Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-794 | September 30, 2020 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Donald R. Shuler

Barkes, Kolbus, Rife & Shuler, LLP

Goshen, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Catherine Brizzi

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael J. Bedtelyon,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

September 30, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-794

Appeal from the Elkhart Superior 

Court

The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

20D03-1802-F4-16

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-794 | September 30, 2020 Page 2 of 11

Case Summary

[1] Michael J. Bedtelyon appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community 

corrections placement and probation. He asserts that the evidence is 

insufficient to support the finding of a violation and that the trial court abused 

its discretion in ordering that his remaining executed sentence be served in the 

Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) and in executing one year of his 

probation. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts most favorable to the judgment are as follows. On June 28, 2017, 

Elkhart police officers discovered Bedtelyon, then age twenty-five, in a public 

park with fourteen-year-old A.S., whom he had met through a smartphone 

dating application. A.S. told the officers that the two had engaged in sexual 

intercourse in the park. She underwent a forensic examination, and test results 

confirmed the presence of DNA consistent with Bedtelyon’s. Bedtelyon 

initially denied having intercourse with A.S. but eventually admitted that the 

two had engaged in sexual intercourse on three different occasions. 

[3] The State charged Bedtelyon with three counts of level 4 felony sexual 

misconduct with a minor and six class A misdemeanor counts, including two 

each for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, public indecency, and 

criminal trespass. Bedtelyon was apprehended in Georgia and eventually pled 

guilty by plea agreement to one count of level 4 felony sexual misconduct with 

a minor and one count of class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. Per the plea 
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agreement, his sentencing was open to the trial court’s discretion with the 

following limitations: sentences were to be concurrent, and any executed 

portion would be served in alternative placement. The trial court sentenced 

him to eight years, with three years executed in community corrections, with 

electronic monitoring, and five years suspended to probation. Bedtelyon 

initialed and signed the list of probation terms, many of which were conditions 

specifically applicable to sex offenders. These conditions also applied during 

his time in community corrections. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 66 (judgment 

of conviction, stating in part, “During defendant’s time on alternative 

placement, the sex offender terms of probation apply.”). The conditions

included prohibitions against accessing or using websites, chat rooms, or instant 

messaging programs frequented by children and against using a third party to 

access social media to communicate with a child. Bedtelyon was ordered to 

give probation technology representatives access to his computer and electronic 

devices for unannounced examinations and was prohibited from accessing the 

Internet or any other online service through any electronic device at any 

location without prior approval of his probation officer. Another condition

required Bedtelyon to submit to polygraph examinations. Id. at 75, 77.

[4] In January 2020, Elkhart community corrections issued a notice of violation

based on a finding that Bedtelyon had failed a polygraph examination. The 

polygraph administrator analyzed Bedtelyon’s physiological responses during 

the polygraph and found that Bedtelyon had a “significant reaction” when 

answering in the negative to two questions: “Since your last polygraph have 
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you had physical sexual contact with anyone?”; and “Since your last polygraph 

have you communicated with a minor through the Internet?” Id. at 102. 

Bedtelyon disclosed to the examiner that he had engaged in phone sex with his 

girlfriend, who is from South Africa and was living either there or in Italy at the 

time. Id. at 95. He also admitted that he had communicated with her on 

“Facebook Messenger” through his sister-in-law, that he did it to save on longdistance charges, that the sister-in-law let her minor child say hello to him, and 

that he had not disclosed this arrangement to his case manager or obtained 

permission before using a third party to access social media. Id. at 95-96. For 

all these reasons, the community corrections director petitioned the trial court

to revoke Bedtelyon’s community corrections placement. The probation 

department also filed a notice of violation against Bedtelyon, claiming that he 

used prohibited websites, chat rooms, or instant messaging programs frequented 

by children.

[5] During a community corrections disciplinary hearing, Bedtelyon admitted to 

violating the sex offender terms of his placement. Tr. Vol. 2 at 20, 23. The trial 

court conducted a violation hearing and found that Bedtelyon had violated the 

conditions of his community corrections placement by circumventing the sex 

offender rules prohibiting him from accessing social media, whether directly or 

through an intermediary, without prior approval. The court revoked his 

placement and ordered that he serve the remaining executed portion of his 

sentence in the DOC. The trial court also revoked his probation, but executed 
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one year and re-suspended the four remaining years to probation. Bedtelyon 

now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The evidence is sufficient to support the trial 

court’s conclusion that Bedtelyon violated the terms of his 

community corrections placement. 

[6] Bedtelyon asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s 

determination that he violated the conditions of his placement. Placement in a 

community corrections program or on probation is a matter of grace and not of

right. Johnson v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1224, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). For 

purposes of our review, we treat a hearing on a petition to revoke a community

corrections placement the same as we do a hearing on a petition to revoke 

probation. Id. In conducting our review, we consider the evidence and 

reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment without reweighing that 

evidence or reassessing witness credibility; if substantial evidence of probative 

value supports the court’s conclusion that a defendant has violated any terms of 

probation, we will affirm its decision to revoke the defendant’s placement/

probation. Id.

[7] Revocation of a community corrections placement or probation is a two-step 

process, wherein the trial court first makes a factual determination as to 

whether the defendant violated the terms of his placement or probation. Treece 

v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied; Woods v. State, 892 

N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). Because such a proceeding is civil in nature, the 
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State need only prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Holmes v. State, 923 N.E.2d 479, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). If a violation is 

found, the court then determines whether the violation warrants revocation. 

Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640. Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a 

revocation. Beeler v. State, 959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. 

denied. As with probationers, those who are placed in community corrections 

are subject to the conditions of that placement; if they violate those terms and 

conditions, the community corrections director may change the terms, continue 

the placement, reassign the person, or ask the trial court to revoke the person’s 

placement. Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-5(a).

[8] Bedtelyon admitted at his disciplinary hearing that he had violated the terms of 

his placement. Yet, he now contends that the State failed to meet its burden of 

demonstrating a violation during the violation hearing. He relies on the 

following language in the sex offender terms, which he initialed and signed: “8. 

You are prohibited from accessing or using certain web sites, chat rooms, or 

instant messaging programs frequented by children.”; and “9. You shall not 

use a social networking web site or an instant messaging or chat room program 

to communicate, directly or through an intermediary, with a child less than 

sixteen (16) years of age.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 75. With respect to 

condition 8, he claims that the State failed to prove that he accessed an instant 

messaging program frequented by children. During the violation hearing, the 

trial court judicially noticed that Facebook is frequented by children. The court 

stated that it lacked familiarity specifically with Facebook Messenger, which is
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part of the Facebook “realm,” but articulated its incredulity concerning any 

claim by Bedtelyon that he was unaware of its usage by children. Tr. Vol. 2 at 

44. 

[9] Regardless, Bedtelyon is quick to point out that he was not accessing social 

media at all. Instead, he simply would call his sister-in-law in Hawaii and have

her access her Facebook Messenger account to contact his girlfriend in South 

Africa or Italy so that he could save money on overseas long-distance calls. He 

claims that he did not violate condition 9 because his girlfriend was not 

underage and his only contact with a child came when his sister-in-law put her 

minor child on the line. He claims that he did not violate condition 8 because it

does not specifically prohibit a sex offender/probationer from using a third party

intermediary to access websites, chat rooms, or instant messaging programs 

frequented by children. In making these arguments, Bedtelyon ignores other 

conditions to which he was subject as a sex offender. For example, condition 

27 requires him to give his probation officer and/or probation technology 

representative access to his home computer and devices for unannounced 

examinations. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 77. Most significantly, condition 26 

reads, in part, “You shall not access the Internet or any other on-line service 

through use of any electronic device at any location ... without prior approval 

of your [case manager or] probation officer.” Id. These rules are in place to 

prevent defendants from avoiding detection on their own computers by using 

the devices and social media accounts of others.
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[10] Here, Bedtelyon did just that. He had been granted permission to contact his 

girlfriend by phone or letter but not through social media. Community 

corrections case manager Lyle Baimter testified that Bedtelyon had never been 

given permission to use an intermediary (his sister-in-law) to contact his 

girlfriend via her device and social media account. Tr. Vol. 2 at 16-17. 

Bedtelyon admitted as much to his polygraph examiner. Appellant’s App. Vol. 

2 at 96. He circumvented the sex offender rules by attempting to do indirectly 

that which he was prohibited from doing directly. See Hively v. School City of 

Nappanee, 202 Ind. 28, 169 N.E. 51, 53 (1929) (contract for leasing of 

schoolhouse held void as attempt to do indirectly what was legally prohibited if 

done directly). The evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the 

judgment are sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that Bedtelyon 

violated the conditions of his placement. 

Section 2 – The trial court acted within its discretion in 

ordering that Bedtelyon serve the remainder of his executed 

sentence in the DOC and in executing a portion of Bedtelyon’s 

probation.

[11] Bedtelyon also challenges the trial court’s choice of sanction for his 

probation/community corrections violation. The trial court’s sentencing 

decisions for probation violations are reviewable for an abuse of discretion. 

Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs 

where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances before it or where the trial court misinterprets the law. 

Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 
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[12] The executed portion of Bedtelyon’s sentence comprised placement in the local 

community corrections program. As stated, Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.6-

5(a)(4) provides, “If a person who is placed under this chapter violates the terms 

of the placement, the community corrections director may .... [r]equest that the 

court revoke the placement and commit the person to the county jail or 

department of correction for the remainder of the person’s sentence.” As for 

probation, once a violation is established, the trial court may impose one or 

more of the following sanctions: (1) continue the defendant’s probation, with 

or without modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend the defendant’s

probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original 

probationary period; or (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that 

was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). 

Here, the trial court actually ordered the execution of only one of the five years

of Bedtelyon’s probation. 

[13] Bedtelyon claims that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a sanction 

that is not commensurate with his violation, which he characterizes as technical 

and relatively minor. He relies on several cases in which the trial court was 

found to have abused its discretion in ordering an excessive sanction, 

considering the nature of the defendant’s violation. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 62 

N.E.3d at 1231-32 (court abused discretion where defendant was remanded to 

DOC for minor violations and defendant had mental limitations); Sullivan v. 

State, 56 N.E.3d 1157, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (court abused discretion in 

imposing maximum term for violation of community corrections placement 
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involving failure to report for home detention as ordered); Ripps v. State, 968 

N.E.2d 323, 325-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (court abused discretion in imposing 

severe sanction given technical nature of violation and other circumstances such 

as defendant’s poor health); Puckett v. State, 956 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011) (abuse of discretion where court considered improper factors).

[14] Here, Bedtelyon’s violation was neither technical nor minor; rather, it went to 

the core of his felony conviction. He had sexual intercourse with a fourteenyear-old girl and, per his plea agreement, received alternative placement in 

community corrections. Many of the sex offender conditions of his placement 

comprised orders to stay away from children and from places where children 

might be expected to go, whether personally or online through a website, chat 

room, or instant messaging program. Bedtelyon was absolutely prohibited from 

accessing the sites and programs frequented by children; he was forbidden from 

using an intermediary to communicate with a child via social media; his 

computer was subject to immediate search; and he was forbidden from using a 

computer or device anywhere unless he had prior authorization to do so. 

Nevertheless, acting without permission, he used an intermediary to circumvent 

these conditions. He admitted that he violated the terms of his community 

corrections placement and that his use of an intermediary was not an isolated 

incident. Tr. Vol. 2 at 20; see also Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 99 (defendant’s 

statement that he continues to communicate with girlfriend through sister-inlaw’s Facebook Messenger). He attempted to downplay his conduct by 

rationalizing that he used his sister-in-law as an intermediary simply because it 
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was more cost effective. This does not justify his repeated circumvention of the 

terms aimed at keeping him away from children. The trial court found him to 

be a risk to “public safety because people who try and circumvent the rules are 

the people that are dangerous.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 44. 

[15] Finally, we remind Bedtelyon of the grace afforded him through the plea 

agreement’s dismissal of three of the four level 4 felony counts against him and 

five of the six class A misdemeanor counts against him. His original placement 

outside the DOC was a demonstration of grace, and again, he has been afforded 

grace, as the trial court chose to re-suspend to probation four years of his 

remaining term. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s chosen 

sanction. Accordingly, we affirm.

[16] Affirmed. 

Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.