COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Frank and Clements 

LAURIE ARSENAULT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2609-00-1 PER CURIAM 

 MAY 29, 2001 

ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTY 

 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTY 

Westbrook J. Parker, Judge 

 (L. Wayne Farmer; Barlow & Riddick, P.C., on 

briefs), for appellant. Appellant submitting 

on briefs. 

 (Richard L. Francis; Inga E. Francis; 

Francis & Francis, P.C., on brief), for 

appellee. Appellee submitting on brief. 

 Laurie Arsenault, appellant, appeals the decision of the 

trial court denying her motion to rehear the termination of her 

residual parental rights to her daughter. Finding that the trial 

court properly terminated appellant's residual parental rights and 

did not abuse its discretion in denying rehearing, we affirm the 

trial court's decision. 

MOTION TO DISMISS

 The Department of Social Services has moved to dismiss the 

appeal on the ground that the statement of facts, which is 

indispensable to a decision on appeal, was not filed in accordance 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
with the requirements of Rule 5A:8(c)(1), and thus was not 

properly made a part of the record. We deny this motion. Counsel 

for the Department of Social Services and the guardian ad litem

endorsed the proposed statement of facts as being accurate and 

noted no objection to any of the circumstances surrounding its 

filing. The trial judge certified the statement, noting no 

objections. The appellee thereby waived any objection to the 

timing and manner of the statement's filing. 

BACKGROUND

 On March 14, 2000, the juvenile and domestic relations 

district court (J&DR court) terminated appellant's residual 

parental rights to her daughter pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C). 

Appellant appealed that decision to the trial court. She signed 

the notice of appeal, which stated that her trial date would be 

scheduled on May 8, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. This notice contained a 

warning, stating: "If you fail to appear, you are subject to a 

conviction and judgment in your absence being entered against your 

case in the Circuit Court." 

 On May 1, 2000, the trial court entered an order setting 

appellant's trial for September 22, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. This order 

stated that counsel for the parties had been contacted and had 

agreed to that date. 

 On September 22, 2000, appellant failed to appear. Her 

counsel, who had also been her attorney at the J&DR court 

proceeding, appeared. He represented to the trial court that he 

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had had no contact with appellant since the hearing in J&DR court. 

He stated that he had attempted unsuccessfully to contact 

appellant by telephone and by mail and that he had not heard from 

her. 

 Debra Alphin, the child's foster mother, and Sharon Banks, a 

social worker for the case, testified that appellant had been in 

contact with them subsequent to the hearing in J&DR court. Both 

women testified that appellant told them she was not going to 

pursue her appeal, that it was in the child's best interests to be 

adopted by the Alphins, and that she was not going to appear 

further in court. 

 The child's guardian ad litem and the child's father 

testified they believed it was in the best interests of the child 

that appellant's residual parental rights be terminated. 

 The trial court dismissed appellant's appeal and terminated 

her residual parental rights to her daughter. 

 On the afternoon of September 22, 2000, appellant's attorney 

notified the trial court that appellant intended to file a motion 

to rehear the matter. On October 25, 2000, the trial court heard 

the motion to rehear. Appellant testified that she thought the 

trial court hearing was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. on September 22, 

2000 because all prior hearings had been at 2:00 p.m. She also 

stated that on September 22, 2000, sometime between 12:00 p.m. and 

1:00 p.m., she telephoned the trial court clerk's office to 

confirm the 2:00 p.m. hearing time and was then advised that the 

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hearing had already taken place. She immediately contacted her 

attorney and advised him that she wanted to pursue the appeal. 

 Appellant also testified that she received a notice stating 

the hearing was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. However, she could not 

produce that notice. She stated that she had received no notice 

from her counsel concerning the trial, but admitted she had moved 

twice, and had not notified her counsel of the changes in her 

address. She admitted that she told Alphin and Banks that she 

might not pursue her appeal, but stated that she made those 

statements during "difficult times." Appellant asserted that, 

subsequent to those conversations, she had resolved several issues 

and now wished to "vigorously pursue her appeal and protect her 

parental rights." 

 The trial court dismissed appellant's appeal, affirmed the 

termination of her residual parental rights, and denied the motion 

for a rehearing. Appellant appeals that decision. 

ANALYSIS

 "The decision whether to grant or deny a rehearing is 

within the trial court's sound judicial discretion." Hughes v. 

Gentry, 18 Va. App. 318, 326, 443 S.E.2d 448, 453 (1994). 

 The record supports the trial court's finding that 

appellant was properly on notice as to when her case would be 

set for trial and of the consequences of her failure to appear 

at the trial. Furthermore, on May 1, 2000, the trial court 

entered an order establishing the September 22, 2000, 9:00 a.m. 

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trial date and time. Appellant was charged with knowledge of 

the trial date and time noted in the court order, a public 

record. Furthermore, her attorney had notice. "The 

attorney-client relationship presumes that attorney and client, 

as servant and master, will communicate about all the important 

stages of the client's upcoming trial. Notice to [appellant's] 

attorney of record of the trial date is evidence that the notice 

was given to [appellant]." Hunter v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 

717, 722, 427 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1993) (en banc) (addressing a 

conviction for willful failure to appear under Code § 19.2-128). 

 The evidence established that appellant's counsel had 

notice of the trial date and time and that he had advised the 

trial court prior to the entry of the order that the date was 

"agreeable." However, appellant failed to keep in touch with 

her attorney, failed to advise him of her changes of address, 

and failed to ascertain the time for the trial. She told two 

witnesses that she intended to withdraw her appeal. Under these 

circumstances, and upon the assertions of the child's father and 

the guardian ad litem, the trial court did not err in 

terminating appellant's residual parental rights and did not 

abuse its discretion in denying a rehearing. 

 Affirmed.

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