COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, Alston and Russell Argued by teleconference

TAMERA S. GILBERT MEMORANDUM OPINION  BY v. Record No . 1771-16-3 JUDGE W ILLIAM G. PETTY JULY 18, 2017 WISE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT C OURT OF WISE COUNTY John C. Kilgore, Judge Jeffery L. Elkins for appellant. 1 (Jeremy B. O’Quinn; Julie nne D. Hensley, Guardian ad litem for the minor child; The O’Quinn Law Office, PLLC; Law Offices of Gregory M. Kallen and Julienne D . Hensley, on bri ef), for appel lee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.

In this appeal, Tamera S. Gilbert argues: I. That the trial court comm itted reversible error by granting the termination of appellant’s resid ual parental rights without not ice to the Appellant thereby depri ving her of an opportunity to be present, and to fully and fairl y litigate the issues in the cas e all in violation of her 14th Amendmen t right to substantive and procedural due process. II. The trial court committed reversible error when it termina ted residual parental rights without achieving service of process o n the parent whose rights were terminated as required by Virginia Code section 16.1-283. III. The trial court committed reversible error in terminating Appellant’s residual parental rights based solely upon the testimony of the social worker Paul Adams as his testimony did [sic] establish by clear and convi ncing evidence the proof

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.

1 By an order dated October 26, 2016, th e trial court granted th e motion of J. Brent Fleming to withdraw as Gilbert’ s trial counsel for “good cause shown,” which was not included in the record. Jeffrey L. Elkins was appointed at that time to represent Gilbert on appeal.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - necessary and required to termin ate Appellant’s residual parent al rights under Virginia Code Section 16.1-283. For the reason below, we affirm the circuit court’s decision.
B ACKGROUND Because the parties are fully c onversant with the record in th is case and this memorandum opinion carries no preced ential value, we recite bel ow only those facts and incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of this appeal. We view the facts i n the light most favorable to the prevailing pa rty below. Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 215-16, 661 S.E.2d 415, 419 (2008 ). On May 2, 2016, Gilbert signed a noti ce of appeal of the juven ile and domestic relations district (JDR) court’s April 26, 2016 order terminating her res idual parental ri ghts. Gilbert’s Pennington Gap, Virginia addre ss had been typed on the form. P ennington Gap is located in Lee County. The date of appearance f or the appeal was filled in wi th a handwritten notation that it was “to be set by Wise Co[unty] C ircuit Court.” Gilbert’s tria l counsel subsequently submitted to the Wise County Circuit Court a “Notice” stating that a hear ing date was set for July 29, 2016. The notice listed Gilbert’s a ddress in Pennington Gap. Gilbert ’s trial counsel asked the clerk of the circuit court to forward t he notice to the Sheriff of Lee C ounty for service of the notice on Gilbert. The notice was not ser ved, and the Sheriff wrote “doe s not live at address” on the return. Gilbert did not appear at the July 29, 2016 trial, and the trial date was rescheduled for September 12, 2016. Gilbert’s trial counsel submitted another “Notice” with Wise County Circuit Court, which stated the rescheduled hear ing date of September 12, 2016. Gil bert’s trial counsel again asked the clerk to forward this noti ce to the Sheriff of Lee County f or service on Gilbert. Although the return service on the first noti ce stated that Gilbert did not reside at the Pennington Gap address listed, Gilbert’s trial counsel requested service of the second notice on Gilbert at the same- 3 - address listed on the first noti ce. The notice was not served; the return stated, “Does not live at address. Was advised lived in Wise Co.” 2 The record contains no evide nce of attempted service to Gilbert at any address other than the failed one in Penningt on Gap. On September 12, 2016, the trial court began the proceeding. Before the trial court even stated the case number, Gilbert’ s trial counsel interrupted, “I have not heard from her. Are you sure service was made?” At the conclusion of the proceeding, G ilbert’s trial counsel stated, “We waive signing of the order.” Tha t was the full extent of parti cipation in the proceeding by Gilbert’s trial counsel. Upon swearing in of a witness from the Foster Care Program in the Wise County Department of Social Services (DSS), the following dialogue occ urred: By the Court: We have the fa ilure of either parent to try and strength [sic] the relationship. By [the witness]: I couldn’t lo cate the mother. She has been in and out of jail. By the Court: It was April 25t h that the order was entered gra nting termination. By [the witness]: I had one cont act with the mother since Augu st of last year. By the Court: The departme nt is moving for a finding. By [counsel for DSS]: We are as king to withdraw and keep it in Juvenile Court. By the Court: I will make that finding that the department has tried to reach the parties. I a m only too glad to dismiss the case and find the same as Juvenile Court. By [counsel for DSS]: It is in the best interest. By the Court: No, if no contact ha s been made then the departm ent is okay. This was the extent of the tes timony and evidence. Neither att orney questioned the witness from Wise County DSS.

2 The return was stamped “receiv ed” by the Wise County Sheriff’s Office on August 16, 2016, but the record does not contai n any indication that the W ise County Sheriff attempted delivery.- 4 - The order withdrawing appeal sta ted that “[p]ursuant to proper Notice to all parties,” Gilbert’s failure to appear, a nd a motion by Wise DSS to withdr aw the appeal pursuant to Code § 16.1-106.1(D), “the Court hereby ORD ERS that [Gilbert’s] appe al[] be withdrawn, thereby reinstating the judgment of the Wise County Juvenile and Domest ic Relations Court.” The order also stated that the circuit co urt had made “findings” regardin g the best interests of the child and the failure of the parents to c ommunicate with the child. This appeal followed.
A NALYSIS Rule 5A:18 states: No ruling of the trial court . . . w ill be considered as a basi s for reversal unless an objection was s tated with reasonable certain ty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enabl e the Court of Appeals to attain the e nds of justice. A mere stateme nt that the judgment or award is co ntrary to the l aw and the evide nce is not sufficient to preserve th e issue for appellate review. The purpose of the rule is to assu re “that the trial court is provided an opportunity to rule intelligently” on an objection or procedural issue raised by a party. Preferred Sys. Sols., Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC, 284 Va. 382, 396, 732 S.E.2d 676, 683 (2012 ). When the issue concerns a matter of law, such as what constitutes sufficient notice, an o bjection will be timely so long as it is raised in a manner that gives the trial court sufficient not ice of the argumen t and time to rule intelligently on the issue while the case remains under the cou rt’s jurisdiction, even if raised for the first time in a post-tria l motion. See Majorana v. Crown C ent. Petroleum Corp., 260 Va. 521, 525 n.1, 539 S.E.2d 426, 428 n.1 (2000). Here, Gilbert was represente d at the September 12, 2016 trial, but her trial counsel made no objection to proceeding without h is client present. Gilbert ’s trial counsel was unsure if- 5 - Gilbert had been give n notice regarding the date and time of th e hearing, 3 but he did not make any argument for a continuance . Gilbert’s trial counsel made n o argument to the court that Gilbert’s lack of notice or servi ce of process deprived Gilbert of an opportunity to be present, and to fully and fairly litigate the issue i n the case in keepi ng with her procedural due process rights. Although the order withdr awing appeal states “Counsel for [Gilbert] objected to” the motion by Wise County DSS to deem the appeal withdrawn, no such objection by Gilbert’s trial counsel is preserved in the reco rd. The order withdrawing the appeal was signed by the judge two weeks after the September 27, 2016 proceeding, but Gilbert’ s trial counsel made no motion for reconsideration during that time nor in the subsequent twen ty-one days. See Rule 1:1. Consequently, the circuit cour t had no opportunity to rule inte lligently on the issue of Gilbert’s failure to be physically present for the trial on termination o f her residual parental rights. Furthermore, each of Gilbert’s assignments of error contends, “The trial court committed reversible error when it terminat ed residual parental rights” o f Gilbert for the reason argued. The circuit court here, however, did no t terminate Gilbert’s residu al parental rights . Rather, the order

3 Gilbert’s trial counsel comme nted that he had not spoken to hi s client and asked if she had been served. It thus appears Gilbert’s tria l counsel had m ade no attempt to contact her. We note that the Rules of Professi onal Conduct place the burden of communication with the client squarely on the lawyer, not the clerk of court. (a) A lawyer shall keep a client r easonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matte r to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. (c) A lawyer shall inform the client of facts pertinent to the matt er and of communications for another party that may significantly affect settlement or resolution of the matter. Prof. R. of Conduct 1.4. The record does not disclose efforts of Gilbert’s trial counsel to communicate with her, beyond the f ailed “Notice” of hearings.- 6 - of the circuit court withdrew G ilbert’s appeal, “thereby reinst ating the judgment of the Wise County Juvenile and Domestic Relat ions Court” terminating Gilbe rt’s residual parental rights. 4 We do not consider assignments of error that do not address a r uling made by the trial court. Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 471, 643 S.E.2d 708, 716 (2007). Because Gilbert did not object to any action by the circuit co urt and does not assign error to any action taken by the circuit court, we conclude Gilbert h as waived these arguments on appeal.
C ONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we affirm the ruling of the circ uit court. Affirmed.

4 The circuit court’s purported f indings of fact included in the order withdrawing appeal became irrelevant when the appeal was withdrawn and the JDR cou rt decision reinstated.