alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY | FILED 2/16/2023 | Document No. 606937 | PAGE Page 1 of 1 * PUBLIC *; 

__________________________________________ 

PUBLIC 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 

) 

In the Matter of ) 

) 

Microsoft Corp., )

 a corporation, and ) 

) Docket No. 9412 

Activision Blizzard, Inc., )

 a corporation, ) 

) 

Respondents. ) 

__________________________________________) 

ORDER GRANTING SECOND AGREED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 

On February 15, 2023, non-party Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC (“SIE”) filed a 

second motion to extend the time for it to file a motion to quash or to limit a subpoena served on 

SIE by Federal Trade Commission Complaint Counsel (“Motion”). SIE represents that 

negotiations between SIE and Complaint Counsel as to the scope of SIE’s production and a 

discovery schedule remain ongoing and that further negotiations may narrow or eliminate areas 

of dispute. SIE further states that Complaint Counsel agrees with the relief requested in the 

Motion. 

Upon review and consideration of the Motion, the Motion is GRANTED. It is hereby 

ORDERED that SIE’s deadline to file a motion to quash or to limit Complaint Counsel’s 

subpoena is extended to March 1, 2023. 

ORDERED: 

D. Michael Chappell 

Chief Administrative Law Judge 

Date: February 16, 2023
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 135 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 135

To express the sense of the House of Representatives that the Chairman 
     of the Federal Communications Commission take certain action.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 18, 1993

   Mr. Gephardt (for himself, Mr. Dingell, Mr. Ford of Michigan, Mr. 
     Markey, Mr. Bonior, and Mr. Williams) submitted the following 
 resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
To express the sense of the House of Representatives that the Chairman 
     of the Federal Communications Commission take certain action.

Whereas the United States Government is in the process of establishing a 
        terrestrial broadcast standard for high definition television;
Whereas superior digitalized systems at laboratories in the United States have 
        given our country the clear and unconditional lead in worldwide 
        technology for high definition television;
Whereas it is necessary for the United States to remain competitive in the 
        development and commercial application of cutting edge technologies, 
        such as high definition television, video display terminals, and 
        computers if the country is to elevate its standard of living and 
        compete successfully in the global economy; and
Whereas the United States must attempt to build a strong domestic manufacturing 
        economy featuring high technology products, such as high definition 
        television transmission systems: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that 
the Federal Communications Commission should consider domestic 
employment as a factor in its selection of a standard for high 
definition television, particularly in the event competing systems are 
technologically equivalent.

                                 <all>
```
#### Matilde Fernandez DeCASTRO, Appellant, v. Fabio NARVAEZ and Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Appellees.

No. 73-1022.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 26, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Massey Energy Company (the
Company) for the quarter ending June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Eric B. Tolbert, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                          
|------------------------------------------
|                                          
|/s/ Eric B. Tolbert                       
|Eric B. Tolbert                           
|Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|                                          
|August 4, 2008
Exhibit 99.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Berthel Growth & Income Trust I (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ronald
O. Brendengen, Chief Financial Officer of Berthel Fisher & Company Planning,
Inc., the Trust Advisor of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

         (1) The Company's Report fully complies with the requirements of
         Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.


March 15, 2003                              /s/  Ronald O. Brendengen
                                            -----------------------------------
                                                 Ronald O. Brendengen
                                                 Chief Financial Officer
                                                 Berthel Fisher & Company
                                                 Leasing, Inc.
                                                 Trust Advisor
                                                 Berthel Growth & Income Trust I
<PAGE>

Exhibit 10.1

                               FOURTH AMENDMENT
                                      TO
                       AMERISTEEL STRATEGIC VALUE ADDED
                      EXECUTIVE SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN

     This Fourth Amendment to the AmeriSteel Strategic Value Added Executive
Short-Term Incentive Plan is made and entered into by AmeriSteel Corporation
(the "Company") this __ day of ________, 2001, but is effective for all purposes
as of January 1, 2001.

                             W I T N E S S E T H:

     WHEREAS, the Company has previously adopted the AmeriSteel Strategic Value
Added Executive Short-Term Incentive Plan (as amended to date, the "Plan"); and

     WHEREAS, Article VI of the Plan authorizes the Company to amend the Plan at
any time with the approval of the Company's Board of Directors; and

     WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Plan further in certain respects.

     NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the Plan is hereby
amended as follows:

     1.  Article IV(d) of the Plan is amended to read as follows:

(d)  The charts referred to in paragraph (a) above shall specify the percent of
Annual Base Pay earned for each SVA Level for each class of Participant. A
Participant's Award for a Plan Year shall be the dollar amount equal to the
amount determined by multiplying such Participant's Annual Base Pay for the Plan
Year by the percentage of Annual Base Pay earned as a result of the SVA Level
achieved by the Participant for such Plan Year, less, solely with respect to the
Plan Year beginning April 1, 1995, the amount of incentive dollars received in
advance by the Participant during such Plan Year. Solely for the Plan Year
beginning January 1, 2001, the incentive calculation shall be based on two
separate six-month financial periods. The first computation shall include the
financial results for the period beginning January 31, 2001 and ending June 30,
2001. The second computation shall include the financial results for the period
beginning July 1, 2001 and ending December 31, 2001. The SVA awards shall be
prorated using the number of days in each period divided by 365 days. In no
event shall an eligible Participant's combined award for the two six-month
periods be less than the Participant's calculated award using the full fiscal
year results.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the foregoing Fourth Amendment is adopted by the
Company.

                                               AmeriSteel Corporation


                                               By:___________________

                                      15
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7901

NORMAN JAMES HAYES,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

WARDEN KIRKLAND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. C. Weston Houck, Chief District

Judge. (CA-95-3825-2BE)

Submitted: April 17, 1997 Decided: May 2, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Norman James Hayes, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Chief

Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal

are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are "mandatory and

jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434

U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S.

220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have thirty days within

which to file in the district court notices of appeal from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only exceptions

to the appeal period are when the district court extends the time

to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal

period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

The district court entered its order on September 19, 1996;

Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on December 2, 1996, which

is beyond the thirty-day appeal period. Appellant's failure to note

a timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leaves

this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant's appeal. We therefore deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal. Appellant's motion for appointment of counsel

is denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 845

To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to require the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to make grants to the

Massachusetts Water Resources Authority for construction of wastewater

treatment works.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 4, 1993

Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. KENNEDY, and Mr. STUDDS)

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on

Public Works and Transportation

A BILL

To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to require

the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to make grants to the Massachusetts Water Resources

Authority for construction of wastewater treatment

works.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Boston Harbor

5 Wastewater Treatment Act of 1993’’.
2

HR 845 IH

1 SEC. 2. BOSTON HARBOR WASTEWATER TREATMENT

2 GRANTS

3 Title V of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

4 of 1972 is amended—

5 (1) by redesignating section 519 (33 U.S.C.

6 1251 note) as section 520; and

7 (2) by inserting after section 518 (33 U.S.C.

8 1377) the following new section:

9 ‘‘SEC. 519. BOSTON HARBOR WASTE WATER TREATMENT

10 GRANTS.

11 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator shall make

12 grants to the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority

13 for constructing wastewater treatment works for the areas

14 served by the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority.

15 ‘‘(b) FEDERAL SHARE.—The Federal share of a

16 project described in subsection (a) shall not exceed 75 per17 cent of the cost of construction of the wastewater treat18 ment works. The non-Federal share may be satisfied by

19 any combination of public or private funds or in-kind

20 services.

21 ‘‘(C) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

22 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be

23 appropriated to carry out this section

24 $1,000,000,000 for the period beginning on the first

25 day of fiscal year 1994, to remain available until ex26 pended.
3

HR 845 IH

1 ‘‘(2) SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDS.—Funds made

2 available under paragraph (1) shall be used to sup3 plement and not supplant other amounts made avail4 able under titles II and VI.’’.

Æ
#### Terry D. CLARK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 68-531, 68-532.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

May 14, 1969.

Rehearing Denied June 11, 1969.

*767Robert E. Jagger, Public Defender, and Carleton L. Weidemeyer, Asst. Public Defender, Clearwater, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and William D. Roth, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

MANN, Judge.

Failure of a probation supervisor to give a Miranda-type warning to Clark prior to his admission of a violation of the terms of probation is argued on this appeal as rendering such an admission inadmissible at a revocation proceeding. We disagree. As Chief Judge Allen said in McNeely v. State, Fla.App.1966, 186 So.2d 520, “the entire probation process is a privilege and those to whom the arms of mercy have been extended should indeed conduct themselves accordingly.”

Clark was lawfully convicted of a crime and was granted probation. The probation supervisor is obligated “to keep informed concerning the conduct, habits, associates, employment, recreations, and whereabouts” of Clark “by visits, requiring reports and in other ways” and “to use all practicable and proper methods to aid and encourage persons on probation, and to bring about improvement in their conduct and condition.” Florida Statutes § 948.02(1) (1967), F.S.A. He is not a policeman. It seems to us that he can be of most usefulness in the rehabilitation of those who have erred if he is not compelled to act like a policeman instead of a sympathetic supervisor. It is the task of others to gather admissible evidence of the commission of the later offense. We find nothing wrong in his asking Clark about an alleged violation of probation, and having been informed of it he is under a duty to advise the court, which he did. The trial court thereafter scrupulously followed Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967), and Clark was represented by counsel at the revocation hearing.

Affirmed.

LILES, C. J., and PIERCE, J., concur.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1836

Filed May 15, 2019

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ALEXIS LANEIS BUMANN

AND CORY BUMANN

Upon the Petition of

ALEXIS LANEIS BUMANN, n/k/a ALEXIS LANEIS ANDERSON

Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning

CORY BUMANN,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Ida County, Jeffrey L. Poulson, 

Judge.

A father appeals the district court’s modification of the physical-care 

provisions of a dissolution-of-marriage decree. AFFIRMED.

Amanda Van Wyhe of Van Wyhe Law Firm & Mediation Center, PLC, Sioux 

City, for appellant.

T. Cody Farrens of Farrens Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Sioux City, for appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., Mullins, J., and Scott, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
2

MULLINS, Judge.

The marriage of Alexis Anderson, formerly Alexis Bumann, and Cory 

Bumann was dissolved in November 2016. By stipulation, approved by the district 

court, the parties were awarded joint legal custody and shared physical care of 

their child, M.B., born in 2014. Alexis has another daughter, born in 2013, from 

another relationship prior to the marriage. In September 2017, Alexis remarried. 

She and her husband are in the military. In December, Alexis’s husband was 

involuntarily transferred to Kentucky. In January 2018, Alexis petitioned for 

modification of the decree, seeking sole legal custody and physical care and citing 

her plans to move out of the state as a substantial change in circumstances. Cory 

contested modification and alternatively counterclaimed for physical care of M.B. 

The matter proceeded to trial. In September 2018, the district court entered its 

modification ruling, in which it ordered joint legal custody of M.B. and awarded 

Alexis physical care, with visitation to Cory. Cory filed a motion to reconsider, 

enlarge, or amend pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), which was 

largely denied by the court. Cory appeals, alleging the court erred in not awarding 

him physical care of M.B. and in placing too much emphasis on the value of M.B.’s

sibling relationship with Alexis’s other daughter.

We have reviewed the record de novo. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re 

Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Iowa 2015). The issues involve only the 

application of well-settled rules of law; disposition on appeal is clearly controlled 

by prior appellate rulings; the written decision of the district court considered all the 

issues presented in this appeal and we approve of the findings, analysis, and 

conclusions it reached; and a full opinion of this court would not augment or clarify 
3

existing law. We affirm by memorandum opinion pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 

21.26(1)(a), (c), (d), and (e). We deny each party’s request for appellate attorney 

fees. Costs on appeal are assessed to Cory. 

AFFIRMED.
# FILED
November 6, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AT JA CKSON JULY 1998 SESSION

STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9707-CC-00277 Appellee, ) ) MADISON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. WHIT LAFON, JOHN EDWARD CLARK, ) JUDGE ) Appellant. ) (Attemp ted Aggrava ted Robb ery, ) Vandalism)

CONCURRING OPINION
I concur in the excellent opinion by Judge Witt. Although this r ever sal is not based upon an issue pre sented f or our revie w, this Cou rt has an a ffirma tive obligation in all casesto “consider whether the trial and appellate cour t have jurisdiction

over the subject matter, whether or nor presented for review.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b). Nevertheless, it is regrettable tha t this Court must at this juncture in the criminal proceedings declare t he indict ment void . Obviousl y, the indictment was seriously flawed; however, there was no p retrial motion a lleging a defect in the indictment. The sufficiency of the indictment was first r aised during trial w

hen defense counsel advised the court that

he did not have a copy of the i ndictmentuntil the lunch hour. Defense counsel then orally moved to di smiss the indictment since i t did notname a victim and
m erelystated the legal conclusi on that an attempted aggrava ted robber

y had bee n committed. The trial court overr uled the motion not ing its frustration that defense counsel had not read the indictment prior to trial. Had this issue been properl y considered before trial , the time and expense of
a trial and this appellate proceeding may well have been avoided. Neverthele ss, it becomes our res ponsibi lity i n light of Hill and Ruff

to declare the indictment v oid.2 In light of the Tennessee Supreme Court ’s pro nouncements in Hill and Ruff , trial courts, prosecutors and defense counsel should be more aware of the importance of properly drafted indictments

.

_____________ __ ______________

_ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
**EXHIBIT      32.1**

**FROZEN      FOOD EXPRESS INDUSTRIES, INC.**

**CERTIFICATION      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**PURSUANT      TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|                              |   |                                                                                                       |   |
|-----------------------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Dated:                May 9, 2007 |   | /s/                Stoney M. Stubbs, Jr.                                                                   |   |
|                              |   | Stoney                M. Stubbs, Jr.Chairman                of the Board and Chief Executive Officer  |   |
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### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-50976 Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. WILLY MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:11-CR-368-2
Before DAVIS, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The attorney appointed to represent Willy Mendoza has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed briefs in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U

. S

. 7 3 8 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Mendoza has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s briefs and the relevant portio n s o f the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion fo r l e ave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Decem ber 1 7, 2 012 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-50976 Document: 00512085521 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/17/2012No. 11-50976

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See5 T H C I R . R. 42.2.

2 Case: 11-50976 Document: 00512085521 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/17/2012