# Recent Reports

Reports News from the GAO

- Precision Agriculture: Benefits and Challenges for Technology Adoption and Use What GAO FoundPrecision agriculture technologies can improve resource management through the precise application of inputs, such as water, fertilizer, and feed, leading to more efficient agricultural production. Precision agriculture can be implemented through a suite of technologies that can be used in isolation or in conjunction with other technologies. Examples of emerging precision agriculture technologies are in the table below.Examples of emerging precision agriculture technologiesTechnology			Description		Remote sensing platforms			Drones and ground robots can provide new ways to provide measurements on crop conditions.		In-ground sensors			Provide farmers near-real-time information on soil and plant properties such as temperature, moisture, and nutrients.		Targeted spray systems			Use machine learning to precisely spray in a specific spot.		Automated mechanical weeders			Use machine learning to start and stop weeding blades to avoid damaging the growing crops.		Source: GAO summary of literature, interviews, and agency documentation. &nbsp;| &nbsp;GAO-24-105962While precision agriculture technologies, such as variable rate fertilizer applications and yield monitoring, have been available since the 1990s, only 27 percent of U.S. farms or ranches used precision agriculture practices to manage crops or livestock, based on 2023 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reporting.Use of precision agriculture practices by U.S. farms, June 2022–June 2023Federal agencies support precision agriculture adoption, research and development, education, and training. USDA supports precision agriculture technology adoption with financial assistance and loan programs, such as through payments for implementing practices that provide a conservation benefit. USDA and the National Science Foundation (NSF) have provided almost $200 million for precision agriculture research and development funding in fiscal years 2017—2021. This funding includes partnerships between the two agencies to support artificial intelligence (AI) research institutes.Benefits to using precision agriculture technologies include:&nbsp;Increased profits. Farmers can increase yields and thus profits with the same amount of inputs or achieve an equivalent yield with fewer inputs.	Reduced application of crop inputs. Technologies can reduce the application of crop inputs such as fertilizer, herbicide, fuel, and water. They can also address water scarcity by promoting the efficient use of water in agriculture.	Environmental benefits. Technologies can prevent excessive use of chemicals and nutrients in a field, potentially reducing runoff into soil and waterways.Challenges limiting the broader adoption and use of precision agriculture include:High up-front acquisition costs. Acquisition costs for the latest technologies can be prohibitive for farmers with limited resources or access to capital.	Farm data sharing and ownership issues. Concerns regarding farm data sharing and ownership can pose obstacles to the widespread use of AI in agriculture.	Lack of standards. An absence of uniform standards can hamper interoperability between different precision agriculture technologies.GAO examined three policy goals and associated options that could help address adoption challenges or enhance the benefits of precision agriculture technologies. These policy options identify possible actions by policymakers, which include Congress, federal agencies, state and local governments, academic and research institutions, and industry. In addition, for each policy goal, policymakers may choose no additional policy interventions, maintaining the status quo by continuing existing activities.Policy Goals and Options That Could Address Challenges or Help Enhance Benefits of Adoption and Use of Precision Agriculture TechnologiesPolicy goals and options			Implementation approaches			Opportunities and considerations		Encourage greater adoption and use&nbsp;(report p. 43)		Provide additional incentives or other financial support						Consider modifying eligibility criteria for existing governmental financial assistance programs.				Consider expanding levels of financial assistance through new or existing programs.									Consider what types of programs to provide to farmers, such as loan guarantees or grants.				Overall program cost, the extent to which equipment acquisition and operating costs are covered, and the potential trade-off with other agricultural programs could be factors.				Programs could be devised to realize goals, such as environmental protection and food insecurity.					Better understand and quantify benefits and costs						Support development of analytical tools and models to quantify benefits and costs.									Analytical tools could be configured for farm geography, soil type, and other factors.				Farmer confidence could increase if estimates of benefits are data-driven and based on real-world experiences.					Promotion and outreach to farmers						Consider expanding Extension services to enable development of more expertise and technical support to farmers.				Increase on-field demonstrations.									The extent to which federal agencies could provide more training, such as through USDA service centers.				Technology companies and dealerships could assume more of a role in educating or helping farmers.					Encourage further innovation&nbsp;(report p. 48)		Conduct research and development to improve on-farm data gathering and analysis						Support research for in-ground sensors for measuring soil conditions.				Examine ways that remote imagery, such as from drones, can be more effectively used to gather data.									In-ground sensors can provide more detailed information on soil conditions, which can enable farmers to further optimize the application of inputs to increase yields and minimize costs.				New remote imagery sensors from drones or ground robots promise to provide greater resolution, more frequent data, and quicker data delivery than traditional satellite sources.&nbsp;					Promote the development and use of standards						Promote data standards that could improve equipment interoperability.				Financial assistance programs could specify that precision agriculture equipment comply with certain standards.									Standards can improve interoperability and compatibility among different devices and platforms.				A lack of standards could result in challenges assessing the quality of the data derived from farm measurements.				Consider the level of federal involvement in standards development and use.					Manage greater amounts of data&nbsp;(report p. 52)		Enhance data analysis						Support the development of software to help farmers better manage their farms.				Examine how AI and machine learning could help facilitate analysis and interpretation of data.									Data analytics and high-performance computing approaches promise to generate valuable information for farmers but are dependent on the availability of large amounts of data.				Farmers may have tools, such as yield monitors, to help identify outcomes of decisions, but few analytical tools and software are available to enhance analysis and translate farm data into actionable decisions.					Encourage data sharing						Develop a governance framework to manage and store agricultural data and its access.				Establish easy-to-understand data license agreements and codes of conduct to enable better flow of data.									Farmers often do not trust the ways farm data are being collected and managed; thus, terms and conditions regarding data use should be simple, transparent, and accountable.				Farmer concerns about data sharing include a potential loss of competitive advantage, data security, and additional regulatory scrutiny may increase as AI is increasingly used for data analysis.					Source: GAO. &nbsp;| &nbsp;GAO-24-105962Why GAO Did This StudyPrecision agriculture involves collecting, analyzing, and taking actions based on data. It can help the agricultural sector meet increasing demand for food products, while also helping farmers improve efficiencies such as through reduced input costs.The Advancing IoT for Precision Agriculture Act of 2021, contained in what is commonly referred to as the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, included provisions for GAO to conduct a technology assessment and review federal programs.This report examines (1) emerging precision agriculture technologies and precision agriculture technology adoption; (2) federal programs providing support for precision agriculture; (3) benefits and challenges of adopting and using precision agriculture technologies; and (4) policy options that could address challenges or help enhance benefits of adopting and using precision agriculture technologies.To conduct this technology assessment and review, GAO reviewed scientific literature and other key reports; interviewed officials and representatives from government, industry, academia, and associations; conducted two site visits to observe technology operations and obtain stakeholder perspectives; and convened a 3-day virtual expert meeting in collaboration with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. GAO is identifying policy options in this report.For more information, contact Brian Bothwell at (202) 512-6888 or BothwellB@gao.gov, or Steve D. Morris at (202) 512-3841, morriss@gao.gov.
- Food Safety: FDA Should Finalize Plans to Implement Its Rule to Help Trace Source of Outbreaks What GAO FoundIn November 2022, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) promulgated a final rule on food traceability to help identify the source of outbreaks of foodborne illness. In developing the rule, the FDA established a list of certain foods for which enhanced recordkeeping is required, and set a compliance date of January 20, 2026. Entities handling an item on the list must maintain specific records, including a traceability plan, at certain points in the item's supply chain.To identify foods for the list, FDA used an approach that incorporates statutorily mandated criteria, such as the history and severity of prior outbreaks involving the item. Several stakeholders GAO interviewed said FDA's methodology for identifying foods for the list was appropriate. Several other stakeholders disagreed with this assessment, stating that FDA's approach resulted in an overly inclusive list. In response to similar comments on the draft rule, FDA provided its rationale for considering foods at the commodity—or category—level, stating that foods in these groups had similar risk characteristics and associated hazards.Examples of Points in the Supply Chain Required to Maintain Traceability Records for a Produce Item on the Food Traceability List FDA has taken some steps to help industry and nonfederal regulators prepare for compliance with and enforcement of the rule. Also, in late 2022, FDA began an iterative planning process for implementing the rule. However, as of October 2023, FDA had not finalized or documented an implementation plan, according to FDA officials.Components of such a plan could help address challenges stakeholders identified in preparing for the compliance deadline. For example, the plan could include additional information on nonfederal regulators' roles in the inspection process and FDA's enforcement strategy and needed resources. It also could identify additional guidance, training, and tools for stakeholders. By finalizing and documenting an implementation plan, FDA will have better assurance it is well positioned to make progress toward its regulatory goals and address the various challenges that stakeholders identified to achieving compliance by the deadline.Why GAO Did This StudyFoodborne illness remains a common and costly public health problem in the U.S. Being able to efficiently trace products linked to a foodborne illness outbreak can help government agencies and those who produce and sell food identify the source of the outbreak. FDA, within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for developing and implementing several rules required by the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, enacted in 2011. These include the food traceability rule.The act also included a provision for GAO to report on the traceability rule. This report, among other things, (1) describes FDA's and selected stakeholders' views on the rule's recordkeeping requirements and (2) examines FDA's actions to implement the rule and challenges FDA and stakeholders may face in achieving compliance.GAO reviewed FDA documentation and interviewed FDA officials and 20 selected stakeholders representing industry associations, consumer advocacy groups, and nonfederal regulators.
- Foreign Investments in U.S. Agricultural Land: Enhancing Efforts to Collect, Track, and Share Key Information Could Better Identify National Security Risks What GAO FoundThe United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) does not share timely data on foreign investments in agricultural land collected under the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, as amended (AFIDA). Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Treasury, identify and review transactions that may pose national security risks, such as the proximity of agricultural land to a sensitive military base. USDA annually publishes selected AFIDA information online that CFIUS agencies may use when considering potential national security risks associated with agricultural land. In addition, USDA officials said they respond promptly when they receive requests for information. However, DOD officials noted they need AFIDA information that is more up-to-date and more specific, and they need to receive this information more than once a year. USDA has requested funding to develop a real-time data system that can be accessed by other U.S. government agencies and the public. Meanwhile, sharing current data could help increase visibility into potential national security risks related to foreign investments in U.S. agricultural land.AFIDA Data Are Not Regularly Part of CFIUS ReviewsUSDA implements AFIDA across field offices and headquarters, but its processes to collect, track, and report key information are flawed. USDA collects the required data on paper forms with county or federal offices and reviews them for accuracy, according to USDA officials. However, its processes to do so are unclear and challenging to implement. For example, USDA's AFIDA handbook provides limited instructions on how to collect reliable AFIDA information. In addition, although Congress required USDA to create an online submission process and public database for AFIDA data by the end of 2025, USDA does not have plans and timelines to do so, in part because USDA has not received funding. USDA also does not sufficiently verify and conduct quality reviews to track the accuracy and completeness of its collected AFIDA data. GAO's review of AFIDA data current through calendar year 2021 found errors, such as the largest land holding associated with the People's Republic of China being counted twice. USDA has begun efforts to identify AFIDA non-compliance through data mining, according to officials, and has opportunities to expand this practice. But without improving its internal processes, USDA cannot report reliable information to Congress or the public about where and how much U.S. agricultural land is held by foreign persons.Why GAO Did This StudyUSDA estimated that foreign investment in U.S. agricultural land grew to approximately 40 million acres in 2021. These investments may have consequences for U.S. national security. For example, there may be foreign ownership of U.S. agricultural land close to sensitive military installations.CFIUS is an interagency committee that reviews certain foreign transactions to determine potential effects on U.S. national security. These include foreign investments in U.S. agricultural land. In addition, USDA's AFIDA statute, enacted in 1978, requires foreign persons acquiring or transferring agricultural land to file a disclosure form with USDA.GAO was asked to review foreign investments in U.S. agricultural land. This report examines the extent to which (1) USDA shares information related to foreign investments in U.S. agricultural land with CFIUS for its national security reviews, and (2) USDA's processes enable it to collect, track, and report reliable data on foreign investments in U.S. agricultural land. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and agency guidance; analyzed USDA data; and interviewed agency officials.
- Farm Credit System: Policy Considerations for a Potential Grant Program for Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers What GAO FoundEstablishing a grant program for socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers within the Farm Credit System (FCS) would involve considerations for policymakers, includinghow the program size and funding approach would affect FCS's mission,	whether the program would expose FCS to legal challenges, and	whether the program would duplicate existing federal programs.The Farm Credit Banks and other stakeholders also identified several potential challenges to establishing such a program. For example, the Bankslack experience with overseeing a grant program, and	do not have the appropriate infrastructure or staff.Banks could address these issues by following leading grant management practices—such as for staffing and training, oversight, and grant management—that have been developed by GAO and others.A grant program would involve costs for FCS and its Banks and borrowers, according to stakeholders. The Banks could fund the program by redirecting funds from net income, thereby reducing funds available for loans and patronage (i.e., funds Banks return to borrowers, who are also owners of the system). (See figure.) GAO analyzed FCS data for 2013–2022 and found that Banks would likely have raised effective borrowing costs in at least some years had they been required to fund a program. All four Banks said that a grant program would increase costs for borrowers, reduce FCS's capacity to lend, and diminish FCS's competitiveness with commercial banks as agricultural credit providers. Advocacy groups noted that a grant program could benefit FCS by helping grantees qualify for FCS loans—for example, by buying land to use as collateral.How Farm Credit Bank Net Income Could Fund a Potential Grant ProgramAlthough Farm Credit Banks' net income, which would potentially fund a grant program, has been relatively stable in recent years, it has been more volatile in the past. More specifically, FCS net income in 1984–1993 was more volatile than in 2013–2022. Further, Farm Credit Administration officials indicated that the most recent decade was unusually strong for the agricultural industry and thus for Farm Credit Bank net income. Farm Credit Banks may face greater income volatility than other financial institutions because of their specialization in agricultural credit. In addition, unique risks in the agricultural industry contribute to uncertainty for Farm Credit Banks' net income.Why GAO Did This StudyCongress created FCS, a government-sponsored enterprise with a network of banks and associations, to meet the needs of creditworthy agricultural producers. FCS consists of four Farm Credit Banks, which fund associations that make loans to farmers and ranchers. Socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers—defined by the U.S. Department of Agriculture as members of certain racial and ethnic minority groups and women—may face challenges in obtaining agricultural credit.GAO was asked to provide information on the implications of establishing an FCS-funded grant program for socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers. This report (1) describes considerations for policymakers and potential challenges such a program might face, (2) examines potential effects of a grant program on Farm Credit Banks, FCS, and borrowers, and (3) examines the stability of funding from net income for a potential FCS grant program.GAO analyzed FCS data for 2013–2022 to examine the potential effects of a grant program. GAO also compared FCS data that reflected more and less stressful periods for FCS (1984–1993 and 2013–2022, respectively). GAO interviewed officials from the Farm Credit Administration, Farm Credit Banks, Farm Credit Council, and socially disadvantaged farmer and rancher advocacy groups.In a letter representing the views of its bank members, the Farm Credit Council stated that the report is comprehensive but raised concerns about some of the analyses. GAO stands behind its analyses.For more information, contact William B. Shear at (202) 512-8678 or ShearW@gao.gov.
- Crop Insurance: Update on Opportunities to Reduce Program Costs What GAO FoundCompensation to private insurers. The federal government pays private insurance companies to deliver the crop insurance program—that is, sell and service policies—to producers such as farmers. This compensation, set in reinsurance agreements between the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the companies, includes subsidies for the companies’ administrative and operating (A&amp;O) expenses and their share of any financial gains associated with the policies (i.e., underwriting gains). The federal government and the companies may also share losses associated with the policies (underwriting losses).In 2022, of the program’s total cost of $17.3 billion, the government paid insurance companies about $3.7 billion to deliver the program. This compensation included about $2.2 billion in A&amp;O subsidies, which are calculated as a percentage of premiums. It also included about $1.5 billion for the companies’ share of underwriting gains from the premiums they retained (i.e., did not cede to the government). The compensation the government pays participating companies is projected to average $3.8 billion yearly from 2024 through 2033.Cost of the Federal Crop Insurance Program, 2011-2022From 2011 through 2022, companies received an annual rate of return on retained premiums of 16.8 percent on average (about $1.4 billion in underwriting gains per year), which exceeded a market-based rate of return (10.2 percent), according to GAO’s analysis. Adjusting the program’s rate of return to more closely reflect market conditions could save the federal government hundreds of millions of dollars per year.GAO’s analysis shows the government could achieve such savings while still providing financial incentives for companies to participate.A provision in the 2014 farm bill prevents the government from realizing any savings through changes to the reinsurance agreements. Specifically, the provision requires that any changes negotiated in new reinsurance agreements cannot reduce the total future underwriting gains for all insurance companies. Consequently, for the government to achieve any savings through revising the agreements, Congress would need to repeal this provision, as GAO recommended that Congress consider in July 2017.Premium subsidies for policyholders. In addition to paying companies to deliver the program, USDA subsidizes the premiums that policyholders pay. In 2022, subsidies averaged about 62 percent of policyholders’ premiums and totaled $12 billion, comprising the largest portion of the program’s total cost of $17.3 billion.Congress sets the subsidy rates, regardless of income level. In contrast, other USDA farm program benefits are not available to producers with incomes that exceed a statutory limit (3-year average adjusted gross income of $900,000 or more). GAO found that, of the 460,615 policyholders who participated in the crop insurance program in 2022, 1,341 (0.3 percent) were high-income. These high-income policyholders accounted for about 0.5 percent of total premiums in the program.Policyholders in the Federal Crop Insurance Program, by Income Level, 2022&nbsp;			High-income policyholders&nbsp;			(adjusted gross income (AGI) $900,000 or more)			Other policyholders&nbsp;			(AGI less than&nbsp;			$900,000)&nbsp;		Number of policyholders			1,341			457,650		Percentage of policyholders			0.3%			99.7%		Percentage of premiums			0.5%			99.5%		Note: Policyholders’ AGIs are averages calculated over a specified 3-year period.GAO found that reducing premium subsidies for high-income policyholders could generate additional savings for the federal government. For example, if subsidies for such policyholders had been reduced by 15 percentage points (e.g., from 62 percent to 47 percent) in 2022, the government could have saved about $15 million.GAO’s analysis shows the government could likely achieve such savings with minimal effects on producer participation in the program and the program’s financial soundness. To realize these savings, Congress would need to reduce premium subsidy rates for high-income policyholders, as GAO recommended that Congress consider in March 2015.&nbsp;Why GAO Did This StudyThe federal crop insurance program offers subsidized crop insurance to protect producers against financial losses from crop price declines and poor harvests due to natural causes.In 2022, the program supported about 1.2 million policies that covered 493 million acres and cost the federal government $17.3 billion, according to USDA. The program's cost is projected to total more than $101 billion over the next decade, according to the Congressional Budget Office.USDA partners with private insurance companies to deliver the program. The federal costs for the program include compensation to these companies and subsidies to pay for part of policyholders' crop insurance premiums.GAO was asked to review the federal crop insurance program and opportunities to reduce its cost. This report builds on GAO's prior work to provide information on (1) private delivery of the crop insurance program through insurance companies and (2) premium subsidies for crop insurance policyholders.GAO analyzed agency data and reviewed relevant legislation, regulations, agency documents, and academic studies. GAO also interviewed agency officials and organizations representing those affected by the crop insurance program, such as producers and insurance companies.
- Dietary Guidelines for Americans: Strengthening Interagency Collaboration Could Help Inform Nutrition Research and Future Guidelines What GAO FoundThe Departments of Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Agriculture (USDA), and Veterans Affairs (VA) are taking various actions to promote the Dietary Guidelines for Americans. These guidelines contain nutritional and dietary information and guidance for the public, as required by law. For example, USDA updated MyPlate, which provides online tools and resources that translate the guidelines for consumer use. In addition, HHS and USDA co-chair a committee that, as required by law, reviews federal nutrition educational materials to ensure consistency with the current guidelines.Assessment of Interagency Committee on Human Nutrition Research Efforts Compared with Leading Practices for Interagency CollaborationHHS and USDA co-chair the Interagency Committee on Human Nutrition Research, through which they collaborate to inform Dietary Guidelines for Americans related nutrition research priorities. The committee has taken various actions to inform nutrition research but has not fully incorporated seven of the eight leading practices identified by GAO for ensuring agencies are effectively collaborating and thereby reducing the risk of overlap and duplication (see fig.). The committee has generally incorporated one of these practices to identify and sustain its leadership but has not incorporated others, such as ensuring accountability and clarifying roles and responsibilities. For example, for ensuring accountability, the committee does not have any mechanisms for tracking progress toward addressing nutrition research gaps, such as the relationship between diet during lactation and infant development outcomes. In addition, for clarifying roles and responsibilities, the committee has not taken actions to ensure that the research each agency conducts is complementary and not overlapping or duplicative. By fully incorporating these seven leading collaboration practices, the committee may be better able to identify and prioritize nutrition research related to addressing gaps identified in prior editions of the guidelines and informing future editions of the dietary guidelines. Doing so would also help the committee avoid the risks of unintentionally overlapping and duplicative research activities.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. faces a nutrition-related health crisis, according to recent federal data. Poor diet is a prominent risk factor for developing chronic health conditions. Dietary patterns emphasizing fruits, vegetables, and whole grains are associated with lower risk of developing diet-related chronic health conditions. HHS and USDA produce the dietary guidelines every 5 years to provide nutrition guidance reflecting the scientific consensus.GAO was asked to review federal efforts to promote the current guidelines and identify research needed to inform future editions of the guidelines. This report (1) describes actions selected agencies have taken to promote the 2020-2025 guidelines and (2) examines HHS and USDA efforts to collaborate to identify and prioritize human nutrition research that may inform future editions.GAO reviewed laws and agencies' documents and interviewed officials from DOD, HHS, USDA, and VA. GAO compared agency efforts with leading interagency collaboration practices identified in prior work. GAO interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 10 stakeholders, such as academic researchers, selected based on their expertise.
- Sugar Program: Alternative Methods for Implementing Import Restrictions Could Increase Effectiveness What GAO FoundThe U.S. sugar program, administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), provides substantial benefits to sugar producers. Because the program guarantees relatively high prices for domestic sugar, sugar farmers benefit significantly, and sugar farms are substantially more profitable per acre than other U.S. farms. Research GAO reviewed suggests the U.S. sugar program results in an increase in domestic sugar production and higher profits for farmers, totaling an estimated $1.4 billion to $2.7 billion in additional benefits annually.The U.S. sugar program creates net costs to the economy, because higher sugar prices created by the program cost consumers more than producers benefit, according to research GAO reviewed. According to some studies, the program costs consumers an estimated $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion per year, yielding net costs to the economy of approximately $1 billion per year. Other studies estimate that the program leads to declines in U.S. employment in industries that rely heavily on sugar, such as confectionery manufacturing. In 2022 U.S. consumers, including food manufacturers, paid twice the world price for sugar.Difference between U.S. and World Raw Sugar Prices, 2003 to 2022Nearly half of U.S. imports of sugar come from Mexico, and according to studies these imports have a significant effect on the U.S. market. Beginning in 2008, sugar imported from Mexico became duty-free and quota-free. In 2014, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to set a minimum price and quantity limits on Mexican imports. Subsequently, imports of Mexican sugar fell and prices rose, benefiting U.S. sugar producers but increasing the cost to consumers and the economy.Almost half of U.S. sugar imports are subject to trade commitments made through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and free trade agreements. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) allocates WTO tariff rate quotas, with input from USDA, among sugar-importing countries using a method based on 40-year-old data. In practice, this has led to fewer sugar imports than planned and delays in obtaining sugar. USDA and USTR have not considered alternatives to their allocation method. Without considering new methods, USDA and USTR may be missing opportunities to make sugar allocations more effective and efficient.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. is among the world's largest sugar producers and consumers. The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 contained provisions to support the price of U.S. sugar and, according to USDA, established the current structure of the U.S. sugar program. The program was reauthorized most recently in 2018.GAO was asked to review the effects of the U.S. sugar program. This report examines (1) the benefits of the U.S. sugar program and groups likely to benefit, (2) the costs of the U.S. sugar program and groups likely to bear the costs, (3) how agreements with Mexico on sugar affect imports and the overall U.S. economy, and (4) how other trade agreements affect the U.S. sugar program, and how they are implemented.GAO reviewed agency documents and data and interviewed federal officials, academics, and industry stakeholders including groups representing sugar producers and sugar using industries. GAO also conducted a literature review on the effects of the U.S. sugar program on the economy and trade.
- School Meals: USDA Should Address Challenges in Its “Foods in Schools” Program What GAO FoundLocal school food authorities primarily used the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Foods in Schools program to obtain beef, poultry, and fresh produce, according to GAO's analysis of the most recent Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) data available. From school years 2014-15 through 2020-21, beef and poultry accounted for nearly 40 percent of all USDA Foods in Schools purchases, an average of more than $625 million per year. Over that same period, fresh produce purchases through the program nearly tripled. Selected states and school food authorities GAO interviewed described several factors that affected which foods school food authorities obtained through the program, including cost, convenience, and the staff resources available to manage inventory.States reported major challenges in operating the USDA Foods in Schools program in school year 2021-22, according to GAO's survey. For example, 28 states reported major challenges with delivery issues, including cancelations, delays, and receiving less than their full order. States reported that this challenge generally existed prior to the pandemic, but worsened during it. Officials from school food authorities GAO interviewed said they had to adjust quickly to address delivery issues, such as by making last-minute menu substitutions or serving the same meal multiple days in a row. Though USDA has begun to identify and address some operational challenges on an ad hoc basis, it does not do so routinely or systematically. Without a mechanism to identify and address challenges, USDA may miss opportunities to respond to risks and achieve the program's main objective—providing domestic foods for nutritious meals.Challenges States Reported in Operating the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Foods in Schools Program, School Year 2021-22Note: For more details, see figure 7 in GAO-23-105697.More than half of states reported satisfaction with FNS's assistance on the USDA Foods in Schools program, according to GAO's survey. However, 21 states identified opportunities for additional assistance, including more timely communication. Specifically, nine states reported delayed or lacking communication from FNS, especially regarding USDA Foods orders. FNS staff said they do not have guidelines for communication with states, but respond as soon as possible. By establishing such guidelines, FNS could track its efforts to provide timely responses and better assist states in operating the program.Why GAO Did This StudyThe USDA Foods in Schools program is an important source of nutritious, domestic food for school meals. Through the program, school food authorities select from over 200 products that USDA offers to purchase on their behalf—an annual value of about $1.6 billion. The program relies on a network of public and private stakeholders to operate effectively.GAO was asked to review implementation of the USDA Foods in Schools program. This report examines (1) spending for the program in recent years and (2) any challenges states and school food authorities faced in operating the program, as well as USDA's assistance in addressing challenges.GAO analyzed data on USDA Foods in Schools purchases from school years 2014-15 through 2020-21. GAO surveyed all states that operate the program, and interviewed officials from a non-generalizable sample of four states and eight school food authorities. GAO selected states based on use of USDA Foods in Schools entitlement, geographic diversity, and other reasons. GAO selected school food authorities for a range of locales. GAO also interviewed USDA officials and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and documents.
- Hunger and Homelessness: Funding Distribution for Key Programs What GAO FoundFive key federal programs can provide food or housing assistance to those experiencing or at risk of homelessness: the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Continuum of Care (CoC) and Emergency Solutions Grants (ESG), Federal Emergency Management Agency's Emergency Food and Shelter Program (EFSP), and Department of Agriculture's Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP).Of the programs providing food or housing assistance, GAO analyzed the geographic distribution of funding for the three that use formulas to allocate funding to qualifying jurisdictions—EFSP, CoC, and ESG. None of the programs are required to use criteria related to homelessness in their formulas. State funding per capita for these programs did not always align with measures of homelessness, rental costs, and income inequality. For example, in fiscal year 2020, two states with some of the highest per capita funding for CoC—Connecticut and Louisiana—were among the states with the lowest level of homelessness. Another state with relatively high per capita funding for CoC, Ohio, ranked among the bottom half for each measure of need. Analysis of per capita funding also showed different geographic patterns. States in the Northeast and West tended to receive the highest EFSP and CoC funding per capita, while ESG funding tended to be concentrated in the Northeast and parts of the Midwest.A CARES Act-related change to the ESG funding formula in 2020 resulted in better targeting of funds to states with large homeless populations than under the traditional formula. The CARES Act provided funds to be awarded in two rounds. The first round allocated $1 billion using the traditional formula, which does not factor in measures of homelessness. The second round allocated $2.96 billion using a formula that weighted indicators of homelessness. As a result, states with the largest homeless populations received a greater share of program funds in the second round. For example, California, New York, Texas, and Florida accounted for over 50 percent of funds allocated in the second round, compared to about 34 percent in the first round.Emergency Solutions Grants – CARES ACT Round 1 and 2 Funding by Percentage of AllocationWhy GAO Did This StudyThe COVID-19 pandemic and recent economic challenges, including inflation and increased housing costs, have raised questions about whether more U.S. households are experiencing hunger and homelessness. House Report 117-99 includes a provision for GAO to conduct a study on federal programs that address hunger and homelessness. Among its objectives, this report (1) describes the geographic distribution of EFSP, CoC, and ESG funding and how per capita program funding aligns with state-level homelessness rates, median rents, and income inequality; and (2) compares the geographic distribution of two rounds of ESG funding under the CARES Act, one using the traditional ESG funding formula and the other a formula developed to target populations experiencing homelessness.GAO reviewed prior work and federal agency documentation and reports to identify key federal programs that can provide food or housing assistance to those experiencing or at risk of homelessness. GAO reviewed agency funding data and documentation. GAO analyzed the geographic distribution of funding of the three key programs that use formulas to allocate funding (EFSP, CoC, and ESG) and how per capita funding aligned with indicators of need that GAO determined relevant to the programs—two of which primarily focus on addressing homelessness. GAO also interviewed agency officials, advocacy groups, and recipient organizations.For more information, contact Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678 or CackleyA@gao.gov.
- Combating Illegal Fishing: Better Information Sharing Could Enhance U.S. Efforts to Target Seafood Imports for Investigation What GAO FoundThe National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) work to combat imports of seafood caught through illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which comprises many illicit activities (see fig.). For example, NMFS administers four trade monitoring programs that, by regulation, require documentation for imports of specific species. In addition, both agencies manage efforts to identify or “target” seafood imports potentially caught through IUU fishing so that such imports can be investigated or held for further inspection. Targeting efforts can include monitoring incoming seafood imports that fit a pattern of concern, such as importers with past trade violations.Common Types of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated FishingCBP and NMFS share information with each other through several mechanisms, including a data analysis tool and a CBP interagency coordination center. However, NMFS officials report difficulties obtaining timely information from CBP. In particular, NMFS officials told GAO that having to request information through CBP's interagency coordination center limits their ability to get the timely information they need. NMFS officials told us that if they want to inspect an incoming shipment, they need sufficient advance notice to coordinate with CBP. In addition, they said that receiving the information they need from CBP's interagency coordination center, in some cases, could take as long as a week. CBP officials told us that coordinating information requests through its coordination center is important to ensure that such requests do not jeopardize or duplicate ongoing CBP operations, among other reasons. Until CBP works with NMFS to ensure timely access to needed information, both NMFS and CBP may miss opportunities to combat imports of seafood caught through IUU fishing.Why GAO Did This StudyMany illicit activities, such as using prohibited fishing gear, constitute IUU fishing. Such fishing undermines the economic and environmental sustainability of the fishing industry. The illicit nature of IUU fishing means that the size of the problem can be estimated only roughly. However, the U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that about 11 percent of the value of the nation's approximately $22 billion in seafood imports in 2019 was derived from IUU fishing.GAO was asked to review federal efforts to combat imports of seafood caught through IUU fishing. This report (1) describes NMFS and CBP efforts to combat such imports; and (2) examines the mechanisms these agencies use to share information on such imports, and related challenges they have identified.GAO reviewed documents on NMFS and CBP efforts to combat imports of seafood caught through IUU fishing, as well as other relevant agency documents. GAO also interviewed officials from CBP and NMFS at the headquarters and port levels about these efforts and how officials share relevant information on seafood imports.
- Meat and Poultry Worker Safety: OSHA Should Determine How to Address Persistent Hazards Exacerbated by COVID-19 What GAO FoundCompanies reported taking steps to address COVID-19 in response to federal guidance. Most of the 15 companies responding to GAO's survey said they encouraged distancing in communal areas, installed barriers, and required masks. However, studies, federal inspections, and worker interviews suggest that meat and poultry workers continued to face high risk of infection in the first year of the pandemic. For example, in 2020, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) found that COVID-19 risk to workers at one large meat plant was more than 70 times higher than to the state's general population.Plastic Sheeting between Poultry Workers Standing in Close Proximity OSHA increased meat and poultry plant inspections in the first year of the pandemic, but faced enforcement challenges. Officials told GAO their ability to protect workers was limited because existing standards did not target COVID-related hazards, such as jobs requiring workers to stand in close proximity. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 permits OSHA to develop safety and health standards for specific industries. OSHA is developing an infectious disease standard for healthcare workers, but not for workers in meat and poultry processing. Without assessing the actions needed to better protect meat and poultry workers—such as assessing the need for an industry standard—OSHA may be missing an opportunity to protect workers.OSHA and Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) officials said they met regularly during the pandemic, but did not provide documentation on whether they addressed worker safety. The agencies reported little field-level collaboration among staff with direct knowledge of plant conditions. In August 2022, the agencies updated their 1994 memorandum of understanding, which states that FSIS should report hazards to OSHA, including infectious diseases. The agencies did not follow some leading collaboration practices, such as defining outcomes and including key participants. By following these practices, OSHA and FSIS could better collaborate on meat and poultry worker safety.Why GAO Did This StudyIn 2016 and 2017, GAO reported that meat and poultry workers faced multiple occupational hazards. OSHA is responsible for ensuring worker safety and health, FSIS is responsible for ensuring the safety of meat and poultry products, and employers are responsible for providing safe and healthful workplaces.The CARES Act includes a provision to monitor and report on the federal pandemic response. GAO also was asked to review federal efforts to ensure meat and poultry worker safety and health during the pandemic.This report examines (1) meat and poultry companies' response to the pandemic and how the pandemic affected these workers; (2) OSHA's enforcement actions and associated challenges; and (3) OSHA and FSIS collaboration on worker safety. GAO surveyed companies, analyzed OSHA inspection data from February 2018 through June 2022—the most recent available at the time; reviewed federal laws and regulations; and spoke to workers from nine states with large meat and poultry processing operations. GAO also compared OSHA and FSIS actions to leading practices for interagency collaboration, and interviewed federal officials.
- Priority Open Recommendations: Department of Agriculture What GAO FoundIn June 2022, GAO identified 13 priority recommendations for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Since then, USDA has implemented 6 of those recommendations by, among other things, developing policies and procedures for the Food and Nutrition Service to enhance its oversight of federal funds it has awarded to nonfederal entities.In May 2023, GAO identified five additional priority recommendations for USDA, bringing the total number to 12. These recommendations involve the following areas:&nbsp;reducing improper payments;	improving USDA's oversight of federal assistance programs;	improving IT and cybersecurity; and	managing federal fiscal exposure to climate risks.USDA's continued attention to these issues could lead to significant improvements in government operations.Why GAO Did This StudyPriority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations.For more information, contact Mark Gaffigan at (202) 512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov.
- School Meal Programs: USDA Could Enhance Implementation of the Buy American Provision What GAO FoundSchool food authorities primarily used exceptions from the Buy American provision to purchase fruits they could not obtain domestically in sufficient quantities. An estimated 94 percent of school food authorities that used exceptions from the Buy American provision did so to purchase fruit, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service's (FNS) survey from school year 2017-18—the most recent nationally representative data available. FNS's survey found that school food authorities used exceptions less frequently to purchase other foods, like grains or meats. Officials from seven of the eight school food authorities GAO interviewed said they used Buy American exceptions each school year primarily to buy fruits, such as bananas, pineapples, and mandarin oranges.Non-domestic Foods Purchased Using a Buy American Provision Exception by School Food Authorities That Used Exceptions in School Year 2017-18Notes: The thin lines display the 95 percent confidence interval for each estimate. Percentages do not add to 100 percent because school food authorities may use multiple exceptions from the Buy American provision in a given school year.aMeat and meat alternates included a variety of foods including beef, poultry, seafood, and nuts.bOther products included yeast, oils, and spices.FNS has provided some tools and assistance to states and school food authorities to implement the Buy American provision, but has not done so with regard to documenting exceptions. For example, FNS provides standard Buy American provision language for solicitations and contracts that school food authorities can use at their discretion. GAO found that some states are providing forms for school authorities to use to document their reasons for using exceptions to the Buy American provision. However, states do not consistently do this, and the forms they provide contain varying levels of guidance and collect different information. Officials from half of the school food authorities that GAO interviewed said having standardized exception forms would be helpful. Without providing a standard Buy American exception form that school food authorities could use, FNS may be missing an opportunity to help school food authorities fully understand their responsibilities to implement the provision.Why GAO Did This StudyFNS administers the school meal programs that provide nutritious, low-cost meals to about 30 million children each day, according to USDA fiscal year 2019 data. School food authorities participating in the National School Lunch Program or the School Breakfast Program must comply with the Buy American provision, which requires them to buy domestic foods and food products to the maximum extent practicable.GAO was asked to review implementation of the Buy American provision in school meal programs. This report examines how school food authorities used exceptions from the Buy American provision and the extent to which USDA supported states and school food authorities in implementing the Buy American provision.GAO reviewed FNS documents; FNS's school year 2017-18 nationally representative survey of school food authorities; and relevant federal laws and regulations. GAO also interviewed officials from FNS and a non-generalizable sample of four states and eight school food authorities. GAO selected states for diversity of program size and geography and randomly selected school food authorities. GAO also reviewed five state exception forms identified through interviews with states and FNS staff.
- Food Prices: Information on Trends, Factors, and Federal Roles What GAO FoundFrom 2021 to 2022, retail food prices in the U.S.—the food prices consumers see at grocery and other food stores—rose 11 percent, the largest annual increase in over 40 years, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). In contrast, retail food prices had generally increased by an average of 2 percent per year from 2013 to 2022.Many factors that affect the food supply chain can affect retail food prices. Such factors include global trade issues, weather events and climate change, animal and plant disease, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It is difficult to determine the individual effect of any one factor on retail food prices, according to USDA officials and experts GAO interviewed.Federal agencies' actions, such as their efforts to support the food supply chain, may indirectly affect retail food prices. For example, FDA responded to disruptions in the food supply chain by offering regulatory relief and other flexibilities that allowed producers to divert food made for consumption in restaurants to grocery stores. This action helped to avert shortages that could have further increased retail food prices during the COVID-19 pandemic, according to FDA officials. In addition, to help lower food costs amid supply chain disruptions, USDA provided funding to help meat and poultry processors expand their operations and for producers to expand fertilizer manufacturing. However, agencies do not have a direct role in controlling price increases, according to agency officials.Why GAO Did This StudyIncreases in food prices can pose a hardship for many in the U.S., particularly low-income consumers whose food expenditures comprise an average of 30 percent of their total income, according to USDA. Multiple factors along the food supply chain can affect the food prices consumers see at grocery and other food stores. Several federal agencies have programmatic and regulatory responsibilities aimed at supporting the food supply chain.GAO was asked to examine factors affecting food prices. This report provides information on (1) retail food price trends from 2013 to 2022; (2) factors that may affect retail food prices; and (3) various roles the federal government may play in supporting the food supply chain. GAO summarized data on retail food prices for 2013 through 2022, analyzed academic literature and agency documents, and interviewed agency officials and experts. This report focuses on actions taken by the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, Labor, and Transportation; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Federal Trade Commission; and the Food and Drug Administration.For more information, contact Steve D. Morris at (202) 512-3841 or morriss@gao.gov.&nbsp;
- Farm Bill: Reducing Crop Insurance Costs Could Fund Other Priorities The Big PictureThe federal crop insurance program offers subsidized crop insurance to protect farmers against financial losses from crop price declines and poor harvests due to natural causes. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), in 2022 the program supported about 1.2 million policies that covered 493 million acres. From 2011 through 2021, the total cost of the program was about $90 billion.To implement the crop insurance program, USDA partners with private insurance companies, which sell and service insurance policies to farmers. The federal government's crop insurance costs include (1) subsidies to pay for part of a farmer's crop insurance premium (over 60 percent in recent years) and (2) compensation to the insurance companies for selling and servicing crop insurance policies.Total Premium and Subsidy Dollars, and Number of Insurance Policies What GAO’s Work ShowsIn our work on the crop insurance program over the past decade, we have reviewed premium subsidies to farmers and compensation to insurance companies for selling and servicing policies. In each area, we have an open matter for congressional consideration to reduce costs, as follows.Reduce Subsidies for High-Income ParticipantsBy statute, the program provides the same level of premium subsidies to participants, regardless of income. In contrast, some other USDA farm programs have statutory limits on the income participants can earn and remain eligible for payments. For example, under the 2014 farm bill, some farm and conservation programs are not available to individuals or legal entities whose average annual gross income (AGI) exceeds $900,000. Not having an AGI limit for the crop insurance program sometimes results in relatively large subsidies for high-income participants. For example, in  March 2015  , we found that one participant whose AGI exceeded the limit in effect for farm and conservation programs from 2009 through 2013 received an average of $1.2 million annually in premium subsidies during those years. Participants whose AGI was less than the limit received an average of about $7,480 annually in premium subsidies during the same period.We also found that reducing crop insurance subsidies for participants whose AGI exceeded the limit would save millions of dollars in program costs while affecting less than 1 percent of program participants. If a provision establishing income limits is enacted, USDA has procedures from other farm programs that it could use to determine the appropriate income limit criteria for farmers participating in the crop insurance program.Open matter:  Congress should consider reducing premium subsidies for the highest-income participants.Adjust Compensation to Insurance CompaniesPayments to farmers and compensation to insurance companies can vary significantly from year to year. In some years, such as 2016, when insurance losses were low, USDA's compensation to insurance companies greatly exceeded payments to farmers. However, in other years, such as 2012, which saw historic droughts, payments to farmers far exceeded compensation to insurance companies.Payments to Farmers and Compensation to Insurance Companies, 2011 through 2021 Note: Annual periods are from July 1 through June 30. Data for 2022 were not available.We found in  July 2017  that the compensation that insurance companies were projected to earn annually under their agreement with USDA for participating in the program was higher, on average, than would be expected under overall market conditions. However, a provision in the 2014 farm bill requires that any changes that USDA negotiates with the companies for a new financial agreement be budget neutral—meaning that the changes cannot result in savings to the government. To allow USDA to adjust insurance companies' expected level of compensation to reflect market conditions so the federal government can realize savings, Congress would need to repeal this provision.Open matter:  Congress should consider (1) repealing the 2014 farm bill requirement that any change to the standard reinsurance agreement be budget neutral and (2) directing USDA to adjust the participating insurance companies' target compensation to reflect market conditions during the next renegotiation of the agreement.Challenges and OpportunitiesCongress must decide how to allocate resources amongst competing priorities in the farm bill.	Savings from these changes could be available for other farm bill priorities, such as funding different agricultural programs.More from GAO's PortfolioCrop insurance premium subsidies:  GAO-15-215  ,  GAO-14-700  ,  GAO-12-256 For more information, contact Steve Morris at&nbsp;(202) 512-3841 or&nbsp;MorrisS@gao.gov.
- Climate Change: Options to Enhance the Resilience of Agricultural Producers and Reduce Federal Fiscal Exposure What GAO FoundThe U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has efforts underway to encourage agricultural producers to enhance their resilience to climate change. Specifically, USDA has taken some steps to develop and disseminate information about climate change to producers and has goals to better integrate climate resilience into agency decision-making through annual updates to its climate adaptation and resilience plan. In addition, some USDA programs may provide indirect incentives for producers to enhance their climate resilience.Through a review of literature and interviews with experts, GAO identified 13 potential options for USDA to enhance producers' climate resilience (see table). Each option has strengths and limitations. For example, regional climate resilience strategic planning could improve coordination, but achieving consensus across a diverse set of stakeholders could be challenging.Potential Options for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to Help Enhance Producers' Climate Resilience&nbsp;					1.&nbsp;  Collect data on practices that enhance climate resilience.								2.&nbsp;  Expand technical assistance to prioritize and promote climate resilience.								3.&nbsp;  Prioritize climate resilience in whole-farm conservation planning.								4.&nbsp;  Expand the capacity and expertise of USDA's Climate Hubs.								5.&nbsp;  Develop an agricultural climate resilience plan that addresses regional needs.								6.&nbsp;  Establish standards for climate-resilient agricultural operations.								7.&nbsp;  Revise the Natural Resources Conservation Service's Conservation Practice Standards to include climate resilience.								8.&nbsp;  Expand conservation program eligibility criteria to include and prioritize climate resilience.								9.&nbsp;  Expand the capacity of USDA's conservation programs.								10.&nbsp;  Research the feasibility of incorporating climate resilience into crop insurance rates.								11.  Require producer adoption of climate-resilient practices to claim crop insurance premium subsidies.								12.  Offer   crop insurance premium subsidies for climate-resilient operations.								13.  Require producer adoption of climate-resilient practices to maintain Farm Bill Title I program eligibility.					Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-23-104557Implementing multiple options offers the most potential to improve the climate resilience of agricultural producers, according to experts and GAO's analysis using the  Disaster Resilience Framework. This framework states that integrating strategic resilience goals can help decision makers focus on a wide variety of opportunities to reduce risk. USDA officials said that some of the options could be implemented administratively through resilience planning updates required by executive orders, while others would require additional authority. The appropriate mix of options is a policy choice that requires complex trade-off decisions. By analyzing options and incorporating them, as appropriate, in future climate resilience planning efforts, USDA could help meet its obligations under executive orders and inform legislative efforts to reduce fiscal exposure from the federal crop insurance program and agricultural disaster assistance programs.Why GAO Did This StudyAgricultural production is projected to decline in regions with increased frequency and duration of climate change impacts, according to the  Fourth National Climate Assessment. Congress has appropriated more than $15 billion in agricultural disaster relief in recent years. Extreme weather events also create fiscal exposure from the federal crop insurance program. In 2021, this program insured over 100 agricultural commodities, with a total program liability of $136.6 billion. In 2013, GAO added  Limiting the Federal Government's Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks  to its High Risk List. Enhancing climate resilience—acting to reduce potential losses by planning for climate hazards—can help manage risks.GAO was asked to review federal efforts to enhance the climate resilience of agriculture agricultural producers. This report examines (1) USDA's efforts in this area and (2) potential options to further enhance them. GAO reviewed laws and regulations related to USDA's climate resilience efforts; analyzed literature; interviewed experts and agency officials; and used GAO's 2019  Disaster Resilience Framework  to evaluate federal climate resilience activities.
- Thrifty Food Plan: Better Planning and Accountability Could Help Ensure Quality of Future Reevaluations What GAO FoundThe Thrifty Food Plan (TFP) describes how much it costs to eat a healthy diet on a limited budget, and is the basis for maximum Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits. In 2021, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reevaluated the Thrifty Food Plan and made decisions that resulted in increased costs and risks for the reevaluated TFP. Specifically, the agency (1) allowed the cost of the TFP—and thus SNAP benefits—to increase beyond inflation for the first time in 45 years, and (2) accelerated the timeline of the reevaluation by 6 months in order to respond to the COVID-19 emergency. The reevaluation resulted in a 21 percent increase in the cost of the TFP and the maximum SNAP benefit. The reevaluation was complex and involved several USDA offices. However, USDA began the reevaluation without three key project management elements in place. First, without a charter, USDA missed an opportunity to identify ways to measure project success and to set clear expectations for stakeholders. Second, USDA developed a project schedule but not a comprehensive project management plan that included certain elements, such as a plan for ensuring quality throughout the process. Third, the agency did not employ a dedicated project manager to ensure that key practices in project management were generally followed.USDA's Thrifty Food Plan Reevaluation Lacked Key Project Management ElementsUSDA gathered external input, but given time constraints, did not fully incorporate this input in its reevaluation. Specifically, USDA substituted a limited internal review of the TFP report for the formal peer review it had initially planned. This review was conducted by USDA officials who had been involved in the TFP reevaluation, and therefore were not independent. The TFP report lacked a comprehensive, external peer review to assess the transparency, clarity, or interpretation of the results. As a result, the review also did not meet relevant Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and USDA guidelines, such as the requirement to publish a report with the results of a peer review.The complexity of the economic model USDA uses to calculate the TFP led officials to make numerous methodological and policy decisions during the 2021 reevaluation, as they had in past reevaluations. However, GAO found that key decisions did not fully meet standards for economic analysis, primarily due to failure to fully disclose the rationale for decisions, insufficient analysis of the effects of decisions, and lack of documentation. As a result, members of the public and policymakers reading the TFP report may not understand the rationale for decisions made by USDA officials, and external parties would face difficulties reproducing the TFP, which further decreases transparency and accountability.Why GAO Did This StudySNAP supplemented the food budgets of more than 41 million people in 2021. Following a provision in the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 to reevaluate the TFP by 2022, USDA completed a reevaluation of the TFP in 2021.GAO was asked to review the reevaluation. This report examines (1) USDA's administrative process for reevaluating the TFP in 2021 and the extent to which the process employed leading project management practices; (2) the extent to which USDA gathered and analyzed external input to inform the reevaluation; and (3) how the methodology and results of the reevaluation compared to methodological standards.GAO reviewed USDA documents, interviewed officials and external experts, and compared the information collected to key project planning practices; relevant OMB and USDA guidelines for information quality, peer review, and scientific integrity; federal standards for internal control; and GAO's assessment methodology for economic analysis.
- National School Lunch Program: USDA Could Enhance Assistance to States and Schools in Providing Seafood to Students What GAO FoundFrom states' and school food authorities' (SFAs) orders, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) purchased a limited quantity of seafood compared to other animal proteins (beef, eggs, pork, and poultry) for the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) for fiscal years 2014 through 2019. USDA's seafood purchases were between 1 and 2 percent of all animal proteins purchased annually for the program. Nationally, the average quantity of USDA-purchased seafood per student through the NSLP over this period was about 3 ounces per year. According to the 2020–2025 Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGA), school-age children should consume between 4 and 10 ounces of seafood per week.Average Quantity of Seafood That USDA Purchased per Student Participating in the National School Lunch Program by State per Fiscal Year, 2014 through 2019aKansas receives cash payments in lieu of USDA-purchased foods. Because Kansas does not order USDA-purchased food, Kansas is not represented in the seafood data reported for this program.Officials from 10 selected states and SFAs, which operate the NSLP in schools, told GAO that several factors, such as student preference, concerns about allergens, and cost, affected their efforts to provide seafood to students. However, officials from six of 10 SFAs expressed an interest in serving more seafood, including some citing it as a healthy option. USDA officials said that at least some of the factors could be addressed with nutrition education.USDA offers limited seafood-related assistance to states and SFAs. USDA has not developed a plan to enhance its assistance that could draw on existing efforts, such as webinars or USDA's previous efforts, including lessons learned from two USDA pilot projects. Without a plan, USDA may be missing an opportunity to enhance its seafood-related assistance.The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides some seafood-related assistance to USDA, but USDA has not fully leveraged its relationship with NOAA. NOAA officials told GAO that it collects and maintains what is likely the most complete list of seafood vendors in the United States, but it does not share this list with USDA. Without obtaining and sharing such information, USDA may miss an opportunity to further assist states and SFAs in providing seafood to students.Why GAO Did This StudyUSDA helps millions of children from low-income households access healthy meals by purchasing food, including seafood, for the NSLP. USDA-purchased foods represent about 15 to 20 percent of the food served in the NSLP. According to the DGA, programs, such as the NSLP, can play an essential role in providing access to healthy meals. This can help reduce the health risks children may face from consuming a poor diet. Seafood offers particular health benefits, including omega-3 fatty acids, which can aid in the prevention of heart disease.GAO was asked to review USDA's purchases of seafood for the NSLP. This report discusses (1) USDA's purchases of seafood for the NSLP, (2) factors affecting selected states' and SFAs' efforts to provide seafood to students, and (3) USDA's efforts to help address these factors.GAO analyzed data from USDA on food purchases, including seafood, from fiscal years 2014 through 2019; interviewed state and SFA officials from a non-generalizable sample of 10 major domestic seafood-producing states with a range of NSLP funding levels; and interviewed USDA officials. GAO excluded data for fiscal years 2020 and 2021 because of the impact of COVID-19 on NSLP participation.
- Food Safety: FDA Oversight of Substances Used in Manufacturing, Packaging, and Transporting Food Could Be Strengthened What GAO FoundThe Department of Health and Human Services' Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has primary responsibility for reviewing the safety of food contact substances before and after they enter the market. These substances come into contact with food during processes such as manufacturing, packaging, and transporting food (see fig.). Such substances may migrate into food, where they could pose a risk to human health. FDA conducts premarket reviews of the safety of substances largely by reviewing companies' submissions of supporting evidence before substances enter the market. FDA bases its postmarket reviews on safety information, including new information published since the substance's initial approval for use.Since 2000, FDA has helped to stop the use of three types of unsafe substances, such as some per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) that are used to greaseproof food packages. These substances may cause health effects, such as liver damage. However, FDA faces two limitations that impede a risk-informed, postmarket review process for food contact substances:FDA does not have specific legal authority to compel companies to provide information and data on substances' safety and extent of use. FDA needs such information to prioritize and conduct postmarket reviews. FDA officials said they have begun to develop options to systematically reassess the safety of food additives, which include food contact substances, in response to a House Appropriations Committee report. Also, FDA has a strategic plan to improve data-driven, postmarket surveillance of substances added to the food supply. In its report to the committee, FDA could support its strategic plan and have additional options for obtaining information on food contact substances if it requested specific authority to compel companies to provide information and data on food contact substances' safety and use.	FDA staff can search the agency's information system for each food contact substance and find the date of the last premarket review. However, FDA's system cannot readily identify all substances that, according to their last review dates, may warrant additional review because new safety information may have emerged. Tracking review dates in a way that allows FDA to identify these substances may help address challenges FDA faces in making risk-informed decisions on which substances to prioritize for postmarket review.Why GAO Did This StudyThousands of food contact substances are available for use in manufacturing, packaging, and transporting food. These substances are used, for example, in food wrappers and in the lining of metal food cans. Academic, consumer, and other stakeholders have raised concerns that some of the substances may, by themselves or in combination with other substances, contribute to adverse health effects, such as thyroid disease and hormone disruption.This report (1) identifies the primary means that companies use to bring food contact substances to the market and describes FDA's premarket safety review process and (2) examines FDA's postmarket safety review actions and the limitations of such reviews. To conduct this work, GAO interviewed FDA officials and stakeholders and reviewed, among other things, FDA documents and the agency's website for actions it took from January 2000 to May 2022 to stop the use of potentially unsafe substances.
- Federal Fisheries Management: Overfishing Determinations Vary Across Regions, and Data Challenges Complicate Management Efforts What GAO FoundGAO's analysis of National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) data found that the number of fish stocks assessed for 2011 through 2020 varied by the six NMFS regional fisheries science centers and that many stocks were not assessed. For example, on average, the Southeast Science Center assessed about 10 percent of the 153 stocks it supported each year, while the Alaska Science Center assessed about 78 percent of its 64 stocks.NMFS uses these assessments to support management, including determining whether a stock is in overfishing or is overfished. GAO found that the number of stocks in these statuses varied by science center and that many stocks had an unknown status (see fig. for overfishing information). Challenges inherent in collecting fisheries data, along with resource challenges, affected the availability and quality of the data. For example, trawl surveys, which are used to collect fisheries data, are challenging and costly to conduct over large geographic areas. These challenges were a key source of the variability in the number of stocks assessed and one of the reasons why many stocks may have unknown status.Average Annual Number of Fish Stocks Experiencing Overfishing and Average Number with an Unknown Overfishing Status, by National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) Fisheries Science Centers for 2011 through 2020Note: Some science centers are jointly responsible for assessing a fish stock. The averages do not total the amount noted in the report, due to rounding. A fish stock is a fish species or stock complex, which is a group of stocks similar enough to be managed as a single unit.In reviewing NMFS' stock assessment and status data, GAO identified issues with the Species Information System database that prevented conducting certain multiyear trend analyses. NMFS has not documented these structural limitations or developed general guidelines for how to complete such analyses. NMFS officials noted that such analyses can be useful for tracking changes in stock status, as well as the frequency with which individual fish stocks have been assessed over time. NMFS is working on two projects to improve the functionality of the database. The plans for these projects do not include key project management elements, such as written goals and timelines. Developing a plan that includes these elements could help ensure completion of the projects and help NMFS conduct additional analyses that could be used to support management measures to prevent overfishing and manage overfished stocks.Why GAO Did This StudyCommercial and recreational marine fisheries are a critical part of our nation's economy. These fisheries contributed $118 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product and supported 1.8 million jobs in 2019. NMFS and eight Regional Fishery Management Councils (Council) are responsible for managing about 460 fish stocks in federal waters. This includes minimizing the extent to which stocks experience overfishing or become overfished. Overfishing occurs when the number of fish caught is above a certain threshold; a stock becomes overfished when its population is deemed to be too low.GAO was asked to review federal efforts to prevent overfishing and manage overfished stocks. Among other things, this report examines the number of stock assessments conducted from 2011 to 2020, along with the number and status of overfishing and overfished stocks during this period. GAO reviewed NMFS policies and documents; interviewed NMFS regions, Councils, and relevant stakeholders based on factors such as familiarity with different regions of the United States; and analyzed data from NMFS' Species Information System database.
- Tracking the Funds: Specific Fiscal Year 2022 Provisions for U.S. Department of Agriculture What GAO FoundThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 designated $405.2 million to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for 287 projects at the request of Members of Congress. The act includes specific provisions that designate an amount of funds for a particular recipient to use for a specific project. These provisions are called "Congressionally Directed Spending" in the U.S. Senate and "Community Project Funding" in the House of Representatives.GAO described, among other things, information about the intended uses for these funds, the recipients to whom they were designated, and when USDA expects recipients will have access to the funds:The intended uses of these funds are to support a variety of efforts, including improving access to broadband and other social infrastructure in rural communities, expanding agricultural research efforts, and managing forests.The designated recipients of these funds are mostly tribal, territorial, state, and local governments and higher education and other nonprofit organizations. The remaining recipients are subunits of USDA. Funding ranged from $17,000 to $39.7 million, with projects located in 45 states and territories.USDA plans to obligate funds to recipients by September 2023 and recipients will have between 1 and 5 years or more to spend the funds, depending on the project.Why GAO Did This StudyThe joint explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 includes a provision for GAO to review agencies' implementation of Community Project Funding/Congressionally Directed Spending.For more information, contact Steve Morris at (202) 512-3841 or morriss@gao.gov.
- Coronavirus Food Assistance Program: USDA Should Conduct More Rigorous Reviews of Payments to Producers What GAO FoundThe Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) provided producers $31.0 billion for various commodities. Specifically, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) paid producers $13.8 billion for field crops; $9.8 billion for livestock; $3.0 billion for dairy; and $4.4 billion for other commodities, such as fruits, tree nuts, and vegetables. Of the total, $661.5 million—primarily for livestock and other commodities—went to high-income producers whose average annual adjusted gross income exceeded $900,000 over a 3-year period.GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 90 producers whose CFAP claims GAO considered to have risk factors for improper payments. Such factors include large claims for commodities for which the USDA agency that administered the program—the Farm Service Agency (FSA)—has limited knowledge because the commodities are not typically eligible for FSA's farm programs. GAO found that over half of the producers (48 of 90) that GAO reviewed did not provide full support for their payments. The payments are therefore potentially improper.Producers That GAO Selected for Review That Received Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) Payments, Including Potentially Improper Payments			Commodity 									Number of producers 									CFAP payments to producers 			(dollars) 									Number of producers receiving potentially improper payments 									Amount of potentially improper payments 			(dollars) 								Livestock									44									78,172,476									24									45,094,863								Other commodities									24									39,337,428									15									26,095,044								Dairy									22									37,099,421									9									16,128,396								Total 									90 									154,609,325 									48 									87,318,303 					Source: GAO analysis of Farm Service Agency data. | GAO-22-104397Note: For more details, see table 4 in GAO-22-104397.For example, 33 producers provided support (e.g., sales receipts) for a lesser amount than they claimed, and nine producers did not clearly establish ownership of commodities they claimed. In some cases, GAO found indicators of fraudulent activity to obtain the payments. GAO referred the 48 producers with potentially improper payments to USDA's Office of Inspector General.FSA conducted spot-check reviews of CFAP payments to ensure that producers' claims were accurate, but these reviews had limitations. For example:Officials from FSA's national office selected producers for spot checks without fully considering risk factors, such as large claims for livestock.	In spot checks, FSA county offices accepted producer-generated documents, such as spreadsheets, which are difficult to verify, as support for claims.	FSA state offices did not monitor the quality of CFAP spot checks that the county offices conducted in 2021 and do not plan to monitor the quality of ongoing CFAP spot checks, according to FSA state officials.By conducting additional and more rigorous reviews of producers' CFAP applications, FSA could better ensure the integrity of CFAP payments to producers impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.Why GAO Did This StudyTo provide support for agricultural producers impacted by COVID-19, USDA distributed tens of billions of dollars in supplemental assistance to agricultural producers, such as farmers and ranchers. Part of this assistance was distributed under CFAP. USDA established CFAP to provide payments to producers that experienced price declines and higher costs to sell their commodities because of COVID-19.Producers received payments based on signed statements certifying that the claims in their CFAP applications were correct. Producers also had to provide records supporting their claims to FSA and GAO, on request.The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to monitor and report on the federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, GAO was asked to review CFAP payments and FSA's implementation and oversight of CFAP. This report examines (1) the distribution of CFAP payments, (2) the extent to which producers that GAO selected for review provided support for CFAP payments, and (3) the extent to which FSA verified producers' compliance with program rules.GAO reviewed statutes, guidance, and other documents; analyzed FSA data on CFAP payments as of December 2021; reviewed CFAP claims and support from 90 producers that GAO selected based on risk factors; and interviewed agency officials.
- Healthy Eating: Government-wide Solutions for Promoting Healthy Diets, Food Safety, and Food Security Each year, millions of people in the U.S. die from diet-related chronic health conditions, get sick from foodborne illnesses, or go hungry. We have recommended a government-wide approach to addressing these widespread and often preventable food-related challenges.For more information, contact Steve Morris at (202) 512-3841 or MorrisS@gao.gov.
- Priority Open Recommendations: Department of Agriculture What GAO FoundIn July 2021, GAO identified 11 priority recommendations for the Department of Agriculture (USDA). Since then, USDA has implemented four of those recommendations by, among other things, revising policies and procedures to help improve its oversight of the funds it awards to nonfederal entities.In June 2022, GAO identified six additional priority recommendations for USDA, bringing the total number to 13. These recommendations involve the following areas:protecting the safety of the food supply.	reducing improper payments.	strengthening protections for wage workers.	improving USDA's oversight of federal assistance and awards.	improving information technology and cybersecurity.USDA's continued attention to these issues could lead to significant improvements in government operations.Why GAO Did This StudyPriority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015 GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations.For more information, contact Mark Gaffigan at (202) 512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov.
- Global Food Security: Coordination of U.S. Assistance Can Be Improved What GAO FoundThe agencies responsible for implementing the U.S. Government Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS)—collectively known as the GFSS Interagency—have established mechanisms for coordinating assistance at the global and country levels. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) leads the coordination of these agencies' efforts to implement the strategy. At the global level, GFSS Interagency working groups meet to coordinate assistance efforts. At the country level, a country coordinator facilitates a whole-of-government strategy and plan in each country where agencies provide food security assistance. Agencies providing assistance in the four countries GAO selected for its review reported using a variety of mechanisms to coordinate with one another and key stakeholders. Agency officials and key stakeholders generally reported favorably on the quality of this coordination.GAO found that the GFSS Interagency's mechanisms for coordinating food security assistance generally address four of seven leading practices GAO has identified as important for collaboration. However, this coordination can be improved. For example, agencies without in-country personnel are not always included in country-level planning of U.S. food security assistance. In addition, the GFSS Interagency has not established a mechanism to ensure all relevant agencies can readily access information about each other's current and planned spending. As a result, they have limited ability to leverage each other's planned assistance and promote a whole-of-government approach.Selected Leading Collaboration Practices Partially Addressed by Agencies Implementing the U.S. Global Food Security StrategyU.S. agencies reported taking steps to mitigate potential negative effects of any duplication, overlap, and fragmentation of food security assistance in the four selected countries, where multiple agencies target similar broad objectives. Agency officials and key stakeholder representatives in the countries observed some duplication, overlap, and fragmentation but also reported coordinating to mitigate potential negative effects. For example, USAID officials in Bangladesh told GAO they try to engage monthly or quarterly with the host government and other bilateral donors to review activities; identify any duplication, overlap, or fragmentation; and devise plans to ensure the activities are complementary. U.S. officials and key stakeholders reported some duplication, overlap, and fragmentation of food security assistance in the four countries—for example, overlapping assistance provided by U.S. agencies, the World Food Program, and the Kenyan government—but generally said this has had positive effects. GAO has previously reported that it may be beneficial for multiple agencies or entities to be involved in the same programmatic area of large or complex federal efforts.Why GAO Did This StudyThe number of food-insecure people has increased since 2014, and an estimated 768 million people were undernourished in 2020, according to the United Nations. The Global Food Security Act of 2016 required the President to coordinate the development and implementation of a whole-of-government global food security strategy. According to the GFSS, increased interagency engagement is intended to build effective coordination among agencies that contribute to global food security.GAO was asked to review U.S. global food security assistance. This report examines (1) U.S. agency coordination of global food security assistance at the global level and in selected countries; (2) the extent to which U.S. agencies coordinate this assistance in accordance with leading collaboration practices; and (3) U.S. agencies' management of any duplication, overlap, or fragmentation of assistance in the selected countries. GAO reviewed GFSS documents and interviewed representatives of GFSS agencies and other stakeholders, including implementing partners and host governments in Bangladesh, Guatemala, Kenya, and Niger. GAO selected these countries using criteria such as geographic diversity and high levels of U.S. food security funding.
- Nutrition Assistance Programs: Federal Agencies Should Improve Oversight and Better Collaborate on Efforts to Support Veterans with Food Insecurity What GAO FoundThe Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has taken several actions to identify veterans who may be experiencing food insecurity—which the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) defines as the condition of limited or uncertain access to adequate food—and refer them for assistance, but has not fully monitored or evaluated the effectiveness of these efforts. In 2016, VA established its Ensuring Veteran Food Security Workgroup (Workgroup), which is led by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). VHA has taken several actions through the Workgroup to address food insecurity among veterans. For example, VHA is using a two-question screening tool to identify and refer veterans who may be food insecure to a social worker, dietitian, or other VA medical center staff (see figure). Veterans who screen “positive” are referred to support and resources they need, which could include a referral to a local food bank. In addition, VHA has trained VA medical center staff on the use of the tool and how to enroll veterans in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. However, VA has not fully monitored the implementation or evaluated the effectiveness of these efforts, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards and may hinder VHA's ability to achieve its defined outcomes and result in fewer veterans receiving the support they need.Example of VHA Food Insecurity Screening Tool RecordUSDA began leading an informal interagency workgroup (workgroup) with VA in 2020 to help address food insecurity among veterans, but it has not fully addressed leading practices for collaboration and cannot fully assess its progress in accomplishing related goals. USDA established the workgroup to, among other things, enhance support for veterans experiencing food insecurity. USDA has taken steps to collaborate with VA through this workgroup, for example, by developing nutritional resources that include common definitions of food insecurity. Developing such resources is consistent with one of GAO's leading collaboration practices. However, USDA did not follow other collaboration practices, including those related to outcomes and accountability. By taking steps to address other leading practices in its workgroup, such as through identifying clear goals that establish organizational outcomes and developing mechanisms for accountability, USDA could enhance collaboration with VA to better support veterans' food insecurity.Why GAO Did This StudyRecent USDA data indicate that veterans experience high rates of food insecurity, which can contribute to many negative health outcomes. GAO was asked to review VA's efforts to support veterans who may be experiencing food insecurity and the extent to which USDA coordinates with VA to support these veterans.This report examines (1) how VA identifies and assists veterans who may be experiencing food insecurity and the extent to which it monitors and assesses the effectiveness of these efforts, and (2) the extent to which USDA coordinates with VA to support those veterans. GAO reviewed relevant VA and USDA initiatives and interviewed key officials responsible for administering these initiatives in addition to veterans' service organizations, among others. GAO assessed VA's process for monitoring and evaluating its efforts in accordance with federal standards for internal control and the extent to which USDA is coordinating with VA in accordance with leading collaboration practices, based on prior work. GAO also conducted virtual site visits to three VA medical centers that were selected to represent a range of criteria including a large number of positive screenings for food insecurity.
- Evidence-Based Policy Making: USDA's Decision to Relocate Research Agencies to Kansas City Was Not Fully Consistent with an Evidence-Based Approach What GAO FoundAn economic analysis conducted by the U.S Department of Agriculture (USDA) with assistance from Ernst and Young was critical to informing USDA leadership about potential sites for relocating the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) and the Economic Research Service (ERS) (see figure).Key Steps in USDA's Economic Analysis of Potential Relocation SitesUSDA's stated objectives for relocation were to improve its ability to attract and retain highly-qualified staff; place its resources closer to stakeholders and consumers; and reduce costs to taxpayers. However, GAO found that the economic analysis did not fully align with those objectives. For example, USDA used cost of living to screen out locations and then eliminated sites that did not have sufficient space to co-locate NIFA and ERS. However, some of the sites eliminated ranked highly in terms of USDA's stakeholder proximity and staff recruitment and retention objectives. In addition, USDA omitted critical costs and economic effects from its analysis of taxpayer savings, such as costs related to potential attrition or disruption of activities for a period of time, which may have contributed to an unreliable estimate of savings from relocation.Overall, GAO found that USDA's development and usage of evidence had significant limitations. In addition to the methodological concerns highlighted above, key characteristics of a high-quality analysis were absent, including transparency around key methodological decisions and sensitivity analysis to assess the reasonableness of critical assumptions. According to Office of Management and Budget guidance on implementing the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018, agencies should use evidence when making decisions related to agency operations. This evidence should be good quality and should be collected and analyzed in a transparent manner that involves stakeholders to maintain accountability and ensure that it is not tailored to generate specific findings. As a result of the weaknesses GAO found, USDA leadership may have made a relocation decision that was not the best choice to accomplish its stated objectives.Why GAO Did This StudyUSDA is made up of several agencies, including the research agencies, ERS and NIFA. ERS reviews trends and emerging issues in food, agriculture, the environment, and rural America, while NIFA administers federal funding through formula and competitive grants, among other things.In October 2019, USDA relocated most staff positions at ERS and NIFA from their headquarters in Washington, D.C. to Kansas City, Missouri. This decision was based on USDA's economic analysis. USDA stated the move would save taxpayers more than $300 million over 15 years compared to remaining in the Washington, D.C. region.GAO was asked to assess the analysis USDA used to support its decision to relocate ERS and NIFA to the Kansas City region. This report reviewed how USDA made its relocation decision, the underlying analyses, and the use of evidence in its decision-making.GAO reviewed USDA's contracting documents and the deliverables provided by the contractor, interviewed USDA officials and contractor staff, and evaluated the economic analysis using criteria in GAO-18-151SP.GAO is not making any recommendations at this time because, among other reasons, the relocation has already taken place and OMB has since circulated comprehensive guidance on how to build and use quality evidence that, if effectively implemented, should address the weaknesses highlighted. USDA neither agreed nor disagreed with our findings but disagreed with the criteria we used to evaluate the agency's economic analysis. We stand by our analysis as discussed in the report.For more information, contact Lawrance L. Evans Jr. at (202) 512-4802 or EvansL@gao.gov.
- Food Program: DOD Should Formalize Its Process for Revising Food Ingredients and Better Track Dining Facility Use and Costs What GAO FoundSince 2017, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been working to develop a new process for making food ingredient decisions, based on its menu standards for providing nutritious food to servicemembers. However, GAO found that DOD has not coordinated with all stakeholders or formalized the process. In response to concerns voiced by food industry representatives that DOD was not sufficiently transparent in making food ingredient decisions, such as prohibiting certain ingredients, DOD drafted a process map for including food industry and other federal agency stakeholders in those decisions. However, while DOD actively sought input from the food industry, it did not similarly engage with other federal agencies—such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture—and some DOD components in developing the new process. DOD also did not formalize its food process map by, for example, clearly identifying stakeholder roles and responsibilities in the proposed process. Coordinating with all stakeholders and formalizing the process would help ensure that DOD has a more transparent and reliable method for making informed food ingredient decisions.GAO also found that DOD does not track key information about its food program. For example, while the military services track head count data—numbers and types of diners who purchase meals at their dining facilities—most do not track the extent to which servicemembers with a meal entitlement use their benefit. Tracking these data would help DOD meet its goal of providing nutritious meals to servicemembers and assess its food program's effectiveness.Ship's Cabin Galley (Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia) and Kiosk (Fort Carson, Colorado)In addition, the military services do not track complete and consistent information on key costs, such as food costs and equipment maintenance costs. Further, the military services reported food costs differently in their fiscal year 2021 budget justifications. Specifically, the military services varied in the line items they used in their respective budget exhibits to report food costs for basic trainees or personnel in non-pay status. By collecting standard data on food program costs at military installations, DOD would improve its ability to measure food program performance, compare operations across installations, properly allocate resources, and control or reduce costs. Further, by reporting more consistent information about food costs in its budget submissions, DOD would improve budget transparency and enable Congress to conduct more effective oversight.Why GAO Did This StudyDOD's food program policy is to provide high-quality and cost-effective food service to military and civilian personnel. To fulfill the objectives of its food service program, DOD relies on multiple food supply chains and dining facilities at military installations worldwide.Two congressional committee reports included provisions for GAO to report on DOD's menu standards, coordination with private industry on food ingredient changes, and military services' use and costs of dining facilities. This report evaluates the extent to which 1) DOD developed and implemented processes to determine and revise menu standards and food ingredient requirements; 2) the military services track the use of their dining facilities by servicemembers with a meal entitlement; and 3) the military services track the costs of their dining facilities to develop budget requests. GAO reviewed laws and guidance; administered questionnaires; and interviewed officials from DOD, other agencies, and private industry.
- USDA Market Facilitation Program: Oversight of Future Supplemental Assistance to Farmers Could Be Improved What GAO FoundUnder the Market Facilitation Program (MFP) launched by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for 2018 and 2019, USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) made payments totaling $23 billion to farms and farmers. GAO's analysis of FSA data found that historically underserved farmers—such as those belonging to socially disadvantaged groups that have been subject to racial, ethnic, or gender prejudice—received $818.9 million collectively (3.6 percent) in MFP payments (see table; data shown cannot be totaled across groups).Payments to Farmers from Historically Underserved Groups by USDA's Market Facilitation Program (MFP)			Historically underserved group									&nbsp;			2018 MFP farmers			(number)									2018 MFP			payments to farmers (dollars)									&nbsp;			2019 MFP farmers (number)									2019 MFP			payments to farmers (dollars)									Total payments to farmers (dollars)								Socially disadvantaged									14,688									141,491,542									19,038									294,204,730									435,696,272 								Military veterans									6,664									91,287,315									7,418									149,293,571									240,580,886 								Beginning to farm									5,124									40,704,803									8,053									111,403,615									152,108,417 								Limited resource									538									1,436,917									995									4,478,125									5,915,042 					Source: GAO analysis of Farm Service Agency data. | GAO-22-10425Note: Some farmers belonged to more than one historically underserved group.FSA also paid $163.4 million (0.7 percent) to 883 high-income farms and 1,164 farmers with adjusted gross incomes (AGI) over $900,000 per year. To be eligible for MFP payments, FSA required applicants to have average AGIs of $900,000 or less per year—unless they certified that at least 75 percent of their income was derived from farming, ranching, or forestry, in which case no income cap applied.USDA agencies conducted several reviews of MFP payments to ensure they had gone to eligible applicants. However, FSA's review to verify that 2018 MFP payments were based on accurate information was limited in its usefulness for several reasons. For example:FSA did not ensure the results of its review were reliable because the agency did not collect or analyze information in a statistically valid manner.	FSA reviewed a sample of larger payments at a higher rate than smaller payments but did not focus on other characteristics posing risk to the accuracy of payments, such as farms with which FSA lacked familiarity or historical data to corroborate eligibility.	FSA did not communicate the results of its review, including a summary of findings and the types of errors found, or identify corrective actions.FSA's guidance for the 2018 MFP review did not direct the agency to (1) ensure results were reliable using sound statistical methodologies; (2) take a more complete risk-based approach, as used for other FSA programs; or (3) communicate results and identify corrective actions. In addition, FSA discontinued its 2019 MFP compliance review because of competing agency priorities, including implementation of another supplemental assistance program. FSA would improve its oversight of payments and enhance the usefulness of future compliance reviews for supplemental assistance programs by developing better guidance for conducting such reviews.Why GAO Did This StudyTo offset losses in agricultural export sales caused by international trade disruptions and increased tariffs on certain U.S. exported products, FSA distributed payments to farms through the MFP, a USDA supplemental assistance program. Such programs aid eligible farms that have been affected by various situations or events, including financial hardship or crop damage and loss following natural disasters.FSA collects demographic information from farmers who participate in programs such as the MFP, including whether they belong to historically underserved groups and their income levels  . GAO was asked to review aspects of USDA's implementation and oversight of the MFP. This report examines (1) USDA's distribution of MFP payments to historically underserved and high-income farmers for both 2018 and 2019 and (2) the extent to which USDA verified farms' compliance with MFP eligibility requirements for both 2018 and 2019.GAO reviewed USDA documents and data and interviewed agency officials.
- USDA Market Facilitation Program: Stronger Adherence to Quality Guidelines Would Improve Future Economic Analyses What GAO FoundThe U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) 2018 and 2019 Market Facilitation Programs (MFP) provided payments to help farm producers affected by foreign retaliatory tariffs. In its estimation of the effect of these foreign actions on farm producers (i.e., trade damages), USDA addressed several key elements of an economic analysis. For example, USDA assessed the sensitivity of its analysis to alternative assumptions. However, for the 2019 MFP, USDA used baselines that did not best represent what trade would be absent the retaliatory tariffs, and that increased trade damage estimates.Trade damage estimates. USDA used an economic model to estimate the percentage that U.S. exports of each eligible commodity to retaliating countries would decline due to retaliatory tariffs. The model used trade data and academic sources for the value of parameters—known as elasticities—that estimate how foreign importers would respond to price changes. USDA then multiplied the percentage decline by a baseline of past exports to calculate trade damages.For the 2018 MFP, USDA used a justifiable baseline, the value of retaliating country imports from the U.S. of an eligible commodity in 2017, the year before retaliatory tariffs. For example, USDA estimated that China imports of U.S. wheat would decline by 61 percent due to retaliatory tariffs and applied that decline to the $391 million value of 2017 trade, producing a trade damage estimate of $238 million. For the 2019 MFP, USDA policymakers requested baseline options from OCE and chose to base trade damages on a baseline OCE calculated as a sum of the highest retaliating country imports in any year from 2009-2018 of each product defining the commodity. As a result, USDA used unrepresentative baselines equal to or higher than the highest value of retaliating country imports in any one year. For example, in 2013, China imports of U.S. durum wheat were $182 million and of “other wheat” were at their highest ($1.1 billion)—a total of $1.3 billion. In 2017, China imports of U.S. “other wheat” were lower but durum wheat was at its highest, $289 million. USDA's 2019 MFP wheat baseline summed the two separate highest values and exceeded $1.3 billion. USDA used the new baseline and the same estimated 61 percent decline to calculate 2019 MFP wheat trade damage of $836 million—more than three times the 2018 MFP estimate and more than twice the 2017 value of China imports of U.S. wheat.USDA 2019 MFP Baseline and Nominal Value of Chinese Imports of U.S. Wheat, 2009-2018For 14 of the 29 MFP-eligible commodities USDA analyzed, USDA's 2019 MFP baseline was higher than the highest value of retaliating country imports from the U.S. in any one year from 2009 through 2018. USDA officials said USDA's baseline methodology treated commodities equitably and was responsive to concerns expressed about the 2018 MFP baseline by attempting to account for policy factors such as nontariff barriers that may have been in place at different points, making it difficult to identify a single baseline. In addition to using unrepresentative baselines, USDA did not transparently document its 2019 MFP baseline methodology or selection of elasticity values.The limitations in USDA's economic analyses occurred even though USDA conducted an internal review designed to ensure it adhered to Information Quality Guidelines requiring sound analytical methods and transparency to the extent possible. As a result, USDA increased its 2019 trade damage estimates in a manner that was not transparent to decision makers and the public.Payments.  USDA's methodology for calculating 2019 MFP payments addressed some limitations of its 2018 methodology but resulted in (1) producers of the same nonspecialty crop (such as corn and soybeans) being paid differently in different counties, and (2) total payments for a nonspecialty crop different from USDA's estimate of trade damage to the crop. USDA's 2018 approach—dividing each commodity's trade damage estimate by its 2017 production—ensured the payments were proportional to trade damages, but excluded indirectly affected nonspecialty producers. In 2019, seeking to address this limitation and avoid influencing planting decisions, USDA calculated separate payment rates per acre for each county and paid the same rate to all nonspecialty producers in the county. USDA calculated each county's rate as its weighted average trade damage per acre—dividing the county's total trade damage to multiple eligible nonspecialty crops by the county's historical acres of eligible crops.USDA's county-based payment methodology for the 2019 MFP resulted in different payment rates for producers of the same nonspecialty crop in different counties. For the 2019 MFP, a county's crop mix (i.e., what others in the county planted) affected the payment rate. USDA paid higher rates to producers of a crop in a county where others planted crops with higher trade damages per acre than it paid producers of that same crop where others planted crops with lower trade damages per acre. Crop payment rates were generally higher in the South because of the South's higher proportion of cotton, sorghum and soybeans, which had higher trade damages per acre. For example, though corn yields are higher in the Midwest and West, corn producers received an estimated average of $69 per acre in the South, $61 in the Midwest, $34 in the Northeast, and $29 in the West. USDA used minimum and maximum county rates to help address potential inequities, but regional differences remained.Estimated Average County Per-Acre Payment Provided by the 2019 Market Facilitation Program by Region for Selected Nonspecialty CropsBecause USDA decoupled an individual nonspecialty crop's trade damage and its payment rate, USDA provided total payments to a nonspecialty crop higher or lower than the crop's estimated trade damage. GAO estimated that, for example, total 2019 MFP payments to corn producers were approximately $3 billion more than USDA's estimate of trade damage to corn, while payments to soybeans, sorghum, and cotton producers were lower than their estimated trade damages.Why GAO Did This StudyIn 2018, the President, citing national security concerns in one action and unfair foreign trade practices in another, increased tariffs on certain imported products. Affected trade partners retaliated with tariffs targeting U.S. exports. USDA's 2018 MFP and 2019 MFP provided a total of $23 billion to address the effect of foreign trade actions on U.S. agricultural producers.GAO was asked to review USDA's methods for estimating trade damages and providing payments to producers. This report examines (1) the extent to which the methodologies USDA used to estimate trade-related damages for the 2018 MFP and 2019 MFP addressed key elements of an economic analysis, and how those methodologies affected the estimates, and (2) strengths and limitations of the methodologies USDA used to calculate payments for the 2018 MFP and 2019 MFP and how the methodologies affected the payments. GAO reviewed USDA's documentation, data and calculations, and written responses from USDA.