alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk November 2, 2011

p1026 

# Order

November 2, 2011

143123

Estate of DARRYL HOUSTON PRICE.

_____________ _______________ _____________

NASTASSIA PRICE and ERIN DUFFY-PRICE, Personal Representatives of the Estate of Darryl Houston Price, Plaintiffs, v SC: 143123 COA: 295212 Ingham CC: 06-000228-NZ LORI JEAN KOSMALSKI and TRADE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a/k/a TRADE WORLD COMPANY, INC., Defendants, and Estate of RUDAFORD R. STERRETT, JR., Defendant-Appellee, and THOMAS WOODS, Receiver, Appellee, and DART BANK, Intervening Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 12, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is GRANTED. The parties shall address: (1) whether a mortgagee must affi rmatively consent to the appointment of a receiver to be required to pay the receiver’s costs and fees; (2) whet her the statutory right of first priority belonging to the holder of the recorded mort gage, MCL 600.3236,
overrides the common-law rule that a receive r’s costs and fees are entitled to first priority; and (3) whether a mort gagee must actually benefit from the incurred expenses or whether a mortgagee can be required to pa y for expenses that did not benefit it.

The Michigan Association of Realtors, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and the Real Property Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups inte rested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.
#### Reather GUEST, Petitioner, v. Joe MILLITELLO and American Mutual Fire Insurance Company, a corporation, Respondents.

No. 41344.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 3, 1971.

E. B. Rood of Rood & Hapner, Tampa, for petitioner.

C. Lawrence Stagg of Holland & Knight, Tampa, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari is granted without oral argument. The decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, 248 So.2d 662, is quashed and the cause is remanded for reconsideration in light of this Court’s opinion in Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d 421 (Fla.1971).

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
NO. 12-09-00196-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

ABDOULIE SARR, § APPEAL FROM THE 241ST

APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

BANK OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

This appeal is being dismissed for failure to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. Pursuant to Rule 32.1, Appellant’s docketing statement was

due to have been filed at the time the appeal was perfected, i.e., June 26, 2009. See TEX. R. APP. P.

32.1. On June 26, 2009, this court notified Appellant that he should file a docketing statement

immediately if he had not already done so. On the same date, by separate letter, this court notified

Appellant that the filing fee was due on or before July 6, 2009.

Because Appellant did not file the docketing statement as requested in our June 26, 2009

letter, this court issued a second notice on July 7, 2009 advising Appellant that the docketing

statement was past due. The notice also advised Appellant that the filing fee in the appeal was due

to have been paid on or before July 6, 2009, but had not been received. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5. The

notice further provided that unless the docketing statement and filing fee were filed on or before

July 17, 2009, the appeal would be presented for dismissal in accordance with Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 42.3. The date for filing the docketing statement and the filing fee have passed,

and Appellant has not complied with the court’s request. Because Appellant has failed, after notice,

to comply with Rules 5 and 32.1, the appeal is dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c).

Opinion delivered July 24, 2009.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)
**Sample letter to Notify Change in Voter Registration Status**

(**Staying**in the same jurisdiction)

LEO address:

Dear Election Official,

I, _________________________ (name as it appears on Voter Registration Card or file), am a/an (select one):

· Member of the uniformed services

· Eligible spouse or dependent 

currently registered as a *UOCAVA[footnoteRef:1]* voter in your jurisdiction. I will be separating from the Service on ___________________ (date) and will no longer be covered under *UOCAVA.*  [1:  The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) covers all active-duty members of the Uniformed Services and their families, members of the merchant marine and their families, and US citizens who reside overseas, and assists them in exercising their right to vote.] 

I want to vote locally in your voting jurisdiction, please update my registration or provide me any required documents. If you have any questions feel free to contact me at (provide best method of contact) 

Regards,

*Signature_________________________________     	Date_____________
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION of CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT to SECTION 1350 of CHAPTER 63 of TITLE 18 of the UNITED
STATES CODE,

as ADOPTED PURSUANT to

SECTION 906 of THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Quarterly Report
of Frischs Restaurants, Inc. (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 18, 2007 (the Report), the undersigned officer of the Registrant certifies, pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of
Title 18 of the United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                 |  |     |  |                           
|---------------- |  | --- |  | --------------------------
|October 18, 2007 |  | By: |  | /s/ Donald H. Walker      
|                 |  |     |  | Donald H. Walker          
|                 |  |     |  | Vice President-Finance and
|                 |  |     |  | Chief Financial Officer   

This certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a  14(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or otherwise subject to the liability of that
Section. This certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act, except as other otherwise stated in such filing.
EXHIBIT
32.2





CERTIFICATIONS
PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350)




In
connection with the Annual Report of Hyperdynamics Corporation (Hyperdynamics),
on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Report"), Jason Davis, Principal Financial Officer and
Principal Accounting Officer of Hyperdynamics, does hereby certify, pursuant to
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), that to his
knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





Date:
September 28, 2010





By:
                /s/ Jason DavisJason
      DavisPrincipal
      Financial Officer andPrincipal
      Accounting Officer
261 La. 230

#### Claude E. NICHOLS v. AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY et al.

No. 51993.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 27, 1972.

In re: George L. Thompson and Claudia P. Thompson applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Caddo. 254 So.2d 159.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal the result is correct.
Exhibit 99.01


      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                   AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
        SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of General
Employment Enterprises, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), the
undersigned hereby certifies, in his capacity as an officer
of the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of
        section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
        1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly
        presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
        and results of the operations of the Company.



Date:  May 12, 2003       By:  /s/ Herbert F. Imhoff, Jr.
                          Herbert F. Imhoff, Jr.
                          Chairman of the Board, Chief
                          Executive Officer and President
                          (Chief executive officer)
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

DAVID PETERS, )

) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9706-CR-00217

Appellant, )

) DAVIDSON COUNTY

VS. ) (No. 2557 Below)

)

RICKY BELL, WARDEN, ) The Hon. J. Randall Wyatt

)

Appellee. ) (Dismissal of Habeas Corpus Petition)

 ) AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20

O R D E R

 This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion requesting that the

judgment in the above-styled cause be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Court of

Criminal Appeals Rules. Although not for the reasons set forth in the state’s motion, we

find that this is an appropriate case for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20.

According to the trial court’s order denying relief, the petitioner is currently

serving a 40-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping, which began to run on May 12,

1986, and a 2-year sentence for felony escape. In his petition for habeas corpus relief and

in this appeal, the petitioner challenges his 1993 conviction for felony escape, asserting

that the indictment failed to specify the underlying conviction or classification thereof and

that the indictment failed to state the necessary mens rea element for the offense. In

dismissing the petition, the trial court stated:

Habeas corpus relief is available in Tennessee only if “it appears upon

the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the

judgment is rendered that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or

authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence of

imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d

157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). This language, however, does not provide a vehicle

for habeas relief on an individual sentence while a prisoner continues to

serve other sentences. Arendall v. State, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9510-CR00341, filed December 30, 1996. The law in this State is clear that habeas

corpus relief is available only to persons eligible for immediate release from

custody. Arendall, supra, citing Taylor v. Morgan, 909 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tenn.

Cr. App. 1995) (emphasis added). See T.C.A. §29-21-122(b)(2).
-2-

In the case sub judice, petitioner only challenges his conviction and

sentence for felony escape, and not his conviction and sentence for

aggravated kidnapping. Irrespective of the validity of petitioner’s challenge

to the escape conviction, then, in light of petitioner’s current forty (40) year

sentence on the latter charge, such a challenge is premature at this time and

is not appropriate for review.

Finding that the trial court properly dismissed the petitioner’s petition for

habeas corpus relief as premature, we grant the state’s motion to affirm the judgment.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the judgment of the trial court is hereby

affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal Rules.

ENTER this the ____ day of September, 1997.

___________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________

JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE

___________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Richard W. PARKER.

No. 60602.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 11, 1977.

In re: Richard W. Parker, applying for writ of review.

Granted. The petition of the relator in the above entitled and numbered case having been duly considered,

It is ordered that a Writ of Certiorari issue herein, directing the Honorable Walter C. Peters, Judge of the 31st Judicial District, Court for the Parish of Jefferson Davis to transmit to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, on or before the 25th day of November, 1977, the record in duplicate, or a certified copy of the record in duplicate, of the proceedings complained of by the relator herein, to the end that the validity of said proceedings may be ascertained.

It is further ordered that the aforesaid Judge of said Court and the respondent through counsel shall show cause, in this court, on a date to be fixed by this Court, why the relief prayed for in the petition of the relator should not be granted.
| (1)   | Such      Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2010, fully      complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities      Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The      information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period      ending March 31, 2010, fairly presents, in all material respects, the      financial condition and results of operations of MedClean Technologies,      Inc. |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:      May 17, 2010       |   | /s/      Cheryl      K. Sadowski |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------|--------|
|                                                        |   | Cheryl      K. Sadowski          |   |
|                                                        |   | Chief      Financial Officer     |   |
|                                                        |   |                             |   |

----
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 919 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 919

                For the relief of Larry Errol Pieterse.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 16, 1993

 Mr. Gingrich introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
                For the relief of Larry Errol Pieterse.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. WAIVER OF GROUNDS FOR DEPORTATION OR EXCLUSION OF LARRY 
              ERROL PIETERSE.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding sections 212(a)(2)(A), 
241(a)(1)(A), and 241(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
Larry Errol Pieterse may not be deported from the United States or 
excluded from admission into the United States by reason of any offense 
for which he received a full pardon from the Governor of Florida prior 
to January 1, 1992.
    (b) Rescission of Outstanding Deportation Order.--The Attorney 
General shall rescind any outstanding order of deportation or finding 
of deportability that has been entered against Larry Errol Pieterse by 
reason of any offense for which he received a full pardon from the 
Governor of Florida prior to January 1, 1992.
    (c) Permanent Residence Status.--Notwithstanding any order 
terminating the status of Larry Errol Pieterse as an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, for purposes of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act he shall be considered lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence as of November 3, 1981, and such status shall be considered 
not to have changed between such date and the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
    (d) Establishment of Good Moral Character.--Notwithstanding section 
101(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, any offense for which 
Larry Errol Pieterse received a full pardon from the Governor of 
Florida prior to January 1, 1992, may not be considered in determining 
whether he is, or during any period has been, a person of good moral 
character for purposes of such Act.

                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 31.1**
I, William E. Crow, certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Qof Friedman Industries, Incorporated;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect tothe period covered by this report;

     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flowsof the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;

     4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:

          a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;

          b) [intentionally omitted per SEC release 33-8238]

          c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, asof the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

          d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant'sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

     5. The registrant's other certifying officers(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant's board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):

          a) All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and

          b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

Dated: August 14, 2007 /s/  William E. Crow Chief Executive Officer and President
#### Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, Appellant, *v.*John Michael Pessagno, Appellee.

*235Argued December 6, 1974,

before Judges Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr. and Rogers, sitting as a panel of three.

*John L. Heaton,*Assistant Attorney General, with him *Anthony J. Maiorana,*Assistant Attorney General, *Robert W. Gunliffe,*Deputy Attorney General, and *Israel Packel,*Attorney General, for appellant.

*John Michael Pessagno,*appellee, for himself.

Decmber 18, 1974:

Opinion by

Judge Wilkinson,

On November 10, 1971, while making what, prior to *Commonwealth v. Swanger,*453 Pa. 107, 307 A. 2d 875 (1973), was considered to be a “routine traffic check,” an officer of the Pennsylvania State Police determined that the appellee was operating a motor vehicle after his operating privilege had been suspended and before it was reinstated in violation of Section 624(6) of The Vehicle Code, Act of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, *as amend*
      *236
      *ed,*75 P.S. §624(6). Although it is not important to the disposition of this case since a de novo hearing was held in the court below, the record shows that appellee was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under suspension in violation of Section 624(6) of The Vehicle Code, 75 P.S. §624(6), and paid a fine and costs in the amount of $110.00 on September 21, 1972. Under the law as later established in *Swanger, supra,*this conviction would now be improper since it resulted from a “routine traffic check” which was there held to be unreasonable and impermissive invasion of privacy.

On July 18, 1973, appellee was notified that his operating privilege was suspended for a one-year period, effective August 22, 1973. On appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County and after a de novo hearing where the arresting officer testified to the circumstances of the arrest, the lower court sustained the appeal on the grounds that “it is unconstitutional to permit the fruits of this intrusion to be used as evidence,” citing *Swanger, supra.*

Judge Mencer’s opinion in *Civitello v. Bureau of Traffic Safety,*11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 551, 555-56, 315 A. 2d 666, 668-69 (1974), makes it unnecessary for us to discuss the controlling principle further: “. . . it is immaterial whether the licensee has been legally arrested. We will not consider alleged procedural defects or errors based on a criminal proceeding involving the licensee. *See*Commonwealth v. Gourley, 88 Dauph. 41 (1967). Even though the basis of the action may be the commission of a crime, the nature of the suspension proceeding before the Secretary of Transportation is civil and not criminal. The disposition of the criminal case in no way controls or precludes the civil proceedings related to a license suspension determination. Royer Motor Vehicle Operator License Case, 213 Pa. Superior Ct. 17, 245 A. 2d 716 (1968).”

*237Accordingly, tlie order of the lower court is reversed and the order of the Secretary of Transportation, suspending the appellee’s operating privileges for one year, is reinstated. A reinstated suspension shall be issued within 30 days.