Filed 4/11/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re Damian L. et al., Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

MADERA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

SOCIAL SERVICES/CHILD WELFARE 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

L.V. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

F083805

(Madera Super. Ct. Nos. MJP018386 

& MJP018387)

OPINION

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Madera County. Thomas L. 

Bender, Judge.

Regina A. Garza, County Counsel, and Doreen Houx, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Respondent L.V.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent David L.

No appearance for of Defendant and Respondent Julio A.

-ooOoo-
2.

Appellant Madera County Department of Social Services (department) appeals 

from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a combined hearing for family reunification 

review and disposition from a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3871 petition on 

November 15, 2021. The department contends the juvenile court erred when it ordered 

the department to provide additional reunification services to L.V. (mother) for her 

dependent children Damian L. and Jesse A. (collectively “the children”). We conclude 

the juvenile court erred in ordering additional reunification services.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY

On September 14, 2019, eight-year-old Damian L. and five-year-old Jesse A. were 

taken into protective custody by law enforcement due to concerns of neglect by mother. 

Damian L. was located by a police officer after being reported as missing by his adult 

sister on the previous evening. Mother’s home was found to be dirty with broken glass 

and doors, and a social worker indicated the mother’s home was a known drug and gang 

home. The social worker placed the children in foster care with their maternal 

grandmother. Four of the children’s siblings were allowed to remain with the maternal 

grandmother after a “Team Decision Making” meeting was held on September 17, 2019. 

The siblings had been living with the maternal grandmother for most of their lives.

The department filed an original petition alleging the children were described 

under section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged the children were at substantial 

risk of suffering serious physical harm as a result of hazardous conditions in mother’s 

home and mother’s failure to provide adequate supervision. The petition further alleged 

that Damian L. was reported missing 24 hours after his whereabouts became unknown, 

and mother was unaware that Damian L. was missing.

On September 18, 2019, the juvenile court continued the hearing to the following 

date after conflicts required the appointment of new counsel for multiple parties. At the 

continued hearing on September 19, 2019, the juvenile court ordered the children 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3.

detained and set a jurisdictional hearing for October 17, 2019. The juvenile court found 

there were no reasonable means by which the children’s physical or emotional health 

may be protected without removing the children from the physical custody of their parent 

and the initial removal of the children from their home was necessary. Services were to 

be provided to the family as soon as possible to reunify the children with their family.

The agency’s jurisdiction report, filed on October 16, 2019, recommended that the 

allegations in the original petition be found true and a disposition hearing be set within a 

statutory timeframe. Mother tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine on 

October 3, 2019, according to a hair follicle drug test that was attached to the report. 

Jesse A.’s presumed father, Julio, also tested positive for amphetamine and 

methamphetamine. The initial jurisdiction hearing was continued to October 31, 2019, 

for mother’s counsel to “discuss the new information in the report with mother.” At the 

continued jurisdiction hearing, the matter was continued further for a contested 

jurisdiction hearing to be held on November 21, 2019.

On November 20, 2019, the department filed an addendum report requesting the 

juvenile court receive three police reports into evidence. The reports documented two 

occasions that Damian L. ran away from the maternal grandmother’s home on September 

19, 2019, and September 20, 2019. The reports also detailed an incident where 

Damian L. ran away from a department conference room. After officers located 

Damian L., he made several statements that he intended to kill himself. Officers placed a 

section 5150 hold on Damian L. due to his statements about harming himself.

On November 21, 2019, mother’s counsel requested a continuance of the 

contested hearing due to her receipt of the report on the previous day. The juvenile court 

found good cause to grant the continuance and reset the contested jurisdiction hearing to 

January 9, 2020. The juvenile court’s minute order reflects no finding of exceptional

circumstances requiring a continuance that would result in the disposition hearing being 

completed more than 60 days from the children’s removal. Mother was not present for 
4.

the continued hearing, and the matter was continued to February 13, 2020, while mother 

was incarcerated at the Madera County Department of Corrections.

The contested jurisdiction hearing proceeded on February 13, 2020, with mother 

both present and incarcerated. All parties submitted with an agreement to dismiss an 

allegation regarding the condition of mother’s home at the time of the children’s removal. 

The juvenile court found the remaining allegation in the petition true and set a disposition 

hearing for February 27, 2020. In setting the disposition hearing beyond the statutory 

time limit, the juvenile court found exceptional circumstances existed “due to the length 

of time it took for the jurisdiction hearing.” The children were ordered to remain in the 

department’s temporary care and custody pending the disposition hearing or further order 

of the court.

On February 26, 2020, the department filed a motion for a three-week continuance 

because it needed additional time to assess a father for placement and develop an 

appropriate recommendation. The juvenile court continued the disposition hearing to 

March 23, 2020, which was more than six months after the detention hearing. Neither the 

minute order nor the department’s motion provide a reason for the department’s inability 

to have its assessments for disposition completed in a timely manner.

At the continued disposition hearing, the juvenile court granted another request for 

continuance because the department was “still assessing bypass on [Damian L.’s] father.” 

The juvenile court found “good cause” to grant the continuance, but its findings do not 

address any exceptional circumstances justifying delays beyond six months from the 

children’s removal. The disposition hearing was continued to April 2, 2020, and the 

juvenile court ordered mother’s counsel to follow up with the department’s counsel 

regarding the placement of Jesse A. with an adult sibling.

The department’s disposition report, filed on March 30, 2020, recommended the 

children remain placed in foster care with family reunification services provided to 

mother and Damian L.’s father. The department recommended that no family 

reunification services be provided to Julio A. pursuant to section 361.5, 
5.

subdivision (b)(13). The whereabouts of Damian L.’s father was unknown, and a due 

diligence report was filed. The report included details of Julio A.’s current dependency 

proceedings involving Jesse A.’s siblings. The department was recommending that 

Julio A.’s family reunification services be terminated for a pending 12-month review 

hearing.

Mother was released from custody on March 17, 2020, related to her arrest for 

ammunition and drug possession. She was also facing kidnapping and other felony 

charges in a pending criminal case in Fresno County. Mother admitted to using 

methamphetamine three times after her children were removed, and she reported 

consuming alcohol daily to help her sleep. She acknowledged that she had an alcohol 

problem and requested to be referred to parenting classes, mental health services, and an 

inpatient substance abuse treatment program where she can have her children with her. 

Mother was expecting another child and living at a homeless shelter.

Damian L. was being evaluated for a heart condition and began mental health 

treatment. The children were developing at an age-appropriate level and meeting 

developmental timelines, and there were no concerns for the children’s education. The 

social worker believed both children appeared mentally and emotionally stable. Mother 

had weekly visits with the children for two hours, and the visits were going well.

The children were placed in separate resource family homes. Damian L. was 

moved to a resource family home due to his “risky behaviors” of running away from the 

maternal grandmother’s home. Jesse A. remained in the maternal grandmother’s home 

until her health became compromised, and he was moved to the home of his adult sibling 

on March 19, 2020. Jesse A. spent one day in the home of his adult sibling until the 

department became aware of “history” involving the adult sibling and her husband that 

would place Jesse A. at risk of abuse or neglect.

At the continued disposition hearing held on April 2, 2020, mother made a request 

to contest the department’s recommendation. The juvenile court set the matter for a 

contested disposition hearing on April 27, 2020. The department filed an addendum 
6.

report on April 24, 2020, which provided updated information on mother’s 

circumstances. Mother was participating in weekly parenting classes after being dropped 

from the program that she began in October 2019 for lack of attendance. A hairscreening test collected March 25, 2020, indicated positive results of methamphetamine 

for mother. Mother eventually admitted to “being under a lot of stress” when informed 

that the test could trace use in the previous three months.

The contested disposition hearing began on April 27, 2020, with testimony from 

mother. On May 4, 2020, the contested disposition hearing continued with additional 

testimony from mother. The juvenile court continued the contested hearing for a ruling 

on May 18, 2020. The department filed an addendum report with additional information 

on the termination of Jesse A.’s father’s reunification services as to his other children on 

May 7, 2020.

On May 18, 2020, the department requested to reopen evidence to allow the 

juvenile court to admit the addendum report and take judicial notice of mother’s recent 

misdemeanor conviction. Jesse A.’s father was not present and had no contact with his 

counsel, but his counsel requested a continuance to review the report. The juvenile court 

admitted the addendum report into evidence and took judicial notice of mother’s 

misdemeanor conviction. The hearing was continued to June 4, 2020, as a result of the 

new evidence being admitted based solely on a finding of good cause.

The juvenile court provided its ruling on the contested disposition on June 4, 2020. 

Mother was present and neither of the children’s fathers were present. The juvenile court 

did not find mother posed a substantial danger to the children, and it found there were 

reasonable means to protect the children. Family maintenance services were ordered for 

mother, and no services were provided to the children’s fathers. A family maintenance 

review hearing was set for December 1, 2020.

Family Maintenance Period

On October 1, 2020, the juvenile court denied mother’s request for approval to 

move to the state of Iowa because the request was not made properly. The department 
7.

filed a motion to continue the family maintenance review hearing on November 30, 2020. 

The motion was based upon the department’s need to wait for “more supportive 

information to make the recommendation on behalf of the children.” On December 1, 

2020, the juvenile court continued the review hearing to December 17, 2020, due to the 

lack of a report.

The department’s report for the section 364 review hearing, filed on December 16, 

2020, recommended that family maintenance services continue for mother. The children 

and mother were living in an apartment, and mother planned to seek employment as an 

agricultural field worker for seasonal employment. Mother completed her parenting 

program on July 6, 2020, and participated in counseling with a therapist over the phone 

since May 2020. The terms of mother’s probation required her to complete mental health 

and alcohol counseling. Mother tested negative for all substances during three urine tests 

in June and July of 2020. Her family maintenance case plan required her to comply with 

her probation conditions, cooperate with requests to drug test and complete any 

recommended substance abuse programs. She hoped to move to Iowa after the 

dependency proceedings were closed.

The department attempted to have mother complete a hair test in order to dismiss 

the case, but mother failed to comply with multiple requests to test. The results of 

mother’s hair test were received by the department on December 16, 2020, and they 

yielded positive results for methamphetamine. At the continued section 364 review 

hearing, mother’s counsel requested a continuance, and the juvenile court continued the 

matter to February 8, 2021. On January 19, 2021, the juvenile court ordered the children 

to undergo hair follicle drug tests at the department’s request. The department made the 

request after mother refused to take the children for hair drug testing to rule out any 

exposure to methamphetamine. Both children’s hair samples tested positive for 

methamphetamine according to the results received by the department on January 26, 

2021.
8.

Supplemental Petitions

On January 27, 2021, the children and their infant sibling were taken into custody 

by a department social worker pursuant to a juvenile court order for detention. The 

children were placed together in the home of their maternal grandmother. At a child and 

family team meeting, the department identified next steps for mother as more classes in 

recovery with a sponsor and substance abuse disorder treatment. Mother intended to start 

treatment on January 28, 2021.

The department filed a supplemental petition alleging the previous disposition of 

family maintenances services was not effective in the protection of the children due to 

their exposure to methamphetamine. At a continued detention hearing held on 

February 8, 2021, the juvenile court ordered the children detained from mother’s custody, 

and it set a jurisdiction hearing for March 1, 2021. Mother informed the juvenile court 

that she was in services, and the juvenile court authorized visits to occur at the maternal 

grandmother’s home.

The initial jurisdiction hearing on the section 387 petition was continued twice at 

mother’s request. On April 23, 2021, the juvenile court sustained the supplemental 

petition and ordered that services be provided to reunify the children with mother. The 

services to be provided included parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, random 

drug testing, and mental health treatment. A disposition hearing was set for May 6, 2021. 

The juvenile court granted the department’s motion to continue the hearing to provide it 

with additional time to “conduct a thorough assessment of the family’s needs to ensure 

appropriate services are provided.”

At the continued disposition hearing held on May 10, 2021, all parties submitted 

the matter on the department’s disposition report. The juvenile court adopted the 

department’s recommendation to order family reunification services to mother and the 

children’s fathers. Mother participated in supervised visits with the children twice per 

week for two hours without any noted concerns. The children remained placed in a 

relative placement with the maternal grandmother. The department initiated referrals for 
9.

mother to complete mental health and substance abuse assessments, parenting classes, 

and random drug testing in accordance with her reunification case plan. A hearing was 

set for September 13, 2021, as a 24-month permanency hearing pursuant to 

section 366.25.

The department filed a second section 387 petition to remove the children from the 

home of their maternal grandmother on July 16, 2021. The petition alleged the maternal 

grandmother allowed the children to regularly spend the night at a home that was unsafe 

and condemned. The home contained a marijuana grow that was accessible to the 

children, and a hair test of the children returned positive results for methamphetamine 

and marijuana. The children were placed together in a nonrelative resource family home. 

After two continuances of the detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered the children to 

be detained and set a jurisdiction hearing for August 16, 2021.

At a continued jurisdiction hearing, all parties submitted on the department’s 

reports, and the juvenile court sustained the supplemental petition. The department’s 

report prepared for the disposition hearing to be held on September 9, 2021, 

recommended continued family reunification services for mother and the children’s 

fathers until September 13, 2021. The children remained placed together with their infant 

sibling in a resource family home. Mother recently began living at a “Rescue the 

Children” program, but a hair drug test of mother from August 19, 2021, provided a 

positive result for methamphetamine. The children’s maternal aunt was considering 

placement of the children, but her husband was not supportive of that option.

Mother requested a contested disposition hearing on the section 387 petition, 

which was set for October 1, 2021, in combination with a contested family reunification 

review hearing. In the department’s status review report, filed September 27, 2021, it 

recommended that family reunification services be terminated for mother and the 

children’s fathers and a section 366.26 hearing be set. The report indicated the review 

hearing was a 24-month permanency review pursuant to section 366.25. Mother tested 

positive for methamphetamine on August 19, 2021, and she acknowledged relapsing 
10.

prior to entering the Rescue the Children program on August 9, 2021. She intended to 

start counseling at an 18-month program with Rescue the Children. The program 

consisted of a 12-month residential program and six months of after care.

On October 1, 2021, mother was present for the contested section 387 disposition 

and 24-month review hearing. Mother’s counsel stated her intent to ask that the children 

be placed with mother at the program on that date. Counsel for the children then 

informed the juvenile court of their belief that the “18-month clock” did not begin until 

the children were removed from mother’s home pursuant to the section 387 petition on 

January 27, 2021. It was then argued that a six-month review hearing should have been 

set at the May 10, 2021, disposition hearing on the section 387 petition. The 

department’s counsel responded that the 24-month review date is calculated from the date 

that the children were initially placed into protective custody despite the initial 

disposition of family maintenance services for mother. The juvenile court took a recess 

to allow the parties to research the issue.

The parties resumed the discussion in the afternoon, and counsel for the 

department acknowledged a split in case law concerning the maximum time period for 

court-ordered services when a child is not placed in the home of their parent. The 

juvenile court had reviewed the cases of In re N.M. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 845, 854 

(N.M.) and In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154 (T.W.), and the parties were asked to 

brief the issue to determine if it could order continued reunification services for mother as 

to the children. Counsel for the children stated its position that a six-month review 

hearing should be set for November because the timeline of reunification “is not running” 

when children are placed with a parent at disposition. Mother’s counsel joined in the 

argument of the children’s counsel.

The juvenile court ultimately continued the hearing to allow the parties to brief the 

issue in order to determine if mother was capable of receiving additional family 

reunification services. However, the juvenile court gave a tentative ruling that it would 
11.

follow T.W. and set a six-month review hearing in November. The department was also 

authorized to allow mother to participate in overnight visits with the children.

After a brief continuance to allow the parties to review and respond to the 

department’s brief that was filed on October 14, 2021, the counsel for the children filed a

responsive brief on October 29, 2021. On November 4, 2021, the juvenile court 

continued the combined hearing again because it needed more time to review the parties’ 

briefs. The section 387 disposition and family reunification review hearing finally 

proceeded on November 15, 2021. The juvenile court initially expressed its inclination to 

follow T.W. and order continued family reunification services to mother with a 12-month 

review hearing in March 2022.

Counsel for the department argued that the decision in T.W. and In re A.C. (2008) 

169 Cal.App.4th 636 (A.C.) incorrectly interpreted the statutory timelines and were 

limited to dispositions involving section 361.2. The department’s counsel concluded that 

the statutory timelines do not change based upon whether a parent is granted family 

maintenance or family reunification services at disposition. In response, the juvenile 

court stated, “Well, yeah. I think there’s a conflict there for sure. [¶] I think, probably, 

someone should appeal, and get a clear ruling from the appellate court on it myself.” 

Counsel for the children and mother submitted on the juvenile court’s tentative ruling. 

The juvenile court ordered the department to provide reunification services to mother and 

Damian L.’s father while the children remained in out-of-home placement, and it set a 

12-month review hearing for March 28, 2022.

DISCUSSION

The department contends the juvenile court erred when it ordered continuation of 

mother’s reunification services for more than 24 months after the children were initially 

taken into protective custody in September 2019. Respondent, mother, contends the 

appeal should be dismissed as both moot and nonjusticiable. She further argues that the 

juvenile court did not err by ordering additional reunification services because she was 
12.

entitled to 12 months of reunification services after the children’s removal at the May 

2021 section 387 disposition hearing.

I. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

“A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment 

which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract 

propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in 

issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation.] A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it 

impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the appellant], to grant 

him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “ ‘On a case-bycase basis, the reviewing court decides whether subsequent events in a dependency case 

have rendered the appeal moot and whether its decision would affect the outcome of the 

case in a subsequent proceeding.’ ” (In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784, 802.) 

Courts also have discretion to resolve appeals that are technically moot if they present 

important questions affecting the public interest that are capable of repetition yet evade 

review. (In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1078–1079.)

“While appellate courts rarely consider postjudgment evidence or evidence 

developed after the ruling challenged on appeal, such evidence is admissible for the 

limited purpose of determining whether the subsequent development has rendered an 

appeal partially or entirely moot.” (In re M.F. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 86, 110 [taking 

judicial notice of minute orders from hearings that occurred after the challenged order]; 

see also In re Salvador M. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422 [augmenting the record to 

show the issue on appeal was rendered moot by subsequent events in the juvenile court].) 

Mother’s September 15, 2022 request to augment the record on appeal with the juvenile 

court’s August 18, 2022 order returning the children to her custody is hereby granted.

According to the juvenile court’s calculation, the 24-month statutory limitation on 

court-ordered services would have expired in January 2023. The juvenile court is no 

longer capable of ordering reunification services in the present case given its subsequent 
13.

termination of jurisdiction.2 To provide guidance and avoid improper extension of 

reunification services by the trial court in any future proceedings, we reach the merits. 

After making its determination, the juvenile court acknowledged, “I think there’s a 

conflict there for sure. [¶] I think, probably, someone should appeal, and get a clear 

ruling from the appellate court on it myself.”

We acknowledge that the department’s notice of appeal was filed on January 14, 

2022, and it is likely that review of any ruling of the juvenile court continuing 

reunification services would be mooted by this extended period of time. This fact is 

evident in the termination of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction of the children prior to the 

completion of this appeal. The issues raised in this appeal are of continuing public 

importance because they challenge the juvenile court’s erroneous calculation of the 

statutory timeframes, which risks children remaining in temporary foster care placements 

for a longer period than necessary. (See In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 

1548 [refusing to address errors on appeal by declaring the case moot has the undesirable 

result of insulating erroneous rulings from review].)

Accordingly, we will reach the merits of this important issue of statutory 

interpretation despite subsequent events. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 273 

[Appellate courts retain inherent discretion to review merits of appeal despite termination 

of juvenile court’s jurisdiction].) The calculation of the statutory timeframe is an issue 

that is capable of repetition by the juvenile court and would otherwise evade review. 

(See In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 563, fn. 3 [Review of merits on extension of 

services to 24-month review hearing even though reunification services could no longer 

be extended].) Furthermore, the juvenile court might provide reunification services in 

subsequent proceedings involving the children until the appropriate statutory limits in 

2 On this court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s 

February 7, 2023 order terminating jurisdiction with sole legal and physical custody of 

the children to mother. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
14.

such cases have been clarified. Thus, we deny mother’s September 15, 2022 motion to 

dismiss the appeal.

II. Legal Principles

When the juvenile court removes a child from parental custody and adjudges the 

child a dependent, the court must ordinarily order family reunification services for the 

parent and child. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) For a child under the age of three when first 

removed, reunification services are presumptively limited to six months. (§ 361.5, 

subd. (a)(1)(B).) The statute provides that for a child in that age class, the juvenile court 

shall provide reunification services “for a period of 6 months from the dispositional 

hearing as provided in subdivision (e) of Section 366.21, but no longer than 12 months 

from the date the child entered foster care, as provided in Section 361.49 ....” (§ 361.5, 

subd. (a)(1)(B).)

A child is deemed to have entered foster care on the earlier of the date of the 

jurisdictional hearing or 60 days after the date on which the child was initially removed 

from parental custody. (§ 361.49.) Furthermore, the juvenile court must conduct a sixmonth status review hearing “6 months after the initial dispositional hearing, but no later 

than 12 months after the date the child entered foster care as determined in Section 

361.49, whichever occurs earlier ....” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) The same 12-month date 

generally governs the 12-month review hearing, which under the statute “shall be held no 

later than 12 months after the date the child entered foster care ....” (§ 366.21, 

subd. (f)(1).)

Section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(A), sets the standard for older children: “[F]or a 

child who, on the date of initial removal from the physical custody of the child’s parent 

or guardian, was three years of age or older, court-ordered services shall be provided 

beginning with the dispositional hearing and ending 12 months after the date the child 

entered foster care as provided in Section 361.49, unless the child is returned to the home 

of the parent or guardian.”
15.

Notwithstanding the 12-month presumptive limitation on reunification services, 

the juvenile court has the authority to extend services up to a period of 18 months after 

the child’s initial removal from parental custody if it is shown at the 12-month review 

hearing “ ‘that the child will be returned and safely maintained in the home within the 

extended time period.’ ” (M.F., supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 101–102.)

“Eighteen months is therefore generally considered the outer statutory time limit 

for reunification services. [Citations.] Indeed, the statutory scheme requires the 

permanency review hearing (when services have been extended beyond the 12-month 

review hearing) to occur ‘within 18 months after the date the child was originally 

removed from the physical custody’ of the parent. [Citation.] In other words, if the court 

does not return the child at the 12-month review hearing and finds there is no substantial 

probability of return to the parent within 18 months of the initial removal from parental 

custody, ‘the court must terminate reunification efforts and set the matter for a hearing 

pursuant to section 366.26 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. 

[Citation.]’ ” (M.F., supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 102.)

The review hearing statutes presume that the hearings are conducted in a timely 

manner. When they are not, “reunification services and timing of review hearings are to 

be determined relative to the child’s initial removal into custody or the jurisdictional or 

dispositional hearing, not the length of previous services or the dates of previous review 

hearings.” (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 846 (Tonya M.).) 

Consequently, the juvenile court is required to reevaluate the propriety of future services 

under the new applicable standard for that hearing and lacks the authority to order 

services extending beyond the next review hearing. (Id. at p. 845.)

“Notably, the authority to continue a hearing pursuant to section 352 beyond the 

time limit ‘within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held’ (§ 352, subd. (a)(1)) 

does not authorize the court to ignore or redefine statutory time limits. Nor does it allow 

the court to grant a continuance that would cause the disposition hearing to be held more 
16.

than six months after detention. (Id., subd. (b); see also Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.550(a)(3).)” (In re M.F., supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 102–103, fn. omitted.)

III. Standard of Review

We ordinarily review fact-bound issues such as removing a child from parental 

custody or, here, continuation of reunification services, “for substantial evidence viewing 

the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings.” (In re Anthony Q.

(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336, 344.) “When the issue on appeal involves the interpretation 

and proper application of the dependency statutes, however, our review is de novo.” 

(Ibid.)

“ ‘Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s 

intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a 

statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We 

construe the statute’s words in context, and harmonize statutory provisions to avoid 

absurd results.” (John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 95–96.)

IV. Analysis

The department contends the juvenile court erred as a matter of law by relying 

upon the case of T.W. and ordering continued reunification services for mother beyond 

24 months from the date the children were originally removed from mother’s physical 

custody. The department argues that the children’s subsequent return to mother’s 

custody at the disposition hearing did not toll the maximum time period for reunification 

services.3 Mother responds that the juvenile court acted appropriately because she was 

entitled 12 months of reunification services from the date of the disposition hearing 

where the children were removed from all parental custody. We agree with the 

department.

3 We grant the department’s request for judicial notice filed on August 1, 2022, for 

the consideration of Assembly Bill No. 706 (2009–2010 Reg. Sess.) and Assembly 

Committee on Human Services, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 2341 (2007–2008 Reg. 

Sess.), as amended March 28, 2008.
17.

Whenever a child is removed from the custody of their parent or guardian, the 

juvenile court “shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child 

and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed father or guardians.” (§ 361.5, 

subd. (a).) A child’s detention pending a jurisdictional hearing is considered a removal 

from parental custody for purposes of section 361.5, subdivision (a). (N.M., supra, 

108 Cal.App.4th at p. 854; see also § 319, subd. (g) [“If a court orders a child detained, 

the court shall state the facts on which the decision is based, specify why the initial 

removal was necessary ... and order services to be provided as soon as possible to 

reunify the child and their family, if appropriate.” (Italics added.)]; § 352, subd. (b) 

[“... if a minor has been removed from the parents’ or guardians’ custody, a continuance 

shall not be granted that would result in the dispositional hearing, held pursuant to 

Section 361, being completed longer than 60 days, or 30 days in the case of an Indian 

child, after the hearing at which the minor was ordered removed or detained, unless the 

court finds that there are exceptional circumstances requiring a continuance.” (Italics 

added.)].) Thus, a child’s initial or original removal occurs at the time a child’s removal 

is ordered at a detention hearing.

“It is difficult, if not impossible, to exaggerate the importance of reunification in 

the dependency system.” (In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 678.) Pursuant to 

section 319, subdivision (g), “services” must be provided, if appropriate, upon the child’s 

initial removal at the detention hearing. Section 361.5, subdivision (a) “ordinarily” 

requires that “child welfare services” be provided to a child and their parents whenever a 

child is removed from the home of their parent or guardian. (Tonya M., supra, 42 Cal.4th 

at p. 843.) The term “child welfare services” is defined in section 16501, subdivision (a): 

“Child welfare services” include “a continuum of services, including emergency response 

services, family preservation services, family maintenance services, family reunification 

services, and permanent placement services.” 

The term “child welfare services” does not necessarily imply reunification 

services. (In re A.L. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 138, 144.) Instead, both reunification 
18.

services and family maintenance services are a subset of the term “child welfare 

services.” (§ 16501, subd. (a)(2).) “[F]amily maintenance services are activities 

designed to provide in-home protective services to prevent or remedy neglect, abuse, or 

exploitation, for the purposes of preventing separation of children from their families.” 

(§ 16501, subd. (g).) “[F]amily reunification services are activities designed to provide 

time-limited foster care services to prevent or remedy neglect, abuse, or exploitation, 

when the child cannot safely remain at home, and needs temporary foster care, while 

services are provided to reunite the family.” (Id., subd. (h).)

“The Legislature has recognized that a parent who has a child removed for neglect, 

abuse or substantial risk thereof, in most cases should be provided with services to assist 

the parent in overcoming the problems that led to removal. (§ 361.5.) It has also 

recognized that, in order to prevent children from spending their lives in the uncertainty 

of foster care, there must be a limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a 

parent to become adequate.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308.) Reunification 

services are a benefit, and there is no constitutional “entitlement” to child welfare

services. (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242, citing In re Joshua M.

(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 476.) Furthermore, the resources available to the juvenile 

court are not unlimited. (In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 566.)

Accordingly, while the statutory scheme generally requires that parents be 

provided “court-ordered services” beginning with the disposition hearing and ending 

12 months after the date the child entered foster care, the Legislature has limited those 

services to “a maximum time period not to exceed 18 months,” which may be extended to 

24 months under certain circumstances. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The 18-month and 24-

month periods are calculated from the date the child was originally removed from 

physical custody of the child’s parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A) and (a)(4)(A).) 

However, “the reunification period may be as short as six months, and in some 

dependency cases there may be no reunification period at all. (See §§ 366.21, subd. (e), 

361.5, subd. (b); In re Troy Z. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1170, 1177 ....)” (In re Zacharia D.
19.

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 446; see also In re Aryanna C., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1242

[father’s abysmal efforts at reunification supported court’s decision to terminate services 

before expiration of six-month period].)

Mother’s contention that the juvenile court was permitted to order additional 

reunification services because she was entitled to 12 months of reunification services 

ignores the outer limits that the Legislature has placed on court-ordered services when a 

child will remain in out-of-home care at the time services are ordered or continued. 

Eighteen months is generally considered the outer statutory time limit for reunification 

services. (In re M.F., supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 102; see also Tonya M., supra, 

42 Cal.4th at p. 845 [describing “three distinct periods and three corresponding distinct 

escalating standards for the provision of reunification services to parents of children 

under the age of three” running “roughly” from the jurisdictional hearing to the sixmonth review, from the six-month review hearing to the 12-month review hearing, and 

from the 12-month review hearing to the 18-month review hearing].) “In addition, 

section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A), and section 366.22, subdivision (b), permit a further 

extension up to a maximum of 24 months at the 18-month review hearing under certain 

narrowly defined circumstances.” (In re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1124, fn. 

omitted.)

“To be sure, the dependency scheme contemplates disposition occurring close in 

time to the designation of foster care entry, thus typically allowing the parent to receive 

12 months of reunification services prior to arriving at the statutory outer bound of ‘no 

longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care.’ (§ 361.5, 

subd. (a)(1)(B).) But when circumstances do result in delays, California courts regularly 

enforce the statutory limits.” (In re M.F., supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.)4 To adopt 

4 We can appreciate that extraordinary circumstances resulting in the delay of the 

disposition hearing beyond the 18-month time limit may require a departure from the 

statutory time period to ensure that a parent’s ability to receive any reunification services 

is not completely undermined. However, a strict adherence to the outer 18-month limit 
20.

the reasoning suggested by mother would place the 18-month limitation prescribed by 

section 361.5, subdivision (a)(3)(A) in subjection to the general provision of courtordered services until 12 months after the child enters foster care in section 361.5, 

subdivision (a)(1)(A). This type of reading of section 361.5 fails to properly consider the 

context of those provisions and how the statute is written as a whole. 

Establishing a mandatory minimum of 12-month reunification services from the 

date of a disposition hearing where the child is removed from the custody of all parents 

would require one to ignore the plain language of the rest of the statute. Section 361.5, 

subdivision (a)(3)(A) begins, “Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of 

paragraph (1), court-ordered services may be extended up to a maximum time period not 

to exceed 18 months after the date the child was originally removed from physical 

custody of the child’s parent ....” Thus, the usual requirement of 12 months of courtordered services in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) is still constrained by the 18-month 

outer limit. (See People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 739 [rejecting defendant’s 

argument, that the general provisions of § 12021, subd. (a)(1) necessarily trumped 

§ 12021.1, subd. (a) to the extent the statutes overlapped in a particular case, because 

“[t]he Legislature’s use of the word ‘notwithstanding’ in this context meant that section 

12021.1(a) applied without prevention or obstruction by section 12021(a)(1)”].) 

“[Mother]’s contrary interpretation of the statute renders the Legislature’s use of the word 

‘notwithstanding’ meaningless, and violates the principle that when interpreting a statute, 

significance should be given to every word, phrase, and sentence where possible. (See 

People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5 ....)” (People v. Sanders, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 

p. 739.)

Although it considered a different issue, we find the discussion in Tonya M., 

supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 836, helpful in our analysis. The combined jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing for the child in Tonya M. took place approximately nine months 

was important in the present case given the multiple continuances of the disposition 

hearing without adequate findings to support their necessity.
21.

before the six-month review hearing because of multiple continuances. (Id. at p. 841.) 

At the six-month review hearing in August 2006, the court ordered termination of the 

mother’s reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 permanency 

planning hearing in December 2006, after determining there was no substantial 

probability the child would be returned to the mother by November 2006, when the court 

would be required to hold the section 366.21, subdivision (f) hearing or the 12-month 

review date. (Tonya M., at p. 842.) Mother appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred, 

since it should have considered whether there was a substantial probability the child 

would be returned to the mother by February 2007, a full six months after the six-month 

review hearing. (Ibid.)

The Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court calculated the correct time period 

when deciding whether reunification services should be continued. The court reviewed

the specific statutory language and broader statutory context and concluded that “[d]elays 

in the timing of one hearing should not affect either the timing of subsequent hearings or 

the length of services to be ordered.” (Tonya M., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 846.) In doing 

so it held that “[t]his approach is consistent with the Legislature’s directive that periods 

for reunification services and timing of review hearings are to be determined relative to 

the child’s initial removal into custody or the jurisdictional or dispositional hearing, not 

the length of previous services or the dates of previous review hearings.” (Ibid.) Thus, 

the Supreme Court reinforced the outer time limits for review hearings despite delays that 

threatened to encroach on a parent’s standard reunification timeline. (See In re M.F., 

supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 105.) Mother’s argument to the contrary is not compelling.

In the present case, the juvenile court initially removed the children from mother’s 

custody on September 19, 2019. This “original” removal fixed the 18-month period to 

expire on March 19, 2021, and the 24-month period to expire on September 19, 2021.

(§ 361.5, subds. (a)(3)(A), (a)(4)(A).) Once a child is initially removed from their 

parent’s custody, a deadline is set, and it is not reset if the parent regains custody at some 

point during the time period. To construe section 361.5’s language as requiring the court 
22.

to reset the 18-month deadline simply because a parent succeeded in temporarily 

regaining physical custody “ ‘ “would scuttle the purpose of the statute merely to 

preserve its form.” ’ ” (See N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 854, citing In re Michael 

S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1459.) 

The reasoning employed by the juvenile court and suggested by mother ignores 

additional language in section 361.5, which clearly states the outer time limit is not tolled 

for the time a child is in the parent’s physical custody. “Physical custody of the child by 

the parents or guardians during the applicable time under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of 

paragraph (1) shall not serve to interrupt the running of the period.” (§ 361.5, 

subd. (a)(3)(B).) This language clearly limits the section’s mandate for services 

beginning at the point in time that the court initially orders a child removed from parental 

custody pursuant to section 361.5, and it expressly excludes tolling of the period in the 

event a parent regains custody during the 18-month period. (See also In re Michael S., 

supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1459.) The statutory deadlines were not written to function 

as stopwatches to be paused and restarted. Rather, the outer limit is fixed by section 

361.5 upon the children’s initial removal, and a date is set to expire in 18 months 

regardless of a custodial parent’s subsequent retention of custody at disposition.

Adopting the interpretation proposed by mother would reward parents who either 

request or acquiesce to numerous continuances that result in excessive delays in 

completing the disposition hearing. (See Tonya M., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 847 [rejecting 

interpretation suggested by parent because it “would only create incentives for a parent to 

interpose delay” in holding review hearings].) Resetting the 18-month time limit in 

situations where a parent regains custody after receiving nine months of predispositional

services while their children are in foster care runs contrary to the purposes of the 

statutory scheme. It would only incentivize parents to delay the proceedings while 

undergoing a quasi-reunification period before the disposition hearing can even be 

completed.
23.

Here, the juvenile court determined that mother had not exceeded the 18- or 24-

month time limit for reunification services in reliance on the case of T.W., supra,

214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154. On appeal, mother also relies on the case of A.C., supra, 169 

Cal.App.4th at page 636 to support her argument that the 18-month time period did not 

begin until the children were removed from mother’s custody pursuant to the section 387 

petition. However, T.W. and A.C. are both distinguishable from our present

circumstances. In both cases, the children were removed from one parent, placed with 

the other, and then removed from that parent and either placed with the original parent 

(T.W.) or placed directly into out of home custody (A.C.). The issue in each case was 

when the timeline for reunification services began considering the children’s initial 

placement at the disposition hearing pursuant to section 361.2.

In A.C., the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s ruling, finding that “the 

time limits for services set forth in section 361.5 do not apply if dependents are not 

removed from the custody of both parents at the dispositional hearing.” (A.C., supra, 

169 Cal.App.4th at p. 649.) The court explained that the “section 361.5, subdivision (a) 

‘clock’ does not start to run against such parents unless and until the children are 

removed from the physical custody of the parent(s) and the court determines whether the 

parent(s) (are) entitled to reunification services pursuant to the lengthy analysis set forth 

in section 361.5.” (Id. at p. 650, fn. omitted.)

The case of T.W. involved a minor’s challenge to a juvenile court’s order to 

provide the mother six more months of reunification services. (T.W., supra, 

214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.) The minor argued the mother had already received 

31 months of services, exceeding the limit under section 361.5, subdivision (a). (T.W., at 

p. 1164.) The Court of Appeal in T.W. discussed the interaction between sections 361.2 

and 361.5, which were enacted as parts of a single legislative scheme and agreed with the 

appellate court in A.C. (T.W., at p. 1165; see also In re Erika W. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 

470, 475.) 
24.

After reviewing the differences between section 361.2 and 361.5, the court 

reasoned, “[a] comparison of sections 361.5 and 361.2 suggests there are two separate 

statutory tracks for services: one when a child is placed with a noncustodial parent 

(§ 361.2), and another when a child is placed with someone other than a parent 

(§ 361.5).” (T.W., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1167.) According to the Court of 

Appeal, the section 361.5 time period was not implicated while father had custody of the 

minor, and the section 361.5 time period was not triggered until the minor was removed 

from both parents’ custody. (T.W., at pp. 1167, 1169.) The court-ordered services the 

parents had previously received under section 361.2 did not preclude them from receiving 

services under section 361.5. (T.W., at p. 1169.)

In the present case, the children were not removed from one parent and placed 

with another pursuant to section 361.2. Instead, they were initially removed from mother 

and placed into the temporary custody of the department from September 2019 to June 

2020. At the disposition hearing mother regained custody of the children until their 

subsequent removal in January 2021. Thus, the 18-month time period began to run as of 

their initial removal in September 2019. Mother’s citation to language from the T.W., 

supra, 214 Cal.App.4th 1154 decision suggesting the section 361.5 time period begins to 

run from disposition was dicta, as it was not necessary to the resolution of that case.

Furthermore, as we have already discussed, the California Supreme Court has 

clarified that reunification services are limited by the 18-month time period, which is 

calculated from “ ‘the date the child was originally taken from the physical custody of his 

or her parent ....’ ” (See In re Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 446.) Reunification 

services under section 361.2 are discretionary and not expressly time-limited because the 

minor remains in the custody of a parent and the goal of placing a child in parental 

custody has been met. (In re Erika W., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 478.) 

The final case relied upon by mother is In re Joel T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 263

(Joel T.), which held that the juvenile court had improperly denied reunification services 

to a parent who only received family maintenance services. In that case, the minors were 
25.

initially detained in October 1996 due to allegations that the appellant allowed a 

perpetrator of sexual abuse into the family’s home. (Id. at p. 265.) However, the juvenile 

court authorized a trial placement of the minors with the appellant pending the 

jurisdiction hearing. (Ibid.) 

At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in January 1997, the juvenile 

court found that return of the minors to the appellant’s custody would be detrimental, 

committed the minors to the custody of the department, and allowed the minors to remain 

in the custody of the appellant “on a trial basis.” (Joel T., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 265–266.) The appellant was ordered to participate in a “reunification” plan, and her 

trial placement was continued with further services at the six-month review hearing. 

(Ibid.) In February 1998, the juvenile court removed the minors from the appellant’s 

custody pursuant to a supplemental petition after she allowed the perpetrator back into 

her home on more than one occasion. (Ibid.) The juvenile court denied the appellant’s 

request for reunification services at the April 1998 dispositional hearing on the

supplemental petition because the department already provided her with 18 months of 

services. (Id. at pp. 266–267.)

In reversing the juvenile court’s orders, the court found the minors’ trial placement 

with the appellant was the “functional equivalent of an in-home dependency in which the 

court orders the parents to participate in child welfare services,” which was disapproved 

of in In re Damonte A. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 894. (Joel T., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 267.) The court then reasoned that, “the court ordered the minors removed from 

parental custody and denied reunification services solely because [the] appellant had 

received court-ordered services for the 18 months following the minors’ original 

detention. However, [the] appellant had not received time-limited services prior to the 

minors’ second detention on the supplemental petition as they were in her custody subject 

to the supervision of the juvenile court. Consequently, the court could not rely on the 

statutory limitations for services provided to parents whose children have been removed 

in denying services to [the] appellant.” (Id. at p. 268.) 
26.

The court concluded by explaining, “[W]hen the juvenile court removes a minor 

from parental custody for the first time, section 361.5, subdivision (a), requires the court 

to order reunification services except in the circumstances specified in subdivision (b) of 

that section. (Cf. Carolyn R. v. Superior Court (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 159, 165–

167 ....)” (Joel T., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 267.) The procedures employed by the 

juvenile court to deny the appellant reunification services in Joel T. stand in stark contrast 

to the present case. The minors were returned to appellant’s custody at the outset of the 

dependency proceedings through the use of a “nonstatutory procedure” that has been 

consistently disapproved. (See Savannah B. v. Superior Ct. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 158, 

162.) Thus, they were not removed from appellant’s custody such that the 18-month 

statutory limitation was applicable where the juvenile court allowed the minors to be 

placed in appellant’s custody pending the jurisdiction hearing. (See N.M., supra, 

108 Cal.App.4th at p. 854 [“a detention pending a jurisdictional hearing should be 

considered an original removal from custody for purposes of section 361.5, 

subdivision (a)”].)

Here, the children continued to be removed from their mother’s custody for a total 

of eight months once the disposition hearing was finally completed. The predispositional 

services provided to mother during this period cannot be compared to the exclusive 

provision of in-home services in Joel T. because the children were not residing with 

mother during that eight-month period. Furthermore, mother received a combination of 

predispositional services, family maintenance services, and family reunification services 

for a total of 26 months of court-ordered services. The children’s initial and continued 

removal during the provision of mother’s predispositional services was sufficient to 

trigger the 18-month statutory limit on court-ordered services. (See N.M., supra, 

108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 855, 857–858 [juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering 

additional services after parent already received almost 20 months of family maintenance 

and family reunification services].)
27.

We will continue to follow the rule that this court set forth in Carolyn R. v. 

Superior Court, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th 159. In that case, the children were detained from 

the mother in San Bernardino County and the mother received eight months of 

reunification services. In November 1994, the mother moved to Kern County and the 

juvenile court in that county returned the children to her based on her having made 

progress in the court-ordered plan. The children remained in the mother’s custody until 

July 1995, when the Kern County Department of Human Services filed a section 387 

petition to remove the children from her home. By that time, the mother had received 

eight months of reunification services and 10 months of family maintenance services. 

(Carolyn R. v. Superior Court, at p. 162.)

This court rejected the mother’s argument that she was entitled to 12 additional 

months of reunification services starting from the date the section 387 petition was filed. 

“At issue when a parent has received child welfare services, in the form of both 

reunification and family maintenance services, is whether those services were reasonably 

designed to assist the parent in overcoming the problems which led to the court’s 

intervention; the label given to the services is not dispositive. The goal of both 

reunification and maintenance services is to address the circumstances which required 

agency and court intervention into a family’s life.... [¶] When a juvenile court sustains a 

supplemental petition pursuant to section 387, the case does not return to ‘ “square one” ’

with regard to reunification efforts.” (Carolyn R. v. Superior Court, supra, 41 

Cal.App.4th at p. 166, fn. omitted.)

Although the Carolyn R. decision did not address the exact issue presented here, 

its reasoning is still applicable. Mother had been receiving court-ordered services for 

20 months at the time of the disposition hearing on the first section 387 petition on 

May 10, 2021. At the time of the disposition hearing on the second section 387 petition 

on November 15, 2021, mother had received almost 26 months of court-ordered services 

comprised of approximately nine months of predispositional services, seven months of 

family maintenance services, and 10 months of reunification services. The services 
28.

provided throughout the proceedings were nearly identical and involved substance abuse 

treatment, random drug testing, parenting classes, and mental health treatment. 

Excluding the entire 20 months that elapsed since the children’s initial removal solely 

because mother briefly regained custody at the disposition hearing would be in clear 

violation of the express terms of section 361.5, subdivision (a)(3)(B).

This approach is also supported by the case of N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at 

page 845 where similar facts were present. In N.M., the juvenile court ordered the 

parents’ 18-month-old child detained due to the parents’ drug abuse in January 2001. (Id.

at p. 848.) At the jurisdiction hearing, the court took jurisdiction over the child and 

ordered the child placed with mother under a plan of family maintenance. (Ibid.) The 

father was granted reunification services and visitation. (Ibid.) The court subsequently 

granted a section 388 petition to allow the father to move back in with the mother, and it 

restored the father’s custody under a family maintenance plan. (Id. at p. 849.)

Due to the parents’ relapse, the department removed the child pursuant to a 

section 387 petition in February 2002. (N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 849.) The 

juvenile court sustained the section 387 petition, removed the child from the parents, and 

granted the parents reunification services. (Id. at p. 850.) At the review hearing, the 

court concluded the family maintenance services provided to the mother would not be 

considered when calculating the amount of reunification services provided to the father. 

(Id. at p. 851.) As a result, the juvenile court concluded reunification services should 

continue to both parents. (Ibid.) The child appealed the juvenile court’s order continuing 

the parents’ reunification services, and the Court of Appeal reversed. The Court of 

Appeal reasoned that, “[m]other’s 18-month period commenced at the time of the 

original detention and not later when she lost custody on the section 387 petition.” (Id. at 

p. 855.)

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal explained: “The 18-month limitation 

set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (a) applies to all ‘court-ordered services.’ 

[Citation.] Nothing in the statute suggests the limitation period should be calculated 
29.

separately for maintenance and reunification services.... [¶] The fact a parent had 

custody during part of the total period does not stop the limitation period in section 361.5 

from continuing to run. Section 361.5 states: ‘Physical custody of the child by the 

parents or guardians during the applicable time period ... shall not serve to interrupt the 

running of the period.’ [Citation.] ‘To construe the section’s language as requiring the 

court to start services anew simply because a parent succeeded in temporarily regaining 

physical custody “would scuttle the purpose of the statute merely to preserve its 

form.” ’ ” (N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 853–854.)

“Indeed, if it were otherwise, a parent whose child was initially detained but who 

regained custody at the jurisdiction hearing could receive up to 12 months of family 

maintenance services [citation], lose custody again on a section 387 petition, and then 

receive up to 18 additional months of reunification services under section 361.5, 

subdivision (a) by arguing that the ‘original’ removal did not occur until the loss of 

custody pursuant to the section 387 petition. The resulting total hiatus of 30 months 

manifestly would not advance the legislative purpose of minimizing delay in dependency 

proceedings. ‘While [22 months] may not seem a long period of time to an adult, it can 

be a lifetime to a young child.’ ” (N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 855.)

“ ‘When a juvenile court sustains a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387, 

the case does not return to “ ‘square one’ ” with regard to reunification efforts. 

[Citations.] Instead, the question becomes whether reunification efforts should resume. 

The answer is yes if: the parent has received less than 12 months of child welfare 

services (§§ 361.5, subd. (a), 366.21, subd. (e)); the parent did not receive reasonable 

child welfare services (§§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1), 366.22, subd. (a)); or the case has passed 

the 12-month mark but there is a substantial probability the child will be returned within 

18 months of the date the child was originally removed from the parent’s physical 

custody (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)).’ ” (N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 853.)

This same rationale is applicable to the present case. We acknowledge that the 

applicable version of section 361.5, subdivision (a) relied upon in N.M. differs from the 
30.

amended version applicable in the instant case. The 2021 version of section 361.5 limits 

subdivision (a)(1)(A) to reunification services, as opposed to encompassing child welfare 

services in general, and clarifies the term, “foster care,” as defined in section 361.49. 

These amendments to section 361.5, subdivision (a), however, do not change the 

underlying rationale expressed in N.M. that a period of family maintenance services after 

a child’s initial removal does not alter the statutory time limit for services pursuant to 

section 361.5, subdivision (a).

To conclude that the Legislature authorized reunification services to be ordered 

such that the children would potentially be in an out of home placement after more than 

40 months have elapsed since their initial removal on January 27, 2021, is simply not 

reasonable. (See, e.g., Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 744 [court 

should avoid construction of statute that will produce “ ‘mischief or absurdity’ ”]; 

Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 578 [“We avoid any construction that would 

produce absurd consequences”].) 

In sum, we believe the juvenile court erred in failing to consider the entire time 

period since the children’s initial removal when it calculated the 18-month statutory limit 

on reunification services. By the time the juvenile court ordered mother’s reunification 

services to continue in November 2021, mother had received approximately 26 months of 

services, which was well over the 18-month limit. “While [26 months] may not seem a 

long period of time to an adult, it can be a lifetime to a young child.” (In re Marilyn H., 

supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.) As our Supreme Court has noted, “ ‘[c]hildhood does not 

wait for the parent to become adequate.’ ” (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 

998, 1016.) 

Therefore, the matter is remanded for the juvenile court to vacate the order 

continuing mother’s family reunification services from the November 15, 2021, hearing. 

However, we acknowledge this may have no practical effect given mother was being 

provided family maintenance services and the children were returned to her custody on 

August 18, 2022. As discussed previously, we render our decision despite these 
31.

subsequent events to address this important issue of statutory interpretation. (In re D.P., 

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 273.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order continuing mother’s reunification services on 

November 15, 2021, is reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with 

directions to vacate its order continuing mother’s family reunification services. In all 

other respects the juvenile court’s orders made at the November 15, 2021 section 387 

disposition and family reunification review hearing are affirmed. 

POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, J.

DE SANTOS, J.