The HONORABLE DAVID S. DOTY, United States District Judge *

for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

 The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for 2

the District of Nebraska.

___________

No. 96-1038

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska

Lee Warn Scott, *

*

Appellant, *

___________

Submitted: June 11, 1996

 Filed: July 30, 1996

___________

Before Magill, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and

DOTY, District Judge. *

___________

DOTY, District Judge.

Lee Warn Scott (“Scott”) was convicted of conspiracy to

distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He

appeals his conviction and 20 year sentence. Finding no error, we

affirm the judgments of the district court.2

I.

The grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Scott
charging him with conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine “[f]rom an

unknown date, but beginning at least as early as on or about June
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30, 1994, and continuing until at least on or about September 21,

1994.” At trial, three witnesses testified to their drug dealings

with Scott. Harold Stewart testified that he first met Scott in

Florida and agreed to travel with Scott and others to Mississippi

to throw a barbecue, something Scott was known to do in Florida.

After the barbecue in Mississippi, the group traveled to Lincoln,

Nebraska, with the aid of another individual, Peter Mays, a “travel

guide.” The party arrived in Lincoln on a Monday sometime in late

June 1994, and checked into a local motel.

On Wednesday of that week, Stewart learned that Scott had been

storing crack cocaine in the hotel room that Stewart shared with

Felton Milner. Stewart observed Scott cut the crack cocaine into

distribution size “rocks” worth $50 a piece and give 25 rocks each

to Mays and another individual, Roy Horton. Scott collected the

sale proceeds from Horton and Mays the next morning. Stewart saw

this activity repeated during the remainder of the week. That

Saturday before returning to Florida, Stewart rode around Lincoln

with Scott collecting drug proceeds from a number of individuals.

Stewart said he did not distribute crack for Scott, but on one

occasion he held money that was the proceeds of crack sales made by

Milner that he (Stewart) later gave to Scott. That summer, Stewart

returned to Nebraska from Florida with his own supply of crack

cocaine and entered into competition with Scott.

Jimmy Simmons testified that Scott offered him crack to sell

during the summer of 1994 in exchange for a cut of the profits.

Simmons failed to sell this crack, instead he smoked his entire

allotment and did not pay Scott. Simmons further testified that

Scott threatened him with a knife because he didn’t pay for the

crack.

Scott provided crack to Christopher Gant for resale, according
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to Gant’s testimony at trial. Gant observed Scott and coconspirator Edward Walker, a/k/a “Pokey,” selling crack to at least

three people on July 9, 1994, at 2410 Vine Street in Lincoln. Gant
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stated that Scott was the money man while Walker actually

distributed the crack that was kept in a white medicine bottle with

a red cap.

The government also offered a video tape of surveillance, and

the testimony of the officer who taped the surveillance, conducted

at 2410 Vine Street on July 9, 1994. The tape depicts a number of

individuals approaching the house on Vine and greeting Scott, who

was standing by a brown car parked in the driveway of the house.

Some of the parties would then greet Edward Walker. After awhile,

individuals arriving at the house would enter the front door of the

house followed by Scott, during which time Walker would stand in

front of the door blocking any view from the street. The

individuals would then exit the house after only one or two minutes

and Scott would return to the front yard. After conducting

approximately an hour of surveillance, officers contacted both

Scott and Walker, eventually arresting both individuals after crack

cocaine was discovered in a white medicine bottle with a red lid in

the grass by the porch of the house.

Scott testified on his own behalf. He denied that he was a

drug dealer and stated that he came to Lincoln to open a barbecue

business. The large sums of cash that had been found on his person

and in the freezer of his hotel room were the proceeds of his

wife’s back social security disability benefits given to him to

start up his business and to enable his family to move from Florida

to Nebraska.

The jury found Scott guilty. The district court, after an

evidentiary hearing at which the trial transcript was admitted as

evidence, found that Scott was responsible for at least 700 grams

of crack cocaine for a base offense level of 36. Two points were

added for obstruction of justice, four points for Scott’s
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leadership role in the conspiracy, and two points for using a

dangerous weapon for a total base offense level of 44. Scott’s
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criminal history level was category II for a guideline sentence of

life imprisonment. The district court departed downward upon the

government’s motion to 20 years because Scott had been advised at

his arraignment that the maximum sentence was 20 years. Scott

challenges his conviction and sentence.

II.

A. Motion to Suppress

Scott first argues that the district court erred by failing to

suppress evidence seized pursuant to his warrantless arrest on July

9, 1994, at 2410 Vine Street. “In determining whether probable

cause exists to make a warrantless arrest, the court looks to the

totality of the circumstances to see whether a prudent person would

believe the individual had committed or was committing a crime.”

United States v. Hawkins, 59 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting

United States v. Segars, 31 F.3d 655, 659 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal

citations omitted)). The historical facts supporting probable

cause are reviewed for clear error, the determination of probable

cause is subject to de novo review. Ornelas v. United States, 116

S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996) (resolving standard of review generally

for reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations);

United States v. Snook, ___ F.3d ___, 1996 WL 368885 *4 n.3 (8th

Cir. July 5, 1996) (citing Ornelas).

The district court adopted, without objection, the report and

recommendation of Magistrate Judge Piester that concluded an

“abundance” of probable cause supported the warrantless arrest of

Scott on July 9, 1994. Reviewing the entire record, there can be

no doubt that this determination is correct. Officers had

information from two confidential informants that a black man

driving a distinct vehicle was selling crack cocaine from 2410 Vine
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Street. One informant stated that this man was staying at a local

motel. Police officers observed the described vehicle at that

hotel, then later at 2410 Vine Street. An officer observed Scott
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exit the vehicle at issue and engage in a number of brief exchanges

consistent with the informant’s description of how the crack sales

were conducted at that residence and that were consistent with

narcotic sales in general. Based on the correlation between the

informants’ information, the officers’ observations and,

considering all reasonable inferences, we agree a prudent person

would believe that Scott was committing the crime of selling a

controlled substance. Scott’s arrest was supported by probable

cause. The district court correctly denied Scott’s motion to

suppress.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Scott challenges the district court’s denial of his Rule 29

motion, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction on the charge of conspiracy. The standard of review of

the sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled. We examine the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and accept all

reasonable inferences as established, only reversing a verdict if

no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt on each essential element of the charge. United

States v. Jenkins, 78 F.3d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations

omitted). To prove a conspiracy, “the government must show an

agreement between two people and that the agreement’s objective was

a violation of the law.” United States v. Escobar, 50 F.3d 1414,

1419 (8th Cir. 1995). 

Reviewing all of the evidence presented at trial, and

considering it in the light most favorable to the verdict, we

conclude that there is sufficient evidence to sustain Scott’s

conviction. The testimony showed an agreement between Scott and

others, including Stewart, Simmons, Gant and Walker, to distribute

crack cocaine. Scott testified to the contrary, and suggests that

the other witnesses were wholly incredible, but it is for the jury
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to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Moreover, Scott’s

argument that the evidence at most establishes a buy-sell agreement

between him and others ignores the repeated testimony that Scott
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furnished a number of individuals with resale quantities of crack,

expecting those individuals to provide him with the proceeds of

these sales. See United States v. Eneff, 79 F.3d 104, 105 (8th

Cir. 1996). A reasonable jury, relying on the testimony of

Steward, Simmons and Gant, the videotape depicting the sales on

July 9, as well as the crack and sums of cash seized, could find

Scott guilty of each essential element of the crime of conspiracy.

Based on this evidence, we cannot agree that no reasonable jury

could have found Scott guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. The

district court properly denied Scott’s motion for judgment of

acquittal.

C. Application of the Guidelines

Scott makes a number of challenges to his sentence. First,

Scott alleges that the district court improperly calculated the

quantity of crack cocaine attributed to him when determining his

base offense level. Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines,

a defendant’s base offense level for drug-related crimes is

calculated according to the quantity of drugs directly attributed

to him and, in the case of jointly undertaken criminal activity,

all reasonably foreseeable quantities that were in the scope of the

criminal activity that he jointly undertook. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1;

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, application note 2. The sentencing court’s

quantity calculations are factual findings reviewed for clear

error. United States v. Flores, 73 F.3d 826, 833 (8th Cir. 1996),

cert. denied, 1996 WL 282539 (U.S. June 24, 1996)).

The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) recommended that

Scott be held accountable for at least 500 grams but less than 1.5

kilograms of crack for a base offense level of 36. The probation

officer’s calculations were based on Stewart’s trial testimony that

Scott told him that he [Scott] had brought 10 ounces of crack to
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Lincoln in June 1994, the 3.56 grams of crack seized on June 9, and

Gant’s testimony that Scott said he [Scott] was planning to “bring

back half a key, kilos, or five kilos or something of that matter”
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in July 1994 (which is at least 500 grams). Trial Transcript,

Volume III, pg. 291 at ln. 9-10. The probation officer also noted

that Gant, Simmons and Stewart had seen Scott in possession of

crack at various times during the summer of 1994. The district

court believed the probation officer’s calculations were

“conservative,” but adopted them “as reasonable from the evidence

adduced at trial.” We agree that this drug quantity determination

is well-supported by the trial record and is indeed a conservative

indication of the large quantities of crack that Scott imported

into Lincoln, Nebraska. Seeing no clear error, we uphold the

district court’s conclusion that Scott should be held accountable

for at least 500 grams but less than 1.5 kilograms of crack.

Whether the district court complied with Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1), however, presents a closer question.

Rule 32 requires the district court to make specific findings as to

each controverted matter in the PSR or determine that no finding is

necessary because the matter will not be taken into account at

sentencing. Such findings ensure “meaningful appellate review and

the fairness of the sentencing process.” United States v. Beatty,

9 F.3d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). This circuit

has stated that “the requirements of this rule [are] satisfied

where the district court made clear at sentencing that it was

relying on its impressions of the testimony of witnesses at trial,

coupled with its specific rejection of the defendant’s quantity

objections.” United States v. Flores, 73 F.3d 826, 835 (8th Cir.

1996) (citing United States v. Edward, 994 F.2d 417, 423 (8th Cir.

1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 701 (1994)). We acknowledge that

the district court satisfied these minimal requirements by the

issuances of its written memorandum that rejected all of Scott’s

sentencing objections, including his position that he should only

be held accountable for the 3.56 grams of crack seized, having

previously concluded that the PSR was “correct in all respects.”
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See Memorandum and Order dated December 15, 1995, at pg. 1;

Tentative Findings Order dated June 1, 1995, pg. 1. Further, the
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district court, in agreeing with the probation officer’s

calculations, expressly stated its reliance on the testimony

presented at trial.

However, the value of specific references to trial testimony,

the substance of that testimony and whether it is credible cannot

be understated. Such specificity is very important in the area of

drug quantity calculations where the findings turn on the

credibility determinations of the trial judge, and where as here,

the testimony presented is the word of one or two individuals.

Because we find that the district court satisfied the minimum

requirements of Rule 32 as established by this circuit, and because

the record clearly shows that the drug quantity is well-supported,

we reject Scott’s challenge to his sentence on this basis.

Scott next argues that the district court incorrectly

calculated his criminal history score by assessing one point each

for his two previous convictions for aggravated battery and one

conviction for aggravated assault. Scott was sentenced to a fine

ranging from $250 to $500 on each conviction. Section 4A1.1(c)

provides that one point shall be added for each “prior sentence”

not otherwise counted under § 4A1.1(a) or (b). A “prior sentence”

is defined as “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of

guilt.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). From the plain language of the

guidelines, non-imprisonment sentences, such as the imposition of

a fine only, are counted as a prior sentence unless the crime is a

misdemeanor or other petty offense that is similar to the excluded

offenses listed in § 4A1.2(c)(1). Scott’s crimes of aggravated

assault or battery are not excluded crimes. Scott simply

misconstrues the guidelines in arguing that points can only be

assessed if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The

district court properly assessed one point each for the nonimprisonment sentences that Scott received for his convictions.
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The district court also enhanced Scott’s base offense level by
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two points for obstruction of justice, two points for possessing a

dangerous weapon and four points for Scott’s role as a leader and

organizer of others. We review the factual findings supporting

each enhancement for clear error. United States v. Adipietro, 983

F.2d 1468, 1479 (8th Cir. 1993) (obstruction of justice); United

States v. Garrido, 995 F.2d 808, 815 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114

S. Ct. 330 (1993) (dangerous weapon); United States v. Pena, 67

F.3d 153, 156-57 (8th Cir. 1995) (role in the offense).

Lying under oath certainly impedes the administration of

justice during the prosecution of a case. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,

application note 3(b). A defendant is subject to an obstruction of

justice enhancement if he gives false testimony under oath in

regard to a material matter and does so willfully rather than out

of confusion or mistake. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87

(1993). A defendant’s testimony should be evaluated in the light

most favorable to him. Applying this heightened standard, the

district court concluded that “Scott’s testimony under oath clearly

constitutes perjury both as to the money in his possession when he

arrived in Lincoln, Nebraska, and as to his involvement in the sale

of crack cocaine.” Memorandum and Order dated December 15, 1995,

at pg. 2. Scott’s testimony concerned a material matter and

nothing suggests that it was given out of confusion or mistake.

The district court’s finding is supported by a review of the record

as a whole and will not be set aside.

The Guidelines provide that a defendant’s base offense level

for a drug-related crime must be increased if the defendant

possessed a dangerous weapon. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Dangerous

weapon means “an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious

bodily injury.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, application note 1(d). This

enhancement is not limited to the possession of a firearm and

should be applied unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon
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was connected to the offense. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, application note

3. Scott’s challenge to this enhancement hinges on the fact that
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the knife was not produced at trial. Because the knife was neither

produced at trial nor described at trial, Scott submits there is no

evidence that the knife was “dangerous,” i.e., capable of

inflicting at least serious bodily injury. Scott, however, has

provided no authority for the proposition that the knife must be

produced. Simmons testified at trial that Scott threatened him

with a knife because he smoked up the crack that Scott gave him to

sell and did not pay for the drugs. Trial Transcript, Volume II,

pg. 141-142. Simmons felt threatened by this conduct. Id. at 142,

ln. 14-16. This testimony, which the district court credited, is

sufficient to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Scott

did indeed possess a dangerous weapon, a knife, in connection with

his criminal conduct.

Scott also challenges his four level enhancement for his

aggravated role in the conspiracy. Scott’s arguments are without

merit. The evidence showed that Scott recruited a number of

individuals including Simmons, Mays, Gant, Stewart, Milner and

Horton, at a minimum, to sell drugs for him. The district court

correctly determined that this recruitment of accomplices, Scott’s

supervision of their sales and the retention of a large share of

the profits warrants the maximum enhancement for his leadership

role in a conspiracy involving five or more participants. See

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, application n. 4.

 Finally, Scott’s arguments regarding the disparity in

punishment between cocaine base and cocaine powder, the application

of the rule of lenity and his equal protection challenge arising

therefrom are foreclosed by this circuit’s clear precedent. United

States v. Long, 77 F.3d 1060, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing

United States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 1213 (8th Cir. 1995), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 966 (1996)). The court has considered Scott’s

remaining arguments in support of his appeal and finds them to be
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without merit.
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III.

Based on the foregoing, we uphold the judgments of the

district court. Probable cause supported Scott’s arrest on July 9,

1994, sufficient evidence supported his conviction on the

conspiracy charge and the district court properly calculated his

offense level and criminal history score. We must note that based

on its calculations, the district court found Scott’s offense level

to be 44, and his criminal history to be category II for a

resulting guideline sentence of life in prison. Notwithstanding

this fact, the district court departed downward on the motion of

the government pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a) to 20 years

imprisonment. The district court was well within its discretion to

do so. Scott’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.