IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

July 14, 2020 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOSEPH CHRISTOPHER HENDRY II

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Wilson County

No. 15-CR-33 Brody N. Kane, Judge

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No. M2019-01284-CCA-R3-CD

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Defendant, Joseph Christopher Hendry II, was indicted for one count of felony first 

degree murder, one count of premeditated first degree murder, one count of criminal 

attempt to commit first degree murder, and four counts of aggravated assault. Pursuant to 

a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder and 

received a sentence of 25 years to be served at 100 percent. Defendant filed a motion 

seeking to reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant 

appeals. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L.

HOLLOWAY, JR. and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Peter J. Strianse, Nashville, Tennessee (on appeal and at trial) and Jeff Cherry, Lebanon, 

Tennessee (at trial) for the appellant, Joseph Christopher Hendry II. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Katharine K. Decker, Assistant 

Attorney General; Tom P. Thompson, Jr., District Attorney General; and Justin G. Harris 

and Thomas Swink, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

Background

On October 26, 2016, Defendant and the State entered into a “Memorandum of

Understanding” whereby the parties agreed that Defendant would plead guilty to second 

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degree murder and receive a sentence of 25 years to be served at 100 percent. The plea 

agreement was contingent upon Defendant making a truthful proffer that produced 

“sufficient corroboration to support criminal prosecutions on all persons” present during 

the offenses or who aided or abetted the commission of the offenses and upon Defendant 

testifying truthfully against those persons. 

On July 9, 2018, Defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder. The trial 

court sentenced him to 25 years to be served at 100 percent and dismissed the remaining 

counts of the indictment pursuant to the plea agreement. 

On November 6, 2018, Defendant filed a timely motion under Rule 35 of the 

Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, seeking a reduction in sentence. Defendant 

asserted that he had “cooperated extensively” with the State in the investigation and 

prosecution of Marvin Bryant and Timothy Wade, Jr., who “participated in the crime to 

an equal extent.” Defendant asserted that without his “willingness to testify, at great 

personal risk to himself and his family,” Mr. Bryant and Mr. Wade “would have never 

entered pleas of guilty and been brought to justice.” Defendant contended that he, Mr. 

Bryant, and Mr. Wade were “equally culpable” and that the sentences received by Mr. 

Bryant and Mr. Wade “represent[ed] a profound sentencing disparity among similarly 

situated defendants.” 

Rule 35 hearing

At the hearing on Defendant’s motion, Lebanon Police Detective David Willmore 

testified that he was the lead investigator in the case. Detective Willmore participated in 

several “proffer sessions” with Defendant, his attorneys, and the district attorney’s office, 

in which Defendant explained the events leading up to the shooting on January 5, 2015. 

Defendant stated that he, Mr. Bryant, and Mr. Wade went to the house of Rashad Seay, 

where the victim, Insatiable Patton, lived. All three men were armed and shot their 

weapons into the house, and Defendant’s weapon fired the bullet that killed the victim. 

Police did not recover any of the weapons. Detective Willmore testified that “[t]here was 

quite a bit of circumstantial evidence that [police] had at the time,” and police were able 

to corroborate parts of Defendant’s proffer. Detective Willmore recalled that Mr. Bryant 

and Mr. Wade both had criminal histories, but he did not recall their prior convictions. 

Based upon Defendant’s proffer, Mr. Bryant and Mr. Wade were indicted for the 

same offenses as Defendant. Pursuant to plea agreements, Mr. Wade and Mr. Bryant 

pleaded guilty to facilitation to commit second degree murder. Mr. Wade was sentenced 

to serve 15 years at 35 percent, and Mr. Bryant was sentenced to serve 12 years at 30 

percent. 
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion, noting 

that a modification of Defendant’s sentence is available “only in exceptional cases where 

unforeseen post[-]sentencing developments would permit modification of the sentence in 

the interest of justice.” The trial court found that the disparity in sentences was not 

unforeseen, noting that “[n]o two cases are exactly the same.” In a subsequent written 

order, the trial court concluded that “merely because [Defendant’s] [c]o-[d]efendants 

received lesser sentences as a result of plea negotiations is not a sufficient ‘development’ 

to warrant the relief sought.” Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Analysis

Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 

motion because the disparity between his sentence and his co-defendants’ sentences 

violates the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act, which is to promote justice by 

eliminating unjustified disparity in sentencing. The State responds that the trial court 

properly denied Defendant’s motion. 

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 provides a mechanism by which a 

defendant may seek reduction of his sentence within 120 days after the date the sentence 

is imposed or probation is revoked. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35(a). The trial court may only 

reduce a sentence to one that the court could have “originally imposed.” Id. at 35(b). 

The denial of a motion to modify sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of 

Criminal Procedure is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. State v. 

Patterson, 564 S.W.3d 423, 429 (Tenn. 2018) (citing State v. Irick, 861 S.W.2d 375, 376 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court applies

incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its decision on a clearly 

erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to 

the complaining party.” West v. Schofield, 460 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Tenn. 2015) (citing 

State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 116 (Tenn. 2008)). 

Where, as in this case, a defendant enters a plea agreement with a specific, 

negotiated sentence, that sentence may only be modified pursuant to Rule 35(b) “where 

unforeseen, post-sentencing developments would permit modification of a sentence in the 

interest of justice.” State v. McDonald, 893 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); 

see State v. Patterson, 564 S.W.3d 423, 434 (Tenn. 2018) (“[A] defendant is required to 

provide such information only if the defendant’s Rule 35 motion seeks reduction of a 

specific sentence imposed in exchange for a guilty plea. For Rule 35 motions of this 

type, the McDonald standard remains applicable and appropriate.”). 

The State argues that it was not unforeseen that Defendant’s co-defendants would 

receive lesser sentences. We agree. As the trial court noted, when Defendant entered 
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into the Memorandum of Understanding, he could not anticipate whether his codefendants would be charged, convicted, or what their sentences would be. Defendant 

did not enter his negotiated plea agreement with the understanding that both codefendants would receive the same sentence Defendant received. As the trial court noted, 

each defendant’s case is its “own little entity[,]” and “[e]ach case has strengths and 

weaknesses as any case does.” Defendant received the benefit of his plea agreement by 

having his remaining charges dismissed and by avoiding a life sentence. 

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Defendant’s Rule 35 motion. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

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THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE