No. 19-14248 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION and STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

KEVIN W. GUICE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Florida 

No. 16-cv-982 

Hon. Carlos E. Mendoza, Judge 

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 

BRIEF OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

AND STATE OF FLORIDA 

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 

ASHLEY MOODY JAMES REILLY DOLAN

Attorney General Acting General Counsel 

JENNIFER HINTON KNUTTON JOEL MARCUS

PATRICK CHRISTOPHER CROTTY Deputy General Counsel Senior Assistant Attorneys General 

O AN FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY MICHAEL BERGM

GENERAL Attorney 

STATE OF FLORIDA FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

135 W. Central Blvd. Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20580 

Orlando, FL 32801 (202) 326-3184 

(407) 316-4840 mbergman@ftc.gov 

Jennifer.Knutton@myfloridalegal.com 

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No. 19-14248 

Federal Trade Commission, et al v. Kevin Guice 

C-1 of 2 

Eleventh Circuit Rule 26.1 Certificate of Interested Persons 

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and 11th Cir. R. 26.1, Appellees the 

Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the State of Florida certify that, in 

addition to the names listed in Appellant’s opening brief, the following persons or 

entities have an interest in the outcome of this appeal: 

Bergman, Michael D. – FTC Attorney 

Crotty, Patrick Christopher – Counsel, Florida Attorney General’s Office 

Doan, Joshua A. – FTC Attorney 

Dolan, James Reilly – FTC Acting General Counsel 

Duncan, Donna – Attorney for Appellant Kevin Guice 

Grilli, Peter J. – Mediator 

Guice, Laura – mother of Defendant Kevin Guice and wife of Relief 

 

 Defendant Robert Guice 

Guice, Robert – Relief Defendant 

Jones, Christine a/k/a Christine Carter-Jones – Organized Shell Defendant 

 

 YCC Solutions LLC 

Kiesel, Bernard – Accountant for Defendant Kevin Guice 

Marcus, Joel – FTC Deputy General Counsel 

Miller, Victoria – Organized Shell Def. PW&F Consultants of Florida LLC 

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No. 19-14248 

Federal Trade Commission, et al v. Kevin Guice 

C-2 of 2 

Moody, Ashley – Florida Attorney General 

Norris, Wayne Thomas – Guice associate who assisted with the creation of 

 certain Shell Defendants 

Roberts, Matthew S. – Organized Shell Defendant URB Management, LLC 

UAD Secure Services LLC – Shell Defendant 

Vest, Inez – Organized Shell Defendant IVD Recovery, LLC 

Wilhelm, Lisa – Plaintiffs’-Appellees’ Expert Witness 

Woods, Eleanor Miner – wife of Relief Defendant Timothy Woods 

Yager, Jr., Michael L. – Organized Shell Defendants UAD Secure Service of 

 FL LLC and UAD Secure Services LLC 

The Federal Trade Commission and the State of Florida further state that, to 

the best of their knowledge, no publicly traded company or corporation has an 

interest in the outcome of the case or appeal. 

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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 

The issues in this case are straightforward. Plaintiffs-Appellees do not 

believe oral argument is necessary. 

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................. i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... ii 

TABLE OF CITATIONS .......................................................................................... iv

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.......................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 2

A. Guice’s Unlawful Telemarketing Scheme ..................................................... 3

 1. Illegal robocalls and calls to numbers on the Do-Not-Call Registry ...... 3

 2. Guice’s deceptive rate-reduction program .............................................. 5 

 3. Guice’s debt-elimination program ........................................................ 13

 4. Illegal up-front fees .............................................................................. 16 

B. Guice’s Common Corporate Enterprise..........................................18 

C. The Government’s Enforcement Lawsuit ................................................... 25

 1. The Complaint and TRO ....................................................................... 25

 2. The Summary Judgment Order and Relief ........................................... 26

STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................... 30

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 30 

ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 33

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AGAINST GUICE ................................................................................................... 33

A. The District Court Properly Held Guice Personally Liable for His 

 Companies’ Illegal Acts .............................................................................. 36

 1. Undisputed Evidence Showed That Guice Controlled the Common 

 Enterprise .............................................................................................. 37

ii 

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iii 

 2. Undisputed Evidence Showed That Guice is Liable for His Companies’ 

 Robocall and Do-Not-Call Registry Violations .................................... 40

 3. Undisputed Evidence Showed that Guice is Liable for His 

 Companies’ Misrepresentations and Omissions...........................42 

B. Undisputed Evidence Showed That Guice’s Companies Did Not 

 Provide the Promised Debt-Relief Services .......................................... 44 

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 51

 

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TABLE OF CITATIONS*

CASES

Allen v Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 

 495 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007) ..................................................................... 39 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ............................................ 44 

* Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) .......................................................... 35 

Coquina Invs. v. TD Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 1300 

 (11th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................. 35 

Dietz v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 598 F.3d 812 (11th Cir. 2010) ...................... 39 

Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 

 561 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................... 35 

FTC v. Figgie Int’l Inc., 994 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993) ............................................ 49 

FTC v. Freecom Communications, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192 

 (10th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................. 49 

* FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir.1996) ..................................... 36 

FTC v. Global Mktg. Group, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1281 

 (M.D. Fla. 2008) ............................................................................................ 35 

FTC v. Grant Connect, LLC, 763 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2014) .................................. 37 

* FTC v. IAB Mktg. Assocs., LP, 746 F.3d 1228 

 (11th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................ 36, 42, 49 

FTC v. Lalonde, 545 F. App’x 825 (11th Cir. 2013) ............................................... 25 

FTC v. Partners In Health Care Ass’n, 189 F. Supp. 3d 1356 

 (S.D. Fla. 2016) ...................................................................................... 43, 49 

 

*

 Cases and other authorities principally relied upon are marked with asterisks

iv 

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v 

FTC v. Primary Grp., Inc., 713 F. App'x 805 (11th Cir. 2017) ............................... 36 

FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2014) .............................................................. 37 

FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2009) .................................................... 43 

* FTC v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2003) ........................................ 44, 49 

FTC v. Transnet Wireless Co., 506 F. Supp.2d 1247 

 (S.D. Fla. 2007) ............................................................................................. 35 

FTC v. World Media Brokers, 415 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2005) ........................... 42, 43 

Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995 (11th Cir. 1997) .................................. 30 

Green v. Hooks, 798 F. App'x 411 (11th Cir. 2020), 

 cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 249 (2020) ................................................................ 34 

Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2018) ................................ 47 

* KC Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) ...................... 37 

Lucas v. W.W. Granger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2001) ............................... 30 

McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378 (11th Cir. 2000) .......................................... 49 

* Nat’l All. for Mentally Ill, St. Johns Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of 

 St. Johns Cty., 376 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2004).....................34, 39, 43, 50 

Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United Steel Workers, 985 F.3d 1309 

 (11th Cir. 2021) ...................................................................................... 34, 50 

Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2008) .................................................. 34 

* Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 

 (11th Cir. 2014) ...................................................................................... 34, 39 

United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) ................................ 35 

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vi 

United States ex rel. v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., 987 F.3d 1340 

 (11th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................................. 30 

United States v. Dish Network L.L.C., 954 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 2020) ...................... 41 

Walace v. Cousins, 783 F. App'x 910 (11th Cir. 2019) ........................................... 47 

STATUTES

* 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) ........................................................................................... 25, 44 

15 U.S.C. § 6101 ...................................................................................................... 25 

15 U.S.C. § 6102(c) ................................................................................................. 25 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................................................................ 2 

28 U.S.C. § 1367 ........................................................................................................ 1 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 ...................................................................................................... 1 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1337(a) ................................................................................................. 1 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 ...................................................................................................... 1 

Fla. Stat. § 501.202(3) .............................................................................................. 37 

Fla. Stat. § 501.203(3) .............................................................................................. 25 

* Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1) ..................................................................................... 25,44 

* Fla. Stat. § 501.204(2) ........................................................................................... 37 

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vii 

RULES

16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(x) ....................................................................................... 45 

16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5)(i) ........................................................................................ 16 

16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) ............................................................................ 3, 41 

16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(v)(A) ............................................................................. 4, 41 

16 C.F.R. § 310.8 ....................................................................................................... 3 

* 16 C.F.R. Part 310 ............................................................................................ 3, 25 

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6) ........................................................................................... 34 

* Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) ........................................................................... 34, 50 

Fed. R. App. P. 30(a)(1)(D) ..................................................................................... 11 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ................................................................................................. 30 

* Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) ......................................................................................... 46 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) ................................................................................................... 2 

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INTRODUCTION 

Uncontested evidence showed that Kevin Guice orchestrated a deceptive 

telemarketing scheme, operated through 13 interlinked companies, that preyed on 

financially distressed consumers by promising to relieve them of their debts while 

often making them even worse off than before. More than 10,000 consumers 

collectively paid Guice and his companies over $23 million for services that were 

not fulfilled as promised. The victims’ resources were drained and their credit 

ratings ruined. Guice claims that there were facts in dispute, making summary 

decision inappropriate. In reality, the voluminous record amply supports the 

judgment below and Guice has identified no genuine dispute of material fact. 

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Federal Trade 

Commission’s claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and 1345. The district 

court had supplemental jurisdiction over the State of Florida’s state-law claims 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The district court issued its summary judgment order and 

permanent injunction disposing of all parties’ claims on December 7, 2018, 

GA.225,1

 and judgment was entered against Guice on December 10, 2018, 

 

1

 “GA” refers to Kevin Guice’s Appendix, cited as: “GA.[Tab #] at [district court 

ECF page #].” “SA” refers to the FTC’s and Florida’s Supplemental Appendix, 

cited as: “SA.[Tab #] at [district court ECF page #].” “Tab #” refers to the district 

court docket number. Exhibits on the electronic docket are cited to their docket 

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GA.226. Guice timely filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 59(e) on January 4, 2019, D.232, which the district court denied on 

September 24, 2019. SA.291. Guice timely filed his notice of appeal on October 

24, 2019. GA.309. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 

1) Whether the district court properly determined on summary judgment that 

Kevin Guice was personally liable for his companies’ violations. 

 2) Whether the district court properly determined on summary judgment 

that Kevin Guice and his companies failed to provide their promised debt-relief 

services. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Voluminous unrebutted evidence shows that for at least three-and-a-half 

years, thirteen companies created and controlled by Kevin Guice sold fraudulent 

debt-relief services. His salesforce falsely promised consumers a permanent and 

substantial reduction in their credit-card interest rates, often to zero percent, and 

substantial savings. Consumers who fell for the first pitch and still had credit were 

 

number. Exhibits supporting the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining 

order were filed on a CD (see D.12 (docket entry); D.13 (list)), are not on the 

electronic docket, see GA.225 at 2 n.1, and were transmitted in the record on 

appeal on the CD; they are cited as: “SA.12(CD)-[PX #] at [exhibit page #]. 

Deposition transcripts are first cited to the district court ECF page # and then to the 

court reporter-assigned page # (cited as: “[Tr. #]”). 

2 

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3 

pitched a second false promise that for a substantial up-front payment, their creditcard debt could be satisfied entirely using a government fund. Guice not only 

failed to provide the promised services, but often left consumers deeper in debt and 

with severely damaged credit. 

Those facts were established through more than forty sworn consumer 

declarations, testimony of Guice’s former employees and business associates, bank 

records revealing that Guice personally collected more than $8 million, and 

internal company documents. Instead of responding to the substance of that 

record, Guice repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment. 

A. Guice’s Unlawful Telemarketing Scheme 

1. Illegal robocalls and calls to numbers on the Do-Not- 

 Call Registry 

 The FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule (“TSR”), 16 C.F.R. Part 310, prohibits 

telemarketing calls to phone numbers listed on the FTC’s Do-Not-Call (“DNC”) 

Registry unless the seller has obtained written consent or has an established 

business relationship with the recipient. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B).2

 The TSR 

also separately prohibits sellers or telemarketers from sending prerecorded 

telephone messages (or “robocalls”) to consumers to induce a purchase unless the 

 

2

 Sellers or telemarketers must also pay an annual fee to access phone numbers for 

a given area code on the Registry. 16 C.F.R. § 310.8. 

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4 

message falls into a defined safe harbor category or the seller has obtained written 

consent. Id. § 310.4(b)(1)(v)(A). 

 Guice’s two main operating companies, Loyal Financial & Credit Services, 

LLC (“Loyal”) and Life Management Services of Orange County, LLC (“LMS”), 

caused an automatic dialer or lead generator to send calls which played a 

prerecorded message (“robocalls”) to consumers nationwide. GA.163-48 at 6 [Tr. 

at 14:5-23]; GA.163-49 at 6, 9 [Tr. at 53:17-56:19, 92:10-14]. When the recipient 

answered, a prerecorded message played, which allowed the recipient to press a 

button to speak with a salesperson who worked for one of the defendant 

companies.3

 In addition, consumers who had listed their telephone numbers on the 

DNC Registry received calls even though they had no prior business relationship 

with Guice’s companies nor had they given the companies written permission to 

 

3 SA.12(CD)-[PX 1 at 1 ¶¶ 2-11]; id.-[PX 4 at 1 ¶¶ 2-13] (KWP Services); id.-[PX 

7 at 1 ¶¶ 2-7] (LPS of FLA); id.-[PX 10 at 1 ¶¶ 2-9] (LPS of FLA); id.-[PX 11 at 1 

¶¶ 2-11] (LMS); id.-[PX 12 at 1 ¶¶ 2-8] (YCC); id.-[PX 15 at 1 ¶¶ 2-9] (UAD 

Secure Services); id.-[PX 16 at 1 ¶¶ 2-9] (KWP Services); id.-[PX 23 at 1 ¶¶ 2-8] 

(UAD Secure Services); id.-[PX 29 at 1 ¶¶ 2-10] (LMS, Credit Assistance); id.-

[PX 32 at 1 ¶¶ 2-20]; id.-[PX 33 at 1 ¶¶ 2-11] (LPS); id.-[PX 34 at 1 ¶¶ 2-13] 

(KWP Services); id.-[PX 35 at 1 ¶¶ 2-9] (KWP); id.-[PX 36 at 1 ¶¶ 2-6] (URB 

Management); id.-[PX 37 at 1 ¶¶ 2-8] (LPS); id.-[PX 111 at 1 ¶ 2-6] (YCC); id.-

[PX 155 at 1 ¶¶ 2-6] (IVD Recovery); see also id.-[PX 46 at 1-5 ¶¶ 3-42] (linking 

robocall numbers to Guice and his businesses). 

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contact them.4

 Consumers complained to the FTC about these robocalls and DNC 

violations more than 27,000 times. See id.-[PX 46 at 5 ¶¶ 40-42].5

 

2. Guice’s deceptive rate-reduction program 

 The robocalls promised lowering the consumer’s credit card interest rate to 

“to as little as 1 percent.” SA.12(CD)-[PX 51 at 4:4-6]; id.-[PX 52 at 4:6-8]. The 

ensuing sales calls pitches were deceptive in three main ways. 

a. The companies used fake names and made false affiliation 

claims 

 Consumers who responded to the robocall were connected to a salesperson 

who often claimed to be a representative of, or affiliated with, the consumer’s 

banks or credit-card issuers (like Citibank) or credit card associations (like 

Mastercard or Visa). Id.-[PX 13 at 1 ¶ 5]; id.-[PX 26 at 1 ¶ 8]; id.-[PX 46 at 2, 4 

¶¶ 16, 29, 31]; id.-[PX 51 at 8-9]; id.-[PX 52 at 7-9]. Call scripts developed by 

 

4 SA.12(CD)-[PX 1 at 1 ¶¶ 10-11]; id.-[PX 2 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 4 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; 

id.-[PX 7 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 8 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 10 at 1 ¶¶ 4-5]; id.-[PX 12 at 

1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 15 at 1 ¶¶ 2-6]; id.-[PX 16 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 18 at 1 ¶¶ 2-3]; 

id.-[PX 20 at 1 ¶ 3]; id.-[PX 21 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 22 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 23 at 1 

¶¶ 2-7]; id.-[PX 24 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 25 at 1 ¶¶ 4-5]; id.-[PX 27 at 1 ¶¶ 2-3]; id.-

[PX 28 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 29 at 1 ¶¶ 4-5]; id.-[PX 30 at 1 ¶¶ 2-3]; id.-[PX 32 at 1 

¶¶ 8-10]; id.-[PX 33 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 35 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 37 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; 

id.-[PX 38 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]; id.-[PX 111 at 1 ¶¶ 3-4]. 

5

 Moreover, neither Guice, his companies, nor anyone on their behalf, paid the 

necessary fee to access the DNC Registry for any area code. Id.-[PX 46 at 6-7 

¶¶ 55-57]. 

5 

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6 

Guice instructed the salesperson to state that “we work directly with the corporate 

office of Visa, Mastercard, American Express and Discover,” and that “the 

corporate offices of Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Discover . . . sent 

out the automated message so when you pressed one you were transferred over to 

the first representative in the qualifications department available to speak with 

you.” SA.41-1, Att. D at 12, 14; SA.41-2 at 7, 9–10, 12–13; GA.163-49 at 13 [Tr. 

184:2–21] (company salespeople falsely told consumers that they were a “licensed 

enrollment center” for MasterCard, Visa, American Express, and Discover).6

 In 

fact, the companies were not affiliated with any of these financial institutions. 

SA.12(CD)-[PX 39 at 3-4 ¶¶ 27-32]; id.-[PX 40 at 1 ¶¶ 4-5]; id.-[PX 41 at 1-2 

¶¶ 7-11]; SA.163-52 at 11, 13, 19 [Tr. 88:3–6, 93:20–22, 136:18–23]. In some 

calls, Loyal’s or LMS’s salesforce falsely stated they worked for non-existent 

companies whose names suggested affiliation with a financial institution, such as 

 

6 Guice’s rate-reduction salesforce used multiple calling scripts, both those that 

Guice or one of his companies had filed with the Florida Department of 

Agriculture and Consumer Services (“DOACS”) and those that it had not. See

SA.163-52 at 20 [Tr. 138:8-25, 139:1-5]. Both sets of scripts contained deceptive 

pitches. The DOACS issues telemarketing sellers’ licenses; it also investigates and 

engages in administrative litigation concerning alleged violations of Florida 

telemarketing laws. SA.12(CD)-[PX 43 at 1 ¶ 7, 5 ¶¶ 29-31, 33, 80-83]. 

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“Bank Card Services” and “Credit Card Services,” or had consumer-friendly 

names, like “American Credit Assistance” and “Credit Assistance Program.”7

 

 Guice was aware of these misrepresentations. When one of his employees 

received an investigative demand addressed to “Bank Card Services” from the 

North Carolina Attorney General’s Office, the employee forwarded it to Guice. 

SA.163-15. When confronted with all this evidence, Guice invoked the Fifth 

Amendment. See SA.163-43 at 16-17, 24-25 [Tr. at 58:3-60.7, 91:23-92:4, 92:17-

94:11]. 

b. False rate-reduction service pitch 

 Guice’s companies falsely promised that their rate-reduction program would 

substantially and permanently reduce consumers’ credit card interest rates.8

 The 

 

7 SA.12(CD)-[PX 5 at 1 ¶ 2]; id.-[PX 11 at 1 ¶¶ 10–11]; id.-[PX 17 at 1 ¶ 3]; id.-

[PX 19 at 1 ¶ 9]; id.-[PX 20 at 1 ¶ 5]; id.-[PX 21 at 1 ¶ 7]; id.-[PX 22 at 1 ¶ 2]; id.-

[PX 33 at 1 ¶ 6]; id.-[PX 34 at 1 ¶ 8]; id.-[PX 46 at 2, 4 ¶¶ 15, 29]; id.-[PX 51 at 8-

9 [Tr. 8:22–9:4]]; id.-[PX 52 at 7 [Tr. 7:18–8:7]]; SA.41-2 at 2 ¶ 9 & Ex. 1 at 7, 10, 

13 (call scripts at LMS’s call center with fake company names); SA.163-52 at 19-

20 [Tr. at 135:18-136:7, 136:25-137:17] (identifying salesperson making 

representation as LMS employee). 

8 SA.12(CD)-[PX 2 at 2 ¶¶ 18-19]; id.-[PX 5 at 1-2 ¶¶ 5, 17]; id.-[PX 8 at 1-2 ¶¶ 

12-13]; id.-[PX 10 at 1 ¶¶ 11-12]; id.-[PX 12 at 2 ¶¶ 17-18]; id.-[PX 13 at 1 ¶¶ 11-

12]; id.-[PX 21 at 2 ¶¶ 19-20]; id.-[PX 23 at 2 ¶ 16]; id.-[PX 24 at 1 ¶¶ 11, 14]; id.-

[PX 34 at 2 ¶¶ 22-23]; id.-[PX 35 at 1 ¶¶ 13-15]; id.-[PX 37 at 1 ¶¶ 12-13]; id.-[PX 

38 at 1 ¶¶ 9-10]; id.-[PX 111 at 1 ¶ 10]; id.-[PX 112 at 1 ¶¶ 6-7]; id.-[PX 155 at 1 

¶¶ 6-7]; see also id. [PX 51 at 14-15]. 

7 

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8 

companies also promised consumers they would save thousands of dollars in a 

short period of time, allowing them to pay off their credit card debt sooner, usually 

three-to-five times faster.9

 

 Such promises were empty. Not a single consumer-declarant received a 

substantial and permanent reduction of their credit card interest rates. See

SA.12(CD)-[PX 1– PX 38, PX 110 – PX 112, PX 155]. Card issuer statements 

refusing to lower consumers’ interest rates buttress the consumers’ experiences. 

See id.-[PX 22 at 1 ¶ 10]; id.-[PX 23 at 1 ¶ 11]; id.-[PX 34 at 2 ¶ 21]; id.-[PX 35 at 

1 ¶ 12]. At most, consumers reported modest and temporary interest-rate 

reductions. Id.-[PX 12 at 2 ¶ 25]; id.-[PX 21 at 2 ¶ 18]. Other consumers indicated 

that they received new credit cards only with temporary teaser rates on carriedover balances.10 

 The unrebutted testimony of industry expert witness Lisa Wilhelm 

confirmed that these consumer experiences reflected industry practices. First, 

 

9 Id.-[PX 2 at 1 ¶¶ 11-12, 2 ¶ 18]; id.-[PX 3 at 1 ¶ 5]; id.-[PX 12 at 1 ¶ 6]; id.-[PX 

18 at 2 ¶ 25]; id.-[PX 20 at 1 ¶¶ 8-9]; id.-[PX 22 at 1 ¶ 8]; id.-[PX 23 at 1 ¶ 13]; 

id.-[PX 33 at 2 ¶ 16]; id.-[PX 34 at 2 ¶¶ 15-17]; id.-[PX 19 at 46-47 [Tr. 38:12-

39:7]]; id.-[PX 43 at 33-35, 149-151, 345-47, 365-67] (company scripts filed with 

DOACS directing its salesforce to tell consumers they would save a minimum of 

$2,500 and get out of debt 3-5 times faster). 

10 Id.-[PX 5 at 2 ¶ 17, 4 ¶ 39]; id.-[PX 7 at 2 ¶ 21]; id.-[PX 10 at 3 ¶ 32]; id.-[PX 12 

at 2 ¶ 26]; id.-[PX 18 at 2 ¶ 23]; id.-[PX 33 at 2 ¶ 22]; id.-[PX 34 at 4 ¶ 42]; id.-

[PX 38 at 2 ¶ 20]; id.-[PX 111 at 2 ¶ 22]. 

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9 

credit card issuers would not lower existing cardholders’ interest rates 

significantly, but might offer a 1-3% reduction for those in good standing. 

SA.12(CD)-[PX 42 at 16 ¶ 49]. Second, the issuers were unlikely to offer fixed 

(i.e. permanent) interest rates to cardholders. Id. at 16-17 ¶ 51. Third, 

“promotional rate” credit cards provide only temporary interest-rate savings with 

rates rising significantly thereafter. Id. at 11-12 ¶ 29, 17 ¶ 52. Fourth, fees 

charged by the issuers, such as cash-advance fees and balance-transfer fees, would 

reduce any modest temporary interest-rate savings the cardholder might receive. 

Id. at 13 ¶ 36, 21-22 ¶ 68, 28-31 ¶¶ 84, 86. 

 Ms. Wilhelm’s testimony also established that Guice’s salesforce lacked the 

information needed to make their promises. For example, one would need to know  

a consumer’s particular economic, financial, credit, and personal circumstances 

before ascertaining if they would qualify for a lower interest rate card. Id. at 15 

¶ 46; see also id. at 8-11 ¶¶ 21–28 (discussing the numerous factors considered by 

issuers to determine whether a consumer qualified for such a card). Such an 

individualized assessment is required before a third-party like LMS could 

guarantee to provide the promised benefits. Id. at 16 ¶ 48. Guice’s companies 

could not determine “the amount of interest that a particular consumer will save on 

his or her credit card debt, or how long it will take to pay off the debt[,]” without 

knowing: (1) the consumer’s credit card debt balance; (2) the interest rate currently 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 19 of 62
10 

paid by the consumer on his/her credit card debt; (3) the new, reduced interest rate 

he/she expects to pay, and (4) the monthly payment amount. Id. at 15-16 ¶ 47. 

 But the undisputed record shows that, at the time of their initial pitch, 

Guice’s salespersons only had some of the requisite information from each 

consumer at the time the misrepresentations were made.11 Guice presented no 

evidence to the contrary, and when confronted about these issues, he invoked the 

Fifth Amendment. SA.163-43 at 24-25 [Tr. 94:12-16, 94:25-96:2]. 

c. Failure to Disclose Additional Costs or Adverse 

 Effects of Hardship Programs 

Guice’s primary method of attempting to lower interest rates involved 

getting customers new credit cards with low teaser rates and then directing the 

customer to transfer their existing credit card balance to the new cards. See

GA.163-49 at 12 [Tr. 179:18–180:2]; SA.168-7 at 1-2.12 But balance transfers 

 

11 See SA.12(CD)-[PX 2 at 1 ¶¶ 9–12]; id.-[PX 4 at 1 ¶¶ 14–17]; id.-[PX 5 at 1 

¶¶ 6, 9]; id.-[PX 7 at 1 ¶¶ 8–10, 13]; id.-[PX 8 at 1 ¶¶ 7–8]; id.-[PX 10 at 1 ¶¶ 10–

11]; id.-[PX 12 at 1-2 ¶¶ 12, 15]; id.-[PX 13 at 1 ¶¶ 7–9]; id.-[PX 16 at 1 ¶¶ 9–11]; 

id.-[PX 18 at 1-2 ¶¶ 10–11, 25]; id.-[PX 19 at 1-2 ¶¶ 11, 16–17]; id.-[PX 20 at 1 

¶¶ 6–9]; id.-[PX 22 at 1 ¶¶ 7–8]; id.-[PX 23 at 1 ¶¶ 9–13]; id.-[PX 24 at 1-2 ¶¶ 8–

10, 26]; id.-[PX 25 at 1 ¶¶ 8–13]; id.-[PX 26 at 1 ¶¶ 6–7 10, 12]; id.-[PX 28 at 1 

¶¶ 5–7]; id.-[PX 33 at 1-2 ¶¶ 12–16]; id.-[PX 34 at 1-2 ¶¶ 13–18]; id.-[PX 35 at 1-2 

¶¶ 10-11, 13-16]; id.-[PX 37 at 1 ¶¶ 9–10, 12–15]; id.-[PX 38 at 1 ¶¶ 7-8, 13]; id.-

[PX 111 at 1 ¶¶ 10–12]; id.-[PX 112 at 1 ¶¶ 5-7]. 

12 Guice failed to include in his Appendix exhibits supporting his opposition to 

summary judgment upon which he has relied in this appeal. By doing so, he 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 20 of 62 
incurred significant transfer fees. Consumers complained they were charged fees 

equaling 3-5% of their credit-card balance, see SA.12(CD)-PX 12 at 2 ¶ 27; id.-

[PX 17 at 3 ¶ 22]; id.-[PX 21 at 3 ¶ 41]; id.-[PX 24 at 3 ¶ 33]; id.-[PX 25 at 3 ¶ 32]; 

id.-[PX 33 at 2 ¶ 21]; id.-[PX 38 at 2 ¶ 21]; id.-[PX 111 at 2 ¶ 24]; id.-[PX 155 at 3 

¶ 21]. Ms. Wilhelm confirmed that, during the relevant period, card issuers 

charged approximately 3% of the balance transferred as fees. Id.-[PX 42 at 11, 13 

¶¶ 29, 36]. Guice’s salespeople did not inform consumers about such fees.13 

Instead, they told some consumers they would incur only a “one time” service fee 

(i.e., an advance fee paid before any services had been provided). SA.12(CD)-[PX 

5 at 2 ¶ 20]; id.-[PX 8 at 5]; id.-[PX 12 at 6]; id.-[PX 13 at 5]; id.-[PX 19 at 5 

¶ 63]. Guice refused to say whether his companies disclosed these fees and instead 

invoked the Fifth Amendment again. SA.163-43 at 17, 25-26 [Tr. 62:19-63:22, Tr. 

96:14-97:19]. 

 

violated Fed. R. App. P. 30(a)(1)(D), which requires the appellant to include those 

“parts of the record” it “wish[es] to direct the court’s attention.” The Government 

has included in its Supplemental Appendix those defendant exhibits addressed by 

the parties on appeal. 

13 See id.-[PX 7 at 1 ¶ 12]; id.-[PX 8 at 2 ¶ 14]; id.-[PX 10 at 1 ¶ 15]; id.-[PX 13 at 

1 ¶13]; id.-[PX 16 at 1 ¶ 13]; id.-[PX 17 at 2 ¶ 15]; id.-[PX 21 at 2 ¶ 21]; id.-[PX 

23 at 2 ¶ 15]; id.-[PX 25 at 1 ¶ 15]; id.-[PX 33 at 2 ¶ 17]; id.-[PX 34 at 2 ¶ 24]; id.-

[PX 35 at 2 ¶ 18]; id.-[PX 37 at 2 ¶ 17]; id.-[PX 38 at 1 ¶ 12]; id.-[PX 111 at 1 

¶ 14]; id.-[PX 155 at 1-2 ¶ 11]; GA.163-49 at 12-13 [Tr. 180:23-182:4]. 

11 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 21 of 62 
 The other method Guice used to “permanently” lower credit card interest 

rates was to request the customer’s credit card companies place accounts in 

“hardship” status. If granted, the accounts would be closed and the customer 

provided a low interest rate for a limited time within which she was required to pay 

off the card balance. SA.163-52 at 6 [Tr. 23:5–19]; SA.168-7 at 1; SA.12(CD)-

[PX 42 at 35 ¶¶ 100-01]. Not only did this approach not result in a permanent 

lower interest-rate card, but it severely affected the consumer’s credit rating. 

SA.12(CD)-[PX 39 at 2-3 ¶¶ 10-18]; GA.175-4 at 1-2 ¶¶ 5-15. Consumers were 

not told about this approach in the initial sales pitch nor were they told about the 

adverse effects of hardship status in subsequent discussions with LMS 

representatives.14 Guice invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked about Loyal’s 

and LMS’s failure to disclose their use of hardship status in their rate-reduction 

programs and the related adverse effects to consumers. SA.163-43 at 26 [Tr. 

97:20-99:8]. 

 Between January 2013 and June 2016, Guice’s companies deceptively sold 

rate-reduction services to approximately 7,500 consumers who collectively paid 

more than $11.4 million. SA.163-18 at 2-3 ¶¶ 6-12. 

 

14 SA.12(CD)-[PX 2 at 3 ¶¶ 33-35]; id.-[PX 3 at 2 ¶¶ 18-20]; id.-[PX 6 at 1 ¶ 8]; 

id.-[PX 14 at 1 ¶ 5]; id.-[PX 16 at 3 ¶¶ 29-31]; id.-[PX 18 at 3 ¶ 37]; id.-[PX 20 at 

2 ¶¶ 23-25]; id.-[PX 25 at 3 ¶¶ 42-43]; id.-[PX 111 at 3 ¶¶ 33-36]. 

12 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 22 of 62 
3. Guice’s debt-elimination program 

 Guice hawked an especially deleterious scheme to customers, often senior 

citizens, who had already purchased his interest rate-reduction plan and remained 

sufficiently in debt, but had enough available credit to pay another advance fee. 

SA.163-50 at 6-7, 10 [Tr. 84:10-85:5, 140:12-15]. Guice and his sister Heather 

Cline (a manager at Loyal and LMS) told their primary debt-elimination 

salesperson, Lea Brownell, how to pitch the program. SA.163-50 at 9-10, 16, 18 

[Tr. 163:24-164:9, 136:17-137:6, 212:16-23]; see SA.12(CD)-[PX 7 at 2 ¶ 25]; id.-

[PX 16 at 3 ¶ 25]; id.-[PX 112 at 1 ¶ 5]; id.-[PX 30 at 1 ¶ 10]; SA.163-52 at 6, 7 

[Tr. 23:23-24, 24:24-25:6]. 

 Brownell and other salespersons told consumers that this program tapped 

into a “government fund” subsidized by the credit card companies’ settlement of a 

lawsuit or fines paid by them for charging illegally excessive interest rates to 

consumers, to pay off their credit card balances.15 Ms. Brownell directly told 

consumers that “throughout the last 10 to 15 years, credit card companies had been 

fined money” and that her company had a “staff of coordinators who utilize the 

 

15 SA.12(CD)-[PX 2 at 3 ¶ 31]; id.-[PX 3 at 2 ¶ 16]; id.-[PX 4 at 2 ¶ 29]; id.-[PX 6 

at 1 ¶ 6]; id.-[PX 7 at 2 ¶ 26]; id.-[PX 9 at1 ¶ 8]; id.-[PX 10 at 3 ¶ 37]; id.-[PX 16 

at 2 ¶ 24]; id.-[PX 20 at 2 ¶ 16]; id.-[PX 25 at 3 ¶ 38]; id.-[PX 28 at 1 ¶ 5]; id.-[PX 

30 at 2 ¶ 16]; id.-[PX 31 at 1 ¶ 8]; id.-[PX 36 at 2 ¶ 18]; id.-[PX 38 at 2 ¶ 24]; id.-

[PX 110 at2 ¶ 12]; id.-[PX 111 at 2 ¶ 27]; id.-[PX 112 at 1 ¶ 5]. 

13 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 23 of 62 
laws and regulations to be able to have a portion of [the consumer’s] debt legally 

discharged.” SA.163-50 at 18 [Tr. 209:17–210:8, 210:24–211:16]. Clark 

Hampton, an LMS employee who worked with purchasers of the company’s debtelimination services, confirmed that he was told by some of them that they 

believed a government fund would be used to settle their credit card debts. 

SA.163-51 at 28, 30 [Tr. 141:2-142:2, 149:23-150:3]. 

 But no fund, government or otherwise, was available to pay off the 

consumers’ credit-card debts. SA.12(CD)-[PX 2 at 3 ¶¶ 33-35]; id.-[PX 39 at 5 

¶¶ 34-35]; SA.163-51 at 28, 30 [Tr. 141:15-22, 149:23-150:3]. Instead, the debtelimination program “worked” by directing the consumer to stop paying their bill, 

which would place them in past-due status. SA.163-50 at 11-12 [Tr. 144:21-145:9, 

147:6-9]; SA.163-51 at 11 [Tr. 58:21-59:7]. The company would then send 

consumers a “new client packet” that included a form to give Guice’s company 

power of attorney and the authority to negotiate with the consumers’ credit card 

issuer. SA.163-51 at 11, 22 [Tr. 58:6-9, 101:15-102:7]; SA.163-53 at 7 [Tr. 29:5-

18]. Debt-elimination negotiators would then attempt to settle the consumer’s debt 

with the issuer, but the debt was not completely eliminated, and the consumer 

remained on the hook for at least a negotiated amount. SA.163-51 at 6, 11, 33 [Tr. 

20:2–12, 58:25–59:19, 177:11-18]. And where the card issuer wrote off a 

significant portion of the debt, the consumer owed taxes on the amount forgiven. 

14 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 24 of 62
SA.12(CD)-[PX 42 at 38-40 ¶ 107]; id.-[PX 31 at 3 ¶ 23 & Ex. 9 at 25]; SA.175-5 

at 2 ¶ 19; SA.175-3 at 1 ¶ 14. Unsuccessful negotiations left the consumer subject 

to collections or suit, impaired credit, and even more debt due to fees and interest 

charges. 

 Ms. Brownell, the program’s main salesperson, acknowledged that the debtelimination program was not funded with payments by credit card companies. 

S.A.163-50 at 18 [Tr. 210:24-211:16, 212:6-15]. She also knew that consumers’ 

failure to pay their debt would lead to default, but failed to warn them that doing so 

would likely result in the adverse consequences described above. Id. at 12 [Tr. 

147:6-25]. Without being warned of such consequences, consumers in the debtelimination program incurred these problems when they stopped paying their credit 

card bills.16 Debt-elimination sales were highly lucrative and salespersons faced 

no discipline when they gave their deceptive debt-elimination pitch. SA.163-52 at 

18, 24-25 [Tr. 120:4-9, 207:2-13, 209:25-210:2]. Guice’s companies garnered 

more than $11.6 million from approximately 2,500 consumer victims of this fraud. 

SA.163-18 at 3 ¶¶ 14-16; SA.163-50 at 5 [Tr. 59:6–7]; SA.163-43 at 39 [Tr. 

 

16 SA.12(CD)-[PX 2 at 3 ¶¶ 33-35]; id.-[PX 3 at 2 ¶¶ 18-20]; id.-[PX 6 at 1 ¶ 8]; 

id.-[PX 16 at 3 ¶¶ 29-31]; id.-[PX 18 at 3 ¶ 37]; id.-[PX 20 at 2-3 ¶¶ 23-27]; id.-

[PX 25 at 3 ¶¶ 42–43]; id.-[PX 28 at 2, 4 ¶ 11, 22]; id.-[PX 110 at 2 ¶¶ 16-18]; id.-

[PX 111 at 3 ¶¶ 33-36]; id.-[PX 112 at 3 ¶¶ 25-27, 4 ¶ 38]; SA.175-4 at 1-2 ¶¶ 14-

15; SA.175-5 at 1-2 ¶¶ 14-16; see also SA.163-50 at 12 [Tr. 147:6–25]. 

15 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 25 of 62 
16 

149:15-22]; SA.163-52 at 25 [Tr. 212:14–25]. Confronted with all this evidence, 

Guice once again pleaded the Fifth. SA.163-43 at 17 [Tr. 61:24-62:18], at 25 [Tr. 

96:3-13] (when asked about the government fund); at 17-18, 26 [Tr. 63:23-65:16, 

97:20-99:8] (when asked about his companies’ failure to disclose the use of 

hardship status and related adverse effects to consumers), and at 20-21, 35-39 [Tr. 

75:2-77:22, 135:11-139:2, 140:12-25, 141:5-25, 144:2-12, 144:24-145:9, 147:4-14, 

148:17-149:14] (when asked about statements and omissions made to consumerdeclarants who were pitched debt-elimination services). 

4. Illegal up-front fees 

 The TSR bars sellers and telemarketers of debt-relief services from 

requesting or receiving any fees until they have actually changed the terms of the 

customer’s debt and the customer has made at least one payment based on the 

modified terms. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5)(i). In other words, the Rule outlaws the 

collection of up-front fees. Salespersons for both of Guice’s debt-relief programs 

unlawfully requested, and often collected, such up-front fees. 

 For the rate-reduction program, the companies charged consumers between 

$500 and $5,000 at the outset before the consumer had made her first payment on a 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 26 of 62
credit card with a new lower interest rate (if she got one at all).17 For the debtelimination program, Ms. Brownell asked consumers to pay the companies’ 

advance fees ranging between $2,000 and $26,000 when she made her initial pitch 

without waiting for the company to even begin negotiations with the consumer’s 

credit-card companies.18 Guice refused to explain whether up-front fees were 

 

17 GA.163-49 at 15 [Tr. at 280:22-24]; SA.163-52 at 26 [Tr. 213:1-4]; SA.12(CD)-

PX 2 at 2 ¶¶ 15, 20–25; id.-[PX 3 at 1 ¶¶ 5–10]; id.-[PX 4 at 1-2 ¶¶ 16, 19, 23, 25–

26]; id.-[PX 5 at 1-2 ¶¶ 10, 12–16]; id.-[PX 7 at 1-2 ¶¶ 10–11, 14–20]; id.-[PX 8 at 

1-3 ¶¶ 9, 16–19, 25]; id.-[PX 10 at 1-3 ¶¶ 14, 17–19, 22–27, 29–30]; id.-[PX 12 at 

2-3 ¶¶ 17, 24–31, 35]; id.-[PX 13 at 1-3 ¶¶ 8, 10–12, 15–16, 20, 24–26]; id.-[PX 15 

at 2 ¶¶ 14, 18–21]; id.-[PX 16 at 1-2 ¶¶ 12, 14–20]; id.-[PX 17 at 2-3 ¶¶ 15–16, 

20–21, 25–27]; id.-[PX 18 at 2-3 ¶¶ 16–18, 26–28, 31–34]; id.-[PX 19 at 2, 4-7 

¶¶ 22, 47–50, 55–56, 63–64, 78–79]; id.-[PX 20 at 1-2 ¶¶ 9–14]; id.-[PX 21 at 3 

¶¶ 30–32, 35–39]; id.-[PX 22 at 1-2 ¶¶ 9–16, 22]; id.-[PX 23 at 1-3 ¶¶ 10–12, 26–

33, 35–37]; id.-[PX 24 at 2-3 ¶¶ 15, 17–28]; id.-[PX 25 at 1, 2-3 ¶¶ 12, 22–31]; id.-

[PX 26 at 1, 2 ¶¶ 13, 17–21]; id.-[PX 33 at 2-3 ¶¶ 20, 24–28]; id.-[PX 34 at 3, 4 

¶¶ 28–31, 43]; id.-[PX 35 at 2, 3 ¶¶ 25, 30–35]; id.-[PX 36 at 1-2 ¶¶ 9–16]; id.-[PX 

37 at 1-3 ¶¶ 15–16, 22, 24–32]; id.-[PX 38 at 1, 2 ¶¶ 11, 17–19, 22]; id.-[PX 111 at 

1, 2 ¶¶ 11, 16–21]; id.-[PX 155 at 3 ¶¶ 21-22]. 

18 SA.163-18 at 3 ¶ 15; SA.163-50 at 5 [Tr. 59:6–7], at 14 [Tr. 153:24–154:7]; 

SA.163-51 at 11 [Tr. 57:9-59:19]; SA.163-52 at 21 [Tr. 141:3-142:7], at 25 [Tr. 

212:14–25]; SA.163-43 at 39 [Tr. 149:15-22]; see SA.12(CD)-[PX 2 at 3 ¶¶ 32, 

37–38]; id.-[PX 3 at 2 ¶¶ 21–23]; id.-[PX 6 at 1 ¶¶ 3, 9]; id.-[PX 7 at 3 ¶¶ 27–28, 

31–35]; id.-[PX 9 at 1 ¶¶ 4–7]; id.-[PX 10 at 3,4 ¶¶ 38–40, 45–49]; id.-[PX 16 at 3 

¶¶ 26–28, 32-37]; id.-[PX 18 at 3-4 ¶¶ 38, 45–52]; id.-[PX 20 at 2-3 ¶¶ 18–22, 29–

30]; id.-[PX 25 at 3-4 ¶¶ 39–41, 46–53]; id.-[PX 26 at 3 ¶¶ 29, 38–42]; id.-[PX 27 

at 1-2 ¶¶ 10, 13, 20–22]; id.-[PX 28 at 2, 5 ¶¶ 15–16, 28]; id.-[PX 30 at 3 ¶¶ 31, 

33–35]; id.-[PX 31 at 1, 2 ¶¶ 8, 14-15]; id.-[PX 36 at 2, 3 ¶¶ 19, 21–22]; id.-[PX 38 

at 2-3 ¶¶ 26–28, 32]; id.-[PX 110 at 2 ¶¶ 20, 22]; id.-[PX 111 at 3, 4 ¶¶ 29–32, 37–

39, 44]; id.-[PX 112 at 2-3 ¶¶ 17, 18, 28]. 

17 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 27 of 62 
18 

charged for his debt-relief programs by pleading the Fifth. SA.163-43 at 18, 26 

[Tr. 65:17-66:6, 99:9-23]. 

B. Guice’s Common Corporate Enterprise 

In November 2011, Guice created Loyal and undisputed evidence reflects 

his ownership. SA.12(CD)-[PX 43 at 65–66, 83]; id.-[PX 48 at 108]; SA.163-44 at 

35 [Tr. 133:23–134:4]; SA.109 at 14; see also SA.163-42 at 3 [Tr. 9:24–10:2)]; 

SA.163-43 at 15-16 [Tr. 55:16-19, 56:10-57:5]. He filed with DOACS the 

application to obtain Loyal’s telemarketing license (which listed him as its 

“Registered Agent” and “Manager”), SA.12(CD)-[PX 43 at 3 ¶¶ 16, 22-27]; id.-

[PX 47 at 22-23], opened its bank account, PX 121, and paid its employees 

(sometimes personally signing the checks). PX 157 at 1. He also submitted

deceptive sales scripts to DOACS on behalf of Loyal containing lies about its ratereduction program. SA.12(CD)-[PX 43 at 3-4 ¶¶, 5-6 ¶¶ 16-25, 35, Exs. 2, 19, 28, 

31] (“we do not charge until the work has been completed,” “no out of pocket 

expense,” “save [consumers] at least $2,500.00,” and “out of debt 3-5 times 

faster”). Guice first set up Loyal’s interest rate-reduction program, id.-[PX 43 at 3 

¶¶ 16-17, 5-6 ¶¶ 30-36], and in 2013, created its debt-elimination service. SA.163-

50 at 5 [Tr. 60:8-17]; SA.163-51 at 24 [Tr. 111:14-17]; SA.163-52 at 6, 7 [Tr. 

23:23–24, 25:3-6]. 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 28 of 62
19 

 Guice soon ran into trouble with both the authorities and consumers. In 

February 2013, DOACS arrested Guice for running an unlicensed telemarketing 

boiler room and employing unlicensed telemarketers, SA.12(CD)-[PX 43 at 5 

¶ 32]; it also imposed civil fines against Guice for being affiliated with unlicensed 

telemarketers and for failing to provide required scripts and other documents. Id.-

[PX 43 at 5 ¶¶ 29-33]; see also SA.163-43 at 13-14 [Tr. 48:15-49:24]. DOACS 

thereafter refused to allow Guice to renew Loyal’s telemarketing license. 

SA.12(CD)-[PX 43 at 5-6 ¶¶ 35, 36, Ex. 10 at 101]; SA.163-44 at 58 [Tr. 226:5-

14]; SA.163-43 at 14 [Tr. 50:8-17]. Later that year, Guice and Loyal were sued by 

a nursing home resident in Ohio for deceptive telemarketing practices (the case 

later settled). SA.163-3; SA.163-4; see also SA.163-43 at 21-22 [Tr. 79:20-83:20]. 

 In February 2014, Guice directed Wayne Norris to set up LMS. Guice 

explained to Norris that he wanted to form a new telemarketing company due to 

Loyal’s then “open court case” in Ohio, but that Norris needed to form the 

company because Guice had to take care of the court proceedings before he could 

renew the license himself. SA.163-44 at 58 [Tr. 225:19-226:4; 226:24-227:6]. 

Norris assigned a friend, Adrien Brezinski, as LMS’s Registered Agent until Guice 

got the Ohio case “cleared up.” GA.225 at 6-7; SA.163-44 at 10, 43, 57-58 [Tr. 

36:19-21, 168:9-12; 224:1-5, 227:5-10]; SA.12(CD)-[PX 47 at 2 ¶ 10]. Norris 

testified, however, that he knew Guice was the real owner of both Loyal and LMS. 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 29 of 62
20 

SA.163-44 at 35 [Tr. 133:23–134:4]. In the face of that information, Guice refused 

at his depositions to answer questions about LMS, instead invoking the Fifth 

Amendment. SA.163-42 at 3 [Tr. 9:15–18]; SA.163-43 at 22, 23 [Tr. 84:2-9, 

86:18-87:9]. 

 LMS offered the same rate-reduction and debt-elimination programs, and 

used the same scripts and documents, as Loyal. SA.12(CD)-[PX 43 at 137–142, 

146–153]; compare id. at 30–36] (Loyal) with id. at 146–153 (LMS). Virtually the 

same scripts Guice submitted on behalf of Loyal were filed with DOACS for LMS 

and KWP Services. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 19-20, 7 ¶ 45 and Ex. 19 at 146-153 (LMS); id. at 

12 ¶¶ 60-61 and Ex. 31 at 362-69 (KWP Services). Guice refused to answer 

whether he developed any scripts by invoking the Fifth Amendment. Doc. 163-42 

PX 188 at 30 [Tr. 117:21-25]. The companies also shared employees: 42 Loyal 

telemarketers began working for LMS shortly after it began operating in May 

2014. SA.12(CD)-[PX 43 at 8-11 ¶¶ 55-56]. Yet the employees saw no change in 

business operations, SA.163-50 at 4 [Tr. 56:1–18], and learned they were working 

for LMS only when they received paychecks or renewed telemarketing licenses 

reflecting LMS as their employer. Id. at 4-5 [Tr. 56:13–57:1]; SA.163-49 at 7 [Tr. 

81:4–8, 82:15–83:23]. 

 Guice played the same central role at LMS as he had at Loyal. LMS 

managers and employees testified that he oversaw LMS’s revenue flow, SA.163-

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 30 of 62
44 at 68 [Tr. 265:2–266:17]; SA.163-47 at 5 [Tr. 14:12–14, 14:25–17:2]; SA.163-

52 at 15 [Tr. 102:14–20], and established hiring criteria for some employees. 

SA.163-45 at 4-5 [Tr. 12:15–13:4]. He supervised and consulted with managers 

including Kara Andrews, Heather Cline (his sister), and Lea Brownell, the primary 

debt-elimination salesperson. They testified – and documents confirm – that Guice 

participated in LMS operational matters. These included monitoring and making 

payments on behalf of customers, and dealing with refund requests, billing errors, 

and debt-elimination fulfillment. He also addressed customer complaints 

forwarded by regulatory agencies throughout the country. See SA.163-15 

(employee forwarding to Guice letters from the three state law enforcement 

agencies concerning consumer complaints); SA.163-45 at 5 [Tr. 13:5-18]; SA.163-

50 at 5, 16 [Tr. 57:14–20, 59:15–16, 163:24–164:7]; SA.163-51 at 17 [Tr. 84:10–

15]; SA.163-52 at 4, 14-15, 23 [Tr. 10:15-11:16, 99:24–101:20, 161:3-6]; SA.163-

7; SA.163-8; SA.163-9; SA-163-10; SA.163-11. 

 Guice also orchestrated the formation of eleven shell companies to support 

Loyal’s and LMS’s business operations. He asked Norris and Clarence (“Harry”) 

Wahl to set up the shell companies to hold “merchant accounts” for Loyal or LMS 

that could bill customers and collect payments. SA.163-44 at 39, 40, 49, 59 [Tr. 

149:14–150:14, 154:13–19, 189:9–25, 229:10–18]. Wahl and Norris, in turn, 

21 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 31 of 62
either created or recruited others to create the shell companies.19 At all times, 

however, they acted at the behest of and under the control of Guice.20 Again, when 

confronted with the evidence showing his control of the enterprise, Guice refused 

to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment instead. See SA.163-43 at 15-16, 28 [Tr. 

55:16-19, 56:10-57:5, 107:18-108:10].

 Loyal and LMS employees were instructed to lie about their true employer 

and told consumers they worked for one of the shell companies.21 Thus, when 

 

19 Wahl formed defendant KWP Services of Florida, LLC (SA.12(CD)-[PX 47 at 3 

¶ 14, 56–57 ¶ 14]), and recruited his wife Karen Wahl and a friend to form KWP 

Services LLC (id. at 3 ¶ 13, 51–52) and IVD Recovery, LLC (id. at 3 ¶¶ 12-13, 47–

48; see SA.163-46 at 6, 11 [Tr. 6:21-24, 66:2-21]. Norris recruited others to form 

defendants LPSofFLA LLC (SA.12(CD)-[PX 47 at 3-4 ¶ 15, 64–65); LPSofFlorida 

L.L.C (id. at 4 ¶ 16, 60–61); YFP Solutions LLC (id. at 5 ¶ 22, 87-88); PW&F 

Consultants of Florida LLC (id. at 4 ¶ 17, 68–69); UAD Secure Service of FL LLC 

(id. at 4 ¶ 19, 75–76]; UAD Secure Services, LLC (id. at 4 ¶ 18, 71–72); URB 

Management, LLC (id. at 5 ¶ 20, 79–80) and YCC Solutions LLC (id. at 5 ¶ 21, 

83–84); SA.163-44 at 10, 45, 59 [Tr. 36:4-14, 174:8-175:5, 231:5-16]. 

20 See SA.163-43 at 18 [Tr. 67:13–68:2]; SA.163-46 at 67-68 [Tr. 67:17–68:3] 

(IVD Recovery); SA.163-43 at 27 [Tr. 101:12–21; SA.163-44 at 59 [Tr. 229:10–

18]; SA.163-46 at 6 [Tr. 6:21–24], SA.12(CD)-[PX 43 at 3 ¶ 19] (KWP Services); 

SA.163-44 at 60 [Tr.234:9–12] (KWP Services of Florida); id. at 59 [Tr. 232:9–14] 

(LPSofFla); id. at 59-60 [Tr. 232:25–233:3] (LPSofFlorida,); id. at 59 [Tr. 230:24–

231:1) (PW&F); id. at 57 [Tr. 221:1–5, 222:17–25] (UAD Secure Services); id. at 

57 [Tr. 217:-25] (UAD Secure Services of Florida); id. at 56 [Tr. 219:20–24] 

(URB Management); id. at 60 [Tr. 233:7-12] (YCC); id. at 60 [Tr. 234:1–8] (YFP). 

21 SA.163-51 at 8-9 [Tr. 46:14–49:23, 50:16–51:13]; SA.163-52 at 21-22 [Tr. 

144:4–145:7]; see also SA.12(CD)-[PX 4 at 2 ¶ 27]; id.-[PX 11 at 1 ¶11]; id.-[PX 

21 at 1, 3 ¶¶ 5, 32–36]; id.-[PX 28 at 4 ¶¶ 22–24]; id.-[PX 49 at 8 [Tr. 8:6–15]]; 

SA.163-51 at 9 [Tr. 49:16-20, 49:24–50:2]. 

22 

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consumers complained to consumer protection agencies, they named the shell 

companies and not Loyal or LMS. See SA.12(CD)-[PX 48 at 3-4 ¶ 20]; see also

id.-[PX 2–PX 10, PX 12–PX 28, PX 30–PX 31, PX 33–PX 38, PX 110–PX 112]. 

 In addition to line employees, the companies also shared managers; Heather 

Cline admitted she supervised all the corporate defendants from 2008 to 2016. 

SA.168-7 at 1. They shared physical addresses (SA.12(CD)-[PX 47 at 2-3 ¶¶ 11–

12, 4 ¶¶ 18–19], id.-[PX 48 at 6 ¶ 29]), IP addresses (id.-[PX 49 at 5-6 ¶¶ 24-27]), 

and telephone numbers (id. at 6 ¶ 28). And they shared documents and program 

information. Id. at 5 ¶¶ 21-23; see, e.g., SA.41-2 at 2 ¶¶ 13-14 (materials at LMS’s 

call center referencing other corporate defendants); SA.163-51 at 8-9 [Tr. 45:13-

52:10]; SA.163-40, SA.163-41 (LMS debt-elimination employee had “Debt 

Elimination Contact Info” for several shell companies). 

 The nominal owners of the shell companies opened up more than a dozen 

bank accounts under Guice’s control. See SA.12(CD)-[PX 115 –PX 154] (bank 

signature cards); SA.163-44 at 65-66, 68 [Tr. 256:6-257:8, 265:2-266:17]; SA.163-

47 at 5, 9 [Tr. 15:23-17:2, 30:6-21]. The shell companies opened up mail drops 

where consumers were told to send payments.22 

 

22 See SA.12(CD)-[PX 2 at 4 ¶ 50]; id.-[PX 3 at 3 ¶ 35]; id.-[PX 7 at 2 ¶ 16]; id.-

[PX 10 at 2 ¶ 27]; id.-[PX 21 at 3 ¶ 34]; id.-[PX 25 at 4 ¶ 58]; id.-PX 33 at 2 ¶ 25;

23 

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 Despite the separate accounts, undisputed evidence showed that payments 

sent to the shell companies often were routed to Loyal and LMS to cover payroll 

and office rent.23 Shell company revenue was also transferred to, and commingled 

with, other companies’ accounts. Id.-[PX 45 at 8-10 ¶¶ 25-39] (detailing $8.8 

million in corporate transfers); see also id.-[PX 98 at 3, 5, 7]; id.-[PX 99 at 1-2]; 

id.-[PX 103 at 1-3]; id.-[PX 113]. Ultimately, money wound up in Guice’s 

pockets. Between January 2013 and June 2016, he received $8,593,352.60 in 

traceable payments from his debt-relief companies. SA.163-33 at 2 ¶ 7. Again, 

confronted with the financial evidence, Guice invoked the Fifth Amendment. He 

refused to say whether he received any money from the companies, SA.163-43 at 

18, 19, 29-31 [Tr. 68:10-15, 72:2-20, 111:5-7, 112:11-13, 113:7-24, 114:13-21, 

116:3-16, 117:18-20, 118:2-22], whether the companies operated in an integrated 

fashion, or whether he created and controlled each one or collectively as a common 

enterprise, id. at 15, 32-35, 39-40 [Tr. 55:2-8, 121:22-122:9, 126:4-134:15, 

152:18–153:6, Tr. 153:7-22]. 

 

id.-[PX 34 at 3 ¶ 31]; id.-[PX 37 at 3 ¶ 30]; id.[PX 38 at 2 ¶ 16]; id.-[PX 48 at 6 

¶ 29]; id.-[PX 55 – PX 59]; id.-[PX 110 at 1 ¶ 7]; id.-[PX 111 at 2 ¶¶ 18-19]. 

 

23 See SA.163-44 at 60, 64, 65 [Tr. 235:17–236:4, 249:17–251:10, 254:11–21]; 

SA.163-47 at 3, 4-6, 9 [Tr. 6:10–15, 9:6–16, 13:6-15:8, 14:2–15:11, 17:6–19:21, 

30:6–21]; SA.12(CD)-[PX 46 at 12 ¶ 91]; id.-[PX 94 at 1–2]; id.-[PX 96 at 1]; id.-

[PX 101 at 1]; id.-[PX 102]. 

24 

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C. The Government’s Enforcement Lawsuit 

1. The Complaint and TRO 

 The FTC and the Office of the Attorney General, State of Florida, 

Department of Legal Affairs (collectively, the “Government”) filed suit in June 

2016 alleging that Guice and four other individual defendants and the thirteen 

corporations engaged in deceptive debt-relief services in violation of Section 5(a) 

of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), Section 501.204 of the Florida Deceptive and 

Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), and the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 

C.F.R. pt. 310.24 GA.1. 

 The complaint charged that Loyal, LMS, and the shell companies, operating 

as a common enterprise, made false promises to consumers about their debt-relief 

services, called consumers on the DNC Registry and charged them illegal upfront 

fees. Id. It asked that Guice be held personally liable for the unlawful corporate 

practices because he controlled, participated in, and knew about them. Id. The 

Government sought a permanent injunction and monetary relief, id., as well as an 

immediate halt to the scheme and other preliminary relief. GA.11, 14. The next 

 

24 The TSR implements the Telemarketing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6101, et seq., which 

prohibits deceptive and abusive telemarketing acts or practices. Pursuant to § 3(c) 

of the Telemarketing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6102(c), misrepresentations and omissions 

that violate the TSR constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of 

Section 5(a) of the FTC Act and the FDUTPA. See FTC v. Lalonde, 545 F. App’x 

825, 840 (11th Cir. 2013); § 501.203(3), Fla. Stat. (2020). 

25 

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day, the court issued a temporary restraining order and asset freeze, and appointed 

a receiver to take over operations of the defendant corporations. SA.36. On June 

30 and July 6, 2016, the court issued preliminary injunctions against all defendants. 

SA.75-81, 83, GA.89. LMS and two shell companies defaulted in April 2017, 

GA.153-156, and in April 2019, the court issued stipulated permanent injunctions 

and monetary judgments against all defendants except Guice. GA.274, 275. 

2. The Summary Judgment Order and Relief 

The Government moved for summary judgment against Guice, GA.163, 

which the district court granted in December 2018, ordering a permanent 

injunction and monetary relief for victims. GA.225, 226. It relied on substantial 

direct evidence of defendants’ law violations along with adverse inferences drawn 

against Guice for invoking the Fifth Amendment. GA.225 at 12 n.11. 

The court first concluded that undisputed evidence showed that Loyal, LMS 

and the shell companies constituted a common enterprise created by Guice. Id. at 

5-10. Guice incorporated Loyal and directed Wayne Norris to form LMS when 

Guice and Loyal were entangled in litigation. Id. at 6. The undisputed evidence 

showed that Loyal and LMS offered the same debt relief programs, used the same 

scripts, and hired substantially the same employees. Id. at 6-7. Guice also 

instructed Wayne Norris and Harry Wahl to find others to form shell companies, 

which acted “as fronts for Loyal and LMS.” Id. at 7-8. Loyal and LMS employees 

26 

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27 

represented they worked for a shell company when speaking to consumers, and 

customers sent their payments to the shells, which were used to pay Loyal or LMS 

expenses, sent to other companies, or paid to Guice. Id. at 8-10. 

Unrebutted evidence reflected Guice’s control over the corporate entities. 

He owned Loyal and controlled its operations by setting up its bank accounts and 

telemarketing practices. Id. at 11-13. He controlled LMS, as demonstrated by its 

use of the same scripts and procedures he implemented at Loyal, his often daily 

consultation with the manager of Loyal and LMS’s debt-elimination program 

about how to deal with all aspects of the program, and his decision making about 

LMS’s revenue stream, hiring criteria, paying customer debts, and dealing with 

refunds and regulatory complaints. Id. at 13, 29. Guice also controlled the shell 

companies as he was behind their creation and operation, and the allocation of their 

revenue flow, directing funds to other companies and paying himself over $8.5 

million. Id. at 15. 

The court then analyzed whether Guice’s companies broke the law and his 

liability for such misconduct. Id. at 15-33. Undisputed facts reflected Loyal’s and 

LMS’s violation of the DNC Registry rules by causing robocalls to be placed to 

people on the Registry and failing to pay Registry fees. Id. at 16-17. Guice was 

liable because he set up the automated calling procedures at Loyal, which carried 

over to LMS, and knew of complaints about the calls. Id. at 17-18. 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 37 of 62
28 

The court next held that undisputed facts showed that Loyal and LMS made 

several misrepresentations when pitching their debt-relief services in violation of 

the FTC Act, the FDUTPA, and the TSR, and that Guice was responsible for these 

practices. Id. at 18-31. First, the companies misrepresented their affiliations with 

financial institutions, which Guice knew about through consumer complaints and 

an investigative demand from a state regulator. Id. at 18-21. The companies failed 

to disclose the total cost of the rate-reduction program by omitting the balance 

transfer fees consumers would incur when switching credit cards; Guice knew of 

this deception because he submitted the calling scripts which failed to disclose 

these additional fees, spoke to company managers aware that consumers were not 

informed about the fees, and based on adverse inferences arising from his pleading 

the Fifth about fee disclosure. Id. at 21-23. The companies also indisputably 

falsely promised rate-reduction customers receipt of a permanent zero or near zero 

percent interest rate card, substantial savings, and a faster time to pay off their 

debts. Id. at 24-26. But Guice presented no evidence that any consumer received 

such a card. Id. at 26 n. 17, 27 n. 18. Further, the companies could not have made 

such promises in their initial pitch because they lacked information necessary to 

determine the consumer’s eligibility for a promotional lower interest rate card or 

hardship status. Id. at 27. Guice knew about these false promises through his 

involvement in day-to-day operations of the common enterprise, close supervision 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 38 of 62
29 

of the companies, discussions with managers aware of these misstatements, along 

with adverse inferences from pleading the Fifth. Id. at 28. 

Unrebutted evidence also showed Guice’s companies’ misrepresentations 

about their debt-elimination program. They failed to tell consumers the likely 

adverse effects of failing to pay their credit card bills, including impacting their 

creditworthiness, increasing their debt when counting accrued fees and interest, 

and subjecting them to suit or collections. Id. They also falsely claimed that their 

program would erase customers’ debt using a government fund where no such fund 

existed. Id. at 30. Guice’s liability arose because he set up the program, hired and 

regularly conferred with its negotiators giving the pitch, and told his managers how 

to deal with customer complaints, in conjunction with adverse inferences by 

invoking the Fifth. Id. at 31. 

Finally, the court determined that undisputed facts showed that Loyal and 

LMS violated the TSR additionally by unlawfully requesting (and often receiving) 

advance payments from customers before they made a payment on a lower rate 

card. Id. at 31-32. Guice was liable for these infractions because he controlled 

company practices requesting the upfront payments and knew consumers 

complained about them. Id. at 32-33. 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 39 of 62
 The court issued a permanent injunction against Guice, id. at 33-35, 40-41, 

and ordered him to pay $23,099,878.02 in monetary relief. Id. at 36; GA.226 at 

2.25 On February 1, 2021, this Court denied a stay of the judgment pending appeal. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Court reviews de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment 

applying the same standard applied by the district court. Summary judgment is 

appropriate if the record shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). All reasonable inferences from the evidence should be drawn in favor of the 

non-moving party. United States ex rel. v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., 987 F.3d 1340, 

1346 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). In challenging summary judgment, the 

non-moving party cannot rest on “mere allegations,” but “must come forward with 

specific factual evidence” to oppose the motion. Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 

F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). This Court may affirm on any ground supported 

by the record. Lucas v. W.W. Granger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001). 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

1. Undisputed facts show that Guice carried out a deceptive debt-relief 

scheme through corporate defendants acting as a common enterprise that he 

 

25 Guice does not challenge the court’s remedy on appeal. 

30 

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31 

controlled. The massive volume of direct evidence is supplemented by adverse 

inferences permissibly drawn from Guice’s repeated invocation of the Fifth 

Amendment. In response, Guice cites no record evidence showing disputes of fact, 

offering only unelaborated arguments and passing references to pleadings below. 

F.R.A.P. 28 requires more. Guice has waived his arguments, and the Court may 

affirm on that ground alone. 

 2. In response to overwhelming and undisputed evidence that Guice 

controlled a common enterprise comprising Loyal, LMS, and the shell companies, 

Guice offers a perfunctory, single-sentence response: that his summary judgment 

response and record evidence showed “sufficient facts to survive summary 

judgment.” That’s it. Even if the argument isn’t simply waived, it fails on the 

merits in the face of the record. Guice conceded that he owned and controlled 

Loyal. Unrebutted facts showed that he controlled LMS, Loyal’s successor, which 

marketed the same debt-relief programs as Loyal and borrowed its practices, 

telemarketing scripts, managers, and employees. The record also showed without 

dispute that Guice oversaw and participated in LMS’s daily operations, directing 

its income flow, developing its hiring criteria, and addressing refund requests and 

consumer complaints (among other things). In response, Guice invoked the Fifth 

Amendment. It was immaterial below, as it is now, that some employees did not 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 41 of 62
think he owned LMS; those employees did not know who owned the company, and 

none disputed that Guice controlled it. 

 3. Guice’s claim that he bears no liability for violating the Telemarketing 

Sales Rule because he personally did not make the illegal calls is frivolous. The 

TSR forbids a seller from “caus[ing] a telemarketer” to make calls, which the 

unrebutted facts proved is exactly what Guice did. 

4.    Unrebutted evidence showed that Guice controlled the corporations that 

directly deceived consumers, which makes him personally liable for the deceit, 

even if he did not lie to consumers directly. That liability also remains 

undiminished even if the company had a policy prohibiting his employees from 

misleading consumers. Any such policy existed only on paper. Indeed, sales 

scripts submitted by Guice to Florida regulators instructed the telemarketers to lie 

to consumers about the interest-rate reduction program. Beyond that, the 

companies’ primary debt-elimination salesperson knew she misled consumers, yet 

faced no sanction. 

 5.   Guice cannot escape liability on the ground that his programs provided 

“helpful services” to consumers. The claim is unsupported by even a single 

consumer declaration. Employee declarations do not create a genuine dispute of 

fact over whether he provided the promised services. The declarants lacked 

personal knowledge of consumers’ satisfaction or their interest rates after the 

32 

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promotional period ended; the declarants also said nothing about undisclosed 

balance transfer fees or adverse credit effects. Consumer files likewise do not 

clearly reflect the provision of new cards with permanently low interest rates; 

every consumer who could be located swore they did not receive the promised 

benefits and were unsatisfied with Guice’s service. Guice’s trivial evidence is 

insufficient to create a dispute of fact in the face of dozens of consumer 

declarations documenting false promises of permanent interest rate reductions or 

elimination of debt through a “government fund.” Their experiences were 

buttressed by unrebutted expert testimony about industry practices. The record 

shows conclusively that even consumers who may have received a short-term 

benefit were deceived by Guice’s opening pitch and often left worse off in the end. 

ARGUMENT 

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AGAINST GUICE 

 The district court held that undisputed facts established the corporate 

violations and Guice’s liability for that misconduct. GA.225. Guice’s brief on 

appeal fails to identify specific record facts that render summary judgment 

inappropriate. Indeed, his brief barely makes an argument in two scanty pages, 

offering conclusory citations to pleadings filed below. In effect, Guice asks the 

33 

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34 

Court to discern his argument and the Government to rebut arguments he could 

have made but did not. 

 The Court therefore may affirm the ruling below on the basis that Guice has 

waived his claims. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) requires that argument in a brief 

“must contain ... [the] appellant's contentions and the reasons for them, with 

citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies[.”] 

The failure to cite record support for a claim “may result in waiver or 

abandonment” of that claim on appeal, Nat’l All. for Mentally Ill, St. Johns Inc. v. 

Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of St. Johns Cty., 376 F.3d 1292, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(citations omitted);26 the same is true when an appellant “makes only passing 

references to [a claim] or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting 

arguments and authority,” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 

681 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United Steel Workers, 985 F.3d 

 

26 Similarly, Guice’s Statement of the Case fails to include any “facts relevant to 

the issues submitted for review . . . with appropriate references to the record,” 

required by Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6). Instead, he cites only to party pleadings and 

the district court’s summary judgment order. Br. 5-8. Such practices “make 

exceedingly difficult this Court's task of determining what material facts are in 

genuine dispute.” Green v. Hooks, 798 F. App'x 411, 419 n. 13 (11th Cir. 

2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 249 (2020); see also Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 

1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried 

in briefs.”) (citation omitted). 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 44 of 62 
1309, 1326 n.16 (11th Cir. 2021) (“conclusory” and “unsupported” arguments 

lacking “sufficient detail” or “significant discussion” deemed abandoned). 

 Should the Court reach the issues, voluminous undisputed evidence shows 

that Guice formed every corporate defendant (either directly or through a proxy) 

and that those companies operated as a common enterprise under his control to 

promote his deceptive debt-relief schemes. Underscoring the evidence, Guice’s 

pervasive reliance on the Fifth Amendment permitted the district court to draw 

adverse inferences against him. See GA.225 at 12 n.11 (citing Eagle Hosp. 

Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2009)); 

see also Coquina Invs. v. TD Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(refusal to answer accusation reflects the reliability of an adverse inference where 

“it would have been natural” to object) (citations omitted). When silence – “often 

evidence of the most persuasive character,” United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. 

Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923) – is coupled with direct supporting evidence, 

such inferences are particularly justified. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 

317-20 (1976).27 

 

27 District courts in this Circuit have applied this principle to find individual 

liability under the FTC Act. See, e.g., FTC v. Global Mktg. Group, 594 F. Supp. 

2d 1281, 1289 (M.D. Fla. 2008); FTC v. Transnet Wireless Co., 506 F. Supp. 2d 

1247, 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 

35 

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36 

Guice argues that the district court erroneously concluded that undisputed 

evidence supported summary judgment in four ways. Br. 10-11. He is wrong on 

all counts. 

A. The District Court Properly Held Guice Personally Liable 

 for His Companies’ Illegal Acts 

 Three of Guice’s four arguments dispute the district court’s ruling that Guice 

is personally liable for his companies’ illegal conduct. An individual may be held 

personally liable for injunctive relief based on unlawful corporate practices if he 

“participated directly in the [deceptive] practices or acts or had authority to control 

them.” FTC v. IAB Mktg. Assocs., LP, 746 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(citation omitted). Authority to control can be shown through “active involvement 

in business affairs and the making of corporate policy,” including assuming the 

duties of a corporate officer. Id. (citations omitted). 

 To obtain monetary relief against an individual defendant for corporate 

conduct, the Government also must show that a defendant had “some knowledge” 

of the deception. FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 470 (11th Cir.1996). 

“Knowledge” can be shown where the individual had “actual knowledge of the 

deceptive conduct, was recklessly indifferent to its deceptiveness, or had an 

awareness of a high probability of deceptiveness and intentionally avoided learning 

of the truth.” FTC v. Primary Grp., Inc., 713 F. App'x 805, 807 (11th Cir. 2017) 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 46 of 62
(citing FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 892 (4th Cir. 2014)). The degree of an 

individual’s participation in business affairs is probative as to knowledge. FTC v. 

Grant Connect, LLC, 763 F.3d 1094, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2014). The same standard 

applies to finding individual liability under the FDUTPA.28 

1. Undisputed Evidence Showed That Guice Controlled 

 the Common Enterprise 

 Guice conceded below that he owned and controlled Loyal, the company 

that first undertook the debt-relief scam, see GA.168 at 16; GA.225 at 11, but 

contested his control over LMS, which principally carried out the scam after 

February 2014. The district court determined that Loyal and LMS were essentially 

“the same company.” GA.225 at 6. The evidence showed that Guice orchestrated 

the formation of LMS as the successor to Loyal after he and Loyal became 

embroiled in a criminal investigation and private civil damages suit. Id. at 6-7; see 

pp. 19-20, supra. LMS offered the same two debt relief programs as Loyal and 

 

28 Liability under the FTC Act and FDUTPA is to be construed the same. See 

§ 501.204(2), Fla. Stat. (legislative intent reflects that, in construing FDUTPA’s 

prohibition against unfair and deceptive practices, “due consideration and great 

weight shall be given to the interpretations of the [FTC]” and judicial construction 

of Section 5); § 501.202(3), Fla. Stat. (state statutory provisions “shall be 

construed liberally . . . [t]o make state consumer protection and enforcement 

consistent with established policies of federal [consumer protection] law.”); KC 

Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972 So. 2d 1069, 1072–74 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (noting that 

“[i]nstead of defining specific elements for an action under the statute,” FDUTPA

directs courts to rely on interpretations of the FTC Act). 

37 

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38 

used the same policies, scripts, and procedures that Guice had implemented at 

Loyal. GA.225 at 13; see p. 20, supra. Indeed, Loyal’s employees saw no change 

in operations when LMS took over operations and only noticed the change of 

ownership when they received paychecks or telemarketing licenses identifying 

LMS as their new employer. GA.225 at 7; see p. 20, supra. 

 The court also found that undisputed “evidence establishes that Guice 

participated in the day-to-day oversight of LMS,” by controlling its income flow 

and developing its hiring criteria. GA.225 at 13; see pp. 20-21, supra. He 

consulted regularly with LMS managers and Lea Brownell, the main debtelimination program salesperson; he also engaged in LMS operational matters, 

such as monitoring and making payments on behalf of customers; dealing with 

refund requests and debt-elimination fulfillment; and addressing consumer 

complaints forwarded from several state law enforcement agencies. See GA.225 at 

13; see p. 21, supra. Guice could have offered direct testimony contradicting that 

evidence, but he instead invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to say whether 

he controlled LMS and the other companies. SA.163-43 at 40 [Tr. 153:18–22]; see 

GA.225 at 11-13. 

 The entire substance of Guice’s argument that the district court erred 

consists of a single sentence: “Mr. Guice’s response in opposition and exhibits, 

deposition testimony and plaintiffs’ exhibits provided sufficient facts to survive 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 48 of 62
39 

summary judgment.” Br. 10. Such a passing contention without any specific 

record cites does not preserve the argument. Nat’l All. Mentally Ill, 376 F.3d at 

1295-96; Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. But even if the issue is preserved, it does not 

demonstrate an error below. Rather, Guice’s burden, both below and on appeal, is 

to “show that specific facts exist that raise a genuine issue for trial.” Dietz v. 

SmithKline Beecham Corp., 598 F.3d 812, 815 (11th Cir. 2010). He has not nearly 

done so. 

 Below, Guice argued that his ownership of LMS was disputed because 

employees Randi Stickles and Lea Ann Brownell never saw Guice at LMS’s 

office, because Stickles “did not consider Kevin Guice to be her boss,” and 

because Brownell and employee Jessica Hernandez believed that Harry Wahl 

owned LMS. GA.168 at 13. That testimony did not create a dispute of material 

fact – one “that may affect the outcome of the suit[,]” Allen v Bd. of Pub. Educ. for 

Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) – because such “low-level” 

employees did not know who owned LMS. GA.225 at 14.29 Brownell and 

Hernandez admitted that their belief that Wahl was their boss was based only on 

second-hand sources; Brownell even admitted she spoke to Guice weekly about the 

 

29 The court recognized that Guice failed to enter the Stickles and Brownell 

testimony excerpts in the record, but that they were “inconsequential” even if 

considered. GA.225 at 13-14. 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 49 of 62 
40 

debt-elimination program. Id.; see SA.163-49 at 7 [Tr. 82:20–84:9] (Stickles); 

SA.163-50 at 16 [Tr. 163:2–164:3] (Brownell); SA.163-53 at 8 [Tr. 34:6–24] 

(Hernandez). The district court determined, moreover, that none of the employees 

contradicted substantial evidence showing that Guice controlled LMS, which is 

sufficient to hold him personally liable for its acts whether or not he owned the 

company. GA.225 at 14. 

2. Undisputed Evidence Showed That Guice is Liable for 

 His Companies’ Robocall and Do-Not-Call Registry 

 Violations 

 Guice next argues that the court could not find him liable for his companies’ 

Do-Not-Call Registry violations because the telephone calls were placed by a 

third-party automatic dialer or lead generator and not directly by him or his 

employees. Br. 10 (citing SA.163-48 at 6 [Tr. 14:5-23]; SA.163-49 at 6 [Tr. 54:5-

8; 55:12-18]).30 

 This is sophistry; there is no dispute of material fact. The evidence showed 

without contradiction that Guice’s companies utilized an automatic dialer to make 

the unlawful robocalls. See SA.163-48 at 5-6 [Tr. 13:11-20, 14:12-23] (supervisor 

Kunz describing companies’ use of off-site dialer); SA.163-49 at 6 [Tr. 53:17-

 

30 Guice did not contest below the Government’s DNC arguments and evidence 

including those showing his personal liability for such calls. See GA.175 at 1 n.1. 

He does not challenge on appeal the district court’s conclusion that his companies 

were liable for those calls. GA.225 at 16-17. 

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56:19] (salesperson Stickles describing their use of a lead generator dialer to send 

automated messages); SA.163-44 at 38-41 [Tr. 147:21-159:14] (Norris discussing 

particular dialers and their connection to, and appearance at, LMS): PX 43 at 5 ¶ 

29 (Loyal employee interviews revealed they were using a dialer at that time); 

GA.225 at 16-17. In the face of this evidence, Guice invoked the Fifth 

Amendment and chose to remain silent. SA.163-43 at 46 [Tr. 179:1-13], SA.163-

42 at 9 [Tr. 33:18-34:9], at 10 [Tr. 37:1-15], at 24 [Tr. 95:17-24, 96:1-21]. 

 As described above at 3-4, the TSR expressly prohibits “a seller” from 

“caus[ing] a telemarketer” to make telephone calls that (1) send “prerecorded 

marketing message[s],” or robocalls, to anyone. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(v)(A), or 

(2) call persons on the DNC Registry, id. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B). See also United 

States v. Dish Network L.L.C., 954 F.3d 970, 976–77 (7th Cir. 2020) (seller of 

services liable for DNC violations committed by its agent telemarketer where the 

seller knew of – but failed to stop – illegal calls, while benefitting from the calls) 

(citations omitted), cert. dismissed, 141 S. Ct. 729 (2021). The plain language of 

the Rule thus makes Guice liable for calls placed on his behalf by a third party. 

Guice identifies no disputed fact contradicting the district court’s determination 

that Guice set up the automatic calling procedures at Loyal, which carried over to 

LMS’s operations. GA.225 at 17-18. 

41 

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42 

3. Undisputed Evidence Showed that Guice is Liable for 

 His Companies’ Misrepresentations and Omissions 

 Guice next claims that that the district court erred in finding him liable for 

his companies’ conduct because 1) he did not directly participate in any misleading 

statements, and 2) company policy prohibited employees from lying to consumers. 

Br. 11 (citing GA.168 at 17-18 (citing SA.168-30 and SA.163-52 [Tr. 195:1-15]). 

Both contentions fail. 

 First, Guice may be held personally liable for illegal practices if he had 

authority to control them, even if he did not carry them out directly. IAB Mktg., 

746 F.3d at 1233; FTC v. World Media Brokers, 415 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Guice did not dispute that he controlled Loyal, and undisputed evidence showed he 

controlled LMS (which adopted the identical business practices Guice created at 

Loyal) and the shell companies. See pp. 18, 20-22, supra. 

 Second, even assuming that there was a corporate policy that prohibited 

misrepresentations, undisputed evidence showed that it had no effect. Indeed, 

Loyal’s scripts submitted by Guice to DOACS (which were adopted wholesale by 

LMS) instructed company salespeople to lie about their interest-rate reduction 

services. See, e.g., SA.12(CD)-[PX 43 at 3, 4 ¶ 21, Exs. 2, 19, 28, 31] (“we do not 

charge until the work has been completed”, “no out of pocket expense”, “save 

[consumers] at least $2,500.00”, and “out of debt 3-5 times faster”); see also id.-

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43 

[PX 42 at 6-7, 17 ¶¶ 6, 48]. While the company did not use scripts to sell its debtelimination services, unrebutted testimony reflects that Ms. Brownell, the 

companies’ primary salesperson, knew that her sales pitch was misleading, and that 

she was never disciplined by her management for making such misleading 

statements to consumers. SA 163-50 at 15, 18 [Tr. 158:20-159:16, 209:17-

212:23]; SA 163-52 at 18 [Tr. 120:2-9]. 

 The record thus reflects no effort by the company to bar misrepresentations 

by its telemarketers; to the contrary, record evidence showed company practices 

that seemingly encouraged such misleading statements. At the very least, Guice 

provided no evidence that any employees were fired or reprimanded for lying to 

consumers or that misrepresentations were limited to rogue employees; indeed, he 

provides no specific record support reflecting his purported robust corporate 

compliance efforts as it was his burden to do. Nat’l All. Mentally Ill, 376 F.3d at 

1295–96; see also World Media Brokers, 415 F.3d at 765 (corporate officer liable 

where he provided no specific facts showing “how he prevented [his] telemarketers 

from misleading consumers”) (emphasis in original). And even if Guice had tried 

to stop his employees from lying to consumers, he would still be liable for the 

misrepresentations. FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 930-31 (9th Cir. 2009); FTC 

v. Partners In Health Care Ass’n, 189 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1365–66 (S.D. Fla. 2016). 

USCA11 Case: 19-14248 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 53 of 62
 B. Undisputed Evidence Showed That Guice’s Companies Did 

 Not Provide the Promised Debt-Relief Services 

 Finally, Guice contends in a single-paragraph argument that the district court 

could not have found that he engaged in deception because the record showed that 

his “lower interest rate services and debt elimination services were legitimate and 

helpful services to consumers.” Br. 11. Specifically, he claims that consumer 

files, employee affidavits, and unspecified Government exhibits create a dispute of 

fact on the question of whether his promises to consumers were deceptive. Id. 

(citing GA.168 at 6-7, 9). In the face of the overwhelming record of deceit, that 

evidence creates no triable issue. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in 

support of [the nonmoving party’s] position [is] insufficient” to defeat summary 

judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). 

 Section 5(a) of the FTC Act and the FDUTPA both prohibit “unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a); Fla. Stat. 

§ 501.204(1) (2020), which bar material misrepresentations or omissions that are 

likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. FTC v. 

Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003). The TSR likewise prohibits 

misrepresentations concerning “[a]ny material aspect of any debt relief service,” 

including “the amount of money . . . that a customer may save by using such 

service; the amount of time necessary to achieve the represented results . . . the 

44 

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45 

effect of the service on a customer’s creditworthiness . . . [and] on collection 

efforts of the customer’s creditors or debt collectors[.]” 16 C.F.R. 

§ 310.3(a)(2)(x). 

 Over forty consumer declarations show that Guice’s employees falsely 

promised permanent and substantial reductions in credit card interest rates, 

significant savings and/or greatly reduced pay-off times, that were never in fact 

realized. GA.225 at 23-28; see pp. 7-8, supra. The declarations also show that 

consumers were not told that any actual reduction in rates would be temporary, or 

that they would likely incur significant balance transfer fees, or be based on the use 

of hardship programs that can lead to lower credit ratings. See pp. 10-12, supra. 

GA.175-4 at 1 ¶¶ 5-10. The consumer declarations were further supported by 

unrebutted expert testimony showing that standard industry practices made 

fulfillment of the promises made by Guice’s salesforce to consumers exceedingly 

unlikely. See pp. 8-10, supra. 

 The declarations and testimony likewise showed that the debt-elimination 

program, which rested on false claims that a “government fund” would pick up 

debts, failed to provide consumers the promised benefit (and often put them in 

worse financial condition). D.225 at 28-30; see pp. 13-16, supra. Guice provided 

no evidence showing that any consumers had their entire credit card debt paid off 

or rebutting the Government’s evidence that many consumers were left worse off. 

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It is also undisputed that Guice’s employees, including his main debt-elimination 

program closer, Ms. Brownell, failed to tell consumers about the likely adverse 

consequences of enrolling in the program. See p. 15, supra. 

 Guice does not dispute that his telemarketers made these false promises. He 

claims only that there is some evidence that consumers received “helpful services.” 

Br. 11. But Guice failed to provide a single declaration from a customer showing 

that his promises were fulfilled. Instead, he relies on a handful of consumer files 

found “at the receiver’s warehouse,” id. (citing GA.168 at 6-7 (citing D.168-9 to 

D.168-18)), and employee declarations claiming they “saved consumers money,” 

id. (citing GA.168 at 9 (citing D.168-2 to D.168-6)). Those materials are 

insufficient to defeat summary judgment. 

 The five employee declarations cited by Guice are identical, devoid of any 

references to the record, and make the conclusory claim that their fulfillment 

worked “to the satisfaction of the consumer.” See SA.168-2 through SA.168-6. 

But the employees lacked personal knowledge of whether consumers were 

satisfied with the promised service. A declaration may create a dispute of material 

fact, but only where it is “made on personal knowledge, set[s] out facts that would 

be admissible in evidence, and show[s] that the affiant or declarant is competent to 

testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). The declarations relied on 

by Guice do not meet those criteria, but are conclusory and speculative. See

46 

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47 

Walace v. Cousins, 783 F. App'x 910, 913 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted); 

Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2018) (citations 

omitted). They failed to mention any balance transfer fees for those customers 

whose rate-reduction was based on obtaining successive promotional rate cards or 

the adverse effects attendant to those placed in a hardship program; indeed, their 

“competen[ce] to testify” is highly questionable given their assertion that some 

consumers obtained “permanent hardship status,” which undeniably is contrary to 

industry practice. See SA.12(CD)-[PX 39 at 2-3 ¶¶ 10-18]. Guice’s employee 

declarations are insufficient to defeat summary judgment in the face of more than 

forty consumer declarations, expert testimony, and other overwhelming evidence 

that Guice’s operations were deceptive. 

 Guice gets no help from ten consumer files “picked at random” which he 

claims showed that those customers benefitted from his rate-reduction program. 

Br. 11 (citing GA.168 at 6-7 (citing D.168-9 through D.168-18 [DX10-19]. First, 

as the district court recognized, Guice failed to cite specific pages in the consumer 

records to support his factual assertions, instead citing generally to scribbled, 

partially unreadable, multipage documents. GA.225 at 27 n.18. The Court is not 

required to decipher such records to substantiate Guice’s assertions. And the 

district court determined that, to the extent it could interpret the notes, Guice’s 

evidence undercut his claims. See, e.g., id. at 26-27 (remarking that one consumer 

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48 

Guice claimed had obtained a permanent zero percent card appeared to have the 

lowered rate last only four years, see SA.168-13 at 11); see also SA.168-9 at 13 

(consumer file seemingly reflecting the same misstatement by Guice); SA.168-15 

at 6 (same). The files also failed to indicate if the consumers paid balance transfer 

fees to get a lower rate card. And while Guice claimed consumers received lower 

rates due to being placed in hardship permanently, see, e.g., GA.168 at 7 (claiming 

two such cards for consumer Masser), it is undisputed that hardship status is 

temporary. See p. 12, supra. Guice also failed to explain whether hardship status 

resulted in adverse effects to his customers’ creditworthiness. 

Moreover, after Guice introduced the customer files for the first time in 

response to summary judgment, the Government located several of the consumers 

whose files Guice relies on, and their experiences only buttress the Government’s 

case. Six of them submitted declarations stating, like the other consumer 

declarants, that Guice’s programs did not provide the promised benefits, that they 

were not satisfied with the service, did not benefit or save money, that their interest 

rates are now higher, that their debt has increased, and/or that their 

creditworthiness was significantly damaged in the process. GA.175-2 at 1, 2 ¶¶ 2–

9, 12–13; GA.175-3 at 1 ¶¶ 2–9, 13–14; GA.175-4 at 1-2 ¶¶ 5–10, 13–14; GA.175-

5 at 1-2 ¶¶ 2–6, 11–16, 18–19; GA.175-6 at 1 ¶¶ 2–11, 13–14; GA.175-7 at 1 ¶¶ 2–

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49 

5, 10–11; see D.225 at 24 n.16.31 Far from showing a dispute of fact, these 

customers’ experiences ratify the absence of genuine dispute. 

Even if Guice had shown some satisfied customers, that still would be 

insufficient to defeat the Government’s showing of deception. See Tashman, 318 

F.3d at 1278; FTC v. Freecom Communications, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1206 n.8 

(10th Cir. 2005); Partners in Health Care, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1367 (collecting 

cases). The transaction was tainted by misrepresentations from the get-go and was 

therefore deceptive even if, for example, some consumers received cards with 

(temporarily) lower rates. See McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1388 (11th 

Cir. 2000); Tashman, 318 F.3d at 1278. Liability for deceptive sales practices does 

not require that the underlying product be worthless, IAB, 746 F.3d at 1233, 

because it is “[t]he fraud in the selling, not the value of the thing sold” that 

governs. FTC v. Figgie Int’l Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 606 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Finally, Guice points to a single page in his opposition to the Government’s 

motion for summary judgment that, without elaboration, he claims shows “specific 

facts contradicting” the Government’s claims. Br. 11 (citing GA.168 at 9). This 

contention fails off the bat because Guice does not identify any actual disputes of 

 

31 Consumers’ experiences showed that Guice did not obtain a successive card after 

the initial low teaser rate expired. See, e.g., GA.175-7 at 1. Guice never provided 

evidence of having obtained a second low-rate promotional credit card for any

customer. 

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50 

fact nor explain which Government claims are disputed or how they conflict with 

his asserted facts. Nat’l Mining, 985 F.3d at 1326 n.16; Nat’l All. Mentally Ill, 376 

F.3d at 1295–96; Fed. R App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). 

The single citation to a pleading filed below does not show a dispute of fact 

anyway. The page Guice refers to in turn relied on a recorded conversation 

between company employees and a consumer, which Guice argued showed that 

whether the company deceptively promised savings in a short amount of time was 

in dispute. GA.168 at 9 (citing SA.12(CD)-[PX 19]). In fact, the recording 

reflected no such thing; rather, it showed that the salesperson stated that she was 

working to lower the consumer’s interest rate within 60 days, but that the 

consumer would realize her savings over a longer period as she made payments on 

her new card. See SA.12(CD)-[PX 19 at 139:8-11]. But that is not inconsistent 

with the Government’s claim that defendants falsely promised consumers that they 

would save thousands of dollars in a short period of time, which would allow them 

to pay off their credit-card debt faster, typically three-to-five times faster than they 

would ordinarily be able to. See GA.163 at 14. The Government never claimed 

that defendants promised savings within 60 days or any other specific time period. 

Indeed, the same consumer was told the unfounded guarantee that defendants’ 

services would allow her to “pay off [her] account three to five times faster than 

[her] current payment practices.” SA.12(CD)-[PX 19 at 46:18-22]. 

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51 

The recording is consistent with the Government’s overwhelming showing 

of deception in additional ways. For example, it reveals that Guice’s salesperson 

falsely claimed to work for “Bank Card Services,” id. at 137:22-24, promised to 

transfer the consumer’s outstanding card balances to a new card that would keep its 

zero percent interest rate until her debt was paid off, id. at 68:21-69:8, and offered 

$2000 in “guaranteed savings” in exchange for an unlawful $1000 up-front 

“processing fee,” id. at 138:9-10. Far from supporting Guice’s position, the 

recording strongly affirms the Government’s case. 

CONCLUSION 

For the forgoing reasons, the district court’s summary judgment order should 

be affirmed. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

ASHLEY MOODY JAMES REILLY DOLAN

Attorney General Acting General Counsel 

/s/ Jennifer Hinton Knutton 

JENNIFER HINTON KNUTTON

PATRICK CHRISTOPHER CROTTY

Senior Assistant Attorneys General 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

JOEL MARCUS

Deputy General Counsel 

/s/ Michael D. Bergman 

MICHAEL BERGMAN

Attorney 

STATE OF FLORIDA FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS

135 W. Central Blvd. Suite 1000 

Orlando, FL 32801 

(407) 316-4840 

Jennifer.Knutton@myfloridalegal.com 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20580 

(202) 326-3184 

mbergman@ftc.gov 

 April 17, 2021 

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52 

 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

I certify that the foregoing brief complies with the type-volume limitation in 

Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(i) because it contains 12,938 words, excluding the 

parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f), and that it complies with the 

typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements 

of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced 

typeface using Microsoft Word 2016 in 14 point Times New Roman type. 

April 17, 2021 /s/ Michael D. Bergman 

Michael D. Bergman 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I certify that on April 17, 2021, I served the foregoing brief on counsel of 

record using the Court’s CM/ECF electronic case filing system. All counsel of 

record are registered CM/ECF filers. 

Dated: April 17, 2021 /s/ Michael D. Bergman 

Michael D. Bergman 

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