The Honorable Edward J. McManus, United States District Judge 1

for the Northern District of Iowa.

___________

No. 95-2507

___________

Laura Anderson, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * Northern District of Iowa.

of the Social Security * [UNPUBLISHED]

Administration, *

 *

Appellee. *

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 Submitted: December 19, 1995

 Filed: December 28, 1995 

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MAGILL, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Laura Anderson appeals the district court's decision affirming the 1

Commissioner's decision denying her application for child's disability

benefits (42 U.S.C. § 402(d)). We affirm.

We review to determine if the Commissioner's decision is supported

by substantial evidence. See Bates v. Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 531-32 (8th

Cir. 1995) (substantial evidence is that which reasonable mind would accept

as adequate to support Commissioner's conclusion). Evidence that detracts

from the Commissioner's decision is considered, but even if inconsistent

conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, the decision will be affirmed

where the evidence as a whole supports either outcome. Chamberlain v.

Shalala, 47 F.3d 1489, 1493 (8th Cir. 1995).
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Having carefully examined the lengthy administrative transcript, we

conclude that substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge's

(ALJ) decision. While the record demonstrates that Anderson had mental and

physical problems during the relevant time period, the record supports the

ALJ's conclusion that the Commissioner proved jobs existed that Anderson

could have performed. See Frankl v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir.

1995) (once burden shifts, Commissioner must demonstrate claimant retains

residual functional capacity to perform significant number of other jobs

in national economy). Specifically, the record supports the ALJ's

conclusion that Anderson retained the residual functional capacity to do

unskilled work that involved little or no contact with the public. Despite

Anderson's mental problems, her moderate physical limitations, and the

combined effect of her mental and physical problems, she demonstrated the

ability to successfully complete her undergraduate studies with a high

grade point average, work as a teaching assistant, and be accepted into

graduate school. Cf. House v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 691, 693-94 (8th Cir. 1994)

(one of daily activities inconsistent with disabling pain was that claimant

had successfully completed 200 hours of college classes during relevant

time period); Grace v. Sullivan, 901 F.2d 660, 661-62 (8th Cir. 1990) (per

curiam) (one factor in deciding that claimant retained residual functional

capacity to work was that claimant was full-time student who obtained

bachelor and masters degree during relevant time period).

To determine whether the ALJ properly applied the factors from

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984) (subsequent history

omitted), we must consider whether the ALJ took into account all the

relevant evidence, and whether that evidence contradicted the claimant's

own testimony so that the ALJ could discount the testimony for lack of

credibility. Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 1987). The ALJ

properly discounted Anderson's complaints of severe headaches in 1981 and

1982 because she did not report these headaches or seek treatment for them

until
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1990. See Barrett v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 1994) (absence

of objective medical evidence supporting degree of pain complained of is

factor ALJ should consider); Benskin, 830 F.2d at 884 (ALJ entitled to find

failure to seek medical attention inconsistent with subjective complaints

of pain).

We further conclude, contrary to Anderson's argument, that the ALJ

appropriately evaluated letters written by a physician Anderson claimed was

her treating physician. See Gude v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 791, 793 (8th Cir.

1992) (opinion of a treating physician is entitled to great weight). The

ALJ specifically noted the doctor's opinions were generated years after the

time in question, and his belief that the doctor's opinion that Anderson

had been disabled since 1978 was not supported by the medical evidence in

the record. See Loving v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 16 F.3d

967, 971 (8th Cir. 1994) (conclusory statement of disability without

supporting evidence does not overcome substantial evidence supporting

Commissioner's decision). 

Finally, we conclude that the ALJ properly developed the record. See

Bishop v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1259, 1262 (8th Cir. 1990) (ALJ has duty to

fully and fairly develop record upon which decision is to be made).

Anderson's ability to offer documentary evidence during the administrative

proceedings was not limited, and Anderson has not shown any resulting

prejudice or unfairness from the limitations the ALJ placed on her

testimony at the hearing. See Highfill v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 112, 115 (8th

Cir. 1987) (claimant must show prejudice or unfairness resulting from an

incomplete record). 

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.