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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 

In the matter of: 

Intuit Inc., a corporation, 

Respondent. 

Docket No. 9408 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT COUNSEL’S 

EXHIBIT LIST AND TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE GX GX870, THE 

SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORT OF DR. YOELI OR, IN THE 

ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION TO INTUIT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

AMEND ITS EXHIBIT LIST AND TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE RX1520, 

THE SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT REPORT OF BRUCE DEAL 

At the eleventh hour, and well after its deadline to serve its expert report or 

exchange expert related exhibits, Intuit served the Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce 

Deal (the “Supplemental Deal Report”). Complaint Counsel (“CC”) did not file a 

motion in limine, but instead simply responded, serving a supplemental rebuttal expert 

report a week later that addresses Mr. Deal’s new opinions and analyses. Now, Intuit 

asks this Court to permit it to add its supplemental expert report to its exhibit list, but to 

bar CC from rebutting that report unless CC agrees to serve a neutered version of the 

report. See generally, Respondent’s Mar. 22, 2023 Motion for Leave to Amend its Exhibit 

List and to Admit into Evidence RX1520, The Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce Deal 

(the “Motion”). Such maneuvering should not be tolerated. CC therefore respectfully 

moves this Court to add the March 17, 2023 Supplemental Rebuttal Expert Report of Dr. 

Erez Yoeli (the “Supplemental Yoeli Rebuttal Report”), GX 870, to CC’s Exhibit List. In 

the alternative, if this Court denies CC’s instant motion, CC opposes Intuit’s Motion. 

Any delay in adding the Supplemental Deal Report to the exhibit list falls squarely at 

the feet of Intuit. See infra. Respondent has not shown good cause to add expert 

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materials late, and the Supplemental Deal Report should not come in, therefore, absent 

an opportunity for CC to rebut it. 

Factual background. 

On December 30, 2022, this Court granted CC’s Motion to Compel (the 

“December Order”) pertaining to Intuit’s customer relational management database 

(the “CRM data”), compelling Intuit to produce the ordered CRM data by January 23, 

2023. Order, Dec. 30, 2022. The December Order also: (1) extended the fact discovery 

deadline for the limited purpose of production of the CRM data, and (2) permitted the 

parties to modify their expert reports “as necessary to respond” to the production of 

CRM data. The December Order, however, did not extend the February 17 deadline to 

exchange expert related exhibits or complete expert related depositions. Absent consent, 

then, the Parties must seek permission of the Court to add any expert exhibits to their 

exhibit lists that were not identified by February 17. See First Revised Sched. Order, 

Sept. 12, 2022. 

On January 13, Intuit served the Expert Report of Bruce Deal (the “January Deal 

Report”). Attachment A, RX 1027. In that report, Mr. Deal does not consider or analyze 

any data from Intuit’s CRM database. See id. On January 23, 2023, Intuit produced its 

CRM data pursuant to the December Order. Intuit’s representation that it then, on 

February 7 and 9, “notified Complaint Counsel..., [that] as contemplated in the 

[December] Order, Intuit planned to modify its expert reports to respond to the CRM 

data” strains candor to the Court. Compare Mot. at 1 with Mot. Ex. B at 2-3. In truth, 

Intuit: (1) on February 7, proposed a schedule in which CC would first serve any 

modified expert reports, after which Intuit, by March 3, would “serve modified expert 

report(s), if any,”1 (emphasis added); and (2) on February 9, (after CC pointed out that 

Intuit shouldn’t need to file a modified expert report to analyze its own data) 

1 In its Motion, Intuit never explains why the report was not served until 11:52 p.m. on 

March 9, nearly a week after March 3. 

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“reserve[d] its right” to file such modified reports2—a far cry from notifying CC that it 

would, in fact, file such reports. 

Then, more than three weeks after Intuit produced its CRM data and two days 

before the deadline to exchange expert related exhibits, on February 15, 2023, Deal was 

deposed. At that time, he confirmed that, while he knew there had been a “back and 

forth between the FTC and Intuit about the CRM data,” he didn’t “have it,” hadn’t 

“analyzed it,” and “didn’t have any need for it.” Attachment B, Excerpts of RX 1395, at 

81:1-10; 173:7-175:3. Deal also confirmed that he has been on the Intuit case “more than 

a year,” and received all data sets he requested. Id. at 8:22-9:3; 77:13-15. Two days later, 

the deadline to exchange expert exhibits passed, without Intuit having disclosed that 

Deal would submit a supplemental expert report. 

On March 9, 2023, at 11:52 p.m.—two weeks before the Pre-Hearing Conference 

in this matter, and nearly three weeks after its February 17 deadline to serve expert 

related exhibits and almost two months after its January 13 deadline to submit expert 

reports—Intuit served the Supplemental Deal Report. See Attachment C (Mar. 9, 2023 

Email from B. Chapin to R. Plett et. al). On Wednesday March 15, 2023, CC informed 

Intuit that it would serve, and sought consent to add to its exhibit list, a brief 

supplemental rebuttal expert report of Yoeli to rebut the Supplemental Deal Report. See 

Mot. at Ex. A. On March 17, 2023, CC served the Supplemental Yoeli Rebuttal Report. 

Id. On March 20, 2023, the Parties met and conferred, and were unable to consent to the 

addition to their exhibit lists of the two expert rebuttal reports. See id. 

I. CC Has Good Cause to Add the Supplemental Expert Report of Dr. Yoeli to Its 

Exhibit List 

“Good cause is demonstrated if a party seeking to extend a deadline 

demonstrates that a deadline cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the 

2 As CC pointed out then, “[a]s there will be no [Complaint Counsel] modification to 

respond to, and given that the production contained Intuit’s own data which it could 

have had its experts analyze before Intuit’s expert reports were due, we don’t believe

Intuit should have a need to modify its expert reports either.” 

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party seeking the extension.” In the Matter of Chicago Bridge & Iron Company N.V., 2002 

FTC Lexis 69, at *5 (Oct. 23, 2002) (citations omitted). CC has good cause to add the 

Supplemental Yoeli Rebuttal Report to its exhibit list because, through no fault of it or 

Yoeli, the supplemental report could not have been timely added to its exhibit list. Yoeli 

is designated as a rebuttal expert in this case and was retained to rebut the expert 

opinions of Intuit’s expert Deal. See e.g., GX 870 at ¶¶1 to 2. Deal’s supplemental report 

was served close to midnight on March 9, weeks after the February 17 expert related 

deadlines. The Supplemental Yoeli Rebuttal Report was served a mere one week after 

receiving the Supplemental Deal Report. CC has therefore acted reasonably and with 

diligence, and good cause exists to add the Supplemental Yoeli Rebuttal Report to its 

exhibit list. 

Intuit’s objection to the Supplemental Yoeli Rebuttal Report is flawed. First, 

Intuit relays that CC “informed Intuit that they did not intend to modify their expert 

reports in response to the CRM data.” Mot. at 2. On February 7, 2023, when Intuit 

inquired, however, CC did not intend to serve an expert report analyzing the CRM data, 

but instead assigned review of the CRM data to an in-house data analyst. Intuit’s 

decision to serve a tardy Supplemental Deal Report, however, created a need for CC to 

rebut Deal’s new report. Neither is it dispositive that Yoeli’s rebuttal report was 

“produced long past the deadline for expert reports and Yoeli’s deposition.” Mot. at 3. 

Yoeli is a rebuttal expert, and his opinions are necessarily, and appropriately, in 

response to those of Deal—whose report was not served on CC until March 9. In his 

January Expert Rebuttal Report, in fact, Yoeli reserved the right to supplement or 

modify his opinions if “any additional report(s) or opinions are offered by experts for 

the defendants.” Attachment D, GX 743, at par. 11. Yoeli does so now.3 

3 It would be prejudicial to CC’s ability to prosecute its case if Intuit is permitted to 

file a supplemental report with new evidence and analysis at the eleventh hour, and

CC’s properly designated rebuttal expert is not permitted to rebut the report. Intuit 

does not provide any sound basis that its late report should be admitted, but CC’s 

(continued) 

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Intuit’s alternative argument to exclude the Supplemental Yoeli Rebuttal Report, 

however, is that Yoeli analyzed additional data beyond the CRM data, and therefore 

goes “beyond the scope” of this December Order. Mot. at 5 As an initial matter, the 

question of whether Yoeli’s report should come in rests on whether CC has good cause 

to add the report to the exhibit list, not on whether Intuit blesses Yoeli’s specific 

analysis. More importantly, however, Intuit asks this Court to read the Supplemental 

Deal Report myopically to be solely about the CRM data first produced in January. This 

characterization ignores that the Supplemental Deal Report to which Yoeli is 

responding applies a new methodology (systematically applying search terms across 

Intuit’s own data) to explicitly bless, and build on, the opinions of in the January Deal 

Report. 

In the January Deal Report, Deal draws conclusions about whether a consumer 

could be deceived based, in part, on filtering customer review data by using the 1 to 5 

rating score that the consumer gave a TurboTax product after being prompted to leave 

a review upon completing their tax filing. Attachment A, RX 1027, at ¶¶ 154 to 160. 

Nowhere in Deal’s January report does he run search terms across the customer review 

data, or any other Intuit data set. In rebutting Deal’s January opinions, Yoeli considers 

Deal’s methodology—filtering based on review score—and opined that evidence of 

customer satisfaction scores does not preclude deception because, for example, 

customers may leave no review or a good review and still have been deceived into 

believing that TurboTax was free for them. Attachment D, GX 743 at ¶¶ 129-130. 

The Supplemental Deal Report, however, applies a new methodology in which 

Deal, for the first time, systematically applies search terms to Intuit’s data. Specifically, 

Deal runs a narrow set of search terms against some fields in the CRM data, and finds a 

small number of examples that meet his criteria. He then extrapolates from the ratio of 

rebuttal—served a mere week after the Supplemental Deal Report—should be excluded 

as untimely. 

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search term hits in the CRM database to the total customer base to purportedly show a 

lack of deception. In his Supplemental Yoeli Rebuttal Report rebutting Deal’s analysis of 

CRM data, among other critiques, Yoeli runs a wider set of search terms against both 

the CRM data and the customer review data “to illustrate how Deal’s analyses fail to 

account for deceived consumers.” Attachment D, GX 743, at par 48. This analysis is 

purely in rebuttal to Deal. And while Intuit tries to constrain Yoeli to applying search 

terms across the CRM, it is appropriate and proper for him to employ this methodology 

in the customer review data, which, unlike the CRM data, captures feedback directly 

from consumers. (As Deal described in his deposition, the CRM data is “moderated 

through whatever the customer service person typed in.”) Attachment B, at 174:22-23. 

While Intuit would like to cabin Yoeli’s rebuttal report, it provides no authority 

for the proposition that Yoeli’s rebuttal of Deal’s new supplemental opinions needs to 

be constrained solely an analysis of the CRM data. It is entirely appropriate for a 

rebuttal expert to rely on the full record in rebutting a supplemental report. This is 

exactly what Yoeli does. Yoeli relies on data that was produced by Intuit, disclosed on 

CC’s exhibit list in December, and directly relates to the analysis performed in the 

Supplemental Deal Report. The court is entitled to evaluate the entire story. The 

Supplemental Yoeli Rebuttal Report is therefore proper and should come in, in full. 

II. In the Alternative, Intuit Has Not Shown Good Cause to Add the

Supplemental Deal Report to the Exhibit List After its Deadline. 

Although CC has legitimate objections to the addition of the Supplemental Deal 

Report to Intuit’s Exhibit List, described below, it would first advocate that both reports 

come into evidence, where their relative merits can be assessed by the trier of fact—this 

Court. If, however, CC’s Motion is denied, then, for the following reasons, CC opposes 

Intuit’s Motion. 

First, the Deal Supplemental Report is untimely. Although this Court’s December 

Order permits the parties to modify their expert reports in response to the CRM data, it 

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expressly did not extend the February 17, 2023 deadlines to exchange expert related 

exhibits. The Court clearly intended such expert materials to be exchanged by February 

17. See Dec. 12, 2023 Order. Intuit, however, did not timely include the Supplemental 

Deal Report as an exhibit. And CC did not consent to its addition. Therefore, Intuit 

requires leave of this Court after showing “good cause” to add the Supplemental Deal 

Report to its exhibit list. Scheduling Order at par. 23. Intuit has not shown good cause. 

In the Supplemental Deal Report, Deal’s assignment was to analyze Intuit’s CRM 

data. As Intuit’s retained expert, Deal could have analyzed the data any time since he 

was retained a year ago. Instead, Deal admitted in his deposition (taken weeks after the 

data was produced to CC and only two days before the deadline to exchange expert 

exhibits), that he did not possess, request or analyze the CRM data. See supra at 3. Intuit, 

therefore, failed to act with diligence, and cannot show good cause to add the 

Supplemental Deal Report to its exhibit list now. 

Second, the Deal Supplemental Report, at least in part, relies on evidence that has 

already been excluded by this Court in its March 7, 2023 Order on Motions in Limine. 

Specifically, in that Order, this Court granted CC’s motion to preclude Intuit from 

introducing evidence of customer satisfaction as a defense to liability. Mar. 7 Order at 8-

9. Deal, however, liberally uses the Supplemental Deal Report to “bless” the numbers 

he arrived at using customer satisfaction evidence, purporting to validate the small 

number of consumers that he arrived at in his January Deal Report – while omitting that 

the methodology used to reach that number relied on evidence of customer satisfaction. 

The Supplemental Deal Report, therefore, is improper. 

Conclusion. 

Intuit accuses CC of withholding consent to belatedly add the Supplemental Deal 

Report in order to “strong arm” Intuit and hold the supplemental report “hostage.” This 

couldn’t be further from the truth. Instead, Complaint Counsel articulated valid 

objections to the Supplemental Deal Report but, in the interest of allowing both parties 

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to put on their cases, agreed to remove its objection as long Yoeli could fully rebut the 

new Deal report. Complaint Counsel submits that that is still the best course of action, 

and respectfully requests that the Supplemental Deal Report and Supplemental Yoeli 

Rebuttal Report be added to the parties’ Exhibit Lists. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Dated: March 22, 2023 /s/ Sara Tonnesen 

Roberto Anguizola, IL Bar No. 6270874 

Rebecca Plett, VA Bar No. 90988 

James Evans, VA Bar No. 83866 

Sara Tonnesen, MD Bar No. 1312190241 

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, CC-6316 

Washington, DC 20580 

(202)

(202)

326-3284 / ranguizola@ftc.gov 

(202) 326-3664 / rplett@ftc.gov 

326-2026 / james.evans@ftc.gov 

(202) 326-2879 / stonnesen@ftc.gov 

Counsel Supporting the Complaint

Federal Trade Commission 

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CONFERENCE STATEMENT 

Counsel for the moving party has conferred with opposing counsel in an effort in 

good faith to resolve by agreement the issues raised by the motion and has been unable 

to reach such an agreement 

/s/ Sara Tonnesen 

Sara Tonnesen 

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 

In the matter of: 

Intuit Inc., a corporation, 

Respondent. 

Docket No. 9408 

[Proposed] ORDER 

Upon consideration of Complaint Counsel’s Motion for Leave to Supplement 

Complaint Counsel’s Exhibit List and to Admit into Evidence GX 870, the Supplemental 

Expert Report of Dr. Erez Yoeli: 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Motion is GRANTED. 

Dated: 

D. Michael Chappell

Chief Administrative Law Judge 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on March 22, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing Motion 

for Leave to Amend its Exhibit List and to Admit into Evidence GX 870, or, In the 

Alternative, to Deny Respondent’s Motion for Leave to Amend its Exhibit List and to 

Admit into Evidence RX 1520, electronically using the FTC’s E-Filing system, and I 

caused the foregoing document to be sent via email to: 

April Tabor

Office of the Secretary

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Suite CC-5610 

Washington, DC 20580 

ElectronicFilings@ftc.gov 

Secretary of the Commission

Clerk of the Court 

Hon. D. Michael Chappell

Chief Administrative Law Judge

Federal Trade Commission 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Suite H-110 

Washington, DC 20580 

Administrative Law Judge 

I further certify that on March 22, 2023, I caused the foregoing document to be 

served via email on: 

David Z. Gringer

Phoebe Silos 

Charles Bridge

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP

7 World Trade Center 

250 Greenwich Street 

New York, NY 10007 

David.Gringer@wilmerhale.com

Phoebe.Silos@wilmerhale.com 

Charles.Bridge@wilmerhale.com

(212) 230-8800 

Shelby Martin

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP

1225 Seventeenth Street, Suite 2600 

Denver, CO 80202 

Shelby.Martin@wilmerhale.com

(720) 274-3135 

Katherine Mackey

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP

60 State Street 

Boston, MA 02109 

Katherine.Mackey@wilmerhale.com

(617) 526-6000 

Jonathan E. Paikin 

Jennifer Milici 

Derek A. Woodman 

Vinecia Perkins 

Andres Salinas 

Spencer Todd

Jocelyn Berteaud

Benjamin Chapin

Margaret (Molly) Dillaway

Reade Jacob 

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP

1875 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, DC 20006 

Jonathan.Paikin@wilmerhale.com 

Jennifer.Milici@wilmerhale.com 

Derek.Woodman@wilmerhale.com 

Vinecia.Perkins@wilmerhale.com 

Andres.Salinas@wilmerhale.com 

Spencer.Todd@wilmerhale.com

Joss.Berteaud@wilmerhale.com 

Benjamin.Chapin@wilmerhale.com

Molly.Dillaway@wilmerhale.com

Reade.Jacob@wilmerhale.com 

(202) 663-6000 

Attorneys for Respondent, Intuit Inc. 

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/s/ Sara Tonnesen 

SARA TONNESEN 

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Attachment A 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

COMMISSIONERS: Lina M. Khan, Chair 

Rebecca Kelly Slaughter 

Christine S. Wilson 

Alvaro M. Bedoya 

In the Matter of: 

Intuit Inc., a corporation. 

Docket No. 9408 

EXPERT REPORT OF BRUCE F. DEAL 

JANUARY 13, 2023 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. Introduction.............................................................................................................................1 

A. Qualifications .................................................................................................................1 

B. Assignment.....................................................................................................................2 

C. Case Background and Allegations of Misrepresentation...............................................3 

II. Summary of Opinions .............................................................................................................4 

III. Tax Preparation Using TurboTax .........................................................................................12 

IV. Complaint Counsel’s Claims of Widespread and Significant Deception Are 

Inconsistent with Intuit’s Economic Incentives....................................................................22 

A. Economic Reasoning Shows That Competition and Pursuit of Repeated 

Customer Interactions Act Together as a Self-Disciplinary Mechanism 

Against a Firm Deceiving Its Customers .....................................................................22 

B. Complaint Counsel’s Claims of Widespread and Significant Deception of 

Intuit’s Customers Are Inconsistent with the Competitive Dynamics in the 

Tax Preparation Industry..............................................................................................28 

1. Saturation: The Tax Preparation Industry Has Few New Customers 

Each Year and Is Characterized by Providers Competing for Repeated 

Customer Purchases .............................................................................................. 30 

2. Competing Solutions: Consumers Choose Among Many Offerings by 

Different Providers Competing Aggressively Against Each Other ...................... 31 

3. Differentiation: Tax Preparation Services Are Differentiated.............................. 35 

4. Switching Costs: Consumers Willing to Consider Digital DIY 

Solutions Face Low Switching Costs ................................................................... 41 

C. Customer Retention and Reputation Building Are Critical Elements of Tax 

Preparation Services Providers’ Competitive Strategies .............................................44 

V. Intuit’s Actual Business Strategy Is Inconsistent with Complaint Counsel’s 

Theory of Deception .............................................................................................................46 

A. Customer Retention Is Essential to Intuit’s TurboTax Business Model......................46 

B. Contrary to Complaint Counsel’s Allegations, the TurboTax Website Is 

Designed to Funnel Customers to the Expected Appropriate Product ........................52 

C. Intuit’s Efforts to Improve Customer Experience by Reducing the Time and 

Effort to File Taxes with TurboTax Are Inconsistent with the Strategy of 

Deception Alleged by Complaint Counsel ..................................................................61 

D. Contrary to Complaint Counsel’s Allegations, Intuit Does Not Have Any 

Means to Prevent Customer Defection ........................................................................67 

VI. Evidence from TurboTax Customer Data Is Inconsistent With Complaint 

Counsel’s Allegations of Deception for the Vast Majority of TurboTax 

Customers..............................................................................................................................73 

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A. Customers Who Explored TurboTax and Pursued Other Options...............................77 

B. Customers Who Filed Their Tax Returns for Free ......................................................82 

C. Customers Who Expressed Rational Economic Choice by Seeking to 

Maximize Their Tax Refund, Revealed Preference for Paid Features, or 

Demonstrated Awareness of TurboTax Paid Products................................................85 

1. Customers Who Expressed Rational Economic Choice by Seeking to 

Maximize Their Tax Refund but Could Have Used Free Edition to 

Report Their Income to the IRS............................................................................ 86 

2. Customers Who Revealed a Preference for Paid Features or Other 

Capabilities Available in Paid Products................................................................ 89 

3. Customers Who Demonstrated Awareness of TurboTax Paid Products .............. 94 

VII. There Are No Data Supporting Claims that Intuit’s Alleged Deception 

Resulted in Customers Using TurboTax Paid Productsin TY21 as Alleged 

by Complaint Counsel.........................................................................................................104 

A. Customers’ Past Interactions with TurboTax Suggest Their Awareness of 

Alternatives to TurboTax Products and Their Preference for TurboTax 

Products......................................................................................................................106 

B. Customers’ Interactions with Marketing Materials and the TurboTax 

Website Indicates Awareness That TurboTax Was Not Free for Them ....................108 

C. Customers Behavior After Filing Using TurboTax Undermines Complaint 

Counsel’s Assertion That They Were Deceived ........................................................110 

Appendix A: Curriculum Vitae................................................................................................... A-1 

Appendix B: Materials Considered..............................................................................................B-1 

Appendix C: Digital DIY Tax Preparation Products Overview ..................................................C-1 

Appendix D: Technical Appendix .............................................................................................. D-1 

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I. INTRODUCTION 

A. Qualifications 

1. My name is Bruce Deal. I am a Managing Principal of Analysis Group, Inc. (“Analysis 

Group”), an economic and financial consulting firm. I lead the economic consulting 

practice in Analysis Group’s Menlo Park, California office. I have over 30 years of 

experience in economic, litigation, and financial consulting. I have developed and 

managed hundreds of assignments requiring complex economic analysis of publicly 

available and internal client information. I have a master’s degree in Public Policy from 

Harvard University and I have completed additional graduate coursework at Harvard. 

2. Before joining Analysis Group in 1996, I worked as a consultant and manager at Arthur 

Andersen, the then-largest accounting and consulting firm in the world. In this position, I 

provided financial and management consulting services in areas such as operational 

organization and efficiency and projected financial performance. In addition, I taught 

economics and analytic methods to graduate students at Harvard, as well as serving as a 

consultant through Harvard University for the Minister of Finance of Indonesia, where I 

joined a group of Harvard colleagues focusing on trade policy and government finance. 

Over the course of my career I have also given many presentations and published articles 

in trade journals and professional journals. 

3. Since joining Analysis Group more than 25 years ago, I have been involved in hundreds 

of projects involving a wide variety of economic issues. This has included dozens of 

projects where I have served as an expert on economic and financial issues. I have been 

accepted as an expert in federal courts, state courts, and international and domestic 

arbitrations. My work has included matters working for both defendants and plaintiffs, 

working for government entities, and has included both civil and criminal matters. 

4. I have led and served as an expert on many matters involving alleged violations of false 

advertising and consumer protection laws in many different contexts, including 

insurance, banking, healthcare, and telecommunications. This work has been done at all 

phases of litigation, including class certification, liability, damages, and restitution. 

Nearly all of my projects involve the analysis of detailed financial and related data. This 

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Complaint Counsel,4 Intuit’s internal documents and presentations prepared in the 

ordinary course of business, and customer-level data on Intuit’s TurboTax customers 

between tax year 2014 (“TY14”) and tax year 2021 (“TY21”).

5 The sources which I 

relied upon when forming my opinions presented in this report are listed in the attached 

Appendix B. Should additional relevant documents, data, or information be made 

available to me, I may adjust or supplement my opinions as appropriate. In preparing my 

report, I have utilized the following commercially-available computer programs: 

Microsoft Office, SAS, and Adobe Acrobat. 

C. Case Background and Allegations of Misrepresentation 

8. I understand that Complaint Counsel filed an administrative complaint against Intuit,6 

followed by a motion for summary decision.7 Complaint Counsel contend that the 

complaint and motion lay out their claim and the evidence they believe supports the 

claim.8 The Complaint alleges that Intuit “represents, directly or indirectly, expressly or 

by implication, that consumers can file their taxes for free using TurboTax” when in 

many cases Intuit actually “does not permit consumers to file their taxes for free using 

TurboTax.”9,10 Complaint Counsel state that Intuit’s marketing of TurboTax Free Edition 

4 Complaint, United States of America before the Federal Trade Commission in the Matter of: Intuit Inc., A 

Corporation, Docket No. 9408, March 28, 2022 (“Complaint”). 5 Tax returns for a particular tax year are filed during the subsequent calendar year. For example, the IRS began 

acceptingTY21 returns (reporting income earned during calendar year 2021) on January 24, 2022, with the 

deadline of April 18, 2022, for most taxpayers. Taxpayers requesting an extension had until October 17, 2022, 

to file their returns. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, “2022 Tax Filing Season begins Jan. 24; IRS Outlines 

Refund Timing and What to Expect in Advance of April 18 Tax Deadline,” January 10, 2022, 

https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/2022-tax-filing-season-begins-jan-24-irs-outlines-refund-timing-and-what-toexpect-in-advance-of-april-18-tax-deadline, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610692. 

6 Complaint. 

7 Complaint Counsel’s Motion for Summary Decision, United States of America before the Federal Trade 

Commission in the Matter of: Intuit Inc., A Corporation, Respondent, Docket No. 9408, May 6, 2022 (“Motion 

for Summary Decision”). 8 See, e.g., Videotaped Deposition of William T. Maxson, In the Matter of Intuit Inc., Docket No. 9408, 

December 8, 2022 (“Maxson Deposition”), CC-00005358 at 9:18-10:1 (“Q. What is it that the bureau believes 

Intuit did that is deceptive? A. The bureau’s allegations against Intuit are set forth in the complaint and detailed 

more specifically in the motion for summary decision.”) and at 10:11-15 (“Q. So the bureau contends that Intuit 

advertised all of it – that all of its tax filing software was free? A. Like I said, the bureau’s position is set forth 

in the complaint.”). 

9 Complaint, ¶¶ 119–120. 

10 While the Complaint mentions ad campaigns and includes screenshots of several commercials aired during 

TY21, the most recent tax season, it references Intuit’s promotionalactivities as early as 2016. The analysis in 

this report focuses on customers who used TurboTax to file their TY21 federal or state returns but similar 

reasoning applies to TurboTax customers in other years. 

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amounts to a “bait and switch” designed to lure “reasonable” consumers to the TurboTax 

platform with the promise of free tax filing,11 only to require them to upgrade to a paid 

version of TurboTax “after they have invested time and effort gathering and inputting 

into TurboTax their sensitive personal and financial information.”12 

II. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS 

9. The vast majority of Intuit’s TY21 TurboTax customer base could not have been 

deceived by Intuit’s marketing campaigns or website design into paying for TurboTax 

products that they had expected to get for free. Complaint Counsel’s claims of 

widespread deception and theories of harm are unsupported and inconsistent with 

economic theory, competition in the industry, Intuit’s incentives and business strategy, 

and the behavior of Intuit’s customers, all of which I have reviewed in forming my 

opinions. Their allegations ignore market forces and incentives that exist in a competitive 

industry characterized by repeated interactions with a largely pre-determined and 

relatively stable set of consumers who need to file a tax return in a given year, but who 

can easily switch providers. Furthermore, considering that the allegations may extend to 

other years, Complaint Counsel’s claims and theories are inconsistent with the nature of 

repeated interactions, and would effectively require an assumption that consumers would 

have no memory of past interaction and a complete lack of awareness of the existence of 

the many other tax filing alternatives. 

10. There are a number of bases for my opinions. First, Intuit has substantial economic 

incentives not to engage in deception: 

a. Economic reasoning shows that two dynamics in the tax software preparation 

industry—competition and the pursuit of repeated customer interactions in the 

11 Complaint, ¶ 94 (“In 2018, Intuit knew that consumers were still confused about the differences b etween the 

Free File and ‘freemium’ versions of TurboTax. For example, a presentation prepared in 2018 by an Intuit 

employee involved with marketing strategy related to both the Free File and ‘freemium’ versions of TurboTax 

stated: ‘Once we launched a free commercialized offering on TT.com, customers have often been confused 

between the two ‘free’ offerings and we have received complaints that we were not transparent and/or a bait and 

switch.’”); Complaint, ¶ 35 (“Given this advertising, reasonable consumers may believe that the TurboTax 

products and services Intuit advertises as free are free for them”). 

12 Complaint, ¶ 6. 

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harmed as a result. It also directly contradicts Dr. Novemsky’s conclusions and his 

assertion that these conclusions are broadly applicable to consumers exposed to Intuit’s 

advertising.14 I describe each of these opinions more fully in the subsequent sections of 

this report. 

III. TAX PREPARATION USING TURBOTAX 

14. In addition to traditional paper filing, consumers in the U.S. can choose among a variety 

of tax preparation solutions such as online “do-it-yourself” (“DIY”) products15 or online 

or offline tax preparation services using the assistance of a tax professional. The majority 

of filers today choose to prepare their return using a tax preparation product or service, 

rather than completing it manually using a paper return. As shown in Figure 1 below, inperson assisted tax preparation (by certified public accountants (“CPAs”) and in tax 

stores) remains the most popular tax preparation method, but the popularity of DIY and 

other online tax preparation products—including TurboTax online and desktop 

products—has grown in recent years. Very few consumers complete their taxes manually. 

14 Novemsky Report, ¶ 5. 

15 Note that some tax preparation companies, including Intuit, offer offline versions of their tax preparation 

software that can be downloaded or installed using a CD, referred to as “desktop” products. Throughout this 

report I focus on TurboTax Online products since I understand these to be the subject of the Complaint. 

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Deluxe, Premier, and Self-Employed (for most complex tax situations).25 Each of these 

four main tiers are available with various levels of support: as DIY products with limited 

assistance; as TurboTax Live (“TTL”) products, which include real-time expert advice 

and final review; or as Full Service (introduced in TY20),26 an assisted preparation 

product more akin to a traditional CPA service, in which a tax expert prepares the entire 

tax return for a customer. Figure 2 shows the lineup of TurboTax products in TY21, as 

depicted on the TurboTax website. 

25 For a list of forms and schedules supported by each product, see Intuit, “TurboTax Deluxe Online 2021-2022,” 

https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/online/deluxe.jsp#tax-forms, accessed July 8, 2022, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000611098. 

26 Hood, Daniel, “Intuit Launches Assisted Tax Prep,” Accounting Today, December 2, 2022, 

https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/intuit-launches-assisted-tax-prep, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613019. 

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Figure 2 

TurboTax Product Lineup, TY21 

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18. Regardless of whether considering DIY or assisted options, the four product tiers are 

designed to assist customers with varying tax complexity. The basic product (referred to 

as Free Edition in the version without any expert assistance) is designed for consumers 

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guidance for freelancers that might not be relevant for TurboTax customers with simple 

tax returns. 

Figure 3 

List of Supported Schedules and Features Available in TurboTax Products 

as of January 2023 

Free Edition: Deluxe: Maximize Tax Premier: Investments and Self-Employed: Personal & 

Simple Returns Only Deductions and Credits Rental Property Business Income and Expenses 

Form 1040 Only +Sch. 1-3, Sch. A, Sch. C +Sch. D &E +Sch. C Expenses, Sch. F 

Income 

Data Import: YOY Data Transfer, W-2, Tax Return Access 

Data Import: Prior Year Competitive PDF, 1099INT, 1099 DIV 

AnswerXchange 

Easy prep, print, and e-file 

Jumpstart your taxes, snap a photo of your W-2 

Hobby Personal Property rental or personal item sales income reported on Form 1099-K (some restrictions apply) 

MyDocs, Smart Insights, ItsDeductible, Online Amend 

Product and Tax Support 

Searches 350+ tax deductions and credits 

Maximizes mortgage and property tax deductions 

Turns donations into big deductions 

Data Import: 1099B 

Covers stocks, bonds, ESPPs, crypto, and other investments 

Auto-import your crypto and stock activity to make sure there's no 

missing info 

Covers rental property income and tax deductions 

Accurately account for gains and losses from crypto transactions 

QuickBooks Self Employed 

Audit Assessor 

Tax Estimate 

Guidance for freelancers, 

independent contractors, and small 

business owners 

Uncovers industry-specific 

deductions for more tax breaks 

Upload your 1099-NEC or 1099-

K with a snap from your 

smartphone 

Audit assessment for added 

confidence 

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Figure 4 

List of 128 Tax Forms and Schedules Supported by TurboTax 

Self-Employed Products as of July 2022 

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Form 1040 Form 4852 Form 8936 

Form 1040-ES Form 4868 Form 8938 

Form 1040-V Form 4952/AMT Form 8941 

Form 1040X Form 4972 Form 8949 

Form 1095-A Form 5329 Form 8958 

Form 1098 Form 5405 Form 8959 

Form 1098-C Form 5695 Form 8960 

Form 1098-E Form 6198 Form 8962 

Form 1098-T Form 6251 Form 8994 

Form 1099-A Form 6252 Form 8995 

Form 1099-B Form 6781 Form 8995-A 

Form 1099-C Form 8283 Form 8995-A Sch A 

Form 1099-DIV Form 8332 Form 8995-A Sch B 

Form 1099-G Form 8379 Form 8995-A Sch C 

Form 1099-INT Form 8396 Form 8995-A Sch D 

Form 1099-K Form 8453 Form 9465 

Form 1099-MISC Form 8582/AMT/CR Form 982 

Form 1099-NEC Form 8586 Form SS-4 

Form 1099-OID Form 8606 Form W-2 

Form 1099-Q Form 8615 Form W-2G 

Form 1099-R Form 8801 Form W-4 

Form 1099-SA Form 8814 Schedule 1 

Form 1116/AMT Form 8815 Schedule 2 

Form 1310 Form 8822 Schedule 3 

Form 14039 Form 8824 Schedule 8812 

Form 2106 Form 8829 Schedule A 

Form 2120 Form 8834 Schedule B 

Form 2210-F Form 8839 Schedule C 

Form 2210/2210AI Form 8853 Schedule D 

Form 2439 Form 8857 Schedule E 

Form 2441 Form 8859 Schedule EIC 

Form 2555 Form 8862 Schedule F 

Form 3468 Form 8863 Schedule H 

Form 3800 Form 8880 Schedule J 

Form 3903 Form 8881 Schedule LEP 

Form 4136 Form 8885 Schedule R 

Form 4137 Form 8888 Schedule SE 

Form 4255 Form 8889 Schedules K-1 (Form 1041) 

Form 4506 Form 8910 Schedules K-1 (Form 1065) 

Form 4562 Form 8911 Schedules K-1 (Form 1120S) 

Form 4684 Form 8915A Schedules K-3 (Form 1065) 

Form 4797 Form 8915B Schedules K-3 (Form 1120S) 

Form 4835 Form 8919 

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21. Each of Intuit’s products offers certain features and services that are available at no 

additional expense, such as automated data imports or access to tax returns filed using 

TurboTax in previous years. Intuit also offers optional paid add-on services or bundles 

such as “PLUS Help & Support” (available for Free Edition customers) or “MAX 

Restore & Defend” (available for customers using paid TurboTax products).38,39 These 

can be purchased in addition to the tax preparation product if the customer is seeking 

services such as audit protection, tax expert assistance with returns, or identity loss 

insurance. These features are not necessary to file one’s taxes but address related 

concerns that may arise for certain customers as they are filing their taxes given the 

central role that taxes play in some consumers’ financial lives. 

22. As Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 show, TurboTax products differ in the forms and 

schedules they support, the extent of features and services included by default or 

available for purchase, the scope of expert assistance, and, as a result, also in price. While 

the most basic Free Edition product allows customers with simple tax situations to file 

federal and state returns completely for free, customers with more complex sources of 

income, those who desire to claim certain credits or deductions, or those seeking 

additional functionality or expert support can take advantage of one of the paid products 

or may purchase additional products and services. 

IV. COMPLAINT COUNSEL’S CLAIMS OF WIDESPREAD AND SIGNIFICANT 

DECEPTION ARE INCONSISTENT WITH INTUIT’S ECONOMIC 

INCENTIVES 

A. Economic Reasoning Shows That Competition and Pursuit of Repeated 

Customer Interactions Act Together as a Self-Disciplinary Mechanism Against a 

Firm Deceiving Its Customers 

23. Firms are understood to behave in an economically rational manner to maximize firm 

value. Firm value is typically measured as the discounted present value of future cash 

38 Paid products include Deluxe, Premier, and Self-Employed products. 

39 In addition, “Premium Services” bundle is available for customers in California. See, e.g., Intuit, “What is 

Premium Services?,” January 4, 2022, https://ttlc.intuit.com/turbotax-support/en-us/help-article/intuit-productorders/premium-services/L3Eq2UXII_US_en_US, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610497. 

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flows.40 In this section, I use this framework to examine whether Complaint Counsel’s 

allegations of widespread deception are consistent with this basic framework. As I 

explain, I find that economic theory is inconsistent with a firm maximizing firm value by 

“bait and switch”-style deception of its customers in situations where (i) the firm relies on 

the customers’ continued patronage, (ii) customers can detect deception early on, and (iii) 

customers can easily switch to competitors. These conditions are satisfied with regards to 

Intuit and its TurboTax product. 

24. The main economic intuition for this result comes from the analysis of repeated games in 

game theory, a branch of economics that has flourished for the past 30 years.41 As an 

example, consider a farmers’ market selling vegetables. In a situation where there is only 

a one-time customer interaction (e.g., a fresh busload of new one-day tourists each day) 

and there are very few sellers, one can imagine that misleading or cheating a customer 

might be an economically rational (albeit unethical and perhaps illegal) strategy. On the 

other hand, if there are multiple vendors and repeated interactions with the same 

customers, the incentives are quite different. Consider repeated daily purchases of the 

vegetables in a market with several sellers. At each interaction with a customer, a selling 

vendor has to choose between two strategies: (i) deceive the customer by misrepresenting 

the characteristics of the good or service on sale, earn higher immediate returns, and 

potentially lose any future business from her; or (ii) behave honestly, earning lower 

immediate returns, and build a trusted relationship that leads to repeated future 

40 See, e.g., Koller, Tim et al., Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies Seventh Ed., 

Hoboken, New Jersey, Wiley, 2020INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613339, p. 17 (“Companies create value when 

they earn a return on invested capital (ROIC) greater than their opportunity cost of capital. If the ROIC is at or 

below the cost of capital, growth may not create value. Companies should aim to find the combination of 

growth and ROIC that drives the highest discounted value of their cash flows.”). 41 See, e.g., Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The 

MIT Press, 1994INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613456, p. 133 (“The model of a repeated game is designed to 

examine the logic of long-term interaction. It captures the idea that a player will take into account the effect of 

his current behavior on the other players’ future behavior, and aims to explain phenomena like cooperation, 

revenge, and threats.”). See also Mailath, George J. and Larry Samuelson, “Reputations in Repeated Games,” 

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. 4, 2015, pp. 165-238, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000616899,pp.166–167 (“Repeated games allow for a clean description of both the myopic incentives that 

agents have to behave opportunistically and, via appropriate specifications of future behavior (and so rewards 

and punishments), the incentives that deter opportunistic behavior. As a consequence, strategic interactions 

within long-run relationships have often been studied using repeated games.”). 

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interactions with the same customer.42 In that situation, the incentives for larger lifetime 

profits from repeated interactions may prevail. If a vendor does try to cheat and the 

cheating can be detected during or after the interaction, the customer will abandon the 

cheater and bring her business to the competitors.43 

25. Sellers practicing the first strategy respond to myopic incentives and are not interested in 

earning customers’ loyalty. Obviously, to punish the cheating sellers, customers need to 

become aware of being misled, for example by realizing at the end of the sale process or 

after the sale is completed that the quality of the vegetables was low or the weight 

received was less than what was represented. The faster customers become aware of 

sellers’ misconduct, the lower the return from the first strategy is.44 The second strategy 

is consistent with the conduct of firms that plan to stay in business over the long haul and 

interact repeatedly with many of the same customers. In particular, sellers with already 

established good reputations have more to lose from acting opportunistically.45 As a 

result, they are less likely to deceive their customers, as it is not in their own economic 

self-interest.46 

42 See, e.g., Klein, Benjamin and Keith B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 

Performance,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4, August 1981, pp. 615-641, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000613403,p. 617 (“Cheating will be prevented and high-quality products will be supplied only if firms are 

earning a continual stream of rental income that will be lost if low quality output is deceptively produced. The 

present discounted value of this rental stream must be greater than the one-time wealth increase obtained from 

low quality production.”). 

43 See, e.g., Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The 

MIT Press, 1994INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613456, p. 133 (“The primary achievement of the [repeated games] 

theory is to isolate types of strategies that support mutually desirable outcomes in any game. The theory gives 

us insights into the structure of behavior when individuals interact repeatedly, structure that may be interpreted 

in terms of a ‘social norm.’ The results that we describe show that the social norm needed to sustain mutually 

desirable outcomes involves each player’s ‘punishing’ any player whose behavior is undesirable.”). 

44 See, e.g., Brickley, James A. et al., “Business Ethics and OrganizationalArchitecture,” Journal of Banking & 

Finance, Vol. 26, 2002, pp. 1821-1835, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613388, p. 1830 (“The costs of cheatingon 

quality are higher if information about such activities is more rapidly and widely d istributed to potential future 

customers.”). 

45 See, e.g., Stiglitz, Joseph E., “Imperfect Information in the Product Market,” Handbook of Industrial 

Organization, Vol. 1, edited by Schmalensee, Richard and Robert D. Willig, North Holland, 1989INTUIT-FTCPART3-000613690, p. 823 (“Why do ‘rational’ individuals not take advantage of others, when they have the 

opportunity to do so? Do we need to rely on vague notions of ‘morality’ or ‘social pressure’? Economists at this 

juncture are wont to introduce the notion of reputations: firms produce high quality commodities because they 

fear the loss of reputation will do greater harm than the slight temporary advantage of cheating.”). 

46 See, e.g., Klein, Benjamin and Keith B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 

Performance,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4, August 1981, pp. 615-641, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000613403,p. 624 (“[...] given a particular quality level, quality-cheatingproblems are less severe the higher 

the level of quality that can be detected prepurchase and the shorter the period of repurchase.”). 

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26. Economic reasoning helps to identify structural factors within a given industry that make 

the prospect of repeated interactions particularly effective in incentivizing firms to selfdiscipline and invest in reputation-building behavior.47 First, sellers in saturated 

industries with repeated interactions that have a relatively small inflow of new 

consumers over time expect to interact repeatedly mostly with the same customers. This 

constitutes a particularly challenging environment for firms considering the use of 

deceptive strategies. In fact, if news about misbehaving sellers spreads quickly among the 

existing buyers, a dishonest seller may be able to target only new, likely transitory, and 

potentially more naïve, customers.48 However, if such customers are relatively few, the 

economic return from deceiving them would be low (potentially high one-time profits, 

but zero repeat business) and the risk of loss of existing customers would be high. 

Second, the presence of competing offerings is critical for consumers who have been 

deceived to be able to punish a dishonest seller by switching to rival vendors.49 Third, 

when competition is not only on price but entails offering goods and services that are 

sufficiently differentiated (although still perceived as viable alternatives), sellers can 

earn a stream of positive profits over time.50 This is true especially when firms can 

operate with very low or close to zero marginal costs, such as in the case of DIY online 

tax preparation. As a result, firms in such settings would find it profitable to retain and 

expand their customer base by continuing to behave truthfully, as each future sale would 

47 See, e.g., Klein, Benjamin and Keith B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 

Performance,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4, August 1981, pp. 615-641, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000613403,p. 616 (“[E]conomists also have long considered ‘reputations’ and brand names to be private 

devices which provide incentives that assure contract performance in the absence of any third-party enforcer 

(Hayek 1948, p. 97; Marshall 1949, vol. 4, p. xi). This private-contract enforcement mechanism relies upon the 

value to the firm of repeat sales to satisfied customers as a means of preventing nonperformance.”). 

48 See, e.g., Brickley, James A. et al., “Business Ethics and OrganizationalArchitecture,” Journal of Banking & 

Finance, Vol. 26, 2002, pp. 1821-1835, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613388, p. 1830 (“The costs of cheatingon 

quality are higher if information about such activities is more rapidly and widely distributed to potential future 

customers.”). 

49 See, e.g., Horner, Johannes, “Reputation and Competition,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 3, 

June 2002, pp. 644-663, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613311, p. 645 (“[C]ompetition supports the existence of 

equilibria in which good firms alwa ys exert high effort. [...] [B]ecause any consumer can break off her 

relationship with a firm and take some other preferred option, it does not matter how good a firm is thought to 

be, but rather whether it is thought to be better than its rivals.”). 

50 See, e.g., Carlton, Dennis W. and Jeffery M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 4th Ed., Harlow, England, 

Pearson Education Limited, 2015INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613616, p. 224 (“In many industries [...] products 

are typically heterogeneous or differentiated: Consumers consider products or brands of variou s firms to be 

imperfect substitutes. If consumers view brands in an industry as imperfect substitutes, a firm may raise its price 

above that of its rivals without losing all its customers.”). 

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involve little, if any, incremental expense.51 Fourth, low switching costs allow customers 

to carry out their punishment (switching to another supplier either immediately or on the 

subsequent transaction) against disreputable vendors.52 As a result, sellers considering 

taking dishonest actions face a credible threat of losing their customers after being 

exposed. 

27. As I describe in the next section, the conditions in the tax preparation industry are not 

consistent with conditions for deception and are consistent with conditions where 

incentives are for self-discipline and reputation-building: (i) the market is saturated, as 

there is a relatively small group of new tax filers each year and a very large group of 

returning filers, and characterized by repeated interactions as most consumers are 

required to a file tax return repeatedly every year; (ii) there are many alternatives 

available and consumers can choose among many competing solutions offered by 

different providers; (iii) tax preparation services are differentiated; and (iv) consumers 

willing to consider digital DIY solutions face low switching costs. 

28. Economists have extensively studied firms’ reputation-building strategies and 

temptations to cheat customers in contexts where firms can deceive their potential 

51 See, e.g., Klein, Benjamin and Keith B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 

Performance,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4, August 1981, pp. 615-641, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000613403,p. 617 (“Cheating will be prevented and high quality products will be supplied only if firms are 

earning a continual stream of rental income that will be lost if low qua lity output is deceptively produced. The 

present discounted value of this rental stream must be greater than the one-time wealth increase obtained from 

low quality production.”); p. 636 (“Similarly, purchase from a diversified firm increases the frequency of repeat 

purchase and lowers the necessary price premium. As long as consumers react to receiving unexpectedly low 

quality from a diversified firm by reducing purchases of the firm’s entire product line, all the firm’s 

nonsalvageable capital serves to assure the quality of each product it produces.”). 

52 See, e.g., Klemperer, Paul, “The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs,” Rand Journal of 

Economics, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1987, pp. 138-150, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613297, p. 138 (“In many markets 

consumers face substantial changeover costs of switching from a product to one of its substitutes. One reason is 

that there may be learning costs, such as the costs of switching to a new brand of computer or cake mix after 

learning to use another brand. These may be large even if the brands are functionally very similar. A second 

reason is that there may be transaction costs, such as the costs of closing an account with one bank and opening 

another with a competitor, of changing one’s long-distance telephone service, or of returning rented equipment 

to one supplier to rent similar equipment from an alternative supplier. A third reason is that firms may create 

artificial switching costs, such as repeat-purchase coupons and ‘frequent-flyer’ programs that reward customers 

for repeated travel on the same airline, and so penalize brand-switchers.”). See also Horner, Johannes, 

“Reputation and Competition,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 3, June 2002, pp. 644-663, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613311, p. 649 (“the worst punishment that can be inflicted upon disappointing firms 

is the consumers’ best alternative, and the patronage of switching consumers represents the best possible reward 

for successful firms. As time passes, the dynamics of competition generate the outside option required for 

consumers to optimally quit after a bad outcome, but not after a good one.”). 

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customers about the quality level of their goods or services.53 More specifically, in a 

competitive market with repeated customer interaction and low switching costs, 

economic theory has shown that “the firms that retain loyal customers are [...] those that 

always provide high quality [while] the reputations of these firms increase with their 

age.”54 Notably, the derived results rely on the firms’ valuation of future business with 

their customers and therefore are not contingent on the specific nature of the deception at 

issue. The same results apply to settings in which sellers may deceive customers about 

quality, quantity, price, or other factors.55 

29. Similarly, marketing research also shows that “companies that strive for customer loyalty 

should focus primarily on satisfaction and perceived value.”56 As Dr. Peter Golder, a 

professor of marketing at the Tuck School of Business retained on behalf of Intuit in this 

53 See, e.g., Horner, Johannes, “Reputation and Competition,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 3, 

June 2002, pp. 644-663, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613311, p. 644 (“Consider for instance the markets in which 

customers can only assess the quality of a seller’s product by purchasing and consuming it. Examples of such 

‘experience good’ markets include nondurables such as wine, durables such as appliances and cars, and most 

service providers such as lawyers, mechanics, and airlines. In these settings, a consumer’s experience with a 

particular product becomes a precious guide-providing imperfect information about a combination of the 

seller’s efforts, ability, and luck. In these markets a seller’s reputation for quality therefore becomes a valuable 

asset.”). See also Klein, Benjamin and Keith B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 

Performance,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4, August 1981, pp. 615-641, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000613403,p. 618 (“The fundamental theoretical result of this paper is that market prices above the competitive 

price and the presence of nonsalvageable ca pital are means of enforcing quality promises.”). 

54 Horner, Johannes, “Reputation and Competition,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 3, June 2002, 

pp. 644-663, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613311, p. 645. 

55 See, e.g., Klein, Benjamin and Keith B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 

Performance,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4, August 1981, pp. 615-641, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000613403, pp. 616-617 (“While our approach is general in the sense that the value of future exchanges can 

motivate fulfillment of all types of contractual promises, we focus in this paper on contra cts between producers 

and consumers regarding product quality.”). See also Chiles, Bennett, “Shrouded Prices and Firm Reputation: 

Evidence from the U.S. Hotel Industry,” Management Science, Articles in Advance, November 16, 2016, pp. 1-

20, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613460, p. 1 (“Ostensibly, firms may have an incentive to avoid price 

obfuscation [i.e., makingprices more difficult, confusing, or time-consuming to discern] if consumers view 

these practices as deceptive and can punish the offending firms. For example, in repeated transaction settings, 

embittered consumers might simply take their business elsewhere in future periods. There may also be 

consequences to obfuscation when demand depends on seller reputation and consumers can provide publicly 

observable feedback on their interactions with firms (e.g., via rating mechanisms such as Yelp or TripAdvisor). 

In this case, if consumers punish firms for deceptive tactics via lower ratings ex post, then firms may have an 

incentive to avoid obfuscation even if interactions are not repeated and the set of buyers in the market is 

different each period.”). 

56 Yang, Zhilin and Robin T. Peterson, “Customer Perceived Value, Satisfaction, and Loyalty: The Role of 

Switching Costs,” Psychology & Marketing, Vol. 21, No. 10, October 2004, pp. 799-822, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000613431, p. 799 (“The results [...] indicate that companies that strive for customer loyalty should 

focus primarily on satisfaction and perceived value. The moderating effects of switching costs on the 

association of customer loyalty and customer satisfaction and perceived value are significant only when the 

level of customer satisfaction or perceived value is above average.”). 

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matter, discusses in more detail in his expert report,57 Complaint Counsel’s theory 

disregards the widely accepted marketing literature on customer satisfaction and 

customer lifetime value that is broadly taught in business schools and the realities of 

Intuit’s business. As Dr. Golder discusses, Intuit’s high customer retention and customer 

experience scores are evidence of a lack of widespread feelings of deception.58 

30. As the economic and marketing research establishes, a firm deceiving its customers over 

time is not economically rational conduct in an environment of intense competition and 

repeated customer interactions. 

B. Complaint Counsel’s Claims of Widespread and Significant Deception of Intuit’s 

Customers Are Inconsistent with the Competitive Dynamics in the Tax 

Preparation Industry 

31. Complaint Counsel allege that Intuit deceived its customers by letting them falsely 

believe that its tax preparation services were free until they have invested too much time 

and effort “gathering and inputting into TurboTax their sensitive personal and financial 

information” to walk away.59 However, the at-issue deception is such that customers will 

necessarily become aware of it—at the very latest—before having to pay for filing their 

tax return. In fact, customers must have discovered the alleged deceit no later than the 

time when they were asked to make a payment for something that they supposedly 

expected to receive for free. As a result, any dissatisfied customer could have left Intuit at 

no financial cost even before the firm could realize its gains. Therefore, according to 

Complaint Counsel’s logic, Intuit put at risk its future repeat business with a large 

number of customers in exchange for an uncertain, one-time reward. Alternatively, 

Complaint Counsel’s logic requires that customers continue to pay voluntarily for Intuit’s 

services even after the alleged deception is discovered, in the face of countless other 

options. 

57 Expert Report of Professor Peter N. Golder, Ph.D., In the Matter of Intuit Inc., Docket No. 9408, January 13, 

2023 (“Golder January 2023 Report”), Section III.A titled “TurboTax Customer Reviews Indica te Customers 

Receive Benefits from the Service and Do Not Feel Misled.” 

58 See Golder January 2023 Report, Section III.A titled “TurboTax Customer Reviews Indicate Customers 

Receive Benefits from the Service and Do Not Feel Misled.” 

59 Complaint, ¶ 6. 

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32. Complaint Counsel’s claims are inconsistent with how competition unfolds in the tax 

preparation industry, at least with regards to an established firm like Intuit. What 

Complaint Counsel allege seems better suited to the strategies of “tax scammers” that the 

IRS warns consumers about and tries to stop every tax season.60 For example, pursuing 

the myopic strategy, these scammers may lure consumers by promising large refunds, 

then collect payments, and run off with the money.61 On the contrary, Intuit has been in 

the tax preparation business for almost four decades and recognizes that its success 

depends on its reputation and the value of its brand.62 Intuit is also among e-file providers 

authorized by the IRS and dependent upon ongoing authorization by the IRS.63 As the 

60 See, e.g., Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, “Justice Department Continues Efforts to Stop 

Fraudulent Tax Preparers,” April 6, 2022, https://justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-continues-efforts-stopfraudulent-tax-preparers, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610925 (“The Department of Justice urges taxpayers to 

choose their return preparers wisely as the April 18th federaltax filing deadline approaches. Return preparer 

fraud is one of the IRS’ Dirty Dozen Tax Scams. Unscrupulous preparers who include errors or false 

information on a tax return could leave a taxpayer open to liability for unpaid taxes, penalties and interest.”). 

See also Internal Revenue Service, “IRS Releases the ‘Dirty Dozen’ Tax Scams for 2014; Identity Theft, Phone 

Scams Lead List,” February 19, 2014, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-releases-the-dirty-dozen-tax-scamsfor-2014-identity-theft-phone-scams-lead-list, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612782 (“Return Preparer Fraud: 

About 60 percent of taxpayers will use tax professionals this year to prepare their tax returns. Most return 

preparers provide honest service to their clients. But, some unscrupulous preparers prey on unsuspecting 

taxpayers, and the result can be refund fraud or identity theft. It is important to choose carefully when hiring an 

individual or firm to prepare your return.”). 

61 See, e.g., Chang, Ellen, “Hackers Are Targeting Taxpayers. Here’s How to Protect Your Data,” TheStreet, April 

5, 2022, https://www.thestreet.com/technology/cybersecurity/hackers-are-targeting-taxpayers-heres-how-toprotect-your-data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610432 (“There are criminals ripping people off the old-fashioned 

way by pretending to be tax preparers. They will add illegal deductions often, Hamerstone [director of advisory 

solutions for TrustedSec, a Strongsville, Ohio-based cybersecurity company] said. ‘This is the one that surprises 

people [...] There are actually fake tax preparers. Some even set up storefronts. They will steal your refund by 

redirecting it to your bank account, and often will pump up your refund with inappropriate/illegal 

deductions.’”). 

62 See e.g., Intuit Inc., “Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended July 31, 2022,” September 2, 2022, 

https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000896878/e04ed275-64f6-4662-a383-a1e01829677b.pdf, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611692, p. 18 (“Our business depends on our strong reputation and the value of our 

brands. Developing and maintaining awareness of our brands is critical to achieving widespread acceptance of 

our existing and future products and services and is an important element in attracting new customers. Adverse 

publicity (whether or not justified) relating to events or activities attributed to us, members of our workforce, 

agents, third parties we rely on, or our users, may tarnish our reputation and reduce the value of our brands. Our 

brand value also depends on our ability to provide secure and trustworthy products and services as well as our 

ability to protect and use our customers’ data in a manner that meets their expectations. In addition, a security 

incident that results in unauthorized disclosure of our customers’ sensitive data could cause material 

reputational harm.”). 

63 Internal Revenue Service, “Authorized IRS E-file Provider Locator Service for Tax Professionals,” 

https://www.irs.gov/e-file-providers/authorized-irs-e-file-provider-locator-service-for-tax-professionals, 

accessed July 22, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610719. 

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Hauser Report and Golder Report explain in more detail, tax preparation is a highinvolvement process for which customers will invest time to choose the right solution.64 

33. The tax preparation industry features characteristics that, as discussed in Section IV.A, 

provide strong incentives for any rational firm that is not myopic against deceiving its 

customers. As discussed above, the four key characteristics that affect the competitive 

dynamics among tax preparation providers during any particular tax filing season 

include: (i) saturation of the tax preparation industry and few new filers; (ii) existence of 

many competing solutions; (iii) differentiation among tax preparation; and (iv) low 

switching costs faced by consumers willing to consider online tax preparation solutions. 

As discussed in Section IV.A, in general, low switching costs make it easier for 

customers to punish unscrupulous providers and bring their business in current and future 

periods to more reputable competitors. 

34. I discuss these four characteristics in turn below. I conclude that given the characteristics 

of the industry, customer retention and reputation building naturally emerge as critical 

factors of tax preparation services providers’ competitive strategies. 

1. Saturation: The Tax Preparation Industry Has Few New Customers Each 

Year and Is Characterized by Providers Competing for Repeated 

Customer Purchases 

35. Tax filing in the U.S. occurs every year and is required for any individual who earns 

income exceeding a certain minimum level. This legal requirement essentially guarantees 

the population saturation of the industry. Moreover, the size of the tax preparation 

industry is largely fixed, except for demographic changes or changes in legal tax filing 

requirements. In other words, the industry is saturated, with a very limited number of 

untapped customers. Completing and filing tax returns is a necessary and required task, 

and not one that will organically grow for any reason (e.g., entertainment value) other 

than legal requirements. An industry report published in 2020 reports the annual growth 

See Expert Report of Professor John R. Hauser, SC.D., In the Matter of Intuit Inc., Docket No. 9408, January 

13, 2023 (“Hauser January 2023 Report”), Section VI titled “Consumers Are Unlikely to be Deceived or 

Locked-In Given the Nature of the Purchase Process for Tax Preparation Software.” See also Golder January 

2023 Report, Section VI titled “Intuit’s Free Ads Are One Source of Information in the High-Involvement 

Consumer Buying Process for Tax Preparation and Would be Unlikely to Deceive Reasonable Consumers,” 

discussing how a prolonged information search is common for high -involvement products like tax preparation. 

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between 2015 and 2020 in the number of households at a low 0.7 percent.65 Consistent 

with the repeated interaction framework described in Section IV.A, it is largely the same 

consumers who repeatedly purchase tax preparation products and services year after year. 

36. Once a consumer begins paying taxes, such activity is likely to continue until the death of 

the consumer unless her economic activity virtually ceases. This does not imply, 

however, that such a consumer will always use the same solution to prepare her taxes. In 

each tax season, given low switching costs, the consumer will have an incentive to review 

what the market offers and look for alternatives that might better fit her needs. As a 

result, tax preparers must constantly compete on the merits of their offerings each year to 

win the business of both past and new customers. 

2. Competing Solutions: Consumers Choose Among Many Offerings by 

Different Providers Competing Aggressively Against Each Other 

37. Industry reports describe the tax preparation industry as “highly competitive.”66 

Compared to other industries, the heterogeneity among providers of competing services is 

striking. In fact, aside from large online providers like Intuit and H&R Block, the 

industry also includes an assortment of smaller players such as Jackson Hewitt and 

Liberty Tax (both chains of franchise and company-owned tax preparation stores and also 

providers of online DIY tax preparation services), or TaxSlayer (online DIY tax 

preparation service provider), as well as tens of thousands of individual licensed tax and 

65 Cook, Dan, Tax Preparation Software Developers, IBISWorld, September 2020, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000612814, p. 7. 

66 See, e.g., The MITRE Corporation, “Independent Assessment of the Free File Program, Appendix A: The 

Economics of IRS Free File,” September 13, 2019, https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/02 -appendix-aeconomics-of-irs-free-file.pdf, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610063, p. 24 (“A new IRS e-filing program would 

have to offer tax preparation services comparable to those offered by a highly competitive private sector to 

ensure sufficient participation and migration of taxpayers from other commercial e -filing methods.” [emphasis 

added]) and p. 29 (“The online tax preparation software industry bears characteristics of a monopolistically 

competitive market. Such a market is characterized by a large number of sellers (suppliers) that offer similar but 

not identical products, i.e., the products are close substitutes to one another. An important feature of 

monopolistic competition is that products are differentiated on the basis of brands. This product differentiation 

is a form of non-price competition, i.e., the firms compete with one another on the basis of these brands. [...] 

Another important attribute of this market is that it has relatively low barriers to entry, i.e., firms can enter and 

exit the market relatively easily. For the tax software industry such barriers to entry may include, for example, 

fixed costs of becoming a licensed tax professional, fulfilling requirements of becoming an IRS authorized efile provider, and resources spent in building up a customer base.”). 

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40. Many tax returns are not completed by individuals filing taxes on their own, but are 

instead filed through tax professionals or tax stores.76 In 2019, for example, there were 

over 110,000 tax professionals who sold tax preparation services.77 Such a high number 

is consistent with the relatively low barriers to enter the industry.78 While many tax 

preparers are CPAs, this is not a requirement for tax preparation.79 Anyone with a valid 

preparer tax identification number (“PTIN”) would be able to prepare or assist in 

preparing tax returns for compensation.80 

41. Ultimately, the choice between DIY solutions and assisted tax preparation will reflect 

consumer’s needs and preferences, as “[b]oth paid preparers and tax software can 

translate complex IRS regulations into simpler language and can call individuals’ 

attention to relevant credits and deductions.”81 Regardless of the tax preparation method, 

76 As Figure 1 shows an estimated of 87 million tax returns were filed in TY21 (FY22) through “CPA/Pros” or 

“Tax Stores”. 77 Patel, Kush, “Tax Preparation Services in the US,” IBISWorld, August 2019, 

https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/54121D%20Tax%20Preparation%20Services%20in%20the%20US%20Industry 

%20Report.pdf, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611633, p. 27 (“The relative ease with which a competitor can enter 

the market enables a large number of industry enterprises estimated at over 110,000 in 2019.”). 78 Patel, Kush, “Tax Preparation Services in the US,” IBISWorld, August 2019, 

https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/54121D%20Tax%20Preparation%20Services%20in%20the%20US%20Industry 

%20Report.pdf, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611633, p. 20 (“The industry has relatively low barriers to entry, 

which has prevented it from exhibiting a high level of concentration. [...] However, the industry’s barriers to 

entry have become higher due to an US InternalRevenue Service (IRS) requirement to file for a preparer tax 

identification number. While it is expected to remain relatively easy for a new firm to enter, this additional 

requirement has contributed to the slowing of the number of firms entering the industry.”). 79 Patel, Kush, “Tax Preparation Services in the US,” IBISWorld, August 2019, 

https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/54121D%20Tax%20Preparation%20Services%20in%20the%20US%20Industry 

%20Report.pdf, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611633, p. 24 (“Currently, tax preparers in 43 states are not required 

to have a state issued license.”). 80 Internal Revenue Service, “PTIN Requirements for Tax Return Preparers,” July 13, 2022, 

https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/ptin-requirements-for-tax-return-preparers, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000613259 (“Most first-time PTIN applicants can obtain a PTIN online in about 15 minutes.”). See also Patel, 

Kush, “Tax Preparation Services in the US,” IBISWorld, August 2019, 

https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/54121D%20Tax%20Preparation%20Services%20in%20the%20US%20Industry 

%20Report.pdf, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611633, p. 24 (“Until 2010, the IRS only required that paid tax 

preparers disclosed their social security number and signatures on the documents they prepared. Since 2011, 

however, the IRS has required that all paid tax preparers have a preparer tax identification number (PTIN). 

While this adds a new barrier to entry, a potentialentrant only needs to submit an IRS W-12 form to receive a 

PTIN.”). 81 Gunter, Samara R., “Your Biggest Refund, Guaranteed? Internet Access, Tax Filing Method, and Reported Tax 

Liability,” International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 26, 2019, pp. 536-570, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000616813 at 565. For example, one study showed that an expansion of tax preparers into low-income 

neighborhoods led to an increase in Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) claims, see Kopczuk, Wojciech and 

Cristian Pop-Eleches, “Electronic Filing, Tax Preparers and Participation in the Earned Income Tax Credit,” 

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 91, 2007, pp. 1351-1367, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613620. Similarly, in a 

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a consumer deceived by a provider would easily find an alternative, comparably suitable 

solution offered by a competitor.82 

3. Differentiation: Tax Preparation Services Are Differentiated 

42. The wide heterogeneity among tax preparation providers and solutions reflects 

differences in customers’ tax filing preferences and needs. There are many examples that 

illustrate how consumers may have different levels of comfort with various aspects, 

including: (i) preparing their tax return totally or largely on their own, (ii) making filing 

choices (e.g., married couple filing jointly or separately), or (iii) the amount of time they 

have available to prepare their returns. A survey of academic literature identified several 

main drivers of demand for tax practitioner assistance, including: ensuring a correct 

return, maximizing refunds/minimizing taxes due, avoiding risks of audits and penalties, 

reducing tax filing time costs, and addressing legal ambiguity.83 According to a recent 

independent study conducted by MITRE to help the IRS better understand taxpayers,84 

the top three factors cited by taxpayers when choosing a filing method were: (i) data 

protection (88%), (ii) ease of use (84%), and (iii) finding all possible deductions and 

credits (79%).85 

43. While cost is also an important consideration for many consumers, their willingness to 

pay for products or assistance with filing their taxes varies greatly and reflects their 

diverse preferences and filing choices. As a result, it is difficult to pinpoint which aspects 

mattered the most to a given customer. It cannot be inferred, for example, that, for 

customers who had started their tax preparation within a free product, price was 

necessarily the most critical factor. Through the process, such customers may have 

related experiment, researchers showed that tax preparers have a large effect on the take-up of incentivized 

individual retirement account (“IRA”) products, see Duflo, Esther et al., “Saving Incentives for Low- and 

Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a Field Experiment With H&R Block,” The Quarterly Journal of 

Economics, Vol. 121, No. 4, November 2006, pp. 1311-1346, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613261. 

82 See Appendix C for a list of Intuit’s key competitors offering commercialDIY tax preparation products. 

83 See, e.g., Frecknall-Hughes, Jane and Erich Kirchler, “Towards a General Theory of Tax Practice,” Social & 

Legal Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, pp. 289-312, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613346, pp. 292-293. 

84 MITRE Corporation is a not-for-profit organization that operates research and development centers for the 

federal government. See The MITRE Corporation, “Corporate Overview,” 

https://www.mitre.org/about/corporate-overview, accessed July 25, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610111. 

85 Patterson, Jodi et al., Understanding Taxpayer Motivation for Filing Method Selection to Improve Customer 

Service, MITRE, January 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610579, p. 16. See also Hauser January 2023 Report, 

Section VI.B titled “Consumers Consider Many Factors When Selecting Tax Preparation Providers,” which 

found that a variety of factors are important to consumers in selecting a tax preparation provider. 

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recognized a higher value in features available only in paid products (e.g., quick access to 

tax experts) and decided to switch to more expensive solutions only because of those 

attributes. 

44. Facing customers with diverse demands, providers diversify their services along several 

dimensions including price, reputation for quality, level of assistance, and other factors. 

Tax and accounting professionals who prepare the entire return for their clients from start 

to finish, cater to customers with a preference for hands-on assistance.86 In contrast, 

digital DIY service providers offer desktop and/or online tax preparation software to 

customers who decide to go through the tax filing process by themselves or with a lower 

level of assistance. 

45. Within the DIY category, higher-priced digital DIY services may include specific add-on 

services (e.g., audit assistance, refund anticipation loans) or may entail a more 

comprehensive, interview-based interaction with the customer, covering a broader set of 

tax contingencies (e.g., related to financial investment gains or self-employment). Free 

online services usually handle a limited number of tax forms and schedules, like H&R 

Block Free Online,87 or are available only to lower-income consumers, like the offerings 

of the IRS Free File Program.88 

46. Notably, Complaint Counsel call out one particular free online service in their Complaint: 

“at least one of TurboTax’s competitors, Cash App Taxes (formerly Credit Karma Tax), 

has offered a truly free online tax preparation and filing service to all consumers for five 

86 See, e.g., Goldin, Jacob, “Tax Benefit Complexity and Take-Up: Lessons from the Earned Income Tax Credit,” 

Tax Law Review, Vol. 72, 2018, pp. 59-110, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613637, at pp. 87-89 (“The first type of 

APM [Assisted Preparation Method] a taxpayer might use involves an expert who assists in the preparation of 

the return. [...] Apart from VITA [Volunteer Income Tax Assistance] and TCE [Tax Counseling for the 

Elderly], most expert tax preparation is not provided for free. The cost of preparing a return typically varies 

based on the return’s complexity. The average price for low income taxpayers is believed to be in the range of 

$200-$400 per return, although there is limited high-quality data available to support this figure. Paid preparers 

sometimes offer additional products that have extra costs, such as Refund Anticipation Loans or Refund 

Anticipation Checks, which can speed the rate at which the taxpayer can access the anticipated refund 

associated with a return.”). 

87 See, e.g., Rounds, Hannah, “H&R Block 2022 Online Tax Prep Review,” The College Investor, June 29, 2022, 

https://thecollegeinvestor.com/20777/hr-block-online-review/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612996 (“H&R Block 

won’t be free for all users. For example, filers with Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) or who have dependent 

care expenses must upgrade to the Deluxe tier.”). 88 InternalRevenue Service, “IRS Free File Online Options,” https://apps.irs.gov/app/freeFile, accessed 

September 23, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610230 (“If your adjusted gross income (AGI) was $73,000 or 

less, review each provider’s offer to make sure you qualify. Some offers include a free state tax return.”). 

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years.”89 Similarly, Dr. Novemsky mentions Cash App Taxes as one of the “[f]ree 

options [...] available in the online tax preparation market.”90 A closer examination of 

this statement finds that “truly free” comes with limitations and tradeoffs. Based on my 

review of the industry,91 there is no commercial DIY product that will cover every tax 

situation, protect all customer information from being used for other purposes, and still 

charge $0 for the entire service. As an initial point of reference, TurboTax Free Edition, 

H&R Block Free Online, and Cash App Taxes can be used by consumers of all income 

levels. If the return is relatively simple, all three products will work even for high-income 

filers. 

47. As I have discussed previously, TurboTax Free Edition supports some tax situations, 

while requiring upgrades for more complex tax returns. Cash App Taxes, on the other 

hand, does not offer a paid version for more complex tax returns, however, it does not 

cover all tax situations, leaving certain customers unable to use the product at all, even 

after having invested time in entering data. For example, while its website claims that 

users “[p]ay $0 to file, no matter your tax situation,”92 Cash App Taxes does not support 

filing multiple state returns,93 non-resident state returns, claiming an increased standard 

89 Complaint, ¶ 35. See also Motion for Summary Decision, p. 20. The Bureau of Competition conceded under 

oath that TurboTax Free Edition is also “truly free” for those who qualify. See Maxson Deposition at 279:6-18 

(“Q. Right. And TurboTax Free Edition is truly free for the people who qualify to use TurboTax Free Edition, 

correct? A. Yes. I believe TurboTax Free Edition product TurboTax or free edition SKU is free for consumers 

that qualify under the TurboTax terms and conditions. Q. Not just free, but by the definition used in the 

complaints it’s – TurboTax Free Edition is truly free for those who quali[f]y, correct? A. For those who qualify, 

yes, I think it would be fair to say truly free.”). 

90 Novemsky Report, ¶ 81 (“In addition to other free online services, free options are available in the online tax 

preparation market.”) and fn. 112 (“See ‘Cash App Taxes,’ Cash App, available at https://cash.app.taxes”). 

91 See Appendix C for a review of commercial DIY tax preparation products. 

92 Cash App Taxes, “Cash App Taxes - 100% Free Tax Filing for Federal & State,” https://cash.app/taxes, 

accessed July 29, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610569. 

93 Millions of Americans need to file multiple state tax returns each year due to situations such as living in 

multiple states during the same year, working remotely, or commuting across state borders. For example, 

approximately 9 million people relocated during the coronavirus pandemic and individuals considered as part -

year resident of two or more states need to file multiple state tax returns. See Washington, Kemberley, “When 

Should I File in Multiple States?,” Forbes, April 14, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/taxes/when-shouldi-file-taxes-in-multiple-states/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000616806. 

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requires one to view ads, the business model for Credit Karma Tax was to require 

customers to provide access to their personal information for advertising purposes as the 

“payment” for the service.

100 As the Washington Post put it: “Credit Karma Tax takes the 

intimate details of your tax returns—like how much you earn and pay for your 

mortgage—to target you with financial advertising.”101 According to former FTC 

Commissioner Rohit Chopra, “too often, we mislabel online services as ‘free.’ [...] These 

services do have a price, and you are paying for them with your data.”102 Therefore, 

Complaint Counsel’s choice of Credit Karma Tax/Cash App Taxes as the archetype of a 

“truly free” service is questionable and rather surprising. It is not clear whether the FTC 

is endorsing a business model of consumers giving up personal financial information as 

“payment” for tax filing services, or whether such a policy would be welfare enhancing. 

49. As discussed in Section IV.B.2, competition pushes providers to imitate their rivals when 

they discover features or services that generate customer interest. Still, despite such 

dynamics, companies offer differentiated products and find ways for their products to 

stand out from the competition. Appendix C provides a broader overview of the product 

lineup for selected providers of online DIY tax preparation. For example, according to 

reviewers, TaxAct offers an appealing guarantee of accuracy and maximum refund.103 

Another example is the superior functionality of Intuit’s TurboTax mobile app, as 

100 Credit Karma, “Credit Karma Tax Takes on the Industry, Expands Its Always-Free Premium Tax Product,” 

December 18, 2018, https://www.creditkarma.com/about/releases/credit-karma-tax-takes-on-the-industryexpands-its-always-free-premium-tax-product, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611231 (“[W]hen a member files with 

Credit Karma Tax and agrees to share their tax information with Credit Karma, they’ll receive more 

personalized recommendations for building their credit or saving money based on the additional insights into a 

member’s full financialpicture. If a Credit Karma member takes one of these offers, the bank or lender pays 

Credit Karma.”). 

101 Fowler, Geoffrey A., “When Tax Prep Is Free, You May Be Paying with Your Privacy,” Post, The Washington, 

March 7, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/03/07/when -tax-prep-is-free-you-may-bepaying-with-your-privacy/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610134. 

102 Written Testimony of FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee 

on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, “Hearing on Online 

Platforms and Market Power, Part 3: The Role of Data and Privacy in Competition,” October 18, 2019, 

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1549812/chopra_-

_testimony_at_hearing_on_online_platforms_and_market_power_part_3_10-18-19.pdf, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000611893, p. 3. 

103 See, e.g., Johnston, Courtney and Joe Van Brussel, “Best Tax Software for 2022: Late or Not, TurboTax, H&R 

Block and More Can Help You File,” CNET, May 4, 2022, https://www.cnet.com/personal-finance/taxes/besttax-software/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610534 (“[TaxAct’s] major distinction is its $100,000 Accuracy 

Guarantee and Maximum Refund Guarantee, which promise to get you an accurate refund and the maximum 

allowable by law. If it fails to do so, TaxAct will refund you up to $100,000 to cover the difference between 

your actual and potential refund, your software costs and any associated legal or audit costs.”). 

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50. In conclusion, firms compete by offering differentiated services at several price points 

(including “free”).108 Given the options available to consumers from competitors, as 

discussed in Section IV.A, the prospect of earning positive returns over time incentivizes 

firms to behave truthfully and makes the short-lived gains of deceiving customers less 

tempting. In addition, in the DIY tax preparation software industry, and in the software 

industry in general, many business costs are fixed, such as the cost of research and 

development (R&D). Unlike for a CPA, where an additional return requires additional 

time and effort by the preparer, providing DIY tax preparation services to an additional 

customer has very low or essentially zero marginal cost. With positive profit on each 

return driven by zero or close to zero marginal cost and positive marginal revenue, 

providers of DIY solutions have an incentive to cater the service to as many people as 

possible and keep customer retention high. 

4. Switching Costs: Consumers Willing to Consider Digital DIY Solutions 

Face Low Switching Costs 

51. Given the wide array of tax preparation solutions, customers have a range of options to 

compare. When working towards filing her tax return, a consumer may face different 

switching costs when considering abandoning one service or category of provider in 

favor of a different one. Switching costs are particularly low when considering switching 

among DIY solutions, as the underlying source documents (e.g., W-2 forms) and other 

personal materials remain within the control of the consumer, whereas if the documents 

are mailed or dropped off to a preparer, they would need to be retrieved before switching 

providers. Indeed, abandoning a partially filled out tax return started on an online DIY 

tax software is logistically and emotionally easier than switching away from a tax 

professional in the midst of her work. 

an explicit reason why, but the pattern of behavior is that I haven ’t used it, and so that leads me to believe that I 

found it to be inferior. [...] Q. When deciding what method to use to prepare and file your taxes, what is 

important to you? A. Having things laid out efficiently or clearly asin ‘Go to Box 11C. Enter that number.’So 

clarity. I like stepping through things in, like, a methodicalway so there’s like a clear path for us to get done 

with this.”). 

108 For example, one CPA firm discussed the competitive threat of online DIY tax preparation providers and 

argued that while Intuit offers a “low out of pocket cost,” CPAs provide important “experience and knowledge” 

and can be “the best option for people with complicated holdings.” See Steward Ingram & Cooper PLLC, 

“TurboTax Vs. A CPA – Why You Should Consider Hiring an Accountant,” October 14, 2020, 

https://stewardingram.com/turbotax-vs-cpa/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612418. 

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retention” as one of the company’s foundational strengths.120 Similarly, TaxSlayer 

retained a marketing agency with the intention to “craft a cross-channel strategy to retain 

customers on a year-over-year basis, while efficiently delivering new customers each tax 

season.”121 Section V describes in more detail Intuit’s own business strategy for customer 

retention. 

57. Reputation building, or brand recognition, is recognized as another crucial factor for 

firms trying to achieve long-term success, particularly in saturated industries. For 

example, a 2020 industry report focused on digital tax preparation noted that “brand 

recognition is a key success factor for operators in this industry” and “[r]eputability, 

brand recognition and compliance are essential for industry players to establish a 

customer base.”122 The focus on reputation and brand recognition is also reflected in 

companies’ public statements and business strategies. Intuit recognizes “brand name 

recognition” as one of the most important competitive factors for their core product 

offerings.123 Similarly, H&R Block recognized the importance of reputation building by 

word-of-mouth in its 2021 Annual Report: “We are successful when we provide valuable 

help to our clients that inspires their own confidence. When we accomplish this, we not 

only create a new H&R Block customer for life, we also create brand advocates.”124 

58. In sum, the tax preparation industry features all the characteristics that lead established 

tax preparation providers to compete over customer retention, aiming at securing 

repeated, periodic purchases from a base of loyal customers. As I explained in 

Section IV.A, such industry conditions have been identified by economists as providing 

120 H&R Block, “Investor Meetings,” July 20, 2018,https://investors.hrblock.com/static-files/5a9ff1ec-7f19-4ffebddc-137a4f99d4ae, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611354, p. 23. 

121 DAC Group, “TaxSlayer - Digital Marketing Case Study,” https://www.dacgroup.com/work/taxslayer/, 

accessed July 22, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610295. 

122 Cook, Dan, Tax Preparation Software Developers, IBISWorld, September 2020, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000612814, p. 7. 

123 Intuit Inc., “Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended July 31, 2021,” September 8, 2021, 

https://s23.q4cdn.com/935127502/files/doc_financials/2021/ar/72fb2688 -540b-4d4a-abe6-e3c5c3aa0683.pdf, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613040, p. 12 (“We believe the most important competitive factors for our core 

offerings – QuickBooks, TurboTax, Lacerte, ProSeries, and Credit Karma – are ease of use, product features, 

size of the installed customer base, size of membership base, member engagement, brand name recognition, 

value proposition, cost, reliability, security, and product and support quality.”). 

124 H&R Block, Inc., “2020 Corporate Responsibility Report,” November 2020, 

https://investors.hrblock.com/static-files/1cd086d4-6d8b-4a72-93db-fa545733fd61, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000618454, p. 6. 

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Rather than starting over from scratch, when a customer provides information that allows 

the system to ascertain that a paid SKU is required to complete their taxes given their 

situation and preferences, the customer will see an “upgrade screen,” which is a 

notification that informs them they will need to upgrade to a higher-price version of the 

software to access all of the desired features or forms. As I discuss in this section, Intuit’s 

internal documents prepared in the ordinary course of business are consistent with a goal 

of initially directing customers to the appropriate product upfront to reduce the number of 

customers who encounter an upgrade screen.154 Similarly, if an upgrade is required, Intuit 

seeks to notify the customer as early in the process as possible.155 The Golder Report 

analyzes in detail the nature and timing of such notifications and disclosures that 

customers encounter on the TurboTax website.156 This is exactly the opposite of a “bait 

154 See also Johnson Deposition at 136:12-137:10 (“Q. [I]f the context is you’re trying to provide all the 

information about your SKUs to consumers, why not provide it to them there, in that spot? When they’re faced 

with an upgrade, why not say, here’s another – you have the discretion to do it, even though you’re not 

obligated, you have the discretion, why not provide them with the information about their Free File SKU there? 

[...] A. [...] we provide [customers] the information to get into the right SKU in our commercialoffering. We 

do that at the very beginning. What we find out is there are a couple of things that we do kn ow to be true. 

Customers come to our business because of our brand and our reputation, and even those customers who 

upgrade and get the experience, they go on to convert high product recommendation scores and we retain – and 

we continue to retain more and more year after year.”); Rubin 2020 Deposition, at 213:3-214:1 (“Q. Why does 

Intuit want to make sure that customers are aware that Free Edition has eligibility requirements and that those 

eligibility requirements are tied to the complexity of a taxpayer’s returns? A. Because we want them to be 

satisfied with their experience and come back year after year and tell their friends. If – I guess it’s in our 

business interest that people who use Free Edition see and are aware that it’s for simple tax returns and those 

conditions apply. If they – if they use the product and were not aware of that and they would be upset and they 

wouldn’t want to come back year after year. That’s not good business; right? So we want them to know that it’s 

for simple tax returns. And, you know, if you look at it, you see, you know, it’s about seven out of ten people 

who start in Free Edition, finish in Free Edition. And of the folks who actually pay for one of TurboTax’s 

products, their repeat rate is actually higher than those who don’t. And so you can actually see in market that, 

you know, we want people to be satisfied, and we want them to come back year after year. We [want] them to 

tell their friends about what a great experience it is, and that’s we’re doing.”). 

155 Johnson Deposition at 131:5-132:11 (“Q. [...] I said, well, what happens if a customer is using a SKU that it 

turns out they’re not eligible for, what does Intuit do next? And you said, well, it provides them a choice to 

either upgrade to a product that will handle their needs, or leave our offering, and I’m asking if in that process 

Intuit provides the details of its Free File SKU. [...] A. When someone comes to turbotax.com, our commercial 

offering, we try to get them into the right commercial SKU. And the right SKU as we define it is the SKU that 

we believe, based on what they’ve shared with us, that they will file in. Now, within that commercial SKU, and 

the SKU that they’re in, they start to enter information that actually moves them outside of the realm of 

eligibility, we communicate that to them. For this reason, for this reason, this form or this information means 

you would need to upgrade to this product. Let’s say they sold stocks, you need to upgrade to our premier 

product in order to file. Then they have a choice, okay, yes, or customers may leave, and we call that abandon, 

where they actually leave our product and go file somewhere else.”). 

156 See Golder January 2023 Report, Section VII titled “The TurboTax Website Provides Information in a Clear 

and Timely Manner.” Dr. Golder describes in detail the TurboTax website and filing process (home page, 

Products & Pricing page, pop-up notices, and other types of information provided to the customer) and explains 

that disclosures appear early and repeatedly. 

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Edition but needs to report interest and dividend income over $1,500, which requires a 

paid product such as TurboTax Deluxe, is shown in Figure 8. 

Figure 8 

Example of Upgrade Screen Alerting Customers 

They Are No Longer Eligible for Free Edition 

73. Customers may disregard a recommendation to start in a paid product and decide to try 

Free Edition with the knowledge that they may have to upgrade to a paid product.170 In 

fact, a strategy of purposefully starting in a version with few features and lower price is 

sometimes recommended by product review websites. For example, the advice on some 

websites that review online tax filing options suggest that “most people should start with 

Free Edition [...] it’s better to start here and upgrade to Deluxe only if you’re required 

to.”171 This is an intuitive recommendation, since it provides customers the option to 

determine as they fill in their information whether they can file for free or not. Unlike 

some other tax products, TurboTax provides customers with the option to use the 

information already entered and upgrade to a paid product if needed to file taxes, rather 

170 I discuss this further in Section VI.C.3. 

171 Pinola, Melanie, “The Best Online Tax Filing Software,” Wirecutter, April 18, 2022, 

https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/reviews/best-tax-software/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611941 (“[...] we 

think most people should start with the Free Edition. Even if you might have some deductible expenses, such as 

mortgage interest or charitable donations, it’s better to start here and upgrade to Deluxe on ly if you’re required 

to.”). 

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than discover that a different product is needed and no ability to use the data already 

entered.172 Given this strategy, it would be inaccurate to assume that starting a tax return 

in TurboTax Free Edition and later having to upgrade to a different product should be 

interpreted as an initial expectation of being able to file for free. A desire for a customer 

to obtain a product or service for free (which would be true of virtually every product and 

service in the world) is different from an expectation of being able to obtain it for free. 

74. General Manager of Intuit’s Consumer Business Group at the time, Greg Johnson, 

testified about the importance of the SKU selector and directing consumers to the 

appropriate product stating: 

“[I]t’s in our best interest for consumers to – to be aware of the 

SKU they’re going into so that we can, in fact, give them a 

delightful experience. And we measure that through things like our 

product recommendation score. We also hope to retain customers, 

and so we innovate to make sure year after year they come back, 

because they’re very confident and feel great about the experience 

we deliver.”173 

75. Mr. Johnson also testified that Intuit alerts customers as soon as they enter information 

indicating they are no longer eligible for a given product, as well as the reason why they 

are no longer eligible, allowing customers to comparison shop.174 This is inconsistent 

172 See Appendix C for more details on Intuit’s TurboTax product offerings. 

173 Johnson Deposition at 67:1-8. See also Johnson Deposition at 161:9–162:19 (“Q. Understood. But the Project 

Mindbender campaign and then the Absolute Zero campaign, that was to drive awareness of Intuit’s free 

commercialproduct. Is that right? [...] A. [...] We want our consumers to come to our website, understand 

what their alternatives are, get them in the right SKU, which is a SKU that best aligns with what we think they 

will file with, or file in, and then make sure that we continuously innovate to make that experience as good as 

possible, as frictionless as possible, and ideally we want to have every single customer that visits us to 

ultimately file with us because they’re so delighted. And so it’s not about a advertising is not our goal. Our goal 

is around building the product experience that delights customers and that they want to tell their friends about. 

And so that is the ultimate goal, and that’s – that will build a healthy franchise that consumers are loyal, they’ll 

continue to retain. That’s why our numbers continue to grow because people are satisfied. They love our 

products, they love our experiences, and they like them more than other alternatives. And we continue to try to 

innovate in that way.”). 

174 Johnson Deposition at 129:20-130:15 (“Q.[...] And so when a consumer is in [...] the flow of, say, completing 

their tax return, if it turns out that they are not eligible for the product they’re using, how does Intuit tell them? 

A. [...] if somebody is in – has selected a SKU and have begun preparing their taxes, and then they enter 

information that all of the sudden signals that, well, wait a minute, they aren’t really eligible for the SKU that 

they’re in, and then therefore at that moment is when we would – I would call it – my term would be pop-up, a 

screen that lets them know that they are no longer eligible in this SKU, and then therefore they have a choice, a 

choice to upgrade to a SKU that would address their situation and their needs. They have the choice to leave our 

offering and go somewhere else, because many customers hunt around and they shop different products and see 

what would happen in a different type product. And so we communicate it and then consumers have a choice.”). 

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94. Intuit’s Vice President of Customer and Business Strategy, Nicholas Soukas, testified that 

he did not believe TurboTax’s TV ads were deceptive based on these same metrics: 

TurboTax has over 80 percent [customer] retention. We have tens 

of thousands of four- and five-star reviews, and if there was an 

issue with comprehension, I’m sure it would be something that I 

would learn about through the customer input we receive.228 

95. Indeed, as discussed, a business model based on deception would not be economically 

rational and would not even be feasible in this industry, given the ease with which 

customers can and do switch tax preparation providers and actively comparison shop 

among tax preparation providers. 

VI. EVIDENCE FROM TURBOTAX CUSTOMER DATA IS INCONSISTENT WITH 

COMPLAINT COUNSEL’S ALLEGATIONS OF DECEPTION FOR THE VAST 

MAJORITY OF TURBOTAX CUSTOMERS 

96. In this section, I discuss my analyses of the evidence available in the form of data for 

TurboTax customer base. I find that experiences of the tens of millions of actual 

TurboTax customers, as reflected in the data, are inconsistent with Complaint Counsel’s 

allegations that Intuit’s advertising and website design misleads consumers into believing 

that they can file their taxes for free using TurboTax.229 I consider data on customers’ 

experiences with TurboTax in the last available tax season, TY21 (and for returning 

customers, their experiences with TurboTax in the recent past).230 These data demonstrate 

that Complaint Counsel’s allegations of deception and theories of harm do not apply to 

the vast majority of Intuit’s TurboTax customers. Not only are there a significant number 

of customers who indeed file for free, the data also suggest that a substantial number of 

customers who paid to file their federal or state tax return made a rational, informed 

decision that is aligned with their preferences and interests. I use actual customer 

experience data to illustrate that TurboTax customers are sophisticated, repeat users of 

228 Soukas Deposition at 136:1-8 (“Q. What is your basis, Mr. Soukas, for thinking that consumers are not misled 

by Intuit’s free television ads? A. TurboTax has over 80 percent [customer] retention. We have tens of 

thousands of four- and five-star reviews, and if there was an issue with comprehension, I ’m sure it would be 

something that I would learn about through the customer input we receive.”). 229 Complaint, Sections II and III. 

230 TY21 Customer-Level Data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608572; TY14–20 Customer-Level Data, INTUITFTC-PART3-000608571. See Appendix D, “Technical Appendix,” for additionalinformation relevant to the 

data. 

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• A customer who used TurboTax Self-Employed in TY21 for free and left a 5-star 

review wrote: “I have been using turbo tax since 2008, and I gotta [sic] say it 

never lets me down. Even now when I am married, bought a house, [selfemployed], multiples jobs and traded stocks, it is still free for military. As long as 

you know what form you should have, I have never been audited and my returns 

nowadays are over 70 pages long!! I can only imagine how much I have saved 

over the years, recently I tried to get a quote from professional tax services for 

returns like mine and they say $300 or more. Can’t beat free!!”253 

• A customer who used TurboTax Live Basic in TY21 for free and left a 5-star 

review wrote: “I always appreciate online services like this one that help me 

accomplish otherwise complicated endeavors. Filing taxes is something not 

negotiable and can be so stressful if attempted on your own. I used to figure out 

my end of [year] on paper filling in every detail....took a long time. SO, SO 

grateful for this user-friendly program and all the tax helpers. They’ve all been 

really friendly and have calmed my spirit when getting anxious about filing. 

Thank you so much! I’m getting a great refund and have saved myself alot [sic] of 

money in the process. Thank you, again!”254 

• Another customer who used TurboTax Live Basic in TY21 for free and left a 5-

star review wrote: “Test run various tax programs, but always return to Turbo 

Tax. Step by step procedures easy to follow and leave no doubt. Especially 

appreciate the free program. I am 83 Yrs. old living on Social Security and 

minimal savings. Thank You TT!”255 

• Another customer who used TurboTax Live Basic in TY21 for free and left a 5-

star review wrote: “I was able to file my taxes for free with the help of a live 

session with a CPA, John. It made the experience totally ‘painfree’ and awesome! 

I have been using Turbo Tax for the past 3 years and always have had a great 

experience! This year was even better! Thank you [TurboTax] and John for all 

your help!!”256 

253 TY21 Customer Reviews, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490341, review_id = “201984935,” overall_rating = “5,” 

name = “TurboTax Online Self Employed;” TY21 Customer Review ID Crosswalk, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000608569; TY21 Customer-Level Data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608572, total_revenue = “0.” 

254 TY21 Customer Reviews, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490341, review_id = “199696372,” overall_rating = “5,” 

name = “TurboTax Live Basic;” TY21 Customer Review ID Crosswalk, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608569; 

TY21 Customer-Level Data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608572, total_revenue = “0.” 

255 TY21 Customer Reviews, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490341, review_id = “201338315,” overall_rating = “5,” 

name = “TurboTax Live Basic;” TY21 Customer Review ID Crosswalk, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608569; 

TY21 Customer-Level Data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608572, total_revenue = “0.” 

256 TY21 Customer Reviews, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490341, review_id = “198998169,” overall_rating = “5,” 

name = “TurboTax Live Basic;” TY21 Customer Review ID Crosswalk, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608569; 

TY21 Customer-Level Data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608572, total_revenue = “0.” 

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TurboTax. Product reviews demonstrate the value that customers place on these features 

and services.267 For example: 

• One customer who upgraded to TurboTax Live Full Service Self-Employed in 

TY21 and left a 5-star rating wrote: “I’m glad I upgraded because there were 

many questions I had that would have taken time away from what I have to do. 

100% worth it.”268 

• Another customer who upgraded to TurboTax Live Full Service Premier in TY21 

left a 5-star review and wrote about how glad they were that they were able to 

upgrade to a product with additional support as they were filing their return late 

and were anxious about doing their return due to more complex taxes involving 

cryptocurrency.269 

118. Other product reviews provide similar examples of customers who upgraded to a 

TurboTax product that offered additional support and features and felt that the cost of the 

upgrade was worth it for what they got.270 Asserting that these customers expected they 

267 Note that Dr. Golder provides a comprehensive analysis of the text of the customer reviews in his report. See 

Golder January 2023 Report,Section IV.B.2 titled “Intuit’s Rates of Keywords Related to Deceptive 

Advertising or Deceptive Pricing in Complaints Are Comparable to Benchmark Companies.” 

268 TY21 Customer Reviews, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490341, review_id = “206689418,” life_changes_tags = 

“My employment status changed this year,” business = “own,” home = “own,” overall_rating = “5,” 

review_text = “I’ve always used the version of Turbo Tax that allows me to do my taxes but this year I’ve had a 

few more complicated tax situations come up. I’m glad I upgraded because there were many questions I had 

that would have taken time away from what I have to do. 100% worth it, name = “TurboTax Live Full Service 

Complex Self-Employed.” 

269 TY21 Customer Reviews, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490341, review_id = “209494044,” overall_rating = “5,” 

life_changes_tags = “My employment status changed this year,[ ]I bought or sold investments,” review_text = 

“A big thank you to Bethanie for helping me through my more complex that usual taxes and easing my stress 

that I was filing late. We were on the phone for a couple hours but I was put at ease because of her knowledge, 

especially with Crypto! I have used TurboTax on my own for years and I[’]m glad I was able to upgrade to full 

service this year because I was very lost and anxious doing it on my own due to added tax situations and 

crypto,” name = “TurboTax Live Full Service Premier.” 

270 See, e.g., a 5-star review from a customer who upgraded to TurboTax Live Deluxe in TY21. TY21 Customer 

Reviews, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490341, review_id = “202296538,” overall_rating = “5,” review_text = 

“Turbo Tax is awesome! I have been using the product on and off for over 10 years. This year was the first time 

I upgraded Turbo Tax to deluxe with live help. It is more than worth it! I had so many questions and spoke to 

two live agents and both were very helpful. I did a video call earlier in the day with Jacqueline and she was 

excellent and answered all of my questions. In the evening before filing, I spoke with Barb via live chat! Both 

Tax experts had over 20 years experience individually and was able to answer all of my questions. I highly 

recommend playing for the premium services as it is more than worth it!!! Thank you Turbo Tax!,” name = 

“TurboTax Live Deluxe.” See also a 5-star review from a customer who purchased TurboTax Live Deluxe in 

TY21, TY21 Customer Reviews, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490341, review_id = “201417112,” overall_rating 

= “5,” review_text = “I have pretty simple taxes but always use TT because they search for all the breaks, it 

pretty much pays for itself. I had a bit of an issue this year so I upgraded the service, glad I did because the nice 

lady I spoke with gave me peace of mind that I was doing things correctly, and even advised me on how to 

ensure the IRS also does things correctly,” name = “TurboTax Live Deluxe.” See also a 5-star review from a 

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• Identity theft monitoring and insurance, protecting the customer if suspicious 

activity is detected and covering stolen funds and expenses caused by identity 

theft; and 

• Priority care, cutting down the time to connect to a TurboTax specialist. 

120. In TY21, TurboTax offered two add-on bundles to customers with complex tax 

situations: “Premium Services” (in California only) and “MAX Restore & Defend.”274 

Customers who purchased either one of these bundles indicated a preference for a 

comprehensive suite of add-on features and services to help them address their complex 

tax situations, and a willingness to pay for assistance in filing their taxes.275 Customer 

reviews confirm this. For example: 

• A customer who purchased TurboTax Live Premier and the MAX bundle in TY21 

and left a 5-star review wrote: “I’ve been using Turbo Tax for years now. I pay 

for the MAX Defense and the whole shebang. It’s worth it every time. Taxes are 

so easy to complete and file. If you need support it’s available all the time. 

Thankfully I didn’t need help this year, that’s because I remember the help I did 

get from last year’s taxes with my investments. I spent hours with the tax pro and 

it was totally worth it. Why do anything else, when TurboTax does it all for you 

and more with the Intuit connection.”276 

• A customer who purchased TurboTax Live Premier and the MAX bundle left a 5-

star review and wrote that “Turbo[T]ax is always easy and accurate and I love the 

Max services for piece [sic] of mind.”277 

274 Intuit, “What is MAX?,” January 4, 2022, https://ttlc.intuit.com/turbotax-support/en-us/help-article/intuitproduct-orders/max/L0Bc4Ve2l_US_en_US, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612595, Intuit, “What is Premium 

Services?,” January 4, 2022, https://ttlc.intuit.com/turbotax-support/en-us/help-article/intuit-productorders/premium-services/L3Eq2UXII_US_en_US, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610497. In TY21, TurboTax also 

offered the “PLUS Help & Support” bundle to customers with simple tax returns. For the purposes of this 

analysis, I do not consider customers who purchased this bundle, as they filed their federal and state returns for 

free and therefore could not have been deceived by TurboTax advertising. See Intuit, “What’s Included in 

PLUS Help & Support?,” January 4, 2022, https://ttlc.intuit.com/turbotax-support/en-us/help-article/intuitproduct-orders/included-plus-help-support/L9YbRiw0c_US_en_US?uid=l63pvp5h, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000610484. 

275 My analytical approach is conservative as it does not include customers with complex tax situations who may 

have chosen TurboTax because of access to individual add-on features or services. Instead, I focus on customers 

who purchased the “bundled” add-on features and services, due to the clear revealed preference for additional 

assistance that is indicated by this purchase decision. 

276 TY21 Customer Reviews, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490341, review_id = “206740780,” overall_rating = “5,” 

name = “TurboTax Live Premier.” 

277 TY21 Customer Reviews, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490341, review_id = “199133871,” overall_rating = “5,” 

name = “TurboTax Live Premier.” 

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APPENDIX A 

BRUCE F. DEAL 

Managing Principal 

Phone: 650 853 7201 1010 El Camino Real 

Fax: 650 323 2796 Suite 310 

bruce.deal@analysisgroup.com Menlo Park, CA 94025 

Mr. Deal leads the economic consulting practice in the Menlo Park, CA office of Analysis Group. He has 

over 25 years of experience in economic, litigation, and management consulting. He has led hundreds of 

projects requiring complex economic analysis of publicly available and internal client information. 

He has served as an expert witness in dozens of litigation and regulatory matters, and has been retained as 

a neutral expert in a complex mediation. His work as an expert has covered a variety of practice areas, 

including antitrust, finance and securities litigation, damages, and business valuation. Mr. Deal’s industry 

experience has included health care, insurance, technology, telecommunications, and many others. 

Prior to joining Analysis Group, Mr. Deal spent several years as a senior consultant and manager with 

Arthur Andersen. In this position, he provided financial and management consulting services to hospitals, 

physicians, and other clients, in such areas as operational organization and efficiency, merger and 

consolidation strategies, current and projected financial performance, and overall strategic planning. 

Mr. Deal has taught economics and analytic methods to graduate students at Harvard University and 

published articles on economics-related topics. He has also consulted on national economic policy issues 

to the government of Indonesia through the Harvard Institute for International Development. 

He coauthored a major report, The Economic Effects of Federal Participation in Terrorism Risk with R. 

Glenn Hubbard, an Analysis Group affiliate and former chair of the President’s Council of Economic 

Advisers. In addition, he also coauthored a study, Economic Impact Analysis: Proposition 71 California 

Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative with Laurence Baker, an Analysis Group affiliate and Stanford 

University School of Medicine faculty member, with whom he published an updated interim economic 

report on California’s stem cell initiative. Mr. Deal is also the coauthor of a chapter on the use of 

econometrics in antitrust litigation for a recent American Bar Association publication. 

EDUCATION 

1994–97 Ph.D. coursework completed, Public Policy, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 

Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 

1990 M.P.P., Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 

Cambridge, MA 

1987 B.A., Summa cum Laude, Economics and Global Studies (double major), Pacific 

Lutheran University, Tacoma, WA 

A-1 
SUMMARY OF PROJECTS BY TOPIC 

Insurance (Health Insurance Included in Health Care Section) 

PUBLIC

 Confidential Universal Life Litigation 

Consulting expert on economic issues in a large cost of insurance (COI) charges litigation. 

 Mayumac v. Met Life 

Testifying expert on economic damages in a disability insurance matter. 

 Various Military Housing Projects v. Ambac 

Testifying expert on economic, insurance, and financial issues surrounding the use of credit 

enhancements and financial performance for large military housing projects. 

 Credit Disability Insurance 

Analysis of financial issues in a case alleging improper disclosure of changes in premium levels. 

 Life Insurance Consulting 

Valuation and analysis of a portfolio of large life insurance policies. 

 Long Trust v. Morgan Stanley 

Analysis of financial issues and damages resulting from alternative policy restructuring options for 

second-to-die estate planning life insurance policies. 

 Insurance Tax Litigation 

Consulting expert in a confidential tax litigation involving the tax treatment of certain insurance 

premiums. 

 Confidential Auto Insurance Litigation 

Analysis of issues relative to claims handling practices of a large auto insurance company. 

 Confidential Life Insurance Litigation 

Analysis of damages resulting from alternative portfolios of investments and second-to-die life 

insurance policies. 

 Confidential Insurance Litigation 

Analysis of damages resulting from lost commissions in an insurance broker insurance litigation. 

 Katz v. Mass Mutual 

Analysis of potential damages in a disability insurance litigation. 

 Confidential Insurance Litigation 

Expert on insurance valuation and general damages issues in a dispute involving non-traditional life 

insurance. 

 Markocki v. Olde Republic Title Insurance 

Expert on class certification issues in a class action regarding charges for title insurance. 

 Campbell v. Metropolitan Life 

Expert on damages calculation in a disability insurance dispute. 

A-2 
PUBLIC

 Cox v. Allstate 

Expert on statistical sampling in the class certification phase of a class action alleging improper 

homeowners’ insurance claims handling by Allstate. 

 Confidential Title Insurance Matter 

Consulting effort on class certification matters in a large multi-state class action. 

 Estate Planning Life Insurance Matter 

Consulting expert analyzing issues associated with the economic performance of a portfolio of large 

estate planning life insurance policies. 

 Confidential Homeowners’ Insurance Matter 

Consulting expert analyzing issues associated with the use of various data sources to obtain 

replacement values. 

 Confidential Indemnity Insurance Investigation 

Consulting expert analyzing issues associated with the deterioration of a set of financial products 

insured by an indemnity insurer. 

 Confidential Auto Insurance Investigation 

Consulting expert analyzing various aspects of auto insurance claims issues. 

 Confidential Life Insurance Litigation 

Consulting expert valuing life insurance policies and other damages issues. 

 Confidential Life Insurance Litigation 

Consulting expert valuing life insurance policies and other damages issues. 

 Hausman v. Union Bank 

Testifying damages expert valuing life insurance policies and other damages issues. Expert report 

provided. 

 Perez v. First American Title Insurance Company 

Testifying expert evaluating class certification issues relating the use of electronic data in identifying 

class members. 

 Windham v. Cook Life Insurance Litigation 

Testifying expert valuing policy performance of a variable universal life insurance contract used in a 

tax planning program. Expert report and trial testimony provided. 

 Confidential Class Action Litigation 

Consulting expert analyzing statistical issues associated with the use of a software package used to 

assist in evaluating bodily injury claims. 

 Confidential Class Action Litigation 

Consulting expert analyzing statistical issues associated with diminished value claims in auto 

insurance. 

 Pavlov, et al. v. CNA 

Testifying expert analyzing class certification issues associated with long-term care insurance. 

A-3 
PUBLIC

 Confidential Class Action Litigation 

Consulting expert analyzing statistical issues associated with claims handling in auto insurance. 

 Class Action v. CNA 

Testifying expert in case involving long-term care insurance premium rates. 

 Confidential Pension Litigation 

Consulting expert in analysis of actuarial and accounting issues in a defined benefit pension plan. 

 Best Buy v. DDR, October 

Testifying expert in analysis of insurance costs applicable to common areas of retail developments. 

 Barnes & Noble v. DDR 

Testifying expert in analysis of insurance costs applicable to common areas of retail developments. 

 Fireman’s Fund v. Cunningham Lindsey 

Testifying expert in analysis of damages related to third-party administration of a commercial auto 

insurance program. 

 Confidential Regulatory Investigation 

Consulting expert in analysis of policy forms used by a property casualty insurer and corresponding 

policy forms approved by state regulators. 

 Variable Annuity Remediation 

Consulting expert in analysis of remediation for deficiencies in administering variable annuities. 

Assisting with analyzing remediation package and negotiating with regulators and other parties. 

 CSR v. Lloyd’s Underwriters 

Testifying expert in coverage litigation involving liability insurance. Report focused on the 

availability and worldwide capacity for liability insurance during the relevant periods. 

 Economic Impact of Federal Participation in Terrorism Risk 

Coauthored a study with Professor R. Glenn Hubbard, former chair of the President’s Council of 

Economic Advisers. Study, which was commissioned by numerous insurance trade organizations, 

focused on the economic impact of the Federal TRIA terrorism legislation and the economic impact 

of failing to renew the legislation. 

 Class Action v. Allstate 

Consulting expert on damages and other issues relating to the estimation of inherent diminished value 

that may still be present after a vehicle has been repaired following an accident. 

 Class Action v. American Home 

Damages expert for American Home in a litigation involving alleged misreporting of certain types of 

claims to the Workers’ Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau (WCIRB) of California. 

 Class Action v. State Compensation Insurance Fund 

Damages expert for plaintiffs in a litigation involving claims estimation and reserving practices of 

State Compensation Insurance Fund in California. 

A-4 
 

PUBLIC

 Class Action v. Knights of Columbus 

Economic expert for the Knights of Columbus in a major sales practices litigation involving over 

500,000 policyholders. Estimated the damage to policyholders under alternative theories of liability, 

including development of computer-based policy performance models. 

 Various Confidential Class Action Litigations v. Mutual Life Insurance Companies 

Consulting expert in the analysis of sales practices for four major class action litigations involving 

between 100,000 and 3.6 million policyholders. Work included estimating the incidence of various 

allegations, evaluating the financial exposure and recommending alternatives to management and 

directors. 

 Insurance Modal Premium Litigation 

Consulting expert on issues relating to the estimation of potential damages exposure for modal 

premium litigation. Prepare preliminary analyses of economic costs and benefits of modal premium 

payments on policyholders. 

 Confidential Liability Insurance Coverage Litigation 

Economic expert in insurance coverage litigation. Managed the abstracting and statistical analysis of 

information contained in paper records useful for determining the possible insurance coverage. 

 Confidential Disability Insurance Sales Practices Litigation 

Consulting expert for issues related to the sale and product performance of individual disability 

insurance policies. Designed and implemented large data abstracting effort for the insurance company 

defendant and assisted in the development and implementation of a settlement for tens of thousands 

of policyholders. 

 Confidential Mortgage Insurance Litigation 

Consulting expert in a large litigation involving primary mortgage insurance. Analysis of issues 

involving the provision of various types of services and insurance products. 

 Health Insurance Redesign Litigation 

Consulting expert in the analysis of a major health insurance benefit redesign program. Analysis of 

various issues associated with estimating damages and developing overall damages models. 

 Confidential Insurance Coverage Litigation Involving Toxic Waste Cleanup Costs 

Consulting expert in the analysis of the allocation of toxic waste cleanup costs across various 

insurance companies. Developed a sophisticated model to predict the allocation behavior of the 

claimant under alternative scenarios. Assisted client personnel and counsel in modeling the impact on 

the client insurance company under different scenarios to assist in litigation and settlement 

negotiations. 

 Class Action v. Ohio National 

Economic expert for Ohio National in a major class action litigation involving over 100,000 whole 

life and universal life policies. Estimated the incidence of various allegations, evaluated financial 

exposure, presented recommendation to management and outside counsel, and developed models to 

project ultimate class member “take rates” for particular forms of relief. 

 Arroyo v. Alexander & Alexander 

Damages expert in a sales practices case involving the sale and subsequent performance of a universal 

life insurance policy. Analyzed exposure and damages. 

A-5 
 

PUBLIC

 Life Insurance/Pension Program Litigation 

Consulting and testifying expert in a complex sales practices case involving the sale of universal life 

insurance policies used to help fund a pension program for a large trade association. Analysis assisted 

counsel in determining exposure and damages. 

 Morris v. Fremont Life 

Consulting expert to assist in evaluating sales practices of an insurance agent selling an annuity 

product. 

 Archuletta v. Fremont Life 

Consulting expert to assist in refuting damages claims put forward by the plaintiff’s expert regarding 

the sale and performance of a Universal Life insurance policy. 

Finance and Securities 

 Securities Litigation 

Consulting expert on numerous issues in a securities matter involving allegations of omissions related 

to a large IPO. 

 Securities Litigation 

Consulting expert on numerous issues in a securities matter involving allegations of omissions and 

misleading financial guidance. 

 Confidential Investigation 

Consulting expert on finance and accounting issues for US Department of Justice (DOJ) in matter 

involving food stamp utilization. 

 Fischer v. Fischer Investment Return Analysis 

Testifying expert on the expected rates of investment return for a diversified portfolio of investments. 

 Confidential Mortgage Litigation 

Consulting expert in a matter involving the financial performance of a program for reducing the term 

and interest amount paid on a mortgage. 

 Confidential Investment Return Litigation 

Testifying expert in a confidential arbitration involving the expected rates of investment returns on 

different assets classes into the future. 

 Class Action Securities Litigation (Confidential) 

Consulting expert on loss causation issues in a large bondholder securities case. 

 Class Action Securities Litigation (Confidential) 

Consulting expert on loss causation issues in a large securities case. 

 Business Interruption (Confidential) 

Consulting expert in a case involving business interruption for a finance and securities firm. 

 Mortgage Securities Litigation (Confidential) 

Consulting expert in a class action litigation alleging that the financial performance of mortgage 

securities were adversely affected by poor underwriting and appraisals. 

A-6 
PUBLIC

 Securities Derivative Litigation (Confidential) 

Consulting expert in a derivative litigation alleging that an acquisition failed to adhere to appropriate 

corporate governance policies. 

 Confidential Cash-Balance Pension Litigation 

Consulting expert in a litigation involving the damages calculation for a class of cash balance pension 

participants who terminated prior to retirement. 

 Confidential CDO Litigation 

Consulting expert in a litigation involving the valuation, financial performance, and default history of 

various collateralized debt obligations. 

 Confidential Securities Litigation 

Consulting expert in a 10b-5 securities litigation. 

 Confidential Tax Shelter Litigation 

Consulting expert in a tax litigation matter for the State of California analyzing the economic basis 

for an identified series of transactions. 

 Confidential Securities Class Action 

Consulting expert in large securities class action matter involving allegations of failure to provide 

accurate financial guidance. 

 Stock Option Backdating Litigation 

Consulting expert on stock option backdating matter. 

 Portfolio Diversification 

Consulting expert on issues relating to portfolio diversification in a large trust. 

 Stock Option Backdating Litigation 

Consulting expert on stock option backdating matter in private securities litigation. 

 Confidential SEC Investigation 

Consulting expert on a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation relating to 

reinsurance disclosures. 

 Confidential Mutual Fund Litigation 

Consulting expert on litigation related to late trading of international mutual funds. 

 Williams Communication Securities Litigation 

Consulting expert on 10b-5 litigation alleging audit failures led to stock decline. Case dismissed. 

 Class Action v. Ernst & Young 

Consulting expert on 10b-5 litigation alleging audit failures led to stock decline. Case went to verdict 

with a no liability verdict for client, Ernst & Young. 

 Confidential Securities Litigation 

Consulting expert assisting academic affiliate in analysis focused on the reasonableness of company 

disclosures based on internal company budgets and forecasts. 

A-7 
 

 

 

PUBLIC

 Confidential Securities Litigation 

Consulting expert for counsel in securities litigation focused on company disclosures. 

 IRS v. Center Apartments 

Consulting expert assisting Professor Steve Grenadier in the analysis of proper commercial apartment 

mortgage interest rates. 

 Class Action v. Major Investment Bank 

Consulting expert analyzing the impact of releasing allegedly fraudulent investment information on 

the stock price of two small software companies for a 10b-5 securities litigation. 

 Class Action v. Conseco 

Consulting expert analyzing the value of a proposed settlement involving universal life crediting 

rates. Assisted expert in the financial evaluation of the value of the proposed settlement using interest 

rate simulation models. 

 IRS v. Major Retail Chain 

Consulting expert in defense of a major retail chain. Provided assistance in evaluating various expert 

reports involving the economic consequences of the purchase of a particular investment. 

 In re: NASDAQ Market Maker Antitrust Litigation 

Consulting expert analysis of millions of stock transactions for seven different NASDAQ market 

makers facing allegations of conspiracy and price-fixing. 

Commercial Damages 

 State of Washington v. Comcast 

Testifying expert in litigation involving allegations related to the provision of repair services to cable 

TV customers. 

 Confidential Regulatory Breach Litigation 

Consulting expert on damages and accounting issues in litigation involving a breach of federal 

regulations in the retail food industry. 

 Confidential Employment Breach Arbitration 

Consulting expert on damages in an arbitration involving a breach of employment obligations. 

 Confidential Breach of Contract Arbitration 

Testifying expert on damages in litigation involving a breach of contract for a health care claims 

administration company. 

 Confidential Breach of Contract Arbitration 

Testifying expert on damages in litigation involving a breach of contract for a laboratory billing 

company. 

 Metzner v. Permanente Medical Group 

Testifying expert on damages in litigation involving allegations of wrongful termination. 

 Confidential Commercial Airline Litigation 

Testifying expert on damages and statistical issues in litigation involving the payment of fees for 

interrupted travel. 

A-8 
PUBLIC

 2880 Stevens Creek v. Blach Construction 

Testifying expert on loss-of-use damages in litigation involving construction defects. 

 Polteco v. Tecsult 

Testifying expert on damages in litigation involving the failure of specialized machinery in a 

manufacturing operation. 

 Confidential Auto Dealership Litigation 

Analysis of liability and damages issues in litigation involving auto dealership sales practices. 

 F&A Restaurant Group v. Shepard and Reyes 

Analysis of damages relating to the sale of a restaurant. Provided arbitration testimony. 

 US Unwired v. Sprint 

Assisted Analysis Group affiliate Robert Hall in the damages analysis associated with the change in 

status of Sprint’s affiliate, US Unwired. Case settled after trial testimony had been presented. 

 Confidential Enterprise Software Litigation 

Assisted Analysis Group affiliate in the damages analysis associated with loss of business in the 

enterprise software market. 

 Her Associates v. Kaiser 

Damages expert for defense in litigation related to consulting firm’s damages claim. 

 General American v. KPMG 

Damages expert for plaintiffs in litigation related to auditor’s alleged obligation to disclose certain 

financial instruments. 

 Creative Artists v. County of Santa Clara 

Damages expert for defense in litigation related to the cancellation of musical events at facilities 

owned by the County of Santa Clara. 

 Class Action v. Ford Credit 

Damages expert for plaintiffs analyzing the costs and charges associated with late fees on consumer 

auto leases. 

 Bar None v. The Duncan Group, January 

Damages expert for defense analyzing damages associated with the failed efforts to develop a 

software program to be used in automating the subprime auto lending business. 

 Coram v. Aetna 

Consulting expert for defense analyzing the damages associated with a home health care contract that 

experienced higher costs than anticipated. Supported industry expert in the cost analysis. 

 Confidential Breach of Contract Litigation 

Consulting expert for defense analyzing the damages associated with the failed joint venture 

development of a removable storage device for personal computers. Supported academic expert in the 

analysis of damages. 

A-9 
PUBLIC

 Bourns v. Raychem 

Consulting expert for defense analyzing damages associated with the monopolization of the market 

for primary lithium battery safety devices. Supported academic experts in the analysis of damages. 

 Procter & Gamble v. Amway 

Consulting expert for plaintiff analyzing the impact of disparaging comments and rumors on the sales 

of Procter & Gamble products. Supported academic experts in the analysis of primary and secondary 

data sources and the development of surveys and laboratory experiments to test the impact of rumors 

on consumer behavior. 

Valuation / Intellectual Property 

 Confidential Stock Appraisals 

Consulting expert in the appraisal of the stock value for several publicly traded companies that have 

been challenged in Delaware Chancery Court. 

 Dell Stock Appraisal 

Consulting expert in the Delaware appraisal of Dell’s shares arising from the October 2013 leveraged 

buyout of Dell’s public shareholders. 

 Confidential International Arbitration 

Testifying damages expert in dispute involving alleged breach of licensing and joint development 

agreements. 

 Confidential Business Valuation 

Designated expert in a business valuation for a medical practice. 

 Confidential Patent Litigation 

Consulting expert in litigation involving PC networking technology. 

 Confidential Patent Litigation 

Consulting expert on determination of royalty amounts in a confidential semiconductor patent 

litigation. 

 Confidential High-Technology Manufacturing Company Valuation 

Valuation expert analyzing economic factors associated with the value of a closely held manufacturer 

of specialized high tech components for defense applications. 

 Confidential Beverage Distributor Valuation 

Valuation expert analyzing the value of the large beverage distributor. 

 Confidential Patent Infringement Litigation 

Consulting expert on reasonably royalties and damages in the semiconductor industry. 

 Appaloosa Interactive Corporation v. Stephen Friedman and Related Cross-Actions, 2007 

Valuation and damages expert in the video game development industry. 

 Confidential Insurance Company Valuation 

Valuation expert analyzing the value of a private auto insurer for a Delaware valuation matter. 

A-10 
PUBLIC

 Carrino v. Carrino 

Valuation expert analyzing the value of an investment management firm. Provided trial testimony. 

 Confidential Valuation 

Valuation expert analyzing the value of capital contributions to a series of jointly invested real estate 

transactions. 

 Confidential Company Valuation 

Valuation expert analyzing a privately held health care provider. 

 Confidential Company Valuation 

Valuation expert analyzing a privately held consulting firm. 

 Confidential Software Distribution Dispute 

Damages expert in an arbitration involving software distribution. 

 Capo v. Dioptics, January 

Intellectual property damages expert in a trade dress case involving protective sunglasses. 

 Arthur Stockton v. Fidelity & Deposit 

Analysis of the value of an investment management firm and any damages related to the payment of 

claims by the insurer. 

 Confidential Company Valuation 

Valuation expert analyzing a privately held construction firm. 

 Redlands Insurance Company v. Edward Wolkowitz 

Valuation expert for plaintiff analyzing the valuation and rating analysis of Redlands Insurance 

Company, a property and casualty insurer. 

 Confidential Catastrophic Insurance Company Valuation 

Consulting expert for defense analyzing the valuation methodology used by the plaintiffs in the 

valuation of a catastrophic risk insurance modeling company. 

 Trigon v. United States of America 

Valuation expert for defense analyzing the valuation methodology used by plaintiffs’ expert for 

intangible assets. 

 Synbiotics v. Heska, November 

Damages expert for defense in a patent infringement case involving antibody tests for animal 

diseases. 

 Air Products v. ATMI 

Damages expert in a patent infringement case involving gases used for semiconductor manufacturing. 

 Confidential Telecommunications Equipment Trade Secret Litigation 

Consulting expert analyzing the potential damages from the sale of telecommunications equipment 

allegedly containing trade secrets. Supported Analysis Group expert in the analysis of relevant data 

and the development of reasonable royalty damages estimates and potential lost profits. 

A-11 
PUBLIC

 Bingo Card Minder v. Gametek 

Consulting expert analyzing reasonable royalties for a handheld computer-based consumer product. 

Supported Analysis Group expert in the analysis of relevant data and development of reasonable 

royalty percentages. 

Health Care 

 Confidential Provider Network Dispute 

Consulting expert analyzing issues associated with the development and maintenance of a provider 

network. 

 Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, et al. v. Health Net 

Consulting expert in a matter involving the provision of addiction care services. 

 CEP America – California v. Heritage Provider Network 

Testifying expert in a matter involving the determination of reasonable value for physician services. 

 CSNI v. Blue Shield 

Testifying expert in a matter involving the determination of reasonable value for physician services. 

 Confidential Arbitrations 

Consulting and testifying expert in matters involving reasonable value rates. 

 Confidential Addiction Care Analysis 

Consulting expert in a matter involving the provision of addiction care services. 

 Confidential Investigation of Charity Care 

Consulting expert in a matter involving the provision of hospital charity care. 

 NorthBay Healthcare Group v. Blue Shield 

Testifying expert in a matter involving the determination of reasonable value for hospital services. 

 YDM Management Inc. v. Blue Shield 

Testifying expert in a matter involving the determination of reasonable value for physician services. 

 San Jose Neurospine v. Blue Shield 

Testifying expert in a matter involving the determination of reasonable value for physician services. 

 Bodner, et al. v. Blue Shield 

Testifying expert in a matter involving the disclosures and financial payments for various types of 

physician services. 

 Confidential Payor-Provider Disputes 

Economic expert in litigation over payment for emergency and post-stabilization care. 

 Confidential Payor-Provider Dispute 

Economic expert in arbitration over payment for emergency and post-stabilization care. 

 Des Roches, et al. v. Blue Shield and Magellan 

Class certification expert for Blue Shield in a matter involving the use of guidelines for certain 

behavioral health services. 

A-12 
PUBLIC

 Confidential Hospital Payment Dispute 

Economics testifying expert in a case involving payments for hospital services. 

 Confidential Hospital Payment Dispute 

Economics testifying expert in a case involving payments for hospital services. 

 Confidential Laboratory Payment Dispute 

Economics testifying expert in a case involving payments for laboratory services. 

 Goel v. Blue Shield 

Economics testifying expert in a case involving the determination of reasonable value for emergency 

department cardiology services. 

 Confidential Hospital Payment Dispute 

Economics and statistical expert in a litigation involving the determination of payment levels 

associated with disputed status of certain payor groups. 

 NCAA Concussion Litigation 

Economics expert in litigation involving the adequacy of funding for a medical monitoring program 

for a class of NCAA athletes. 

 Confidential Health Care Litigation 

Consulting expert in a matter involving a dispute over the classification of various health care 

expenses related to deductible and maximum out-of-pocket expenditures. 

 Confidential Health Care Arbitration 

Testifying expert in a dispute between a payor and provider involving payment levels and business 

practices. 

 Martin, et al. v. Blue Shield 

Testifying expert on class certification issues in a matter involving plan-level premium change 

calculations for individual health insurance policies. 

 Prime v. Kaiser 

Damages expert in dispute involving business practices and claims payment issues. 

 Confidential Health Care Litigation 

Damages expert in a dispute involving group health insurance. 

 Confidential Class Action Litigation 

Consulting expert on damages issues in a dispute over coverage issues for certain types of individual 

health insurance policies. 

 Confidential Payor/Provider Dispute 

Consulting expert on damages issues in a dispute between a payor and provider involving payment 

terms and allowed services. 

 Confidential Arbitration 

Expert on damages issues in a dispute between a payor and provider affecting enrollment and 

profitability for a large Medicare managed-care program and other patient programs. 

A-13 
PUBLIC

 Class Action v. Wellpoint 

Expert on class certification matters in a class action alleging improper termination of a health 

insurance company. 

 Confidential Arbitration 

Expert on damages issues in a dispute between a payor and provider regarding a change in payment 

methodology. 

 Clark v. Blue Shield 

Expert for defense assisting in the economic analysis of policy rescission. 

 Confidential Arbitration 

Expert on damages calculation in a dispute between a health insurer and a provider of supplemental 

insurance benefits. 

 Confidential Hospital Association 

Consultant assisting with developing economic models and developing legislative for Medicaid 

financing arrangements among hospitals. 

 Paul v. Blue Shield 

Expert for defense assisting in the economic analysis of policy rescission. 

 Simoes v. Blue Shield 

Expert for defense assisting in the economic analysis of policy rescission. 

 Hailey v. Blue Shield 

Expert for defense assisting in the economic analysis of policy rescission. 

 Leyra v. Blue Shield 

Expert for defense assisting in the economic analysis of liability for policy rescission. 

 Sutter v. Blue Shield 

Consulting expert for defense assisting in the economic analysis of hospital charges. 

 Various Health Insurance Matters 

Consulting expert for defense assisting in the economic analysis of policy rescissions. 

 Class Action v. Health Insurer 

Consulting expert for defense assisting in the economic analysis of liability for alleged 

misclassification of patient populations. 

 Missouri Stem Cell Economic Valuation 

Authored a study examining the likely economic impact of possible health research breakthroughs for 

health care costs in Missouri. 

 California Stem Cell Economic Impact Valuation 

Coauthored a study with Professor Laurence Baker of Stanford examining the likely economic impact 

of a proposed major health research initiative in California. 

A-14 
 

 

PUBLIC

 Health Guideline Analysis 

Consulting expert leading a team of health economists and statisticians in the evaluation of clinical 

and payment guidelines developed for heart valve replacement surgery. 

 California Attorney General v. Alta Bates/Summit Medical 

Consulting expert analyzing the ability of managed care plans to move patients in response to quality 

or price incentives. Supported industry expert in developing report and preparing for deposition. 

 Various Hospital Mergers 

Financial expert for various clients analyzing proposed mergers between not-for-profit community 

hospitals. Estimated the potential efficiencies resulting from the mergers, conducted market research 

on community needs, and presented findings to management, directors, and outside counsel. 

 Class Action Health Insurance Litigation 

Hired by the nation’s largest mediation service to serve as a neutral expert in a litigation involving the 

calculation of health insurance payments. Worked with experts from both sides and assisted the 

mediator in bringing the parties to a settlement. 

Antitrust and Other Cases 

 Medical Supply Rental 

Consulting expert in antitrust matter alleging antitrust harm and damage related to medical equipment 

rentals. 

 Slovin, et al. v. Sunrun, et al. 

Testifying expert on class action and data issues in a matter involving allegations of improper 

telephone sales calls. 

 Lucero v. Solar City 

Testifying expert on class action and data issues in a matter involving allegations of improper 

telephone sales calls. 

 Solyndra v. Trina, et al. 

Testifying expert on antitrust and damages issues in a matter involving allegations of below-cost 

pricing for solar panels. 

 Confidential Antitrust Investigation 

Consulting expert on antitrust issues in the automobile industry. 

 US Department of Justice v. Richard Bai 

Testifying expert on antitrust issues in a price-fixing case in the LCD industry. 

 Confidential Antitrust Investigation 

Consulting expert on antitrust issues in a high tech industry. 

 Indirect Purchaser Class Action v. AUO, et al. 

Designated testifying expert on antitrust issues in an alleged price-fixing case in the LCD industry. 

 Korean Fair Trade Commission v. AUO, et al. 

Designated testifying expert on antitrust issues in an alleged price-fixing case in the LCD industry. 

A-15 
PUBLIC

 US Department of Justice v. AUO 

Testifying expert on antitrust issues in price-fixing case in the LCD industry. 

 Confidential Antitrust Investigation 

Consulting expert on antitrust issues in a high technology industry. 

 Confidential Predatory Pricing Litigation 

Consulting expert on litigation related to antitrust claims in the replacement auto parts industry. 

 Confidential Private Antitrust Litigation 

Consulting expert on litigation related to antitrust claims in the building construction industry. 

 Regulatory Investigation 

Consulting expert for government regulatory body investigating allegations of consumer overcharges. 

 Class Action v. Noranda and DuPont 

Consulting expert for defense assisting in the economic analysis of liability for alleged antitrust 

violations affecting sulfuric acid in the United States. 

 Class Action v. Microsoft 

Consulting expert for defense assisting in the economic analysis of antitrust liability and damages 

issues in a series of price overcharge litigations. Assist various academic affiliates, including 

Professor Robert Hall. 

 Neon v. BMC Antitrust Litigation 

Consulting expert for plaintiffs analyzing antitrust violations in the sale of computer software for 

large computer databases. Supported academic affiliate expert in the analysis of relevant data and 

development of damages estimates. 

 CFM v. Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. 

Consulting expert for defense analyzing the potential monopolization by CFM of the semiconductor 

cleaning market. Support academic affiliate, Professor Robert Hall. 

 Proposed Merger of WorldCom and Sprint 

Consulting expert assisting in the economic evaluation of the proposed merger between WorldCom 

and Sprint. Evaluate issues relating to market share and pricing of residential long distance services. 

TEACHING 

1994–96 Teaching Fellow, Analytic Methods, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 

1994–96 Instructor, Economics Summer Program for Mid-Career Graduate Students, Kennedy 

School of Government, Harvard University 

1989–90 Teaching Assistant, Statistics, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 

A-16 
PUBLIC

PUBLICATIONS AND REPORTS 

“COVID-19’s Strain on Hospitals May Necessitate More Relief,” with Mark Gustafson and Phil HallPartyka, Law360 (May 26, 2020) 

“Presentation of Econometric Analyses,” with Samuel Weglein, in Econometrics: Legal, Practical, and 

Technical Issues, published by the American Bar Association (2014) 

“Risk Management and the Economic Impact of Terrorism,” with Peter Hess, in Business Continuity and 

Homeland Security, Volume 1, edited by David H. McIntyre and William I. Hancock, Edward Elgar 

Publishing (2012) 

“Taming a Whale Lurking in Pension Financing,” Pensions & Investments (August 9, 2010) 

Interim Economic Impact Review, with Laurence Baker, CIRM (California Stem Cell Agency) (October 

10, 2008) 

Winning Initiative Campaigns with Economic Analysis, Campaigns & Elections, 39 (February 2006) 

“The Economic Effects of Federal Participation in Terrorism Risk,” with R. Glenn Hubbard and Peter 

Hess, Risk Management and Insurance Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 177–209 (2005) 

Some Economic Implications of State Stem Cell Funding Programs, with Lawrence Baker, prepared for 

“States and Stem Cells: A Symposium on the Policy and Implications of State-Funded Stem Cell 

Research, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University (April 15, 2005) 

Health Analysis of the Potential Benefits of SCNT Stem Cell Research and Therapies in Missouri: Patient 

Population and Health Care Costs (February 8, 2005) 

The Economic Effect of Federal Participation in Terrorism Risk, with R. Glenn Hubbard (September 14, 

2004) 

Economic Impact Analysis Proposition 71: California Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative, with 

Laurence Baker (September 14, 2004) 

“Hospital Consolidation: Optimal Strategy for a Two-Hospital Town,” with John F. Tiscornia, in 

Ambulatory Health Care: Case Studies for the Health Services Executive, edited by Austin Ross and 

Mary Richardson, Health Administration Press (1996) 

PRESENTATIONS 

“Modern Strategies & Approaches in Consumer Class Action Suits”, presented on expert witness issues at 

a continuing education forum for attorneys sponsored by the National Law Journal (November 2012) 

“The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Disclosures: What Went Wrong?”, presented at a webinar continuing 

education forum for attorneys sponsored by Analysis Group/Economics (July 29, 2008)

 “The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Disclosures: What Went Wrong?”, presented at a continuing 

education forum for attorneys sponsored by Analysis Group/Economics, San Francisco, CA (June 24, 

2008) 

A-17 
 

 

 

 

PUBLIC

“Stock Option Backdating”, presented at a continuing education forum for attorneys sponsored by 

Analysis Group/Economics, New York, NY (March 21, 2007) 

“Stock Option Backdating”, presented at a continuing education forum for attorneys sponsored by 

Analysis Group/Economics, Menlo Park, CA and San Francisco, CA (November 7, 2006) 

“Overview of Stem Cell Legislation”, moderator and presenter at a presentation on implementing 

California’s stem cell initiative, sponsored by the Food and Drug Law Institute (FDLI), San Mateo, CA 

(March 9, 2004) 

“Challenges to Expert Testimony,” presentation at Law Seminar International Conference, San Francisco, 

CA (November 5, 2004) 

“Federal Terrorism Insurance Panel Discussion,” presentation and panel participant, National Press Club, 

Washington, DC (October 24, 2004) 

“Insurance 101,” presentation on the design and performance of whole life and universal life policies, 

presented to customer services representatives administering a life insurance sales practices settlement, 

Ogden, UT (April 27, 1999) 

“Antitrust Case Study: NASDAQ Market Maker Litigation,” presented at a continuing education forum 

for attorneys sponsored by Analysis Group/Economics, Menlo Park and San Francisco, CA (September 

15, 1998) 

“An Economist’s Perspective on Life Insurance Sales Practices Problems,” presented at the spring 

meeting of the Society of Actuaries, Maui, HI (June 15, 1998) 

“Valuing Intellectual Property in an Age of Employee Mobility,” presented at a continuing education 

forum for attorneys sponsored by Analysis Group/Economics, Menlo Park and San Francisco, CA (June 

9, 1998) 

EXPERT DESIGNATION, TESTIMONY, AND REPORTS 

December 2022 Arbitration testimony in Confidential Arbitration (contractual dispute) 

December 2022 Arbitration testimony in Confidential Arbitration (payor-provider contractual 

dispute) 

December 2022 Expert deposition in Harold Parsons v. The Commerce Insurance Company 

(proposed claims payment class action) 

November 2022 Expert report in Liberty Dialysis Hawaii LLC, et al. v. Health Management Network 

Inc., et al. (payor-provider contractual dispute) 

November 2022 Expert report in Kirk Prest v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP America 

Production Company, and BP p.l.c. (economic damages) 

November 2022 Expert deposition in CEP America – California v. Heritage Provider Network (health 

insurance payor-provider matter) 

October 2022 Expert deposition in Brian J. Lyngaas, D.D.S., P.L.L.C. v. IQVIA, Inc. (TCPA matter) 

A-18 
 

PUBLIC

October 2022 Expert declaration in Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc., et al. v. Health Net, 

Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

October 2022 Expert rebuttal report in Brian J. Lyngaas, D.D.S., P.L.L.C. v. IQVIA, Inc. (TCPA 

matter) 

October 2022 Expert deposition in Saint Alphonsus Health Alliance, Inc., et al. v. Corizon LLC, et 

al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

September 2022 Expert report in Brian J. Lyngaas, D.D.S., P.L.L.C. v. IQVIA, Inc. (TCPA matter) 

August 2022 Expert declaration in Emergency Physician Services of New York., et al. v. 

UnitedHealth Group, Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

August 2022 Expert report in Saint Alphonsus Health Alliance, Inc., et al. v. Corizon LLC, et al. 

(health insurance payor-provider matter) 

August 2022 Expert deposition in Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 Pension Fund v. ProAssurance 

Corporation, et al. (class certification opposition in a securities class action) 

July 2022 Expert deposition in Jeffrey Leonard, et al. v. John Hancock Life Insurance Company 

of New York, et al. (life insurance policy performance litigation) 

July 2022 Expert declaration in Adam Viguers et al. v. California Physicians’ Service (health 

insurance payor-provider matter) 

July 2022 Trial testimony in Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc., et al. v. Health Net, Inc., 

et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

June 2022 Expert report in Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 Pension Fund v. ProAssurance 

Corporation, et al. (class certification opposition in a securities class action) 

June 2022 Expert declaration in Emergency Physician Services of Pennsylvania, P.C., et al. v. 

UnitedHealth Group, Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

May 2022 Expert declaration in Florida Emergency Physicians Kang & Associates, M.D., Inc., 

et al. v. United Healthcare of Florida, Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider 

matter) 

May 2022 Expert deposition in Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc., et al. v. Health Net, Inc., 

et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

May 2022 Expert report in Jeffrey Leonard, In His Capacity As Trustee of the Poplawski 2008 

Insurance Trust, et al. v. John Hancock Life Insurance Company of New York, et al. 

(life insurance matter) 

May 2022 Deposition testimony in Travel Nurse Across America, LLC v. Floyd Edwards 

Holdings, Inc., et al. (company valuation) 

March 2022 Deposition testimony in Hooman Melamed, M.D., Inc. v. Blue Shield of California 

Life and Health Insurance Company (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

A-19 
PUBLIC

January 2022 Expert declaration in Eileen S. Natuzzi, et al. v. California Physicians’ Service d/b/a 

Blue Shield of California (class action involving provider payment methodology) 

December 2021 Expert report in Los Robles Regional Medical Center, et al. v. Kaiser Foundation 

Health Plan, Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

December 2021 Deposition testimony in Los Robles Regional Medical Center, et al. v. Kaiser 

Foundation Health Plan, Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

December 2021 Deposition testimony in Matthew N. Fulton v. Enclarity, Inc., et al. (TCPA matter) 

November 2021 Deposition testimony in Los Robles Regional Medical Center, et al. v. Kaiser 

Foundation Health Plan, Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

November 2021 Expert report in Matthew N. Fulton v. Enclarity Inc., et al. (TCPA matter) 

November 2021 Trial testimony in Fremont Emergency Services (Mandavia), Ltd., et al. v. 

UnitedHealth Group Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

November 2021 Deposition testimony in Confidential – OCC (securities valuation) 

October 2021 Expert report in Confidential Litigation (company valuation) 

October 2021 Expert declaration in Eileen S. Natuzzi, et al. v. California Physicians’ Service d/b/a 

Blue Shield of California (class action involving provider payment methodology) 

September 2021 Expert report in Fremont Emergency Services (Mandavia) Ltd., et al. v. UnitedHealth 

Group Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

September 2021 Expert declaration in Fremont Emergency Services (Mandavia) Ltd., et al. v. 

UnitedHealth Group Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

September 2021 Deposition testimony in Fremont Emergency Services (Mandavia) Ltd., et al. v. 

UnitedHealth Group Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

August 2021 Expert rebuttal report in Fremont Emergency Services (Mandavia) Ltd., et al. v. 

UnitedHealth Group Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

July 2021 Expert report in Fremont Emergency Services (Mandavia) Ltd., et al. v. UnitedHealth 

Group Inc., et al. (health insurance payor-provider matter) 

June 2021 Deposition testimony in Charles Tillage, et al. v. Comcast, et al. (class action 

alleging improper disclosure of fees) 

May 2021 Deposition testimony in Highfields Capital I LP, et al. v. SeaWorld Entertainment, 

Inc., et al. (securities fraud litigation) 

May 2021 Deposition testimony in Luke Davis, et al. v. Laboratory Corporation of America 

Holdings (class action alleging damages due to inadequate access to facilities) 

April 2021 Expert rebuttal report in Luke Davis, et al. v. Laboratory Corporation of America 

Holdings (class action alleging damages due to inadequate access to facilities) 

A-20 
PUBLIC

April 2021 Deposition testimony in California Physicians’ Service v. HealthPlan Services 

(contract performance dispute) 

March 2021 Expert report in Highfields Capital I LP, et al. v. SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., et al. 

(securities fraud litigation) 

March 2021 Expert report in Luke Davis, et al. v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings 

(class action alleging damages due to inadequate access to facilities) 

March 2021 Expert declaration in Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, et al. v. Health Net, Inc., et 

al. 

February 2021 Deposition testimony in Confidential – OCC (securities valuation) 

January 2021 Arbitration testimony in Confidential Arbitration (health insurance payor-provider 

matter) 

January 2021 Expert report in California Physicians’ Service v. HealthPlan Services (contract 

performance dispute) 

November 2020 Arbitration testimony in Confidential Arbitration (health insurance payor-provider 

matter) 

November 2020 Expert report in Confidential – OCC (securities valuation) 

October 2020 Arbitration testimony in Confidential Arbitration (health insurance payor-provider 

matter) 

October 2020 Expert reply report in California Physicians’ Service v. HealthPlan Services 

(contract performance dispute) 

September 2020 Deposition testimony in California Physicians’ Service v. HealthPlan Services 

(contract performance dispute) 

September 2020 Deposition testimony in In re: The Allstate Corporation Securities Litigation (class 

action alleging claim frequency misstatements) 

August 2020 Expert declaration in California Physicians’ Service v. HealthPlan Services (contract 

performance dispute) 

July 2020 Deposition testimony in Confidential Arbitration (health care pricing dispute) 

July 2020 Expert report in Confidential Arbitration (health care pricing dispute) 

July 2020 Expert rebuttal report in re: The Allstate Corporation Securities Litigation (class 

action alleging claim frequency misstatements) 

July 2020 Expert reply report in re: The Allstate Corporation Securities Litigation (class action 

alleging claim frequency misstatements) 

July 2020 Expert report in Scott Crosby, et al. v. California Physicians’ Service, et al. (class 

action alleging care restrictions) 

A-21 
 

PUBLIC

May 2020 Expert declaration in Scott Crosby, et al. v. California Physicians’ Service, et al. 

(class action alleging care restrictions) 

April 2020 Deposition testimony in re: CenturyLink Sales Practices and Securities Litigation 

(class action alleging customer cramming and related allegation) 

February 2020 Expert report in re: The Allstate Corporation Securities Litigation (class action 

alleging claim frequency misstatements) 

February 2020 Deposition testimony in CEP America – California v. Heritage Provider Network 

(health insurance payor-provider matter) 

January 2020 Arbitration testimony in Confidential Arbitration (DMHC pricing matter) 

January 2020 Expert rebuttal report in Confidential Arbitration 

January 2020 Expert report in Confidential Arbitration 

January 2020 Arbitration testimony in Confidential Arbitration (ownership dispute matter) 

January 2020 Arbitration testimony in Confidential Arbitration (physician IPA affiliation matter) 

January 2020 Expert deposition in Confidential Arbitration (DMHC pricing matter) 

December 2019 Expert report in Confidential Arbitration 

December 2019 Expert report in Confidential Arbitration 

December 2019 Expert deposition in Confidential Arbitration (ownership dispute matter) 

November 2019 Expert rebuttal report in CEP America – California v. Heritage Provider Network 

October 2019 Expert declaration in Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, et al. v. Health Net 

July 2019 Expert declaration in CEP America – California v. Heritage Provider Network 

July 2019 Expert deposition in Physicians Healthsource Inc., et al. v. Masimo Corp. (TCPA 

matter) 

July 2019 Expert deposition in Empire Land, LLC (bankruptcy matter) 

June 2019 Expert report in Prime Healthcare Services, Inc., et al. v. Humana Insurance 

Company, et al. (Evaluation of health care utilization data) 

June 2019 Expert deposition in Michael Johnson, et al. v. Comodo Group (TCPA matter) 

June 2019 Trial testimony in California Spine and Neurosurgery Institute v. Blue Shield (health 

insurance payor-provider matter) 

June 2019 Arbitration testimony in Confidential Health Care Payment Matter (health insurance 

payor-provider matter) 

A-22 
 

PUBLIC

May 2019 Expert deposition in California Spine and Neurosurgery Institute v. Blue Shield 

(health insurance payor-provider matter) 

May 2019 Expert deposition in Confidential Health Care Payment Matter (health insurance 

payor-provider matter) 

March 2019 Expert deposition in California Spine and Neurosurgery Institute v. Blue Shield 

(health insurance payor-provider matter) 

March 2019 Expert deposition in Confidential Health Care Payment Matter (health insurance 

payor-provider matter) 

March 2019 Expert deposition in Confidential Health Care Payment Matter (health insurance 

payor-provider matter) 

February 2019 Expert deposition in San Joaquin General Hospital v. Blue Shield (health insurance 

payor-provider matter) 

February 2019 Trial testimony in Northbay Healthcare Group v. Blue Shield (health insurance 

payor-provider matter) 

February 2019 Expert report in Confidential Arbitration 

January 2019 Trial testimony in State of Washington v. Comcast (consumer fraud matter) 

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 

American Economics Association 

American Bar Association (non-lawyer member) 

Association for Health Services Research 

A-23 
PUBLIC

APPENDIX B 

Materials Considered 

B-1 
PUBLIC

Videoconference Examination of Catherine C. Goode, United States of America before the 

Federal Trade Commission in the Matter of: TurboTax, Inc., A Corporation, Docket No. 

1923119, October 23, 2020, CC-00003393. 

Videoconference Examination of Cathleen Ryan, United States of America before the Federal 

Trade Commission in the Matter of: TurboTax, Inc., A Corporation, Docket No. 

1923119, October 9, 2020, CC-00004770. 

Videoconference Examination of Jack Rubin, United States of America before the Federal Trade 

Commission in the Matter of: TurboTax, Inc., A Corporation, Docket No. 1923119, 

October 30, 2020, CC-00004546. 

Data 

Complainant Tax History Data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608568. 

Paid Search Data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490339. 

TY14–20 Customer-Level Data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608571. 

TY19–20 Upgrade Screen Data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608573. 

TY21 Customer-Level Data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608572. 

TY21 Customer Review ID Crosswalk, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608569. 

TY21 Customer Reviews, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000490341. 

TY21 Upgrade Screen Categorization, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608570. 

TY21 Upgrade Screen Data, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608574. 

Academic Sources 

Becker, Jan U., et al., “Impact of Proactive Postsales Service and Cross-Selling Activities on 

Customer Churn and Service Calls,” Journal of Service Research, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2020, 

pp. 53-69, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613371. 

Brickley, James A., et al., “Business Ethics and Organizational Architecture,” Journal of 

Banking & Finance, Vol. 26, 2002, pp. 1821-1835, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613388. 

Carlton, Dennis W., and Jeffery M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 4th Ed., Harlow, 

England, Pearson Education Limited, 2015, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613616. 

Chiles, Bennett, “Shrouded Prices and Firm Reputation: Evidence from the U.S. Hotel Industry,” 

Management Science, Articles in Advance, November 16, 2016, pp. 1-20, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000613460. 

Duflo, Esther, et al., “Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a 

Field Experiment With H&R Block,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 121, No. 

4, November 2006, pp. 1311-1346, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613261. 

Frecknall-Hughes, Jane, and Erich Kirchler, “Towards a General Theory of Tax Practice,” Social 

& Legal Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, pp. 289-312, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613346. 

Goldin, Jacob, “Tax Benefit Complexity and Take-Up: Lessons from the Earned Income Tax 

Credit,” Tax Law Review, Vol. 72, 2018, pp. 59-110, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613637. 

Gunter, Samara R., “Your Biggest Refund, Guaranteed? Internet Access, Tax Filing Method, and 

Reported Tax Liability,” International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 26, 2019, pp. 536-

570, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000616813. 

Horner, Johannes, “Reputation and Competition,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 

3, June 2002, pp. 644-663, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613311. 

B-2 
PUBLIC

Kerin, Roger A., and Steven W. Hartley, Marketing Fifteenth Ed., McGraw Hill, 2020, INTUITFTC-PART3-000596659. 

Klein, Benjamin, and Keith B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 

Performance,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4, August 1981, pp. 615-641, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613403. 

Klemperer, Paul, “The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs,” Rand Journal of 

Economics, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1987, pp. 138-150, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613297. 

Koller, Tim, et al., Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies Seventh Ed., 

Hoboken, New Jersey, Wiley, 2020, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613339. 

Kopczuk, Wojciech, and Cristian Pop-Eleches, “Electronic Filing, Tax Preparers and 

Participation in the Earned Income Tax Credit,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 91, 

2007, pp. 1351-1367, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613620. 

Kotler, Philip, and Kevin Lane Keller, Marketing Management Fifteenth Ed., Pearson, 2016, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000597494. 

Mailath, George J., and Larry Samuelson, “Reputations in Repeated Games,” Handbook of 

Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. 4, 2015, pp. 165-238, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000616899. 

Osborne, Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 

The MIT Press, 1994, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613456. 

Stiglitz, Joseph E., “Imperfect Information in the Product Market,” Handbook of Industrial 

Organization, Vol. 1, edited by Schmalensee, Richard and Robert D. Willig, North 

Holland, 1989, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613690. 

Yang, Zhilin, and Robin T. Peterson, “Customer Perceived Value, Satisfaction, and Loyalty: The 

Role of Switching Costs,” Psychology & Marketing, Vol. 21, No. 10, October 2004, pp. 

799-822, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613431. 

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Business Insider, January 11, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/personalfinance/cash-app-taxes-review, accessed November 3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000610930. 

Benson, Alana, and Tina Orem, “TaxSlayer Review 2022,” NerdWallet, March 7, 2022, 

https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/taxes/taxslayer-review, accessed November 3, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611085. 

Benson, Alana, et al., “Best Tax Software for 2022,” NerdWallet, March 28, 2022, 

https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/taxes/best-tax-software, accessed December 14, 

2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610501. 

Block, Inc., “Form 8-K,” February 24, 2022, https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK0001512673/0f73afbc-595a-418b-a74c-c723c0c9a460.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610178. 

Block, Inc., “Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021,” February 24, 2022, 

https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001512673/13386837-50ba-466f-b8ff81824f066c1e.pdf, accessed October 20, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611971. 

Block, Inc., “Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2022,” August 4, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611238. 

B-3 
PUBLIC

Block, Inc., “Square, Inc. Changes Name to Block,” December 1, 2021, 

https://squareup.com/us/en/press/square-changes-name-to-block, accessed October 11, 

2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610232. 

Butler, Peter, “Cash App Taxes Review 2022: Online Tax Software with No Fees Ever,” CNET, 

April 16, 2022, https://www.cnet.com/personal-finance/taxes/cash-app-taxes-review2022-online-tax-software-with-no-fees-ever/, accessed July 25, 2022, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000610462. 

Cash App Taxes, “$1 Million Tax Audit Defense Membership Program Agreement,” 

https://taxprotectionplus.com/sites/default/files_xvdb/TPP.CashApp.Taxes_.Membership. 

Agreement.TY2021.pdf, accessed January 5, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612589. 

Cash App Taxes, “5 Things You Should Know about Filing State Income Taxes,” March 22, 

2022, https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/5-things-you-should-know-about-filing-stateincome-taxes, accessed November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611515. 

Cash App Taxes, “About Our Accurate Calculations Guarantee,” 

https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/About-our-Accurate-Calculations-Guarantee, accessed 

November 3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610457. 

Cash App Taxes, “About Our Maximum Refund Guarantee,” January 5, 2022, 

https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/About-our-Maximum-Refund-Guarantee, accessed 

November 3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611524. 

Cash App Taxes, “Audit Defense When You File with Cash App Taxes,” February 2, 2022, 

https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/Audit-Defense-when-you-file-with-Cash-App-Taxes, 

accessed November 3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610554. 

Cash App Taxes, “Cash App Taxes - 100% Free Tax Filing for Federal & State,” 

https://cash.app/taxes, accessed July 29, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610569. 

Cash App Taxes, “Cash App Terms of Service,” November 14, 2022, 

https://cash.app/legal/us/en-us/tos, accessed November 21, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000610327. 

Cash App Taxes, “Credit Karma Tax is now Cash App Taxes,” November 17, 2021, 

https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/Cash-App-Taxes, accessed November 3, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613027. 

Cash App Taxes, “Forms and Situations Cash App Taxes Does Not Support,” February 18, 2022, 

https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/Forms-and-situations-Cash-App-Taxes-does-notsupport, accessed August 10, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610558. 

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000611084. 

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October 18, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613234. 

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B-4 
PUBLIC

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INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612789. 

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3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610228. 

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Credit Karma, “Credit Karma Tax Takes on the Industry, Expands Its Always-Free Premium Tax 

Product,” December 18, 2018, https://www.creditkarma.com/about/releases/creditkarma-tax-takes-on-the-industry-expands-its-always-free-premium-tax-product, accessed 

September 23, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611231. 

Cruz-Martinez, Gabriella, et al., “10 Best Tax Software of 2022,” Money, March 25, 2022, 

https://money.com/best-tax-prep-software/, accessed July 26, 2022, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000611416. 

DAC Group, “TaxSlayer - Digital Marketing Case Study,” 

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INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610450. 

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INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610657. 

Fowler, Geoffrey A., “When Tax Prep Is Free, You May Be Paying with Your Privacy,” Post, 

The Washington, March 7, 2019, 

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000610134. 

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B-5 
PUBLIC

FreeTaxUSA, “State Availability and E-file Support,” https://www.freetaxusa.com/states/, 

accessed October 13, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610241. 

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https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/54121D%20Tax%20Preparation%20Services%20in%20th 

e%20US%20Industry%20Report.pdf, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611633. 

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Improve Customer Service, MITRE, January 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610579. 

Pinola, Melanie, “The Best Online Tax Filing Software,” Wirecutter, April 18, 2022, 

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INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611941. 

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College Investor, June 29, 2022, https://thecollegeinvestor.com/21156/the-best-taxsoftware/, accessed December 14, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612421. 

Rounds, Hannah, “Cash App Taxes Review 2022 (Formerly Credit Karma Tax),” The College 

Investor, June 29, 2022, https://thecollegeinvestor.com/39045/cash-app-taxes-review/, 

accessed October 20, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610516. 

Rounds, Hannah, “H&R Block 2022 Online Tax Prep Review,” The College Investor, June 29, 

2022, https://thecollegeinvestor.com/20777/hr-block-online-review/, accessed September 

28, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612996. 

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INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610467. 

ScamRisk, “FreeTaxUSA Review,” https://www.scamrisk.com/freetaxusa/, accessed October 27, 

2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612535. 

Square, “Cash App Announces Definitive Agreement to Acquire Credit Karma Tax,” November 

25, 2020, https://squareup.com/us/en/press/credit-karma-tax, accessed October 20, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610122. 

Steward Ingram & Cooper PLLC, “TurboTax Vs. A CPA – Why You Should Consider Hiring an 

Accountant,” October 14, 2020, https://stewardingram.com/turbotax-vs-cpa/, accessed 

July 25, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612418. 

TaxAct, “Expert Tax Advice on All Returns for $0!,” 

https://www.taxact.com/?version=091522gl&ref=none, accessed October 20, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612465. 

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TaxAct, “Form 1041 - Amending,” https://www.taxact.com/support/24691/2021/form-1041-

amending?hideLayout=False, accessed January 5, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000610928. 

TaxAct, “Import Last Year’s Return,” https://www.taxact.com/support/425/2021/import-lastyears-return/, accessed September 28, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611669. 

TaxAct, “Most Popular Help Topics,” https://www.taxact.com/support, accessed November 3, 

2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000616979. 

TaxAct, “Preparing Your State Return,” https://www.taxact.com/support/521/2021/preparingyour-state-return?hideLayout=False, accessed November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000611631. 

TaxAct, “ProtectionPlus Audit Defense,” 

https://www.taxact.com/support/24912/2021/protectionplus-audit-defense, accessed 

November 3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610514. 

TaxAct, “State Part-Year/Non-Resident Form Availability,” 

https://www.taxact.com/support/436/2016/state-part-year-non-resident-form-availability, 

accessed October 28, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610938. 

TaxAct, “State Program Release Dates,” https://www.taxact.com/support/516/2021/stateprogram-release-dates?hideLayout=False, accessed October 13, 2022, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000610309. 

TaxAct, “TaxAct Deluxe,” https://www.taxact.com/individual-taxes/online/deluxe, accessed 

October 26, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612760. 

TaxAct, “TaxAct ExpressTM for iPhone®,” https://www.taxact.com/mobile-taxes, accessed 

November 3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611920. 

TaxAct, “TaxAct Free,” https://www.taxact.com/individual-taxes/online/free, accessed October 

26, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612850. 

TaxAct, “TaxAct Premier,” https://www.taxact.com/individual-taxes/online/premier, accessed 

October 26, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610219. 

TaxAct, “TaxAct Self-Employed,” https://www.taxact.com/individual-taxes/online/selfemployed, accessed October 26, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610721. 

TaxAct, “TaxAct® Guarantees,” https://www.taxact.com/company/guarantees, accessed 

November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611921. 

TaxAct, “We’re Here to Help,” https://www.taxact.com/support/request, accessed November 4, 

2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611510. 

TaxAct, “xpertAssist,” https://www.taxact.com/tax-xpert-assist, accessed October 28, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610488. 

TaxHawk, “Deluxe & Pro Support,” https://www.taxhawk.com/deluxe.jsp, accessed November 

4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610128. 

TaxHawk, “File Federal Taxes Free!,” https://www.taxhawk.com/, accessed October 11, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610031. 

TaxHawk, “File with Help from a Pro,” https://www.taxhawk.com/pro.jsp, accessed November 

4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613031. 

TaxHawk, “Free Import,” https://www.taxhawk.com/software.jsp, accessed September 28, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611881. 

TaxHawk, “Free Tax Software,” 

https://www.taxhawk.com/software.jsp?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIuqOE1bWTB-14 
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wIVvTizAB33kQHGEAAYASABEgIdofD_BwE, accessed November 3, 2022, INTUITFTC-PART3-000611679. 

TaxHawk, “Supported Federal Tax Forms,” https://www.taxhawk.com/federal-forms.jsp, 

accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612520. 

TaxHawk, “TaxHawk® Safe and Secure,” https://www.taxhawk.com/secure.jsp, accessed 

October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612859. 

TaxHawk, “Terms of Use for TaxHawk®,” https://www.taxhawk.com/terms-of-use.jsp, accessed 

November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610258. 

TaxHawk, “We’re Here to Help,” https://www.taxhawk.com/search_faq.jsp, accessed November 

4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611096. 

TaxSlayer, “4 Low-Cost Ways to File Your Taxes Online in 2022,” March 28, 2022, 

https://www.taxslayer.com/blog/cheapest-way-to-file-taxes-online/, accessed October 27, 

2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611399. 

TaxSlayer, “Audit Assistance,” https://www.taxslayer.com/supportcenter/auditassistance, 

accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611236. 

TaxSlayer, “Commonly-Used IRS Tax Forms and Schedules,” https://www.taxslayer.com/taxtools/federal-forms-for-taxes, accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000613250. 

TaxSlayer, “Compare Our Online Tax Software,” https://www.taxslayer.com/tax-tools/comparetax-software/, accessed October 11, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612470. 

TaxSlayer, “File on the Go with Our Free Tax App,” https://www.taxslayer.com/taxtools/mobile-apps/, accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611389. 

TaxSlayer, “How Do I Amend My Federal/State Tax Return?,” 

https://support.taxslayer.com/hc/en-us/articles/360015909411-How-do-I-amend-myfederal-state-tax-return-, accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611350. 

TaxSlayer, “How Do I File a Part Year New York Return?,” https://support.taxslayer.com/hc/enus/articles/4408870111245-How-do-I-file-a-Part-Year-New-York-return-, accessed 

November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610042. 

TaxSlayer, “How Do I File My Taxes for Free in 2022?,” December 6, 2021, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20211223002120/https:/www.taxslayer.com/blog/how-tofile-taxes-for-free/, accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611618. 

TaxSlayer, “How Do I File My Taxes for Free in 2023?,” September 26, 2022, 

https://www.taxslayer.com/blog/how-to-file-taxes-for-free/, accessed October 27, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613243. 

TaxSlayer, “How Do I Pull My Prior Year Information to the Current Year?,” 

https://support.taxslayer.com/hc/en-us/articles/360015899211-How-do-I-pull-my-prioryear-information-to-the-current-year-, accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000610576. 

TaxSlayer, “How Do I Report My Business Income or Loss on My Tax Return?,” 

https://support.taxslayer.com/hc/en-us/articles/360015713872-How-do-I-report-mybusiness-income-or-loss-on-my-tax-return-, accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000610024. 

TaxSlayer, “Is TaxSlayer Simply Free Really Free?,” 

https://www.taxslayer.com/products/taxslayer-free-tax-filing#simply-free-info, accessed 

October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610695. 

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TaxSlayer, “Our Guarantees,” https://www.taxslayer.com/policies/guarantees, accessed October 

27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610552. 

TaxSlayer, “Our Maximum Refund Guarantee,” 

https://www.taxslayer.com/links/maxrefundguarantee, accessed October 27, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610173. 

TaxSlayer, “Ready to get your biggest refund?,” https://www.taxslayer.com/homev3/, accessed 

January 10, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000616981. 

TaxSlayer, “Tax Identity Theft: How It Happens and Ways to Prevent It,” February 1, 2022, 

https://www.taxslayer.com/blog/how-to-prevent-or-report-tax-identity-theft/, accessed 

December 12, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611922. 

TaxSlayer, “TaxSlayer Premium,” https://www.taxslayer.com/products/taxslayer-premium/, 

accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612986. 

TaxSlayer, “TaxSlayer Pro Support Knowledgebase,” https://support.taxslayerpro.com/hc/enus/articles/360009168894-SecurelyID, accessed December 12, 2022, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000610949. 

TaxSlayer, “TaxSlayer Self-Employed,” https://www.taxslayer.com/products/taxslayer-selfemployment-taxes/, accessed November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610684. 

TaxSlayer, “TaxSlayer Unmasks All New Brand Strategy, Putting the Customer at the Center,” 

December 12, 2017, https://www.taxslayer.com/media-room/prdetails?articleID=122488, 

accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611512. 

TaxSlayer, “What is My State Residency Status?,” September 11, 2019, 

https://www.taxslayer.com/blog/what-is-my-state-residency-status/, accessed October 27, 

2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612754. 

TaxSlayer, “Where’s My Refund?,” https://www.taxslayer.com/tax-tools/refund-status/, accessed 

October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611901. 

TaxSlayer, “Who Claims a Child of Divorced or Separated Parents?,” 

https://support.taxslayer.com/hc/en-us/articles/360015701492-Who-claims-a-child-ofdivorced-or-separated-parents-, accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000610481. 

TaxSlayer, “Your Security Is Our Priority,” https://www.taxslayer.com/policies/security, 

accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611505. 

The MITRE Corporation, “Corporate Overview,” https://www.mitre.org/about/corporateoverview, accessed July 25, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610111. 

The MITRE Corporation, “Independent Assessment of the Free File Program, Appendix A: The 

Economics of IRS Free File,” September 13, 2019, 

https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/02-appendix-a-economics-of-irs-free-file.pdf, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610063. 

Van Bloom, Chelsea, and Ed Oswald, “Best Mobile Tax Apps of 2022,” U.S. News, February 2, 

2022, https://www.usnews.com/360-reviews/technology/tax-software/best-mobile-taxapps, accessed September 29, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613189. 

Washington, Kemberley, “Best Tax Software of September 2022,” Forbes, September 19, 2022, 

https://www.forbes.com/advisor/taxes/best-tax-software/, accessed September 29, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611623. 

Washington, Kemberley, “When Should I File in Multiple States?,” Forbes, April 14, 2021, 

https://www.forbes.com/advisor/taxes/when-should-i-file-taxes-in-multiple-states/, 

accessed January 10, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000616806. 

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APPENDIX C 

Digital DIY Tax Preparation Products Overview 

1. This appendix details characteristics of various tax preparation services that were offered 

during TY21. The focus is on Intuit’s TurboTax products and other direct-to-consumer 

digital DIY tax preparation services provided by the private sector corporations which, 

according to its recent 10-K filings, Intuit itself identified as key competitors.1,2 These are (i) 

H&R Block, (ii) Blucora’s TaxAct, (iii) TaxHawk’s FreeTaxUSA, (iv) TaxSlayer, and (v) 

Block’s Cash App Taxes.3 

I. OVERVIEW OF INTUIT AND COMPETITOR DIGITAL DIY PRODUCT 

OFFERINGS 

2. Figure C.1 below lists products offered by Intuit and its competitors for TY21.4 The figure 

shows whether a product offers “Free Federal Returns” and “Free State Returns” based on 

1 Intuit Inc., “Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended July 31, 2021,” September 8, 2021, 

https://s23.q4cdn.com/935127502/files/doc_financials/2021/ar/72fb2688-540b-4d4a-abe6-e3c5c3aa0683.pdf, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613040, p. 11 (“In the U.S. private sector we face intense competition from H&R 

Block, which provides tax preparation services in its stores and a competing software offering. We also face 

competition from several other large tax preparation service providers, from a myriad of small tax preparers, 

and from numerous online self-preparation offerings, including Blucora’s TaxAct, Free Tax USA, TaxSlayer, 

and Square. Some of these competitors are offering electronic tax preparation and filing services at no cost to 

individual taxpayers.”). See also Intuit Inc., “Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended July 31, 2020,” August 31, 

2020, https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000896878/476c5038-90d1-40f4-b916-ed16fb6c3311.pdf, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612614, p. 10 (“In the U.S. private sector we face intense competition from H&R 

Block, which provides tax preparation services in its stores and a competing software offering. We also face 

competition from several other large tax preparation service providers, from a myriad of small tax preparers, 

and from numerous online self-preparation offerings, including Free Tax USA, TaxSlayer, Blucora’s TaxAct 

and Credit Karma.”); Intuit Inc., “Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended July 31, 2022,” September 2, 2022, 

https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000896878/e04ed275-64f6-4662-a383-a1e01829677b.pdf, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611692, p. 10 (“Given the breadth of the products and services that we offer as a 

global technology company and the customer problems that we aim to serve, we compete with the offerings 

from a variety of companies across a range of industries, including large global companies, smaller 

geographically focused companies, startups and professional services. Our current global competitors include 

Blucora (TaxAct), Block, H&R Block, The Sage Group, Microsoft (Dynamics), Oracle (NetSuite) and Xero.”). 2 As discussed in Section IV.B.2, companies other than digital DIY tax preparation service providers compete for 

taxpayers’ business. Such companies include providers of offline and online assisted tax preparation services, 

for example. 3 Square, Inc. changed its name to Block on December 1, 2021. See Block, Inc., “Square, Inc. Changes Name to 

Block,” December 1, 2021, https://squareup.com/us/en/press/square-changes-name-to-block, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000610232. 4 Some tax preparation companies, including Intuit, also offer offline versions of their tax preparation software 

that can be downloaded or installed using a CD, referred to as “desktop” products. I focus on online products 

since I understand these to be the subject of the Complaint. See Complaint, ¶ 4 (“As used in this Complaint, 

‘TurboTax’ only refers to online products and services.”). 

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the federal and state prices listed on the company website.5 “Free” products are referred to as 

those that have both free federal return and one free state return and “Paid” products are 

referred to as those that require payment for either federal or state returns (or both). 

The price listed on the company website for each product is the standard price for TY21 as of November 7, 

2022. Subject to discounts, promotions, or special deals, customers may be able to use a given product at a 

different price. For instance, in TY21 TurboTax Live Basic was offered for free until March 31, 2022 for simple 

tax returns. Intuit, “File Your Simple Tax Return for $0 Any Way – Even When Handing it off to a TurboTax 

Live Tax Expert!,” July 27, 2022, https://blog.turbotax.intuit.com/turbotax-news/file-your-simple-tax-returnfor-0-any-way-even-when-handing-it-off-to-a-turbotax-live-tax-expert-50635/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000613227. 

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Figure C.1 

Free Products Among Intuit’s and Competitors’ Digital DIY Offerings in TY216,7 

Product Free Federal Returns Free State Returns 

Intuit 

TurboTax Free Edition ✓ ✓

TurboTax Deluxe 

TurboTax Premier 

TurboTax Self-Employed 

TurboTax Live Basic 

TurboTax Live Deluxe 

TurboTax Live Premier 

TurboTax Live Self-Employed 

H&R Block 

H&R Block Free Online ✓ ✓

H&R Block Deluxe 

H&R Block Premium 

H&R Block Self-Employed 

H&R Block Basic Online Assist 

H&R Block Deluxe Online Assist 

H&R Block Premium Online Assist 

H&R Block Self-Employed Online Assist 

Blucora 

TaxAct Free ✓

TaxAct Deluxe 

TaxAct Premier 

TaxAct Self-Employed 

TaxHawk 

Tax Hawk Free Edition ✓

Tax Hawk Deluxe Edition 

Tax Hawk Pro Support 

TaxSlayer 

TaxSlayer Simply Free ✓ ✓

TaxSlayer Classic 

TaxSlayer Premium 

TaxSlayer Self-Employed 

Block, Inc. 

Cash App Taxes (requires opening a Cash ✓ ✓ App account) Except Montana 

3. Before its acquisition by Block (at the time named Square) in November 2020, Cash App 

Taxes was known as Credit Karma Taxes.8 Until TY19, its underlying business model had 

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been to generate revenue by requiring users to provide access to their personal information 

for advertising purposes.9 

4. Currently, Cash App Taxes is offered within Cash App, a mobile application providing 

banking, money transfer, and financial investing services. Using Cash App Taxes requires 

downloading the Cash App application and accepting Cash App’s terms and conditions.10 As 

described in its 2021 10-K filing, Block considers the free services offered through Cash App 

Taxes as a “marketing initiative aimed at attracting new customers and encouraging the 

usage of Cash App.”11 In fact, Cash App generates revenues by charging businesses that 

6 TaxHawk, Inc. owns the TaxHawk, FreeTaxUSA, and 1040Express labels. Under these different brands, 

TaxHawk offers the same software. See Rounds, Hannah, “TaxHawk 2022 Review,” The College Investor, 

January 10, 2022, https://thecollegeinvestor.com/20857/taxhawk-review/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610467. 7 Intuit, “Getting Your Maximum Refund Starts Here, Choose Your Product,” 

https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/compare/online/, accessed October 11, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000612408; Intuit, “File Your Simple Tax Return for $0 Any Way – Even When Handing it off to a TurboTax 

Live Tax Expert!,” July 27, 2022, https://blog.turbotax.intuit.com/turbotax-news/file-your-simple-tax-returnfor-0-any-way-even-when-handing-it-off-to-a-turbotax-live-tax-expert-50635/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000613227; H&R Block, “File Online,” 

https://web.archive.org/web/20221109234846/https://www.hrblock.com/online-tax-filing/free-online-taxfiling/, accessed January 9, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610275; TaxAct, “Expert Tax Advice on All 

Returns for $0!,” https://www.taxact.com/?version=091522gl&ref=none, accessed October 20, 2022, INTUITFTC-PART3-000612465; TaxHawk, “File Federal Taxes Free!,” https://www.taxhawk.com/, accessed October 

11, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610031; TaxSlayer, “Compare Our Online Tax Software,” 

https://www.taxslayer.com/tax-tools/compare-tax-software/, accessed October 11, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000612470; Cash App Taxes, “Get Your Taxes Done in Minutes from Your Computer,” 

https://api.taxes.cash.app/auth, accessed October 11, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611084; Cash App Taxes, 

“Getting Started with Cash App Taxes,” October 18, 2021, https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/Getting-startedwith-Cash-App-Taxes, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613234 (“You will need to sign up for a Cash App account to 

use and file your taxes with Cash App Taxes. [...] Cash App is free. You can use Cash App to pay anyone 

instantly, order a customized Cash Card that matches your style, invest in stocks or bitcoin, and now file your 

tax returns through Cash App Taxes.”); Cash App Taxes, “5 Things You Should Know about Filing State 

Income Taxes,” March 22, 2022, https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/5-things-you-should-know-about-filingstate-income-taxes, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611515. 8 Square, “Cash App Announces Definitive Agreement to Acquire Credit Karma Tax,” November 25, 2020, 

https://squareup.com/us/en/press/credit-karma-tax, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610122. 9 Fowler, Geoffrey A., “When Tax Prep Is Free, You May Be Paying with Your Privacy,” Post, March 7, 2019, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/03/07/when-tax-prep-is-free-you-may-be-paying-with-yourprivacy/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610134. 10 Cash App Taxes, “Cash App Taxes - 100% Free Tax Filing for Federal & State,” https://cash.app/taxes, 

accessed July 29, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610569 (“You’ll need to download Cash App to log in and 

use Cash App Taxes. If you don’t already have it, download Cash App and create an account to get started.”). 11 Block, Inc., “Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021,” February 24, 2022, 

https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001512673/13386837-50ba-466f-b8ff-81824f066c1e.pdf, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611971, p. 62 (“We consider the free services such as stock investing, Cash App Tax 

[sic], and certain Cash Card and peer-to-peer services offered Cash App customers to be marketing initiatives 

aimed at attracting new customers and encouraging the usage of Cash App.”); Block, Inc., “Form 8-K,” 

February 24, 2022, https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001512673/0f73afbc-595a-418b-a74cc723c0c9a460.pdf, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610178, p. 6 (“Historically, Cash App gross profit growth has 

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accept Cash App payments.12 In addition, Cash App collects fees from individual users for 

specific services, including expedited transfers,13 payments made using a credit card instead 

of the in-app cash balance,14 ATM withdrawals,15 transactions involving virtual currencies 

(e.g., Bitcoin).16 

5. Among the companies reviewed, there are providers that, like Block, sell services other than 

tax preparation. For example, Intuit offers Mint (a personal financial management app) and 

QuickBooks (an accounting software package), among other products.17 In no instance other 

than Cash App Taxes, however, creating accounts for these other services is required for the 

customer to file a tax return. 

II. FREE DIGITAL DIY PRODUCT OFFERINGS 

6. Figure C.2.A and Figure C.2.B list the free product offerings of Intuit and its key digital 

benefited from the seasonal impact of tax refunds as customers bring more money into Cash App— both 

directly and indirectly—benefiting from greater spending power. Cash App Taxes is completely free for 

customers and easy enough to file in minutes from a phone or computer. Approximately 60% of Americans 

cannot comfortably afford a $1,000 emergency expense, while the average tax refund is $2,700, which means 

millions depend on their tax refund. By offering customers their tax refund up to two days early if they choose 

to receive it in Cash App, we are creating an opportunity to attract more inflows and increase engagement.”). 12 Cash App Taxes, “What is Cash for Business?,” https://cash.app/help/us/en-us/6502-what-is-cash-for-business, 

accessed November 21, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612498, at § 1 (“With your business account, you’ll 

have a 2.75% processing fee automatically deducted on each payment you receive.”). 13 Cash App Taxes, “Cash App Terms of Service,” November 14, 2022, https://cash.app/legal/us/en-us/tos, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610327, at § 1 (“Fee for expedited transfer from your Cash App account to a linked 

account. Funds are typically available within minutes. The applicable fee amount is disclosed at the time of the 

transaction. 0.5%-1.75% ($0.25 min).”). 14 Cash App Taxes, “Cash App Terms of Service,” November 14, 2022, https://cash.app/legal/us/en-us/tos, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610327, at § 1 (“Send from Credit Card: 3%.”). 15 Cash App Taxes, “Cash App Terms of Service,” November 14, 2022, https://cash.app/legal/us/en-us/tos, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610327, at § 1 (“Our ATM withdrawal fee is $2.50.”). 16 Cash App Taxes, “Cash App Terms of Service,” November 14, 2022, https://cash.app/legal/us/en-us/tos, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610327, at § 7 (“We may charge fees for Virtual Currency transactions within Cash 

App, including any purchase, sale, transfer, or transaction on any Supported Network. For any transaction you 

initiate, you agree to pay the fees shown to you at or prior to you confirming the transaction. We may change 

the fees at any time, with or without notice to you.”) See also § 8 (“You may buy or sell Virtual Currency 

through the Virtual Currency Services. Any such buy or sell transaction is subject to the Block “Conversion 

Rate” for the given transaction. ‘Conversion Rate’ means the price of Virtual Currency in terms of Fiat 

Currency as displayed in the Cash App once you have selected ‘Buy’ or ‘Sell’ and such Conversion Rate is the 

price in terms of Fiat Currency at which you may buy Virtual Currency from or sell Virtual Currency to Block. 

You acknowledge that Block may add a margin or ‘spread’ between the quoted mid market price displayed on 

the Virtual Currency dashboard and the quoted buy or sell price and, as such, that the quoted buy price 

Conversion Rate may not be the same as the sell price Conversion Rate at any given time.”). 17 Intuit, “Intuit Mint,” https://mint.intuit.com/, accessed November 22, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613238; 

Intuit, “Intuit QuickBooks,” https://quickbooks.intuit.com/, accessed November 22, 2022, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000610673. 

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DIY competitors. As discussed above, only products that offer free federal return and one 

free state return are considered as free product offerings. Despite their name, TaxAct Free 

and TaxHawk Free Edition are excluded from this section because they offer free federal 

returns but do not offer state returns for free. 

7. These products are compared along several dimensions. Figure C.2.A and Figure C.2.B 

show whether each product supports the handling of different common tax situations and 

includes different features, respectively. The tax situations and features summarized here are 

not comprehensive but include information publicly available across product webpages and 

product comparison websites.18 

8. Each characteristic (i.e., tax situation or feature) reported in the figure can be available for 

free within the free product (indicated as a “Yes” in the figure), available within the free 

product subject to payment (“Add-On”), available only as an upgrade to a paid product 

(“Upgrade”), or not available at all (“No”). 

18 See, e.g., Rounds, Hannah, “The Best Tax Software 2022: What’s the Best Tax Program For Me?,” The College 

Investor, June 29, 2022, https://thecollegeinvestor.com/21156/the-best-tax-software/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000612421; Benson, Alana et al., “Best Tax Software for 2022,” NerdWallet, March 28, 2022, 

https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/taxes/best-tax-software, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610501; Yakal, Kathy, 

“The Best Tax Software for 2022,” PCMag, August 24, 2022, https://www.pcmag.com/picks/the-best-taxsoftware, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610735; Pinola, Melanie, “The Best Online Tax Filing Software,” 

Wirecutter, April 18, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/reviews/best-tax-software/, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000611941; Van Bloom, Chelsea and Ed Oswald, “Best Mobile Tax Apps of 2022,” U.S. News, 

February 2, 2022, https://www.usnews.com/360-reviews/technology/tax-software/best-mobile-tax-apps, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613189; Washington, Kemberley, “Best Tax Software of September 2022,” Forbes, 

September 19, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/taxes/best-tax-software/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000611623; Johnston, Courtney and Joe Van Brussel, “Best Tax Software for 2022: Late or Not, TurboTax, 

H&R Block and More Can Help You File,” CNET, May 4, 2022, https://www.cnet.com/personalfinance/taxes/best-tax-software/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610534. 

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Figure C.2.A 

Comparison of Tax Situation Coverage Across Free Digital DIY Tax Product Offerings 

in TY21 

Intuit, Inc. H&R Block TaxSlayer Block, Inc. 

TurboTax H&R Block TaxSlayer CashApp 

Free Edition Free Online Simply Free Taxes Source(s) 

Income 

W-2 Income Yes Yes Limited to Yes C-1, C-4, C-9, C-20 

taxable income 

< $100,000 

Non Employee Compensation (1099-NEC) Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-10, C-11, C20 

Profit or Loss from Business - Income Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-10, C-20 

(Schedule C) 

Profit or Loss from Business - Expense Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-10, C-20 

(Schedule C) 

Rental Income & Deductions (Schedule E) Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-12, C-20 

Retirement Income (1099-R) Yes Yes Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-13, C-20 

Foreign Earned Income (Form 2555) Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade No C-1, C-4, C-5, C-13, C-14, C21 

Limited Interest Income (1099-INT)A Yes Yes Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-13, C-20 

Unlimited Interest Income (1099-INT) Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-15, C-20 

Limited Dividend Income (1099-DIV)B Yes Yes Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-13, C-20 

Unlimited Dividend Income (1099-DIV) Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-15, C-20 

Capital Gains and Losses (Schedule D) LimitedC Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-12, C-20 

Cryptocurrency Sales (1099-MISC) Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-12, C-20 

Partnership and S Corporation Income Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-13, C-14, C-

(Schedule K-1 Forms 1065 & 1120S) 20 

Estate and Trust Income (Schedule K-1 Form Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade No C-1, C-4, C-5, C-13, C-14, C1041) 21 

Unemployment Income (1099-G) Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-1, C-4, C-9, C-20 

Deductions, Tax Credits, and Other Situations 

Itemized Deductions (Schedule A) Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-4, C-5, C-12, C-21 

Earned Income Credit (Schedule EIC) Yes Yes Upgrade Yes C-1, C-7, C-12, C-20 

Non Dependent EIC (Release of Claim to Yes Yes Upgrade No C-1, C-4, C-16, C-21 

Exemption for Child by Custodial Parent -

Form 8332) 

Child Tax Credit (Schedule 8812) Yes Yes Upgrade Yes C-1, C-7, C-17, C-20 

Foreign Tax Credit (Form 1116) Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade No C-1, C-5, C-7, C-13, C-14, C21 

Mortgage Interest Statement (1098) Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-7, C-13, C-14, C-20 

Student Loan Interest and Education Expenses Yes Yes Yes Yes C-2, C-4, C-12, C-20 

(1098-E) 

Health Savings Account (1099-SA) Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1, C-7, C-13, C-14, C-20 

Underpayment Penalty Calculations and Yes Yes Upgrade No C-1, C-4, C-15, C-21 

Payments (Form 2210) 

State Filing 

Multiple State Returns Filing Add-On Yes Add-On No C-2, C-7, C-13, C-18, C-21 

Part-Year/Non-Resident State Return FilingD Add-On Yes Add-On No C-3, C-8, C-13, C-18, C-19, 

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Notes: 

[A] Interest income lower than $1,500 for TurboTax and H&R Block. 

[B] Dividend income lower than $1,500 for TurboTax and H&R Block. 

[C] Limited use of schedule to report personal item sales income reported on 1099-K. 

[D] Taxpayers living in states without income taxes may be able to file one non-resident state return using a free product. 

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

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9. As shown by Figure C.2.A, none of these products cover all tax situations. 

10. Each tax situation included in the figure is identified with either forms that taxpayers receive 

(e.g., W-2, 1099-INT) or forms that taxpayers file (e.g., Schedule A, Form 2210). In general, 

since taxpayers might not know in advance which tax forms they will file, digital DIY 

products are designed precisely to complete the task through an interview-like process. 

Whether a product covers a given tax situation depends on whether the product’s questionand-answer session enables taxpayers to file their taxes with the specific form/schedule listed 

in the figure. 

11. TurboTax Free Edition and H&R Block Free Online are comparable in terms of supported 

tax forms and schedules. TaxSlayer Simply Free presents more limitations. For example, to 

file with TaxSlayer Simply Free, filers are required to have taxable income less than 

$100,000 and only claim standard deductions.19 Earned income tax credit, child tax credit, 

and retirement income, which are supported by TurboTax Free Edition and H&R Block Free 

Online, are not covered by TaxSlayer Simply Free. 

12. Compared to the other competitors’ products, Cash App Taxes has a wider set of tax 

situations covered. Still, although its website claims that users “[p]ay $0 to file, no matter 

[their] tax situation,”20 Cash App Taxes does not support situations such as filing multiple 

state returns, filing non-resident state returns, or reporting foreign earned income, among 

other situations.21 

19 TaxSlayer, “How Do I File My Taxes for Free in 2022?,” December 6, 2021, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20211223002120/https:/www.taxslayer.com/blog/how-to-file-taxes-for-free/, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611618. 20 Cash App Taxes, “Cash App Taxes - 100% Free Tax Filing for Federal & State,” https://cash.app/taxes, 

accessed July 29, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610569. 21 For example, Cash App Taxes also does not cover married individuals filing separately in community property 

states (“If you live in a community property state [Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, or 

Wisconsin] and you’re filing as married filing separately, we won’t be able to help prepare your state tax 

return.”). See Cash App Taxes, “Forms and Situations Cash App Taxes Does Not Support,” February 18, 2022, 

https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/Forms-and-situations-Cash-App-Taxes-does-not-support, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000610558. 

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Figure C.2.B 

Comparison of Features Across Free Digital DIY Tax Product Offerings in TY21 

PUBLIC

Intuit, Inc. 

TurboTax 

Free Edition 

H&R Block 

H&R Block 

Free Online 

TaxSlayer 

TaxSlayer 

Simply Free 

Block, Inc. 

CashApp Taxes Source(s) 

Available as App on Google Yes Yes Yes Yes C-2, C-27, CPlay/Apple App Store 35, C-36, C-48 

W-2/1099 Upload/Auto Import Yes Yes Upgrade No C-3, C-7, C-17, 

C-49 

W-2 Import through Taking a Yes Yes Upgrade No C-2, C-7, C-17, 

Picture C-37, C-49 

Prior Year Return Import YesA From a PDF Yes From Credit Karma, C-10, C-22, CFrom Any TurboTax, H&R 28, C-50 

Source Block, and Tax Act 

Live Phone or Chat Tech Yes Upgrade Yes Yes C-3, C-7, C-17, 

Support C-49, C-51 

Access to Searchable Yes Yes Yes Yes C-3, C-17, CKnowledge Base 100, C-102 

Tax Expert/Pro Assist and Final Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade No C-7, C-23, CReview 39, C-52 

Audit Defense/Audit Support Add-On Yes Upgrade Yes C-7, C-24, C40, C-53 

Data Security Promise Yes Yes Yes Yes C-1, C-29, C41, C-54 

Identity Theft Restoration Add-On Add-On No Yes C-24, C-30, C42, C-43, C-53, 

C-55 

Identity Theft Insurance Add-On No No No C-24, C-31, C42, C-43, C-53, 

C-55 

Updated “Real-Time” Refund Yes Yes Yes Yes C-2, C-7, C-44, 

Display C-51 

Maximum Refund Guarantee Yes; Customers Yes; free Upgrade Yes; difference in C-7, C-45, Care entitled to online amend the refund or tax 46, C-56, C-59 

payment of $30 amount owed up to 

$100 (minimum $25) 

in the form of a gift 

card 

Accuracy Guarantee Yes; federal or Yes; maximum Yes; federal or 

state penalties and of $10,000 state penalties 

interest charges and interest 

charges 

Yes; up to a 

maximum of $1,000 

in the form of gift 

card 

C-1, C-32, C45, C-57 

Refund AdvanceB Yes Limited No No C-13, C-25, C33, C-49 

Online Amend Add-On Upgrade Add-On No C-26, C-34, C47, C-58 

Notes: 

[A] Prior Year Return Import accepts PDFs from tax providers, such as H&R Block, Credit Karma, TaxAct, ezTaxReturn, 

TaxSlayer, or Liberty Tax/Tax Brain, and more. 

[B] The Refund Advance loan was available at participating H&R Block offices Jan. 4 – Feb. 28, 2022. 

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

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13. Similar to the overview of tax situations, Figure C.2.B describes the features available in 

each of these products. 

14. As seen in the figure, TurboTax Free Edition and H&R Block Free Online present 

similarities in a set of basic attributes, including features such as Form W-2, Form 1099 auto 

import, and previous year tax return import. For those attributes that are not included by 

default in either product, some can be purchased within the free version, including features 

such as filing in multiple states, while others are available by upgrading to paid products, as 

in the case of many complex tax situations. In contrast, TaxSlayer Simply Free has a more 

limited set of attributes among the ones presented, as important features such as Form W-2 

and Form 1099 auto-import and prior return import are only available as upgrades to paid 

products. 

15. Cash App Taxes has many important differences. Unlike the other competitors’ products, 

Cash App Taxes does not provide customers the option of receiving additional features or 

services by paying for them separately or by upgrading to a paid product. For example, Cash 

App Taxes does not offer on-call support by tax professionals or the option to upload 

documents (other than last year’s 22 return). Moreover, product reviewers note that taxpayers 

find the lack of access to tax expert support a critical limitation.23 In addition, some 

22 Cash App Taxes only allow last year’s tax return import from the following services: Credit Karma, TurboTax, 

H&R Block, and TaxAct. See Cash App Taxes, “How to Import Last Year’s Tax Return into Cash App Taxes,” 

October 18, 2021, https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/How-to-import-last-year-s-tax-return-into-Cash-AppTaxes/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610021. 23 Butler, Peter, “Cash App Taxes Review 2022: Online Tax Software with No Fees Ever,” CNET, April 16, 2022, 

https://www.cnet.com/personal-finance/taxes/cash-app-taxes-review-2022-online-tax-software-with-no-feesever/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610462 (“Those wanting tax support should look elsewhere. Cash App Taxes 

has an adequate help section and live chat for simple technical and tax questions, but no support by tax 

professionals.”). See also Yakal, Kathy, “Cash App Taxes 2022 (Tax Year 2021) Review,” PCMag, March 3, 

2022, https://www.pcmag.com/reviews/cash-app-taxes, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610138 (“Anyone who has 

ever prepared his or her own taxes knows that questions always arise and that getting quality help is absolutely 

critical. Cash App Taxes hasn’t had many years to build up the support resources that its competitors have, so 

the guidance it offers is still sparse in comparison. It does a fairly good job of letting you know what it’s 

looking for on every screen, but it doesn’t hyperlink complex terms the way TurboTax does, for example. The 

site often doesn’t even fully explain the current question or concept.”). 

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reviewers noted a further limitation, namely that Cash App Taxes is more difficult to set up 

because it requires the Cash App mobile application to get started.24 

16. There are several other examples of features that vary significantly across free digital DIY 

tax preparation products in TY21: 

• Filing an online amended return is available as add-on for TurboTax Free Edition and 

TaxSlayer Simply Free. H&R Block requires its Free Online customers to upgrade to 

a paid product (H&R Block Deluxe). Cash App Taxes does not offer the option to file 

an online amended return. 

• Refund advances are not available for Cash App Taxes and TaxSlayer Simply Free 

customers. H&R Block’s Refund Advances are available only at its participating 

stores.25 In contrast, Intuit offers a Refund Advance program to its customers, 

including the ones who used TurboTax Free Edition to file their taxes.26 

• With the exception of TaxSlayer Simply Free,27 all free DIY tax preparation offerings 

include a “maximum refund guarantee.” Such a guarantee applies whenever a 

customer could obtain a larger refund or smaller tax due using another tax preparation 

method. The terms of the guarantee differ significantly across providers. TurboTax 

Free Edition customers are entitled to a fixed payment of $30, even if they filed for 

24 Rounds, Hannah, “Cash App Taxes Review 2022 (Formerly Credit Karma Tax),” The College Investor, June 

29, 2022, https://thecollegeinvestor.com/39045/cash-app-taxes-review/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610516. 

Customers are required to “go to cash.app/taxes” on their computer and click log in, scan a QR code, and are 

then required to type their PII information such as name, date of birth, and the last 4-digit SSN before being 

directed to the filing screen on the computer. See Cash App Taxes, “Cash App Taxes - 100% Free Tax Filing 

for Federal & State,” https://cash.app/taxes, accessed July 29, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610569. 25 H&R Block, “Refund Advance,” https://www.hrblock.com/offers/refund-advance/, accessed October 27, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612387 (“The Refund Advance loan was available at participating H&R Block 

offices Jan. 4 – Feb. 28, 2022.”). 26 Intuit, “Offer Details and Disclosures for the Refund Advance Program,” April 15, 2022, 

https://ttlc.intuit.com/turbotax-support/en-us/help-article/tax-refund/offer-details-disclosures-refund-advanceprogram/L4ljXp6TI_US_en_US?uid=l5jqhavn, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610215 (“If you’re receiving a 

federal refund of $500 or more, you could be eligible for a Refund Advance, a loan provided by First Century 

Bank, N.A., Member FDIC not affiliated with MVB Bank, Inc. Member FDIC Refund Advance is a loan based 

upon your anticipated refund (minus any stimulus payment credit, also known as a Recovery Rebate Credit) and 

isn’t the refund itself. The Refund Advance loan has a 0% APR and zero loan fees. [...] This Refund Advance 

offer expires February 15, 2022, or until available funds have been exhausted, whichever comes first. Offer and 

availability subject to change without further notice.”). 27 TaxSlayer, “Our Guarantees,” https://www.taxslayer.com/policies/guarantees, accessed October 27, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610552 (“Guaranteed maximum refund. [...] TaxSlayer Simply Free is excluded 

from this guarantee.”). 

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free.28 H&R Block Free Online customers may be able to “amend [the return] at no 

additional charge.”29 Cash App Taxes customers “may be eligible to receive the 

difference in the refund or tax amount owed up to $100 (minimum $25) in the form of 

a gift card.”30 

• Similarly, providers offer a variety of Accuracy Guarantees that protect their 

customers from issues due to calculation errors. In fact, if calculation errors arise, 

Intuit and TaxSlayer offer to refund their customers any resulting penalty or interest 

charge paid to the IRS or the state. H&R Block offers reimbursements up to a 

maximum $10,000.31 Cash App Taxes customers can receive a refund “up to a 

maximum of $1,000 in the form of a gift card(s).”32 

III. PAID DIGITAL DIY PRODUCT OFFERINGS 

17. Other than Cash App Taxes, Intuit and its key digital competitors all offer paid products. 

Figures C.3.A.i–C.3.E.ii list these paid product offerings. For each provider, information on 

price, tax situations that are covered, and features offered are included in the figures. These 

figures demonstrate that product offerings vary along many different dimensions, and that 

these providers do not compete exclusively on price. As shown in these figures, consumers 

can choose among a wide spectrum of services which differ in terms of tax situations covered 

and features included.33 

18. Digital DIY tax preparation providers use similar categories to label the products within their 

paid portfolios. For example, “Deluxe,” “Premium” or “Premier,” and “Self-Employed” are 

the most common labels for products with progressively increasing tiers of features as tax 

28 Intuit, “Intuit Terms of Service for TurboTax Online Tax Preparation Services,” July 2022, 

https://turbotax.intuit.com/corp/license/online, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610673. 29 H&R Block, “File Online,” https://web.archive.org/web/20221109234846/https://www.hrblock.com/online-taxfiling/free-online-tax-filing/, accessed January 9, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610275. 30 Cash App Taxes, “About Our Maximum Refund Guarantee,” January 5, 2022, 

https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/About-our-Maximum-Refund-Guarantee, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611524. 31 H&R Block, “H&R Block Accuracy of Tax Return Calculations,” https://www.hrblock.com/online-taxfiling/guarantees/accuracy-of-calculations/, accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611906. 32 Cash App Taxes, “About Our Accurate Calculations Guarantee,” https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/About-ourAccurate-Calculations-Guarantee, accessed November 3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610457. 33 See Sections IV.B.2 and IV.B.3. 

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situations become more complex.34 Irrespective of the common labels, providers diversify 

their product offerings along different dimensions. 

19. TaxHawk and TaxSlayer, for example, offer the same tax situation coverage across all their 

products.35 Higher tier products differ from lower tier in terms of the level of tax expert 

assistance provided. On the contrary, all offerings in Blucora’s TaxAct product line include 

the same features (e.g., tax expert assistance). Higher tier products cover more tax situations 

than lower tier products. Intuit and H&R Block differentiate their products along both 

dimensions: higher tier services cover more tax situations and include more features. 

20. As another example, Blucora (“TaxAct Free”) and TaxHawk (“TaxHawk Free Edition”) 

combine the offering of free federal return filing with paid state return filing. Note that 

federal and state return filings are offered separately. Therefore, customers can use a 

software allowing free federal return filing and choose other ways to file their state returns (if 

needed).36 

34 TaxSlayer uses the label “Classic” instead of “Deluxe” to represent the first tier of its paid product. TaxHawk 

only has one paid-tier product labeled “Deluxe.” See Intuit, “Getting Your Maximum Refund Starts Here, 

Choose Your Product,” https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/compare/online/, accessed October 11, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612408; Intuit, “File Your Simple Tax Return for $0 Any Way – Even When 

Handing it off to a TurboTax Live Tax Expert!,” July 27, 2022, https://blog.turbotax.intuit.com/turbotaxnews/file-your-simple-tax-return-for-0-any-way-even-when-handing-it-off-to-a-turbotax-live-tax-expert50635/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613227; H&R Block, “File the Way You Want with Our Tax Software,” 

https://www.hrblock.com/tax-software/, accessed October 11, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612791; TaxAct, 

“Import Last Year’s Return,” https://www.taxact.com/support/425/2021/import-last-years-return/, accessed 

September 28, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611669; TaxHawk, “File Federal Taxes Free!,” 

https://www.taxhawk.com/, accessed October 11, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610031; TaxSlayer, 

“Compare Our Online Tax Software,” https://www.taxslayer.com/tax-tools/compare-tax-software/, accessed 

October 11, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612470; Cash App Taxes, “Get Your Taxes Done in Minutes from 

Your Computer,” https://api.taxes.cash.app/auth, accessed October 11, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611084; 

Cash App Taxes, “Getting Started with Cash App Taxes,” October 18, 2021, 

https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/Getting-started-with-Cash-App-Taxes, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000613234; 

Cash App Taxes, “5 Things You Should Know about Filing State Income Taxes,” March 22, 2022, 

https://taxeshelp.cash.app/s/article/5-things-you-should-know-about-filing-state-income-taxes, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000611515. 35 The only exception is TaxSlayer Self-Employed that support more business tax situations (Profit or Loss from 

Business- Expense, Schedule C) than TaxSlayer Classic or TaxSlayer Premium. See TaxHawk, “File Federal 

Taxes Free!,” https://www.taxhawk.com/, accessed October 11, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610031; 

TaxSlayer, “Compare Our Online Tax Software,” https://www.taxslayer.com/tax-tools/compare-tax-software/, 

accessed October 11, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612470. 36 See, e.g., FreeTaxUSA, “State Availability and E-file Support,” https://www.freetaxusa.com/states/, accessed 

October 13, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610241. E-file is also available for states that do not require an 

individual state income tax return. TaxAct, “State Program Release Dates,” 

https://www.taxact.com/support/516/2021/state-program-release-dates?hideLayout=False, accessed October 13, 

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21. As another example, tax expert assistance varies across paid product offerings. In TY21, 

Intuit and H&R Block offered full lines of products, “Live” and “Online Assist,” that added 

tax expert assistance to the specifications of the DIY offerings (e.g., TurboTax Deluxe and 

TurboTax Live Deluxe, H&R Block Deluxe and H&R Block Deluxe Online Assist). 

22. Just as the products themselves vary, the variety of features that providers include in their 

product offerings testify to a high level of differentiation. For example: 

• H&R Block includes Audit Support in all its products. TaxHawk and TaxSlayer offer 

it only within their higher tier offerings. Intuit and Blucora sell it separately as an 

add-on. 

• Intuit and TaxSlayer are the only companies among the ones reviewed offering their 

customers the option to purchase Identity Theft Insurance. 

• Although all products include both a maximum refund and an accuracy guarantee, the 

terms of such programs differ across providers. Intuit, TaxAct, and TaxSlayer commit 

to refund all federal or state penalties and interest charges. Blucora offers refunds up 

to a maximum of $100,000. H&R Block sets its maximum refund at $10,000. 

23. These and other differences across products can be seen in the figures below. Each 

characteristic (i.e., tax situation or feature) reported in the figure can be available for free 

within the product (indicated as a “Yes” in the figure), available within the product subject to 

payment (“Add-On”), available only as an upgrade to another paid product (“Upgrade”), or 

not available at all (“No”). 

2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610309; FreeTaxUSA, “Can I File Just a State Return?,” 

https://www.freetaxusa.com/help/display_faq.jsp?filing-state-return-only&faq_id=1725, accessed November 

22, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611889. 

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Figure C.3.A.i 

Intuit Paid Tax Product Offering Tax Situations in TY21 

TurboTax TurboTax TurboTax TurboTax 

TurboTax TurboTax Self- TurboTax Live Live Live SelfDeluxe Premier Employed Live Basic Deluxe Premier Employed Source(s) 

Income 

W-2 Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Non Employee Compensation (1099-

NEC) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Profit or Loss from Business -

Income (Schedule C) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Profit or Loss from Business -

Expense (Schedule C) Upgrade Upgrade Yes Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-1 

Rental Income & Deductions 

(Schedule E) Upgrade Yes Yes Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes C-1 

Retirement Income (1099-R) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Foreign Earned Income (Form 

2555) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Interest Income (1099-INT) Yes Yes Yes LimitedA Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Dividend Income (1099-DIV) Yes Yes Yes LimitedB Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Capital Gains and Losses (Schedule 

D) LimitedC Yes Yes LimitedC LimitedC Yes Yes C-1 

Cryptocurrency Sales (1099-MISC) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Partnership and S Corporation 

Income (Schedule K-1 Forms 1065 Upgrade Yes Yes Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes C-1 

& 1120S) 

Estate and Trust Income (Schedule 

K-1 Form 1041) Upgrade Yes Yes Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes C-1 

Unemployment Income (1099-G) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Deductions, Tax Credits, and Other 

Situations 

Itemized Deductions (Schedule A) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Earned Income Credit (Schedule 

EIC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Non Dependent EIC (Release of 

Claim to Exemption for Child by Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Custodial Parent - Form 8332) 

Child Tax Credit (Schedule 8812) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Foreign Tax Credit (Form 1116) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Mortgage Interest Statement (1098) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Student Loan Interest and Education 

Expenses (1098-E) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Health Savings Account (1099-SA) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Underpayment Penalty Calculations 

and Payments (Form 2210) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-1 

State Filing 

Multiple State Returns Filing Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On C-23, C-59 

Part-Year/Non-Resident State 

Return Filing Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On C-3 

Notes: 

[A] Interest income lower than $1,500. 

[B] Dividend income lower than $1,500. 

[C] Limited use of schedule to report personal item sales income reported on 1099-K. 

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

C-15 
Figure C.3.A.ii 

Intuit Paid Tax Product Offering Features in TY21 

PUBLIC

TurboTax TurboTax 

TurboTax TurboTax Self- TurboTax TurboTax TurboTax Live SelfDeluxe Premier Employed Live Basic Live Deluxe Live Premier Employed Source(s) 

Features 

Available as App on 

Google Play/Apple Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-59 

App Store 

W2/1099 

Upload/Auto Import Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-59 

W-2 Import through 

Taking a Picture Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-59 

Prior Year Return 

Import YesA YesA YesA YesA YesA YesA YesA C-22 

Live Phone or Chat 

Tech Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-59 

Access to Searchable 

Knowledge Base Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-59 

Tax Expert/Pro Assist 

and Final Review Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes Yes Yes C-23, C-59 

Audit Defense/Audit 

SupportB Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On 

C-61, C-73, 

C-74, C-75, 

C-76, C-77 

Data Security Promise Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-59 

Identity Theft 

Restoration Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On C-73 

Identity Theft 

Insurance Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On C-73 

Updated “Real-Time” 

Refund Display Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-1 

Maximum Refund 

Guarantee YesC YesC YesC YesC YesC YesC YesC C-59 

Accuracy Guarantee YesD YesD YesD YesD YesD YesD YesD C-59 

Refund Advance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-25 

Online Amend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-59 

PricesE 

Federal Return $59 $89 $119 $79 $119 $169 $199 C-98, C-99 

State Return (per 

state) $49 $49 $49 $44 $54 $54 $54 C-98, C-99 

Notes: 

[A] Prior Year Return Import accepts PDFs from tax providers, such as H&R Block, Credit Karma, TaxAct, ezTaxReturn, TaxSlayer, or 

Liberty Tax/Tax Brain, and more. 

[B] Audit Defense available as Add-On for all products; Audit Support available for all products. 

[C] Customers will receive a refund of the purchase price paid for federal and/or state TurboTax services if larger refund amount is received 

or if customer pays a smaller tax due amount using other tax providers. 

[D] TurboTax will cover the IRS or state penalty and interest if incurred because of a TurboTax miscalculation. 

[E] Prices reflect those listed on November 7, 2022. 

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

C-16 
H&R Block H&R Block H&R Block H&R Block 

H&R H&R H&R Basic Deluxe Premium SelfBlock Block Block Self- Online Online Online Employed 

Deluxe Premium Employed Assist Assist Assist Online Assist Source(s) 

Income 

W-2 Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-80 

Non Employee Compensation (1099-

NEC) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-5, C-60, C-80, C-101 

Profit or Loss from Business - Income 

(Schedule C) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-5, C-60, C-80, C-101 

Profit or Loss from Business -

Expense (Schedule C) Upgrade Upgrade Yes Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-4, C-5, C-60, C-80, C-101 

Rental Income & Deductions 

(Schedule E) Upgrade Yes Yes Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes C-4, C-5, C-7, C80, C-101 

Retirement Income (1099-R) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-80 

Foreign Earned Income (Form 2555) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-5, C-7, C80, C-101 

Interest Income (1099-INT) Yes Yes Yes LimitedA Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-5, C-7, C80, C-101 

Dividend Income (1099-DIV) Yes Yes Yes LimitedB Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-5, C-7, C80, C-101 

Capital Gains and Losses (Schedule 

D) Upgrade Yes Yes Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes C-4, C-5, C-7, C80, C-101 

Cryptocurrency Sales (1099-MISC) Upgrade Yes Yes Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes C-4, C-5, C-7, C80, C-101 

Partnership and S Corporation 

Income (Schedule K-1 Forms 1065 & 

1120S) 

Upgrade Yes Yes Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes C-4, C-5, C-60, 

C-80, C-101 

Estate and Trust Income (Schedule K1 Form 1041) Upgrade Yes Yes Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes C-4, C-5, C-7, C80, C-101 

Unemployment Income (1099-G) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-80 

Deductions, Tax Credits, and Other 

Situations 

Itemized Deductions (Schedule A) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-5, C-7, C80, C-101 

Earned Income Credit (Schedule EIC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-7 

Non Dependent EIC (Release of 

Claim to Exemption for Child by Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-80 

Custodial Parent - Form 8332) 

Child Tax Credit (Schedule 8812) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-7 

Foreign Tax Credit (Form 1116) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-7, C-60 

Mortgage Interest Statement (1098) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-7 

Student Loan Interest and Education 

Expenses (1098-E) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-80 

Health Savings Account (1099-SA) Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-7 

Underpayment Penalty Calculations 

and Payments (Form 2210) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-4, C-80 

State Filing 

Multiple State Returns Filing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-7 

Part-Year/Non-Resident State Return 

Filing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-8 

2. H&R Block 

Figure C.3.B.i 

H&R Block Paid Tax Product Offering Tax Situations in TY21 

PUBLIC

Notes: 

[A] Interest income lower than $1,500. 

[B] Dividend income lower than $1,500. 

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

C-17 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-7 Refund Display 

Maximum Refund Yes; refund Yes; refund Yes; refund Yes; refund Yes; refund Yes; refund Yes; refund Guarantee product product product product product product price product price price and price and price and price and price and C-7 and free and free online free online free online free online free online free online online amend amend amend amend amend amend amend 

Accuracy Guarantee Yes; Yes; Yes; Yes; Yes; Yes; 

Figure C.3.B.ii 

H&R Block Paid Tax Product Offering Features in TY21 

PUBLIC

H&R Block H&R Block H&R Block H&R Block 

H&R Block Basic Deluxe Premium SelfH&R Block H&R Block Self- Online Online Online Employed 

Deluxe Premium Employed Assist Assist Assist Online Assist Source(s) 

Features 

Available as App on 

Google Play/Apple Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-27 

App Store 

W2/1099 Upload/Auto 

Import Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-7 

W-2 Import through 

Taking a Picture Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-7 

Prior Year Return From a PDF From a PDF From a PDF From a PDF From a PDF From a PDF From a PDF 

Import From Any From Any From Any From Any From Any From Any From Any C-28 

Source Source Source Source Source Source Source 

Live Phone or Chat 

Tech Support Yes Yes Yes Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-78 

Access to Searchable 

Knowledge Base Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-102 

Tax Expert/Pro Assist 

and Final Review Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes Yes Yes C-7, C-79 

Audit Defense/Audit 

Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-7, C-78 

Data Security Promise Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-29 

Identity Theft 

Restoration Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On C-30 

Identity Theft 

Insurance No No No No No No No C-31 

Updated “Real-Time” 

Yes; maximum maximum of 

$10,000 

maximum of 

$10,000 

maximum of 

$10,000 

maximum of 

$10,000 

maximum of 

$10,000 

maximum of 

$10,000 of $10,000 C-32 

Refund AdvanceA Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited C-33 

Online Amend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C-34 

PricesB 

Federal Return $54.99 $74.99 $114.99 $69.99 $109.99 $159.99 $194.99 C-7, C-80 

State Return (per state) $44.99 $44.99 $44.99 $39.99 $49.99 $49.99 $49.99 C-7, C-80 

Notes: 

[A] The Refund Advance loan was available at participating H&R Block offices Jan. 4 – Feb. 28, 2022. 

[B] Prices reflect those listed on November 7, 2022. 

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

C-18 
TaxAct TaxAct TaxAct TaxAct 

Free Deluxe Premier Self-Employed Source(s) 

Income 

W-2 Income Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Non Employee Compensation (1099- Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 NEC) 

Profit or Loss from Business - Income Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 (Schedule C) 

Profit or Loss from Business - Expense Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 (Schedule C) 

Rental Income & Deductions (Schedule Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 E) 

Retirement Income (1099-R) Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Foreign Earned Income (Form 2555) Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Interest Income (1099-INT) Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Dividend Income (1099-DIV) Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Capital Gains and Losses (Schedule D) Upgrade Upgrade Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Cryptocurrency Sales (1099-MISC) Upgrade Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Partnership and S Corporation Income No Information No Information No Information No Information (Schedule K-1 Forms 1065 & 1120S) 

Estate and Trust Income (Schedule K-1 No Information No Information No Information No Information Form 1041) 

Unemployment Income (1099-G) Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Deductions, Tax Credits, and Other 

Situations 

Itemized Deductions (Schedule A) Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Earned Income Credit (Schedule EIC) Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Non Dependent EIC (Release of Claim to 

Exemption for Child by Custodial Parent Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

- Form 8332) 

Child Tax Credit (Schedule 8812) Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Foreign Tax Credit (Form 1116) Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Mortgage Interest Statement (1098) Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Student Loan Interest and Education Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 Expenses (1098-E) 

Health Savings Account (1099-SA) Upgrade Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Underpayment Penalty Calculations and Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 Payments (Form 2210) 

State Filing 

Multiple State Returns Filing Yes Yes Yes Yes C-66 

Part-Year/Non-Resident State Return Yes Yes Yes Yes C-67 Filing 

3. Blucora 

Figure C.3.C.i 

Blucora Paid Tax Product Offering Tax Situations in TY21 

PUBLIC

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

C-19 
Figure C.3.C.ii 

Blucora Paid Tax Product Offering Features in TY21 

PUBLIC

TaxAct TaxAct TaxAct TaxAct 

Free Deluxe Premier Self-Employed Source(s) 

Features 

Available as App on Google 

Play/Apple App Store Yes Yes Yes Yes C-81 

W2/1099 Upload/Auto ImportA 

Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

W-2 Import through Taking a 

PictureA Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Prior Year Return Import Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Live Phone or Chat Tech 

Support Yes Yes Yes Yes C-82 

Access to Searchable 

Knowledge Base Yes Yes Yes Yes C-83 

Tax Expert/Pro Assist and 

Final Review Yes Yes Yes Yes C-84 

Audit Defense/Audit Support Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On C-85 

Data Security Promise Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Identity Theft Restoration No Information No Information No Information No Information 

Identity Theft Insurance No Information No Information No Information No Information 

Updated “Real-Time” Refund 

Display Yes Yes Yes Yes C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Maximum Refund Guarantee Yes; refund Yes; refund Yes; refund Yes; refund 

product price 

and free online 

product price 

and free online 

product price 

and free online 

product price 

and free online C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

amend amend amend amend 

Accuracy Guarantee Yes; maximum 

of $100,000 

Yes; maximum 

of $100,000 

Yes; maximum 

of $100,000 

Yes; maximum 

of $100,000 C-86 

Refund Advance Add-On Add-On Add-On Add-On C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65 

Online Amend Yes Yes Yes Yes C-87 

PricesB 

Federal Return $0.00 $46.95 $69.95 $94.95 C-88 

State Return (per state) $39.95 $54.95 $54.95 $54.95 C-88 

Notes: 

[A] Quick start options include PDF import, prior year import, and W-2 photo capture. To import your prior year return, you must 

either have a PDF copy of a return available or have led your return the previous year with TaxAct. To capture your W-2 with a 

camera with your phone, you must be able to download and install TaxAct's mobile app and grant it the necessary camera and 

image privileges. To ensure accuracy, we will ask you to review any information we're able to import (either through PDF import, 

prior year import, or W-2 photo capture) and review it for accuracy. These quick start options save time by not requiring you to 

enter some of your information manually. 

[B] Prices reflect those listed on November 7, 2022. 

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

C-20 
4. TaxHawk 

PUBLIC

Figure C.3.D.i 

TaxHawk Paid Tax Product Offering Tax Situations in TY21 

TaxHawk Free TaxHawk TaxHawk Pro 

Edition Deluxe Edition Support Source(s) 

Income 

W-2 Income Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Non Employee Compensation (1099-NEC) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Profit or Loss from Business - Income 

(Schedule C) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Profit or Loss from Business - Expense 

(Schedule C) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Rental Income & Deductions (Schedule E) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Retirement Income (1099-R) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Foreign Earned Income (Form 2555) No No No C-68 

Interest Income (1099-INT) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Dividend Income (1099-DIV) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Capital Gains and Losses (Schedule D) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Cryptocurrency Sales (1099-MISC) Yes Yes Yes C-68, C-69 

Partnership and S Corporation Income 

(Schedule K-1 Forms 1065 & 1120S) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Estate and Trust Income (Schedule K-1 Form 

1041) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Unemployment Income (1099-G) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Deductions, Tax Credits, and Other Situations C-68 

Itemized Deductions (Schedule A) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Earned Income Credit (Schedule EIC) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Non Dependent EIC (Release of Claim to 

Exemption for Child by Custodial Parent - No Information No Information No Information 

Form 8332) 

Child Tax Credit (Schedule 8812) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Foreign Tax Credit (Form 1116) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Mortgage Interest Statement (1098) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Student Loan Interest and Education Expenses 

(1098-E) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Health Savings Account (1099-SA) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

Underpayment Penalty Calculations and 

Payments (Form 2210) Yes Yes Yes C-68 

State Filing 

Multiple State Returns Filing Add-On Add-On Add-On C-89 

Part-Year/Non-Resident State Return Filing No No No C-71 

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

C-21 
Figure C.3.D.ii 

TaxHawk Paid Tax Product Offering Features in TY21 

PUBLIC

TaxHawk TaxHawk TaxHawk 

Free Edition Deluxe Edition Pro Support Source(s) 

Features 

No No No 

No No No 

No No No 

From TurboTax, From TurboTax, From TurboTax, 

H&R Block, and H&R Block, and H&R Block, and 

Tax Act Tax Act Tax Act 

Low priority High Priority High Priority 

Yes Yes Yes 

Upgrade Upgrade Yes 

Upgrade Yes Yes 

Yes Yes Yes 

No Information No Information No Information 

No Information No Information No Information 

Yes Yes Yes 

Yes; refund Yes; refund Yes; refund 

product price product price product price 

and free online and free online and free online 

amend amend amend 

Yes; federal or Yes; federal or Yes; federal or 

state penalties state penalties state penalties 

and interest and interest and interest 

charges charges charges 

No No No 

Add-On Yes Yes 

$0.00 $6.99 $24.99 

$14.99 $14.99 $14.99 

C-70 

C-94 

C-94 

C-89 

C-89, C-90 

C-91 

C-90, C-92 

C-70, C-90, C-92 

C-93 

C-94 

C-95 

C-95 

C-70 

C-89 

C-89 

C-89 

Available as App on Google 

Play/Apple App Store 

W2/1099 Upload/Auto Import 

W-2 Import through Taking a 

Picture 

Prior Year Return Import 

Live Phone or Chat Tech 

Support 

Access to Searchable 

Knowledge Base 

Tax Expert/Pro Assist and 

Final Review 

Audit Defense/Audit Support 

Data Security Promise 

Identity Theft Restoration 

Identity Theft Insurance 

Updated “Real-Time” Refund 

Display 

Maximum Refund Guarantee 

Accuracy Guarantee 

Refund Advance 

Online Amend 

A Prices

Federal Return 

State Return (per state) 

Note: 

[A] Prices reflect those listed on November 3, 2022. 

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

C-22 
PUBLIC

5. TaxSlayer 

Figure C.3.E.i 

TaxSlayer Paid Tax Product Offering Tax Situations in TY21 

TaxSlayer TaxSlayer TaxSlayer SelfClassic Premium Employed Source(s) 

Income 

W-2 Income Yes Yes Yes C-17 

Non Employee Compensation (1099-NEC) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Profit or Loss from Business - Income 

(Schedule C) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Profit or Loss from Business - Expense 

(Schedule C) Upgrade Upgrade Yes C-10, C-17, C72 

Rental Income & Deductions (Schedule E) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Retirement Income (1099-R) Yes Yes Yes C-13 

Foreign Earned Income (Form 2555) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Interest Income (1099-INT) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Dividend Income (1099-DIV) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Capital Gains and Losses (Schedule D) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Cryptocurrency Sales (1099-MISC) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Partnership and S Corporation Income 

(Schedule K-1 Forms 1065 & 1120S) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Estate and Trust Income (Schedule K-1 Form 

1041) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Unemployment Income (1099-G) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Deductions, Tax Credits, and Other Situations C-10, C-17 

Itemized Deductions (Schedule A) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Earned Income Credit (Schedule EIC) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Non Dependent EIC (Release of Claim to 

Exemption for Child by Custodial Parent - Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Form 8332) 

Child Tax Credit (Schedule 8812) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Foreign Tax Credit (Form 1116) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Mortgage Interest Statement (1098) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Student Loan Interest and Education Expenses 

(1098-E) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Health Savings Account (1099-SA) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

Underpayment Penalty Calculations and 

Payments (Form 2210) Yes Yes Yes C-10, C-17 

State Filing 

Multiple State Returns Filing Add-On Add-On Add-On C-13, C-18 

Part-Year/Non-Resident State Return Filing Add-On Add-On Add-On C-13, C-18, C19 

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

C-23 
Figure C.3.E.ii 

TaxSlayer Paid Tax Product Offering Features in TY21 

PUBLIC

TaxSlayer TaxSlayer TaxSlayer 

Classic Premium Self-Employed Source(s) 

Features 

Available as App on Google 

Play/Apple App Store Yes Yes Yes C-35, C-36 

W2/1099 Upload/Auto Import Yes Yes Yes C-17 

W-2 Import through Taking a 

Picture Yes Yes Yes C-17, C-37 

Prior Year Return Import Form 1040 PDF 

From Any 

Source 

Form 1040 PDF 

From Any 

Source 

Form 1040 PDF 

From Any 

Source 

C-17, C-38, 

C-96 

Live Phone or Chat Tech 

Support Yes Yes Yes C-17 

Access to Searchable 

Knowledge Base Yes Yes Yes C-17 

Tax Expert/Pro Assist and 

Final Review Upgrade Yes 

Yes, SelfEmployed 

Expertise 

C-17, C-39 

Audit Defense/Audit Support Upgrade Yes Yes C-40 

Data Security Promise Yes Yes Yes C-41 

Identity Theft Restoration No No No C-42, C-43 

Identity Theft Insurance No No No C-42, C-43 

Updated “Real-Time” Refund 

Display Yes Yes Yes C-44 

Maximum Refund GuaranteeA Yes Yes Yes C-45, C-46 

Accuracy GuaranteeB Yes; federal or 

state penalties 

and interest 

Yes; federal or 

state penalties 

and interest 

Yes; federal or 

state penalties 

and interest C-45 

charges charges charges 

Refund Advance No No No C-13 

Online Amend Add-On Add-On Add-On C-47 

PricesC 

Federal Return $29.95 $49.95 $59.95 C-97 

State Return (per state) $39.95 $39.95 $39.95 C-97 

Notes: 

[A] Maximum Refund Guarantee ensures a reimbursement of the purchase price if customer receives 

a larger refund or pays a smaller tax through a different tax preparer. 

[B] Accuracy Guarantee ensures a reimbursement of federal or state penalties and interest charges. 

[C] Prices reflect those listed on October 31, 2022. 

Sources: See Table C.4 for an index of sources. 

C-24 
PUBLIC

IV. INDEX OF DIGITAL DIY PRODUCT OFFERINGS TABLE SOURCES 

Table C.4 

Digital DIY Product Offerings Table Sources 

Source Citation 

C-1 Intuit, TurboTax Free Edition Tax Forms, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personaltaxes/online/free-edition.jsp#tax-forms, accessed July 25, 2022, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000610436. 

C-2 Intuit, Why Use TurboTax Free Edition?, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20221221181628/https://turbotax.intuit.com/personaltaxes/online/free-edition.jsp, accessed January 5, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000610301. 

C-3 Intuit, How Do I File a Part-Year State Return?, https://ttlc.intuit.com/turbotaxsupport/en-us/help-article/printers-printing/file-part-year-statereturn/L82I8dCHS_US_en_US, accessed November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000610548. 

C-4 H&R Block, H&R Block Online Free Federal Forms, 

https://www.hrblock.com/pdf/HRB-Online-Fed-Forms/free.pdf, accessed January 

5, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611528. 

C-5 H&R Block, H&R Block Online Premium Federal Forms, 

https://www.hrblock.com/pdf/HRB-Online-Fed-Forms/premium.pdf, accessed 

January 5, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610922. 

C-6 Johnston and Van Brussel, Best Tax Software for 2022: Late or Not, TurboTax, 

H&R Block and More Can Help You File, https://www.cnet.com/personalfinance/taxes/best-tax-software/, accessed September 29, 2022, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000610534. 

C-7 H&R Block, File Online, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20221109234846/https://www.hrblock.com/onlinetax-filing/free-online-tax-filing/, accessed January 9, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000610275. 

C-8 H&R Block, Does H&R Block Online Support Nonresident or Part-Year Resident 

State Taxes?, https://www.hrblock.com/tax-center/support/online/online-taxfiling/prepare-to-file-taxes-online/non-resident-part-year-taxes/, accessed 

November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610008. 

C-9 TaxSlayer, How Do I File My Taxes for Free in 2022?, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20211223002120/https:/www.taxslayer.com/blog/how 

C-25 
PUBLIC

-to-file-taxes-for-free/, accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000611618. 

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C-26 
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accessed November 3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610457. 

C-58 Cash App Taxes, How Do I File an Amended Federal Return? Form 1040X, 

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C-59 Intuit, TurboTax 2021-2022 Online Tax Software, 

https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/online/, accessed August 1, 2022, 

INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612599. 

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https://www.hrblock.com/pdf/HRB-Online-Fed-Forms/deluxe.pdf, accessed 

January 5, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612993. 

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C-62 TaxAct, TaxAct Free, https://www.taxact.com/individual-taxes/online/free, 

accessed October 26, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612850. 

C-63 TaxAct, TaxAct Deluxe, https://www.taxact.com/individual-taxes/online/deluxe, 

accessed October 26, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612760. 

C-64 TaxAct, TaxAct Premier, https://www.taxact.com/individual-taxes/online/premier, 

accessed October 26, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610219. 

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000610721. 

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C-66 TaxAct, Preparing Your State Return, 

https://www.taxact.com/support/521/2021/preparing-your-statereturn?hideLayout=False, accessed November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000611631. 

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https://www.taxact.com/support/436/2016/state-part-year-non-resident-formavailability, accessed October 28, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610938. 

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C-69 FreeTaxUSA, Where Do I Enter Cryptocurrency Held for Investment?, 

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27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610027. 

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October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612535. 

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https://www.taxslayer.com/products/taxslayer-self-employment-taxes/, accessed 

November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610684. 

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INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612595. 

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https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/taxes/turbotax-review, accessed January 9, 

2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610939. 

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https://web.archive.org/web/20221009154729/https://turbotax.intuit.com/personaltaxes/online/live/basic.jsp, accessed January 5, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000613009. 

C-76 Intuit, Why Use TurboTax Live Deluxe?, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20221015024518/https://turbotax.intuit.com/personaltaxes/online/live/deluxe.jsp, accessed January 5, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000610645. 

C-77 Intuit, Why Use TurboTax Live Premier?, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20221010055634/https://turbotax.intuit.com/personalC-31 
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taxes/online/live/premier.jsp, accessed January 5, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000612411. 

C-78 H&R Block, File Online. Basic Online Assist, https://www.hrblock.com/onlinetax-filing/basic-online-assist-tax-filing/#, accessed November 4, 2022, INTUITFTC-PART3-000613199. 

C-79 H&R Block, File Online. Premium Online Assist, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20220524121833/https://www.hrblock.com/onlinetax-filing/premium-online-assist-tax-filing/, accessed January 5, 2023, INTUITFTC-PART3-000612483. 

C-80 H&R Block, When Filing Online, Expert Help is Here, 

https://www.hrblock.com/online-assist/, accessed October 27, 2022, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000612501. 

C-81 TaxAct, TaxAct ExpressTM for iPhone®, https://www.taxact.com/mobile-taxes, 

accessed November 3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611920. 

C-82 TaxAct, We’re Here to Help, https://www.taxact.com/support/request, accessed 

November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611510. 

C-83 TaxAct, Most Popular Help Topics, https://www.taxact.com/support, accessed 

November 3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000616979. 

C-84 TaxAct, xpertAssist, https://www.taxact.com/tax-xpert-assist, accessed October 28, 

2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610488. 

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https://www.taxact.com/support/24912/2021/protectionplus-audit-defense, 

accessed November 3, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000610514. 

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accessed November 4, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611921. 

C-87 TaxAct, Form 1041 - Amending, 

https://www.taxact.com/support/24691/2021/form-1041-

amending?hideLayout=False, accessed January 5, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000610928. 

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INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612465. 

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https://www.taxhawk.com/software.jsp?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIuqOE1bWTC-32 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 3/24/2023 | Document No. 607316 | PAGE Page 205 of 316 * PUBLIC *; PUBLIC

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Online-Fed-Forms/self-employed.pdf, accessed January 6, 2023, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000611410. 

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January 7, 2023, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000616848. 

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APPENDIX D 

Technical Appendix 

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In this Technical Appendix, I provide notes and sources for the figures and analyses presented in 

my expert report. This appendix is structured in the following way. Section I provides the notes 

and sources to each Figure and Section II describes the underlying datasets used in these 

analyses. 

Table of Contents 

I. Figures.....................................................................................................................................2 

II. Data Summary.......................................................................................................................27 

A. Customer-Level Data ............................................................................................ 27 

B. Upgrade Screen Data ............................................................................................ 33 

C. Customer Review Data ......................................................................................... 36 

D. Paid Search Data................................................................................................... 37 

E. Complainant Tax History Data ............................................................................ 38 

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Figure 2 

TurboTax Product Lineup, TY21 

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Source: 

[1] Intuit, TurboTax 2021-2022 Online Tax Software, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personaltaxes/online/, accessed August 1, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612599. 

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Figure 4 

List of 128 Tax Forms and Schedules Supported by TurboTax 

Self-Employed Products as of July 2022 

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Form 1040 Form 4852 Form 8936 

Form 1040-ES Form 4868 Form 8938 

Form 1040-V Form 4952/AMT Form 8941 

Form 1040X Form 4972 Form 8949 

Form 1095-A Form 5329 Form 8958 

Form 1098 Form 5405 Form 8959 

Form 1098-C Form 5695 Form 8960 

Form 1098-E Form 6198 Form 8962 

Form 1098-T Form 6251 Form 8994 

Form 1099-A Form 6252 Form 8995 

Form 1099-B Form 6781 Form 8995-A 

Form 1099-C Form 8283 Form 8995-A Sch A 

Form 1099-DIV Form 8332 Form 8995-A Sch B 

Form 1099-G Form 8379 Form 8995-A Sch C 

Form 1099-INT Form 8396 Form 8995-A Sch D 

Form 1099-K Form 8453 Form 9465 

Form 1099-MISC Form 8582/AMT/CR Form 982 

Form 1099-NEC Form 8586 Form SS-4 

Form 1099-OID Form 8606 Form W-2 

Form 1099-Q Form 8615 Form W-2G 

Form 1099-R Form 8801 Form W-4 

Form 1099-SA Form 8814 Schedule 1 

Form 1116/AMT Form 8815 Schedule 2 

Form 1310 Form 8822 Schedule 3 

Form 14039 Form 8824 Schedule 8812 

Form 2106 Form 8829 Schedule A 

Form 2120 Form 8834 Schedule B 

Form 2210-F Form 8839 Schedule C 

Form 2210/2210AI Form 8853 Schedule D 

Form 2439 Form 8857 Schedule E 

Form 2441 Form 8859 Schedule EIC 

Form 2555 Form 8862 Schedule F 

Form 3468 Form 8863 Schedule H 

Form 3800 Form 8880 Schedule J 

Form 3903 Form 8881 Schedule LEP 

Form 4136 Form 8885 Schedule R 

Form 4137 Form 8888 Schedule SE 

Form 4255 Form 8889 Schedules K-1 (Form 1041) 

Form 4506 Form 8910 Schedules K-1 (Form 1065) 

Form 4562 Form 8911 Schedules K-1 (Form 1120S) 

Form 4684 Form 8915A Schedules K-3 (Form 1065) 

Form 4797 Form 8915B Schedules K-3 (Form 1120S) 

Form 4835 Form 8919 

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Source: 

[1] Intuit, TurboTax Free Edition Tax Forms, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personaltaxes/online/free-edition.jsp#tax-forms, accessed July 25, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000610436. 

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Figure 5 

TurboTax TY21 Products & Pricing Page 

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Source: 

[1] Intuit, TurboTax 2021-2022 Online Tax Software, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personaltaxes/online/, accessed August 1, 2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000612599. 

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[4] Each column in the dataset represents a variable that describes information associated with a 

particular return as seen in the figures below. The dataset contains information on: 

• Whether the return was completed or not: completed_flag; 

• Revenue received by Intuit from the customer: total_revenue, total_federal_revenue, 

total_state_revenue, total_max_revenue, total_premium_services_revenue, 

total_plus_revenue, and total_refund_transfer_revenue; 

• Products recommended, accessed, and purchased: start_sku, product_purchased, 

paid_sku_recommended, and free_sku_recommended; 

• Tax forms and schedules: f1040_CHARAMT_line10b_charity_un, 

f1040_adjinc_income_adjustments, f1040_f8863_american_opportunity, 

f1040_fs_filing_status , f1040_l11_tax_amount, f1040_l14_other_taxes, 

f1040_l33_adjusted_gross_income_, f1040_l35a1_taxpayer_born_before, 

f1040_l35a3_spouse_born_before_1, f1040_l36_deduction_amount, 

f1040_l39_taxable_income, f1040_l47_child_tax_credit, f1040_l57_total_tax, 

f1040_l6_total_income, f1040_otherinc_other_income, f1040_sched5_schedule3_line14, 

f1040_state, f1040s1_l24_student_load_interes, f1040s1_por_schedule_1_part_of_r, 

f1040s2_por_schedule_2_part_of_r, f1040s3_por_schedule_3_part_of_r, 

f1040s4_por_schedule_4_part_of_r, f1040s5_por_schedule_5_part_of_r, 

f1040s6_por_schedule_6_part_of_r, fk1_por_schedule_K1_part_of_retu, 

fperswks_ymil_active_military_in, fperwks_age_taxpayer_age, 

fscha_por_schedule_A_part_of_ret, fschb_por_schedule_B_part_of_ret, 

fschc_por_schedule_C_part_of_ret, fschd_por_schedule_D_part_of_ret, 

fsche_por_schedule_E_part_of_ret, fschf_por_schedule_F_part_of_ret, and 

fschse_por_schedule_SE_part_of_r; 

• How the customer arrived at the TurboTax website: channel_group; 

• Date the return was started and completed: first_start_date, and completed_date; 

• PRS score if customer filled post filing survey: prs_score. 

For observations associated with auth_id’s of customers who did not start a return, only the 

variables auth_id, tax_year, and completed_flag are populated. For observations associated with 

auth_ids of customers who abandoned a return, only the variables auth_id, tax_year, 

first_start_date, start_sku, and completed_flag are populated. Similarly, for observations 

associated with TY14–20, only the variables auth_id, tax_year, first_start_date, start_sku, 

product_purchased, completed_flag, total_federal_revenue, and total_state_revenue, are 

populated. 

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B. Upgrade Screen Data 

1. Data files: INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608573 for TY19-20, INTUIT-FTCPART3-000608574 for TY21, and INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000608570 for 

categorization crosswalk 

2. Data Description 

[1] The Upgrade Screen Data contain information on the upgrade screen(s) customers were 

shown and whether these upgrade offers were accepted. The data are provided at the level of tax 

year and at the upgrade screen displayed or taken, which means that for a given auth_id and 

tax_year combination, there may be multiple upgrade screens presented, resulting in multiple 

observations. 

[2] The Upgrade Screen Data consist of two files, one that covers TY19–20 and one that covers 

TY21. The TY21 Upgrade Screen Data only contain required upgrade screens seen or taken by 

customers through June 10, 2022. Customers who interacted with a TurboTax Online product 

and may have seen or taken an upgrade offer between June 11, 2022 and the October 17, 2022 

extension deadline are not included in these data. 

[3] The Upgrade Screen Data consist of upgrade screens encountered or accepted by customers 

during the tax preparation process in instances such as when a customer entered information 

which would require an IRS form not supported by the TurboTax product that the customer was 

using at the time. Reporting such information would therefore require an upgrade to another 

TurboTax product. Examples of such upgrade screens include screens shown to customers 

seeking to claim a deduction or credit and screens shown to customers who report having earned 

certain types of income. 

[4] In total, when combining the Upgrade Screen Data files covering TY19–20 and TY21, there 

are 33,162,167 observations, containing 21,197,381 unique auth_id and tax_year combinations, 

and 18,515,470 unique auth_id values. 

[5] Upgrade screen data for TY21 include details on the offer presented (offer_see and 

offer_see_category), whether the offer was seen or accepted (offer_event_type), and when the 

offer was encountered (offer_timestamp). A crosswalk is also provided that maps offer_see and 

offer_see_category combinations to broader categories (offer_type) and includes the following 

offer_types: “wages and income,” “deductions and credits,” and “other” (which includes, for 

example, offers related to foreign assets and foreign trust). Upon reviewing of this crosswalk, I 

have modified the type of two upgrade offers. Offers associated with offer_see of 

“FUS_Business_Income|tto/alias/fus-business-income-16-64/deluxe-confirm 512 TTO” and 

offer_see_category of “FUS_Business_Income” are labeled as “Wages and Income” upgrade 

offers, and those associated with offer_see of “FUS_Itemized_Refund|tto/alias/fus-itemizedrefund/offer 512 TTO-FUS_Itemized_Refund” and offer_see_category of 

“FUS_Itemized_Refund” are labeled as “Deductions and Credits” upgrade offers. 

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it's a reference to, you know, kind of in the recent

 past, what did I do to get ready for the deposition?

 Is that how you intend that question?

 Q. Sure. I guess since submitting your report on

 January 13th, what have you done to prepare?

 A. Yeah. So, largely, sort of what you might call

 self-study, if you will. So I, you know, read my

 report a couple times. I've read some of the other

 reports. I reviewed some of the documents that I had

 included. You know, met with counsel a couple times.

 Those are the primary things.

 Q. Do you have any notes here with you today?

 A. No. I have -- I have a pad of paper that -- I

 have so far just written a couple of names on it. It's

 just a blank piece of paper.

 Q. Whose names are on it?

 A. Oh, the people sitting here. So Early, Sara,

 Shastri, Jake.

 Q. Smart. I can see you've been around the block.

 A. Not my first -- not my first deposition, so --

yeah.

 Q. Okay. Let's talk a little bit about how you

 became involved in this matter. When did you first

 become involved in the Intuit case?

 MR. CHAPIN: Object to form. 

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THE WITNESS: I don't remember the exact date,

 but probably something like a year ago, maybe a little

 more than that. So it's been more than a year.

 BY MS. TONNESEN:

 Q. Okay. Who first contacted you regarding the

 Intuit case?

 A. My recollection is probably initially, it was

 an internal Analysis Group person. Probably Kris

 Comeaux.

 Q. And then when did you first become engaged by

 Intuit?

 MR. CHAPIN: Object to form.

 THE WITNESS: The short answer is, I don't

 know. I don't recall exactly. But, again, something

 like a year ago or thereabouts, to the best of my

 recollection, but I honestly don't really remember

 exactly.

 BY MS. TONNESEN:

 Q. Sure. Around that time, when you first began

 working on the Intuit matter, what did you understand

 your assignment to be?

 A. You know, largely, what it ended up in my

 report, which is to say, you know, some kind of

 background review and framing of the industry,

 description of kind of incentives and the type of 

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Page 77

 Broadly speaking, yes, I -- but the way I would

 phrase it is, I use Intuit's data to sort of test the

 hypothesis of, is there evidence in the data of

 deception? Which I clearly find the answer to be no to

 that.

 So what I am using the data for is to test that

 theory, effectively.

 BY MS. TONNESEN:

 Q. And we mentioned that that data you looked at

 is on B-2 in the "Materials Considered" under the

 heading "Data"?

 A. Yes.

 Q. Did you ever ask for other datasets or other

 data fields that you didn't get access to?

 A. No.

 Q. And is there any data that you looked at that's

 not listed there?

 MR. CHAPIN: Object to form.

 THE WITNESS: No.

 BY MS. TONNESEN:

 Q. I guess I can ask that a little more precisely.

 Of the data you had access to in forming your

 opinions at page B-2 -- strike that.

 In B-2, the data identified as TY14 through 20

 customer-level data, do you know what database that 

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Q. Did you ever -- do you have that data for

 Intuit?

 MR. CHAPIN: Object to form.

 THE WITNESS: I don't. I mean, the only thing

 I know is that -- just at a high level, I know there's

 been some back-and-forth between the FTC and Intuit

 about the CRM data. I don't have it. I haven't

 analyzed it. But if at some point --

It wasn't necessary for any of my analyses,

 so --

BY MS. TONNESEN:

 Q. That's what I am asking about. I'm not -- I'm

 not asking for the purposes of any back-and-forth

 between counsel.

 I guess I'm asking, if you would have

 expected -- and it sounds like this is the case --

based on your experience, a company big like Intuit

 would have some sort of CRM data that could contain

 complaints both about Free but any myriad of things and

 part of your report focuses on complaints, why you

 didn't look at it?

 MR. CHAPIN: Object to form. Asked and

 answered. And move to strike counsel's testimony.

 THE WITNESS: Well, as I said before, I didn't

 need it for my analysis. So what I focus on in my 

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Q. Uh-huh.

 And is it fair to assume that you didn't look

 at these -- or didn't ask for CRM data because it's

 messy?

 MR. CHAPIN: Object to form.

 BY MS. TONNESEN:

 Q. I think that's what I understood from you

 earlier today.

 Let me step back, then, and say, would CRM

 data, in your experience, potentially be another place

 that you could find evidence of consumer negative

 feedback?

 MR. CHAPIN: Object to form.

 THE WITNESS: I think we've had this discussion

 already.

 You know, the typical CRM database is sort of

 basically tracking -- think about every customer

 service agent you've ever talked to. They are typing

 in some notes. So it's the customer service agent

 typing in notes into some kind of a CRM, saying, oh, I

 just talked to Bruce, and, you know, he loved his cable

 TV show, or whatever.

 So I certainly agree it's very messy data.

 And, you know, I think before, we were talking about,

 is it possible that in that data, there could be 

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someone typing in, Customer XYZ is upset about -- you

 know, thought it was free, and it's not -- in any kind

 of context; cable TV, whatever.

 You know, that's a very common sort of generic

 complaint you see across a lot of things; I didn't

 think I was paying for this, and why do I have this; I

 was told it was free. Things like that.

 So it's certainly -- you know, within this

 data, there can be that information. For the analysis

 I was doing, I had a set of complaints the FTC had

 identified, and I had these actual customer reviews,

 which are kind of systematic and numeric and, you know,

 represent the actual experience that they had at the

 time, so I didn't -- excuse me -- I didn't have any

 need for the CRM data.

 It's messy. If CRM becomes available in some

 form that can be used and produced in this matter, one

 can certainly, you know, use it.

 But my experience is, it would be -- it would

 be a big challenge to try and separate out any --

again, there's just so much in there and it's so all

 over the place and it's sort of moderated through

 whatever the customer service person typed in, things

 like that. So there's a lot of challenges and problems

 with using the data. 

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Attachment C 
PUBLIC

From: Chapin, Benjamin 

To: Plett, Rebecca; Anguizola, Roberto; Tonnesen, Sara; Evans, James 

Cc: Perkins, Vinecia; Salinas, Andres C.; Gringer, David; Todd, Spencer L.; Berteaud, Joss; Chapin, Benjamin; 

Dillaway, Molly; Jacob, Reade; Mackey, Katherine; Martin, Shelby L.; Silos, Phoebe; Bridge, Charles; Milici, 

Jennifer; Paikin, Jonathan; Shapiro, Howard 

Subject: Docket No. 9408 - Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce Deal 

Date: Thursday, March 9, 2023 11:53:52 PM 

Attachments: Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce Deal (2023.03.09) - CONFIDENTIAL.pdf 

Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce Deal (2023.03.09) - PUBLIC.pdf 

Counsel, 

Pursuant to the Court’s Order Granting Complaint Counsel’s Motion to Compel Production of 

Documents, dated December 30, 2022, and my emails of February 7 and 9, 2023, attached please 

find confidential and public versions of the Supplemental Expert Report of Bruce F. Deal analyzing 

the CRM Data produced by Intuit pursuant to the Court’s December 30 Order. The supporting 

materials will be transmitted separately via SFTP and are designated as Confidential. 

Benjamin Chapin | WilmerHale 

1875 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, DC 20006 USA 

+1 202 663 6443 (t) 

+1 202 663 6363 (f) 

benjamin.chapin@wilmerhale.com 

Please consider the environment before printing this email. 

This email message and any attachments are being sent by Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, are confidential, and may be 

privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify us immediately—by replying to this message or by sending an email to 

postmaster@wilmerhale.com—and destroy all copies of this message and any attachments. Thank you. 

For more information about WilmerHale, please visit us at http://www.wilmerhale.com. 
PUBLIC

Attachment D 
 

  

______________________________________ 

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

COMMISSIONERS: Lina M. Khan, Chair 

 Rebecca Kelly Slaughter 

 Christine S. Wilson 

 Alvaro M. Bedoya 

IN THE MATTER OF: 

INTUIT INC., A CORPORATION. 

Docket No. 9408 

EXPERT REBUTTAL REPORT OF 

EREZ YOELI, PH.D. 

1/27/2023 

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I. Qualifications 

1. I am a research scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)’s Sloan 

School of Management, and the founder and co-director of its Applied Cooperation Team. 

I received my A.B. in economics from Stanford University in 2003, and my M.B.A. in 

2008 and Ph.D. in 2009 in economics from University of Chicago Booth School of 

Business. 

2. I am also currently a lecturer at Harvard University’s Economics Department since 2016, 

and an external graduate faculty at the University of Maine since 2021. 

3. Prior to joining MIT’s Sloan School of Management in 2018, I held academic and research 

positions at Harvard and Yale: I was a research scientist at Yale University’s Human 

Cooperation Laboratory from 2017 to 2018, and a research scientist at the Harvard 

University’s Program for Evolutionary Dynamics from 2015 to 2017. 

4. For over ten years, I have taught courses to undergraduate and graduate students on 

economics topics at the Harvard University, the Stanford Graduate School of Business, 

MIT, Boston College, University of California San Diego, Johns Hopkins University, and 

Technion. The economics topics covered in my courses include, among other things, game 

theory, prosocial behavior, microeconomics, statistics, and survey design. In addition to 

teaching, I have served as an academic advisor for startup companies such as Culdesac, 

Stepchange, Activote, and Keheala, with whom I normally focus on the use behavioral 

science tools to promote prosocial behaviors. 

5. My published research has focused on understanding people’s preferences and beliefs, as 

well as how to affect their decisions. On these subjects and others I have published 

numerous articles in peer reviewed scientific and economics journals, including Nature, the 

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, the New England Journal of Medicine, 

British Medical Journal Global Health, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 

Behavioral Public Policy, and Journal of Behavioral Public Administration. My research 

employs economic models, as well as surveys, survey experiments, and field experiments. 

I have also published a game theory book in 2022, coauthored with Moshe Hoffman, titled 

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“Hidden Games: The Surprising Power of Game Theory to Explain Irrational Human 

Behavior.” 

6. Prior to working at academic institutions, I was an economist at the U.S. Federal Trade 

Commission (“FTC”) from 2009 to 2015. While at the FTC, I served as an expert witness 

in cases against companies in matters related to consumer deception and do not call list 

violations; most recently, I served as an expert witness in United States v. Dish Network 

L.L.C., Case No. 09-3073 (C.D. Ill. filed Mar. 25, 2009).. 

7. A copy of my curriculum vitae, including a list of the publications I have authored and a 

list of prior testimony are attached hereto as Appendix A. I have previously qualified as an 

expert and provided expert testimony. 

II. Assignment 

8. Counsel supporting the FTC’s complaint in this matter (“Complaint Counsel”) asked me to 

evaluate and rebut the Expert Report of Mr. Bruce Deal dated January 13, 2023 (the “Deal 

Report”). I understand that Mr. Deal was asked to evaluate the competitive dynamics of the 

tax preparation industry, including that of Intuit Inc., (“Intuit”), and respond to the Expert 

Report of Dr. Nathan Novemsky dated December 9, 2022 (the “Novemsky Report”).1

2 

 As 

part of my rebuttal, I have also been asked to consider reports submitted by other experts 

on behalf of Intuit, including the Expert Report of Dr. Peter N. Golder (the “Golder 

Report”) dated January 13, 2023, the Expert Report of Rebecca Kirk Fair (the “Kirk Fair 

Report”) dated January 13, 2023, and the Expert Report of Sc.D. John R. Hauser (the 

“Hauser Report”) dated January 13, 2023. 

9. I understand that, in its March 28, 2022 Complaint, the FTC alleges Intuit violated 

provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act through deceptive advertisements,

1 Expert Report of Nathan Novemsky, Ph.D., In the Matter of Intuit Inc., a corporation, Docket No. 9408, 

December 9, 2022 (“Novemsky Report”), CC-00006504-635. 

2 Complaint, Before the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of: Intuit Inc., a corporation, March 28, 2022, 

FTC Docket No. 9408 (“Complaint”). 

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namely, that Intuit deceptively advertised that consumers could file their taxes for free 

using the online version of TurboTax.3 

10. Complaint Counsel asked me to specifically review and respond to the evidence presented 

by Mr. Deal to the allegation of widespread deception and theories of harm. In the Deal 

Report, Mr. Deal concludes: (a) that Intuit had no economic incentives to engage in 

widespread deception; (b) that Intuit’s business strategy is not consistent with deception; 

and (c) that, of consumers who logged into TurboTax’s website, almost none could have 

been deceived. As I will explain in this report, I disagree with all three of these 

conclusions. 

11. A list of the documents I have relied upon in forming my opinions is attached hereto as 

Appendix B. The opinions presented in this report are based on the information available 

to me as of the date of this report, and they could be supplemented or modified if new 

information becomes available, or any additional report(s) or opinions are offered by 

experts for the defendants. 

12. I am being compensated for my work in this matter at an hourly rate of $750. Consulting 

staff at The Brattle Group have assisted me by performing work at my direction, and they 

are also compensated on an hourly basis. All the opinions and conclusions stated in this 

report are my own. My compensation and The Brattle Group’s compensation are not 

affected by the outcome of this matter. 

III. Summary of Opinions 

13. My opinions are based on my knowledge and expertise gained during my academic and 

professional career and the materials that I have reviewed in this matter. 

14. Mr. Deal’s report includes three primary bases on which he believes “Complaint Counsel’s 

claims of widespread deception and theories of harm are unsupported and inconsistent.”4 

3 See Complaint ¶¶ 4–8. 

4 

 Expert Report of Bruce F. Deal, January 13, 2023, (“Deal Report”), ¶ 9. 

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My report will rebut each of these three bases, one at a time, following the basic structure 

of Mr. Deal’s arguments. 

PUBLIC

First, I disagree that “Intuit has substantial economic incentives not 

to engage in deception.”5 

15. Mr. Deal’s Contentions: In Section IV of his report, Mr. Deal argues that Intuit’s 

economic incentives are inconsistent with deception. I disagree. 

16. To arrive at this conclusion, Mr. Deal argues that the market for tax preparation services 

has certain characteristics which are inconsistent with firms being able to profit from 

deception. Specifically, Mr. Deal cites the following three characteristics which he claims 

act as incentives “not to engage in deception”: (1) competition and the pursuit of repeated 

customer interactions act as a “self-correcting mechanism against a firm deceiving its 

customers;” (2 6 ) a largely fixed set of consumers who must choose among many 

competing solutions cause “Intuit and its competitors [to] derive greater value from 

exceeding customer expectations and repeated patronage of their customers;”7

 and (3) a tax 

preparation industry characterized by “intense competition, investment of firms focused on 

multi-year customer retention programs, and lowering switching costs.”8 

17. Rebuttal: In drawing his conclusions about TurboTax’s market, Mr. Deal employs a 

rhetorical trick that conflates ‘less’ with ‘none.’ Market conditions can make it less likely 

that deception will be in firms’ best interest, but that’s not the same as establishing that 

these conditions preclude deception from ever being in any firm’s best interest. 

18. Instead, as I detail in Section IV, it is quite straightforward to see why deception could be 

in Intuit’s best interest, even, and perhaps especially, in a market with TurboTax’s 

market’s characteristics. If, for instance, consumers who were deceived into visiting 

turbotax.com have some tendency towards using a tax preparation solution that is in front 

of them, have some tendency towards preparing their taxes using the same service they 

5 Deal Report, ¶ 10 [emphasis in original]. 

6 Deal Report, ¶ 10. 

7 Deal Report, ¶ 10. 

8 Deal Report, ¶ 10. 

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used in the previous year, prefer not to start afresh in another solution, and/or if consumers 

tend to discount other firms’ advertising claims after encountering Intuit’s deception, then 

Intuit’s deception could have led it to grow its paying consumer base in a given year, keep 

those consumers from year to year, made it less likely that consumers would search for 

alternatives, and made it harder for competitors to compete with Intuit—all of which are in 

Intuit’s economic interest. 

Second, I disagree that “Intuit’s business strategy is inconsistent with 

Complaint Counsel’s claims.”9 

19. Mr. Deal’s Contentions: In Section V of his report, Mr. Deal concludes that Intuit’s 

business practices are inconsistent with deception. I disagree with this conclusion. 

20. To arrive at this conclusion, Mr. Deal presents the following characteristics of Intuit’s 

business model: (1) customer retention is essential to Intuit’s business model; (2) the 

TurboTax website is designed to funnel customers to the appropriate product; (3) Intuit has 

made effort to improve customer experience by reducing the time and effort to file taxes 

with TurboTax; and (4) Intuit does not have any means to prevent customer defection.10 

21. Rebuttal: As I will explain in Section V, none of these characteristics precludes the 

possibility of deception. First, a business model prioritizing customer retention does not 

prevent, and might increase, the benefits of deception. Second, neither Intuit’s funneling of 

customers to appropriate products, nor its efforts to improve customer experience, preclude 

deception. And third, the fact that Intuit does not have the “means to prevent customer 

defection” does not mean that customers who have started their taxes in TurboTax are not 

disincentivized to switch. 

Third, I disagree that “the actual evidence from Intuit’s customerlevel data is not consistent with a “bait and switch” strategy as 

alleged by Complaint Counsel.”11 

9 Deal Report, ¶ 11 [emphasis in original]. 

10 See, Deal Report, ¶ 11. 

11 Deal Report, ¶ 12 [emphasis in original]. 

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IV. In contrast to Mr. Deal’s claim, economic analysis shows deception can 

be in Intuit’s best interest 

29. Mr. Deal argues in Section IV of his report that economic analysis suggests deception is 

not in Intuit’s best interest. He summarizes the argument as follows: “I find that economic 

theory is inconsistent with a firm maximizing firm value by ‘bait and switch’-style 

deception of its customers in situations where (i) the firm relies on the customers’ 

continued patronage, (ii) customers can detect deception early on, and (iii) customers can 

easily switch to competitors.”17 

30. Before I rebut Mr. Deal’s economic analysis, I emphasize that it possible for firms to act 

against their best interest and, in doing so, break the law. Intuit’s deceptive ads may well 

not have been in its long-term best interest. This would not make the actual ads at issue in 

this case any less deceptive. 

31. That said, I disagree with Mr. Deal’s economic analysis for the following reasons: 

32. First, his description of Intuit’s economic incentives —what he calls the ‘structural factors’ 

of the market for tax preparation services—are flawed. Starting in Section IV and 

continuing throughout his report, Mr. Deal presumes the discovery of deception would 

preclude a user from using TurboTax; however, he does not establish this empirically, and 

his position is at odds with the academic literature, which (a) identifies that the nature of 

Intuit’s deception would make it so that many consumers would not feel compelled to walk 

away, and (b) provides many examples—including some canonical ones—in which 

deceived parties do not break off an interaction. 

33. In Section IV.B.4. of his report, Mr. Deal argues that consumers in the Do It Yourself 

(“DIY”) tax preparation market face “low switching costs”.18 While I will argue that 

switching costs can be low for Intuit to benefit from its deception, Mr. Deal’s own 

numbers show that, in practice, switching costs are non-trivial. 

17 Deal Report, ¶ 23. 

18 Deal Report, ¶¶ 51–54. 

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34. In Sections IV.B.3. and IV.C. of his report, Mr. Deal argues that the market for tax 

preparation services is competitive,19 but, in fact, the market is relatively concentrated, and 

Intuit holds more market share than all of its competitors combined. 

35. Second, even taking as given Mr. Deal’s assertions about the ‘structural factors’ of the 

market in which Intuit operates, I disagree that economic analysis of these factors leads to 

the conclusion that deception was not in Intuit’s best interest: 

a. Mr. Deal claims in Section IV.A. of his report that repeated interactions are 

inconsistent with deception. However, the vast literature on repeated games finds 

that repeated interactions can sometimes lead parties to act in others’ interests, not 

that parties will always act in others’ interest, or, in particular, that they will not 

deceive others. Repeated interactions do not preclude deception. 

b. Mr. Deal claims in Sections IV.A., IV.B.2., and IV.B.3. of his report that competition 

and product differentiation will reduce the incentive to deceive, but he gets the 

analysis wrong. Their effects on the incentive to deceive are ambiguous, and depend 

on the weights of various countervailing forces. 

c. Mr. Deal claims in Sections IV.A. and IV.B.4. that low switching costs preclude 

deception. However, he conflates low switching costs with no switching costs. 

Crucially, even low switching costs make it possible to benefit from deception. The 

intuition is straightforward: if a consumer who is deceived into using TurboTax 

prefers nonetheless to continue using it over starting afresh with a competing 

product, Intuit can benefit from the deception. 

d. In his discussion of whether a competitive marketplace incentivizes honesty in 

Sections IV.A., IV.B.2., and IV.C of his report, Mr. Deal omits the anticompetitive 

benefits of cheating. If deception makes it harder for competitors to advertise, for 

instance because it leads consumers to place less trust in claims about the price of tax 

preparation services in general or to search less for competing products, then 

deception can benefit Intuit by making it harder for competitors to attract users. 

19 Deal Report, ¶¶ 37–41. (“Industry reports describe the tax preparation industry as “highly competitive.”). 

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36. To summarize: (1) Mr. Deal’s economic analysis is largely beside the point as firms can 

deceive consumers even if it is not in the firms’ economic best interest; (2) Mr. Deal does 

not correctly characterize Intuit’s economic incentives; and (3) Mr. Deal is incorrect: 

economic analysis of Intuit’s economic incentives can be consistent with deception. 

37. I now discuss points (2) and (3) in more detail: in Section A, I discuss how Mr. Deal 

mischaracterizes Intuit’s economic incentives, and in Section B, I discuss why economic 

analysis can lead one to conclude that there could be an incentive to deceive. 

A. Mr. Deal’s description of Intuit’s economic incentives is flawed 

1. Contrary to Mr. Deal’s presumptions, deception would not preclude a 

user from using TurboTax 

38. A core presumption in Mr. Deal’s analysis in Section IV.A. of his report is that consumers 

cease using TurboTax upon discovering that they have been deceived. He argues that 

At each interaction with a customer, a selling vendor has to choose 

between two strategies: (i) deceive the customer by misrepresenting 

the characteristics of the good or service on sale, earn higher 

immediate returns, and potentially lose any future business from her; 

or (ii) behave honestly, earning lower immediate returns, and build a 

trusted relationship that leads to repeated future interactions with the 

same customer... If a vendor does try to cheat and the cheating can be 

detected during or after the interaction, the customer will abandon the 

cheater and bring her business to the competitors.20 

39. I first note that Mr. Deal provides no empirical evidence to support this presumption that 

consumers will abandon the TurboTax software on learning that they were deceived. 

40. However, there are some reasons why one might expect that consumers would not cease 

using TurboTax. 

20 See Deal Report, ¶ 24; see also, Deal Report, ¶ 26 (“low switching costs allow customers to carry out their 

punishment (switching to another supplier either immediately or on the subsequent transaction) against 

disreputable vendors. As a result, sellers considering taking dishonest actions face a credible threat of losing 

their customers after being exposed.”); and Deal Report, ¶ 41 (“Regardless of the tax preparation method, a 

consumer deceived by a provider would easily find an alternative, comparably suitable solution offered by a 

competitor.”). 

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41. Some of these reasons have to do with consumers’ perceptions of the deception. For 

instance, the consumer may lack certainty about whether they were deceived. This could 

be because they are uncertain either whether what they received was in fact what they were 

promised, or whether they understood the promise correctly. A firm might even leverage 

the customer’s ignorance to create uncertainty about whether there was a deception or 

merely a misunderstanding. The initial promise could be framed through the use of 

industry-specific jargon which can be explained in the course of the upsell. This is 

consistent with the FTC’s complaint: Intuit is accused of having promised free preparation 

of “simple” returns to a consumer base that is largely unequipped to know intuitively what 

that means. In the absence of clarity about whether, in fact, a deception occurred, the 

consumer may be surprised by the price they paid, but would not feel justified in punishing 

the seller.21 

42. A third possibility is that the consumer perceives the deception as ‘sunk’ and not especially 

informative about the relationship going forward. 

 Consider the vegetable vendor Mr. Deal discusses in his report (Section IV). The 

vendor seeking to establish ongoing relationships with repeat customers may 

certainly be deterred from outright cheating them. However, this does not restrict 

them from gaining their initial attention by advertising a sale on a particular species 

of potato even long after they’ve run out of that particular inventory. The excuse 

will usually be accepted, and if their other offerings are competitive enough, it is 

easier to maintain buyer interest given they’ve already arrived at the vendor stall, 

and, if they leave, would have to start their search afresh. In fact, precisely such a 

deception is the subject of well published paper by Edward Lazear, titled “Bait and 

Switch”, in which it is shown that deception can persist in equilibrium, so long as 

the “bait” (Free Edition) is more popular than the “switch” (paid versions of 

TurboTax). 22 

21 See Gillespie et al. "A Tangled Web: Views of Deception from the Customer’s Perspective," Business Ethics. A 

European Review (2016) Vol. 25, No. 2. 

22 Edward P. Lazear, “Bait and Switch,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol 103. No. 4 (1995). 

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30%

25%

Market Share (%)

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Source: Deal Report, Figure 1. See Workpaper 2 – TurboTax Market Share. 

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

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significant TurboTax is in the tax preparation industry, Figure 2 shows TurboTax’s market 

share among all tax preparation options. Since 2016, over 25% of all the IRS tax returns 

were filed with TurboTax. 

FIGURE 2: TURBOTAX MARKET SHARE OF TOTAL TAX PREPARATION MARKET 

35%

50. Figure 3 also examines TurboTax’s market share, but this time among the DIY tax 

preparation industry.34 For the last ten years, TurboTax has had over 60% of the DIY tax 

preparation market. If one were to calculate the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (“HHI”) 

measure of market concentration for the DIY tax preparation sector, TurboTax’s 

contribution to the HHI alone would be greater than 3,600. Competition agencies typically 

consider HHIs in excess of 2,500 to be “highly concentrated.”35 Thus, contrary to Mr. 

34 I do not include manual tax filers in the DIY sector as Mr. Deal differentiates manual from DIY tax preparers, 

“the popularity of DIY and other online tax preparation products—including TurboTax online and desktop 

products—has grown in recent years. Very few consumers complete their taxes manually.” Deal Report, ¶14. 

35 See “Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,” The United States Department of Justice, accessed January 26, 2023, 

https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index for discussion of Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. (“The 

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70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Source: Deal Report, Figure 1; Assuming entire TurboTax share is DIY. See Workpaper 2 – TurboTax 

Market Share. 

DIY Share (%)

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

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Deal’s claims, the DIY tax preparation market should be viewed as a highly concentrated 

market due to TurboTax’s presence.36 

FIGURE 3: TURBOTAX DIY SHARE OF DIY TAX PREPARATION MARKET 

B. Contrary to Mr. Deal’s conclusion, economic analysis can lead one to 

conclude that deception was in Intuit’s best interest 

51. In the last section, I discussed that I disagree with Mr. Deal’s characterization of Intuit’s 

economic incentives. In this section, I argue that, even taking as given his description of 

Intuit’s economic incentives, economic analyses do lead to the conclusion that these 

incentives are inconsistent with deception. 

HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the 

resulting numbers.”) TurboTax’s contribution to the HHI is greater than 602

 which works out to be greater than 

3,600. 

36 “Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,” The United States Department of Justice, accessed January 26, 2023, 

https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index for discussion of Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. (“The 

agencies generally consider markets in which the HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500 points to be moderately 

concentrated, and consider markets in which the HHI is in excess of 2,500 points to be highly concentrated.”). 

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1. Contrary to Mr. Deal’s claim, repeated interactions are not 

inconsistent with deception 

52. Mr. Deal says in Section IV.A. of his report that his “main economic intuition... comes 

from the analysis of repeated games in game theory.”37 However, repeated games do not 

preclude deception or otherwise guarantee that parties behave in others’ best interest: 

 In empirical studies of repeated games, it is common to observe that parties do not 

behave in others’ interests. This is, for instance, true in virtually every ‘laboratory’ 

experiment involving repeated games.38 

 In computer simulations of repeated games, parties often do not behave in others’ 

interest, either because they are not behaving according to any equilibrium, or 

because they have arrived at one in which they do not behave in others’ best 

interest.39 

 Theoretical models of repeated games typically have equilibria in which parties do 

not behave in others’ best interest.40 In addition, there is theoretical literature that 

focuses on deception by firms, and finds deception is possible even when there are 

repeated interactions, or reputations are otherwise important.41 

 Finally, I note that deception has often been perpetrated by firms that interact with 

consumers repeatedly.42 

37 Deal Report, ¶ 24. 

38 See, e.g., Anna Dreber, David G. Rand, Drew Fudenberg, and Martin A. Nowak. “Winners Don’t Punish.” 

Nature, Vol. 452, No. 7185 (2008): 348-351. 

39 See Matthijs van Veelen, Julian Garcia, David G. Rand, and Martin A. Nowak, “Direct Reciprocity in 

Structured Populations,” PNAS Vol. 109, No. 25 (2012): 9929-34 (“Our simulations also suggest that in a wellmixed population, paths out of cooperation are more likely than paths into cooperation.”) pp. 9930-9933. 

https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1206694109. 

40 See, e.g., Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The 

MIT Press (1994); Johannes Horner, “Reputation and Competition,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, 

No.3 (June 2002): 644-663. 

41 See Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,” 

Journal of Political Economy, Vol 89. No. 41 (1981): 615-641. 

42 For example, in 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau fined Wells Fargo Bank $100 million for its 

widespread practice of opening unauthorized deposit and credit card accounts “by transferring funds from 

consumers’ authorized accounts without their knowledge or consent.” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 

“Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of 

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53. In fact, the literature on repeated interactions does not just fail to preclude deception, it 

also explores ways in which this structural factor facilitates deception. For instance, the 

Nobel Laureates George Akerlof and Robert Shiller argue that firms that interact 

repeatedly with consumers and, over time have developed good reputation can, under the 

right conditions, benefit by engaging in “reputation mining” and deceive consumers at 

some cost to their reputations.43 All that is needed for this strategy to be profitable is for it 

to take some time for the firm’s reputation to reflect the deception.44 

2. Contrary to Mr. Deal’s claims, structural factors such as competition 

and product differentiation can increase the incentive to deceive 

54. Mr. Deal claims in Section IV.A. of his report that competition will reduce the incentive to 

deceive. Specifically, he writes: “The presence of competing offerings is critical for 

consumers who have been deceived to be able to punish a dishonest seller by switching to 

rival vendors.”45 

55. In fact, the effect of competition on the incentive to deceive is ambiguous. Competition can 

increase the benefits from deceiving on price because, for instance, such deception could 

attract more customers from a product that competes more intensely with one’s own. 

Additionally, in more competitive markets, while the benefits to deception accrue solely to 

the deceiving firm, the costs of deception in terms of reduced consumer confidence is 

Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts,” September 8, 2016, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practicesecretly-opening-unauthorized-accounts/. Another example is in 2014, the Federal Trade Commission filed a 

complaint alleging AT&T advertised and sold unlimited data plans to its customers, but would reduce or 

“throttle” data speeds once a certain amount of data was used and in 2019 AT&T was required to pay $60 

million into a fund to provide refunds to customers in order to settle the litigation. Federal Trade Commission 

Press Release, “AT&T to Pay $60 Million to Resolve FTC Allegations It Misled Consumers with ‘Unlimited 

Data’ Promises,” November 5, 2019, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/11/att-pay-60-

million-resolve-ftc-allegations-it-misled-consumers-unlimited-data-promises. 

43 See George A. Akerlof, and Robert J. Shiller, “Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and 

Deception,” Princeton University Press, 2015, pp. 9-10 and pp. 23-25. 

44 See George A. Akerlof, and Robert J. Shiller, “Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and 

Deception,” Princeton University Press, 2015, pp 31-34. 

45 Deal Report, ¶ 26. 

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shared with more firms. This is a direct consequence of George Akerlof’s Nobel Prize 

winning analysis of so-called ‘markets for lemons’.46 

56. Likewise, Mr. Deal claims, again in Section IV.A. of his report, that product differentiation 

reduces the incentive to deceive: “When competition is not only on price but entails 

offering goods and services that are sufficiently differentiated (although still perceived as 

viable alternatives), [honest] sellers can earn a stream of positive profits over time.”47 

57. In fact, product differentiation and market competition are not distinct: one way in which 

markets become less competitive is if there is more product differentiation, which makes it 

so that firms’ offerings compete less with another’s. 

58. When one recognizes this, one also recognizes that the effect of product differentiation, 

like that of competition, is ambiguous. I believe the source of Mr. Deal’s confusion might 

be the paper he cites in support of his conclusion, which assumes that, upon any consumer 

being deceived, all consumers cease using the product.48 This assumption excludes the 

very realistic case where product differentiation makes it harder to cease using a product 

upon discovering deception and switch to another in its stead. (Note, however, that even in 

this very extreme case, firms can benefit from deception, providing further evidence for 

my conclusion in paragraph 61). 

59. Finally, low switching costs do not preclude deception. Mr. Deal claims in Section IV.A. 

of his report that low switching costs are inconsistent with deception. Specifically, he 

argues that because “low switching costs allow customers to carry out their punishment 

46 Akerlof, George. 1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” The 

Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.84, No. 3, pp. 488-500 at 495 (“The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not 

only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred from driving 

legitimate business out of existence.”). 

47 Deal Report, ¶ 26. 

48 Benjamin Klein, Keith B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,” Journal 

of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4 (1981): 615-641, at 617 (“[our model] assumes that consumers costlessly 

communicate among one another. Therefore, if a firm cheats... all consumers in the market learn this and all 

future sales are lost.”). This appears to be a simplifying assumption made to intentionally make the environment 

in the model more extreme than in real life—a common modeling tactic used to isolate what is driving the 

results. 

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(switching to another supplier either immediately or on the subsequent transaction) against 

disreputable vendors... sellers considering taking dishonest actions face a credible threat of 

losing their customers.... The conditions in the tax preparation industry are [therefore] not 

consistent with conditions for deceptions.”49 

60. However, so long as there are some switching costs—as I have argued there are, in Section 

IV.A.A.2.—then there can be a benefit to deception. The logic is simply that a consumer 

who discovers deception and is deciding whether to switch compares two options: 

 Option A (switch): search for an alternative, familiarize themselves with this new 

product, re-enter their information, and continue their taxes. 

 Option B (stay): continue their taxes. 

61. The costs included in option A are ‘sunk’ in option B—they’ve already been paid.50 So 

long as the benefits of switching to the tax preparation service in A do not outweigh the 

extra costs of using A, the consumer won’t switch, and Intuit can profit from them. As I 

will explain in the next section, a deception may also deter consumers from searching for 

alternatives if their trust in similar advertisements is generally undermined. 

3. Mr. Deal omits the anticompetitive benefits of deception from his 

analysis 

62. Mr. Deal omits from his discussions in Sections IV.A., IV.B.2., and IV.C of his report the 

anticompetitive benefits of deception from his analysis. One ‘side effect’—though it may 

well be the most important effect—of deception is that it makes it more difficult for 

consumers to rely on ads, which can incur a cost on all firms in the industry—not just the 

deceiving firm. This is a canonical application of models of “adverse selection”— 

situations in which undesirable behavior drives out desirable behavior, because it is hard to 

distinguish one from the other: 

49 Deal Report, ¶¶ 26-27. 

50 Edward Lazear, “Bait and Switch,” Journal of Political Economy, The University of Chicago, Vol. 103, No. 4 

(1995): 813-830. 

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There are many markets in which buyers use some market statistic to 

judge the quality of prospective purchases. In this case there is 

incentive for sellers to market poor quality merchandise since the 

returns for good quality accrue mainly to the entire group whose 

statistic is affected rather than to the individual seller.... Consider a 

market in which... quality may be represented, or it may be 

misrepresented. The purchaser's problem, of course, is to identify 

quality. The presence of... dishonest dealings tend to drive honest 

dealings out of the market....The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not 

only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also 

must include the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of 

existence.51 

It is also a result of canonical models of deception in the ‘cheap talk’ literature. In these 

models, deception can persist in equilibrium, but it makes communication less effective.52 

63. This means the deceiving firm can benefit not only because it unfairly acquires consumers, 

but also because it makes it harder for its competitors to acquire consumers. Specifically, 

Intuit’s free claims would have made it harder for competitors to advertise their own free 

products, because, after encountering Intuit’s deception, consumers would have come to 

doubt that those products are, in fact, free. It might have likewise made it harder for them 

to advertise other product features. 

64. Deal’s failure to consider the negative consequences of deception on consumers’ ability to 

understand and rely on ads also leads him to fail to consider an important burden imposed 

on consumers of tax preparation software by Intuit’s deception: that its deception made it 

harder for consumers to understand and rely upon ads for tax preparation services. This 

51 George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” The Quarterly 

Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3 (1970): 488-500, at pp. 488 and 495. 

52 See George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” The 

Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3 (1970): 488-500, at p. 495 (“The Lemons model can be used to 

make some comments on the costs of dishonesty. Consider a market in which goods are sold honestly or 

dishonestly; quality may be represented, or it may be misrepresented. The purchaser's problem, of course, is to 

identify quality. The presence of people in the market who are willing to offer inferior goods tends to drive the 

market out of existence –as in the case of our automobile ‘lemons.’ It is this possibility that represents the major 

costs of dishonesty -for dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the market. There may be 

potential buyers of good quality products and there may be potential sellers of such products in the appropriate 

price range; however, the presence of people who wish to pawn bad wares as good wares tends to drive out the 

legitimate business. The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is 

cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence.”). 

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would not only disincentivize TurboTax customers from searching for alternatives as we 

just discussed, but also impact consumers who don’t use TurboTax. For all of these 

consumers, they would, likewise be less likely to search, and thus end up in a product that 

does not suit their needs as well. It could also lead consumers to distrust DIY services and, 

thus, pay more for ‘live’ ones. In other words, deception does not just lead to ill-gotten 

gains, it also harms all consumers by making it harder to make well-informed decisions in 

the marketplace, which has implications for the products they purchase, and the gains they 

obtain from engaging in the marketplace. 

V. Mr. Deal’s analysis of Intuit’s business strategy is largely irrelevant, and 

consistent with deception 

65. In this section, I address Mr. Deal’s arguments regarding Intuit’s “actual business 

strategy.” In my view, Mr. Deal’s analysis in Section V of his report is unpersuasive 

because: (1) none of his points about Intuit’s business model preclude that Intuit engaged 

in deception; and (2) his analysis ignores large swaths of consumers who were or could 

have been deceived by Intuit’s advertisements. Below, I will address each of his primary 

arguments. 

A. Contrary to Mr. Deal’s conclusion, Intuit’s strategy of retaining 

customers for the long term can increase benefits to deception 

66. Mr. Deal emphasizes in Section V.A. of his report that Intuit derives value from retaining 

customers over the long term.53 Although his support is limited,54 my primary response is 

that this does not preclude deceiving consumers into showing up in the first place. In fact, I 

53 Deal Report, ¶ 59 (“Intuit’s long-term business strategy, as observed in its public statements, internal 

documents, and behavior, is based on retaining existing customers by improving customer experiences and 

expanding its market share at both “ends” of the tax preparation market.”); ¶ 63 (“Intuit is incentivized to 

retain customers who might otherwise leave for assisted tax preparation products.”); ¶ 65 (“Intuit is further 

incentivized to retain customers over the long term due to high customer acquisition costs (approximately 

$40 for DIY but $120 for TurboTax Live customers in TY18.).”). 

54 For example, Mr. Deal’s footnote for the statement that “Intuit’s long-term business strategy, as observed in 

its public statements, internal documents, and behavior, is based on retaining existing customers by 

improving customer experiences and expanding its market share at both “ends” of the tax preparation 

market” is a cite to a single document. Deal Report, ¶ 59. 

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find that some of the evidence Mr. Deal cites in his explanation actually support that Intuit 

could have benefitted by deceiving its customers. 

67. Mr. Deal argues in Section V.A. of his report that, for Intuit, offering a free tax preparation 

product for simple returns is a key driver of Intuit’s growth, and that it was designed to 

drive consideration of “not just customers with simple tax situations but of all 

customers.”55 Specifically, he states: 

Getting customers to try out TurboTax and retaining these customers 

over the long term, including when their taxes become more 

complicated, is an essential part of Intuit’s business strategy, not an 

attempt to deceive them into believing that TurboTax is free for all 

customers, that all TurboTax products are free, or that TurboTax is 

always free for them as Complaint Counsel allege at varying times.56 

68. Mr. Deal also provides a number of quotes emphasizing the importance of retention.57 For 

example, Mr. Deal references Greg Johnson, Intuit’s former General Manager of the 

Consumer Group as saying that “Intuit’s strategy of ‘winning in free’ means getting 

consumers to consider TurboTax.”58 Mr. Deal concludes that this desire to get consumers 

to consider TurboTax is inconsistent with deception.59 The problem with this logic is the 

same problem that I have already highlighted: Mr. Deal presumes that deceived consumers 

would not use TurboTax. However, as already discussed in Section IV, there is neither 

theoretical nor empirical evidence for this. If consumers were more likely to use TurboTax 

following a deception, then the deception would have aided Intuit in the described strategy. 

69. Mr. Deal also explains in Section V.A. of his report that internal documents estimate that 

the “5-year lifetime value of new customers in 2019 was $292 for customers using paid 

55 See Deal Report, ¶¶ 60–61. 

56 Deal Report, ¶ 61 [emphasis in original]. 

57 Deal Report, ¶ 59 (“Intuit’s long-term business strategy, as observed in its public statements, internal 

documents, and behavior, is based on retaining existing customers by improving customer experiences and 

expanding its market share at both “ends” of the tax preparation market.”). 

58 Deal Report, ¶ 61. 

59 See, Deal Report, ¶ 63. 

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DIY TurboTax products and $511 for TurboTax Live customers.”60 He points out that 

“These values far exceed the one-time revenue that might be derived from a strategy that 

would—at least hypothetically—extract payment in the year of deception but lose the 

customer thereafter.”61 Again, the problem with this logic is that Mr. Deal presumes, for 

instance, in Section IV.B. of his report, that deceived consumers would not use or return to 

TurboTax, and, again, I emphasize that if (and I’ve argued can be the case in Section 

IV)—this is not true, and the deceived consumer was more likely to become a 5-year 

lifetime user, then the deception was especially beneficial to Intuit. 

70. To summarize, contrary to Mr. Deal’s conclusion, a strategy of consumer retention does 

not preclude—and can even increase the benefit from—deception. 

B. Mr. Deal’s claims about the TurboTax website’s design do not 

preclude deception 

71. Mr. Deal’s discussion in Section V.B. of his report about the TurboTax website and its 

design to funnel users to the ‘right’ products does not nullify the deception in Intuit’s 

advertisements. Mr. Deal begins by discussing the fact that internet advertisements are 

intended to “target consumers who are likely to have simple tax returns.”62 First, this 

creates an unduly limited consumer set that ignores all of the customers who reached 

TurboTax’s website from means other than targeted ads, including through Intuit’s widely 

disseminated television ads that ran,63 for example, during the Super Bowl. Mr. Deal 

justifies this exclusion by saying that there are not data connecting exposure to TV 

advertisements to specific customer data, and that consumer purchase decisions are not 

determined solely through exposure to TV advertising.64 The fact that Mr. Deal does not 

have data linking TV advertisements to consumers does not mean these advertisements did 

60 Deal Report, ¶ 63. 

61 Deal Report, ¶ 63. 

62 Deal Report, ¶ 66. 

63 See, e.g., Remote Deposition of Connor T. Benbrook, in the matter of Intuit, Inc., a corporation, No. 9408, 53: 

3-25, October 25, 2022 (“Q...What kinds of ads had you seen for TurboTax? A. Television ads, online ads and 

physical ads via, you know, bus stop whatchamacallits and benches and the such...The words ‘free’ and the 

‘zero dollar’ repeated numerous times across all ads...occasionally the word ‘guaranteed’ as well.”). 

64 Deal Report, ¶ 150 and note 312. 

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not deceive consumers. Likewise, the fact that consumers do not make decisions solely 

based on TV advertisements does not mean these advertisements did not deceive 

consumers. 

72. Second, the fact that internet advertisements are targeted fails to address whether Intuit’s 

targeted internet advertisements for its Free Edition actually attracted a meaningful number 

of consumers who could not file for free. Regarding this second point, it is common 

practice for companies to track which advertisements users clicked on to arrive at their 

website. In its response to an FTC Civil Investigative Demand, Intuit has demonstrated that 

it has data65 that would reveal whether a meaningful number of consumers who could not 

file for free clicked on advertisements for Free Edition. That Mr. Deal relied upon quotes 

from Intuit executives rather than relying on such data makes me place more weight on the 

possibility that such data would be consistent with substantial deception. 

73. Mr. Deal continues by discussing features of turbotax.com’s landing page which he claims 

are designed to elicit more information from consumers so as to funnel customers to “the 

expected appropriate product.” I have two criticisms of this argument. First, it is irrelevant: 

the Complaint focuses on whether consumers were deceived by Intuit’s advertisements, 

which would have occurred prior to consumers seeing the claims on TurboTax’s website.66 

Regardless of what happened on the website, Intuit’s advertisements could have been 

deceptive with the goal of bringing consumers to the site in the first place. Second, it is 

unclear to me that Mr. Deal is right that the TurboTax’s landing page reflects Intuit’s 

strategy to funnel consumers to the right product. As Deal’s Fig. 5 shows, Intuit presented 

consumers with the option “I want to maximize deductions and credits”, in the (most 

prominent)67 top-left position. Given that all consumers would want this, the fact that a 

65 See, e.g., GX 80, at INTUIT_FFA_FTC_C013.09 to .012 (CC-00000844 to 847). 

66 Videoconference Deposition of Joseph Walter In the matter of Intuit, Inc., a corporation, No. 9408, 33:2-6, 

November 30, 2022 (“Q. And where did you see advertisements that said ‘free’? A. Websites and on TV. Q. 

What website? A. TurboTax website.”) 

67 William Lidwell, Kritina Holden, and Jill Butler, Universal Principles of Design, (Rockport Publishers, 2010), 

118 (“The Gutenberg diagram divides a display medium into four quadrants: the primary optimal area at the 

left, the terminal area at the bottom right, the strong fallow area at the top right, and the weak fallow area at the 

bottom left. According to the diagram, Western readers naturally begin a the primary optical area and move 

across and down the display medium in a series of sweeps in the terminal area.”); Jakob Nielsen, “F-Shaped 

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consumer clicks on this button should not provide Intuit with any information that would 

aid it in funneling customers to the appropriate product. The design of the website 

therefore reflects other considerations, and importantly, there is the possibility that this 

button was included to funnel people into paid products, rather than the “appropriate” 

product.68 

74. Mr. Deal continues by arguing, in the same section of his report, that some customers 

“start in Free Edition despite knowing [they] likely [have] a more complex tax return”69 or 

“may disregard a recommendation to start in paid product and decide to try Free Edition 

with the knowledge that they may have to upgrade to a paid product.”70 This does not rule 

out that many started in Free Edition without knowing they had a more complex tax 

return.71 Moreover, I note that, the only evidence Mr. Deal provides for the theory that 

people who know they are likely to have to pay might still start in the Free Edition comes 

from a single Wirecutter article which recommends “most people should start with Free 

Edition.... And upgrade to Deluxe only if you’re required to.”72 

Pattern For Reading Web Content (original study),” Neilsen Norman Group, accessed January 27, 2023. (“In 

our new eyetracking study, we recorded how 232 users looked at thousands of Web pages. We found that users’ 

main reading behavior was fairly consistent across many different sites and tasks. The dominant reading pattern 

looks somewhat like an F and the following three components: Users read in a horizontal movement, usually 

across the upper part of the content area.”). 

68 See, e.g., Zoom Examination of Benjamin T. Dukatz, In the Matter of Intuit, Inc., a corporation, No. 9408, 63: 

16-24, September 29, 2022 (“Q And then going back to the top where there are four headings that read "Free 

Edition," "Deluxe," "Premier" and "Self-Employed," do you see the Free Edition option? A I do. Yes. Q And 

having looked at this page, do you have an understanding of who would be eligible to use the Free Edition? A 

No.”). 

69 Deal Report, ¶ 72. 

70 Deal Report, ¶ 73 citing Melanie Pinola, “The Best Online Tax Filing Software,” Wirecutter, April 18, 

2022, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611941. 

71 See, e.g., Oral Deposition of Shaun Ryan Dougher, In the Matter of Intuit, Inc., a corporation, No. 9408 

33:12-19, November 9, 2022 (“Q. Under Free Edition, it also says, "For simple tax returns only." ... Q. Do 

you know what that means? A. "For simple"? I don't know. What does it mean? For, like, simple tax 

returns? I don't know.”); see also, Oral Deposition of Denise Robinson, In the Matter of Intuit, Inc., a 

corporation, No 9408, 59:10-21, November 29, 2022 (“A...Yes, it says “Free Edition”. It’s always switching 

you into deluxe. No matter what you do, you cannot back out of the deluxe...I attempted to file free for 

every tax year you have on here. It pushed me into the deluxe edition and would not let me do anything, 

otherwise.”) 

72 Deal Report, ¶ 73 and note 171, quoting Melanie Pinola, “The Best Online Tax Filing Software,” Wirecutter, 

April 18, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/reviews/best-tax-software/, INTUIT-FTC-PART3-

000611941. 

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75. Mr. Deal concludes that, “Given this strategy, it would be inaccurate to assume that 

starting a tax return in TurboTax Free Edition and later having to upgrade to a different 

product should be interpreted as an initial expectation of being able to file for free.”73 This 

is a strawman. The FTC has not claimed this, nor is it a prerequisite for there to have been 

deception. 

C. Contrary to Mr. Deal’s claims, Intuit’s efforts to improve customer 

experience and reduce time and effort to file taxes do not preclude 

deception 

76. In Section V.C. of his report, Mr. Deal sets up a straw man, asserting that the Complaint 

alleges that Intuit intentionally makes it “more difficult and time consuming to complete 

one’s tax return” before informing users of the need to pay.74 He argues that such a “bait 

and switch” strategy is unlikely because “[c]ontrary to Complaint Counsel’s allegations, 

most TurboTax customers with complex tax needs do not invest significant time and effort 

filling in their taxes before they are notified of the need to pay,”75 and that Intuit has 

introduced many features “that reduce the amount of manual entry required by TurboTax 

customers, making it easier, more efficient, and ultimately faster for customers to complete 

their taxes.”76 

77. I disagree with Deal’s conclusion for three key reasons. First, as I said in the previous 

section, the question of whether deception occurred relates to consumers’ beliefs prior to 

arriving at the website. Whether they could then switch easily can be relevant for whether 

Intuit could profit from the deception, and how much harm consumers experienced from 

the deception, but does not determine whether deception occurred. 

73 Deal Report, ¶73. 

74 Deal Report, ¶ 78. 

75 Deal Report, ¶ 78 [emphasis in original]. 

76 Deal Report, ¶ 78 [emphasis in original]. 

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78. Second, the same is true for whether Intuit made entering tax information more efficient. 

This, too, could impact the harm from the deception, but it could not impact whether 

deception occurred. 

79. Third, the introduction of features that reduce time spent on manual entry, does not 

preclude deception. Intuit likely faces competitive pressures that lead it to invest in 

reducing the amount of manual entry required by TurboTax customers. These pressures 

exist regardless of deception, and the fact that Intuit makes these investments tells us 

nothing about whether they are motivated to deceive in theory, much less whether they 

actually deceived in practice. 

80. In sum, I find this section does not change my opinion on whether Intuit engaged in 

deception. 

D. Mr. Deal’s contention that Intuit employs a “try before you buy” 

business model and does not have any means to prevent customer 

defection again ignores the fact that consumers who have begun 

filling out their taxes have a disincentive to switch services 

81. In Section V.D. of his report, Mr. Deal points out that Intuit employs a “try before you 

buy” business model and does “not have any means to prevent customer defection.” Based 

on this, Mr. Deal precludes that consumers can be “locked-in” in to TurboTax: “Contrary 

to Complaint Counsel’s allegations that Intuit requires its customers to invest significant 

time and effort filling out their taxes (thus implying they will inevitably file using 

TurboTax), many customers do abandon their returns before completion.”77 Before 

responding to this argument, I emphasize that it does not inform us as to whether deception 

occurred. As discussed in the preceding sections, deception occurs prior to, and regardless 

of, switching. 

82. As for Mr. Deal’s argument, I highlight that it conflates the colloquial use of “locked-in” 

with the economic term of art, which just means that once customers have begun filling out 

77 Deal Report, ¶ 87. 

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85

85. I reply to this in the same way I replied in Section IV. First, the number of consumers who 

defect is not a function of switching costs alone—it reflect costs and benefits of switching. 

Second, the fact that consumers can defect does not inform us as to the advantage gained 

by Intuit prior to this defection, as a consequence of the fact that the consumer has ‘sunk’ 

time and energy into entering their taxes into TurboTax, and, in deciding to switch, is 

comparing a product for which they would not have to put in this time and energy again 

(TurboTax) to one in which the consumer would need to expend additional time and 

energy to, for example, create an account, familiarize themselves with the product, and 

either manually reenter their information or transfer it. 

86. Finally, in this section, Mr. Deal brings up what he says is TurboTax’s strategy of pursuing 

customer satisfaction: “Intuit’s business model is based on customer lifetime value, 

meaning retaining customers for multiple years and generating revenue across multiple 

years from the possibility of their repeated patronage. Offering a free version of TurboTax 

is a core component of Intuit’s business strategy to build customer satisfaction and 

loyalty.” Towards this aim, Mr. Deal brings up TurboTax customer reviews, as well as 

quotes from executives. I respond that TurboTax’s customer reviews are highly skewed 

because one cannot leave a review without completing one’s filing with TurboTax. This 

means that consumers who did not file because they were dissatisfied with TurboTax 

would not be eligible to leave a review. Likewise, any review of the TurboTax Free 

Edition product is necessarily from a consumer who completed filing their taxes in the free 

product. Additionally, consumers may be deceived into using TurboTax, but still end up 

being satisfied with the product. 

VI. Contrary to the conclusion Mr. Deal reaches with his empirical analysis, 

a large number of consumers could have been deceived by Intuit’s claims 

87. In this section, I respond to the data analysis in Section VI and Section VII of the Deal 

Report. In these sections, Mr. Deal considers TurboTax customers in FY21. He organizes 

these customers into three main categories: “Filed Federal and State Tax Returns for Free;” 

“Explored TurboTax and Pursued Other Options;” and “Paid to File and Expressed 

85 Deal Report, ¶ 11. 

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VII. Conclusion 

135. As set forth in my rebuttal report at Sections III to V, and contrary to the arguments of 

Mr. Deal’s, Intuit’s economic incentives and business strategy are not inconsistent with 

deception. Moreover, and as set forth in my rebuttal report at Section VI, Mr. Deal’s data 

analysis does not disprove complaint counsel’s theory of deception. In sum, the Deal 

Report fails to support for Intuit’s position that deception did not occur. 

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Appendix - Qualifications of Erez Yoeli 

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 

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• Director, Applied Cooperation Team (2015–present) 

• Research Scientist, MIT Sloan Human Cooperation Lab (2018–present) 

• Visiting Faculty, Harvard University Department of Economics (2016–present) 

• External Graduate Faculty, University of Maine School of Marine Sciences (2021–present) 

• Affiliated Researcher, Harvard University Program for Evolutionary Dynamics (2017– 

2020) 

• Research Scientist, Yale Human Cooperation Lab (2017–2018) 

• Research Scientist, Harvard University Program for Evolutionary Dynamics (2015–2017) 

• Affiliated Researcher, Yale Human Cooperation Lab (2015–2017) 

• Visiting Scholar, Harvard University Program for Evolutionary Dynamics (2012–2015) 

• Economist, Federal Trade Commission (2009–2015) 

EDUCATION 

• University of Chicago Booth School of Business, MBA (2008) and PhD in Economics 

(2009) 

• Stanford University, AB in Economics with Departmental Honors (2003) 

• Columbia University (1999–2000) 

• Manhattan School of Music (1999) 

BOOKS 

• Moshe Hoffman and Erez Yoeli. 2022. Hidden Games: The Surprising Power of Game Theory 

to Explain Irrational Human Behavior. Basic Books 

ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS 

• Justin Boutilier, Erez Yoeli, Jon Rathauser, Philip Owiti, Ramnath Subbaraman, and Jonas 

Oddur Jonasson. 2022. “Can digital adherence technologies reduce inequity in tuberculosis 

treatment success? Evidence from a randomised controlled trial.” British Medical Journal 

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Global Health, 7 

• Lukas Hensel, Marc Witte, Stefano Caria, Thiemo Fetzer, Stefano Fiorin, Friedrich M. 

Goetz, Margarita Gomez, Johannes Haushofer, Andriy Ivchenko, Gordon Kraft-Todd, 

Elena Reutskaja, Christopher Roth, Erez Yoeli, and Jon M. Jachimowicz. 2021. “Global 

Behaviors, Perceptions, and the Emergence of Social Norms at the Onset of the COVID19 Pandemic.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 193 

• Justin Boutilier, Jonas Jonasson, and Erez Yoeli. 2021. “Improving TB Treatment 

Adherence Support: The Case for Targeted Behavioral Interventions.” Manufacturing and 

Service Operations Management. Finalist, the INFORMS William Pierskalla Best Paper 

Competition. 

• Juan Palacios, Yichun Fan, Erez Yoeli, Jianghao Wang, Yuchen Chai, Weizeng Sun, David 

Rand, and Siqi Zheng. 2022. “Encouraging the resumption of economic activity after 

COVID-19: Evidence from a large scale field experiment in China.” Proceedings of the 

National Academy of Sciences, 119(5) 

• Jillian Jordan, Erez Yoeli, and David Rand. 2021. “Don’t get it or don’t spread it: 

Comparing self- interested versus prosocial motivations for COVID-19 prevention 

behaviors.” Nature Scientific Reports, 11 

• Zoe Rahwan, Erez Yoeli, and Barbara Fasolo. 2019. “Heterogeneity in Banker Culture and 

its Influence on Dishonesty.” Nature, 575(7782), 345-349• Erez Yoeli, Jon Rathauser, 

Syon Bhanot, Maureen Kimenye, Eunice Mailu, Enos Masini, Philip Owiti, and David 

Rand. 2019. “Digital Health Support in Treatment for Tuberculosis.” The New England 

Journal of Medicine, 381: 986-987 

• Syon Bhanot, Gordon Kraft-Todd, David Rand, and Erez Yoeli. 2018. “Putting Social 

Rewards and Identity Salience to the Test: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Teachers 

in Philadelphia.” Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, 1(1): 1-16 

• Erez Yoeli, David Budescu, Amanda Carrico, Magali Delmas, Paul Ferraro, Hale Forster, 

Carol Heller, Howard Kunreuther, Ezra Markowitz, Bruce Tonn, Michael Vandenbergh, 

Rick Larrick, Mark Lubell, and Elke Weber. 2017. “Behavioral Science Tools for Energy 

and Environmental Policy.” Behavioral Science & Policy, 3(1): 69-79 

• Todd Rogers, John Ternovski, and Erez Yoeli. 2016. “Potential Follow-up Increases 

Private Contributions to Public Goods.” The Proceedings of the National Academy of 

Sciences, 113 (19): 5218-5220 

• Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli, and Martin Nowak. 2015. “Cooperate Without Looking.” The 

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112.6: 1727-1732 

• Gordon Kraft-Todd, Erez Yoeli, Syon Bhanot, and David Rand. 2015. “Promoting 

Cooperation in the Field.” Current Opinions in Behavioral Sciences 3: 96-101 

• Dave Rand, Erez Yoeli, and Moshe Hoffman. 2014. “Harnessing Reciprocity to Promote 

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Cooperation and the Provisioning of Public Goods.” Policy Insights from Behavioral and 

Brain Sciences, 1.1: 263-269 

• Erez Yoeli, Moshe Hoffman, David Rand, and Martin Nowak. 2013. “Powering Up With 

Indirect Reciprocity in a Large-Scale Field Experiment.” The Proceedings of the National 

Academy of Sciences 110 (Supplement 2): 10424-10429 

PUBLICATIONS IN THE POPULAR PRESS 

• “Nudging Consumers to Purchase More Sustainably,” Harvard Business Review, August 

11, 2022 

• “How Game Theory Explains Why We Have to Sanction Putin—Even If It’s Costly,” 

Politico, April 21, 2022, with Moshe Hoffman 

• “The Resurgence of Tuberculosis is Behavioral, not Medical. Nudges Can Fix It,” STAT, 

October 25, 2019, with Dave Rand 

• “Is the Key to Successful Prosocial Nudges Reputation?” Behavioral Scientist, July 31, 

2018 

• “Feeling helpless about the US election? Five things you can do to get out the vote in 

2016,” Quartz, November 2, 2016, with Moshe Hoffman and Dave Rand 

• “The Trick to Acting Heroically,” The New York Times, August 28, 2015, with Dave 

Rand 

• “How to Get People to Pitch In,” The New York Times, May 15, 2015, with Gordon 

Kraft-Todd, Syon Bhanot, and Dave Rand 

• “How to Prevent Summer Blackouts,” The New York Times, July 5, 2014, with Moshe 

Hoff- man and Dave Rand 

• “Effective Red Lines,” The Economist, September 14-20 2013, with Moshe Hoffman 

• “Assigning Property Rights to Human Tissue,” Rady Business Journal, Winter 2013, with 

Marcella Bothwell 

• “The Risks of Avoiding a Debate on Gender Differences,” Rady Business Journal, Winter 

2013, with Moshe Hoffman 

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Appendix - Documents Relied Upon 

Legal Pleadings Document Date 

[1] Complaint. Before the Federal Trade Commission. In the Matter of 

Intuit Inc., a corporation. March 28, 2022. FTC Docket No. 9408. 

3/28/2022 

[2] Complaint Counsel’s Motion for Summary Decision, In the Matter 

of Intuit Inc., a corporation, FTC Docket No. 9408, August 22, 

2022. 

Expert Reports and Related Exhibits 

[3] Expert Report of Bruce F. Deal. In the Matter of Intuit Inc., a 

corporation. Docket No. 9408. January 13, 2023. 

1/13/2023 

[4] Expert Report of Professor John R. Hauser, SC.D. In the Matter of 

Intuit Inc., a corporation. Docket No. 9408. January 13, 2023. 

1/13/2023 

[5] Expert Report of Nathan Novemsky, Ph.D. In the Matter of Intuit 

Inc., a corporation. Docket No. 9408. December 9, 2022. 

12/9/2022 

[6] Expert Report of Peter N. Golder, Ph.D. In the Matter of Intuit Inc., 

a corporation. Docket No. 9408. January 13, 2023. 

1/13/2023 

[7] Expert Report of Rebecca Kirk Fair. In the Matter of Intuit Inc., a 

corporation. Docket No. 9408. January 13, 2023. 

1/13/2023 

Depositions 

[8] Remote Deposition of Caitlyn Beck. In the Matter of Intuit, Inc., a 

corporation. No. 9408, October 13, 2022 

10/13/2022 

[9] Remote Deposition of Connor T. Benbrook. In the Matter of Intuit, 

Inc., a corporation. No. 9408. October 25, 2022. 

10/25/2022 

[10] Videotaped Deposition of Angela R. Derscha. In the Matter of 

Intuit, Inc., a corporation. No. 9408. November 29, 2022. 

11/29/2022 

[11] Oral Deposition of Shaun Ryan Dougher. In the Matter of Intuit, 

Inc., a corporation. No. 9408. November 9, 2022. 

11/9/2022 

[12] Zoom Examination of Benjamin T. DuKatz. In the Matter of Intuit, 

Inc., a corporation. No. 9408. September 29, 2022. 

9/29/2022 

[13] Oral Deposition of Denise Robinson. In the Matter of Intuit, Inc., a 

corporation. No 9408. November 29, 2022. 

11/29/2022 

[14] Videoconference Deposition of Joseph Walter. In the Matter of 

Intuit, Inc., a corporation. No. 9408. November 30, 2022. 

11/30/2022 

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Governance and Regulatory 

[15] Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial 

Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread 

Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts,” 

September 8, 2016, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-fines-wellsfargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-openingunauthorized-accounts/. 

9/8/2016 

[16] 

[17] 

Federal Trade Commission Press Release, “AT&T to Pay $60 

Million to Resolve FTC Allegations It Misled Consumers with 

‘Unlimited Data’ Promises,” November 5, 2019, 

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/11/attpay-60-million-resolve-ftc-allegations-it-misled-consumersunlimited-data-promises. 

The United States Department of Justice. "Herfindahl-Hirschman 

Index." Accessed January 26, 2023. 

https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index. 

11/5/2019 

7/26/2023 

Academic Literature 

[18] 

[19] 

[20] 

[21] 

Akerlof, George A. and Shiller, Robert J. “Phishing for Phools: The 

Economics of Manipulation and Deception.” Princeton University 

Press (2015). 

Akerlof, George. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty 

and the Market Mechanism.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 

Vol. 84, No. 3 (1970): 488-500. 

Dreber, Anna, Rand, David G., Fudenberg, Drew, and Nowak, 

Martin, A. "Winners Don’t Punish." Nature. Vol 452, No. 7185 

(2008): 348-351. 

Farrell, Joseph and Rabin, Matthew. “Cheap Talk,” Journal of 

Economic Perspectives. Vol. 10, No. 3 (1996): 103-118. 

2015 

1970 

2008 

1996 

[22] Foad, Hisham. Behavioral Finance: Investors, Corporations, and 

Market. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (2010). 

2010 

[23] Gillespie et al. "A Tangled Web: Views of Deception from the 

Customer’s Perspective." Business Ethics. A European Review. Vol. 

25, No. 2 (2016). 

2016 

[24] Horner, Johannes. “Reputation and Competition.” The American 

Economic Review. Vol. 92, No. 3 (June 2002): 644-663. 

2002 

[25] Klein, Benjamin and Leffler, Keith B. “The Role of Market Forces 

in Assuring Contractual Performance.” Journal of Political 

Economy. Vol. 89. No. 41 (1981): 615-641. 

1981 

[26] Lazear, Edward P. “Bait and Switch.” Journal of Political 

Economy. Vol. 103, No. 4 (1995): 813-830. 

1995 

[27] Lidwell, William, Kritina Holden, and Jill Butler. Universal 

Principles of Design.(Rockport Publishers, 2010). 

2010 

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[28] 

[29] 

Nielsen, Jakob. “F-Shaped Pattern For Reading Web Content 

(original study)." Neilsen Norman Group, 

https://www.nngroup.com/articles/f-shaped-pattern-reading-webcontent-discovered/. 

Raval, Devesh. “Whose Voice Do We Hear in the Marketplace? 

Evidence from Consumer Complaining Behavior.” Marketing 

Science. Vol. 39, No. 1 (2020): 168-187. 

2006 

2020 

[30] 

[31] 

Veelen, Matthijs V., García, Julián, Rand, David G., Nowak, Martin 

A. “Direct Reciprocity in Structured Populations.” PNAS. Vol. 109, 

No. 25 (2012). 

Osborne, Martin J. and Rubinstein, Ariel. A Course in Game 

Theory.Cambridge, Massachusetts. The MIT Press (1994). 

2012 

1994 

[32] Zajonc, Robert B. "Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure." Journal 

of Personality and Social Psychology. Vol. 9, No. 2 (1968). 

1968 

Websites 

[33] CNBC. "Tesla Breaks into America’s Bestselling Cars List for 

2022, but Trucks Still Dominate." January 7, 2023. 

https://www.cnbc.com/2023/01/07/americas-top-10-bestsellingcars-of-2022-tesla-makes-the-cut.html. 

1/26/2023 

Produced Documents 

[34] INTUIT_FFA_FTC_C01. 

[35] INTUIT_FFA_FTC_C013. 

[36] INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000593208. 

[37] INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000602376. 

[38] INTUIT-FTC-PART3-000611941. 

*Note: I also considered any other documents specifically cited in 

the report, but not listed in this appendix. 

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