Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JC-2116 | February 4, 2019 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Melinda K. Jackman-Hanlin

Greencastle, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re the Matter of J.G. and J.T. 

(Minor Children), Children in 

Need of Services;

S.B. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

February 4, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JC-2116

Appeal from the Hendricks 

Superior Court

The Honorable Karen M. Love, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

32D03-1709-JC-141

32D03-1709-JC-143

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JC-2116 | February 4, 2019 Page 2 of 9

Statement of the Case

[1] S.B. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s adjudication of her two minor 

children, J.G. and J.T. (“the Children”), as children in need of services 

(“CHINS”).1 Mother raises a single issue for our review, which we restate as 

the following two issues: 

1. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded 

that the Children’s physical or mental conditions are

seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of 

the inability, refusal, or neglect of Mother to supply the 

Children with necessary supervision. 

2. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded 

that the care, treatment, or rehabilitation the Children 

need is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the 

coercive intervention of the court.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother is the adoptive mother of the Children, both of whom have extensive 

special needs. In particular, J.G. cannot speak, is mentally delayed, is deaf or 

nearly deaf, and has chronic lung disease, chronic respiratory failure, congenital 

osteodystrophy, and Melnick-Needles syndrome. J.T. is quadriplegic, blind, 

cannot speak, is intellectually challenged, cannot care for herself or urinate on 

 

1

 The adoptive father of the Children does not participate in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JC-2116 | February 4, 2019 Page 3 of 9

her own, and has scoliosis and a seizure disorder. Both of the Children need 

“around the clock supervision.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 54-55. 

[4] Mother lived with the Children at her residence, and she is a licensed registered 

nurse. Mother frequently relied on other adults to care for the Children. 

Occasionally Mother relied on home health nurses, but Mother also relied on 

close friends, namely, T.H.; T.H.’s boyfriend, P.R.; and Mother’s boyfriend, 

M.S. M.S. in particular frequently stayed overnight at Mother’s residence.

[5] In late August of 2017, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) 

responded to a report that the Children were unsupervised and that there was 

substance abuse at Mother’s home. The next day, DCS received an additional 

report that M.S. had sexually abused J.T. at Mother’s residence. DCS case 

managers met Mother at her home, and J.T. was transported to Riley Hospital 

for an examination. The examination substantiated that J.T. had been the 

victim of sexual abuse.

[6] Child-abuse professionals at Riley Hospital directed Mother to bring J.T. to a 

follow-up appointment, but Mother did not do so. Although Mother 

acknowledged that the report had alleged M.S. as the perpetrator, Mother told 

DCS case managers that M.S. never had one-on-one contact with J.T. 

However, she acknowledged that M.S. spent the night at her home several 

times each week, and she agreed to a safety plan with DCS that was to prevent 

“any of the [C]hildren . . . to be around [M.S.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 30. 
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[7] Less than one week later, in a follow-up visit with DCS case managers, Mother 

admitted that she had violated the safety plan by allowing M.S. to be inside her 

home with the Children present. Mother also admitted that M.S. continued to 

have a key to her home. And Mother admitted that she knew T.H. suffered 

from schizophrenia and substance-abuse issues, but Mother “would still allow 

[T.H.] to supervise and watch the [C]hildren . . . .” Tr. Vol. 2 at 106.

[8] DCS filed its petition alleging the Children to be CHINS, and the Children 

were removed from Mother’s care. After an ensuing fact-finding hearing in 

December 2017 and March 2018, the trial court found as follows:

31. The Court finds Hannah Lyman[, a DCS family case 

manager (“FCM”),] is qualified, experienced[,] and credible. 

Multiple times while Ms. Lyman was the FCM [Mother] told her 

she did not want to do any services but she wanted to terminate

her parental rights. FCM Lyman made specific referrals so 

[Mother] could visit [the Children] but [Mother] did not.

* * *

41. [Mother] has not visited [J.G.] while h[is] case has been 

pending.

42. Michelle Schwab is a[n] LPN. Ms. Schwab was [J.G.’s] 

home health care nurse for almost a year. She also cared for 

[J.T.] a few times.

Court finds Ms. Schwab credible. Ms. Schwab observed [M.S.] 

in the home with the [C]hildren six or seven days a week in the 

eight months before the [C]hildren were removed by DCS.
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* * *

44. At least once a week[,] [M.S.], [T.H.], or [P.R.] supervised 

the [C]hildren without [Mother].

45. Ms. Schwab saw [M.S.] drink alcohol to the point of 

intoxication and to the point he passed out. . . .

46. Ms. Schwab observed [T.H.] caring for the [C]hildren. 

When she was stable [T.H.] was appropriate but when [T.H.] 

was in a “sensitive state” she talked crazy and [T.H.] was not an 

appropriate caregiver.

Ms. Schwab observed [M.S.] pinch [J.T.’s] cheeks and push her 

head back and forth.

47. [P.R.] is/was [T.H.’s] boyfriend. [Mother] left [P.R.] alone 

with the [C]hildren at least two times. [P.R.] does not know how 

to care for [the Children with their] special needs.

48. When [J.G.] gets excited or over[-]tired he has difficulty 

breathing.

49. As of 12-19-17 [Mother] had not visited with [J.T.] since 

[J.T.] was removed from [Mother’s] care. [Mother] had refused 

services from DCS. [Mother] indicated she wanted to voluntarily 

terminate her rights to [the Children]. In mid-November 2017 

[Mother] said she changed her mind and wanted services and she 

provided a few drug screens which were negative. However, 

when FCM [Emily] Dippold last talked with [Mother] (before 3-

1-18) [Mother] was not willing to participate in services.

50. The Court does not find [Mother’s] testimony credible. The 

Court does find that [Mother] did admit she had not visited with 
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[J.G.] since he was removed from her care. [Mother] admitted 

she had seen [J.T.] one time on 2-14-18 since removal.

* * *

54. Further, after [Mother] was notified that [J.T.], who is nonverbal, blind, and a [quadriplegic], was a victim of sexual abuse 

and was told the alleged perpetrator was her live-in boyfriend, 

[M.S.], and she agreed to deny [M.S.] any access to [J.T., s]he 

continued to allow him in her home and did not require him to 

surrender his key to the home. This indicates to the Court that 

[Mother] will not protect [J.T.] from potential sexual abuse. 

[J.T.] is helpless to protect herself and is fully dependent on 

caregivers twenty-four hours a day. [Mother] knew that [M.S.] 

drank alcohol to the point of intoxication and she was warned by 

home health care nurse Schwab that [M.S.] acted sexually 

inappropriately with her yet [Mother] continued to allow [M.S.] 

access to [J.T.] and continued to leave [the Children] in his care.

Further, [Mother’s] failure to visit [J.T.] until approximately two 

weeks before the last day of the fact-finding hearing indicates to 

the Court that [Mother] does not really care about [J.T.] and it is 

unlikely that [Mother] will protect [J.T.] from individuals who 

may want to abuse [J.T.] in the future. [Mother] does not 

recognize the risk to [J.T.] and she needs professional help to 

learn how to recognize the risk and how to take appropriate 

precautions to protect [J.T.]

* * *

56. . . . [J.G.] needs twenty-four[-]hour[-]a[-]day care by 

someone who is trained to recognize his special health needs and 

health issues and who can provide [J.G.] safe[,] appropriate 

supervision. [Mother] has left [J.G.] in the care of [T.H.] and 

others who were not able to appropriately supervise [J.G.] . . .
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57. [Mother’s] statements that she wanted to terminate her 

parental rights and [Mother’s] failure to visit [J.G.] at all during 

the six months this case has been pending indicates to this court 

that she does not care about [J.G.’s] welfare especially his mental 

conditions (emotions). Based on the testimony presented the 

court concludes that [J.G.] can interact with and enjoy the 

presence and love of others.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 31-33. The court then adjudicated the Children to be 

CHINS. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[9] Mother appeals the trial court’s adjudication of the Children as CHINS. Our 

Supreme Court recently set out our standard of review:

When reviewing a trial court’s CHINS determination, we do not 

reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. In re S.D., 2 

N.E.3d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2014). “Instead, we consider only the 

evidence that supports the trial court’s decision and [the] 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. at 1287 (citation, 

brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). When a trial 

court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and 

conclusions law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We 

consider, first, “whether the evidence supports the findings” and, 

second, “whether the findings support the judgment.” Id.

(citation omitted). We will reverse a CHINS determination only 

if it was clearly erroneous. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 

(Ind. 2012). A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do 

not support the findings or “if it applies the wrong legal standard 

to properly found facts.” Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 

(Ind. 1997) (citation omitted).
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Gr. J. v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs. (In re D.J.), 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017) 

(alterations in original).

Issue One: Necessary Supervision

[10] Mother’s first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred when it 

concluded that the Children’s physical or mental health is seriously impaired or 

seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of Mother to 

supply the Children with necessary supervision. See Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1(1) 

(2018); Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 32-33. The entirety of Mother’s argument on 

this issue as it relates to both J.G. and J.T. is simply a request for this Court to 

disregard the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and to 

instead consider only the evidence Mother deems favorable to her desired 

conclusion. In other words, Mother’s argument is entirely premised on having 

this Court disregard our standard of review, which we will not do. 

[11] Mother has not carried her burden on appeal of demonstrating trial court error 

on this issue. The trial court’s findings as set out above are supported by the 

record—indeed, Mother does not actually challenge the trial court’s findings as 

set out above, she just ignores them—and the court’s findings support its 

conclusion. We affirm the trial court on this issue.

Issue Two: Coercive Intervention

[12] Mother next asserts that the trial court’s conclusion that the Children are 

unlikely to receive needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation without the 

coercive intervention of the court is clearly erroneous. But, again, the entirety 
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of Mother’s argument on this issue contravenes our standard of review as 

Mother simply requests this Court to consider only evidence that the trial court 

did not rely on. We will not disregard our standard of review. As with her first 

issue on appeal, Mother has not carried her burden on appeal of demonstrating 

trial court error, and, having reviewed the record, we cannot say that the trial 

court’s judgment on this issue is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the 

court’s adjudication of the Children as CHINS.

[13] Affirmed.

Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.