### The Honorable Edward J. McManus, United S tates District Judge 1 

### for the Northern District of Iowa. ___________ No. 95-2507

___________ Laura Anderson, * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * Northern District of Iowa. of the Social Security * [UNPUBLISHED] Administration, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: December 19, 1995 Filed: December 28, 1995

___________ Before WOLLMAN, MAGILL, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Laura Anderson appeals the district court's decision affirming the 1 Comm issioner's decision denying her application for child's disabilit y benefits (42 U.S.C. § 402(d)). We affirm.

We review to determine if the Commissioner's decision is supporte d by substa ntial evidence. See Bates v. Chater , 54 F.3d 529, 531-32 (8t h Cir. 1995) (substantial evidence is that which reasonable mind would accep t as adequate to support Commissioner's conclusion ). Evidence that detracts fromthe Commissioner's decision is considered, but even if inconsistent conclusions may be dr awn from the evidence, the decision will be affirmed where the evidence as a whole supports either outcome. Chamberlain v

. Shalala , 47 F.3d 1489, 1493 (8th Cir. 1995).

### -2- Having ca refully examined the lengthy administrative transcript, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision. While the record demonstrates that Anderson had mental an d physical problems during the relevant time perio d, the record supports the ALJ's conclusion that the Commissioner proved jobs existed that Anderson could have performed. See Frankl v. Shalala , 47 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir. 1995) (once burden sh ifts, Commissioner must demonstrate claimant retains residual functional capacity to perform significant number of other jobs in nat ional economy). Specifically, the record supports the ALJ' s conclusion that Anderson retained the residual functional capacity to do unskilled work that involved little or no contact with the public. Despit e Ande rson's mental problems, her moderate physical limitations, and th e combined effect of he r mental and physical problems, she demonstrated the abilit y to successfully complete her undergraduate studies with a hig h grade point average, work as a teaching assistant, and be accepted int o graduate school. Cf. House v. Shalala , 34 F.3d 691, 693-94 (8th Cir. 1994 ) (one of daily activities inconsistent with disabling pain was that claiman t had su ccessfully completed 200 hours of college classes during relevan t time period); Grace v. Sullivan , 901 F.2d 660, 6 61-62 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (one factor in deciding that claimant re tained residual functional capacit y to work was that claimant was full-time student who obtaine d bachelor and masters degree during relevant time period).

To determine whether the ALJ properly applied the factors fro m Polaski v. Heckler , 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984) (subsequent histor y omit ted), we must consider whether the ALJ took into account all th e relevant evidence, and whether that evidence contradicted the claimant's
own testimony so that the ALJ could discount the testimony for lack o f credibility. Benskin v. Bowen , 830 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 1987). The AL J properly discounted A nderson's complaints of severe headaches in 1981 and 1982 because she did not report these headaches or seek treatment for them until

### -3-

1990. See Barrett v. Shalala , 38 F.3d 1019, 102 2 (8th Cir. 1994) (absence of objective medical evidence supporting degree of pain complained of is factor ALJ should consider); Benskin , 830 F.2d at 884 (ALJ entitled to fin d failure to seek medic al attention inconsistent with subjective complaints of pain).

We further conclude, contrary to Anderson's argument, that the AL J appropriately evaluated letters written by a physician Anderson claimed wa s her treating physician. See Gude v. Sullivan , 9 56 F.2d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 1992) (opinion of a t reating physician is entitled to great weight). The ALJ specifically noted the doctor's opinions were generated years after th e time in question, and his belief that the doctor's opinion that Anderson had been disabled sin ce 1978 was not supported by the medical evidence in the record. See Lovi ng v. Department of Health and Human Servs. , 16 F.3d 967, 9 71 (8th Cir. 1994) (conclusory statement of disability withou t sup porting evidence does not overcome substantial evidence supportin g Commissioner's decision).
Finally, we conclude that the ALJ properly developed the record

. See Bishop v. Sullivan , 900 F.2d 1259, 1262 (8th Cir. 1990) (ALJ has duty to fully and fairly develop record upon which decision is to be made)

. Anderson's ability to offer documentary evidence during the administrative proceed ings was not limited, and Anderson has not shown any resultin g prejudic e or unfairness from the limitations the ALJ placed on he r testimony at the hearing. See Highfill v. Bowen , 832 F.2d 112, 115 (8th Cir. 1987) (claimant must show prejudice or unfairness resulting from an incomplete record).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

### -4- A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.