alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 21

                         SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

Parent

Coastal Financial Corporation


Subsidiary                                   Percentage          State of
                                             Owned               Incorporation

Coastal Federal Savings Bank                 100%                United States

Coastal Federal Mortgage, Inc.               100%                South Carolina

Coastal Investor Services, Inc.              100%                South Carolina

Coastal Federal Holding Corporation          100%                Delaware

Coastal Real Estate Investment               100%                North Carolina
  Corporation (3)

Coastal Mortgage Bankers and                 100%                South Carolina
  Realty Co., Inc. (1)

Shady Forest Development                     100%                South Carolina
  Corporation (2)

Sherwood Development                         100%                South Carolina
  Corporation (2)

Ridge Development Corporation (2)            100%                South Carolina

501 Development Corporation (2)              100%                South Carolina

North Beach Investment, Inc. (2)             100%                South Carolina

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(1)  First tier subsidiaries of Coastal Federal.
(2)  Second tier subsidiaries of Coastal Federal and first tier subsidiaries of
     Coastal Mortgage.
(3)  First tier operating subsidiary of Coastal Federal Holding Corporation,
     consolidated with Coastal Federal for Regulatory Reporting.
257 La. 173

#### Robert Dale SMITH v. KELLY LABOR SERVICE.

No. 50997.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 14, 1970.

In re: Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited applying for certiora-ri, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 239 So.2d 685.

Writ refused. The judgment is correct.

SUMMERS, Justice, is of the opinion the writ should be granted.
#### Robert Edward GARNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-56.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 21, 1973.

James A. Gardner, Public Defender, and Charles H. Livingston, Asst. Public Defender, Sarasota, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard C. Booth, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Reversed on the authority of CrPR 3.191(d)(2), 33 F.S.A. See also Esperti v. State (Fla.App.1973), 276 So.2d 58, 64.

MANN, C. J., and McNULTY and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.
#### Ruloff E. Cutten et al., Copartners Doing Business as E. F. Hutton *&*Company, Plaintiffs, *v.*Josephine Kostyrka et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,

November 5, 1952.

Tompkins, *Boat & Tompkins*for plaintiffs.

*Stephen J. Jarema*for defendants.

G-avagan, J.

This is a motion for summary judgment and for certain additional relief.

The action is brought by stockbrokers to replevy a stock certificate delivered in error to one of the defendants, who transferred it immediately to her son, the other defendant. The mother alone appears. Her answer, in addition to a general denial and the admission that she received the stock certificate in issue, sets forth as separate defenses that without knowledge of the facts she transferred the stock to her son; that he had purchased it in her name and he was entitled to said stock certificate immediately upon delivery to her. It is not denied that the plaintiffs, by reason of a clerk’s error, had delivered the wrong certificate. The mother contends, however, that she *“*acted solely as a dummy in the transaction ”.

In a similar case, though the action there sounded in conversion, it was held: *u*An agent or servant who converts the property of a third person is liable for such conversion, and it is no defense if his acts were committed in pursuance to his *941employment or for the benefit of his principal or master, though the servant or agent acted under a *bona fide*belief that his master or principal was the owner of the property and in ignorance of the true owner’s rights, since one who interferes with personal property must at his peril see that he is protected by authority of the true owner ” *(Passaic Falls Throwing Co.*v. *Villeneuve-Pohl Corp.,*169 App. Div. 727, 729).

It is fundamental that replevin is analogous to an action of trespass or trover and that where trespass or trover can be maintained for the unlawful conversion of goods, replevin will also lie (77 C. J. S., Replevin, § 6, p. 16). And when one is in possession of property without right, the action of replevin cannot be avoided by wrongfully disposing of the property before suit is brought *(Sinnett*v. *Fieock,*165 N. Y. 444; *Nichols*v. *Michael,*23 N. Y. 264).

The motion for summary judgment is accordingly granted against the defendant who appears herein and the action against the other defendant is severed.
257 La. 853

#### Herman A. PLESSALA v. ST. MARY PARISH DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE et al.

No. 50931.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 19, 1970.

In re: Merval J. Landry applying for writs of certiorari or review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, 244 So.2d 298.

Writs refused. This Court will not exercise its supervisory jurisdiction when, due to the element of time, any judgment which might be rendered by it could not become effective to afford Relator the relief sought.

SUMMERS, Justice,

dissents from the refusal to grant writs. The mandate of Article VIII, Section 12 of the Constitution requiring that “The Legislature shall provide by law for the trial and determination of contested elections of all public officers * * * ” is not satisfied by La.R.S. 18:362, for it is impracticable within the time that statute provides to obtain review of any decision. When the Constitution provides that the Legislature shall provide for “trial” it clearly contemplates .review in the ordinary process of any determination by a court of original jurisdiction.
IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 243

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to require a threefifths vote to adopt a rule disallowing germane amendments to a bill

or resolution.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 5, 1993

Mr. BUYER (for himself, Mr. FAWELL, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. QUINN, Mr.

ISTOOK, Mr. HUFFINGTON, Mr. HORN, Mr. EVERETT, Mr. HUTCHINSON,

Mr. GREENWOOD, Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland, Mr. PORTMAN, Mr.

CRAPO, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. GRAMS, Mr. TORKILDSEN, Mr. MANZULLO,

Mr. MCINNIS, Mr. MILLER of Florida, Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina, Ms.

PRYCE of Ohio, Mr. MCKEON, Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas, Mr.

CUNNINGHAM, Mr. GOODLATTE, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr.

DOOLITTLE, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. GOSS, Mr. ZIMMER, Mrs.

FOWLER, Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. LINDER, Mr. PETRI, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr.

HERGER, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. GALLEGLY, Mr. RAVENEL,

Mr. RAMSTAD, Mr. BONILLA, Mr. QUILLEN, Mr. BACHUS of Alabama,

Mr. CANADAY, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, and Mr.

TALENT) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Rules

RESOLUTION

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to

require a three-fifths vote to adopt a rule disallowing

germane amendments to a bill or resolution.

1 Resolved, That clause 4 of rule XI of the Rules of

2 the House of Representatives is amended by adding at the

3 end the following new paragraph:
2

•HRES 243 IH

1 ‘‘(e) The affirmative vote of three-fifths of those vot2 ing, a quorum being present, is required to adopt any rule

3 or order reported by the Committee on Rules providing

4 for the consideration of any bill or resolution that limits

5 the right of Members to offer germane amendments, if

6 that bill or resolution would otherwise be subject to

7 amendment under House rules.’’.

Æ
`[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 898 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.898
                       One Hundred Third Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America


                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
  the fifth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-three


                                 An Act

  
 
  To authorize the Air Force Memorial Foundation to establish a memorial 
in the

                  District of Columbia or its environs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH MEMORIAL.

    (a) In General.--The Air Force Memorial Foundation is authorized to 
establish a memorial on Federal land in the District of Columbia or its 
environs to honor the men and women who have served in the United States 
Air Force and its predecessors.
    (b) Compliance With Standards for Commemorative Works.--The 
establishment of the memorial shall be in accordance with the Act 
entitled ``An Act to provide standards for placement of commemorative 
works on certain Federal lands in the District of Columbia and its 
environs, and for other purposes'', approved November 14, 1986 (40 
U.S.C. 1001 et seq.).

SEC. 2. PAYMENT OF EXPENSES.

    The Air Force Memorial Foundation shall be solely responsible for 
acceptance of contributions for, and payment of the expenses of, the 
establishment of the memorial. No Federal funds may be used to pay any 
expense of the establishment of the memorial.

SEC. 3. DEPOSIT OF EXCESS FUNDS.

    If, upon payment of all expenses of the establishment of the 
memorial (including the maintenance and preservation amount provided for 
in section 8(b) of the Act referred to in section 1(b)), or upon 
expiration of the authority for the memorial under section 10(b) of such 
Act, there remains a balance of funds received for the establishment of 
the memorial, the Air Force Memorial Foundation shall transmit the 
amount of the balance to the Secretary of the Treasury for deposit in 
the account provided for in section 8(b)(1) of such Act.







                                Speaker of the House of Representatives.







                             Vice President of the United States and    
                                                President of the Senate.`
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

 Office of the Secretary 

May 21, 2020 

Michael Slattery 

Re: In the Matter of LendEDU, FTC File No. 182 3180 

Dear Mr. Slattery: 

Thank you for your February 14, 2020, comment regarding the above-referenced matter. 

Your comment was placed on the public record pursuant to Section 2.34 of the Commission 

Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 2.34. 

Your comment indicates your belief that the proposed consent order should include 

stronger monetary relief in the form of a civil monetary penalty. The Commission’s complaint 

alleges violations of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, and the Commission is not authorized to 

collect penalties based on such violations. The Commission’s proposed consent order does, 

however, impose a strong injunction prohibiting, among other things, misrepresentations about 

the objectivity of any content or the truthfulness of any endorsements and requiring disclosure of 

the influence of compensation on any representations, as well as a $350,000 monetary judgment 

payable by Shop Tutors Inc., d/b/a LendEDU; its co-founder and Chief Executive Officer, 

Nathaniel Matherson; its co-founder and Chief Technology Officer, Matthew Lenhard; and the 

Vice President of Product, Alexander Coleman (“Respondents”). In addition, if any 

Respondents violate the Commission’s final order, they will be liable for civil penalties of up to 

$42,530 per violation, pursuant to Section 5(l) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(l). 

After considering your comment, along with others received in this matter, the 

Commission has determined that the public interest would be served best by issuing the Decision 

and Order in final form without modification. A copy of the final Decision and Order and other 

relevant materials are available from the Commission’s website at http://www.ftc.gov. 

Thank you again for your comment. The Commission is aided in its analysis by hearing 

from a variety of sources, and we appreciate your interest in this matter. 

By direction of the Commission. 

April J. Tabor 

Acting Secretary
#### Dana S. BRAY and Germaine Bray, his wife, et al., Appellants, v. DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 68-559.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

May 20, 1969.

*779J. E. Ludick, North Miami, for appellants.

Thomas C. Britton, County Atty., and John R. Farrell, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, BARKDULL, and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellants are landowners who seek review of a final judgment based upon the jury’s verdict rendered in an eminent domain proceeding below. The appellee is here in its capacity as the condemning authority. The condemnation proceedings here involved a total taking of the appellant’s property.

The appellants’ main point on appeal is that the court erred by refusing to admit proffered testimony which would have shown the depressing effect upon the value of property surrounding that of the appellant, after the appellee’s announcement that an incinerator was to be built on the appellant’s property. In the case of State Road Department v. Chicone, Fla.1963, 158 So.2d 753, the Supreme Court enunciated its rule with regard to the measure of value of condemned land and the effect of a prior announcement of forthcoming condemnation. Addressing itself to a question very similar to the one now before us, the court stated as follows:

> “We make it clear that we are not here concerned with the question of decrease in value, before appropriation, because of the anticipated damaging effect of a proposed public improvement which when completed might have a harmful effect either on a specific parcel or on all properties in a community.” Id. at 756.

In view of this statement, we feel that we should not accept the appellants’ contentions; instead, we feel that the position taken by the court below as to its refusal to admit the testimony in question, was a proper one. Therefore, we affirm the court’s judgment as to the value of the appellants’ property.

The appellant has also questioned the correctness of the court’s determination of the reasonable fee to be taxed to the county with regard to the appellants’ two expert witnesses. No abuse of discretion having been demonstrated as to this point, that portion of the court’s order is also affirmed.

Based on the above authority, as well as the arguments and briefs of counsel before us, we have determined that the judgment and order of the court below were correct.

Affirmed.

PEARSON, J., concurs in the decision reached.
# L_2009022EN.01S00301.xml

| 26.1.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 22/s3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.1.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 22/s3

---

NOTE TO THE READER

The institutions have decided to no longer quote in their texts the last amendment to cited acts.

Unless otherwise indicated, references to acts in the texts published here are to the version of those acts currently in force.

---
#### Kathrine BROWN and Sarah M. Pitman, Appellants, v. Anna A. JOSEPH, Appellee.

No. 67-105.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

Nov. 29, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 3, 1968.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### DANIEL HUDSON *vs.*LEVIN PETTIJOHN.

On the trial of an appeal, the record of the justice’s judgment is not admissible in evidence; but if read without objection, it is not sufficient ground to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial.

This was appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, in an action for money had and received. Trial and verdict for plaintiff.

On motion of the defendant’s counsel, rule to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside, and a new trial granted, on the ground that the record of the judgment and proceedings below were read to the jury, and taken by them from the bar.

*Cullen,*

showed for cause; 1st. That there was no affidavit of the fact that this paper was taken from the bar; and 2d. That the record of the justice was read during the trial without objection, and it was *357therefore in evidence. It is in fact proper evidence for certain purposes, viz., to shoxv the origin of the cause, and the appeal.

*Layton,*for the rule.

*Cullen,*contra.

A new trial will not be granted for the admission of improper evidence, unless there be ground to believe that injustice has been done by its effect. (12 *Wend. Rep.*41; 2 *Tidd’s Pr.*907; 2 *Taunt.*12.)

The causes filed for a new trial do not even alledge that any injustice has been done, and there is no affidavit of the party. Even on affidavit filed, the court will not go out of it on a hearing for new trial, or to set aside an inquisition or sale, of lands.

*Layton*

replied, that no affidavit was necessary as the reading of the paper in evidence was shown to the court; and it is admitted that it was taken from the bar. Such a paper carried to the jury room, suggesting to them the judgment of the magistrate below, cannot but have an improper influence on the minds of the jurors.

*The Court*

discharged the rule, on the ground that the admissibility of the transcript in evidence was not objected to at the time; and though it was not strictly regular to read this paper, or take it from the bar; the one was done without objection, and the latter was not likely to produce such an influence as to vitiate the verdict.

If a verdict should be set aside for the introduction of any evidence, however unimportant, and admitted without objection, it would be scarcely possible for any verdict to stand.

Rule discharged.
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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-02-1995
<CASH>                                          13,284
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      926
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     23,817
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                41,347
<PP&E>                                          35,352
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,035
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  61,513
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           19,957
<BONDS>                                          1,312
<COMMON>                                         8,858
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    61,513
<SALES>                                         36,642
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<CGS>                                           21,072
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   21,072
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                15,360
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  27
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    183
<INCOME-TAX>                                        76
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                107
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       107
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.01
        

</TABLE>
#### Chadbourne & Parke L. L. P., Respondent, v John B. Coleman, Appellant.

[722 NYS2d 147]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane Solomon, J.), entered April 10, 2000, which denied defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment entered against him on February 22, 2000 based on his failure to timely respond to plaintiffs discovery requests, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted and the default judgment vacated.

Plaintiff commenced this action in June 1999 to recover unpaid legal fees and disbursements resulting from representation provided defendant. When defendant failed to respond to certain discovery demands, plaintiff moved, pursuant to CPLR 3124, to compel disclosure and for a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3126 in the event that defendant failed to comply with any court order compelling disclosure. Plaintiff did not request an immediate default judgment. Defendant neither opposed this motion nor provided the discovery responses.

The IAS court, instead of granting a conditional order to compel discovery, struck defendant’s answer and awarded plaintiff a default judgment. Within a week thereafter, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment, alleging he had been unable to provide the discovery due to extensive travel as well as health problems. Defendant also claimed that he had understood plaintiffs motion as seeking a conditional order which, if not subsequently followed, could later form the basis for a default judgment. The IAS court then denied this motion to vacate, finding that defendant had still failed to provide the discovery sought.

Striking a party’s pleading is inappropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful, contumacious or in bad faith *(see, Rosario v New York City Hous. Auth.,*272 AD2d 105; *Pyfrom v Tishman Constr.*
      *279
      *Co.,*270 AD2d 24). Here, plaintiffs motion only sought a conditional order; the relief granted was greater than that requested or warranted. Even had plaintiff moved for such relief, the complaint was not verified and the record does not contain an affidavit of merit by plaintiff on the underlying motion documenting the amount due or the invoices supporting plaintiffs claim, so that the judgment is subject to vacatur in any event *(see, Moskowitz v Chambers Deli Corp.,*269 AD2d 198). Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Mazzarelli, Ellerin, Wallach and Buckley, JJ.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   Exhibit 10.17

                  Amendment to the Benefit Equalization Plan of
                         United States Trust Corporation
                 As Amended and Restated through January 1, 1997

      RESOLVED that effective January 1, 1999 the Benefit Equalization Plan
("BEP") is amended to read as follows:

      The last paragraph of Section 7 is amended by the addition of the
      following;

      "Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Participant who is a Managing Director
      (or more senior executive); who has attained age 55; and has satisfied his
      or her U.S. Trust stock ownership target, may elect that 100% of the
      amount credited to his or her Participant Account for any Plan Year
      commencing on or after January 1, 1999, be credited to the Cash Portion of
      his or her Account by filing a written notice with the Committee."