Case 22-87, Document 49, 05/05/2022, 3310228, Page1 of 40 

No. 22-87 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

Gia Sessa, on behalf of herself and all others 

similarly situated, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

Trans Union, LLC, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of New York 

Hon. Kenneth M. Karas 

Case No. 7:19 -cv-9914 

Brief of Amici Curiae 

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

and the Federal Trade Commission 

in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal 

Joel Marcus Seth Frotman 

Deputy General Counsel General Counsel 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Steven Y. Bressler 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Acting Deputy General Counsel 

Washington, DC 20580 Laura Hussain 

(202) 326-3350 Assistant General Counsel 

jmarcus@ftc.gov Ryan Cooper 

Counsel 

CONSUMER FINANCIAL 

PROTECTION BUREAU 

1700 G Street NW 

Washington, DC 20552 

(202) 702-7541 

ryan.cooper@cfpb.gov 
 

 

 

Case 22-87, Document 49, 05/05/2022, 3310228, Page2 of 40 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................i 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................................................................iii 

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE.......................................................... 1 

STATEMENT.....................................................................................3 

A. The FCRA................................................................................3 

B. Facts........................................................................................5 

C. Procedural History................................................................... 7 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..............................................................9 

ARGUMENT.....................................................................................11 

I. The FCRA Does Not Distinguish Between Factual and Legal 

Accuracy. ....................................................................................11 

A. The FCRA does not contain an exception for legal 

inaccuracies. .......................................................................... 13 

B. It is difficult and arbitrary to distinguish between factual 

and legal accuracy.................................................................. 15 

C. The district court’s arguments for importing a 

legal/factual distinction into the FCRA are unpersuasive........20 

D. Any inaccuracy in a consumer report, whether factual or 

legal, is sufficient to serve as a predicate element of 

FCRA liability.........................................................................22 

II. The FCRA Requires Credit Reporting Agencies to Maintain 

Reasonable Procedures to Assure the Accuracy of 

Information Provided by Furnishers...........................................23 

A. Information provided by a furnisher is not per se 

accurate. ................................................................................24 
Case 22-87, Document 49, 05/05/2022, 3310228, Page3 of 40 

B. Reliance on a furnisher to provide accurate information 

is not per se reasonable..........................................................28 

CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 31 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases Page(s) 

Amorah v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 

No. 19 CV 7534, 2020 WL 6565220 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2020)..................19 

Batterman v. BR Carroll Glenridge, LLC, 

829 F. App’x 478 (11th Cir. 2020) .........................................................15 

Cable News Network, Inc. v. FBI, 

293 F. Supp. 3d 59 (D.D.C. 2018)..........................................................21 

Chuluunbat v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 

4 F.4th 562 (7th Cir. 2021).........................................................18, 19, 23 

Collins v. Experian Credit Reporting Serv., 

494 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D. Conn. 2007).....................................................12 

Cornock v. Trans Union LLC, 

638 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D.N.H. 2009).......................................................18 

Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 

617 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2010) ..........................................................passim 

Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 

259 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2001).................................................................31 

Dalton v. Cap. Associated Indus., Inc., 

257 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2001)................................................................. 11 

Denan v. Trans Union LLC, 

959 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2020) ................................................................14 

Frydman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 

2016 WL 11483839 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2016) .........................................27 

Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 

802 F.3d 437 (2d Cir. 2015) ................................................................... 4 

Gorman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 

2008 WL 4934047 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2008) .................................. 13, 30 

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Grayson v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 

2021 WL 2010398 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021)......................................... 22 

Houston v. TRW Info. Servs., Inc., 

707 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)......................................................... 30 

Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 

729 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2013) ....................................................................16 

Koropoulous v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 

734 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1984)..................................................................12 

Mora-Meraz v. Thomas, 

601 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2010).................................................................21 

Ogbon v. Beneficial Credit Servs., Inc., 

2013 WL 1430467 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2013) ............................................13 

Philbin v. TransUnion Corp., 

101 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 1996) ...................................................................13 

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 

456 U.S. 273 (1982) ..............................................................................17 

Rodas v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 

2020 WL 4226669 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2020)......................................... 23 

Sarver v. Experian Info., Sols., 

390 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2004)..........................................................29, 31 

Sessa v. Linear Motors, LLC, 

No. 19-cv-9914, 2021 WL 6052134 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2021) ......... passim 

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

578 U.S. 330 (2016)............................................................................... 3 

Twumasi-Ankrah v. Checkr, Inc., 

954 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2020) ................................................................14 

United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 

171 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 1999)....................................................................21 

Walton v. BMO Harris Bank N.A., 

761 F. App’x 589 (7th Cir. 2019)............................................................12 

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Watson v. Caruso, 

424 F. Supp. 3d 231 (D. Conn. 2019).............................................. 26, 30 

Wenning v. On-Site Manager, Inc., 

2016 WL 3538379 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2016)....................................22, 30 

Wilson v. Corelogic SafeRent, LLC, 

2017 WL 4357568 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017)................................... 26, 30 

Wright v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 

805 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2015)............................................................. 29 

Statutes 

15 U.S.C. § 45(a).........................................................................................1 

15 U.S.C. § 1681 ..........................................................................................1 

15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)................................................................................. 3 

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)............................................................................... 4 

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).................................................................................... 4 

15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)..........................................................................passim 

15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A).....................................................................11, 15 

15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)................................................................................... 5 

15 U.S.C. § 1681n(1)(A).............................................................................. 5 

15 U.S.C. § 1681o .................................................................................. 5, 12 

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(8)(A) .....................................................................21 

15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a) ................................................................................ 1, 2 

15 U.S.C. § 1681s(e) ....................................................................................1 

15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)-(c)...............................................................................1 

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Regulations 

12 C.F.R. § 1022.41(a).............................................................................. 20 

12 C.F.R. § 1022.41(a)(1).......................................................................... 20 

12 C.F.R. § 1022.42(a) ............................................................................. 20 

Other Authorities 

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, List of Consumer Reporting Companies, 

https://go.usa.gov/xu9Y9...................................................................... 6 

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Response Annual Report 

(March 2022), https://go.usa.gov/xudGS .............................................. 3 

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, TransUnion, https://go.usa.gov/xu9Ye........ 6 

Fed. Trade. Comm’n, 40 Years of Experience with the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act: An FTC Staff Report with Summary of Interpretations 

(2011), https://go.usa.gov/xupMd....................................................... 29 

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/accurate ........................................................ 25 

S. Rep. No. 91-517 (1969)........................................................................... 4 

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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 

To ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., imposes various 

requirements that consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) must follow when 

they compile and disseminate personal information about individuals. 

Relevant here, section 1681e(b) of the FCRA requires CRAs to “follow 

reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of the 

information contained in consumer reports. 

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Bureau) has exclusive 

rule-writing authority for most provisions of the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1681s(e). The Bureau interprets and, along with various other federal and 

state regulators, enforces the law’s requirements. Id. § 1681s(a)-(c). These 

requirements include section 1681e(b)’s mandate that CRAs follow 

reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the 

information contained in consumer reports. 

The Federal Trade Commission has been charged by Congress with 

the mission to protect consumers from deceptive or unfair trade practices. 

15 U.S.C. § 45(a). As part of that mission, the Commission has long played a 

key role in the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of the 

FCRA. A violation of the FCRA “constitute[s] an unfair or deceptive act or 
 

 

 

 

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practice in commerce, in violation of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade 

Commission Act.”15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a). And the FCRA grants the 

Commission “such procedural, investigative, and enforcement powers . . . 

as though the applicable terms and conditions of the Federal Trade 

Commission Act were part of [the FCRA].” Id. 

The district court adopted an unduly narrow interpretation of section 

1681e(b)’s reasonable-procedures requirement. To hold a CRA liable under 

section 1681e(b), a private plaintiff must show, as one element of the claim, 

that inaccurate information was included in his or her consumer report. 

The district court held that the information in a consumer report is 

accurate (and therefore plaintiff did not show this element of section 

1681e(b) liability) so long as any inaccuracies can be characterized as “legal” 

rather than “factual” in nature. It also held that the information in a 

consumer report is accurate so long as that information was reported by the 

CRA as it was provided by a furnisher, i.e. an entity that provides 

information relating to consumers to CRAs for inclusion in consumer 

reports. 

In addition to being unsupported by the statutory text, these 

holdings would substantially curtail section 1681e(b)’s reasonableprocedures requirement and undermine the remedial purpose of that 

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provision, which is to ensure accurate credit reporting. The private right of 

action to enforce section 1681e(b) is an important supplement to 

government enforcement, conserving limited government enforcement 

resources and creating an effective deterrent to violations of law. If this 

Court were to adopt such an unduly narrow reading of “accuracy” for 

purposes of a 1681e(b) claim, it could result in increased inaccuracy in 

credit reporting and inaccurate information about consumers being 

conveyed to lenders, landlords, employers, and other entities that purchase 

consumer reports. A likely consequence would be an increase in the volume 

of consumer complaints related to credit reporting that the Bureau receives 

and is required to address.1 For all these reasons, the Bureau and the FTC 

have a substantial interest in the issues presented in this case. 

STATEMENT 

A. The FCRA 

“The FCRA seeks to ensure ‘fair and accurate credit reporting.’” 

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 334 (2016) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 

1 In 2021, the Bureau received and addressed over 700,000 consumer 

complaints related to credit reporting. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 

Consumer Response Annual Report 11 (March 2022), 

https://go.usa.gov/xudGS. These complaints constituted 71% of all the 

consumer complaints received by the Bureau and a 122% annual increase 

since 2020. Id. 

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1681(a)(1)). It was enacted by Congress to “prevent consumers from being 

unjustly damaged because of inaccurate or arbitrary information in a credit 

report.” S. Rep. No. 91-517, at 1 (1969); see also Galper v. JP Morgan Chase 

Bank, N.A., 802 F.3d 437, 444 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The FCRA was enacted in 

1970 amidst concerns about the accuracy of information disseminated by 

credit reporting agencies.”). 

To that end, the FCRA regulates consumer reporting agencies (CRAs), 

which includes any entity that, in exchange for monetary fees, “regularly 

engages ... in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit 

information or other information on consumers for the purpose of 

furnishing consumer reports to third parties.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). With 

exceptions not relevant here, a “consumer report” is a CRA’s 

“communication of any information ... bearing on a consumer’s credit 

worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, 

personal characteristics, or mode of living” if that communication “is used 

or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of 

serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for” specified 

purposes, including employment, credit, and insurance. Id. § 1681a(d)(1). 

The FCRA imposes a variety of requirements on CRAs. As relevant 

here, it requires that “[w]henever a [CRA] prepares a consumer report it 

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shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of 

the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 

Id. § 1681e(b). 

If a CRA “willfully fails to comply with any requirement” of the FCRA, 

it may be held liable by a private plaintiff for actual damages “of not less 

than $100 and not more than $1000” per consumer. Id. § 1681n(a), (1)(A). 

If a CRA negligently violates a provision of the FCRA, it may be held liable 

for the actual damages arising from the violation. Id. § 1681o. 

B. Facts 

Plaintiff-Appellant Gia Sessa leased a Subaru Forrester from Linear 

Motors d/b/a Curry Hyundai Subaru in November 2018.The lease was 

financed by Hudson Valley Federal Credit Union (“Hudson Valley”). Under 

the lease, Sessa was required to pay $237.75 per month, and the “total of 

payments,” i.e. the full amount that Sessa was obligated to pay by the end of 

the lease, was $12,721.25. At the end of the 36-month lease, assuming all 

payments were made, Sessa had the option to purchase the vehicle for its 

“residual value,” i.e., the value of the vehicle at the end of the lease, in 

addition to certain fees. The lease states that the “residual value” of the 

vehicle was $19,444.07. Sessa was not required to purchase the vehicle at 

the end of the lease. 

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Defendant-Appellee Trans Union, LLC (“TransUnion”) is one of three 

nationwide consumer reporting agencies, which compile and sell consumer 

reports. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, List of Consumer Reporting 

Companies (last visited May 4, 2022), https://go.usa.gov/xu9Y9. 

TransUnion sells consumer reports to a wide variety of entities such as 

lenders, employers, landlords, and insurance companies. Id. These entities 

use the information in the consumer reports to inform decisions such as 

whether the consumer is eligible for credit, employment, housing, or 

insurance. Id. The consumer reports compiled and sold by TransUnion 

include, among other information, the consumer’s payment obligations and 

payment history on loans and other financial products, such as the 

automotive lease at issue in this case. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 

TransUnion (last visited May 4, 2022), https://go.usa.gov/xu9Ye. 

Hudson Valley furnished data to TransUnion pertaining to Sessa’s 

automotive lease. That data indicated she owed a “balloon payment” of 

$19,440 due on January 1, 2022. In fact, that amount was the “residual 

value” of the vehicle leased by Sessa, which she was not obligated to pay. 

In December 2018, Sessa discovered that her TransUnion consumer 

report showed that she owed a balloon payment on the lease. Sessa 

contacted the dealership and the lease assignees, who confirmed that she 

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did not owe a balloon payment. TransUnion’s records indicate that it issued 

thirteen consumer reports concerning Sessa that contain the allegedly 

erroneous balloon payment information. 

C. Procedural History 

On October 25, 2019, Sessa filed a putative class action lawsuit in the 

Southern District of New York againstTransUnion.2 Sessa alleged that 

TransUnion violated section 1681e(b) of the FCRA when it inaccurately 

reported that she owed a $19,440 balloon payment at the end of her lease. 

In a motion for summary judgment, TransUnion argued that it is not 

obligated to resolve a legal challenge to the validity of the balloon payment 

obligation reported by Hudson Valley and that it reasonably relied on 

Hudson Valley to report accurate information. TransUnion also argued that 

even if it did violate section 1681e(b), Sessa was not entitled to damages 

because the violation was neither willful nor negligent. 

The district court granted summary judgment to TransUnion. See 

Sessa v. Linear Motors, LLC, No. 19-cv-9914, 2021 WL 6052134, at *3 

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2021). The court held that Sessa had failed to make the 

“threshold showing” of inaccuracy. Id. at *6. In the court’s view, the 

2 The complaint also named Linear Motors, LLC, Hudson Valley Federal 

Credit Union, and CULA, LLC as defendants. These companies later settled, 

and the claims asserted against them are not at issue in this appeal. 

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information in the consumer report indicating that Sessa owed a balloon 

payment at the end of her lease was accurate, and TransUnion was thus 

entitled to summary judgment because “reporting accurate information 

absolves a CRA of liability.” Id. at *6. 

The court determined that the consumer report’s representation that 

Sessa owed a balloon payment at the end of the lease was accurate for two 

reasons. First, the court drew a distinction between factual and legal 

inaccuracies and held that “CRAs cannot be held liable when the accuracy 

at issue requires a legal determination as to the validity of the debt the 

agency reported.” Id. at *8. In the court’s view, whether Sessa in fact owed a 

balloon payment at the end of the lease was a “legal dispute” that requires 

“a legal interpretation of the loan’s terms.” Id. at *10. The court reached its 

holding despite acknowledging that the FCRA itself “does not ... draw a line 

between factual and legal accuracy,” and that the Second Circuit has never 

“explicitly adopt[ed]” this distinction. Id. at *6-7 (quotations omitted). 

Second, the court concluded that the information in Sessa’s credit 

report was factually accurate “because TransUnion reported the exact 

information it received from a data furnisher.” Id. at *9. The court 

emphasized that Sessa “admits that the data Hudson Valley furnished to 

TransUnion indicated that [Sessa] owed a balloon payment of $19,444.00.” 

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Id. at *9 (cleaned up). In the court’s view, “[t]his fact alone sustains 

TransUnion’s argument” and is all TransUnion needs to “absolve itself of 

FCRA liability.” Id. 

On January 13, 2022, Sessa appealed. 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

The FCRA requires CRAs to follow reasonable procedures to assure 

maximum possible accuracy of the information included in consumer 

reports. To hold a CRA liable for a reasonable-procedures violation, a 

private plaintiff must show as a threshold matter that his or her consumer 

report contains an inaccuracy. The district court’s opinion endorses a 

definition of inaccuracy that is not supported by the statute, risks exposing 

consumers to more inaccurate credit reporting, and thereby undercuts the 

remedial purpose of the FCRA. The district court erred in two key respects. 

First, the district court held that the FCRA is concerned only with 

“factual,” not “legal” inaccuracies. There is no support in the text of the 

statute for this reading. And importing a factual/legal distinction into the 

FCRA is likely to prove unworkable in practice. Indeed, this case illustrates 

the difficulty courts face in trying to distinguish factual and legal 

inaccuracies. TransUnion erroneously reported that Sessa owed a balloon 

payment at the end of her vehicle lease and drastically overstated the 

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amount she owed on the lease. The district court held that this inaccuracy 

should be characterized as “legal” simply because it implicates the terms of 

the contract. But whether Sessa owes a balloon payment and how much she 

owes are straightforward questions about the nature of her debt 

obligations. This Court should thus clarify that any incorrect information in 

a consumer report, whether “legal” or “factual” in character, constitutes an 

inaccuracy that triggers reasonable-procedures liability under the FCRA. 

Second, the district court held that a consumer report is factually 

accurate so long as the CRA correctly reports the information it received 

from a furnisher, regardless of whether that underlying information is 

actually correct. However, the FCRA requires procedures to assure 

“accuracy,” and the fact that a CRA obtains information from another 

source simply does not mean that the information is free from error. This 

Court should clarify that a CRA’s reliance on information provided by even 

a reputable furnisher does not categorically insulate the CRA from 

reasonable-procedures liability under the FCRA. 

For these reasons, this Court should reverse the district court’s 

holding that Sessa failed to satisfy her threshold burden of showing that her 

consumer report contained an inaccuracy. 

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ARGUMENT 

I. The FCRA Does Not Distinguish Between Factual and Legal 

Accuracy. 

Section 1681e(b) of the FCRA requires that “[w]henever a [CRA] 

prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure 

maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual 

about whom the report relates.” Congress believed “that in too many 

instances agencies were reporting inaccurate information,” and worried 

that inaccurate credit reporting “can literally ruin [a person]’s reputation 

without cause.” Dalton v. Cap. Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 414 

(4th Cir. 2001). Thus, “[i]n enacting [the] FCRA, Congress adopted a 

variety of measures designed to insure that agencies report accurate 

information.” Id. at 414–15. Among those measures, section 1681e(b) plays 

an important role because it uniquely places an affirmative obligation on 

CRAs to undertake reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of the 

information in consumer reports, a duty that exists separately from their 

obligations when a consumer identifies or disputes an inaccuracy. Compare 

15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (requiring CRAs to adopt reasonable procedures to 

assure the accuracy the maximum possible accuracy of information in 

consumer reports) with id. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (requiring CRAs to 

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reinvestigate the accuracy of information in a consumer report when 

disputed by the consumer). 

In order to hold a CRA liable under section 1681e(b), most courts 

have held that a private plaintiff must make a threshold showing that the 

CRA reported inaccurate information.3 See, e.g., Walton v. BMO Harris 

Bank N.A., 761 F. App’x 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that a CRA 

“cannot be liable as a threshold matter if it did not report inaccurate 

information”); Collins v. Experian Credit Reporting Serv., 494 F. Supp. 2d 

127, 135 (D. Conn. 2007) (“Every circuit to consider the question has agreed 

that this threshold showing is fundamental to the success of a claim under § 

1681e(b).”). The district court granted TransUnion summary judgment on 

this threshold question. See Sessa, 2021 WL 6052134, at *10. Accordingly, 

the court never reached the ultimate question of whether TransUnion 

3 Courts have generally held that private plaintiffs are required to show 

an inaccuracy in their report because under section 1681o(1) of the FCRA, a 

private cause of action is authorized “with respect to any consumer ... [for] 

an amount equal to ... any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a 

result of the failure.” “Read together, these provisions allow a consumer to 

bring suit for a violation of section 1681e(b) only if a credit reporting agency 

issues an inaccurate report on the consumer, since only then does harm 

flow from the agency’s violation.” Koropoulous v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 

F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). This requirement does not apply to 

government suits for section 1681e(b) violations since the government is 

not required to show injury. 

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utilized reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of the information it 

reports about consumers.4 The district court’s decision was erroneous 

because it rested on an atextual reading of the statute and would be 

impossible to implement in practice. 

A. The FCRA does not contain an exception for legal 

inaccuracies. 

The district court adopted an exceedingly narrow view of what 

constitutes an inaccuracy for purposes of the FCRA. Specifically, it held 

“that accuracy with respect to FCRA claims applies to factual but not legal 

accuracy.” Id. at *7. The factual/legal distinction undergirding the district 

court’s holding finds no support in the text of the statute. Section 1681e(b) 

references “accuracy” generally, and there is no textual basis to conclude 

that Congress intended that term to be limited to factual accuracy. As the 

district court acknowledged, “[s]ection 1681e(b) does not ... draw a line 

4 Nor did the Court reach the other elements of a reasonable-procedures 

claim. In addition to showing an inaccuracy, courts have held that a 

plaintiff asserting a claim under section 1681e(b) must show: “(1) the 

consumer reporting agency was negligent in that it failed to follow 

reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of its credit report; ... (3) the 

plaintiff was injured; and (4) the consumer reporting agency’s negligence 

proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Ogbon v. Beneficial Credit 

Servs., Inc., No. 10-cv-3760, 2013 WL 1430467, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 

2013) (quoting Gorman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 07-cv-1846, 

2008 WL 4934047, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2008)); see also Philbin v. 

TransUnion Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 963 (3d Cir. 1996) (same). 

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between factual and legal accuracy.” Sessa, 2021 WL 6052134, at *6 

(quoting Denan v. Trans Union LLC, 959 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 2020). 

The law requires CRAs to have “reasonable procedures” with respect 

to accuracy, without exception. Of course, what constitutes “reasonable 

procedures” may vary from situation to situation. Accordingly, there is little 

reason to believe that it is somehow impossible for CRAs to have such 

procedures with respect to legal accuracy. This Court should not endorse a 

judge-made exception to the statute’s plain text. 

Moreover, the statute states that CRAs must “assure maximum 

possible accuracy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (emphasis added). “[T]he 

distinction between ‘accuracy’ and ‘maximum possible accuracy’ is ... quite 

dramatic.” Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 709 (3d Cir. 2010). 

The use of the phrase “maximum possible accuracy” thus “suggests that 

Congress wanted to hold CRAs to a higher standard than mere technical 

accuracy.” Twumasi-Ankrah v. Checkr, Inc., 954 F.3d 938, 942 (6th Cir. 

2020). By holding that a so-called legal inaccuracy cannot serve as the 

plaintiff’s predicate for a section 1681e(b) violation, the district court 

ignored the statute’s clear textual indication that Congress intended CRAs 

to be held to a high standard of accuracy and that the scope of inaccuracies 

that trigger reasonable-procedures liability should be read expansively. 

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Case 22-87, Document 49, 05/05/2022, 3310228, Page22 of 40 

Indeed, as discussed below, the accuracy of a consumer report often 

turns on questions of contractual interpretation that can be plausibly 

characterized as legal, such as how much is owed, to whom, by when and 

for what reason. Failing to hold CRAs accountable for these sorts of 

inaccuracies in how they report a consumer’s debt obligations fails to fulfill 

the FCRA’s command that CRAs strive to assure “maximum possible 

accuracy.” 

Notwithstanding the absence of any factual/legal distinction in the 

text of the statute, some courts have concluded that the FCRA is 

unconcerned with or applies a different standard to so-called “legal” 

inaccuracies. E.g., Batterman v. BR Carroll Glenridge, LLC, 829 F. App’x 

478, 481 (11th Cir. 2020). However, as the district court acknowledged, this 

Court has never “explicitly adopt[ed] this view.” Sessa, 2021 WL 6052134, 

at *7. Nor should it do so here. Distinguishing between factual and legal 

inaccuracy is in practice impossible, and this case illustrates the conceptual 

flaws inherent in the factual/legal distinction that the district court 

imported into section 1681e(b) of the FCRA. 

B. It is difficult and arbitrary to distinguish between 

factual and legal accuracy. 

In addition to lacking a statutory basis, this Court should reject the 

district court’s reliance on a distinction between factual and legal 

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inaccuracy because it will prove unworkable in practice and undermine the 

purpose of the statutory regime. Many, if not all, inaccuracies in consumer 

reports could be characterized as legal, which would create an exception 

that would swallow the rule, effectively rendering section 1681e(b) a nullity. 

Consumer reports generally include information about an individual’s debt 

obligations. Yet, debts are creatures of contract. Thus, any inaccurate 

representation pertaining to an individual’s debt obligations could arguably 

be characterized as a legal inaccuracy insofar as determining the truth or 

falsity of the representation requires contractual interpretation. Cf. Kolel 

Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 

107 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that a question of “contractual interpretation 

... is a question of law”). 

This case illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing between factual 

and legal inaccuracy. TransUnion erroneously reported that Sessa owed a 

$19,444 balloon payment at the end of the lease. In fact, that figure is the 

“residual value” of the vehicle, an amount Sessa was not obligated to pay. 

The lease is unambiguous: Nothing in its text suggests the “residual value” 

of the vehicle is an amount due by Sessa. To the contrary, it defines 

“residual value” simply as “the Value of the vehicle at the end of Lease used 

in calculating my Base Monthly Rent.” And, it sets the “total of payments” 

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due by Sessa at $12,721.25, an amount vastly less than the $19,444 balloon 

payment that Sessa purportedly owed. Put simply, TransUnion erroneously 

reported that Sessa owed an amount she did not owe. A more basic, 

straightforward inaccuracy is hard to imagine. 

But TransUnion argued and the district court concluded that this 

inaccuracy was legal, not factual, because it implicated “a contractual 

dispute.” Sessa, 2021 WL 6052134, at *9 (quotation omitted). It is true that 

determining whether Sessa owed a $19,444 balloon payment requires 

reading and interpreting the contract. Beyond this, there is no basis to 

characterize the error as legal. The district court’s reasoning appears to be 

that any inaccuracy pertaining to a contract must implicate a contractual 

dispute and all contractual disputes are legal, not factual. But this 

understanding of what constitutes a legal inaccuracy could encompass 

nearly any inaccuracy pertaining to a debt instrument. 

Put simply, whether an inaccuracy is legal or factual depends entirely 

on how those terms are defined. Indeed, courts have long “noted the vexing 

nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law.” 

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). It is no surprise 

then that courts that have erroneously attempted to do so have struggled to 

distinguish between factual and legal inaccuracy in the FCRA context. 

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For example, in Cornock v. Trans Union LLC, 638 F. Supp. 2d 158 

(D.N.H. 2009), the court considered whether the plaintiff’s allegation that a 

credit card account was fraudulently opened in his name implicated factual 

or legal accuracy. The court explained that the plaintiff’s challenge to the 

debt “could be called ‘factual’ in the sense that ... he did not sign the credit 

card application as a matter of fact,” but, on the other hand, “it could also 

be called ‘legal’ in the sense that ... he claimed that he therefore had no 

liability as a matter of law.” Id. The court’s difficulty disentangling factual 

disputes from legal question led it to observe that “classifying a dispute over 

a debt as ‘factual’ or ‘legal’ will usually prove a frustrating exercise.” Id. at 

163. The court ultimately concluded that distinguishing “between a ‘factual’ 

and a ‘legal’ inaccuracy” for FCRA purposes is “unworkable.” Id. at 164. 

Other courts, too, have found distinguishing between factual and legal 

accuracy to be a daunting task. In Chuluunbat v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 

4 F.4th 562 (7th Cir. 2021), the Seventh Circuit considered a set of seven 

consolidated FCRA cases in which plaintiffs claimed they did not owe 

certain debts to the creditors listed on their consumer reports because the 

debts had purportedly been assigned to other companies. The district 

courts offered different reasoning and conclusions in each of the cases: two 

of the courts determined that ownership of a debt was a question of law, 

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one decided that ownership of a debt was a mixed question of law and fact, 

and four “eschewed a rigid distinction between law and fact and focused on 

the institutional competency of the [CRAs] to resolve the claims.” Id. at 

566. 

It is telling that four courts considering the same set of facts were 

unable to resolve whether a consumer report that misidentifies the owner 

of a debt is factually or legally inaccurate. As one of those courts explained, 

“[l]abeling an issue as one of fact, one of law, or a mix of the two is not 

always simple.” Amorah v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 19 CV 7534, 2020 

WL 6565220, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2020). It concluded, perplexingly, that 

the same question may be factual in one context but legal in another. Id. at 

*3. For example, whether a right has been assigned may be a factual 

question in the breach-of-contract context, but somehow a legal question in 

the FCRA context. Id. That court ultimately decided that “labeling debt 

ownership in the abstract as an issue of fact, a mixed question, or a 

question of law is beside the point.” Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 

As these cases illustrate, the factual/legal distinction adopted by the 

district court is not only without any basis in the statutory text, but it 

invites CRAs and furnishers to skirt their legal obligations by characterizing 

inaccuracies as “legal” (as evidenced in this case), while confusing rather 

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than clarifying the scope of liability under section 1681e(b) of the FCRA. 

This court should thus decline to endorse such a distinction. 

C. The district court’s arguments for importing a 

legal/factual distinction into the FCRA are 

unpersuasive. 

The district court offers two justifications for reading “accuracy” in 

section 1681e(b) to mean only factual accuracy, not legal accuracy. Neither 

is persuasive. 

First, the court observed that under the FCRA’s implementing 

regulations “only furnishers are tasked with accurately reporting liability” 

whereas “CRAs are bound by no comparative duty.” Sessa, 2021 WL 

6052134, at *7. It is true that those regulations compel furnishers to adopt 

“written policies and procedures regarding the accuracy and integrity of the 

information relating to consumers that it furnishes to a [CRA].” 12 C.F.R. § 

1022.42(a). Those regulations also define “accuracy” with respect to 

furnishers to mean, among other things, that the information “correctly[] 

[r]eflects the terms of and liability for the account or other relationship.” Id. 

§ 1022.41(a), (1). The district court reasoned that “having charged a 

furnisher with duty to review the legal validity of a debt ... the CFPB clearly 

knew what language would charge CRAs with an identical duty.” Sessa, 

2021 WL 6052134. 

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The FCRA’s framework, however, places responsibilities for accuracy 

on both the CRA and the furnisher. There is no inconsistency between 

imposing a duty of accurately reporting liabilities on furnishers, while also 

imposing duties on CRAs to help identify, investigate, and correct 

inaccuracies when the furnisher fails to do. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); 

§ 1681i(a)(1)(A). The Bureau’s regulatory silence as to the meaning of 

“accuracy” as it pertains to CRAs has no bearing on the proper 

interpretation of section 1681e(b). E.g., Mora-Meraz v. Thomas, 601 F.3d 

933, 941 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We also may not read into the agency’s silence 

and make inferences thereupon.”); Cable News Network, Inc. v. FBI, 293 F. 

Supp. 3d 59, 75 (D.D.C. 2018)(“[T]he agency’s silence is just that — 

silence.”). If anything, the regulatory definition of “accuracy” as it pertains 

to furnishers should be read to apply to CRAs as well. E.g., United States v. 

Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Normally, the same term 

appearing in different portions of a single act is taken to have the same 

meaning in each appearance.”).

5 

5 Notably, the Bureau is specifically required by statute to prescribe 

regulations governing furnishers. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(8)(A). There is 

no analogous statutory mandate compelling the Bureau (or any other 

agency) to prescribe regulations governing CRAs, and to date no analogous 

regulations have been promulgated. 

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Second, the district court suggests that “creditors are ‘in a better 

position to determine the validity’ of a debt instrument they themselves 

hold than CRAs.” Sessa, 2021 WL 6052134, at *8. Whether or not this is 

true, it is not a persuasive reason to categorically exempt CRAs from 

reasonable-procedures liability for so-called legal inaccuracies. CRAs still 

have a statutory obligation to use reasonable procedures to assure that 

consumer reports are accurate. To the extent that assessing certain legal 

issues imposes a significant burden on CRAs, that concern could be taken 

into account in determining what procedures are “reasonable,” which 

requires balancing the potential harms from inaccuracies with the costs 

imposed on CRAs. E.g., Wenning v. On-Site Manager, Inc., No. 14-cv9693, 2016 WL 3538379, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2016). 

D. Any inaccuracyin a consumer report, whether factual 

or legal, is sufficient to serve as a predicate element of 

FCRA liability. 

The district court correctly observed that “the overwhelming weight 

of authority holds that a credit report is ... inaccurate either when it is 

patently incorrect or when it is misleading in such a way and to such an 

extent that it can be expected to have an adverse effect on credit decisions.” 

Sessa, 2021 WL 6052134, at *6; see also Grayson v. Equifax Credit Info. 

Servs., No. 18-cv-6977, 2021 WL 2010398, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021) 

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Case 22-87, Document 49, 05/05/2022, 3310228, Page30 of 40 

(collecting cases). This rule should govern regardless of whether the 

inaccuracy is factual or legal. 

Here, TransUnion incorrectly reported that Sessa owed a substantial 

balloon payment at the end of the lease and thus overstated the total 

amount Sessa owed on the lease. Whether that error is best described as 

factual or legal, the consumer report was thus clearly incorrect in 

describing an important aspect of the debt owed by Sessa, including the 

amount she owed. See Sessa, 2021 WL 6052134, at *7 (referencing 

“inaccurate amounts” as one example of patently incorrect information 

(quoting Rodas v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 19-CV-07706, 2020 WL 

4226669, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2020), aff’d sub nom. Chuluunbat v. 

Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 4 F.4th 562 (7th Cir. 2021)). Because the 

consumer report was incorrect, Sessa has satisfied her threshold burden of 

showing that her consumer report contained an inaccuracy. 

II. The FCRA Requires Credit Reporting Agencies to Maintain 

Reasonable Procedures to Assure the Accuracy of 

Information Provided by Furnishers. 

The district court also erred in holding that “CRAs can only be held 

liable for FCRA claims when the information reported does not match the 

information furnished.” Sessa, 2021 WL 6052134, at *8. According to the 

court, “TransUnion reported the exact information it received from a data 

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furnisher,” and, therefore, Sessa “cannot establish as a matter of law that 

TransUnion reported inaccurate information.” Id. at *9 (emphasis added). 

This holding is flawed for two reasons. First, the mere fact that a CRA 

correctly reports the information relayed to it by a furnisher does not 

render that information accurate. Therefore, a CRA’s reliance on a 

furnisher is not a proper basis to reject a reasonable-procedures claim at 

the threshold level, without ever assessing the reasonableness of the 

procedures used by the CRA. Second, while the fact that a CRA relied on an 

accredited furnisher may constitute some evidence of the reasonableness of 

its procedures, whether those procedures are reasonably designed to assure 

the maximum possible accuracy of the information in a consumer report is 

a fact-intensive question that usually cannot be resolved at summary 

judgment. 

A. Information provided by a furnisher is not per se 

accurate. 

The fact that information is provided to a CRA does not categorically 

make that information “accurate.” There is simply no reason to believe that 

information provided to a CRA by a furnisher is always “free from error” or 

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“conforming exactly to the truth.”6 Furnishers can—and do—provide CRAs 

with information that has errors, or is “inaccurate” under any plausible 

definition of that term. Not surprisingly, courts have routinely held that 

CRAs can be held liable for inaccuracies in consumer reports that 

originated with third parties. Any other rule would be contrary to the 

statutory text, allowing CRAs to evade reasonable-procedures liability even 

when their procedures were plainly inadequate to assure maximum 

possible accuracy of the information in consumer reports, would expose 

consumers to inaccurate credit reporting, and would vitiate the remedial 

purposes of the FCRA. 

In Cortez, the Third Circuit held that TransUnion could not evade 

reasonable-procedures liability simply because it correctly reported 

information it pulled from a government database: “Congress surely did not 

intentionally weave an exception into the fabric of the FCRA that would 

destroy its remedial scheme by allowing a credit reporting agency to escape 

responsibility for its carelessness whenever misleading information finds its 

way into a credit report through the agency of a third party.” Cortez, 617 

6 Accurate, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/accurate (“1: free from error especially as the 

result of care an accurate diagnosis 2: conforming exactly to truth or to a 

standard”). 

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F.3d at 710. Rather, the court held that TransUnion was required to 

compare the information provided by the third party to its “own records” 

and screen for “discrepancies.” Id. 

District courts in this Circuit have reached the same conclusion. One 

court rejected as “misguided” a defendant’s argument that it could not be 

held liable under section 1681e(b) because it relied on “a well-established, 

reputable, and reliable third party vendor.” Watson v. Caruso, 424 F. Supp. 

3d 231, 246 (D. Conn.Dec.2,2019). “If this were the case,” the court 

reasoned, “then [CRAs] could insulate themselves from liability under 

section 1681e, so long as they outsource their work to contractors ... The 

FCRA’s remedial purpose could not be achieved under that theory.” Id. 

Another court rejected a defendant’s argument that it could not be held 

liable under section 1681e(b) “as a matter of law because it relied on 

records obtained from [the New York Department of Corrections].” Wilson 

v. Corelogic SafeRent, LLC, No. 14-cv-2477, 2017 WL 4357568, at *4 

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017). The court reasoned that “[t]o accept [the 

defendant]’s argument that reliance on information obtained from a 

governmental agency, regardless of context, categorically insulates a CRA 

from liability, would severely undermine FCRA’s remedial purpose.” Id. 

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Accordingly, the district court’s holding that TransUnion’spassthrough reporting of the information it received from Hudson Valley, the 

furnisher, is “all [TransUnion] needs to ... absolve itself of FCRA liability,” 

Sessa, 2021 WL 6052134, at *9, finds no support in the law. Indeed, the 

sole case the court cites for that proposition, Frydman v. Experian Info. 

Sols., Inc., No. 14-cv-9013, 2016 WL 11483839 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2016), 

supports the opposite conclusion. The court there held that “[a] jury 

reasonably could conclude” that the credit reporting agency “report[ed] an 

inaccurate debt.” Id. at *12. It reached this conclusion despite finding that 

the CRA correctly reported information it received from furnishers, all of 

which were “generally reliable sources of consumer credit information.” Id. 

at *13. In other words, unlike the district court in this case, the Frydman 

court properly rejected the suggestion that a CRA’s reliance on furnishers 

allowed it to dispose of plaintiff’s reasonable-procedures claim on the 

threshold question of whether the consumer report contained an 

inaccuracy. 

To be sure, a credit reporting agency’s reliance on a reputable 

furnisher, as discussed below, may be relevant to the ultimate question of 

whether the consumer reporting agency followed reasonable procedures to 

assure maximum possible accuracy of the information contained in a 

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consumer report. But that reliance is irrelevant to the threshold question of 

whether a consumer report contains an inaccuracy. 

B. Reliance on a furnisher to provide accurate 

information is not per se reasonable. 

This Court should reverse because whether TransUnion followed 

reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the 

information in Sessa’s consumer report is a fact question that cannot be 

resolved at summary judgment. A credit reporting agency’s reliance on a 

reputable furnisher may be evidence that the credit reporting agency 

followed reasonable procedures. However, contrary to the district court’s 

holding, reliance on a furnisher does not categorically insulate a credit 

reporting agency from reasonable procedures liability under section 

1681e(b). Whether TransUnion’s procedures for screening furnishers were 

in fact reasonable and whether an error concerning the mischaracterization 

of the residual value of the car as a “balloon payment” could have been 

detected through other reasonable procedures that TransUnion failed to 

adopt are all fact questions that must be resolved. 

In contrast to the district court’s ruling, even courts that have held 

that a credit reporting agency may rely on information furnished by a thirdparty source make clear that the reliance is only appropriate if, at 

minimum, the source is reputable and there is no other reason to discredit 

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the information. E.g., Wright v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 805 F.3d 1232, 

1240 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding a CRA can rely on information furnished by 

source as long as it is “not inaccurate on its face, inconsistent with 

information the CRAs already had on file, or obtained from a source that 

was known to be unreliable”); Sarver v. Experian Info. Sols., 390 F.3d 969, 

972 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding a CRA can rely on information “received from 

a source that it reasonably believes is reputable ... unless the [CRA] receives 

notice of systemic problems with its procedures”); see generally Fed. Trade 

Comm’n, 40 Years of Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act: An 

FTC Staff Report with Summary of Interpretations 67 (2011), 

https://go.usa.gov/xupMd (noting that a CRA must use “a source that it 

reasonably believes to be reputable”). 

Thus, a CRA’s reliance on a furnisher is never, in and of itself, 

sufficient to show that the CRA followed reasonable procedures. Indeed, a 

CRA’s reasonable-procedures responsibilities are not limited to screening 

furnishers. For example, CRAs are required to “establish procedures to 

avoid reporting information from its furnishers that appears implausible or 

inconsistent” and avoid “obvious logical inconsistencies, such as a credit 

account opened when the consumer was known to be a minor.” Id. at 67-

69; see also Cortez, 617 F.3d at 709 (holding that “inconsistencies between 

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two different reports concerning a single consumer” were sufficient 

evidence that procedures were unreasonable). 

Put simply, a CRA’s reliance on information provided by a furnisher 

or other source is not “per se reasonable for purposes § 1681e(b).” Watson, 

424 F. Supp. 3d at 247 (quoting Wilson, 2017 WL 4357568, at *4). Even 

reliance on information received from a government agency is insufficient 

to “categorically insulates a CRA from liability.” Id. (cleaned up). Rather, 

“‘reasonableness’ under [the] FCRA requires ‘context-specific balancing.’” 

Id. (quoting Wilson, 2017 WL 4357568, at *4); see also Wenning, 2016 WL 

3538379, at *16 (“Assessing reasonableness generally requires ‘balancing 

the potential harm from inaccuracy against the burden on the agency of 

safeguarding against such inaccuracy.’” (quoting Houston v. TRW Info. 

Servs., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 689, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 

This balancing act generally does not lend itself to resolution at 

summary judgment: “Whether or not the credit reporting agency followed 

reasonable procedures ‘will be a jury question in the overwhelming 

majority of cases.’” Wenning, 2016 WL 3538379, at *16 (quoting Gorman 

v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 07-cv-1846, 2008 WL 4934047, at *4 

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2008)) (collecting cases); see also Cortez, 617 F.3d at 

709 (“[T]he reasonableness of a [CRA]’s procedures is ‘normally a question 

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for trial unless the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the procedures is 

beyond question.’” (quoting Sarver, 390 F.3d at 971)); Crabill v. Trans 

Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The determination of the 

‘reasonableness’ of the defendant’s procedures ... is treated as a factual 

question even when the underlying facts are undisputed. It therefore 

cannot be resolved on summary judgment unless the reasonableness or 

unreasonableness of the procedures is beyond question.”). 

In short, the fact that TransUnion relied on information provided by a 

furnisher does not establish the absence of a fact issue as to whether 

TransUnion followed reasonable procedures. Determining whether 

TransUnion followed reasonable procedures is a fact-intensive question 

that must be resolved by a jury. Accordingly, this Court should reverse and 

allow the trier-of-fact to assess whether TransUnion’s procedures comport 

with section 1681e(b) of the FCRA. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court should be 

reversed. 

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Case 22-87, Document 49, 05/05/2022, 3310228, Page39 of 40 

May 5, 2022 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Ryan Cooper 

Seth Frotman 

General Counsel 

Steven Y. Bressler 

Acting Deputy General Counsel 

Laura Hussain 

Assistant General Counsel 

Ryan Cooper 

Counsel 

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 

BUREAU 

1700 G Street NW 

Washington, DC 20552 

(202) 702-7541 

ryan.cooper@cfpb.gov 

Joel Marcus 

Deputy General Counsel 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, DC 20580 

(202) 326-3350 

jmarcus@ftc.gov 

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Case 22-87, Document 49, 05/05/2022, 3310228, Page40 of 40 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

I hereby certify that this brief complies with Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and (6) because it has been prepared in 14-

point Georgia, a proportionally spaced font. 

I further certify that this brief complies with the type-volume 

limitation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(5) and Local Rule 

29.1(c) because it contains 6,645 words, excluding the portions exempted 

by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(f). 

May 5, 2022 /s/ Ryan Cooper 

Ryan Cooper