alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 242

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives respecting waivers

of rules.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 5, 1993

Mr. BUYER (for himself, Mr. FAWELL, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. QUINN, Mr.

ISTOOK, Mr. HUFFINGTON, Mr. HORN, Mr. EVERETT, Mr. HUTCHINSON,

Mr. GREENWOOD, Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland, Mr. PORTMAN, Mr.

CRAPO, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. GRAMS, Mr. TORKILDSEN, Mr. MANZULLO,

Mr. MCINNIS, Mr. MILLER of Florida, Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina, Ms.

PRYCE of Ohio, Mr. MCKEON, Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas, Mr.

CUNNINGHAM, Mr. GOODLATTE, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr.

DOOLITTLE, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. GOSS, Mr. ZIMMER, Mrs.

FOWLER, Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. LINDER, Mr. PETRI, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr.

HERGER, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. GALLEGLY, Mr. RAVENEL,

Mr. RAMSTAD, Mr. BONILLA, Mr. QUILLEN, Mr. BACHUS of Alabama,

Mr. CANADY, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, and Mr. TALENT) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules

RESOLUTION

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives

respecting waivers of rules.

1 Resolved, That clause 4 of rule XI of the Rules of

2 the House of Representatives is amended by adding at the

3 end the following new paragraph:
2

•HRES 242 IH

1 ‘‘(e) The affirmative percentage of those voting that

2 is required to adopt any rule or order reported by the

3 Committee on Rules providing for the consideration of any

4 bill or resolution that waives any rule of the House shall

5 be the same as the affirmative percentage of those voting

6 that is required by the rules of the House to waive that

7 rule.’’.

Æ
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NHUONG VAN NGUYEN,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

JACKSON LUCKY; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 18

- 56400

D.C. No. 5:18

- cv

- 01452

- JGB

- KK

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 19, 2019 **

Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Nhuong Van Nguyen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action arising out of his prior state court divorce proceedings

. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s

dism issal under the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall , 341 F.3d 1148, 1154

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 26 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 56400

(9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Nguyen’s action against defendan t

Judge Lucky and the Riverside County Superior Court for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine because Nguyen ’s action is a

“ forbidden de facto appeal.” Id . at 1163 (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under

Rooker

- Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal

wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment

of that court.”); see also Cooper v. Ramos , 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) ( “To

determine whether an acti on functions as a de facto appeal, [courts] pay close

attention to the relief sought by the federal

- court plaintiff.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Contrary to Nguyen’s contention that he has alleged “fraud upon the court

, ”

the district court properly concluded that Nguyen did not allege facts sufficient to

show that an adverse party committed an extrinsic fraud on the state court. See

Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc ., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140

- 41 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining

extrinsic fraud, and recognizing that the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine does not apply

if extrinsic fraud prevented a party from presenting his or her claim in state court ).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing defendant Miller

because Nguyen voluntarily moved to dismiss Miller under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(a)( 2 ). See Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. , 679 F.2d 143,3 18

- 56400

145 (9th Cir. 1982) (setting forth standard of review); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(a)( 2 ) (explaining that an “action may b e dismissed at the plaintiff ’ s request

. . .

by court order, on terms that the court considers prope r”).

Nguyen’s contention that Federal Rule Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) provides

federal subject matter jurisdiction over this action is unpersuasive.

Nguyen’s motion to vacate the judgment (Docket Entry No. 3 ) is denied.

AFFIRMED.
Verizon North Inc.



EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Verizon North Inc. (the Company) for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), each of the undersigned officers of
the Company certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C., Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:



| | (1) |  | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the
periods presented in the Report.
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       |  | 
|---------------------- |  | 
|Dated: August 12, 2003 |  | 
|                       |  | 





|                       |  | 
|---------------------- |  | 
|                       |  | 
|                       |  | 
|Dated: August 12, 2003 |  | 
|                       |  | 



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to
Verizon North Inc. and will be retained by Verizon North Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EX-10.5





 Exhibit 10.5 

Leo Holdings Corp. II 
 100
Wilshire Boulevard 
 Los Angeles, CA 90401 

January 12, 2021 
 Leo Investors II Limited
Partnership 
 100 Wilshire Boulevard 
 Los Angeles, CA 90401

 Ladies and Gentlemen: 
 This letter will
confirm our agreement that, commencing on the effective date (the “Effective Date”) of the registration statement (the “Registration Statement”) for the initial public offering (the
“IPO”) of the securities of Leo Holdings Corp. II (the “Company”) and continuing until the earlier of (i) the consummation by the Company of an initial business combination or (ii) the
Company’s liquidation (in each case as described in the Registration Statement) (such earlier date hereinafter referred to as the “Termination Date”), Leo Investors II Limited Partnership shall take steps directly or
indirectly to make available to the Company certain office space, secretarial and administrative services as may be required by the Company from time to time, situated at 100 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90401 (or any successor location). In
exchange therefore, the Company shall pay Leo Investors II Limited Partnership or one of its affiliates a sum of $10,000 per month, respectively, on the Effective Date and continuing monthly thereafter until the Termination Date. Leo Investors II
Limited Partnership hereby agrees that it does not have any right, title, interest or claim of any kind in or to any monies that may be set aside in a trust account (the “Trust Account”) that may be established upon the
consummation of the IPO (the “Claim”) and hereby waives any Claim it may have in the future as a result of, or arising out of, any negotiations, contracts or agreements with the Company and will not seek recourse against the
Trust Account for any reason whatsoever. 












 
			
	Very truly yours,
	
	LEO HOLDINGS CORP. II
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Simon Brown

	Name:	 	Simon Brown
	Title:	 	Secretary


  

					
	AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED BY:
	
	LEO INVESTORS II LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
		
	By:	 	Leo Investors GP II Ltd., its general partner
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Simon Brown

	Name:	 	Simon Brown
	Title:	 	Director

 Signature Page to Administrative Services Agreement
Order entered October 10, 2013

In The



## Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 13

- 00224

- CR

SYLVIA RENE WILLIAMS

, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 401

- 81042

- 10



### O RDER

The Court GRANTS appellant’s October 7, 2013 motion to extend time to file her reply

brief. We ORDER the reply brief received on October 1, 2013 filed as of the date of this order.

/s/ DAVID EVANS

JUSTICE
The State of TexasAppellee/s

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 30, 2015

No. 04-14-00252-CR

Philip GARAY,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CR2843

Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding

ORDER

On January 26, 2015, appellant Philip Garay filed a pro se motion to dismiss, seeking to 

dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant also filed a pro se motion 

for leave to file a pro se supplemental brief. Counsel has been appointed to represent appellant

in this criminal appeal, and counsel has submitted a brief on appellant’s behalf. In Texas, 

appellants do not have a right to hybrid representation. Rudd v. State, 616 S.W.2d 623, 625 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Therefore, appellant’s pro se motions are DENIED. We will only 

consider the brief filed by appellant’s counsel.

It is so ORDERED on the 30th day of January, 2015.

PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO: ____________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
258 La. 914

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Clifton Fowler v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 51470.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 7, 1971.

In re: Clifton Fowler applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and habeas corpus.

Writ granted. The sentence imposed on September 29, 1967, in State v. Fowler, No. 7714, is set aside and the district judge is ordered to resentence the defendant in the presence of counsel, either retained or appointed, for him. See State v. Henderson, 257 La. 179, 241 So.2d 762; State v. Austin, 255 La. 108, 229 So.2d 717.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7634

ROBERT J. CAPROOD,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

LAURIE F. BESSINGER, Warden; CHARLES CONDON,

Attorney General of the State of South

Carolina,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District

Judge. (CA-97-295-22BD)

Submitted: May 28, 1998 Decided: June 9, 1998

Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert J. Caprood, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Chief

Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Robert J. Caprood seeks to appeal the district court's order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West

1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

Caprood's motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss

the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Caprood v.

Bessinger, No. CA-97-295-22BD (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 1997). We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 99.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Global DECS Corp. (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Willard G. Weins,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section
1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, That
to the best of my knowledge:

     a)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     b)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


/s/  Willard G. Weins
-----------------------------
     Willard G. Weins
     President


     May 20, 2003
<PAGE>

                                                                EXHIBIT 22.1
                                                               ------------

                     SIGNIFICANT SUBSIDIARIES OF REGISTRANT
                     --------------------------------------



NAME OF SUBSIDIARY                          JURISDICTION OF INCORPORATION
------------------                          -----------------------------

CBT Systems USA, Ltd.                       Delaware
Personal Training Systems, Inc.             California
Fidalco Limited                             Ireland
CBT Systems Limited                         Ireland
CBT Systems UK Limited                      England
CBT Systems Africa (Proprietary) Limited    South Africa
CBT Finance Limited                         Grand Cayman
CBT (Technology) Limited                    Ireland
New Technology Training Limited             Canada
CBT Systems Deutscheland GmbH               Germany
Applied Learning Pty Ltd                    Australia
CBT Systems Benelux, B.V.                   The Netherlands
#### JOHN-DAN CORP., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. NEIL DISTRIBUTORS, INC., d/b/a Neil Beauty Supply Company, Appellee.

No. 72-621.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 8, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Arnold NAYLOR, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 41533.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 28, 1971.

Certiorari dismissed.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.

DEKLE, J., dissents.
### Devany, Dennis (OST) From: Phil Madore [papaphil72@hotmail.com] Sent: ._. Saturday, February 13, 20102:21 PM To: Oevany, Dennis (OST) Subject: Let's petition to keep CapeAir

.... ! ; To Whom it May-Concern: , " ""1'4\' I fully agree with your segment..Cape Air loss a big mistake. Let's start an online petition to oustout our elected officials decision to bring in Colgan Air in favor ofCape Air. I feel like yourarticle stated, had all the facts been revealed such as fewerflights, more expensive airfares and more than likely flight cancellations due to flights not being filled the results would of been very different; I'll sign, as

# I'm sure many more .from the North Country will do the same to reverse this legislature. ThankYou foryour efforts. Phil Madore Hotmail: Trusted email with Microsoft's powerful SPAM protection. Sign up now.

1
CONTACT US

CONFIDENTIALITY FOR ALL

GPO EMPLOYEES

GPO OIG Hotline at (866) 4-GPO-OIG [866-447-6644]

Under GPO Directive 1215.1B, Program to Eliminate

Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in GPO Programs and

Operations, all employees are responsible for:

Reporting as soon as possible to the Inspector

General illegal activity, wrongdoing, waste,

indication of irregularities, or violations of laws,

rules, or regulations in GPO programs or activities.

Cooperating with OIG investigative and/or audit

personnel in investigations, audits, or reviews.

CONFIDENTIALITY AND

MANAGERS

Management officials are responsible for ensuring that

their subordinates cooperate fully with the OIG and that

officials themselves avoid any action that could hinder

employee cooperation.

Management officials should not question employees

about OIG interviews, including details of questions asked,

answers given, or the content of the interviews.

Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–(9)

Management cannot retaliate or threaten to retaliate

against an employee for making a complaint or

disclosing information to the OIG

DID YOU KNOW!

WHY CHOOSE US?

Employees who disclose information to the

OIG do not have to request confidentiality - IT

IS AUTOMATIC!

This confidentiality is provided by the Inspector

General Act (407 of title 5) to encourage employees to

provide complete and candid information to the OIG

and to generally protect the integrity of the OIG

inquiry.

The OIG may disclose an employee’s identity without

consent only in extremely limited circumstances in which

the IG determines that such disclosure is unavoidable

during the course of the investigation or if it is otherwise

required by law.

The GPO OIG hotline is available to all

GPO employees, contractors, and

members of the public who wish to

report allegations of fraud, waste, abuse

of mismanagement within GPO

programs and operations.

What does

Confidentiality

mean for you?

www.gpo.gov/who-we-are/our agency/inspectorgeneral/overview
IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 253

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives on the urgency of

United States ratification of United Nations human-rights treaties.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 21, 1993

Mr. LAFALCE submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives on

the urgency of United States ratification of United Nations human-rights treaties.

Whereas human rights form the basis of the values and principles on which the United States was founded;

Whereas the United States has derived its identity from the

ideal of universal human rights as delineated in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and Bill of

Rights;

Whereas the United States has specifically grounded the

principles of its foreign policy on the fundamental values

of democracy and rights of the person;
2

HRES 253 IH

Whereas the United States has announced the pursuit of

human rights in its bilateral relations with all governments;

Whereas the United Nations World Conference on Human

Rights in Vienna, June 14–25, 1993, reaffirmed the universality of human rights;

Whereas the United States Secretary of State at the United

Nations World Conference on Human Rights publicly

committed the United States to move promptly to obtain

the consent of the Senate for the pending ratification of

the United Nations human-rights treaties;

Whereas the United States is the only Western democracy

that has not ratified four of the human-rights treaties

and thereby is in the company of such human-rights violators as China, Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Paraguay, Sudan, and Syria;

Whereas Presidents Nixon and Carter transmitted four of the

treaties to the Senate in 1973, 1978, and 1980 where

they have languished, and one treaty and two protocols

have received no executive branch action;

Whereas ratification of these treaties may require implementing legislation that would be addressed by the House of

Representatives; and

Whereas it is the expected role of the United States to provide the moral and ethical leadership in the pursuit of

protecting and promoting global human rights: Now,

therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the Congress that

2 the United States ought to ratify expeditiously and with3 out delay the following treaties and protocols:
3

HRES 253 IH

1 (1) International Convention on the Elimination

2 of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

3 (2) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

4 of Discrimination Against Women.

5 (3) American Convention on Human Rights.

6 (4) International Covenant on Economic, Social

7 and Cultural Rights.

8 (5) Convention on the Rights of the Child.

9 (6) Optional Protocol to the International Cov10 enant on Civil and Political Rights.

11 (7) Additional Protocol on Economic, Social

12 and Cultural Rights to the American Convention on

13 Human Rights.

Æ
#### Charles L. MESENBRINK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-698.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 24, 1970.

Hughlan Long, Public Defender, and Louis Kimler, Assitant Public Defender, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

HENDRY, Judge.

The appellant was charged by information for the crime of Possession of Burglary Tools, in violation of § 810.06, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. (1967). He pleaded not guilty, and was found guilty as charged.

The arresting officers initially observed the appellant in a residential neighborhood and concluded that his actions were so suspicious as to justify their further surveillance. Shortly thereafter, the appellant was placed under arrest for vagrancy. He was taken to the police station and fully informed of his constitutional rights. Thereafter, during interrogation, the appellant was asked by the police for his permission to search his apartment. The appellant gave that permission, signing a search waiver which contained his voluntary consent to the search.

The search of the house produced numerous tools, many of which were certainly capable of use as burglary instruments. However, as his main point on appeal, the appellant now contends that the evidence adduced was insufficient to convict him of the crime charged, to-wit: Possession of Burglary Tools. The position taken by the appellant is that since' the applicable statute requires that the person so charged must have the “intent to use or employ or allow the [burglary tools] to be used or employed for [commission of burglary]”, the state failed to demonstrate the felonious intent so required. It is significant that all prior convictions in the state under § 810.06, supra, which have been affirmed on appeal have shown situations wherein the convicted defendant below was in immediate possession of the tools. Eg., Brown v. State, 98 Fla. 871, 124 So. 467 (1929); Fitzgerald v. State, Fla.App.1967, 203 So.2d 511; Estevez v. State, Fla.App.1966, 189 So.2d 830.

It is our opinion that the evidence, i. e., the tools which were seized in the appel*853lant’s apartment, was insufficient to show his intent to feloniously use the tools for criminal purposes. Therefore, we must reverse the judgment of the trial court, and further order that the appellant be discharged from custody which resulted from the charge upon which he was convicted in the instant cause.