Filed 3/30/17

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARCOS MENDOZA et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 H039705

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. Nos. 212506, C1114503)

Maurillo Garcia died in August 2011 after receiving multiple stab wounds. 

Defendants Marcos Mendoza, David Martell, and Juan Javier Ramirez (collectively, 

defendants) appeal their convictions, following a joint trial, for second degree murder 

(Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189)1 with gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) for killing

Garcia. 

On appeal, defendants briefed the case separately but many of their arguments 

overlap. All defendants argue the trial court erred by: (1) excluding statements of Javier 

Barragan, a co-perpetrator; (2) allowing the prosecutor to commit misconduct during the 

opening statement; (3) admitting unduly prejudicial evidence of gang-related 

intimidation; and (4) failing to properly instruct the jury regarding (a) voluntary 

intoxication, (b) the required mental state for guilt as an aider and abettor, and (c) the 

evidence necessary to prove the gang enhancement. All defendants argue that the 

prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support their gang enhancements. 

 

*

 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion 

is certified for publication with the exception of part II.

1

 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2

Mendoza and Ramirez argue that the trial court erred by: (1) allowing the 

prosecution to commit misconduct during its examination of John Deleone, a witness for 

the prosecution; (2) admitting unduly prejudicial out-of-court statements by Mendoza and 

Ramirez; (3) admitting unduly prejudicial evidence of prior convictions to prove a 

“ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)); and (4) allowing the gang 

expert to show unduly prejudicial slides in the slideshow that accompanied his expert 

testimony. 

Mendoza argues that the prosecution provided insufficient evidence to corroborate 

accomplice Tommy Gonzalez’s testimony about Mendoza’s involvement in the 

homicide. 

Martell argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his 

guilt and contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 

present a plausible theory of Martell’s innocence and by failing to properly crossexamine a witness. 

All defendants argue the foregoing errors were cumulatively prejudicial. 

In our original unpublished opinion, we found no prejudicial error, modified the 

judgments to specify a 15-year minimum parole eligibility (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5)), and 

affirmed the judgments as modified.

2

 

All defendants petitioned for rehearing. Ramirez argues, among other things, that

Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, should be applied 

retroactively to his case because he was 16 years old at the time of the offense and his 

judgment was not final when voters approved Proposition 57 at the November 2016 

general election. We granted rehearing to determine whether Ramirez was entitled to 

relief under Proposition 57. 

 

2

 The same day we filed the original opinion, we denied a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus filed by Martell’s appellate counsel that alleged ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.387(b)(2)(B).)
3

In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude that Proposition 57 does not 

apply retroactively to Ramirez’s case. In the unpublished portion (part II), we adhere to 

our original analysis and again find no prejudicial error, however we will direct that a 

new abstract of judgment be prepared for each defendant to note a 15-year minimum 

parole eligibility date based on Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5). 

I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

A. THE HOMICIDE

The jury heard two accounts of Maurillo Garcia’s death. Tommy Gonzalez, an 

accomplice, provided one account. Tommy testified that he was drinking with fellow 

Norteño gang members in the front yard of his house when a suspected Sureño gang 

member started spray-painting on the street by the house, leading Tommy and several 

others to chase down and assault the Sureño.3 Salvador Rivas, an eyewitness, provided a 

second account. He testified that he was at a party at his father’s house when he saw a 

group of five to seven men run toward and assault a man who was spray-painting in the 

street.

1. Co-Perpetrator Tommy Gonzalez’s Account

Tommy Gonzalez testified for the prosecution as part of a plea agreement whereby 

the prosecutor agreed to reduce his murder charge related to Maurillo Garcia’s death to 

voluntary manslaughter in return for his truthful testimony at defendants’ trial. Tommy 

lived at 436 Ezie St. with his mother, his brother Raymond Gonzalez, Jr. (Raymond Jr.), 

his nephew Raymond Gonzalez III (Raymond III), and others. Tommy had been a 

Norteño gang member since he was nine years old. His nickname was Beast because he 

fought frequently when he was incarcerated for a juvenile offense.

Tommy’s friend Javier Barragan called him in the afternoon on August 27, 2011 

and asked if he could come “kick back” at Tommy’s house. Barragan arrived around 

 

3

 Meaning no disrespect, we refer to members of the Gonzalez family by their 

first names because multiple members of the Gonzalez family were involved in this case.
4

6:00 or 7:00 p.m. with defendants Mendoza and Ramirez. Tommy knew Mendoza by the 

nickname Travieso and Ramirez by the nickname Smiley. Tommy testified that 

Barragan, Mendoza, and Ramirez were all part of a Norteño subset called San Jose 

Unidos. They all drank beers in the front yard and were eventually joined around 

8:00 p.m. by defendant Martell, known to Tommy as Guerro. Tommy had not met 

Martell before, but Barragan assured him that Martell was “ ‘good people.’ ” At trial, 

Tommy identified all three defendants as the people who came to his house on 

August 27. 

Around 10:00 p.m., Tommy saw a person (later identified as Maurillo Garcia) who 

looked like a Sureño gang member walk past the house twice within two minutes. Garcia

walked to a stop sign where Richdale Avenue dead-ends into Ezie Street and spraypainted something on the ground while saying “Sur Trece Putos Calle.” Tommy 

perceived Garcia’s actions as a challenge. Tommy ran toward Garcia, followed closely 

by Martell and then more distantly by Mendoza, Ramirez, and Barragan. Tommy swung 

at Garcia but missed; Garcia cut Tommy’s stomach with a screwdriver. Tommy backed 

up and “everybody jump[ed] on” Garcia. Mendoza and Ramirez were punching Garcia. 

Tommy did not see Martell or Barragan do any punching or kicking. Tommy and the 

others ran back to his mother’s Cadillac that was parked in front of 436 Ezie St. and 

drove away.

2. Witness Salvador Rivas’s Account

Salvador Rivas testified that on the night of the homicide he was attending a party 

at his father’s house on Ezie Street, which faces the intersection of Richdale Avenue and 

Ezie Street. Rivas was in the garage and the garage door facing the street was open. Jose 

Garcia (Maurillo Garcia’s brother, whom we refer to as Jose for clarity) walked by the 

house and Rivas’s father invited Jose to have a beer. Rivas noticed Maurillo Garcia

spray-painting on the street near a stop sign. Five to seven men came from the direction 
5

of 436 Ezie St. and chased Garcia.

4

 Rivas heard someone yell “ ‘Get him’ ” and 

“ ‘Norte.’ ”

Rivas testified that Garcia ran but was tripped and fell, at which point all of the 

men who chased him started beating him. Rivas stated that everyone participated in the 

assault. Garcia managed to get up for a moment but the men knocked him down again 

and continued to beat him. Rivas testified that the men mostly kicked Garcia but some 

punches were also thrown. He could not clearly see any weapons. He saw something 

shiny but acknowledged it could have been a belt buckle. Rivas also could not see any of 

the attackers well enough to identify them in court. The attack lasted about 30 seconds. 

The men went back toward 436 Ezie St. and left in a Cadillac. One of the men might 

have left separately in a van.

Rivas described the assailants as Hispanic males between 20 and 30 years old. He 

acknowledged that it was not very light outside the night of the homicide, that there were 

no streetlights in the area of Richdale where the homicide took place, and that there were 

some cars and trucks parked in the driveway of his father’s house. He estimated his 

vantage point in the garage was 60 yards from the victim. 

B. DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH MURDER

Defendants were each charged in a single felony information with murder (§ 187), 

with a special allegation that each committed the murder for the benefit of, at the 

direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).5

Ramirez, who was 16 on August 27, 2011, was charged as an adult. (Former Welf. & 

 

4

 As relevant to one of Martell’s appellate arguments, Rivas’s testimony at trial 

regarding the chase was somewhat inconsistent. On direct examination, Rivas testified 

that one male led the chase and was followed by the remaining people. On crossexamination, Rivas testified that two men led the chase but that one of them was slightly 

in front of the second, with the rest further behind the second man. 

5

 Ramirez and Martell were held to answer following a joint preliminary hearing. 

Mendoza was indicted by a grand jury. Defendants’ cases were eventually consolidated.
6

Inst. Code, § 707, subds. (b), (d)(1); Stats. 2008, ch. 179, § 236, pp. 653–656.) The 

information alleged that Martell had a prior juvenile adjudication that qualified as a 

strike. (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i); Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b); Stats. 2008, 

ch. 179, § 236, pp. 653–656.)

C. TRIAL

Trial commenced in February 2013. Defendants moved for a mistrial after the 

prosecutor’s opening statement, alleging that he argued facts that would not be 

introduced into evidence, vouched for prosecution witnesses, denigrated defendants, and 

committed Griffin error through improper reference to Ramirez’s silence when 

interrogated after his arrest. (Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 (Griffin).) The 

court denied the motion. 

1. Additional Testimony About the Homicide

Raymond Gonzalez, Jr. testified that Barragan, Martell, and Ramirez were 

drinking with Tommy in the front yard of 436 Ezie St. on the evening of the homicide. 

When the prosecutor pointed to Mendoza in the courtroom and asked if he was also there, 

Raymond Jr. responded, “I think so.” Tommy dropped Raymond Jr. off at a clubhouse in 

San Jose around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. on August 27 and Raymond Jr. did not return home 

until after 2:00 a.m. On cross-examination, Raymond Jr. acknowledged that he was a 

Norteño when he was younger but said he “grew up out of it.” He also acknowledged 

that the district attorney’s office had paid to relocate his family in return for his 

cooperation and that he had never told the police that Tommy was at the house on the 

night of the homicide.

Raymond Jr.’s son, Raymond III, also testified. Raymond III testified that he 

stayed inside the house at 436 Ezie St. the whole night on August 27. Raymond III was 

on juvenile probation when the homicide occurred. He did not want to testify. He denied 

that any of the defendants were at 436 Ezie St. the night of the homicide. He claimed that 

he lied to the police over the course of several interviews, telling them multiple versions 
7

of what happened that night and providing fictitious descriptions of suspects. He 

acknowledged testifying at Martell and Ramirez’s preliminary hearing that five men 

came over to the house the night of the homicide, that he had seen those men before, and 

that they eventually left in his grandmother’s Cadillac. He denied that his uncle Tommy 

was at the house the night of the homicide, and said his father Raymond Jr. had been 

there but had left at some point.

San Jose Police Detective Merlin Newton testified about Raymond III’s statements 

to him in the early morning the night of the homicide and during subsequent interviews. 

The night of the homicide, Raymond III described three suspects to Newton: a man with 

the nickname Big Tone; a man with “S.J.” tattooed on his chest; and a 16-year-old. 

Newton testified that Raymond III made different statements at different interviews but 

that at some point he told Newton that he had been in the front yard of the house the night 

of the homicide and saw five Norteño men run after a person who was spray-painting on 

Richdale Avenue. Raymond III reportedly told Newton that the men ran out of Raymond 

III’s view and eventually returned to the house before driving away in his grandmother’s 

Cadillac. 

Newton testified that, over the course of four interviews, Newton showed 

Raymond III pictures of individuals (including the defendants) and asked Raymond III if 

any of them were at the house the night of the homicide. Raymond III was inconsistent 

regarding whether Martell had been there the night of the homicide but at some point he 

identified a picture of Martell as a suspect during one of the interviews. Raymond III

identified a picture of Ramirez as the 16-year-old he had described as being present the 

night of the homicide. He also identified pictures of three people who were never 

charged. Raymond III never identified pictures of Tommy or Mendoza. 
8

2. Defendants’ Flight the Night of the Homicide

a. Tommy’s Testimony

Tommy testified that he drove the Cadillac away from 436 Ezie St. with Mendoza, 

Ramirez, Martell, and Barragan. While they were driving, Mendoza reportedly stated,

“ ‘I got that nigga,’ ” and also stated that he “ ‘booked him’ ” 14 or 15 times. Ramirez 

said “I was carving that fool’s face,” and then complained to Mendoza that “you fucking 

cut me, bitch.” Mendoza responded that Ramirez “shouldn’t be getting in my way when 

I’m handling my business.” Ramirez had a deep cut on his hand.

Tommy testified that Barragan told him to drive to Peckerwood’s (later identified 

as John Deleone’s) apartment in the Thornbridge Apartments, which were near Ezie 

Street. Barragan asked for the weapons and Tommy reportedly saw a kitchen knife that 

had been used by Mendoza as well as a screwdriver.6 At some point, Martell said that he 

had dropped his phone somewhere. Tommy parked, they wiped down the car, and he and 

Barragan went upstairs to Deleone’s apartment. Tommy or Barragan handed the 

weapons to Deleone, Deleone’s girlfriend took them into the bathroom, and then “you 

hear the water running.” 

Tommy testified that Barragan’s brother Junior picked the group up from 

Deleone’s apartment about ten minutes after they arrived and drove them to Barragan’s 

mother’s house near the Oakridge Mall. The group stayed at Barragan’s mother’s house 

for a short time. Martell left separately before the others. Tommy, Barragan, Mendoza, 

and Ramirez were picked up by someone with the nickname Creeper and driven to 

Milpitas. When they arrived in Milpitas, a “cop car pulled in right behind us, and we got 

off and took off running.”

 

6

 Tommy acknowledged on cross-examination that he had told the police during 

previous interviews that he never saw the weapons.
9

b. John Deleone’s Testimony

John Deleone testified in return for use immunity and an agreement that the 

prosecutor would resolve pending drug charges against Deleone with drug rehabilitation 

and a county jail sentence. Deleone testified that in August 2011 he was a heavy 

methamphetamine user, using up to one-eighth ounce per day. His girlfriend was also a 

heavy methamphetamine user. He acknowledged at trial that he had a poor memory due 

to his prior drug use. He knew Barragan and also knew Mendoza, but only by the 

nickname Travi. He knew Ramirez by the nickname Smiley and claimed to be like a big 

brother to him. Based on refreshed recollection from Deleone’s testimony at Mendoza’s

grand jury proceedings, Deleone testified that Barragan was a Norteño who was affiliated 

with San Jose Unidos. Deleone acknowledged that he identified Ramirez at the grand 

jury hearing as a member of San Jose Unidos but testified at trial that “I might have 

misspoke when you asked me that question.”

Deleone testified that Barragan and Smiley came to his apartment on August 27 

around 11:00 p.m. with a third person whose identity Deleone could not remember. The 

prosecutor purported to refresh Deleone’s recollection by reading the following out loud 

from the grand jury transcript: “ ‘What happens on this occasion? Who came over on 

this occasion?’ [¶] Your answer was: [¶] ‘I remember Javi, Javier, Juan, and somebody 

else. I don’t remember who the other person -- I think it was Travi, but I couldn’t be 

certain.’ ”

7

 Deleone acknowledged at trial that he had also told investigating officers that 

the third person could have been Beast (Tommy’s nickname). Deleone did not see 

Martell that night.

Deleone testified that the people who came to his apartment that night were 

agitated. Ramirez reportedly told Deleone that he hit a guy with a Phillips-head 

screwdriver five to ten times and demonstrated by making stabbing motions on a couch 

 

7

 The court overruled defense objections to the prosecutor’s method of refreshing 

Deleone’s recollection.
10

or a pillow. When asked whether the people who came to his house brought weapons, 

Deleone stated that they brought a knife, a box cutter, and a Phillips-head screwdriver. 

The court later struck that testimony when Deleone clarified that he never saw weapons 

that night and instead only saw a black sweatshirt wrapped around certain items that 

Barragan brought to the apartment. Deleone’s girlfriend took the black sweatshirt to a 

sink and turned on the water, at which point Deleone “could hear all the stuff rattling 

around in the sink.”8 Deleone testified that it seemed like the others were trying to shift 

the blame for the stabbing to Ramirez.

3. Tommy Flees, Is Arrested in Texas, and Cooperates with Police

Tommy testified that he moved to Texas after the homicide, where he was arrested 

in March 2012 for resisting arrest. San Jose police detectives came to Texas and 

interrogated Tommy regarding the Garcia homicide. Tommy testified that the officers 

played a short portion of a videotaped interview between Barragan and the police, during 

which Barragan appeared to be trying to blame everything on Tommy.9 Faced with that 

interview, Tommy decided to cooperate with the police and tell them his version of the 

homicide.

On cross-examination, Tommy acknowledged that he had an extensive criminal 

history and that he cooperated with the police to avoid a possible life sentence. He also 

acknowledged that he might not have positively identified Martell during the initial Texas 

 

8

 After the court struck the testimony about weapons, the prosecutor referred to 

the items in the sweatshirt as weapons two more times and the trial court sustained 

defense objections each time. The court later denied a defense mistrial motion based on 

the prosecutor’s conduct.

9

 The court denied a defense motion to admit statements from the Barragan 

interview.
11

interview and might have stated more generally that a picture of Martell looked 

familiar.10 

4. Cell Phone, DNA, and Fingerprint Evidence

A San Jose police officer testified that police found a cellular phone on Richdale 

Avenue near the intersection of Richdale and Ezie Street the night of the homicide. The 

phone was registered to Martell’s mother and contained a photograph of Martell that 

looked like it was taken by Martell “holding out his cell phone and taking a photo of 

himself.” The clip on the phone’s case that would secure it to a pocket was loose.

The prosecution introduced information about the general locations of various 

cellular phones based on call activity on the night of the killing. San Jose Police 

Detective Juan Vallejo testified that cellular phone calls generally connect through the 

nearest cellular tower to the phone’s location. The San Jose Police Department employee 

who created a trial exhibit mapping cellular phone activity testified that a phone’s 

location cannot be precisely identified based on its connection with a cellular tower and 

that if a tower is busy a phone can connect through a different tower.

Detective Vallejo testified that on August 27, calls from Martell’s phone 

connected through a cellular tower in the San Francisco area before 8:00 p.m. and

through towers in San Jose between 8:20 p.m. and 8:23 p.m. No further calls were made 

from that phone after 8:23 p.m. that night. Data for a phone number associated with 

Tommy showed that the phone connected with a tower near the crime scene from 

6:22 p.m. until 10:02 p.m., through a tower south of the crime scene and closer to 

Deleone’s apartment at 10:41 p.m., through a tower southwest of the crime scene near 

Barragan’s mother’s house at 10:58 p.m., and through a tower in Milpitas between 2:51 

and 4:03 a.m. on August 28. Data for a phone number associated with Mendoza were 

 

10

 Merlin Newton, one of the San Jose detectives who interviewed Tommy in 

Texas, testified at trial that Tommy identified Martell during the Texas interrogation as 

the person who lost his phone the night of the homicide.
12

generally consistent with Tommy’s in both time and location on August 27 and the early 

morning of August 28. A phone number associated with Ramirez showed phone calls 

made through a tower in Milpitas around the same time as some of Tommy’s calls. 

The jury also heard testimony regarding fingerprint and DNA evidence. A 

fingerprint on a beer can found in the back yard at 436 Ezie St. matched Martell. 

Martell’s DNA was found on a cigarette located in the front yard of 436 Ezie St. A 

fingerprint on a different beer can found in the back yard of 436 Ezie St. matched 

Mendoza. One of Mendoza’s fingerprints matched a fingerprint found on a beer can in 

the front driveway of 436 Ezie St. Mendoza’s DNA was found on a swab collected from 

that same beer can. Ramirez’s DNA was present in dried blood taken from the exterior 

rear passenger side door of a gray Cadillac the police found on August 31 at the 

Thornbridge Apartments.

5. Victim Information and Autopsy Results

A crime scene investigator testified that Garcia had “S.U.R.” tattooed in capital 

letters on his left arm as well as a tattoo of a man’s head wearing a bandana with 

“V.S.T.” and “13” written on it. He also had a star to the left of his left eye and three 

dots to the right of his right eye.

Dr. Joseph O’Hara testified as an expert in pathology and cause of death about the 

autopsy he performed in the case. Garcia suffered 15 stab wounds to his face, chest, 

abdomen, thighs, arms, right foot, and lower back. Among the most severe stab wounds 

were a four- and one-half-inch deep wound to the chest; a four-inch deep wound to the 

abdomen that perforated his liver; a three-inch deep wound to the chest that collapsed a 

lung; and a five-inch deep wound to the armpit. Each of those four stab wounds could 

have been independently fatal without medical treatment. Though he could not be 

certain, Dr. O’Hara testified that the structure of the stab wounds indicated the possibility 

that two weapons were used: one with a single-edged blade and another with a doubleedged blade. There were no round puncture wounds, as would be expected if a Phillips-
13

head screwdriver was used as a weapon. Garcia suffered three incised wounds (wounds 

that are longer than they are deep) and multiple blunt-force injuries, including contusions, 

abrasions, and lacerations. Dr. O’Hara opined that the cause of death was multiple stab 

wounds of the head, trunk, and extremities.

6. Statements by Defendants

Detective Vallejo testified about interrogating Martell on August 31 with 

Detective Newton.

11

 Martell was read his Miranda12 rights and asked about the night of 

the homicide. Martell claimed he had been in San Francisco watching a football game 

that day and returned to the San Jose area around 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. Martell claimed he 

was dropped off at a grocery store near Ezie Street, walked to the house of his cousin

(who was not home), and then walked to his aunt’s house where he stayed the rest of the 

night. Martell said he lost his phone that day and thought he dropped it while walking 

from the grocery store to his cousin’s house. The prosecutor asked Vallejo whether 

Martell admitted being a Norteño when he was younger, and Vallejo testified that Martell 

“said back when he was a juvenile, he was involved with gangs.” Martell repeatedly 

denied being on Ezie Street on August 27 and told the police he did not know anything 

about the homicide. Detective Vallejo testified that at the time of the interview Martell 

had scratches and abrasions on his hands and a large “S.J.” tattooed on his stomach.

Detective Newton testified about interrogating Ramirez in September 2011 after 

arresting him and reading him his Miranda rights. Ramirez had what Newton described 

as a healing wound on his right ring finger. Ramirez said he was familiar with Ezie 

Street and had been there on one afternoon about two months earlier. He identified a 

picture of Barragan as a friend but claimed not to know his name. Ramirez denied being 

a Norteño, stating “No, I just hang out with,” before trailing off. He steadfastly denied 

 

11

 The video recording of the interrogation and a transcript were admitted into 

evidence at trial after certain information was redacted.

12

 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
14

being on Ezie Street on August 27 and also denied participating in any sort of assault that 

might have occurred there.

The jury heard statements made by Mendoza from three sources: a non-custodial 

interview; a booking interview; and text messages from Mendoza’s cellular phone. 

Detective Newton conducted a non-custodial interview with Mendoza at Mendoza’s 

workplace in March 2012.

13

 At the non-custodial interview, Mendoza stated that he had 

heard of Ezie Street but had never been there. He denied being in a gang. When asked if 

he “claimed Northern,” Mendoza responded “[j]ust Northern, yeah.” Newton showed 

Mendoza pictures of Martell, Barragan, and possibly other suspects; Mendoza denied 

knowing any of them. Mendoza had a large “U” tattoo that extended from the top of his 

chest down to his belly button. He also had “Unidos” tattooed across his stomach. 

Newton testified that Mendoza told him those tattoos were in support of a college team 

he liked, the Utah Utes. 

When Mendoza was booked into the county jail after his arrest, correctional 

officer Gilbert Rios conducted a classification interview with Mendoza. Rios testified

that all inmates are asked if they associate with a gang when they are booked into the 

county jail. Inmates were told that the gang association question was for their safety and 

that their response would remain confidential. Rios testified that if an individual 

indicated they would rather be housed with members of a certain gang, that would be 

treated as an admission. Rios’s notes indicated that Mendoza “admitted Northerner.” 

The trial court also admitted text messages from Mendoza’s phone relating to drug 

sales.

7. Gang Expert

San Jose Police Detective Chris Gridley testified as an expert regarding gang 

crimes. Gridley testified about Norteños generally, described prior convictions offered to 

 

13

 After minor redactions, the audio recording of Mendoza’s non-custodial 

interview was admitted into evidence over his relevance objection. 
15

prove a pattern of criminal gang activity, offered opinions about defendants’ gang 

affiliations, and opined that the murder was gang-related. As Gridley’s testimony is 

relevant to several issues on appeal, we will discuss it in greater detail in Part II.D.1.

8. Evidence of Intimidation 

Evidence suggesting intimidation of witnesses was admitted over defendants’ 

objections. Deleone testified that he was punched in the mouth by an inmate while in 

custody in the Santa Clara County Jail in May 2012. Deleone was told that the attack had 

been ordered by “the Nortenos” because Deleone had made statements to the police 

related to defendants’ case.

14

 He was “[s]omewhat” fearful for his life afterward and was 

moved into protective custody. Deleone asked the district attorney’s office to relocate 

him and also asked for an escort to and from testifying at defendants’ trial because he 

feared for his life.

Tommy testified that at some point between the homicide and his arrest in Texas, 

Barragan’s brother Junior told Tommy that his nephew and his brother (presumably 

meaning Raymond Jr. and Raymond III) “are snitching on me and on everybody” and 

asked Tommy if he knew where they were.15 Tommy withheld the information because 

he feared for both his and his family’s safety.

Salvador Rivas testified that his home was vandalized in October 2011 when

someone spray-painted graffiti on his garage and his car. Among the graffiti was “XIV.” 

Rivas feared for his family’s safety and believed the graffiti was related to him talking to 

the police because the graffiti occurred within two hours after he received a subpoena to 

testify in defendants’ case. He remained fearful at trial.

 

14

 The hearsay statement was admitted for the limited purpose of showing 

Deleone’s state of mind.

15

 The hearsay statement was admitted for the limited purpose of showing the 

effect on the listener (Tommy).
16

9. Defense Case

Though technically called by the prosecution, Martell’s attorney sought favorable 

testimony from Randy Carrasco, whose grandmother was Martell’s grandmother’s 

partner. Carrasco worked with Martell as a furniture mover and testified that it was 

common for employees to get scratches while at work.

Defense investigator James O’Keefe testified based on a site visit that the 

approximate distance between where Garcia was stabbed and the garage at 452 Ezie 

Street was 198 feet, or 66 yards. He also testified, based on an Internet search, that there 

would have been almost no light from the moon on the night of the homicide.

D. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, VERDICT, AND SENTENCING

Among other instructions, the court read versions of CALCRIM Nos. 252 (general 

v. specific intent), 400 (aiding/abetting generally), 401 (aiding/abetting intent),

403 (natural and probable consequences), 520 (murder), 875 (assault with a deadly 

weapon), 915 (simple assault), 1401 (gang enhancement) and 3426 (voluntary 

intoxication). 

The jury deliberated for several days, and ultimately found all defendants guilty of 

the lesser included offense of second degree murder and found the gang allegations true. 

Martell waived jury on the strike allegation, which the court found true after a hearing. 

The trial court sentenced each defendant to an indeterminate term of 15 years to 

life for murder. The court purported to stay the sentence for the gang enhancements. 

(See § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)16 The court granted Martell’s Romero17 motion to strike 

the true finding on the strike allegation.

 

16

 The minute order states the stay was “purs. to Johnson case,” presumably 

meaning People v. Johnson (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1237, 1239 (Johnson) [finding 

§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C) inapplicable to second-degree murder indeterminate sentence 

because § 186.22, subd. (b)(5) applies to “ ‘a felony punishable by imprisonment in the 

state prison for life’ ” and “requires that the defendant serve a minimum of 15 calendar 

years before being considered for parole”].
17

II. ISSUES RAISED IN THE ORIGINAL APPEALS

[The portion of this opinion that follows (part II) is deleted from publication.]

In this unpublished portion of the opinion, we address defendants’ appellate 

arguments in the following order: (1) exclusion of Barragan’s statements; (2) claimed 

prosecutorial misconduct in the opening statement; (3) claimed prosecutorial misconduct 

during Deleone’s testimony; (4) sufficiency of the evidence to support the gang 

enhancement; (5) admission of predicate offenses; (6) admission of certain slides in 

Gridley’s PowerPoint presentation; (7) admission of defendants’ statements; 

(8) sufficiency of the evidence corroborating Tommy’s testimony about Mendoza;

(9) admission of intimidation evidence; (10) claimed instructional error; (11) sufficiency 

of the evidence to convict Martell; (12) effectiveness of Martell’s trial counsel; (13) the 

purported stay of the gang enhancements; and (14) cumulative error.

A. EXCLUSION OF BARRAGAN’S STATEMENTS

Defendants argue that the trial court erred by excluding statements Barragan had 

made to the police under a use immunity agreement, arguing they were admissible as 

declarations against interest. (Evid. Code, § 1230.) We review a trial court’s evidentiary 

decisions for abuse of discretion. (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 711 (Grimes).)

1. Background

During trial, outside the jury’s presence, defendants moved to introduce statements 

Javier Barragan had made to the police while under a grant of use immunity. The district 

attorney’s office had apparently agreed to consider entering into a plea agreement with 

Barragan in exchange for his complete and truthful answers to police officers’ questions. 

The agreement stated: “Should the prosecution decide not to extend such [plea] offer to 

Javier Barragan, the prosecution agrees: [¶] (1) not to use any statement ... against Javier 

 

17

 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
18

Barragan in the prosecution’s case-in-chief in ... any criminal matter ... regarding which 

he has provided information.” (Capitalization omitted.)

After signing the immunity agreement, Barragan (accompanied by an attorney) 

spoke at length with Detectives Newton and Vallejo about the homicide. As relevant 

here, Barragan admitted actively participating in killing Garcia. Barragan stated that 

Mendoza came to 436 Ezie Street only briefly to buy “bud” and “dope” and that 

Mendoza left before the homicide occurred. Barragan appeared to suggest that Martell 

was minimally involved in the killing, stating that after assaulting Garcia, Barragan 

“looked back, like ‘ ... where’s Martell,’ you know, what the fuck? And I look, and he’s 

in there, like, looking around, and I’m like, ‘What the fuck’s he looking for?’ ” Barragan 

also stated that Martell was “nowhere near there” after the assault and that Martell did not 

leave the scene of the homicide with the others. 

Barragan’s statements were inconsistent regarding Ramirez. He stated that 

Ramirez was one of the first people to run after Garcia and that “Ramirez pulled out his 

knife and used it against” Garcia. But later in the interview Barragan stated that Tommy 

and an unidentified teenager were the only two people who stabbed Garcia and that 

Ramirez was merely kicking Garcia. 

Defendants argued the statements were admissible as statements against penal 

interest (Evid. Code, § 1230). The court denied defendants’ motion. 

2. Analysis

Out-of-court statements like Barragan’s statements to the police are generally 

inadmissible to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) A 

statement that would otherwise be hearsay is admissible if: the declarant had “sufficient 

knowledge of the subject”; the declarant is unavailable as a witness; and “the statement, 

when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so 

far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid 

a claim by [the declarant] against another, or created such a risk of making [the declarant] 
19

an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable 

[person] in [the declarant’s] position would not have made the statement unless [the 

declarant] believed it to be true.” (Evid. Code, § 1230.) The “ ‘heart of this 

exception ... is ... the basic trustworthiness of the declaration.’ ” (People v. Gordon 

(1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1251 (Gordon), disapproved on another ground by People v. 

Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835.) Whether “trustworthiness is present requires the 

[trial] court to apply to the peculiar facts of the individual case a broad and deep 

acquaintance with the ways human beings actually conduct themselves in the 

circumstances material under the exception.” (Gordon, at p. 1251.) 

The Supreme Court recently clarified that trial courts need not “sever and excise 

any and all portions of an otherwise inculpatory statement that do not ‘further 

incriminate’ the declarant.” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 716.) Instead, “courts must 

consider each statement in context” to determine whether the “statement, even if not 

independently inculpatory of the declarant, is nevertheless against the declarant’s interest, 

such that ‘a reasonable man in [the declarant’s] position would not have made the 

statement unless he believed it to be true.’ ” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court noted that a 

statement is more likely to satisfy the against-interest exception when the declarant 

inculpates himself or herself while also exculpating someone else. However, “not all 

such statements are admissible; sometimes a declarant who makes an inculpatory 

statement may have a substantial incentive to exculpate others.” For example, a 

“member of a criminal street gang ... may choose to take the fall for fellow gang 

members by making a confession that exculpates them.” (Ibid.) 

The trial court could reasonably find that Barragan’s statements were 

insufficiently trustworthy for two reasons: (1) the statements were made in return for a 

promise of immunity; and (2) the statements were made about fellow gang members. 

Barragan’s written agreement to be interviewed informed him that after the interview 

“the prosecution may offer to enter into a negotiated plea ... .” The agreement also 
20

included a broad immunity clause under which the prosecution agreed not to use any 

statements made during the interview against Barragan “in the prosecution’s case-in-chief 

in ... any criminal matter[, or] in the prosecution’s case-in-chief in any matter in which he 

is criminally charged ... .” The trial court could reasonably conclude that Barragan’s 

statements—made with the hope of a negotiated plea and with the knowledge that the 

statements could not be used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief in any criminal matter 

against Barragan—were not made under circumstances that were so far contrary to 

Barragan’s interests that a reasonable person in his position would not have made them 

unless he believed them to be true. (Evid. Code, § 1230.) Even if the agreement did not 

immunize Barragan from every conceivable penal consequence, the trial court could 

nonetheless find that the agreement made Barragan’s statements insufficiently 

trustworthy.

Defendants attack the trial court’s justification for excluding the statements, which 

was based on Justice Kennard’s concurrence in Gordon, where she stated “it is well 

established that a statement made under a grant of immunity is not admissible as a 

declaration against penal interest.” (Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1281 (conc. opn. of 

Kennard, J.).) Though the trial court was not legally bound by that statement, Justice 

Kennard’s discussion is persuasive authority that identifies a relevant factor to consider 

when evaluating the trustworthiness of a declarant’s statements.

In addition to being made under an immunity agreement, Barragan’s exculpatory 

statements about defendants were made about fellow gang members. The Supreme Court 

in Grimes cautioned that statements by a gang member exculpating fellow gang members 

might not meet the against-interest exception because a gang member “may choose to 

take the fall for fellow gang members by making a confession that exculpates them.” 

(Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 716.) The gang expert testified that Barragan, Mendoza, 

and Martell were Norteño gang members, and that Ramirez was a Norteño gang 

associate. The trial court could reasonably conclude that Barragan had an incentive to 
21

inculpate himself to protect fellow his gang members (i.e., defendants), which would 

vitiate the statements’ trustworthiness. The trustworthiness of Barragan’s exculpatory 

statements was particularly suspect here because Barragan knew, based on the immunity 

agreement, that he would suffer no penal consequences for incriminating himself to 

protect defendants. 

Defendants’ due process argument is without merit. The cases cited by defendants 

finding federal constitutional error all involved objectively trustworthy evidence that was 

excluded by mechanistic or erroneous application of evidentiary rules. (Chambers v. 

Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284 [federal constitutional error where trial court excluded 

evidence that another person “had admitted responsibility for the murder on four separate 

occasions”]; Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 96–97 [federal constitutional error 

where Supreme Court found “substantial reasons” to assume the excluded statements’ 

reliability]; Cudjo v. Ayers (9th Cir. 2012) 698 F.3d 752, 763 [federal constitutional error 

where “trustworthy and material exculpatory evidence was erroneously excluded”].) 

Because the trial court properly applied the hearsay exception and Barragan’s statements 

lack the level of reliability that would support a showing of federal constitutional error, 

there was no due process violation in the trial court’s decision to exclude Barragan’s 

statements. (See Miller v. Stagner (9th Cir. 1985) 757 F.2d 988, 995 [reviewing courts 

“must give due weight to the substantial state interest in preserving orderly trials, in 

judicial efficiency, and in excluding unreliable or prejudicial evidence.”].)

B. MISCONDUCT IN OPENING STATEMENT 

1. Statements About Rivas’s Veracity

Defendants argue the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of 

Salvador Rivas. A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of witnesses by referring 

to evidence outside the record but may mention the “ ‘apparent honesty or reliability’ ” of 

witnesses so long as that statement is based on facts in the record as well as reasonable 

inferences drawn from those facts. (People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 39.) 
22

The prosecutor described Rivas’s expected testimony, stating: “And he can’t see 

any stabbing, but can ... see that everyone in this group is participating. He says five to 

seven people. This is what he -- he was cooperative with the police and told them that 

much. And I believe that he will be a cooperative and an honest witness here in court.”

There was no suggestion by the prosecutor that he was relying on personal 

knowledge outside of what he intended to present as evidence to vouch for Rivas. He 

merely expressed a belief that he thought Rivas would testify honestly and implied that 

he based that belief on Rivas’s cooperation with the police. The prosecutor’s comments 

did not amount to improper vouching. 

2. Stating that Defendants Lied to Police

Defendants argue that the prosecutor improperly denigrated them by stating that 

they lied to police. “Prosecutors ‘are allowed a wide range of descriptive comment and 

the use of epithets which are reasonably warranted by the evidence,’ ” and they may 

make fair comments on what they anticipate the evidence may show. (People v. Farnam

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 168 [finding no misconduct where prosecutor referred to the 

defendant during opening statement as monstrous, cold-blooded, and a predator].)

The prosecutor here told the jury that officers would testify about their interviews 

with the defendants. The prosecutor argued that when confronted with evidence that his 

cellular phone was at the scene, Martell “gives them a lie. He does not give any

explanation, that he just watched, or that he was acting in self-defense. [¶] He says: ‘No. 

No. I wasn’t there.’ And then gives this phony alibi ... .” The prosecutor continued: 

“The police ... arrest Juan Ramirez. ‘Look, we know you were there. Just tell us what 

happened.’ Give them an opportunity to tell their evidence. ... [¶] Juan Ramirez lies. 

He doesn’t say: ‘I just watched. I didn’t participate.’ He says: ‘No. Wasn’t there. I may 

have been drunk one time two months ago, but I wasn’t at no murder scene on Ezie 

Street.’ ” As for Mendoza, the prosecutor stated Mendoza denied he was at Ezie Street 

the night of the murder and “[l]ies to the police.” The prosecutor concluded: “The 
23

evidence will show you that all these defendants lied because they knew they were guilty 

of first degree murder.” 

Rather than labeling them generally as liars, as defendants suggest on appeal, the 

prosecutor stated that each defendant lied in a specific context (i.e., when asked by police 

whether he was present at the scene of the homicide). The prosecutor could reasonably 

expect the evidence to show that the defendants were indeed present on Ezie Street on the 

night of the homicide based on the anticipated testimony of Tommy and Raymond Jr., as 

well as physical evidence including DNA and fingerprints. The prosecutor’s statements 

were not improper. 

3. Claimed Griffin Error

Defendants argue that the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendants’ 

failure to explain when given “an opportunity to tell their evidence” when questioned by 

the police. A prosecutor’s comment on a defendant’s silence violates the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 615 [“[T]he 

Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government, and in its bearing 

on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the 

prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is 

evidence of guilt.”].) 

The prosecutor stated during his opening statement that the police gave defendants 

“an opportunity to tell their evidence” and that “all these defendants lied” when given 

that opportunity. Counsel for Ramirez (joined by the other defendants) asserted Griffin

error during his mistrial motion, arguing that “it was very subtle, but it’s [Griffin] error, 

because my client asked for an attorney, and [the prosecutor] should not be allowed to 

say my client wouldn’t cooperate.”

Defendants argue that after the jury heard that defendants lied to the police when 

given an opportunity to explain themselves, the jury was “improperly encouraged ... to 

consider [defendants’] assumed decision not to testify at trial when considering” 
24

defendants’ statements to police. They continue that because the prosecutor called

attention to defendants’ failure to testify, the jury necessarily took the prosecutor’s 

statements as a comment on their failure to testify.

The prosecutor did not focus on defendants’ silence, but rather on their assertions 

that they were not involved in the homicide. The prosecutor characterized defendants’ 

assertions as lies, based on the evidence he intended to present. As discussed in the 

preceding section, the prosecutor stated that defendants lied in a specific context. 

Contrary to defendants’ argument, taking the stand at trial was not “the only means to 

redeem [defendants’] credibility ... .” Defendants could have supported their pretrial 

assertions of non-involvement by attacking the prosecutor’s circumstantial evidence of 

defendants’ presence or by presenting evidence of their own. Thus, we do not find that 

the prosecutor’s statement could reasonably be construed by the jury as a comment on 

defendants’ failure to testify at trial.

4. Reference to Deleone’s Girlfriend’s Motive to Dispose of Weapons

Mendoza and Ramirez argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 

referencing facts that the prosecutor knew could not be introduced into evidence. “The 

purpose of the opening statement is to inform the jury of the evidence the prosecution 

intends to present, and the manner in which the evidence and reasonable inferences relate 

to the prosecution’s theory of the case.” (People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 137.) 

Remarks made during an opening statement are not impermissible misconduct “unless 

the evidence referred to by the prosecutor ‘was “so patently inadmissible as to charge the 

prosecutor with knowledge that it could never be admitted.” ’ ” (People v. Wrest (1992) 

3 Cal.4th 1088, 1108 (Wrest).) 

a. Background

Deleone testified during Mendoza’s grand jury proceedings that Barragan and 

others came to his apartment with “bloody weapons and a bloody sweatshirt.” The 

people who came over wanted the weapons washed and Deleone’s girlfriend “told 
25

everybody that she was going to wash them and dispose of them.” Deleone stated that 

the weapons were “wrapped up in a dark sweatshirt” and that while he did not see the 

weapons, he knew what they were because his girlfriend told him what they were. He 

answered in the affirmative when the prosecutor asked him if he used to buy 

methamphetamine “from the Barragans ... .”

The prosecutor told the jury in his opening statement that he expected Deleone to 

testify that Barragan, Ramirez, and another person came to his apartment with “weapons, 

which Javi, Mr. Barragan, had wrapped up in a black sweatshirt, that [Deleone’s] 

girlfriend took these weapons and disposed of them for these guys. She was also a meth 

user, wanted to continue to participate in getting meth.” There was no contemporaneous 

objection but counsel for Ramirez included argument on this point in the mistrial motion 

he made after the opening statement.

The prosecutor asked Deleone at trial about his drug source. Deleone testified that 

he did not get his drugs from Javier Barragan, stated that he knew Barragan’s brother, 

and responded “Yeah” when the prosecutor asked: “Did you get drugs from either of 

them?” The trial court sustained a relevance objection to the prosecutor’s next question 

(“Who?”).

b. Analysis

Mendoza and Ramirez argue that the prosecutor’s opening statement informed the 

jury that defendants brought weapons to Deleone’s apartment and that Deleone’s 

girlfriend disposed of those weapons to support her methamphetamine habit even though 

the prosecutor knew he could not provide evidence to support those facts. Regardless of 

Deleone’s personal knowledge (or lack thereof), the prosecutor’s statement about the 

presence of weapons is supported by Tommy’s trial testimony that he and Barragan 

brought weapons to the house and handed them to Deleone’s girlfriend. 

As for Deleone’s girlfriend’s motive to dispose of the weapons, the prosecutor did 

not produce direct evidence at trial regarding a motive. However, when he made his 
26

opening statement the prosecutor knew that Deleone had testified to the grand jury that at 

the time of the homicide Deleone’s girlfriend obtained her methamphetamine from 

Deleone, who purchased it from the Barragans. Based on that grand jury testimony, the 

prosecutor could reasonably expect Deleone to give the same testimony at trial and it is a 

reasonable inference that Deleone’s girlfriend would help a drug dealer dispose of 

evidence due to a desire to continue receiving methamphetamine. Further, while the jury 

never heard which of Barragan’s family members was Deleone’s drug supplier because 

the trial court sustained a relevance objection to the prosecutor’s question, the prosecutor 

did not know when he made his opening statement that the court would later sustain that 

objection. And that evidence was not so patently inadmissible that the prosecutor should 

have known the trial court would sustain an objection. (See Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 

1108.)

5. Reference to Ramirez Dealing Drugs

Ramirez argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating that Ramirez 

dealt drugs even though “the prosecutor had never identified drug dealing as a bad act on

which he intended to rely.” Ramirez appears to argue that the prosecutor’s reference to 

drug dealing violated a pretrial order, which would constitute misconduct. (People v. 

Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 373 [“[I]t is misconduct to elicit or attempt to elicit 

inadmissible evidence in violation of a court ruling ... .”].) 

a. Background

Ramirez filed a pretrial motion in limine, entitled “Alleged Juvenile Bad Acts 

and/or Acts of Moral Turpitude,” that specifically referenced two bad acts: Ramirez’s 

arrest in the early morning of August 28, 2011 for being drunk in public, and Ramirez’s 

arrest in September 2011 for a “beer run” where he stole a case of beer from a 

convenience store. (Emphasis omitted.) The motion stated that Ramirez believed the 

prosecution would seek to admit evidence of “these bad acts” and sought to exclude “any 
27

mention of this evidence” under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court granted the 

motion.

During his opening statement, the prosecutor said: “Barragan and Juan Ramirez, 

they are tight. I believe Mr. Deleone will tell you that when Javier Barragan was arrested 

for his attempted murder as a juvenile, he went away, also, to C.Y.A. And during that 

time, it was Juan Ramirez who took his cell phone and conducted the drug-dealing that 

he’d been doing on his behalf during that time period.” There was no contemporaneous 

objection but counsel for Ramirez argued in his oral mistrial motion after the prosecutor’s 

opening statement that he had previously moved to exclude “all, not just convictions, but 

all bad acts of my client ... . And the court ruled in my favor.” 

b. Analysis

On appeal, Ramirez argues that “[a]t no time, in any brief or argument, did the 

prosecutor reveal an intention to suggest that Mr. Ramirez was a drug dealer.” But 

Ramirez does not identify any legal duty requiring the prosecutor to have done so. 

Ramirez suggests that his pretrial motion sought to exclude “any prior bad acts,” but his 

motion was not so broad. Apparently based on information received from the 

prosecution, the motion specified two bad acts, neither of which was drug dealing.

Ramirez’s motion did not mention, much less seek to exclude, evidence that Ramirez 

dealt drugs, nor did he raise that bad act at the pretrial hearings on the motion. As 

Ramirez has not demonstrated that he sought to exclude evidence that he dealt drugs, the 

prosecutor was under no obligation to withhold discussion of that topic.

C. PROSECUTOR’S DIRECT EXAMINATION OF DELEONE

1. Testimony About Weapons

Mendoza and Ramirez contend that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 

asking Deleone questions he knew would elicit inadmissible hearsay. “[A] prosecutor 

may not ‘ “ask questions of a witness that suggest facts harmful to a defendant, absent a 

good faith belief that such facts exist.” ’ ” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 
28

1186; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 689 [“It is, of course, misconduct for a 

prosecutor to ‘intentionally elicit inadmissible testimony.’ ”], overruled on another 

ground by People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1 (Hill).) 

a. Background

Deleone testified during Mendoza’s grand jury proceedings that he never saw 

weapons the night of the homicide and knew about them only because his girlfriend told 

him about them. 

At trial, the prosecutor asked Deleone if the people who came to his apartment the 

night of the homicide brought weapons and, after Deleone answered affirmatively, asked 

Deleone: “What kind of weapons?” Deleone testified that the weapons were a knife, a 

box cutter, and a Philips-head screwdriver. Defense counsel objected that the testimony 

was based on hearsay, which the trial court initially overruled. When Deleone later 

testified that “I don’t really think I seen [the weapons], but my girlfriend told me they 

were there,” the trial court struck “the testimony relating to the Philips screwdriver and 

the box cutter and the knife” and instructed the jury to “[d]isregard it.” Deleone testified 

that he heard “all the stuff” that was in the black sweatshirt one of the people who came 

to the apartment brought “rattling around in the sink.” 

The prosecutor next referred to “weapons” in the following two questions: “And 

you never saw the weapons after that?”; “You never saw the weapons after you heard that 

rattling around and the water in the sink?” The court sustained objections to each of 

those questions on the ground that they misstated the testimony. The trial court denied a 

renewed mistrial motion at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, reminding “all 

counsel that there has to be a good faith basis for any and all questions” but finding that 

“given the nature of the testimony that was to be anticipated from Mr. Deleone, who 

really knew what he was going to say[?]”
29

b. Analysis

We see no error in the trial court’s implicit finding that there was a good faith

basis for the prosecutor’s initial question about weapons. Though the prosecutor was 

likely aware that Deleone had testified during the grand jury proceedings that he never 

saw the weapons, the prosecutor also knew, as Deleone freely admitted at trial, that 

Deleone had been a heavy methamphetamine user at the time of the homicide and that his 

prior drug use adversely affected his ability to remember things. Based on that history, 

the prosecutor could reasonably believe at trial that Deleone might remember personally 

seeing the weapons. However, once Deleone testified at trial that he had not seen the 

weapons, the prosecutor no longer had any good faith basis for continuing to refer to 

“weapons” in further questions to Deleone. The trial court correctly sustained objections 

to those questions and instructed the prosecutor to rephrase. 

Mendoza and Ramirez argue that despite the trial court’s proper response to those 

questions, the prosecutor’s misconduct in asking the questions constitutes reversible 

error. Mendoza argues that the error should be reviewed under the harmless-beyond-areasonable-doubt standard applicable to federal constitutional error but does not explain 

why that standard applies. The cases he cites regarding prosecutorial misconduct apply 

the test applicable to state law error: whether there is a reasonable probability that he 

would have received a more favorable result had the error not occurred. (Citing People v. 

Wagner (1975) 13 Cal.3d 612, 620 [citing Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13]; see also People v. 

Johnson (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 866, 874 [“ ‘[M]isconduct will cause reversal if it caused 

a miscarriage of justice, that is, if there is a reasonable probability that it shifted the 

verdict.’ ”]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) We likewise apply 

the Watson standard.

The trial court struck Deleone’s testimony regarding weapons, instructing the jury 

to “[d]isregard it.” The court also sustained objections to the prosecutor’s reference to 

“weapons” in later questions to Deleone. We presume the jury followed those specific 
30

instructions, as well as the general provisions of CALCRIM No. 222 that the attorneys’ 

“questions are not evidence.” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 453 (Boyette).) 

Further, the jury heard testimony from Tommy about the weapons the defendants 

allegedly used during the attack, and Tommy further testified that Mendoza and Ramirez 

made statements while fleeing the attack suggesting they used weapons. Mendoza and 

Ramirez have not demonstrated a reasonable probability of a more favorable result had 

the prosecutor not asked the improper questions. 

2. Improperly Refreshing Deleone’s Recollection

Mendoza argues, and the People essentially concede, that the prosecutor 

improperly refreshed Deleone’s recollection by reading an excerpt from Deleone’s grand 

jury testimony out loud in front of the jury. “Statements which have no independent 

basis of admissibility may not be introduced under the guise of refreshing a witness’ 

memory. If it is necessary to refresh the memory of a witness through the use of a prior 

recorded statement, that statement should not be read aloud before the jury but should be 

given to the witness to read or be read by the attorney outside the presence of the jury.” 

(People v. Parks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 955, 960–961 (Parks).)

a. Background

Deleone testified at trial that on the night of the homicide, Barragan and Ramirez 

came into his apartment but that he did not “remember any other people coming in [his]

house.” The prosecutor asked Deleone: “Do you remember testifying at the grand jury, 

and you weren’t sure about this, but that you thought that a third person, Travi, came in?” 

Mendoza’s trial counsel objected that the prosecutor was leading the witness, which the 

court overruled. Deleone testified: “Yeah, I thought there was a third person. I wasn’t 

sure who it was.” The prosecutor eventually read from the grand jury transcript: “My 

question to you, line 24: [¶] ‘What happens on this occasion? Who came over on this 

occasion?’ [¶] Your answer was: [¶] ‘I remember Javi, Javier, Juan, and somebody else. 

I don’t remember who the other person -- I think it was Travi, but I couldn’t be certain.’ ” 
31

b. Analysis

As the People concede that the prosecutor improperly refreshed Deleone’s 

recollection, the only dispute is whether that error was prejudicial. Mendoza cites 

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman) as the appropriate standard for 

prejudice, but does not demonstrate how the prosecutor’s action violated any of 

Mendoza’s federal constitutional rights. Absent a showing that Mendoza’s federal 

constitutional rights were violated, we consider whether it is reasonably probable that he 

would have obtained a more favorable result had the error not occurred. (Parks, supra,

4 Cal.3d at p. 961, citing Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

At trial, Deleone testified that he could not remember the name of the third person 

who came to his house the night of the homicide. He was not even sure if a third person 

accompanied Barragan and Ramirez at all. Though it was damaging to Mendoza to have 

the jury hear that Deleone had previously indicated at the grand jury hearing that 

Mendoza might have been present, the grand jury testimony was equivocal. Deleone 

stated he thought Mendoza was the third person, “but I couldn’t be certain.” During 

extensive cross-examination at trial by all three defendants’ attorneys, Deleone 

consistently acknowledged both generally that he had a poor memory due to his history 

of heavy methamphetamine use and specifically that he could not remember the identity 

of the third person who came to his apartment. Deleone also testified that during at least 

one interview with police he had identified Tommy as the third person. The only other 

testimony the jury heard regarding who was present at the apartment came from Tommy, 

who testified that only he and Barragan went up to the apartment.

Further, whether Mendoza actually entered Deleone’s apartment was of secondary 

importance to the prosecution’s case. On the more fundamental issue of whether

Mendoza was with the other assailants in the hours after the homicide, the prosecution 

presented independent supporting evidence. For example, Tommy testified that Mendoza

participated in the attack and fled with the others. The prosecution also introduced 
32

evidence showing that calls from a cellular phone associated with Mendoza connected 

through towers in the vicinity of the crime scene around the time of the crime (around 

10:00 p.m.), through a tower closer to Deleone’s house closer to 11:00 p.m., through a 

tower near Barragan’s mother’s house after 11:00 p.m., and through a tower in Milpitas 

shortly after 2:00 a.m. Those locations are consistent with Tommy’s testimony about the 

group’s flight. On this record, Mendoza has not demonstrated that it is reasonably 

probable that he would have obtained a more favorable result had the jury not heard 

Deleone’s grand jury testimony. 

D. GANG ISSUES

All three defendants argue that insufficient evidence supported their gang 

enhancements. Mendoza and Ramirez argue that the prosecution was allowed to present 

an unduly prejudicial number of predicate offenses and also contend that certain slides in 

the gang expert’s slideshow were unduly prejudicial.

1. Gang Expert Testimony

Detective Chris Gridley was a gang detective with more than 100 hours of training 

about gangs, including training specifically about Hispanic gangs in San Jose. This was 

his first homicide investigation as a gang expert. He testified that indicia of gang 

membership he looks for when determining whether an individual is a gang member 

include: use of gang symbols, hand signs, and clothing; admission of gang affiliation; 

association with known gang members; tattoos; and prior gang-related criminal conduct.

Gridley testified that he was “familiar with a gang called the Nortenos.” He stated 

that the gang has approximately 2,000 members in San Jose and that their “territory 

would be considered Bakersfield north to Northern California.” The primary activities of 

the Norteño gang include assault with a deadly weapon, homicide, drive-by shootings, 

car theft, robbery, and burglary. Norteño gang members commonly carry weapons for 

protection and for use in attacks. Violence is common and is used to gain respect from 

other gang members and to intimidate non-gang members. It is common for gang 
33

members to support themselves by selling drugs. Common names, signs, and symbols 

for the Norteño gang include: Norte, Norteño, Northerner, the color red, the number 14, 

the Huelga bird symbol, the San Jose Sharks symbol, and “compass-bearing points for 

San Jose, such as East Side San Jo, E.S.S.J.” 

Gridley stated that the Norteño gang is an informal gang. The Norteño gang is 

affiliated with the Nuestra Familia prison gang, which Gridley described as “the pinnacle 

of Norteño prison gangs.” At the local level, gang members sometimes create formal 

subsets that claim specific territory. While street gangs “derive a history” from the 

Nuestra Familia, “not all Northerner gang members are affiliated” with the Nuestra 

Familia. The Nuestra Familia influences Norteño street gangs to “a certain extent” 

through sending out kites18 that “may be disseminated down to the street level.” But 

Gridley testified that in his experience, “some of our subsets in San Jose don’t align 

themselves with the N.F.” Further, some Norteño gang members are what Gridley 

termed “solo Northerners,” who do not follow orders from the Nuestra Familia or any 

formal subset.

The Norteño gang’s main rival is the Sureño gang. Gridley stated that if a Sureño 

gang member walks into a Norteño neighborhood, it is likely he will be challenged, and 

possibly attacked, by Norteño gang members. Based on pictures taken of graffiti in the 

neighborhood surrounding 436 Ezie St., Gridley opined that it was a Norteño 

neighborhood that was specifically claimed by a Norteño subset called Seven Trees. 

There was no evidence that any of the defendants were part of the Seven Trees subset.

Gridley opined that the Norteño gang has engaged in a pattern of criminal gang 

activity, based on seven predicate offenses. In 2001, Tommy Gonzalez admitted 

committing assault with a deadly weapon with a gang enhancement as a juvenile in 

Gilroy. Gridley testified that Tommy or another suspect called the victims “ ‘scraps’ ” 

 

18

 Detective Gridley explained that a kite is a method of communicating in jail by 

sending messages written on a small strips of paper.
34

and Tommy hit a victim’s car multiple times with a bat. In 2004, Barragan admitted 

committing attempted murder with a gang enhancement in Stanislaus County. Gridley 

testified that Barragan was visiting “two other Northerners” when a Sureño drove by and 

that Barragan eventually shot the car the victim was driving multiple times. In 2007, 

Mendoza admitted robbing someone as a juvenile in San Jose. Despite the lack of a gang 

enhancement allegation in Mendoza’s robbery adjudication, Gridley opined that the 

offense was related to Norteño gang activity because Mendoza asked the victim if he 

“bangs,” which Gridley described as a “street check” that gang members sometimes ask 

perceived rivals.19 In 2008, Martell admitted committing assault with a deadly weapon 

with a gang enhancement in San Jose as a juvenile. Gridley testified that Martell was in a 

group of “Northerners” that challenged another group to a fight “by calling them ‘Scraps’ 

and yelling out ‘Norte.’ ” A fight ensued, an individual in the group referred to as Scraps 

was stabbed, and Martell pleaded guilty to that stabbing.

In addition to predicate offenses involving defendants or accomplices to Garcia’s 

homicide, the prosecution offered additional predicate offenses committed by other 

individuals. In 2010, Jose Sotelo pleaded no contest to felony vandalism with a gang 

enhancement in San Jose. Gridley testified that Sotelo was “a Northerner gang member.” 

In 2010, Orlando Heredia and Miguel Hurtado pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly 

weapon with gang enhancements in San Jose. Gridley testified that in that case the 

victim was walking through “a known Norteño hood claimed by Triple L., Los Latinos 

Locos” and a suspect (presumably Heredia or Hurtado) cut the victim’s chin while the 

other suspect “yells ‘Norte’ and also pulls out a knife.” In 2010, Andy Martinez pleaded 

guilty to assault with a deadly weapon with a gang enhancement in San Jose. Gridley 

 

19

 Though all of the predicate offenses involved a suspect or were for crimes 

committed in Santa Clara County, Detective Gridley agreed on cross-examination with 

Ramirez’s attorney’s statement that based on Gridley’s theory about the breadth of the 

Norteño gang’s territory, “you could just as well have brought in a criminal act by 

somebody in Fresno that was a Norteño, or Crescent City, or Sacramento ... .” 
35

testified that a group of what the victim apparently identified as “Northerners” challenged 

the victim to fight while yelling “ ‘Puro Norte,’ ” and that Martinez eventually threw a 

brick through the victim’s car window.

Regarding the gang membership of the defendants and other suspected 

perpetrators, Gridley opined that Barragan and Tommy were active Norteño gang 

members, based on each of them self-identifying as Norteños and on their previous 

convictions for Norteño-related offenses. Gridley thought Martell was an active solo 

Norteño gang member who was not affiliated with any subsets. That opinion was based 

on Martell’s tattoos; the presence of his name on a jail kite found after the homicide; his 

criminal history; his mode of dress; and Martell’s admission during a 2011 field 

interview that he had been a Norteño since he was 12 years old. Gridley believed 

Mendoza was an active Norteño gang member based on his admission during booking; 

his tattoos (Gridley opined the “U” and “Unidos” were gang-related rather than being 

related to a Utah college); his juvenile adjudication where he asked the victim if he 

“banged”; and the facts of the present case. 

Regarding Ramirez, the prosecutor asked Gridley “whether Mr. Ramirez is a 

member of the Norteño gang,” and Gridley stated he “found him to be an associate,” or 

someone who was working to become a gang member. That opinion was based on 

Ramirez’s “East Side” tattoo, Tommy’s statement that Ramirez was “putting in work” to 

benefit the gang, and Ramirez’s close association with Barragan. Gridley acknowledged 

that Ramirez had no criminal record, no arrests, and no gang-related field identifications 

before this case. Finally, Gridley opined that Maurillo Garcia was a Sureño gang 

member (and therefore a rival to defendants) based on his tattoos and on the graffiti he 

spray-painted being Sureño-related. 

In addition to being Norteño gang members, Gridley testified that Barragan, 

Mendoza, and Ramirez were part of a Norteño subset called San Jose Unidos. Gridley 

had never heard of that subset before working on this case and said he learned about it
36

from Tommy, Deleone, and another gang detective. Deleone had apparently told police 

during an interview that Barragan “and others” were members of San Jose Unidos. 

Gridley testified that Deleone referred to San Jose Unidos as “ ‘the U’ ” and Gridley 

believed Mendoza’s “U” and “Unidos” tattoos demonstrated his affiliation with the 

subset. Gridley was not aware of any affiliation or relationship between San Jose Unidos 

and the subset who claimed the neighborhood where the homicide occurred (Seven 

Trees). On cross-examination, counsel for Mendoza asked Gridley: “And the reason that 

you are using Norteño as the sort of umbrella street gang is because I think you said that 

there are no crimes that have been committed by the subset S.J.U. if it exists, right?” 

Gridley responded: “I did not find any predicates by them, no,” and also acknowledged 

that he found no evidence of any criminal activity by the San Jose Unidos subset before 

the homicide in this case.

Gridley opined that the homicide was gang-related. He believed defendants 

committed the homicide for the benefit of, and in association with, the Norteño gang 

based on the way the defendants worked together to carry out the assault. The homicide 

benefited the Norteño gang by increasing the gang’s respect and intimidating others in 

the neighborhood.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Gang Enhancement

Citing People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59 (Prunty), defendants argue that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the finding that the Norteños were a criminal street 

gang. Defendants were alleged to have murdered Maurillo Garcia “for the benefit of, at 

the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to 

promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members ... .” (§ 186.22, 

subd. (b)(1).) The prosecution’s theory during closing argument was that the crimes were 

committed for the benefit of the Norteño gang. 

“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the 

light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is 
37

reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 

331 (Bolin).) We presume the “existence of every fact that the trier of fact could 

reasonably deduce from the evidence” to support the judgment. (People v. Medina

(2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919 (Medina).) To overturn a conviction, “it must clearly appear 

that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.” 

(People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)

a. Section 186.22 and Prunty 

Section 186.22, subdivision (f) defines a criminal street gang as “any ongoing 

organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, 

having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of [certain 

enumerated] criminal acts ... , having a common name or common identifying sign or 

symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a 

pattern of criminal gang activity.” Those enumerated offenses are called predicate 

offenses. (People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1044 (Tran).) Section 186.22, 

subdivision (e), in turn, defines a pattern of gang activity as “the commission of, 

attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile 

petition for, or conviction of two or more of the following offenses” listed in the 

subdivision, “provided at least one of these offenses occurred after the effective date of 

this chapter and the last of those offenses occurred within three years after a prior 

offense, and the offenses were committed on separate occasions, or by two or more 

persons ... .” 

In Prunty, the Supreme Court addressed “what type of showing the prosecution 

must make when its theory of why a criminal street gang exists turns on the conduct of 

one or more gang subsets.” (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 67.) The court reviewed the 

definition of “criminal street gang” in section 186.22, subdivision (f) and determined that 

“where the prosecution’s case positing the existence of a single ‘criminal street 
38

gang’ ... turns on the existence and conduct of one or more gang subsets, then the 

prosecution must show some associational or organizational connection uniting those 

subsets.” (Prunty, at p. 71.) The court decided that the statute’s reference to an 

“ ‘ongoing organization, association, or group’ ” is a “distinct requirement” and cannot 

be satisfied merely by showing “shared colors, names, and other symbols.” (Id. at 

pp. 74–75, quoting § 186.22, subd. (f).) 

The Prunty court presented an expressly non-exclusive list of methods prosecutors 

can use to establish that “the ‘gang’ that the defendant sought to benefit, and the ‘gang’ 

that the prosecution proves to exist, are one and the same.” (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 

p. 75.) Prosecutors might provide evidence that multiple subsets are connected by some 

form of hierarchy. Examples of that sort of proof include evidence that multiple subsets 

each have a “ ‘shot caller’ ” who answers to a higher authority within the chain of 

command; engage in independent activities that benefit the same higher ranking 

individual or group (e.g., “various Norteño subset gangs that share a cut of drug sale 

proceeds with the same members of the Nuestra Familia prison gang”); are governed by 

the same bylaws; act to protect the same territory; or conduct “independent, but 

harmonious, criminal operations within a discrete geographical area ... .” (Id. at pp. 77–

78.) Absent evidence of a hierarchy, prosecutors might provide evidence of 

“collaboration, unity of purpose, and shared activity” sufficient to support a finding of a 

single organization, association, or group. Examples of that sort of proof includes 

evidence that multiple subsets: work in concert to commit a crime; profess or exhibit 

loyalty to one another; have fluid or shared membership among subsets; or have a 

“ ‘liaison’ ” who coordinates relations between subsets. (Id. at p. 78.) Finally, 

prosecutors can demonstrate that multiple subsets “manifest specific behavior” that 

suggests a shared identification with a single group. Examples of that sort of proof 

include evidence that: “a certain Norteño subset retaliates against a Sureño gang for 

affronts that gang has committed against other Norteño subsets”; or multiple subsets 
39

within a geographic area require prospective members to perform the same initiation 

activities. (Id. at pp. 79–80.)

The Prunty court noted that nothing in that opinion should be construed to reflect 

“any skepticism regarding the general factual question of whether the Norteños exist” and 

noted that the court had “previously upheld gang enhancements where the ‘criminal street 

gang’ in question was a geographically dispersed group.”20 (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 

p. 85.) 

b. Analysis 

The prosecution’s theory was that defendants murdered Garcia for the benefit of

“the Norteño gang” rather than any gang subset. 

Gridley testified that the Norteño gang has about 2,000 members. According to 

Gridley, Tommy, Barragan, Mendoza, and Martell were all Norteño gang members. 

Ramirez was a Norteño gang associate. That evidence supported a finding that the 

Norteño gang had three or more members. (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) 

Gridley testified that the Norteño gang’s primary activities include assault with a 

deadly weapon (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1)), homicide (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(3)), drive-by 

shootings (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(6)), car theft (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(9) [grand theft]), robbery 

(§ 186.22, subd. (e)(2)), and burglary (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(11)). That testimony supported 

a finding that the Norteño gang’s primary activities included “commission of one or more 

of the criminal acts enumerated” in section 186.22, subdivision (e)(1) through (e)(25) or 

(e)(31) through (e)(33). (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) 

 

20

 Prunty disapproved In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, where a different 

panel of this court found that the prosecutor had provided sufficient evidence supported 

the existence of “the Norteño gang.” (In re Jose P., at pp. 467–468; disapproved by 

Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 78, fn. 5.) But the Prunty court noted that the 

prosecution’s evidence in In re Jose P. “was likely sufficient to satisfy the framework” 

laid out in Prunty. (Prunty, at p. 78, fn. 5.)
40

Gridley testified that common names, signs, and symbols for the Norteño gang 

include: Norte, Norteño, Northerner, the color red, the number 14, the Huelga bird 

symbol, the San Jose Sharks symbol, and compass-bearing points for San Jose. That 

evidence supported a finding that the Norteño gang has “a common name or common 

identifying sign or symbol.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) 

As for the requirement in section 186.22, subdivision (f) that the prosecution prove 

the Norteño gang “engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,” the prosecution could 

do so by showing that two or more predicate offenses were committed (or attempted) on 

separate occasions, and that the last of the predicate offenses occurred within three years 

after a prior offense. (§ 186.22, subdivision (e).) Gridley discussed several prior 

offenses committed either by the current defendants (Mendoza and Martell) or their

accomplices (Tommy and Barragan), all of whom Gridley identified as Norteño gang 

members. Tommy admitted committing assault with a deadly weapon with a gang 

enhancement as a juvenile in 2001. Assault with a deadly weapon is a predicate offense. 

(§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) Barragan admitted committing attempted murder with a gang 

enhancement as a juvenile in 2004. Homicide is a predicate offense. (§ 186.22, 

subd. (e)(3).) Mendoza admitted robbing someone as a juvenile in 2007, and Gridley 

opined that the robbery was related to Norteño gang activity based on the circumstances 

of the case. Robbery is a predicate offense. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(2).) And Martell 

admitted committing assault with a deadly weapon with a gang enhancement as a 

juvenile in 2008. There was therefore evidence of two or more predicate offenses 

committed by two or more Norteño gang members, and Martell’s juvenile adjudication 

occurred within three years after Mendoza’s juvenile adjudication. 

Prunty clarified that section 186.22 also “requires the prosecution to introduce 

evidence showing an associational or organizational connection that unites members of a 

putative criminal street gang.” (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 67.) In the instant case, 

the prosecutor provided evidence of an associational connection by introducing predicate 
41

offenses committed by the very same individuals who were involved in Garcia’s 

homicide. Because the prosecutor also presented evidence that Tommy, Mendoza, 

Barragan, Martell, and Ramirez were all at Tommy’s house the night of the homicide, 

defendants cannot reasonably argue they had no connection to one another. The evidence 

in this case is therefore different from the evidence presented in Prunty, where the 

predicate offenses introduced by the prosecution were committed by individuals other 

than the current defendant and there was no evidence connecting those individuals to the 

defendant. (Prunty, at pp. 82–85.) 

The prosecution presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find

that defendants’ gang qualified as a criminal street gang beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.)

3. Predicate Offenses

Mendoza and Ramirez argue that the trial court admitted an unduly prejudicial 

number of predicate offenses. (Evid. Code, § 352.) We review the trial court’s decision 

for abuse of discretion. (Tran, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1049.) 

a. Legal Principles

In Tran, the Supreme Court provided guidance regarding an Evidence Code 

section 352 objection to predicate offenses in the related context of showing a 

defendant’s active participation in a criminal street gang. (Tran, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 

p. 1048; § 186.22, subd. (a).) The court acknowledged that “evidence a defendant 

committed an offense on a separate occasion is inherently prejudicial” but explained that 

“Evidence Code section 352 requires the exclusion of evidence only when its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” (Tran, at p. 1047, italics in 

original.) Evidence is less likely to be prejudicial if it comes from “a source independent 

of evidence of the charged offense” or if the previous offense “is no stronger or more 

inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offense.” (Ibid.) Evidence of 

uncharged criminal acts that did not result in a criminal conviction has a higher 
42

prejudicial effect. (Ibid.) The Tran court concluded that “evidence of a defendant’s 

separate offense may be admissible to prove a predicate offense” but cautioned that while 

a trial court “need not limit the prosecution’s evidence to one or two separate offenses 

lest the jury find a failure of proof as to at least one of them, the probative value of the 

evidence inevitably decreases with each additional offense, while its prejudicial effect 

increases, tilting the balance towards exclusion.” (Id. at p. 1049.) 

b. Mendoza’s Juvenile Adjudication was Properly Admitted 

The trial court overruled Mendoza’s Evidence Code section 352 objection to 

Gridley’s use of Mendoza’s juvenile adjudication for robbery as a predicate offense. The 

court noted that Detective Newton had already testified that Mendoza admitted having 

suffered a prior juvenile adjudication, meaning “there is prejudice that’s already 

occurred.” Mendoza argues that the court abused its discretion because Detective 

Newton’s testimony about the adjudication was general and Gridley went into greater 

detail by opining that even though the robbery was not charged as a gang-related offense, 

Mendoza’s conduct of asking the victim “ ‘Do you bang?’ ” was consistent with gang 

activity (specifically, as evidence of a street check).

Whether Mendoza was affiliated with the Norteño street gang was a disputed issue 

at trial. Although he acknowledged during his police interview that he claimed 

“Northern,” Mendoza denied being a gang member. Evidence that Mendoza engaged in 

a street check was highly probative of whether he was a gang member. Mendoza has not 

demonstrated that the inherently prejudicial nature of the sustained juvenile adjudication 

posed such an intolerable risk of prejudice that the court should have excluded it. (Tran,

supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1047 [“ ‘Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than 

probative ... [only] if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable “risk to the fairness of the 

proceedings or the reliability of the outcome” [citation].’ ”].) 
43

c. Predicate Offenses Were Not Unduly Prejudicial or Cumulative

Four of the seven predicate offenses were committed by individuals who were 

allegedly involved in Garcia’s murder, including Barragan, Martell, Tommy, and 

Mendoza. Three of those convictions specifically included gang enhancements and 

Gridley opined that the fourth offense (Mendoza’s) was gang-related. Those four 

predicate offenses were highly probative because they provided support for the 

prosecutor’s theory that those four individuals killed Garcia for the benefit of the Norteño 

street gang. (See Tran, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1048 [evidence of a defendant’s prior 

gang-related offense “provides direct evidence of a predicate offense ... and that the 

defendant knew the gang engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.”].) As for the 

three predicate offenses committed by other people, the crimes of which they were 

convicted (assault with a deadly weapon and felony vandalism) were less serious than the 

murder charges defendants faced. Further, all seven predicate offenses were convictions 

and not merely uncharged criminal conduct, meaning there was less risk that the jury 

would be confused about the issues in the case. (See Tran, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1047 

[uncharged acts not resulting in conviction are more prejudicial “because the jury might 

be inclined to punish the defendant for the uncharged acts regardless of whether it 

considers the defendant guilty of the charged offense”].) On this record, defendants have 

not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. 

4. Gang Expert’s PowerPoint Presentation

Mendoza and Ramirez argue the trial court erred in overruling their objections to 

four slides included in Gridley’s PowerPoint presentation. Evidentiary rulings are 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 485 

(Thomas).)

a. Slide Four

Slide four listed some of the predicate offenses enumerated in section 186.22, 

subdivision (e) as well as a picture of what Ramirez’s trial counsel described as “guns, 
44

drugs, cash, [and] more drugs ... .” The court overruled defendants’ Evidence Code 

section 352 objection, reasoning that the slide was generic, the list of offenses was 

accurate, and the picture was “relatively small.” 

Mendoza argues that the slide “suggested that appellant and his co-defendants may 

have committed rapes, tortures, or kidnappings” and that it implied defendants “were 

involved in a lifestyle of guns, drugs, and cash.” There is no evidence that the prosecutor 

spent any significant amount of time discussing this slide or that he or the gang expert 

made any statements that would connect defendants with the content of the slide. The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion.

b. Slide 10

Slide 10 had the heading “ ‘Norteño’ ” and showed pictures of people making 

what the prosecutor stated were Norteño gang hand signs. The trial court overruled 

objections by Ramirez’s counsel that the pictures had not been authenticated and that 

they were unduly prejudicial. The court obtained Gridley’s assurance that slide 10 was 

the only slide demonstrating gang signs, and the detective later testified before the jury 

that the use of gang hand signs is one indicator of gang membership. 

Because there was no evidence that the defendants used gang signs on the date of 

the homicide, the slide was irrelevant and should not have been admitted. However, the 

error was not prejudicial. The slide was one of several shown during Gridley’s 

testimony, and the prosecutor did not place any special emphasis on slide 10. The 

remainder of Gridley’s testimony provided ample independent evidence of Mendoza’s 

and Ramirez’s gang affiliation (including their tattoos, Mendoza’s juvenile adjudication 

for what Gridley opined was a gang-related offense, Ramirez’s close association with 

Barragan, and the facts of the present case). Mendoza and Ramirez therefore have not 

demonstrated that it was reasonably probable that they would have obtained a more 

favorable result had the error not occurred. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 
45

439 [“Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evidence is subject to 

the traditional Watson test.”].) 

c. Slides 40 and 41

Mendoza argues that slides 40 and 41, which contained photographs of graffiti, 

were unauthenticated and unduly prejudicial. At a hearing outside the presence of the 

jury, Ramirez’s trial counsel argued that two of the four photographs in slide 40 were not 

authenticated because there was no testimony about “how long they have been there, 

where they came from, what neighborhood they are in.” He raised the same objection 

about all of the pictures in slide 41. A person identified in the Reporter’s Transcript as 

“The Witness” (presumably Gridley) stated that the photos “are all from the

neighborhood.” The trial court overruled the objections and when the prosecutor 

continued his direct examination of Gridley, he confirmed that two successive slides of 

graffiti (presumably slides 40 and 41) showed “some of the gang graffiti in this area of 

[Richdale] and Ezie Street ... .” Mendoza’s argument on appeal that the “officer did not 

know what neighborhood the photographs on slide no. 40 came from” is contradicted by 

the foregoing testimony from Gridley that the graffiti photographs were taken in the area 

of the homicide. 

Mendoza contends that Gridley “did not know who painted the graffiti or when the 

graffiti was painted.” As the purpose of the photographs was to support Gridley’s expert 

opinion that the area surrounding the scene of the homicide was claimed by a Norteño 

subset, the photographs were relevant and admissible without testimony regarding who 

painted the graffiti or the length of time the graffiti was present in the area. The absence 

of testimony about those characteristics merely affected the weight of the photographic 

evidence and factored into the court’s Evidence Code section 352 determination. The 

trial court could reasonably conclude that any prejudice from the jury seeing photographs 

that might not be directly related to defendants’ actions did not substantially outweigh the 
46

photographs’ probative value in supporting Gridley’s opinion that the area around the 

homicide was claimed by a Norteño subset. 

E. DEFENDANTS’ STATEMENTS 

1. Mendoza’s Statements at the Non-Custodial Interview

Mendoza argues that the court abused its discretion by admitting his March 2012 

non-custodial interview into evidence and by allowing Detective Newton to testify about 

statements Mendoza made during that interview. He contends that his statements “did 

not provide any evidentiary value” and were unduly prejudicial. (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 

350, 352.) A trial court’s decisions that evidence is relevant and that its probative value 

is not substantially outweighed by the probability of undue prejudice are reviewed for 

abuse of discretion. (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 523 (Kelly); Thomas, supra,

51 Cal.4th at p 485.)

Mendoza fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in finding 

his statements relevant. Mendoza made statements at the interview that were relevant 

and admissible as party admissions (Evid. Code, § 1220), including that he claimed 

“Northern” and that he admitted having a juvenile adjudication for robbery. Mendoza 

also made statements that were relevant to show a consciousness of guilt, including that 

he denied visiting Ezie Street, denied being in a gang, and denied knowing the other 

homicide suspects. The prosecutor provided other evidence (including Tommy’s 

testimony about Mendoza’s presence and Gridley’s opinion about Mendoza’s gang 

membership) that suggested Mendoza’s denials were false. (Cf. People v. Kimble (1988) 

44 Cal.3d 480, 496 [“[A]s a general rule, false statements made by a defendant at the 

time of arrest are admissible—not for the truth of the statements—but to show 

consciousness of guilt.”].)

We likewise see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to overrule

Mendoza’s Evidence Code section 352 objection. Mendoza’s admission that he claimed 

“Northern” was highly probative of whether he was a gang member. Mendoza’s denials 
47

of involvement in the homicide had probative value both in supporting his defense case 

and in supporting the prosecutor’s theory that his statements showed a consciousness of 

guilt. Either way, they had probative value. Nothing in his statements was so prejudicial 

as to compel the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion when it decided that

the statements’ probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue 

prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.) 

2. Mendoza’s Booking Interview Statement

Mendoza argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from correctional 

officer Rios that Mendoza “admitted Northerner” during a classification interview at the 

county jail after his arrest. In People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523 (Elizalde), the 

Supreme Court determined that questions about gang affiliation during a jail 

classification booking interview are reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses, 

making the interview a custodial interrogation under the Fifth Amendment. (Elizalde, at 

pp. 527, 541; U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) As a custodial interrogation, the Elizalde court 

found that answers to such questions are inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief 

unless preceded by a Miranda advisement. (Elizalde, at pp. 527, 541.) 

Mendoza received no Miranda advisement before being questioned at booking. 

The trial court thus erred in allowing correctional officer Rios to testify about Mendoza’s 

statements during the booking interview. 

“The erroneous admission of a defendant’s statements obtained in violation of the 

Fifth Amendment is reviewed for prejudice under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard

of Chapman ... .” (Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 542.) The jury had already heard that 

Mendoza had claimed to be “Northern” during the non-custodial interview he had with 

Officer Newton. Gridley opined that Mendoza was an active Norteño gang member, 

based on his tattoos, a juvenile adjudication, and the facts of the present case. Because 

other admissible evidence (including an admission by Mendoza himself) suggested that 
48

Mendoza was a Norteño gang member, the trial court’s erroneous admission of 

Mendoza’s booking statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. Text Messages Sent from Mendoza’s Phone

Mendoza argues that the trial court erred in admitting text messages sent from 

Mendoza’s cellular phone because they were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.

(Evid. Code, §§ 350, 352.) We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion. 

(Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 523; Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 485.) 

a. Background

People’s Exhibit 21 (Mendoza’s phone records) includes just over 20 text 

messages sent from or received by the phone. Some of those text messages reference 

“pills” and “bud ... .”

Gridley indicated multiple times during his testimony that he based his opinions 

about whether individuals were gang members on the totality of the circumstances. The 

detective agreed with the prosecutor that selling controlled substances is one of the 

enumerated crimes that can be used to validate a criminal street gang. (See § 186.22, 

subd. (e)(4).) He also agreed that it is common for gang members to support themselves 

by selling drugs. Gridley stated that some of Ramirez’s text messages were consistent 

with drug dealing. The prosecutor asked him whether “that’s consistent with being a 

gang member,” to which Gridley responded: “Well, I mean, I think it depends on the 

gang member. [¶]...[¶] But, yes, selling drugs is something that gang members do.” 

During cross-examination, Mendoza’s attorney had the following exchange with 

Gridley: “[Mendoza’s counsel:] All right. Now, [the prosecutor] showed you yesterday 

some text messages that were from a phone that was attributed to Marcos Mendoza, and 

it was some text messages about drug sales. Did it appear to you that it was minor drug 

sales? [¶] [Gridley:] It appeared to me to be marijuana. [¶] [Mendoza’s counsel:] As far 

as this case goes, do you see these text messages as very important to the case? [¶] 

[Gridley:] As far as establishing the homicide of the victim and the assault, no. [¶] 
49

[Mendoza’s counsel:] What about as far as in forming your opinion about his gang 

membership? [¶] [Gridley:] No, I wouldn’t -- even though a lot of gang members sell 

drugs, it’s not a stand-alone criteria that I would use. [¶] [Mendoza’s counsel:] And, in 

fact, in these text messages, there is absolutely no information that would associate Mr. 

Mendoza with gang type of activity at all? [¶] [Gridley:] Not that I found.” Mendoza’s 

counsel asked: “So, just to be clear, you would not say that the text messages indicate 

any gang-related activity?” Gridley responded: “Correct.” 

The court overruled Mendoza’s relevance and Evidence Code section 352

objections, finding that drug dealing is an enumerated section 186.22 offense, Gridley 

testified that his opinions were based on the totality of the circumstances (including the 

text messages), and the “relatively innocuous” nature of the messages meant that the 

“prejudice is minimal.”

b. Analysis

Mendoza does not provide the content of the messages to which he objects on 

appeal. He argues generally that to the extent any of the text messages suggested that 

Mendoza sold drugs, they were irrelevant because Gridley did not rely on drug dealing to 

form his opinion about Mendoza’s gang affiliation.

Gridley testified that it is common for gang members to sell drugs, noted that 

drug-dealing is one enumerated crime relevant to establishing a pattern of criminal gang 

activity (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(4)), and opined that Mendoza was a gang member. Based on 

that testimony, evidence of drug dealing in text messages from Mendoza’s phone was 

relevant to the jury’s resolution of the case. Mendoza’s trial counsel effectively crossexamined Gridley, with Gridley agreeing with counsel that the text messages were not 

“very important” to establishing Mendoza’s gang membership and that drug dealing was 

“not a stand-alone criteria that I would use.” But Gridley never testified that evidence of 

drug dealing in text messages was wholly irrelevant to his opinion; his cross-examination 

testimony merely affected the weight of the text message evidence. 
50

As for Mendoza’s Evidence Code section 352 argument, the messages were 

relatively innocuous and were confined to five heavily redacted pages from among over 

300 pages of phone records in a trial with a voluminous record. Mendoza has not shown 

that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the risk of undue prejudice did not 

substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value. 

4. Text Messages Received on Mendoza’s Phone

Mendoza argues, based on his trial counsel’s argument at a hearing, that two 

messages received on Mendoza’s cellular phone should have been excluded as hearsay.

We review the trial court’s evidentiary decision for abuse of discretion.21 (People v. 

Pirwani (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 770, 787.)

Our review of People’s Exhibit 21 does not disclose the first message trial counsel 

paraphrased as saying “only call him if they are calling him.” Because defendant has not 

shown that the foregoing message was part of the exhibit provided to the jury, we do not 

address his appellate argument related to it.

The exhibit contains the other message Mendoza challenged in the trial court, 

which was received by Mendoza’s phone and reads: “Dont give tht number out to 

eneone cuz. He only wnts s0certain ppl to have tht only u me n marty n cholo have tht 

shit, just so u kno bro, gracias.” (Errors in original.) The prosecutor did not respond to 

the hearsay objection, and the trial court implicitly overruled the hearsay objection by 

admitting the evidence. (Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 409, 449

[“Although the court did not rule on the objection, we infer from its reliance upon the 

[evidence] that it implicitly overruled the objection.”]; see People v. Bryant, Smith and 

Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 407.)

 

21

 Contrary to the People’s argument on appeal, Mendoza’s trial counsel 

preserved the hearsay objection by arguing that the messages received by Mendoza were 

“hearsay. There is no exception. The expert did not rely on the hearsay, so there is 

further no exception to that rule.”
51

The message received on Mendoza’s phone was an out-of-court statement. But 

the trial court could reasonably conclude that the message was not hearsay because it was 

not offered to prove the truth of any matters asserted. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) 

The person referred to as “He” in the message was not identified, nor was there any 

testimony or argument that the unidentified person indeed only wanted certain people to 

have access to the number the message refers to. The court could have admitted the 

message for the non-truth purpose of connecting Mendoza with people named Marty and 

Cholo, who could be Barragan’s brothers (based on Tommy’s testimony at trial). We see

no abuse of discretion. 

5. Ramirez Forfeited Objections to His Statements

Ramirez joins Mendoza’s appellate arguments about Mendoza’s statements to 

police and text messages. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.200(a)(5) [“[A] party may join in 

or adopt by reference all or part of a brief in the same or a related appeal.”]; 8.360(a).) 

Ramirez also appears to argue that the trial court erred in admitting Ramirez’s statements 

to police and text messages because the parts of Mendoza’s brief that he joins apply 

“equally to Mr. Ramirez’s denials of guilt and text messages.” But Ramirez provides no 

analysis to challenge the trial court’s decision regarding Ramirez’s statements. 

A party challenging the admission of evidence must, at the very least, describe the 

evidence being challenged and explain why the trial court erred in admitting it. Even if 

the evidence Ramirez challenges falls into the same broad categories as the evidence 

Mendoza challenges (i.e., statements to police and text messages), a trial court’s decision 

whether to admit evidence is necessarily evidence-specific. As Ramirez fails to provide 

reasoned argument to support his claim on appeal, he has forfeited his appellate argument 

related to admission of his statements at trial. (Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 

240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066 [“When an appellant asserts a point but fails to support it 

with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as forfeited.”].)
52

F. EVIDENCE CORROBORATING TOMMY’S TESTIMONY ABOUT MENDOZA

Mendoza argues that there was insufficient evidence of his involvement in the 

homicide to corroborate Tommy’s accomplice testimony. (Citing § 1111.)

“A conviction can not [sic] be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it 

be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the 

commission of the offense ... .” (§ 1111.) But corroboration can come from 

circumstantial evidence that would be of limited weight if standing alone, so long as it 

tends to “implicate the defendant by relating to an act that is an element of the crime.” 

(People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 986 (McDermott).) The prosecutor is not 

required to present corroborating evidence establishing every element of the crime, but 

the corroborating evidence must, “without aid from the accomplice’s testimony, tend to 

connect the defendant with the crime.” (Ibid.) We are bound by the jury’s decision 

“unless the corroborating evidence should not have been admitted or does not reasonably 

tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.” (Ibid.)

Tommy testified that Mendoza was at 436 Ezie St. the night of the homicide; that 

Mendoza was punching the victim during the attack; that Mendoza fled with Tommy and 

the others; and that Mendoza stated while in the car that “ ‘I booked him’ ... .” Tommy 

also suggested that Mendoza accompanied Tommy and the others to Deleone’s house, 

Barragan’s mother’s house, and Milpitas after the homicide.22

As for corroborating evidence, Raymond Jr. responded “I think so” when asked at 

trial whether Mendoza was at 436 Ezie St. on the night of the homicide. Mendoza’s 

fingerprints matched those on a beer can recovered from the back yard at 436 Ezie St. 

and his fingerprints and DNA were recovered from a can in the house’s front driveway. 

 

22

 Tommy did not explicitly mention Mendoza’s name every time he testified 

about the next destination of their flight, but also never testified that Mendoza left the 

group. Tommy also stated that Creeper picked up “[a]ll of us except David [Martell]” 

from Barragan’s mother’s house in order to drive them to Milpitas.
53

Calls from a cellular phone associated with Mendoza connected through towers in the 

vicinity of the crime scene around the time of the crime (around 10:00 p.m.), through a 

tower closer to Deleone’s house closer to 11:00 p.m., through a tower near Barragan’s 

mother’s house after 11:00 p.m., and through a tower in Milpitas shortly after 2:00 a.m. 

Rivas testified that everyone who ran from 436 Ezie St. participated in the assault.

The corroborating evidence supported findings that Mendoza was at 436 Ezie St. 

around the time of the homicide, that he participated in the assault on Garcia (if the jury 

believed he was one of the people who left 436 Ezie St. to chase Garcia), and that he fled 

the scene of the crime with the other assailants. The corroborating evidence sufficiently 

tended to connect Mendoza to the homicide. 

Mendoza relies on People v. Pedroza (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 635 (Pedroza). In 

Pedroza, an accomplice testified that he heard two gun shots, turned and saw Pedroza 

with a revolver pointed at the victim, and then saw a third person (Garivay) shoot the 

victim twice with a shotgun. (Id. at p. 640.) Pedroza, Garivay, and the accomplice drove 

to Garivay’s house (20 minutes away from the crime scene) where Garivay’s girlfriend 

Lisa also lived. (Id. at pp. 639–640.) 

On appeal from the trial court’s acquittal of Pedroza based on its finding that there 

was insufficient corroboration as a matter of law, the Court of Appeal summarized the 

corroborating evidence connecting Pedroza to the murder charge as follows: 

“(1) [Pedroza] was in the same gang as the victim and [the accomplice]; (2) the gang—

which had over 400 members—was experiencing frequent in-house murders; and (3) at 

some time after 11:00 p.m., Lisa heard a banging noise at her house; a few hours later, 

between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., she saw [Pedroza] in her garage, along with Garivay, [the 

accomplice], and Renteria.” (Pedroza, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 643, 647, 651.) 

The Court of Appeal found that the corroborating evidence showed nothing more than a 

general connection to the victim and other perpetrators and that there was no evidence 
54

about Pedroza’s acts or conduct, “except that he was with at least one admitted 

perpetrator, hours after the crime.” (Id. at p. 651, italics in original.) 

Pedroza is distinguishable because the only corroborating evidence in that case

came from someone who was nowhere near the scene of the crime and who only saw the 

defendant hours after the crime was committed. By contrast, the corroborating evidence 

in this case supported findings that Mendoza was at the scene of the crime when the 

crime took place, participated in the assault, and fled with the other perpetrators.

G. INTIMIDATION EVIDENCE

Defendants argue the trial court erred in denying their motion in limine to exclude

intimidation evidence related to Rivas, Tommy, and Deleone as unduly prejudicial.

(Evid. Code, § 352.) We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion. 

(Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 485.)

1. Background

The trial court denied defendants’ motion in limine to exclude intimidation 

evidence and invited counsel to make specific objections during trial. Rivas testified that 

his home was vandalized within hours after he received a subpoena to testify at 

defendants’ trial and that he remained fearful at the time of trial. Tommy testified that 

Barragan’s brother made statements about Raymond Jr. and Raymond III “snitching,”

which made Tommy fearful for both his and his family’s safety. Deleone testified that he 

was attacked while in county jail and was told that the attack had been ordered by 

Norteños because he had made statements to the police about defendants’ case. Deleone

testified that he became somewhat fearful after the attack and had requested that the 

district attorney’s office escort him to and from his testimony at defendants’ trial. 

The court instructed the jury before deliberations: “A witness or witnesses have 

testified regarding threats made by someone other than the defendants. Evidence of 

third-party threats is relevant only as to the witness’ state of mind, attitude, actions, bias 
55

and prejudice. Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose. Such evidence may 

not be used to infer direct, or consciousness of, guilt on the part of defendants.”

2. Analysis

“[E]vidence that a witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is 

relevant to that witness’s credibility ([citations]), and may be admissible whether or not 

the threat is directly linked to the defendant ... .” (People v. Mendoza (2011) 

52 Cal.4th 1056, 1087 (Mendoza); Evid. Code, § 780.) Each of the three witnesses 

testified to receiving threats that they perceived were related to their involvement in 

defendants’ trial, and each testified that those threats made them fearful. The evidence 

was probative of their state of mind and credibility. (Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 

p. 1087.) The trial court reduced the risk of prejudice related to the statements by 

providing a limiting instruction directing the jury not to use the evidence “to infer direct, 

or consciousness of, guilt on the part of defendants.” We presume the jury followed that 

instruction. (Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 453.) Because the evidence had probative 

value and the trial court properly limited the purposes for which the evidence could be 

considered, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision that the probative 

value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its risk of undue prejudice.

H. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Defendants argue the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the 

mental state necessary to convict defendants for aiding and abetting assault or murder;

the extent to which the defendants’ voluntary intoxication could be considered; and the 

definition of a criminal street gang.

23

 We review defendants’ argument on appeal despite 

their failure to object at trial because “ ‘[w]hether claimed instructional error affected the 

substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the 

claim’ ... .” (People v. Ngo (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 126, 149; § 1259 [“The appellate 

 

23

 Mendoza originally claimed an additional instructional error (related to 

CALCRIM No. 400) in his Opening Brief but withdrew the argument in his Reply Brief.
56

court may also review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no 

objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant 

were affected thereby.”].) 

1. Standard of Review

“No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground 

of misdirection of the jury, ... unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including 

the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in 

a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) We review claims that a trial court 

has misdirected a jury de novo. If the challenged instruction is ambiguous, we 

independently review whether there is a “reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or 

applied the challenged instructions in a manner” contrary to law. (People v. Berryman

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1077, overruled on another ground by Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 

p. 823, fn. 1.) In reviewing whether the trial court properly instructed the jury, we 

consider “ ‘the entire charge of the court’ ” rather than focusing on only parts of an 

instruction. (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192 (Carrington).)

2. Mens Rea for Aiding and Abetting Liability

a. Mens Rea Instructions

The jury was instructed as follows.24 CALCRIM No. 252 provided that the 

“following crime and allegation requires a specific intent or mental state: Murder as 

charged in Count 1 and the gang enhancement.” The instruction explained that to find a 

defendant guilty the jury must find not only that the defendant “intentionally commit[ted] 

the prohibited act” but also that he did so “with a specific intent and/or mental state,” as 

“explained in the instruction for that crime or allegation.” CALCRIM No. 252 provided

that the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter 

require only general criminal intent.

 

24

 As the written instructions do not materially differ from the oral 

pronouncement, we quote the instructions as they appear in the Clerk’s Transcript. 
57

CALCRIM No. 400 provided that the jury may find a defendant guilty of a crime 

in two ways, either by finding that the defendant “directly committed the crime” or by 

finding that the defendant “aided and abetted a perpetrator, who directly committed the 

crime.” CALCRIM No. 401 defined the elements of aiding and abetting liability and also 

states that someone “aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s 

unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, 

promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.”

CALCRIM No. 403 provided, in relevant part: “Before you may decide whether 

the defendant is guilty of murder, you must decide whether he is guilty of assault or 

assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. [¶] To prove that the defendant is 

guilty of murder, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant is guilty of assault or 

assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury; [¶] 2. During the commission of 

the assault or assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury a co-participant in that 

assault or assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury committed the crime of 

murder; [¶] and [¶] 3. Under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the 

defendant’s position would have known that the commission of the murder was a natural 

and probable consequence of the commission of the assault or assault with force likely to 

cause great bodily injury. [¶] ... [¶] The People are alleging that the defendant originally 

intended to aid and abet assault or assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury.

[¶] If you decide that the defendant aided and abetted one of these crimes and that 

murder was a natural and probable consequence of that crime, the defendant is guilty of 

murder. You do not need to agree about which of these crimes the defendant aided and 

abetted.” (Capitalization omitted.) 

CALCRIM Nos. 915 and 875 defined assault and assault with force likely to cause 

great bodily injury, respectively, and informed the jury that to find a defendant 

committed one of those crimes, “[i]t is not required that [the defendant] intend[ed] to 
58

break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.” Those instructions also state 

that “[v]oluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.”

b. Mens Rea Instructions Were Adequate

Defendants argue that the combination of the foregoing instructions caused the 

jury to be “advised that no ‘specific intent’ need be proven for guilt to arise as to assault 

for [an] aider and abettor.” Ramirez states in his Opening Brief that “[a]s will be shown, 

CALCRIM 401 did not save the day” but then proceeds to his argument about voluntary 

intoxication without explaining why CALCRIM No. 401 did not adequately instruct the 

jury regarding the mens rea necessary to convict defendants as aiders and abettors. 

Defendants’ argument appears to be that, (1) CALCRIM No. 252 purportedly 

informed the jury that specific intent need only be shown for murder and the gang 

enhancement; (2) specific intent is necessary to be convicted for aiding and abetting; 

(3) CALCRIM Nos. 915 and 875 informed the jury that assault and assault with force 

likely to cause great bodily injury do not require specific intent; (4) CALCRIM No. 403, 

which stated that the prosecutor’s theory of the case was that defendants intended to aid 

and abet an assault or assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, did not repeat 

the statement from CALCRIM No. 401 that specific intent is required for aider and 

abettor liability; and (5) that failure to repeat the specific intent mental state left the jury 

with the impression that specific intent did not need to be shown to find defendants guilty 

of murder based on aiding and abetting assault (the natural and probable consequence of 

which was murder).

We disagree with defendants’ first premise and their conclusion. CALCRIM 

No. 252 stated that murder and the gang enhancement “requires a specific intent or 

mental state” but did not instruct the jury that those were the only issues in the case 

requiring specific intent. That instruction merely informed the jury that the only 

substantive count charged in the case (murder) was a specific intent crime and that lesser 

included offenses related to that count (voluntary and involuntary manslaughter) were 
59

general intent crimes. The jury was also not misinstructed by the court’s failure to repeat

the mens rea necessary for aider and abettor liability in CALCRIM No. 403. The trial 

court explicitly stated that specific intent was necessary for aider and abettor liability in 

CALCRIM No. 401 immediately before providing CALCRIM No. 403. When read in 

the context of the instructions as a whole, we find no reasonable likelihood that the 

instructions caused the jury to misapply the law. (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at 

p. 192.)

3. Voluntary Intoxication Instruction 

Defendants argue that the voluntary intoxication instruction provided to the jury 

improperly limited the issues about which the jury could consider evidence of 

defendants’ voluntary intoxication. “[T]he intent requirement for aiding and abetting 

liability is a ‘required specific intent’ for which evidence of voluntary intoxication is 

admissible” under section 29.4, subdivision (b). (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 

1114, 1131; § 29.4, subd. (b) [“Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on 

the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent ... .”].) 

The jury was instructed: “You may consider evidence, if any, of a defendant’s 

voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in 

deciding whether the defendant acted with the specific intent to kill or to promote, 

further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members or a mental state such as 

premeditation. [¶] ... [¶] Do not consider evidence of intoxication in deciding whether 

murder was a natural and probable consequence of assault or assault with force likely to 

cause great bodily injury. [¶] In connection with the charge of murder the People have 

the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the 

requisite specific intent or mental state required. If the People have not met this burden, 

you must find the defendant not guilty of murder. [¶] ... [¶] You may not consider 

evidence of voluntary intoxication for any other purpose.” (Capitalization omitted.)
60

Contrary to defendants’ argument, the foregoing instruction informed the jurors 

that they could consider evidence of defendants’ voluntary intoxication in deciding three 

things: (1) intent to kill; (2) intent to promote, further, and assist in gang conduct; or 

(3) regarding “a mental state such as premeditation.” It also specifically stated that the 

People had the burden to prove that defendants “acted with the requisite intent or mental 

state required” to convict one or all of them of “the charge of Murder ... .” (Italics 

added.) The prosecutor’s theory was that defendants were guilty of murder by aiding and 

abetting an assault. As aiding and abetting liability was only relevant to whether 

defendants were guilty of the murder charge, we find that reasonable jurors would have 

understood their freedom to consider voluntary intoxication when deciding whether 

defendants formed the specific intent necessary to convict them of murder under an 

aiding and abetting theory.

4. Section 186.22 Instruction 

Defendants argue that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Prunty, the trial 

court erred by not instructing the jury about the “ ‘associational or organizational 

connection’ ” and “ ‘sameness’ ” requirements necessary to support the gang 

enhancement. (Quoting Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 71, italics omitted.) 

The trial court read the jury a version of CALCRIM No. 1401, which provided the 

elements of the section 186.22, subdivision (b) gang enhancement and also defined the 

phrases “ ‘criminal street gang’ ” and “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ” by 

paraphrasing section 186.22, subdivisions (f) and (e), respectively.

a. Legal Background and Prunty 

“ ‘ “It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial 

court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the 

evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154.) Among other things, 

that sua sponte duty includes instructing the jury regarding the elements of special 

allegations like the section 186.22, subdivision (b) enhancements alleged here. (People v. 
61

Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409.) That duty is generally satisfied by providing an 

instruction that tracks the language of the statute defining the enhancement at issue, 

especially if “the jury would have no difficulty in understanding the statute without 

guidance ... .” (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 327.) When “a phrase ‘is 

commonly understood by those familiar with the English language and is not used in a 

technical sense peculiar to the law, the court is not required to give an instruction as to its 

meaning in the absence of a request.’ ” (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 270–

271.)

In Prunty, the Supreme Court interpreted “organization, association, or 

group, ... whether formal or informal,” as used in section 186.22, subdivision (f) to 

“contemplate some kind of relationship, or degree of ‘togetherness,’ uniting those 

individuals.” (Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 72.) The court’s decision was based on the 

common understanding of those terms, as shown by the Supreme Court’s reliance on 

dictionary definitions to support its reasoning. The Prunty court rejected the argument

that it was adding “ ‘an element to the statute that the Legislature did not put there.’ ” 

(Id. at p. 76, fn. 4.) The court clarified that it was merely interpreting the words of 

section 186.22. (Ibid.)

b. Analysis

Defendants do not explain how the trial court could have a duty to instruct the jury 

sua sponte about a case that would not be decided by the California Supreme Court until 

two years after the trial ended. Even if it would be possible to impose such a duty, 

defendants’ argument here is without merit. Defense counsel did not seek clarification of 

the phrase “ongoing, association, or group ... , whether formal or informal,” as used in 

section 186.22, subdivision (f) and in the version of CALCRIM No. 1401 provided to the 

jury. The trial court provided an instruction that tracked the language of section 186.22, 

subdivisions (b), (e), and (f), thereby providing the jury the elements of the gang 

enhancement. The organizational association discussed in Prunty is not a separate 
62

statutory element of the enhancement but rather a judicial interpretation of the “ongoing 

organization, association, or group” language used in section 186.22, subdivision (f). 

(Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 71.) Further, the Prunty court’s discussion demonstrates 

that the phrase in section 186.22, subdivision (f) does not have a technical meaning

different from its commonly understood meaning. Because the trial court instructed the 

jury about all elements of the gang enhancement, defendants’ instructional error claim 

fails.

I. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING MARTELL’S MURDER CONVICTION 

Martell argues there was insufficient evidence to support his second degree 

murder conviction. As stated above, “we review the entire record in the light most 

favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.) 

Based on the instructions the jury received, we assume the jury found Martell 

guilty of second degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine 

based on the following implicit findings: Martell personally assaulted Garcia; Martell 

aided and abetted Mendoza and Ramirez (and possibly others) in their assault of Garcia; 

one or more of the perpetrators to that assault murdered Garcia; and a reasonable person 

in Martell’s position would have or should have known that murder was a reasonably 

foreseeable consequence of the group assault.

1. Rivas’s Credibility was a Question for the Jury

Martell argues that Rivas’s testimony about what he could see the night of the 

homicide was not credible as a matter of law and that, without Rivas’s testimony, there 

was insufficient evidence that Martell committed any crime (either directly or as an aider 

or abettor). 
63

a. Background

Rivas testified that five to seven men came from the direction of 436 Ezie St., 

chased Garcia, and knocked him down. Those men “were all participating” in the assault 

that followed, which included mostly kicking but also some punching. Rivas 

acknowledged that it was not very light outside that night, that there were no streetlights 

near the victim’s location on Richdale, and that his vantage point in the garage was about 

60 yards from the victim. A defense investigator testified that the distance between Rivas 

and the victim was around 66 yards and that, based on information from the Internet, 

there would have been almost no light coming from the moon on the night of the 

homicide. Martell’s trial counsel did not elicit testimony from any witness (expert or 

otherwise) regarding how well one might be able to see an assault occurring under similar 

circumstances as those experienced by Rivas.

b. Analysis

Contrary to Martell’s argument, Rivas’s credibility as an eyewitness was a 

quintessential jury question. Rivas testified about what he saw that night and 

acknowledged factors (including distance and lighting) that might affect how the jury 

would weigh his testimony. Attorneys for Martell and Ramirez cross-examined Rivas at 

length about the lighting conditions and distance from which he witnessed the homicide. 

It is not unreasonable as a matter of law that someone could see whether a group 

of five to seven men were all participating in an assault occurring about 60 yards from the 

eyewitness despite poor lighting conditions. The defense provided no expert testimony to 

call into question Rivas’s ability to see under those circumstances, much less testimony 

that could discredit Rivas’s account as a matter of law. Martell cannot discredit Rivas’s 

testimony by simply labeling it an “improbable and extraordinary visual feat” on appeal. 

The jury was free to weigh Rivas’s credibility and decide whether his testimony should 

be credited. Based on defendants’ convictions, we infer that the jury found Rivas’s 
64

testimony credible, a finding we must defer to on appeal. (People v. Jackson (2014) 

58 Cal.4th 724, 749.)

2. Evidence Supporting Aider and Abettor Liability

Based largely on his argument about Rivas’s credibility, Martell argues there was 

insufficient evidence to convict him of aiding and abetting the assault on Garcia. 

“[P]roof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct 

perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and 

abettor’s mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to 

assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—

conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.” 

(People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225 (Perez); § 31 [“All persons concerned in 

the commission of a crime ... , whether they directly commit the act constituting the 

offense, or aid and abet in its commission ... , are principals in any crime so 

committed.”].)

There was ample evidence that a perpetrator assaulted Garcia, including Tommy’s 

testimony that Ramirez and Mendoza punched Garcia; Mendoza’s hearsay statement to 

Tommy that he “ ‘booked’ ” Garcia 14 or 15 times; and Dr. O’Hara’s testimony that 

Garcia received numerous stab wounds, lacerations, and blunt-force trauma.

There was also evidence showing that Martell assisted in the attack by personally 

assaulting Garcia. Martell “concede[s] here that Martell was not only drinking with the 

other co-defendants that evening, but also went with them to the vicinity where the 

homicide took place.” Rivas testified that the people who ran from 436 Ezie St. (a group 

that Martell now concedes he was a part of) “were all participating” in the assault on 

Garcia. Detective Vallejo testified that when he interrogated Martell four days after the 

assault, Martell had scratches or abrasions on his hands. And Tommy testified that 

Martell left the scene of the homicide with the other defendants. Though the foregoing 

evidence was challenged by calling into question Rivas’s ability to see and by offering an 
65

innocent explanation for the scratches on Martell’s hands (that he had sustained the 

injuries at work), those challenges were only to the weight of the evidence. A reasonable 

trier of fact could have found that Martell assisted the other defendants by personally 

assaulting Garcia. (Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.)

As for Martell’s mens rea, the prosecutor had to show not only Martell’s 

knowledge of the perpetrators’ unlawful intent but also Martell’s intent to assist the 

perpetrators. (Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1225.) The evidence supported a finding 

that Martell was present and directly participated in the assault. Based on that evidence, 

the jury could find both that Martell had knowledge of the other perpetrators’ intent 

(because he could see them assaulting Garcia), and that Martell intended to assist those

other perpetrators by actively assaulting Garcia. 

Martell’s arguments to the contrary all go to the weight of the evidence rather than 

to its sufficiency to support a conviction. Martell argues that Rivas “never testified as to 

when he heard” the perpetrators yell, meaning those statements could not support a 

finding that Martell knew of the perpetrators’ intent. But the jury could reasonably infer 

that whoever yelled “ ‘Get him’ ” would do so before assaulting Garcia, thus supporting a 

finding that Martell became apprised of the perpetrators’ intent in advance. Martell also 

argues that he was intoxicated, which he deems “important in evaluating the motive of 

[an] intoxicated 20-year-old following others [to] where the homicide eventually 

occurred.” But, as already discussed, the jury was properly instructed regarding 

voluntary intoxication and its decision to convict Martell supports an inference that the 

jury determined that voluntary intoxication did not negate Martell’s specific intent to aid 

and abet.

3. Evidence Supporting Martell’s Murder Conviction

Martell argues that even if there was sufficient evidence that he assaulted Garcia

and aided and abetted the other perpetrators’ assault, the evidence was nonetheless

insufficient to show that murder was a natural and probable consequence of the assault. 
66

“ ‘A person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the 

intended crime [target offense] but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually 

commits [nontarget offense] that is a natural and probable consequence of the intended 

crime.’ ” (Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 920, brackets in Medina.) A nontarget offense 

is a natural and probable consequence of the target offense if a reasonable person in the 

defendant’s position should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably 

foreseeable consequence of the intended crime the defendant aided and abetted. (Ibid.) 

Whether the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence “is a factual 

issue to be resolved by the jury.” (Ibid.)

Tommy testified that he, Barragan, Martell, Mendoza, and Ramirez all ran toward

Garcia, and Rivas testified that everyone in the group who ran after Garcia participated in 

the assault by punching or kicking Garcia. Based on that evidence, a jury could

reasonably conclude that a reasonable person in Martell’s position should have known 

that Garcia’s death would be a foreseeable consequence of five men assaulting one 

victim. 

J. EFFECTIVENESS OF MARTELL’S TRIAL COUNSEL

Martell argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 

raise a defense theory and by failing to adequately cross-examine Rivas.

To establish ineffectiveness of trial counsel in violation of a defendant’s right to 

counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant must 

show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the 

deficiency. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216–217 (Ledesma).) Deficient 

performance is rarely shown if there was a tactical reason for trial counsel’s conduct. 

(See People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 255–256 [“except in rare cases, an appellate 

court should not attempt to second-guess trial counsel as to tactics”]; Bolin, supra,

18 Cal.4th at p. 317 [affirming conviction when alleged failure to object “may well have 

been ‘an informed tactical choice within the range of reasonable competence’ ”].) To 
67

prove prejudice, a defendant must affirmatively show a reasonable probability that, but 

for his trial counsel’s errors, the result would have been different. (Ledesma, at pp. 217–

218.) 

1. Counsel Was Not Ineffective During Closing Argument

Martell argues that the theory of the case his trial counsel argued to the jury—that 

Martell drank a beer at 436 Ezie St. but left the area before the homicide—was not 

plausible and that he should have instead argued that Martell was present at the scene of 

the homicide but did not aid and abet any crime. Alternatively, Martell argues that his 

trial counsel should have at least presented both theories to the jury.

a. Trial Counsel’s Theory Was Plausible

Martell’s trial counsel acknowledged that Martell’s DNA and fingerprints were 

found on one cigarette and one beer can, respectively, at 436 Ezie St. Based on that 

evidence, trial counsel argued Martell came to the house for one beer and then left. Trial 

counsel noted that Tommy was the only person who testified that Martell was at the 

scene of the crime, and trial counsel read the jury parts of CALCRIM No. 335, which 

instructed the jury to view Tommy’s accomplice testimony with caution. Trial counsel 

argued that Martell lied to the police about not visiting Ezie Street on the night of the 

homicide because Martell knew “ ‘snitches get stitches,’ ” “[y]ou’ve looked at what 

happened to Mr. Deleone,” and “you can imagine what it would be [like] out on the street 

for Mr. Martell having been involved in gang activity and now being labeled a snitch.”

And counsel argued that it was “certainly a possibility” that Martell dropped his cellular 

phone in the vicinity of the homicide area when he walked to 436 Ezie St. from where he 

had been dropped off earlier, or when he walked away from the house before the 

homicide occurred.

On appeal, Martell argues that the foregoing theory was implausible and that his 

theory on appeal—that he was present at the scene of the homicide but did not aid and 

abet any crime—was better supported by the evidence. But both theories have significant 
68

weaknesses. Martell’s preferred appellate theory was inconsistent with Rivas’s testimony 

that everyone who approached Garcia participated in the assault. His appellate theory 

would have also required trial counsel to make the complicated argument that while 

Martell was present at the scene of the homicide, the jurors should not construe any 

action he took there as assisting the perpetrators. Given the number of ways conduct can 

be found to aid and abet a crime (“aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the 

perpetrator’s commission” of a crime), any theory that isolated Martell entirely from the 

scene of the crime would benefit his defense.

Trial counsel’s argument also harmonized Martell’s version of events with what 

Rivas saw because if Martell was not at the scene of the homicide then Rivas’s testimony 

that everyone who was there participated would not implicate Martell. Trial counsel’s 

argument attempted to insulate Martell from the homicide by making the straightforward 

argument that he did not aid and abet any crime because he was not there when the crime

occurred. Trial counsel could have reasonably concluded that a jury would be less likely 

to be confused by that argument. 

Martell’s attack on his trial counsel’s argument is unpersuasive. He argues that his 

trial strategy required him to admit that Martell lied to the police. But, as Martell 

acknowledges, evidence about lying to the police “was obviously not favorable evidence 

for any argument,” and even under his appellate theory Martell would have had to admit 

lying to the police. Further, trial counsel provided a plausible explanation for Martell’s 

lies, arguing that he lied to protect himself from retaliation from the actual perpetrators. 

As for the location of Martell’s cellular phone, Martell contends that trial 

counsel’s argument that Martell happened to lose his phone in the same area where the 

homicide later occurred “would have been extraordinarily bad luck” and was mere 

speculation. But counsel provided a plausible explanation for its location by arguing that 

Martell would have likely walked through that area before the homicide occurred. Trial 

counsel also reminded the jury that an officer had testified that the clip securing Martell’s 
69

phone to his pocket was loose. While the cellular phone’s location was certainly a major 

weakness in trial counsel’s theory, providing an innocent explanation for its location 

allowed Martell to isolate himself from the scene of the homicide. 

Trial counsel’s decision about which theory to pursue also informed counsel’s 

decision about which evidence to use and Martell does not demonstrate that trial counsel 

erred in choosing which evidence to present to support that theory. Because we find that 

trial counsel made an informed tactical decision when selecting the theory to present to 

the jury, Martell has not demonstrated ineffective assistance from trial counsel.25

b. Trial Counsel’s Decision Not to Argue Two Theories

Martell argues that trial counsel should have at least argued both theories to the 

jury and that by not arguing both theories he impliedly conceded that Martell’s preferred 

appellate theory was not supported by the evidence. But the two theories were 

contradictory. Either Martell was not at the scene of the homicide at all (trial counsel’s 

theory) or he was at the scene but did not participate (Martell’s appellate theory). Trial 

counsel could reasonably conclude that arguing both theories would risk confusing the 

jury or, even worse, suggest to the jury that trial counsel was not confident enough in 

either of the theories to rely on only one. (See People v. Palmer (2005) 

133 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1159 [“Counsel may have wished to concentrate on the argument 

he viewed as more persuasive ... rather than potentially confusing the issues and 

detracting from his credibility with the jury by making a nonpersuasive argument.”].) 

 

25

 Trial counsel stated: “[T]here is an old kind of a joke: how can you tell when a 

lawyer is lying? When his lips are moving. I think the same is true of the Gonzalez 

family. How can you tell when the Gonzalez family is lying? Their lips are moving.” 

Martell calls that analogy “a vile slur against all counsel” and appears to suggest that the 

jury would have found trial counsel’s argument less credible as a result. Trial counsel’s 

intent was to attack the credibility of the Gonzalez family and not himself or the entire 

legal profession.
70

Given those risks, there was a tactical reason for trial counsel’s decision to rely on but

one theory. 

2. Counsel Was Not Ineffective During Rivas’s Cross-Examination 

Martell argues his trial counsel was deficient for failing to impeach Rivas with two 

statements Rivas made during Mendoza’s grand jury proceedings. 

a. Participation in the Homicide

On direct examination at trial, Rivas responded “Yes” when asked, “Did they all 

participate in beating him up?” At the grand jury proceedings, the prosecutor had asked a 

similar question and Rivas responded: “Yes. It looked like everybody did.” Martell’s 

trial counsel did not ask Rivas about his grand jury testimony.

Counsel for Ramirez cross-examined Rivas at length at trial about what Rivas 

could see that night. As part of that cross-examination, counsel for Ramirez drew a 

diagram (with an X representing the body and the letters A through G surrounding the X) 

and proceeded to ask Rivas what he recalled seeing each assailant do. Rivas 

acknowledged that he could not testify regarding any specific assailant’s actions and that 

“I just seen everybody swinging.” Ramirez’s counsel eventually asked Rivas, “Is it safe 

to say that ... if you had seen seven people in front of you, you couldn’t tell us what each 

one of them did today?” to which Rivas responded, “No.” 

Seizing on the words “looked like” in Rivas’s grand jury testimony, Martell argues 

on appeal that Rivas “was not certain that everyone participated” and that Martell’s trial 

counsel was deficient for not impeaching Rivas with his grand jury testimony. But after 

the extensive cross-examination by Ramirez’s trial counsel, Martell’s trial counsel could 

have reasonably concluded that the issue of Rivas’s ability to see the assault and his 

ability to recall what he saw had been adequately explored. This is especially true 

because Rivas’s grand jury testimony was almost identical to his trial testimony. 

Martell’s trial counsel could have also concluded based on Rivas’s responses to his crossexamination by counsel for Ramirez that asking Rivas additional questions would lead to 
71

further damaging statements about what Rivas saw (e.g., “I just seen everybody 

swinging”). Martell has not shown his trial counsel was deficient.

b. Order of Chase

Martell argues that his trial counsel was deficient for not questioning Rivas about 

the order of the people chasing Garcia. 

i. Grand Jury and Trial Testimony

Rivas testified before the grand jury that “[o]ne individual from 436 started 

running towards him ... [a]nd then, after he started trotting up to him, two people started 

running behind him,” followed by three or four more. That grand jury testimony was not 

introduced at trial.

At trial, Rivas initially testified that one person approached Garcia from 

436 Ezie St., followed by the others. Rivas testified during cross-examination by Martell 

that he initially saw one person approach Garcia but that when the group decided to 

charge Garcia “[t]here was two guys at first that were charging. One was a little bit 

closer than the other guy. And then after those two guys came closer to him and four 

more guys started rushing closer.” 

Tommy testified at trial that he ran toward Garcia first, followed by Martell and 

then the others. During closing argument, the prosecutor paraphrased Rivas’s testimony 

about two people charging Garcia, with one slightly in front of the other. The prosecutor 

did not provide names for the people he thought those two people were. 

ii. Analysis

Martell notes that Tommy testified that Martell was the closest person following 

Tommy as they approached Garcia. Martell argues that the prosecutor’s paraphrasing of 

Rivas’s testimony relied on Tommy’s testimony and implied that Martell was the second 

person chasing Garcia. Martell contends that eliciting Rivas’s grand jury testimony 

somehow “would have greatly undercut” the inference that Martell was the second person 
72

“as well as casting further doubt on Rivas’s ability to accurately recall what he believed 

he had seen.”

Martell seems to suggest that Tommy’s testimony should have triggered Martell’s 

trial counsel to question Rivas about his grand jury testimony. But Tommy testified after

Rivas. Martell does not explain how his trial counsel would have known that Tommy 

would implicate Martell as the person who followed Tommy most closely during the 

chase. 

Even if Martell’s trial counsel could have known what Tommy would say, 

Tommy’s testimony could be accurate under each of the scenarios Rivas described. If 

one person was followed by a group of people, Martell could have been the first one in 

that later group. If two people initially approached Garcia, with one a little bit closer than 

the other, Martell could have been the second person. And if one person originally 

approached Garcia, followed by a group of two people, Martell could have been the first 

person in that group of two people. As eliciting Rivas’s grand jury testimony would not 

have materially assisted Martell’s defense, trial counsel may have had a tactical reason 

for not doing so.

K. STAYING THE GANG ENHANCEMENTS

The trial court purported to stay the sentence for the section 186.22, 

subdivision (b) gang enhancements, citing Johnson, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 1230. We 

requested supplemental briefing regarding whether section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5)

requires that the abstracts of judgment be amended to note a 15-year minimum parole 

eligibility date. In supplemental briefing, Ramirez (joined by Mendoza and Martell) 

argues that we do not have “jurisdiction to add a section 186.22(b)(5) allegation where 

there was none below.”

1. Background

The information alleged that defendants committed the murder for the benefit of a 

criminal street gang “within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1)(C).” The 
73

verdict forms also specifically identified the enhancement as involving section 186.22, 

subdivision (b)(1)(C). 

At sentencing, counsel for Mendoza stated: “So as we discussed in chambers --

and [the prosecutor] was kind enough to provide the citation -- the ten years would not be 

imposed on this case because it’s a homicide case. And the cite is People versus 

Johnson, 109 Cal.App.4th 1230 at 1236–7. So I’m going to ask the Court not to impose 

the ten-year gang enhancement, the punishment pursuant to that statute.” The court 

concluded that the “additional ten-year term for the enhancement pursuant to Penal Code 

section 186.22(b)(1)(c) is stayed pursuant to the Johnson case cited by counsel.”

2. Analysis

Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) provides that “[e]xcept as provided in 

paragraphs (4) and (5),” any person convicted of committing a felony for the benefit of a 

criminal street gang “shall be punished” with a term that varies based on the severity of 

the underlying felony. Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) states that if the underlying 

“felony is a violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, the person shall 

be punished by an additional term of 10 years.” However, section 186.22, 

subdivision (b)(5) provides, in relevant part: “any person who violates this subdivision in 

the commission of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life shall 

not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served.” 

In Johnson, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 1230, the Court of Appeal decided that the 10-

year section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) enhancement could not apply to a seconddegree murder conviction because that felony conviction “is a ‘felony punishable by 

imprisonment in the state prison for life’ within the meaning of section 186.22, 

subdivision (b)(5).” (Johnson, at p. 1237.) The Johnson court struck the 10-year 

enhancement and instructed the trial court to “modify the abstract of judgment to ... note 

a 15-year minimum parole eligibility date on that count pursuant to section 186.22,

subdivision (b)(5).” (Johnson, at pp. 1239–1240.)
74

Here, in response to a request from Mendoza’s counsel, the trial court purported to 

stay the gang enhancements based on Johnson, and it appears the trial court intended to 

follow that case’s holding. But the abstracts of judgment here do not contain the 

section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5) parole eligibility limitation discussed in Johnson. To 

effectuate the trial court’s apparent intent (which, again, was based on a request from 

Mendoza), we will order that the abstracts of judgment be modified to note a 15-year 

minimum parole eligibility date. 

L. CUMULATIVE ERROR

Defendants claim that the various errors they identify are cumulatively prejudicial. 

“Lengthy criminal trials are rarely perfect, and this court will not reverse a judgment 

absent a clear showing of a miscarriage of justice.” (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 844.) 

“Nevertheless, a series of trial errors, though independently harmless, may in some 

circumstances rise by accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error.” (Ibid.) 

We have found the following errors: (1) the prosecutor improperly continued to 

ask about weapons during his direct examination of Deleone; (2) the prosecutor used an 

improper method of refreshing Deleone’s recollection; (3) the trial court admitted an 

irrelevant slide during the gang expert’s slide show; and (4) the court improperly 

admitted evidence of Mendoza’s statements about gang affiliation during his jail 

classification interview. These issues are not insignificant, but neither are they 

cumulatively prejudicial.

[The remainder of this opinion is to be published.]

III. NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF PROPOSITION 57

We granted rehearing and asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing 

regarding whether Proposition 57 had any effect on Ramirez’s appeal. Ramirez argues 

that he is entitled to relief under Proposition 57 because: (1) the voters intended to apply 

Proposition 57 to non-final cases; (2) In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada) 

compels retroactive application of Proposition 57; and (3) the failure to apply Proposition
75

57 retroactively would violate his California and federal constitutional rights to equal 

protection and due process.

A. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND PROPOSITION 57

Ramirez, who was 16 years old when the homicide occurred, was charged by 

direct filing in adult court.26 At that time, former Welfare and Institutions Code section 

707, subdivision (d)(1) allowed a prosecutor to bypass the juvenile court and directly file 

certain charges against a minor in adult court. (Stats. 2008, ch. 179, § 236, pp. 656–657.) 

Specifically, a prosecutor could file an accusatory pleading directly in adult court against 

a minor, like Ramirez, who was both 16 years of age or older and accused of committing 

certain specified offenses (including murder). (Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subds. 

(d)(1), (b)(1); Stats. 2008, ch. 179, § 236, pp. 654–657.) 

The voters approved Proposition 57 at the November 8, 2016 general election; it 

took effect the next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).) Proposition 57 amended 

the Welfare and Institutions Code to mandate that any allegation of criminal conduct 

against any person under 18 years of age be commenced in juvenile court, regardless of 

the age of the juvenile or the severity of the offense. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. 

Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) Text of Proposed Laws, pp. 141–145.) As amended by 

Proposition 57, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (a)(1) now 

specifies that the sole mechanism by which a minor can be prosecuted in adult court is 

through a motion by a prosecutor to transfer the case from juvenile court to adult court.27 

In response to a motion to transfer, “the juvenile court shall decide whether the minor 

 

26

 As we will be differentiating between courts of criminal jurisdiction and 

juvenile courts, we will refer to courts of criminal jurisdiction as adult courts. 

27

 Specifically, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (a)(1) now 

provides: “In any case in which a minor is alleged to be a person described in 

Section 602 by reason of the violation, when he or she was 16 years of age or older, of 

any felony criminal statute, or of an offense listed in subdivision (b) when he or she was 

14 or 15 years of age, the district attorney ... may make a motion to transfer the minor 

from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” 
76

should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction,” considering: the “degree of 

criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor”; whether “the minor can be rehabilitated 

prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”; the “minor’s previous 

delinquent history”; the success “of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate 

the minor”; and the “circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to 

have been committed by the minor.”28 (§ 707, subd. (a)(2)(A)–(a)(2)(E).)

Proposition 57 also changed parole eligibility for both adults and juveniles tried in 

adult court. It added section 32 to article I of the California Constitution, which 

provides: “Any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state 

prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term for his or 

her primary offense.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (a)(1).)

 Proposition 57 contains uncodified sections, some of which are relevant to 

Ramirez’s contentions. Section 2 states that the purpose and intent of the proposition 

was, among other things, to “[s]ave money by reducing wasteful spending on prisons”; 

“[s]top the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for 

juveniles”; and “[r]equire a judge, not a prosecutor, to decide whether juveniles should be 

tried in adult court.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) Text of 

Proposed Laws, p. 141.) Section 5 states that the act “shall be broadly construed to 

accomplish its purposes.” (Id. at p. 145.) Section 9 states that the act “shall be liberally 

construed to effectuate its purposes.” (Id. at p. 146.) 

B. TEXT AND HISTORY OF PROPOSITION 57 DO NOT SUPPORT RETROACTIVITY

Whether the voters intended Proposition 57 to apply retroactively is a question of 

law to which we apply our independent judgment. (People v. Arroyo (2016) 

62 Cal.4th 589, 593 (Arroyo).) When interpreting a voter initiative, we apply the same 

 

28

 Proposition 57 also amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, but 

those amendments are not relevant to this appeal. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. 

(Nov. 8, 2016) Text of Proposed Laws, pp. 141–142.)
77

rules that govern statutory construction. We first look to the language of the enactment, 

giving the words their ordinary meaning. If the law is ambiguous, we refer to other 

sources of voter intent, including the arguments and analyses contained in the official 

ballot pamphlet. (Ibid.)

“Whether a statute operates prospectively or retroactively is, at least in the first 

instance, a matter of legislative intent. When the Legislature has not made its intent on 

the matter clear with respect to a particular statute, the Legislature’s generally applicable 

declaration in section 3 provides the default rule: ‘No part of [the Penal Code] is 

retroactive, unless expressly so declared.’ ” (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 319 

(Brown).) We are “cautious not to infer retroactive intent from vague phrases and broad, 

general language in statutes.” (Ibid.) 

The text of Proposition 57 contains no express statement of intent regarding 

prospective or retroactive application. Ramirez argues that retroactive intent can be 

inferred from broadly and liberally construing the initiative’s stated purposes of saving 

money by reducing spending on prisons and requiring judges rather than prosecutors to 

decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court. (Citing Voter Information Guide, 

Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) Text of Proposed Laws, p. 141.) But even broadly construed, 

none of the stated purposes provide a reference to timing from which retroactive intent 

can be inferred. In fact, there is arguably textual support for an inference of prospective

intent. One stated purpose is to require judges rather than prosecutors to decide “whether 

juveniles should be tried in adult court.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 

2016) Text of Proposed Laws, p. 141, italics added.) That statement suggests an intent 

that Proposition 57 apply only to cases that have not already been tried. At most, the text 

of Proposition 57 is ambiguous. 

Because the text of the initiative is arguably ambiguous, we look to the ballot 

materials to determine whether they shed light on the voters’ intent. (Arroyo, supra, 

62 Cal.4th at p. 593.) Ramirez points to several statements from the argument in favor of 
78

Proposition 57, which we separate into two groups because they appear to discuss 

different aspects of the initiative. 

The first group includes three statements that Ramirez argues suggest the voters 

intended to apply Proposition 57 retroactively: “Prop. 57 focuses resources on keeping 

dangerous criminals behind bars, while rehabilitating juvenile and adult inmates and 

saving tens of millions of taxpayer dollars”; “Prop. 57 focuses our system on evidencebased rehabilitation for juveniles and adults because it is better for public safety than our 

current system”; and “Prop. 57 saves tens of millions of taxpayer dollars by reducing 

wasteful prison spending, breaks the cycle of crime by rehabilitating deserving juvenile 

and adult inmates, and keeps dangerous criminals behind bars.” (Voter Information 

Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) argument in favor of Proposition 57 and rebuttal to 

argument against Proposition 57, pp. 58–59.) But those statements all reference both 

juveniles and adults, suggesting that they refer to the changes to parole Proposition 57 

added to the California Constitution rather than to the Welfare and Institutions Code 

amendments. 

The second group includes two passages that Ramirez points to as indications of 

voter intent, which appear to be related to the Welfare and Institutions Code amendments 

at issue here: “Requires judges instead of prosecutors to decide whether minors should 

be prosecuted as adults, emphasizing rehabilitation for minors in the juvenile system”; 

and “Evidence shows that the more inmates are rehabilitated, the less likely they are to 

re-offend. Further evidence shows that minors who remain under juvenile court 

supervision are less likely to commit new crimes. Prop. 57 focuses on evidence-based 

rehabilitation and allows a juvenile court judge to decide whether or not a minor should 

be prosecuted as an adult.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) 

argument in favor of Proposition 57, p. 58.) Though those passages express voter intent 

to focus on rehabilitation, they are silent as to intent regarding retroactive application. 

And, like the statement of intent from Proposition 57 we already discussed, those 
79

passages are susceptible of the same inference of prospective intent. Both state that 

judges should decide whether minors “should be prosecuted,” suggesting an intent for the 

law to apply only in the future. 

In sum, we find that the voters did not make their intent clear regarding retroactive 

application in the text of Proposition 57 nor can we clearly discern their intent from the 

ballot pamphlet, meaning that we must follow section 3 and apply Proposition 57 

prospectively unless the Estrada rule applies. (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 319.)

C. THE ESTRADA RULE DOES NOT APPLY

Ramirez argues that retroactive application of Proposition 57 is compelled by the 

Estrada rule, which is a judicially-created exception to the general section 3 presumption 

that new statutes apply prospectively.

1. The Estrada Rule 

Even in the absence of voter intent to apply a proposition retroactively, the 

Estrada rule provides a “contextually specific qualification to the ordinary presumption” 

of prospective application. (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 323, citing Estrada, supra, 

63 Cal.2d 740.) When the electorate (or Legislature) amends “a statute to reduce the 

punishment for a particular criminal offense,” the Estrada rule provides an inference that 

the voters “intended the amended statute to apply to all defendants whose judgments are 

not yet final on the statute’s operative date.” (Brown, at p. 323.) That conclusion is 

based on the “premise that ‘[a] legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime

represents a legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is 

sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Estrada, at 

p. 745, italics in Brown.)

Brown is instructive regarding application of the Estrada rule. Brown involved a 

legislative amendment to section 4019 that temporarily increased the rate at which 

presentence custody credits were calculated. (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 317–319.) 

Brown was sentenced to prison before the amendment but argued, based on the Estrada 
80

rule, that the amendment should apply retroactively to him because his judgment was not 

yet final when the amendment became effective. (Id. at pp. 318–319, 323.) The Brown 

court decided the Estrada rule did not apply. It reasoned that unlike a legislative 

mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime, “a statute increasing the rate at which 

prisoners may earn credits for good behavior does not represent a judgment about the 

needs of the criminal law with respect to a particular criminal offense, and thus does not 

support an analogous inference of retroactive intent.” (Id. at p. 325.) The court noted 

that section 4019 did not alter the penalty for a crime at all, it merely “addresses future 

conduct in a custodial setting by providing increased incentives for good behavior.” 

(Brown, at p. 325, italics in original.)

The Brown court rejected an argument that the Estrada rule should “apply more 

broadly to any statute that reduces punishment in any manner.” (Brown, supra,

54 Cal.4th at p. 325.) The court reasoned that such a broad application would expand the 

Estrada rule to such an extent as to swallow the general section 3 presumption of 

prospective application. (Ibid.) That expansion would run counter to the court’s 

interpretation of the Estrada rule “not as weakening or modifying the default rule of 

prospective operation codified in section 3, but rather as informing the rule’s application 

in a specific context by articulating the reasonable presumption that a legislative act 

mitigating the punishment for a particular criminal offense is intended to apply to all 

nonfinal judgments.” (Brown, at p. 324.) The court also explained that broadening the 

Estrada rule to apply to the section 4019 amendments would not “represent a logical 

extension of Estrada’s reasoning.” (Brown, at p. 325.) While acknowledging that “a 

convicted prisoner who is released a day early is punished a day less,” the court noted 

that “the rule and logic of Estrada is specifically directed to a statute that represents ‘ “a 

legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime” ’ [citation] because such a 

law supports the inference that the Legislature would prefer to impose the new, shorter 

penalty rather than to ‘ “satisfy a desire for vengeance.” ’ ” (Ibid., italics in Brown.) 
81

2. Analysis

Ramirez argues that the Estrada rule applies because Proposition 57 “specified 

that ‘different treatment’ as a juvenile was sufficient to meet ... ‘the legitimate ends of the 

criminal law.’ ” (Quoting Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 323.) The fundamental problem 

with Ramirez’s argument is that—unlike every case he cites where a court found that the 

Estrada rule applied29—Proposition 57 does not mitigate the penalty for a particular 

crime. As the court emphasized in Brown: “We based this conclusion [that the Estrada 

rule requires retroactive application of statutes that reduce punishment for a particular 

offense] on the premise that ‘[a] legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular 

crime represents a legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treatment is 

sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law.’ ” (Brown, at p. 323, quoting 

Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745, italics in Brown.)

Proposition 57 is distinguishable in two respects from the laws at issue in cases 

applying the Estrada rule. First, Proposition 57 does not expressly mitigate the penalty 

for any particular crime. Instead, it amends the Welfare and Institutions Code to create a 

presumption that all individuals under the age of 18 come within the jurisdiction of the 

 

29

 Other than Estrada and Brown, Ramirez cites: People v. Francis (1969) 

71 Cal.2d 66, 75–78 [defendant entitled to resentencing on controlled substances 

conviction where amendment made offense a wobbler instead of a straight felony]; 

People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 298 [reversing oral copulation conviction after 

legislative amendment rendered the defendant’s conduct non-criminal]; People v. 

Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 721–722 [reversing television piracy convictions where 

conduct no longer illegal under amendment enacted while appeal pending]; People v. 

Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 787 [defendant entitled to shorter sentencing 

enhancement under legislative amendment increasing the minimum value of stolen 

property required for longer enhancement to apply]; People v. Trippett (1997) 

56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1536, 1548–1549 [reversing for limited retrial as to whether 

medicinal marijuana initiative provided valid defense to the defendant’s marijuana 

possession conviction]; People v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 783–786 

[reversing for new trial to allow the defendant to argue that legislative amendments 

related to medicinal marijuana provided a valid defense to conspiracy to possess 

marijuana for sale charge].
82

juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602), and provides a procedural method for 

prosecutors to move to transfer a juvenile case to adult court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, 

subd. (a)(1)). We acknowledge that the amendments may have the effect of reducing the 

punishment in some cases because, unlike adult court sentences, the longest that juvenile 

court jurisdiction generally extends is until the juvenile offender is 25 years old. (§ 607, 

subd. (b).) But, as the Brown court reasoned when reviewing the amendments to section 

4019, the Estrada rule is not applicable to any amendment that may reduce a punishment. 

Instead, the Estrada rule is “specifically directed to a statute that represents ‘ “a 

legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime.” ’ ” (Brown, supra, 

54 Cal.4th at p. 325, italics in Brown.) 

Second, Proposition 57 provides no certainty that a minor will actually receive a 

mitigated penalty because juvenile courts have discretion under Proposition 57 to transfer 

juvenile cases to adult court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2).) If a case is 

transferred to adult court, the penalty for all offenses will be the same as they were before 

Proposition 57.

Given these distinctions, we find that applying the Estrada rule to Proposition 57 

would expand that rule in such a manner as to risk swallowing the general section 3 

presumption that legislation is intended to apply prospectively. (Brown, supra,

54 Cal.4th at pp. 324–325.) 

People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66 (Francis), relied on by Ramirez, is 

distinguishable. Francis was convicted of committing a felony drug offense. While his 

case was pending on appeal, the statute prohibiting that drug offense was amended to 

change it from a straight felony to a wobbler that could be charged as a felony or a 

misdemeanor. The Francis court determined that the Estrada rule applied. (Id. at 

pp. 75–78.) The court reasoned that while the amendment did not guarantee Francis a 

lower sentence, making the crime punishable as a misdemeanor showed a legislative 
83

intent that punishing the offense as a felony might be too severe in certain cases. (Id. at 

p. 76.) 

Francis is distinguishable because it involved a legislative mitigation of the 

potential punishment for a specific crime. Where, as under Proposition 57, the potential 

benefit inures to a class of offenders based on their age rather than on the offenses they 

commit, the inference that voters deemed the entire Penal Code unduly severe when 

applied to minors is too attenuated to support application of the Estrada rule.30 

Our conclusion that the Estrada rule does not apply is consistent with a recent 

decision interpreting Proposition 57. (People v. Cervantes (Mar. 9, 2017, A140464) 

__ Cal.App.5th __ (Cervantes).) Cervantes (who was 14 years old) was charged as an 

adult before Proposition 57 and convicted of several charges, including attempted murder 

and torture. (Cervantes, at p. __ [pp. 1, 6–7].) Proposition 57 passed while his case was 

pending on appeal. The Court of Appeal rejected Cervantes’s argument that Proposition

57 should apply retroactively to him under the Estrada rule, reasoning that while 

Proposition 57 “will have a substantive impact on time in custody in some cases—

sometimes a big impact—the transfer procedure required under [Welfare and Institutions 

Code] Section 707 does not resemble the clear-cut reduction in penalty involved in 

Estrada.” (Id. at pp. __ [pp. 52–54].) The court observed that Proposition 57 “may or 

may not in some attenuated way affect punishment, but it is not a direct reduction in 

penalty as required for retroactivity under Estrada.” (Ibid.)

 

30

 In concluding that the Estrada rule does not apply to Ramirez’s case, we 

express no opinion on the possible applicability of Proposition 57 to cases where trial had 

not commenced before the initiative took effect. (See People v. Superior Court (Lara) 

(Mar. 13, 2017, E067296) __ Cal.App.5th __, __ [pp. 33–36] [finding juveniles charged 

in adult court by direct filing before Proposition 57 are entitled to fitness hearings before 

trials commence]; Cervantes, supra, __ Cal.App.5th at p. __ [pp. 54-69] [finding juvenile 

convicted in adult court after direct filing was entitled to a fitness hearing on remand 

before retrial of counts the Court of Appeal reversed].)
84

D. NO EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION

Ramirez argues that not applying Proposition 57 retroactively to his case would 

violate his state and federal constitutional rights to equal protection. (U.S. Const., 

14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)

1. Standard of Review

The concept of equal protection recognizes that individuals who are similarly 

situated should be treated equally, unless there is a justification for the differential 

treatment. (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 328.) The first step in an equal protection 

challenge is demonstrating that the state adopted a classification that affects two or more 

similarly situated groups in an unequal way. (Ibid.) That “initial inquiry is not whether 

persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for 

purposes of the law challenged.’ ” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 

253.) 

The second step is determining whether there is a sufficient justification for the 

unequal treatment. The level of justification needed is based on the right implicated. 

When the disparity implicates a suspect class or a fundamental right, strict scrutiny 

applies. (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836 (Wilkinson).) When no suspect 

class or fundamental right is involved, the challenger must demonstrate that the law is not 

rationally related to any legitimate government purpose. (People v. Turnage (2012) 

55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage).) “In other words, the legislation survives constitutional 

scrutiny as long as there is ‘ “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide 

a rational basis for the classification.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

2. Ramirez is Similarly Situated with Juveniles Benefiting from 

Proposition 57

Ramirez is similarly situated with another class for purposes of his challenge to 

Proposition 57. The two classes are distinguished by whether trial had commenced 
85

before Proposition 57’s effective date.31 Ramirez falls within the class of individuals 

whose trials had already commenced. He is similarly situated with a class of hypothetical 

individuals who are 16 or 17 years old and accused of crimes that could result in transfer 

to adult court, but whose trials had not commenced before Proposition 57 became 

effective. 

3. There is a Rational Basis for Ramirez’s Differential Treatment 

Having determined that Ramirez is similarly situated with another class of 

individuals, we must decide whether there is a justification for the differential treatment 

caused by prospective application of Proposition 57. But first we must decide which 

standard of review applies: strict scrutiny or rational basis.

Ramirez argues both that strict scrutiny applies because Proposition 57 implicates 

Ramirez’s fundamental liberty interest (citing People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 251 

(Olivas)), and that the distinction cannot even survive rational basis review. 

Olivas involved a challenge to a law that allowed adult misdemeanants who were

under 21 years old to be tried in adult court and then remanded to the California Youth 

Authority. (Olivas, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 239.) The California Youth Authority could 

retain an individual until he or she turned 23 years old. (Id. at p. 241.) Olivas (who was 

19 years old when he was arrested) was convicted of a misdemeanor that had a maximum 

sentence of six months, meaning that under the challenged law he faced a “potential 

period of confinement several times longer than the longest jail term which might have 

been imposed.” (Id. at pp. 239–242.) Because his challenge implicated a fundamental 

 

31

 We acknowledge that when remanding the case for possible retrial or 

resentencing, the Cervantes court found that the distinguishing event for application of 

Proposition 57 was sentencing rather than commencement of trial. (Cervantes, supra, __ 

Cal.App.5th __ [pp. 62–67] [“[B]eginning with the effective date of Prop[.] 57, a juvenile 

felon may not be ‘sentenced in adult court’ without a prior transfer hearing under 

Section 707, subdivision (a), if he or she so requests.”].) We explain in footnote 7, post, 

why defining the two classes based on sentencing rather than the commencement of trial 

would not change our equal protection analysis here. 
86

liberty interest, the Supreme Court concluded that strict scrutiny applied. (Id. at pp. 247–

251.) 

Ramirez essentially argues that strict scrutiny applies here because he is 

potentially subject to a longer period of incarceration than those to whom Proposition 57 

applies. Though Olivas could be interpreted to require strict scrutiny in any case 

involving penal statutes authorizing different sentences, “Olivas properly has not been 

read so broadly.” (Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 837–838 [applying rational basis to 

equal protection challenge to two statutes prohibiting battery against custodial officers 

where it was possible that statute prohibiting battery without injury could be punished 

more severely than statute prohibiting battery with an injury]; accord People v. Owens

(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 798, 802 [“California courts have never accepted the general 

proposition that ‘all criminal laws, because they may result in a defendant’s incarceration, 

are perforce subject to strict judicial scrutiny.’ ”].) In a similar context, the Ninth Circuit 

concluded that the rational basis standard applied to a challenge brought by a defendant 

sentenced under Washington’s indeterminate sentencing scheme who argued that he had 

been denied equal protection by not having that state’s later-enacted determinate 

sentencing scheme applied to his case. (Foster v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms 

and Parole (9th Cir. 1989) 878 F.2d 1233, 1235.)

Ramirez’s prosecution, conviction, and sentencing in adult court were all proper 

under the laws in place at the time of those events. Proposition 57 differentiates between 

people based on the timing of their prosecution rather than on any suspect classification. 

And Ramirez had no vested liberty interest “ ‘ “in a specific term of imprisonment or in 

the designation a particular crime receives.” ’ ” (Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 74.) 

We find that the rational basis standard applies.

Ramirez argues that the differential treatment he receives “bears no rational 

relationship to [Proposition] 57’s ‘objective.’ ” But the rational basis standard does not 

focus solely on a law’s stated objective. It allows for “ ‘ “any reasonably conceivable 
87

state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” ’ ” (Turnage,

supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 74, italics added.) The voters could rationally conclude that 

applying Proposition 57 prospectively would serve the legitimate purpose of not 

overwhelming the juvenile courts with requests for fitness hearings by those who had 

already been convicted in adult court for crimes committed as juveniles. (E.g., Talley v. 

Municipal Court (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 109, 114–116 [finding no equal protection 

violation in prospective-only application of alcohol treatment program that bypassed 

license suspension because differential treatment rationally related to law’s purpose of 

“ ‘prevent[ing] the courts and programs in each county from being overburdened at the 

commencement of the implementation of this article’ ”].) 

The voters could also rationally conclude that applying Proposition 57 

prospectively was rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of assuring that 

“ ‘penal laws will maintain their desired deterrent effect by carrying out the original 

prescribed punishment as written’ ” when the defendant committed the crime and was 

tried for that offense. (People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 188, 190–191 [rejecting 

equal protection challenge to prospective-only application of Proposition 36, the 

Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, which guaranteed probation for 

individuals convicted of nonviolent possession offenses, subject to certain disqualifying 

circumstances].) We acknowledge that the penal laws will not maintain their desired 

deterrent effect in all cases because Proposition 57 likely applies to juveniles who 

committed crimes before Proposition 57 but who were not prosecuted until after its 

effective date. But a “ ‘classification is not arbitrary or irrational simply because there is 

an “imperfect fit between means and ends” ’ [citations], or ‘because it may be “to some 

extent both underinclusive and overinclusive.” ’ ” (Johnson v. Department of Justice

(2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 887.) 

More fundamentally, the federal Constitution “ ‘does not forbid ... statutory 

changes to have a beginning and thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and 
88

later time.’ ” (Califano v. Webster (1977) 430 U.S. 313, 314–316, 321 [rejecting equal 

protection challenge to an amendment to the Social Security Act that improved a 

retirement benefit calculation but applied only prospectively; plaintiff had argued 

retroactive application was required to prevent discrimination based on date of birth].) 

Because there is a rational basis for prospective-only application of 

Proposition 57, Ramirez’s equal protection challenge fails.32

E. NO DUE PROCESS VIOLATION

Ramirez argues that not applying Proposition 57 retroactively to his case would 

violate his federal constitutional right to due process. He cites a single case to support 

that proposition, Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541 (Kent). 

Kent involved what the Supreme Court characterized as “a number of disturbing 

questions concerning the administration ... of the District of Columbia laws relating to 

juveniles.” (Kent, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 542–543.) When Kent was 16 years old, he was 

apprehended after his fingerprints were found in the apartment of a woman who had been 

raped. Police interrogated Kent for several hours, delivered him to a “Receiving Home 

for Children” for the night, and then interrogated him for several more hours the next 

day. (Id. at pp. 543–544.) Kent’s mother retained counsel for Kent. His counsel filed 

motions requesting a hearing on the juvenile court’s apparent intention to transfer Kent to 

 

32

 Even assuming, consistent with Cervantes, that the two classes are 

distinguished by whether sentencing had occurred before Proposition 57’s effective date 

(see Cervantes, supra, __ Cal.App.5th at p. __ [p. 67]), our equal protection analysis 

would not change. Applying Proposition 57 to juveniles who had been found guilty in 

adult court before Proposition 57 but who were not sentenced until after the initiative 

became effective would slightly increase the class of people who benefit from 

Proposition 57. But the voters could still rationally conclude that applying Proposition 57 

only to that slightly larger class of juveniles would serve the legitimate government 

interest of preventing juvenile courts from being overwhelmed with requests for fitness 

hearings by those who had already been convicted and sentenced in adult court for crimes 

they committed as juveniles. 
89

adult court and seeking access to Kent’s juvenile court file. The juvenile court file 

contained a report that discussed the possibility of Kent having a mental illness. (Id. at 

pp. 544–546.) Without holding a hearing, the juvenile court summarily ordered Kent’s 

case transferred to adult court, finding that “after ‘full investigation, I do hereby waive’ ” 

the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 546.) Kent was charged in adult court with 

residential burglary, robbery, and rape. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity of 

rape, but was found guilty of the remaining charges. (Id. at pp. 548, 550.)

The Supreme Court found that the juvenile court violated Kent’s rights to due 

process and the effective assistance of counsel when it summarily transferred his case to 

adult court. (Kent, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 557, 561–562.) The statute at issue stated that 

the juvenile judge “may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child 

held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of 

such offense if committed by an adult.” (Id. at pp. 547–548.) The court found that “the 

statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the 

assistance of counsel” required the juvenile court to provide a hearing, assistance of 

counsel (including providing the attorney access to juvenile court files), and a statement 

of reasons to support its decision. (Id. at pp. 557, 561–562.)

We find Kent readily distinguishable. Kent did not involve review of whether a 

law that had taken effect after a conviction should be applied retroactively. And the 

Supreme Court was careful to note that it was deciding the case based on its 

interpretation of the statute at issue there, read in the context of constitutional principles. 

(Kent, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 557.) Ramirez does not argue that the trial court here 

violated any procedural statute in effect when he was prosecuted. 

Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court concluded that for purposes 

of due process, “the 14th Amendment does not forbid statutes and statutory changes to 

have a beginning, and thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later 

time.” (Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes (1911) 220 U.S. 502, 505 [denying due 
90

process challenge to new law prohibiting use of person’s picture in advertising without 

consent].) Ramirez has failed to demonstrate any due process violation.

IV. DISPOSITION

The superior court is directed to prepare a new abstract of judgment for each 

defendant to note a 15-year minimum parole eligibility date based on Penal Code 

section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5), and to forward those abstracts to the Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation. As so modified, the judgments are affirmed. 
____________________________________

Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________

Manoukian, Acting P.J. 

____________________________

Mihara, J. 

People v Mendoza et al

H039705
Trial Court: Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case 

Nos.: 212506, C1114503

Trial Judge: Hon. Andrea Y. Bryan

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent:

The People

Xavier Becerra 

 Attorney General of California 

Gerald A. Engler 

 Chief Assistant Attorney General

Jeffrey M. Laurence 

 Senior Assistant Attorney General

Catherine A. Rivlin 

 Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Moona Nandi 

 Deputy Attorney General 

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant:

Marcos Mendoza

James S. Thomson

 Attorney at Law 

Under Appointment by the Court of 

Appeal Sixth District Appellate Project 

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant: 

Juan Ramirez

Kyle Gee

 Attorney at Law

Under Appointment by the Court of 

Appeal Sixth District Appellate Project 

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant: 

David Martell 

David D. Martin

 Attorney at Law

Under Appointment by the Court of 

Appeal Sixth District Appellate Project