NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

RICK EUGENE MALIN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0189

Appeal from the Superior Court in La Paz County

No. S1500CR201400171

The Honorable Samuel E. Vederman, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

David Goldberg, Ft. Collins, CO

Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined.
STATE v. MALIN

Decision of the Court

2

G O U L D, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Rick Malin appeals from his convictions for DUI, 

arguing the superior court erred by denying his motion to suppress. For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 On the Fourth of July weekend of 2014, Deputy R. was 

assigned to a special detail in Parker, Arizona, that was tasked with traffic 

enforcement, “with emphasis on alcohol enforcement and seat belt 

restraint[s].” 

¶3 On Saturday, July 5, Deputy R. was monitoring traffic on 

Highway 95 in Parker. Around midnight, he saw Malin’s car make a “wide 

sweeping turn” northbound onto Highway 95 from Lakeside Boulevard, 

passing from the curb lane to the inside lane without using his turn signal. 

After driving past Deputy R., Malin moved into the left turn lane at 

Riverside Drive, again without using his turn signal. 

¶4 Based on his training and experience, Deputy R. recognized 

that Malin’s “wide sweeping turn” and failure to signal lane changes were

signs of driving while impaired. As a result, Deputy R. followed Malin and

pulled him over. When Deputy R. spoke to Malin, he admitted that he had 

an interlock device restriction on his license, and that he had consumed 21⁄2 

rum and cokes earlier that day. After Malin performed poorly on several 

field sobriety tests, Deputy R. arrested him for driving under the influence. 

Malin’s breath samples later showed a BAC of 0.15 and 0.147, and his blood 

samples revealed a BAC of between .144 to .159. 

¶5 Malin was charged with two counts of aggravated driving 

under the influence pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 

sections 28-1383(A)(4) and 28-1381(A)(1). Before trial, Malin filed a motion 

to suppress on the grounds there was no reasonable suspicion justifying the 

stop. Following an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied Malin’s 

motion to suppress. 

 

1 “In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we view 

the facts in the light most favorable to upholding its ruling.” State v. Moreno, 

236 Ariz. 347, 349, ¶ 2 (App. 2014). 
STATE v. MALIN

Decision of the Court

3

¶6 In denying Malin’s motion, the court determined there was 

reasonable suspicion to stop Malin’s vehicle on multiple grounds. First, by 

failing to signal his turns and lane changes, Malin violated A.R.S. §§ 28-

754(A), (B). The court further found that Malin’s violation of A.R.S. § 28-

754 “may have affected other traffic.” Second, Malin’s wide turn onto 

Highway 95 violated A.R.S. § 28-751(1). Third, the court found that Malin’s 

failure to signal and his wide turn provided reasonable suspicion to stop 

him for driving while impaired in violation of A.R.S. § 28-1381(A). 

¶7 The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Malin guilty 

on both counts. Malin timely appeals. 

DISCUSSION

¶8 On appeal, Malin challenges the court’s determination there 

was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop based on his alleged violation 

of A.R.S. §§ 28-754(A), (B). Malin does not challenge the court’s other 

findings supporting reasonable suspicion. 

¶9 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 

evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Peterson, 228 Ariz. 405, 407, ¶ 6 

(App. 2011) (citations omitted). We consider only the evidence before the 

trial court at the suppression hearing, and defer to the court’s factual 

findings that are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. 

State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, 288, ¶ 2 (App. 2004). However, we review the 

trial court’s legal conclusions de novo, including whether there was a 

Fourth Amendment violation. Id. 

¶10 An officer may conduct a traffic stop based on reasonable 

suspicion the defendant has violated the law. See State v. Evans, 237 Ariz. 

231, 234, ¶ 7 (2015) (citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion for a traffic 

stop consists of “some minimal level of objective justification” under the 

totality of the circumstances, including specific reasonable inferences an 

officer is warranted in making in light of his training and experience. Id. at 

234, ¶¶ 7-8. (citations omitted). 

¶11 Because Malin has not challenged the court’s finding the stop 

was justified based on a reasonable suspicion he was driving while 

impaired, he has abandoned this argument on appeal. ARCAP 13(a)(6); 

DeElena v. S. Pac. Co., 121 Ariz. 563, 572 (1979) (issues not argued on appeal 

are deemed abandoned). However, we have discretion to address this 

issue, and choose to do so, because it provides an undisputed basis to 

resolve this appeal. Cf. State v. Payne, 223 Ariz. 555, 568 n.8, ¶ 47 (App. 2009) 

(“‘If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose 
STATE v. MALIN

Decision of the Court

4

of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us 

to consider the issue.’”) (internal citations omitted); State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 

75, 79, ¶ 12 (2002) (appellate court may address argument otherwise 

waived). 

¶12 Here, the record shows there was reasonable suspicion to stop 

Malin for driving while impaired in violation of A.R.S. § 28-1381(A). 

Deputy R. observed Malin make a wide turn and repeatedly fail to signal 

his lane changes; both of these observations indicated to Deputy R., based 

on his training and experience, that Malin may have been driving while 

impaired by alcohol.

2 Accordingly, we find no error.

CONCLUSION 

¶13 For the above reasons, we affirm the superior court’s denial 

of Malin’s motion to suppress. 

 

 

2 Because we conclude the stop was justified based on reasonable 

suspicion of DUI, we need not reach the issue of whether the stop was 

justified based on a violation of A.R.S. § 28-751(1).