*

  The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not

participating in this appeal. After examining appellant’s brief and the record, we have

concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the

appellant’s brief and the record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a); CIR. R. 34(f).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted April 16, 2008*

Decided July 17, 2008

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 06‐3404

VANTICE L. BESHEARS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CHAMPAIGN COUNTY SHERIFF, et

al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 06‐2132

Harold A. Baker,

Judge.

O R D E R

Vantice Beshears brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he received

inadequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment when he was a pretrial detainee

at the Champaign County Jail. He claims that the jail’s medical staff prescribed and

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06‐3404 Page 2

administered several medications that adversely interacted to cause him to suffer a stroke or

seizure, which made him fall and hit his head against a steel door, and that he was denied

adequate treatment after the accident. The district court screened Beshears’s complaint, see

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed it for failure to state a claim. Because Beshears stated

claims against two of the defendants, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the case

for further proceedings.

For purposes of review we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint.

Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 622 (7th Cir. 2006). In September 2004 Beshears was in

the custody of the Champaign County Jail; medical personnel there administered several

medications to him. As a result of an adverse interaction between his medications, Beshears

fainted, fell to the floor, and lost consciousness. A correctional officer witnessed this episode

and called the nurse, who arrived several hours later. The nurse stated that Beshears had

suffered a “sudden loss of blood to the brain” and that he would be fine. Beshears asked to

be examined in an emergency room, but the nurse told him that it would cost too much

money and that he could see the jail doctor when he came in. Beshears saw the jail doctor a

few days later, and the doctor told him that the medications could not have caused the

episode and that he would be fine after resting. The doctor also concurred with the nurse’s

decision not to send Beshears to the hospital for further examination.

After Beshears saw the doctor (exactly when is not clear from the complaint), he

again requested further treatment from the nurse. Beshears told the nurse he was still

suffering “serious problems.” She responded that she was “not interested in helping” him

and that if he did not like the medical care he was receiving he should “bond out of jail.”

The nurse communicated this to him both orally and in writing, though he did not attach

the writing to his complaint. Beshears alleges that as a result of the accident and the delay in

receiving proper treatment, he suffered neurological and cognitive damage.

We review de novo a dismissal under § 1915A for failure to state a claim. Sanders v.

Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626, 626 (7th Cir. 1999). We construe all facts in the light most favorable to

Beshears, and we will draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Wynn v. Southward,

251 F.3d 588, 591‐92 (7th Cir. 2001). We may affirm the dismissal only if the complaint “fails

to set forth ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” St. John’s

United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 2008

WL 593773 (U.S. May 12, 2008) (No. 07‐1127) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). Pretrial detainees have a right to adequate medical care under the

Fourteenth Amendment; we assess those claims using the same standards for deliberate

indifference that we would use for an Eighth‐Amendment claim. Williams v. Rodriguez, 509

F.3d 392, 401 (7th Cir. 2007). To succeed on a deliberate‐indifference claim, a pretrial

detainee must show that (1) the harm the detainee suffered was objectively serious, and (2)
No. 06‐3404 Page 3

the official acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee’s health or safety. Id.

Negligence, even gross negligence, does not constitute deliberate indifference, Guzman v.

Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2007), and neither does medical malpractice, Edwards v.

Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007).

Although Beshears’s complaint alleges claims against eight defendants, on appeal

Beshears presses his claims against only the nurse, the doctor, and the corrections officer

who witnessed his accident, none of whose names he knows. The fact that he does not know

any of their names does not necessarily defeat his claim, as his allegations are against

persons who could be identified in pretrial discovery. See Billman v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrs.,

56 F.3d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 1995). The district court did not address Beshears’s claim against

the officer, but because Beshears admits in his complaint that the officer immediately called

the nurse after Beshears fell and hit his head, he pleaded himself out of court by alleging

facts that belie deliberate indifference. See Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2006);

Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1292 (7th Cir. 1991).

As for the claims against the nurse and the doctor, the district court dismissed them

on the basis that Beshears’s allegations amounted only to medical malpractice, which is not

cognizable under § 1983. But Beshears alleges more than medical malpractice. Regarding

the nurse, Beshears alleges that at some point after he saw the doctor, he again requested to

see the nurse, and she told him that she was not interested in helping him when he told her

he was still having “serious problems.” Although his allegation may turn out to be false, at

this stage we must accept it. Viewing Beshears’s allegations in that light, we hold that

Beshears sufficiently alleged that the nurse withheld or denied treatment. A prisoner who

alleges that treatment has been delayed or withheld without reason, as Beshears did here,

may survive prescreening. See Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir. 2001)

(holding inmate’s allegation that defendants denied him “prompt and effective treatment

for pain” was enough to put defendants on notice to nature of claim); Edwards, 478 F.3d at

832; see also Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding defendants not

entitled to judgment as a matter of law where delay in treatment may have exacerbated

prisoner’s pain). As for the doctor, Beshears alleges that he “treats inmates worse than the

public at large” or provides them with “next to no treatment.” In other words, he alleges

that the doctor’s medical judgments were not entitled to deference because “no minimally

competent medical professional” would have acted the same way. See Sain v. Wood, 512

F.3d 886, 894‐95 (7th Cir. 2008). Beshears has stated a claim with respect to doctor’s and the

nurse’s alleged withholding of treatment. We therefore AFFIRM the dismissal with respect to

all defendants but the nurse and the doctor. With respect to the nurse and the doctor, we

VACATE and REMAND the case for further proceedings.