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441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 16, 2024

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Seth Magaziner

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

Homeland Security: DHS Internal Entities Facilitate Information Sharing in Key Areas and 

Collaborate as Needed 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for responding to new and 

emerging threats against the nation. To help accomplish this broad mission—encompassing 

counterterrorism, cyber protection, border security, and disaster response, among others—

departmental offices and components must effectively share information. DHS’s Strategic Plan 

for 2020–2024 made information and intelligence sharing, as well as close coordination and 

collaboration across the department, a top priority.1

DHS’s headquarters offices and its components play a key role in intradepartmental information 

sharing. For example, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has a leading role in 

providing intelligence, analysis, and related information to support DHS operations.2 A variety of 

established internal information sharing entities (i.e., groups) exist to assist I&A, other DHS 

components, and headquarters offices to routinely share such information and intelligence.3

1Department of Homeland Security, DHS Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2020–2024. 

2The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 amended the Homeland Security Act of 

2002, reorganizing DHS and creating the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, title II, subtitle 

A, § 201, 116 Stat. 2135, 2145-49, as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-53, title V, subtitle D, § 531, 121 Stat. 266, 332-

35 (classified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 121).

3Intelligence is information gathered within or outside the U.S. that involves threats to our nation, its people, property, 

or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; and any other matter bearing on 

U.S. national or homeland security. Intelligence information includes classified information, which is information that, 

for reasons of national security, is specifically designated by a U.S. government agency for limited or restricted 

dissemination or distribution. 
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In our prior work we found that clear communication is essential to effectively counter the rising 

threat of domestic terrorist events and violent extremism.4 However, the DHS Office of Inspector 

General and members of Congress have raised concerns about the number and effectiveness 

of various information sharing groups.5 You asked us to review issues related to these groups, 

including the number and purpose of such groups. This report (1) describes the various groups 

DHS uses to promote internal information sharing and their purpose and operating status and

(2) identifies the extent to which any similar groups collaborate to avoid duplicating efforts.

To address both objectives, we first identified internal information sharing groups led by select 

DHS headquarters offices and component members of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise.6 More 

specifically we sought information (such as membership and key activities) on groups—

including task forces, working groups, committees, councils, centers, forums, or other 

coordination groups—with the following characteristics:

(1) Promoted the sharing of information within DHS—to include intelligence (both finished 

and unevaluated), data, written products, and discussions—as a primary responsibility;7

(2) Were focused on issues or topics related to DHS’s mission, and not administrative 

issues (e.g., payroll, office space); and 

(3) Were operational any time from January 1, 2020, through September 30, 2023.8 We 

selected these dates because these were the three most recent calendar years at the 

time that we distributed our data collection instrument. 

4See the list of related GAO products at the end of this report.

5Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, DHS Cannot Determine the Total Cost, 

Effectiveness, and Value of Its Joint Task Forces, OIG-20-80 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2020).

6We included DHS headquarters offices whose purpose is to promote collaboration across the department—

specifically the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans; the Management Directorate; and the Office of Homeland 

Security Situational Awareness. In addition, we included I&A because its mission is to promote information and 

intelligence sharing across the department, as well as the members of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise because of 

their intelligence and information sharing responsibilities. The DHS Intelligence Enterprise is headed by the Under 

Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, who also holds the position of DHS Chief Intelligence Officer. It is composed 

of I&A and the intelligence components of the following DHS entities: the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Office, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the

Federal Protective Service (within the Management Directorate), the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement. 

7Unevaluated intelligence reports contain unanalyzed content whereas finished intelligence products contain the 

assessment, judgment, or other analytic input of personnel.

8Three intradepartmental joint task forces were operational during this time, but we did not include them in the scope 

of this review. In 2014, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed the establishment of Joint Task Force-East, Joint 

Task Force-West, and Joint Task Force-Investigations to address, among other things, the smuggling of illicit drugs 

over the southern border and approaches to the U.S. In 2020, DHS terminated Joint Task Force-West and Joint Task 

Force-Investigations, and as of November 2023, Joint Task Force-East continued to operate. We did not include the 

joint task forces in the scope of our review because a concurrent GAO review addressed DHS’s use and oversight of 

joint task forces, including the extent to which DHS has developed and documented criteria for determining whether 

to establish or terminate a joint task force. The review found, among other things, that DHS had not developed and 

documented such criteria as of November 2023. The review made recommendations to address this issue and DHS 
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In addition, to confirm we collected data on formally established information sharing groups, we 

ensured the identified groups had one or more of the following: a charter or a memorandum of 

understanding/agreement, dedicated funding, and/or a statutory mandate. For groups that met 

our criteria for inclusion, we reviewed agency documentation—including charters, 

memorandums, policies and procedures, agendas, meeting minutes, and annual reports—and 

categorized them by similarities in their purpose. In addition, we requested available information 

on groups’ costs, such as budgets and resources. We also interviewed relevant DHS 

headquarters and component officials about the history of the information sharing groups we 

identified (i.e., why groups were established, and if applicable, discontinued), purpose, activities, 

and any collaboration practices, among other things. 

Using GAO’s fragmentation, overlap, and duplication evaluation and management guide, we 

analyzed the characteristics of the information sharing groups we identified to determine areas 

of duplication and overlap, if any.9 Specifically, we assessed for duplication and overlap 

between the identified groups by comparing key attributes such as the purpose, membership, 

users, and activities of the groups. For groups that we identified as similar from this 

assessment, we compared their efforts to select leading interagency collaboration practices 

identified in our prior work because such practices could mitigate possible duplication of 

activities between similar groups. Specifically, we compared their efforts to collaboration 

practices, including the practice of leveraging resources and information—which includes 

looking for opportunities to address crosscutting needs through staffing and technology.10 We 

also compared DHS’s efforts to the control environment component of federal internal control 

standards, specifically the principle that management should establish an organizational 

structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve organizational goals.11

We conducted this performance audit from July 2023 to April 2024 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

concurred and identified ongoing and planned steps to address the recommendations. See GAO, Department of 

Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Joint Task Forces, GAO-24-106855

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2024).

9Overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to 

achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries. Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are 

engaged in the same activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries. Fragmentation, which we did 

not assess in this review, is when more than one agency (or organization within an agency) is involved in the same 

broad area of national need and opportunities exist to improve service delivery. See GAO, Fragmentation, Overlap, 

and Duplication: An Evaluation and Management Guide, GAO-15-49SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2015).

10See GAO, Government Performance Management: Leading Practices to Enhance Interagency Collaboration and 

Address Crosscutting Challenges, GAO-23-105520 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2023). 

11See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

2014).
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Nine DHS Groups Facilitate Internal Information Sharing

We identified nine formal DHS groups that are focused on sharing information internally within 

the department.12 The nine groups generally align with one of three purposes (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: Categories of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Internal Information Sharing Groups and 

Their Purpose

Note: These groups were operational any time from January 1, 2020, through September 30, 2023.

aDHS discontinued the Operations Deputies Board in 2022 as part of a departmental reorganization initiative.

DHS established these nine groups based on senior DHS leadership (i.e., Secretary or other 

senior officials) priorities, or in response to newly enacted statutory requirements.13 We provide 

more information on the specific priorities or requirements leading to the establishment of each 

group later in the enclosure to this report. DHS discontinued one group—the Operations 

Deputies Board—during the time frame of our review because of a departmental reorganization 

initiative.14 When establishing and discontinuing these groups, DHS demonstrated it had the 

necessary internal controls, including structures and authorities, in place to carry out

organizational goals articulated by DHS senior leaders or Congress.15 For example, DHS 

12We identified an additional group—the Senior Leaders Council—a forum of senior leaders across the department to 

provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security on policy issues, among other things. 

According to DHS officials, the group may have been discontinued in 2018 and therefore was not in the time frame of 

our review (January 1, 2020, through September 30, 2023). However, officials were unable to confirm this or provide 

us with additional information on the activities of the group or a rationale for why it was discontinued.

13One group (the Counter Threats Advisory Board) was statutorily authorized after it was established by DHS. Pub. L. 

No. 116- 260, div. U., tit. VI, § 602(a), 134 Stat. 1182, 2294-5 (2020) (classified at 6 U.S.C. § 124m–1). We discuss 

this group in more detail in the enclosure to this report.

14The Secretary of Homeland Security initiated this departmental reorganization initiative in 2021 with the goal of 

improving DHS operations. We discuss how this reorganization initiative impacted information sharing groups in the 

enclosure to this report.

15See GAO-14-704G.
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implemented senior leadership requirements that directed the establishment of the Deputy’s 

Management Action Group and the Continuity Mission Assurance Board. 

In addition, we found that two groups were not actively meeting during the time frame of our 

review—January 1, 2020, through September 30, 2023—but there were no costs associated 

with this inactivity. These were the Deputy’s Management Action Group and the Information 

Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board, which had periods of inactivity but were not 

disbanded and remained ready for use. Specifically, the Deputy’s Management Action Group 

was inactive for approximately 2 years between April 2019 and June 2021 due to 

management’s preference not to use the group as a mechanism for information sharing.16 In 

addition, according to I&A officials, the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance 

Board has been inactive for approximately 3 years, but select subgroups remained active as of 

January 2024. According to DHS officials, the main costs associated with all nine groups are 

support staff’s time spent organizing and conducting group activities and group members’ time 

spent on those activities. Therefore, when groups are inactive there generally are few, if any, 

cost implications.17 

Some DHS Groups Were Similar, but Collaboration Activities Helped Address Potential 

Duplication 

We found no evidence of unnecessary duplication among these groups, however, we found that 

some of the groups’ purposes and activities had the potential for overlap. Specifically, we found 

the potential for overlap between the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board 

and the Chief Data Officer Council. We also found the potential for overlap between the Counter 

Threats Advisory Board and the Homeland Security Intelligence Council.18 

However, we also found that agency officials associated with these groups described activities 

to leverage their respective resources and information—a leading interagency collaboration 

practice—to mitigate possible duplication of activities. For example, officials told us that the 

Chief Data Officer Council is leading an effort to standardize the format of data sharing 

agreements across the department and also led an effort to catalogue the data assets of the 

department. The Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board would have 

previously addressed these activities as part of its role to set information sharing policy and 

resolve information sharing disputes. However, officials explained that because the Chief Data 

Officer Council includes many of the same subject matter experts who would have participated 

in the board’s efforts in these areas, officials utilize the council’s meetings. Officials told us that 

one of the reasons the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board has not met 

since March 2021 is because the Chief Data Officer Council has incorporated these types of 

issues and activities into its regular meetings. 

16The Deputy’s Management Action Group meets at the discretion of the Deputy Secretary. See Department of 

Homeland Security, DHS Leadership Forums, Directive 071-01 (June 30, 2015). 

17Officials from all nine groups told us that they did not track members’ time devoted to these groups because group 

activities are a collateral duty. 

18We describe the purpose of these four information sharing groups in the enclosure to this report. 
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In addition, according to officials associated with the Counter Threats Advisory Board and the 

Homeland Security Intelligence Council, these groups also leverage resources and information 

to help manage possible duplication of group activities. Specifically, according to DHS officials,

the Homeland Security Intelligence Council, which is composed of less senior staff than the 

Counter Threats Advisory Board, schedules its meetings to occur a month or so before board’s

meetings. This allows the more detailed information from the council meetings to inform

meetings of more senior staff serving on the board.

Additional details on each group’s characteristics and rationales for why groups were 

established and discontinued are presented in the enclosure to this report.

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the relevant congressional committees and the 

Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or 

McNeilT@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 

may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are Mona Nichols Blake (Assistant Director); Natalie Swabb (Analyst-in-Charge); Michele 

Fejfar; Megan Johnson; Susan Murphy; Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi; and Sarah Veale. 

Triana McNeil 

Director Homeland Security and Justice

Enclosure – 1
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Related GAO Products 

Countering Violent Extremism: FBI and DHS Need Strategies and Goals for Sharing Threat 

Information with Social Media and Gaming Companies, GAO-24-106262 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 31, 2024). 

Counterterrorism: Action Needed to Further Develop the Information Sharing Environment, 

GAO-23-105310 (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2023). 

Capitol Attack: Federal Agencies Identified Some Threats, but Did Not Fully Process and Share 

Information Prior to January 6, 2021, GAO-23-106625 (Washington, D.C.: Feb 28, 2023). 

Domestic Terrorism: Further Actions Needed to Strengthen FBI and DHS Collaboration to 

Counter Threats, GAO-23-104720 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2023). 
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