IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alton D. Brown, :

Appellant :

: No. 1898 C.D. 2016

v. : Submitted: May 26, 2017

:

Zygmont Pines and Tom Wolf :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE PELLEGRINI FILED: June 20, 2017

Alton D. Brown (Brown), an inmate currently incarcerated at the State 

Correctional Institution at Greene (SCI-Greene), appeals pro se an order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Philadelphia Common Pleas) 

sustaining the preliminary objections filed by defendant Governor Tom Wolf 

(Governor Wolf) that Philadelphia Common Pleas was the improper venue to hear 

the matter and transferring it to the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County. 

We affirm.

Brown commenced this action by filing a complaint with the 

Philadelphia Common Pleas on March 2, 2016, asserting numerous claims 

pertaining to his incarceration and treatment at SCI-Greene, including retaliation, 

denial of access to courts, cruel and unusual punishment, civil conspiracy, 
2

intentional infliction of emotional distress, malpractice, assault and battery, and 

unlawful use of force. Brown’s complaint names 55 defendants,1including 

Governor Wolf and former Court Administrator of Pennsylvania Courts Zygmont 

Pines (Administrator Pines). Brown seeks injunctive, declaratory and mandamus 

relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.

On March 28, 2016, Administrator Pines filed preliminary objections 

to Brown’s complaint seeking dismissal of the actions based on sovereign 

immunity, quasi-judicial and qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim. 

Brown failed to respond, and by order dated April 21, 2016, the Philadelphia 

Common Pleas sustained Administrator Pines’ preliminary objections and 

dismissed all claims against him, with prejudice.

On August 18, 2016, Governor Wolf filed preliminary objections 

asserting that venue in Philadelphia County was improper. Governor Wolf argued 

that pursuant to Section 8523 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8523, venue 

should be transferred to Greene County because that is where the events that led to 

the cause of action all occurred. By order dated September 13, 2016, the 

Philadelphia Common Pleas sustained Governor Wolf’s preliminary objections and 

 

1 Also named as defendants are former Attorney General Kathleen Kane; former 

Inspector General Graying Williams; Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel; three named 

employees of the Department of Corrections’ central office; 42 named and unnamed corrections 

officers at SCI-Greene; SCI-Greene’s contracted medical provider; four employees of Greene 

County; and Washington Hospital and Waynesburg Hospital, both of which are located in 

Greene County. While Brown named all of these individuals and entities as defendants, the only 

defendants who were properly served with the complaint were Governor Wolf and Administrator 

Pines.
3

transferred the case to the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County. This appeal 

followed.2

Brown argues3that the Philadelphia Common Pleas abused its 

discretion in transferring his complaint to Greene County because Administrator 

Pines is the lead defendant, his principal office is located in Philadelphia County, 

and the cause of action against him arose in Philadelphia County. In the 

alternative, Brown argues that venue properly lies in Dauphin County as opposed 

to Greene County because that is where Governor Wolf’s principal office lies.

When there are multiple named defendants with different venue rules, 

the venue rules for the Commonwealth party4controls. Shaffer v. Department of 

Transportation, 842 A.2d 989, 992-93 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (citing Ribnicky v. 

Yerex, 701 A.2d 1348, 1351 n.4 (Pa. 1997)). Accordingly, Section 8523(a) of the 

Judicial Code is the proper venue rule, and that section provides:

 

2

Pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 311(c), an order in a civil action transferring venue is 

interlocutory, but appealable as of right.

3 A trial court’s decision to transfer venue will be upheld unless the court abused its 

discretion. Shaffer v. Department of Transportation, 842 A.2d 989, 992 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) 

(citation omitted). “A trial court’s ruling on venue will not be disturbed if the decision is 

reasonable in light of the facts.” Id.

4

The Judicial Code defines “Commonwealth party” as “[a] Commonwealth agency and 

any employee thereof, but only with respect to an act within the scope of his office of 

employment.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 8501. Here, it is undisputed that Brown named numerous 

Commonwealth parties as defendants.
4

Actions for claims against a Commonwealth party may 

be brought in and only in a county in which the principal 

or local office of the Commonwealth party is located or 

in which the cause of action arose or where a transaction 

or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action 

arose. If venue is obtained in the Twelfth Judicial 

District (Dauphin County) solely because the principal 

office of the Commonwealth party is located within it, 

any judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin 

County shall have the power to transfer the action to any 

appropriate county where venue would otherwise lie.

42 Pa. C.S. § 8523(a). Similarly, the regulation implementing that provision and 

governing tort claims brought against the Commonwealth provides:

(a) Venue in actions for claims against a Commonwealth

party as defined in 42 Pa. C.S. § 8501 (relating to 

definitions) shall be in the county in which one of the 

following exists:

(1) The cause of action arose.

(2) A transaction or occurrence took place out of 

which the cause of action arose.

(3) The principal office of the Commonwealth

party is located.

(4) The local office of the Commonwealth party is 

located.

* * *

(c) For purposes of subsection (a)(4), the local office of 

the Commonwealth party is the local office located in 

that county where the cause of action arose or where a 

transaction or occurrence took place out of which the 

cause of action arose.
5

37 Pa. Code § 111.4.

Brown’s contention regarding Administrator Pines that venue should 

be in Philadelphia County is without merit because all of the asserted claims 

against him were dismissed with prejudice approximately four months before 

Governor Wolf’s preliminary objections were filed. In any event, as the 

Philadelphia Common Pleas noted, Administrator Pines’ principal office is located 

in Harrisburg, Dauphin County, and none of the alleged transactions or 

occurrences from Brown’s complaint took place in Philadelphia County; therefore, 

venue could not lie in Philadelphia County.

We agree with the Philadelphia Common Pleas that venue properly 

lies in either Greene County or Dauphin County. Greene County is appropriate 

because the cause of action arose at SCI-Greene, the transactions or occurrences 

averred in the complaint all took place there, and the majority of the defendants are 

located in Greene County. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 8523(a); 37 Pa. Code §§ 111.4(a)(1) 

and (2). Venue could also be in Dauphin County because Governor Wolf’s 

principal office is located in Harrisburg, Dauphin County. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 

8523(a); 37 Pa. Code § 111.4(a)(3). However, if venue was transferred to Dauphin 

County, Governor Wolf could still file a motion pursuant to Section 8523(a) of the 

Judicial Code to have the case transferred to Greene County since venue is only 

proper in Dauphin County because that is where Governor Wolf’s principal office 

is located. We note that in his preliminary objections, Governor Wolf specifically 

requested that the case be transferred to Greene County.
6

We also agree with the Philadelphia Common Pleas that transferring

the case to Greene County is proper given that the cause of action involves acts 

that purportedly took place in Greene County. That venue is appropriate given the 

ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for the 

attendance of unwilling witnesses, cost of obtaining attendance of willing 

witnesses, and possibility of a view of premises if any other problem arises which 

affects the ease, celerity or expense of the litigation. This is not to mention that 46 

of the 55 defendants are employees of or affiliated with SCI-Greene.

Accordingly, because the Philadelphia Common Pleas did not abuse 

its discretion in transferring the case to Greene County,5the order is affirmed.

 

DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

Judge Cosgrove did not participate in the decision of this case.

 

5 Brown’s argument that the trial court erred in sustaining the preliminary objections 

based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens is without merit because Governor Wolf did not 

raise this issue and the trial court specifically found that venue was improper, which is an 

appropriate ground for preliminary objections pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(1).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alton D. Brown, :

Appellant :

: No. 1898 C.D. 2016

v. :

:

Zygmont Pines and Tom Wolf :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of June, 2017, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.

 

DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge