# Recent Reports

Reports News from the GAO

- Ukraine: Status of Foreign Assistance What GAO FoundRussia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has had devastating consequences: causing tremendous loss of life, creating a humanitarian crisis, threatening democracy, and exacerbating global challenges such as food insecurity. In response, Congress appropriated more than $113 billion under four Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts (Ukraine acts). From those appropriations, the Departments of State, the Treasury, Agriculture (USDA), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) identified $43 billion in foreign assistance as allocated in response to the crisis in Ukraine. In addition to the supplemental funding, State, Treasury, USDA, and USAID identified about $1.1 billion in other funding in response to the crisis in Ukraine. This combined $44.1 billion in foreign assistance was allocated largely for economic and humanitarian assistance. As of December 31, 2023, based on data that GAO compiled and assessed, State, USAID, Treasury, and USDA had obligated about $42.5 billion of this amount and disbursed about $33.8 billion of it.GAO found that State was not using a systematic approach to categorize and separately track the status of foreign assistance specifically in response to the crisis in Ukraine. Consequently, State faced challenges in providing the status of this foreign assistance. Without such separate tracking, State cannot provide timely information on the status of foreign assistance related to the Ukraine crisis that can be used to understand the status of assistance and to inform decisions about future funding.This foreign assistance generally falls into six categories:Economic Growth, such as financial support for the Ukrainian private sector;	Humanitarian Assistance, such as food and shelter for internally displaced persons and refugees;	Peace and Security, such as equipment for border police;	Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, such as strengthening public financial management practices;	Health, such as addressing infectious disease outbreaks; and	Education and Social Services, such as mental health programs for people affected by the war.Why GAO Did This StudyForeign assistance supports U.S. national interests and responds to humanitarian crises, among other things. This report focuses on foreign assistance funds—largely for civilians—allocated in response to the crisis in Ukraine, including for efforts associated with countries outside Ukraine that have also been affected by the crisis. This review does not cover funds allocated for other purposes or to other agencies, such as funding to the Department of Defense related to the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Specifically, this report examines the status of the $44.1 billion in foreign assistance funding identified by State, Treasury, USDA, and USAID, as well as the types of activities this funding supports, in response to the crisis in Ukraine caused by the 2022 Russian invasion.Division M of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, included a provision for GAO to conduct oversight of the assistance provided in the Ukraine acts. This report is part of a series of reviews that GAO has underway evaluating the types of U.S. assistance, including security assistance, being provided in response to the crisis in Ukraine. To determine the status of funding, we reviewed and assessed State, Treasury, USDA, and USAID financial information. To describe the types of assistance, we reviewed agency documentation and interviewed agency officials.
- International Mail: Effects of Rate Increases and Other Factors on USPS and Domestic Stakeholders What GAO FoundThe United States Postal Service's (USPS) international mail volume declined from about 1 billion pieces in fiscal year 2017 to about 355 million pieces in fiscal year 2022 (see figure). USPS officials stated that the drop was caused primarily by the implementation of substantially higher rates in 2020. These rates are called “self-declared” rates because the U.S. and other countries were allowed to set their own rates for certain inbound international mail items. USPS's inbound volume subject to self-declared rates fell substantially from fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2022. USPS's revenue from international mail also declined over this period but still covered or exceeded its costs.U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) Inbound, Outbound, and Total International Mail Volume, Fiscal Years 2017-2022All domestic stakeholders GAO interviewed cited at least one of the following factors as contributing to the decline in USPS's international mail business since 2017.International mail rates increased.	COVID-19 restricted options to get mail in and out of the U.S.	New customs laws increased costs for sending international mail.Several stakeholders GAO interviewed said increases in international mail rates likely benefited some businesses and hindered others. They said that express companies, such as FedEx and UPS, may have become more competitive as USPS and other national postal carriers raised their prices for their international mail products. USPS's increases were passed along to U.S. businesses that send mail out of the U.S., making them less competitive. These increases may have been passed on to U.S. consumers. However, stakeholders noted that the effect on consumers is difficult to estimate as mailing rates are not transparent to the consumer and are only one input to the cost of the item.Why GAO Did This StudyUSPS provides postal services to and from other countries through the Universal Postal Union, a specialized agency of the United Nations. This agency established a system for international mailing rates that reimburse postal operators for delivering international mail in their countries. In 2017, GAO reported that USPS lost money on delivering international mail from other countries because mailing rates on small packages did not cover USPS's costs.GAO was asked to review the effects of increased international mail rates on USPS's international mail business. This report describes: (1) how USPS's international mail business has changed in the past 6 years; (2) what factors domestic stakeholders identified that contributed to those changes; and (3) effects those stakeholders identified from increased international mail rates.GAO analyzed USPS data from fiscal years 2017 through 2022 and reviewed reports on international mail from USPS, the Universal Postal Union, and others. GAO visited two USPS mail processing facilities and interviewed USPS officials and 12 industry stakeholders. These stakeholders were selected to represent a range of views, including express companies, U.S. companies that send international mail, U.S. companies that compete with foreign firms that use international mail, and independent experts on international mail. While not generalizable, the interviews provide illustrative examples of stakeholders' views. This is a public version of a sensitive report that was issued in February 2024. Information that USPS deemed sensitive has been omitted.For more information, contact David Marroni at (202) 512-2834 or marronid@gao.gov.
- Border Security: Border Patrol's Missing Migrant Program What GAO FoundBorder Patrol established the Missing Migrant Program in 2017 to help rescue migrants in distress and reduce migrant deaths along the southwest border. Through this program, Border Patrol coordinates with external entities (e.g., state and local officials) to assist migrants in distress and to recover and identify remains.Border Patrol sector agents are responsible for collecting and recording data on migrant deaths. In April 2022, GAO reported that Border Patrol had not collected and recorded, or reported to Congress, complete data on migrant deaths. Specifically, GAO reported that while Border Patrol has a policy for recording information on migrant deaths in the agency's system of record, Border Patrol sectors had not entered all available information on migrant deaths into the system consistent with that policy. In particular, GAO found that Border Patrol was not recording all migrant deaths in instances where an external entity first discovered the remains.Border Patrol agreed with GAO's recommendation that it take steps to ensure it collects and records available information on migrant deaths, including those identified by external entities. Border Patrol has implemented the recommendation by taking steps to revise its guidance, meeting with sectors and reviewing their program reports, and coordinating with external entities.In its August 2023 report to Congress on migrant deaths, Customs and Border Protection provided data for fiscal years 2018 through 2022 on migrant deaths. However, the report does not include a discussion of data limitations as GAO previously recommended. For instance, officials from one sector told us that large land areas along the border, sometimes combined with hazardous terrain, make it difficult to discover all remains, leading to some migrant deaths going unreported. More specifically, in April 2022, GAO reported that Border Patrol had not reported to Congress complete data on migrant deaths or disclosed limitations with the data it reported. GAO recommended that Border Patrol include known migrant deaths, including those reported by external entities, and any data limitations in public agency reports and those to Congress. Border Patrol agreed with this recommendation and has taken some steps toward addressing it. To fully address the recommendation, Border Patrol should include data limitation disclosures in its annual reports to Congress. By including data limitations in its reports, Border Patrol could provide context for Congress and the public to better understand data on migrant deaths.Border Patrol has also taken steps to evaluate the Missing Migrant Program. In April 2022, GAO found that Border Patrol collected and reviewed information about program activities; however, it did not have a plan to evaluate the program overall. GAO recommended that Border Patrol develop a plan with time frames to evaluate the program. Border Patrol agreed with GAO's recommendation and implemented it. Specifically, in November 2023, Border Patrol provided a plan for evaluating the Missing Migrant Program that notes that headquarters will review the program every 6 months. A Border Patrol official told us that the first reports from sectors based on the evaluation plan were expected in March 2024. It includes activities that are intended to help Border Patrol monitor and improve the Missing Migrant Program.Why GAO Did This StudyU.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security, is the lead federal agency responsible for border security. U.S. Border Patrol, within CBP, is responsible for securing the U.S. border between ports of entry to prevent individuals and goods from entering the U.S. illegally. In fiscal year 2022, Border Patrol reported a record number of migrant deaths—approximately 900—and the rescue of about 22,000 migrants.The Missing Persons and Unidentified Remains Act requires CBP to submit annual reports to Congress that include, among other elements, the number and location of unidentified remains found along the southwest border. In response, Border Patrol submitted its most recent report to Congress in August 2023. The Act also includes a provision for GAO to review how CBP collects data on migrant deaths and how CBP works with external entities in cases involving missing migrants or unidentified remains. This report addresses (1) the actions Border Patrol has taken to collect and record available information on migrant deaths; (2) Border Patrol's reporting on migrant deaths and the extent to which data limitations are included; and (3) Border Patrol's efforts to evaluate the Missing Migrant Program.GAO analyzed Border Patrol documentation and interviewed officials at Border Patrol headquarters, four field locations, and one external entity. GAO selected the field locations to reflect a range in the number of reported migrant deaths, types of terrain, and interactions with external entities. This report supplements information and draws from GAO's April 2022 report (GAO-22-105053) and November 2022 correspondence (GAO-23-106007) on the Missing Migrant Program. It also describes Border Patrol's efforts to address GAO's prior recommendations.For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov.
- Central America: USAID Should Strengthen Staffing and Fraud Risk Management for Initiative Addressing Migration to the U.S. What GAO FoundIn November 2021, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) announced Centroamérica Local (CL), an initiative to empower local organizations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to implement programs addressing root causes of migration to the U.S. GAO's review of all 18 CL grants and other awards from August 2021 through June 2023 found each included elements aligning with at least one of five pillars of the  U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America  (Root Causes Strategy). GAO also found USAID consulted with local stakeholders, including implementing partners and mission staff, in developing CL. Stakeholders told GAO that USAID's CL project development process—“co-creation”—is more collaborative than prior localization efforts and better addresses local needs.U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Application and Co-Creation ProcessThe El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras missions assessed staffing levels and requested additional positions to support localization. However, their staffing to oversee CL and other localization efforts has gaps resulting from resource constraints, such as space limitations. For example, in Guatemala, the new embassy compound is too small to accommodate all USAID mission staff. USAID has taken short-term measures, such as allowing one mission to hire short-term contractors. However, mission officials said they will need to hire additional staff to oversee the growing number of smaller awards for CL. Identifying long-term solutions to the missions' staffing shortages would help ensure adequate oversight of CL.The El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras missions have taken steps to identify and mitigate risks, including fiduciary, programmatic, reputational, and fraud risks that could affect CL. However, the missions have not followed GAO's leading practices for assessing fraud risk. The missions considered and documented some fraud risk through annual risk management processes but have not examined program-specific fraud risks. Also, missions and implementing partners have access to fraud awareness training, but attendance is not mandated or tracked because USAID does not require it agencywide. As a result, USAID lacks assurance that its missions and partners know how to identify and mitigate key fraud risks to CL-related programs.Why GAO Did This StudyHundreds of thousands of Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran nationals are encountered at the southwest U.S. land border each year. In July 2021, the White House launched the Root Causes Strategy to address economic, governance, and security factors driving migration to the U.S. from Central America. In November 2021, USAID announced CL, a 5-year, $300 million initiative. Through CL, USAID seeks to empower local organizations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to address root causes of migration by, among other things, advancing economic growth, improving governance, and strengthening security.GAO was asked to review USAID's implementation of CL. Although the initiative is too new for an evaluation of its effectiveness, this report examines, among other things, the extent to which USAID (1) integrated elements of the Root Causes Strategy and consulted local stakeholders in developing CL; (2) assessed and adjusted its staffing levels for grant management and program oversight; and (3) identified risks to CL, including fraud risks. GAO reviewed USAID documents, analyzed USAID data, and interviewed USAID officials in Central America and Washington, D.C. GAO also interviewed local stakeholders in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
- Ukraine: DOD Should Improve Data for Both Defense Article Delivery and End-Use Monitoring What GAO FoundSince Russia's full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the U.S. has provided more than $42 billion in security assistance, including defense articles, training, and services, to the government of Ukraine. U.S.-origin defense articles have been provided primarily using Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), which allows the President to transfer articles and services from U.S. stocks, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which the U.S. government may use to provide articles and services to Ukraine. The Department of Defense (DOD) has established new entities to deliver an unprecedented volume of defense articles to Ukraine in condensed time frames using PDA and USAI. However, DOD has not fully documented the roles and responsibilities of these new entities. Doing so would help provide clarity around the processes for quickly delivering defense articles in current and potential future conflicts...U.S.-Origin Defense Articles Loaded from Aircraft to Truck for Delivery to Ukraine DOD does not have quality data to track delivery of defense articles to Ukraine. DOD guidance on PDA does not clearly define at what point in the delivery process defense articles should be recorded as delivered or provide clear instructions for how DOD service branches are to confirm delivery. As a result, DOD officials sometimes record defense articles as delivered while they are in transit, weeks before they arrive in Ukraine. Additionally, DOD has not used its data systems to track the delivery of some defense articles provided under USAI. DOD officials use these data to ensure that defense articles have been delivered, to request funding for replacement of certain PDA articles, and as a baseline for conducting end-use monitoring. By taking steps to ensure the accuracy and completeness of its data, DOD will better ensure that it has the quality data needed to inform strategic decisions.DOD has a program to monitor the end-use of all defense articles provided to Ukraine but has had to alter some traditional end-use monitoring procedures in response to the ongoing conflict. For instance, DOD has been unable to directly observe some sensitive defense articles and has allowed Ukrainian officials to self-report the status of such articles. However, DOD has not formally assessed the effectiveness of its modified approach. By conducting such an assessment, DOD will better understand whether its adjusted monitoring approach ensures that defense articles are used for the purposes for which they were provided and will have the feedback needed to inform additional policy changes.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion of the country on February 24, 2022. The amount and speed at which assistance has been distributed has raised questions about the need for greater efforts to monitor and ensure accountability for the defense articles provided.Senate Report 117-130 includes a provision for GAO to review the allocation and use of security assistance in Ukraine since the start of the conflict. GAO's review examines (1) processes DOD has used to provide U.S.-origin defense articles to Ukraine, (2) the extent to which DOD has tracked the delivery of defense articles to Ukraine, and (3) the extent to which DOD and the Department of State have monitored the end-use of defense articles delivered.GAO analyzed agency documentation; met with DOD and State officials in the U.S., Germany, and Poland; and assessed DOD data on defense article deliveries to Ukraine from August 2021 to October 2023.
- International Military Students: DOD and State Should Assess Vetting Implementation and Strengthen Information Sharing What GAO FoundStarting in fiscal year 2020, DOD developed and phased in procedures to vet international military students attending training at Department of Defense (DOD) installations and facilities in the U.S. With few exceptions, DOD vets these students prior to travel to the U.S. for training and periodically during the students' stay. According to training management system data, from October 1, 2019, through March 31, 2023, DOD vetted over 29,000 cases, including students and any accompanying family members. DOD identified findings in 103 cases: four were classified as “high” risk, 18 were “moderate”, and 81 were “low.” DOD denied access to nine students for various security-related reasons.International Military Student Cases by Risk Level and Adjudication Result for October 1, 2019, through March 31, 2023			Risk level									Cases									Approved for training									Denied									Pending									Adjudication not performeda								High risk									4									0									4									0									0								Moderate risk									18									7									3									4									4								Low risk									81									47									2									14									18								No findings									29,202									29,202									0									0									0								Total									29,305									29,256									9									18									22					Source: GAO analysis of data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. | GAO-24-106421Note: Vetting of international military students began with basic screening in December 2019 and DOD continued to phase in initial security vetting through March 2022.aDepartment of Defense (DOD) officials stated they did not adjudicate 22 of the moderate and low risk cases for reasons such as training cancellation or the student completed training during the establishment of vetting procedures and has since departed the U.S.DOD has taken some steps to improve implementation of vetting procedures for international military students. However, DOD has not assessed implementation to identify opportunities for improvement. For example, stakeholders told GAO of factors in vetting implementation that could be improved, such as limitations with in-country data collection and a time-consuming process for sharing information between stakeholders. DOD circulated a draft progress report on program metrics, such as the number of students who underwent vetting for fiscal year 2022. However, DOD has not finalized the report, and it is unclear if it will include an assessment of any opportunities for improvement in the vetting procedures. Without an assessment, DOD will not have a full understanding of factors that hinder vetting implementation. DOD also cannot determine whether or how it should take action to improve vetting implementation.The Department of State and DOD share information to support international military student vetting in a variety of ways, such as sharing database access and confirming vetting. However, State and DOD have not ensured that roles and responsibilities are fully clarified in guidance or written agreements. If DOD and State take actions to clarify roles and responsibilities for sharing information on issues related to international military students, the agencies can better coordinate on program management, including communicating relevant policy updates and sharing additional data and analysis regarding vetting.Why GAO Did This StudyDOD provides education and training to foreign military personnel at DOD sites. On December 6, 2019, an international military student killed three U.S. service members and injured eight others while attending training at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida. The attack raised questions about personnel safety at DOD sites hosting students for training.The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's implementation of security vetting for international military students and accompanying family members. GAO's report assesses the extent to which (1) DOD has developed vetting procedures for international military students and addressed any implementation challenges; and (2) State and DOD have shared information related to students' training at DOD sites in the U.S.GAO reviewed documentation; analyzed vetting result data for October 1, 2019, through March 31, 2023; and interviewed DOD and State officials and stakeholders from six unified combatant commands and three U.S. embassies.
- Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Greater Transparency Could Improve Worker Ratio Reports What GAO FoundU.S. workers made up at least half of employed workers in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) between 2018 and 2022, according to GAO's analysis of CNMI tax data. When comparing 2018 to 2022, GAO found the U.S. portion of CNMI workers increased and the foreign portion decreased. In addition to categorizing U.S. and foreign workers using the CNMI tax data, GAO categorized workers as "unknown" when the data were insufficient to place them in the other two categories. Due to this unknown portion, the precise ratio of U.S. to foreign workers for each year is uncertain. The figure below illustrates the minimum share U.S. workers represented each year, as well as the degree to which that share might increase depending on whether unknown workers were U.S. or foreign.U.S. and Foreign Workers in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Calendar Years 2018–2022Note: GAO’s categorization of these workers is based solely on CNMI’s tax data and is not a determination based on records underlying the data of whether any individual meets the definition of U.S. worker under the Northern Mariana Islands U.S. Workforce Act of 2018. Percentages shown for 2021 do not sum to 73 and 100 due to rounding. For more details, see section related to fig. 1 in GAO-24-106698.The Northern Mariana Islands U.S. Workforce Act of 2018 (the Act) requires the Governor of CNMI to report annually on the ratio of U.S. to foreign workers. To create these reports, the CNMI government uses employers' tax data. However, it has reported that these data include a relatively high share of workers with unknown visa types—from 13 to 33 percent in the 2018 to 2021 reports, making the precise ratio of U.S. to foreign workers uncertain. CNMI has recently taken steps to improve its data analysis process, reducing the unknown portion of workers to 4 percent in the 2022 data.The CNMI government has taken some steps to communicate the analytical approach it uses to create its annual worker ratio report. For example, it uses the report and a Standard Operating Procedure to communicate some of its analytical approach. However, these documents do not include key information such as the approach CNMI uses to categorize unknown workers as U.S. or foreign, as well as the implications of the unknown portion for the ratio. Key elements of economic analysis call for transparency of an analytical approach to allow the public to assess its structure and to understand how much of its result hinges on the specific choices made by the authors.Improved transparency of the approach could benefit CNMI and other stakeholders. Specifically, greater transparency would enable CNMI officials to consistently replicate recent improvements to the annual worker ratio reports in the future. It would also help CNMI and stakeholders determine worker trends over time and assess whether CNMI's efforts to achieve one of the Act's goals—increasing the percentage of U.S. workers in the CNMI workforce—have been successful.The Office of Insular Affairs within Interior promotes the coordination of federal policy for CNMI and provides discretionary financial and technical assistance to CNMI. Interior officials also said they work with CNMI to identify the needs for future grants and coordinate that work with other agencies as appropriate.Why GAO Did This StudyCNMI's economy has historically relied on foreign workers, who made up more than half of its workers for the decade before the passage of the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 (CNRA). Under the CNRA, the Department of Homeland Security established a temporary foreign worker permit program for the CNMI called the CNMI-Only Transitional Worker (CW-1) program. The 2018 Act extended the CW-1 program through December 31, 2029, and sought, in part, to increase the percentage of U.S. workers in the total CNMI workforce while maintaining the minimum number of workers who are not U.S. workers to meet the changing demands of CNMI's economy. The Act calls for various reports on CNMI's progress toward this goal, including an annual report by CNMI's Governor identifying the ratio between U.S. workers and foreign workers in CNMI's workforce.The Act includes a provision for GAO to report every 2 years on the ratio between U.S. and foreign workers in CNMI's workforce in each of the previous 5 calendar years. This is GAO's third report in response to the provision. GAO analyzed CNMI government and U.S. agency data and reports, reviewed prior GAO reports, and interviewed and corresponded with officials from CNMI's government and the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Labor.
- Drug Safety: FDA Has Faced Persistent Challenges Overseeing Foreign Drug Manufacturing What GAO FoundOver the years, GAO has reported on efforts by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to improve its oversight of foreign drug manufacturing establishments. FDA inspected a relatively small number of foreign establishments in fiscal year 1997 but significantly increased these numbers over the next two decades, with a peak in fiscal year 2016. However, beginning in March 2020, FDA postponed most inspections because of the COVID-19 pandemic.During the time inspections were paused, FDA used alternative inspection tools to maintain oversight of drug manufacturing quality. These tools included relying on inspections conducted by foreign regulators and requesting and reviewing records and other information. The postponement of inspections led to a backlog of establishments never inspected or not inspected by FDA within 5 years—categories for which FDA considers inspections mandatory. GAO reported that this backlog could both extend the interval between inspections and reduce the resources FDA has available for other high-priority inspections.Since 2007, GAO also has reported on unique challenges to conducting foreign inspections that can raise questions about their equivalence to domestic inspections. For example, in January 2022, GAO reported that, while domestic inspections have almost always been unannounced, FDA's practice of generally preannouncing foreign inspections up to 12 weeks in advance may have given establishments the opportunity to fix problems before the inspection. As a result, investigators may be less likely to see the true day-to-day operating environment of foreign establishments as compared to domestic. Further, FDA has relied on translators provided by the foreign establishments being inspected, which investigators noted can raise questions about the accuracy of information FDA investigators collect.Vacancies among investigators available to conduct foreign inspections represent another challenge GAO identified in multiple reports. In January 2022, GAO reported that FDA had persistent vacancies among staff who specialize in foreign inspections. This included vacancies among U.S.-based staff who conduct foreign inspections and among staff in FDA's foreign offices located in China and India.Why GAO Did This StudyFDA is responsible for ensuring the safety and effectiveness of all drugs marketed in the U.S., regardless of where they are produced. Globalization and the COVID-19 pandemic have complicated FDA's oversight of the more than 4,800 establishments manufacturing drugs for the U.S. market. FDA reported that 58 percent of these establishments were located overseas as of October 2022. GAO has had long-standing concerns about FDA's ability to oversee the increasingly global drug supply chain, an issue highlighted in our High-Risk Series since 2009. A critical element in FDA's oversight of overseas manufacturing is its inspection of foreign manufacturing establishments.This statement discusses findings related to FDA's foreign drug inspection program that GAO has reported on over two decades, including findings that GAO previously reported in January 2022 and in its April 2023 High-Risk Series. This statement provides observations on FDA's inspections of foreign drug manufacturers, challenges unique to conducting foreign inspections, and FDA's foreign inspection workforce. For GAO's prior work, it analyzed FDA inspection and workforce data, interviewed FDA staff—including drug investigators who conduct foreign inspections—and reviewed agency documents. This statement also includes updates on the status of agency efforts to address relevant recommendations that GAO previously identified.
- International Trade: USTR Should Improve Coordination on New Automotive Rules of Origin What GAO FoundAgencies used three key mechanisms to coordinate the implementation, verification, and enforcement of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement's (USMCA) new rules of origin for automotive goods:The Interagency Autos Committee, chaired by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), provides advice about and monitoring of the USMCA provisions regarding automotive goods.	The USMCA Center provided guidance to stakeholders and facilitated verification activities from its inception in March 2020 to its closure in February 2023.	Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Labor (DOL) jointly developed guidance and shared information on certification and verification processes to ensure the value of the labor content of goods (Labor Value Content, or LVC) conforms to requirements.GAO evaluated the effectiveness of ongoing coordination against selected leading collaboration practices identified in prior GAO work.GAO's Leading Interagency Collaboration PracticesIn its efforts to coordinate on the implementation, enforcement, and verification of new automotive rules of origin, the Interagency Autos Committee generally followed six of the eight leading collaboration practices, as identified in GAO's prior work. However, the committee partially followed two other practices. For example, the committee had not developed written guidance to help ensure accountability. Clearly articulated written guidance could improve communication, limit uncertainty for agencies and stakeholders, and aid in the monitoring of progress toward committee outcomes.CBP and DOL have generally followed all eight of the leading collaboration practices during their implementation of the LVC certification process and planning for LVC verifications. Their LVC guidance details the agencies' roles and responsibilities, as well as other leading collaboration practices, for these two processes. In addition, GAO found that no significant interagency coordination takes place for enforcement of the new rules of origin, because CBP alone conducts those activities. According to officials, CBP has not yet enforced some of the requirements because the final set of rules of origin regulations are awaiting approval.Why GAO Did This StudyThe USMCA, which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, entered into force in July 2020. According to agency officials and industry stakeholders, this change was significant because it strengthened the rules of origin for automotive goods with a potentially widespread effect on trade. USMCA implementing legislation includes a provision for GAO to review the effectiveness of U.S. interagency coordination on implementation, enforcement, and verification of the automotive rules of origin, and the customs procedures of the USMCA with respect to automotive goods.In this report, GAO examines (1) what mechanisms U.S. agencies use to coordinate on the new rules of origin; and (2) the extent to which relevant agencies are effectively coordinating the implementation, enforcement, and verification of the new rules and customs procedures. GAO reviewed legislation and documents, interviewed agency and labor and industry stakeholders, and analyzed responses from nine agencies that participate on the Interagency Autos Committee against leading interagency collaboration practices, identified in prior GAO work.
- Nuclear Waste: Changing Conditions May Affect Future Management of Contamination Deposited Abroad During U.S. Cold War Activities What GAO FoundU.S. Cold War activities resulted in radioactive contamination in three locations: Greenland (part of the Kingdom of Denmark), Spain, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) (see fig.). In Greenland, radioactive liquid—generated by a small nuclear reactor that powered the U.S. Camp Century base—remains entombed under ice. In Spain, a mid-air collision resulted in radioactive contamination around Palomares. The United States and Spain cleaned up much of the radioactive material and have monitored the remaining material since. In RMI, contamination from nuclear weapons tests and the resulting fallout remains measurable on several atolls, some of which are still uninhabitable.Figure: Locations of Radioactive Contamination from U.S. Cold War Activities AbroadConditions have changed in all three locations since the original contamination. Most affected are the environment and inhabitants of RMI, where the Department of Energy (DOE) has ongoing responsibilities. Specifically:Greenland. At Camp Century, Denmark instituted permanent ice sheet monitoring to address concerns that climate change could release contamination. However, a 2021 study reported that contamination likely would remain immobile through 2100.	Spain. In Palomares, Spanish officials reevaluated the radioactive contamination in the 1990s and found it exceeded European Union standards. In 2015, U.S. and Spanish authorities signed a statement of intent to further remediate Palomares but have not reached a final agreement.	RMI. In RMI, people are concerned that climate change could mobilize radiological contamination, posing risks to fresh water and food sources. DOE assesses human radiation exposure and monitors environmental contamination in RMI. DOE considers human health risk to be low, but RMI officials believe DOE has downplayed the risk. This and other disagreements fuel distrust of DOE's information. By implementing a sustainable communication strategy in RMI, DOE could improve the Marshallese people's access to, and trust in, information on contamination as environmental conditions change.Why GAO Did This StudyThe United States conducted defense activities in many countries during the Cold War. These activities resulted in radioactive contamination in three countries: Greenland, Spain, and RMI. During the 1960s, the United States buried radioactive liquid in Greenland's ice while operating the experimental Camp Century base to study the feasibility of installing nuclear missiles there. In 1966, in Spain, two U.S. defense aircraft collided, dispersing radioactive debris over the town of Palomares. From 1946 to 1958, the United States conducted 67 nuclear weapons tests in RMI, and the resulting radioactive fallout contaminated several atolls.This report examines (1) the amount and type of radioactive contamination in Greenland, Spain, and RMI; and (2) how conditions have changed at these sites, and the extent to which the environment and inhabitants have been affected by these changed conditions. GAO reviewed key literature on the contamination and interviewed U.S. and foreign government officials.
- Foreign Investments in U.S. Agricultural Land: Enhancing Efforts to Collect, Track, and Share Key Information Could Better Identify National Security Risks What GAO FoundThe United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) does not share timely data on foreign investments in agricultural land collected under the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, as amended (AFIDA). Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Treasury, identify and review transactions that may pose national security risks, such as the proximity of agricultural land to a sensitive military base. USDA annually publishes selected AFIDA information online that CFIUS agencies may use when considering potential national security risks associated with agricultural land. In addition, USDA officials said they respond promptly when they receive requests for information. However, DOD officials noted they need AFIDA information that is more up-to-date and more specific, and they need to receive this information more than once a year. USDA has requested funding to develop a real-time data system that can be accessed by other U.S. government agencies and the public. Meanwhile, sharing current data could help increase visibility into potential national security risks related to foreign investments in U.S. agricultural land.AFIDA Data Are Not Regularly Part of CFIUS ReviewsUSDA implements AFIDA across field offices and headquarters, but its processes to collect, track, and report key information are flawed. USDA collects the required data on paper forms with county or federal offices and reviews them for accuracy, according to USDA officials. However, its processes to do so are unclear and challenging to implement. For example, USDA's AFIDA handbook provides limited instructions on how to collect reliable AFIDA information. In addition, although Congress required USDA to create an online submission process and public database for AFIDA data by the end of 2025, USDA does not have plans and timelines to do so, in part because USDA has not received funding. USDA also does not sufficiently verify and conduct quality reviews to track the accuracy and completeness of its collected AFIDA data. GAO's review of AFIDA data current through calendar year 2021 found errors, such as the largest land holding associated with the People's Republic of China being counted twice. USDA has begun efforts to identify AFIDA non-compliance through data mining, according to officials, and has opportunities to expand this practice. But without improving its internal processes, USDA cannot report reliable information to Congress or the public about where and how much U.S. agricultural land is held by foreign persons.Why GAO Did This StudyUSDA estimated that foreign investment in U.S. agricultural land grew to approximately 40 million acres in 2021. These investments may have consequences for U.S. national security. For example, there may be foreign ownership of U.S. agricultural land close to sensitive military installations.CFIUS is an interagency committee that reviews certain foreign transactions to determine potential effects on U.S. national security. These include foreign investments in U.S. agricultural land. In addition, USDA's AFIDA statute, enacted in 1978, requires foreign persons acquiring or transferring agricultural land to file a disclosure form with USDA.GAO was asked to review foreign investments in U.S. agricultural land. This report examines the extent to which (1) USDA shares information related to foreign investments in U.S. agricultural land with CFIUS for its national security reviews, and (2) USDA's processes enable it to collect, track, and report reliable data on foreign investments in U.S. agricultural land. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and agency guidance; analyzed USDA data; and interviewed agency officials.
- Foreign Assistance: Agencies Allocated $8.4 Billion Congressionally Directed Funds to Advance U.S. Goals in the Indo-Pacific Region What GAO FoundIn December of 2018, Congress passed and President Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA). ARIA’s stated purpose was to advance U.S. policy interests and American influence in the Indo-Pacific region as well as to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region. ARIA’s principles are aligned with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) that also drives the security, economic, and democratic activities the U.S. undertakes in the Indo-Pacific region.The Department of State and USAID allocated approximately $8.4 billion in ARIA/IPS congressionally directed funds to support ARIA and IPS related efforts for Indo-Pacific region from FY 2019 through FY 2023. Specifically, from FY 2019 through FY 2022, three-quarters of ARIA/IPS directed funds were allocated to support activities under three U.S. government-wide foreign assistance funding categories of health, economic growth, and peace and security across the region. According to State officials, these government-wide foreign assistance funding categories generally align with all three core principles of ARIA: promote U.S. security interests, promote U.S. economic interests, and promote U.S. democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region. See figure for a map of the locations included in this region.Indo-Pacific Region Locations for which Asia Reassurance Initiative Act/Indo-Pacific Strategy Directed Funds Were Allocated for Efforts in Fiscal Years 2019–2023From FY 2019 through FY 2022, State and USAID allocated $6.6 billion of this funding, largely to support activities associated with Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Vietnam. For example:In Bangladesh funds support activities to improve facilities for birth deliveries,	In the Philippines funds support activities for the formation of partnerships to support biodiversity conservation, natural resources management, sustainable landscapes, sustainable supply chains, and safeguards,	In Vietnam funds support activities for the analysis of the impacts of Vietnam’s Social Health Insurance policies on patient visits at different health care levels.For FY 2023, State and USAID estimated allocating an additional $1.8 billion of ARIA/IPS directed funds, with activities in Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Vietnam once again receiving the most funding.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Indo-Pacific region is home to more than 50 percent of the global population, nearly two-thirds of the world’s economy, and seven of the world’s largest militaries. The U.S. has long recognized the Indo-Pacific region as vital to its security and prosperity.GAO was asked to provide information on the amount of funds that State and USAID allocated for the implementation of ARIA, including information on the types of activities supported and for which countries, for fiscal years 2019 through 2023. GAO collected and analyzed funding data from State and USAID for FY 2019 through FY 2023, reviewed agency documents, and interviewed agency officials.For more information, contact Latesha Love-Grayer at (202) 512-4409 or lovegrayerl@gao.gov.
- Cyber Diplomacy: State's Efforts Aim to Support U.S. Interests and Elevate Priorities What GAO FoundThe Department of State (State) conducts a range of diplomatic and foreign assistance activities intended to support objectives identified in the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy. Specifically, State engages in multilateral fora and agreements that aim to strengthen norms of responsible state behaviors, deter unacceptable state behaviors, and advance cyber policies. For example, State worked with the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts and Open-Ended Working Group to develop a framework on behavior in cyberspace, including a set of peacetime norms and confidence building measures. According to State officials, establishing cyber norms, including enforcing consequences for rule-breakers, raises the cost of bad behavior in cyberspace and deters wrongdoing. State also engages in bilateral activities to promote U.S. aligned cyber norms and policies, such as working with Denmark to advance the Copenhagen Pledge on Tech for Democracy. This pledge intends to counter authoritarian repression of free speech online and advance digital freedom globally. In addition, State provides foreign assistance, such as training and technical assistance, to strengthen partner capacity all over the world.New Entities State Created to Elevate Cyber PrioritiesState established the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP) in April 2022 to elevate cyber priorities and is taking steps to address some of the challenges the new bureau faces as it works to promote U.S. cyber interests. State consolidated its efforts and leadership of cyberspace-related activities into CDP—a single unit led by an Ambassador-at-Large. Previously, several entities within State shared responsibility for cyber diplomacy. GAO found that this change has helped to better position State to achieve its cyber diplomacy goals. For example, CDP's ambassador level leadership has enabled engagement with higher levels of foreign government officials and raised the U.S. profile on cyber globally. GAO also found that State addressed relevant leading reform practices when forming the Bureau. For example, State has an implementation team dedicated to addressing capacity staffing, resources, and change management. CDP still faces challenges as it pursues cyber goals under the reformed structure, such as needing to clarify roles between the bureau and its partners. However, CDP officials identified steps that they are taking to address them.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. and its allies face intensifying foreign cyber threats as international trade, communication, and critical infrastructure grow more dependent on digital technology. State and non-state actors are using cyberspace increasingly as a platform for irresponsible behavior to undermine democracies. The Department of State leads U.S. government international efforts to advance U.S. interests in cyberspace. In April 2022 State stood up CDP with a mission to address national security challenges, economic opportunities, and implications to U.S. values associated with cyberspace, digital technologies, and digital policy.The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to review U.S. diplomatic efforts to advance interests in cyberspace and other related matters. This report examines, among other things, (1) activities State is undertaking to advance U.S. interests regarding cyberspace, including the use of international agreements and fora, and (2) the extent to which organizational changes have helped position or presented challenges for State to achieve its cyber diplomacy goals.To identify State's activities, GAO analyzed program documents and discussed implementation of strategic objectives with officials from State. To examine State's organizational changes, GAO analyzed documentation of State's reform plans and implementation, and evaluated the extent to which State addressed selected practices identified by GAO as important to reform.For more information, contact Latesha Love-Grayer at (202) 512-4409 or lovegrayerl@gao.gov.
- Research Security: Strengthening Interagency Collaboration Could Help Agencies Safeguard Federal Funding from Foreign Threats What GAO FoundGAO found that determining whether federal research and development (R&amp;D) funds were provided to a foreign entity of concern is challenging. Such entities include foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated nationals, among others. Awarding agencies are generally prohibited from doing business with foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated nationals.GAO found that government-wide databases which report on some of these entities lack common identifying information such as a unique identifier or personally identifiable information. For example, a physical address, date of birth, or other identifying information for entities on the foreign terrorist organization list is often unavailable as entities often try to conceal their identity or location, according to the Treasury Department. When personally identifiable information such as date of birth is available, similar information is not available in the public federal funding data source, USAspending.gov. Specifically, although awarding agencies collect other identifying information, such as phone numbers of entities seeking an award, not all such information is reported in USAspending.gov. Together, these challenges limit the ability to match foreign entities on certain lists with those receiving government-wide funding.Example of Gaps in Crossmatching Identifying Information for Restricted Foreign Entities With Federal Spending DataGAO found that some requirements exist specific to R&amp;D awards to foreign entities of concern. For example, agencies are generally required to vet potential awardees against the federal exclusions list, which includes foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated nationals. Agencies that GAO interviewed reported challenges in identifying foreign ownership, control, or influence. Officials from two agencies we reviewed said they use analytical tools and other available information to try to identify foreign ownership. Such efforts, however, are not shared across agencies. Recent guidance from the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)—the lead federal agency for interagency coordination on science and technology policies—does not address the issue of foreign ownership, control, or influence. OSTP officials told GAO that they handle this issue on a case-by-case basis and acknowledged the challenges that agencies face in addressing such risks. Information sharing on such complex matters would better position agencies to more fully safeguard R&amp;D funds.Why GAO Did This StudyAccording to the National Science Foundation, federal agencies obligated about $1.4 billion for R&amp;D with foreign entities in fiscal year 2020 (the most recent data available). However, some foreign entities may try to exploit U.S. openness in sharing R&amp;D for nefarious purposes.The Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act includes a provision for GAO to review research funding provided to foreign entities of concern. The act's definition of such entities includes foreign terrorist organizations and foreign entities subject to the control, ownership, and jurisdiction of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.This report examines challenges in identifying R&amp;D funds awarded to foreign entities of concern and requirements for awarding and monitoring such funding.GAO searched USAspending.gov and reviewed documents from federal funding and law enforcement agencies. GAO also interviewed federal agency officials, including those from the five agencies that obligated the most R&amp;D funding in fiscal year 2020.
- Economic Sanctions: Agency Efforts Help Mitigate Some of the Risks Posed by Digital Assets What GAO FoundDigital assets like Bitcoin and other virtual currencies pose risks to implementing and enforcing U.S. sanctions, but several factors partially mitigate these risks (see table). A key feature of digital assets is that they enable users to rapidly transfer value across countries' borders. Yet many digital assets are recorded on a public ledger, which may enable U.S. agencies and analytics firms to trace transactions and potentially identify illicit actors. However, digital asset owners also may use the anonymizing features of some digital assets or other techniques that obscure their identities in an attempt to evade sanctions.Selected Risks Digital Assets Pose to Sanctions Implementation and Enforcement and Factors that Help Mitigate Risks			Examples of Risks Digital Assets Pose to Sanctions Implementation and Enforcement 									Examples of Factors that Help Mitigate Risks Posed by Digital Assets 								Digital assets provide users some anonymity, and actors may use techniques that obscure their financial transactions.				Actors may take advantage of discrepancies between legal systems and financial reporting requirements in different jurisdictions to avoid consequences of illicit financial activity.				Sanctioned actors may use cybercrime to generate revenue, for example by stealing digital assets.									Agencies may be able to trace transactions on public blockchains and identify illicit actors.				Use of digital assets as a means of payment is limited and the value of digital assets is highly volatile.				The implementation of global standards may lead to increased compliance with Anti-Money Laundering requirements.					Source: GAO. | GAO-24-106178Because digital assets currently have relatively limited use as a payment mechanism, sanctioned entities and other illicit actors may seek to convert digital assets to a more traditional currency in jurisdictions with weak regulations and limited sanctions programs. Efforts to increase compliance with global standards may help to mitigate this risk, but uneven implementation from country to country remains a vulnerability that sanctioned actors may exploit.The risks digital assets pose to sanctions implementation will likely continue to evolve. An increase in the use and acceptance of digital assets could erode the potency of U.S. sanctions and lead to greater sanctions evasion. On the other hand, advancements in capabilities to trace transactions and identify illicit actors could mitigate some sanctions evasion risks.GAO found that agencies have taken various actions to address the risks posed by digital assets to U.S. sanctions implementation. For example, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has sanctioned, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other agencies have taken enforcement actions against, entities and individuals for facilitating sanctions evasion with digital assets. Treasury, the Department of State, DOJ, and other agencies also work with international organizations and foreign partners to build investigative capacity and implement anti-money laundering standards to protect the global financial system from digital assets being used for illicit purposes, including sanctions evasion.Why GAO Did This StudyThe increasing use of digital assets may pose challenges for the implementation and enforcement of U.S. sanctions. As of October 2023, the total market capitalization of all cryptocurrencies was about $1.1 trillion, according to one index. The U.S. maintains dozens of economic sanctions programs to serve a range of foreign policy goals. Sanctions may place economic restrictions on entire countries, sectors of countries' economies, individuals, or entities. Such restrictions can include, for example, denying a designated entity access to the U.S. financial system or freezing an entity's assets under U.S. jurisdiction.GAO was asked to review matters relating to the national security implications of certain types of digital assets. This report describes (1) the risks that digital assets pose to U.S. agencies' ability to implement and enforce U.S. sanctions and factors that may mitigate those risks, and (2) actions U.S. agencies have taken to address the risks that digital assets present with regard to implementing and enforcing U.S. sanctions.GAO interviewed agency officials and reviewed government reports, guidance, and press releases related to sanctions actions and digital assets. GAO also interviewed 15 stakeholders who GAO selected based on their experiences related to digital assets and sanctions. These stakeholders, many of whom had prior government experience, included researchers, representatives of the digital assets industry, and individuals who provide legal or advisory services on sanctions and digital assets issues.For more information, contact Kimberly Gianopoulos at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov.
- West Bank and Gaza Aid: USAID Generally Ensured Compliance with Anti-terrorism Policies and Addressed Instances of Noncompliance What GAO FoundThe U.S. government resumed the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) West Bank and Gaza program using Economic Support Fund assistance in April 2021 after suspending the program in January 2019. In resuming the program, USAID used its established policies and procedures, such as Mission Order 21, for making awards and implemented some additional vetting requirements for U.S.-based organizations. Mission Order 21 establishes requirements to ensure that the program does not inadvertently provide funding to entities or individuals associated with terrorism. During program suspension, USAID reassigned experienced staff from the West Bank and Gaza mission to other missions on a temporary basis. Those staff came back to the program when it resumed. As of September 2022, USAID has obligated all $150 million in fiscal year 2020 and 2021 Economic Support Fund assistance that Congress provided. Most funding was obligated for project assistance, and about 16 percent of the funding was obligated for debt relief payments to the East Jerusalem Hospital Network, as allowable under U.S. law.Photo of U.S. Agency for International Development-Funded Project for a Wastewater Collection SystemGAO found that USAID generally complied with Mission Order 21 requirements during fiscal years 2020 through 2022. Mission Order 21 outlines three requirements: vetting procedures, anti-terrorism certifications, and mandatory provisions in all award documents. GAO reviewed all 18 prime awards active as of September 2022, and a random generalizable sample of 106 subaward actions that were active during fiscal years 2020 through 2022. GAO's analysis found that USAID had completed vetting in all cases where it was required for the prime awards and subaward actions in the sample but had vetted one subaward action late. In addition, all prime awards and subawards in the sample that required anti-terrorism certifications and mandatory provisions included them. To detect issues with active prime awards, USAID commissioned compliance reviews and financial audits. USAID conducted eight compliance reviews, two of which found instances of noncompliance, including missing or late vetting of subawards and not reporting a subaward to USAID. The awardees addressed the issues of noncompliance, according to the reviews. The compliance reviews also determined whether the prime awardees obtained the necessary vetting approvals for subawards, as needed. Additionally, USAID conducted four financial audits of prime awards that assessed compliance with Mission Order 21. None of these financial audits found issues of noncompliance.Why GAO Did This StudySince 1993, the U.S. government has provided more than $7.6 billion in bilateral assistance to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. This assistance, primarily through the Economic Support Fund, supports projects in areas including economic growth and recovery. According to USAID and the Department of State, the U.S. government resumed the West Bank and Gaza program in April 2021, following the suspension of Economic Support Fund assistance in 2019 due to a combination of policy and legal actions. USAID is primarily responsible for administering the assistance to the West Bank and Gaza and ensuring compliance with its anti-terrorism policies and procedures.Appropriations acts for fiscal years 2020 through 2022 include provisions for GAO to review the treatment, handling, and uses of funds provided through the Economic Support Fund for assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. This report examines (1) the status of the program for fiscal years 2020 through 2022, as of September 30, 2022, and (2) the extent to which USAID complied with its policies and procedures to ensure that program assistance did not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism in fiscal years 2020 through 2022.GAO reviewed relevant laws and USAID data, policies and procedures, compliance reports, and financial audits. GAO analyzed active prime awards and a random generalizable sample of subaward actions for compliance with USAID's anti-terrorism policies and procedures. GAO also interviewed USAID and State officials.For more information, contact Latesha Love-Grayer at (202) 512-4409 or LoveGrayerL@gao.gov.
- Arctic Region: Factors That Affect the Advancement of U.S. Priorities What GAO FoundManagement roles for advancing U.S. Arctic priorities span the federal government. In October 2022, the federal government published an updated Arctic strategy that serves as a framework for guiding its approach to addressing emerging challenges and opportunities in the Arctic. While many federal entities engage with foreign partners on Arctic issues, the Department of State serves as the lead for Arctic diplomacy efforts. The Biden administration announced that an existing Arctic coordinator position at State would be elevated to an Ambassador-at-Large position in August 2022, but the nominee has yet to be confirmed.Stakeholders identified five factors that facilitated and five factors that hindered the federal government's management of U.S. Arctic priorities. For example, stakeholders identified U.S. Arctic expertise and engagement as factors that facilitated its influence in the Arctic Council. However, some stakeholders said that the Arctic Executive Steering Committee and the broader federal government face various challenges related to interagency coordination that hinder implementation of U.S. Arctic priorities outlined in the 2022 strategy.Stakeholders identified three factors pertaining to State's structures that facilitated and two factors that hindered State's management of U.S. Arctic priorities. For example, stakeholders identified continuity within the Senior Arctic Official position and supporting office as a factor that has deepened institutional knowledge for Arctic Council work, facilitating efforts to promote U.S. priorities. However, some stakeholders identified gaps in leadership and limited convening authority as factors that had hindered management. Many stakeholders viewed the announcement of the Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic Region position positively but identified elements State and the new Ambassador should consider to manage U.S. Arctic priorities successfully going forward. These elements include consistency in position and title, a formalized office structure, clarity of Ambassador's role within the department, and greater authority to coordinate with all the relevant bureaus across the department.Why GAO Did This StudyThe United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic nation and has substantial interests in the region. In recent years, the effects of climate change, technological advancements, and economic opportunities have driven increasing interest and activity in the Arctic region. In addition, there has been an escalation of great power competition between the United States, Russia, and China, which seeks Arctic resources, among other things. This competition has introduced tension into the Arctic's geopolitical environment.GAO was asked to review the federal government's management of Arctic efforts, including State's current structures for Arctic diplomacy. This testimony summarizes our September 2023 report entitled Arctic Region: Factors That Facilitate and Hinder the Advancement of U.S. Priorities and discusses (1) federal entities' roles in managing U.S. Arctic priorities, (2) factors stakeholders identified that may facilitate or hinder the federal government's management of U.S. Arctic priorities, and (3) factors stakeholders identified that may facilitate or hinder State's role in managing U.S. Arctic priorities.GAO reviewed Arctic strategies, State documentation, and other relevant reports. GAO also interviewed 31 stakeholders, grouping similar stakeholders on the basis of their affiliations to create six groups for GAO's analysis and discussion. These groups were State, other agencies, U.S. experts on Arctic issues, foreign governments of Arctic countries, Alaska Native organizations, and the state government of Alaska. GAO selected these groups to capture a range of perspectives concerning any factors that may facilitate or hinder the federal government's or State's management of U.S. Arctic priorities.For more information, contact Chelsa Kenney at (202) 512-2964 or kenneyc@gao.gov.
- Sugar Program: Alternative Methods for Implementing Import Restrictions Could Increase Effectiveness What GAO FoundThe U.S. sugar program, administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), provides substantial benefits to sugar producers. Because the program guarantees relatively high prices for domestic sugar, sugar farmers benefit significantly, and sugar farms are substantially more profitable per acre than other U.S. farms. Research GAO reviewed suggests the U.S. sugar program results in an increase in domestic sugar production and higher profits for farmers, totaling an estimated $1.4 billion to $2.7 billion in additional benefits annually.The U.S. sugar program creates net costs to the economy, because higher sugar prices created by the program cost consumers more than producers benefit, according to research GAO reviewed. According to some studies, the program costs consumers an estimated $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion per year, yielding net costs to the economy of approximately $1 billion per year. Other studies estimate that the program leads to declines in U.S. employment in industries that rely heavily on sugar, such as confectionery manufacturing. In 2022 U.S. consumers, including food manufacturers, paid twice the world price for sugar.Difference between U.S. and World Raw Sugar Prices, 2003 to 2022Nearly half of U.S. imports of sugar come from Mexico, and according to studies these imports have a significant effect on the U.S. market. Beginning in 2008, sugar imported from Mexico became duty-free and quota-free. In 2014, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to set a minimum price and quantity limits on Mexican imports. Subsequently, imports of Mexican sugar fell and prices rose, benefiting U.S. sugar producers but increasing the cost to consumers and the economy.Almost half of U.S. sugar imports are subject to trade commitments made through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and free trade agreements. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) allocates WTO tariff rate quotas, with input from USDA, among sugar-importing countries using a method based on 40-year-old data. In practice, this has led to fewer sugar imports than planned and delays in obtaining sugar. USDA and USTR have not considered alternatives to their allocation method. Without considering new methods, USDA and USTR may be missing opportunities to make sugar allocations more effective and efficient.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. is among the world's largest sugar producers and consumers. The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 contained provisions to support the price of U.S. sugar and, according to USDA, established the current structure of the U.S. sugar program. The program was reauthorized most recently in 2018.GAO was asked to review the effects of the U.S. sugar program. This report examines (1) the benefits of the U.S. sugar program and groups likely to benefit, (2) the costs of the U.S. sugar program and groups likely to bear the costs, (3) how agreements with Mexico on sugar affect imports and the overall U.S. economy, and (4) how other trade agreements affect the U.S. sugar program, and how they are implemented.GAO reviewed agency documents and data and interviewed federal officials, academics, and industry stakeholders including groups representing sugar producers and sugar using industries. GAO also conducted a literature review on the effects of the U.S. sugar program on the economy and trade.
- China: With Nearly All U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative Language Support What GAO FoundThe number of Confucius Institutes at U.S. universities and colleges declined since 2019, from about 100 to fewer than five. Schools most commonly cited the potential loss of federal funding and external pressures as contributing to their decision to close their Confucius Institute. More than 60 percent of the 74 respondents to GAO's survey stated that the potential loss of or ineligibility for federal funding, such as Department of Defense funding subject to limitations in the FY 2019 and FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Acts, contributed to “a great extent” to the institution's decision to close the Confucius Institute. Schools also cited pressure from U.S. government, congressional, or state representatives among other factors that contributed to their decision.Contributing Factors Schools Reported for Decision to Close Confucius InstituteMost survey respondents from both closed and open Confucius Institutes reported implementing a variety of practices to address potential concerns associated with hosting a Confucius Institute. Eleven respondents reported that, following the closure of their Confucius Institute, they continued to apply these practices to other foreign partnerships that fund Chinese language or academic programming. The two most commonly cited practices were (1) ensuring Confucius Institute foreign national staff had no decision-making authority on campus (97 percent) and (2) making the U.S. director of the Confucius Institute accountable to senior officials at the school (96 percent).Some schools that closed Confucius Institutes reported using alternate sources of support to provide Chinese language and cultural programming. Many survey respondents stated that the closure of their Confucius Institute reduced opportunities for Chinese language learning and China-related cultural and academic programming, among others. Schools that closed their Confucius Institutes reported various other sources of support for Chinese language at their institutions, including the schools' academic departments (43 respondents) and U.S. government-sponsored language programs (16). Others reported receiving support, such as scholarships or joint degree programs, from Taiwanese entities (12) and the Chinese partner institution associated with the former Confucius Institute (9).Why GAO Did This StudyConfucius Institutes, educational partnerships between entities in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and schools in the U.S. and other countries, offer Chinese language instruction, cultural programming, and funding for China-related research. Some officials have raised questions about Confucius Institutes, including their relationship to the PRC government, their sources of funding, and the potential for undue PRC influence or risks to national security.GAO was asked to review the status of Confucius Institutes at U.S. schools. This report examines (1) factors schools cited for closing their Confucius Institutes; (2) steps schools reported taking to address potential concerns associated with Confucius Institutes or similar programs supported by foreign partnerships; and (3) how, if at all, schools that closed Confucius Institutes responded to any effects of the closure on resources and programming.In January 2023, GAO conducted two surveys of almost 100 schools (1) with open Confucius Institutes and (2) that have closed their Confucius Institutes since 2019. GAO's survey covered topics such as the impact of the Confucius Institutes' closure, practices implemented to address risks and concerns, and other foreign partnerships. GAO reviewed guidance documents and written agreements. GAO also interviewed officials at the Departments of Defense, Education, Justice, and State; researchers; representatives from higher education associations; and 12 officials at schools with open or recently closed Confucius Institutes.For more information, contact Kimberly Gianopoulos at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov.
- Freely Associated States: Agencies Should Enhance Procedures to Address Millions of Dollars in Questionable Spending What GAO FoundThe Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Interior did not consistently issue management decisions for audit findings related to grants to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and Republic of Palau within the time frame specified by federal regulation. Each country must annually obtain an audit—known as a single audit—of its use of grant funds and submit a report of the findings. Within 6 months, the agencies must issue a management decision for each finding—including expenditures the auditor questioned, known as questioned costs—clearly stating any expected corrective action. For single audits in fiscal years (FY) 2015 through 2019, HHS failed to issue seven of 11 decisions and Interior failed to issue seven of 12 decisions within the 6-month time frame. Both agencies attributed their failure to issue timely decisions to staffing gaps. Taking appropriate action, such as devoting needed staffing resources, to ensure they issue management decisions in the required time frame would help the agencies reduce the risk that the countries will fail to implement timely corrective actions.Table 1: Timeliness of HHS and Interior Management Decisions for Questioned Costs Identified in FSM, RMI, and Palau Single Audits, Fiscal Years 2015–2019			Agency 									Management decisions required for findings with questioned costs 									Management decisions not issued in required timeframe 									Total questioned costs associated with delayed management decisions 								HHS									11									7									$1,430,918								Interior									12									7									2,044,207					Legend: HHS = Department of Health and Human Services, FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, RMI = Republic of the Marshall Islands, Palau = Republic of Palau.Source: GAO analysis of information from HHS and Department of the Interior. | GAO-23-106160GAO's review of FY 2019 single audit reports for FSM, RMI, and Palau found that HHS had not resolved, and Interior could not show it resolved, several long-standing questioned costs as federal regulation requires.At the time of our review, HHS had not yet resolved several questioned costs, totaling almost $600,000, that were first reported in FY 2010 for RMI. GAO found HHS did not initiate required follow-up to address some of these questioned costs until many years after they were first identified. HHS's procedures for resolving questioned costs do not specify when follow-up should begin or how frequently it should occur. Revising its guidance to specify timing for audit follow-up would help HHS reduce the risk of questioned costs remaining unresolved.	Interior was unable to provide information showing the resolution of three questioned costs totaling more than $650,000 that were first reported for FSM and RMI in FYs 2008 through 2014. Though Interior told GAO it had resolved these findings, evidence it provided did not substantiate its claim. Interior has not fully documented procedures for resolving audit findings. Documenting procedures would clarify Interior staff's responsibilities related to resolving audit findings, including issuing management decisions for FSM, RMI, and Palau.Why GAO Did This StudyFSM, RMI, and Palau annually receive millions of dollars of U.S. assistance. U.S. agencies have provided some of this assistance through grant awards under the U.S. compacts of free association and other agreements with the three countries. Because of the amount of their grant spending, each country must obtain a single audit of its use of these funds each year and submit a report of the audit findings, including any questioned costs.Federal regulation requires the awarding agency to issue a management decision for each audit finding. Federal regulation also requires the agency to follow up on audit findings to ensure timely corrective action. If agencies do not issue decisions and conduct follow-up within 2 years, the country may potentially avoid repayment of any ineligible costs. More than 95 percent of questioned costs identified in the single audit reports GAO reviewed were related to grants awarded by HHS and Interior.This report examines the extent to which HHS and Interior have met federal requirements for (1) issuing management decisions and (2) following up on questioned costs. GAO reviewed the single audit reporting packages the countries submitted for FYs 2015 through 2019—the most current reports available—and HHS and Interior documentation. GAO also interviewed HHS and Interior officials.
- Mental Health Services: State Should Collect Ongoing Feedback to Ensure Overseas Employees' Needs Are Being Met What GAO FoundThe Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) offer several mental health services to help sustain the well-being of employees and their eligible family members based overseas. For example, State employs overseas psychiatrists—each typically serving 12 to 15 posts—and both agencies offer counseling services. Of the 16 State overseas psychiatrists who responded to a GAO survey, 12 reported that their overseas workloads increased in 2022 because of factors such as a rise in demand for care and vacant psychiatrist positions. State officials told GAO that demand for its short-term counseling services had also risen, due to the war in Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, and other stressors. In addition, USAID officials reported that demand for counseling had almost doubled since 2018 in response to those crises and other factors. To meet the increased demand, State is seeking funding for additional psychiatrists and social workers, and USAID plans to increase funding for its counseling services and for programs to build resilience.Respondents to GAO's survey of psychiatrists identified several challenges related to delivery of, and access to, State's mental health services for overseas employees. (The figure shows 15 psychiatrists' ratings of such challenges.) Foreign Service members GAO surveyed reported some of the same challenges. State has undertaken efforts to address these challenges, such as conducting outreach to reduce stigma associated with mental health care.Significance of Challenges in Providing Mental Health Services to State Department Employees and Family Members Based Overseas, Reported by 15 Overseas PsychiatristsState has obtained some feedback about its mental health services from employees and their family members based overseas. For example, in 2023, State conducted two one-time surveys to identify concerns about its mental health services. USAID also surveys clients to collect feedback about the mental health services it provides. However, State does not collect ongoing feedback about all of its services to help ensure they are meeting the needs of those who receive them. Ongoing feedback about its mental health services for employees and family members overseas would help State ensure that employees maintain their ability to protect and promote U.S. interests abroad.Why GAO Did This StudyState and USAID employees based overseas often face high levels of stress due to heavy workloads and to instability or conflict in countries where they are based. As of June 2023, about 15,000 State and about 1,600 USAID personnel and family members were based overseas.GAO was asked to review State's and USAID's mental health services for employees based overseas. This report examines, among other things, (1) reported factors affecting workloads of State and USAID mental health providers, (2) reported challenges associated with delivering or obtaining mental health services overseas and efforts to address these challenges, and (3) State's monitoring of its mental health services for employees and their family members overseas to help ensure it is meeting their needs.GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from State and USAID. GAO surveyed 17 State overseas psychiatrists in December 2022, asking about their workload and any challenges, and received 16 responses. (State has 21 overseas psychiatrist positions, but four were vacant or recently filled.) GAO also conducted a nongeneralizable survey of Foreign Service members, asking about their experiences in obtaining mental health services, and received 437 responses.
- International Trade Administration: Global Markets Employee Focus Groups Raise Workforce Management Concerns What GAO FoundIn previous work, GAO found that the Department of Commerce should improve workforce planning and management in the International Trade Administration's (ITA) Global Markets (GM) unit. GAO found that GM had limited funding increases and a decreasing federal workforce, did not document some staffing allocation procedures, lacked a comprehensive workforce plan, and had difficulty providing core human capital services, among other issues. During audit work, GAO conducted six virtual focus group sessions with a total of 35 GM employees to obtain their perspectives on GM's workforce planning and management. Of the six focus groups, two each were composed of participants from (1) headquarters, (2) overseas, and (3) the U.S. field.The six focus groups provided a range of perspectives on several selected workforce management areas, including (1) human capital activities, (2) resources, (3) organizational structure, (4) collaboration and coordination, (5) administrative functions and technology, and (6) agency mission and impact. For example, with regard to human capital activities, focus group participants discussed issues related to hiring and recruiting; vacancies and succession planning; employee career progression; and diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA). With regard to resources, headquarters participants raised concerns about the timing of the budget cycle, overseas participants highlighted increasing administrative costs, and U.S. field participants noted strong concerns about understaffing.Why GAO Did This StudyGM supports U.S. businesses by assisting them in increasing their exports and entering new international markets, advancing U.S. business interests abroad, and attracting investment in the U.S. economy. At the end of fiscal year 2021, GM had about 1,440 employees, including Foreign Commercial Service Officers in 76 countries, as well as Civil Service staff in U.S. field offices in metropolitan areas around the country and at GM headquarters in Washington, D.C.Obtaining employee input is a component of workforce management leading practices. Focus groups are not methodologically designed to measure the extent or magnitude of a problem or generalize results to a larger population of all GM employees. Nevertheless, these findings provide a cross-section of thoughts and ideas that may be similar or different across the groupings of participants.To identify these perspectives, GAO conducted six virtual focus group sessions that involved structured small-group discussions designed to gather in-depth information about specific workforce management issues. In each focus group session, GAO asked a series of discussion questions as well as five polling questions.For more information, contact Kimberly Gianopoulos at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov.
- Human Rights: Agency Actions Needed to Address Harassment of Dissidents and Other Tactics of Transnational Repression in the U.S. What GAO FoundForeign governments may use various tactics—from spyware to assault—to silence U.S.-based dissidents. Agencies have worked to track such incidents, generally known as transnational repression (TNR). Agencies have reported on foreign governments known to engage in TNR worldwide, some of which receive U.S. arms transfers. However, officials said that a lack of common understanding of TNR hinders efforts to fully track incidents against U.S.-based persons.Foreign Governments that Received U.S. Arms Transfers in Fiscal Year 2017-2021 and/or Were Named as Transnational Repression Perpetrators in Reports (Issued 2022–2023)aDid not receive any U.S. arms transfers in fiscal year 2017-2021.Note: For more details, see figures 2 and 4 in GAO-24-106183.U.S. law does not specifically criminalize TNR, but agencies have used existing tools to penalize individuals for TNR against U.S.-based persons. State imposed visa restrictions on 76 Saudis believed to have been engaged in acts of TNR, including the murder of U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi. FBI officials said gaps in U.S. law limit their ability to counter TNR, but DOJ has not developed a DOJ-wide position on the sufficiency of existing laws. Developing such a position may help Congress determine whether new legislation is needed to address TNR.Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)—which prohibits arms transfers to countries that the President determines are engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment against individuals in the U.S.—offers a way to hold some governments accountable for TNR against individuals in the U.S. However, no such determinations have been made, and none of the agencies we spoke with had performed any work related to implementing the statute. Because Section 6 only requires reporting following a positive determination, it is unclear the extent to which the law has ever been considered. Amending its reporting requirement could improve visibility into how, if at all, the law is used.Why GAO Did This StudyRecent high-profile acts of TNR against U.S.-based persons highlight TNR's threat to national security. Some advocates and members of Congress have called for more accountability for foreign governments that benefit from U.S. arms transfers yet engage in TNR against U.S.-based persons.GAO was asked to review federal agency efforts to address TNR using available tools, including Section 6 of the AECA. This report examines the extent to which: (1) agencies have collected and analyzed information about the nature and prevalence of TNR against U.S.-based persons; (2) agencies have used available tools to hold individuals accountable for TNR against U.S.-based persons; and (3) the U.S. government has implemented Section 6 of the AECA.GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from nongovernmental organizations and the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security.
- Nuclear Arms Control: U.S. May Face Challenges in Verifying Future Treaty Goals What GAO FoundNew START, a treaty that limits U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces, will expire in 2026. The U.S. has established three goals for a nuclear arms control treaty with Russia to follow New START:Retain limits on systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons at intercontinental ranges, or “strategic delivery vehicles”;	Address all nuclear weapons, including nonstrategic nuclear weapons and weapons in storage; and	Address new and novel Russian delivery vehicles, such as a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile.According to U.S. officials, the measures for verifying compliance with a New START successor are likely to be similar to those employed for New START, including exchanges of data about deployed strategic delivery vehicles, inspections at relevant bases, and use of satellites. In the long term, the U.S. has aspirational goals—such as nuclear weapons reductions—that may require more extensive verification using more intrusive technologies.The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has a plan for developing verification technologies that would support an array of possible treaty scenarios. NNSA's plan groups these technologies into three “approaches” based on increasing levels of intrusiveness and confidence in compliance. Officials stated that technologies in the first, “baseline” approach are largely proven or already used under New START and are ready to support a potential successor treaty. More intrusive technologies—such as devices to measure weapons' radiation signatures—would provide increased confidence in compliance and support longer-term treaty goals but may require 5 to 10 more years of development.Stakeholders GAO interviewed and studies GAO reviewed noted likely challenges to verifying Russian compliance with future treaties that address U.S. nuclear arms control goals. For example, nuclear weapons are smaller than strategic delivery vehicles and would thus be harder to monitor using satellites. Verifying Russian compliance with limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons may also be challenging, in part because many Russian nonstrategic delivery vehicles can carry nuclear or conventional weapons, making visual differentiation difficult.Size Comparison of Russian Strategic Delivery Vehicles to a Nuclear WeaponWhy GAO Did This StudyNew START limits the number of U.S. and Russian strategic delivery vehicles—such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)—and the total number of nuclear weapons that each party is allowed to deploy on those vehicles. New START also details a collection of verification measures—such as inspections and the use of satellites—intended to provide confidence that parties are complying with treaty limits. The U.S. has sought to negotiate a New START successor with Russia and aspires to pursue future arms control with China.The Senate report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 includes a provision for GAO to review technologies that could support verification of future nuclear arms control treaties. This report describes (1) U.S. goals and likely verification measures for future nuclear arms control treaties, including a successor to New START; (2) the extent NNSA has planned for or developed verification technologies to support future arms control goals; and (3) challenges stakeholders have identified to implementing verification measures to support future treaties.GAO reviewed U.S. government plans and reports pertaining to nuclear arms control treaty verification, as well as relevant studies. GAO also interviewed 43 stakeholders, including U.S. government officials, representatives from the Department of Energy's national laboratories, and nuclear arms control experts.For more information, contact Allison Bawden at (202) 512-3841 or bawdena@gao.gov.
- Cybersecurity: State Needs to Expeditiously Implement Risk Management and Other Key Practices What GAO FoundThe Department of State has documented a cybersecurity risk management program that meets federal requirements. Specifically, the department has identified risk management roles and responsibilities and developed a risk management strategy. However, State has not fully implemented its program to identify and monitor risk to assets and the information maintained on its systems, as shown in the figure below.Examples of State's Progress in Implementing Its Cybersecurity Risk Management ProgramUntil the department implements required risk management activities, it lacks assurance that its security controls are operating as intended. Moreover, State is likely not fully aware of information security vulnerabilities and threats affecting mission operations.State's incident response processes for detecting, responding to, and recovering from cybersecurity incidents generally align with federal guidance by requiring the department to establish an incident handling capability for its information systems. For example, State's Cyber Incident Response Team and other units within its Monitoring and Incident Response Division provide the capability to identify active and potential threats to the department's network security 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.However, the department has not fully implemented processes that support its incident response program. For example, State has not fully updated and tested information system contingency plans to ensure continuity of operations nor configured its centralized inventory management database to identify asset inventory information from all available data sources.Further, State has not adequately secured its IT infrastructure to support its incident response program. This includes replacing the 23,689 hardware systems and 3,102 occurrences of network and server operating system software installations that have reached end-of-life. Certain installations of operating system software had reached end-of-life over 13 years ago.Without fully implemented incident response processes and an adequately secured IT infrastructure to support State's incident response program by, among other things, updating outdated or unsupported products, State's IT infrastructure is vulnerable to exploits. Furthermore, the department risks being unable to fully detect, investigate, and mitigate cybersecurity-related incidents.In the last several years, State has taken a number of steps to clarify and strengthen the role of the Chief Information Officer (CIO). For example, in October 2020, State issued a memo and matrix outlining the roles and responsibilities for cybersecurity of State's CIO and others.Nevertheless, the ability of State's CIO to secure the department's IT systems is limited due to shared management responsibilities and a lack of communication. In State's IT structure, the CIO manages State's main network and sets department-wide standards, but bureaus perform many activities independently, purchasing much of their own equipment, managing many of their own IT systems, and obtaining their own funding. In addition, a lack of communication among the CIO, Information Resource Management, and the bureaus also hampers the CIO's ability to secure the department's IT systems. For example, this created confusion among information system security officers about the applicability of IT-related requirements. State's IT structure, insulated culture (i.e., bureaus operating independently), and the lack of communication between the CIO and the bureaus is responsible for many of the deficiencies identified in this report, as shown in the figure below.Examples of Deficiencies at State Due to Its IT Structure and Insulated CultureIn October 2021, the CIO noted that the roles and responsibilities matrix needed to be updated to better reflect the specific cyber functions and activities that department leadership and bureaus engage in throughout State. Until State addresses these and other deficiencies, the CIO faces challenges managing and overseeing the department's cybersecurity program, including risk management and incident response, and the department's systems remain vulnerable.Why GAO Did This StudyThe security of State's IT systems is vital to promoting an open, interoperable, and reliable information and communications infrastructure in the department.GAO was asked to review State's cybersecurity practices. This report assesses the extent to which (1) State has implemented a cybersecurity risk management program; (2) State has a process and supporting infrastructure to detect, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity incidents; and (3) State's Chief Information Officer (CIO) is able to secure its IT systems department-wide.To conduct this work, GAO reviewed federal laws and guidance and compared them to department policies. GAO also analyzed samples of IT risk, incident response, and configuration data for selected enterprise-wide systems and 16 embassies and consular locations. Additionally, GAO interviewed State officials from the Bureau of Information Resource Management and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security with primary responsibility for managing and securing State's IT systems and networks. GAO also met with high-level officials at the Bureau of Consular Affairs, given that it operates more IT systems than any other bureau.This is a public version of a sensitive report with limited distribution. In response to a request from State officials, GAO excluded from this public report information deemed sensitive, such as specific post locations, system names, and technologies as well as a specific weakness.
- COVID-19: USAID Plans to Share Lessons Learned from Efforts to Meet Global Vaccination Goal What GAO FoundThe U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supports COVID-19 vaccine country readiness and delivery abroad by assisting a country's capacity to receive and administer vaccines. As of March 2023, USAID obligated an estimated $904 million to support its COVID-19 country readiness and delivery efforts in 125 countries. USAID's obligations for these efforts covered eight areas of technical assistance, including promoting demand for vaccination and supporting supply chain logistics.USAID, together with other U.S. agencies, host governments and other entities, helped vaccinate an average of 45 percent of the population across assisted countries as of July 2023. This average was in comparison to the global goal of 70 percent vaccination in each country. Close to two-thirds of the assisted countries had vaccination rates below 50 percent, and most of those rates have leveled off. Regional vaccination rates for countries that received USAID assistance ranged from an average of 28 to 63 percent (see figure). USAID stated that it could not measure its direct contribution to countries' vaccination progress because, among other things, the agency is only one of many entities involved in these efforts.Average Fully Vaccinated Rate by Region for Countries Assisted by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as of July 5, 2023Note: Vaccination rates reflect the efforts of USAID and other entities in assisted countries. USAID officials, citing World Health Organization guidance, defined “fully vaccinated” as a complete primary series, which may be one or two doses depending on the vaccine manufacturer. USAID assisted 125 countries; no vaccination data existed for two small USAID-assisted countries in Asia. The most recent vaccination rate data for most countries are prior to July 2023.USAID faced demand, supply, and other challenges in providing COVID-19 vaccine country readiness and delivery assistance. U.S. agency officials in assisted countries reported that demand issues have overtaken supply issues as the greatest challenge to these efforts. Demand issues included, for example, vaccine hesitancy and barriers associated with people getting to vaccine sites. As vaccine demand diminished, USAID and other partners shifted priorities to vaccinating vulnerable groups and incorporating activities into countries' primary healthcare systems on the way to reaching the global 70 percent vaccination goal. USAID initiated several efforts to learn from these challenges, and has plans to disseminate the lessons learned, in accordance with agency guidance.Why GAO Did This StudyTo attain high population immunity from COVID-19 during the pandemic, the U.S. pledged to substantially contribute toward a 70 percent vaccination goal of the world's population, initially by the end of 2022. USAID has partnered with other U.S. agencies, multilateral organizations, and donor countries on country readiness and delivery efforts to significantly increase assistance to countries around the world to meet the vaccination goal.The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to monitor the federal government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report examines (1) the assistance USAID has provided to support COVID-19 vaccine country readiness and delivery abroad, (2) progress USAID has made in its efforts to support COVID-19 vaccine country readiness and delivery abroad, and (3) any challenges USAID has faced and how it has addressed them.GAO reviewed laws, funding, and guidance documents from USAID, the Department of State, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the World Health Organization. GAO analyzed publicly available data to obtain global vaccination rates. GAO also interviewed USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and USAID officials and other local stakeholders in three countries: Guatemala, Malawi, and South Africa. GAO selected these countries based on factors such as the amount of estimated country readiness and delivery assistance USAID obligated for each country.For more information, contact Latesha Love-Grayer at (202) 512-4409 or LoveGrayerL@gao.gov.
- Asistencia de Los Estados Unidos a México: El Departamento de Estado Debería Tomar Medidas Para Evaluar El Progreso General This is the Spanish language highlights associated with GAO-23-103795.Conclusiones de la GAODesde 2008, las metas de la asistencia estadounidense a México se han centrado generalmente en fomentar el estado de derecho y combatir el narcotráfico. En 2021, los Estados Unidos y México acordaron en el Marco Bicentenario para la Seguridad, la Salud Pública y las Comunidades Seguras (Marco Bicentenario), que amplía el alcance de la Iniciativa Mérida al añadir nuevos compromisos por parte de los Estados Unidos para reducir la demanda de drogas en los Estados Unidos y el flujo de armas ilícitas de los Estados Unidos a México.La Oficina Internacional de Asuntos Antinarcóticos y Procuración de Justicia (INL, por sus siglas en inglés) del Departamento de Estado (State, por su nombre en inglés) y la Agencia de los Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID, por sus siglas en inglés) son las agencias de los Estados Unidos principales de la implementación de la asistencia estadounidense en México. Ambas agencias han presentado resultados logrados a nivel de proyecto a pesar de numerosos desafíos. Según las agencias, entre estos desafíos se encuentran la impunidad y la corrupción política en México y la demanda creciente de drogas en los Estados Unidos que estimula las organizaciones criminales transnacionales. Los resultados de los proyectos de State/INL incluyen el desarrollo de capacidades de investigación forense en México, y entre los resultados de la USAID se incluye la provisión de oportunidades educativas a jóvenes en riesgo.State/INL ha abordado dos de los cinco elementos clave que la GAO había determinado anteriormente como elementos importantes para analizar progreso mediante definir los resultados deseados y el establecimiento de una jerarquía de metas y objetivos. Sin embargo, para el Marco Bicentenario, State/INL 1) no identificó los proyectos específicos diseñados para lograr sus metas, 2) no destacó qué hitos e indicadores de rendimiento deberían utilizarse para medir los resultados ni 3) estableció planes de monitoreo y evaluación para analizar el progreso de alcanzar sus metas. Funcionarios de State/INL señalaron que la oficina todavía no ha empezado a analizar el progreso logrado respecto a las metas comunes del Marco Bicentenario debido a que actualmente se encuentra negociando con el Gobierno de México un grupo de indicadores de rendimiento, que es uno de los tres elementos clave para analizar el progreso. Si no se incorporan todos los elementos clave para analizar los avances, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos no puede mostrar si está alcanzando sus metas en México y si sus inversiones—más de US$3 mil millones desde 2008—se han empleado eficazmente.Análisis de la GAO de las medidas adoptadas por State para abordar los elementos clave en analizar progreso hacia las metas comunes del Marco Bicentenario			Elemento clave									Descripción									Análisis global de la GAO								Resultados deseados									El resultado final que la estrategia pretende lograr						✓					Jerarquía de las metas y los objetivos subordinados									Los vínculos lógicos entre las metas y los objetivos de la estrategia									✓								Actividades para lograr resultados									Etapas y actividades previstas para lograr resultados						✕					Hitos e indicadores de rendimiento									Prioridades, hitos e indicadores de rendimiento para medir los resultados						✕					Planes de monitoreo y evaluación									Planes para analizar el progreso hacia el logro de las metas						✕		Leyenda: ✓ - Elemento clave abordado. ✕ - Elemento clave no abordado a fondo. Examinamos los documentos de planificación y estrategia del Departamento de Estado (State, por su nombre en inglés) relativos a la asistencia a México. Determinamos que State consideró un elemento clave si tomó medidas para incorporar los elementos críticos para analizar progreso en los documentos de planificación o estrategia. Determinamos que State no abordó plenamente un elemento clave si no adoptó medidas críticas para analizar los avances.Fuente: Análisis de la GAO de las medidas adoptadas por State y elementos clave de la GAO pertinentes al análisis de progreso hacia metas estratégicas. | GAO 23-106871Propósito de Este EstudioDesde 2008, los Estados Unidos ha proporcionado más de US$3 mil millones en asistencia a México para abordar el crimen y la violencia en México y reforzar el estado de derecho del país. Dos acuerdos cooperativos entre los Estados Unidos y México han guiado la mayor parte de esta asistencia: la Iniciativa Mérida (2008–2021) y el Marco Bicentenario (desde los finales de 2021 al presente).Se le solicitó a la GAO que analizara los resultados de la asistencia de los Estados Unidos a México. Este informe analiza 1) cómo, si acaso, las metas de la asistencia de los Estados Unidos a México han cambiado desde 2008, 2) los desafíos que State/INL y la USAID identificaron en el logro de los resultados generales y a nivel de proyecto, y 3) la medida en que State/INL ha abordado elementos clave para analizar el progreso hacia las metas del Marco Bicentenario. La GAO analizó documentos y datos de State y de la USAID, entrevistó a funcionarios de State, la USAID y de los Departamentos de Defensa, Justicia y Seguridad Nacional en Washington, D.C. Además, llevó a cabo trabajo sobre el terreno y entrevistó a funcionarios de los Gobiernos de los Estados Unidos y de México.
- U.S. Assistance to Mexico: State Department Should Take Steps to Assess Overall Progress Para la versión de esta página en español, ver a GAO-23-106871.What GAO FoundSince 2008, the goals of U.S. assistance to Mexico have generally focused on promoting the rule of law and countering the drug trade. In 2021, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to the Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities (Bicentennial Framework), which expands the scope of the Mérida Initiative by adding new U.S. commitments to reduce drug demand in the United States and the flow of illegal firearms from the U.S. to Mexico.The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the lead U.S. agencies for implementing U.S. assistance to Mexico. Both agencies have reported project-level results of assistance despite numerous challenges. Among these challenges, according to the agencies, are political corruption and impunity in Mexico and a growing U.S. drug demand that fuels transnational criminal organizations. State/INL project results include developing forensic investigation capabilities in Mexico, and USAID results include providing at-risk youth with educational opportunities.State/INL has addressed two of five key elements GAO previously identified as important to assessing progress by defining desired results and establishing a hierarchy of goals and objectives. However, for the Bicentennial Framework, State/INL has not 1) identified the specific projects designed to achieve their goals, 2) outlined which milestones and performance indicators should be used to gauge results, or 3) established monitoring and evaluation plans to assess progress toward their goals. State/INL officials said the bureau has not yet begun to assess progress toward the shared goals of the Bicentennial Framework because it is currently negotiating with the Mexican government on a set of performance indicators, which is one of three key elements critical to assess progress. Without incorporating all key elements for assessing progress, the U.S. government cannot demonstrate that it is achieving its goals in Mexico and that its investments, at over $3 billion since 2008, have been spent effectively.GAO's Analysis of State's Actions Addressing Key Elements for Assessing Progress toward Shared Bicentennial Framework Goals			Key Element 									Description 									GAO overall assessment								Desired results 									The end state that the strategy aims to achieve						✓					Hierarchy of goals and subordinate objectives 									The logical links among the strategy's goals and objectives.									✓								Activities to achieve results 									Planned steps and activities to achieve the results						✕					Milestones and performance indicators 									Priorities, milestones, and performance indicators to gauge results.						✕					Monitoring and evaluation plans 									Plans to assess progress toward achieving goals.						✕		Legend: ✓ - Addressed key element. ✕ – Has not fully addressed key element. We reviewed State Department planning and strategy documents for assistance to Mexico. We determined State addressed a key element if it took actions to incorporate the elements critical to assess progress into planning or strategy documents. We determined State had not fully addressed a key element if it had not taken actions critical to assess progress. Source: GAO analysis of Department of State actions and GAO's key elements relevant to assessment of progress toward strategic goals.Why GAO Did This StudySince 2008, the U.S. has provided over $3 billion in assistance to Mexico to address crime and violence and enhance the country's rule of law. Two cooperative arrangements between the U.S. and Mexico have guided most of this assistance: the Mérida Initiative (2008-2021) and the Bicentennial Framework (late 2021-present).GAO was asked to assess the results of U.S. assistance to Mexico. This report examines 1) how, if at all, the goals of U.S. assistance to Mexico have changed since 2008, 2) challenges State/INL and USAID identified achieving results and project-level results each agency reported, and 3) the extent to which State/INL has addressed key elements critical to assess progress toward Bicentennial Framework goals. GAO reviewed State and USAID documents and data, interviewed officials from State, USAID, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security in Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork and interviewed U.S. and Government of Mexico officials in Mexico.
- Arctic Region: Factors That Facilitate and Hinder the Advancement of U.S. Priorities What GAO FoundManagement roles for advancing U.S. Arctic priorities span the federal government. In October 2022, the federal government published an updated Arctic strategy that serves as a framework for guiding its approach to addressing emerging challenges and opportunities in the Arctic. While many federal entities engage with foreign partners on Arctic issues, the Department of State serves as the lead for Arctic diplomacy efforts. The Biden administration announced that an existing Arctic coordinator position at State would be elevated to an Ambassador-at-Large position in August 2022, but the nominee has yet to be confirmed.Map of the Arctic RegionStakeholders identified five factors that facilitated and five factors that hindered the federal government's management of U.S. Arctic priorities. For example, stakeholders identified U.S. Arctic expertise and engagement as factors that facilitated its influence in the Arctic Council. However, some stakeholders said that the Arctic Executive Steering Committee and the broader federal government face various challenges related to interagency coordination that hinder implementation of U.S. Arctic priorities outlined in the 2022 strategy.Stakeholders identified three factors pertaining to State's structures that facilitated and two factors that hindered State's management of U.S. Arctic priorities. For example, stakeholders identified continuity within the Senior Arctic Official position and supporting office as a factor that has deepened institutional knowledge for Arctic Council work, facilitating efforts to promote U.S. priorities. However, some stakeholders identified gaps in leadership and limited convening authority as factors that had hindered management. Many stakeholders viewed the announcement of the Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic Region position positively but identified elements State and the new Ambassador should consider to manage U.S. Arctic priorities successfully going forward. These elements include consistency in position and title, a formalized office structure, clarity of Ambassador's role within the department, and greater authority to coordinate with all the relevant bureaus across the department.Why GAO Did This StudyThe United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic nation and has substantial interests in the region. In recent years, the effects of climate change, technological advancements, and economic opportunities have driven increasing interest and activity in the Arctic region. In addition, there has been an escalation of great power competition between the United States, Russia, and China, which seeks Arctic resources, among other things. This competition has introduced tension into the Arctic's geopolitical environment.GAO was asked to review the federal government's management of Arctic efforts, including State's current structures for Arctic diplomacy. This report discusses (1) federal entities' roles in managing U.S. Arctic priorities, (2) factors stakeholders identified that may facilitate or hinder the federal government's management of U.S. Arctic priorities, and (3) factors stakeholders identified that may facilitate or hinder State's role in managing U.S. Arctic priorities.GAO reviewed Arctic strategies, State documentation, and other relevant reports. GAO also interviewed 31 stakeholders, grouping similar stakeholders on the basis of their affiliations to create six groups for GAO's analysis and discussion. These groups were State, other agencies, U.S. experts on Arctic issues, foreign governments of Arctic countries, Alaska Native organizations, and the state government of Alaska. GAO selected these groups to capture a range of perspectives concerning any factors that may facilitate or hinder the federal government's or State's management of U.S. Arctic priorities.For more information, contact Chelsa Kenney at (202) 512-2964 or kenneyc@gao.gov.
- Export-Import Bank: Monitoring of Exports with Dual Military and Civilian Uses as of 2023 What GAO FoundAs of August 2023, the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) was monitoring the end use of a single transaction that it had continued to finance in fiscal year 2021, as summarized below:Two satellites for the government of Mexico. EXIM had provided financing to the government of Mexico for (1) a fixed-service satellite that launched in December 2012 and became operational in February 2013 and (2) a mobile-service satellite that launched in October 2015 and became operational in December 2015. In 2023, EXIM received all documents from the government of Mexico on time and subsequently determined that Mexico was in compliance with the bank's dual-use policy.EXIM did not finance any new exports under its dual-use authority in fiscal year 2022, according to EXIM authorization data and EXIM officials.Why GAO Did This StudyEXIM's mission is to support the export of U.S. goods and services overseas through loans, loan guarantees, and insurance, thereby supporting U.S. jobs. In 1994, Congress passed legislation authorizing EXIM to facilitate the financing of U.S. exports of defense articles and services with both civilian and military applications, provided that the bank determines such dual-use items are nonlethal and primarily meant for civilian end use. Included in the same act was a provision for GAO, in consultation with EXIM, to report annually on the end uses of dual-use exports financed by EXIM during the second preceding fiscal year.This report (1) examines the status of EXIM's monitoring of dual-use exports that it continued to finance in fiscal year 2021, as of August 2023, and (2) identifies any new dual-use exports that EXIM financed in fiscal year 2022. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed EXIM documentation and data on dual-use exports and interviewed EXIM officials.For more information, contact Kimberly Gianopoulos at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov.