UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

)

v. ) No. 16–cr–0072 (KBJ)

)

ANTOINE MILLER, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant Antoine Miller has been charged with one count of Unlawful 

Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Person Convicted of a Crime Punishable 

by Imprisonment for a Term Exceeding One Year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

(See Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 1.)1 Before this Court at present is Miller’s motion to 

suppress the gun and the ammunition that were recovered during his arrest. (See Def.’s 

Mot. to Suppress Physical Evid. (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 7.) Miller contends that he 

was unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when officers in the 

Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Gun Recovery Unit approached him in an 

unmarked vehicle while he was walking down the sidewalk and repeatedly asked him 

whether or not he was carrying a gun. (Id. at 4.)

On October 12, 2016, this Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Miller’s

motion to suppress, during which Officers Matthew Hiller and John Wright of the MPD

 

1 Page-number citations to the documents the parties have filed refer to the page numbers that the 

Court’s electronic filing system automatically assigns. However, page-number citations to the October 

12, 2016 evidentiary hearing transcript refer to the page numbers within that transcript, which was not 

filed in the Court’s electronic filing system.
2

testified to the events surrounding Miller’s arrest. Miller also testified at the 

evidentiary hearing; he provided an account of the events leading up to his arrest that

directly contradicted the testimony of Officers Hiller and Wright. As explained fully 

below, this Court credits the testimony of Officers Hiller and Wright, and as a result, 

concludes that Miller was not seized for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment when the 

officers approached him and asked whether he was carrying a gun. Moreover, under 

binding precedents from the D.C. Circuit, it is clear that a Fourth Amendment seizure 

occurred only when Officer Hiller physically restrained and arrested Miller following 

Miller’s admission that he had a gun, and at that point, Officer Hiller plainly had 

probable cause to justify Miller’s arrest. Accordingly, Miller’s motion to suppress the 

gun and ammunition is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 26, 2016, a grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Columbia indicted Defendant Antoine Miller of one count of being a felon-inpossession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (See generally 

Indictment.) According to the indictment, Miller had “unlawfully and knowingly” 

possessed a .40 caliber semiautomatic Smith & Wesson pistol and .40 caliber 

ammunition on or about March 31, 2016. (Id. at 1.) During the evidentiary hearing that 

this Court held regarding Miller’s motion to suppress, the law enforcement officers who 

were involved in Miller’s arrest testified about the circumstances leading up to their 

discovery of the weapon, and Miller also testified to facts that contradicted the officers’ 

testimony in several respects. The different versions of the events preceding Miller’s 

arrest are as follows.
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A. Arrest-Related Facts Attested To By Officers Hiller And Wright

At approximately 9:53 PM on March 31, 2016, Officer Matthew Hiller, Officer 

John Wright, and Detective Kirk Delpo of the MPD Narcotics and Special Investigation 

Division Gun Recovery Unit were patrolling the Seventh District in the District of 

Columbia. (See Oct. 12, 2016 Suppression Hr’g Tr. (“Hr’g Tr.”), at 13:423, 14:1322; 

Gov’t Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Suppress (“Gov’t Opp’n”), ECF No. 8, at 1.) The Gun 

Recovery Unit, which is tasked with recovering illegal firearms in Washington, D.C., 

had been dispatched to the Seventh District due to recent spikes in violent crime and 

gun activity in that area. (See Hr’g Tr. at 12:2021, 14:1618.) The three officers rode 

in an unmarked gray Ford Explorer, and Officer Wright—to whom the vehicle had been 

assigned—was driving. (See id. at 14:18, 111:1617, 117:811.) Officer Hiller was 

located in the front passenger seat, and Detective Delpo was situated in the back seat. 

(See id. at 14:712, 112:511.) All three officers wore tactical vests bearing the word 

“Police” in white block lettering on the front and back. (See id. at 14:24, 16:1014.) 

Officers Hiller and Wright wore casual attire underneath their tactical vests, while 

Detective Delpo wore an MPD shirt with a badge underneath his vest. (See id. at 

14:24, 45:714.)2

While driving northbound on the 4600 block of Livingston Road, Southeast, the 

officers observed Miller and another individual walking southbound on the sidewalk

while apparently engaged in a conversation. (See id. at 14:1921, 15:1619, 22:1416, 

56:812.) Consistent with his standard practice, Officer Wright slowed the car, pulled 

 

2 Officer Hiller initially testified that all three officers wore casual attire underneath their tactical vests 

(see Hr’g Tr. at 14:24), but he later clarified that Detective Delpo was, in fact, wearing an MPD shirt 

with a badge underneath his tactical vest (see id. at 45:1214).
4

up alongside the two individuals, identified himself as police, and asked the two men if 

they were carrying any firearms. (See id. at 16:2417:10, 113:910, 119:15.) Officer 

Hiller testified that, in response to Officer Wright’s question, Miller replied, “no,” and 

then turned his body away from the police vehicle and lifted the back of his vest jacket 

to reveal his rear waistband. (Id. at 17:1214 (testimony of Officer Hiller); see also id. 

at 18:1421.) The second individual lowered his head and continued walking along the 

sidewalk at a faster pace. (See id. at 17:1416.) 

While still seated in the vehicle, Officer Wright then called out to the second 

individual to ask if he was carrying any firearms. (See id. at 18:2419:1.) According 

to Officer Hiller’s testimony, in response to this question directed at the second 

individual, Miller “turned around almost frantically . . . and showed the back of his 

waistband again,” while repeatedly stating “no.” (Id. at 19:24 (testimony of Officer 

Hiller).) After Miller revealed his rear waistband in this manner, he then continued to 

walk in the direction of the second individual. (See id. at 23:1415.) 

Officer Hiller testified that, based on Miller’s frantic demeanor and “strange” 

mannerisms, as well as the second individual’s avoidant behavior, he and Detective 

Delpo decided to exit the vehicle to speak further with the two men. (Id. at 24:27

(testimony of Officer Hiller); see also id. at 68:47.) Officer Hiller approached Miller, 

while Detective Delpo approached the second individual, who was standing 

approximately 20 feet away from Miller at this point. (See id. at 25:28.) Officer 

Wright remained in the unmarked vehicle. (See id. at 25:914.) 

Upon exiting the vehicle, Officer Hiller walked toward Miller and asked, “Hey

man can I talk to you?” (Gov’t Opp’n at 2; see also Hr’g Tr. at 61:811 (“Q: Okay. 
5

And you said at that point you called out to Mr. Miller saying, Hey, can I talk to you or 

something like that; is that right? A. Correct.”) (testimony of Officer Hiller).) Officer 

Hiller’s firearm was visible in his right hip holster but was not drawn. (See Hr’g Tr. at 

24:810, 61:1222.) In response to Officer Hiller’s question, Miller stopped walking, 

turned around to face Officer Hiller, and began walking toward Officer Hiller with a 

nervous look on his face. (See id. at 24:1819, 25:2324.) Officer Hiller then calmly 

asked, “Hey, man, do you have any firearms on you?” (Id. at 27:1314 (testimony of 

Officer Hiller); see also id. at 24:1112.)

In response to this second question from Officer Hiller, Miller turned away from 

Officer Hiller to face the wrought-iron fence that was beside the sidewalk, and again 

lifted the back of his jacket to reveal his rear waistband. (See id. at 27:1518.) Officer 

Hiller testified that he did not instruct Miller to turn toward the fence in this manner. 

(See id. at 28:1923.) Officer Hiller then asked, “What about the front of your 

waistband?” (Id. at 30:2324 (testimony of Officer Hiller).) In response, Miller 

grasped the wrought iron fence with both hands, and mumbled something that, 

according to Officer Hiller, could not be understood. (See id. at 30:2425, 32:12.) 

Officer Hiller explained that he could not hear Miller, who was still facing away from 

Officer Hiller at this point. (See id. at 32:2021.) Miller again replied by mumbling 

something that Officer Hiller could not understand. (See id. at 32:2324.) Officer 

Hiller then asked Miller to turn around, stating, “We’re both men, we can talk face-toface.” (Id. at 33:1416 (testimony of Officer Hiller).) In response, Miller turned 

around to face Officer Hiller with a “nervous” and “frantic” look on his face. (Id. at 

34:2324 (testimony of Officer Hiller).) While the two men stood face-to-face, Officer 
6

Hiller again asked whether Miller had a gun. (See id. at 34:2435:1.) At this point, 

Miller exclaimed, “I have one[!] I’ve been telling you I have one. Just take it, you can 

have it, you can have it, just take it.” (Id. at 35:24 (testimony of Officer Hiller).) 

Upon hearing Miller’s admission that he had a gun in his possession, Officer 

Hiller immediately placed Miller into a “bear hug,” which is a maneuver whereby the 

officer places his arms under the suspect’s shoulders and around his body in order to 

raise his arms upwards and thereby prevent the suspect from accessing the firearm. (Id. 

at 36:1013, 37:2425.) Officer Hiller then called out a code word to the other 

officers, indicating the presence of a firearm, and Detective Delpo ran over to assist 

Officer Hiller in placing Miller in handcuffs and under arrest. (See id. at 37:57.) 

At this point, Officer Wright—who had been turning the car around in order to 

secure the perimeter during the period in which Officer Hiller and Detective Delpo were 

talking to Miller and his acquaintance—exited the car to assist Officer Hiller and 

Detective Delpo. (See id. at 120:2023, 114:1518.) Once Miller was placed under 

arrest, the three officers called for a crime scene search officer to remove and process 

the firearm that Miller had referenced. (See id. at 53:825.) The crime scene search 

officer arrived approximately five minutes later, and removed a .40 caliber Smith & 

Wesson semi-automatic handgun from Miller’s front waistband. (See id. at 50:1221, 

53:1625.) The handgun magazine was loaded with nine rounds of ammunition. (See 

id. at 50:2225, 51:910.) 

B. Arrest-Related Facts That Miller Asserted During The Hearing

Miller also testified at the evidentiary hearing, and he provided an account of the 

March 31st encounter that differs from that of the officers in five notable respects. 
7

First, Miller testified that, in addition to asking whether he had a firearm, the MPD 

officer specifically asked Miller and his companion an additional question from inside 

the vehicle: “Can we see your waistbands?” (Id. at 75:1976:5.) Miller testified that 

he lifted his jacket to reveal his rear waistband in response to this question. (See id. at

76:56, 100:24101:3.) 

Second, and more fundamentally, Miller testified that Officer Hiller was not the 

officer who approached him on the sidewalk, and in fact, Miller asserted that the entire 

conversation that Officer Hiller recounted in detail while on the stand—testimony that 

Miller heard—actually never occurred. (See id. at 83:2125, 107:22108:11.) Miller 

maintained that it was the two other officers (Officer Wright and Detective Delpo) who 

exited the car and spoke with Miller on the sidewalk prior to his arrest. (See id. at 

77:410, 78:14, 107:89.) In other words, despite the account that Officers Hiller and 

Wright consistently testified to, Miller claimed that not one, but two, MPD officers 

approached him on the sidewalk, and that neither officer was Officer Hiller. (See id. at 

107:1108:11.) Miller explained that he specifically recalled that Officer Wright

approached him because Officer Wright had a distinctive beard. (See id. at 78:24, 

80:19, 81: 521.) 

The third key difference between Miller’s testimony and the officers’ testimony 

was the manner in which Miller characterized the initial statement that one of the 

officers made to him upon exiting the vehicle. Miller testified that when the two 

officers exited the unmarked vehicle and approached him, one officer said, “You two, 

hold up for a second[,]” or “You two stop for a second, hold up for a second[,]” rather 

than “Hey man can I talk to you?” (Id. at 102:24103:1, 106:89.) Miller did not 
8

specify which officer allegedly made this statement. (See id. at 102:2425.) Miller

also testified that Officer Wright and Detective Delpo ordered him to turn toward the 

fence and to place his hands on the fence (see id. at 78:613, 79:1213), and that he 

took both actions in compliance with the officers’ express orders (see id. at 78:68, 

79:1213). 

Finally, Miller claimed that, when his hands were up against the fence, Officer 

Wright stated, “Before I search you, do you want to come clean about having something 

on you?” (Id. at 79:1720, 82:1318.) Miller testified that he admitted that he was 

carrying a firearm because he “figured that they [were] already going to search [him] 

anyway and they had [him] surrounded against the fence.” (Id. at 82:1318.) 

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

As outlined above, at the Court’s evidentiary hearing, the witnesses for the 

prosecution and the defense provided directly conflicting accounts of the events of 

March 31, 2016. This Court has considered the testimony and demeanor of all of the 

witnesses, and it accepts the testimony of Officers Hiller and Wright because it finds 

that their account of the events pertaining to Miller’s arrest is most credible. 

Several factors undercut Miller’s story. As noted previously, Miller testified that 

the conversation Officer Hiller recounted never occurred and that, in fact, Miller only

spoke with Officer Wright and Detective Delpo. (See id. at 83:1925.) But Officer 

Hiller provided a detailed account of how he contacted Miller on the sidewalk, and in so 

doing, he exhibited a high degree of recall regarding this conversation. (See, e.g., id. at 

33:1516 (“I actually said something to th[e] effect [of,] ‘We’re both men, we can talk 

face-to-face.’”).) Moreover, this Court believes Officer Hiller’s credible testimony
9

regarding the events leading up to the dramatic culmination of this sidewalk

encounter—whereby Officer Hiller wrapped Miller in a “chest-to-chest” bear hug 

following Miller’s admission that he was carrying a firearm (id. at 37:1923)—and, 

thus, it is difficult for the Court to credit Miller’s assertion that Officer Hiller was 

entirely uninvolved in Miller’s arrest. 

What is more, Officer Hiller’s account of what happened was corroborated by 

Officer Wright, who was not present in the courtroom when Officer Hiller or Miller 

testified. Officer Wright explained that, after the initial inquiry, he remained in the 

vehicle and observed Officer Hiller talking to Miller. (See id. at 114:18.) Officer 

Wright also explained that the Ford Explorer was his assigned vehicle and that he drives 

it the “overwhelming majority of the time” when he is partnered with Officer Hiller, 

lending further support to Officers Hiller and Wright’s testimony that Officer Wright 

remained in the vehicle during the encounter. (Id. at 117:1618 (testimony of Officer 

Wright); see also id. 117:811.) Officer Wright’s Gerstein affidavit further 

corroborates the account that Officers Hiller and Wright provided during the hearing; it

details the encounter in a manner that is substantially similar to the officers’ live 

testimony. (See Gerstein Aff. of John Wright, Ex. 13 to Gov’t Opp’n, at 1.)3 Finally, 

this Court can conceive of no reason why Officers Hiller and Wright would fabricate 

their account in the way that Miller suggests; as far as this Court can tell, it makes no

difference whether the contact was made by Officer Hiller alone, or Officer Wright and 

Detective Delpo together, and thus, the officers simply had no motivation to 

 

3 A Gerstein affidavit is an arresting officer’s sworn statement that is prepared at or near the time of an 

arrest and that states that probable cause exists to believe that a crime was committed and that the 

person identified in the statement is the one who committed it. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 

120, 124 n.25 (1975). 
10

misrepresent the identity of the officer who approached and arrested Miller. Cf. 

Jackson v. United States, 353 F.2d 862, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (explaining that the court

properly considers “whether the witness was interested in the outcome” when assessing 

credibility); Wierzbicki v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1024 (D.S.D. 2014) (“In 

evaluating the credibility of a witness, a court considers . . . any motives that witness 

may have for testifying a certain way.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

In short, based on the credible and detailed testimony that the officers presented,

the consistencies between Officers Hiller and Wright’s testimony and the Gerstein

affidavit, and also the absence of any motive for Officers Hiller and Wright to fabricate 

their accounts, this Court credits Officers Hiller and Wright’s testimony regarding the 

circumstances leading up to Miller’s arrest, and does not accept Miller’s conflicting 

account of those same events. 

III. ANALYSIS

Having found (for the purpose of evaluating Miller’s motion to suppress) that the 

facts are as Officers Wright and Hiller described them during the hearing, this Court 

now turns to evaluate Miller’s contention that he was unlawfully seized in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment, and thus, that the gun and ammunition that he was carrying on 

his person when the officers arrested him should be suppressed. As expla ined below, 

Miller was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes until he was physically 

restrained, and at the time of this seizure, Officer Hiller had probable cause to believe 

that Miller was committing a crime. Consequently, there was no Fourth Amendment 

violation.
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A. Legal Standard

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their 

persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. As a 

result of this guarantee, “all seizures” must “be founded upon reasonable, objective 

justification.” United States v. Gross, 784 F.3d 784, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation 

omitted), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 247 (2015). It is clear beyond cavil, however, that

“not all interactions between police officers and citizens amount to a ‘seizure’ for 

Fourth Amendment purposes.” Id. Consensual encounters plainly fall outside the scope 

of the Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); Florida v. 

Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 56 (1984). A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs only “when 

physical force is used to restrain movement or when a person submits to an officer’s 

‘show of authority.’” United States v. Brodie, 742 F.3d 1058, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)). The threshold task of the 

Court, then, is to determine when, if at all, a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred. 

No seizure will have taken place unless a “reasonable person in view of all the 

circumstances surrounding the incident, . . . would have believed that he was not free to 

leave.” United States v. Castle, 825 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting United States v. Wood, 981 F.2d 536, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); see also 

Gross, 784 F.3d at 787 (“That ‘reasonable person’ test asks, ‘not . . . what the defendant 

himself . . . thought, but what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have 

thought had he been in the defendant’s shoes.’” (quoting United States v. Goddard, 491 

F.3d 457, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (per curiam))). Courts have concluded that “[e]xamples

of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to 
12

leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by 

an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use o f language or 

tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” 

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.); see also 

Goddard, 491 F.3d at 460 (“[W]e [also] consider the demeanor of the approaching 

officer, whether the officer . . . wore a uniform, and the time and place of the 

encounter.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Significantly for present purposes, it is by now well established that “[l]aw 

enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of

unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public 

places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen.” United States v. 

Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002); see also id. at 201 (“Even when law enforcement 

officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, 

ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage.” (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. 

at 434)); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion); United States 

v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 129798 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Such questioning rises to the level 

of a Fourth Amendment seizure only when the officers “‘convey a message that 

compliance with their requests is required[,]’” Gross, 784 F.3d at 787 (quoting Bostick, 

501 U.S. at 435), or otherwise “induce cooperation by coercive means[,]” Drayton, 536 

U.S. at 201. See also Castle, 825 F.3d at 633. The Supreme Court has also made clear 

that, “[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, 

and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the 

consensual nature of the response.” Drayton, 536 U.S. at 205 (internal quotation marks 
13

and citation omitted). 

Once an encounter loses its consensual nature, it becomes a seizure for Fourth 

Amendment purposes, and must “be founded upon reasonable, objective justification.” 

Gross, 784 F.3d at 786 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 

(1975)). The justification that is required depends upon the character of the policecitizen interaction at issue. Generally, Fourth Amendment seizures must be supported 

by probable cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 20809 (1979); see also 

id. at 208, n.9 (“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within . . . [the 

officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] 

sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief th at an 

offense has been or is being committed [by the person to be arrested].” ( alterations in 

original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). However, in Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception to the probable 

cause requirement, permitting officers to justify a “brief, investigatory stop” by 

providing “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Thus, once a court has concluded that a seizure 

has occurred, in order to decide whether or not that seizure violated the Fourth 

Amendment, the court must identify the “rubric of police conduct” at issue, and then 

determine whether the officers have provided the requisite justification fo r that conduct. 

Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209. 

Finally, as a general matter and subject to certain exceptions not implicated here , 

“[w]hen the government conducts an unconstitutional search or seizure, the Court must 

exclude any evidence obtained as the ‘fruit’ of that search or seizure.” United States v. 
14

Sheffield, 799 F. Supp. 2d 22, 28 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 

U.S. 471, 484 (1963)). “The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of 

establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged 

search or seizure.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.1 (1978). However, “[w]hen 

a defendant establishes that he was arrested or subjected to a search without a warrant, 

the burden then shifts to the government to justify the warrantless search.” United 

States v. Williams, 878 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197 (D.D.C. 2012); see also United States v. 

Jones, 374 F. Supp. 2d 143, 147 (D.D.C. 2005) (“The government bears the burden of 

justifying this warrantless seizure.”); 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A 

Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 11.2(b) (5th ed. 2012) (“[I]f the search or seizure 

was pursuant to a warrant, the defendant has the burden of proof; but if the police acted 

without a warrant[,] the burden of proof is on the prosecution.”). 

B. Discussion

Miller raises two alternative arguments in support of his motion to suppress: (1)

that the officers subjected him to a show of authority (i.e., they seized him) when they 

initiated contact with him from inside their vehicle, or, alternatively, (2) that Officer 

Hiller subjected Miller to a show of authority when Officer Hiller exited the vehicle and 

made further contact with Miller. (See Hr’g Tr. at 9:2425, 138:1116; Def.’s Mot. at 

45.) For the reasons explained below, no seizure occurred at either of those points in 

time and, indeed, a cognizable Fourth Amendment seizure occurred only when Officer 

Hiller physically restrained Miller following Miller’s admission that he had a gun, at 

which point there was ample probable cause to justify that seizure and Miller’s 

subsequent arrest. 
15

1. Miller Was Not Seized When The Officers Called Out To Him From 

Inside Their Unmarked Vehicle To Ask If He Was Carrying A Gun

In order to determine whether the police subjected Miller to a show of authority

that qualifies as a seizure for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the Court must 

determine if, “‘in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable 

person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’” Wood, 981 F.2d at 539 

(quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). Miller contends that a reasonable person in his 

situation would not have felt free to leave once the officers called out to him from their 

unmarked vehicle, because there were multiple armed officers wearing tactical vests 

marked “police,” and the officers repeatedly asked whether Miller had a gun. (See 

Def.’s Mot. at 45; Hr’g Tr. at 139:615.) But given the current state of the law in this 

Circuit, Miller is mistaken to maintain that these circumstances constitute a Fourth 

Amendment seizure.

A recent D.C. Circuit case, United States v. Gross, 784 F.3d 784 (D.C. Cir. 

2015), is particularly informative. In Gross, the Circuit evaluated a Fourth Amendment 

suppression motion in a case involving four Gun Recovery Unit officers wearing 

tactical vests who drove up beside the defendant as he was walking along the sidewalk.

See id. at 785. One officer spoke to the defendant “from [inside] the police car,” and

“asked if [the defendant] was carrying a gun and would expose his waistband.” Id. at

787. The D.C. Circuit considered—and specifically rejected—all of the arguments that 

Miller now raises in support of his first seizure argument, and concluded that no seizure 

occurred. Specifically, the Gross panel made clear that, while certainly probative of the 

issue of whether the individual was subjected to a show of authority, “‘the presence of 

multiple officers’ wearing ‘[police] gear, including guns and handcuffs,’ does not 
16

‘automatically mean that a stop has occurred.’” Id. at 787 (alteration in original)

(quoting Goddard, 491 F.3d at 461). And the D.C. Circuit emphasized that, “[a]lthough 

the presence of a police car might be somewhat intimidating, the act of approaching a 

person in a police car does not constitute a seizure where the officers [do] not use their 

siren or flashers, [do] not command the [person] to stop, [do] not display their weapons, 

and [do] not drive aggressively to block or control the [person’s] movement.” Id. at 

788 (first alteration added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also id. 

at 787 (explaining that the circumstances were “less suggestive of a seizure” because

“all four officers remained in a car separated from [the defendant] by one lane of traffic 

during [the officer’s] questioning”).

In the instant case, according to the testimony of Officers Hiller and Wright, all 

three officers remained in their unmarked Ford Explorer while Officer Wright called out

to Miller from the rolled-down car window to ask if Miller had a gun. (See Hr’g Tr. at 

16:24–17:6, 113:912.) As in Gross, “while the officers carried weapons, there is no 

indication that the weapons were visible to [the defendant] from the sidewalk.” Gross, 

784 F.3d at 787. In fact, Officer Hiller specifically testified that none of the officers

had their weapons out while inside the car, and that his firearm was located on his right 

hip. (See Hr’g Tr. at 23:36, 61:1221). Moreover, Miller never indicated that he was 

able to see the officers’ firearms while they addressed him from inside their vehicle. 

There is likewise no evidence to suggest that Officer Wright positioned the vehicle so 

as to block or otherwise limit Miller’s freedom of movement on the sidewalk. Thus, 

this Court concludes that the three MPD officers in tactical vests did not subject Miller 
17

to a show of authority merely by pulling their unmarked car alongside Miller while he 

was walking down the sidewalk.

The officers’ questioning of Miller from inside the vehicle similarly did not 

convert the encounter into a seizure. Although “the nature of a police officer’s 

question[s] can bear on whether a person has been seized[,] [q]uestions alone . . . 

ordinarily do not amount to a ‘show of authority’ sufficient to constitute a seizure.” 

Gross, 784 F.3d at 788 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also id.

(acknowledging that “direct accusations of criminal conduct by officers have weighed 

in favor of finding a seizure” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). As noted 

previously, Officers Hiller and Wright both testified that Officer Wright called out to 

Miller from inside the car and asked if Miller was carrying a gun. (See Hr’g Tr. at 

16:2417:10, 67:1013, 113:914.) The Gross Court analyzed substantially similar 

officer questioning, see 784 F.3d at 788 (“Do you have a gun?”, “Can I see your 

waistband?”), and concluded that the Gun Recovery Unit officers “did not accuse [the 

defendant] of possessing a gun or committing a crime[,]” and that the officer’s

questions “did not effect a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment[,]” id. at 788. 

This Court finds that the factual circumstances Miller emphasizes are materially 

indistinguishable from those in Gross, and that Gross compels the conclusion that no 

seizure occurred when the officers initiated contact with Miller from inside their 

vehicle. 

2. Miller Was Not Seized When Officer Hiller Exited The Vehicle And 

Asked To Speak With Miller

Miller alternatively contends that the encounter progressed into a seizure when

Officer Hiller, who was armed with a gun in his hip holster, exited the vehicle and 
18

approached Miller, and when he again asked Miller whether he was carrying a gun. 

(See Hr’g Tr. 138:1116, 141:12142:19; Def.’s Mot. at 45.)4 The issue of whether a 

seizure occurred at that point in the encounter presents a closer question, but this Court 

concludes that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred when Officer Hiller exited the 

vehicle and asked to speak further with Miller for the following reasons. 

First, Officer Hiller’s approach did not constitute a show of authority in and of 

itself, because “[t]he approach and direction of a question by a police officer cannot be, 

as a matter of fact or of law, a seizure of the person so approached.” Gomez v. Turner, 

672 F.2d 134, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Rather, “[t]here must be some additional conduct 

by the officer to overcome the presumption that a reasonable person is willing to 

cooperate with a law enforcement officer.” Id. Officer Hiller credibly testified that he 

exited the vehicle, approached Miller on the sidewalk, and asked something to the 

effect of, “Hey man can I talk to you?” (Gov’t Opp’n at 2; see also Hr’g Tr. at 61:811

(testimony of Officer Hiller).) Officer Hiller further testified that he made this request

in a calm, conversational tone. (See Hr’g Tr. at 24:1112, 24:2021.) In responding to 

Officer Hiller’s question, Miller halted his journey in the opposite direction, turned

around, and walked toward Officer Hiller (see id. at 24:1819), which also indicates 

willing cooperation on Miller’s part. Thus, Officer Hiller did not seize Miller for 

Fourth Amendment purposes merely by exiting the vehicle and approaching him with a 

question.

 

4 As explained above, during the hearing, Miller testified that it was Officer Wright and Detective 

Delpo—not Officer Hiller—who approached him in this manner. (See Hr’g Tr. at 77:410, 78:14,

107:89.) However, this Court has already decided to credit the officers’ testimony regarding the 

identity of the officer who exited the vehicle and spoke directly to Miller, and, in any event, this 

discrepancy has no bearing on the Court’s legal analysis.
19

Nor did Officer Hiller seize Miller when Officer Hiller posed further questions

while they were both standing on the sidewalk. The Supreme Court has “held 

repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.” Bostick, 501 

U.S. at 434; see also id. at 43435 (“[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting 

a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual.”). As 

explained, it is well established that police officers may freely pose questions, so long 

as they do not “convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.” Id.

at 435. This means that the officer’s tone and statements might convey a message that 

rises to the level of a seizure. See, e.g., Castle, 825 F.3d at 633 (finding seizure where 

an officer instructed the defendant to remove his hands from his pockets and to “hold 

on,” while blocking the defendant’s path); Wood, 981 F.2d at 540 (finding seizure 

where a uniformed officer, blocking the defendant’s path, ordered the defendant to “halt 

right there” and “stop”); United States v. Jones, 142 F. Supp. 3d 49, 54, 59 (D.D.C. 

2015) (finding seizure where Gun Recovery Unit officers exited their vehicle and 

attempted to keep the defendant from departing by stating, “I need to talk to you for a 

second, you need to stop”). However, here, no seizure occurred at the point in which

Officer Hiller posed additional questions to Miller, because Officer Hiller did not 

suggest that Miller was required to answer. 

Rather, Officer Hiller credibly testified that his investigatory questions were 

limited to inquiries such as: “Hey man can I talk to you?”; “Hey, man, do you have any 

firearms on you?”; “What about the front of your waistband?”; and other, similar

requests related to the potential presence of firearms. (Hr’g Tr. at 27:1314, 30:2324, 

61:811; Gov’t Opp’n at 2.) Furthermore, when Miller turned away and Officer Hiller 
20

was unable to understand Miller’s responses, Officer Hiller asked Miller to turn back

towards him in a respectful manner, stating, “We’re both men, we can talk face-toface.” (Hr’g Tr. at 33:16 (testimony of Officer Hiller); see also id. at 33:1416.) 

Officer Hiller testified that his tone of voice remained calm throughout the encounter, 

and unlike the officers in the Castle or Wood cases, Officer Hiller never made any 

threatening commands, and credibly characterized the entire encounter as a mere 

conversation. (See id. at 33:2022, 34:6); cf. Castle, 825 F.3d at 633; Wood, 981 F.2d 

at 540. This Court is persuaded that the circumstances described were such that a 

reasonable person in Miller’s position would have believed he was free to leave up until 

the point when Miller admitted he had a firearm (see Hr’g Tr. at 35:2125, 51:1722), 

and, therefore, in this Court’s view, no seizure occurred at that point in the encounter, 

see Lewis, 921 F.2d at 1297.

5

 

Notably, the fact that Officer Hiller was armed throughout his conversation with 

Miller does not, without more, alter this Court’s conclusion. See Goddard, 491 F.3d at 

461 (“[T]he fact that . . . officers [wear police] gear, including guns and handcuffs, 

does not mean that a stop occurred.”); see also id. at 46162 (concluding no seizure 

occurred when four officers “jump[ed]” out of their police car and approached the 

defendants while wearing police gear and carrying guns); United States v. Lloyd, 868 

F.2d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding no seizure occurred when one officer

 

5 Although Miller’s account of the interaction—which featured one officer purportedly ordering Miller 

to “hold up for a second[,]” followed by Officer Wright and Detective Delpo “surround[ing]” Miller 

near the fence (Hr’g Tr. at 82:14, 106:9)—bears similarities to the circumstances that supported a 

seizure in the Castle, Wood, and Jones cases, this Court has declined to credit Miller’s testimony, and 

thus, it need not determine whether a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred under Miller’s version of 

events. Cf. Castle, 825 F.3d at 633; Wood, 981 F.2d at 540; Jones, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 54, 59.
21

“dressed in plain clothes” “politely asked [the defendant] a series of questions,” and 

“neither made threats nor brandished weapons”). Officer Hiller credibly testified that 

he calmly approached Miller, and that his firearm was not brandished at any point

during the encounter, despite the fact that it was visible in his hip holster. (See Hr’g Tr. 

at 23:36, 24:812, 61:1218.) In short, there is no indication that Officer Hiller took

any actions—with his firearm or otherwise—that were designed to threaten or 

intimidate Miller. Consequently, the Court confidently concludes that no seizure 

occurred when Officer Hiller exited his vehicle and asked to speak further with Miller.

6

3. Miller Was Seized When Officer Hiller Physically Restrained Him To 

Effectuate His Arrest; However, At That Point, Officer Hiller Had 

Probable Cause For The Seizure Based On Miller’s Admission That He 

Was Carrying A Gun

It is axiomatic that a “‘Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a 

governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally 

applied.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (alterations in original) (quoting 

 

6 The Court’s conclusion that there was no seizure at this point in Miller’s encounter with the police not 

only disposes of Miller’s argument that physical evidence (the gun itself) should be suppressed, but 

also addresses the argument Miller’s counsel made during the hearing regarding suppression of the prearrest statements that Miller made in response to the officers’ repeated inquiries regarding the presence 

of guns. (See Hr’g Tr. at 9:1416.) Defense counsel argued that, just as Miller was “seized” by the 

officers’ repeated inquiries about guns, so too was Miller in “custody” for Miranda purposes when the 

officers questioned Miller in this manner. (See id. at 9:210:4.) Courts employ discrete analyses when 

assessing whether a defendant was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, or was “in 

custody” for the purposes of Miranda; however, these analyses are fundamentally similar. See, e.g., 

Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (“The ultimate ‘in custody’ determination for Miranda

purposes” requires courts to employ an objective standard that focuses on whether “a reasonable 

person” in the suspect’s position would “have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the 

interrogation and leave”); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (per curiam); United 

States v. Richardson, 36 F. Supp. 3d 120, 12627 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[W]hen determining whether a 

suspect is in ‘custody’ within the meaning of Miranda, courts have considered circumstances including 

the location and length of the encounter, the number of officers and citizens present, whether the police 

entered the location by force, whether the officers’ weapons were visible or drawn, whether officers 

were present throughout the encounter, whether the suspect was handcuffed, and the tone and demeanor 

of the officers and the suspect.” (citations omitted)). Thus, because this Court concludes that Miller 

was not “seized” when he responded to the officers’ questions for the reasons explained above, this 

Court likewise concludes Miller was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes, and accordingly denies 

Miller’s motion to suppress his pre-arrest statements. 
22

Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989)); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 

471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (“It must be recognized that whenever a 

police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 

‘seized’ that person.”). 

Officer Hiller’s actions following Miller’s admission that he was carrying a gun 

easily fit this well-established seizure definition. Officer Hiller credibly testified that, 

upon hearing Miller’s admission that he was carrying a gun, Officer Hiller immediately 

placed Miller in a chest-to-chest bear hug—a maneuver whereby Officer Hiller placed 

his arms under Miller’s shoulders and around Miller’s body in order to raise Miller’s 

arms upward and to prevent Miller from accessing any firearm. (See Hr’g Tr. at 

36:1013, 37:2425.) Officer Hiller acknowledged that he physically restrained Miller 

in this manner in order to “make sure that we [could] place [Miller] under arrest 

without anybody getting hurt.” (Id. at 37:13 (testimony of Officer Hiller).) There can 

be little doubt that Officer Hiller’s act—which was plainly designed to restrain Miller’s 

freedom of movement while Officer Hiller effectuated the arrest—constituted a Fourth 

Amendment seizure. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. 

Furthermore, with respect to the issue of whether the government has established 

the necessary justification for that warrantless seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, 

this Court finds that, at the moment Officer Hiller physically restrained Miller, Officer 

Hiller had the requisite probable cause to justify the arrest. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 

543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense 

has been or is being committed.”). It is well established that “[p]robable cause exists 
23

where ‘the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officer’s] knowledge and of 

which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to 

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being 

committed.” Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (fourth alteration in 

original) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). And when 

Officer Hiller wrapped Miller in a bear hug, Officer Hiller had knowledge of the 

following facts: (i) Miller appeared nervous and frantic throughout the encounter; (ii) 

Miller had repeatedly shifted his body away from the officers in an effort to conceal the 

front portion of his waistband; (iii) similar efforts by individuals to conceal their

waistband while communicating with the police had been a means of concealing the 

presence of a firearm7; and (iv) Miller expressly admitted that he was carrying a 

firearm. (See Hr’g Tr. at 18:1421, 19:24, 24:27, 34:2335:4, 68:413, 71:216.) 

The Court concludes that, under the circumstances presented here, these facts were 

sufficient to justify Officer Hiller’s belief that Miller was committing a criminal 

offense when Officer Hiller seized him, and as a result, Miller’s seizure was not an 

unlawful violation of the Fourth Amendment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Up until the moment that Officer Hiller physically restrained Miller, the 

encounter between Miller and the MPD officers (as the government has credibly 

described it) was a consensual interaction that does not warrant Fourth Amendment 

scrutiny. No Fourth Amendment seizure occurred until Officer Hiller wrapped Miller in 

a bear hug and, at that point in time, Officer Hiller had probable cause to justify 

 

7 Officer Hiller testified that he knew this from his own experience. (See Hr’g Tr. at 68:413, 

71:216.)
24

Miller’s arrest, as explained above. Accordingly, and as set forth in the order 

accompanying this opinion, Miller’s motion to suppress physical evidence is DENIED. 

DATE: November 11, 2016 Ketanji Brown Jackson

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON

United States District Judge