alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Harold L. BERRY v. MASONITE CORPORATION.

No. 49687.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Jan. 11, 1978.

*1146Hall, Callender & Dantin, Maurice Dan-tin, Columbia, for appellant.

Gibbes, Graves, Mullins, Bullock & Ferris, William S. Mullins, III, Jones H. Hoskins, Laurel, for appellee.

Before INZER, P. J., ROBERTSON and BOWLING, JJ., and BOST, Commissioner.

JAMES E. BOST, Commissioner

for the Court:1

Masonite Corporation filed its bill of complaint against Harold L. Berry in the Chancery Court of Lawrence County, praying that the court grant unto complainant a reasonable extension of time within which to cut and remove the timber sold to Masonite by Berry or, in the alternative, to direct the defendant to return the $60,-778.95 consideration paid for the timber.

Berry filed a general demurrer asserting no equity on the face of the bill, and the court overruled. Berry then moved for allowance of appeal under the provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 11-51-7 (1972), assigning as his reason therefor that such appeal would settle all controlling principles involved. Appeal from the order overruling the demurrer was allowed, and this Court is now presented with two issues: (1) Was there error in allowing the interlocutory appeal? (2) Was there error in overruling the general demurrer? In view of our decision on the first issue, that the interlocutory appeal was improperly granted, we do not reach the second issue.

Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 11-51-7 (1972) provides for the granting of appeals from interlocutory orders or decrees under certain conditions. The statute contemplates that an interlocutory appeal will be granted only if all the controlling principles in the case may be settled, or to avoid expense and delay. Interlocutory appeals are to be granted with caution. *Burns v. Arrington,*251 Miss. 247, 169 So.2d 831 (1964); *Martin v. Reed,*232 Miss. 258, 98 So.2d 765 (1957); *Prine v. Smith,*226 Miss. 701, 85 So.2d 210 (1956); *Stirling v. Whitney National Bank,*170 Miss. 674, 150 So. 654 (1933).

All the controlling principles cannot be settled on this appeal. Accordingly, allowance of this interlocutory appeal was error.

The order granting an interlocutory appeal is reversed and this case is remanded for a hearing on the merits.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

PATTERSON, C. J., INZER and SMITH, P. JJ., and ROBERTSON, SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE and BOWLING, JJ., concur.

1

. Sitting pursuant to Chapter 430, Laws of 1976. The above opinion is adopted as the opinion of the Court.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 May 28, 2015

a0518

Order 

Clerk

May 28, 2015

149956

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 149956

COA: 319539

Oakland CC: 1986-071910-FC

SPENCER TRACY HOLLOWAY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 23, 2014 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
#### Herbert DAVIS et al. v. Lottie Bell SMITH et al.

No. 54233.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 4, 1974.

In re: Herbert Davis et al. applying for Certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Bien-ville. 286 So.2d 517.

Writ denied. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in the judgment complained of.

BARHAM, J., is of the opinion the writ should be granted.

CALOGERO, J., dissents from the refusal to grant writs.
1442THE BANKERS GUARANTEE TITLE AND TRUST COMPANY               Last Business Day of the month           20131231
2218VANDERBILT MORTGAGE AND FINANCE INC.                        25th Calendar Day                        20131231
2532REGIONS MORTGAGE  INC.                                      First Business Day of the following month20131231
2813CENLAR FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK                                 First Business Day of the following month20131231
#### Jesse Jewell ODOM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-54.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 2, 1971.

Melvyn Kessler, Miami, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Alan M. Medof, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals from his judgment of conviction for the crimes of carrying a concealed weapon and bribery.

His argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress has been considered and is found to be insufficient. See Guillory v. Wilson, 402 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1968); State v. Browning, Fla.App.1970, 233 So.2d 866; and Godbee v. State, Fla.App.1969, 224 So.2d 441.

*446The argument that the trial court erred in denying the motion of the defendant for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon is without sufficient merit to warrant reversal. § 790.01, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

The defendant’s final argument for reversal has been considered and a review of the record and briefs convince us that it is insufficient.

The judgment of conviction is

Affirmed.
#### MARGATE HEALTH CENTER, INC., etc., Petitioner, v. Dr. Channing FOX, Respondent.

No. 43609.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 31, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 16, 1973.

Certiorari denied. 274 So.2d 273.

CARLTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
```

EXHIBIT 31.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Kevin T. Dunphy, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report for the three month period ended March
31, 2006 on Form 10-QSB of General Devices, Inc.

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of and for the periods presented in this report.

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over
financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f))
for the Company and we have:

      a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

      b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

      c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small
business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth
fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or
is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting.

5. The small business issuer's other certifying officers and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of
small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

      a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

      b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting.

Date: May 25, 2006

/s/ Kevin T. Dunphy

Kevin T. Dunphy
Treasurer, Chief Financial Officer
and Director
```
**Exhibit 99.1**

 

**NITRO PETROLEUM INCORPORATED APPOINTS NEW CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

 

April 2, 2009, Oklahoma City, OK:  Nitro Petroleum Incorporated is pleased to announce that it has appointed Shane Broesky to the Position of Chief Financial Officer effective April 1, 2009. Mr. Broesky has also been elected to the Nitro Board of Directors.

 

Shane Broesky resides in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. He has an extensive business background which includes management positions in numerous private corporations involved in sales, computers, and public relations. Shane is currently the principal of a private investment firm, whose specialty is the raising of capital and operational funding for oil and gas entities.

 

Larry Wise, President of Nitro commented “the addition of Shane as Chief Financial Officer and Director will be very significant and strategic to Nitro. His strong organization skills and his ability to raise funds is very timely as we push to develop our substantial Powder River Basin project in Montana. Shane will also be invaluable in finding and negotiating working interest participation in new oil and gas projects, especially in Alberta where he resides.”

 

**About Nitro:**

 

Nitro Petroleum, Incorporated is an independent, energy company engaged in the acquisition, exploitation and development of oil and natural gas properties in the United States. Nitro’s objective is to seek out and develop opportunities in the oil and natural gas sectors that represent a low risk opportunity. As well, Nitro aims to define larger projects that can be developed with Joint Venture partners. More information about the company is available at www.nitropetroleuminc.com.

 

Certain statements in this news release may contain forward-looking information within the meaning of Rule 175 under the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 3b-6 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and are subject to the safe harbor created by those rules. All statements, other than statements of fact, included in this release, including, without limitation, statements regarding potential future plans and objectives of the company, are forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties. There can be no assurance that such statements will prove to be accurate and actual results and future events could differ materially from those anticipated in such statements. We do not intend to, and undertake no duty to, update any such forward looking statements to reflect the impact of circumstances or events that arise after the date such forward looking statements were made.

 

Investor Relations:

Toll Free: (888) 805-NTRO

Email: info@nitropetroleuminc.com

Web: www.nitropetroleuminc.com
#### William O. KUHN, Petitioner, v. Maria C. KUHN, Respondent.

No. 42513.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 11, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 1972.

Certiorari denied. 261 So.2d 532.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS and McCAIN, JJ., concur.

BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., dissent.
MIGUEL REYNOZA,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

___________________________/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D17-0201

Opinion filed February 6, 2017.

Petition for Writ of Prohibition -- Original Jurisdiction.

Anabelle Dias of Anabelle Dias P.A., Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of prohibition is denied on the merits.

LEWIS, BILBREY, and WINOKUR, JJ., CONCUR.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 96 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 96

    To provide for the conduct of basic research on certain matters 
                      relating to ovarian cancer.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 5, 1993

  Mrs. Mink introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To provide for the conduct of basic research on certain matters 
                      relating to ovarian cancer.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Ovarian Cancer Research Act of 
1993''.

SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT REGARDING CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF BASIC RESEARCH ON 
              OVARIAN CANCER.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting 
through the Director of the National Institutes of Health and the 
Director of the National Cancer Institute, shall conduct or support 
basic research--
            (1) to develop a test capable of detecting ovarian cancer 
        in the earlier stages of the cancer; and
            (2) to determine whether there is a genetic basis to such 
        cancer.
    (b) Limitation.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary may 
not conduct or support clinical research regarding the matters 
described in paragraph (1) or (2) of such subsection.

SEC. 3. FUNDING.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--For the purpose of carrying 
out section 2(a), there is authorized to be appropriated $50,000,000 
for fiscal year 1994, $60,000,000 for fiscal year 1995, $70,000,000 for 
fiscal year 1996, $80,000,000 for fiscal year 1997, and $90,000,000 for 
fiscal year 1998.
    (b) Rule of Construction Regarding Other Authorizations.--
Subsection (a) may not be construed to affect the authority to make, 
under any authorization of appropriations established in any other 
provision of law, appropriations for the purposes described in section 
2(a).

                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
ACCOMPANYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                               1
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      598
<ALLOWANCES>                                        64
<INVENTORY>                                         58
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   733
<PP&E>                                          10,524
<DEPRECIATION>                                   6,778
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   6,006
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,577
<BONDS>                                          1,666
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,400
<OTHER-SE>                                         337
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     6,006
<SALES>                                          1,654
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,654
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      880
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  75
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    701
<INCOME-TAX>                                       299
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                402
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       402
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### James Fred ROBERTS v. K & D ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.

No. 62656.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 1, 1978.

In re: James F. Roberts applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Writ denied.
#### Edward Wesley BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-922.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 1, 1972.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Alan S. Becker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Arnold Ginsberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before SWANN, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On appeal by the defendant below from conviction of carrying a concealed firearm, it is contended the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence (a hand gun) which it is argued was the product of an illegal search of his person, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment. Those contentions having been considered by this court in the light of the record and briefs and found to be without merit, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.
#### PALM BEACH COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. John B. McKEE and Margaret B. McKee et al., Appellees.

No. 70-385.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 24, 1970.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Palm Beach County; Culver Smith, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Jackie HARVEY and Marvin Tyre, Appellants, v. B. G. MOORE, Appellee.

No. JJ-51.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 12, 1978.

Rehearing Denied June 6, 1978.

John S. Winnie, of Winnie & Winnie, P. A., Gainesville, for appellants.

Frederick T. Mickler, III, of Brannon, Brown, Norris, Vocelle & Haley, P. A., Lake City, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The interlocutory appeal is DISMISSED. Rule 4.2 c, F.A.R. Treating the appeal papers as a petition for common law certio-rari, certiorari is DENIED.

McCORD, C. J., and SMITH, J., concur.

BOYER, J., dissents.

BOYER, Judge,

dissenting.

I would treat this case as a review by common law certiorari, would grant the petition and reverse.

The issue is whether the learned trial judge erred when ordering the plaintiff (petitioner here) to obtain and furnish to the defendant (respondent here) information in response to discovery not in the possession of the plaintiff but available to the defendant via deposition or subpoena duces tecum, or in the alternative to prepare, execute and deliver to the entity having possession (in this instance, a Veteran’s Administration Hospital) an authorization for release of such information to the defendant. In my view Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.350 authorizes the court, upon appropriate proceedings, to re*1096quire a party to produce for the purposes enumerated in the rule the documents and things enumerated in the rule which are in the possession, custody or control of the responding party and which are not readily available to the requesting party. But when the documents or things sought to be produced are not in the possession or custody of the responding party but are available to the requesting party without the consent or authorization of the responding party, the responding party should not be required to obtain same for the requesting party nor to create new documents, viz: Authorizations or consents which are not necessary in order for the requesting party to obtain such documents or information by the ordinary means of subpoena duces tecum, or other methods of discovery. Obviously, if the documents or information can only be obtained by the responding party or with the consent or authorization of the responding party, then an order in the alternative, requiring either production or execution of authorization or consent would be appropriate. But such are not the facts sub judice.

I would reverse.
#### Rene DE LA PAZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 77-1416.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 28, 1978.

Weiner, Robbins & Tunkey, Miami, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Joel D. Rosenblatt, Jose R. Rodriguez and Steven R. Jacob, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, NATHAN and KE-HOE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals an order revoking probation and a sentence of two concurrent terms of five years. The State accepts appellant’s statement of facts, which reveals the following: The defendant was sentenced on April 20, 1971, to four one year sentences in the Dade County jail to be served concurrently with another one year sentence, and a one year sentence, also in the Dade County jail, to be served at the expiration of the concurrent one year sentences.1 On September 24, 1971, the court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to mitigate the sentences. At this time, the court also corrected the sentences in light of the holding in *State v. Evans,*225 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). The court set aside the sentence that was to be served consecutively so that it would be served concurrently with the other sentences. Finally, the court mitigated the four concurrent sentences to a sentence of the time already *1094served, plus seven years probation. (The court denied the motion to mitigate the one year sentence to which the four concurrent one year sentences attached.)

The court was without jurisdiction to mitigate the legal sentences imposed. See *Collins v. State,*343 So.2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). However, the court did have jurisdiction to correct the illegal sentence. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(a), and see the principle of law in *Perrin v. Enos,*56 So.2d 920 (Fla.1951). Therefore, the only legal sentences were the four concurrent sentences of one year in the Dade County jail to run concurrently with another one year sentence. The order placing the defendant on probation was a nullity. Accordingly, the sentence imposed for violation of the probation is an illegal sentence.

The defendant shall be returned to the trial judge with directions to reinstate the original sentences as corrected, the defendant being given credit for any time served on the original sentence and the sentence that is now vacated. Cf. *Solomon v. State,*341 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

Reversed and remanded with directions.

1

. Therefore, in summation, defendant was to serve a one year sentence (sentence one) to run concurrently with four other one year sen-fences (sentences two, three, four and five) and then to serve a consecutive one year sentence (sentence six), all in the Dade County jail.