# Recent Reports

Reports News from the GAO

- Homeland Security: DHS Internal Entities Facilitate Information Sharing in Key Areas and Collaborate as Needed What GAO FoundGAO identified nine Department of Homeland Security (DHS) groups that are focused on sharing information internally within the department. GAO found the purpose of these groups was generally to facilitate information sharing for one of the following three purposes: (1) leadership decision-making; (2) internal policymaking, or (3) threat identification.&nbsp;Categories of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Internal Information Sharing Groups and Their PurposeNote: These groups were operational any time from January 1, 2020, through September 30, 2023.aDHS discontinued the Operations Deputies Board in 2022 as part of a departmental reorganization initiative.Although there was no evidence of unnecessary duplication among these nine groups, GAO found that some of the groups' purposes and activities had the potential for overlap. In those instances, GAO also found that agency officials associated with these groups described activities to leverage their respective resources and information—a leading interagency collaboration practice—to mitigate possible duplication. For example, according to DHS officials, the Homeland Security Intelligence Council, which is composed of less senior staff than the Counter Threats Advisory Board, schedules its meetings to occur a month or so before board's meetings. This allows the more detailed information from the council meetings to inform meetings of more senior staff serving on the board.Why GAO Did This StudyGAO was asked to review the number and purpose of groups DHS uses to promote information sharing across its headquarters offices and components. This report (1) describes the various groups DHS uses to promote internal information sharing and their purpose and operating status and (2) identifies the extent to which any similar groups collaborate to avoid duplicating efforts.GAO identified information sharing groups with select characteristics that were operational any time between January 1, 2020, and September 30, 2023, the most recent calendar years at the time GAO distributed its request for information to DHS. GAO reviewed documentation, such as charters, policies, and procedures, and interviewed relevant DHS headquarters and component officials about the history of the information sharing groups it identified.For more information, contact Triana McNeil at: 202-512-8777 or McNeilT@gao.gov.
- Restrictive Housing: Actions Needed to Enhance BOP and ICE Management and Oversight What GAO FoundFederal correctional and immigration detention facilities can place individuals in restrictive housing settings in certain circumstances. Restrictive housing generally consists of one- or two-person cells that isolate individuals from the general population. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) have policies and processes that govern their use of restrictive housing. Two prior studies examined restrictive housing at BOP, both of which identified ways for BOP to improve oversight. The first was a 2014 contracted assessment and the second was a 2016 Department of Justice report.In February 2024, GAO reported that BOP had not fully implemented 54 of 87 recommendations from these two studies. BOP had fully implemented 33, partially addressed 42, and had not taken any steps to address the remaining 12 recommendations. This was due in part to BOP not assigning responsibility for recommendation implementation to appropriate officials and not establishing a time frame for completion. GAO recommended that BOP develop and execute an approach to fully implement recommendations from these prior studies. This would include assigning implementation responsibility, establishing a time frame for completion, and monitoring progress. BOP concurred and described its planned steps.BOP and ICE have not consistently collected or used information needed for restrictive housing oversight. In reports from 2020–2024, GAO recommended actions to improve both BOP's processes for monitoring restrictive housing operations and BOP and ICE's analysis of complaints data. For example:In February 2024, GAO found that BOP was not monitoring key aspects of restrictive housing operations. Specifically, it did not examine the cause behind substantial racial disparity in a restrictive housing unit designed for individuals with heightened security concerns. GAO recommended that BOP conduct an evaluation to determine and address the cause of the racial disparity. BOP concurred and as of February 2024, said it would take steps to implement it.	In August 2020 and February 2024, GAO found that neither ICE nor BOP was analyzing complaint data from those in its custody to identify areas for improvement, such as concerns over restrictive housing conditions. GAO made recommendations to ICE and BOP to analyze complaint data, which could help each agency identify trends and ultimately enhance oversight. As of December 2023, ICE has taken some steps, including integrating several data systems that store detention-related information into a new system to provide enhanced analysis capabilities. As of February 2024, BOP agreed to take steps toward implementation.Why GAO Did This StudyICE recorded 14,581 restrictive housing placements of detained noncitizens from fiscal years 2017 through 2021. Those placements increased by 18 percent from fiscal year 2017 to 2020 before declining in 2021. As of October 2023, BOP housed about 8 percent of all incarcerated individuals (approximately 11,600) in restrictive housing. Studies have shown some potentially harmful mental and physical impacts of such placements.This statement discusses the extent to which (1) BOP has addressed recommendations from two prior restrictive housing studies and (2) BOP and ICE have information needed to manage and oversee use of restrictive housing.This statement is based on three prior GAO reports published from August 2020 through February 2024, along with selected updates on ICE efforts to address previous GAO recommendations. To produce those reports, GAO reviewed ICE and BOP documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed agency officials. For selected recommendation updates, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed ICE officials.
- Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments Needed What GAO FoundThe U.S. Coast Guard relies on its aircraft to support its many missions, using them most heavily for search and rescue. However, its aircraft generally did not meet the Coast Guard's 71 percent availability target during fiscal years 2018 through 2022. Specifically, the aircraft fleet availability ranged from 66 percent to 68 percent during this timeframe. The Coast Guard set this target to help ensure a high probability that its air stations can deploy at least one aircraft on short notice for search and rescue. Coast Guard officials attributed the aircraft fleet generally not meeting availability targets to maintenance and repair challenges.Coast Guard Aircraft As of January 2024, the Coast Guard had four programs underway to modernize its aircraft and help ensure they are available for operations in the coming decades, at an estimated cost of $105.6 billion. These programs were generally meeting their approved cost and schedule baselines. One of these programs aims to consolidate the fleet from 98 short-range and 48 medium-range helicopters to an all medium-range helicopter fleet. This would reduce the fleet size from 146 to at least 127 total helicopters.However, the Coast Guard has not fully assessed whether this transition will result in the type and quantity of helicopters needed to meet its mission demands. For example, it has not conducted an analysis of alternatives—an analytical study comparing the operational effectiveness, costs, and risks—to determine the best suited aircraft to meet mission needs. Assessing different helicopters using such an analysis would help the Coast Guard determine the best alternative to replace its short-range helicopter. Additionally, a fleet mix analysis would help ensure it identifies the necessary number of helicopters it requires to meet its mission demands.As of July 2023, the Coast Guard had 387 of 4,134 (9 percent) of its authorized military aviation workforce positions vacant. However, the Coast Guard has not fully determined its aviation workforce needs. Coast Guard guidance calls for the Coast Guard to assess and determine necessary staffing levels and skills to meet mission needs. This may be higher or lower than the number of its authorized positions. The Coast Guard has not used this process for a large portion of its aviation workforce, including all 25 of its air stations and its major aircraft repair facility. Until such analysis is completed, the Coast Guard will not fully understand the resources it requires for its aviation units.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Coast Guard, a multi-mission military service within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for protecting and defending more than 100,000 miles of U.S. coastline and inland waterways. It relies heavily on its fleet of about 200 aircraft to do so.Several of the Coast Guard's aircraft are approaching the end of their original service lives. The Coast Guard is amid a multibillion-dollar acquisition effort to modernize its aircraft fleet. It has also reported challenges maintaining a sufficient workforce to meet its growing mission demands.The James N. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to review issues related to Coast Guard aircraft availability. This report examines, among other things, (1) the extent Coast Guard aircraft met operational availability targets, (2) Coast Guard efforts to modernize its aircraft fleet, and (3) the extent it has determined its aviation-related workforce needs.GAO analyzed Coast Guard documentation and data on aircraft availability, acquisitions, and aviation workforce. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials, including those representing eight of 25 air stations with a mix of aircraft and geographic locations.
- Border Security: Border Patrol's Missing Migrant Program What GAO FoundBorder Patrol established the Missing Migrant Program in 2017 to help rescue migrants in distress and reduce migrant deaths along the southwest border. Through this program, Border Patrol coordinates with external entities (e.g., state and local officials) to assist migrants in distress and to recover and identify remains.Border Patrol sector agents are responsible for collecting and recording data on migrant deaths. In April 2022, GAO reported that Border Patrol had not collected and recorded, or reported to Congress, complete data on migrant deaths. Specifically, GAO reported that while Border Patrol has a policy for recording information on migrant deaths in the agency's system of record, Border Patrol sectors had not entered all available information on migrant deaths into the system consistent with that policy. In particular, GAO found that Border Patrol was not recording all migrant deaths in instances where an external entity first discovered the remains.Border Patrol agreed with GAO's recommendation that it take steps to ensure it collects and records available information on migrant deaths, including those identified by external entities. Border Patrol has implemented the recommendation by taking steps to revise its guidance, meeting with sectors and reviewing their program reports, and coordinating with external entities.In its August 2023 report to Congress on migrant deaths, Customs and Border Protection provided data for fiscal years 2018 through 2022 on migrant deaths. However, the report does not include a discussion of data limitations as GAO previously recommended. For instance, officials from one sector told us that large land areas along the border, sometimes combined with hazardous terrain, make it difficult to discover all remains, leading to some migrant deaths going unreported. More specifically, in April 2022, GAO reported that Border Patrol had not reported to Congress complete data on migrant deaths or disclosed limitations with the data it reported. GAO recommended that Border Patrol include known migrant deaths, including those reported by external entities, and any data limitations in public agency reports and those to Congress. Border Patrol agreed with this recommendation and has taken some steps toward addressing it. To fully address the recommendation, Border Patrol should include data limitation disclosures in its annual reports to Congress. By including data limitations in its reports, Border Patrol could provide context for Congress and the public to better understand data on migrant deaths.Border Patrol has also taken steps to evaluate the Missing Migrant Program. In April 2022, GAO found that Border Patrol collected and reviewed information about program activities; however, it did not have a plan to evaluate the program overall. GAO recommended that Border Patrol develop a plan with time frames to evaluate the program. Border Patrol agreed with GAO's recommendation and implemented it. Specifically, in November 2023, Border Patrol provided a plan for evaluating the Missing Migrant Program that notes that headquarters will review the program every 6 months. A Border Patrol official told us that the first reports from sectors based on the evaluation plan were expected in March 2024. It includes activities that are intended to help Border Patrol monitor and improve the Missing Migrant Program.Why GAO Did This StudyU.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security, is the lead federal agency responsible for border security. U.S. Border Patrol, within CBP, is responsible for securing the U.S. border between ports of entry to prevent individuals and goods from entering the U.S. illegally. In fiscal year 2022, Border Patrol reported a record number of migrant deaths—approximately 900—and the rescue of about 22,000 migrants.The Missing Persons and Unidentified Remains Act requires CBP to submit annual reports to Congress that include, among other elements, the number and location of unidentified remains found along the southwest border. In response, Border Patrol submitted its most recent report to Congress in August 2023. The Act also includes a provision for GAO to review how CBP collects data on migrant deaths and how CBP works with external entities in cases involving missing migrants or unidentified remains. This report addresses (1) the actions Border Patrol has taken to collect and record available information on migrant deaths; (2) Border Patrol's reporting on migrant deaths and the extent to which data limitations are included; and (3) Border Patrol's efforts to evaluate the Missing Migrant Program.GAO analyzed Border Patrol documentation and interviewed officials at Border Patrol headquarters, four field locations, and one external entity. GAO selected the field locations to reflect a range in the number of reported migrant deaths, types of terrain, and interactions with external entities. This report supplements information and draws from GAO's April 2022 report (GAO-22-105053) and November 2022 correspondence (GAO-23-106007) on the Missing Migrant Program. It also describes Border Patrol's efforts to address GAO's prior recommendations.For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov.
- Weapons of Mass Destruction: DHS Has Made Progress in Some Areas, but Additional Improvements Are Needed What GAO FoundThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in addressing challenges that GAO identified related to the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD). However, additional improvements are needed. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in several of CWMD's key areas, reported by GAO since 2018.Chemical defense:  GAO reported on challenges and progress in CWMD's chemical defense efforts. In August 2018, GAO found that DHS had not fully integrated and coordinated its chemical defense programs and activities among its component agencies. By not doing so, DHS risked missing opportunities to leverage resources, share information, and improve its effectiveness in addressing chemical threats through improved integration and coordination. To address GAO's recommendation, CWMD issued a Chemical Defense Strategy in December 2019 that established goals and objectives that included integrating and coordinating DHS's chemical defense capabilities. DHS subsequently issued an implementation plan in September 2021 that involved CWMD and several participating DHS component agencies.Biodefense:  GAO reported on challenges with two of DHS's biosurveillance efforts that CWMD oversees—the Biological Detection for the 21st Century program and the National Biosurveillance Integration Center. In May 2021, GAO found that DHS did not 1) apply best practices when conducting technology readiness assessments for its Biological Detection for the 21st Century program; or 2) conduct these assessments before key acquisition decision points. In response, DHS revised its program guide to incorporate best practices, but as of March 2024, had not demonstrated that it is conducting such assessments before key acquisition decisions. In November 2023, GAO reported that the National Biosurveillance Integration Center documented its efforts to obtain adequate personnel and develop new technology, but did not clearly define performance measures and associated time frames in its strategic planning documents. As of March 2024, DHS reported it was developing a strategy and implementation plan for the center that will include milestones, actions, targets, and time frames. GAO will monitor DHS's efforts.Radiological and nuclear detection:  In March 2024, GAO reported on CWMD's Securing the Cities program, which is designed to enhance the nuclear detection capabilities in select cities. GAO found that CWMD took steps to strengthen program outreach among its partners, but had not clearly communicated performance expectations. GAO will monitor DHS's efforts to address these and other challenges.Why GAO Did This StudyChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons have the potential to kill thousands of people. To manage threats in these areas, federal statute established CWMD in December 2018 by reorganizing functions of predecessor offices in DHS.This statement describes findings from GAO's reports on CWMD's programs from August 2018 through March 2024. They address challenges and opportunities for the effective operations and implementation of CWMD's chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security activities.To conduct prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, policies, strategic plans, and other documents. GAO also interviewed federal, state, industry, and other officials.
- Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: DHS Has Strengthened the Securing the Cities Program, but Actions Are Needed to Address Key Remaining Challenges What GAO FoundThe Department of Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) has taken multiple steps to strengthen the Securing the Cities (STC) program and is working with regions to address remaining program implementation challenges. CWMD awards funding to support STC regions' program administration. It also funds the procurement and deployment of radiological and nuclear detection equipment and training for the law enforcement officers and other agency partners who use it. To strengthen the program, CWMD has increased outreach and communication activities, developed templates for regional planning and quarterly reporting, and ensured regions' access to long-term federal funding to sustain their STC-related capabilities.As CWMD continues to improve the program, it is also working with STC regions to address challenges that may affect program implementation. Regions identified several key challenges, including staff attrition and turnover; availability and difficulty of scheduling training courses; and keeping partner agencies engaged with the STC program mission among other competing priorities.Photos of Types of Nuclear and Radiological Detection EquipmentCWMD's approach to measuring and tracking regions' performance—outlined in a 2023 revision to its STC program implementation plan—generally follows the key practices and their supporting actions for assessing program effectiveness. For example, CWMD uses weekly or biweekly meetings with the STC regions to provide tailored information that regions need to address specific issues affecting their program implementation. However, it has not clearly communicated to the regions the performance expectations and planned assessment approach adopted in the revised plan. By doing so, CWMD would increase the transparency and accountability for results being achieved through the program.CWMD is collecting and reviewing regional performance data to set targets and benchmarks for assessments that it plans to begin in fiscal year 2025. However, it needs to take additional steps to ensure that information collected from the regions is timely, consistent, complete, and accurate. CWMD officials also stated that they need to complete ongoing and planned efforts to better oversee and hold regions accountable for their performance and timely progress through program phases and toward achieving program goals. By taking these steps, CWMD will be in a better position to use evidence to manage the STC program more effectively, demonstrate regions' progress toward meeting the program goals, and communicate these results to stakeholders.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. faces an enduring threat that terrorists could steal or smuggle nuclear or radiological materials to use in a terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security initiated the STC program as a pilot in 2007 to reduce the risk of such attacks by developing and enhancing sustainable radiological and nuclear detection capabilities of state and local agencies in high-risk urban areas. The program includes 13 regions. CWMD awarded about $300 million to these regions through fiscal year 2023.The CWMD Act of 2018 included a provision for GAO to evaluate the STC program once CWMD completed an assessment of the program, which it did in 2022. This report evaluates (1) CWMD's efforts to strengthen the STC program and address regions' challenges and (2) the extent to which CWMD is measuring and tracking STC regions' performance.GAO reviewed CWMD and STC regions' documents, interviewed officials from CWMD and from each region, and visited two regions carrying out training exercises. GAO compared CWMD's performance assessment approach with key practices for assessing program effectiveness that GAO identified in prior work.
- Wildfire Disasters: Opportunities to Improve Federal Response, Recovery, and Mitigation Efforts What GAO FoundGAO's ongoing and prior work identified challenges that federal agencies face:Wildfire response and recovery.  GAO has previously reported that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) faces challenges in assisting state, local, and tribal governments after wildfire events. For example, securing temporary housing for survivors is difficult because disasters exacerbate pre-disaster shortages of affordable housing. Further, wildfires generally destroy entire structures and leave contaminated debris and soil that require lengthy clean-up before property is safe for habitation. FEMA is taking steps to address these post-disaster housing challenges and GAO will continue to assess these efforts in its ongoing work.Residential Wildfire Debris, Lahaina, Hawaii, September 2023Recruitment and retention of wildland firefighters.  GAO's prior work identified barriers to the recruitment and retention of federal wildland firefighters, including low pay and opportunities for career advancement. Congress has authorized pay increases through fiscal year 2026, but longer-term solutions are needed, according to agency officials.	Interagency coordination.  GAO's prior work identified opportunities for improved interagency coordination in managing risks from wildfire smoke and in federal disaster recovery efforts. In March 2023, GAO made recommendations to help strengthen federal coordination between the Environmental Protection Agency and land management agencies in reducing risks to air quality and public health from wildfire smoke. As of March 2024, four of the six recommendations were partially addressed. Additionally, in November 2022, GAO reported that the federal approach to disaster recovery is fragmented across more than 30 federal agencies and departments and at least 32 congressional committees. GAO recommended that agencies identify and take steps to better manage this fragmentation and that Congress consider establishing an independent commission to recommend reforms to the federal government's approach to disaster recovery. As of March 2024, a commission has not been established.Why GAO Did This StudyIn recent decades, the nation has witnessed an increase in the size and severity of wildfires as well as longer wildfire seasons. Demand for federal resources to prepare for, respond to, or recover from these wildfires is expected to increase.This testimony discusses GAO's ongoing and prior work and recommendations on challenges related to (1) wildfire response and recovery, (2) recruitment and retention of wildland firefighters, and (3) interagency coordination.This statement is based on GAO's ongoing work on FEMA's wildfire prevention and recovery efforts and prior reports, published from November 2022 through March 2023. For its ongoing work, GAO reviewed relevant FEMA policies, procedures, and guidance related to wildfires; conducted a site visit to Hawaii to observe response and recovery efforts; and interviewed relevant FEMA officials. Details about the scope and methodology for published GAO reports are included in those products.
- FEMA: Opportunities Exist to Address Mission Challenges and Increased Workload What GAO FoundThe increasing frequency of disasters overall and the additional responsibilities for responding to other events have stretched the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) workforce in unprecedented ways. GAO's work has identified various challenges FEMA has faced in its efforts to respond to these additional events.The scale and scope of federal efforts and funding required to address the COVID-19 pandemic tested FEMA's and other federal agencies' capacity to mount an equitable and effective nationwide response. FEMA's role included lost wages assistance; COVID-19 funeral assistance; public assistance to state, tribal, and territorial governments; mission assignments to other federal agencies; and mobile vaccination units. For example, GAO reported in April 2022 that FEMA had received and was processing more than 444,000 applications for COVID-19 funeral assistance since April 2021—when it began accepting applications—compared to the approximately 6,000 cases of funeral assistance the agency had processed over the decade prior to the pandemic. FEMA reported that as of December 2023 it has obligated $123 billion in response to the pandemic and projected that it will obligate a total of $144 billion by the end of fiscal year 2024. In addition to the 59 major disaster declarations for COVID-19, as of July 2022, FEMA had about 500 non-COVID-19 active major disaster declarations in various states of response and recovery. At the same time, FEMA recently reported a projected deficit of nearly $6.4 billion in the fund by September 2024GAO has also identified several gaps in FEMA's internal controls meant to prevent improper or potentially fraudulent payments in funeral assistance. In April 2022, GAO recommended that FEMA implement additional control activities to ensure that consistent and accurate data are available to prevent and detect improper payments and potential fraud. FEMA has fully addressed this recommendation implementing additional controls but as of April 2023 has only partially addressed the recommendation on data consistency and accuracy. Until FEMA fully addresses this recommendation, they will continue limited ability oversee and prevent and detect fraud.GAO's past work has identified longstanding challenges facing the FEMA workforce, which have been exacerbated given FEMA's additional responsibilities. Specifically, in May 2023, GAO reported that FEMA had a disaster workforce strength of approximately 11,400 employees at the beginning of fiscal year 2022, a gap of 35 percent between the actual number of staff and the staffing target of 17,670. FEMA officials stated that they faced additional responsibilities due to COVID-19, while also managing the traditional seasonal peaks of disaster activity during the year. This created burnout for many employees and increased employee attrition. GAO recommended that FEMA document plans to monitor and evaluate the agency's hiring efforts to address staffing gaps, among other recommendations. As of January 2024, FEMA has taken some steps to address these recommendations, including developing yearly hiring targets to ensure they are on pace to meet overall hiring goals. To fully address the recommendation, FEMA should finalize its staffing plans.Why GAO Did This StudyFEMA leads the nation's efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters. In recent years, the increasing frequency and costs of disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic, and other responsibilities have placed additional pressures on FEMA.This statement discusses GAO's prior work and recommendations related to FEMA's (1) roles and responsibilities outside of natural disasters and (2) workforce challenges.This statement is based on products GAO issued from May 2020 through May 2023, along with selected updates to address GAO recommendations, and updates from FEMA. For those products, GAO reviewed and analyzed federal laws, agency guidance, and other agency documents. GAO also analyzed data on FEMA's workforce, and disaster assistance, among others. GAO interviewed knowledgeable officials from FEMA; other selected federal agencies; and state, local, and territorial officials impacted by disasters.
- DHS Annual Assessment: Most Programs Are Meeting Current Goals, but Some Continue to Face Cost and Schedule Challenges [Reissued with revisions on Mar. 7, 2024] What GAO FoundDHS invests billions of dollars annually to acquire systems that help secure the border, increase marine safety, screen travelers, enhance cybersecurity, and execute a wide variety of other operations.Cost and schedule status. Of the 26 DHS acquisition programs that GAO selected to review, 16 had department-approved acquisition program baselines—a summary of measurable goals indicating how the system will perform, when it will be delivered, and what it will cost. Fifteen of the 16 programs met their current cost and schedule goals, while one program was in breach status in fiscal year 2023. The Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology program breached its schedule due to continued technical challenges and contributing financial constraints associated with increment 1 development. Further, some programs experienced ongoing challenges, while two of DHS's costliest programs reported significant cost growth and delays.The Offshore Patrol Cutter continues to face significant cost and schedule challenges despite a program restructure in 2020. The program has incurred cost growth of $6 billion since 2012 and it faces delays of almost 1.5 years for delivery of the first four cutters.	The Polar Security Cutter program increased its cost baseline by $3.5 billion and its lead ship delivery goal has been delayed by more than 2 years as the program faces continued challenges with achieving a stable design.Thirteen of the 16 programs we reviewed have rebaselined—established new cost, schedule, or performance goals—at least once since their initial baselines were established. Some have rebaselined due to scope changes like increasing quantity, while others have rebaselined due to insufficient understanding of requirements and complexity of the work to be accomplished. In addition, five programs requested schedule adjustments to address COVID-19 effects.Performance status. All seven of the 16 programs GAO reviewed that completed testing in 2023, met their current performance goals. These programs completed operational test and evaluation for at least one increment or segment in operationally realistic conditions, which determines whether a system can perform as required. The remaining nine programs have either not yet started operational test and evaluation or testing is ongoing.Why GAO Did This StudyTo help execute its many critical missions, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to spend more than $4 billion on its portfolio of major acquisition programs—those with life-cycle costs generally over $300 million—in fiscal year 2024. DHS acquisition management was removed from GAO's High-Risk Series in 2023.The Explanatory Statement accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act, 2015, included a provision for GAO to review DHS's major acquisitions on an ongoing basis. This report, GAO's ninth review, assesses the extent to which selected DHS major acquisition programs are meeting their baseline cost, schedule, and performance goals.GAO selected and reviewed 26 of DHS's largest acquisition programs, including those that GAO identified as at risk of poor outcomes, to determine program status as of September 30, 2023. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed key acquisition documents; collected cost, schedule, and performance information; and interviewed DHS officials.For more information, contact Travis J. Masters at (202) 512-4841 or masterst@gao.gov.
- Coast Guard: Action Needed to Evaluate Efforts to Address Sexual Assault and Harassment What GAO FoundThe Coast Guard has taken action to address sexual assault and harassment but has not developed a plan to assess its efforts. In a 2020 internal investigation called “Operation Fouled Anchor,” the Coast Guard examined 102 separate allegations of sexual assault from 1990 to 2006 at the Coast Guard Academy and concluded that the academy often mishandled these cases. More recently, service members reported a total of 263 sexual harassment allegations between September 2020 through April 2023, according to Coast Guard data. After media reporting on Operation Fouled Anchor in June 2023, the Commandant directed a 90-day review of policy processes, practices, and service culture relevant to countering sexual assault and harassment in the Coast Guard. The resulting report identified areas for organizational improvement to ensure a culture of accountability and transparency. In November 2023, the Commandant directed the Coast Guard to implement 33 initial actions by certain dates to address the findings of the review and help ensure service members have an experience free from sexual assault and harassment (see figure). The actions span six categories, including training, the academy, and information and data. According to Coast Guard officials, they have completed five actions as of February 2024.Number of Coast Guard Planned Actions Each Month to Respond to Sexual Assault and Harassment and Selected Examples The Commandant-directed actions include administering a Coast Guard-wide survey and analyzing survey results. However, the service has not developed an evaluation plan to assess the results of its 33 initial actions. According to Coast Guard officials, they have had discussions about assessing the results of the actions but have not developed plans or mechanisms to do so because measuring culture change is difficult. However, these officials identified certain resources, such as employee surveys and Department of Defense officials, that could prove useful in this effort.Developing an evaluation plan and mechanisms for assessing the effectiveness of actions taken to improve its culture of accountability and transparency would better ensure that Coast Guard has the information it needs to evaluate whether the actions are helping service members have an experience free from sexual assault and harassment. Further, taking these steps would help ensure the service is improving its culture, which could assist in the recruitment and retention of its workforce.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Coast Guard is a maritime military service within the Department of Homeland Security that employs more than 55,000 personnel. Sexual assault and harassment have a negative effect on the victims, negatively affect retention, and disrupt mission readiness.This statement discusses the Coast Guard's recent efforts to address sexual assault and harassment.GAO analyzed Coast Guard documents, interviewed agency officials, and reviewed prior GAO reports on Department of Defense and Coast Guard efforts to prevent sexual assault and harassment. We also compared Coast Guard efforts to the Commandant instruction on internal controls as well as federal internal control standards.
- Trusted Traveler Programs: DHS Has Enrollment Processes, but CBP Should Provide Additional Information on Reconsiderations What GAO FoundThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operate five distinct trusted traveler programs—(1) TSA PreCheck® and CBP's (2) Global Entry, (3) NEXUS, (4) Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), and (5) Free and Secure Trade (FAST). These programs allow for expedited screening or inspection of preapproved, low-risk travelers at certain domestic and international airports and at select land and sea ports of entry. TSA and CBP have enrolled millions of travelers to these programs through a multi-step process that generally includes an online application, traveler vetting, and an enrollment eligibility decision. In fiscal year 2020 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2023, TSA enrolled or renewed TSA PreCheck® memberships for over 99 percent of applications, and CBP enrolled or renewed membership for over 97 percent of applications across its four programs.NEXUS Lane at the U.S. Port of Entry in Blaine, Washington TSA and CBP have reconsideration processes for travelers denied or revoked from a trusted traveler program. TSA informs travelers of its decision in a letter that includes steps for pursuing reconsideration—known as a “correction of record”—if travelers believe TSA based its decision on incorrect or incomplete information. CBP also informs travelers of its decision via a letter that includes steps for pursuing reconsideration. The CBP Ombudsman has sole discretion to sustain or overturn denial or revocation decisions, based on the totality of circumstances and any new information that the traveler has provided.While CBP notifies travelers of denial and revocation decisions through letters posted to its online portal, it does not include instructions—required by regulation—for seeking additional information on the reason for its denial decision. According to CBP officials, the agency changed the format of its letters in 2018 when it updated its online portal and inadvertently removed these instructions. By providing these instructions, CBP could improve travelers' understanding of the specific reason for the decision, as appropriate, and could better ensure that travelers are able to directly address the reason for their denial or revocation when pursuing reconsideration.Why GAO Did This StudyThe summer of 2023 marked one of the busiest travel seasons on record. According to Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) data, each day approximately 2.5 million passengers boarded a commercial flight, and approximately 1.1 million travelers entered the U.S. through a port of entry during that period.Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review the DHS trusted traveler programs and reconsideration process. This report addresses (1) DHS's trusted traveler programs and enrollments and (2) the extent to which DHS provides reconsideration for travelers it denied or revoked from its programs.GAO analyzed relevant regulations, policies, and program data from fiscal year 2020 through the second quarter of 2023; interviewed headquarters and field officials involved in the trusted traveler programs; and conducted in-person and virtual site visits to CBP enrollment centers that processed the highest volume of program applications in fiscal year 2022. While not generalizable, these visits provided program insights.
- Countering Violent Extremism: FBI and DHS Need Strategies and Goals for Sharing Threat Information with Social Media and Gaming Companies What GAO FoundDomestic violent extremists use social media and gaming platforms for several purposes, including to reach wide audiences; to insert their extremist ideas into the mainstream; and to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize others, according to government reports and experts GAO spoke with (see figure). Experts noted that violent extremists generally use a variety of platforms for different purposes, depending on available features, audiences, and content moderation practices.Example of the Viral Nature of Domestic Violent Extremists' Use of Online PlatformsAccording to social media and gaming companies GAO met with, they use various content moderation tools to identify and remove content they determine violates their platforms' policies related to domestic violent extremism on their platforms. For example, they report using machine learning tools to scan for content that violates their policies, as well as reviews by employees. However, companies and experts reported that several factors affect these moderation efforts, such as company financial considerations and diversity in standards of acceptable content. For example, content banned on one platform could be allowed on another.The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have mechanisms to share and receive domestic violent extremism threat-related information with social media and gaming companies. However, neither agency has developed a strategy that articulates how it identifies and selects companies to engage with or the goals and desired outcomes of those engagements. Without a strategy or goals, the agencies may not be fully aware of how effective their communications are with companies, or how effectively their information-sharing mechanisms serve the agencies' overall missions.Why GAO Did This StudyIn recent years, content on social media and gaming platforms that promotes domestic violent extremism has influenced several high-profile attacks, according to experts and agency officials. As a result, some social media and gaming companies, as well as federal agencies, are making an effort to understand and address online content that promotes domestic violent extremism.GAO was asked to review domestic violent extremists' use of social media and gaming platforms. This report (1) describes the purposes for which domestic violent extremists use these platforms; (2) describes how selected companies report mitigating content promoting domestic violent extremism; and (3) assesses the extent to which the FBI and DHS have developed goals and strategies for sharing threat-related information with companies.GAO reviewed FBI and DHS documentation and interviewed officials. GAO obtained views from 16 subject matter experts identified by the National Academies of Sciences and prior work. GAO also interviewed representatives from a non-generalizable sample of five social media and gaming companies.
- Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Could Further Improve Officer Engagement What GAO FoundLeadership of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has identified the need to improve employee engagement—their sense of purpose in their job—as central to the agency's security mission. According to the Office of Personnel Management, engaged employees are more innovative, productive, and committed in their jobs, and thus less likely to leave. GAO found that five key drivers affect the engagement of TSA's Transportation Security Officers (TSO), who comprise the majority of TSA employees.&nbsp;TSA has taken actions to address all five key drivers. However, challenges related to each persist. For example, to address TSO concerns with managing and recognizing performance, TSA began requiring supervisors to take a 1-hour performance management course in 2018. In 2021, it set up two programs to reward top performance. However, these actions did not fully address the root causes of TSO dissatisfaction—namely, inconsistent management of TSOs' performance. By identifying and implementing actions that fully address the root causes of the driver, TSA will be better able to improve engagement. Further, TSA has not identified root causes of TSO dissatisfaction for three other drivers—career development, work-life balance, and communication. Without doing so, TSA will have difficulty implementing effective corrective actions that address the specific challenges for each of the drivers.Transportation Security Officers Gather for a Shift BriefingFor the final driver—demonstrating responsiveness to input—TSA has solicited TSO input on the root causes of low engagement at airports through a survey and other initiatives. However, TSA has not tracked follow-through on these initiatives. By tracking and monitoring follow-through on planned steps, TSA would be better able to ensure implementation and realize the desired effect of improving TSO engagement.Why GAO Did This StudyTSA employs almost 50,000 TSOs who screen passengers and their baggage at U.S. airports. TSA employees' engagement has historically ranked among the lowest within the Department of Homeland Security and across the federal government.GAO was asked to review the factors that affect TSO engagement and TSA's actions to improve it. This report examines (1) the key drivers that affect engagement and (2) the extent to which TSA has taken actions to address them.GAO analyzed the Office of Personnel Management's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey results from 2020 through 2023, reviewed agency guidance and documentation on TSA's actions to improve engagement, and interviewed human capital officials. GAO interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of TSOs, their supervisors, and senior leaders at five airports selected to capture variation in levels of employee engagement. GAO also interviewed five employee groups, including the union that represents TSOs.
- Coast Guard: Enhanced Safety Oversight Needed for Fish Tender Vessels What GAO FoundUnder U.S. law, certain fish tender vessels are subject to load line and stability requirements to ensure their safety in different waters, including by reducing their likelihood of capsizing.A fish tender vessel supplies and transports fish from a catcher vessel to a processing facility.	A load line ensures a vessel's overall seaworthiness and includes maintaining certain structural features such as watertight closures.Example of Load Line Markings on a Fish Tender VesselThe Coast Guard's data system captures information on the activities of commercial fishing industry vessels but does not capture data on vessels engaging in multiple service types, such as both catching and tendering fish. As a result, the Coast Guard is unable to generate a reliable list of fish tender vessels to identify which vessels are subject to load line requirements and the extent they have been in accidents. By assessing the feasibility of updating its system to capture multiple service types, the Coast Guard will be better positioned to oversee fish tender vessels.In 2015, the Coast Guard recognized that some vessels that were operating as part-time fish tender vessels were not in compliance with load line requirements. In August 2019, the Coast Guard created a task force that proposed an alternative compliance program that would exempt certain fish tender vessels from load line requirements while still providing an appropriate level of oversight. The task force paused its work after May 2022 without (1) fully assessing the safety risks posed to vessels participating in such a program, and (2) clearly identifying the proposed program's legal basis. Should the Coast Guard pursue implementation of a program, fully assessing the safety risks posed to fish tender vessels without a load line can help it ensure that any proposed alternative compliance program maximizes vessel safety within existing resource limitations. By clearly identifying a legal basis for the program, the Coast Guard can better ensure that any proposed program is consistent with its legal authorities.Why GAO Did This StudyCommercial fishing is an important part of the economy, yet one of the most hazardous occupations in the U.S. The U.S. Coast Guard is the primary federal agency responsible for marine safety, which includes enforcing safety requirements for fish tender vessels.The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to review issues related to load line requirements for fish tender vessels. This report addresses: (1) the load line and stability requirements for fish tender vessels; and the extent the Coast Guard (2) collected data on the activities of commercial fishing industry vessels in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest as they pertain to tendering and what its data show, and (3) addressed fish tender vessel noncompliance with load line requirements.GAO assessed relevant statutes, regulations, and Coast Guard documentation and data; and interviewed officials from the Coast Guard and commercial fishing industry (such as seafood companies and industry associations).
- DHS Employee Misconduct: Actions Needed to Better Assess Differences in Supervisor and Non-Supervisor Discipline What GAO FoundSelected Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components have some controls in place to ensure consistent adjudication of employee misconduct, but gaps exist. GAO assessed selected components' controls for (1) documenting the disciplinary adjudication process, (2) training employees responsible for the disciplinary adjudication process, (3) evaluating these employees' performance, and (4) monitoring misconduct data. Of the four selected DHS components, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and U.S. Secret Service have implemented all four controls. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) have not. GAO found that CBP policies do not fully detail the disciplinary process for all employees. USCIS lacks a process to periodically monitor and analyze misconduct data. By strengthening these controls, the agencies can better ensure consistent and fair adjudication of employee discipline cases.DHS has not assessed disciplinary outcomes between supervisors and non-supervisors. However, GAO's analysis of selected DHS components' data for cases of alleged misconduct found that supervisors were less likely to be disciplined than non-supervisors. DHS officials noted possible explanations, including that allegations brought against supervisors may not be substantiated or may be unfounded. Although DHS requires components to provide data to the department on whether an allegation was substantiated, the components did not report complete or consistent information on this to DHS. Because DHS also does not require components to report data on supervisory status, it is not positioned to analyze substantiation to better identify and address reasons for the differences in disciplinary outcomes. By clarifying guidance for reporting misconduct data, DHS could better position components to report complete and consistent information. By also requiring components to report data on supervisory status and analyzing these data, DHS would be positioned to better identify the reasons for any differences in disciplinary outcomes.Estimated Average Chance of Discipline by Supervisory Status at Selected Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Components, Fiscal Years 2020–2022Why GAO Did This StudyEmployee misconduct can detract from an agency's mission, negatively impact employee morale, and damage an agency's reputation. DHS is the third-largest cabinet-level department, employing more than 240,000 staff in a broad range of jobs. As such, it is important for DHS to effectively address misconduct, while also respecting employees' due process rights.The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 includes a provision for GAO to review DHS's disciplinary outcomes for supervisors and non-supervisors. This report examines the extent that (1) selected DHS components have controls to ensure consistent and equitable adjudication of misconduct cases for employees and (2) DHS has assessed for any differences in disciplinary outcomes for supervisors and non-supervisors. GAO selected four DHS components based on factors such as mission type, variation in workforce size, unionization, and hiring authorities. GAO reviewed their disciplinary processes, interviewed officials, and analyzed data on disciplinary outcomes for fiscal years 2020 through 2022.
- Puerto Rico Disasters: Progress Made, but the Recovery Continues to Face Challenges What GAO FoundThe Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had awarded about $23.4 billion in Public Assistance to Puerto Rico's permanent recovery work related to hurricanes Irma and Maria and the 2019 and 2020 earthquakes, as of June 2023. Of that, Puerto Rico has expended about $1.8 billion and a substantial amount of permanent work remains. Further, about $11.3 billion of the awarded funds needs FEMA's authorization before Puerto Rico can expend it. Puerto Rico subrecipients plan to submit project applications and obtain FEMA's authorization to access and expend these remaining funds through 2030 and possibly beyond.Work on Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority's Central Laboratory in 2021 and 2022To help jump-start permanent work construction, FEMA and Puerto Rico have taken actions, such as providing advance disbursements of funds; however, projects face additional challenges. Specifically, grant subrecipients that received awards from FEMA through an expedited process in Puerto Rico have identified increased project costs that pose risks to the completion of work on their facilities. For example, officials from Puerto Rico's Aqueduct and Sewer Authority said that the costs for one water treatment plant project exceeded its original estimate by 42 percent. Under the expedited process, these cost increases are of concern because a subrecipient's award acts as a fixed budget to complete projects across its various facilities. Therefore, increased costs for one project could excessively reduce the established budget to complete later projects.In May 2021, GAO identified a number of risks to Puerto Rico's recovery, including subrecipient difficulties in starting project construction, and recommended that FEMA take several actions to manage them. FEMA has partially addressed these recommendations; however, further steps are needed, including finalizing its risk management plan and taking actions to continuously monitor recovery risks. As challenges continue to complicate Puerto Rico's recovery, fully implementing GAO's prior recommendations remains important.FEMA has monitored Puerto Rico's use of Public Assistance grant funds through two oversight activities: improper payment reviews and grants management compliance reviews. Both efforts found improvement in Puerto Rico's ability to manage FEMA grant funds since the 2017 hurricanes. For example, by fiscal year 2020, FEMA found that Puerto Rico's potential improper payments fell below the amount considered significant by statute.Why GAO Did This StudyIn September 2017, hurricanes Irma and Maria caused billions of dollars in damage to Puerto Rico's infrastructure, housing, and economy. Earthquakes in 2019 and 2020 caused additional damages. More than 6 years after hurricanes Irma and Maria, Puerto Rico's recovery is ongoing.FEMA is the lead federal agency assisting Puerto Rico's recovery operations. It administers the Public Assistance program to provide grant funds to repair and rebuild damaged infrastructure, such as schools and the power grid, among other things.GAO was asked to review federal recovery efforts in Puerto Rico. This report addresses: (1) the status of permanent recovery work in Puerto Rico using Public Assistance; (2) the extent to which FEMA and Puerto Rico's government have addressed challenges to starting and completing permanent recovery work; and (3) the results of FEMA efforts to monitor Puerto Rico's use of grant funds. For this report, GAO analyzed relevant FEMA and Puerto Rico government documents and data; conducted site visits; and interviewed FEMA, Puerto Rico, and grant subrecipient officials.
- Artificial Intelligence: Fully Implementing Key Practices Could Help DHS Ensure Responsible Use for Cybersecurity What GAO FoundTo promote transparency and inform the public about how artificial intelligence (AI) is being used, federal agencies are required by Executive Order No. 13960 to maintain an inventory of AI use cases. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established such an inventory, which is posted on the Department's website.However, DHS's inventory of AI systems for cybersecurity is not accurate. Specifically, the inventory identified two AI cybersecurity use cases, but officials told us one of these two was incorrectly characterized as AI. Although DHS has a process to review use cases before they are added to the AI inventory, the agency acknowledges that it does not confirm whether uses are correctly characterized as AI. Until it expands its process to include such determinations, DHS will be unable to ensure accurate use case reporting.DHS has implemented some but not all of the key practices from GAO's AI Accountability Framework for managing and overseeing its use of AI for cybersecurity. GAO assessed the one remaining cybersecurity use case known as Automated Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Detection—against 11 AI practices selected from the Framework (see figure).Status of the Department of Homeland Security's Implementation of Selected Key Practices to Manage and Oversee Artificial Intelligence for CybersecurityGAO found that DHS fully implemented four of the 11 key practices and implemented five others to varying degrees in the areas of governance, performance, and monitoring. It did not implement two practices: documenting the sources and origins of data used to develop the PII detection capabilities, and assessing the reliability of data, according to officials. GAO's AI Framework calls for management to provide reasonable assurance of the quality, reliability, and representativeness of the data used in the application, from its development through operation and maintenance. Addressing data sources and reliability is essential to model accuracy. Fully implementing the key practices can help DHS ensure accountable and responsible use of AI.Why GAO Did This StudyExecutive Order No. 14110, issued in October 2023, notes that while responsible AI use has the potential to help solve urgent challenges and make the world more secure, irresponsible use could exacerbate societal harms and pose risks to national security. Consistent with requirements of Executive Order No. 13960, issued in 2020, DHS has maintained an inventory of its AI use cases since 2022.This report examines the extent to which DHS (1) verified the accuracy of its inventory of AI systems for cybersecurity and (2) incorporated selected practices from GAO's AI Accountability Framework to manage and oversee its use of AI for cybersecurity.GAO reviewed relevant laws, OMB guidance, and agency documents, and interviewed DHS officials. GAO applied 11 key practices from the Framework to DHS's AI cybersecurity use case—Automated PII Detection. DHS uses this tool to prevent unnecessary sharing of PII. GAO selected the 11 key practices to reflect all four Framework principles, align with early stages of AI adoption, and be highly relevant to the specific use case.
- Surface Transportation Threats: Better Communication with Stakeholders Needed about the Security Clearance Process What GAO FoundThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&amp;A) allocated field-based intelligence staff to locations with higher-risk surface transportation assets. TSA and DHS I&amp;A considered surface transportation security risks differently when doing so because each took into account their other mission priorities. Though their approaches differed, in fiscal year 2023, TSA and DHS I&amp;A each allocated field-based intelligence staff to approximately half of the 62 geographic areas with higher-risk surface transportation assets. According to TSA and DHS I&amp;A officials, the remaining locations with higher-risk surface transportation assets that did not have field-based intelligence staff located within the geographic area were supported by field-based intelligence staff in other locations.Surface Transportation ModesDHS made the security clearance application process available to surface transportation stakeholders, but some misunderstood aspects of the process. DHS and its entities—TSA, DHS I&amp;A, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)—have applicable policies and other guidance. However, agency officials, field-based intelligence staff, and surface transportation stakeholders GAO interviewed misunderstood how some aspects were applied, specifically as they related to accessing the security clearance application process. For example, some misunderstood which DHS entity was responsible for initiating applications for surface transportation owners and operators, whether there was a maximum number each would sponsor, and the type of employee eligible. Implementing a coordinated communications approach could help ensure relevant agency staff, as well as surface transportation stakeholders, have consistent and accurate information about the security clearance application process and ultimately facilitate classified information sharing when the need arises. Each DHS entity is responsible for ensuring its own staff have accurate information about the security clearance process. Further, as the lead agency for sharing transportation security-related information, TSA would be best positioned to coordinate the communications approach for sharing information with surface transportation owners and operators and external stakeholders about accessing the security clearance application process.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. surface transportation system comprises multiple modes of transportation and moves billions of passengers and millions of tons of goods each year. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 includes provisions for DHS to take steps to enhance surface transportation security through information sharing. Steps include allocating intelligence staff to locations with higher-risk assets and making security clearance applications available to surface transportation stakeholders. The act includes a provision for GAO to review implementation of these steps.This report describes (1) how and where TSA and DHS I&amp;A allocated field-based intelligence staff and (2) the extent to which DHS made the security clearance application process available to surface transportation stakeholders, among other topics. GAO analyzed TSA and DHS I&amp;A documents and data, including staff allocations for fiscal year 2023, conducted site visits to areas with higher-risk surface transportation assets, and interviewed agency officials and surface transportation stakeholders.
- Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Joint Task Forces What GAO FoundThe Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Joint Task Force-East coordinates activities across DHS components and U.S. government and international partners in the U.S. southern maritime environment. In fiscal year 2023, Joint Task Force-East officials stated they focused on activities such as preparing for maritime mass migration incidents and combatting transnational criminal organizations in the eastern Caribbean.DHS has not developed and documented criteria for establishing or terminating joint task forces, as of November 2023. From 2015 to 2020, DHS operated three task forces, but terminated two in 2020 (see table).Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Joint Task Force Operating Status, as of November 2023			Joint task force 									Scope of operations 									Lead DHS component 									Operating status 								East									The southern maritime environment, such as Puerto Rico and the coastline along the Gulf of Mexico and Florida.									U.S. Coast Guard									Active								West									The land border with Mexico from California to the Gulf of Mexico, among other surrounding areas.									U.S. Customs and Border Protection									Terminated September 2020								Investigations									Responsible for supporting DHS-wide investigations and sharing information to support the other two task forces.									U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement									Terminated September 2020					Source: GAO analysis of DHS documentation. | GAO-24-106855DHS is statutorily required to inform Congress within 7 days after establishing or terminating a joint task force of the criteria and conditions required to establish or terminate it. Further, DHS is required to establish the criteria for terminating each joint task force using leading practices in performance management and lessons learned by other law enforcement task forces and joint operations. DHS officials stated they recognize the need for criteria but did not provide GAO with drafts or interim documents to support planned actions, as of November 2023. Such criteria could better position the department to convey the conditions under which the Secretary decides to establish or terminate a joint task force.DHS has taken some steps to develop performance measures for Joint Task Force-East but had not finalized them, as of November 2023. In 2019, GAO recommended that DHS develop outcome-based performance measures for joint task forces. Developing and implementing such measures would better position DHS to demonstrate task force effectiveness. Subsequently, DHS was statutorily required to establish targets—numeric values indicating the level of performance expected—for joint task force performance measures. DHS is also required to include, as part of its performance measures for joint task forces, a description of the methodology used to establish such measures. As of November 2023, DHS had not developed targets or its methodology for joint task force performance measures. Establishing targets and developing and documenting the methodology for Joint Task Force-East's performance measures would better position DHS to measure the task force's results.Why GAO Did This StudyIn 2014, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed the development of intradepartmental joint task forces to respond to long-term, multi-faceted challenges such as the smuggling of illicit drugs. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 established in statute the Secretary of Homeland Security's authority to create joint task forces. In 2019, GAO reported on DHS's management of joint task forces, and recommended improvement to DHS's performance measures.The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes new requirements related to joint task forces and a provision for GAO to review how DHS uses them. This report examines (1) the missions and activities of Joint Task Force-East; (2) criteria for establishing or terminating a joint task force; and (3) performance measures and targets for Joint Task Force-East. GAO analyzed DHS documentation on management and oversight of joint task forces, including actions taken since GAO's prior report (GAO-19-441) . GAO also interviewed DHS headquarters, Joint Task Force-East, and component officials on task force activities and performance management.
- Disaster Assistance: Information on the 2021 Condominium Collapse in Surfside, Florida What GAO FoundThe partial collapse of the 12-story Champlain Towers South condominium in Surfside, Florida, on June 24, 2021, is one of the deadliest structural disasters in American history. Ninety-eight people were killed and many others injured. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the primary federal agency responsible for coordinating the response and recovery to this emergency. As of June 2023, FEMA had obligated about $106.9 million in response to the collapse. These funds supported survivors and other individuals affected by the collapse and state and local response and recovery efforts.To determine the technical cause of the collapse, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched an investigation. NIST's investigation is ongoing, and the agency plans to publicly report its findings and any recommendations in 2025. As of June 2023, NIST had obligated about $15.4 million for its investigation. In addition to NIST's technical investigation, the Miami-Dade Police Department and the Town of Surfside are also investigating the cause of the collapse.Following the collapse, questions have been raised about the potential for FEMA to recover assistance costs for this emergency. Federal law allows FEMA to recover costs for emergencies or major disasters that were intentionally caused. When determining whether to pursue recovering such costs, FEMA considers various factors, such as whether an intentional act can be shown and the time and cost of litigation. As of January 2024, FEMA has taken no action to recover costs related to the collapse.FEMA has several hazard mitigation assistance grant programs and a revolving loan fund program that could be used to improve the disaster resilience of condominiums. For example, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program has provided funding to assist communities with condominium acquisitions, landslide stabilization of condominium buildings, and purchasing generators, among other things.Why GAO Did This StudyGAO was asked to examine aspects of the federal response to the Champlain Towers South collapse. This report provides information on FEMA and NIST obligations in response to the collapse, the factors that affect whether FEMA attempts to recover federal assistance costs, the entities investigating the cause of the collapse, and whether FEMA grants can be used to increase condominiums' disaster resilience. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed agency documents and FEMA and NIST data on federal funds obligated in response to the collapse. GAO also interviewed officials from FEMA, NIST, Miami-Dade County, and the Town of Surfside.For more information, contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov.
- Coast Guard: Better Feedback Collection and Information Could Enhance Housing Program What GAO FoundAround 41 percent of U.S. Coast Guard units are located in remote areas or high vacation rental areas, or both (see figure below), and military personnel generally rotate every 3 to 4 years. While most Coast Guard service members receive a private sector housing allowance, the service manages its housing program—including more than 2,500 government-owned housing units throughout the U.S. and its territories—using various policies and procedures. Coast Guard service members and spouses told GAO that certain areas can create challenges related to the affordability and availability of private sector housing, which the Coast Guard relies upon for most members.The Coast Guard has not conducted a service-wide survey of service members on their housing experiences and challenges since 2012. Establishing a process to routinely collect and use such feedback from service members and their spouses would better position the Coast Guard to manage its housing program to meet service member needs.Coast Guard Units Located in Areas that are Either Remote, Contain Majority High Vacation Rentals, or Both, as of 2023 GAO identified 10 Department of Defense (DOD) statutory housing authorities that Coast Guard officials stated could potentially benefit the service. For example, DOD has the authority to enter into utility service contracts for periods up to 10 years, as well as to enter into multiyear energy or fuel contracts for military installations. Coast Guard officials told GAO that having similar statutory authorities could be beneficial and may result in cost savings to the service. Assessing the extent of benefits from the 10 DOD authorities and developing a legislative proposal to obtain certain statutory authorities, as appropriate, could better position the Coast Guard to manage its housing program, as well as support its service members and dependents.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Coast Guard has over 41,000 active-duty military personnel stationed across the U.S. and its territories. Coast Guard units are often situated along major waterways and coastlines in remote areas or areas where most of the available housing is seasonal.The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes provisions for GAO to review the Coast Guard's housing program. This report addresses (1) how the Coast Guard manages its housing program, (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard collected and used service member feedback and other quality information to manage the program, and (3) the extent to which the Coast Guard has considered potentially beneficial DOD housing authorities.GAO analyzed Coast Guard policies, program documentation, and Coast Guard and DOD statutory housing authorities. GAO used Coast Guard and other data to determine the proportion of Coast Guard units located in remote areas, in areas with a high density of vacation rental properties, or both. GAO interviewed Coast Guard officials, toured housing at a non-generalizable sample of three bases, and met with base officials and housing residents, including spouses in Alameda, CA; Cape Cod, MA; and Kodiak, AK.
- Coast Guard: Enforcement of Egress Requirements for Historic Wood Sailing Vessels What GAO FoundThe Coast Guard's enforcement of egress requirements helps ensure that passengers and crew can safely exit vessels in the event of an emergency. Egress requirements for small passenger vessels have become more stringent over time. However, older small passenger vessels were allowed to comply with less stringent egress requirements until the Coast Guard issued its 2021 interim rule, in response to statute. The rule requires small passenger vessels with overnight accommodations for passengers that are not ferries, regardless of when they were built, to comply with newer, more stringent requirements by December 27, 2023.While no operational vessels meet all the elements of the statutory definition of a "historic wood sailing vessel," GAO identified 27 vessels— referred to in the report as wood sailing vessels—that meet most of the elements of the definition. These 27 vessels account for a small portion of the total number of vessels (308) that are required to comply with egress requirements in the 2021 interim rule.GAO's review of Coast Guard marine casualty reports found that from January 2013 through July 2023, some of these wood sailing vessels were involved in incidents, none of which resulted in significant damage or fatalities. Additionally, GAO's review of safety inspection data found 42 deficiencies during this same time period that could be related to egress. The largest number of deficiencies (18) were related to properly labeling exits.At the time of our review, it was unknown how feasible it would be for wood sailing vessels to comply with the 2021 interim rule by December 27, 2023, because each vessel is different. Some maritime stakeholders and Coast Guard field personnel initially told GAO that some wood sailing vessels in their area of responsibility may easily comply with the 2021 interim rule, while others may need to make significant modifications. Modifications to wood sailing vessels may require significant time and resources due to their construction and operational nature, according to maritime stakeholders. However, in October 2023, the Coast Guard issued a policy letter providing clarification on the enforcement of egress requirements, such as the level of discretion provided to authorized field personnel when enforcing requirements. Subsequently, Coast Guard and maritime stakeholders said that the clarification provided by the policy letter would likely result in wood sailing vessels being able to comply with the 2021 interim rule without signification modifications. The policy letter expires with the issuance of the final rule, which is expected in November 2024.Why GAO Did This StudyIn 2019, a vessel named Conception caught fire off the coast of California, resulting in the deaths of 34 people, in part due to exits that all led to where the fire was located. An investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board resulted in recommendations to the Coast Guard to revise fire safety requirements for small passenger vessels. In 2021, the Coast Guard issued an interim rule related to egress requirements that went into effect on December 27, 2023.The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to review the effect of these egress requirements on historic wood sailing vessels, including the feasibility of compliance and associated risk and costs. This report addresses changes to egress requirements, the safety of wood sailing vessels, and the feasibility of vessels complying with the 2021 interim rule. GAO analyzed Coast Guard data, reviewed relevant laws and Coast Guard policies, and interviewed agency officials and maritime stakeholders.For more information, contact Heather MacLeod at (202) 512-8777 or MacLeodH@gao.gov.
- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Improvements Needed to Workforce and Expansion Plans for Unit of Native American Law Enforcement Personnel What GAO FoundWithin U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Shadow Wolves program operates on the Tohono O'odham Nation reservation in Sells, Arizona. Shadow Wolves members are required to have at least one-quarter American Indian ancestry. The program's operating environment has changed in recent years due to advances in technology, an increase in federal law enforcement presence along the southwest border, and changes in smuggling tactics. As a result, in 2015, ICE shifted the program's focus from interdiction—using traditional Indigenous tracking methods and technology to seize narcotics—to investigation, such as gathering evidence and serving warrants. However, the agency did not define the program's mission, goals, or staffing needs after shifting its operations. Doing so would better position ICE to ensure that Shadow Wolves operations are having the desired impacts. Further, once ICE defines the mission and goals, determining the program's staffing needs would better position ICE to develop recruitment efforts that help accomplish those goals.In October 2022, ICE issued a strategy for recruiting additional Shadow Wolves, retaining existing Shadow Wolves, and expanding the program to other tribal lands. ICE's strategy includes high-level recruitment methods, such as partnering with colleges and recruiting tribal law enforcement officers, but does not include goals, timelines, and milestones. Adding these elements would enable ICE to assess the effectiveness of the agency's recruitment plans. Moreover, since the program has not hired any new employees since 2007 and most Shadow Wolves are eligible to retire, developing a succession plan would better position ICE to ensure experienced Shadow Wolves will be available to train new recruits.Timeline of Current Shadow Wolves' Retirement by Fiscal YearNote: Generally, federal law enforcement personnel must retire at age 57, or when they complete 20 years of certain specialized federal service after age 57.ICE has outlined steps that it plans to take to evaluate possible Shadow Wolves expansion locations, including coordinating with tribal leaders, engaging with ICE field officials, and conducting site visits to assess the feasibility and appropriateness of expansion. However, ICE has not developed criteria for evaluating and selecting locations. Doing so would help ensure officials evaluate locations consistently and transparently.Why GAO Did This StudyAbout 62 miles of the U.S. southwest border is located on the Tohono O'odham Nation reservation, which may be vulnerable to illicit cross-border activity. The Shadow Wolves program began operations in 1974 to address the illegal smuggling of controlled substances from Mexico to the Tohono O'odham Nation reservation in Arizona. The program contributed to hundreds of arrests and the seizure of tens of thousands of pounds of drugs between 2010 and 2020, according to ICE.The Shadow Wolves Enhancement Act, which became law in April 2022, includes a provision for GAO to assess the effectiveness of ICE's strategy for the Shadow Wolves program. This report assesses ICE's (1) efforts to define the program's mission and staffing needs, (2) strategies for recruiting and retaining Shadow Wolves, and (3) planning efforts to expand the program to other tribal lands. GAO analyzed ICE human capital documents and policies and Shadow Wolves program planning documents. GAO also surveyed the eight current Shadow Wolves and visited the Tohono O'odham Nation reservation to interview ICE officials, Shadow Wolves, and tribal officials.
- U.S. Ports of Entry: Update on CBP Public-Private Partnerships What GAO FoundSince GAO's January 2022 report, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security, continued to expand its public-private partnership programs—the Reimbursable Services Program (RSP) and the Donations Acceptance Program (DAP). The RSP allows partners, such as port authorities or local municipalities that own or manage ports, to reimburse CBP for providing services that exceed CBP's normal operations, such as paying overtime for CBP personnel that provide services at ports of entry (POE) outside regular business hours. The DAP enables partners to donate property or provide funding for POE infrastructure improvements.Regarding the RSP, since our January 2022 report, CBP selected an additional 135 RSP applications for partnerships, bringing the total of RSP selections to 398 since fiscal year 2013. As of October 2023, CBP and its partners had executed 464 memorandums of understanding (MOU) from RSP partnerships that they entered into since fiscal year 2013. These MOUs outline how agreements are to be implemented at one or more POEs. Of those 464 MOUs, 12 cover agreements at land POEs, 73 cover agreements at sea POEs, and 379 cover agreements at air POEs. GAO previously reported that although the number of RSP partnerships has increased, the growth in the total number of reimbursable CBP officer assignments, officer overtime hours, and reimbursed funds were still less than in 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in October 2023, CBP officials said that the number of requests for RSP services and the number of applications that CBP receives were increasing due to a post-COVID-19 rebound and their outreach, particularly to general aviation partners. Furthermore, officials told us that their outreach efforts to stakeholders include communicating application requirements and time frames and encouraging potential applicants to apply in advance of when they will need services.Regarding DAP, since our January 2022 report, CBP entered into three new donation acceptance partnerships, bringing the total number of agreements to 46 since fiscal year 2015. Partners span a variety of sectors such as state and local governments, private companies, and airline companies. Correspondingly, donations served a variety of purposes such as expanding inspection facility infrastructure, providing biometric detection services, and providing luggage for canine training. As of October 2023, 30 of 46 of these projects, or 65 percent, were at land POEs. CBP officials estimated that the total value of all donations entered into between September 2015 and October 2023 was $262.1 million.Why GAO Did This StudyOn a daily basis in fiscal year 2022, approximately 869,000 passengers and pedestrians and over 91,000 truck, rail, and sea containers carrying goods worth approximately $9.2 billion entered the United States through 328 U.S. land, sea, and air POEs, according to CBP. To help meet demand for CBP inspection services, since 2013, CBP has entered into public-private partnerships under the RSP and DAP. Section 482 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by the Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2016 and amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, includes a provision for GAO to biennially review the agreements along with the funds and donations that CBP has received under the RSP and DAP. We were previously directed to review these RSP and DAP agreements, funds, and donations annually. Under the prior annual reporting requirement, GAO issued five reports on the programs—in January 2022, January 2021, January 2020, March 2019, and March 2018. This sixth report updates key information from GAO's January 2022 report by examining the status of CBP public-private partnership program agreements, including the purposes for which CBP used the funds and donations from these agreements in 2022 and 2023. GAO collected and analyzed information on any new RSP agreements, DAP agreements, and MOUs for both programs for 2022 and 2023. GAO also analyzed data on the use of the programs and interviewed CBP officials to identify any significant changes to how the programs are administered.For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov.
- Coast Guard: Improved Reporting on Domestic Icebreaking Performance Could Clarify Resource Needs and Tradeoffs What GAO FoundGreat Lakes vessel-based commerce declines during the winter, primarily due to lock closures and weather conditions. GAO found, by conducting a regression analysis, that the amount of ice coverage on the Great Lakes was generally not associated with selected economic indicators, such as regional unemployment rates and unfilled orders for iron and steel production. Some industry stakeholders told GAO they take steps in their operational planning to mitigate the effects of delays due to ice. For example, two Great Lakes steel producers said they stockpile several months of iron ore inventory as the ice season begins.The Coast Guard operates a fleet of 33 vessels comprised of heavy, medium, and light domestic icebreakers as well as two types of ice-capable buoy tender vessels to conduct its domestic icebreaking mission. The Coast Guard generally meets its domestic icebreaking goals using available vessels; however, it identified challenges with its aging fleet and the need for additional heavy and medium capabilities as risks to its ability to conduct its icebreaking mission in the future. To address these risks, the Coast Guard determined that it would need more than $3 billion to recapitalize its medium and light domestic icebreaking fleet and procure a second heavy icebreaker, plus funds for related port infrastructure.The Coast Guard reports some information on its domestic icebreaking performance, but it collects additional information it could use to improve the transparency of its icebreaking performance and articulate resource needs and tradeoffs. For example, the Coast Guard projects its future mission needs by conducting a fleet mix analysis to determine the type and number of assets needed to meet forecasted demands. However, this analysis does not reflect the full scope of the assets required to fulfill the mission, as it excludes the ice-capable buoy tenders that serve as a stop-gap for the aging icebreaking vessels when they are not available due to maintenance. By more transparently communicating its performance, including the actual extent of vessel utilization and resource-based prioritization, the Coast Guard could provide stakeholders with better information on operational gaps, risks, as well as resource needs and tradeoffs.The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 introduces proposed domestic icebreaking performance standards for the Coast Guard specific to the Great Lakes. According to Coast Guard officials, the proposed standards will not change how the Coast Guard conducts its icebreaking operations, but could lead to improved data collection and performance reporting. However, new data collection requirements could increase operating costs as both the Coast Guard and industry may need additional equipment or procedures to collect new or more detailed data.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. Coast Guard operates and maintains icebreaking vessels to promote safety in U.S. waters, along with its other missions. The Coast Guard breaks ice to help keep channels and harbors open to navigation to facilitate "the reasonable demands of commerce." This assistance includes establishing and maintaining open tracks in critical waterways, assisting and escorting vessels stuck in ice, and removing hazards created by ice. In 2020, industries shipped over 100 million tons of iron ore, limestone, coal, and other commodities through the Great Lakes. Some industry stakeholders who rely on shipping channels in the Great Lakes raised concerns that the Coast Guard does not have adequate resources available to facilitate the reasonable demands of commerce.The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to review Coast Guard icebreaking operations in the Great Lakes. This report describes the economic impacts of ice coverage on the Great Lakes by examining associations between ice coverage and effects on certain economic indicators; the Coast Guard's determinations of its icebreaking resource needs; and the potential effects of the proposed standards on the Coast Guard's icebreaking efforts.To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant laws and Coast Guard policies, guidance, and analyses. GAO conducted regression analyses to examine the relationship between the average monthly Great Lakes ice coverage using data from the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and a variety of relevant regional and industry-specific economic indicators. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials to understand domestic icebreaking operations and priorities, as well as industry stakeholders who operate or rely on the Great Lakes.
- Research Security: Strengthening Interagency Collaboration Could Help Agencies Safeguard Federal Funding from Foreign Threats What GAO FoundGAO found that determining whether federal research and development (R&amp;D) funds were provided to a foreign entity of concern is challenging. Such entities include foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated nationals, among others. Awarding agencies are generally prohibited from doing business with foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated nationals.GAO found that government-wide databases which report on some of these entities lack common identifying information such as a unique identifier or personally identifiable information. For example, a physical address, date of birth, or other identifying information for entities on the foreign terrorist organization list is often unavailable as entities often try to conceal their identity or location, according to the Treasury Department. When personally identifiable information such as date of birth is available, similar information is not available in the public federal funding data source, USAspending.gov. Specifically, although awarding agencies collect other identifying information, such as phone numbers of entities seeking an award, not all such information is reported in USAspending.gov. Together, these challenges limit the ability to match foreign entities on certain lists with those receiving government-wide funding.Example of Gaps in Crossmatching Identifying Information for Restricted Foreign Entities With Federal Spending DataGAO found that some requirements exist specific to R&amp;D awards to foreign entities of concern. For example, agencies are generally required to vet potential awardees against the federal exclusions list, which includes foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated nationals. Agencies that GAO interviewed reported challenges in identifying foreign ownership, control, or influence. Officials from two agencies we reviewed said they use analytical tools and other available information to try to identify foreign ownership. Such efforts, however, are not shared across agencies. Recent guidance from the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)—the lead federal agency for interagency coordination on science and technology policies—does not address the issue of foreign ownership, control, or influence. OSTP officials told GAO that they handle this issue on a case-by-case basis and acknowledged the challenges that agencies face in addressing such risks. Information sharing on such complex matters would better position agencies to more fully safeguard R&amp;D funds.Why GAO Did This StudyAccording to the National Science Foundation, federal agencies obligated about $1.4 billion for R&amp;D with foreign entities in fiscal year 2020 (the most recent data available). However, some foreign entities may try to exploit U.S. openness in sharing R&amp;D for nefarious purposes.The Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act includes a provision for GAO to review research funding provided to foreign entities of concern. The act's definition of such entities includes foreign terrorist organizations and foreign entities subject to the control, ownership, and jurisdiction of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.This report examines challenges in identifying R&amp;D funds awarded to foreign entities of concern and requirements for awarding and monitoring such funding.GAO searched USAspending.gov and reviewed documents from federal funding and law enforcement agencies. GAO also interviewed federal agency officials, including those from the five agencies that obligated the most R&amp;D funding in fiscal year 2020.
- Traveler Inspections: DHS Mechanisms to Help Prevent Discrimination and Address Complaints What GAO FoundU.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has policies, guidance, and training courses to help prevent and address aspects of potential discrimination in its traveler inspection process. For example, consistent with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) nondiscrimination policy, CBP issued a 2014 memorandum prohibiting the consideration of race or ethnicity in law enforcement, investigation, and screening activities in all but the most exceptional circumstances. As of November 2023, DHS is considering updates to its policy. CBP officials noted that the agency has been working with DHS's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) on this effort. It will be important to ensure that CBP's policy continues to be consistent with departmentwide policy, as these policies help to guide CBP officers' activities as part of the inspection process. CBP has issued other guidance documents that include directives on officers' standards of conduct, for example. Further, CBP's training program includes courses on law enforcement professionalism and unconscious bias. CBP evaluates the effectiveness of its trainings by administering course evaluation surveys, according to CBP officials.CBP also has mechanisms for reviewing and monitoring its traveler inspection processes to oversee implementation of the agency's inspection policies and to help prevent discrimination, among other objectives. For example, CBP has developed and implemented processes to review its pre-primary targeting rules used to identify potentially high-risk travelers. These reviews occur as they are developed and on a regular basis thereafter and are conducted to ensure each rule meets its intended purpose, is supported by current law enforcement or intelligence information, and does not impose an unjustifiable impact on legitimate travelers. Moreover, CBP officers and supervisors collect, review, and monitor data and information related to primary and secondary inspections conducted at ports of entry. Supervisors are responsible for monitoring traveler inspections at ports of entry by interacting with officers and travelers to help ensure officers comply with policies and guidance and reviewing inspection records. For example, during a visit to one port of entry, GAO observed a supervisor walking around the secondary baggage inspection area to observe inspections as they were occurring. Further, CBP supervisors GAO spoke with at seven ports of entry said travelers may ask a supervisor why they were selected for secondary inspection. CBP officers and supervisors at those ports of entry stated, and GAO observed at two of the four ports of entry visited, that supervisors answered questions about the inspection process from travelers.Canine Search During Secondary Inspection at a U.S. Land Port of EntryCBP uses various methods at ports of entry and through other communication means to address concerns raised by travelers and share information about complaint mechanisms. At ports of entry, CBP officials stated that if a traveler raises a concern about potential discrimination, generally on-site supervisors first try to address the concern immediately by speaking with the traveler. Officials also stated that travelers may request to speak with a CBP supervisor at any time during the inspection process, and the supervisor can provide the traveler with additional information about the inspection process and answer any questions. Representatives from four of the nine stakeholder organizations GAO interviewed said that some travelers have expressed concerns to them regarding not knowing why they were referred for a secondary inspection. Generally, CBP officials are not permitted to provide specific details regarding reasons a traveler is referred for secondary inspection if that referral is based upon law enforcement and other sensitive information, according to CBP officials.CBP also provides travelers with information on how to submit complaints, including posters and brochures in the inspection areas at ports of entry. GAO observed CBP posters and contact cards in the inspection areas at each of the four ports of entry GAO visited. These posters and brochures encourage travelers to provide comments or compliments via phone, mail, or online forms.Several DHS and CBP offices, such as DHS's CRCL and CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), have varying responsibilities in receiving or investigating complaints about traveler inspections, including potential discrimination. These entities can receive complaints from other DHS entities, employees, travelers, and from stakeholder organizations that submit complaints on behalf of individual or groups of travelers. Representatives from five of the nine stakeholder organizations GAO interviewed said they had filed complaints with CRCL or CBP. For example, representatives noted filing complaints on behalf of travelers with disabilities who experienced issues related to accessibility as well as complaints regarding secondary inspection referrals based solely on nationality or country of birth.From fiscal years 2017 through 2021, CRCL and OPR received and investigated hundreds of complaints related to potential discrimination during traveler inspections. During that time period, CBP inspected over 1.5 billion arriving travelers at land and air ports of entry. CRCL, responsible for addressing civil rights and civil liberties complaints related to DHS activities, received 479 complaints related to potential discrimination in the traveler inspection process. Based on its investigations, CRCL identified findings and issues that it summarized in seven memoranda to CBP. These memoranda included 22 recommendations to CBP to address those findings and issues, such as for it to implement additional training for employees on policies related to nondiscrimination and update guidance on things like personal searches. As of August 2023, CBP had taken action in response to most of those recommendations. In particular, CBP concurred or partially concurred with 17 of the 20 recommendations, and completed planned actions for all but one of those 17 recommendations. These actions included providing training or reminders on CBP's disability access and nondiscrimination policies and updating its Personal Search Handbook. CBP expects to complete action for the remaining recommendation by February 2024. For the three recommendations with which CBP did not concur, it provided CRCL with the rationale for its determination, such as that existing policies addressed identified issues.CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility, responsible for investigating allegations of CBP employee misconduct, received 443 complaints from fiscal year 2017 through 2021 and took action against employees in about 4 percent of the 425 cases in which investigations had been completed at the time of GAO's review. CBP did not take action against employees in most cases (410 cases) due to insufficient evidence of misconduct, according to CBP officials. In cases where CBP took action against employees (15 cases), actions included written or verbal counseling, reprimand, and suspension.Why GAO Did This StudyOn a typical day, CBP officers inspect hundreds of thousands of travelers entering the U.S. CBP is responsible for inspection activities that facilitate the flow of legitimate travel and trade while also keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and contraband, and inadmissible individuals out of the country. Some travelers and stakeholder organizations have raised concerns about CBP inspections, including concerns related to potential discrimination based on race, religion, or other characteristics.GAO was asked to review CBP's efforts to help prevent and address potential discrimination during the traveler inspection process. This report describes (1) CBP's mechanisms to help ensure that its inspection practices at air and land ports of entry do not result in discrimination against travelers based on race, ethnicity, religion, disability, and other characteristics; (2) DHS and CBP mechanisms for receiving complaints related to potential discrimination during traveler inspection process; and (3) mechanisms for investigating complaints related to potential discrimination and the outcomes of those investigations.GAO interviewed DHS and CBP headquarters officials and CBP officials at seven field locations selected based on a mix of criteria including geographic location and volume of travelers. GAO also conducted in-person observations of traveler inspections at four of these locations to gain firsthand knowledge of the traveler inspection process.GAO also interviewed representatives from nine stakeholder organizations, selected based on their work on addressing discrimination or immigration-related issues and prior interaction with CRCL. These organizations included the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the American Civil Liberties Union Texas Border Rights Center, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Disability Rights Education Defense Fund, the National Center for Transgender Equality, the National Disability Rights Network, the National Immigrant Justice Center, the Paralyzed Veterans of America, and the Sikh Coalition.GAO reviewed agency documents, including DHS's and CBP's policy memos on nondiscrimination and CBP's directive on standards of conduct. GAO also reviewed materials from CBP officer training programs and training-related activities that discuss aspects of preventing discrimination during the traveler inspection process. GAO also interviewed CBP officials to obtain information on how CBP assesses the effectiveness of its training.GAO also analyzed documentation on the processes used by DHS and CBP offices that receive and investigate complaints, including DHS's CRCL and CBP's OPR.GAO analyzed CRCL and OPR data on complaints of potential discrimination in CBP's traveler inspection process received in fiscal years 2017 through 2021 (the most recent available). In particular, GAO analyzed the complaints to describe categories of complaints and types of investigations. For the complaints received and retained by CRCL for investigation, GAO interviewed CRCL officials and reviewed agency documentation to describe any outcomes, such as policy recommendations to CBP documented in memoranda, as well as documentation on CBP's responses to those recommendations. For the complaints received and investigated by OPR, GAO analyzed information on outcomes of each investigation, such as whether the complaint resulted in employee discipline.For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or GamblerR@gao.gov.
- Homeland Security Grants: DHS Implemented National Priority Areas but Could Better Document and Communicate Changes What GAO FoundThe Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) established a process for making changes to its Homeland Security Grant Program National Priority Areas. However, it has not fully documented the rationale and process used for making the changes. Doing so could help DHS improve transparency for how or why these decisions are made and ensure continuity of institutional knowledge about the program.FEMA has hosted webinars and technical assistance calls to provide grantees information on grant applications. But FEMA has not conducted additional targeted outreach, such as the listening sessions it conducted in fiscal year 2021 to solicit suggestions to improve its communication with stakeholders. Doing so would help FEMA better understand and address communication and other challenges stakeholders reported facing with implementing National Priority Area changes. This could also help FEMA better assist grantees with their planning efforts and help allow for the better prioritization of program funds moving forward.Homeland Security Grant Program Funded Bomb Squad VehicleSource: GAO observation of Homeland Security Grant Program funded bomb squat vehicle at the 2023 National Homeland Security Conference. | GAO-24-106327FEMA uses a variety of methods to monitor grantees' projects to ensure they align with National Priority areas. GAO found that grant projects from fiscal year 2020 through 2022 generally aligned with these areas. GAO also found that grantee projects changed over time to reflect associated changes to the National Priority Areas. For example, DHS added domestic violent extremism as a National Priority Area in fiscal year 2021. GAO's analysis of FEMA data found that grantees met required spending thresholds for this area and implemented associated projects.Why GAO Did This StudySince fiscal year 2002, FEMA has awarded over $55 billion in threat preparedness grants to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. One of these grants is the Homeland Security Grant Program. In fiscal year 2020, DHS introduced National Priority Areas to this grant to target funding toward evolving threats. FEMA's process for changing the National Priority Areas consists of soliciting and analyzing information from various sources. FEMA provides potential recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security who makes the changes.GAO was asked to examine how DHS established and makes changes to National Priority Areas. This report examines the extent to which: (1) DHS documented its process for changing the National Priority Areas and communicated changes to stakeholders; and (2) FEMA monitored grantee projects' alignment with the Priority Areas. GAO evaluated agency guidance and fiscal year 2020 through 2022 program data—the most current available—and interviewed FEMA officials. GAO interviewed state and local emergency management officials from 16 grantee jurisdictions selected to reflect a range of funding level and geography.
- Artificial Intelligence in Natural Hazard Modeling: Severe Storms, Hurricanes, Floods, and Wildfires What GAO FoundGAO found that machine learning, a type of artificial intelligence (AI) that uses algorithms to identify patterns in information, is being applied to forecasting models for natural hazards such as severe storms, hurricanes, floods, and wildfires, which can lead to natural disasters. A few machine learning models are used operationally—in routine forecasting—such as one that may improve the warning time for severe storms. Some uses of machine learning are considered close to operational, while others require years of development and testing.GAO identified potential benefits of applying machine learning to this field, including:Reducing the time required to make forecasts by replacing components of models that are slow and that increase the cost of modeling.	Increasing model accuracy by more fully exploiting available data, using other data that traditional models cannot, and creating synthetic data to fill gaps.	Reducing the uncertainty of model output by improving ensemble modeling—the processes of generating combined predictions from numerous models—and making better use of historical data.Forecasting natural disasters using machine learningGAO also identified challenges to the use of machine learning. For example:Data limitations hamper the training of machine learning models and can reduce accuracy in some regions, such as rural areas where weather observations are sparse.	A lack of trust and understanding of the algorithms as well as concerns about bias can make forecasters and other users hesitant to use machine learning models.	Limited coordination and collaboration create challenges for fully developing some machine learning models. For example, some forecasters told us they lack opportunities to interact with researchers and convey their needs.	Workforce and resource gaps also create challenges. For example, the upfront costs to develop and run machine learning models are high, and some companies working on these models do not fully understand the data and phenomena they are modeling, according to academic researchers.GAO identified five policy options that could help address these challenges. These options are intended to inform policymakers, including Congress, federal and state agencies, academic and research institutions, and industry of potential policy implementations. The status quo option illustrates a scenario in which government policymakers take no additional actions beyond current ongoing efforts.Policy Options to Help Address Challenges to the Use of Machine Learning in Natural Hazard ModelingPolicy Option			Opportunities			Considerations		Facilitate improved data collection, sharing, and use (report p. 37).			Government policymakers could expand use of existing observational data and infrastructure to close gaps, expand access to certain data, and (in conjunction with other policymakers) establish guidelines for making data AI-ready.						Efforts to address gaps in data sets can improve machine learning model performance.				&nbsp;Expanded access to existing data would improve the ability of researchers and groups to develop and test machine learning technologies.				Adopting standards for AI-ready data could reduce resources needed to curate data and facilitate more efficient modeling.									Expanding observational infrastructure can be expensive and could divert limited resources from other efforts.				Agencies need to weigh the benefits of greater data sharing against any increase in risks related to data security and privacy.				Strict data standards may slow research and innovation if they burden or constrain machine learning researchers.					Expand education and training (report p. 38).			Government policymakers could update education requirements to include machine learning-related coursework and expand learning and support centers, while academic policymakers could adjust physical science curricula to include more machine learning coursework.						Updating education requirements would better prepare students to use machine learning in government.				More robust education can better prepare both researchers and end users in fields like meteorology and climatology to develop and use machine learning.									Education and training reforms may need to be repeatedly adjusted, as technological change in this space can be rapid and unpredictable.				Establishing and expanding professional development and training opportunities throughout government may require substantial investment.					Address hiring and retention barriers and certain resource shortfalls (report p. 39).			Government policymakers could address pay scale limitations for positions that include machine learning expertise and work with private sector policymakers to expand the use of public-private partnerships (PPP).						Providing workforce incentives to government employees for machine learning development could allow agencies to bolster workforce capacities.				Expanding PPPs might help agencies overcome computational resource shortfalls and help industry draw on government expertise.									Increasing salary limits for some employees would require agency budget increases or cuts to other budget items.				Expanding the use of PPPs could magnify resource disparities between government and private industry.				PPPs that entail hosting government data on collaborator systems may pose security risks that would need to be considered and addressed.					Take steps to mitigate bias and foster trust in data and machine learning models (report p. 40).			Policymakers could establish efforts to better understand and mitigate various forms of bias, support inclusion of diverse stakeholders for machine learning models, and develop guidelines or best practices for reporting methodological choices.						Sustained efforts to address bias in data sets can reduce the likelihood of models negatively affecting certain communities.				Acquiring diverse stakeholder perspectives throughout machine learning models’ life cycles can help reduce certain types of bias in data and models.				Fostering machine learning model transparency could improve end-user and decision-maker trust.									Embedding efforts to address bias throughout the model life cycle may increase model costs and slow model development.					Maintain status quo efforts (report p. 41).			Government policymakers could maintain existing policy efforts and organizational structures, along with existing strategic plans and agency commitments.						Some agency efforts are underway to address the challenges described.									The extent to which agencies will meet their commitments under status quo efforts is unclear. Status quo efforts may not address challenges specific to the use of AI in natural hazard modeling.					Source: GAO. | GAO-24-106213Why GAO Did This StudyNatural disasters cause on average hundreds of deaths and billions of dollars in damage in the U.S. each year. Forecasting natural disasters relies on computer modeling and is important for preparedness and response, which can in turn save lives and protect property. AI is a powerful tool that can automate processes, rapidly analyze massive data sets, enable modelers to gain new insights, and boost efficiency.This report on the use of machine learning in natural hazard modeling discusses (1) the emerging and current use of machine learning for modeling severe storms, hurricanes, floods, and wildfires, and the potential benefits of this use; (2) challenges surrounding the use of machine learning; and (3) policy options to address challenges or enhance benefits of the use of machine learning.GAO reviewed the use of machine learning to model severe storms, hurricanes, floods, and wildfires across development and operational stages; interviewed a range of stakeholder groups, including government, industry, academia, and professional organizations; convened a meeting of experts in conjunction with the National Academies; and reviewed key reports and scientific literature. GAO is identifying policy options in this report.For more information, contact Brian Bothwell at (202) 512-6888 or bothwellb@gao.gov.
- Cybersecurity: Federal Agencies Made Progress, but Need to Fully Implement Incident Response Requirements What GAO FoundFederal agencies rely upon the following for cybersecurity incident response:tools, such as endpoint detection and response solutions;	services, such as threat hunting or cyber threat intelligence provided by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and third party firms; and	resources, such as skilled staff and funding.The 23 civilian Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 agencies have made progress in cybersecurity incident response preparedness by taking steps to standardize their incident response plans and demonstrating improvement in their capabilities for incident detection, analysis, and handling (see table).Executive Order 14028 Cybersecurity Incident Response Requirements and Status of Completion, as of August 2023			Requirement 									Status 								Agencies are to use the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency playbook (issued in November 2021) for planning and conducting cybersecurity vulnerability and incident response activities for agency information systems									Agencies have incorporated or are incorporating the playbook into their plans, and all 23 agencies substantially completed the preparation phase activities.								Agencies are to deploy an endpoint detection and response initiative and work toward ensuring coverage on 80 percent of endpoints									All 23 agencies have begun to deploy an endpoint detection and response solution, and 16 agencies have reported 80 percent or greater coverage.								Agencies are to assess their event logging maturity against the maturity model in the Office of Management and Budget's M-21-31 memorandum, identify gaps associated with completing each of the requirements, and work toward reaching event logging tier 3 by August 2023									Twenty agencies did not reach the maturity level tier 3 by the deadline.					Source: GAO analysis of agency cybersecurity incident response information. | GAO-24-105658However, 20 agencies have not met requirements for investigation and remediation (event logging) capabilities. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) required agencies to reach the advanced (tier 3) level by August 2023. The tier 3 level means that logging requirements at all criticality levels are met. However, as of August 2023, three of the 23 agencies were at tier 3. Of the remaining 20, three were at the basic (tier 1) level and 17 were at the not effective (tier 0) level. Until the agencies implement all event logging requirements, the federal government's ability to fully detect, investigate, and remediate cyber threats will be constrained.Agencies described three key challenges that hindered their abilities to fully prepare to respond to cybersecurity incidents: (1) lack of staff, (2) event logging technical challenges, and (3) limitations in cyber threat information sharing. Federal entities have ongoing efforts that can assist in addressing these challenges. These efforts include onsite cyber incident response assistance from CISA, event logging workshops and guidance, and enhancements to a cyber threat information sharing platform. In addition, there are long-term efforts planned such as implementation of the  National Workforce and Education Strategy  and a new threat intelligence platform offering from CISA, targeted to roll out its first phase to federal departments and agencies in fiscal year 2024.Why GAO Did This StudyCyber-based attacks on federal systems have become more damaging and disruptive. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) requires that agency information security programs include procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. Executive Order (EO) 14028 builds on FISMA and establishes priorities for the federal executive branch to improve efforts to protect against and respond to persistent and malicious cyber campaigns. The EO and OMB and CISA guidance require agencies to address these priorities.GAO's objectives were to (1) describe the capabilities agencies use to prepare for and respond to cybersecurity incidents, (2) evaluate the extent to which agencies have made progress in preparing for cybersecurity incident response, and (3) describe the challenges agencies face in preparing for incident response and the efforts to address them.GAO interviewed officials and reviewed documentation from the 24 CFO Act agencies, CISA, and OMB on their capabilities, progress, and challenges in cybersecurity incident response. GAO analyzed questionnaire responses to evaluate agencies' progress in incident response preparation. The Department of Defense was excluded from some analysis because it was not subject to all requirements.