alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### JACOB DAISEY et al vs. HENRY HUDSON.

Trespass to real property lies only by a party in actual possession.

This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit.

The plaintiffs were the children and heirs-at-law of Abraham Daisey, who died leaving a widow in possession of the land, and several children, the plaintiffs, of whom one of them, Susan, came in September, 1848, to live with her mother; in the dwelling house which was on the premises. Abraham Daizey died after January, 1848; the widow rented the land to Henry Hudson, for one year; cultivated it herself the second, and rented it out to another person the third year. The trespass complained of, was moving a fence in April of the year when Hudson tilled the farm, under rent from the widow; she being in the house. The question was, whether plaintiffs could recover in this action ; the defendant insisting that being out of possession, plaintiffs could not maintain trespass. (1 *Harr. Rep.,*335; 9 *Johns. Rep.,*60-1; 1 *Ibid,*510; 19 *Wend. Rep.,*507.)

*Mr. Layton,*contra,

argued that the law of descents cast upon the heirs such a possession as would enable them to maintain tres*321pass for injuries to the land, and that the possession of the widow, or at least, the possession of the widow and one heir, was possession of all. (2 *Phill.,*132 ; 11 *Mass. Rep.,*519; 6 *Bac. Ab.,*593 ; *Roscoe,*380; 4 *Barn. & Cress.,*583; 4 *Harr. Rep.,*345.)

*Layton,*for plaintiff.

*Cullen,*for defendant.

*Chief Justice*Booth charged the jury:—that the action being for a trespass to real property, it could be maintained only by a person in the actual and immediate possession of the premises at the time the trespass was committed. The action is for an injury to the possession; and the form of remedy is not merely arbitrary, but necessarily arising from the nature of the injury.

Verdict for defendant.
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           79,266,721
<SECURITIES>                                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    14,227,820
<ALLOWANCES>                                      3,429,973
<INVENTORY>                                               0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 94,130,089
<PP&E>                                            4,829,916
<DEPRECIATION>                                    2,349,874
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  110,880,977
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           110,883,608
<BONDS>                                          35,294,406
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                377,406,231
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   378,768,857
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 74,046,687
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  2,791,996
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                1,881,573
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (80,082,882)
<INCOME-TAX>                                          2,139
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (80,085,021)
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<NET-INCOME>                                    (80,085,021)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                         (9.18)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         (9.18)
                                               


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Exhibit 32









CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the annual report on Form 10-Q of Florida Public Utilities Company (the "Company") for the period ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Form 10-Q"), we, John T. English, Chief Executive Officer and George M. Bachman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, to the best of our knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)

The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/John T. English

John T. English

Chief Executive Officer

May 14, 2008





/s/George M. Bachman

George M. Bachman

Chief Financial Officer

May 14, 2008
#### Helen Ross PINK, Appellant, v. George Leonard PINK, Appellee.

No. 71-715.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 13, 1971.

Rehearing- Denied Jan. 18, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1998
<CASH>                                       8,081,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,582,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   536,000
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            12,502,000
<PP&E>                                       4,873,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,906,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              20,905,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       12,038,000
<BONDS>                                      2,580,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        83,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,225,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                20,905,000
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,712,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             8,909,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               136,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,939,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   721,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,218,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,218,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .16
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .14
        

</TABLE>
#### FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES, Relator, v. The Honorable George L. PATTEN as Circuit Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit In and For Bradford County, Respondent.

No. T-149.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 10, 1973.

Mary W. Clark, Tallahassee, for relator.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Relator has instituted an action entitled “Suggestion for Writ of Prohibition”.

Relator alleges that the respondent Circuit Judge has entered a “special judicial order” authorizing the Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of Bradford County to make the determination of whether a juvenile shall be detained in cases involving special circumstances and an offense the gravity of which would make it inimical to the interest of the child and the public for said child to remain at large for a period of not more than 48 hours without a court order.

Relator contends that the respondent has no jurisdiction to enter such an order, contending that under Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Rule 8.040, the decision of whether a child should be detained is vested exclusively with the intake officer. A reading of the rule however reflects that it *321contemplates special judicial orders may be entered providing that such decisions may be made by one other than the intake officer.

It is clear, therefore, that under appropriate circumstances Juvenile Procedure Rule 8.040 contemplates that a court of competent jurisdiction may provide for detention decisions to be made by other than the intake officer. We have no knowledge as to the circumstances underlying the order sought to be assailed by the instant proceeding and thus make no judgment as to its correctness. Nor can we do so, since it is not the office of an action in prohibition to test the correctness of orders rendered by a trial court where such orders are within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Accordingly, the suggestion for writ of prohibition not having stated a prima facie case, the same must be and is hereby denied.

SPECTÓR, C. J., and WIGGINTON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
H. Res. 182

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

May 25, 1993.

Resolved, That the election contest of Bill McCuen, contestant, against Jay Dickey, contestee, relating to the office

of Representative from the Fourth Congressional District of

Arkansas, is dismissed.

Attest:

Clerk.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q
QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                         711,215
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               10,172,113
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                 24,904,371
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            36,061,898
<PP&E>                                      19,567,822
<DEPRECIATION>                              11,646,488
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              44,569,646
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       11,992,474
<BONDS>                                      4,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     7,188,213
<OTHER-SE>                                  20,914,399
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                44,569,646
<SALES>                                     29,397,118
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            29,397,118
<CGS>                                       27,117,844
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               28,213,041
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              97,345
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,120,165
<INCOME-TAX>                                   380,857
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            739,308
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   739,308
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.10


</TABLE>
#### Dunice P. BRASSEAUX v. Ray J. GIROUARD and Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Company.

No. 53099.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 15, 1973.

In re: Ray J. Girouard applying for Cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Lafayette. 269 So.2d 590.

Application denied. The judgment of the court of appeal is correct.

TATE, J., is recused, having participated in prior proceedings in this case while a member of another court. La.C.Civ.P. Art. 151(3).
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION
Memorandum Subject: Summary ofStakeholder Meetings From: John Bradfield To: Dockets EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-6002, EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0603, and EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0495 This memorandum summarizes meetings held with stakeholders in the month ofJuly, 2014 On July 

### 7, Sector Policy and Programs Division Associate Director Kevin Culligan metwith Misa Paden of theJapan Bank for International Cooperation. Mr. Culligan generally answered basic questions about the clean power plan proposal for existing sources. On July 

### 10, Sector Policy and Programs Division Associate Director Kevin Culligan met with Surina Didi of the UBS Utilities Investment Research Team. Mr. Culligan generally answered basic questions aboutthe clean power plan proposal for existing sources. On July 

### 10, Office ofAtmospheric Programs Director Sarah Dunham, Climate Change Division Director Paul Gunning, Sector Policy and Programs Division Director PeterTsirigotis an Associate Directors Kevin Culligan, Fred Thompson and Steve Fruh, metwith Peter Zalzal ofthe Environmental Defense Fund. EPA generally answered basic questions aboutthe clean power plan proposal for existing sources. On July 

### 10, Sector Policy and Programs Division Associate Director Kevin Culligan metwith Paul Fischbeck ofCarnegie Mellon University. EPA generally answered basic questions aboutthe clean power plan proposal for existing sources. On July 

### 15, Sector Policy and Programs Division Associate Director Kevin Culligan metwith Stacey Davis ofthe Centerfor Clean Air Policy. EPA generally answered basic questions aboutthe clean power plan proposalfor existing sources. On July 18, Sector Policy and Programs Division Associate Director Kevin Culligan metwithJessica Furey of lS Power Development. EPA generally answered basic questions aboutthe clean power plan proposal for existing sources. On July 

### 22, Sector Policy and Programs Division Associate Director Kevin Culligan metwithJoe Kruger of the Canadian Electricity Association. EPA generally answered basic questions about the clean power plan proposal for existing sources. On July 

### 22, Sector Policy and Programs Division Director Peter Tsirigotis and Associate Director Kevin Culligan metwith Dick Wilson of First Energy Corp. EPA generally answered basic questions aboutthe clean power plan proposal for existing sources.

InternetAddress {URL) • http://www

.epa
.gov Recycled/Recyclable • Printed with Vegetable Oil Based Inks on 100% Postconsumer. Process Chlorine Free Recycled PaperOn July 23, Sector Policy and Programs Division Associate Director Kevin Culligan metwith Nick Pearson ofthe Tennessee Valley Authority. EPA generally answered basic questions aboutthe clean power plan proposal forexisting sources.
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 888

To amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 16, 1993

Mr. FIELDS of Texas (for himself and Mr. BONILLA) introduced the following

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries

A BILL

To amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SOLE SOURCE AQUIFER.

4 Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973

5 (16 U.S.C. 1539) is amended by adding at the end the

6 following new subsection:

7 ‘‘(k) SOLE SOURCE AQUIFER.—This Act does not

8 apply to the taking or jeopardy of an endangered species

9 or threatened species if the taking or jeopardy results from

10 the modification of a water habitat located in or fed by

11 a sole source aquifer designated under the Safe Drinking

12 Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.).’’.
2

HR 888 IH

Æ
<PAGE>   1
                                                                 EXHIBIT 10.197

                                   DEMAND NOTE

$300,000.00                                                  New York, New York
                                                                   May 29, 2001

        FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, Wilshire Technologies, Inc. a
California corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Borrower"), hereby
unconditionally PROMISES TO PAY to the order to TRILON DOMINION PARTNERS, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company ("Lender"), at 245 Park Avenue, 28th Floor,
New York, NY 10167, or at such other place as the holder of this Demand Note may
designate from time to time in writing, in lawful money of the United States of
America and in immediately available funds, the principal amount of Three
Hundred Thousand and 00/100, DOLLARS ($300,000.00), together with interest on
the unpaid principal amount of this Demand Note outstanding from time to time
from the date hereof, at a rate per annum equal to the Prime rate of interest
plus 3.0%, or the highest rate permitted by law, whichever shall be less.

        The principal amount of the indebtedness evidenced hereby shall be
payable on demand. Interest thereon shall be paid when principal is paid from
the date hereof until such principal amount is paid in full at such interest
rate as specified above. Following failure to pay on demand, Borrower agrees to
pay interest on any overdue payment of principal at a rate per annum equal to
the stated interest rate plus 5%, or the highest rate permitted by law,
whichever shall be less. All interest calculations shall be computed on the
basis of a 360 day year.

        Demand, presentment, protest and notice of nonpayment and protest are
hereby waived by Borrower.

        Borrower shall have no right to make any off-set against or deduct from
any payment due under this Demand Note.

        Principal and interest may be prepaid at any time without penalty.

        This Demand Note may not be changed orally, but only by an agreement in
writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement of such change is
sought.

        All covenants of Borrower in this Demand Note and all rights of the
holder under this Demand Note shall bind Borrower and its successors and
assigns, and all such covenants and rights shall inure to the benefit of the
holder of this Demand Note and its successors and assigns.

        This Demand Note has been delivered and accepted at New York, New York
and shall be interpreted, governed by, and construed in accordance with, the
laws of the State of New York.

                                                  Wilshire Technologies, Inc.



                                                  By: /s/ KATHLEEN E. TERRY
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  Name:  Kathleen E. Terry
                                                  Title: Chief Financial Officer
#### Ludwika SUPRUN, Appellant, v. Leon SUPRUN et al., Appellees.

No. 69-971.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 26, 1970.

Engel & Palgon, Miami, for appellant.

Joseph Pardo, Miami, for appellees.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, HEN-DRY and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Ludwika Suprun, appeals from a summary final judgment for the plaintiffs (appellees) in a declaratory decree action.

The record on appeal reveals that plaintiffs are the children of Michael and Agnes Suprun. In 1947 their parents purchased certain real property and resided on it as a homestead until Agnes Suprun died. Michael continued to live on the property and subsequently married Ludwika. On March 20, 1967, Michael and Ludwika executed a deed conveying the land to Michael and Ludwika Suprun as tenants by the entirety. Approximately four months later Michael died. His children filed suit and sought to have the property declared to be homestead giving a life estate only to Ludwika and to have the deed of March 20, 1967 declared to be null and void.

The trial court rendered a summary final judgment for the children in which it held *745that the real property was homestead and that the deed of March 20, 1967 was void ab inito. Ludwika has appealed from that summary final judgment.

We reverse. There appear to be genuine issues of material fact which should be determined by a trial of the issues in this cause.

Among other facts it does not conclusively appear that the conveyance of the land by the deed of March 20, 1967 was without valuable consideration. In Regero v. Daugherty, Fla.1954, 69 So.2d 178, the Supreme Court said at page 181:

> * * * * * *

> “ * * * The only restriction in respect to the alienation of a homestead by deed or mortgage, duly executed by the husband and wife, or by the surviving spouse when such spouse is vested with the whole estate in the property, is that the conveyance may be subject to attack by homestead beneficiaries unless it is free from fraud, deceit, undue influence or duress and for a valuable consideration. Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242; Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255. Compare Florida Nat. Bank v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 30 So.2d 298.”

> * * * * * *

See also Betts v. Hawkins, Fla.App. 1967, 202 So.2d 135. 16 Fla.Jur. Homesteads § 50 states:

> ******

> “ * * * There appears to be no prohibition against a conveyance of a homestead either directly to the wife, or through an intermediary to the husband and wife, where there is an adequate consideration therefor, and the conveyance is bona fide and not merely a device to circumvent the children’s homestead rights.”

Since there was no conclusive showing in the record on appeal that Ludwika failed to pay a valuable consideration for the real property in question the entry of a summary final decree was improper.

The summary final judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further action consistent herewith.
#### Joseph James SPINA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 67-19.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Oct. 10, 1967.

*21Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender and Marvin J. Emory, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

PEARSON, Judge.

The appellant was convicted of bookmaking and operating a gambling room. This appeal concerns itself only with the conviction for the operation of a gambling room, which was charged pursuant to § 849.01, Fla.Stat. (1965), F.S.A. This statute provides that one who by himself or agent “ * * * keeps, exercises or maintains a gambling table or room * * shall be guilty of the crime.

The case made by the State established (1) that the defendant was the only one present in the room when the police broke in; (2) that phone calls were received in which the caller wished to place a bet and asked for “Joey”.

While these facts are persuasive to the ordinary mind that the appellant, Joseph Spina, was actually operating the room, they are not sufficient as legal proof to sustain a criminal conviction. The rule is that circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to sustain a conviction must be such that the only reasonable implication is that of guilt. Harrison v. State, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 391; LaMonte v. State, Fla.App.1962, 145 So.2d 889.

This conviction must be reversed upon the failure of the State to prove that the defendant either owned or controlled the gambling room. See Creash v. State, 131 Fla. Ill, 179 So. 149 (1938); Stanger v. State, Fla.App.1960,117 So.2d417.

Reversed.