alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT      32.1**

**FROZEN      FOOD EXPRESS INDUSTRIES, INC.**

**CERTIFICATION      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**PURSUANT      TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|                                 |   |                                                                                                                      |   |
|--------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Dated:                August 9, 2006 |   | /s/                Stoney M. Stubbs, Jr.                                                                                  |   |
|                                 |   | Stoney                M. Stubbs, Jr.Chairman                of the Board and                Chief Executive Officer  |   |
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-02-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-02-2000
<CASH>                                          12,778
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,059
<ALLOWANCES>                                       249
<INVENTORY>                                     16,185
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                44,047
<PP&E>                                         510,675
<DEPRECIATION>                                 267,764
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 311,135
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           90,212
<BONDS>                                        281,988
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            74
<OTHER-SE>                                   (104,998)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   311,135
<SALES>                                        309,477
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               313,519
<CGS>                                           95,129
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  264,429
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              15,901
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (32,720)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (17,215)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (15,505)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (15,505)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (2.08)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.08)


</TABLE>
Price Waterhouse





2 November 1998


The Directors
Senetek PLC
23 Palace Street
London
SW1E 5HW

Dear Sirs:

We give notice that we are resigning as auditors of Senetek PLC with effect from
2 November 1998.  There are no circumstances connected with our resignation
which we consider should be brought to the notice of the shareholders or 
creditors of Senetek PLC.

Yours faithfully

/s/ Price Waterhouse
Price Waterhouse
#### Carroll E. BROUSSARD et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Paul ANNALORO, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 3801.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

April 19, 1972.

Daniel L. Regard, New Iberia, for plaintiffs-appellants.

*92Joel E. Gooch and Raymond M. Allen, Lafayette, Armentor & Wattigny by Gerard B. Wattigny, New Iberia, for defendant-appellee.

Before FRUGÉ, HOOD, and CULPEP-PER, JJ.

FRUGÉ, Judge.

This case was tried by a jury and the trial judge signed the judgment on the 22nd of March, 1971. On May 10, 1971, the plaintiff obtained an order for an appeal. However, he did not file the devolutive appeal bond until the 28th of July, 1971. No motion for a dismissal has been made by any of the parties in this suit. However, this Court, ex proprio motu, has the authority to dismiss the suit wherein it appears that the bond had not been timely filed in the record. Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, Rule VII, § 5(c).

LSA-C.C.P. Article 2087 and its jurisprudence is quite clear. In this instance this court does not have jurisdiction unless this is a case which comes under Article 1913 wherein the applicable period of Article 2087 does not begin until notice is given. Clearly, there was no request of record for notice as provided for under that article.

The litigants have been given the opportunity to argue the merits of the issue of lack of jurisdiction of this Court. Plaintiff-appellant has advanced the argument that since his motion for an interlocutory order fixing jury costs, made during the initial stages of the proceeding, was taken under advisement, notice was required under LSA-C.C.P. Article 1913. This argument has no merit. Article 1913 expressly states that it applies “when a case has been taken under advisement by the court notice of the signing of a final judgment therein shall be mailed by the Clerk of Court”. The article applies only to final judgments. It does not apply to interlocutory orders or judgments such as those fixing jury costs. Interlocutory orders or judgments are provided for in LSA-C.C.P. Article 1914.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed; the appellant to pay all costs.

Dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains a summary of financial information extracted from the
Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets and Condensed Consolidated Statements of
Operations and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-2000             OCT-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-2000             APR-30-1999
<CASH>                                           7,886                  27,137
<SECURITIES>                                   128,455                 492,132
<RECEIVABLES>                                  327,812                 276,506
<ALLOWANCES>                                    39,032                  39,967
<INVENTORY>                                    274,760                 236,409
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               685,985                 623,997
<PP&E>                                         314,509                 340,653
<DEPRECIATION>                                 182,479                 190,388
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,790,952               3,224,728
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          665,968                 829,823
<BONDS>                                      1,279,294               1,254,298
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                        808                     902
<COMMON>                                        73,111                  71,104
<OTHER-SE>                                     515,628                 789,907
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,790,952               3,224,728
<SALES>                                        813,220                 766,038
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               813,220                 766,038
<CGS>                                          311,297                 286,386
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  889,144                 840,814
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                54,021                  51,425
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              51,566                  52,049
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (118,058)               (122,321)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (43,681)                (47,908)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (73,562)                (71,669)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                  28,594
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (73,562)                (43,075)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.04)                  (0.61)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.04)                  (0.61)


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6410

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JAMES RICHARD HYDEN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Cynthia D. Kinser, Magistrate

Judge. (CR-90-39-B, CA-94-597-R)

Submitted: July 23, 1996 Decided: August 5, 1996

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Richard Hyden, Appellant Pro Se. Julie C. Dudley, Assistant

United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* The parties consented to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c) (West 1993).

2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the magistrate judge's order denying

his motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988), as amended by

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.

104-132, 110 Stat. 1217.* We have reviewed the record and the magistrate judge's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly,

we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. United States v.

Hyden, Nos. CR-90-39-B; CA-94-597-R (W.D. Va. Feb. 26, 1996). We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13

- 40546 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
EDGAR RODRIGUEZ

- BALVANEDA , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 2:12

- CR

- 1025

- 1

Before KING, HAYNES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Edgar Rodriguez

- Balvaneda raises an argument that he concedes is foreclosed by United States v.
Betancourt , 586 F.3d 303, 308

- 09 (5th Cir. 2009), which held that knowledge
of drug type and quantity is not an element of the offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841. Accordingly, Rodriguez

- Balvaneda ’s unopposed motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

.

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED June 17, 2014 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 13-40546 Document: 00512666173 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/17/2014
**UNITED STATES**

**SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION**

**Washington, D.C.  20549**

 

**FORM 10-Q/A**

**(Amendment No. 1)**

 

[X]  QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d)

 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

 

For the quarterly period ended June 30, 2010

OR

[  ]  TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

 

For the transition period from

__________to __________

 

Commission File No.                                                      000-06404                                

 

GATEWAY ENERGY CORPORATION

(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)

 

 

 

(713) 336-0844

(Registrant’s telephone number, including area code)

 

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days.                 Yes   X     No  

 

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant has submitted electronically and posted on its corporate Web site, if any, every Interactive Data File required to be submitted and posted pursuant to Rule 405 of Regulation S-T during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to submit and post such files).Yes   X    No   

 

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer, or a smaller reporting company. See the definitions of “large accelerated filer,” “accelerated filer” and “smaller reporting company” in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act.:

 

 

Indicate by checkmark whether the registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act.)  Yes______ No___X___ 

 

As of August 12, 2010, the registrant had 19,402,853 shares of its common stock, par value $0.25 per share, outstanding.

 

 

 

                                                                                                            

 

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Company's Balance Sheet as of March 31, 2000 and the Statement Of Income
for the year ended March 31, 2000, and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 172,340
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   172,340
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 2,321<F1>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,321<F2>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-BASIC>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1> Dividend Income
<F2> Legal Fees


</TABLE>
1The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 99-3223

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Howard Harris, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: August 7, 2000

 Filed: August 11, 2000

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, BEAM, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Howard Harris challenges the sentence imposed by the district court1 after he

pleaded guilty to a drug offense. His counsel has filed a brief and moved to withdraw

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Harris has filed a pro se

supplemental brief and a motion to proceed pro se on appeal.
-2-

As part of his plea agreement, Harris waived his right to appeal his sentence

unless the district court departed upward from the Guidelines range. We conclude that

this waiver was knowing and voluntary. Among other things, Harris was assisted by

counsel at the change-of-plea and sentencing hearings; the court questioned him about

the appeal waiver at the change-of-plea hearing, verifying that he understood he was

waiving his right to appeal as part of the plea bargain, and then reminded him of the

appeal waiver at sentencing; his sentence does not conflict with the plea agreement; and

he was age 28, reported having earned a GED, and had prior experience with the

criminal justice system. See United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871-72 (8th

Cir.) (appeal waiver is enforceable so long as it resulted from knowing and voluntary

decision; examining personal characteristics of defendant, such as age, education, and

prior experience with criminal justice system, when assessing knowledge and

voluntariness of decision), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 942 (1998); United States v. Greger,

98 F.3d 1080, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 1996) (so long as sentence is not in conflict with

negotiated plea agreement, knowing and voluntary waiver of right to appeal from

sentence will be enforced; waiver was knowing and intelligent where it was included

in plea agreement, discussed at change-of-plea hearing, and reviewed by court at

sentencing).

Accordingly, because Harris’s sentence was not an upward departure from the

Guidelines range, we now specifically enforce his promise not to appeal by dismissing

his appeal. See United States v. Estrada-Bahena, 201 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000)

(per curiam). We also grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and deny the pending

motion as moot.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit 10.26



EXHIBIT 10.26



Amendment to Employment Agreement



        This Amendment to Employment Agreement (this "Amendment") is made and entered into as of the 28th day of March, 2001, by and between Gerber Scientific, Inc., a Connecticut
corporation (the "Company") and Michael J. Cheshire (the "Executive") (the Company and the Executive may collectively be referred to as the "Parties").  This Amendment amends the Employment Agreement by and between the Parties, dated as of January 29,
1997, as amended on June 1, 1998 and on June 29, 1999 (collectively the "Employment Agreement").

        Whereas the Company and the Executive wish to amend Article III of the Employment Agreement, 

        Now Therefore, in consideration of the promises and the mutual covenants contained herein, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Parties, intending legally to be
bound, agree as follows:

        Article III, Compensation and Benefits, is hereby amended by deleting Sections 3.2(b)(ii) and 3.2(b)(iii) in their entirety so that Section 3.2(b) shall read and provide as follows:

3.2(b)Additional Benefits.  In addition to the benefits listed in Section 3.2(a), the Company shall provide to the Executive:

(i)        Four weeks vacation in each calendar year (it is understood that the Company's then existing policy on vacation not taken in any year shall apply to unused vacation); and,

(ii)       Participation in the Company's Supplemental Pension Benefit Plan ("SERP").




        Except as herein provided, the Employment Agreement shall continue in full force and effect.

        In Witness Whereof, the Parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first above written.



Gerber Scientific, Inc.

 

	
By:                                        
           
	 	
                                      
           

	
       Rebecca Q. McNab

       Vice President, Human Resources
	 	
Michael J. Cheshire
#### Horace Leroy MADDOX, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. R-152.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 27, 1972.

Rehearing Denied July 13, 1972.

Horace Leroy Maddox, in pro. per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

JOHNSON, Judge.

This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which the petitioner is, at this late date, complaining of the fact that he had been arrested on August 9, 1968, and booked on a charge of vagrancy and for investigation of charge of robbery and murder, but was not furnished an attorney; was indicted on November 1, 1968 for first degree murder, but was not informed of the indictment until February 9, 1969, at which time the circuit court appointed the public defender’s office to defend the petitioner. His trial was had about June 30, 1969, at which he was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

This conviction and sentence was appealed to this court and affirmed by this court by opinion filed June 16, 1970. The As*35sistant Public Defender who represented the appellant at his trial and his appeal to this court, was the Honorable Gerald Sohn. This counsel is generally recognized as an astute criminal trial lawyer, and we are of the opinion that the appellant (petitioner) was well-represented at his trial and that all justiciable defenses were raised at trial as well as on appeal, which have been decided adversely to the appellant. The record of the appeal which is lodged in this court, as well as the petition in this cause, does not reveal that due process was denied the appellant (petitioner), and the fact that he was held in jail for about sixty days before he was indicted and no notice of indictment given, nor counsel appointed until February 9, 1969, does not entitle the appellant to the relief he desires. By going to trial, represented by very competent counsel, any complaint about due process or lateness in appointment of counsel, was waived. The petition filed here does not overcome this waiver.

The petition is therefore denied.

SPECTOR, C. J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.