Filed 10/27/22 In re Bo.U. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re Bo.U. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B314447

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP00360)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ESTHER C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Temporary Judge. 

Affirmed.
2

Landon Villavaso, under appointment by the 

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and 

Family Services (DCFS or the agency) initiated juvenile 

dependency proceedings concerning Bo.U. and Ba.U. based on 

their mother’s commission of acts of domestic violence against 

their father.1 The juvenile court sustained the dependency 

petition, removed the children from mother, and placed them

with father. The court later issued an exit order awarding father 

sole legal and physical custody of Bo.U. and Ba.U, authorizing 

mother to have monitored visits with the children, and

terminating dependency jurisdiction.

Mother appeals from this exit order. She argues that the 

court improperly delegated to father the power to determine 

whether she could have visits by conditioning her visitation right 

on father’s approval of a monitor. 

Mother’s argument is belied by the record. The order 

provides explicitly that if father does not approve of a monitor, 

then mother may pay for a professional monitor for her visits. 

Although the court did not mention this provision during the 

hearing at which it decided to terminate jurisdiction with an exit 

order, the inclusion of this provision in the final ruling is fatal to 

mother’s claim of error. We thus affirm the order. 

1 Father is not a party to this appeal. 
3

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

We summarize only the procedural history that is relevant 

to our disposition of this appeal.

On January 19, 2018, DCFS filed a dependency petition 

concerning Bo.U. and Ba.U., who were then eight and five years 

old, respectively. The agency asserted jurisdiction over the 

children under Welfare and Institutions Code3 section 300, 

subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), and alleged two jurisdictional 

counts—i.e., counts a-1 and b-1. Counts a-1 and b-1 both read as 

follows: “The children[’s] . . . mother . . . and . . . father . . . have a 

history of engaging in violent altercations, in the children’s 

presence. On 01/01/2018, the mother repeatedly struck the 

father with the mother’s fists inflicting marks and bruises. In 

October 2017, the mother struck the father inflicting a bruise to 

the father’s eye. The father failed to protect the children in that 

the father allowed the mother to have unlimited access to the 

children. The children were prior dependants [sic] of the 

Juvenile Court due to the domestic violence between the parents 

and the father’s failure to protect the children; the mother did not 

reunify with the children. Such violent conduct on the part of the 

mother against the father and the father’s failure to protect the 

children endangers the children’s physical health and safety and 

2 We derive part of our Procedural Background from 

undisputed portions of the parties’ appellate briefing. (See Artal 

v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[B]riefs and 

argument . . . are reliable indications of a party’s position on the 

facts as well as the law, and a reviewing court may make use of 

statements therein as admissions against the party.’ ”].)

3 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
4

places the children at risk of serious physical harm, damage, 

danger and failure to protect.” 

On January 22, 2018, the juvenile court held a detention 

hearing. The court detained Bo.U. and Ba.U. from mother,4

released them to father, and authorized mother to have 

monitored visits with the children. 

On April 19, 2018, the juvenile court held a combined 

jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The court sustained the 

dependency petition, removed the children from mother’s custody

and placed them with father, authorized mother to have 

monitored visits with the children, and ordered mother to 

participate in certain services. 

On October 18, 2018, April 18, 2019, November 13, 2019,

November 19, 2020, and July 6, 2021, the juvenile court held 

status review hearings pursuant to section 364.5 At the 

4 At the conclusion of the prior dependency proceedings, 

the juvenile court awarded father sole legal and physical custody 

of the children, and mother monitored visitation. Thus, although 

the parents did not have joint physical custody of the children at 

the outset of the instant case, mother had a particular, albeit 

limited, custodial right vis-à-vis the children—i.e., monitored 

visitation. (See Fam. Code, § 3004 [“ ‘Joint physical custody’

means that each of the parents shall have significant periods of 

physical custody.”]; City and County of San Francisco v. H.H.

(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 531, 543 [indicating that visitation is a 

type of custodial right].) Therefore, even though the children did 

not reside with mother at the beginning of this case, the juvenile 

court’s order detaining the children from mother’s custody 

was not superfluous. 

5 Section 364 applies when “an order is made placing a 

child under the supervision of the juvenile court pursuant to
5

July 6, 2021 hearing, the juvenile court decided to award father 

sole legal and physical custody of Bo.U. and Ba.U., grant mother 

monitored visits with the children, and terminate dependency 

jurisdiction. 

On July 9, 2021, the court issued a juvenile custody order 

awarding sole legal and physical custody of the children to father 

and monitored visitation to mother; and terminating dependency 

jurisdiction. Regarding mother’s monitored visits, the juvenile 

custody order provides in relevant part: “Mother’s visits are to be 

monitored by a monitor approved of by Father. If no approval, 

then a professional monitor paid for by Mother. Father not to 

monitor the visits and visits not to take place in the Father’s 

home. Visits are a minimum of two hour[s] twice a month.” The 

order allowed mother to have only monitored visits because she 

had not completed certain court-ordered programs, including a 

domestic violence treatment program for offenders. 

On July 28, 2021, mother appealed the juvenile custody 

order. 

DISCUSSION

“Section 362.4 provides that when the juvenile court 

terminates jurisdiction over a dependent child, and there is a 

pending family court case, the juvenile court may issue an order 

determining the custody of, or visitation with, the minor, which 

order ‘shall’ become part of the family court file and ‘shall 

continue’ unless ‘modified’ or ‘terminated’ by that court.” (In re 

Cole Y. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1455, quoting § 362.4, 

subd. (b).) “If no action is filed or pending relating to the custody 

Section 300 and . . . the child is not removed from the physical 

custody of his or her parent or guardian . . . .” (§ 364, subd. (a).)
6

of the minor in the superior court of any county, the juvenile 

court order may be used as the sole basis for opening a file in the 

superior court of the county in which the parent, who has been 

given custody, resides.” (§ 362.4, subd. (c).) “An order entered 

pursuant to section 362.4 is commonly referred to as an ‘ “exit” ’ 

order.” (Cole Y., at p. 1455.)

“The power to determine the right and extent of visitation 

by a noncustodial parent in a dependency case resides with the 

court and may not be delegated to nonjudicial officials or private 

parties. [Citation.] This rule of nondelegation applies to exit 

orders issued when dependency jurisdiction is terminated. 

[Citations.] [¶] A visitation order may delegate to a third party 

the responsibility for managing the details of visits, including 

their time, place and manner. [Citation.] That said, ‘the 

ultimate supervision and control over this discretion must remain 

with the court . . . .’ [Citation.] Several appellate courts have 

overturned visitation orders that delegate discretion to determine 

whether visitation will occur, as opposed to simply the 

management of the details.” (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 

1119, 1123.)

“We review a juvenile court’s decision to . . . issue an . . . 

exit custody order for abuse of discretion, and may not disturb 

such rulings unless the court made an ‘ “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious 

or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (In re C.W.

(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835, 863; see also In re D.P. (2020) 

44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1070 [“The power to regulate visits between 

dependent children and their parents rests with the juvenile 

court and its visitation orders will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent an abuse of discretion.”].) “The juvenile court’s orders are 

‘presumed to be correct, and it is appellant’s burden to 
7

affirmatively show error.’ [Citations.]” (In re J.F. (2019) 

39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79 (J.F.).)

Mother cites an excerpt from the reporter’s transcript for 

the July 6, 2021 hearing for the proposition that “the juvenile 

court terminated jurisdiction with a juvenile court custody order 

that awarded the mother monitored visitation by a monitor that 

the father must approve.” She asserts the court thus “improperly 

delegated the right and extent of the mother’s visitation solely to 

the father and violated the separation of powers doctrine.” 

Mother further contends that the “visitation order was illusory” 

because the court “effectively gave the father veto power over” 

mother’s right of visitation and he “had no interest in promoting 

or maintaining the mother’s relationship with the minors.” 

Admittedly, at the July 6, 2021 hearing, the juvenile court 

did express its intention to issue an order that would grant father 

sole legal and physical custody, and provide that “mother’s visits 

[were] to be monitored by a monitor approved of by father.” The 

juvenile custody order issued on July 9, 2021, however, provides 

in pertinent part: “Mother’s visits are to be monitored by a 

monitor approved of by Father. If no approval, then a 

professional monitor paid for by Mother.”

6 (Italics added.)

6 DCFS acknowledges that at certain points during the 

dependency proceedings, mother apparently claimed that she 

could not afford a professional monitor. In her appellate briefing, 

however, mother does not claim that the visitation order is 

defective because she lacked the means to retain a professional 

monitor. She thus waives any such argument. (See J.F., supra, 

39 Cal.App.5th at p. 79 [“ ‘ “When an appellant fails to raise a 

point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument 

and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ”].) 
8

“ ‘[A]s a general rule[,] . . . when . . . the record is in conflict 

it will be harmonized if possible . . . .’ [Citations.]” (See People v. 

Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599; see also In re Byron B. (2004) 

119 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1014–1015, 1018 [applying this general 

rule in a wardship case].) Here, the July 6, 2021 oral ruling can 

easily be reconciled with the juvenile custody order the court 

ultimately issued on July 9, 2021. The court’s minute order for 

the July 6, 2021 hearing stayed the court’s ruling terminating 

jurisdiction to July 9, 2021 “to allow father’s counsel to prepare

and submit” a proposed juvenile custody order for the court’s 

review. The first page of the juvenile custody order shows that 

father’s counsel had prepared that document for the court. The 

July 9, 2021 minute order indicates that on that date, the court

received, signed, and filed counsel’s proposed juvenile custody 

order, and that the court thereafter terminated dependency 

jurisdiction. Thus, it is apparent from the record that the court 

intended for the juvenile custody order prepared by counsel—and 

not the court’s prior oral ruling—to constitute the final custody 

and visitation order that would govern the rights of the parties.

Because we find that the juvenile court authorized mother 

to hire a professional monitor if father did not approve of any of 

her candidates for the position, mother’s assertion that father 

could veto her right to visitation necessarily fails. Accordingly, 

mother has not discharged her burden of affirmatively 

demonstrating that the juvenile court abused its discretion, and 

we affirm the visitation order.7

7 In light of our disposition, we do not address DCFS’s 

contention that mother forfeited her challenge to the visitation 

order by failing to object to it during the dependency proceedings. 
9

DISPOSITION

We affirm the July 9, 2021 juvenile custody order. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENKE, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth 

Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.