### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 29, 200 4
DEBRA LYNN LAWS ON GO RMAN v. RICH ARD EUGENE GO RMAN

A p p ea l f ro m th e C ircu it C o u rt fo r H a m b len C o u n ty N o. 95- C V

- 457 K i ndal l T
. L aw s on, Judge

No. E2003–02879-COA-R 3-CV F iled Augu st 12, 2004

T h i s i s a p o s t -d i v o rc e c u s t o d y ca s e wh er ei n t h e Tr i al C o u rt d en i ed t h e Fat h er ’s p et i t i o n fo r c h an ge of custody

and denie d the Mother’ s petition for pay ment of uncove red m e d ic al expenses and a ttorney fe e s. B oth pa

rt ie s a pp e a le d. We h a ve de te rm ine d th a t th e Tr ia l Co urt di d n ot e rr a ndwe a ff

ir m it s decision.

Te nn.R .A pp.P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d; Case Re m anded

S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P

. J . and C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., joined. Christopher P. Capps, Morristown, for Appe llant Richard Eug ene G orman.
J . Randall Shelton, Morristown, for Appe llee De bra L y nn L awson Gorman.

OP IN ION

I. The pa rties wer e divorce d by judgme nt e ntere d April 1, 1996. The final dec ree of divorce incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution ag ree ment (MDA) . At the time of the divorc e, neither child born of the ma

rriage h ad reac hed the a g e of ma jority . The MDA pr ovides that the parties would exercise “

joint custody ” of both c hildren, wit h Mother being the primary phy sical custodian of the ir daug hte r M a tte a

(D OB : Ma

rc h 22 , 1 99 4) , a ndF a the r the pr ima ry ph y sic a l c us tod ia n o f the ir son Matthew (D OB : March 24, 1985)

. On De c e mbe r 5, 200 1, Mo the r fi le d a pet iti on fo r ch a ng e of c us tod y , all e g ing that th e pa rt ie s’ son, Matthew, had move d from the F ather ’s home to the M other’s home. The F ather filed an a nswer and counte r-pe tition requesting tha t the C ourt establish him as the primary residential c ustodian of-2-

both Matthew and Ma ttea. B oth parties submitted proposed pare n t i ng plans to the Court. At the time of the hea

ring , Matthew ha d attained the a g e of ma jority , and so the issue re g arding custody and visitation i nvolved only

Mattea.

After the hea ring , the Trial Court adopte d Mother’s pa renting plan, and incor

porate d it into i ts final judgme nt. Fathe r ar g ues on appe al that the Tria l Court failed to make f indings of f

act which require s this Court to va cate the Trial Court’s judgme nt r eg arding the desig nation of Mother as primary

residential pa

rent. Father also arg ues t hat the Tria l Court abused its discretion in ref using to gr ant him more visitation tim e with the minor child. Mother arg ues on appea l that the Trial Court abused its discre tion in not awarding her attorney fee s and not ordering the Fa ther to pay all of the min or c hil d’ s u nc ov e re d me dic a l e xpe ns e s. Mo the r a lso se e ks he r atto rn e y fe e s o n a pp e a l.

II.

The issues bef

ore the Court are : 1. Whether the Tr ial Court erre d in its decision reg arding Fa ther’s pe tition for chang e of custody and aw ard of

visitation t ime. 2. Whether the Tr ial Cou rt er red in its decision re g arding the parties’ division of responsibilityfor the unpa id medical expenses of the ir minor child. 3. Whe the r the Tr ia l Cou rt e rr e d in its de c isi on re g ard ing the de nia l of the Mo the r’ s r e qu e st fo r atto rn e y

fe e s.
III
. Cus tod y a nd vis ita tio n ca se s ar e a mon g the mos t impo rt a nt ca se s tha t c ou rt s c on sid e r. Th e ir chief purpose is to promote the be st interests of the c hild. Steen v . Steen , 61 S.W . 2d 324, 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Custody case s are very often factually driven a nd hinge on fac tors such as the demea nor and cr edibilityof the witnesse s, which is a matter that is peculiarly

within the province of the Tr ial Court. Bowman v. Bowman , 8 3 6 S

. W

. 2 d 5 6 3 , 5 6 7 ( T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 9 0 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we re vie w the se de c isi on s de novo o n t h e re co rd wi t h a p re s u m p t i o n t h at t h e T ri al C o u rt ’s fi n d i n gs of fa ct ar e cor

rec t unless the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise

. Kendrick v . Shoemake , 90 S.W .3d 566, 569-570 (Te nn.2002). When the Trial Court makes no spec ific finding s of fa ct, howeve r, we must re view the rec ord to determine wher e the pr eponder ance of the e vidence lies. Ganzev oort v. Ru sse ll , 949 S.W .2d 293, 296 (Tenn.1997)

. I n co ns ide ri ng a pe tit ion to mod if y c us tod y fr om o ne pa

re nt t o a no the r p are nt, the thr e sh old issue is whether a

materia l chang e in circ umstances has occur red a fter the initial custody deter mination. Fac tors to consider a re w hether

a cha ng e has oc curr ed af ter t h e en t ryof the orde r soug ht to be modified; whether the cha ng e wa s known or re asonably anticipated w hen the or der w as e s t ab l i s h e d ; a n d w h e t h e r t h e c h a n g e i s o n e t h a t a f f e c t s t h e c h i l d ’ s w e l l

- b e i n g i n a m e a n i n g f

u l w a y. I f a ma terial c hang e in circ umstances ha s occur red, the n it must be dete rmi n ed wh et h er the modification is in the child’s best interest accor ding to the factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106. Kendrick v . Shoemake , 90 S.W .3d 566, 569-570 (Te nn. 2002).-3-

I n this case, the T rial Court did not make a spe cific f inding a s to whether a
ma te ri a l c ha ng e of ci rcu mst a nc e s o c c ur re d s ub se qu e nt t o th e div or c e de c re e a ndMD A. I t c ou ld
c e rt a inl y be arg ue d in thi s c a se that su c h a c ha ng e didno t occu r, bu t neithe r p art y pr e se nts thi s arg ument. Eac h proposed pa renting plan soug ht chang es in the arrang ement set forth in t he MDA and followe d by

the parties. Consequently , we will proc eed to the i ssue of whether the Trial Court’s modification of the c ustody and visitation arrang ement re flec ted the best intere sts of the child. See Steen v . Steen, 61 S.W .3d 324, 327 (Tenn.A pp.2001).

Th e fa c tor s e nu me rate d in Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 6- 10 6, which guide the c ou rt s in de te rm ini ng wh e the r mod if ic a tio n of cu sto dy

is i n a c hil d’ s b e st i nte re sts , p ro vid e in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s: (1) The lo ve, af fec tion and emotional ties exi sting be tween the pare nts and child; (2) The dis p o s i t i o n of the pa rents to provide the child with food, cl o th in g , me d ic a l c ar e , e d u c a ti o n a n d o th e r n e c e s s ar y

c ar e a n d the deg ree to which a pa

rent ha s been the primary car eg iver; (3) The importance of continui ty in the child's life and the leng th of time the child has lived in a stable, sa tisfactory environment;. . . (4 ) T he sta

bil ity of the fa mil y

un it o f the pa

re nts ; (5 ) T he me nta l a ndph y sic a l he a lthof the pa re nts ; (6) The home, school and c ommunityrec ord of the c hild;

* * * (9) The char acte r and behavior of any other person who resides in or fre quents the hom e of a parent and such person' s interac tions with t he child; and (10) Ea ch par ent' s past and potential for futu re perf

ormanc e of pare nting r esponsibiliti es, including the willingne ss and ability of
eac h of the pare nts to fac ilitate a nd encour ag e a c lose and c ontinuing pa re nt- c hil d relati on sh ip b e tw e e n th e c hil d a ndthe oth e r p are nt, consistent with the best interest of the child. The MDA sig ned by

the parties at the t i me of the divorc e provide s as follows re g arding visitation: Th e pa

rt ie s sha ll ha ve re a so na

ble vis ita tio n w ith the c hil d n ot i n h is or her phy sical custodyand the pa rties shall coope rate with eac h other to ensure tha t t h e ch ildren spend time with ea ch other , and with the
no n- c us tod ia l pa

re nt.-4- The pa rties shall alternate and/or d i v i d e the holiday s with the
c hil dr e n. Ea c h part y sh a ll ha ve tw o we e ks of su mme r va c a tio n ti me w i t h t h e c h i l d n o ti n h i s /h e r p h ys i c a l c u s t o d y. The pa rties ag ree d that during the five y ear s from the divorce in 1996 unt il Mother’s filing of he r p e tit ion in 2 00 1, the pa rt ie s fol low e d a sch e du le wh ic h p ro vid e d F a the r v isi ta tio n ti me wi th Mattea every other weeke nd. Fa ther testified that in addition to alternate w eeke nds, he usually took
a we ek of va cation during spring brea k, and the we ek of his birthday , and during those we eks he ke pt bo th the c hil dr e n. Mo the r t e sti fi ed th a t F a the r n e ve r c a lle d o r c on ta c te d M a tte a in b e tw e e n h is custodial wee kends, and tha t he never reque sted any more visitation t ime with her than w hat he ha d. Fa ther testified tha t he had c ontacted Mothe r “severa l” t imes and requested more time with Mattea, to which the Mother did not ag ree
. Mo the r’ s p ro po se d p are nti ng pla n ma int a ins the sc he du le a llo wi ng F a the r a lter na te wee kends, and inc rea ses his pare n t i ng time to include every Tuesday evening from 5:00 to 7:00. Among other thing s, it provides for a lternating holiday s, alternating spring br eaks, a nd g rants F ather two wee ks with Mattea in J une and two w eeks in July

. The written proposed p l an submitt ed to the Tria l Court by Fa ther is sty led “tempor ary pare nting plan” and provides that “the fathe r shall be re sponsible for the c hild from 6:00 p.m. Sunday to 6:00 p.m. Friday

every other we ek and. . .a ll week e very other we ek ” wi t h “Mother to ha ve additional time as may

be ar rang ed betwe en the parties.” Howeve r, at the hearing Fa ther testified that he was reque sting “that she [ Mattea] spend fifty perc ent of the t ime with [hi m] , and fifty perc ent of the time with her m other.” He testified tha t he was r equesting phy sical custody alterna ting betwee n the parties every wee k. He f urther te stified on direc t examination as follows reg arding the proposed we ekly

alternating visitation schedule:
Q: You rec og nize – Do y ou rec og nize that starting like – li k e t oday wi th th a tt yp e o f

a n arr a n g e m e n tm i g h tw e l l b e t r a u m a t i c f o r t h is child? A: Ye s. Q: But is tha t – is tha t the situation that y ou want to wo rk t o wa rd, with reg ard to y our daug hter? A: Yes.

After hearing the witnesses’ testimony , the Trial Court a dopted Mother’ s proposed pa renting plan. On appeal , Fa ther ra ises the following issue, quoted ver batim from his brief: “ whether the Trial Court er

red in fa iling to make fi n dings of fac t justi fy ing its desig nation of Mother a s the primary residential pa

rent or a s to visit ation.” We disag ree with Fathe r’s a ss er t i o n that the Trial Cou rt fa ile d to make fi nd ing s o f f a c t in thi s c a se ; bu t e ve n if thi s a sse rt ion we re c or

re c t, w e a lso dis a g re e wi th his arg ume nt tha t the abs e nc e of fi nd ing s of fa c t by a Tr ia l Co urt requires this court to v a c a te the low e r c ou rt ’s jud g me nt. “ Whe n th e Tr ia l Co urt ma ke s n o s pe c if

ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t, howeve r, we must review the r ecor d to determine w here the prepondera nce of the evidence lies.”-5-

Kendrick v . Shoemake, 9 0 S

. W

. 3 d 5 6 6 , 5 7 0 (T en n , 2 0 0 2 ), ci t i n g Ga nz e v oo rt v . R us se ll , 9 4 9 S. W. 2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997)

. Th e tr a ns c ri pt o f the he ari ng re ve a ls tha t th e Tr ia l Co urt f ou nda s f oll ow s in re le va nt p art : All rig ht. Well, here’s what I think a b o u t it. I t appea

rs to the court that both pa

rents are g ood pare nts, love the child, and do the best they can with every thing. The problem see ms to be that there w as one of t h o s e ag ree ments some y ear s back tha t said nothing. . .it didn’t say anything spe cific. A nd as is most usually the ca se, it didn’t work out t o o w e l l

. A n d s o t h i n g s h a v e n o tb e e n w o rk i n g t o o w e l l , ap p ar e n t l y. Th e mothe r’ s h a d p ri mary c us tod y of the ch ildthe se y e ars
. An d app are ntl y ha s do ne a n e xce lle nt job

. I – y ou kn ow , th e c hil d is making four- O [straight As in school ] , an d n o problems and – or
an y t h i n g. I ’m n o t s ay i n g t h e fa t h er h ad n ’t , al s o
. I ce rt ai n l y d o n ’t go – But I think that under the proof , the evidenc e shown here , that the mothe r w ou ld b e the pr ima ry pa re nt. Th e fathe r w ou ld –

a ndI ’d– a g a in, I ’v e he ardthat the re is a reque st f or visitation, but as I indicated at the outset, fra nkly , I don’t think – And I

think studi es have shown, and it s been g ener ally held, that the child needs a home base, a place that is home, and not to be
mov e d a bo ut t oo muc h. An d I

thi nk th at, on th e ba sis of wh a t I understand in the f

acts of this c ase, all that – The father should have pare nting tim e fr om Frida y at 5:00 to Sunday

at 6:00 every

other
wee k, and Tue sday

from 5:00 to 7:00 every

wee k. The Supreme Court has noted on seve ral oc casions that “the details of custody and visitation with children are peculiarly within the broad discretion of the t rial judg e.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S

. W

. 3 d 8 2 , 8 5 ( T e nn .2 00 1) ; S u t tles v. Suttles , 748 S.W .2d 427, 429 (Tenn.1988) . Ba sed on our revie w of the rec ord, the applicable statutory fac tors and cir cumstance s, we find that the e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the Trial Court’s decision and we there fore aff irm the Trial Court’s order in this reg ard.

Mother ra ises the issue as to the a ppropriate divi s io n o f

M att e a ’ s u n c o v e red me dical expenses betwee n the parties. The rec ord shows that at the time of the hearing, Mattea was c overe d by three separ ate he alth policies: Fa ther’s, he r step fa t h er ’s (Mother has since r emar

ried), a nd also by Te nn Care . T he MD A p ro vid e s th a t F a the r w ill be re sp on sib le fo r 60 % of Ma tte a ’s un c ov e re d h e a lth
car e expenses, and Mothe r wi ll be responsible for the re maining 40% . After hearing Mothe r’s arg ument that Fa ther s h o u ld have to pay a hig her pe rce ntag e of the se expenses, the Tr ial Court order ed that the same arr ang ement, the 60/40 split, continue. We f ind tha t the evidenc e does not pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t the Tr ia l Cou rt ’s de c isi on a nd we the re fo re a ff ir m th e Tr ia l Co urt’ s o rd e r i n th is reg ard.-6-

The Mother

arg ues that the Trial Court erre d by not awar ding he r attorne y fee s and further
re qu e sts a n aw ard fo r he r atto rn e y fe e s o n a pp e a l. T he de c isi on wh e the r t o a wa rda tto rn e y s’ fe e s is within the s o u n d d iscretion of the Trial Court and will not be disturbed upon a ppeal unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst such a de cision. Kin c aid v . Ki nc aid , 912, S.W

. 2d 140, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). We find that the Trial Court’s decision re g arding attorney fee s is appropriate and the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the Trial Court’s decision. We a ffirm the Trial Court’s de c isi on re g ard ing a tto rn e y fe e s a ndfu rthe r d e c lin e to a wa rda tto rn e y

fe e s to the Mo the r o n a

pp e a l.

We aff irm the j udg ment of the Tr ial Court in its entirety , and re mand the ca se for collection of costs below. Costs on appea l are assessed a g ainst the Appellant, Richar d Eug ene G orman.

___________________________________ S HA RO N G. L EE , J UDGE