2 0 6 (W e st); see a l so 21 5 Il l

. C o m p
. Stat

. 5/14 3 a (20 0 4 ).



### -1 4- injury , the insureds oc cupied or operated vehicles decla

red in the subject policy . ( Sq uire v . Ec on om y Fi re & Cas ua lty Co .)

. . . Since the exclusionary

clause in the instant case is virtually ident i cal to the clause in Sq uire , andsin c e it m akes cov e ra g e de pe nd e nt u po n th e ins ur e d b e ing in a ve hic le lis te d inthe po lic y , it vio la te s se c tio n 1 43 a

a ndis r e nd e re d u ne nf

or c e able by section 442. Roby v . Illinois Founders Ins. Co. , 372 N.E.2d 1097, 1100-01 ( I ll.App.Ct.1978). 2
I n Briones v. State Farm M ut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 790 S.W .2d 70 (Tex. App.1990), the Te x as Court of Appea ls, abandoning prior holding s to the contra ry , followed the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Stracene r v. United Sv c. Auto. Ass’n. , 77 7 S.W. 2d 37 8 (T e x. 19 89 ) in h old ing that art ic le 5.06-1 of the T exas I nsuranc e Code mandated that uninsured motorist policies provide c overa g e. Sa id the Cou rt : Having taken this position, we conclude that under the fac ts of t his case and the uncontrove rt ed ev i dence , that to deny Briones rec overy

under the uninsured motorist clause of his fa milypolicy would be to f

rustrate the intent of

the leg islature to p r o v id e p r o te c ti o n f

o r c o n s c ie n ti o u s mo to r is ts f r o m “ f in a n c ia l lo s s c aused by neg lige nt financia lly

irresponsible motorists” as is mandated b y the inclusion of uninsured and unde rinsured motorist cove rag e in the Te x as I nsuranc e Code.
Briones v. State Farm M

ut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 790 So.2d 70, 74 (Tex.App.1990).
I n construing the “re g ular use” exception a s to uninsured motorist covera g e in a c ase w here a deputy sheriff was driving his patrol ca r wh en inj ured by an uninsured motorist, the Court of Ap pe a ls o f Wa sh ing tonup he ld the e xclu sio n, po int ing ou t that the na me d in su re d h a d th e op tio n to re j ec tu n i n s u re d m o t o ri s tco v er age i n i t s en t i re t y
. Un d erW as h i n gt o n ’s l es s -t h an -b ro ad co v er age uninsured motorist statute, the Court held:

### -1 5- Moreove r, to interpre t reg ular use to e x clude the patr o l car violates the purpose of

the exclusion bysignific antly incre asing the risk to Safec o without any corr esponding incre ase in pre miums. Grange Ins. Ass’ n , 103 Wash.2d at 712-13, 69 4 P. 2d10 87 . T he da ily us e of a patr ol v e hic le , o ft e n inri sky drivi ng situati ons, su bs ta nti a lly

increa se s th e ri sk s o f a c c ide nts . Co ns e qu e ntl y , w e fi ndthe pu rp os e behind the statutory

exclusion i s met and the court did not err in finding the policy excluded cover ag e. Drollinger v. Safeco I

ns. Co. of America , 797 P.2d 540, 543 (Wash.App. 1990).
Col or a do is a

no -f ault jurisd ic tio n th a t ha s g on e thr ou g h a de c a de s- lon g str

ug g le wi th un ins ur e d mo torist

c ov e ra g e a ndpu bli c po lic y . T hec on tr oll ing statut e in Co lor a do , li ke that in T e n n e s s e e , p r o v i d e s t h a tt h e n a m e d i n s u r e d m a y r e j e c tu n i n s u r e d m o t o r i s tc o v e r a g e i n w r i t i n g
. In c on str uin g a n “o wn e d- bu t- un ins ur e d” e xclu sio na ry c laus e re la tiv e to C olo ra do ’s un ins ur e d mo torist statut e a ndits no -f

ault ins ur a nc e la w, the Col or a do Cou rt of Ap pe a ls a c kn ow le dg e d th e g e ne ra l sp lit of auth ority a mon g sis te r j urisd ic tio ns
. A split of authority exis ts among the many jurisdictions that have addr essed the eff ectivene ss of the exclusion. 12A G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law , § 45:636 (M. Rhodes rev. 2d ed. (1981) ; 2 N.P. Terry , No- Fa ult & Un ins ure d M

oto ris t Automobile Insurance § 24.10[5] (1984).
A number of

decisions have held the “ow ned -b ut-uninsured” exclusionary clause unenfor cea

ble. See Bradley v. Mid-Century I nsurance Co. , 409 Mich. 1, 294 N. W.2 d 1 41 (1 98 0) ; Harvey v. Trave lers Indem nity Co. , 188 Conn. 245, 449 A.2d 15 7 ( 19 82 ); Kau v. Stat e Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 58 Haw. 49, 564 P.2 d 4 43 (1 97 7) ; Kaufmann v. EconomyFire & Casualty Insurance Co. , 52 I ll.App.3d 940, 10 I ll. De c.776, 368 N.E.2d 371 ( 1977), aff’d, 76 I ll.2d 11, 27 I ll. De c .7 42 , 3 89 N.E .2 d 1 15 0 ( 19 79 ); Lin da hl v . H owe , 345 N.W.2d 548 (I owa 19 84 ); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hinke l , 87 Nev. 478, 488 P.2d 1151 (1971). Other jurisdictions have upheld the exclusion. Se e Ho lc om b v . F ar me rs I n s u r a n c e E x c h a n ge , 2 54 Ar

k. 51 4, 49 5 S. W.2 d 1 55 (1 97 3) ; Shipley v. A merican S t a ndard Insurance Co. , 1 83 Ne b. 10 9, 15 8 N .W. 2d23 8 ( 19 68 ); B e a u p r e v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. , 736 S.W. 2d 23 7 ( Te x.Ap p. 19 87 ); An de rso n v . S tate F a r mM u tual Automobile Insurance Co. , 4 71 N.E .2 d 1 17 0 (I nd .Ap p. 19 84 ); Simmons v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. , 65 Ohio App.2d 28, 414 N.E.2d 440 (1979)

. I n tho se jurisd ic tio ns inv a lid a tin g the e xclu sio n, a prima ry c on c e rnis that it conflicts with the purpose for uninsured motorist insurance , which is to provide the sa me de g re e of

pr ote c tio n to a n in su re d a s he wo uldha ve re c e ive d f ro m a fi na nc ia lly responsible tortfe asor. See, e.g., Jacobson v . Implem ent Deale rs Mutual Insurance

### -1 6-

Co. , 1 9 6 M o n t

. 5 4 2 , 6 4 0 P

. 2 d 9 0 8 ( 1 9 8 2 )

. T h e e xc l u s i o n i s t h e r e f o r e v i e w e d a s a re stric tio n o n th e int e nd e d s c op e of un ins ur e d mo torist

c ov e ra g e wh ic h o rd ina

ri ly applies reg ardle ss of whether the insured is injured i n an ins ured ve hicle, an unow ned vehicle, or

on foot. See, e .g., Calvert v. Farme rs Insurance Co. , 144 Ariz. 291, 697 P.2d 684 (1985).
On the other

hand, courts upholding the exclusion arg ue that the insured a nd his ins ur e r f

re e ly e nter e d in to a

c on tr a c t to e xclu de re c ov e ry in the ow ne d- bu tuninsured vehic le situation. See Clark v . State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 743 P.2d 122 7 (Utah 1987) . To permit re covery otherwise, w ould result in a “fr ee- ride” for some multiple-vehic le owner s and would f o rce insurers to provide g ratuit o u s cover ag e while incur ring additional risk. See A nderson v. Am erican Economy Insurance C o. , 43 Wash.App. 852, 719 P.2d 1345 (1986). Moreove r, re wa rd ing a pl aint if

f w ho him se lf

is o pe ratin g a n o wn e d b ut u nin su re d v e hic le is unfair and repug nant to the leg islative policy behind uninsured motorist statutes. See D u ll e n ty v . R o c k

y M o u n ta in F ire & Casualty Co. , 111 I daho 98, 721 P.2d 198 (1986).
W ill iam s- Di e hl v . S tate Fa rm , 793 P.2d 587, 589-90 (Colo.App.1989).
I n 1995, the Supreme Court of Colora do reite rate d its view that the Colorado uninsured motorist st at u t es p ro v ided for br oad cove rag e “. . . to a ssure the w ide-spre ad availabilityto the ins uring pu bli c of

ins ur a nc e pr ote c tio n again st f inanc ia l lo ss c aus e d b y

ne g lig e nt f

inanc ia lly irresponsible motorists.” Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. M cMic hael , 906 P.2d 92, 98 (Colo.1995).
I n April of 2001, the Supre me Court of C olorado, in the contex t of construing the Colorado u n i n sured motorist statutes as related to the son of the named insured injured while ri d i n g a motorcy cle, applied the broade st possible uninsure d motorist covera g e, re leg ating the sig nificanc e of the name d in su re d’ s rig ht t o w a ive the c ov e ra ge t o cases w he re in the waive r w a s a c tua lly a c c omp lis he d. Sa id the Cou rt :

We now addre ss whether DeHe rre ra is elig ible for UM/UI M co v erag e. As with PI P c o v e r a g e , Se n try ar g u e s th a t th e p o li c y

u n a mb ig u o u s ly

f a il s to p r o v ide UM/UIM cover ag e to a pe rson occ upy ing a vehicle that is not a car at the time of injury and thus excludes the motorcy clist from cove rag e in this case.
The UM/UIM statute conta ins no provisions ex cluding protec tion for an i n s u r e d b a s e d o n t h e k i n d o f v e h i c l e a n i n s u r e d o c c u p i e s a tt h e t i m e o f i n j u r y. Rather, it s imply states t hat UM/ UIM cover ag e, if not waived by the named insure d, must protect “pe rsons insured there under who ar e leg ally entitled to rec over damag es from owne rs or ope rators of uninsured motor vehic les.” § 10-4-609( 1). This phrase, “ ‘ p er s o n s i n s u re d t h er eu n d er ’ m ea n s t h at i n s u re rs m u s tp ro v i d e U M /UIM c o v er age fo r t he prote ction of persons i n s u r e d u n d e r t h e l i ab i l i t y

p o l i c y t h a tt h e i n s u r e r

is

### -1 7-

issuing. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 906 P.2 d at 97 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T hu s, the statut e provides cove rag e for persons ; it does not place g eog raphic al limits on cover ag e and does not purport to tie prot ec t i o n ag ainst uninsured motorists to occupanc y in any kind of v e hic le

. This construct i o n o f the UM/UIM statute is consistent with the effe ct of UM/UIM cover ag e limits t o act as a re place ment for the liability policy limit s of an uninsured or unde rinsured motorist who is at fault in a motor vehicle a ccide nt. I f a mot orist ins ur e s a ve hic le fo r l ia

bil ity c ov e ra g e , h is p oli c y

a ff or ds pr ote c tio n to a ll members of

the public injured by

neg lige nt conduct “a

rising out of t h e use of the motor vehicle,” irrespe ctive of w hether the i n jured pe rson was a

pedestria n, a bic y c lis t, a mot or c y c lis t, or a n oc c up a nt of a c ar. § 1 0- 4- 70 6( 1) (a ); see also § 42-7- 41 3( 1) (c ); Kohl v. Union Ins. Co. , 7 3 1 P

. 2 d 1 3 4 , 1 3 5 (C o l o
. 1 9 8 6 ) ( l i ab i l i t y co v er age applies whe never

the injury

is causally

related to a conc ei v able use of the insure d ve hic le ); Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 2 5 2 S o
. 2 d 2 2 9 , 2 3 6 ( F l a
. 1 9 7 1 ) ( “ If an auto liability

policy insured neg lige ntly

hits another with his insured automobile, it is i mmaterial whether such other is a pedestrian or occupie s any particula r vehic le; the insured’ s car

rier is liable.” )
DeHe rrera v. Se ntry Ins. Co. , 30 P.3d 167, 174-75 (Colo.2001).
Whil e DeHe rrera v. Sentry Ins. Co. by dicta sp e c if

ic a lly dis app ro ve s W

ill iam s- Di e hl v . S tate Farm Fire & Casualt

y C o. , it does not mention Cruz v. Farmers Ins. Ex change , 12 P.3d 307 (Colo

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 0 ). Cruz wa s d e c ide d b y the Col or a do Cou rt

of Ap pe a ls o n M arc h 1 6, 20 00 , w ith rehe aring denied on June 1, 2000 , and ce rtiorari denied by the Supreme Court of Colora do on November

14, 2000.
Cruz v. Farmers Ins. Ex change , 1 2 P. 3d30 7 ( Col o. Ap p. 20 00 ) in vo lveda n o n- du ty policeman who sustaine d injuries in an accident while driving his reg ularly assig ned police ve hicle. He fi le d a

c la im u nd e r the un ins ur e d mo torist pr ov isi on s o f h is wi fe’s po lic y of ins ur a nc e wi th Fa rmers Exchang e. The trial court g rante d summary judgme nt to the insure r base d on the “r eg ular use” e x clusio n . The Colorado Court of A ppeals a ffirme d noting that unde r the Colorado statute, un ins ur e d mo torist

c ov e ra g e wa s n ot m a nd a tory . Said the Cou rt : Pla int if f n e xt co nte nd s th a t, as su min g the “ re g ula r u se ” e xclu sio n a

pp lie s to him , it ne ve rthe le ss v iol a te s th e pu bli c po lic y be hin d Col or a do ’s un ins ur e d mo torist statute, § 10-4-609, C.R.S.1999.
An ins ur a nc e po lic y

ma y be vo id as ag a ins t pu bli c po lic y if it d ilu te s, conditions, or l imits statutorily mandated c overa g e. Terranova v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 800 P.2d 58 (Colo.1990). Howeve r, a policy exclusion i s n o tv o i d s i m p l y

b ec au s e i tn arro ws t h e c i rc u m s t a n c e s u n d erwh i ch co v er age applies. Farmers Insuranc e Ex change v . Chacon , 939 P.2d 517 (Colo.App.1997).

### -1 8- The que stion is whether the policy lang uag e which limi ts underinsured motorist covera g e to v ehicles c overe d under the policy and other

vhicles used occa sionally is c onsistent with the lang uag e, intent, and public policy considerations of § 1 0- 4- 60 9, C.R .S. 19 99 . We c on c lud e that it is.
Se c tio n 1 0- 4- 60 9 s ta te s, in p e rt ine nt p art : No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy . . . shall be delivere d or issued . .

. unless cover ag e is provided ther ein or supplemental there to, in lim its for bodily injury or death set forth in, section 42-7- 103(2), C.R. S., under provisions approve d by the commissioner, for the pr otection of pe rsons insured ther eunder who are leg ally

entitled to rec o v er d am ag es fr om owners or operators of uninsured motor vehic les bec ause of bodily injury , sickness, or disease, inc luding de ath, re sulting there from; except that the name d i n s u re d m ayre

j ec ts u ch co v er age i n wr i t i n g. The intent of the statute is to compensate innocent insureds f or losses caused by financ ially

irresponsible drivers. Howe ver, underinsured motorist cover ag e is not mandatory , and individual insure ds are fre e to de cline such cove rag e. Se e Sta te Fa rm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v . Nissen , sup ra . F urthe r, the statut e do e s n ot r e qu ir e fu ll ind e mni fi c a tio n o f l os se s su ff e re d at th e ha nd s o f u nd e ri ns ur e d mo torist s u nd e r a ll c ir c ums ta nc e s. Ra the r, it i nte nd s to pu t a pe rs on inj ur e d b y a n u nd e ri ns ur e d mo torist in the same position as one injured by a tortfeasor insure d in compliance w ith the law. See Terranov a v. State Farm M utual Insurance Co. , supra. Thus, under § 10- 4-609(1) , insu re rs are requir ed to offe r un ins ur e d/u nd e ri ns ur e d mo torist c ov e ra g e to a

c la ss o f i nd ivi du a ls c oe xten siv e wi th the class c overe d by

the liabilityprovi s i o n o f t he re spective policy . See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. M cMic hael , 906 P.2d 92 (Colo.1995).
Her e, plaintiff’ s policy contains the same “ reg ular use” exclusion i n both the liabilityand uninsured/unde rinsured sections of the policy . Thus, the same c lasses of pe op le are pr ov ide d c ov e ra g e un de r b othpr ov isi on s to the sa me e xten t. Plaintiff relies upon cas es from other jurisdictions holdi ng that simil ar exclusions violate public policy

. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duran , 163 Ariz. 1, 785 P.2d 570 (1989). Ho we v er , t h ose ca ses ar e ina pp os ite

. The y

de a l w ithstatut e s a ndpu bli c po lic ie s th a t di ff e r f ro m th os e in Colorado.
We theref

ore c onclude that the “ reg ular use” exclusion i n the uninsured motorist covera g e of plaintiff’s policy does not offe nd public policy

. See W ill iam s-

### -1 9-

Diehl v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 79 3 P. 2d58 7 ( Col o. Ap p. 19 89 ); se e als o Urtado v. Shupe , supra ( “drive other c ar” exclusions i n the liabilitycover ag e portion of insuranc e policies do not violate public policy ).
Cruz v. Farmers Ins. Ex change , 12 P.3d 307, 312 (Colo.App.2000).
I n Jaimes v . State Farm Mu t

. A u t o . Ins. C o. , 53 P.3d 743 (Colo.App.2002), the Colorado C o u rt o f A p p ea l s fa ce d an ex cl u s i o n p ro v i d i n g:
THERE I S NO COVERAGE

. . . . 2. F OR B O D I

L Y I N J U R Y TO AN INSURED : a. WHILE OC CU

PYING , O R b. THROUGH B EING STRUCK BY AMOTOR VEHI CLE OW NED B Y Y OU , Y OUR SPOU

SE OR ANY

RELATIVE IFIT IS N O T IN S U R E D F O R T H IS COVERAGE UND ER THI S POL I CY.
The Court first dete rmined t h at t he exclusion was valid, but on g rant of c ertiora ri by the supreme court, the case was rema nded for rec onsideration in the light of De He rre ra v . Se ntr y In s. Co. , 30 P.3d 167 (Colo.2001).
T h e C o u r to f

A p p e a l s t h e n c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e e x c l u s i o n w a s v o i d a s a g a i n s tp u b l i c p o l i c y: We first addre ss the “owne d but not insured under this policy ” exclusion as applied to UM/UIM cover ag e and c onclude that the exclusi on is contrary to the public policy

of Colorado a nd thus void.
Th e abil ity

of a n in su re r t o e x clu de UM /U IM b e ne fi ts u nd e r c e rt a in circ umstances historica lly has bee n rec og nized a s valid and enf orce able in Colorado and not repug nant to public policy

. See § 1 0- 4- 60 9; Terranova v. State Farm M utual A u to m o b ile Insurance Co. , 8 0 0 P

. 2 d 5 8 ( C o l o
. 1 9 9 0 ) ( e x c l u s i o n o f U M /UIM c o v er age fo r the ow ne r- oc c up a nt i nju re d ina on e -v e hic le a c c ide nt i s e nfo rceab le); Cruz v. F a r m e r s I n s u r ance E xchange , 1 2 P

. 3 d 3 0 7 (C o l o
. Ap p
. 2 0 0 0 )( “r egu l aru s e” ex cl u s ion app lic able to UM /U IM cov e ra g e is n ot c on tr ary to p ub lic po lic y ); W

illiams-Diehl v. Sta te Fa rm Fi re & Cas ua lty Co. , s up ra (“ow ned but not insured” exclusion is not c on tr ary to p ub lic po lic y ); Arguello v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., su pr a (same)

. Howeve r, in DeH

e rre ra , the supreme court indicated its disapproval of W illiams-Diehland im plicitlydisapproved of Ar gu e lla , to the extent they

conflicte d wi t h De He rre ra . De He rre ra v . S e ntr y In su ra nc e Co. , s up ra , 3 0 P. 3 d a t 1 7 6 n. 8.

### -2 0-

Thus, the supreme court, in obiter dictum, has announced its limit ed disapprova l of the e xclu sio n inthe UM /U IM c on te xt.
I n De He rre ra , the insured’ s child was inj ured while riding an unlicense d, offthe-roa d motor b i k e o wned by the child, upon being struck by an uninsured or underinsure d motor vehicle. The insured then soug ht Personal I njury Protection and UM /U IM b e ne fi ts p ro vid e d b y a po lic y ins uring he r a

uto mob ile . T he appli c able policy provided UM/UIM cover ag e only if an insured person wa s occupying a car or was ap e d e s trian , a n d c o v e r a g e w a s d e n ie d o n th e b a s is th a t th e c h il d w a s not occupying a

car and wa s not a pede strian. As pertinent he re, in De He rre ra , t h e s u p r e m e c o u r t h e l d t h a tU M /U IM cover ag e extended to the child, an insure d party , even when operating the motor bike, beca use UM / UIM co v era g e is persona l, rather than vehicle specific , under § 10- 4- 609. The c overa g e thus trave ls with the insured, there a re sident family member driving an uninsured ve hicle. The court, the re fore , voided the limitation on the UM/UIM cover ag e to insureds who are in a car or are pedestria ns as being contra ry to § 10-4-609 and the public policy of Colorado.
Jaimes v . State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 53 P.3d 743, 745-46 (Colo.App.2002). We will leave the pr esent authorita t i v e o r u nauthoritative status of Cru z v . F ar me rs I ns
. Exc hange , 12 P.3d 307 (Colo.App.2000) to the courts of Colorado.
Whil e the app e llate c ou rt s of Te nn e sse e ha ve no t a dd re sse d th e “ re g ula r u se ” e xclu sio n in a c on te xt simi lar t o th e c a se a t ba r, tw o v e ry

re le va nt c on sid e ratio ns mus t g uid e ou r a c tio ns
. 1

. As l at e a s No v em b er2 0 0 2 , t h e S u p re m e C o u rt o f T en n es s ee h as re i t er at ed t h e l o n gstanding rule in Terry v. Ae tna Casualt y & S u r ety Co. , 510 S.W .2d 509 (Tenn.1974) that Tenne ssee’ s uninsured motorist statutes do not provide for broad coverag e but effec tuate a limited and nar row purpose
. Poper ex

rel. Poper v . Rollins , 90 S.W .3d 682, 687 (Tenn.2002)

. 2. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec ti o n 5 6 -7 -1 2 0 1 (a )( 2 ) p ro v i d i n g t h atan y n am ed i n s u re d may reje ct uninsured motorist cove rag e in its entirety is a valid and e nforc eable statute. W e iss v . S tate Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 107 S.W .3d 503, 505 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). Recog nizi ng that Tenne ssee is not a “ broad c overa g e” state and that Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 56-7-1201 a llows the named insured the unconditional option to reject uninsure d and underinsured motorist cover ag e altog ether , it would a ppear that the public policy

considerations sustaining the Illinois , Arizona and Te x as holding s are inapplicable to Te nnessee
. Jack son v. Jone s , 804 N.E.2d 155 (I nd.App.2004) involved a n on-duty I ndianapolis police office r in a fa ct situation that very closel y p ar allels the ca se at ba r. The Indianapolis Police

### -2 1-

Depa rtment provided a

motorcy cle f

or Jackson’s reg ular use. T he City of I ndianapol is is s e lf

-insured a ndis n ot r e qu ir e d to c arry un ins ur e d a ndun de ri ns ur e d mo torist c ov e ra g e . Jon e s col lid e d w ith J ackson causing persona l injury to Jackson. After determining that J ones wa s uninsured, Jackson filed a c laim ag ainst I llinois Fa rmers I nsuranc e C ompany under his persona l automobile policy . The tr i a l c o u r tg r a n t e d s u m m ar y j u d g m e n tt o t h e i n s u r e r u n d e r t h e “ r e g u l ar u s e ” e x c l u s i o n i n i t s p o l i c y. I t is well to note the striking similarity of t he dil emma face d by

J ackson to that fa ced by

Shepherd. Metropolitan Government of Na shville is self-insured a nd is not required t o car ryuninsuredun de ri ns ur e d mo torist

c ov e ra g e . T he pr oo f s ho ws that Sh e ph e rdc an n o t pr e va il u po n h is o wn private insurance car

rier to pr ovide uninsured motorist cover ag e for him in the use of police ve hicles. The court in Jack

son a c kn ow le dg e d th e patr olm a n’s dile mma bu t de te rm ine d th a t th e so lut ionis le g isl a tiv e , n ot j ud ic ia l:

J ackson doe s not contend that his Fa rmers’ policy is ambiguous or that it does not expl icitly

exclude uninsured or unde rinsured co v erag e under the fa cts here

. Rather he contend s th at the exclusion i n the uninsured a nd underinsure d section, eve n tho ug h it is c omp a ra ble to that f

ou ndin the lia

bil it y section, is v oidbe c aus e it i s again st pub lic po lic y

to e xclu de pu bli c sa fe ty of fi c e rs fr om c ov e ra g e un de r the ir persona l insurance policies, eve n while on duty , beca use the g overnme nt e ntitywho owns and thus insures the ve hicle is not require d to provide uninsured or underinsure d motorist covera g e. J ackson contends t hat because the statute, I C 27-7- 5-2, does not provide for e x ceptions, g overnme nt ve hicles cannot be excluded from cover ag e by

persona l insurance policies. Beca u s e g overnme nt entities are se lfinsured and the ref

ore e x empted by the Tort Claims Ac t from being require d to car ry uninsured motorist cover ag e, such e x clusion would leave him and other g overnme nt employ ees without the uni nsured motorist cover ag e provided for by law. He arg ues that becaus e the leg islature did not specific ally provide for

the exception, such exception should not be allowed.
J ackson note s that the purpose of uninsured motorist cover ag e is to place the insured in substantially

the same position as if the other party had complied with the minimum financ ial responsibilityrequire ments of the insuranc e statutes. See A m. States Ins

. C o. v. Braden , 625 N.E.2d 1252, 1257 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). J ackson c on c e d e s t h ath i s “ p o l i c y s p e c i f i c a l l y l i m i t s u n i n s u r e d m o t o r i s tc o v e r a g e a s to persons who w ould otherwise qua lify as insured f

or liabilitypurposes.” See W hitledge , 586 N.E.2d at 887.
Jac ks on arg ue s th a t Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co. does not control bec au s e the vehicle the re w as owne d by a private business which could pur chase uninsured and underi n s u r e d mo to r is t c o v e r a g e
. H o w e v e r , lan g u a g e ina n in s u r a n c e p o li c y which lim its or dim ini sh e s th e pr ote c tio n r e qu ir e d b y the un ins ur e d mo torist

statut e is contra ry to public policy only if it specific ally limit s uninsured mot orist protection a s to pe rs on [s] wh o w ou ld o the rw ise qu ali fy as insu re d f or lia bil ity pu rp os e s.

### -2 2-

Harden v . Monroe Guar. I nc. Co. , 62 6 N. E.2d 814, 819 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), tra ns
. denied

. Our supre me court has stated that “w e may even a g ree that public policy fa vo rs a re qu ir e me nt that se lf

-i ns ur e rs un de r the fi na nc ia l r e sp on sib ili ty la w s ho uld be require d to pr ovide some sort of uninsured motorist prote ction for those who drive their [v eh icles], it i s not our role to sit as a judicial leg islator and write such a require ment into the act.” Cityof Gar y , 6 1 2 N.E.2d at 119. Since no le g islative action has be en take n on this iss ue, it is clea rly the intent of the leg islature to allow g overnme nt e ntities to be self-insure d for liability and not insured f

or uninsured or un de ri ns ur e d c la ims

. Mo re re c e ntl y , ou r s up re me c ou rt wr ote that “ pu bli c po lic y is a matter for the G ener al Assembly subject only

to constitutional li mitations on leg islative aut h o ri t y .” Murray v . Conseco, Inc

. , 795 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ind.2003). J ackson’ s Fa

rm ers’ policy

is neither ambig uous nor contra ry to statute. Our leg islat ure ha s not revised e ither statute to make the exceptions in either the g overnme ntal entity ’s lack of uninsured or unde rinsured pr otection or the e x ceptions i n J a c k s o n ’ s F ar m e r s ’ p o l i c y a g a i n s tp u b l i c p o l i c y. Jack son v. Jone s , 804 N.E.2d 155, 160-61 ( I nd.App.2004).
As noted ea

rlier, Shephe rd asse rts the same d i l em m a as the patrolman did in Jack son
. Metropolitan Nashville doe s not provide uninsured or underinsure d motorist cover ag e for patrolmen op e ratin g its fl e e t of

patr ol v e hic le s. She ph e rd c a nn ot pr e va il up on his pe rs on a l ve hic le ins ur e r t o e xten d to him

un ins ur e d mo torist

pr ote c tio n w hil e he is dr ivi ng a n ass ig ne d pa tr ol v e hic le . H e is, thu s, tr app e d in what he co rr e c tly re fe rs to as a “ bla c k hole .” L ike Jac ks on , h ow e ve r, his dil e mma is l e g isl a tiv e , n ot j ud ic ia l. S inc e Te nn e sse e is a le ss- than- br oa d c ov e ra g e un ins ur e d mo torist state and the na med insured ha s the unconditional statutory option to reject such c overa g e altog ether , the

“ r e g u l ar u s e ” e x c l u s i o n d o e s n o tc o n tr a v e n e p u b l i c p o l i c y.
T h e judgment of the tria l court is in all respec ts affirme d with costs of appe al assesse d ag ainst the appellant, Dennis R. Shephe rd, for which execution may issue. The case i s re m an d ed t o t h e tr i a l c o u r tf

o r s u c h o t h e r

p r o c e e d i n g s a s m a y b e n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE