No. 84-203 

IN THE SUPRE143 COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1984 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

-vsRONALD LEE RONNINGEN, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Robert Holmstrom, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, 

Montana 

For Respondent : 

Law Offices of Russell K. Fillner, Billings, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: August 2, 1904 

Decided: November 20, 1984 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opini-on of the 

Court. 

The State of Montana appeals from an order of the 

Yel-lowstone County District Court dismissing a misdemeanor 

charge filed against the defendant, Ronald Lee Ronningen, 

because of the State's failure to bring the matter tc trial 

within the statutorily mandated six -month period for all 

mi-sdemeanors. The trial. court ruled that the sole question 

under the statute is whether the State demonstrated "good 

cause" for the delay, and that the State did not do so. We 

affirm. 

The State argues first that the trial court erred 

because it did not consider, in addition to the "good cause" 

requirement of the sta.tute, other factors that may bear on 

delay attributable to the State. Second, the State argues 

that it did establish "good cause" for the delay beyond the 

six-month deadline of the statute. The statute applies only 

to misdemeanors. Section. 46-13-201(2), MCA, provides: 

"The court, unless cause -- to the contrary is 

shown, must order the prosecution -- to be dismissed 

if a defendant whose trial has not been postponed 

upon his application is not brought to trial within 

6 months after entry of plea upon a complaint, 

information, or indictment charging a. misdemeanor." 

(Emphasis added.) 

This st.atute manda.tes dismissal of a misdemeanor charge 

if not brought to trial within six months if defendant has 

not asked for the postponement and if the State has not shown 

good cause for the delay. The State effectively concedes and 

the record shows that defendant did not ask for a 

postponement. The record is just as clear that the State had 

several chances to ha-ve the trial set within the statutory 

deadline, hut failed to do so. 
On October 12, 1983, the State filed a misdemeanor 

information in Yelloczrstone County District Court charging 

defendant with violating section 61-7-103, MCA, a charge that 

he failed to remain at the scene of a personal injury 

accident. On the same day, the defendant appeared and pled 

not guilty and the court set trial for February 28, 1984, 

well within the six-month statutory deadline. However, on 

January 15, 1984, the judge who was to preside over the 

February 28 trial announced his resignation effective on 

February 3. Despite this announcement the State did nothing 

to assure that the February 28 trial date was still on. The 

State neither moved for another judge to preside over the 

trial nor that another trial date be set before another judge 

that would be within the six-month statutory deadline. 

After the resignation became effective on February 3, 

the chief district judge issued an order on February 6 

declaring that during the vacancy created by the judge's 

resignation, counsel who had pending criminal matters before 

the retired judge that required attention, could have a 

temporary judge assigned upon request. The State failed to 

ask that a temporary judge be assigned so that the case would 

be heard on February 28 or on any other date within the 

statutory deadline. 

On February 16, the chief district judge issued a 

memorandum stating that all hearings, pretrials and trials 

that had been set for hearing before March 16 by the judge 

who had retired, would be vacated and reset at a later time. 

The State knew that the February 28 trial setting was off but 

that it would have to be reset and tried before the statutory 

deadline. However, the State did nothing until after the new 
judge had been sworn in on March 16, a month after the State 

was notified that the February 28 trial setting was vacated. 

On March 23, counsel for the State met wit.h the new 

judge and asked that trial be set for defendant. The Court 

set April 30 as the trial date and March 30 as the omnibus 

hearing for all motions to be considered. The State's 

counsel did not inform the judge that the trial setting was 

beyond the statutory six-month deadline, and clearly 

consented t.o the setting. 

On March 30, counsel for the State and counsel for 

defen2ant met with the trial court for an omnibus hearing to 

dispose of any pretrial matters. Even then the State did not 

suggest to the court that a problem existed with relation to 

the April 30 trial setting, and that it shou1.d be either 

moved up or that the defendant could waive his right to the 

benefit of the statute. Again, the State did nothing. 

On April 12, 1984, the precise date on which six months 

had expired from the time defendant had entered his plea to 

the misdemeanor charge, defense counsel moved to dismiss the 

complaint because defendant had not been tried within the 

required six months. On April 24, the trial court dismissed 

the complaint. The State's appeal followed. 

We have set forth in the procedural history several 

instances in which the State had the opportunity to request 

another trial setting, but failed to do so. The State in 

effect concedes and the record shows that defendant did not 

request a postponement. The question is one then of 

determining whether the State demonstrated "good cause" 

within the meaning of section 46-13-201 (2), MCA, for the 

delay of trial beyond the six-month deadline. The trial 
court held the State did not demonstrate qood cause and we 

also hold that the State did not demonstrate good cause. 

The State would have this Court impose a speedy trial 

constitutional analysis in determining whether "good cause" 

was met based on the six-month statutory deadline. The 

speedy trial tests, however, apply only in the case of 

felonies, and we would be inclined to apply them to 

misdemeanors only if a statute did not exist that was even 

more restrictive than the speedy trial tests. Here the 

statutory deadline set forth in section 46-13-201(2), is more 

strict than any constitutional analysis would he required to 

be arid we simply use the statute as containing the sole 

standard of whether "good cause" for the delay has been 

shown. 

The State also argues that defendant must be held 

responsible for the delay because defense counsel, in signing 

off the check list at the omnibus hearing, did not indicate 

that a problem of speedy trial loomed. on the horizon. But 

the statute is clear and the facts are clear. If the 

defendant requests the postponement the six-month trial 

deadline does not apply. But if this is not so, then the 

State must prove the existence of good cause for the delay. 

Here the delay, occasioned in part by the resiqnation of 

a judge and the appointment of a successor, is not the only 

institutional delay that inheres in the process given these 

circumstances. Rather, the State contributed to this delay 

by its failure to take any action when it had knowledge that 

the retiring judge would not be presiding over the trial on 

February 28. The State did nothing until it met with the new 

judge on March 23 and then the State acquiesced in the trial 

settina for April 30, set at least two weeks past the 
statutory deadline. Neither defendant nor his counsel were 

present at this hearing, and they can hardly be held 

responsible for the trial setting. 

The District Court order dismissing the misdemeanor 

charges for failure to comply with the six-month statutory 

deadline, is a££ irmed. 

We Concur: 

~P.J?/d-@#&\ 

Chief ~usfice