### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00 414 -CV

Eliz abe th Sifue nt e s , A ppe lla nt

v. Enriq ue C. Arr iola and Sara Arr iola , Appellees

FR OM T HE C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W N O. 1 OF T R A V IS C OU N T Y NO. 2706 33 , HO NORAB LE ORLI NDA NARAN JO , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Elizabeth Sifuentes appe als a trial c ourt order d en ying he r summary judgme nt motions and gr anting the summary judgme nt motion of appellees, Enr ique and Sar a Arriola. Sifue ntes argues that she should have preva iled on summary judgme nt and that, in the alternative, fac t questions preclude d the t rial court from gra nting the Arriolas’ summar y judgme nt mot ion . We wi ll a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND On Novembe r 14, 1997, Sifuentes obtaine d a judgm ent ag ainst Raul Chag oy a for $1 5, 00 0 p lus int e re st. I n M arc h 1 99 8, Sif ue nte s r e c or de d a

n a bs tr a c t of th e jud g me nt i n T ra

vis County , there by

establishing a

lien ag ainst any non-exempt r eal pr operty that Chag oy a owne d in the county . Chag oy a did in fac t own a piec e of r eal proper ty in the county : roug hly one-f ifth of an a cre with a four- plex on it ( “the Property”), which Chag oy a had purc hased in Septembe r 1995. F rom the2

time he purc hased the Property until August 2002, Chag oy a lived in one unit of the f our-plex and rente d out the other thre e units. On August 9, 2002, Chag oy a sold the Proper ty to the Arriolas. The Arriolas immediate ly

took up residenc e in t he unit that Chag oya had occupie d, and they continued to r e nt o ut t

he oth e r t hr e e un its
. I n M ay 20 03 , Si fu e nte s su e d Ch a g oy a and th e Ar

ri ola s. She so ug ht t o f

or c e a sa le
o f t h e P r o p e rt y an d t o o b t a i n t h e p r o c e e d s i n s a t i s f a c t i o n o f h e r

j u d g m e n ta g a i n s tC h a g o ya . C h a g o ya
never filed an answe r to Sifue ntes’s petition, a nd for rea sons not r efle cted in the r ecor d, Sifuentes subsequently

nonsuited him. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 162. The Arriolas, on the ot her hand, did file an
answe r to Sifuentes’s petition, a nd in a n amende d answe r they asser ted as an aff

irmative defe nse that the Property

was thei r h o m estea d and ther efor e exempt from judg ment liens. See Te x. Con st. art. XV I , §§ 50, 51; Tex. P rop. Code Ann. §§ 41.001, .002 ( West 2000 & Supp. 2008).

On J uly 23, 2004, Sifuentes and the A rriolas filed a n Ag ree d Stipu l at i o n of Un d i s p u t edFa ct s t h at es t ab l i s h edt h e f o l l o wi n g:

• Th e fo ur -p le x wa s a sin g le tw o- sto ry

str uc tur e div ide d into f

our s e pa ra te re sid e nc e s.

• Be sides the four- plex, t he P roper ty featured the following improvements: a par king are a shar ed by

all residents; sidewa lks going to the front door of ea ch unit; privacy fenc es dividing the lot into four y ards; and c oncre te patios in eac h unit’s y ard.

• No un it o f t

he fo ur -p le x ha d inte rn a l a c c e ss t o a ny oth e r u nit
.

• Eac h unit shared c ommon interior walls with adjoining units, and a ll units share d a single roof.

• Ea c h unit

ha d it s o wn

a ir c on dit ion ingand

he a tin g sy ste m.

• Duringthe time that he owne d the P roper ty , Chag oy a occupied only one unit of the fo ur -p le x an d r e nte d th e oth e r t hr e e un its to u

nr e late d th ir d- pa

rt y te na nts
.3

• I n J une of 1997, Chag oy a applied for a re sidential homestead tax exempti on for the P r o p e rt y.

• The Tr avis Central Appr aisal District g rante d Chag oy a an a d valore m tax exemption o nt w e n t y- f

i v e p e r c e n to f

th e P r o p e rty.

• Chag oy a n ev er protested or appea led the twenty -five- perc ent ad va lorem tax exemption determination.

• Cha g oy a ’s ind ivi du a l un it w a s h is h ome ste a d at th e tim e that he so ld t he Pr op e rt

y to the Ar ri ola s. The Ar riolas fi l ed a motion for summary judgme nt. Tex. R . Civ. P . 166a(c ). Sifuentes filed he r own “ traditional” motion for summary judgm ent as we ll as a “no- evidenc e” motion for summary judgme nt. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c ), (i). Chag oy a filed a n aff idavit in support of the Arriolas’ motion. I n it, he claimed that despite his a cce ptance of the twenty -five- perc ent ad valore m tax exemption, he had alway s considere d the entire Property to be his home ste ad
. T he tr i a l c o u rtd e n i e d

S i f u e n t e s ’ s m o t i o nf

o r s u m m ar y j u d g m e n tan d

g r an t e d th a to f th e A rr iol a s. Sif ue nte s a pp e a ls.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW A “tra ditional” m o t i o n for summary judgme nt is properly

g rante d only

when the
mov ant e sta

bli sh es that th e re are no g e nu ine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l f a c t and that sh e is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a

matte r o f l aw. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); Lear Siegler, Inc . v. Pe rez , 819 S.W .2d 470, 47 1 ( Te x. 19 91 ); Holmstrom v. Lee , 26 S.W .3d 526, 530 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet. ). A defe ndant seeking summary judgme nt must negate as a matter of la

w at lea st one eleme nt of ea ch of the plaintiff’ s theories of r ecove ry or prove as a matter of law ea ch el em ent of an aff

irmative defe nse. Centeq Realty, I nc. v. Sie gler , 899 S.W .2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995).4 A par ty seeking a “no-e vidence ” summary judgme nt, on the other ha nd, does not bea

r the burd e n of es ta

bli sh ing he r ri g ht to jud g me nt by pr ov inga de fe ns e or

c la im, but in ste a d a sse rt s that th e re is n o e vid e nc e of on e or mor e e sse nti a l e le me nts of a c la im o n w hic h th e op po sin g pa rt y wi ll have the burd e n of pr oo f at tr ia l. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ); Holmstrom , 26 S.W .3d at 530. I f the nonmovant fails to produce more than a scintilla of probative ev i d en ce raising a g enuine issue of materia l f act as to e ach challeng ed element on which he has the burde n of proof , summary

judgme nt is proper. Id
. I n revie wing a g rant of summary judgme nt, w e take as true evidenc e favor able to the nonmovant, making ever

y rea sonable infe renc e and r esolving all doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Ce nte q R e alt

y , 899 S.W. 2d a t 197. I f b oth pa rt ie s mo ve fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, we de te rm ine a ll questions presente d and re nder the judgme nt the trial court should ha ve re ndere d. Com mi

ssi on e rs Court v. Agan , 940 S.W .2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1997).
DI SCU SSIO N The c onstitut i o n al l y cre ated homeste ad intere st protects prope rty from most ty

pes
o f l i en s , including judg ment liens. Flor e yv . E sta te of M

c Con ne ll , 2 1 2 S. W. 3 d 4 3 9, 443 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). H omestead rig hts e njoy robust protec tion unde r Texas law. See Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chesson , 149 S.W .3d 796, 807 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied). To e sta bli sh that a pie c e of pr op e rt y is a ho me ste a d e xemp t f

ro m ju dg me nt l ie ns , “ the c la ima nt m us t show a c ombination of both overt ac ts of homes t ea dusag e and the intention on the part of the
owner to clai m t h e land a s a homestea d.” Dominguez v . Castaneda , 163 S.W .3d 318, 330 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 20 05 , p et. den ied ). Whil e me re ly ow nin g or

oc c up yinga

pie c e of pr op e rt yI t is less clea r whether S ifuentes admits that the uni t beca me t he Arriolas’ homestea d when 1 they purcha sed the Proper

ty and moved into it, but in any event the law enta ils that conclusion. See Cadle Co. v. Harv ey , 46 S.W .3d 282, 285 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 2001, pet. denied) (“Ajudgme nt debtor may

sell [t he homestea d] and pass titl e fr ee of any judgme nt lien, and the purc haser may asser t that titl e ag ainst the judg ment cre ditor.”). 5 does not automatica lly

make it a homeste ad, “[ p]oss ession and use of l and by one who owns it and who re sides upon it makes it the homestead in law a nd in fac t.” Id. at 331. Sifuentes admits that the unit Chag oy a lived in while he owned the Prope rty was Ch a g o y a ’ s h o me stead. Sifuentes also ac knowledg es that homestea ds are exempt from judgment 1 l i e n s . S h e ar g u e s , h o w e v e r , t h a t C h a g o ya ’ s i n t e n t an d u s a g e o f th e P r o p e rty s h o w th a to n l y tw e n tyfive pe rce nt of the P ro p er t y
— t h e portion that Chag oy a and the Arriolas ha ve occ upied—has e ver qualified as a homestead, rende ring the rema ining seventy -five perc ent subject to he r judg ment lien.

We disag ree . As a star

ting point, we pr esume that one who o wn s and re sides on a lot make s the whole lot his homestead. See Sc ottish Am. Mortgage Co. v. Milner , 30 S.W .2d 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex arka na 1930, wr it ref’ d). Furthermore , Texas law is long settled that one who owns and r esides in a building may claim the entire building as home stead e ven if he rents out pa rt s o f i t. Th e sem in al ca se is Fo rd v . F or sg ar d , 2 7 S. W. 5 7 ( Te x. 18 94 ), in whic h th e su pr e me court he ld that a cour

t cannot orde r the sale of par t of a buil ding if the rest of the building qua lifies as homestea d. Id . at 58. For rea sons unstated, the Fo rd court a ssumed that the entire lot under the b u i l d i n g at issue was home stead. Se e id
. T h a t a s s u mp ti o ndr o v e th e r e s u lt b e c a u s e , a s th e court
rec og nized, homestead rig hts attach pri m arily to land and incidenta lly

to buildings there on. Id
. Thus, Fo rd

is not directly

on point h ere ; we ca

nnot assume that the land unde r the four -plex was homestead, a s the cha

rac ter of the land is one of the thing s we a re a sked to dec ide.6 T h e c as es fo l l o wi n g Fo rd have not a ll e x pressly share d its unde rlyin g as sumption, but the y h av e al l share d its conclusion. See F olse v. Monroe , 190 S.W .2d 604, 610 (Tex. Civ. App.—B eaumont 1945, wr it ref’ d w.o.m.) (e ntire building qua lified as homestea d even tho ug h o wn e rs rent ed ou t kitc he n, din ingro om, and thr e e -r oo m a

pa rtme nt) ; Person v. Lev enson , 14 3 S.W. 2d 41 9, 42 1 (T e x. Civ
. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 40 , no wr it) (e nti re bu ild ing di vi ded into thirty -six apar

tments qualified as homestea d even t h o ug h owner occupie d only

one apa rtment); Po sta l Sa v . &Loa n A ss’n v . P owe ll , 4 7 S. W.2 d 3 43 , 3 51 -5 2 ( Te x. Civ
. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 31 , w ri t ref ’d) ( entire building qualified a s homestead e ven though owner rente d out upstairs as rooming ho us e ); Tyler v. Thomas , 297 S.W . 609, 610 (Tex. Civ. App
. — Ga l veston 1927) (e ntire building di v i d ed into four apa

rtments qualified a s homestead e ven thoug h owner only occupie d one apar tment), r e v ’ d o n o th er grounds , 6 S.W. 2d 35 0 ( Te x. Com m’ n App . 1 92 8) ; Ke lly v . No wlin , 227 S.W . 373, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex arka na 1921, no wr it) (entire building qualifie d as ho me ste a d e ve n tho ug h ow ne r re nte d out fi rs t flo or ); Bente v . Sullivan , 115 S.W . 350, 353-54 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1908, writ denied) (entire building containing residenc e, hotel, and other unspecifie d space qualified a s homestead) . We have f ound no case , and Sifuentes cites none, whe re
a cour t held that some part of an owne r-oc cupied building d i d n o t q u al ify as the owne r’s residential homeste ad.

Sif ue nte s ne ve rt

he le ss a rgue s th a t th is c a se is uniq ue be c a us e Cha g oy a

int e nd e d o nly
a po rt ion of the Pr op ert y

to b e his ho me ste a d. Whil e ho me ste a d c la ima nts no rm a lly

do have to demonstrate intent, pr operty owner s who reside on and use the ir proper ty do not. See B raden Stee l Cor p. v . M c Clu re , 6 03 S.W. 2d

28 8, 29 3 ( Te x. Civ . App .— Am ari llo 19 80 , n o w rit) ; se e als oSee P erson v. Lev enson , 143 S.W .2d 419, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1940, no writ); 2 Tyler v. Thomas , 2 9 7 S. W. 6 0 9 , 6 1 0 ( T e x. Ci v . Ap p . — G a lv e s to n1 927), rev’d on other grounds , 6 S. W.2 d 3 50 (T e x. Comm’ n App . 1 92 8, jud g m’ t a do pte d) ; Bente v . Sullivan , 115 S.W . 350, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1908, writ denied). The owner in Po we ll m ay a l s o h av e o c c u p i e d o n l y a p o rti o n o f h is p r o p e rty f

r o m th e o u ts e t, b u t th e o p in io n is un c le ar. See Postal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v . P owe ll , 47 S.W .2d 343, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.—El P aso 1931, writ re f’d)
. 7 Dominguez , 163 S.W .3d at 331. Chag oy a re sided on t h e P ro p erty and used it ana logously

to the
o w n e r s i n t h e c a s e s c i t e d

a b o v e
— e s p e c i a l l y Person , Tyler , and Be nte , wher e the owne rs occ upied
on ly po rt ion s of

the ir pr op e rt ie s f

ro m th e outse t. Acc ording ly , we conclude that his re sidence and 2 usag e we re suf

ficient to obviate the issue of intent and re nder the entire Prope rty his homestead. Sifuentes also ar g ues that the layout of the Proper ty —“sepa rate units and sever ed y ards” —must hav e l i m i t ed Chag oy a’s usa g e. We disag ree . First, nothing indicates that the four- plex uni ts were materia lly more sepa

rate than the units in the case s cited above . Second, we would not char acte rize the Property as having“seve red” y ards; the r ecor d indicates that the “ privac y fenc es” on the Property , which we re only a fe w fe et in leng th, did not im pede f ree passag e fr om any pa rt of the lot to any oth e r. Th is arr ang e me nt do e s n ot d ic tate that Ch a g oy a po sse sse d a

nd us e d o nly one-f ourth of t he property for homestead purposes. Cf. Sc ottish Am. Mortgage Co. , 30 S.W .2d at 584 (complete sever ance o f homestea d proper ty by fenc e may

indicate a

bandonment of fenc ed-of f portion). Finally , Sifuentes ar g ues that all of the a bove conside rations m ust y ield to one key fa c t: Ch a g oy a

sp e c if ic a lly de c lare d th a t on ly

tw e nty -f ive pe rc e nt o f th e P roper ty wa s h is homestead. We dis ag ree . Occ upancy deter mines homestead sc ope; dec larations do not. Sc hu lz v. L . E. W hitham & Co. , 27 S.W .2d 1093, 1095 (Tex. 1930). Moreove r, Chag oy a did not “dec lare ”8

tw e nty -f ive pe rc e nt o f the Pr op e rt

y to be his ho me ste a d; rathe r, he me re ly a c c e pte d, wi tho ut p ro te st, a twenty -five- perc ent homestea d tax ex emption on the Property
.

A proportional homeste ad tax exemption has no impact on a proper ty ’s homestea d status . Se c tio n 1 1. 13 (k ) o f t he Te xas T a x Code state s: A qualified residential structure does not lose its chara cter as a r esidenc e homestea d if a portion of the structure is r ented to a nother or is use d primarily for other purposes that are incompatible wit h the owner’s residential use of the structure. H oweve r, the amount of any residenc e home stead ex emptio n d

o es n o t apply to the value of that po rti on of

the str uc tur e tha t is us e d

pr im ar ily for pu rp os es tha t ar e inc om pa tib le with theown e r’

s re sid e nti al u se . Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 11.13(k) (West 2008) (emphasis added)
. In other words, the Travis Central Appra isal Di strict was statutorily require d to limi t Chag oy a’s homeste ad tax ex emption to the portion of t he P roper

ty in which C hag oy a resided (twenty -five perc ent). As the statute make s clea r, howeve r, that limitation di d n o t af fe ct t he Proper

ty ’s homestea d status. A fortiori, Chag oy a’s
acc eptanc e of a twe nty -five- perc ent tax ex emption—the maxi mum that the law allowed him—does
no t in dic a te that Ch a g oy a “ de c lare d” on ly

tw ent y -f ive pe rc e nt o f t

he Pr op e rt

y to b e his constitutional homestead.

For the re asons detailed a

bove, we hold that this case fa lls under the rule that an entire bu ild ingc ounts a s ho me ste a d wh e n the ow ne r r e sid e s in pa rt of the bu ild ingand

re nts out th e re st. The re mainder of

the P roper

ty , namely the l and under the four-plex, follows sui t. See Te x. Con st. art. XV I , § 51 (homestea d attache s to land and improvements on it).9 CO NC LU SION The Proper

ty in dispute is ex emp t fr o m judgment liens be cause it has been a ho me ste a d at a ll r e le va

nt t ime s. We t

he re fo re a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s summa ry jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pemberton a nd Waldrop Affir med Filed: Apr il 22, 2009