NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERLINDA ABIBAS ANIEL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, AKA 

PHH Mortgage Services; WESTERN 

PROGRESSIVE LLC; OCWEN LOAN 

SERVICING, LLC; MORTGAGE 

ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 

SYSTEMS, INC.; HSBC BANK USA, 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, As Trustee 

for Deutesche Alt-A Securities Mortgage 

Loan Trust Series 2007-OA5 (DALT), 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-15896 

D.C. No. 4:21-cv-06071-YGR 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 12, 2023**

Before: BENNETT, SUNG, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 14 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Erlinda Aniel appeals the dismissal of her claims against PHH Mortgage 

Corporation; Western Progressive, LLC (Western); Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

(Ocwen); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; and HSBC Bank USA, 

National Association as Trustee for Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan 

Trust Series 2007-OA5 (HSBC), arising out of Western’s attempt to foreclose on

Aniel’s home.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review the district 

court’s decision on a motion to dismiss de novo.” Harper v. Nedd, 71 F.4th 1181, 

1184 (9th Cir. 2023). “Factual allegations are accepted as true and pleadings are 

construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. “[W]here, as 

here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, we must ‘construe the pleadings liberally’ and 

‘afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.’” Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 

774 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)).

“We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to decline 

supplemental jurisdiction.” Lima v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 947 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th 

Cir. 2020). We affirm.1

1. Two issues are central to Aniel’s appeal. The first is whether an IRS Form 

1098 Aniel received from Ocwen demonstrates that her loan was fully repaid in 

2013. The second is whether a 2016 order by the United States Bankruptcy Court

1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.
3 

for the Southern District of New York established that HSBC does not own the 

deed of trust encumbering Aniel’s home. Issue preclusion bars Aniel from 

litigating these issues.

Issue preclusion applies where “(1) the issue at stake was identical in both 

proceedings; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the prior 

proceedings; (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) 

the issue was necessary to decide the merits.” Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. 

Washington, 8 F.4th 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Janjua v. Neufeld, 933 F.3d 

1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2019)). These conditions are met with respect to the two 

issues above. Those issues were fully adjudicated by the United States Bankruptcy 

Court for the Northern District of California in Aniel’s 2019 Chapter 11 

bankruptcy case.

Even if the bankruptcy court erred in its assessment of those issues, Aniel is 

precluded from relitigating them here. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 

Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 157–58 (2015) (affirming that “issue preclusion prevent[s] 

relitigation of wrong decisions just as much as right ones.”). And though Aniel’s 

2019 bankruptcy case was ultimately dismissed, the bankruptcy court dismissed 

the petition upon Aniel’s request; the decisions made in that case therefore

continue to have preclusive effect. Cf. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. W. Conf. of 

Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721 (9th Cir. 1982) (the principle of judicial finality 
4 

would be undermined if a party dissatisfied with a judgment could relitigate issues

simply by destroying her right to appeal that judgment).

2. Aniel argues that because of her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, 

the district court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss Aniel’s claims. Aniel also argues

that the court abused its discretion by stating that Aniel’s husband and son “appear 

to be indispensable parties” in this case. These arguments are insufficiently 

developed in Aniel’s brief to be cognizable on appeal. See Greenwood v. F.A.A., 

28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We review only issues which are argued 

specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”); Hilao v. Est. of Marcos, 

103 F.3d 767, 778 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996). By failing to address the other bases of the 

district court’s dismissal of her federal claims, moreover, Aniel has forfeited 

argument with respect to them. See Orr v. Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 

2018) (“The usual rule is that arguments . . . omitted from the opening brief are 

deemed forfeited.”).

3. The district court dismissed all of Aniel’s federal claims without leave to 

amend. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in declining to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Aniel’s remaining state law claims. See 

Lima, 947 F.3d at 1128; see also Parra v. PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 

1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing not to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the only claim over which it had original 
5 

jurisdiction was dismissed at an early stage of the litigation).

AFFIRMED.