J-S09004-22

2022 PA Super 102

HABTE Z. FREZGHI

v.

ADHANOM K. TESFAMARIAM, AND 

ASMERET M. GEBREHIWOT 

Appellants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1845 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 17, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 191201113

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: Filed: June 2, 2022

Adhanom K. Tesfamariam and Asmeret M. Gebrehiwot (Defendants) 

appeal from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

County, granting Habte Frezghi’s (Plaintiff) post-trial motion, in part,1 and 

ordering a new trial. After our review, we reverse the trial court’s order 

granting a new trial. However, we remand the matter, without prejudice, to 

allow the Plaintiffs to file appropriate pleadings, if any, and to caution the trial 

court that it must not allow the unauthorized practice of law. 

On December 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed an action in quiet title/fraudulent 

conveyance of the properties located at 318 S. 52nd Street (318) and 324 S. 

52nd Street (324) in Philadelphia. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged Defendants 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The court denied Plaintiff’s request for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 

See Order, 8/13/21.
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never paid the sale price of $58,000.00. Plaintiff’s Complaint, 12/6/19, ¶¶ 1-

4. The Defendants filed an answer and new matter, averring that: Plaintiff 

never owned the 318 property and, thus, Plaintiff had no standing to quiet 

title; Plaintiff was a record owner of the 324 property and he agreed to sell 

that property to Defendants for $58,000.00; Plaintiff received $15,000.00 

from Defendants as a deposit toward the purchase of that property; the deed 

for the 324 property was transferred to Defendants and recorded in favor of 

Defendants; and, Defendants sold the 324 property and no longer hold title. 

Defendants’ Answer and New Matter, 2/21/20, at ¶¶ 6-21.

Following a non-jury trial, at which Plaintiff was “represented” by his 

nephew, Mehari E. Tedla, a non-lawyer, the trial court entered judgment in 

favor of Defendants, without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file appropriate 

claims as to the 318 and 324 properties. See Order, 4/9/21. The court found

Plaintiff failed to submit evidence of a fraudulent conveyance of either of the 

two properties. 

Plaintiff filed a pro se post-trial motion, as well as a counseled post-trial 

motion and amended post-trial motion.

2 The trial court denied Plaintiff’s 

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granted Plaintiff’s 

request for a new trial. See Order, 8/17/21. On August 26, 2021, Defendants 

filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. See Order, 

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2 On May 5, 2021, Lopez T. Thompson, Esquire, entered an appearance on 

behalf of Plaintiff and filed a counseled post-trial motion and an amended posttrial motion. 
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9/1/21. On September 13, 2021, Defendants filed this timely appeal. Both 

Defendants and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Defendants raise 

the following issue: 

Did the trial court commit an error of law in holding that the 

Plaintiff’s representation by a non-attorney stripped the court of 

subject matter jurisdiction over the trial and hence, even though 

the Plaintiff did not preserve the issue by objection at trial or raise 

it in his post-trial motion, the issue could not be waived[,] and the 

court properly raised it sua sponte in granting Plaintiff a new trial?

Appellants’ Brief, at 4.

Questions of the unauthorized practice of law and the trial court’s 

jurisdiction are pure questions of law, and therefore, our standard of review 

is de novo and our scope of review plenary. See Harkness v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 920 A.2d 162, 166 n.2 (Pa. 2007). 

See also Barak v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208, 215 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating, 

“[j]urisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate standard of review is 

de novo and the scope of review plenary”) (citation omitted). 

Defendants argue Plaintiff waived the issue regarding representation by 

a non-attorney at trial. Defendants contend that the trial court clearly had 

jurisdiction over the fraudulent conveyance claims, see Pa. Const. art. V, § 5; 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931(a) (“[T]he courts of common pleas shall have unlimited 

original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings, including all actions and 

proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or usage in the courts of common 

pleas.”), and, because representation by a non-attorney did not implicate the 
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court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the court could not raise the issue sua 

sponte. Appellants’ Brief, at 10-12. 

Plaintiff is from East Africa and speaks Tigrinya, a language his nephew, 

Tedla, could speak and understand. Tedla was also designated as Plaintiff’s 

power of attorney. In its order granting Plaintiff a new trial, the court 

concluded that it had erred when it permitted Tedla to represent Plaintiff at 

trial. The court stated:

Although [Plaintiff] gave a power of attorney to Mr. Tedla, a power 

of attorney does not grant a layperson the authority to represent 

parties in a legal proceedings. Kohlman v. Western 

Pennsylvania Hospital, 652 A.2d 849, 852 (Pa. Super. 1994). 

[] “In a civil action, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the 

claims raised by a non-attorney.” David R. Nicholson, Builder, 

LLC v. Jablonski, 163 A.3d 1048, 1054 (Pa. Super. 2017) []. 

The trial court also erred in not obtaining a translator when it 

became apparent that one was necessary for [Plaintiff], who has 

a limited ability to speak or understand English. See, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 4402 (definitions). See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§§] 4401-

4417 (court interpreters for persons with limited English 

proficiency). 

Order, 8/17/21. For the reasons that follow, we find Defendants’ argument 

has merit, and we reverse. 

First, the Jablonski case, on which the court relied,3 was disapproved 

by our Supreme Court in Bisher v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, Inc.,

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3 The Supreme Court decided Bisher four months after the trial court entered 

its order in this matter. See Christy v. Cranberry Volunteer Ambulance 

Corps, Inc., 856 A.2d 43, 51 (Pa. 2004) (changes in law are applied 

retroactively to cases pending on appeal); see also August v. Stasak, 424 

A.2d 1328, 1330 (Pa. 1981) (“At common law, an overruling decision is 

normally retroactive.”).
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265 A.3d 383 (Pa. 2021). In Bisher, the Court held that the unauthorized 

practice of law did not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, and thus could 

not be raised sua sponte. Id. at 389, 401. 

In that case, Carla and Brenton Bisher, without representation by 

counsel, filed suit against eleven defendants, named individuals and corporate 

entities, alleging medical malpractice resulting in their son Brenton’s death. 

Id. at 388. Each parent brought their own wrongful death action, and Carla 

Bisher filed a survival action on behalf of her son’s estate. Id. The trial court 

struck the amended complaint with prejudice due to defects in the certificates 

of merit mandated by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3. Id. On 

appeal, this Court, sua sponte determined that the Bishers committed two 

errors that jointly deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over 

all claims: Carla’s unauthorized practice of law, and the lack of verification of 

the complaint. We also concluded that this Court lacked jurisdiction, and we 

quashed the appeal. Id. at 388-89. 

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal, see Bisher v. Lehigh 

Valley Health Network, Inc., 251 A.3d 779 (Pa. 2021) (per curiam), and, 

after an analysis of jurisdictional principles and a survey of the law on the 

issue of the unauthorized practice of law, made clear its holding:

This issue does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction 

Our survey establishes that few courts view the participation of a 

non-attorney as implicating subject-matter jurisdiction. Some of 

our sister courts describe the unauthorized practice of law as 

jurisdictional but rarely, if ever, in terms of the trial court’s

competency to adjudicate the controversy. The closest 
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jurisdictional tenet involves standing, but our jurisprudence does 

not view standing as a jurisdictional issue subject to sua sponte

intervention. As explained, our views on this subject largely align 

with those of the United States Supreme Court, and we agree 

that “[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants 

used the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing 

rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of 

cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons 

(personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory 

authority.” Kontrick [v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)]. 

Because the participation of a non-attorney has no 

connection to the classes of cases that a court may hear, 

we hold that the unauthorized practice of law is not a 

subject-matter jurisdiction issue. Accordingly, we 

disapprove of Jablonski and other cases to the extent they 

suggest the unauthorized practice of law implicates 

subject-matter jurisdiction. That conclusion is of dispositive 

significance with respect to the Superior Court's ability to raise 

that issue sua sponte, and the court should not have quashed the 

appeal regarding the Estate claims or Brenton’s claims based on 

a perceived jurisdictional defect at the trial court level. 

Id. at 405-06 (emphasis added). 

Although the Court acknowledged that “a court cannot ignore the 

unauthorized practice of law and must intervene[,]” it determined that this 

did “not conflict with our holding that the unauthorized practice of law does 

not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 406.

The critical distinction is that a court’s duty to stop the 

unauthorized practice of law is limited to the proceedings before 

that tribunal. As applied here, the Superior Court properly issued 

an order requiring Carla to cease her activities[, and] would have 

been justified in dismissing all of the appellate claims pertaining 

to Brenton and the Estate had Carla refused to hire an attorney. 

Thus, the Superior Court had discretion to give Carla a reasonable 

period of time to obtain counsel. But its ability to prevent Carla 

from continuing the authorized practice of law does not extend 

to undoing what had already transpired at the trial court level. 
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Id. (emphasis in original). The Court, finding “that the participation of a nonattorney is properly characterized as a technical defect[,]” id. at 407, and 

guided by the preference for adjudicating cases on the merits and the liberal 

construction of rules of court, see Pa.R.C.P. 126, adopted the view that “any 

instance of unauthorized practice of law is curable in the court’s discretion[.]” 

Id. at 408-09. 

As indicated above, the trial court’s order in this case was “without 

prejudice to Plaintiff Habte Frezghi's right to file appropriate claims as to the 

above referenced properties.” See Order, 4/9/21. The court recognized, and 

Defendants acknowledge on appeal, that Plaintiff’s claims sounded in breach 

of contract. Plaintiff filed a pro se post-trial motion on April 17, 2021, a 

counseled post-trial motion two days later, on April 19, 2021, and an amended

counseled post-trial motion on April 21, 2021. On May 5, 2021, another 

attorney entered an appearance on behalf of Plaintiff, and filed a notice of 

appeal, which was ultimately dismissed for failure to file a docketing 

statement. Order, 7/28/21. See Pa.R.A.P. 3517. Thus, instead of proceeding 

with appropriate pleadings, Plaintiff filed a pro se post-trial motion and

Plaintiff’s counsel pursued appellate review, resulting in the court’s order 

granting Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. 

We agree with the Defendants’ argument that the court had already 

provided “a cure for the taint” of representation by a non-attorney, when it 

entered judgment without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to retain counsel and 
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file a new complaint alleging appropriate causes of action.4 The Plaintiff’s 

representation by a non-attorney did not implicate the trial court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction, and, accordingly, the trial court erred by sua sponte

invoking subject-matter jurisdiction. In light of our Supreme Court’s decision 

in Bisher, we are constrained to reverse the court’s order granting a new trial,

and, as it appears the trial court has already determined the pleadings were 

defective and Plaintiff is now represented by counsel, we remand for further 

proceedings.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/2/2022

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4 We emphasize, as did the Bisher Court, that a court cannot tolerate the 

unauthorized practice of law and must timely intervene. The court is obligated 

to take corrective action, regardless of whether the adverse party requests 

such action. Bisher, 265 A.3d at 406. We decline to order a new trial unless 

the new pleadings warrant same. By this action, we are placing both parties 

in the position that they would have been pre-complaint.