If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re D. L. HARRIS, Minor. January 25, 2024

No. 366679

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2013-514880-NA

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and RICK and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-mother appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to her son, 

DLH, under MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), (i) (parental 

rights to siblings terminated because of serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse), 

and (j) (reasonable likelihood the child will be harmed if returned to the parent). We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mother gave birth to DLH in January 2022. During her hospitalization, staff became 

concerned about mother’s behavior and some of the statements she was making. Specifically, 

mother indicated that her other children were not in her care and that she was “responding to 

internal stimuli.” A Children’s Protective Services (CPS) worker spoke with a clinical social 

worker at the hospital, who indicated that mother appeared to be suffering from delusions. Mother 

confirmed that she had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, but disputed having the 

disorder. She further stated that she believed “people were out to get her.” Mother also indicated 

that she was not taking the medication she had been prescribed to help manage her schizoaffective 

symptoms. A review of mother’s CPS record at the time revealed that another child, FAH, had 

been temporarily removed from her care. Mother had been ordered to complete a case service plan 

in relation to FAH, but had failed to fully comply with its requirements. A petition for termination 

of mother’s parental rights to FAH was pending in Oakland County when she gave birth to DLH.

Petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services, filed a petition for termination 

of mother’s parental rights in March 2022. The petition alleged that mother failed to benefit from 

prior mental health services as part of her ongoing case service plan for FAH, and that termination 

of her parental rights to FAH was already pending. The petition noted that mother’s untreated 

mental health diagnoses created a risk of harm to DLH, and that she had not sought prenatal care 
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while pregnant with him. Additionally, the petition stated that mother was living with her brother, 

who also suffered from untreated mental health issues and had a criminal record. At the time the 

petition was filed, her brother had been arrested and charged with two assaultive felonies. The 

petition indicated that mother could not afford to take over her brother’s rent obligation for their 

shared home and would soon become homeless. The trial court authorized the petition and found

that it was contrary to DLH’s welfare to remain in mother’s care. DLH was placed in the care of 

relatives.

When the termination hearing took place, mother’s parental rights to FAH were already

terminated because of her failure to comply with her case service plan. She was homeless, having 

been unable to pay the rent to keep her brother’s house, and was living in a homeless shelter. In 

all, mother had limited resources to provide for DLH. The trial court found that along with housing 

instability, mother’s untreated mental health issues adversely affected her ability to parent DLH, 

as well as her ability to provide him with permanency and stability. During the hearing, a foster 

care worker assigned to DLH testified that mother’s behavior during parenting time was mixed. 

She would attempt to show him positive attention, while also speaking out loud as though to 

someone who was not actually in the room. Mother was verbally aggressive while speaking out 

loud during parenting time, although it does not appear that this aggression was directed toward 

DLH. Regardless, mother’s consistent habit of responding to voices or people who did not appear 

to exist suggested that she was still failing to follow a consistent medication schedule to help 

manage her schizoaffective symptoms. Accordingly, the trial court found that grounds for 

termination were established under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), and (j).

1

 The trial court also found 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minor child’s best interests, noting that 

mother had not established a bond with DLH during parenting time visits. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Mother argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding termination of her parental rights 

was in the minor child’s best interests.

2 We disagree.

We review “for clear error the trial court’s determination regarding the child[]’s best 

interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding . . . is clearly 

 

1 Petitioner concedes on appeal that termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide 

proper care and custody) was improper. Regardless, because termination was also based on 

statutory grounds (i) and (j), any error was harmless. See In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 91; 836 

NW2d 182 (2013) (confirming only one statutory ground need be established for termination of 

parental rights).

2 To the extent that mother’s argument addresses issues concerning reasonable efforts toward 

reunification and challenges to the statutory grounds for termination, these issues are waived 

because mother failed to include them in the statement of questions presented, and otherwise failed 

to adequately brief either claim. See English v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich, 263 Mich App 

449, 459; 688 NW2d 523 (2004) (“An issue not contained in the statement of questions presented 

is waived on appeal.”); MCR 7.212(C)(5) (requiring parties to an appeal to state their arguments 

in their statement of questions involved).
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erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed . . . .” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted; alterations in original). “When applying the clear-error standard in parental 

termination cases, regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“The trial court must order the parent’s rights terminated if the Department has established 

a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and it finds from a 

preponderance of the evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children’s best 

interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. “The trial court should weigh all the evidence 

available to determine the children’s best interests.” Id. “The focus at the best-interest stage has 

always been on the child, not the parent.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 

(2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When determining whether termination is in a 

child’s best interest, the trial court should consider a wide number of factors, which may include 

the following:

[T]he child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for 

permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the 

parent’s home. Other considerations include the length of time the child was in 

care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to her parents’ home within the 

foreseeable future, if at all, and compliance with the case service plan. [Id. at 346-

347 (citation omitted).]

Further, the trial court should consider the child’s safety and well-being, and any risk of harm the 

child may suffer if returned to the parent. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 142; 809 NW2d 

412 (2011). Where, as here, a child has been placed with a relative, such arrangements are an 

“explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best 

interests[.]” In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). “Placement with a relative 

weighs against termination,” but even so, a trial court may nevertheless “terminate parental rights 

in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests[.]” In 

re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120 at 147 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Mother argues that the termination of her parental rights was not in DLH’s best interests

because she was not given a fair opportunity to develop and maintain a bond with him. Mother 

contends that DLH’s best interests would be better served by allowing her to do so, but that 

petitioner did not provide her an opportunity to prove that she could properly parent DLH before 

seeking to terminate her parental rights.

Mother is essentially asking for more time to establish a bond with DLH to prove that 

termination was not in his best interests. But we cannot turn back the clock, and on the record 

before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err. The evidence presented at the termination 

hearing indicated that mother had not established a bond with DLH. The trial court noted that 

during parenting time visits, DLH cried inconsolably when mother held him, and that she was 

unable to calm him. DLH did not cry when his caregiver held him. The trial court also expressed 

concern with mother’s inability to commit to a case service plan in relation to FAH. It also 

determined that her mental health issues remained severe. The court opined that mother’s 

continued failure to take medication designed to help manage her schizoaffective symptoms would 
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negatively impact her ability to parent DLH and provide him with stability and permanency. DLH

was still an infant and would be reliant on mother to fulfill all his needs. According to the trial 

court, mother’s inability to care for her own needs demonstrated that she would be unable to 

properly care for a child as young as DLH.

Considering the above, the relevant factors weighed in favor of the court’s conclusion that 

termination was in DLH’s best interests, and that doing so would be the best way to provide DLH 

with the stability, finality, and permanence he both needs and deserves. The record indicated that 

DLH was thriving in his placement with relatives, and his caregiver expressed interest in moving 

forward with adopting him. The trial court explicitly considered DLH’s placement with a relative

in making its best-interest determination, and properly weighed all of the other relevant factors. 

See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347-356. In sum, the trial court did not clearly err by finding

that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in DLH’s best interests, despite his relative 

placement.

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Michelle M. Rick 

/s/ Sima G. Patel