UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-5187

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CECIL DEAN WHITE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

District Judge. (2:06-cr-00023-D-1)

Submitted: August 31, 2010 Decided: October 22, 2010

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research 

and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, 

Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Cecil Dean White appeals from his twenty-four month 

sentence imposed pursuant to the revocation of his supervised 

release. On appeal, White asserts that his sentence is 

procedurally and substantively plainly unreasonable because the 

district court failed to consider the mitigating circumstances, 

gave excessive weight to the exaggerated severity of the 

violations, and failed to provide sufficiently compelling 

support for a major variance. We affirm.

A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised 

release should be affirmed if it is within the applicable 

statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In 

making this determination, we first consider whether the 

sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry 

takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of 

fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review 

for guideline sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 

652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). In making our review, we “follow 

generally the procedural and substantive considerations that 

[are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original sentences, . . . 

with some necessary modifications to take into account the 

unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences.” 

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. 
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A sentence imposed upon revocation of release is 

procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the 

Chapter Seven policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) factors that it is permitted to consider. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. A sentence imposed upon

revocation of release is substantively reasonable if the 

district court stated a proper basis for concluding that the 

defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the 

statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. We will affirm if 

the sentence is not unreasonable. Id. at 439. Only if a 

sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable 

will we “decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” 

Id. “[T]he court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its 

previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the 

statutory maximum.” Id.

When imposing sentence, the district court must 

provide individualized reasoning. See United States v. Carter, 

564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The Carter rationale applies 

to revocation hearings; however, “a court need not be as 

detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it 

must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United 

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Because White did not request a sentence different 

from the one imposed, review is for plain error. See United 
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States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580 (4th Cir. 2010). “To 

establish plain error, [White] must show that an error occurred, 

that the error was plain, and that the error affected his

substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 

249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if White makes this showing, 

“correction of the error remains within [the court’s] 

discretion, which [the court] should not exercise . . . unless 

the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). In the sentencing context, an 

error affects substantial rights if the defendant can show that 

the sentence imposed “was longer than that to which he would 

otherwise be subject.” United States v. Angle

We conclude that White failed to make the requisite 

showings. His excuses for his admitted release violations fail 

to outweigh the fact that he repeatedly violated the terms of 

his supervised release. The district court considered White’s 

excuses and rejected them. The court explicitly considered the 

Guidelines range (six to twelve months) as well as many of the 

statutory factors that it was permitted to consider when 

arriving at a sentence. In this regard, the court mentioned 

White’s continuing criminal conduct, the leniency of the 

probation officer and the court in the past, the need to deter 

, 254 F.3d 514, 

518 (4th Cir. 2001).
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future violations, White’s unsatisfactory conduct while on 

supervised release, and his failure to take responsibility. In 

addition, the court recommended that White receive substance 

abuse treatment. 

Moreover, White faces a very heavy burden on the 

claims he raises. Even if he could show that his sentence was 

unreasonable, he would still need to show that it was plainly 

unreasonable. A sentence is “plainly unreasonable” if it 

“run[s] afoul of clearly settled law.” Thompson

 Accordingly, we affirm White’s sentence. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

, 595 F.3d at 

549. White has flatly failed to make such a showing. In 

addition, because his sentence is reviewed for plain error, 

White must also show that there is a reasonable probability that 

the claimed irregularity in sentencing affected his substantial 

rights and that any error affected the fairness and integrity of 

the judicial system. White’s assertions of error illustrate 

essentially a disagreement with the district court’s conclusions 

that his behavior constituted serious breaches of his release 

conditions. Even assuming rational minds could differ on 

whether the district court’s conclusions were exaggerated, White 

cannot show that his substantial rights were affected or that 

the sentencing error was so egregious that it called into 

question the fairness of the sentencing system.
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED