Global Markets 

Analysis Report

A MONTHLY PUBLICATION OF GINNIE MAE’S 

OFFICE OF CAPITAL MARKETS

PREPARED FOR GINNIE MAE 

BY STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS 

URBAN INSTITUTE, HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER
Relative Attractiveness of US Fixed Income and Ginnie Mae MBS

Barclays US Aggregate and Global Indices 5

Global 10-year treasury yields 6

Ginnie Mae yields and yield spreads—USD, JPY, Euro 7-9

Ginnie Mae yield spreads - Intermediate Credit 10

MBS yield per duration 11

Total return and Sharpe Ratios 12 

State of the US Housing Market 

Serious delinquency rates 13

National HPI, HPI by state 13-14 

Ginnie Mae Agency issuance and Agency outstanding by state 15

FHA and VA Outstanding Loan Count Maps 16

Size and value of the US Residential housing and mortgage markets 17

Outstanding Agency MBS 18

Origination volume over time 19

US Agency Market, Originations

Agency Gross and Net Issuance 20-22 

Purchase versus refi: Refi Issuance Breakdown 23 

Credit Box 

First time home buyer share—purchase only loans 24-25

FICO score distribution 26

Credit box at a glance (FICO, LTV, DTI) 27-29

Historical credit box (FICO, LTV,DTI) 30-31

Cumulative Default Rates: FHA and VA 32

High LTV credit box 33-34

Ginnie Mae Nonbank Originators

Nonbank originator share (All, Purchase, Refi) 35-36

Bank vs. nonbank originators historical credit box, Ginnie Mae vs. GSE (FICO, LTV, DTI) 37-40

Holders of Ginnie Mae Mortgage Servicing Rights 

Top Holders of Ginnie Mae MSR 41-42

Non-bank Holders of Ginnie Mae MSR 42

Prepayments 

Aggregate 43

Select coupon/origination year cohorts 44-46

Other Ginnie Mae Programs

HMBS 47

Multifamily 48

Market Conditions-Agency MBS

Average daily trading volume and turnover by sector 49

Dealer net positions, repo volume 50

MBS Ownership

Ownership breakdown of total agency debt 51

MBS share of total agency debt and commercial bank ownership of MBS 52

Bank and Thrift Residential MBS Holdings 53

Foreign ownership of MBS 54-55

Fed Ownership of MBS 56

CONTENTS
HIGHLIGHTS

Re-default expectations in the COVID-19 era

The Global Financial Crisis that started in 2008 resulted in steep house price declines, tens of millions of mortgage 

defaults, and subsequent loan modifications to try to keep struggling borrowers in their homes. Given the severe 

and sustained nature of the Global Financial Crisis, many borrowers found their loan modifications to be 

unsustainable, resulting in high re-default rates and prepayments for security holders. Ginnie Mae issuers have the 

authority to pull seriously delinquent loans out of mortgage pools. Thus, high default or re-default rates can 

increase involuntary prepayments. Given millions of borrowers are in COVID-19 forbearances today, a key 

question facing MBS investors is whether the COVID-19 re-default experience will be different from the Global 

Financial Crisis.

Future re-default experience will, in large part, depend on the future course of the broader economy and the job 

market. However, we would expect re-default rates to remain below Global Financial Crisis levels for several 

reasons.

The pandemic is different from the Global Financial Crisis: Following 2008, we witnessed severe house price 

declines, negative equity, and a flood of defaults. House price declines were accompanied by a swift run-up in job 

losses and long-term unemployment. Borrowers were not only unable to make payments, but also unable to exit 

their mortgages by selling their homes, forcing them to re-default. The unemployment rate peaked at 10 percent in 

late 2009. In the pandemic the rate peaked at 14.7 percent early on but stands at 7.9 percenttoday.

Americans today have record levels of home equity. The ratio of total mortgage debt outstanding to the value of 

the US housing stock is at a record-low 35 percent, compared with 54 percent on the eve of the Global Financial 

Crisis. Large equity buffers, helped by continued house price growth even during the pandemic, give struggling 

homeowners the option to sell and move out rather than default. Note that the average loan age for currently 

delinquent FHA loans is about 4 years. The national house price appreciation over the last 4 years, i.e. from Aug 

2016 to Aug 2020 was 21 percent. This suggests that delinquent FHA borrowers who purchased homes with a 3.5 

percent down payment, on average, have an equity buffer of 24 percent.

Improved loss mitigation toolkit – The mortgage market was not prepared for the Global Financial Crisis. Before 

2008, short-term assistance programs such as repayment and modification plans were available but neither 

codified or standardized; and they often capitalized delinquent interest and fees into the mortgage balance, 

limiting payment relief. Lack of standard terms meant programs could not be deployed quickly and on a large scale.

While many crisis-era standard programs have now expired, FHA’s implementation of HAMP (FHA-HAMP) 

continues. In addition, during the pandemic the FHA moved swiftly, announcing the COVID-19 National 

Emergency Standalone Partial Claim program in April of this year. This will allow borrowers to receive a partial 

claim modification at the end of their forbearance. When combined with rate reduction and/or term extension 

available under FHA-HAMP, and deployed at scale, it will provide meaningful payment reduction opportunities to 

struggling borrowers. FHA loans comprise 74 percent of Ginnie Mae’s COVID-19 Forbearance population.

Plummeting mortgage rates have already cut payments for many – The steep decline in rates in 2020 has created 

a large opportunity for borrowers to reduce their monthly payment by refinancing. An FHA borrower with a 4 

percent mortgage rate and a $250,00 loan balance will see a P&I reduction of 12 percent solely by refinancing to 

the prevailing rate of 3.125 percent. If the same borrower were to obtain FHA partial claim equal to 15 percent of 

the defaulted UPB, they would reduce their monthly P&I payment by 25 percent. Note, this is well in excess of the 

20 percent payment reduction loan modification programs typically target. Also, FHA allows partial claim up to a 

maximum of 30 percent. Thus, in the example above, the borrower would still have room to receive an even bigger 

payment reduction if needed. The combination of low rates and FHA partial claim is a very powerful loss 

mitigation tool in the current environment.
Much higher quality book of business going into the pandemic – The dramatic tightening of credit post2008 has led to a much higher quality book of business compared to when we entered the Global 

Financial Crisis. For FHA loans, the median FICO score for pre-2008 originations ranged from 620 to 

650. For post-2009 originations it has ranged from 670 to 700, or 40 to 50 points higher (See Figure 1.) 

The difference between pre- and post-2008 VA loans tells a very similar story, i.e. dramatic 

improvement in FICO scores. This is supported by the fact that the vast majority of borrowers in 

forbearance, 87 percent, were current just prior to the pandemic. Also note that in addition to higher 

FICO scores for VA borrowers, VA lending represents a much larger share of Ginnie Mae market today. 

These factors put Ginnie Mae’s overall book of business in a much stronger credit position compared to 

on the eve of the Global Financial Crisis.

Figure 1: Median Origination FICO Scores for FHA and VA 

Source: Urban Institute Calculations using Black Knight McDash

Many of the factors outlined above can change, especially house prices. Falling house prices and 

potential loss of home equity would make it harder to keep modifications sustainable. However, 

increases in house prices during the pandemic coupled with a historic shortage of housing supply makes 

it unlikely that prices will fall or fall by much. On balance, this analysis suggests that post-pandemic redefault activity may be much benign compared to the last housing crisis.

Disclosure:

For Ginnie Mae’s Internal Use only. All the information contained in this document is as of date indicated unless otherwise noted. The information provided does 

not constitute investment advice and it should not be relied on as such. All information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but its accuracy 

is not guaranteed. The views expressed in this material are the views of Urban Institute and Street Global Advisors as of October 15th, 2020 and are subject to 

change based on market and other conditions. This document contains certain statements that may be deemed forward-looking statements. Please note that 

any such statements are not guarantees of any future performance and actual results or developments may differ materially from those projected.

© 2020 State Street Corporation. All Rights Reserved.

United States: State Street Global Advisors, 1 Iron Street, Boston, MA 02210-1641. 

Tracking Code: 3286026.1.1.AM.INST

Expiration Date: 10/31/2021

Highlights this month:

• Home prices have turned up for the 12-month period ending August 2020, the first upturn since

COVID-19 hit (page 13).

• The net increase in Ginnie Mae outstanding is far smaller than their GSE counterparts; this reflects

negative net FHA issuance (page 21).

• The Ginnie Mae nonbank origination share reached a record high of 91.4 percent in August 2020

(page 35).

• The Federal Reserve’s share of agency debt increased from 15 percent in the first quarter of 2020 to

20 percent in the second quarter due to substantial purchases of MBS in response to the COVID-19

crisis (page 51).

• Agency MBS held by foreigners in June 2020 ($1.16 trillion), while up on a year-over-year basis, has

declined slightly since March 2020, possibly reflecting increased MBS absorption by the Fed (Page

54).

HIGHLIGHTS

560

580

600

620

640

660

680

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720

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760

Jan-00

Sep-00

May-01

Jan-02

Sep-02

May-03

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Sep-06

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Jan-08

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May-13

Jan-14

Sep-14

May-15

Jan-16

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Sep-18

May-19

Jan-20

FHA VA
Relative Attractiveness of US Fixed 

Income and Ginnie Mae MBS

US MBS (Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac) comprise 28 percent of the Barclays US Aggregate Index—less 

than either the US Treasury share (37 percent) or the US Credit share (32 percent). Fannie Mae 30-year MBS 

accounts for 10 percent of the overall index, the largest MBS component, while Ginnie Mae 30-year MBS and Freddie 

Mac 30-year MBS both comprise 7 of the market. Mortgages with terms of 15 and 20 years comprise the remaining 

balance (4 percent) of the Barclays US Aggregate Index. US securities are the single largest contributor to the 

Barclays Global Aggregate, accounting for 37 percent of the global total. US MBS comprises 10 percent of the global

aggregate.

37%

2%

32%

7%

10%

7%

4%

2%

Barclays US 

Aggregate Index

Treasury

Agency

Credit

GNMA MBS 30y

FNMA MBS 30y

FHLMC MBS 30y

15y and 20y MBS

ABS & CMBS

53%

9%

25%

10%

1% 2%

Global Treasury

Global Agency

Global Credit

US MBS

5

ABS & CMBS

Collateralised

(Pfandbrief)

2%

3% 1%

37%

30%

21%

1%

0.04%

2%

0%

Australia

Canada

Middle East

United States

Europe

Asia & Pacific Rim

Latin America

Africa

Supranational

Others

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Note: Numbers in chart may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Barclays Global Aggregate Index by Country Barclays Global Aggregate Index by Sector

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors. 

Note: Data as of September 2020.

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors

Note: Data as of September 2020.
Relative Attractiveness of US Fixed 

Income and Ginnie Mae MBS

-2.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

Sep-13 Mar-14 Sep-14 Mar-15 Sep-15 Mar-16 Sep-16 Mar-17 Sep-17 Mar-18 Sep-18 Mar-19 Sep-19 Mar-20 Sep-20

Yield (%)

Global 10-year Treasury Yields

6

US 10y UK 10y GER 10y ITA 10y JPY 10y

-2.0

-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

-2.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

Sep-13 Sep-14 Sep-15 Sep-16 Sep-17 Sep-18 Sep-19 Sep-20

10yr US Treasury hedged yield, JPY

10y US hedged yield, JPY (left)

US 10y hedged yield advantage vs 10y JGB (right)

-2.0

-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

-2.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

Sep-13 Sep-14 Sep-15 Sep-16 Sep-17 Sep-18 Sep-19 Sep-20

10yr US Treasury hedged yield, EUR

10y US hedged yield, EUR (left)

10y US hedge yield advantage vs 10y bund (right)

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors. 

Note: Data as of September 2020.

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors

Note: Data as of September 2020.

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors. Note: Data as of September 2020.

After experiencing COVID-19 related volatility in March and April of this year, government bond yields across 

the globe stabilized. Yields fell across the board in September 2020, with the yield on the 10-year treasury 

declining by 2 bps to 0.68 percent. The yield on the Italian 10-year note, which is the highest in the developed 

world, dropped by 23 bps to 0.87 percent. The yield on the UK 10-year bond fell by 8 bps to 0.23 percent, the 

Japanese 10-year government bond yield fell by 4 bps to 0.02 percent, and the German 10-year yield fell by 13 

bps to negative 0.52 percent in September. At the end of Septmeber, the hedged yield differential between the 

10-year Treasury and the 10-year JGB stood at 8 bps, an tightening of 12 bps since August 2020. The hedged 

yield differential between the 10-year Treasury and the 10-year Bund stood at 30 bps, a tightening of 2 bps 

since the end of August 2020.

Yield(%)

Yield(%)
Relative Attractiveness of US Fixed 

Income and Ginnie Mae MBS

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

Sep-18 Dec-18 Mar-19 Jun-19 Sep-19 Dec-19 Mar-20 Jun-20 Sep-20

G2SF CC yield & nominal spread, USD

7

G2SF CC yield, USD (left) G2SF CC yield nominal spread vs UST 5/10 blend (50%/50%) (right)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

Sep-09 Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-14 Sep-15 Sep-16 Sep-17 Sep-18 Sep-19 Sep-20

GNSF CC yield & nominal spread, USD

GNSF CC yield, USD (left) GNSF CC yield nominal spread vs UST 5/10 blend (50%/50%) (right)

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Nominal yields diverged in September 2020, with GNMA II yields increasing 10 bps to 1.28 percent and GNMA 

I yields down 4 bps to 1.45 percent. At the end of September, current coupon Ginnie Mae securities outyield

their Treasury counterparts (relative to the average of 5- and 10-year Treasury yields) by 80 bps on the G2SF 

and 97 bps on the GNSF, an increase of 11 and decrease of 4 bps, respectively, since last month.

Yield(%) Yield(%)

Yield(%)

Yield(%)
Relative Attractiveness of US Fixed 

Income and Ginnie Mae MBS

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

Sep-18 Dec-18 Mar-19 Jun-19 Sep-19 Dec-19 Mar-20 Jun-20 Sep-20

G2SF CC yield & nominal spread, JPY

8

G2SF CC yield, JPY (left) G2SF CC yield nominal spread vs JGB 5/10 blend (50%/50%) (right)

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors. Note: Data as of September 2020.

If Ginnie Mae securities are hedged into Japanese Yen, they look favorable on a yield basis versus the JGB 5/10 

blend at the end of September. More precisely, hedged into Japanese yen, the G2SF and GNSF have a 74 and 91 

bp yield versus the JGB 5/10 blend. This represents a 1 bp widening for G2SF and a 14 bp tightening for GNSF 

since the end of August 2020.

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

Sep-09 Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-14 Sep-15 Sep-16 Sep-17 Sep-18 Sep-19 Sep-20

GNSF CC yield & nominal spread, JPY

GNSF CC yield, JPY (left) GNSF CC yield nominal spread vs JGB 5/10 blend (50%/50%) (right)

Yield(%) Yield(%)

Yield(%) Yield(%)
Relative Attractiveness of US Fixed 

Income and Ginnie Mae MBS

-0.4

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Sep-18 Dec-18 Mar-19 Jun-19 Sep-19 Dec-19 Mar-20 Jun-20 Sep-20

G2SF CC yield & nominal spread, EUR

9

G2SF CC yield, EUR (left) G2SF CC yield nominal spread vs GER 5/10 blend (50%/50%) (right)

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

Sep-09 Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-14 Sep-15 Sep-16 Sep-17 Sep-18 Sep-19 Sep-20

GNSF CC yield & nominal spread, EUR

GNSF CC yield, EUR (left) GNSF CC yield nominal spread vs GER 5/10 blend (50%/50%) (right)

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors. Note: Data as of September 2020.

If Ginnie Mae securities are hedged into Euros, they look favorable on a yield basis versus the German 5/10 

Blend. The figures below show that at the end of September, the current coupon G2SF and GNSF hedged into 

euros have a 100 and 116 bp higher yield than the average of the German 5/10, respectively. This represents an 

8 bp widening for the G2SF and a 7 bp tightening for the GNSF since the end of last month.

Yield(%) Yield(%)

Yield(%) Yield(%)
Relative Attractiveness of US Fixed 

Income and Ginnie Mae MBS

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Jul-16 Dec-16 May-17 Oct-17 Mar-18 Aug-18 Jan-19 Jun-19 Nov-19 Apr-20 Sep-20

Sources: State Street Global Advisors. Note: Data as of September 2020.

10

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Jul-16 Dec-16 May-17 Oct-17 Mar-18 Aug-18 Jan-19 Jun-19 Nov-19 Apr-20 Sep-20

U.S. Intermediate Credit - OAS US GNMA 30yr II - OAS

Sources: State Street Global Advisors. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Spread between Intermediate credit and 30-year GNMA MBS OAS

G2 30 MBS versus Intermediate Credit

After tightening steadily from mid-2016 to January 2020, the spread between US Intermediate Credit and GNMA II 

30 year OAS skyrocketed in February 2020 in response to the COVID-19 panic. This was followed by substantial 

tightening over the period of March-September 2020. The OAS on intermediate credit partially recovered from its 

enormous widening early in the year, while the Ginnie Mae II 30-year fell to multi-year lows. Despite this tightening, 

the spread between the two remains much elevated, ending September 2020 at 82 basis points in comparison to 21 

basis points at the end of January, reflecting heightened investor concern about corporate credit risk.
Relative Attractiveness of US Fixed 

Income and Ginnie Mae MBS

Sources: Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors. Note: Yields are in base currency ofsecurity and unhedged. 

Data as of September 2020.

US MBS yields are about the same or higher than most government securities with the same or longer durations. 

The only asset classes with significantly more yield are the US and Pan-Euro high yield and credit indices. 

Duration, a measure of sensitivity to interest rate changes, does not fully capture the volatility of the high yield 

asset classes, as there is a large credit component, which has moved front and center in light of COVID-19.

Security Duration Yield

US 5y 5.0 0.28

US 10y 9.6 0.69

GNMA II 3.0% 3.5 1.01

GNMA II 3.5% 2.5 1.44

JPY 5y 4.7 -0.12

JPY 10y 10.0 0.01

GER 5y 5.1 -0.71

GER 10y 9.9 -0.52

ITA 5y 4.6 0.26

ITA 10y 9.3 0.87

US credit 8.3 1.91

US credit >= A 8.1 1.49

US HY 3.9 5.77

Pan-Euro Corp 5.8 0.74

Pan-Euro HY 3.9 4.80

11

US 5y US 10y

G2 3.5%

G2 3.0%

JPY 5y

GER 10y

GER 5y JPY 10y

ITA 5y

ITA 10y

US Credit

US Credit>=A

US HY

Pan-Euro 

Corp

Pan-Euro HY

-2.00

-1.00

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0

Yield

Duration

Yield versus duration
Relative Attractiveness of US Fixed 

Income and Ginnie Mae MBS

Source: State Street

*A 2% max r

Average Return (Per Month)

Time Period US MBS 

Ginnie Mae US Treasury US Credit Corp Pan Euro Credit Corp US High Yield* Pan EuroHigh Yield*

1 year 0.32 0.65 0.68 0.08 0.35 0.02

3 year 0.28 0.45 0.54 0.21 0.38 0.18

5 year 0.23 0.31 0.50 0.22 0.58 0.34

10 year 0.24 0.26 0.43 0.34 0.54 0.51

* ssumes 2 capitalization ma per issue

*Assumes 2% capitali ati per issuer

Source: State Street

Average Excess Return (Per Month)

Time Period US MBS 

Ginnie Mae US Treasury US Credit Corp Pan Euro Credit Corp US High Yield* Pan EuroHigh Yield*

1 year 0.26 0.60 0.62 0.13 0.30 0.07

3 year 0.15 0.33 0.41 0.27 0.25 0.24

5 year 0.14 0.22 0.41 0.28 0.48 0.39

10 year 0.19 0.22 0.38 0.37 0.50 0.54

zat on max

*A 2% on max 

Source: State Street

Standard Deviation

Time Period US MBS 

Ginnie Mae US Treasury US Credit Corp Pan Euro Credit Corp US High Yield* Pan EuroHigh Yield*

1 year 0.54 1.33 2.99 2.74 4.27 4.75

3 year 0.66 1.22 1.97 1.64 2.63 2.84

5 year 0.60 1.13 1.66 1.42 2.30 2.39

10 year 0.64 1.05 1.46 1.37 2.03 2.03

* ssumes 2 capitalizatiCor o ma per issuer

12

Sharpe Ratio

Time Period US MBS 

Ginnie Mae US Treasury US Credit Co p

Pan Euro 

Credit Corp US High Yield Pan EuroHigh Yield*

1 year 0.49 0.45 0.21 0.05 0.07 0.02

3 year 0.23 0.27 0.21 0.16 0.10 0.08

5 year 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.16

10 year 0.30 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.26

*Assumes 2% capitalization max per issuer on high yield indices

Sources: Barclays Indices, Bloomberg and State Street Global Advisors Note: Data as of September 2020.

The average return on the Ginnie Mae index over the past decade is less than other indices. However, the 

standard deviation of the Ginnie Mae index is the lowest of any sector, as it has the least price volatility over a 1, 

3, 5 and 10 year horizon. The result: The Sharpe Ratio, or excess return per unit of risk for the Ginnie Mae index is 

highest among all asset classes over 1 and 10-year horizons and second highest over 3 and 5-year horizons.
2.65%

2.48%

7.96%

3.98%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

4Q063Q072Q081Q094Q093Q102Q111Q124Q123Q132Q141Q154Q153Q162Q171Q184Q183Q192Q20

Serious delinquency rates

Fannie Mae Freddie Mac FHA VA

Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, MBA Delinquency Survey and Urban Institute.

Note: Serious delinquency is defined as 90 days or more past due or in the foreclosure process. Data as of Q2 2020.

Serious Delinquency Rates: Single-Family Loans

State of the US Housing Market

13

4.5%

5.0%

4.2%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

Aug-01

Feb-02

Aug-02

Feb-03

Aug-03

Feb-04

Aug-04

Feb-05

Aug-05

Feb-06

Aug-06

Feb-07

Aug-07

Feb-08

Aug-08

Feb-09

Aug-09

Feb-10

Aug-10

Feb-11

Aug-11

Feb-12

Aug-12

Feb-13

Aug-13

Feb-14

Aug-14

Feb-15

Aug-15

Feb-16

Aug-16

Feb-17

Aug-17

Feb-18

Aug-18

Feb-19

Aug-19

Feb-20

Aug-20

Year-over-year growth rate

National Year-Over-Year HPI Growth

Bottom price tier Middle price tier Top price tier

Sources: Black Knight and Urban Institute. Note: Black Knight divides home prices in each region into quintiles; this figure shows the performance of the 

bottom, middle and top quintiles. Data as of August 2020.

Serious delinquency rates for single-family GSE loans, FHA loans and VA loans spiked in Q2 2020, reflecting the 

impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. These delinquency numbers include loans in COVID-19 forbearance. The bottom 

chart shows nationwide house prices for the bottom, middle and the top quintiles by price. House prices have risen 

most at the lower end of the market where Ginnie Mae plays a major role. Prices at the lower end of the market rose 

by 5.0 percent for 12 months ended August 2020, higher than the 4.2 percent for the top end of the market. Yearover-year price growth in August was higher than in July for all price tiers.
State of the US Housing Market

bt,

ousehold

De

h

mortg

$9,833

Sources: Black Knight and Urban Institute. Note: 

rtgages,

HPI data as of August 2020. Negative sign indicates that state is above earlier peak. Peak refers to the month when 

HPI reached the highest level for each state/US during the housing boom period, ranging from 09/2005 to 09/2008. Trough represents the month when HPI fell to 

the lowest level for each state/US after the housing bust, ranging from 01/2009 to 03/2012. Current is 08/2020, the latest HPI data period.

Nationally, nominal home prices have increased by 59.9 percent since the trough, and now exceed their pre-crisis 

peak valuation on a nominal basis by 19.5 percent. The picture is very different across states, with many states well in 

excess of the prior peak, while Connecticut remains 10.2 percent below peak level.

14

HPI Changes

State 2000 to Peak Peak to Trough Trough to Current YOY Current HPI % Above Peak

National 75.0% -25.3% 59.9% 4.0% 19.5%

Alabama 36.1% -15.4% 36.8% 4.6% 15.8%

Alaska 69.5% -3.0% 26.9% 2.7% 23.1%

Arizona 109.9% -47.8% 92.2% 6.1% 0.3%

Arkansas 41.4% -9.8% 28.8% 3.3% 16.2%

California 154.8% -43.3% 97.7% 3.9% 12.0%

Colorado 40.3% -12.9% 87.7% 4.3% 63.5%

Connecticut 92.2% -24.7% 19.2% 2.5% -10.2%

Delaware 94.6% -23.5% 35.2% 4.6% 3.5%

District of Columbia 174.5% -13.7% 61.6% 5.1% 39.5%

Florida 128.3% -46.8% 79.2% 5.5% -4.7%

Georgia 38.4% -31.4% 71.1% 3.9% 17.4%

Hawaii 162.7% -22.5% 56.2% 4.1% 21.1%

Idaho 71.8% -28.7% 101.0% 8.1% 43.4%

Illinois 61.6% -34.4% 41.8% 1.3% -7.0%

Indiana 21.6% -8.0% 41.2% 3.5% 29.9%

Iowa 28.2% -4.7% 30.5% 2.0% 24.4%

Kansas 34.6% -9.2% 47.0% 2.9% 33.5%

Kentucky 29.6% -7.5% 36.4% 3.1% 26.2%

Louisiana 48.7% -5.1% 26.4% 2.7% 20.0%

Maine 82.1% -12.3% 45.4% 3.4% 27.5%

Maryland 129.2% -28.6% 31.1% 3.0% -6.4%

Massachusetts 92.4% -22.4% 60.7% 3.4% 24.6%

Michigan 23.9% -39.3% 82.7% 2.7% 10.8%

Minnesota 66.4% -27.7% 61.9% 3.4% 17.0%

Mississippi 41.0% -13.8% 33.3% 5.0% 14.9%

Missouri 42.6% -15.3% 41.8% 3.9% 20.1%

Montana 82.2% -11.2% 59.1% 4.9% 41.3%

Nebraska 26.7% -6.6% 46.8% 3.0% 37.1%

Nevada 126.9% -59.0% 129.2% 4.0% -6.1%

New Hampshire 90.7% -23.1% 48.1% 4.6% 13.8%

New Jersey 117.7% -28.0% 32.1% 3.2% -4.9%

New Mexico 66.8% -16.4% 32.8% 6.8% 11.0%

New York 98.4% -15.3% 47.4% 4.2% 24.9%

North Carolina 40.6% -15.8% 42.4% 4.3% 20.0%

North Dakota 53.5% -3.9% 58.0% 2.9% 51.9%

Ohio 21.1% -18.3% 42.4% 3.5% 16.3%

Oklahoma 37.4% -2.5% 24.8% 4.6% 21.7%

Oregon 81.9% -28.1% 87.2% 4.0% 34.7%

Pennsylvania 70.1% -11.7% 28.9% 2.5% 13.9%

Rhode Island 130.6% -34.2% 61.2% 6.2% 6.1%

South Carolina 45.0% -19.4% 41.0% 4.3% 13.7%

South Dakota 45.3% -4.0% 48.3% 2.1% 42.5%

Tennessee 35.0% -11.9% 52.1% 4.7% 34.0%

Texas 33.5% -5.8% 56.9% 3.9% 47.8%

Utah 54.8% -22.1% 85.6% 5.7% 44.6%

Vermont 83.5% -7.5% 40.9% 4.9% 30.4%

Virginia 99.6% -22.7% 32.1% 3.9% 2.1%

Washington 85.1% -28.7% 98.1% 6.1% 41.3%

West Virginia 42.4% -6.5% 30.0% 3.9% 21.5%

Wisconsin 44.9% -16.3% 40.2% 1.6% 17.3%

Wyoming 77.4% -5.7% 36.8% 5.3% 29.0%
State of the US Housing Market

bt,

hold

De

house

mortg

$9,833

rtgages,

Agency Issuance (past 1 year)

State GNMA Share GNMA Loan 

Count

GNMA Avg.

Loan Size (000)

GSE Avg. Loan 

Size (000)

Agency Outstanding 

GNMA Share GNMA Loan 

Count

GNMA Avg. 

Loan Size (000)

GSE Avg. Loan 

Size (000)

National 28.3% 2,648,743 251.0 274.4 26.5% 11,301,474 164.9 197.0

Alabama 41.0% 48,170 192.2 217.1 40.8% 238,419 128.6 157.7

Alaska 50.3% 8,185 309.0 278.1 46.5% 37,931 230.5 205.1

Arizona 29.1% 100,355 245.7 253.4 25.4% 313,164 167.9 190.3

Arkansas 38.8% 25,655 164.0 195.6 40.5% 139,862 111.1 142.7

California 21.6% 247,704 389.6 383.8 17.1% 769,302 269.3 281.6

Colorado 27.5% 82,837 328.9 318.4 22.6% 235,545 227.0 240.5

Connecticut 27.8% 21,029 235.2 259.7 26.8% 108,932 181.0 191.7

Delaware 35.0% 11,777 238.1 255.2 33.0% 52,379 179.7 189.3

District of Columbia 15.6% 2,286 484.8 430.6 12.6% 9,613 298.9 316.0

Florida 38.6% 225,439 240.7 241.3 32.0% 853,520 170.3 179.7

Georgia 36.7% 120,596 213.6 246.3 34.3% 515,969 145.2 178.1

Hawaii 43.9% 11,563 552.2 439.7 26.3% 32,265 382.4 324.9

Idaho 27.0% 20,825 248.8 245.1 26.0% 77,957 160.9 182.5

Illinois 20.1% 73,815 199.8 234.0 21.9% 368,714 140.3 165.0

Indiana 30.4% 63,018 167.7 189.1 32.8% 303,501 111.7 132.7

Iowa 19.5% 16,697 169.8 194.9 22.5% 86,622 114.3 137.0

Kansas 28.9% 19,681 179.7 209.9 31.4% 104,142 119.7 145.3

Kentucky 33.7% 35,123 174.0 196.9 35.2% 169,158 121.4 138.5

Louisiana 38.1% 37,960 190.8 225.4 38.6% 190,557 137.3 163.8

Maine 28.4% 9,448 208.8 232.6 28.5% 40,781 152.9 168.3

Maryland 39.1% 74,251 317.8 311.3 34.6% 301,041 229.6 225.5

Massachusetts 17.4% 32,510 327.9 335.0 16.5% 122,774 240.0 240.6

Michigan 19.2% 60,440 170.1 201.9 21.9% 303,552 114.1 140.7

Minnesota 18.8% 38,423 226.9 245.2 19.9% 183,924 156.9 178.8

Mississippi 46.9% 22,137 174.0 200.1 47.3% 117,282 121.1 146.1

Missouri 28.0% 53,916 177.1 206.7 30.9% 264,094 120.6 144.9

Montana 26.4% 8,692 248.7 253.4 24.9% 36,411 170.6 187.1

Nebraska 27.3% 13,942 192.9 201.1 29.0% 72,467 123.4 143.2

Nevada 36.3% 46,191 282.8 266.6 29.3% 140,750 194.3 202.8

New Hampshire 26.2% 11,100 263.2 260.4 25.3% 44,284 194.9 189.5

New Jersey 24.0% 54,317 281.0 310.9 23.7% 245,045 210.1 226.4

New Mexico 39.0% 18,324 207.3 220.7 39.0% 98,697 141.4 158.2

New York 22.2% 48,715 276.4 309.1 22.6% 327,883 186.5 220.9

North Carolina 31.9% 99,898 213.0 242.5 29.6% 432,940 142.3 174.2

North Dakota 23.0% 3,987 234.9 231.6 22.6% 16,818 167.1 171.8

Ohio 29.1% 83,520 167.1 187.9 31.6% 450,012 112.2 132.0

Oklahoma 42.4% 33,183 177.1 200.1 44.2% 196,718 119.7 144.6

Oregon 24.0% 36,947 293.1 294.4 19.9% 125,736 204.4 219.6

Pennsylvania 27.4% 70,994 190.1 230.1 29.3% 414,438 135.4 162.8

Rhode Island 30.9% 8,762 259.5 257.2 30.1% 36,880 192.0 190.4

South Carolina 37.6% 58,826 214.7 229.9 33.5% 231,823 148.6 168.1

South Dakota 27.6% 7,086 205.1 217.4 30.9% 30,884 143.6 158.8

Tennessee 34.9% 67,598 216.4 239.7 34.4% 296,084 140.8 174.3

Texas 33.7% 234,145 228.9 251.0 31.5% 1,091,068 146.4 183.7

Utah 21.2% 37,369 285.4 287.8 21.4% 121,411 198.2 224.4

Vermont 22.0% 2,624 213.6 230.0 19.2% 12,799 164.2 162.1

Virginia 39.8% 110,672 314.0 315.2 35.7% 450,977 216.8 225.1

Washington 26.0% 79,721 332.2 338.8 22.6% 267,645 224.8 246.7

West Virginia 46.6% 11,352 177.3 182.7 43.6% 56,220 126.0 130.6

Wisconsin 17.0% 30,324 192.6 209.7 17.7% 135,617 133.4 147.5

Wyoming 36.8% 6,614 239.2 247.2 35.5% 26,867 177.3 183.3

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Ginnie Mae outstanding share are based on loan balance as of August 2020. Ginnie Mae issuance is based on the last 12 

months, from August 2019 to August 2020.

Ginnie Mae MBS constitute 26.5 percent of outstanding agency issuance by loan balance and 28.3 percent of new 

issuance over the past year. However, the Ginnie Mae share varies widely across states, with the share of 

outstanding (by loan balance) as low as 12.6 percent in the District of Columbia and as high as 47.3 percent in 

Mississippi. In general, the Ginnie Mae share is higher in states with lower home prices.

15
FHA and VA Outstanding Loan Count 

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Ginnie Mae outstanding share are based on loan balance as of August 2020. 

FHA Outstanding Loan Count by State

VA Outstanding Loan Count by State

Texas , Florida, and California are the top 3 states for FHA and VA lending as measured by the number of loans 

outstanding. As of August 2020, TX has 750,000 FHA and 310,000 VA loans outstanding, FL had 540,000 FHA and 

270,000 VA loans outstanding, and CA had 510,000 FHA and 240,000 VA loans outstanding. Virginia ranks 4th for 

number of VA loans outstanding and 11th for number of FHA loans outstanding.

16
State of the US Housing Market

$11.3

$21.5

$32.8

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Q2

$ Trillions

Value of the US Housing Market

17

Debt Household equity Total Value

$0.44

$0.47

$7.13

$3.26

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Q2

$ Trillions

Size of the US Residential Mortgage Market

Private Label Securities Home Equity loans Agency MBS Unsecuritized first liens

Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, eMBS and Urban Institute. Last updated September 2020. 

Note Top: Single family includes 1-4 family mortgages. The home equity number is grossed up from Fed totals to include the value of households and 

the non-financial business sector. Note Bottom: Unsecuritized first liens includes loans held by commercial banks, GSEs, savings institutions, credit 

unions and other financial companies. 

The Federal Reserve’s Flow of Fund Report has indicated a gradually increasing total value of the housing market, 

driven primarily by growing home equity since 2012. The Q2 2020 numbers show that while mortgage debt 

outstanding remained steady at $11.3 trillion, total home equity grew slightly from $21.1 trillion in Q1 2020 to 

$21.5 trillion in the second quarter of 2020, bringing the total value of the housing market to $32.8 trillion, 28.4 

percent higher than the pre-crisis peak in 2006. Agency MBS account for 63.1 percent of the total mortgage debt 

outstanding, private-label securities make up 3.9 percent, and unsecuritized first liens make up 28.8 percent. 

Home equity loans comprise the remaining 4.2 percent of the total.
State of the US Housing Market

As of August 2020, outstanding securities in the agency market totaled $7.25 trillion: 42.7 percent Fannie Mae, 

28.8 percent Freddie Mac, and 28.4 percent Ginnie Mae MBS. Freddie’s outstanding volume in August 2020 was 

greater than Ginnie Mae for the first time since June 2016. Within the Ginnie Mae market, both FHA and VA have 

grown very rapidly since 2009, although since May 2020, FHA has contracted. FHA comprises 56.9 percent of total 

Ginnie Mae MBS outstanding, while VA comprises 37.3 percent.

18

$3.07

$2.06

$2.09

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

Aug-02

Feb-03

Aug-03

Feb-04

Aug-04

Feb-05

Aug-05

Feb-06

Aug-06

Feb-07

Aug-07

Feb-08

Aug-08

Feb-09

Aug-09

Feb-10

Aug-10

Feb-11

Aug-11

Feb-12

Aug-12

Feb-13

Aug-13

Feb-14

Aug-14

Feb-15

Aug-15

Feb-16

Aug-16

Feb-17

Aug-17

Feb-18

Aug-18

Feb-19

Aug-19

Feb-20

Aug-20

$ Trillions

Outstanding Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities

Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Ginnie Mae

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

$1.2

$0.8

$0.1

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

Jul-02

Jan-03

Jul-03

Jan-04

Jul-04

Jan-05

Jul-05

Jan-06

Jul-06

Jan-07

Jul-07

Jan-08

Jul-08

Jan-09

Jul-09

Jan-10

Jul-10

Jan-11

Jul-11

Jan-12

Jul-12

Jan-13

Jul-13

Jan-14

Jul-14

Jan-15

Jul-15

Jan-16

Jul-16

Jan-17

Jul-17

Jan-18

Jul-18

Jan-19

Jul-19

Jan-20

Jul-20

$ Trillions

Outstanding Ginnie Mae Mortgage-Backed Securities

FHA VA Other

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute Note: Data as of August 2020.
State of the US Housing Market

$0.56

$0.18

$0.01

$0.11

$0.0

$0.5

$1.0

$1.5

$2.0

$2.5

$3.0

$3.5

$4.0

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Q1

2020

Q2

$ trillions

First Lien Origination Volume

19

Portfolio

PLS securitization

FHA/VA securitization

GSE securitization

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of Q2 2020.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Q1

2020

Q2

First Lien Origination Share

In the second quarter of 2020, first lien originations totaled $865 billion, up from the Q2 2019 volume of $565 

billion. The share of portfolio originations was 12.7 percent in Q2 2020, a significant decline from the 42.1 percent 

share in the same period 2019. The Q2 2020 GSE share was up significantly at 65.2 percent, compared to 38.6 

percent in Q2 2019. The FHA/VA share grew to 21.1 percent, also up compared to 17.5 percent last year. Privatelabel securitization currently tallies 1.0 percent, down from 1.6 percent one year ago, and a fraction of its share in 

the pre-bubble years. The sharp decline of the portfolio and private label channels in Q2 reflected COVID-19 

generated market liquidity issues, which made it difficult to originate mortgages in channels without government 

support. The sharp increase in the GSE share reflected the huge amount of refinances done through this channel.

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of Q2 2020. 

12.7%

1.00%

21.1%

65.2%
US Agency Market, Originations

Debt,

$9,833

household

mortgage ,s

Ginnie Mae Breakdown: Agency Gross Issuance

Issuance Year FHA VA Other Total

2000 $80.2 $18.8 $3.2 $102.2

2001 $133.8 $34.7 $3.1 $171.5

2002 $128.6 $37.9 $2.5 $169.0

2003 $147.9 $62.7 $2.5 $213.1

2004 $85.0 $31.8 $2.5 $119.2

2005 $55.7 $23.5 $2.1 $81.4

2006 $51.2 $23.2 $2.3 $76.7

2007 $67.7 $24.2 $3.0 $94.9

2008 $221.7 $39.0 $6.9 $267.6

2009 $359.9 $74.6 $16.8 $451.3

2010 $304.9 $70.6 $15.3 $390.7

2011 $216.1 $82.3 $16.9 $315.3

2012 $253.4 $131.3 $20.3 $405.0

2013 $239.2 $132.2 $22.2 $393.6

2014 $163.9 $111.4 $21.0 $296.3

2015 $261.5 $155.6 $19.2 $436.3

2016 $281.8 $206.5 $19.9 $508.2

2017 $257.6 $177.8 $20.2 $455.6

2018 $222.6 $160.8 $17.2 $400.6

2019 $266.9 $225.7 $16.0 $508.6

2020 YTD $211.6 $254.5 $14.8 $480.9

2020 % Change YOY 31.9% 109.8% 57.0% 65.1%

2020 Ann. $317.4 $381.7 $22.2 $721.3

 

Agency Gross Issuance

Issuance Year Fannie Mae Freddie Mac GSE Total Ginnie Mae Total

2000 $202.8 $157.9 $360.6 $102.2 $462.8

2001 $506.9 $378.2 $885.1 $171.5 $1,056.6

2002 $710.0 $529.0 $1,238.9 $169.0 $1,407.9

2003 $1,174.4 $700.5 $1,874.9 $213.1 $2,088.0

2004 $517.5 $355.2 $872.6 $119.2 $991.9

2005 $514.1 $379.9 $894.0 $81.4 $975.3

2006 $500.2 $352.9 $853.0 $76.7 $929.7

2007 $633.0 $433.3 $1,066.2 $94.9 $1,161.1

2008 $562.7 $348.7 $911.4 $267.6 $1,179.0

2009 $817.1 $462.9 $1,280.0 $451.3 $1,731.3

2010 $626.6 $377.0 $1,003.5 $390.7 $1,394.3

2011 $578.2 $301.2 $879.3 $315.3 $1,194.7

2012 $847.6 $441.3 $1,288.8 $405.0 $1,693.8

2013 $749.9 $426.7 $1,176.6 $393.6 $1,570.2

2014 $392.9 $258.0 $650.9 $296.3 $947.2

2015 $493.9 $351.9 $845.7 $436.3 $1,282.0

2016 $600.5 $391.1 $991.6 $508.2 $1,499.8

2017 $531.3 $345.9 $877.3 $455.6 $1,332.9

2018 $480.9 $314.1 $795.0 $400.6 $1,195.3

2019 $597.4 $445.2 $1,042.6 $508.6 $1,551.2

2020 YTD $795.1 $579.0 $1,374.1 $480.9 $1,854.9

2020 % Change YOY 137.2% 129.1% 133.7% 65.1% 111.0%

2020 Ann. $1,192.6 $868.5 $2,061.1 $721.3 $2,782.4

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute (top and bottom). 

Note : Dollar amounts are in billions. “Other“ refers to loans insured by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing and the Department of 

Agriculture’s Rural Development. All data is as of August 2020.

Agency gross issuance in the first eight months of 2020 was $1.85 trillion, greater than the 2019 full year volume 

of $1.55 trillion. 2020 is well on track to be the highest agency origination year in the 21st century. While rates 

were low in 2019, they fell even more in 2020, pushing home purchase volumes higher and refinances through the 

roof. Compared to the same period of 2019, agency gross issuance was up 111.0 percent. Ginnie Mae gross 

issuance was up by 65.1 percent and GSE gross issuance was up by 133.7 percent. Within the Ginnie Mae market, 

FHA was up by 31.9 percent and VA origination was up by 109.8 percent.

20
US Agency Market, Originations

Debt,

$9,833

household

mortgages,

Ginnie Mae Breakdown: Net Issuance

Issuance Year FHA VA Other Total

2000 $29.0 $0.3 $0.0 $29.3

2001 $0.7 -$10.6 $0.0 -$9.9

2002 -$22.5 -$28.7 $0.0 -$51.2

2003 -$56.5 -$21.1 $0.0 -$77.6

2004 -$45.2 $5.1 $0.0 -$40.1

2005 -$37.3 -$12.1 $7.2 -$42.2

2006 -$4.7 $3.8 $1.2 $0.2

2007 $20.2 $8.7 $2.0 $30.9

2008 $173.3 $17.7 $5.4 $196.4

2009 $206.4 $35.1 $15.8 $257.4

2010 $158.6 $29.6 $10.0 $198.3

2011 $102.8 $34.0 $12.8 $149.6

2012 $58.9 $45.9 $14.3 $119.1

2013 $20.7 $53.3 $13.9 $87.9

2014 -$4.8 $53.9 $12.5 $61.6

2015 $22.5 $66.9 $7.9 $97.3

2016 $45.6 $73.2 $6.0 $124.9

2017 $50.1 $76.1 $5.0 $131.3

2018 $49.2 $61.2 $3.5 $113.9

2019 $35.9 $58.0 $1.9 $95.7

2020 YTD -$26.6 $47.9 $0.7 $22.0

2020 % Change YOY -191.6% 34.4% -33.2% -66.6%

2020 Ann. -$39.9 $71.8 $1.1 $32.9

21

Agency Net Issuance

Issuance Year Fannie Mae Freddie Mac GSE Total Ginnie Mae Total

2000 $92.0 $67.8 $159.8 $29.3 $189.1

2001 $216.6 $151.8 $368.4 -$9.9 $358.5

2002 $218.9 $138.3 $357.2 -$51.2 $306.1

2003 $293.7 $41.1 $334.9 -$77.6 $257.3

2004 $32.3 $50.2 $82.5 -$40.1 $42.4

2005 $62.5 $111.7 $174.2 -$42.2 $132.0

2006 $164.3 $149.3 $313.6 $0.2 $313.8

2007 $296.1 $218.8 $514.9 $30.9 $545.7

2008 $213.0 $101.8 $314.8 $196.4 $511.3

2009 $208.1 $42.5 $250.6 $257.4 $508.0

2010 -$156.4 -$146.8 -$303.2 $198.3 -$105.0

2011 -$32.6 -$95.8 -$128.4 $149.6 $21.2

2012 $32.9 -$75.3 -$42.4 $119.1 $76.8

2013 $53.5 $11.8 $65.3 $89.6 $154.9

2014 -$4.0 $30.0 $26.0 $61.6 $87.7

2015 $3.5 $65.0 $68.4 $97.3 $172.5

2016 $60.5 $66.8 $127.4 $126.1 $261.6

2017 $83.7 $77.0 $160.7 $132.3 $293.0

2018 $81.9 $67.6 $149.4 $112.0 $261.5

2019 $87.4 $110.3 $197.8 $95.7 $293.5

2020 YTD $189.7 $163.8 $353.5 $22.0 $375.4

2020 % Change YOY 274.2% 134.6% 193.3% -66.6% 101.5%

2020 Ann. $284.5 $245.7 $530.2 $32.9 $563.2

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note : Dollar amounts are in billions. “Other“ refers to loans insured by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian

Housing and the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development. All data is as of August 2020.

The first eight months of 2020 have been very robust for agency net issuance, with $375.4 billion of net new supply, up 

101.5 percent compared with the same period of 2019. 2020 YTD Ginnie Mae net issuance is $22.0 billion, comprising 

5.9 percent of total agency net issuance. This is down substantially from 2019 levels, reflecting a contraction in FHA 

securities outstanding.
US Agency Market, Originations

Deb

 

t,

old

ges,

$9,833

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

househ

Note : Dollar amounts are in billions. “Other“ refers to loans insured by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing and the Department of 

Agriculture’s Rural Development. All data is as of August 2020.

mortga

Agency gross issuance moves inversely to interest rates, generally declining as interest rates rise, increasing when 

interest rates fall, but the seasonal trend is also very strong. This table allows for a comparison with the same 

month in previous years. The August 2020 gross agency issuance of $324.8 billion was significantly higher than 

the same month in 2019, and the highest since we have tracked issuance, as lower rates gave borrowers a 

stronger incentive to refinance.

22

Date

Gross Issuance Net Issuance

Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Ginnie Mae Total Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Ginnie Mae Total

Jan-17 $55.6 $38.5 $42.6 $136.6 $8.5 $10.7 $10.3 $29.5

Feb-17 $37.6 $27.4 $33.1 $98.1 $2.5 $6.5 $9.4 $18.5

Mar-17 $39.5 $24.4 $31.3 $95.2 $9.7 $6.2 $9.7 $25.6

Apr-17 $39.3 $21.2 $36.4 $97.0 $3.3 $0.4 $11.7 $15.4

May-17 $40.3 $22.6 $36.4 $99.3 $7.7 $2.7 $13.3 $23.8

Jun-17 $45.7 $25.1 $39.9 $110.7 $7.9 $2.4 $13.3 $23.5

Jul-17 $45.3 $27.6 $40.6 $113.5 $5.6 $3.5 $12.3 $21.5

Aug-17 $49.1 $29.3 $42.8 $121.1 $12.0 $6.7 $15.4 $34.1

Sep-17 $47.3 $27.9 $40.2 $115.5 $7.7 $3.8 $10.6 $22.0

Oct-17 $42.9 $34.6 $38.4 $115.9 $5.5 $12.5 $11.0 $28.9

Nov-17 $43.5 $37.2 $37.8 $118.5 $3.9 $13.6 $8.3 $25.8

Dec-17 $45.3 $30.0 $36.2 $111.5 $9.2 $8.1 $7.0 $24.4

Jan-18 $47.4 $21.4 $35.2 $104.0 $12.1 $0.2 $7.7 $20.0

Feb-18 $40.3 $21.5 $31.9 $93.7 $8.3 $2.2 $7.1 $17.6

Mar-18 $35.6 $21.3 $29.0 $85.9 $4.9 $3.0 $6.3 $14.1

Apr-18 $36.3 $26.2 $32.7 $95.2 $1.7 $6.0 $8.8 $16.5

May-18 $38.9 $27.5 $33.7 $100.1 $5.1 $7.2 $10.5 $22.8

Jun-18 $38.2 $28.8 $35.6 $102.5 $2.5 $6.8 $10.3 $19.6

Jul-18 $40.3 $26.2 $35.6 $102.1 $4.2 $3.7 $10.4 $18.3

Aug-18 $50.4 $29.9 $37.5 $117.8 $15.8 $7.9 $12.5 $36.1

Sep-18 $41.8 $30.1 $34.8 $106.6 $5.9 $6.2 $9.0 $21.1

Oct-18 $39.8 $27.4 $33.2 $100.3 $9.7 $7.1 $11.4 $28.2

Nov-18 $35.1 $30.1 $32.4 $97.6 $3.6 $11.0 $9.8 $24.4

Dec-18 $36.9 $23.9 $28.4 $89.1 $8.2 $6.4 $8.2 $22.8

Jan-19 $33.3 $19.2 $29.0 $81.6 $5.9 $2.5 $9.2 $17.6

Feb-19 $27.3 $19.9 $23.5 $70.7 $1.4 $3.4 $4.6 $9.3

Mar-19 $29.6 $27.3 $26.6 $83.5 $1.8 $10.3 $5.6 $17.6

Apr-19 $33.1 $30.8 $32.9 $96.8 $1.3 $10.8 $8.3 $20.4

May-19 $44.5 $34.3 $38.8 $117.6 $6.7 $9.8 $9.4 $26.0

Jun-19 $44.6 $34.0 $43.3 $121.9 $1.9 $5.9 $9.0 $16.8

Jul-19 $51.7 $36.9 $45.9 $134.5 $10.9 $10.1 $11.0 $32.0

Aug-19 $71.1 $50.4 $51.2 $172.6 $20.8 $17.1 $8.7 $46.6

Sep-19 $67.1 $43.0 $52.0 $162.1 $14.1 $7.5 $6.5 $28.0

Oct-19 $65.0 $46.2 $58.4 $169.6 $7.4 $7.1 $11.9 $26.5

Nov-19 $68.1 $50.7 $54.3 $173.1 $5.2 $8.6 $4.1 $18.0

Dec-19 $62.1 $52.5 $52.7 $167.3 $10.1 $17.3 $7.4 $34.7

Jan-20 $61.7 $51.4 $56.0 $169.0 $9.1 $16.5 $8.6 $34.2

Feb-20 $56.5 $39.5 $51.2 $147.2 $9.4 $7.9 $7.1 $24.4

Mar-20 $69.5 $41.1 $53.0 $163.9 $17.9 $6.3 $8.8 $33.0

Apr-20 $101.6 $76.3 $61.4 $239.3 $30.5 $27.5 $10.2 $68.2

May-20 $124.3 $70.6 $60.8 $255.7 $35.2 $8.2 $5.7 $49.1

Jun-20 $118.9 $78.1 $58.5 $255.4 $30.0 $15.9 $1.3 $47.2

Jul-20 $125.0 $108.1 $66.5 $299.5 $23.4 $38.0 -$15.5 $45.9

Aug-20 $137.6 $113.6 $73.6 $324.8 $34.2 $43.4 -$4.1 $73.5

Monthly Agency Issuance
$5.5 $0

$78.4

$58.0

$14.7

$2.6 

.2

$0.6

$14.9

$19.4

$6.2

$2.1 $0.8

$3.1

$28.1

$18.3

$3.3

$0.6

$0.2 

$0

$20

$40

$60

$80

$100

$120

$140

2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5

Streamlined Cash-out Not streamlined, not cash-out

Coupon

$ billions

Ginnie Mae Refinance Issuance by Type: 2020 YTD

US Agency Market, Originations

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Note: Based on at-issuance balance. Data as of August 2020.

23

The FHA refinance share stood at 34.5 percent in August 2020, below the 68.1 percent refi share for GSE 

originations and the 64.4 percent share for the VA. Refinances as a share of all originations grew during 2019 and 

early 2020 as interest rates fell. Refinances have declined slightly from their peaks but remain at high levels, as 

interest rates have stabilized at generational lows. The bottom section shows that nearly all of 2020 YTD Ginnie 

Mae refinances, predominantly streamlined, were securitized in lower coupon pools. Cash-out refinances are 

typically securitized in higher coupons, but their volume has fallen sharply in recent months due to restrictions 

Ginnie Mae put in place in late 2019, to combat the “churning” problem.

68.1%

34.5%

64.4%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Aug-14

Oct-14

Dec-14

Feb-15

Apr-15

Jun-15

Aug-15

Oct-15

Dec-15

Feb-16

Apr-16

Jun-16

Aug-16

Oct-16

Dec-16

Feb-17

Apr-17

Jun-17

Aug-17

Oct-17

Dec-17

Feb-18

Apr-18

Jun-18

Aug-18

Oct-18

Dec-18

Feb-19

Apr-19

Jun-19

Aug-19

Oct-19

Dec-19

Feb-20

Apr-20

Jun-20

Aug-20

Percent Refi at Issuance

Refishare GSE FHA VA

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Based on at-issuance balance. Data as of August 2020.
Credit Box

42.2%

45.8%

69.0%

52.5%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Dec-14Apr-15Aug-15Dec-15Apr-16Aug-16Dec-16 Apr-17Aug-17Dec-17 Apr-18Aug-18Dec-18Apr-19Aug-19Dec-19Apr-20Aug-20

First-time homebuyer share (%)

First Time Homebuyer Share: Purchase Only Loans

Freddie Fannie Ginnie All

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

The first time homebuyer share of Ginnie Mae purchase loans was 69.0 percent in August 2020, down slightly 

from 70.1 percent in August 2019. First time homebuyers comprise a significantly higher share of the Ginnie 

Mae purchase market than of the GSE purchase market, with first time homebuyers accounting for 45.8 

percent and 42.2 percent of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase originations, respectively. The bottom table 

shows that based on mortgages originated in August 2020, the average first-time homebuyer was more likely 

than an average repeat buyer to take out a smaller loan, have a lower credit score, a higher LTV, a similar DTI, 

and pay a slightly higher rate.

24

Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Ginnie Mae All

First-Time Repeat First-Time Repeat First-Time Repeat First-Time Repeat

Loan Amount ($ ) 286,104 310,270 270,066 297,680 240,707 298,029 260,885 302,015 

Credit Score 748.6 759.4 747.1 757.6 690.1 709.1 722.5 745.6

LTV (%) 88.0 80.4 88.3 79.5 97.1 96.2 92.1 84.1

DTI (%) 34.1 35.1 34.4 35.6 41.2 41.6 37.3 37.0

Loan Rate (%) 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. 

Note: In May 2017 Ginnie Mae began disclosing issuer-reported LTV for FHA loans, which includes the financed upfront mortgage insurance 

premium. To make it consistent with the previously reported LTV, we removed the financed upfront mortgage insurance premium by 

subtracting 169 bps from this new issuer-reported LTV. Data as of August 2020.
Credit Box

78.5%

51.6%

77.1%

69.0%

40%

45%

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

75%

80%

85%

90%

Nov-14Mar-15 Jul-15 Nov-15Mar-16 Jul-16 Nov-16Mar-17 Jul-17 Nov-17Mar-18 Jul-18 Nov-18Mar-19 Jul-19 Nov-19Mar-20 Jul-20

First-time homebuyer share (%)

First Time Homebuyer Share: 

Ginnie Mae Breakdown

 

FHA VA Other All

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: “Other“ refersto loansinsured by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing and the Department of

Agriculture’s Rural Development. In May 2017 Ginnie Mae began disclosing issuer-reported LTV for FHA loans, which includes the financed upfront 

mortgage insurance premium. To make it consistent with the previously reported LTV, we removed the financed upfront mortgage insurance premium by 

subtracting 169 bps from this new issuer-reported LTV. Data as of August 2020.

Within the Ginnie Mae purchase market, 77.1 percent of FHA loans, 51.6 percent of VA loans and 78.5 percent of 

other loans represent financing for first-time home buyers in August 2020. The bottom table shows that based on 

mortgages originated in August 2020, the average first-time homebuyer was more likely than an average repeat 

buyer to take out a smaller loan, have a lower credit score, higher LTV, similar DTI and pay a slightly higher rate.

25

FHA VA Other Ginnie Mae Total

First-Time Repeat First-Time Repeat First-Time Repeat First-Time Repeat

Loan Amount ($) 230,464 249,919 297,398 353,782 172,867 180,730 240,707 298,029 

Credit Score 679.2 680.2 714.5 734.6 701.0 701.3 690.1 709.1

LTV (%) 95.8 94.5 99.6 97.2 99.5 99.1 97.1 96.2

DTI (%) 42.7 43.6 39.5 40.7 35.1 35.1 41.2 41.6

Loan Rate (%) 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.2

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Includes only purchase loans. Data as of August 2020.
Credit Box

Sources: Credit Bureau Data and Urban Institute. 

Note: Data as of August 2017.

FICO Score Distribution: Mortgage Owners vs All Consumers

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

300-500500-520520-540540-560560-580580-600600-620620-640640-660660-680680-700700-720720-740740-760760-780780-800800-820820-850

All Consumers Mortgage owners

All Consumers- Percentiles

Minimum P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 Maximum

300 503 524 587 682 774 813 822 839

26

Mortgage Owners- Percentiles

Minimum P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 Maximum

300 570 615 682 752 801 818 824 839

Consumers who have a mortgage are concentrated at the high end of the general credit score spectrum. The top 

table shows that the median FICO score for all consumers (682) is equal to the 25th percentile of those with a 

mortgage (682).
t,

rtgages,

house

mortg

$9,833

hold

Deb

Purchase FICO

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 419,918 657 714 743 782 800 735 

Fannie 158,959 693 734 762 794 803 754 

Freddie 120,976 694 727 764 790 803 756 

Ginnie 139,983 635 656 687 733 777 696 

Refi FICO

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 682,206 688 728 769 794 807 757 

Fannie 327,452 703 740 774 796 808 764 

Freddie 269,850 698 734 771 794 807 761 

Ginnie 84,904 642 674 718 770 797 718 

All FICO

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 1,102,124 673 714 760 790 804 749 

Fannie 486,411 700 734 770 794 807 761 

Freddie 390,826 697 732 769 793 806 759 

Ginnie 224,887 638 661 697 750 788 704 

 

Purchase FICO: Ginnie Mae Breakdown By Source

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 139,983 635 656 687 733 777 696 

FHA 81,532 629 648 673 705 742 679 

VA 45,576 648 678 727 773 797 724 

Other 12,875 646 665 696 734 767 701 

Refi FICO: Ginnie Mae Breakdown By Source

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 84,904 642 674 718 770 797 718 

FHA 23,070 621 647 675 706 747 677 

VA 60,819 657 693 741 781 802 734 

Other 1,015 650 674 713 754 780 708 

All FICO: Ginnie Mae Breakdown By Source

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 224,887 638 661 697 750 788 704 

FHA 104,602 628 648 673 705 743 679 

VA 106,395 652 687 735 778 800 730 

Other 13,890 646 665 698 735 769 702 

August 2020 Credit Box at a Glance

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: “Other“ refers to loans insured by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing and the Department of

Agriculture’s Rural Development.Data as of August 2020.

In August 2020, the median Ginnie Mae FICO score was 697 versus 770 for Fannie Mae and 769 Freddie Mac. Note 

that the FICO score for the 10th percentile was 638 for Ginnie Mae, versus 700 for Fannie Mae and 697 for Freddie 

Mac. Within the Ginnie Mae market, FHA loans have a median FICO score of 673, VA loans have a median FICO score 

of 735 and other loans have a median FICO score of 698.

27
August 2020 Credit Box at a Glance

old

m rtgages,

Debt,

househ

or

$9,833

Purchase LTV

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 420,468 73.0 80.0 95.0 96.5 100.0 87.7 

Fannie 158,909 66.0 80.0 85.0 95.0 97.0 83.1 

Freddie 121,015 66.0 80.0 85.0 95.0 95.0 83.1 

Ginnie 140,544 94.8 96.5 96.5 100.0 101.0 96.8

Refi LTV

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 718,075 45.0 58.0 70.0 80.0 91.3 68.8 

Fannie 327,466 42.0 55.0 67.0 76.0 80.0 64.6 

Freddie 269,859 44.0 56.0 69.0 77.0 83.0 65.5 

Ginnie 120,750 70.6 81.5 91.0 97.2 99.9 87.7 

All LTV

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 1,138,543 50.0 64.0 79.0 93.4 96.6 75.8 

Fannie 486,375 46.0 59.0 74.0 80.0 95.0 70.6 

Freddie 390,874 47.0 60.0 74.0 80.0 95.0 71.0 

Ginnie 261,294 79.6 90.0 96.5 99.0 100.7 92.6 

 

Purchase LTV: Ginnie Mae Breakdown By Source

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 140,544 94.8 96.5 96.5 100.0 101.0 96.8 

FHA 82,008 94.8 96.5 96.5 96.5 96.5 95.5 

VA 45,617 93.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 102.3 98.5 

Other 12,919 96.4 99.3 101.0 101.0 101.0 99.4

Refi LTV: Ginnie Mae Breakdown By Source

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 120,750 70.6 81.5 91.0 97.2 99.9 87.7 

FHA 40,683 76.8 82.9 92.7 96.7 98.0 89.0 

VA 79,018 67.6 80.7 90.0 97.9 100.5 87.0

Other 1,049 75.1 87.6 96.6 100.1 101.3 92.0 

All LTV: Ginnie Mae Breakdown By Source

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 261,294 79.6 90.0 96.5 99.0 100.7 92.6

FHA 122,691 83.5 94.4 96.5 96.5 96.6 93.3 

VA 124,635 73.1 85.3 96.6 100.0 102.3 91.2 

Other 13,968 94.9 99.1 101.0 101.0 101.0 98.9 

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: “Other“ refers to loans insured by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing and the Department of

Agriculture’s Rural Development. In May 2017 Ginnie Mae began disclosing issuer-reported LTV for FHA loans, which includes the financed 

upfront mortgage insurance premium. To make it consistent with the previously reported LTV, we removed the financed upfront mortgage 

insurance premium by subtracting 169 bps from this new issuer-reported LTV. Data as of August 2020.

In August 2020, the median loan-to-value ratio (LTV) was 96.5 percent for Ginnie Mae and 74 percent for both 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The 90th percentile was 100.7 percent for Ginnie Mae and 95 percent for both Freddie 

and Fannie. Within the Ginnie Mae market, the median LTV was 96.5 for FHA, 96.6 for VA and 101.0 for other 

programs.

28
De

mortgages,

household

$9,833

bt,

Purchase DTI

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 420,063 23.0 30.0 38.0 44.0 49.0 36.9 

Fannie 159,020 21.0 28.0 36.0 43.0 46.0 34.9 

Freddie 121,014 21.0 28.0 36.0 42.0 46.0 34.5 

Ginnie 140,029 28.3 35.0 42.0 48.3 53.5 41.3

Refi DTI

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 624,576 19.0 25.0 33.0 41.0 45.0 32.5 

Fannie 327,408 19.0 25.0 32.0 40.0 45.0 32.2 

Freddie 269,849 19.0 25.0 33.0 40.0 45.0 32.4 

Ginnie 27,319 22.0 30.0 37.6 46.0 52.3 37.4 

All DTI

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 1,044,639 20.0 27.0 35.0 42.0 47.0 34.3 

Fannie 486,428 19.0 26.0 34.0 41.0 46.0 33.1 

Freddie 390,863 20.0 26.0 34.0 41.0 45.0 33.0 

Ginnie 167,348 27.2 34.1 41.5 48.0 53.3 40.7 

 

Purchase DTI: Ginnie Mae Breakdown By Source

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 140,029 28.3 35.0 42.0 48.3 53.5 41.3 

FHA 81,924 30.7 37.3 43.9 49.6 54.1 42.9 

VA 45,224 26.2 33.0 40.6 47.5 53.2 40.1 

Other 12,881 25.6 30.7 36.0 40.3 43.2 35.1 

Refi DTI: Ginnie Mae Breakdown By Source

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 27,319 22.0 30.0 37.6 46.0 52.3 37.4

FHA 11,924 26.3 33.1 41.5 48.6 53.6 40.5 

VA 14,720 20.3 27.8 35.0 43.5 50.3 35.4 

Other 675 12.8 19.0 28.3 34.9 40.9 27.7 

All DTI: Ginnie Mae Breakdown By Source

Number of Loans P10 P25 Median P75 P90 Mean

All 167,348 27.2 34.1 41.5 48.0 53.3 40.7 

FHA 93,848 30.1 36.8 43.7 49.5 54.0 42.6 

VA 59,944 24.5 31.8 39.4 46.7 52.6 38.9 

Other 13,556 24.8 30.2 35.7 40.2 43.1 34.7 

August 2020 Credit Box at a Glance

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: “Other“ refers to loans insured by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing and the Department of

Agriculture’s Rural Development. Data as of August 2020.

In August 2020, the median Ginnie Mae debt-to-income ratio (DTI) was 41.5 percent, considerably higher than the 

34.0 percent median DTI for both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. The 90th percentile for Ginnie Mae was 53.3 

percent, also much higher than the 46.0 and 45.0 percent DTI for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, respectively. Within 

the Ginnie Mae market, the median FHA DTI ratio was 43.7 percent, versus 39.4 percent for VA and 35.7 percent for 

other lending programs.

29
Credit Box: Historical

660

680

700

720

740

760

780

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

FICO Scores

FICO Scores for Purchase Loans 

Freddie Median FICO Fannie Median FICO

Ginnie Median FICO All Median FICO

660

680

700

720

740

760

780

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

FICO Scores for Refinance Loans

Freddie Median FICO Fannie Median FICO

Ginnie Median FICO All Median FICO

769

770

697

760

660

680

700

720

740

760

780

Dec-14Apr-15Aug-15Dec-15Apr-16Aug-16Dec-16Apr-17Aug-17Dec-17Apr-18Aug-18Dec-18Apr-19Aug-19Dec-19Apr-20Aug-20

FICO Scores

FICO Scores for All Loans

30

Freddie Median FICO Fannie Median FICO Ginnie Median FICO All Median FICO

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note:Data as of August 2020. Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

The median FICO score for all agency loans originated in August 2020 was 760, up considerably since the start 

of last year, owing to the refinance wave, which higher FICO borrowers take advantage of with greater 

frequency. In addition, the increases in refinance activity have been much more dramatic at the GSEs than at 

Ginnie Mae, shifting the composition toward higher FICO scores borrowers. Note since early 2019, the median 

FICO scores for Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie borrowers have moved up for both purchase and refinance loans. 

The difference between Ginnie Mae and GSE borrower FICOs is slightly wider for purchase loans than for refi 

loans.
Credit Box: Historical

96.5

65.0

70.0

75.0

80.0

85.0

90.0

95.0

100.0

Aug-15

Oct-15

Dec-15

Feb-16

Apr-16

Jun-16

Aug-16

Oct-16

Dec-16

Feb-17

Apr-17

Jun-17

Aug-17

Oct-17

Dec-17

Feb-18

Apr-18

Jun-18

Aug-18

Oct-18

Dec-18

Feb-19

Apr-19

Jun-19

Aug-19

Oct-19

Dec-19

Feb-20

Apr-20

Jun-20

Aug-20

Loan-to-Value Ratio

LTV Ratio for All Loans

Freddie Median LTV Fannie Median LTV Ginnie Median LTV All Median LTV

Median LTVs for Ginnie Mae loans have historically been at 96.5 percent, much higher than the 74–80 LTVs 

for the GSEs. Median debt-to-income ratios for Ginnie Mae loans have historically been in the low 40s, 

considerably higher than for the GSEs. DTIs increased in the 2017-2018 period for both Ginnie Mae and 

GSE loans, with the movement more pronounced for Ginnie Mae. Increases in DTI are very typical in an 

environment of rising interest rates and rising home prices. All three agencies witnessed measurable 

declines in DTI, beginning in early 2019, driven by lower interest rates.

31

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: In May 2017 Ginnie Mae began disclosing issuer-reported LTV for FHA loans, which includes the financed 

upfront mortgage insurance premium. To make it consistent with the previously reported LTV, we removed the financed upfront mortgage insurance 

premium by subtracting 169 bps from this new issuer-reported LTV. Sources and note apply to all three graphs. Data as of August 2020.

79.0

74.0

34.0

41.4

35.0

32.0

34.0

36.0

38.0

40.0

42.0

44.0

46.0

Dec-14 Apr-15 Aug-15 Dec-15 Apr-16 Aug-16 Dec-16 Apr-17 Aug-17 Dec-17 Apr-18 Aug-18 Dec-18 Apr-19 Aug-19 Dec-19 Apr-20 Aug-20

Debt-to-Income Ratio

DTI Ratio for All Loans

Freddie Median DTI Fannie Median DTI Ginnie Median DTI All Median DTI
Credit Box: Historical

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88

FHA Cumulative Default Rate by DTI and FICO

32

DTI<=45, FICO <=660 DTI <=45, FICO>660

DTI>45, FICO <=660 DTI>45, FICO>660

Loan age

Cumulative default rate

0.00%

2.00%

4.00%

6.00%

8.00%

10.00%

12.00%

1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91

VA Cumulative Default Rate by DTI and FICO

DTI<=45, FICO <=700 DTI <=45, FICO>700

DTI>45, FICO <=700 DTI>45, FICO>700

Loan age

Cumulative default rate

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Defaults = 180 days delinquent. Data as of August 2020.

DTI is a much weaker predictor of performance than FICO score. The top chart shows FHA borrowers with higher 

DTIs do default more than those with lower DTIs, but the differences are modest, as evidenced by the fact that the 

black line is very close to the blue line and the grey line is not that much above the yellow line. By contrast, FICO 

makes a much larger difference, as can be seen by comparing the blue line to the yellow line or the black line to the 

gray line. And low DTI/low FICO borrowers default much less than high DTI/high FICO borrowers, as can be seen 

by comparing the blue line to the gray line. The bottom chart, for VA borrowers illustrates the same point; DTI is a 

much weaker predictor of loan performance than credit score.

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Defaults = 180 days delinquent. Data as of August 2020.
95%

83%

61%

42%

32%

95%

88%

61%

37%

28%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

<640 640–680 680–700 700–750 ≥ 750

33

94%

82%

61%

42%

33%

94%

86%

60%

35%

27%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

<640 640–680 680–700 700–750 ≥ 750

June 2018- September 2018 June 2020- September 2020

Credit Box: Historical

DTI < 35

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. 

Ginnie Mae Share of Agency Market by DTI and FICO for Loans with LTV ≥ 95 

35 ≤ DTI < 45 

98% 93%

80%

60%

48%

99% 98%

89%

65%

48%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

<640 640–680 680–700 700–750 ≥ 750

Credit score

Credit score

Credit score

DTI ≥ 45

This table shows Ginnie Mae’s share of agency high-LTV lending by DTI and FICO. In each DTI bucket, Ginnie 

Mae’s share is more concentrated in lower FICO scores than in higher FICO scores. In June 2020- September 

2020, Ginnie Mae accounted for 94 percent of agency issuance for DTIs under 35 and FICOs below 640, 

compared to just 27 percent for DTIs below 35 and FICO 750 and higher. The Ginnie/GSE split in the 35-45 DTI 

bucket looks a lot like the below 35 percent DTI bucket. In June 2020− September 2020, Ginnie Mae’s share of 

issuance was higher for DTIs of 45 and above, as compared with the two lower DTI buckets. Ginnie Mae share of 

loans with a DTI of 45 and above and a FICO of 680-700 was 89 percent; it was between 60-61 percent for the 

same FICO in the lower DTI buckets. Comparing this period to 2 years earlier, it is clear the GSEs have stepped 

up their higher LTV lending for borrowers with FICOs of 700 or higher for DTIs less than 45 (the less than 35 and 

the 35-45 buckets).
High LTV Loans: Ginnie Mae vs. 

GSEs

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

June 2018-September 2018

FICO

DTI <640 640–680 680–700 700–750 ≥ 750 All

34

< 35 2.8% 4.7% 2.6% 6.9% 8.9% 25.9%

35 −45 5.4% 9.0% 4.8% 11.2% 9.9% 40.2%

≥ 45 4.8% 8.9% 4.3% 9.2% 6.6% 33.9%

All 13.0% 22.6% 11.7% 27.2% 25.5% 100.0%

June 2020-September 2020

FICO

DTI <640 640–680 680–700 700–750 ≥ 750 All

< 35 1.7% 4.7% 2.9% 8.8% 13.0% 31.0%

35 −45 3.0% 8.7% 5.0% 13.1% 12.6% 42.4%

≥ 45 2.4% 7.1% 3.5% 7.6% 6.0% 26.6%

All 7.1% 20.5% 11.4% 29.5% 31.6% 100.0%

Agency Market Share by DTI and FICO for Loans with LTV ≥ 95

Share of Loans with LTV ≥ 95

Ginnie Mae GSE All

June 2018- September 2018 73.0% 22.1% 39.1%

June 2020- September 2020 73.6% 10.7% 20.6%

Ginnie Mae dominates high-LTV lending, with 73.6 percent of its issuances in the June 2020- September 2020 

period having LTVs of 95 or above, compared to 10.7 percent for the GSEs. The GSEs have decreased their highLTV lending share from 22.1 percent in June 2018− September 2018. Ginnie Mae’s high-LTV lending has grown 

over the same period from 73.0 percent. The share of high-LTV agency loans going to highest FICO borrowers 

(i.e. above 750) has increased from the June 2018-September 2018 period to the June 2020-September 2020 

period, as has the share of lower DTI borrowers (below 35).
Nonbank Originators

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute

Note:Data as of August 2020.

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: “Other“ refers to loans insured by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing and the Department of Agriculture’s Rural 

Development. Data as of August 2020.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Aug-13

Oct-13

Dec-13

Feb-14

Apr-14

Jun-14

Aug-14

Oct-14

Dec-14

Feb-15

Apr-15

Jun-15

Aug-15

Oct-15

Dec-15

Feb-16

Apr-16

Jun-16

Aug-16

Oct-16

Dec-16

Feb-17

Apr-17

Jun-17

Aug-17

Oct-17

Dec-17

Feb-18

Apr-18

Jun-18

Aug-18

Oct-18

Dec-18

Feb-19

Apr-19

Jun-19

Aug-19

Oct-19

Dec-19

Feb-20

Apr-20

Jun-20

35

Aug-20

Nonbank Origination Share: All Loans

All Fannie Freddie Ginnie

91.4%

68.8%

63.7%

61.1%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Aug-13

Dec-13

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

All Fannie Freddie Ginnie

Nonbank Origination Share: 

Refinance Loans

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Aug-13

Dec-13

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

All Fannie Freddie Ginnie

Nonbank Origination Share: 

Purchase Loans

The nonbank origination share has been rising steadily for all three agencies since 2013. The Ginnie Mae 

nonbank share has been consistently higher than the GSEs, standing at 91.4 percent in August 2020, a new 

record high. Freddie’s nonbank share fell to 61.1 percent, while Fannie’s nonbank share fell to 63.7 percent in 

August (note that these numbers can be volatile on a month-to-month basis). Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac have 

higher nonbank origination shares for refi activity than for purchase activity; Fannie Mae has a higher share for 

purchase activity. Freddie Mac’s nonbank share is the lowest among the three agencies for both purchase and 

refinance loans.
Ginnie Mae Nonbank Originators 

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute

Note:Data as of August 2020.

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: “Other“ refers to loans insured by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing and the Department of Agriculture’s Rural 

Development. Data as of August 2020.

In August 2020, Ginnie Mae’s nonbank share rose to 91.4 percent. The nonbank originator share for FHA grew 

slightly to 93.8 percent in August, compared to 92.4 percent the previous month. The nonbank originator share 

for VA was higher than last month at 89.8 percent and the nonbank originator share for other loans, which can 

fluctuate quite a bit month to month, rose to 89.9 percent.

36

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Aug-13

Oct-13

Dec-13

Feb-14

Apr-14

Jun-14

Aug-14

Oct-14

Dec-14

Feb-15

Apr-15

Jun-15

Aug-15

Oct-15

Dec-15

Feb-16

Apr-16

Jun-16

Aug-16

Oct-16

Dec-16

Feb-17

Apr-17

Jun-17

Aug-17

Oct-17

Dec-17

Feb-18

Apr-18

Jun-18

Aug-18

Oct-18

Dec-18

Feb-19

Apr-19

Jun-19

Aug-19

Oct-19

Dec-19

Feb-20

Apr-20

Jun-20

Aug-20

Non-bank originator share

Ginnie Mae Nonbank Originator Share: All Loans

All FHA VA Other

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Aug-13

Dec-13

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

Non-bank originator share

Ginnie Mae Nonbank Share: 

Purchase Loans

All FHA VA Other

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Aug-13

Dec-13

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

Ginnie Mae Nonbank Share: 

Refinance Loans

All FHA VA Other

94%

91%

90%
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. 

Note: Data as of August 2020. 

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. 

Note: Data as of August 2020. 

761

770

755

680

690

700

710

720

730

740

750

760

770

780

Feb-14

Apr-14

Jun-14

Aug-14

Oct-14

Dec-14

Feb-15

Apr-15

Jun-15

Aug-15

Oct-15

Dec-15

Feb-16

Apr-16

Jun-16

Aug-16

Oct-16

Dec-16

Feb-17

Apr-17

Jun-17

Aug-17

Oct-17

Dec-17

Feb-18

Apr-18

Jun-18

Aug-18

Oct-18

Dec-18

Feb-19

Apr-19

Jun-19

37

Aug-19

Oct-19

Dec-19

Feb-20

Apr-20

Jun-20

Aug-20

Agency FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank

FICO All Median FICO Bank Median FICO Nonbank Median FICO

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020. 

660

680

700

720

740

760

780

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

All Median FICO Bank Median FICO

Nonbank Median FICO

Ginnie Mae FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank

660

680

700

720

740

760

780

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

All Median FICO Bank Median FICO

Nonbank Median FICO

GSE FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank

Nonbank Credit Box

FICO FICO

Nonbank originators have played a key role in opening up access to credit. FICO scores for loans originated by 

nonbanks are lower than their bank counterparts. Within the GSE space, where the differentials between banks and 

non-banks are small, FICO scores for both have increased since early 2014. The sharp rise in bank and non-bank FICOs 

reflects an increase in GSE refinance activity, producing a shift in their business mix toward higher FICO activities. 

Within the Ginnie Mae space, FICO scores for bank originations are much higher since early 2014 while nonbank 

FICOs are up somewhat less. This reflects both the sharp cut-back in FHA lending by many banks, and increased refi 

activity for higher FICO borrowers.
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020. Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020. 

66

68

70

72

74

76

78

80

82

84

86

88

90

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

GSE LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank

All Median LTV Bank Median LTV

Nonbank Median LTV

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

All Median LTV Bank Median LTV

Nonbank Median LTV

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020. 

38

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

All Median DTI Bank Median DTI

Nonbank Median DTI

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

GSE DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank

All Median DTI Bank Median DTI

Nonbank Median DTI

Nonbank Credit Box

Ginnie Mae LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank

Ginnie Mae DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank

LTV LTV

DTI DTI

The median LTVs for nonbank and bank originations are comparable, while the median DTI for nonbank loans is higher 

than for bank loans, indicating that nonbanks are more accommodating in both this and the FICO dimension. Between 

early 2017 and early 2019, there was a substantial increase in DTIs; over the subsequent months, this has mostly 

reversed in the Ginnie Mae space, and more than completely reversed for the GSEs, leaving GSE DTIs lower than they 

have been at any point in the last 7 years. This is true for both Ginnie Mae and the GSEs, for banks and nonbanks. As 

interest rates increased, DTIs rose, because borrower payments were driven up relative to incomes. With the fall in 

interest rates in 2019 and 2020, DTIs have dropped.
650

660

670

680

690

700

710

720

730

740

750

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

FICO scores

Ginnie Mae VA FICO Scores: Bank 

vs. Nonbank

VA All Median FICO VA Bank Median FICO

VA Nonbank Median FICO

Ginnie Mae Nonbank Originators: 

Credit Box

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute

Note:Data as of August 2020.

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute

Note: “Other“ refers to loans insured by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing 

and the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development. Data as of August 2020.

The median FICO score for Ginnie Mae nonbank originators climbed in August 2020. Bank FICOs are 17 points 

above non-banks. The gap between banks and non-banks is very apparent for all categories of government 

lending.

39

650

660

670

680

690

700

710

720

730

740

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

FICO score

Ginnie Mae FICO Scores: 

Bank vs. Nonbank

All Median FICO Bank Median FICO

Nonbank Median FICO

650

660

670

680

690

700

710

720

730

740

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

Ginnie Mae FHA FICO Scores: 

Bank vs. Nonbank

FHA All Median FICO FHA Bank Median FICO

FHA Nonbank Median FICO

650

660

670

680

690

700

710

720

730

740

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

Ginnie Mae Other FICO Scores: 

Bank vs. Nonbank

Other All Median FICO Other Bank Median FICO

Other Nonbank Median FICO

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute Note:Data as of August 2020. Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute Note:Data as of August 2020.
34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

FICO scores

Ginnie Mae VA DTI: Bank vs. 

Nonbank

VA All Median DTI VA Bank Median DTI

VA Nonbank Median DTI

Ginnie Mae Nonbank Originators: 

Credit Box

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute

Note:Data as of August 2020.

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute

Note: “Other“ refers to loans insured by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing 

and the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development. Data as of August 2020.

An analysis of borrowers’ DTI ratios for bank versus non-bank originators indicates that the former have a 

lower median DTI. The DTIs for FHA and VA borrowers experienced notable increases during 2017 and 2018 

for both banks and nonbank originators, while the Other origination DTIs stayed relatively flat. Rising DTIs are 

expected in a rising rate environment. After peaking in January 2019, Ginnie DTIs have reverted to 2017 levels, 

as rates have declined.

40

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

FICO score

Ginnie Mae DTI: 

Bank vs. Nonbank

All Median DTI Bank Median DTI

Nonbank Median DTI

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

Ginnie Mae FHA DTI: Bank vs. 

Nonbank

FHA All Median DTI FHA Bank Median DTI

FHA Nonbank Median DTI

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

Ginnie Mae Other DTI: Bank vs. 

Nonbank

Other All Median DTI Other Bank Median DTI

Other Nonbank Median DTI

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute Note:Data as of August 2020. Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute Note:Data as of August 2020.
Holders of Ginnie Mae MSRs

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note:Data as of August 2020.

Top 30 Holders of Ginnie Mae Mortgage Servicing Rights (MSRs), by UPB

41

Rank MSR Holder UPB ($ millions) Share Cumulative 

Share

1 Lakeview $206,476 12.6% 12.6%

2 PennyMac $191,651 11.7% 24.3%

3 Wells Fargo $176,629 10.8% 35.0%

4 Freedom Home Mortgage $119,358 7.3% 42.3%

5 Nationstar $97,684 5.4% 47.7%

6 Quicken Loans $69,561 4.2% 51.9%

7 Newrez $51,709 3.2% 55.1%

8 US Bank $50,368 3.1% 58.2%

9 Carrington Mortgage $44,085 2.7% 60.8%

10 Caliber Home Loans $39,835 2.4% 63.3%

11 USAA Federal Savings Bank $39,064 2.4% 65.7%

12 Truist Bank $29,775 1.8% 67.5%

13 Navy Federal Credit Union $28,710 1.7% 69.2%

14 Amerihome Mortgage $28,012 1.7% 70.9%

15 Home Point Financial Corporation $22,676 1.4% 72.3%

16 The Money Source $20,644 1.3% 73.6%

17 Loan Depot $18,239 1.1% 74.7%

18 JP Morgan Chase $17,734 1.1% 75.8%

19 Midfirst Bank $17,152 1.0% 76.8%

20 Guild Mortgage $16,255 1.0% 77.8%

21 M&T Bank $14,896 0.9% 78.7%

22 Roundpoint Mortgage $14,736 0.9% 79.6%

23 Citizens Bank $13,693 0.8% 80.4%

24 PHH Mortgage $13,365 0.8% 81.3%

25 Shore Financial $13,238 0.8% 82.1%

26 Planet Home Lending $12,246 0.7% 82.8%

27 Flagstar Bank $10,987 0.7% 83.5%

28 Pingora $10,674 0.7% 84.1%

29 Fifth Third Bank $9,632 0.6% 84.7%

30 Bank of America $9,395 0.6% 85.3%

This table shows 30 largest owners of mortgage servicing rights (MSR) by UPB for Ginnie Mae securitizations. As 

of August 2020, over half (51.9 percent) of the Ginnie Mae MSRs are owned by the top six firms. The top 30 firms 

collectively own 85.3 percent. Eighteen of these 30 are non-depositories, the remaining 12 are depository 

institutions.
74.6%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Share of outstanding loans by UPB

The composition of the largest owners of Ginnie Mae MSR has evolved quite a bit over time. In December 2013, 

Wells Fargo and JP Morgan Chase were the two largest owners of Ginnie Mae MSRs, holding $375 billion and 

$139 billion in servicing UPB respectively. In August 2020, Wells Fargo’s holdings of MSRs dipped to $176.6 

billion, below the $206.5 and $191.7 billion held by Lakeview and PennyMac, respectively (both nonbanks). 

Freedom Home Mortgage and Nationstar (both nonbanks) make up the remainder of the top five largest holders 

of MSRs, owning $119 billion and $89 billion respectively as of August 2020. Nonbanks collectively owned 

servicing rights for 74.6 percent of all outstanding unpaid principal balance guaranteed by Ginnie Mae in August 

2020. In December 2013, the nonbank share was much smaller at 27.7 percent. 

Holders of Ginnie Mae MSRs

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

Share of Ginnie Mae MSRs held by Nonbanks

Top 5 MSR Holders: Outstanding Ginnie Mae Loans by UPB

42

$191,651

$88,707

$206,476

$176,629

$119,358

$0

$50,000

$100,000

$150,000

$200,000

$250,000

$300,000

$350,000

$400,000

$450,000

1. Lakeview 2. PennyMac

3. Wells Fargo 4. Freedom Home Mortgage

UPB ($ millions) 5. Nationstar
Prepayments

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

Mar-13 Sep-13 Mar-14 Sep-14 Mar-15 Sep-15 Mar-16 Sep-16 Mar-17 Sep-17 Mar-18 Sep-18 Mar-19 Sep-19 Mar-20 Sep-20

Constant Prepayment Rate (%)

2011 Issued 4.0 Coupon CPR

43

Fannie 2011 4.0 Coupon CPR Freddie 2011 4.0 Coupon CPR Ginnie II 2011 4.0 Coupon CPR

Sources: Credit Suisse and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Sources: Credit Suisse and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.

While prepayment speeds on all securities have risen since early 2019, the speed increase has been especially 

dramatic in 2020, with speeds on both Ginnie II and GSE securities rising rapidly due to a sharp drop in rates. At 

this point, the speeds on GSE securities have largely converged with those on Ginnie II securities, as the former 

have ramped up more quickly in the last few months. The faster Ginnie speeds from 2013-early 2020 reflected 

the growing share of VA loans, which tend to prepay faster than either FHA or GSE loans. In addition, FHA puts 

fewer restrictions on streamlined refinances, and some of the upfront mortgage insurance premium can also be 

applied to the refinanced loan.

33%

32%

29%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Sep 11 Mar 12 Sep 12 Mar 13 Sep 13 Mar 14 Sep 14 Mar 15 Sep 15 Mar 16 Sep 16 Mar 17 Sep 17 Mar 18 Sep 18 Mar 19 Sep 19 Mar 20 Sep 20

Constant prepayment rate (%)

Aggregate Prepayments

Fannie CPR Freddie CPR Ginnie I CPR Ginnie II CPR

43%

42%

40%

34%
Prepayments

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

May-15Sep-15 Jan-16 May-16Sep-16 Jan-17 May-17Sep-17 Jan-18 May-18Sep-18 Jan-19 May-19Sep-19 Jan-20 May-20Sep-20

Constant Prepayment Rate (%)

2015 Issued 3.5 Coupon CPR

44

Fannie 2015 3.5 Coupon CPR Freddie 2015 3.5 Coupon CPR Ginnie II 2015 3.5 Coupon CPR

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

Mar-17 Sep-17 Mar-18 Sep-18 Mar-19 Sep-19 Mar-20 Sep-20

Constant Prepayment Rate (%)

2016 Issued 3.0 Coupon CPR

Fannie 2016 3.0 Coupon CPR Freddie 2016 3.0 Coupon CPR Ginnie II 2016 3.0 Coupon CPR

Sources: Credit Suisse and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Sources: Credit Suisse and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Speeds on the 2015 3.5s and the 2016 3.0s, the largest coupon cohorts of those vintage years, have been 

increasing since early 2019.; the speed increases have been especially dramatic in 2020 due to a sharp drop in 

rates, with speeds on both Ginnie II and GSE securities rising rapidly. The speeds on the 2015-issued Ginnie 3.5s 

fell slightly below their conventional counterparts in August 2020, although the speeds on the 2016-issued 

Ginnie Mae 3.0s remain very comparable to their conventional counterparts. The faster historical speeds on the 

Ginnie Mae cohorts reflect the fact that 2015 and 2016 Ginnie originations consist of a large component of VA 

loans, which prepay faster than either FHA or GSE loans. The FHA streamlined programs are likely another 

contributor to the historically faster speeds.

45%

43%

45%

43%

37%
Prepayments

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Jun-18 Sep-18 Dec-18 Mar-19 Jun-19 Sep-19 Dec-19 Mar-20 Jun-20 Sep-20

Constant Prepayment Rate (%)

2018 Issued 4.0 Coupon CPR

Fannie 2018 4.0 Coupon CPR

45

Freddie 2018 4.0 Coupon CPR Ginnie II 2018 4.0 Coupon CPR

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Jun-17 Sep-17 Dec-17 Mar-18 Jun-18 Sep-18 Dec-18 Mar-19 Jun-19 Sep-19 Dec-19 Mar-20 Jun-20 Sep-20

Constant Prepayment Rate (%)

2017 Issued 3.5 Coupon CPR

Fannie 2017 3.5 Coupon CPR Freddie 2017 3.5 Coupon CPR Ginnie II 2017 3.5 Coupon CPR

Sources: Credit Suisse and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Sources: Credit Suisse and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.

The charts below show the behavior of the 2017-issued 3.5s and the 2018-issued 4.0s, the largest coupon 

cohorts of those vintage years. Despite slower seasoning, 2017 Ginnie II 3.5s were prepaying faster than their 

conventional counterparts from late 2017 to March 2020, due primarily to fast VA prepayment speeds. 

Similarly, the 2018 Ginnie II 4.0s prepaid more slowly than their conventional counterparts until January of 

2019. In 2019, speeds of 2018 4.0s and 2017 3.5s accelerated, and Ginnie II speeds accelerated more than 

their conventional counterparts. However, in early 2020 conventional speeds accelerated more than Ginnie

speeds. Since March 2020, conventional speeds have exceeded those of the Ginnie cohorts.

50%

49%

43%

50%

44%
Prepayments

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445

Constant Prepayment Rate (%)

2017 Issued 4.0 Coupon CPR, by Loan Age

46

Fannie 2017 4.0 Coupon CPR Freddie 2017 4.0 Coupon CPR Ginnie II 2017 4.0 Coupon CPR

Loan age

Sources: Credit Suisse and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Sources: Credit Suisse and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.

The charts below show the prepayment speeds by loan age for 2017 Ginnie II 4.0s and 2018 Ginnie II 4.5s—the 

cohorts 50 basis points above the largest coupon cohort for those years. Prepayment speeds on the 2017 Ginnie 

II 4.0s jumped up sharply at the 7-9 month loan age, reflecting abuse of the VA Streamlined Refi program 

(IRRRL). The 2018 Ginnie II 4.5s do not show increased speeds until the 9-10 month point; reflecting both the 

effect of lower rates and the actions taken by both Ginnie Mae and the VA in H1 2018 to curb this abuse. Ginnie 

Mae actions have included suspending a few servicers whose VA prepayment speeds are especially high from 

selling VA loans into Ginnie Mae II securities, as well as rewriting the pooling requirements so that if loans that 

do not meet the seasoning requirement are refinanced, the new loan is ineligible for securitization. Ginnie’s 

latest action on this front became effective for securities issued on or after Nov 1 2019. It bars the securitization 

of over 90% LTV cash-out refinances into Ginnie I and Ginnie II pools (custom pools excepted). In addition, VA 

has implemented a net tangible benefit test, requiring the lender to show the borrower has obtained a benefit 

from the refinance. The recent experience of these cohorts indicates that, as a result of the cumulative actions 

taken in response to “churning” plus the acceleration of speeds in the conventional market in response to lower 

rates, Ginnie Mae and conventional speeds on 2017 issues 4.0s and 2018 4.5 have largely converged for 

mortgages 42 and 30 months old, respectively.

38.8%

36.0%

35.5%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Constant Prepayment Rate (%)

2018 Issued 4.5 Coupon CPR, by Loan Age

Fannie 2018 4.5 Coupon CPR Freddie 2018 4.5 Coupon CPR Ginnie II 2018 4.5 Coupon CPR

Loan age

40.1%

32.6%

30.7%
Reverse Mortgage Volumes

$0.86

$0.0

$0.2

$0.4

$0.6

$0.8

$1.0

$1.2

$1.4

$1.6

$ Billions

HMBS Issuance Volume

$55.2

$0

$10

$20

$30

$40

$50

$60

Feb-13

Apr-13

Jun-13

Aug-13

Oct-13

Dec-13

Feb-14

Apr-14

Jun-14

Aug-14

Oct-14

Dec-14

Feb-15

Apr-15

Jun-15

Aug-15

Oct-15

Dec-15

Feb-16

Apr-16

Jun-16

Aug-16

Oct-16

Dec-16

Feb-17

Apr-17

Jun-17

Aug-17

Oct-17

Dec-17

Feb-18

Apr-18

Jun-18

Aug-18

Oct-18

Dec-18

Feb-19

Apr-19

Jun-19

Aug-19

Oct-19

Dec-19

Feb-20

Apr-20

Jun-20

Aug-20

$ Billions

HMBS Outstanding

Other Ginnie Mae Programs

Sources: Ginnie Mae and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

Sources: Ginnie Mae and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

Ginnie Mae reverse mortgage issuance has been volatile over the past two years, but has been generally 

declining since early 2018 largely due to the implementation of the new, lower principal limit factors. August 

continued the trend, with issuance dropping to $0.86 billion. In August 2020, outstanding reverse mortgage 

securities totaled $55.2 billion, up slightly from last month, reflecting a higher volume of new issuances relative 

to paydowns.

47
Multifamily Market

$4.1

$0.0

$0.5

$1.0

$1.5

$2.0

$2.5

$3.0

$3.5

$4.0

$4.5

Feb-13

Apr-13

Jun-13

Aug-13

Oct-13

Dec-13

Feb-14

Apr-14

Jun-14

Aug-14

Oct-14

Dec-14

Feb-15

Apr-15

Jun-15

Aug-15

Oct-15

Dec-15

Feb-16

Apr-16

Jun-16

Aug-16

Oct-16

Dec-16

Feb-17

Apr-17

Jun-17

Aug-17

Oct-17

Dec-17

Feb-18

Apr-18

Jun-18

Aug-18

Oct-18

Dec-18

Feb-19

Apr-19

Jun-19

Aug-19

Oct-19

Dec-19

Feb-20

Apr-20

Jun-20

Aug-19

$ Billions

Ginnie Mae Multifamily MBS Issuance

$128.0

$0

$20

$40

$60

$80

$100

$120

$140

Feb-13

Apr-13

Jun-13

Aug-13

Oct-13

Dec-13

Feb-14

Apr-14

Jun-14

Aug-14

Oct-14

Dec-14

Feb-15

Apr-15

Jun-15

Aug-15

Oct-15

Dec-15

Feb-16

Apr-16

Jun-16

Aug-16

Oct-16

Dec-16

Feb-17

Apr-17

Jun-17

Aug-17

Oct-17

Dec-17

Feb-18

Apr-18

Jun-18

Aug-18

Oct-18

Dec-18

Feb-19

Apr-19

Jun-19

Aug-19

Oct-19

Dec-19

Feb-20

Apr-20

Jun-20

Aug-19

$ Billions

Ginnie Mae Multifamily MBS Outstanding

Other Ginnie Mae Programs

Sources: Ginnie Mae and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

Sources: Ginnie Mae and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

Ginnie Mae multifamily issuance volume in August 2020 totaled $4.1 billion, the fourth consecutive month of 

increase from the prior month, and the highest single month of issuance in the last 8 years. Outstanding 

multifamily securities totaled $128.0 billion as of the eight month of 2020.

48
Market Conditions

Sources: SIFMA and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.

$289 

$626 

$41 

$0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019

49

$ Billions

Average Daily Fixed Income Trading Volume by Sector

SF Agency MBS trading vol ($B) Treasury trading volume ($B) Corporates trading volume ($B)

4.11%

3.38%

0.42% 0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018

Percent

Average Daily Turnover by Sector

Agency MBS Turnover Treasury Turnover Corporates Turnover

Agency MBS trading volume is $289 billion/day on average for the first eight months of 2020, more robust than 

in the 2014-2019 period, but still below the pre-crisis peak of $345 billion in 2008. Average daily trading 

volume for Treasuries now exceed the pre-crisis peak. Agency MBS turnover in 2020 YTD (through August) has 

also been higher than the 2014-2019 period; in 2020, average daily MBS turnover was 4.11 percent, above the 

2019 average of 3.67 percent. Note that agency MBS turnover in the first eight months of 2020 has been higher 

than US Treasury turnover, a rare occurrence. Both average daily mortgage and Treasury turnover are down 

from their pre-crisis peaks. Corporate turnover is miniscule relative to either Agency MBS or Treasury turnover.

Sources: SIFMA and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.
Market Conditions

$222.8

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

$ Billions

Repo Volume: Securities In

50

$81.1

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

$ Billions

Dealer Net Positions: Federal Agency and GSE MBS

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Primary Dealer Statistics and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Primary Dealer Statistics and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of September 2020.

Dealer net positions are at the higher end of their post-crisis range, and very close to their pre-crisis highs. 

By contrast, dealer gross positions have fallen dramatically. The volume of repurchase activity is at the lower 

end of the post-crisis range, and much lower than pre-crisis levels. The large decline through time reflects 

banks cutting back on lower margin businesses.
MBS Ownership

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2008Q2 2009Q2 2010Q2 2011Q2 2012Q2 2013Q2 2014Q2 2015Q2 2016 Q2 2017 Q2 2018 Q2 2019 Q2 2020 Q2

GSEs

Commercial Banks

Federal Reserve

Broker/Dealers

REITs

Other

Who owns Total Agency Debt?

Mutual Funds

Money Market and Pension Funds

Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds and Urban Institute. Note: The “other” category includes primarily life insurance companies, state and 

local govts, households, and nonprofits. Data as of Q2 2020.

Credit Unions

Foreign Investors

The largest holders of agency debt (Agency MBS + Agency notes and bonds) include the Federal Reserve (20 

percent), commercial banks (21 percent), foreign investors (12 percent), and money market & pension funds (12 

percent). The broker/dealer and GSE shares are a fraction of what they once were. The Federal Reserve’s share 

increased from 15 percent in the first quarter of 2020 to 20 percent in the second quarter due to substantial 

purchases of MBS in response to the COVID-19 crisis.

Share of Total Agency Debt by Owner

51
MBS Ownership

Debt,

$9,833

household

mortgages,

Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds and Urban Institute. Note: The MBS share of agency debt unexpectedly dropped in Q1 2020 due to a 

higher than usual, $400 billion discrepancy between agency assets and liabilities, as reported by Fed flow of funds. Data as of Q2 2020.

70.7%

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

75%

2008Q2 2009Q2 2010Q2 2011Q2 2012Q2 2013Q2 2014Q2 2015Q2 2016 Q2 2017 Q2 2018 Q2 2019 Q2 2020 Q2

Percent of MBS over Outstanding Agency Debt

MBS Share of Total Agency Debt

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank and Urban Institute. Note: Small domestic banks includes all domestically chartered commercial banks not 

included in the top 25. Data as of September 2020.

As Fannie and Freddie reduce the size of their retained portfolio post 2008, fewer agency notes and bonds were 

required to fund that activity. As a result, the MBS share of total agency debt increased over time. Commercial 

banks are now the largest holders of Agency MBS. Out of their $2.3 trillion in holdings as of the end of September 

2020, $1.7 trillion was held by the top 25 domestic banks.

52

` Commercial Bank Holdings ($Billions) Week Ending

Aug-19 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20 Aug-20Sep 2 Sep 9 Sep 16 Sep 23

Largest 25 

Domestic Banks 1473.7 1547.8 1597.0 1637.9 1636.7 1630.5 1662.0 1716.5 1736.3 1709.6 1695.1 1694.7

Small Domestic 

Banks 500.6 532.8 538.6 541.1 543.0 551.8 559.7 570.6 575.9 575.5 577.1 583.0

Foreign Related 

Banks 33.3 40.0 43.9 46.1 43.5 43.7 43.2 41.5 39.6 39.6 38.5 40.0

Total, 

Seasonally

Adjusted 2007.6 2120.6 2179.5 2225.1 2223.2 2226.0 2264.9 2328.6 2351.8 2324.7 2310.7 2317.7
MBS Ownership

hous h

mortgages,

Debt,

e old

$9,833

Top Bank & Thrift Residential MBS Investors Total ($MM) GSE PT ($MM)

GNMA PT 

($MM)

Agency REMIC 

($MM)

Non-Agency 

($MM)

Market 

Share

1 Bank of America Corporation $335,366.0 $191,632.0 $130,226.0 $13,209.0 $299.0 15.30

2 Wells Fargo & Company $251,111.0 $174,271.0 $68,543.0 $7,756.0 $541.0 11.40

3 JP Morgan Chase & Co. $214,143.0 $132,514.0 $63,132.0 $228.0 $18,269.0 9.80

4 Charles Schwab Bank $132,419.0 $74,363.0 $17,109.0 $40,947.0 $0.0 6.00

5 U S. Bancorp. $96,324.6 $62,461.2 $18,365.2 $15,497.5 $0.6 4.40

6 Citigroup Inc. $86,684.0 $75,645.0 $3,298.0 $5,971.0 $1,770.0 3.90

7 Truist Bank $71,526.0 $25,581.0 $19,903.0 $26,042.0 $0.0 3.30

8 Capital One Financial Corporation $71,357.3 $33,774.1 $13,105.7 $23,806.7 $670.9 3.30

9 Bank of New York Mellon Corp. $62,069.0 $42,127.0 $4,314.0 $13,957.0 $1,671.0 2.80

10 PNC Bank, National Association $59,170.5 $48,983.4 $6,516.4 $1,988.7 $1,682.0 2.70

11 State Street Bank and Trust Company $42,060.6 $22,424.0 $8,975.0 $8,431.6 $2,230.0 1.90

12 Morgan Stanley $33,078.0 $19,228.0 $5,754.0 $8,096.0 $0.0 1.50

13 HSBC Banks USA, National Association $27,422.7 $6,792.2 $11,409.5 $9,218.7 $2.2 1.20

14 TD Bank $25,549.8 $1,699.1 $176.5 $23,437.3 $236.9 1.20

15 E*TRADE Bank $24,784.5 $12,280.2 $3,988.5 $8,515.7 $0.0 1.10

16 Ally Bank $23,701.0 $15,008.0 $2035.0 $3,293.0 $3365.0 1.10

17 USAA Federal Savings Bank $23,163.0 $19,278.5 $2,623.6 $1,260.9 $0.0 1.10

18 Citizens Bank $21,301.8 $11,358.1 $3600.9 $5,756.4 $586.5 1.00

19 KeyBank National Association $18,805.1 $1,229.1 $591.7 $16984.3 $0.0 0.90

20 Silicon Valley Bank $18,739.9 $13,893.4 $158.5 $4,687.9 $0.0 0.90

Total Top 20 $1,638,777 $984,542 $383,826 $239,085 $31,324 74.80%

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of Q2 2020.

Out of the $2.2 trillion in MBS holdings at banks and thrifts as of Q2 2020, $1.7 trillion was agency pass-throughs: 

$1.2 trillion in GSE pass-throughs and $441 billion in Ginnie Mae pass-throughs. Another $478 billion was agency 

CMOs, while non-agency holdings totaled $47 billion. In Q2, 2020, MBS holdings at banks and thrifts increased for 

the seventh consecutive quarter. The increase was driven by both GSE pass-throughs and agency CMO holdings, 

with the increase in GSE pass-throughs making the larger contribution.

53

All Banks & Thrifts ($Billions)

Total Agency MBS PT GSE PT GNMA PT Agency CMO Private MBS PT Private CMO

2000 $683.90 $392.85 $234.01 $84.26 $198.04 $21.57 $71.43

2001 $810.50 $459.78 $270.59 $109.53 $236.91 $37.62 $76.18

2002 $912.36 $557.43 $376.11 $101.46 $244.98 $20.08 $89.88

2003 $982.08 $619.02 $461.72 $75.11 $236.81 $19.40 $106.86

2004 $1,113.89 $724.61 $572.40 $49.33 $208.18 $20.55 $160.55

2005 $1,139.68 $708.64 $566.81 $35.92 $190.70 $29.09 $211.25

2006 $1,207.09 $742.28 $628.52 $31.13 $179.21 $42.32 $243.28

2007 $1,236.00 $678.24 $559.75 $31.58 $174.27 $26.26 $357.24

2008 $1,299.76 $820.12 $638.78 $100.36 $207.66 $12.93 $259.04

2009 $1,345.74 $854.40 $629.19 $155.00 $271.17 $7.53 $212.64

2010 $1,433.38 $847.13 $600.80 $163.13 $397.30 $7.34 $181.61

2011 $1,566.88 $917.10 $627.37 $214.81 $478.82 $3.28 $167.70

2012 $1,578.86 $953.76 $707.87 $242.54 $469.27 $17.16 $138.67

2013 $1,506.60 $933.73 $705.97 $231.93 $432.60 $26.11 $114.15

2014 $1,539.32 $964.16 $733.71 $230.45 $449.90 $20.33 $104.94

2015 $1,643.56 $1,115.40 $823.10 $292.30 $445.39 $11.14 $71.63

2016 $1,736.93 $1,254.13 $930.67 $323.46 $419.80 $7.40 $55.60

1Q17 $1,762.38 $1,280.63 $950.72 $329.91 $419.34 $7.03 $55.39

2Q17 $1,798.66 $1,320.59 $985.12 $335.47 $417.89 $6.38 $53.79

3Q17 $1,838.93 $1,364.75 $1,012.89 $351.86 $418.08 $5.65 $50.45

4Q17 $1,844.15 $1,378.53 $1,010.83 $367.70 $413.97 $4.63 $47.01

1Q18 $1,809.98 $1,352.28 $991.57 $360.71 $412.37 $3.92 $41.37

2Q18 $1,806.58 $1,345.80 $976.92 $368.88 $414.41 $7.45 $38.92

3Q18 $1,794.39 $1,339.72 $966.52 $373.21 $416.20 $2.42 $36.04

4Q18 $1,814.97 $1,361.00 $980.56 $380.43 $419.59 $2.69 $34.69

1Q19 $1,844.99 $1,385.10 $1,001.61 $383.49 $422.18 $3.06 $34.65

2Q19 $1,907.13 $1,445.91 $1,037.93 $407.97 $421.56 $2.90 $36.76

3Q19 $1,975.78 $1,506.92 $1,079.82 $427.10 $428.69 $4.74 $35.44

4Q19 $1,985.38 $1,516.26 $1,089.41 $426.85 $428.99 $4.62 $35.52

1Q20 $2,107.66 $1,621.00 $1,173.36 $448.34 $443.73 $4.65 $37.56

2Q20 $2,195.19 $1,669.93 $1,228.87 $441.06 $478.11 $5.00 $42.14

Bank and Thrift Residential MBS Holdings
Sources: SIFMA and Treasury International Capital (TIC). Note: Data as of June 2020.

16.3%

10.0%

11.0%

12.0%

13.0%

14.0%

15.0%

16.0%

17.0%

18.0%

Dec-12

Mar-13

Jun-13

Sep-13

Dec-13

Mar-14

Jun-14

Sep-14

Dec-14

Mar-15

Jun-15

Sep-15

Dec-15

Mar-16

Jun-16

Sep-16

Dec-16

Mar-17

Jun-17

Sep-17

Dec-17

Mar-18

Jun-18

Sep-18

Dec-18

Mar-19

Jun-19

Sep-19

Dec-19

Mar-20

Jun-20

Percent of Agency MBS Owned by Foreigners

Foreign Share of Agency MBS

MBS Ownership

54

$1,160.0

$497.7

$662.1

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

Jun-14

Aug-14

Oct-14

Dec-14

Feb-15

Apr-15

Jun-15

Aug-15

Oct-15

Dec-15

Feb-16

Apr-16

Jun-16

Aug-16

Oct-16

Dec-16

Feb-17

Apr-17

Jun-17

Aug-17

Oct-17

Dec-17

Feb-18

Apr-18

Jun-18

Aug-18

Oct-18

Dec-18

Feb-19

Apr-19

Jun-19

Aug-19

Oct-19

Dec-19

Feb-20

Apr-20

Jun-20

$ Billions

Monthly Agency MBS Holdings by Foreigners

Total Agency MBS Held by Foreigners Foreign Official MBS Foreign Private MBS

Sources: Treasury International Capital (TIC) and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of June 2020. In December 2017, there was a data 

correction that moved about $120 billion from privately held U.S. agency bonds to officially held U.S. agency bonds; this resulted in a series 

break at December 2017 in the split between the portion held by foreign private and the portion held by foreign official.

Foreign investors held 16.3 percent of agency MBS in June 2020, up from a low of 12.0 percent in July 2014. 

For the month of June 2020, this represents $1.16 trillion in Agency MBS, $498 billion held by foreign private 

institutions and $662 billion held by foreign institutions. This represents a $33.8 billion drop in Agency MBS 

from the peak in April 2020.
MBS Ownership

Agency MBS+ Agency Debt

Agency MBS Only (Estimates)

Sources :Treasury International Capital (TIC) and Urban Institute. 

Note: *calculated based on June 2018 report with amount asset backed per country. Revised to include Top 10 holders of MBS listed as of June 

2018. Monthly data as of June 2020.

The largest foreign holders of Agency MBS are Japan, Taiwan, and China; these three comprise just under 70 

percent of all foreign holdings. Between June 2019 and June 2020, we estimate that both China and Japan have 

increased their agency MBS holdings by $13.3 billion and Taiwan has increased their holdings by $2.5 billion. 

All three countries have experienced declines since March.

Levelof Holdings ($Millions)* Change in Holdings ($Millions)*

Country Jun-19 Sep-19 Dec-19 Mar-20 Jun-20 Q3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020 Q2 2020

Japan 297,016 311,047 305,332 322,155 310,268 14,031 -5,715 16,823 -11,887

Taiwan 265,524 263,018 261,740 269,133 267,918 -2,506 -1,278 7,393 -1,215

China 227,357 233,783 231,753 260,479 239,045 6,426 -2,030 28,726 -21,434

Luxembourg 47,646 46,641 39,015 36,789 42,389 -1,005 -7,626 -2,226 5,600

Ireland 45,829 41,367 38,731 26,131 29,399 -4,462 -2,636 -12,600 3,268

South Korea 42,879 41,485 40,810 40,964 38,891 -1,394 -675 154 -2,073

Cayman Islands 34,967 29,540 31,827 27,154 34,564 -5,427 2,287 -4,673 7,410

Bermuda 29,365 29,184 33,897 27,790 27,790 -181 4,713 -6,107 0

Netherlands 14,074 10,549 10,902 10,886 13,255 -3,525 353 -16 2,369

Malaysia 12,167 15,585 16,600 21,399 20,390 3,418 1,015 4,799 -1,009

Rest of world 128,142 135,515 152,489 202,143 201,165 7,373 16,974 49,654 -978

Total 1,144,971 1,157,714 1,163,096 1,245,023 1,225,074 12,743 5,382 81,927 -19,949

55

Levelof Holdings ($Millions)* Change in Holdings ($Millions)*

Country Jun-19 Sep-19 Dec-19 Mar-20 Jun-20 Q3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020 Q2 2020

Japan 293,662 307,738 302,212 319,241 306,963 14,076 -5,526 16,823 -12,278

Taiwan 265,234 262,732 261,470 268,881 267,700 -2,502 -1,262 7,393 -1,181

China 221,738 228,240 226,526 255,596 235,078 6,502 -1,714 28,726 -20,518

Luxembourg 43,978 43,023 35,603 33,602 40,207 -955 -7,420 -2,226 6,605

Ireland 37,674 33,322 31,145 19,045 21,091 -4,352 -2,177 -12,600 2,047

South Korea 34,969 33,682 33,452 34,091 28,743 -1,287 -230 154 -5,347

Cayman Islands 29,896 24,538 27,110 22,748 28,431 -5,358 2,572 -4,673 5,684

Bermuda 26,394 26,253 31,133 25,208 25,111 -141 4,880 -6,107 -97

Netherlands 13,904 10,381 10,744 10,738 12,739 -3,523 363 -16 2,001

Malaysia 11,881 15,303 16,334 21,150 20,028 3,422 1,031 4,799 -1,122

Rest of world 97,585 105,371 124,063 175,591 173,716 7,786 18,692 49,654 -1,874

Total 1,076,916 1,090,579 1,099,788 1,185,887 1,159,808 13,663 9,209 81,927 -26,079
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Dec-09

Apr-10

Aug-10

Dec-10

Apr-11

Aug-11

Dec-11

Apr-12

Aug-12

Dec-12

Apr-13

Aug-13

Dec-13

Apr-14

Aug-14

Dec-14

Apr-15

Aug-15

Dec-15

Apr-16

Aug-16

Dec-16

Apr-17

Aug-17

Dec-17

Apr-18

Aug-18

Dec-18

Apr-19

Aug-19

Dec-19

Apr-20

Aug-20

$ Billions

Total Fed Absorption

Gross Issuance Total Fed Purchases

MBS Ownership

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Aug-12

Feb-13

Aug-13

Feb-14

Aug-14

Feb-15

Aug-15

Feb-16

Aug-16

Feb-17

Aug-17

Feb-18

Aug-18

Feb-19

Aug-19

Feb-20

Aug-20

$ Billions

Fed Absorption of GSE MBS

Gross Issuance Total Fed Purchases

Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Urban 

Institute. Note: Data as of August 2020.

Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Urban Institute. 

Note: Data as of August 2020.

56

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Aug-12

Feb-13

Aug-13

Feb-14

Aug-14

Feb-15

Aug-15

Feb-16

Aug-16

Feb-17

Aug-17

Feb-18

Aug-18

Feb-19

Aug-19

Feb-20

Aug-20

$ Billions

Fed Absorption of Ginnie Mae MBS

Gross Issuance Total Fed Purchases

On March 23, 2020, in response to the market dislocations caused by the coronavirus pandemic, the Fed 

announced they would purchase Treasuries and agency MBS in an amount necessary to support smooth 

functioning markets. In March the Fed bought $292.2 billion in agency MBS, and April clocked in at $295.1 billion, 

the largest two months of mortgage purchases ever; and well over 100 percent of gross issuance for each of those 

two months. After the market stabilized, the Fed slowed its purchases to around $100 -$104 billion per month in 

May, June, July, and August. Fed purchases in August were $102.8 billion, 32 percent of monthly issuance, still 

sizeable from a historical perspective. Prior to the COVID-19 intervention, the Fed was winding down its MBS 

portfolio from its 2014 prior peak.
Disclosures:

All the information contained in this document is as of date indicated unless otherwise noted. The 

information provided does not constitute investment advice and it should not be relied on as such. All 

information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but its accuracy is not guaranteed. 

The views expressed in this material are the views of the staff of the Urban Institute's Housing Finance 

Policy Center and State Street Global Advisors as of October 21st, 2020 and are subject to change based 

on market and other conditions. The views should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, 

or its funders. This document contains certain statements that may be deemed forward-looking 

statements. Please note that any such statements are not guarantees of any future performance and 

actual results or developments may differ materially from those projected.

© 2020 State Street Corporation. All Rights Reserved.

United States: State Street Global Advisors, 1 Iron Street, Boston, MA 02210-1641. 

Tracking Code: 3286037.2.1.GBL.INST 

Expiration Date: 10/31/2021