This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A23-0596

In re: Guardianship of Jill Lee Osufsen.

Filed November 27, 2023

Affirmed

Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Itasca County District Court

File No. 31-PR-22-2801

Daniel S. Kufus, Steinhagen, Crist, Wehrly & Kufus, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for 

appellant Andrea Turk)

Kent E. Nyberg, Kent E. Nyberg Law Office, Ltd., Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for 

respondent Andrew Strugar)

Wallace John Licke, Licke Law Office, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent Jill Lee 

Osufsen) 

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Smith, 

Tracy M., Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

Appellant Andrea Turk challenges the district court’s appointment of respondent 

Andrew Strugar as guardian of her mother, respondent Jill Lee Osufsen. We affirm.

FACTS

Strugar is Osufsen’s significant other. In November 2022, Strugar filed a verified

petition for emergency guardianship of Osufsen, seeking to be appointed her guardian. In 
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his petition, Strugar stated that Osufsen’s health-care provider had recommended a 

surrogate decision-maker for Osufsen due to her impairment from dementia, and he 

submitted a neuropsychological assessment of Osufsen from her health-care provider that 

documented that recommendation. Strugar also stated that Osufsen had previously granted 

him durable power of attorney for health care, and he submitted the document granting him 

that authority. The district court granted the petition and appointed Strugar as Osufsen’s

temporary emergency guardian. The order was set to expire 60 days from the date of 

appointment.

On January 5, 2023, Strugar filed a petition to be appointed permanent guardian of 

Osufsen. The district court scheduled a hearing on this petition for February 14. Strugar’s 

attorney mailed notice of the hearing to Osufsen’s two daughters, including Turk, on 

January 6. Five days later, Strugar applied for an extension of his appointment as 

emergency guardian because his original, 60-day appointment had expired. The district 

court granted a 60-day extension of the appointment on January 12.

That same day, Turk filed a verified petition for emergency appointment of 

guardian, seeking to be appointed Osufsen’s emergency guardian. The district denied

Turk’s petition. In its order, the district court stated that Strugar was appointed emergency 

guardian. It also stated that a hearing was scheduled for February 14 to address Strugar’s 

general guardianship petition and that “[t]he emergency guardianship filed by [Turk] will 

be addressed at the February 14, 2023 hearing.”

A hearing was held by videoconference on February 14. Osufsen’s counsel 

appeared, as did Strugar and his counsel. Osufsen’s daughters also attended. After hearing 
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from Strugar’s attorney and from Osufsen’s attorney, who stated that Osufsen had no 

objection to Strugar’s continued appointment, the district court asked if anyone present had 

objections. Turk and her sister both responded that they had objections. The district court 

asked Turk to explain her objections. Turk responded that she did not believe that Osufsen 

was safe with Strugar as guardian. She explained that her mother had suffered two bone 

fractures under the emergency guardianship and that the daughters did not feel that Strugar 

was capable or that her mother’s home was safe. Strugar’s attorney responded to Turk’s 

argument.

The district court stated that it “always give[s] folks . . . time to chat with [the court] 

. . . so they have their day in court.” It explained that, notwithstanding the absence of a 

written objection in the file, it wanted to “hear what people [had] to say.” And, the district 

court explained, based on what was presented, it saw no reason to deny the petition. One 

of the daughters then requested a continuance to consult their attorney, which the district 

court denied. On March 1, the district court filed an order appointing Strugar as guardian 

of Osufsen.

Turk appeals.

DECISION

Turk argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) not allowing her to be 

heard at the February 14 hearing, (2) not receiving evidence at the February 14 hearing, 

(3) adopting verbatim Strugar’s proposed findings of fact, (4) appointing Strugar as 
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guardian, and (5) not granting Turk a continuance to consult counsel.1 “The appointment 

of a guardian is uniquely within the discretion of the appointing court, and we will not 

interfere with the exercise of that discretion except in the case of a clear abuse of 

discretion.” In re Guardianship of Wells, 733 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Minn. App. 2007) 

(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007). We review a district court’s factual 

findings for clear error, giving deference to the district court’s credibility determinations. 

Id.

I. The district court did not deny Turk the opportunity to be heard during the 

February 14 hearing.

Turk first argues that the district court denied her the opportunity to be heard at the 

February 14 hearing.

Minnesota has adopted the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act 

(UGPPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 524.5-101 to -502 (2022). Under the UGPPA, at a hearing on a 

petition for guardianship, the petitioner and the respondent2 “may present evidence and 

subpoena witnesses and documents; examine witnesses . . . ; and otherwise participate in 

the hearing.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-307(a). Relevant here, the statute also provides that

“[a]ny person may request permission to participate in the proceeding” and the district 

1

As a threshold matter, Strugar argues that we should dismiss the appeal because Turk, by 

not petitioning the district court for Strugar’s removal as guardian, has “not exhausted her 

lower court options.” Strugar cites no authority that suggests that a person first must file a 

petition for removal of a guardian before appealing the order appointing that guardian, and 

we know of none. We therefore decide the merits of this appeal.

2 In a guardianship proceeding, the “respondent” is the person “for whom the appointment 

of a guardian . . . is sought.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-102, subd. 15. 
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court “may grant the request, with or without hearing” and “may attach appropriate 

conditions to the participation.” Id. (b). The word “may” is permissive. See City of Circle 

Pines v. County of Anoka, 977 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Minn. 2022) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.44, 

subd. 15 (2020)). Thus, the district court has the discretion to decide whether to allow 

persons other than the petitioner and respondent to participate in the hearing and to 

determine any conditions on their participation.

At the February 14 hearing, the district court first heard from the petitioner’s and 

the respondent’s lawyers. It then asked if anyone present had objections to Strugar’s

appointment as guardian. When Turk said that she did, the district court allowed her to 

explain her objections. Strugar’s attorney then responded to Turk’s objections. Consistent 

with section 524.5-307(a) and (b), the district court permitted Turk to participate in the 

hearing and to be heard on her objections to Strugar’s appointment. The district court did 

not offer Turk the opportunity to present evidence and witnesses, but the statute does not 

require that, and, we note, Turk did not ask to do so during the hearing. Thus, Turk is 

functionally arguing that the district court abused its discretion by not granting her relief 

she did not request.

Turk argues, though, that she was entitled to present evidence at the hearing 

because, in its order denying her earlier petition to be appointed emergency guardian, the 

district court stated that her petition for emergency guardianship would “be addressed” at 

the February 14 hearing. That order is admittedly confusing. It (1) denies Turk’s petition 

for appointment as emergency guardian, (2) states that a hearing is scheduled for 

February 14 to address the general-guardianship petition filed by Strugar, and (3) states 
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that “[t]he emergency guardianship filed by Andrea Turk will be addressed” at the 

February 14 hearing. Because the district court denied Turk’s emergency-guardianship

petition, it is unclear what was meant by the statement that her petition would be 

“addressed” at the February 14 hearing. Nevertheless, the February 14 hearing addressed

Strugar’s general-guardianship petition, for which Turk was neither a petitioner nor a 

respondent, and reference was made at the hearing to the fact that Turk had filed an 

emergency-guardianship petition and that it had been denied. The district court had the 

discretion to decide whether and how Turk could participate in the hearing and acted within 

its discretion when it allowed Turk to orally object and explain her objections to Strugar’s 

petition.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the petitions and 

exhibits for its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order.

Turk next challenges the district court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

order, because the district court did not hear testimony or receive other evidence during the 

February hearing.

Again, under the UGPPA, at a guardianship hearing, the petitioner and the 

respondent “may” present evidence and examine witnesses. Minn. Stat. § 524.5-307(a). 

The petitioner and respondent thus can choose whether to present evidence or testimony at 

the guardianship hearing.

Neither Strugar nor Osufsen chose to examine witnesses or introduce evidence at 

the February hearing. Instead, they relied on the evidence submitted in the verified petitions

for appointment of guardian, including the exhibits. It was within the district court’s 
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discretion to make factual findings based on this evidence, without requiring Strugar or 

Osufsen—or another interested person such as Turk—to examine witnesses or introduce 

evidence at the February 14 hearing. 

In support of her argument, Turk contrasts the proceedings here with the 

proceedings in a nonprecedential case in which we determined that a district court did not 

abuse its discretion by appointing a conservator after holding an evidentiary hearing on a 

contested petition. See In re Guardianship of Neu, No. A22-0578, 2022 WL 17574951 

(Minn. App. Dec. 12, 2022). While the February 14 hearing differed from the evidentiary 

hearing in Neu, Turk cites no caselaw, and we are aware of none, in which a guardianship 

appointment has been reversed because the district court did not hear testimony or receive 

other evidence at a guardianship hearing when neither the petitioner nor the respondent 

asked to present it. 

In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s reliance on the 

contents of verified petitions and exhibits to make its factual findings, conclusions of law, 

and order when neither party sought to present further testimony or other evidence at the 

February 14 hearing.

III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by adopting verbatim Strugar’s 

proposed findings of fact.

Turk asserts that the district court abused its discretion by adopting verbatim 

Strugar’s proposed findings of fact in the district court’s order.

“Adoption of a party’s proposed findings by a district court is generally an accepted 

practice. But if a court adopts a proposed order, it raises the question of whether the court 
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independently evaluated the evidence. A reviewing court examines the findings to 

determine whether they are clearly erroneous.” Schallinger v. Schallinger, 699 N.W.2d 15, 

23 (Minn. App. 2005) (citations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005). A finding is 

clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not 

reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 

N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “A district court’s verbatim adoption 

of a party’s proposed findings and conclusions of law is not reversible error per se.” 

Schallinger, 699 N.W.2d at 23.

Under the UGPPA, a district court may appoint a guardian if it finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that “(1) the respondent is an incapacitated person; and (2) the 

respondent’s identified needs cannot be met by less restrictive means.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-

310(a). The Act defines “incapacitated person” as

an individual who, for reasons other than being a minor, is 

impaired to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or 

capacity to make personal decisions, and who is unable to meet 

personal needs for medical care, nutrition, clothing, shelter, or 

safety, even with appropriate technological and supported 

decision making assistance.

Minn. Stat. § 524.5-102, subd. 6.

Although the district court made the factual findings required by these statutes, Turk 

contends that the findings are not supported by the record because no testimony was taken

and no other evidence was admitted at the February hearing. But, as discussed above, the 

district court relied on the information in the verified petitions and the exhibits—

particularly, the physician’s neuropsychological assessment of Osufsen—to make its 
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factual findings and was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. The record therefore 

supports the district court’s factual findings. Because Turk has not shown that the findings 

are clearly erroneous, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

adopting Strugar’s proposed findings of fact verbatim.

IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by appointing Strugar as 

Osufsen’s guardian.

Turk contends that the district court abused its discretion by appointing Strugar as 

guardian. She argues that Minnesota law places Strugar at a lower priority for appointment 

as guardian than Turk. “We review a district court’s application of the law de novo.” 

Harlow v. State, Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016).

Under the UGPPA, when deciding whom to appoint as guardian, the district court 

must consider qualified individuals in a specific order of priority. Minn. Stat. § 524.5-

309(a). The categories relevant to this appeal, in order of highest priority to lowest, are “a 

health care agent appointed by the respondent in a health care directive that does not 

include limitations on the nomination of the health care agent as a guardian and is executed 

pursuant to chapter 145C,” “an adult child of the respondent,” and “an adult with whom 

the respondent has resided for more than six months before the filing of the petition.” Minn. 

Stat. § 524.5-309(a)(2), (4), (6).

Turk argues that she has priority because she is the “adult child of [Ofusen]” and 

Strugar is only “an adult with whom [Osufsen] has resided for more than six months.” 

Strugar counters that he has priority because he is “a health care agent appointed by 

[Osufsen].” The question of priority does not appear to have been raised to or decided by 
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the district court and is therefore not properly before this court. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 

N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (noting that appellate courts generally address only those 

questions previously presented to and considered by the district court). Regardless of this 

defect, Turk has failed to establish error in the district court’s appointment of Strugar. See 

Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944) (stating that error is not 

presumed on appeal and the appellant has the burden of showing error on appeal). 

Accompanying the petition for emergency appointment of a guardian is a copy of a durable 

power of attorney for health care naming Strugar as Osufsen’s attorney-in-fact for making 

health care decisions, dated January 9, 2019. Thus, Strugar was higher on the priority list 

than Turk because he was a health care agent for Osufsen before Strugar petitioned for 

guardianship.

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Moreover, even if Strugar were lower on the priority list, the district court has the 

discretion to appoint a lower-priority guardian. “The court, acting in the best interest of the 

respondent, may decline to appoint a person having priority and appoint a person having a 

lower priority or no priority.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-309(b). The district court found that 

Strugar “is the most suitable and best qualified among those available.” Reasonable 

evidence in the record supports that determination, and we discern no abuse of discretion 

in the district court’s appointment of Strugar as Osufsen’s guardian.

3 In her appellate brief, Turk states—without explanation—that the health-care power of 

attorney “doesn’t appear to meet the requirements of Minn. Stat.§ 145C.03, subd. 1.” Such 

a conclusory assertion is insufficient to assert or establish error. See Minn. Dep’t of Labor 

& Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (stating that 

appellate courts do not reach issues that are inadequately briefed).
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V. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Turk a continuance 

to consult counsel.

Turk argues that the district court erred by not granting Turk and her sister a 

continuance. We review the denial of a continuance for an abuse of discretion. Torchwood 

Props., LLC v. McKinnon, 784 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn. App. 2010) (citing Dunshee v. 

Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Minn. 1977)). Turk appeared for the February 14 hearing 

without counsel. Because she received notice of the hearing more than a month earlier, she 

had time to consult counsel and to arrange for her lawyer to attend the hearing. At the 

hearing, the district court allowed Turk to participate by explaining her objections to 

Strugar’s appointment. Only after the district court stated that it would grant Strugar’s 

petition did Turk request a continuance to consult her attorney. The district court acted 

within its discretion by denying the request. 

Affirmed.