*

The Honorable Joseph H. McKinley, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky,

sitting by designation.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 05a0288p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

KEVIN JOHNSON, on behalf of himself and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LONG JOHN SILVER’S RESTAURANTS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

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No. 04-5810

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

Nos. 01-01526—Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., District Judge.

Argued: June 3, 2005

Decided and Filed: July 5, 2005 

Before: MARTIN and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; McKINLEY, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: David F. Gore, STEWART, ESTES & DONNELL, Nashville, Tennessee, for

Appellant. John F. Dienelt, PIPER RUDNICK, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: M.

Reid Estes, Jr., STEWART, ESTES & DONNELL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. John F.

Dienelt, PIPER RUDNICK, Washington, D.C., John Knox Walkup, WYATT, TARRANT &

COMBS, Nashville, Tennessee, Robert P. Davis, MAYER, BROWN, ROWE & MAW, Washington,

D.C., for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION _________________

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Kevin Johnson appeals the district court’s order

compelling arbitration. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

 Johnson filed a potential collective action in the district court alleging that defendant Long

John Silver’s Restaurants, Inc., had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act in its treatment of Johnson

and others similarly situated. Long John Silver’s moved to compel arbitration under a standard

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No. 04-5810 Johnson v. Long John Silver’s Restaurants Page 2

employee arbitration agreement. Johnson argued that because Long John Silver’s was unable to

produce a signed arbitration agreement—the company allegedly lost Johnson’s file—he could not

be bound to arbitrate his claim. Johnson also argued that any arbitration agreement found to exist

was unconscionable and that he had not made a voluntary and knowing waiver of the right to a

judicial forum. He further argued that collective actions were outside the scope of the arbitration

agreement, or alternately that arbitration would not permit him to pursue a collective action, and that

therefore the arbitral forum was inadequate. Finally, he argued that a number of other clauses of the

arbitration agreement were impermissible and should be severed, such as provisions providing for

the scope of discovery and the payment of costs and fees.

The district court made two alternative findings with respect to the existence of an arbitration

agreement, concluding that Johnson had signed an arbitration agreement, or, in the alternative, that

Johnson was bound by an implied-in-fact arbitration agreement. Johnson v. Long John Silver’s

Rests., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 656, 664-65 (M.D. Tenn. 2004). In the remainder of its detailed and

well-reasoned opinion, the district court held that the agreement was enforceable. The district court

rejected Johnson’s challenges to the agreement as a whole and declined to sever any individual

clauses. Accordingly, the district court granted Long John Silver’s motion to compel arbitration.

Id. at 670. 

After carefully considering the record on appeal, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable

law, and having had the benefit of oral argument, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that

Johnson is bound by an implied-in-fact arbitration agreement under Missouri law, for the reasons

given by the district court. Id. at 664-65. We do not reach the issue of whether Johnson in fact

signed an arbitration agreement. On the remaining issues, we conclude that the factual

determinations of the district court were not clearly erroneous and that the legal determinations were

correct. Because the reasoning that supports the judgment has been clearly articulated by the district

court in a thorough and comprehensive published decision, the issuance of a detailed written opinion

by us would be unduly duplicative. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court, Johnson v. Long

John Silver’s Rests., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 656 (M.D. Tenn. 2004), is affirmed.

In addition to appealing the district court’s order granting Long John Silver’s motion to

compel arbitration, Johnson also appealed the district court’s disposition of several other motions.

Specifically, Johnson appealed (1) the district court’s order denying Johnson’s motion for a case

status conference; and (2) the district court’s order affirming the magistrate’s order denying

Johnson’s motions to compel discovery and denying a motion for expedited court service and

disclosure of the identities of similarly situated employees. The basis for the first order was included

in the district court’s published opinion, id. at 670. The second order, regarding discovery,

expedited court service, and disclosure, was issued separately on November 24, 2003. 

Again, the district court did not err in its disposition of Johnson’s motions, and adequately

addressed Johnson’s arguments in its opinions. The district court’s denial of Johnson’s motion for

a case status conference is therefore affirmed on the basis of the reasoning detailed in the published

opinion, id. The district court’s order denying compelled discovery, expedited court service, and

compelled disclosure of the identities of similarly situated employees is affirmed on the basis of the

reasoning set forth in the November 24, 2003, order of Judge Wiseman. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.