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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-17-00331-CR

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MICHAL LYNN DAVIS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the 163rd District Court

Orange County, Texas

Trial Cause No. B160374-R

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

In one issue on appeal, Michal Lynn Davis complains that the trial court erred

by denying his motion to quash the indictment because the indictment failed to 

provide him with sufficient notice of the charge against him. We affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

BACKGROUND

A grand jury indicted Davis for intoxication manslaughter. See Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. § 49.08(a) (West 2011). A person commits the offense of intoxication 
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manslaughter if the person (1) operates a motor vehicle in a public place; (2) is 

intoxicated; and (3) by reason of that intoxication causes the death of another by 

accident or mistake. Id.; Auldridge v. State, 228 S.W.3d 258, 260 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2007, pet. ref’d). Here, the indictment, which directly tracks the language of 

the statute, alleges that Davis

did then and there operate a motor vehicle in a public place while 

intoxicated and did by reason of such intoxication cause the death of 

another, namely, Jerry Campbell, by accident or mistake, to wit: by 

failing to control the speed and direction of the motor vehicle he was 

operating and by driving the said motor vehicle off the roadway and 

hitting the said Jerry Campbell against the peace and dignity of the 

State.

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.08(a).

Davis filed a motion to quash the indictment, arguing that the indictment did 

not fairly inform him of the charge against which he was required to defend, because 

the indictment failed to allege the manner and means of how he was intoxicated and 

failed to adequately allege a causal connection to the victim’s death. The trial court 

denied Davis’s motion to quash. Davis pleaded guilty to intoxication manslaughter, 

and a jury assessed Davis’s punishment at twenty years of confinement and a 

$10,000 fine. 
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ANALYSIS

In his sole issue, Davis complains that the indictment failed to provide him 

with sufficient notice because it omitted an essential element of the offense, namely 

the manner and means of how Davis was intoxicated as well as the manner and 

means to make the causal connection between the intoxication and the use of Davis’s 

vehicle and the death of the victim. According to Davis, the specific result nature of 

the offense of intoxication manslaughter mandates a more specific manner and 

means than those set forth in his indictment. 

Because the sufficiency of a charging instrument is a question of law, we 

review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash a charging instrument for failure 

to provide adequate notice de novo. State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248, 251-52

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008); State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 

To meet the accused’s right to notice under both the United States and Texas 

Constitutions, the indictment “must be specific enough to inform the accused of the 

nature of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense.” Moff, 154 

S.W.3d at 601. Article 21.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth 

requirements for an indictment and specifically provides that the “offense must be 

set forth in plain and intelligible words.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.02(7) 

(West 2009). Article 21.03 provides that “[e]verything should be stated in an 
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indictment which is necessary to be proved.” Id. art. 21.03 (West 2009). Article 

21.04 provides that “[t]he certainty required in an indictment is such as will enable 

the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any prosecution 

for the same offense.” Id. art. 21.04 (West 2009). The trial court should grant a 

motion to quash “only where the language concerning the defendant’s conduct is so 

vague or indefinite as to deny the defendant effective notice of the acts he allegedly 

committed.” DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 

An indictment that tracks the statutory language generally satisfies the 

constitutional and statutory requirements, and the State need not allege facts that are 

merely evidentiary in nature. State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Crim. App.

1998). Because the definitions of “intoxicated” are purely evidentiary matters and 

not elements of the offense, they need not be alleged to give a defendant sufficient 

notice. State v. Jarreau, 512 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Barbernell, 

257 S.W.3d at 254-55. The language of the indictment also alleges that there was a 

causal connection between Davis’s intoxication and the victim’s death. See Garcia 

v. State, 112 S.W.3d 839, 852 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) 

(stating that the death must be the result of the defendant’s intoxication). The 

indictment alleges that due to Davis’s intoxication, Davis failed to control the speed 
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and direction of his motor vehicle, which caused Davis to leave the roadway and hit 

and kill the victim. 

We conclude that the indictment is sufficient to notify Davis of the charges 

against him and to allow him to prepare a defense. See Jarreau, 512 S.W.3d at 354; 

Mays, 967 S.W.2d at 406; Auldridge, 228 S.W.3d at 260-62. Accordingly, we further 

conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Davis’s motion to quash. We 

overrule Davis’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

AFFIRMED. 

______________________________

 STEVE McKEITHEN

 Chief Justice

Submitted on October 9, 2018

Opinion Delivered January 16, 2019

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.