Filed 8/28/24 L.A. Dong San Church Corp. v. Moon CA2/2

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

LOS ANGELES DONG SAN 

CHURCH CORPORATION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DANA MOON et al.,

Defendants and 

Respondents.

 B325926

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 21STCV36918)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Barbara Ann Meiers, Judge. Affirmed.

Henry M. Lee for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Jason W. Shim and Jason W. Shim for 

Defendants and Respondents.
2

Los Angeles Dong San Church Corporation (LADSC) 

appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained a 

demurrer without leave to amend in favor of defendants and 

respondents Dana M. Dorsett also known as Dana Moon; Jeffrey 

Dorsett; Mark Hu; and Moon & Dorsett, PC (respondents) on 

LADSC’s claims against respondents for breach of fiduciary duty; 

legal malpractice; and conversion. We affirm.

BACKGROUND—THE FACTION CONTROL CASE

Respondents are former attorneys for Young Chun Park 

(Pastor Park), Mee Young Koba, and Eric Soo Chul Kang. 

Respondents represented Pastor Park, Koba and Kang 

(sometimes referred to as the withdrawing faction) in a prior 

lawsuit (the faction control case) in which the withdrawing 

faction purported to represent LADSC and further purported to 

withdraw LADSC from the Korean Methodist Church (KMC) and 

the Korean Methodist Church of the Americas (KMCA).1

The initial March 2017 complaint in the faction control case 

was filed by LADSC against Pastor Park, alleging causes of 

action for declaratory relief, breach of fiduciary duty, accounting, 

1 “KMC is a hierarchical religious organization formed in the 

late 1800’s but formally established as an entity in 1930. KMC 

has grown over the years to have 6,000 local member churches 

globally. The organization of KMC is based on the Wesleyan 

faith.

“The global organization is divided into geographical 

regions. KMCA represents one of the geographical regions. It 

covers the North American territories, part of Mexico, and part of 

Canada.” (Los Angeles Dong San Church Corp. v. Park (July 15, 

2020, B292605, B294232) [nonpub. opn.].)
3

and quiet title.2 In June 2017, KMC, KMCA, and LADSC filed 

the second amended complaint, naming as defendants Pastor 

Park and then-officers Koba and Kang. The second amended 

complaint also named LADSC as a defendant. The second 

amended complaint sought to void the defendants’ withdrawal 

from KMC and KMCA and affirm KMC and KMCA’s control of 

LADSC. At the time, LADSC’s current counsel, Henry Lee, 

represented the plaintiffs, and Karen Jung represented the 

defendants.

On December 14, 2017, the trial court granted a 

preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs KMC, KMCA and 

LADSC ousting the withdrawing faction from the premises of 

LADSC and charging KMC, KMCA and LADSC with the duty to 

conduct the affairs of the church until further order of the court.

In December 2017, the withdrawing faction moved for 

summary adjudication to quiet title in favor of LADSC.

In January 2018, respondents substituted in as counsel for 

the withdrawing faction. This was approximately a month after 

the withdrawing faction had already lost control of and access to 

2 Documents from the faction control case, including the trial 

court judgment and this court’s final opinion in the appeal from 

the judgment (Los Angeles Dong San Church Corp. v. Park, 

supra, B292605, B294232), are part of the record in this matter. 

We have granted appellant’s request for judicial notice of the first 

amended complaint and jury verdict in the faction control case. 

While review of the sustaining of a demurrer is generally limited 

to the confines of the complaint, we may consider matters subject 

to judicial notice. (Kanter v. Reed (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 191, 

203.) On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the record on 

appeal and our opinion in the faction control case.
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LADSC premises and properties by virtue of the December 2017 

preliminary injunction.

Following briefing, on April 25, 2018, the trial court 

granted the withdrawing faction’s motion for summary 

adjudication, quieting title in favor of LADSC.

The remaining claims were bifurcated. A bench trial took 

place on the remaining equitable claims in July 2018. In 

September 2018, the trial court issued a judgment. The 

judgment quieted title to the church properties in LADSC. It 

declared that the relationship that existed among the three 

church entities prior to Pastor Park’s tenure at LADSC was not 

affected by the purported withdrawal of Pastor Park and the 

withdrawing faction. Management rights of the property of 

LADSC was to be shared by LADSC, KMC and KMCA as set 

forth in their governing documents. The withdrawing faction was 

ordered to return to LADSC any church property in their 

possession.

The withdrawing faction filed an appeal from the judgment 

in September 2018. Respondents in this matter continued to 

represent the withdrawing faction in their appeal from the 

September 2018 judgment.

In an order issued after a status conference in January 

2019, the trial court ordered, “the Moon/Dorsett firm cannot 

continue to represent, or more accurately purport to represent 

[LADSC] in this court.”

On March 28, 2019, respondents substituted out of the 

faction control case, and Attorney Brad Lee substituted in to 

represent the withdrawing faction.

A jury trial took place on the remaining cause of action for 

breach of fiduciary duty in October 2019, with Attorney Brad Lee 
5

representing the withdrawing faction. A judgment was entered 

in favor of LADSC, KMC and KMCA on November 8, 2019.

This court affirmed the judgment in favor of LADSC, KMC 

and KMCA and issued a remittitur on October 9, 2020.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 6, 2021, LADSC filed its initial complaint in 

this matter against respondents. The complaint alleged two 

causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice.3

On August 12, 2022, LADSC filed its first amended 

complaint (FAC), naming the same parties and alleging three 

causes of action: breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and 

conversion.

In the first cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, 

LADSC alleged that because respondents were purporting to 

represent LADSC in the faction control case, they owed LADSC a 

fiduciary duty, and breached such duty by falling below the 

standards of conduct set forth in various Rules of Professional 

Conduct. The second cause of action for legal malpractice 

contained similar allegations, asserting that respondents fell 

below the applicable standards of care, resulting in prejudice to 

LADSC. In the third cause of action for conversion, LADSC 

alleged that respondents converted, or aided, abetted and 

conspired with Pastor Park and the withdrawing faction to 

convert and exercise unlawful dominion over certain personal 

property, which belonged to LADSC.

On October 12, 2022, respondents filed a demurrer, arguing 

that the causes of action alleged in the complaint did not state 

3 Respondents assert that LADSC’s complaint was identical 

in all material respects to an earlier complaint filed against Jung.
6

facts sufficient to constitute causes of action, were barred by the 

applicable statutes of limitation, and were uncertain. LADSC 

opposed the demurrer.

On November 14, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on 

the demurrer. On November 16, 2022, after taking the matter 

under submission, the court issued a ruling sustaining 

respondents’ demurrer as to every cause of action without leave 

to amend. The court noted that LADSC was “seeking to recover 

for things which were before the court and the jury in the 

underlying case of L.A. Dongsan Church v. Young Chun Park, et 

el., BC654597 . . . with those same damages and issues as were 

addressed then now forming the keystone for the plaintiff’s 

current lawsuit.” The court noted that LADSC was now 

attempting “to go even further . . . in its attempt now to sue the 

attorneys who dared to represent the [withdrawing faction] even 

though what is being relied upon appears to have been asserted 

with either a lack of knowledge of or an indifference to important 

principles of law or even of public policy that require a dismissal 

of this action.”

The court cited Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) as 

providing litigation privilege to respondents for acting as the 

withdrawing faction’s attorneys in the prior matter. The court 

also made reference to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16

(anti-SLAPP statute) as prohibiting lawsuits against attorneys 

for their representation of clients in litigation. The court noted 

that, “As a matter of law, there was no breach of fiduciary duty, 

there was no legal malpractice and there was no conversion not 

already addressed and compensated in the earlier lawsuit 

between these parties and no basis for any damages shown 

herein.” 
7

On December 19, 2022, LADSC filed its appeal from the 

judgment of dismissal entered after the order sustaining the 

demurrer.

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable law and standard of review

“The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the 

complaint by raising questions of law.” (Aragon-Haas v. Family 

Security Ins. Services, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 232, 238.) 

“When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the 

complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” 

(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “‘“We treat the 

demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but 

not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.”’” 

(Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) “[W]e give the 

complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and 

its parts in their context.” (Ibid.) “‘As a reviewing court we are 

not bound by the construction placed by the trial court on the 

pleadings but must make our own independent judgment 

thereon, even as to matters not expressly ruled upon by the trial 

court.’” (Aragon-Haas, supra, at p. 239.)

When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we 

decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect 

can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has 

abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no 

abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 

Cal.3d at p. 318.) “The burden of proving such reasonable 

possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Ibid.)

It is a “fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a 

trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the 

burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the 
8

record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court 

committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” 

(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)

II. First cause of action—breach of fiduciary duty

The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are “‘(1) 

the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) its breach, and (3) 

damage proximately caused by that breach.’” (O’Neal v. 

Stanislaus County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2017) 8 

Cal.App.5th 1184, 1215.) LADSC cannot meet the elements of 

this cause of action because it has not sufficiently alleged the first 

element.

The FAC alleges that in the faction control case, LADSC 

was a named plaintiff and “named Defendant.” LADSC “filed the 

action to obtain immediate relief, including declaratory relief and 

quiet title, to purge itself of a rogue board of directors who sought 

to overturn and change the entire 24+ year organization of 

[LADSC].” The rogue board included the withdrawing faction. 

LADSC named as defendants the withdrawing faction as well as 

LADSC and alleged claims of “quiet title, declaratory relief and 

breach of fiduciary duty,” and sought a “declaration of the true 

board of [LADSC], ownership of [LADSC] assets,” as well as 

membership in KMC. When respondents substituted into the 

action in January 2018, “the substitution was signed by a 

member of the rogue, unauthorized board . . . . Therefore, 

[respondents were] never authorized at any time to act as 

attorneys of record for [LADSC].”

Because respondents were never authorized to represent 

LADSC by a legitimate member of LADSC’s board, respondents 
9

never had a fiduciary relationship with LADSC.4 Thus, LADSC 

has not made allegations sufficient to meet the first element of its 

cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against respondents, 

and the cause of action fails as a matter of law.

III. Second cause of action—legal malpractice

The elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice are 

“(1) the attorney-client relationship or other basis for duty; (2) a 

negligent act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages.” 

(Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853, 863.)

LADSC’s allegations for legal malpractice suffer from the 

same omissions as its allegations for breach of fiduciary duty. 

LADSC never authorized respondents to represent LADSC, 

therefore there was no attorney-client relationship between the 

two. The substitution of attorney which purported to begin 

respondents’ representation of the rogue LADSC was authorized 

by Pastor Park who had already been ordered, via injunction, to 

cease acting for LADSC. The substitution of attorney did not 

create an attorney-client relationship between respondents and 

LADSC. Respondents held themselves out to represent the 

withdrawing faction of LADSC, which was ultimately determined 

not to be legitimate. Under the circumstances, there was no 

attorney-client relationship between respondents and LADSC, 

and LADSC cannot maintain an action for legal malpractice 

against respondents.

LADSC complains that despite the order in the trial court 

prohibiting respondents from representing LADSC in that court, 

4 Attorneys owe no duty of care to adversaries in litigation;

therefore respondents owed no duty of care to the legitimate 

LADSC. (Acacia Patent Acquisition, LLC v. Superior Court 

(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1091, 1107.)
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respondents continued to purport to represent LADSC on appeal 

after the withdrawing faction appealed from the trial court 

judgment.

Respondents did not violate the trial court’s order 

prohibiting respondents from representing LADSC. The trial 

court’s order specified, “the Moon/ Dorsett firm cannot continue to 

represent, or more accurately purport to represent [LADSC] in 

this court.” (Italics added.) The trial court limited its order to 

that specific court. It did not prohibit respondents from 

representing LADSC in any other court. Therefore, respondents 

were not prohibited from representing the withdrawing faction, 

and the illegitimate church the withdrawing faction purported to 

represent, in the appeal from the trial court judgment.5

IV. Third cause of action—conversion

LADSC’s third cause of action for conversion alleges that 

respondents “converted, or aided, abetted and conspired with [the 

withdrawing faction] to convert and exercise unlawful dominion 

over the following personal property which at all times belonged 

5 We note that “an appeal of an order disqualifying an 

attorney automatically stays enforcement of the order.” (URS 

Corp. v. Atkinson/Walsh Joint Venture (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 

872, 887.) While respondents did not directly appeal from the 

trial court order prohibiting them from representing the 

illegitimate church in the trial court, the withdrawing faction’s 

appeal from the trial court judgment contained an argument that 

respondents were, in fact, representing the legitimate LADSC. 

Had the trial court judgment been reversed by this court, the 

order disqualifying respondents from representing LADSC would 

have also had to have been reversed. Thus, respondents were not 

prohibited from purporting to represent LADSC on appeal. The 

entity they represented was the withdrawing faction of LADSC, 

not the legitimate church.
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to the Church: computers and laptops, computer financial files 

and folder, financial records including bank statements, 

accounting ledgers, financial statements, accounts receivable and 

payable, offerings and tithes, copies of checks reflecting payments 

to [respondents] and payments on behalf of [the withdrawing 

faction], all Clients files from the [faction control case], trust 

account records, communications with [the withdrawing faction].” 

LADSC also asserts that respondents “have converted monies in 

a sum to be determined at the time of trial but estimated at 

$439,500 for the monies which were converted from Church 

accounts and transferred by unauthorized means to 

[respondents].”

The elements of a cause of action for conversion are: “‘(1) 

the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) 

the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of 

property rights; and (3) damages.’” (Hernandez v. Lopez (2009) 

180 Cal.App.4th 932, 939.)

At the same time as it makes these allegations, LADSC’s 

FAC admits that at the time respondents substituted in as 

attorneys in the faction control case, the court had already 

prohibited the withdrawing faction “from in any way acting for, 

on behalf of or even purporting to act with any authority for the 

Church,” as well as being ordered “to transfer possession and 

control of Church premises to [LADSC].” Thus, at the time 

respondents began representing the withdrawing faction, the 

withdrawing faction had no authority to exercise dominion over 

any aspect of church property.

Further, the judgment in the faction control case quieted 

title in LADSC’s properties in LADSC and ordered the 

withdrawing faction to return to LADSC any church property in 

their possession. To the extent that the withdrawing faction has 
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not complied with this order, LADSC’s sole remedy is to bring an 

action in the trial court for contempt.6 The return of property to 

LADSC has been fully litigated in the faction control case and is 

now res judicata. LADSC may not raise the issue again in the 

instant action.7

V. Leave to amend

We review the trial court’s denial of leave to amend for 

abuse of discretion. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at

p. 318.) The burden of proving a reasonable possibility that the 

deficiencies of the complaint may be cured by amendment is 

squarely on the plaintiff. (Ibid.) LADSC has failed to meet this 

6 The elements of contempt include “‘(1) a valid order, (2) 

knowledge of the order, (3) ability to comply with the order, and 

(4) willful failure to comply with the order.’” (Wanke, Industrial, 

Commercial, Residential, Inc. v. Keck (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 

1151, 1168.)

7 The elements of res judicata or issue preclusion are “‘(1) the 

issue is identical to that decided in the former proceeding, (2) the 

issue was actually litigated in the former proceeding, (3) the issue 

was necessarily decided in the former proceeding, (4) the decision 

in the former proceeding is final and on the merits, and (5) 

preclusion is sought against a person who was a party or in 

privity with a party to the former proceeding.’” (Murphy v. 

Murphy (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 376, 398-399.) As the trial court 

noted, LADSC is seeking in this matter “to recover for things 

which were before the court and the jury in the [faction control] 

case . . . with those same damages and issues as were addressed 

then now forming the keystone for [LADSC’s] current lawsuit.” 

The trial court’s order in the prior lawsuit was not restrictive; it 

required the withdrawing faction to return all property to 

LADSC. As set forth above, to the extent such property was not 

returned, the issue must be addressed through a contempt 

proceeding in that matter.
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burden. LADSC provides no information as to how the FAC 

could be amended to state any alleged cause of action, nor does it 

provide information as to other potentially plausible causes of 

action that could be raised against respondents.

LADSC argues that respondents “continue to withhold 

client files, communications [and] Church funds.” As set forth 

above, respondents’ withholding of church property must be 

addressed in the trial court by way of contempt. These assertions 

do not change the legal insufficiency of the pleading in this 

matter.8

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their 

costs of appeal.

___________________________

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

_______________________________ ___________________________

ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. HOFFSTADT, J.

8 Because we have determined that LADSC’s allegations are 

insufficient to state causes of action, we decline to discuss the 

parties’ competing arguments as to whether LADSC had 

standing to sue in the faction control case and whether the causes 

of action in the present matter are timely under the applicable 

statutes of limitation.