FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRYAN BRASWELL, a married 

person but filing in his individual

capacity,

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 09-35974

v. D.C. No. 

SHORELINE FIRE DEPARTMENT,

CV 08-00924-RSM

formerly known as King County OPINION

Fire District No. 4; and GARY

SOMERS,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 16, 2010—Seattle, Washington

Filed September 16, 2010

Before: Susan P. Graber and Richard A. Paez,

Circuit Judges, and Larry A. Burns, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Graber

*The Honorable Larry A. Burns, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of California, sitting by designation. 

14275
COUNSEL

W. Mitchell Cogdill, Cogdill Nichols Rein Wartelle Andrews,

Everett, Washington, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Kara R. Masters, Skellenger Bender, P.S., Seattle, Washington; and Christi C. Goeller and Clarence C. Jones, Jr., Gierke,

Curwen, Dynan & Jones, P.S., Tacoma, Washington, for the

defendants-appellees.

Paul A. Olsen, Assistant City Attorney, Seattle City Attorney’s Office, Seattle, Washington, and Taya Briley, General

Legal Counsel, Washington State Hospital Association, Seattle, Washington, for the amicus curiae.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Bryan Braswell, a firefighter employed by Defendant Shoreline Fire Department (“Shoreline”) who formerly

practiced as a paramedic with Shoreline under Defendant

Gary Somers’ medical license, filed this action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that he had a property interest

in his employment with Shoreline and a liberty interest in pursuing his profession as a paramedic and that Defendants

deprived him of those interests without due process when they

removed him from his paramedic position without providing

adequate notice and a hearing. Plaintiff also alleges that Dr.

14278 BRASWELL v. SHORELINE FIRE DEPARTMENT
Somers tortiously interfered with his employment. The district

court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Reviewing

de novo, Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892,

896 (9th Cir. 2008), we affirm except with respect to the

alleged liberty interest. As to that claim, we reverse and

remand. 

Plaintiff was first employed by Shoreline in 1987 as a firefighter. In 2002, he applied to Shoreline’s paramedic training

program. Plaintiff became certified as a paramedic in 2003.

This certification qualified him to practice as a paramedic.

Wash. Rev. Code § 18.71.200(3). The certificates are valid for

three years, after which time a paramedic must recertify. Id.

§ 18.71.205(2), (3); Wash. Admin. Code § 246-976-141(3).

Washington law provides that, even though an individual is

certified as a paramedic, he or she cannot practice paramedicine except while working under the license and supervision

of a qualified medical doctor. Wash. Rev. Code

§§ 18.71.030(13), 18.71.205(6).

Paramedics employed by Shoreline work under the medical

license of Dr. Somers, a Program Medical Director for King

County Emergency Medical Services who is in charge of the

Shoreline area. Plaintiff worked as a paramedic for Shoreline

from 2003 until December 2005, when the incident occurred

that gave rise to this litigation.

On November 30, 2005, Plaintiff and his paramedic partner

were dispatched to the residence of Tommy Davis, who had

called emergency services complaining of chest pain. As part

of the examination, Plaintiff asked whether Mr. Davis had

used any recreational drugs that evening. Mr. Davis became

agitated. Plaintiff administered a lung exam and instructed

Mr. Davis to breathe deeply. However, Mr. Davis either

would not or could not comply. Plaintiff bent down and spoke

directly into Mr. Davis’ face, instructing him repeatedly to

breathe deeply. After several requests, Mr. Davis became

angry and asked Plaintiff what his problem was. Plaintiff

BRASWELL v. SHORELINE FIRE DEPARTMENT 14279
repeated his instructions and asked Mr. Davis to give him “a

little less attitude.”

The exchange between Plaintiff and Mr. Davis led to a verbal altercation. Mr. Davis stood up and threw a file folder on

a desk so forcefully that papers and objects flew off the desk.

Mr. Davis told the paramedics to leave. Plaintiff asked Mr.

Davis to fill out a release form stating that he did not consent

to treatment. Mr. Davis replied, using profanities, that he

would not sign the form. In the course of the altercation,

Plaintiff asked whether he should call the police, and Mr.

Davis responded that he would give Plaintiff a reason to

throw him in jail. Feeling physically threatened and suspecting that Mr. Davis, who was rummaging through desk drawers, might be looking for a weapon, Plaintiff and his partner

left without treating Mr. Davis or obtaining a release form.

The next day, Plaintiff met with his fire department supervisors and two union representatives to discuss the incident.

Several days later, Plaintiff met with the chief of the fire

department, the deputy chief, and Dr. Somers. Dr. Somers,

after having reviewed written statements from witnesses,

stated that Plaintiff had an anger management problem, that

he failed to identify medically significant symptoms in Mr.

Davis, and that he abandoned Mr. Davis. Dr. Somers told

Plaintiff that Plaintiff was no longer authorized to practice

paramedicine under Dr. Somers’ medical license.

Because Dr. Somers had revoked Plaintiff’s ability to practice under his medical license, Plaintiff could not legally practice paramedicine with Shoreline. See Wash. Rev. Code

§§ 18.71.030(13), 18.71.205(6). For that reason, Shoreline

reassigned Plaintiff from a paramedic position back to a firefighter position. Shoreline froze Plaintiff’s salary at the higher

paramedic level until his firefighter salary caught up to that

level. Plaintiff’s paramedic certification was not revoked, but

it lapsed in 2007 when Plaintiff failed to seek recertification.

14280 BRASWELL v. SHORELINE FIRE DEPARTMENT
Plaintiff brought this action, alleging that Defendants violated his due process rights. The district court dismissed

Plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment after holding that

Plaintiff had neither a property nor a liberty interest in his job

and that, as a matter of law, Dr. Somers did not commit tortious interference. Plaintiff timely appeals.

Plaintiff first argues that, as a certified paramedic, he has

a protected property interest in his employment as a paramedic with Shoreline. Specifically, Plaintiff claims a property

right both in his paramedicine certificate and in the statutorily

required supervision by Dr. Somers. Defendants concede that

a property interest does attach to a professional license, but

they argue that it does not attach to any specific job just

because that job requires a license or certificate.

[1] The United States Supreme Court has defined the

boundaries of a “property interest” in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment: 

To have a property interest in a benefit, a person

clearly must have more than an abstract need or

desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral

expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate

claim of entitlement to it. . . . 

Property interests, of course, are not created by the

Constitution. Rather, they are created and their

dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such

as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement

to those benefits.

Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577

(1972); see also Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1547-48

(9th Cir. 1988). State law creates a “legitimate claim of entitlement” giving rise to a protected property interest if it “imBRASWELL v. SHORELINE FIRE DEPARTMENT 14281
pose[s] ‘significant limitation[s] on the discretion of the

decision maker.’ ” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d

867, 873 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998) (second alteration in original)

(quoting Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.3d 818, 820 (9th Cir.

1984)).

[2] Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Washington law

creates a property interest in the statutorily required supervision by Dr. Somers. Plaintiff points to no Washington statute

or regulation that limits a medical director’s discretion to

revoke a paramedic’s permission to practice under his or her

license. Without such a limit on a medical director’s authority

to revoke a paramedic’s permission to practice, Plaintiff could

not have a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to that permission. 

[3] Plaintiff argues, however, that because he has a property interest in his paramedicine certificate, he also has a

property interest in any position he obtains with that certificate. This does not follow. In support of his argument, Plaintiff cites two Washington Supreme Court cases, Nguyen v.

State, 29 P.3d 689 (Wash. 2001), and Ongom v. State, 148

P.3d 1029 (Wash. 2006), that hold that the state must prove

violations by clear and convincing evidence before revoking

a medical license (Nguyen) or a nursing license (Ongom). We

agree with Defendants’ concession that Washington courts

would treat a paramedicine certification similarly. But neither

case even suggests that the fact that an individual has a protected interest in a paramedicine certification means that he

also has a property interest in a specific paramedic position or

with a specific entity. 

[4] Because Plaintiff’s paramedic certificate did not give

him a protected property interest in his particular employment

as a paramedic with Shoreline, and because we find no state

law that did, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Defendants with regard to that issue.

14282 BRASWELL v. SHORELINE FIRE DEPARTMENT
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants violated his liberty

interest in pursuing his profession as a paramedic when they

revoked his permission to practice in a way that damaged his

reputation, thereby effectively precluding him from ever finding other employment in his field. On this issue, we reverse

the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

[5] A person “has a liberty interest in employment protected by the Due Process Clause” if “the dismissal effectively precludes future work in the individual’s chosen

profession.”1 Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th

Cir. 1987). To establish a violation of such a liberty interest,

Plaintiff must show that his dismissal “destroyed [his] freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities”

and that, because of the dismissal, it is “virtually impossible

for [him] to find new employment in his chosen field.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 998 (9th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Chief Marcus Kragness provided deposition testimony that Plaintiff would not

likely be hired as a paramedic by any other fire department

because of his removal from the Shoreline paramedic position. That testimony raises a triable issue of fact as to whether

Plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of his liberty interest in

pursuing his paramedical career. 

[6] Finally, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Somers tortiously

interfered with his employment relationship with Shoreline by

“failing to provide due process rights and recommending

immediate removal . . . from his [p]aramedic position.” Under

Washington law, to prove tortious interference, one must

1A person’s liberty interest is also implicated if “the dismissal is for reasons that might seriously damage his standing in the community.” Merritt

v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Plaintiff does not allege a deprivation of any liberty interest in

his reputation untethered from his liberty interest in pursuing his profession. 

BRASWELL v. SHORELINE FIRE DEPARTMENT 14283
show: “(1) a business expectancy, (2) knowledge of the relationship, (3) intentional interference which results in the termination of the expectancy, (4) improper purpose or means,

and (5) damage.” Woody v. Stapp, 189 P.3d 807, 811 (Wash.

Ct. App. 2008). The district court rejected Plaintiff’s tortious

interference claim on the ground that no evidence exists that

Dr. Somers acted with an improper purpose in withdrawing

Plaintiff’s privileges. We agree that Plaintiff failed to raise a

triable issue on that element.

[7] Plaintiff points to no evidence, and we find none in the

record, that Dr. Somers had an improper purpose or used

wrongful means. Dr. Somers was charged with ensuring

appropriate care to King County through his oversight of

Shoreline’s paramedics. No evidence suggests that Dr.

Somers had any improper or wrongful motivation for his decision. Thus, we affirm the district court’s holding that Plaintiff’s tortious interference claim fails as a matter of law.

In summary, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether

Plaintiff was deprived of a liberty interest. We therefore

remand that claim for further proceedings.2 As to the remaining claims, we affirm.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and

REMANDED. The parties shall bear their own costs on

appeal.

2We note that the district court concluded only that Plaintiff had no constitutional right and that Dr. Somers did not tortiously interfere with Plaintiff’s employment. It did not consider whether Dr. Somers might be

entitled to qualified immunity on the remaining federal claim on the

ground that the law was not clearly established, nor did the court rule on

other legal issues that the parties raised. Those issues remain open on

remand. 

14284 BRASWELL v. SHORELINE FIRE DEPARTMENT