* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAR 5 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re: MIDGARD CORPORATION,

Debtor.

MIDGARD CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. PAUL TODD, CUSTOM CUTTING MILLWORKS INCORPORATED and TODD’S RECYCLING CENTER INCORPORATED, Defendants-Appellees. Nos. 96-6016, 96-6017 (D.C. Nos. CIV-94-2073-T & CIV-94-2072-T) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BRISCOE, Circuit Jud ges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. SeeFed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This appeal challenges the bankruptcy court’s impos ition under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 of sanctions of $500 each, payable to the court, against debtor Midgard Corporation’s president, David Personette, and its attorney, Wilburn C. Hall, for bringing an adversary proceeding against defendants that was not well-grounded in law or fact. (The merits of the adversary proce eding are addressed in a separate appeal, No. 96-6018.) Midgard itself was not sanctioned because the bankruptcy court expressly chose not to further bur den the estate. However, Midgard is the appellant here, as it was in the dis trict court. The district court questioned its jurisdiction over the sanctions impo sed on Hall, but entered orders affirming the imposition of sanctions on both Hall and Personette. Defendants have moved to dismiss the appeal because Midgard itself was not sanctioned and therefore lacks standing to appe al. Midgard contends that it is the “real party in interest” and that “[a]ll relate d sanction rights, titles, interests or expectancies have been disclaimed” by Hall and Pers onette in favor of Midgard. Appellant’s response to appellees’ motions to dismi ss at 1. It also contends that the district court “ratified” its interests by ruli ng on the matter. Id.-3-

Standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be rais ed at any time. See Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. , 9 F.3d 849, 854 (10th Cir. 1993). Federal courts have only limited jurisdicti on, and when the record discloses that the district court lacked jurisdicti on to address the merits of a case, we will correct the district court’s error. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist. , 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); see alsoDeyhimy v. Rupp (In re Herwit) , 970 F.2d 709, 709-10 (10th Cir. 1992) (dismissing appea l where district court lacked jurisdiction over appeal from bankruptcy court, eve n though district court addressed merits of appeal). Thus, the district co urt here could not have “ratified” Midgard’s standing if Midgard lacked standing to begin with. We conclude Midgard did lack standing. “To have st anding, one must be aggrieved by the order from which appeal is taken.” Uselton , 9 F.3d at 854. The imposition of sanctions against Hall and Personettepersonally did not aggrieve Midgard. We note that Midgard cites no authority f or the interesting proposition that a party can assign its rights or interests in being sanctioned. The district court orders affirming the imposition of sanctions are VACATED. Appellees’ motion to dismiss these appeal s is GRANTED. Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge