NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

ELIZABETH P. CORRAL, a.k.a. Elizabeth 

Corral,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-50369

D.C. No. 3:12-cr-01430-WQH

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 15, 2016**

Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Elizabeth P. Corral appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges 

the 10-month custodial sentence and two special conditions of supervised release

imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 21 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-50369

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

Corral contends that, although she was permitted to allocate before 

sentencing, the district court procedurally erred by failing to provide her with an 

opportunity to be heard prior to the court’s decision to revoke. Contrary to Corral’s

contention, the denial of the right of allocution is not error warranting automatic 

reversal. See Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather, 

we review for plain error, see United States v. Waknine, 543 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir.

2008), and find none. In light of the district court’s rejection of Corral’s request for

a low-end custodial sentence and placement in a halfway house, she has not shown a 

reasonable probability that, but for the alleged error, the district court would not 

have revoked supervised release. See id. at 553-54.

Corral next contends that the custodial sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Corral’s

sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The sentence at the 

high-end of the Guidelines range is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including 

Corral’s repeated breaches of the court’s trust. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United 

States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2007). 
3 15-50369

Finally, Corral challenges the special conditions of supervised release 

requiring her to, as directed by probation, (1) reside in a residential reentry center 

for up to 120 days pending placement in a long-term residential drug treatment 

program, and (2) enter and complete a long-term residential drug treatment 

program. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. 

Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008). In light of Corral’s history and 

circumstances, the challenged conditions are reasonably related to rehabilitation

and do not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1), (2); Daniels, 541 F.3d at 924 (“[W]e give considerable 

deference to a district court’s determination of the appropriate supervised release 

conditions.” (internal quotations omitted)). 

AFFIRMED.