1

Exemption No. 11096

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

RENTON, WASHINGTON 98057-3356

PARTIAL GRANT OF EXEMPTION

By a submission to the Department of Transportation’s Federal Docket Management System 

(FDMS) dated March 18, 2014, Mr. John W. Dietrich of Atlas Air, Inc. – EVP and COO, Mr. Pete 

Sanderlin, Kalitta Air, Inc. – VP and GM, Mr. Dan McHugh of Southern Air, Inc. – President and 

CEO, and Mr. Brian Bauer of World Airways, Inc. – EVP and CCO, jointly petitioned the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) for an exemption from the requirements of Title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 121.141 

related to the requirements for transporting cargo.

The petitioner requests relief from the following regulations:

§ 91.9(a) Civil aircraft flight manual, markings, and placard requirements, which states that 

no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in 

the approved Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual, markings, and placards, or otherwise 

prescribed by the certificating authority of the county.

§ 91.1025(a) Program operating contents, which requires the program operating manual include 

procedures for ensuring compliance with aircraft weight and balance limitations.

In the matter of the petition of

Atlas Air, Inc.

Kalitta Air, Inc.

Southern Air, Inc.

World Airways, Inc.

for an exemption from §§ 91.9(a), 

91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 

121.135(b)(21), and 121.141 of Title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations

 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2014-0184
2

§ 121.135(a)(4) Manual contents, which requires that each manual required by § 121.133 must 

not be contrary to any Federal regulations or the certificate holder’s operations specifications or 

operating certificate.

§ 121.135(b)(21) Manual contents, which requires that each manual required by § 121.133 

contain methods and procedures for maintaining the aircraft weight and center of gravity within 

approved limits.

§ 121.141 Airplane flight manual, which requires that each certificate holder shall keep a current 

approved airplane flight manual for each type of airplane that it operates except for non-transport 

category airplanes; and that in each airplane required to carry an airplane flight manual, the 

certificate holder shall carry either the manual required by § 121.133 or an approved Airplane 

Manual.

The petitioner supports its request with the following. This information is quoted from joint 

petition letter dated March 18, 2014. The complete petition may be found in the docket. 

Reasons Why the Exemption Would Not Adversely Affect Public Safety 

As explained below, Petitioners are not aware of data substantiating the application of the 

9G requirement to freighter aircraft. However, more recent studies that were not available 

when the 9G forward restraint requirement was developed in the 1950s demonstrate that a 

3G forward restraint standard would have no adverse impact on safety, would provide an 

equivalent level of safety, and would be in the public interest.

A. Reports and Data Show that a 3G Forward Restraint Requirement Would Have

No Adverse Impact on Safety and Would Provide an Equivalent Level of Safety.

The deficiencies with the 9G forward restraint requirement are numerous.

First, the 9G standard was established in the 1950s, well before the B-747 aircraft was 

certificated.

Second, it considered analyses of passenger seats, passenger seat attachments, and the 

geometric relationship of the passenger seat to the interior of the passenger compartment. 

This seat-based requirement appears to have become a regulatory "come along" to apply to 

cargo transport, without any analysis of the validity or efficacy of applying such a seatbased requirement to the cargo compartment.

Third, since the 9G forward restraint standard predated the B-747 by more than a decade, it 

did not account for many of the B-747's exceptional characteristics. It does not properly 

reflect the actual loads and behavior of cargo restrained by the cargo restraint system, 

straps, and nets on a B-747. Nor does it take into account the spatial separation of B-747 

upper deck occupants and the tall rigid cargo, the capability of the crown barrier net to 

restrain tall rigid cargo, or the crashworthiness and energy absorbing capability of the 

B-747 upper deck structure.
3

Fourth, the 9G standard clearly did not account for the infinitesimal probability that all of 

the events necessary for an occupant on the upper deck of a B-747 freighter to be harmed 

by tall rigid cargo in an emergency landing would occur. U.S. Air Force studies concluded 

that a crash event at higher than 3G with cargo and passengers is "extremely rare", with a 

probability of one occurrence per 4 million hours of operation. Cargo Aircraft and 

Spacecraft Forward Restraint Criteria, Technical Report ASD-TR-76-30, at 21 (December 

1977) ("1977 USAF Technical Report"). Put another way, combining major and minor 

accidents for the period 1962 to July 1976, the probability of a crash at the "3G to N/S 

Level with Cargo and Passenger'' was "extremely rare" at 0.00000025 per hours/operation. 

1977 USAF Technical Report, at 38, 50. And, in November 1981, "CSAF/LET approved 

permanent reduction to 3G forward restraint, citing 7 years of operations (6.73M flight 

hours) with no cargo related accidents." Presentation: Cargo Restraint for Fixed Wing 

Aircraft, 21 May 02, Aeronautical Systems Center, USAF. According to the same USAF 

presentation, "In concert with 2G up and 1.5G aft & laterally, 3G forward restraint has 

proven adequate and cost effective for 30 years of USAF cargo operations involving over 

29M flight hours."

Fifth, in commercial operations, more than 420 B-747 freighters have flown more than 20 

million flight hours and 4 million flight cycles. There has been no report of cargo shifting 

forward and harming an occupant on a B-747 freighter during emergency landing 

conditions (see NTSB Accident Aviation Database and 17 hull-loss occurrences on B-747 

freighters documented by the Aviation Safety Network, www.aviation-safety.net; see also 

FAA Accident/Incident Data System). Based on a review of the B-747 model freighter 

accidents, it can be concluded that any resulting injury or fatality related to the accidents 

was not attributable to cargo shifting forward. In fact, if a cargo shift was involved in any 

reported accident, it only involved cargo shifting aft, with no reported accidents involving a 

forward shift at all. Since the majority of cargo is below the tall-rigid threshold, it can be 

concluded that tying down to flight loads at 1.5G (loading) has been shown to be sufficient 

in actual incidents and accidents to secure cargo against forward-shifting, and this Petition 

for a 3G tie down therefore is more than sufficient.

This conclusion is supported by the results of the 2008 accident of a Kalitta aircraft in 

Brussels. That accident involved a B-747 freighter which suffered severe damage, breaking 

into three sections after an aborted takeoff due to a bird strike. Although the main deck 

floor beams in the forward cargo section were shattered in the accident, cargo in the other 

sections which was restrained to 1.5G was still secured to the aircraft, and the crew escaped 

uninjured. See Final Report, Ref. AAIU-2008-13 (issued July 2009), Belgium Federal 

Public Service Mobility and Transport, Air Accident and Investigation Unit.

Sixth, at forward load forces between 3G (the standard requested in this Joint Petition and 

the standard adopted by the USAF) and 9G (the current standard), it is highly likely that the 

B-747 would not stay intact. At such high G-force loads, whether the tall rigid cargo was 

shifting forward would be the least of the occupants' and crew's worries because the aircraft 

would likely not remain intact. As a 1977 USAF Technical Report pointed out: "The 

maximum landing loads that the C-130, C-141, and C-5 can generate are 0.94, 1.05, and 
4

1.20G, respectively. This is assuming full reverse thrust, full braking, and a loose dirt 

runway. For any load above these, the aircraft is in a crash condition as defined by this 

report." 1977 USAF Technical Report, at 21. And, according to Boeing, during hard 

braking the forward flight load factors are 1.5G for the B-747-400 and 1.2G for the 

B-747-8. Indeed, loads in the 9G range would not involve an "emergency landing 

condition", but rather a crash. The aircraft and the attachment points would fail well before 

9G.

Seventh, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), which the FAA considers to be a 

competent authority, implemented the reduced 3G forward restraint requirement, and there 

has been no report of an accident where occupants have been harmed by cargo shifting 

forward during emergency landing conditions. The 1977 USAF Technical Report, which 

was issued after the development of the passenger-based 9G forward restraint standard, 

concluded that reducing the requirement to 3G for cargo operations would maintain safety 

and result in significant cost savings and simplification. In pertinent part, the Report 

summarized:

"The civilian fleet can also use the data in determining what design criteria to 

utilize. For example, either a 3G positive locking rail system or a 3G net in 

conjunction with current 11⁄2G rail system would provide an adequate system rather 

than the 9G system in use today." 1977 USAF Technical Report, at 50-51. 

Accordingly, Petitioners submit that a 3G forward restraint requirement would provide an 

equivalent level of safety to the outdated 9G standard.

Reason the Exemption Would Benefit the Public Interest

Granting this exemption would be in the public interest because it would enable U.S. 

operators of B-747 freighter aircraft to safely and efficiently carry tall rigid cargo, 

including multiple 20-foot sea containers, aircraft engines, large oil/gas equipment, and 

large vehicles, for humanitarian, commercial, and U.S. military shippers around the world. 

It would also enable B-747 operators to more efficiently utilize and to realize the full 

capabilities of their B-747 aircraft. Shippers need access to reasonable, safe, and timely air 

transportation for their shipments of tall rigid cargo. Absent this exemption, shippers will 

have fewer choices of carriers and fewer B-747 aircraft to handle critical missions, because, 

as explained above, the 9G forward restraint requirement effectively precludes U.S. B-747 

freighter operators from competing for tall rigid cargo shipments, without any 

improvement in safety. This, in turn, leads to delays for the delivery of critical cargo 

and/or substantially increases costs for shippers to get their cargo delivered. For example, 

U.S. exporters and importers are detrimentally affected as their costs are being driven up, 

and therefore their competitiveness is reduced. The U.S. military and NGOs with urgent 

humanitarian missions involving tall rigid cargo also encounter delays and substantially 

increased costs in having their vital shipments delivered.

Even in cases where a single item of tall rigid cargo could be carried, other tall rigid items 

could not be transported because the requisite tie-down attachments needed to restrain to 
5

9G would not be available for additional items. Kalitta estimates that the need to provide 

frangible freight or restrain tall rigid cargo to the 9G standard reduces the cargo-carrying 

capability by a minimum of 30% and, in some cases, up to 50% of the allowable volume 

and weight allowed by the Boeing 747 weight and balance loading and control manual. 

The public interest would be much better served with a 3G restraint requirement because it 

would allow more pieces of tall rigid cargo to be carried on a single flight without any 

reduction in safety. Adherence to the 9G standard results in more flights required to 

transport the same amount of tall rigid cargo, making U.S. operators uncompetitive in the 

marketplace.

Petitioners are losing substantial business due to their inability to offer competitive bids to 

carry tall rigid loads as a result of the 9G forward load requirement. Many foreign 

competitors routinely carry 20-foot containers and other tall rigid cargo without restraining 

them to withstand a forward 9G force.

Atlas estimates that it is losing millions of dollars of air cargo business because it is unable 

to effectively compete for tall rigid cargo shipments in light of the 9G forward restraint 

requirement. Kalitta Air operates many of its flights as unscheduled "ad hoc" charters, and 

therefore frangible freight is most often not available. As the absence of the frangible 

cargo requires the use of 9G tie downs, Kalitta Air often loses charters to foreign 

competitors as the tie-down requirements result in the inability to carry all of the cargo 

required for the charter. As such, Kalitta Air has noted a significant reduction in business 

and the loss of millions of dollars in revenue due to the 9G requirement. Kalitta Air 

additionally notes that on flights where non- revenue frangible freight can be used, it has 

done so at the airline's (not the shipper's) expense, resulting in additional cost to the airline 

for the buildup and disposal of this cargo. This has also caused substantial losses due to 

these additional unrecouped costs.

In the context of economic regulation, Congress directed the Secretary to strengthen the 

competitive position of U.S. air carriers to at least ensure equality with foreign air carriers, 

including the attainment of the opportunity for U.S. air carriers to maintain and increase 

their profitability in foreign air transportation. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a)(15) and (e)(1). We 

believe that the FAA can act in the public interest and level the playing field without any 

diminution of safety by granting this exemption to provide for a 3G forward restraint 

requirement. 

Federal Register publication 

A summary of the petition was published in the Federal Register on April 16, 2014 [79 FR 21506]. 

The FAA received public comments from four entities, all supportive of the petitioners’ 

exemption. Commenters include: Airlines for America, Boeing, Cargo Airline Association, and 

National Air Carrier Association. 
6

The FAA’s analysis

The Boeing 747 Cargo airplane can carry cargo in the fuselage aft of the flight deck that is taller 

than the height of the flight deck floor structure above the main deck. When this tall cargo is rigid, 

such as an Intermodal Container, it is identified in the current Boeing 747 Weight & Balance 

(W&B) Manual1as “tall rigid cargo.” Because the upper portions of the tall rigid cargo can 

encroach on the flight deck floor during high “G” forward emergency landing load conditions, this 

tall rigid cargo, and all cargo aft of that location, needs to be restrained to 9G forward emergency 

landing loads [Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 25.561] to protect the flight crew 

and other occupants. Standard height cargo (96 inches or less) is only restrained for 1.5G forward 

flight loads since it fits below the flight deck (§ 25.787). The petitioners have indicated that under 

the current Boeing 747 W&B Manual, the carriage of tall rigid cargo (including Intermodal

Containers) is not economically viable due to number of straps required to secure the cargo for the 

9G forward load and the corresponding airplane space/volume required for the strap attachments to 

the airplane. 

As an alternative to restraining the tall rigid cargo (and all cargo aft of the tall rigid cargo) for 9G

loads, the Boeing 747 W&B Manual permits the use of frangible cargo in the forward fuselage 

(note: this approach is used for other cargo airplanes). Boeing’s definition for frangible cargo is 

that which would compress and conform to the fuselage in the event of an accident with forward 

loads exceeding 1.5G. Using this method, the tall rigid cargo is restrained for only 1.5G forward 

loads, which then allows for the accommodation of more cargo. Frangible cargo precludes the tall 

rigid cargo from impacting the flight deck floor during a survivable crash event when the forward 

loads exceed 1.5G (tall rigid cargo that becomes loose during a crash cannot impact the flight deck 

floor). This alternative method of preventing the cargo from impacting the flight deck floor has 

been shown to meet the forward emergency landing load requirements. The petitioners have 

expressed concerns about the availability and associated costs of frangible cargo at many airports, 

resulting in severe limitations in the amount of tall rigid cargo that can be carried. Under the 

current Boeing 747 W&B Manual, the carriage of tall rigid cargo, including Intermodal

Containers, is not economically viable without sufficient frangible cargo. 

The following is the FAA’s analysis of each of the petitioners’ numbered arguments regarding the 

alleged “deficiencies” of the existing 9G standard.

1. Since the codification of part 25, the emergency landing condition requirements in 

§ 25.561 have been updated three times2. The 9G forward load requirement was based on 

research and in-service data available when the rule was originally promulgated. The FAA 

reviewed this standard each time § 25.561 was updated, and concluded each time that the 

research and data available at each amendment level indicated that the standard was still 

necessary and appropriate for the transport airplane fleet (which included the Boeing 747

airplane). The Boeing 747 does not contain any unique features or attributes that affect the 

applicability and appropriateness of the 9G forward emergency landing load requirement. 

 

1

Boeing W&B Manual: The Boeing W&B Manual is referenced in the operating limitations section of the airplane flight manual. It is, 

therefore, legally mandatory under § 91.9.

2

14 CFR § 25.561 was revised at amendment 25-23, 5/8/1970; amendment 25-64, 6/16/1988; amendment 25-91, 7/29/1997
7

2. As discussed in the United States Air Force (USAF) Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) 

report referenced by the petitioners [Cargo Aircraft and Spacecraft Forward Restraint 

Criteria, Technical Report ASD-TR-76-30, at 21 (December 1977) ("1977 USAF Technical 

Report")], it was found during FAA crash tests that instrumentation on pallet loads and 

seats recorded different G-force levels at the same lateral location in the aircraft. It was 

determined that the difference in the resultant G-load was attributable to the differences in 

the structural stiffness and corresponding dynamic responses of seat installations as 

compared to cargo/cargo restraint systems. Therefore, while the seat requirement has 

increased to a 16G forward dynamic load, the corresponding forward load for cargo has 

remained at 9G; both requirements protect occupants for the same airplane level event. 

Therefore, contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the 9G standard has been shown to be 

inadequate for seats, but appropriate for cargo. 

3. As discussed above, two methods for restraining tall rigid cargo for the forward emergency 

landing loads on a Boeing 747 are presented in the Boeing W&B Manual. One is to secure 

the cargo for the 9G forward load, and the other is to carry frangible cargo in front of the 

tall rigid cargo. While these methods have been shown to satisfy the requirements of 

§§ 25.561 and 25.787, these may not be the only acceptable methods. The FAA will 

consider proposals for changes to the Boeing747 W&B manual for other methods, provided 

sufficient substantiating data is included with each proposal. While the petitioners have 

indicated that there may be features unique to the Boeing 747 cargo airplane that may 

mitigate the safety risk to occupants during a crash event, the petitioners have provided no 

data to show that the occupants would be afforded the same level of safety (intended by the 

regulations) during a crash landing if the proposed lower emergency landing loads were 

employed. 

4. Crash landings in any kind of transport airplane are rare. Nevertheless, the FAA has 

imposed standards to ensure occupants are protected when survivable crash landings do 

occur. The requirements in § 25.561 are intended to protect occupants in the event of a rare 

crash landing, up to what is considered a survivable event in a transport category airplane. 

The requirements have evolved over many years, supported by extensive research and inservice data. To grant an exemption, we must find that it’s in the public interest, the 

primary consideration of which is safety. Petitioners have offered nothing to indicate that, 

in the event of a rare crash landing, the occupants would be protected. 

5. The emergency landing condition requirements in § 25.561 apply to all transport category 

airplanes. The 9G forward load factor in § 25.561 is considered adequate and appropriate 

for crash events that are considered survivable. While there may not have been a specific 

crash event involving a Boeing 747 where the airplane has been subjected to a condition 

equivalent to the most severe event addressed by the regulatory standards (e.g., maximum 

forward emergency landing load), the standards were developed with consideration of the

available data deemed applicable to all transport category airplanes. The longitudinal loads 

experienced during a survivable crash landing, and the physiological effects on occupants, 

are similar regardless of airplane type. As noted above, the FAA finds that the Boeing 747 

does not contain any unique features or attributes that would warrant a forward emergency 

landing load factor different than that provided in § 25.561.
8

The fact that, to date, there has not been a Boeing 747 crash landing with the maximum 

forward emergency landing load is irrelevant to whether the standard is appropriate for 

protecting occupants in the event of a crash landing in which that load is experienced. 

6. The petitioners are correct that the standards in § 25.561 are not intended to protect 

occupants only during emergency landings. They are intended to protect occupants in 

precisely those circumstances in which the aircraft itself may be destroyed, but the crash 

loads and their effects on occupants are survivable. During the promulgation of 

Amendment 25-64 (effective June 16, 1988) of § 25.561, the FAA increased certain load 

factors in § 25.561(b)(3)(iii) to ensure that compartments and items of mass would not fail 

during a crash event that would otherwise be survivable. The 9G forward load factor was 

considered adequate and appropriate for crash events that were considered survivable. For 

the survivable crash events considered in the FAA’s investigation (which included FAA 

and NASA research and a review of existing accident data), it was shown that the airplane 

structure remains substantially intact and provides a livable volume for the occupants 

throughout the impact sequence. The FAA findings were discussed in the FAA Notice of 

Proposed Rule Making for Amendment 25-64 of § 25.561, Docket No. 25040. Petitioners 

have provided no data demonstrating these findings are inapplicable to the Boeing 747 or 

that compliance with the current standards would not protect occupants in an otherwise 

survivable crash landing. 

7. In the summary of the USAF report, it is stated that the probability of occurrence of a crash 

landing that would produce a longitudinal force between the range of 3G and 9G on cargo 

was low, and this probability is not accounted for in the FAA rule. Consideration of this 

low probability, coupled with the unique mission of the USAF, supported the use of a 

lower longitudinal load factor than that used by the FAA for the civilian fleet. However, 

later USAF aircraft, including the KC-10 and the Boeing 767-2C tanker, were required by 

the USAF to meet a 9G forward emergency landing load requirement. 

The probability of crash landings of different levels of severity was not considered in the 

development of the emergency landing factors in § 25.561. These factors are intended to 

protect occupants in precisely those circumstances in which the aircraft itself may be 

destroyed, but the crash loads and their effects on occupants are survivable.

The FAA 9G emergency landing load standard can be traced back to promulgation of the 

emergency landing conditions requirement in Civil Air Regulations 4b.260, Amendment 4b-6, 

effective March 5, 1952. The origin of the 9G forward load requirement in the § 4b.260 was 

investigated and documented by ASD in the aforementioned USAF report. In the USAF study, the 

ASD traced the roots of this requirement back to crash investigations and crash tests of various 

aircraft types conducted between the 1920s and 1950s. Later investigations included the 

consideration of the differences in dynamic responses of crew/passenger seats, cargo/cargo 

restraint systems, and aircraft structure. The regulations have since been updated to improve crew 

and passenger safety for emergency landing and crash conditions. 
9

The current regulatory standards have established a level of safety for the overall airplane through 

the FAA’s rulemaking process. Based on review of available data, including this USAF study, the 

FAA cannot justify what would amount to a significant reduction in the airworthiness safety 

standards. The FAA concludes that granting this exemption for all Boeing 747 cargo operations is 

not in the public interest, and is not a benefit to the public as a whole as the alternative standard 

(reduction in the emergency landing load factors of § 25.561(b)(3)(ii) to 3G forward) proposed by 

the petitioners would be a reduction in the level of safety compared to that provided by the existing 

rule and would not provide adequate protection for occupants in the event of a survivable crash 

landing. 

The petitioners’ public interest justification is based primarily on the assertion that compliance 

with § 25.561 results in a competitive disadvantage relative to certain foreign operators that are not 

required to comply with this standard. This justification could be applied to any airworthiness 

standard with which a foreign operator is not required to comply, and is not, in itself, grounds for 

finding that it is in the public interest to allow a reduced level of safety. 

Although currently approved methods for cargo retention that apply to the carriage of tall rigid 

cargo on the Boeing 747 may not be economically advantageous, the FAA recognizes that methods 

can be developed that are both practical and economically viable. New methods may include the 

addition of barrier nets, fixed airplane anchor points, and other methods that have previously been 

employed in other mission specific airplanes. 

As noted (below) in the documentation of FAA coordination with DoD representatives involved 

with the retrograde activity in Afghanistan: the current US Administration has indicated that by the 

end of 2014, the US troops in Afghanistan will transition from a combat to a support role, resulting 

in withdrawal of the majority of US troops from Afghanistan. This action will require the 

transport of a large quantity of cargo by contract air carriers. A significant amount of this cargo is 

considered “tall rigid cargo” as described above. This is a unique, time-limited mission, linked to 

US national security. 

The FAA’s Decision

The FAA has concluded that it is in the public interest to grant a time-limited exemption from 

§§ 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 121.141, to not apply the forward 

emergency landing load factor of 9G specified in § 25.561(b)(3)(ii) for restraint of cargo on the 

main deck of Boeing 747 series airplanes. This exemption applies only to all-cargo flights 

originating in Afghanistan for the transport of cargo for the DoD, including all flight segments to 

reach the intended final destination, provided the cargo or method to secure the cargo is not altered 

or changed prior to reaching the final destination.

Section 25.561 provides requirements for emergency landing conditions on land or water where 

the airplane may be damaged or destroyed. The scope of this exemption is limited to the forward 

loads of the emergency landing conditions of section 25.561(b)(3)(ii). This exemption provides no

relief from flight loads. Part 25 subpart C – Structure, under the subheadings Flight Loads and 

Flight Maneuver and Gust Conditions, provides requirements for in-flight conditions for all 

transport category airplanes. All cargo must be secured to the loads prescribed for these in-flight 

conditions.
10

This determination is based on the limited risk exposure of this specific mission coupled with the 

importance of the mission as it relates to US National security. This determination is also 

consistent with the USAF recommendation in the aforementioned report: “9G was a reasonable 

level of restraint for protection of passengers, yet it was recognized that it could not be achieved 

under all circumstances, particularly not in combat conditions.” 

Additional Information

The FAA has held discussions with the DoD regarding air carrier all cargo operational support for 

the DoD mission to remove military equipment out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. This DoD 

effort began in 2013, involving the movement of approximately 24,000 vehicles and 20,000 

shipping containers. In discussions with the DoD, DoD representatives have indicated that one 

mode of transit employed by the DoD to remove this cargo from Afghanistan is by the use of air 

cargo carriers. Existing limitations in air carrier cargo operator manuals limit the amount of cargo 

that can be carried on Boeing 747 cargo airplanes, which is one of the primary airplane models 

used for this mission. Representatives of the DoD have indicated that these limitations may inhibit 

the ability of the DoD to meet their planned mission requirement to remove military equipment 

from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. By easing the current limitations in the air carrier cargo 

operator manuals, this exemption would allow the petitioners to better support the DoD mission.

Documentation of this communication may be found in the docket.

By submission to the Federal Docket Management System on September 5, 2014, the petitioners 

have provided additional information regarding US National and public interest in support of their 

petition for exemption. The petitioners’ justification is based primarily on the assertion that 

compliance with § 25.561 results in a competitive disadvantage relative to certain foreign 

operators that are not required to comply with this standard. As noted in the FAA’s analysis, this 

justification could be applied to any airworthiness standard with which a foreign operator is not 

required to comply, and is not, in itself, grounds for finding that it is in the public interest to allow 

a reduced level of safety. 

The FAA is aware of concerns raised by the petitioners regarding the perception of a lack of parity 

within the air cargo transport industry as it relates to the usage of Boeing 747 cargo airplanes and 

compliance with the subject regulations. The FAA is investigating this issue to determine whether 

regulatory action is necessary and appropriate. 

The Grant of Exemption

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a partial grant of exemption is in the public interest 

and provides a benefit to the public as a whole. Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 

49 U.S.C. §§ 106(f), 40113 and 44701, delegated to me by the Administrator, Atlas Air, Inc., 

Kalitta Air, Inc., Southern Air, Inc., and World Airways, is hereby granted a time-limited 

exemption from §§ 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 121.141, to not apply 

the forward emergency landing load factor of 9G specified in § 25.561(b)(3)(ii), for restraint of 

cargo on the main deck of Boeing 747 series airplanes, subject to the conditions and limitations 

below.
11

Conditions and Limitations

1. This exemption applies only to all-cargo flights originating in Afghanistan for the transport 

of cargo for the United States Department of Defense, including all flight segments to reach 

the intended final destination, provided the cargo or method to secure the cargo is not 

altered or changed prior to reaching the final destination.

2. All cargo must be secured for all flight loads as required by 14 CFR part 25, subpart C. 

This exemption provides no relief from 14 CFR part 25, subpart C, flight loads. . 

3. The flight crew must carry a copy of this exemption on all flights operated under this 

exemption.

This exemption expires one year from the date of issuance of this exemption, unless sooner 

superseded or rescinded.

Issued in Washington, D.C. on October 31, 2014.

 

//s//

John Barbagallo

Director, Flight Standards Service