# Recent Reports

Reports News from the GAO

- Counternarcotics: DOD Should Improve Coordination and Assessment of Its Activities What GAO FoundThe amount of funding available for Department of Defense (DOD) counternarcotics and counter–transnational organized crime activities changed from about $750 million in fiscal year (FY) 2018 to about $580 million in FY 2022. In FY 2022, DOD allocated most of the funding to support detection and monitoring activities and allocated the remainder to support intelligence activities and efforts, such as constructing training facilities, in partner nations.DOD's six geographic combatant commands—DOD components responsible for efforts in designated geographic areas—coordinate on activities. However, three reported varying understandings of their roles in an overlapping joint operation area, including confusion over the management of air and naval operations. Although DOD required the three commands to develop agreements defining their responsibilities, the three commands have not fully documented their roles in the overlapping joint operation area. Without such agreements, confusion about the commands' responsibilities in the area may continue, reducing DOD's ability to disrupt the transport of illicit drugs to the U.S.Map Showing Overlap of Joint Operation AreaDOD has not assessed the agency-wide effectiveness of its counternarcotics and counter–transnational organized crime activities and does not have a plan for future assessments. DOD has defined its strategic objectives, strategies, and performance goals. But contrary to key practices, it has not identified measurable outcomes for each strategic objective. As a result, DOD cannot measure progress toward these objectives. Officials also said they intend to assess agency-wide progress but have not developed a plan to do so. Assessing agency-wide progress toward its strategic objectives would better position DOD to make decisions about priorities, resource allocations, and strategies for improvements.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the criminal organizations that produce and traffic them, as significant threats to both the U.S. and partner nations. DOD is the lead department responsible for detecting and monitoring the aerial and maritime transport of illicit drugs to the U.S.Senate report 117-130 accompanying the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act contains a provision for GAO to examine issues related to counternarcotics and counter–transnational organized crime activities. This report examines (1) funding available for DOD's activities and funding allocation in FYs 2018 through 2022; (2) the extent to which DOD components coordinate activities; and (3) how DOD assessed the effectiveness of these activities, and the extent to which its future assessments align with key practices.GAO reviewed DOD documents and data about its authorities, funding, and activities, including coordination and performance management. GAO also interviewed DOD officials, including officials at headquarters and combatant commands.
- Persistent Chemicals: Navy Efforts to Address PFAS at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam What GAO FoundAs of February 2024, DOD testing had not detected any per-and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) in the active drinking water shaft at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. PFAS are a large group of heat and stain resistant chemicals that can persist in the environment—including in water, soil, and air—for decades or longer. In November 2022, during maintenance activities 1,300 gallons of aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) concentrate was released from a pipe in a tunnel at the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii. Because AFFF—a product used to fight flammable liquid fires—contains PFAS, this incident raised concerns about PFAS in the installation's drinking water and how the Department of Defense (DOD) remediates PFAS contamination at the installation.Following the AFFF release, DOD took immediate action to ensure the AFFF was contained and removed from the affected area. Both DOD and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have since completed investigations of the November 2022 AFFF release and issued final reports. Both investigations recommended that (1) increased government oversight of AFFF-related activities at the Red Hill facility was necessary, (2) all AFFF concentrate should be removed from the Red Hill facility, and (3) the AFFF system at Red Hill should be decommissioned.On April 10, 2024, EPA announced a National Primary Drinking Water Regulation establishing allowable levels of 4 parts per trillion for certain PFAS in drinking water (one part per trillion is equivalent to a single drop of water in 20 Olympic-sized swimming pools). Prior to this, PFAS in drinking water were not regulated at the federal level. However, in 2016, under the authority of the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA published health advisory levels of 70 parts per trillion for certain PFAS in drinking water. Since 2016, DOD has had policies in place for monitoring PFAS levels in drinking water at its installations at 70 parts per trillion. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam regularly monitors for PFAS in its active drinking water shaft at frequencies required by DOD policy and requests by EPA and the state of Hawaii. While PFAS have not been detected in the active drinking water shaft at the installation, low amounts of PFAS falling below 70 parts per trillion have been detected in the installation's two inactive drinking water shafts. These two shafts are currently not in use and according to DOD officials, the PFAS detected are not due to the November 2022 AFFF release. According to DOD policy and officials we met with, DOD will implement and comply with the April 2024 EPA regulation.PFAS contamination at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam is being addressed by DOD's environmental restoration program. Through this program the Navy has identified 32 sites of known or potential PFAS contamination (e.g., soil or groundwater) at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam and is taking steps to assess these sites and, where appropriate, develop plans for their long-term cleanup. The Navy has finalized its preliminary assessment and site inspection reports for these 32 sites, with recommendations for the areas in 20 of these sites to advance to the in-depth remedial investigation phase of the environmental cleanup program. The remaining 12 sites were found to have no documentation of past use of AFFF or other potentially PFAS-containing products or materials.Why GAO Did This StudyDOD has policies related to monitoring PFAS levels in drinking water at its installations, long term cleanup of PFAS contamination, and use and disposal of products containing PFAS. According to EPA, exposure to certain PFAS may have adverse effects on human health, including effects on fetal development, the immune system, and the thyroid, and may cause liver damage and cancer.GAO was asked to examine DOD efforts to address PFAS contamination at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. This report describes DOD's response to the November 2022 AFFF release at the installation; DOD processes for ongoing monitoring and long-term cleanup of PFAS at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam; and DOD's and EPA's policies addressing PFAS in the environment.To conduct this work, GAO reviewed and summarized information from previous GAO reports and relevant DOD, EPA, and state of Hawaii guidance, policies, and other documentation on regulating release, response, use, and disposal of PFAS-containing substances. GAO interviewed DOD, EPA, and state of Hawaii officials and conducted a site visit to Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam to observe the site of the November 2022 AFFF release. GAO met with Navy and state of Hawaii officials to understand the Navy's response to and cleanup of the release, as well as ongoing efforts to monitor and cleanup PFAS at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam.For more information, contact Alissa Czyz at (202) 512-3058 or CzyzA@gao.gov.
- F-35 Sustainment: Costs Continue to Rise While Planned Use and Availability Have Decreased What GAO FoundThe F-35 Lightning II aircraft (F-35) is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most ambitious and costly weapon system and its most advanced fighter aircraft. DOD operates and sustains about 630 F-35 aircraft and plans to buy about 2,500 total by the mid-2040s with a projected planned life into the 2080s.However, DOD's projected costs for sustaining the F-35 continue to increase while planned use of the aircraft declines. Specifically:Sustainment cost estimates have increased 44 percent, from $1.1 trillion in 2018 to $1.58 trillion in 2023.	DOD's planned use of the F-35 and its availability have decreased. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps project they will fly the F-35 less than originally estimated on an annual basis. The F-35 fleet's overall availability has trended downward considerably over the past 5 years, and none of the variants of the aircraft (i.e., the F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C) are meeting availability goals.	The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps' have made progress in meeting their affordability targets (i.e., the amount of money they project they can afford to spend per aircraft per year for operating the aircraft). This is due in part to the reduction in planned flight hours, and because the Air Force increased the amount of money it projects it can afford to spend. DOD currently estimates the Air Force will pay $6.6 million annually to operate and sustain an individual aircraft. This continues to be well above the $4.1 million original target. In June 2023, the Air Force increased the amount of money it can afford to spend per F-35 aircraft to $6.8 million per year.	DOD has pursued cost savings efforts and continues to look for new ways to reduce costs. However, DOD officials generally agree that these efforts are not likely to fundamentally change the estimated costs to operate the aircraft.Why GAO Did This StudyDOD plans to use the F-35 aircraft through 2088 and plans to spend over $2 trillion on acquisition and sustainment. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 includes a provision for GAO to conduct an annual review of F-35 sustainment efforts, including DOD's ability to reduce sustainment costs, or otherwise maintain the affordability of the F-35 fleet. This report provides information on the F-35's sustainment cost estimates over the life of the program, actions taken by the F-35 Joint Program Office to reduce sustainment costs, and the extent to which the F-35 fleet has met performance goals. GAO analyzed DOD's F-35 sustainment cost estimates and performance data and interviewed cognizant DOD officials about these issues.
- Army Modernization: Production Challenges for Stryker Upgrade Reinforce Need to Follow Acquisition Leading Practices in Future Efforts [Reissued with revisions on Apr. 3, 2024] What GAO FoundAfter the drawdown of U.S. Army armored combat vehicles from Europe in 2013, the Army reassessed threats in the region and determined that its Stryker brigades did not have sufficient firepower compared with potential adversaries. The Medium Caliber Weapon System is one of the Army's latest modernization efforts to increase the lethality of its Stryker Family of Vehicles Program.The Components of a Medium Caliber Weapon SystemGAO found that the Army followed leading practices when developing requirements for the Medium Caliber Weapon System. In 2018, the Army used the lessons learned when field testing 83 modified Stryker vehicles delivered to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Germany. It used the 2nd Cavalry's experience to inform and refine weapon system requirements, including increases in lethality, survivability, and situational awareness. Subsequently, the Army developed an accelerated acquisition approach for the system by placing it within the Stryker Family of Vehicles Program, rather than designating it a separate program of record. This allowed the Army to minimize documentation required for approval. According to program officials, the accelerated approach was intended to shorten the acquisition by 2 years.The Army, however, did not fully implement leading practices for acquisition to mitigate production risks, which were introduced, in part, by using a different turret and chassis than what was tested in Germany. Since production started in March 2022, the Army found problems with the contractor's manufacturing processes as well as software issues. Ultimately, this resulted in the Army halting acceptance of vehicles in February 2023, after 19 had been delivered. These challenges may have been identified and addressed earlier if the Army followed sound acquisition practices, such as conducting a production readiness review and ensuring that software worked as intended before ordering most of the 269 vehicles. While the Army mitigated its cost risk by awarding fixed-price orders, the time needed to address production issues will delay fielding by a year. Implementing leading practices for acquisition in production would ensure that the Army develops sufficient knowledge about production maturity for future Stryker upgrades prior to entering production and potentially avoids the issues experienced with the Medium Caliber Weapon System.Why GAO Did This StudyIn response to a 2015 urgent need request from a unit in Germany, the Army developed and fielded a limited number of Stryker combat vehicles with increased lethality, including an uncrewed, turreted 30-millimeter automatic cannon on a Stryker. After testing, further modifications were made and a competition was held to produce additional upgraded vehicles for all Stryker brigades. This upgraded vehicle was subsequently termed the Medium Caliber Weapon System.A House report includes a provision for GAO to review the Army's efforts to upgrade and improve the lethality of the Medium Caliber Weapon System. This report addresses the (1) requirements and acquisition approaches for the system, and (2) extent to which the Army followed relevant GAO leading practices in identifying and mitigating risks, among other issues.GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant policies, requirements, and acquisition documents, and contracts. GAO also interviewed Army and Marine Corps officials and a representative of the contractor responsible for the upgrades.
- Army Corps of Engineers: Actions Needed to Better Align Management of Real Estate Administrative Fees with Key Practices What GAO FoundThe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) charges real estate administrative fees (administrative fees) to public and private entities that are issued leases, licenses, or easements to use Corps-managed property. These uses may include privately operated marinas on lakes and power lines crossing canals or rivers. The administrative fees cover expenses incurred by the Corps related to, for example, approving and overseeing these uses. Most of the work of managing administrative fees is handled by the Corps' division and district offices.In reviewing division and district practices for managing administrative fees, GAO found that the Corps does not consistently follow key practices for user fees, as described below:The Corps uses inconsistent inputs to set fees. Selected districts generally set administrative fees by estimating the costs the Corps incurs using activity, time, and labor inputs. However, the specific inputs used to estimate costs differed across districts. For example, two selected districts include the cost of compliance inspections while the other four do not, which may result in disparate fees across districts for similar real estate transactions.	The Corps does not regularly review and update fees. Almost none of the selected divisions and districts regularly reviewed and, as appropriate, updated administrative fees. Officials from one district noted that as a result, its fee amounts have not kept up with increases to its costs.	The Corps does not consistently share information with the public. Less than half of the selected divisions and districts posted administrative fee information—including the amount of the fees—on their websites.In most cases, GAO found that the Corps' agencywide policies for administrative fees lacked detail or direction to divisions and districts on how to set, review, and share information on administrative fees. By developing policies that better align with key considerations and practices, the Corps could improve the perceived equity and transparency of its administrative fees. For example, by regularly reviewing its fees, the Corps could better ensure it recovers its costs and does not significantly overcharge or undercharge payers. In addition, by sharing information on the fees on its websites, the Corps could make the purpose and amount of the fees transparent to the public.Why GAO Did This StudyThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's December 2023 report, entitled Army Corps of Engineers: Better Alignment with Key Practices Would Improve Management of Real Estate Administrative Fees (GAO-24-106188).
- Military Readiness: Comprehensive Approach Needed to Address Service Member Fatigue and Manage Related Efforts What GAO FoundMany service members are not getting the Department of Defense (DOD) recommended 7 or more hours of sleep each day. The department's overarching fatigue-related guidance emphasizes service members obtain at least 7 hours of sleep for optimal performance and readiness. For over a decade, DOD surveys have found that the majority of service members report sleeping 6 or fewer hours per night. Respondents to GAO's nongeneralizable survey cited similar issues. For example, many respondents are sleeping too little, and roughly half of respondents have poor sleep quality regardless of quantity. Survey respondents provided examples of how sleep deprivation has affected their work, from nearly colliding with another aircraft to falling asleep on the job.Service Members on How Sleep Deprivation Has Affected Their WorkDOD and the services have taken steps to address fatigue-related issues, such as developing guidance on fatigue management, but DOD faces oversight and enterprise-wide collaboration challenges in managing fatigue.Oversight structure limitations.  DOD has not identified and delegated sufficient oversight authority at the department level, and the military services have not assigned leadership to oversee service-level efforts. Without an assessment of DOD's oversight structure and assigning DOD and service-level leadership, DOD will be hindered in its efforts to limit and manage fatigue across the department.	Fragmented fatigue-related research.  GAO identified nearly 130 fatigue-related research projects the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force conducted from 2017 to 2023. Forty-eight of these projects studied the use of wearable devices to track sleep data among other uses, with many of them using the same type of technology or even the same model. Establishing a list of all fatigue-related research will help DOD gain visibility and reduce any fragmentation that may exist, potentially leading to cost savings.  Wearable Device Use Across Services for Fatigue-Related Research, 2017—2023Why GAO Did This StudyFatigue caused by inadequate sleep can negatively affect a service member's performance and has contributed to accidents resulting in deaths and hundreds of millions of dollars in damage to ships, vehicles, and aircraft. DOD recognizes that impairment from fatigue can be equivalent to the effects of alcohol intoxication and significantly increases the risk of physical injury.House Report 117-118, which accompanied a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's efforts to limit sleep deprivation and manage fatigue across the military services. Among other things, this report assesses the extent to which (1) service members are getting adequate sleep and (2) DOD has addressed and managed service member fatigue.GAO analyzed fatigue-related policies and guidance; interviewed cognizant officials; and surveyed service members from selected occupations, including pilots, aviation maintenance personnel, missileers, and motor vehicle operators.
- Space Acquisitions: Analysis of Two DOD Reports to Congress What GAO FoundThe Department of Defense (DOD) makes significant investments in space capabilities to meet the nation’s security, economic, and logistical needs. DOD’s space programs—now led by the U.S. Space Force—continue to face many development challenges, which GAO has reported on for several decades.DOD has made various changes to policies that govern its acquisitions. In one such change in January 2020, DOD reissued its foundational acquisition policy, establishing the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, which emphasizes speed and agility in the acquisition process. In response to statutory mandates, the Department of the Air Force (DAF), under which the Space Force is organized, and DOD each released a report that addressed elements to improve DOD space acquisition programs.In May 2020, the DAF transmitted its report on an alternative acquisition system for the Space Force to congressional committees. The report described nine features of the DAF’s proposed space-specific acquisition system, several of which DOD subsequently implemented.	In September 2022, DOD published its final report on applying the Adaptive Acquisition Framework to space systems acquisitions and addressed eight required areas of focus.A Falcon 9 Rocket Launches a Satellite from the Space Cape Canaveral Space Force StationCollectively, the acquisition system elements addressed in the reports were aimed at improving the acquisition process for space programs and fell into three categories: acquisitions, budgeting, and requirements.Summary of Proposed Acquisition System Elements in Department of the Air Force Report and DOD Report, by Category			Acquisitions									Budgeting									Requirements					Milestone decision authority delegation						Separate Space Force budget									Modified joint capabilities integration and development system approach								New start letter notification proposals									Line-Item restructure									—								List of programs for alternative space acquisition pathways									Codification of efficient space procurement									—								New space acquisition pathway									—									—								Useable end item determination									—									—								Space Force Head of Contracting Activity									—									—					Legend:&nbsp; — = not applicableSource: GAO analysis of Department of the Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) information. | GAO-24-106984GAO found that some of the elements discussed in the two reports align with GAO’s prior findings and recommendations, although the DAF and DOD are no longer pursuing other elements. For example, both reports proposed a new space acquisition pathway to help better manage space acquisition efforts. While GAO has not commented specifically on a space pathway under the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, GAO has noted challenges with developing and acquiring space systems. For instance, in GAO-21-520T, GAO noted that specific characteristics of space programs, such as the cost and complexity of space systems, can cause complications in the acquisition process and have posed challenges to DOD, including schedule delays and cost increases, among others. However, according to DOD officials, the department is no longer pursuing such a pathway because it is not needed due to changes in the way DOD is planning to acquire future space capabilities. As DOD develops the Space Force, it has the opportunity to leverage prior GAO recommendations to strengthen Space Force acquisitions.Why GAO Did This StudyThe DAF and DOD each produced a report on space acquisition processes. House Report 116-442 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 include provisions for GAO to review those reports. GAO assessed how elements included in the DAF and DOD reports align with GAO’s prior work and address identified challenges to acquiring space systems.To conduct this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed the reports and compared them to its relevant work on leading practices in acquisitions, weapon system acquisitions, and other related topics. GAO reviewed supporting documentation and interviewed DOD officials. GAO also summarized and updated work previously briefed to congressional committees in 2020 and 2021.For more information, contact Jon Ludwigson at (202) 512-4841 or ludwigsonj@gao.gov.
- Service Members Transitioning to Civilian Life: Agencies Can Improve Warm Handovers for Additional Assistance What GAO FoundTo assist certain service members who may be at risk for a difficult transition from military to civilian life, the Department of Defense (DOD) provides them with a person-to-person connection, known as a “warm handover,” to other agencies. These other agencies include the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Labor (DOL), which can help the service members obtain additional transition services. Through its Transition Assistance Program, DOD ensures these service members receive agency contact information, but does not ensure that a connection with a person actually occurs (see figure). DOD provided at least one warm handover to about 41,000 service members, according to available data from April 1, 2021, to March 31, 2023. However, during this same time period the agency did not provide a warm handover to over 4,300 other service members who were also considered at-risk of having a challenging transition. DOD officials said the agency has not analyzed the reasons why these service members did not receive a warm handover. Without developing a written plan to analyze its data, DOD cannot ensure that the thousands of service members transitioning annually have access to the additional assistance they need and the benefits they have earned.DOD's Warm Handover Process Does Not Ensure Service Members Connect with Agencies for Additional Assistance with Their Transition to Civilian LifeTransition Assistance Program counselors and others told GAO that warm handovers could be helpful to some service members, but DOD has not assessed their helpfulness. DOD has recently worked with VA and DOL on pilot projects that will provide some additional information, but these efforts are expected to provide limited information on warm handovers, and other agency efforts to assess the Transition Assistance Program do not focus on warm handovers. Without a plan to assess the helpfulness of warm handovers, program officials may be missing opportunities to ensure they are meeting the needs of service members.Agencies generally collaborated effectively to implement pilot projects aimed at refining warm handovers, but they have not identified criteria to make decisions about scaling all of the piloted approaches. Without identifying specific criteria, these agencies risk not collecting data needed to decide whether and how to scale the piloted approaches to the broader Transition Assistance Program and warm handover processes.Why GAO Did This StudyHundreds of thousands of service members transition from military service to civilian life each year, and some can be at risk for unemployment, homelessness, or gaps in medical care. To help them succeed, DOD provides certain service members with a warm handover to other agencies and organizations for additional assistance.Senate report 117-130 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's warm handover process. GAO's report addresses the extent to which DOD: (1) ensures that service members receive a warm handover as appropriate, (2) assesses information on the helpfulness of warm handovers, and (3) collaborates with VA and DOL in their efforts to refine the warm handover process.GAO analyzed DOD program data for April 1, 2021, to March 31, 2023, the most recent available. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws, policies, and agency documents, and interviewed officials from relevant federal agencies and five military installations selected for diversity in numbers of transitioning service members, geographic location, and service branch.
- Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: DHS Has Strengthened the Securing the Cities Program, but Actions Are Needed to Address Key Remaining Challenges What GAO FoundThe Department of Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) has taken multiple steps to strengthen the Securing the Cities (STC) program and is working with regions to address remaining program implementation challenges. CWMD awards funding to support STC regions' program administration. It also funds the procurement and deployment of radiological and nuclear detection equipment and training for the law enforcement officers and other agency partners who use it. To strengthen the program, CWMD has increased outreach and communication activities, developed templates for regional planning and quarterly reporting, and ensured regions' access to long-term federal funding to sustain their STC-related capabilities.As CWMD continues to improve the program, it is also working with STC regions to address challenges that may affect program implementation. Regions identified several key challenges, including staff attrition and turnover; availability and difficulty of scheduling training courses; and keeping partner agencies engaged with the STC program mission among other competing priorities.Photos of Types of Nuclear and Radiological Detection EquipmentCWMD's approach to measuring and tracking regions' performance—outlined in a 2023 revision to its STC program implementation plan—generally follows the key practices and their supporting actions for assessing program effectiveness. For example, CWMD uses weekly or biweekly meetings with the STC regions to provide tailored information that regions need to address specific issues affecting their program implementation. However, it has not clearly communicated to the regions the performance expectations and planned assessment approach adopted in the revised plan. By doing so, CWMD would increase the transparency and accountability for results being achieved through the program.CWMD is collecting and reviewing regional performance data to set targets and benchmarks for assessments that it plans to begin in fiscal year 2025. However, it needs to take additional steps to ensure that information collected from the regions is timely, consistent, complete, and accurate. CWMD officials also stated that they need to complete ongoing and planned efforts to better oversee and hold regions accountable for their performance and timely progress through program phases and toward achieving program goals. By taking these steps, CWMD will be in a better position to use evidence to manage the STC program more effectively, demonstrate regions' progress toward meeting the program goals, and communicate these results to stakeholders.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. faces an enduring threat that terrorists could steal or smuggle nuclear or radiological materials to use in a terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security initiated the STC program as a pilot in 2007 to reduce the risk of such attacks by developing and enhancing sustainable radiological and nuclear detection capabilities of state and local agencies in high-risk urban areas. The program includes 13 regions. CWMD awarded about $300 million to these regions through fiscal year 2023.The CWMD Act of 2018 included a provision for GAO to evaluate the STC program once CWMD completed an assessment of the program, which it did in 2022. This report evaluates (1) CWMD's efforts to strengthen the STC program and address regions' challenges and (2) the extent to which CWMD is measuring and tracking STC regions' performance.GAO reviewed CWMD and STC regions' documents, interviewed officials from CWMD and from each region, and visited two regions carrying out training exercises. GAO compared CWMD's performance assessment approach with key practices for assessing program effectiveness that GAO identified in prior work.
- Weapons of Mass Destruction: DHS Has Made Progress in Some Areas, but Additional Improvements Are Needed What GAO FoundThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in addressing challenges that GAO identified related to the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD). However, additional improvements are needed. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in several of CWMD's key areas, reported by GAO since 2018.Chemical defense:  GAO reported on challenges and progress in CWMD's chemical defense efforts. In August 2018, GAO found that DHS had not fully integrated and coordinated its chemical defense programs and activities among its component agencies. By not doing so, DHS risked missing opportunities to leverage resources, share information, and improve its effectiveness in addressing chemical threats through improved integration and coordination. To address GAO's recommendation, CWMD issued a Chemical Defense Strategy in December 2019 that established goals and objectives that included integrating and coordinating DHS's chemical defense capabilities. DHS subsequently issued an implementation plan in September 2021 that involved CWMD and several participating DHS component agencies.Biodefense:  GAO reported on challenges with two of DHS's biosurveillance efforts that CWMD oversees—the Biological Detection for the 21st Century program and the National Biosurveillance Integration Center. In May 2021, GAO found that DHS did not 1) apply best practices when conducting technology readiness assessments for its Biological Detection for the 21st Century program; or 2) conduct these assessments before key acquisition decision points. In response, DHS revised its program guide to incorporate best practices, but as of March 2024, had not demonstrated that it is conducting such assessments before key acquisition decisions. In November 2023, GAO reported that the National Biosurveillance Integration Center documented its efforts to obtain adequate personnel and develop new technology, but did not clearly define performance measures and associated time frames in its strategic planning documents. As of March 2024, DHS reported it was developing a strategy and implementation plan for the center that will include milestones, actions, targets, and time frames. GAO will monitor DHS's efforts.Radiological and nuclear detection:  In March 2024, GAO reported on CWMD's Securing the Cities program, which is designed to enhance the nuclear detection capabilities in select cities. GAO found that CWMD took steps to strengthen program outreach among its partners, but had not clearly communicated performance expectations. GAO will monitor DHS's efforts to address these and other challenges.Why GAO Did This StudyChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons have the potential to kill thousands of people. To manage threats in these areas, federal statute established CWMD in December 2018 by reorganizing functions of predecessor offices in DHS.This statement describes findings from GAO's reports on CWMD's programs from August 2018 through March 2024. They address challenges and opportunities for the effective operations and implementation of CWMD's chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security activities.To conduct prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, policies, strategic plans, and other documents. GAO also interviewed federal, state, industry, and other officials.
- Civilian Harm: DOD Should Take Actions to Enhance Its Plan for Mitigation and Response Efforts What GAO FoundThe Department of Defense's (DOD) August 2022 action plan generally captures recommendations from nine studies on civilian harm. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy—the office that led the development of the action plan and is leading its implementation—told GAO that that these studies were fundamental in developing the action plan. While there is no requirement that the action plan incorporate all of the recommendations from these studies, the action plan captures 61 of 68 recommendations from the nine studies. For example, it incorporates recommendations from two studies to develop guidance for addressing civilian harm across the full spectrum of DOD operations. The action plan does not capture seven recommendations, such as five that focused on specific military operations or DOD components.DOD has begun work on all 11 objectives of the action plan, according to Policy officials, initially focusing on implementing five (see figure). The officials stated that the five objectives are particularly critical in the implementation of the action plan. For example, the Army is leading a DOD-wide workforce study to determine the personnel needs for the implementation of the action plan. That is, the study will assess the need for 166 full-time equivalents across DOD components, as initially set forth in the action plan.DOD's Initial Focus in Implementing the Civilian Harm Action PlanHowever, DOD has not addressed two key challenges as it has begun to implement the action plan. First, some DOD component officials do not know what constitutes improvement. For example, officials from one component told GAO that they do not know what the end state is for the action plan. Establishing performance goals and measures could help DOD target resources and make adjustments in the remaining years of implementation, currently planned to go through 2025. Second, some DOD component officials are unclear on how the action plan is relevant to nonkinetic activities, such as space and cyber operations. A Policy official stated that figuring out the specifics of how to mitigate and respond to civilian harm in nonkinetic activities was not a priority for DOD, but this will become increasingly important. Without conducting an assessment to clarify how to mitigate and respond to civilian harm for nonkinetic activities, DOD components will not be positioned to implement the action plan for those activities.Why GAO Did This StudyDOD has reported to Congress that civilian casualties are a tragic and unavoidable part of war. Nevertheless, the U.S. military is steadfastly committed to protecting civilians in military operations. As a part of the commitment to continue improving DOD's approach to civilian harm mitigation and response, in August 2022, the department issued an action plan to help improve the approach.House Report 117-397 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's processes to identify and evaluate studies on the protection of civilians in U.S. military operations. GAO examined (1) how the action plan captures the studies on civilian harm and the associated recommendations, (2) the status of the action plan's implementation, and (3) the extent to which DOD has addressed any challenges in implementing its action plan.GAO analyzed DOD and external studies on civilian harm, reviewed reports and briefings on action plan implementation, and interviewed officials from DOD components with knowledge of the development and implementation of the action plan.
- Defense Contracts: Better Monitoring Could Improve DOD's Management of Award Lead Times What GAO FoundThe length of time between when an agency solicits offers from potential contractors and the date it awards a contract is known as the procurement administrative lead time (PALT). GAO found that median award lead times, or PALT, generally decreased from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2022 for Department of Defense (DOD) contracts and orders valued above $250,000. This suggests that DOD has realized some contracting efficiencies since 2018 when it began collecting data to measure PALT. However, PALT varied by characteristics such as total contract value, contracting approach, contract type, extent of competition, and the type of product or service procured. For example, median PALT values increased by 70 days over the four-year period GAO reviewed for DOD contracts and orders valued over $50 million.Change in DOD-wide Median Procurement Administrative Lead Time for All DOD Contracts and Orders Above and Below $50 Million in Value, Fiscal Years 2019–2022After its adoption of the current PALT definition, DOD updated guidance to encourage the use of practices intended to reduce award lead times. For example, DOD reissued its Source Selection Procedures memorandum in August 2022, adding streamlining techniques for procurement officials to consider. These techniques generally reflect practices to reduce PALT that were suggested in a January 2021 Office of Management and Budget memorandum.While updating guidance is a positive step, DOD does not have insight into PALT at the department-wide level, in part for the following reasons:DOD officials do not regularly monitor PALT on a department-wide basis, such as by reviewing PALT data maintained by the defense components or discussing PALT changes with the components.	A DOD tool, the PALT Tracker, implemented in February 2019 for the detailed tracking of PALT for procurements over $250 million in value, has data gaps, which limits its usefulness as a monitoring tool. Components reported that it is burdensome and duplicative of other systems they use.DOD would benefit from engaging with the components to determine how existing procurement data can be leveraged to enhance DOD's visibility into PALT changes and whether the PALT Tracker is still needed. If the PALT Tracker remains necessary to supplement existing procurement data, then improvements are needed to ensure its data are complete.Why GAO Did This StudyDOD uses contracts to procure goods and services ranging from cutting-edge military aircraft to common office supplies. DOD leadership and contractors have expressed concern about the length of time it takes to award contracts, which includes PALT. DOD began collecting data to measure PALT in June 2018 for contracts and orders valued above $250,000.A committee report included a provision for GAO to review DOD's efforts to address PALT. This report assesses changes in PALT over a four-year period and the extent of efforts—both DOD-wide and by selected DOD components—to manage and monitor the length of time it takes to award contracts.GAO selected the four DOD components (Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency) with the most contracting activity from fiscal years 2019 through 2022 and analyzed data on PALT. GAO also reviewed relevant DOD guidance and memorandums, and interviewed officials at DOD and the selected components.
- Ukraine: DOD Should Improve Data for Both Defense Article Delivery and End-Use Monitoring What GAO FoundSince Russia's full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the U.S. has provided more than $42 billion in security assistance, including defense articles, training, and services, to the government of Ukraine. U.S.-origin defense articles have been provided primarily using Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), which allows the President to transfer articles and services from U.S. stocks, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which the U.S. government may use to provide articles and services to Ukraine. The Department of Defense (DOD) has established new entities to deliver an unprecedented volume of defense articles to Ukraine in condensed time frames using PDA and USAI. However, DOD has not fully documented the roles and responsibilities of these new entities. Doing so would help provide clarity around the processes for quickly delivering defense articles in current and potential future conflicts...U.S.-Origin Defense Articles Loaded from Aircraft to Truck for Delivery to Ukraine DOD does not have quality data to track delivery of defense articles to Ukraine. DOD guidance on PDA does not clearly define at what point in the delivery process defense articles should be recorded as delivered or provide clear instructions for how DOD service branches are to confirm delivery. As a result, DOD officials sometimes record defense articles as delivered while they are in transit, weeks before they arrive in Ukraine. Additionally, DOD has not used its data systems to track the delivery of some defense articles provided under USAI. DOD officials use these data to ensure that defense articles have been delivered, to request funding for replacement of certain PDA articles, and as a baseline for conducting end-use monitoring. By taking steps to ensure the accuracy and completeness of its data, DOD will better ensure that it has the quality data needed to inform strategic decisions.DOD has a program to monitor the end-use of all defense articles provided to Ukraine but has had to alter some traditional end-use monitoring procedures in response to the ongoing conflict. For instance, DOD has been unable to directly observe some sensitive defense articles and has allowed Ukrainian officials to self-report the status of such articles. However, DOD has not formally assessed the effectiveness of its modified approach. By conducting such an assessment, DOD will better understand whether its adjusted monitoring approach ensures that defense articles are used for the purposes for which they were provided and will have the feedback needed to inform additional policy changes.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion of the country on February 24, 2022. The amount and speed at which assistance has been distributed has raised questions about the need for greater efforts to monitor and ensure accountability for the defense articles provided.Senate Report 117-130 includes a provision for GAO to review the allocation and use of security assistance in Ukraine since the start of the conflict. GAO's review examines (1) processes DOD has used to provide U.S.-origin defense articles to Ukraine, (2) the extent to which DOD has tracked the delivery of defense articles to Ukraine, and (3) the extent to which DOD and the Department of State have monitored the end-use of defense articles delivered.GAO analyzed agency documentation; met with DOD and State officials in the U.S., Germany, and Poland; and assessed DOD data on defense article deliveries to Ukraine from August 2021 to October 2023.
- Defense Contracting: DOD Should Encourage Greater Use of Existing Expertise to Review Indemnification Requests What GAO FoundWhen a contract involves unusually hazardous or nuclear risk, which insurers may decline to cover, the government may indemnify defense contractors. This indemnification financially protects contractors from liability arising from a catastrophic incident. Contractors report that it also incentivizes them to complete work that would otherwise be financially untenable, as an incident could exceed the limit of a contractor's commercial insurance policy.Financial Protection Provided by Commercial Insurance and Government Indemnification			Type of financial protection									Coverage provided								Commercial insurance									Coverage provided for claims involving covered contractor products, subject to the limit of the insurance policy								Government indemnification									Coverage provided for claims, losses, or damages that arise out of or result from a risk that the contract defines as unusually hazardous or nuclear, and is not compensated for by insurance or other meansa					Source: GAO analysis of aviation insurance industry and defense contractor information. I GAO-24-106403aIndemnification coverage is limited in some circumstances. For example, contractors will not be indemnified against government claims against the contractor or for losses or damages affecting the contractor's property, if the claim, loss, or damage is caused by willful misconduct or lack of good faith on the part of certain contractor officials.Indemnification requests are infrequent and generally approved. The Department of Defense (DOD) components that GAO reviewed reported receiving only about 350 indemnification requests over the past 15 years. Components' processes for evaluating indemnification requests varied. GAO found that contracting officials at some components were unaware of or did not use a specialized insurance review team within the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to assist in their evaluations. Components that did use this team found the reviews helpful. Lack of knowledge and use of this expertise means components may be missing an opportunity to facilitate the review process  . Defense contractors generally obtain coverage for their work from multiple multi-national insurers. Insurers develop a comprehensive risk profile on contractors to determine what coverage they will provide. According to industry representatives, world events and market volatility in recent years shrunk the insurance market and reduced coverage available to contractors. Insurer representatives that GAO interviewed stated that as a result, government indemnification is an increasingly important factor they consider when providing coverage to defense contractors.DOD experienced challenges negotiating indemnification requests related to weapons carried on  Virginia  class submarines. Those challenges were resolved, but officials could not estimate the impact of these negotiations due to pre-existing program delays. Additionally, while contractors have expressed concern about not defining unusually hazardous risk in regulation, DOD officials noted the importance of maintaining the flexibility to consider indemnification requests based on each component's unique mission profile.Why GAO Did This StudyRecently, DOD has experienced challenges indemnifying—or providing financial protection to—contractors working on certain weapon systems. A congressional report expressed concern that DOD's application of indemnification laws and an increase in programs with unusually hazardous risks could affect DOD's ability to field advanced weapon systems.The report included a provision for GAO to report on DOD's indemnification of contractors against unusually hazardous risk. GAO's report examines (1) how DOD has indemnified risk related to contracts over the past 15 years and how it makes those decisions, (2) how defense contractors obtain insurance and the risk factors that influence insurance coverage decisions, and (3) what indemnification challenges, if any, DOD and contractors have experienced and may experience in the future.GAO analyzed available indemnification data from six selected DOD components—including the military departments, Missile Defense Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency—from 2008 through 2022; reviewed government-wide and DOD indemnification policies and regulations; and interviewed officials at DOD, five selected defense contractors, and four selected insurers.
- Special Operations Forces: Documented Policies and Workforce Planning Needed to Strengthen Civilian Oversight What GAO FoundSince 2019, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict's (ASD-SO/LIC) oversight responsibilities for U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). DOD has also increased resources for the Secretariat for Special Operations, which assists the ASD-SO/LIC in conducting oversight. However, as of September 2023, the Secretariat's staffing levels remained below the 80–94 full-time equivalent levels the Secretariat identified as required to oversee SOCOM.Comparison of Secretariat Staffing Levels with Required Levels, as of September 2023Note: Per the 2022 staffing assessment, the expanded requirement includes a 20-percent adjustment for unanticipated workload and staff availability (e.g., leave and training) for some functions.In November 2023, the Secretariat finalized a staffing plan required by statute, including milestones to reach 69 full-time equivalents by early 2024. However, the finalized plan does not fully incorporate some key principles for strategic workforce planning, such as aligning with long-term goals, identifying critical skill gaps, and developing strategies to address them. Developing a staffing plan that incorporates these principles would help ensure that the Secretariat hires the personnel required to meet its future needs for overseeing SOCOM.Section 922 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 strengthened the ASD-SO/LIC's service secretary-like role for overseeing SOCOM's activities. The Secretariat developed 57 benchmarks for implementing section 922 and reported completing 49 of them as of January 2023. However, according to officials, the respective work process policies for the Secretariat and SOCOM are not always documented for two reasons. First DOD's Office of the Director of Administration and Management has concerns about ASD-SO/LIC's authority to issue guidance. However, the ASD-SO/LIC has broad statutory and regulatory authority under its charter to establish DOD-wide policy. Second, the Secretariat does not have a systematic approach for identifying and documenting its oversight policies. Implementing a systematic approach for documenting policies would help ensure consistent oversight.The Secretariat has at times had limited input into how its hiring, office space, and IT needs are met because of confusion about ASD-SO/LIC's administrative role, given ASD-SO/LIC's unique position within DOD. Until the ASD-SOLIC and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy clarify that administrative role, the Secretariat will continue to have limited input into its administrative services—affecting its ability to effectively oversee SOCOM.Why GAO Did This StudyCongress established the ASD-SO/LIC in 1986 to oversee SOCOM's special operations activities. Section 922 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 strengthened the ASD-SO/LIC's service secretary-like role in overseeing SOCOM's activities, such as budgeting and programming.Senate Report 117-130 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's implementation of section 922. GAO examined the extent to which the Secretariat for Special Operations has (1) hired the staff needed to oversee SOCOM, (2) reported on its implementation of section 922 reforms and documented its oversight policies, and (3) faced challenges related to obtaining administrative support services.GAO analyzed fiscal years 2019–2023 Secretariat staffing levels. GAO also compared the Secretariat's staffing plan with strategic workforce planning principles, and ASD-SO/LIC's policies and practices with leading principles for interagency collaboration.
- Weapon System Sustainment: DOD Identified Operating and Support Cost Growth but Needs to Improve the Consistency and Completeness of Information to Congress What GAO FoundThe Department of Defense (DOD) conducted sustainment reviews for 25 weapon systems for fiscal year 2022, including developing operating and support (O&amp;S) cost estimates for the remainder of each system's life cycle. O&amp;S costs are comprised of costs for repair parts, maintenance activities, contract services, and personnel. DOD assessed O&amp;S cost growth for 16 systems but was unable to make cost growth determinations for the nine remaining systems, due to a lack of available information to conduct the comparison (see first figure). DOD identified critical cost growth for seven of the 16 systems and the reasons for that growth (see second figure). A statute defines critical O&amp;S cost growth as at least 25 percent more than the estimate documented in the most recent independent cost estimate; or at least 50 percent more than the estimate documented in the original baseline cost estimate for the system. The other nine systems experienced O&amp;S cost changes, but any growth identified did not meet the critical O&amp;S cost growth criteria.Number of Weapon Systems Reviewed and Operating and Support (O&amp;S) Cost Growth Identified by the Department of Defense (DOD) in Fiscal Year 2022Causes of Critical Operating and Support (O&amp;S) Cost Growth in Seven SystemsDOD's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation updated its guidance based on lessons learned from the most recent sustainment reviews. However, military departments vary in how they report the details of cost estimates. For example, they presented cost information differently in several areas, including the time frames for the estimate, the breakdown of information across cost categories, and the effects of inflation. Without the development and implementation of clear guidance on the presentation of such information, DOD stakeholders and Congress will not have consistent and complete information for effective decision making and oversight.Why GAO Did This StudyDOD spends billions of dollars to sustain its weapon systems. O&amp;S costs are about 70 percent of a system's total life-cycle cost. In response to a statutory provision, DOD is required to annually submit sustainment reviews that include O&amp;S cost estimates and the reasons for any critical cost growth.The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's annual sustainment reviews and O&amp;S cost estimates through 2025. GAO's report evaluates the extent to which DOD (1) developed sustainment reviews for fiscal year 2022 that identified critical O&amp;S cost growth and related causes; and (2) identified and implemented any lessons learned for critical O&amp;S cost growth from conducting the reviews.GAO reviewed and analyzed DOD guidance and documentation, the submitted fiscal year 2022 reviews, and the supporting independent cost estimates. GAO interviewed DOD officials who conducted the reviews. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO is issuing concurrently. GAO omitted information that DOD deemed sensitive.
- DOD Reviews and Responses to GAO Reports: Second Semiannual Report Examining Delays What GAO FoundThe Department of Defense (DOD) submitted 55 percent of its agency comments and almost 70 percent of its sensitivity reviews to GAO after the deadline. DOD conducted two security reviews, and both were submitted late. In comparing the results of GAO's analysis of DOD's performance during this period of review with those in the first semiannual report on this topic, DOD was less timely in providing both agency comments and sensitivity/security reviews.GAO provides audited agencies with an opportunity to review and comment on draft reports before GAO issues the final report. Additionally, for any reports that may contain controlled unclassified or classified information, GAO requests that the department complete a review for such information and communicate the results of the review in writing.DOD provided GAO comments on 76 reports from May 16, 2023, to November 11, 2023. While GAO generally provides DOD with 30 days for agency comment, DOD took 35 days, on average. Of the 76 reports, DOD submitted comments for 42 after the 30-day deadline and took an additional 16 days, on average, to submit agency comments on those reports. For one report, DOD took 98 days to provide its comments.DOD completed 28 reviews—26 sensitivity and 2 security reviews—during the same period. Sensitivity reviews are conducted to identify sensitive information, such as controlled unclassified information. Reviews for classified information, such as information designated as Secret or Top Secret, are generally referred to as security reviews. On average, DOD completed sensitivity reviews in 40 days and security reviews in 77 days—exceeding the 30-day deadline.Of the 34 reports for which GAO granted an extension to the deadline for submitting comments or reviews, DOD did not meet the extension for ten. DOD also submitted comments late for eight additional reports without requesting extensions.Why GAO Did This StudyDelays in DOD submitting agency comments or the sensitivity/security reviews result in GAO issuing products later than mandated or requested by Congress. In some cases, delays may result in GAO taking the unusual step of issuing reports without DOD comments in order to provide Congress with requested information. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 included a provision for GAO to report every 6 months over a 2-year period on the extent to which DOD submitted agency comments and sensitivity or security reviews in a timely manner and in accordance with GAO protocols. This report is the second in a series of four reports on this topic.For more information, contact Alissa Czyz at (202) 512-3058 or czyzA@gao.gov.
- Nuclear Weapons: Information on the National Nuclear Security Administration's Research Plan for Plutonium and Pit Aging What GAO FoundThis report provides an unclassified summary of GAO's classified briefing to the House of Representatives' Committee on Armed Services. In 2021, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) developed a 10-year research program plan to study plutonium and pit aging. According to NNSA officials, the results from the research plan will allow NNSA to more confidently predict pit lifetimes for each nuclear weapon system in the U.S. stockpile. To do so, NNSA requires the use of experimental facilities across the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA will also need to expand its inventory of samples of artificially aged plutonium so that aging effects can be projected decades into the future. NNSA's estimated budgetary requirements to carry out the planned experiments, modeling, and simulation activities total about $1 billion over the 10-year period of fiscal years 2021 through 2030.Why GAO Did This StudyNNSA is responsible for ensuring the stockpile's performance, safety, and reliability. Scientists and other weapons experts have identified concerns that radioactive decay of plutonium in a pit, called aging, over many years may degrade a weapon's performance. Prior to 2021, independent evaluations indicated that NNSA was not sufficiently prioritizing plutonium and pit aging research. The results of this research are needed to inform decisions about stockpile management and modernization.For more information, contact Allison Bawden at (202) 512-3841 or bawdena@gao.gov.
- International Military Students: DOD and State Should Assess Vetting Implementation and Strengthen Information Sharing What GAO FoundStarting in fiscal year 2020, DOD developed and phased in procedures to vet international military students attending training at Department of Defense (DOD) installations and facilities in the U.S. With few exceptions, DOD vets these students prior to travel to the U.S. for training and periodically during the students' stay. According to training management system data, from October 1, 2019, through March 31, 2023, DOD vetted over 29,000 cases, including students and any accompanying family members. DOD identified findings in 103 cases: four were classified as “high” risk, 18 were “moderate”, and 81 were “low.” DOD denied access to nine students for various security-related reasons.International Military Student Cases by Risk Level and Adjudication Result for October 1, 2019, through March 31, 2023			Risk level									Cases									Approved for training									Denied									Pending									Adjudication not performeda								High risk									4									0									4									0									0								Moderate risk									18									7									3									4									4								Low risk									81									47									2									14									18								No findings									29,202									29,202									0									0									0								Total									29,305									29,256									9									18									22					Source: GAO analysis of data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. | GAO-24-106421Note: Vetting of international military students began with basic screening in December 2019 and DOD continued to phase in initial security vetting through March 2022.aDepartment of Defense (DOD) officials stated they did not adjudicate 22 of the moderate and low risk cases for reasons such as training cancellation or the student completed training during the establishment of vetting procedures and has since departed the U.S.DOD has taken some steps to improve implementation of vetting procedures for international military students. However, DOD has not assessed implementation to identify opportunities for improvement. For example, stakeholders told GAO of factors in vetting implementation that could be improved, such as limitations with in-country data collection and a time-consuming process for sharing information between stakeholders. DOD circulated a draft progress report on program metrics, such as the number of students who underwent vetting for fiscal year 2022. However, DOD has not finalized the report, and it is unclear if it will include an assessment of any opportunities for improvement in the vetting procedures. Without an assessment, DOD will not have a full understanding of factors that hinder vetting implementation. DOD also cannot determine whether or how it should take action to improve vetting implementation.The Department of State and DOD share information to support international military student vetting in a variety of ways, such as sharing database access and confirming vetting. However, State and DOD have not ensured that roles and responsibilities are fully clarified in guidance or written agreements. If DOD and State take actions to clarify roles and responsibilities for sharing information on issues related to international military students, the agencies can better coordinate on program management, including communicating relevant policy updates and sharing additional data and analysis regarding vetting.Why GAO Did This StudyDOD provides education and training to foreign military personnel at DOD sites. On December 6, 2019, an international military student killed three U.S. service members and injured eight others while attending training at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida. The attack raised questions about personnel safety at DOD sites hosting students for training.The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's implementation of security vetting for international military students and accompanying family members. GAO's report assesses the extent to which (1) DOD has developed vetting procedures for international military students and addressed any implementation challenges; and (2) State and DOD have shared information related to students' training at DOD sites in the U.S.GAO reviewed documentation; analyzed vetting result data for October 1, 2019, through March 31, 2023; and interviewed DOD and State officials and stakeholders from six unified combatant commands and three U.S. embassies.
- Sexual Harassment: Actions Needed to Improve Prevention Training for Federal Civilian Employees What GAO FoundSelected Department of Defense (DOD) components and other federal agencies vary in the extent to which they have incorporated management practices to enhance the effectiveness of the sexual harassment prevention training they require their federal civilian employees to complete. All seven DOD components and six other federal agencies in this review require their employees to complete some sexual harassment prevention training. However, none of them have fully incorporated GAO and U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission management practices to enhance the effectiveness of their training content and the implementation of such training (see figure). They also do not know if their training needs improvements because they have not developed and implemented plans to evaluate its effectiveness. Without training evaluation plans to identify needed improvements, they may be missing opportunities to foster a climate free from harassment.Number of Management Practices Selected DOD Components and Federal Agencies Incorporated to Enhance Sexual Harassment Prevention Training Implementation as of October 2023DOD conducts limited oversight of required sexual harassment prevention training for federal civilian employees. For example, DOD's Office for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion requested that components self-assess their compliance with anti-harassment training programs. However, it does not routinely review civilian sexual harassment prevention training, as required by DOD policy, or have plans to do so. Developing and implementing a plan to oversee sexual harassment prevention training could help DOD to better ensure that it is consistent with DOD's requirements.Why GAO Did This StudySafety from sexual harassment and other harmful behaviors such as sexual assault helps ensure the effectiveness, retention, and morale of the federal workforce, according to federal government research. DOD and other federal agencies have taken steps to address such behaviors, but data show that sexual harassment persists and is underreported.The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to review sexual harassment prevention training at DOD and other federal agencies. This report examines (1) the extent to which selected DOD components and federal agencies have incorporated management practices to enhance the effectiveness of their required sexual harassment prevention training for federal civilian employees, and (2) the extent to which DOD conducted oversight of such training. GAO selected seven DOD components and six federal agencies and assessed their training, reviewed guidance, and interviewed relevant officials.
- Environmental Cleanup: DOD Should Communicate Future Costs for Red Hill Remediation and Closure What GAO FoundThe Department of Defense (DOD) responded to fuel and other releases that accidentally occurred from 2014 through 2022 at the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Facility on O‘ahu, Hawaii, by containing pollutants and taking abatement measures. Since then, DOD has developed and begun implementing a defueling plan and developed an initial closure plan for the tank system. However, as of August 2023, DOD had not finished a site investigation or remediation plan. DOD plans to close the tanks in place and complete its site investigation by the end of fiscal year 2027, but comprehensive remediation of the site could take decades.Timeline of Major Releases during 2014 through 2022DOD faces three key challenges in its efforts to defuel, remediate, and close Red Hill: (1) obtaining regulatory approval from the Hawaii Department of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), (2) assessing contamination amid the site's unique geologic complexity, and (3) gaining trust and working with community stakeholders. Red Hill's proximity to several drinking water wells in the Honolulu Hawaii area compounds the unique geologic complexity.Map of Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility, Nearby Navy Drinking Water Wells (Shafts), and the Surrounding AreaIn response to challenges, DOD has taken several actions, including developing a joint integrated master schedule to prioritize key deliverables for defueling tasks and align them with state officials' priorities and working with EPA to make groundwater well monitoring data more easily available to the public.DOD and its components stated that the accidental 2021 Red Hill fuel release affected their fiscal year 2022 financial statements in a variety of ways. DOD concluded that while the future outflow of resources to clean up and close Red Hill was probable, an amount was not reasonably estimable given the lack of a completed remedial investigation and experience with a similar site. Accounting standards require that if a future outflow or other sacrifice of resources is probable but not reasonably estimable, an entity should not record an environmental liability in the financial statements. In such cases, an entity should disclose certain information about the event within the notes of its financial statements. Accordingly, DOD and relevant DOD components disclosed information in their fiscal year 2022 financial statements, including a description of the Red Hill event and its effect.While federal accounting standards require certain environmental liabilities and contingencies to be reported or disclosed in federal agencies' financial statements, other future costs not included in financial statements can be communicated to Congress in budget materials. The financial statement estimates do not represent the total federal fiscal exposure or the total amount that the federal government may have to pay. In addition to the liabilities and contingencies in financial statements, there are other components that, when combined, account for total federal fiscal exposure. These include costs to clean up and close known sites that are not currently reasonably estimable, and unknown cleanup and closure costs that may be identified in the future as remedial investigations are completed and closure plans are approved.DOD had not, as of the end of fiscal year 2023, communicated information to Congress about total fiscal exposures for anticipated Red Hill remediation activities for fiscal years 2025 and beyond. Specifically, DOD is aware of millions of dollars of costs that it is likely to incur as part of the Red Hill remediation and closure. It is also aware of numerous other costs for significant tasks that it cannot estimate at this time. Congress has appropriated at least $1.2 billion to DOD for activities related to improvement of infrastructure and defueling at Red Hill, and DOD has spent or plans to spend these funds. However, DOD's reports to Congress have not included projected cost estimates for fiscal year 2025 and beyond, which is the time frame during which DOD will likely incur substantial costs. Because these projected cost estimates have not been conveyed, Congress does not have information on total estimated remediation and closure costs in budget materials. With this financial exposure information, Congress would be better equipped to make decisions regarding funding remediation and closure activities.Why GAO Did This StudyIn November 2021, approximately 21,000 gallons of fuel was accidentally released from Red Hill, part of a fuel storage system the Navy manages. The Navy was unable to recover about 5,500 gallons, which ultimately contaminated portions of the surrounding area and a nearby well that supplied drinking water to about 93,000 service members and civilians. The November 2021 spill was not the first accidental release at Red Hill. Over the last decade, this facility, which supplied various types of fuel to DOD resources in the Pacific, experienced several other spills that DOD could not fully recover. In March 2022, the Secretary of Defense announced that DOD planned to defuel and permanently close the facility and remediate the site.House Report 117-397 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's efforts to remediate Red Hill and report on liabilities and costs to clean up and close the facility. This report (1) describes actions DOD is taking to defuel and close the Red Hill facility, including remediating the site, and the challenges it faces in doing so; (2) assesses to what extent DOD estimated and recorded environmental and contingent liabilities for the November 2021 Red Hill fuel release in its financial statements; and (3) assesses to what extent DOD estimated and reported to Congress on the total fiscal exposure to defuel and close Red Hill. GAO visited the Red Hill site, interviewed DOD regulatory and other officials, and evaluated financial and regulatory documentation. Specifically, GAO met with officials from EPA, the Hawaii Department of Health, the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, the Hawaii Commission on Water Resource Management, and five selected community groups.
- K-12 Education: DOD Has Taken Steps to Support Students Affected by Problematic Sexual Behaviors, but Challenges Remain What GAO FoundThe Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA), which educates over 66,000 military-connected pre-K through grade 12 students worldwide, collects detailed information about reported incidents of unwanted sexual behavior among students. These behaviors include those that are normative (but inappropriate), like unwanted touching in younger grades. It also includes behaviors that are severe and problematic at any age, like sexual assault. Since 2019, unwanted sexual behavior reports at DODEA schools have increased substantially due to enhanced reporting requirements. However, DODEA has not sought feedback on its updated reporting requirements from school leaders, who raised concerns about significant administrative burden with formally reporting normative behaviors, and stigma for students involved in them.DODEA School Incident Reports and Key Efforts to Enhance ReportingNote: DODEA school closures during the pandemic may also have contributed to fewer reports of unwanted sexual behaviors during school years 2019–2020 and 2020–2021.DODEA students who are harmed by or exhibit problematic sexual behaviors face challenges accessing appropriate support services. DOD policy directs the Military Community Advocacy Directorate's Family Advocacy Program (FAP) to implement a consistent response strategy. However, GAO identified various weaknesses hindering these efforts. Specifically, the Military Community Advocacy Directorate:has not monitored how consistently FAP includes DODEA in multidisciplinary teams, which are installation-wide response efforts, despite known issues;	has not monitored its efforts to close the gap in the number of FAP clinicians with expertise needed to treat children with problematic behaviors;	has not assessed the effectiveness of its efforts to address low participation in FAP clinical support services among eligible military families; and	chose to exclude the nearly one in five DODEA students who are children of civilian defense workers from accessing most FAP services and has not assessed whether this policy meets the needs of military communities.Without addressing these weaknesses, DOD risks ongoing challenges in ensuring that students who are harmed by or exhibit problematic sexual behavior receive the support needed to assure the safety of the DODEA community.Why GAO Did This StudyDODEA is required to protect students from discrimination based on sex, which can include sexual harassment.Senate Report 117-130 and House Report 117-397 include a provision for GAO to examine DODEA's response to unwanted sexual behaviors. This report examines (1) the information DODEA collects to identify unwanted sexual behavior and (2) the availability of support services to students that are harmed by or exhibit such behavior.GAO analyzed the most recent available DODEA data on reported incidents of unwanted sexual behavior among students in school years 2019–2020 through 2022–2023. GAO also conducted site visits to 11 DODEA schools and the FAP agencies serving five military communities in the U.S. and Europe, selected for geographic, grade level, and service branch variation. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws and agency policies and interviewed agency officials from DODEA, Child and Youth Advocacy, and FAP.
- DOD Intelligence: Actions Needed to Strengthen Program Oversight and Manage Risks What GAO FoundThe Department of Defense's (DOD) Senior Intelligence Oversight Official (SIOO) and DOD's intelligence oversight office have conducted oversight of DOD intelligence activities through a variety of means (see figure). For example, inspections of DOD components over the last 5 years have identified over 100 findings and recommendations for improvement to these components' intelligence oversight programs.Tools Used by the Department of Defense's (DOD) Intelligence Oversight OfficeHowever, GAO identified some risks that could adversely affect the future success of the DOD intelligence oversight office's oversight program:Incomplete monitoring of recommendations. The intelligence oversight office does not track the status of all recommendations it has made to DOD components. By improving its monitoring of prior recommendations, the office would know if components were addressing identified deficiencies.	Halting inspections. In 2022, the office transitioned from conducting inspections of individual components to DOD-wide topic assessments. While assessments on intelligence topics such as DOD's counterdrug-funded analytical support may be warranted, the cessation of more specific inspections introduces risks—such as increased reliance on component oversight programs. Without taking steps to mitigate the risks of ceasing inspections, there may be fewer opportunities to identify improper activities.	Lack of criteria for topic assessments. The office's process for its new topic assessments does not incorporate all 22 standards that GAO identified as necessary to develop high-quality and reliable products. For example, the office met most standards but somewhat met standards for quality control and assessing risk and independence of investigators. If the office meets all 22 standards, the office could increase confidence in the quality and credibility of the oversight information it provides to DOD leadership.By addressing these risks, DOD would be better positioned to ensure its oversight of intelligence activities is effective.Why GAO Did This StudyDOD recognizes that intelligence oversight is critical in enabling its components that perform authorized intelligence functions to carry out those functions in a manner that protects the constitutional rights of U.S. persons. In 1982, following a period of improper activities—including for example the interception of communications of civil rights protesters—DOD established an independent oversight office headed by the SIOO to oversee all DOD intelligence and intelligence-related activities.GAO was asked to review DOD's intelligence oversight office. This report, among other objectives, assesses the office's oversight activities and the extent to which DOD faces risks to the success of the office's oversight program.GAO reviewed relevant documents, including DOD directives, inspection reports, and planned topic assessments. GAO developed and applied criteria for high-quality and credible reports to the office's intelligence topic assessments. GAO also visited 15 DOD components that conduct intelligence oversight and interviewed relevant officials.
- DOD Law of War Policies: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Reporting and Retention of Alleged Violations What GAO FoundU.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) must comply with the “law of war”—that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities—when conducting kinetic strikes, which involve the use of explosive munitions. The Department of Defense (DOD) integrates law of war principles into training and exercises, strike procedures, and legal support as part of its approach for ensuring AFRICOM and CENTCOM compliance with the law of war.Selected Elements of DOD's Approach for Ensuring Law of War ComplianceDOD established a process to report alleged violations of the law of war and to protect individuals who report such allegations from reprisal. AFRICOM and CENTCOM have issued policies to implement the reporting process, but AFRICOM's policy is outdated and not fully aligned with current DOD policy. For example, it uses outdated definitions for what constitutes a “reportable incident.” As a result, AFRICOM may not be aware of all such allegations or be in a position to forward reporting to DOD leadership as required. The DOD Office of the Inspector General and component inspectors general, such as those for AFRICOM and CENTCOM, investigate claims of reprisal related to reports of law of war violations. In January 2013 – December 2022, there were no substantiated cases of reprisal against individuals who reported alleged law of war violations in the AFRICOM or CENTCOM area of responsibility.DOD lacks comprehensive records of alleged law of war violations. GAO obtained records of 47 alleged law of war violations committed by U.S. personnel in January 2012 – December 2022 in the AFRICOM and CENTCOM areas of responsibility. However, not all entities responsible for reporting and retaining records of alleged violations were able to provide a complete record in accordance with DOD records management requirements. Neither CENTCOM nor one of its subordinate commands retained comprehensive records of allegations. Additionally, another DOD entity, which receives and forwards such reports to DOD leadership, did not have records of all alleged law of war violations sent by AFRICOM and CENTCOM. Without a system to retain comprehensive records of alleged law of war violations, DOD leadership may not be fully aware of all allegations and thus lacks information needed to fully implement the law of war program.This is a public version of a classified report that GAO issued in December 2023. Information that DOD deemed classified has been omitted.Why GAO Did This StudySince 2012, AFRICOM and CENTCOM have conducted thousands of kinetic strikes. Such strikes must comply with the law of war. In 2021, the DOD Office of the Inspector General and media reporting identified deficiencies with DOD reporting of alleged law of war violations following kinetic strikes.GAO was asked to evaluate DOD law of war policies, including operations involving kinetic strikes. This report (1) describes DOD's approach for ensuring AFRICOM and CENTCOM comply with the law of war when conducting kinetic strike operations, (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD has established processes to report law of war violations and to protect individuals who report violations from reprisal, and (3) evaluates information on the extent of reported alleged law of war violations in AFRICOM and CENTCOM. GAO compared law of war principles and reporting requirements with training materials and strike procedures. GAO collected reports of alleged law of war violations that occurred within AFRICOM and CENTCOM and conducted site visits and interviewed cognizant officials involved in kinetic strike operations.
- Military Spouse Employment: Part-Time Workforce Characteristics and Perspectives What GAO FoundIn 2021, about a third of employed military spouses worked part time, based on GAO's estimates using data from the Department of Defense's (DOD) most recent survey of military spouses. Overall, GAO estimates that there were about 540,000 civilian spouses of active-duty military service members. The vast majority—around 90 percent—were women. Additionally, GAO estimates that about half of all military spouses (270,000) were employed in 2021. Of those individuals who were employed, about a third (88,000) worked part time.Military spouses GAO interviewed who worked part time reported various employment challenges, including being underpaid or overqualified for their job, lacking opportunities for career advancement, and not earning retirement benefits. Although many other civilian workers may experience similar challenges, military spouses discussed how military life—including frequent moves—contributes to their employment challenges.In DOD's 2021 survey, military spouses who worked part time reported levels of satisfaction with military life that were similar to military spouses who worked full time. However, DOD reported that, overall, military spouses' satisfaction with military life has been decreasing since 2012.Why GAO Did This StudyHouse Report 117-397 includes a provision for GAO to examine the characteristics and experiences of military spouses who work part time. GAO is providing information on the size, demographic characteristics, employment experiences, and health and well-being of this workforce.To provide this information, GAO analyzed data from DOD's 2021 Survey of Active Duty Spouses, the most recent and comprehensive data available on the employment status and well-being of military spouses at the time of GAO's review. GAO also analyzed 2021-2022 DOD administrative data on military spouses who were employed by DOD in federal civil service positions or positions at individual military bases. Finally, GAO conducted five discussion groups with a non-generalizable sample of 17 military spouses who were selected based on whether they had part-time employment experience while their spouse was on active duty, and whether they had children.For more information, contact John D. Sawyer at (202) 512-7215 or SawyerJ@gao.gov.&nbsp;
- Defense Health Care: DOD Should Monitor Urgent Referrals to Civilian Behavioral Health Providers to Ensure Timely Care What GAO FoundDOD's Defense Health Agency (DHA) oversees the TRICARE program, which offers behavioral health care to active-duty service members. DOD aims to provide this care at its military treatment facilities (MTF), but may also refer service members to civilian network providers. GAO's analysis of DHA data found that in fiscal year 2022, service members obtained routine and urgent specialty behavioral health care appointments (e.g., psychotherapy and substance use disorder treatments) at MTFs within required time frames (see figure). For referrals to civilian network providers, appointments after routine referrals fell just outside time frame requirements. Regarding appointments after urgent referrals, DHA has not established a specific time frame, but MTFs are instructed to use such referrals when expedited care is needed. GAO found average appointment wait times following these referrals ranged from over 2 weeks, to more than 3 weeks, depending on the region.Average Days to Active-Duty Service Members' Initial Specialty Behavioral Health Care Appointments, Fiscal Year 2022Note: MTF urgent behavioral health care appointments should generally occur within 24 hours. For all other initial specialty appointments, including with civilian providers, DHA applies a 28-day standard.Provider vacancies were the main challenge to maintaining behavioral health care appointment availability for service members, according to officials at the six MTFs GAO selected for site visits. This is consistent with DHA-wide data, which showed vacancy rates for MTF civil service behavioral health care providers exceeded 40 percent, as of January 2023. To mitigate the effects of provider vacancies, officials from selected MTFs reported taking several steps, including increasing referrals to civilian network providers and prioritizing initial over follow-up appointments. DHA officials also reported taking mitigation steps, such as piloting a new triaging approach to better match patients' needs to level of care.GAO found that DHA generally monitors the timeliness of behavioral health care provided to its service members under TRICARE. However, because there is not an established time frame for obtaining specialty appointments specific to urgent referrals to civilian network providers, DHA monitors urgent and routine network referrals in the aggregate rather than separately. As a result, DHA does not know the extent to which service members with urgent behavioral health concerns are experiencing delays obtaining the critical care they need following a referral outside an MTF. It also is not able to identify factors that may be contributing to delays and in turn, address any timeliness issues.Why GAO Did This StudyMilitary service may carry a psychological cost for active-duty service members. Recent research has shown a fourfold increase in behavioral health conditions for this population. If left untreated, such conditions can affect deployment readiness, among other negative consequences.A House report includes a provision for GAO to examine efforts to address mental health under the Department of Defense's (DOD) TRICARE program. This report (1) describes DHA data on average days to outpatient specialty behavioral health care appointments for active-duty service members in fiscal year 2022; (2) describes challenges to availability for these appointments at selected MTFs and steps taken to mitigate those challenges; and (3) examines relevant DHA oversight efforts.GAO reviewed DHA documents and interviewed agency officials; analyzed DHA data on behavioral health care appointments in fiscal year 2022 (the most recent available) and staffing levels in fiscal year 2023; and conducted site visits at six MTFs, selected for variation in military service affiliation, installation size, and geographic location.
- Nuclear Waste: Changing Conditions May Affect Future Management of Contamination Deposited Abroad During U.S. Cold War Activities What GAO FoundU.S. Cold War activities resulted in radioactive contamination in three locations: Greenland (part of the Kingdom of Denmark), Spain, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) (see fig.). In Greenland, radioactive liquid—generated by a small nuclear reactor that powered the U.S. Camp Century base—remains entombed under ice. In Spain, a mid-air collision resulted in radioactive contamination around Palomares. The United States and Spain cleaned up much of the radioactive material and have monitored the remaining material since. In RMI, contamination from nuclear weapons tests and the resulting fallout remains measurable on several atolls, some of which are still uninhabitable.Figure: Locations of Radioactive Contamination from U.S. Cold War Activities AbroadConditions have changed in all three locations since the original contamination. Most affected are the environment and inhabitants of RMI, where the Department of Energy (DOE) has ongoing responsibilities. Specifically:Greenland. At Camp Century, Denmark instituted permanent ice sheet monitoring to address concerns that climate change could release contamination. However, a 2021 study reported that contamination likely would remain immobile through 2100.	Spain. In Palomares, Spanish officials reevaluated the radioactive contamination in the 1990s and found it exceeded European Union standards. In 2015, U.S. and Spanish authorities signed a statement of intent to further remediate Palomares but have not reached a final agreement.	RMI. In RMI, people are concerned that climate change could mobilize radiological contamination, posing risks to fresh water and food sources. DOE assesses human radiation exposure and monitors environmental contamination in RMI. DOE considers human health risk to be low, but RMI officials believe DOE has downplayed the risk. This and other disagreements fuel distrust of DOE's information. By implementing a sustainable communication strategy in RMI, DOE could improve the Marshallese people's access to, and trust in, information on contamination as environmental conditions change.Why GAO Did This StudyThe United States conducted defense activities in many countries during the Cold War. These activities resulted in radioactive contamination in three countries: Greenland, Spain, and RMI. During the 1960s, the United States buried radioactive liquid in Greenland's ice while operating the experimental Camp Century base to study the feasibility of installing nuclear missiles there. In 1966, in Spain, two U.S. defense aircraft collided, dispersing radioactive debris over the town of Palomares. From 1946 to 1958, the United States conducted 67 nuclear weapons tests in RMI, and the resulting radioactive fallout contaminated several atolls.This report examines (1) the amount and type of radioactive contamination in Greenland, Spain, and RMI; and (2) how conditions have changed at these sites, and the extent to which the environment and inhabitants have been affected by these changed conditions. GAO reviewed key literature on the contamination and interviewed U.S. and foreign government officials.
- DOD Education Activity: Civilian Payroll Remediation Continues What GAO FoundThe Department of Defense's (DOD) Education Activity operates schools around the world, providing educational services for the dependents of military service members and civilian employees. Since fiscal year 2018, independent public accounting firms auditing DOD's annual financial statements have reported more than 100 notices of findings and recommendations across the department related to the civilian payroll system. Many of these notices remain open and affect the pay of all DOD employees, including overseas civilian employees.DOD Civilian Payroll Notices of Findings and Recommendations, as of March 2023			Total									Closed									No longer applicable									Open								147 									92									8									47					Source: GAO analysis of DOD data on notices auditors issued since fiscal year 2018. | GAO-24-105679Closed notices addressed issues such as approving and maintaining time cards, gross pay reconciliation, and unsupported payroll allowances for some components of DOD. Some common issues identified in the open notices are (1) inconsistent documentation supporting employees' payrolls and (2) payroll amounts not agreeing with calculations based on supporting documentation. These open issues are similar to instances GAO observed, as discussed below. DOD has developed corrective action plans and roadmaps to remediate these open notices, but they will take time to effectively implement and address the issues that other auditors and GAO found.DOD Education Activity uses the Civilian Human Resources Agency and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to perform human resources and payroll processing. DOD bases payroll computations on various requirements and must support payments with one or more source documents.GAO reviewed payroll records for 10 overseas DOD Education Activity employees. GAO found that the records for regular pay and incentives were accurate and contained adequate supporting documentation. GAO also found that of the five employees receiving allowances—such as for their living quarters—the amounts paid to three were inconsistent with the supporting documentation. In addition, GAO found that for eight of these 10 employees, at least one payroll deduction was not adequately supported.GAO also reviewed payroll records for 24 employees and found that 21 had adjustments that were not all processed timely or communicated adequately. The department processed 57 adjustments for the 21 employees' pay, 23 of which were retroactive, paid in a lump sum, and without many details provided on the employees' earnings and leave statements. The amount of time it took to process the adjustments ranged from a low of one biweekly pay period to a high of 34 biweekly pay periods. According to Defense Finance and Accounting Service officials, these delays are attributable to retroactive pay adjustments, corrective actions initiated by human resources offices or timekeepers, or employee-generated changes that were not sent timely for processing.Why GAO Did This StudyA committee report accompanying a national defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2022 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's payroll system for overseas DOD Education Activity employees. This report (1) describes the status of DOD's efforts to address auditors' prior recommendations to improve its civilian payroll system, which includes overseas DOD Education Activity employees, and (2) examines the process DOD used to calculate overseas DOD Education Activity employees' pay, including base pay, differentials, additional allowances, and deductions, as well as how the department communicated payroll changes to employees.GAO reviewed an extract from a database containing all civilian payroll notices of findings and recommendations as of March 2023 to report on the status of prior recommendations. GAO also examined fiscal year 2021 payroll records (the most recent available at the time of GAO's analysis) and interviewed DOD representatives to gain an understanding of the payroll process. GAO traced payroll records for 10 employees to supporting documentation and verified the calculations using applicable criteria. GAO also reviewed payroll adjustments for 24 employees that were the result of either normal adjustments or payroll errors. Since DOD was not able to provide sufficient supporting documentation timely, the number of DOD Education Activity employees that GAO was able to review was too small to support generalizable conclusions.For more information, contact Asif A. Khan at (202) 512-9869 or khana@gao.gov.
- National Nuclear Security Administration: Better Performance Tracking and Documentation Needed for Minor Construction Projects What GAO Found&nbsp;The threshold for minor construction projects limits what the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) can spend on these projects without having to identify them as specific line items in its budget for congressional authorization and appropriation. Congress first set this threshold at $5 million in fiscal year 2003 and has raised it numerous times, most recently to $30 million in fiscal year 2023. The threshold is now more than double what it would have been had Congress tied it to inflation or a construction-specific economic indicator in fiscal year 2003. Specifically, the threshold would have been between $8 million and $12 million in fiscal year 2022.Further raising the minor construction threshold could enable NNSA to more quickly address emerging issues without having to seek specific congressional authorization and appropriations for these projects, according to NNSA officials. However, a higher threshold could also limit congressional and departmental insight into the performance of some minor construction projects.From fiscal year 2019 through July 2023, NNSA offices undertook 414 minor construction projects that cost an estimated total of about $3 billion. However, GAO could not assess the performance for some of these projects—that is, the extent to which they adhered to their baseline cost estimates and schedules—because the NNSA program offices responsible for the projects did not collect quality information in a consistent manner. NNSA also has not documented, in a formal and comprehensive manner, their processes and related requirements for managing minor construction projects.Consistently collecting and tracking information on minor construction projects and documenting the processes and related requirements for managing these projects will enable NNSA to better manage and assess projects' performance—including schedule and cost. This is important because cost overruns on minor construction projects have been significant, and NNSA plans to initiate up to 437 minor construction projects over the next 5 fiscal years totaling about $5 billion.Why GAO Did This StudyNNSA, a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), carries out numerous minor construction projects each year at its eight nuclear security enterprise sites, which include national laboratories. These projects include additions, new or replacement facilities, and installations or upgrades that do not change a facility's footprint.The minor construction threshold limits how much NNSA can spend on these projects before certain budgetary requirements kick in. A 2022 NNSA report recommended that NNSA request Congressional approval raise the minor construction threshold to $50 million or $100 million.Senate Report 117-39, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2022, included a provision for GAO to review the minor construction threshold and evaluate the potential effects of raising it. This report provides information on how NNSA manages minor construction projects, the number of these projects NNSA has undertaken and planned, and GAO's analysis of the potential effects of raising the threshold.GAO analyzed data for NNSA's recent and planned minor construction projects and certain other projects, reviewed relevant DOE and NNSA directives and policies, and interviewed knowledgeable officials from selected DOE and NNSA offices. GAO assessed NNSA's data and policies against federal standards for internal control.
- Army Corps of Engineers: Better Alignment with Key Practices Would Improve Management of Real Estate Administrative Fees What GAO FoundThe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) charges real estate administrative fees (administrative fees) to public and private entities that are issued leases, licenses, or easements to use Corps-managed property. These uses may include privately operated marinas on lakes and power lines crossing canals or rivers. The administrative fees cover expenses incurred by the Corps related to, for example, approving and overseeing these uses. Most of the work of managing administrative fees is handled by the Corps' division and district offices.Examples of Nonfederal Uses of Real Estate at Corps-Managed PropertyIn reviewing division and district practices for managing administrative fees, GAO found that the Corps does not consistently follow key practices for user fees, as described below:The Corps uses inconsistent inputs to set fees.  Selected districts generally set administrative fees by estimating the costs the Corps incurs using activity, time, and labor inputs. However, the specific inputs used to estimate costs differed across districts. For example, two selected districts include the cost of compliance inspections while the other four do not, which may result in disparate fees across districts for similar real estate transactions.	The Corps does not regularly review and update fees.  Almost none of the selected divisions and districts regularly reviewed and, as appropriate, updated administrative fees. Officials from one district noted that as a result, its fee amounts have not kept up with increases to its costs.	The Corps does not consistently share information with the public.  Less than half of the selected divisions and districts posted administrative fee information—including the amount of the fees—on their websites.In most cases, GAO found that the Corps' agencywide policies for administrative fees lacked detail or direction to divisions and districts on how to set, review, and share information on administrative fees. By developing policies that better align with key considerations and practices, the Corps could improve the perceived equity and transparency of its administrative fees. For example, by regularly reviewing its fees, the Corps could better ensure it recovers its costs and does not significantly overcharge or undercharge payers. In addition, by sharing information on the fees on its websites, the Corps could make the purpose and amount of the fees transparent to the public.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Corps manages hundreds of civil works projects in the U.S. In addition, the Corps oversees over 65,000 uses of its real estate by individuals, businesses, and government entities nationwide. The Corps is authorized to charge fees to these users to cover the expenses it incurs in connection with entering into certain real estate transactions.GAO was asked to review how the Corps manages administrative fees. This report examines the extent to which the Corps follows key practices for (1) setting fees, (2) reviewing and updating fees, and (3) sharing information about fees.GAO reviewed policy documents and interviewed officials from Corps' headquarters and selected divisions and districts. The three selected divisions collected the most fees in fiscal years 2018–2022, and the six selected districts had the highest number of fee payers for the same fiscal years. GAO also interviewed a sample of fee payers. GAO compared the information collected to key considerations and practices in GAO's design guide for federal user fees and other federal guidance.