IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alton D. Brown, :

Appellant :

: No. 1898 C.D. 2016

v. : Submitted: May 26, 2017

: Zygmont Pines and Tom Wolf :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONOR ABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
SENIOR JUDGE PELLEGRINI FILED: June 20, 2017

Alton D. Brown (Brown) , an inmate currently incarcerated at the State

Correctional Institution at Greene (SCI

- Greene), appea ls pro s e an order of the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County ( Philadelphia Common Pleas )

sustain ing the preliminary objection s filed by defendant Governor Tom Wolf

(Governor Wolf) that Philadelphia C ommon P l eas was the improper venue to hear

the matter and transferring it to the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County

.

We affirm.

Brown commenced this action by filing a complaint with the

Philadelphia Common Pleas on March 2, 2016, asserting numerous claims

pertaining to his incarceration and tre atment at SCI

- Greene, including retaliation,

denial of access to courts, cruel and unusual punishment, civil conspiracy,2

intentional infliction of emotional distress, malpractice, assault and battery, and

unlawful use of force. Brown’s complaint names 55 defendants, 1 including

Governor Wolf and former Court Administrator of Pennsylvania Courts Zygmont

Pines (Administrator Pines). Brown seeks injunctive, declaratory and mandamus

relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.

On March 28, 2016, Adm inistrator Pines filed preliminary objections

to Brown’s complaint seeking dismissal of the actions based on s overeign

immunity, quasi

-

judicial and qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim.

Brown failed to respond, and by order dated April 21, 201 6, the Philadelphia

Common Pleas sustained Administrator Pines’ preliminary objections and

dismissed all claims against him, with prejudice.

On August 18, 2016, Governor Wolf filed preliminary objections

asserting that venue in Philadelphia County was im proper. Governor Wolf argued

that pursuant to Section 8523 of the Judicial Code , 42 Pa. C.S. § 8523, venue

should be transferred to Greene County because that is where the events that led to

the cause of action all occurred. By order dated September 13, 2016, the

Philadelphia Common Pleas sustained Governor Wolf’s preliminary objections and

1 Also named as defendants are former Attorney General Kathleen Ka ne; former

Ins pector General Graying Williams; Secretary of Corr ections John Wetzel; three named employees of the Department of Corrections’ central office; 42 nam ed and unnamed cor rections

officers at SCI

- Greene; SCI

- Greene’s contracted medical provider; four em ployees of Greene County; and Washington Hospital and Waynesburg Hospital, both of which are located in Greene County. While Brown named all of these indiv iduals and entities as defendants, the only defendants who were properly served with the complaint were Governor Wolf and Administrator

Pines.3

transferred the case to the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County . This appeal

followed. 2

Brown argues 3 that the Philadelphia Common Pleas abused its

discretion in transferring his complaint to Greene County because Administrator

Pines is the lead defendant, his principal office is located in Philadelphia County,

and the cause of action against him arose in Philadelphia County. In the

alternative, Brown argues that venue properly lies in Dauphin County as opposed

to Greene County because that is where Governor Wolf’s princi pal office lies.

When there are multiple named defendants with different venue rules,

the venue rules for the Commonwealth party 4 controls. Sh affer v. Department of

Transportation , 842 A.2d 989, 992

- 93 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (citing Ribnicky v.

Yerex , 701 A.2d 1348, 1351 n.4 (Pa. 1997)). Accordingly , Sec tion 8523(a) of the

Judicial Code is the proper venue rule, and that section provides:

2 Pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 311(c), an order in a civil action transferring venue is interlocutory, but appealable as of right.

3 A trial court’s decision to transfer ve nue will be upheld unless the court abused its

discretion. Shaffer v. Department of Transportation , 842 A.2d 989, 992 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (citation omitted). “ A trial court’s ruling on venue will not be disturbed if the decision is reasonable in light of the facts.” Id.

4 The Judicial Code defines “Commonwealth party” as “[a] Commonwealth agency and any employee thereof, but only with respect to an act within the scope of his office of employment .” 42 Pa. C.S. § 8501. Here, it is undisputed that Brown named numerous Commonwealth parties as defendants.4 Actions for claims against a Commonwealth party may be brought in and only in a county in which the principal or local office of the Commonwealth party is located or
in which the cause of action arose or where a transaction or occurrence took place out of which th e cause of action
arose. If venue is obtained in the Twelfth Judicial District (Dauphin County) solely because the principal office of the Commonwealth party is located within it, any judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County shall have the pow er to transfer the action to any appropriate county where venue would otherwise lie.

42 Pa. C.S. § 8523(a). Similarly, the regulation implementing that provision and

governing tort claims brought against the Commonwealth provides:

(a) Venue in actions for claims against a Commonwealth party as defined in 42 Pa. C.S. § 8501 (relating to definitions) shall be in the county in which one of the following exists:

(1) The cause of action arose.

(2) A transaction or occurrence took place out of
which the cause of a ction arose.

(3) The principal office of the Commonwealth party is located.

(4) The local office of the Commonwealth party is
located.

* * *

(c) For purposes of subsection (a)(4), the local office of
the Commonwealth party is the local office located in that county where the cause of action arose or where a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the
cause of action arose.5

37 Pa. Code § 111.4

.

Brown’s contention regarding Administrator Pines that venue should

be in Philadelphia County is without merit because all of the asserted claims

against him were dismissed with prejudice approximately four months before

Governor Wolf’s preliminary objections were filed

. In any event, as the

Philadelphia Common Pleas noted, Administrator Pines’ prin cipal office is located

in Harrisburg, Dauphin County, and none of the alleged transactions or

occurrences from Brown’s complaint took place in Philade lphia County; therefore,

venue c ould not lie in Philadelphia County

.

We agree with the Philadelphia Com mon Pleas that venue properly

lies in either Greene County or Dauphin County. Greene County is appropriate

because the cause of action arose at SCI

- Greene, the transactions or occurrences

averred in the complaint all too k place there , and the majority of the defendants are

located in Greene County

. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 8523(a); 37 Pa. Code §§ 111.4(a)(1)

and (2). Venue c ould also be in Dauphin County because Governor Wolf’s

principal office is located in Harrisburg, Dauphin County. See 42 Pa. C.S. §

8523(a ); 37 Pa. Code § 111.4(a)(3). However, if venue was transferred to Dauphin

County, Governor Wolf could still file a motion pursuant to Section 8523(a) of the

Judicial Code to have the case transferred to Greene County since venue is only

proper in Dauphin County because that is where Governor Wolf’s principal office

is located

. We note that i n his preliminary objections, Governor Wolf specifically

requested that the case be transferred to Greene County.6 We also agree with the Philadelphia Common Pleas t hat transferring

the case to Greene County is proper given that the cause of action involves acts

that purp orted ly took place in Greene County. That venue is appropriate given the

ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for the

attendance of unwilling witnesses, cost of obtaining attendance of willing

witnesses, and possibility of a view of premises if any other problem arises which

affects the ease, celerity or expense of the litigation. This is not to mention that 46

of th e 55 defendants are employees of or affiliated with SCI

- Greene.

A ccordingly, because the Philadelphia Common Pleas did not abuse

its discretion in transferring the case to Greene County, 5 the order is affirmed.

DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

Judge Cosgrove did not participate in the decision of this case.

5 Brown’s argument that the trial court erred in sustaining the preliminary objections

based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens is without m erit because Governor Wolf did not raise this issue and the trial court specifically found that venue was improper, which is an appropriate ground for preliminary objections pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(1).IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alton D. Brown, :

Appellant :

: No. 1898 C.D. 2016

v. :

: Zygmont Pi nes and Tom Wolf :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20 th day of June , 2017, the order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above

- captioned matter is affirmed.

DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge