JAMES L. JARRETT, ) ) Movant-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. SD 35458 ) Filed: April 17, 2019 STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NEW MADRID COUNTY Honorable W. Keith Currie, Special Judge
AFFIRMED James Jarrett (Jarrett) appeals from an order denying his amen ded Rule 29.15 motion to set aside his convictions for one count of forcible rape and tw o counts of first-d egree statutory sodomy. See §§ 566.030, 566.062. 1 Because the motion court’s decision to deny relief after an evidentiary hearing was not clearly erroneous, we affirm. Jarrett bore the burden of proving the grounds asserted in his post-conviction motion by a preponderance of the evidence. See Rule 29.15(i); McLaughlin v. State , 378 S.W.3d 328, 337 (Mo. banc 2012). Our review of the denial of a Rule 29.15 motion is limited to determining

1 All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2018). All statutory references are to RSMo Cum. Supp. (2010).2 whether the motion c ourt’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 29.15(k); Williams v. State , 168 S.W.3d 433, 439 (Mo. banc 2005). We will find clear erro r only if a full review of the record leaves us with a definite a nd firm impression that a mistake has been made. Zink v. State , 278 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Mo. banc 2009). We presume the motion court’s findings and conclusions are correct. McLaughlin , 378 S.W.3d at 336-37. “The motion court is not required to believe the testimony of the movant or any other witness, even if uncontradicted, and this Court defers to the motion court’s det ermination of credibility.” Smith
v. State , 413 S.W.3d 709, 715 (Mo. App. 2013). The following summary o f facts has been prepared in accordance with these principles. Jarrett was charged with the following offenses committed in 20 10 against three of his adopted children: forcible rape of his 17-year-old daughter, H .J. (Count 1); first-degree statutory sodomy of his 13-year -old daughter, T.J. (Count 2); a nd first-degree statutory sodomy of his 12-year-old son, M.J. (Count 3). Following a jury trial in February 2014, Jarrett was found guilty on all three counts. The trial court imposed the jury-recommended sentences of 25 years on each count, with the sentences on Counts 1 and 2 ru nning concurrently and the sentence on Count 3 running consecutively to the other sentence s. This Court affirmed Jarrett’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal in an unpublished or der and statement. State v.
Jarrett , SD33266 (Mo. App. October 6, 2015). Jarrett filed a pro se motion seeking relief pursuant to Rule 29.15. Thereafter, app ointed counsel filed an amended motion. 2 In the amended motion, Jarrett claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective in three respects and his appellate counsel was ineffective in one respect. The

2 This Court has independently verified the timeliness of Jarrett ’s post-conviction motions. See Moore v. State , 458 S.W.3d 822, 825-26 (Mo. banc 2015); Dorris v. State , 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012).3 motion alleged: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Jarrett’s older daughter, H.E., as a witness; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to each of the verdict-directing instructions on the ground that t hey failed to identify the spe cific incident upon which the jurors were required to agree and, ther efore, violated Jarrett’s right to a unanimous verdict; (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a plain- error point challenging the verdictdirecting instructions on the same ground; and (4) trial counse l was ineffective for failing to object to T.J.’s testimony about different sexual acts Jarrett forced her to engage in other than the act charged. In November 2017, the motion court held an evidentiary hearing at which Jarrett and his trial counsel, Daren Todd (T odd), testified. Jarrett’s app ellate counsel, Margaret Johnston (Johnston) testified via deposition. Thereafter, the motion co urt issued findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Jarret t’s amended motion for post-co nviction relief. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review All of Jarrett’s points on app eal involve alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Because those allegations involve both trial and appellate coun sel, we will set out the applicable standard of review for each type of claim. Jarrett’s first, second and fourth points contend he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of tr ial counsel, the movant must satisfy a two-prong test. Zink , 278 S.W.3d at 175. First, the movant must “show that counsel ’s representation fell below an obj ective standard of reasonablene ss.” Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). “A fair assessment of attorney perfo rmance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to re construct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the4 time.” Id . at 689. Second, the movant must show that trial counsel’s fa ilure prejudiced him.
Id . at 687; Anderson v. State , 196 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Mo. banc 2006) (to satisfy the prejudice prong under the Strickland test, movant is required to show there is a reasonable probabi lity that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of th e proceeding would have been different). Both of these prongs must be shown in order to pro ve ineffective assistance of counsel. Zink , 278 S.W.3d at 175. Movant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and effective. Id . at 176. Jarrett’s third point contends h e received ineffective assista nce of appellate counsel. The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance o f appellate counsel is the same as the standard for evaluating a cl aim of ineffective assistance o f trial counsel. Richardson v.
State , 386 S.W.3d 803, 806 (Mo. App. 2012). That is, a movant must prove his appellate counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reaso nableness and that his defense was prejudiced by that unreasonable performance. Baumruk v. State , 364 S.W.3d 518, 525 (Mo. banc 2012). Similarly, appellate counsel’s performance is “presumed reasonable.” Id . at 526. To overcome that presumption, “the movant must establish that c ounsel failed to raise a claim of error that was so obvious that a competent and effecti ve lawyer would have recognized and asserted it.” Tisius v. State , 183 S.W.3d 207, 215 (Mo. banc 2006). “The claimed error must have been sufficiently serious to create a reasonable prob ability that, if it was raised, the outcome of the appeal would have been different.” Id .; Meiners v. State , 540 S.W.3d 832, 842 (Mo. banc 2018).
Discussion and Decision Presenting four points on appe al, Jarrett contends the motion court clearly erred in denying each of the four claims alleged in his amended Rule 29. 15 motion for post-conviction relief. Jarrett asserts that he received ineffective assistanc e of trial counsel for failing to call a5 witness (Point 1) and failing to object to certain testimony (P oint 4). In addition, Jarrett also asserts that both trial and a ppellate counsel, respectively, we re ineffective for failing to object to verdict-directing instructions at trial (Point 2) and failin g to raise a plain-error point addressing that issue on appeal (Point 3). For ease of analysi s, we discuss these points in the order outlined above. Additional facts will be included below as we discuss each point on appeal.
Points 1 and 4 Point 1 contends trial counsel was ineffective for failure to c all Jarrett’s oldest daughter, H.E., to refute T.J.’s testimony at trial that the first time J arrett sexually abused her was on Halloween night in 2005 when she was eight years old. At trial , Jarrett testified that he never kept T.J. from going trick-or-treating. In the amended motion for post-conviction relief, Jarrett alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call H.E., who would have corroborated Jarrett’s testimony. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel Todd was asked why he did not call H.E. Todd testified that he chose not to call H.E. to avo id the possibility of the State calling Jarrett’s son, E.J., and Jarrett ’s former wife as rebuttal witn esses, both of whom potentially could have given testimony that might damage the defense: When I was speaking with [Jarrett], I was concerned that the St ate would call his son, [E.J.], as a rebuttal witn ess. [Jarrett] indicated he and [E.J.] didn’t have a very good relationship, and I was concerned about that. In add ition, I was also concerned about his wife at the time ... also rebutting that pres umption or that statement. I didn’t want to muddle up the record with who are we going to believe more, the mother or the daughter. As I explained to [Jarrett], the whole case was going to depend on whether they believed him or they didn’t bel ieve him. So that was my strategy. Jarrett testified at the eviden tiary hearing that Todd explaine d this strategy to him, but he asked Todd to call H.E. anyway. H.E. testified that she was availabl e to testify. The motion court rejected the claim because, inter alia , Todd was aware of H.E. and had interviewed her, but it was his reasonable trial strate gy to not call her as a witness.6 Jarrett’s first point maintains that the motion court clearly erred because H.E.’s testimony “was necessary to provide [Jarrett] with a viable def ense[,]” and “[b]ut for trial counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of [the] trial would have been different.” According to Jarre tt, “counsel’s strategy not to c all [H.E.] was unreasonable under the circumstances[.]” We disagree. “Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill-fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” Anderson , 196 S.W.3d at 33. Further, “[t]he selection of witnesses and evidence are matters of trial strategy, virtually unchallengable in an ineffective assistance claim.” Williams , 168 S.W.3d at 443 (emphasis added); see also Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690 (“strategic choices made after a thorough investigation of law and facts re levant to plausible options ar e virtually unchallengeable”). Here, the record shows that Todd had investigated H.E. as a wit ness and, after further consideration, reasonably decide d not to call her at trial beca use he was afraid that the State might call Jarrett’s son and former wife as rebuttal witnesses, whom he believed would harm the defense. Moreover, the first-degree statutory sodomy charge against T.J. was alleged to have occurred five years later in 2010. H.E.’s alleged testimony co ncerning whether T.J. went trickor-treating years earlier would have only served to impeach T.J .’s statement about the exact date Jarrett’s sexual abuse agai nst her first began – a collate ral matter. Counsel could have reasonably decided that the opportunity to present impeachment evidence on this collateral issue was outweighed by other strategic considerations. See State v. Twenter , 818 S.W.2d 628, 643 (Mo. banc 1991) (“[o]rdinaril y, a defendant is not entitled to relief merely because defense counsel elects not to present evidence of dubious impeachment v alue”); see also Tucker v.
State , 468 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Mo. App. 2015) (“decision whether to imp each a witness is7 presumed to be a matter of trial strategy”). Because Jarrett h as failed to overcome the strong presumption that Todd’s conduct was reasonable and effective, P oint 1 is denied. Point 4 contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to o bject when T.J. testified about other uncharged acts of sexual abuse Jarrett committed ag ainst her. Jarrett was charged with committing first-degree stat utory sodomy against T.J. when he knowingly touched T.J.’s genitals with his hand. In Jarr ett’s amended motion, he allege d that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecutor asked T.J. whether Ja rrett “ever tried to put his penis in her vagina and other places besides her vagina” and for aski ng T.J. on recross-examination whether Jarrett “ever touched her breasts” or “ever tried to ma ke her put his penis in [her] mouth.” Jarrett further alleged that by “failing to object and for asking these questions, trial counsel allowed uncharged crimes and prior bad acts evidence to be presented against him.” At the evidentiary hearing, Todd testified that there were thr ee reasons for not objecting to this testimony: (1) to avoid signaling to the jury that the defense was concerned about T.J.’s testimony; (2) to move the case along by getting T.J., who was visibly distraught, off the witness stand as soon as possi ble; and (3) because Todd did not think the judge would sustain the objection. The motion court credited Todd’s testimony as r easonable trial strategy and denied the claim. The court specifically found that it was “To dd’s trial strategy to not object to the line of questioning to prevent highlighting the addition al alleged incidents, to conclude an unfavorable witness, and to f ocus on Mr. Jarrett’s own testi mony.” Jarrett’s fourth poin t posits clear error in denying the claim because “[a] reasonably competent trial counsel” would have objected to questions that would lead to the admission of uncharged crimes, which deprived Jarrett of a fair trial. Acco rding to Jarrett, “[b]ut for trial counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of [Jarrett’s] trial would have been different.” We disagree.8 Here, Jarrett has again failed to demonstrate that trial counse l’s failure to object was unreasonable trial strategy. It is well recognized that even s easoned trial attorneys will oftentimes not object to otherwise improper questions or argume nts because it is feared that frequent objections “highlight the statements complained of, re sulting in more harm than good.”
Barton v. State , 432 S.W.3d 741, 754 (Mo. banc 2014) (citation omitted); see Marshall v. State , 567 S.W.3d 283, 293 (Mo. App. 2019) (merely because trial couns el failed to object to everything objectionable does not equate to incompetence or ine ffective assistan ce of counsel). In addition, Jarrett failed to pr ove that he was prejudiced, be cause any objection to the prosecutor’s questions on the gr ound that they sought to elicit evidence of other crimes would not have been meritorious. “Numerous cases in Missouri involvi ng sexual crimes against a child have held that prior sexual conduct by a defendant toward the victim is admissible as it tends to establish a motive, that is satisfaction of defendant’ s sexual desire for the victim.” State
v. Primm , 347 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation marks o mitted); see also
State v. Evans , 490 S.W.3d 377, 383 n.2 (Mo. App. 2016). Thus, because Jarre tt’s uncharged sexual conduct toward T.J. was admissible, any objection would not have been meritorious. Trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a non-meri torious objection. Zink , 278 S.W.3d at 188; Marshall , 567 S.W.3d at 292; see also Anderson v. State , 564 S.W.3d 592, 615 (Mo. banc 2018). Accordingl y, Point 4 is denied.
Points 2 and 3 In Points 2 and 3, Jarrett recogni zes that the underlying crimi nal case was a “multiple acts case,” in which there was “evidence of multiple, separate incidents of forcible rape and statutory sodomy[.]” In each poi nt, Jarrett asserts that “the verdict directors failed to differentiate between the various sexual encounters in a way th at ensured the jury unanimously convicted [Jarrett] of the same act or acts” as required in State v. Celis-Garcia , 344 S.W.3d 1509 (Mo. banc 2011). Our Supreme Court in Celis-Garcia suggested two ways to address the unanimity problem in cases regarding multiple acts: [A] defendant’s right to a unani mous verdict would be protected in a multiple acts case by either the state (1) electing the particular crimi nal act on which it will rely to support the charge or (2) the verdict director spe cifically describing the separate criminal acts presented to the jury and the jury b eing instructed that it must agree unanimously that at least one of those acts occur red.
Id . at 157. Distinguishi ng between the offenses is of crucial im portance. Hoeber v. State , 488 S.W.3d 648, 658 (Mo. banc 2016). “[T]he separate offenses coul d be distinguished on the basis of time or other characteristics besides the place in which the offense occurred.” Id .; see also
Sanders v. State , 564 S.W.3d 380, 383-84 (Mo. App. 2018) (noting that the deter mination of
Strickland prejudice with respect to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cl aims concerning jury unanimity is case-specific and dependent on the factual circums tances of each case). With that background review completed, the following additional facts are relevant to these two points on appeal. H.J. told a forensic interviewer that she was raped by Jarrett. H.J. said that the last time Jarrett sexually abused her was Thursday, May 6, 2010. On that date, Jarrett made her get on the floor on her hands and knees and then Jarrett put “his dick ” in her “pussy” and then pulled it out and ejaculated into a paper towel. She said that Jarret t had done this “a lot,” perhaps multiple times per week, in various different rooms in their ho use and at various locations when she was with Jarrett in his truck. H.J. also told a sheriff’s deputy that the last time Jarrett raped her was on May 6, 2010. The verdict-directing instructi on for Count 1 (forcible rape) required the jury to find that Jarrett had sexual intercourse by the use of forcible compulsio n with H.J. “on or about May 6, 2010[.]” During closing argument, the prosecutor focused the j ury’s attention on the verdict-10 directing instruction for Count 1 and the incident of forcible rape to which H.J. was subjected by Jarrett on May 6, 2010. At trial, T.J. testified that Jarrett put his hands in T.J.’s p ants and rubbed her “panties.” After the first time this occurred on Halloween, Jarrett would touch her like this weekly. Although she could not remember pr ecisely when Jarrett last tou ched her, she testified that it was about two weeks before H.J. disclosed to their mother (Moth er) that Jarrett was abusing her. T.J. testified that the las t incident occurred in Jarrett ’s bedroom after everyone else had left the house. She said that she was folding laundry when Jar rett made her go to his room, where Jarrett began touching her vagina with his penis and his hand. T.J. also told a forensic examiner that the last time Jarrett touched her in this way was a couple of weeks before the forensic interview. A sheriff’s deputy similarly testified tha t T.J. said the last time Jarrett sexually abused her was about two weeks before their interview, which occurred on May 9, 2010. T.J. told the deputy that Jarrett rubbed his penis on he r vagina and also touched her vagina with his hand. She told the deputy that Jarrett had don e this to her numerous times before then. The verdict-directing instructi on for Count 2 (first-degree sta tutory sodomy) required the jury to find that Jarrett touched T.J.’s genitals with his hand “on or between April 15 and May 1, 2010[.]” Mother testified that, on the way to spend Mot her’s Day with her mother in 2010, H.J. and T.J. disclosed that Jarrett had been sexually ab using them. The prosecutor argued to the jury that T.J. ha d testified about Jarrett rubbin g her genitals approximately two weeks before she gave a statement to police on May 9, 2010. M.J. testified that in Novemb er 2010, while at Jarrett’s house , Jarrett stuck his penis in M.J.’s “butt.” M.J. said that Jarrett sexually abused him in t he same manner a few other times after this incident. M.J. also told the forensic examiner that Jarrett “raped” him in this way11 more than once at Jarrett’s hous e. M.J. said the last time Jar rett did this to h im was on the day he told Mother about the abuse. M other testified that, in earl y December 2010, M.J. disclosed to her that Jarrett wa s sexually abusing him. The verdict-directing instructi on for Count 3 (first-degree sta tutory sodomy) required the jury to find that Jarrett placed his penis in M.J.’s anus “ on or between November 7 and December 1, 2010.” At trial, Jarrett’s counsel object ed to the verdict-directing i nstruction for Count 2 only on the ground that the time frame alleged was different than th at alleged in the charging document. No objection was made to the verdict-directing instr uctions on jury-unanimity grounds. At the post-conviction evidenti ary hearing, Todd testified that he did not have a trial strategy for not objecting to the verdict directors for lack of specificity because he did not believe Jarrett was guilty of a ny offense. Counsel also said t hat the defense theory at trial was that Jarrett had not committed the charged offenses. Appellate counsel Johnston testifie d that the verdict-directing instruction pertaining to H.J. alleged a specific date – May 6, 2010 – on which the forci ble rape had occurred. According to Johnston, this required the jury to unanimously agree that a specific incident of forcible rape committed against H.J. occurred on that particular date. She s aid this specificit y led her to not to raise a jury-unanimity cla im on appeal with respect to Count 1 involving H.J. Johnston testified that the same was true for the allegations i nvolving T.J. Even though there was evidence that Jarrett engaged in multiple acts of sex ual abuse with T.J., there was enough specificity for jury unanimity when T.J. testified the l ast time Jarrett abused her was when she was folding laundry. C ounsel did not “see a jury unan imity problem” with the verdictdirecting instruc tion involving T.J.12 With respect to M.J., Johnston testified that she did not raise a jury-unanimity claim because the evidence showed that Jarrett committed the same act multiple times against M.J. without any additional specificity to distinguish one act from another. 3 Moreover, she noted that the prosecutor told jurors that the instruction was focuse d on the last time this occurred to M.J. Johnston believed that thi s was specific enough not to im plicate a jury-unanimity issue. The motion court found that appell ate counsel’s explanation reg arding why she chose not to pursue a jury-unanimity c laim on direct appeal constitut ed reasonable strategy. The court agreed with appellate counsel that, with respect to each victim , the prosecutor directed the jurors to a specific incident occurring within the limited time frame contained in the verdict-directing instructions. Consequently, the defense trial strategy of “abs olute denial” coupled with the

3 In Celis-Garcia , our Supreme Court recognized that a case in which a victim re ported repeated, identical acts of sexual abuse occurring in the same location might suggest a different result: The state argues that requiring the state to differentiate betw een multiple acts would make it impossible to pros ecute sexual abuse cases involv ing repeated, identical sexual acts committed at the same location and during a short time span because the victim would be unable to distinguish sufficiently among the acts. The case hypothesized by the state w as not the one presented he re because both [victims] provided details of multiple sexual acts that were co mmitted at different times and in different locations.
Id . at 157 n.8. In State v. Watson , 407 S.W.3d 180 (Mo. App. 2013), th e eastern district of this Court cited this footnote and held that Celis-Garcia did not control a case in which repeated identical acts of statutory rape occurred in the same location. Id . at 185; see State v. Walker , 549 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Mo. App. 2018) ( western district similarly co ncluded that “factual restrictions contained in [the] verdict director” precluded any “further basis upon which the jurors could possibly distinguis h one act of statutory rape fro m another” and held that “[b]ecause the jurors had no evidentiary basis upon which to di fferentiate between...repeated acts, [defendant’s] right to a unanimous verdict was not at ris k of being violated”); see also State v. Armstrong , 560 S.W.3d 563, 572-74 (Mo. App. 2018) (eastern district agai n holding that defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict was not violated “because there was absolutely no evidentiary basis upon which the jurors could possibly diffe rentiate between the repeated, identical acts that fell within each verdict director”); State v. Dutcher , --- S.W.3d ----, 2019 WL 1323957, at *2 (Mo. App. S.D. Ma r. 25, 2019) (same holding).13 limited time frame of the verdict directors pointing to one spe cific incident did not misdirect the jury in a way that affected the verdict. Based on these fi ndings, the motion court rejected Jarrett’s claims of ineffectiv e assistance of both trial and ap pellate counsel. In Points 2 and 3, Jarrett maintains the motion court clearly e rred in refusing to find ineffective assistance of counsel . Jarrett insists trial couns el should have objected to the verdict directors on unanimity grounds, and appellate counsel “should h ave raised this meritorious issue on appeal.” We disagree. Jarrett’s claims are without mer it because he failed to prove a ppellate counsel ’s actions were anything other than reasonable strategy. “Appellate couns el is not ineffective for failing to raise every non-frivolous claim on appeal but may use his pr ofessional judgment to focus on the most important issues.” Barnes v. State , 334 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Mo. App. 2011); see Baumruk , 364 S.W.3d at 539 (“no duty to present non-frivolous issues w here appellate counsel strategically decides to winnow out arguments in favor of other arguments”). Further, counsel will not be found ineffective fo r deciding not to raise a non-m eritorious claim. Royer v. State , 421 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Mo. App. 2013). “In fact, a post-convicti on movant fails to prove counsel’s performance is deficient when appellate counsel testi fies he or she did not raise a particular issue because he or she believed it would be without merit.” Id .; see, e.g ., Storey v.
State , 175 S.W.3d 116, 149 (Mo. banc 2005) (reasonable decision of a ppellate strategy to not raise the issue on appeal “is not a ground for ineffective assi stance of counsel”). Here, Johnson explained in detail why she di d not think a point on appeal reg arding jury unanimity would have been meritorious, and the motion court agreed, finding her strategy reasonable. Consequently, Jarrett failed to overcome the heavy burden of pr oving counsel’s performance was deficient. See Storey , 175 S.W.3d at 149; Royer , 421 S.W.3d at 490. Further, “appellate14 counsel cannot be deemed ineffec tive for failing to raise a non meritorious claim.” Joyner v.
State , 421 S.W.3d 580, 582 (Mo. App. 2014). Appellate counsel’s testimony on this issue also supports the t rial court’s ruling that trial counsel was not required to asse rt a unanimity objection to the verdict-directing instructions. Just like appellate counsel, trial counsel here is not ineffect ive for failing to make a nonmeritorious objection. Zink , 278 S.W.3d at 188. Thus, the motion court did not clearly er r in denying Jarrett’s related claims concerning trial and appellate counsel. Accordingly, Points 2 and 3 are denied.
Conclusion After reviewing the entire record, we do not have a definite a nd firm impression that a mistake was made. Therefore, the findings and conclusions of t he motion court are not clearly

erroneous. See Rule 29.15(k); Williams , 168 S.W.3d at 439. The motion court’s order denying Jarrett’s amended Rule 29.15 motion is affirmed.

JEFFREY W. BATES, J . – OPINION AUTHOR WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., P.J. – CONCUR MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCUR