Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sheron A. Barton, Misc. Docket AG No. 86, Sept. 

Term, 2012, Misc. Docket AG No. 13, Sept. Term, 2013, and Misc. Docket AG No. 57, 

Sept. Term, 2013, Opinion by Battaglia, J. 

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE - SANCTIONS – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION 

Respondent, Sheron A. Barton, violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and 

(b), 1.16(d), 5.3(a), (b) and (c), 5.4(b), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a), (c) and (d) of the Maryland 

Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct. Indefinite suspension is the appropriate 

sanction when an attorney neglects client affairs, fails to refund unearned fees, 

commingles funds, fails to supervise a nonlawyer employee and makes a 

misrepresentation to the tribunal. 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, 

Maryland 

Case Nos. 28463M; 28714M; 29405M

Argued: December 9, 2014

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

 MARYLAND 

Misc. Docket AG No. 86 

September Term, 2012 

 Misc. Docket AG Nos. 13 and 57 

 September Term, 2013 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 

COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 

v. 

SHERON A. BARTON 

Barbera, C.J. 

Harrell

Battaglia 

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, 

Specially Assigned) 

 JJ.

Opinion by Battaglia, J. 

Filed: March 2, 2015
1

Sheron A. Barton, Respondent, was admitted to the Bar of this Court on December 

17, 2002. On February 25, 2013, May 1, 2013 and October 23, 2013, the Attorney 

Grievance Commission, (“Petitioner” or “Bar Counsel”), acting pursuant to Maryland 

Rule 16-751(a),1

 filed three separate Petitions for Disciplinary or Remedial Action 

against Respondent related to her role as the supervising attorney of the Cardinal Law 

Firm, located in Camp Springs, Maryland. 

In its initial petition, filed on February 25, 2013, in which Winifred Winston, 

Brent Ellis, Howard and Avon Chapman (“the Chapmans”), and Joseph and Ernestine 

Johnson (“the Johnsons”) were complainants, collectively identified as the “Complaint of 

Bar Counsel,” as well as Rosemary Tyner and Teresa Barnes, Petitioner alleged that 

Respondent violated the following Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 

(“Rule”): 1.1 (Competence),2 1.3 (Diligence),3 

 

1 Rule 16-751(a) provides, in relevant part: 

(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon 

approval or direction of Commission. Upon approval or direction of the 

Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial 

Action in the Court of Appeals. 

2 Rule 1.1 provides: 

 A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 

Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness 

and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

3 Rule 1.3 provides: 

 A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 

representing a client.
2

1.4(a) and (b) (Communication),4 1.5(a) (Fees),5

 1.15(a) and (b) (Safekeeping Property),6

 

4 Rule 1.4 provides, in relevant part: 

(a) A lawyer shall: 

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect 

to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is required 

by these Rules; 

(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; 

(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and 

(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s 

conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not 

permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or 

other law. 

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 

permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 

5 Rule 1.5 provides, in relevant part:

(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an 

unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be 

considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 

following: 

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 

involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 

particular employment will preclude other employment of the lawyer; 

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 

performing the services; and 

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

6 Rule 1.15 provides, in relevant part: 

(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a 

lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the 

lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account 

maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules, and 

records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that 

Chapter. Other property shall be identified specifically as such and 

appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall 

 (continued...) 
3

1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation),7

 5.1(a), (b) and (c) (Responsibilities 

of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers),8 5.3(a), (b) and (c) (Responsibilities 

 

(...continued)

be created and maintained. Complete records of the account funds and of 

other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a 

period of at least five years after the date the record was created. 

(b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer’s own funds in a client trust account 

only as permitted by Rule 16-607 b. 

7 Rule 1.16(d) provides: 

(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the 

extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving 

reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other 

counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and 

refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned 

or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent 

permitted by other law. 

8 Rule 5.1 provides, in relevant part: 

(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with 

other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, 

shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures 

giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the 

Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct. 

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall 

make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the 

Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct. 

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of the 

Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct if: 

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the 

conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the 

law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory 

authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when 

its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable 

remedial action.

The hearing judge made no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding Rule 5.1(a), 

(b) and (c), and Bar Counsel filed no exceptions. We, therefore, will not discuss Rule 5.1. 
4

Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants),9

 5.4(a) and (b) (Professional Independence of a 

Lawyer),10 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law),11

and 8.4(c) and (d) (Misconduct).12

 

 

9 Rule 5.3. provides, in relevant part:

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer: 

(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers 

possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall make 

reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving 

reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the 

professional obligations of the lawyer; 

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall 

make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible 

with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be 

a violation of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct if 

engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies 

the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the 

law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory 

authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its 

consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable 

remedial action; 

10 Rule 5.4 provides, in relevant part:

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except 

that:

(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or associate 

may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time 

after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified 

persons; 

(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a lawyer who is deceased or 

disabled or who has disappeared may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 

1.17, pay the purchase price to the estate or representative of the lawyer. 

(3) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a 

deceased, retired, disabled, or suspended lawyer may pay to that lawyer or 

that lawyer’s estate the proportion of the total compensation which fairly 

 (continued...)
5

In a second petition, filed on May 1, 2013, the complainants were Arnell 

Simmons, Gwendelyn Rhett and Winifred Winston, clients of the Cardinal Law Firm,

and Respondent was charged with violations of Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 

1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 5.3(a), (b) and (c) (Responsibilities Regarding 

Nonlawyer Assistants), 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional 

Practice of Law), and 8.4(d) (Misconduct). The Commission also charged Respondent 

with a violation of Rule 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation) with respect 

to Ms. Winston’s complaint. 

In a third petition, filed on October 23, 2013, the complainants were Alma 

Miljkovic and Christine Gray-Knight, clients of the Cardinal Law Firm, and Respondent 

 

(...continued) 

represents the services rendered by the former lawyer;

(4) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a 

compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or 

in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and 

(5) a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit 

organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the 

lawyer in the matter. 

(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the 

activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law. 

11 Rule 5.5(a) provides: 

(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the 

regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in 

doing so. 

12 Rule 8.4 states, in pertinent part: 

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

* * * 

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation; 

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
6

was charged with violations of Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) 

(Communication), 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating 

Representation), 5.3(a), (b) and (c) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants), 

5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law), and 8.4(a) 

and (d) (Misconduct).13 The Commission also charged Respondent with a violation of 

Rule 1.5(a) (Fees) with respect to Ms. Miljkovic’s complaint. 

By Order, we referred the initial petition to Judge Marielsa A. Bernard of the 

Circuit Court for Montgomery County for a hearing, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-757.14

 

13 Rule 8.4(a) provides: 

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 

* * * 

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 

through the acts of another;

14 Maryland Rule 16-757 states: 

(a) Generally. The hearing of a disciplinary or remedial action is governed 

by the rules of evidence and procedure applicable to a court trial in a civil 

action tried in a circuit court. Unless extended by the Court of Appeals, the 

hearing shall be completed within 120 days after service on the respondent 

of the order designating a judge. Before the conclusion of the hearing, the 

judge may permit any complainant to testify, subject to cross-examination, 

regarding the effect of the alleged misconduct. A respondent attorney may 

offer, or the judge may inquire regarding, evidence otherwise admissible of 

any remedial action undertaken relevant to the allegations. Bar Counsel 

may respond to any evidence of remedial action. 

(b) Burdens of proof. The petitioner has the burden of proving the 

averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence. A respondent 

who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation 

has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the 

evidence.

(c) Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate 

(continued...)
7

Respondent was personally served with the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action 

and the Writ of Summons, to which she filed a timely response. 

By Order, we referred the second petition to Judge David A. Boynton of the 

Circuit Court for Montgomery County for a hearing, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-757. 

Respondent was again personally served with the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial 

Action, our Order, and the Writ of Summons, to which Respondent filed a timely 

response. We issued an Order consolidating the first two petitions and transferred the 

second petition from Judge Boynton to Judge Bernard. 

By Order, we referred the third petition to Judge Bernard for a hearing, pursuant to 

Maryland Rule 16-757. Respondent was served through counsel with the Petition for 

Disciplinary or Remedial Action, our Order and the Writ of Summons. Respondent filed 

a Motion to Extend Time and Consolidate Disciplinary Petitions. We issued an Order 

consolidating the third petition with the two other previously consolidated petitions. 

 

(...continued)

into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of fact, including 

findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of 

law. If dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. 

Unless the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or 

transcribed statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record 

no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall 

mail a copy of the statement to each party. 

(d) Transcript. The petitioner shall cause a transcript of the hearing to be 

prepared and included in the record. 

(e) Transmittal of record. Unless a different time is ordered by the Court 

of Appeals, the clerk shall transmit the record to the Court of Appeals 

within 15 days after the statement of findings and conclusions is filed.
8

Respondent was served through counsel with Interrogatories, a Request for 

Production of Documents and a Request for Admission of Facts and Genuineness of 

Documents, to which no response was forthcoming. Bar Counsel then filed an 

Emergency Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Maryland Rules 2-432 and 2-433, to which 

no answer was filed. On the Friday prior to the January 27, 2014 hearing date on the 

Consolidated Petition, Respondent responded to the discovery requests, albeit over two 

weeks out of time. On the hearing date, prior to taking evidence, after arguments of 

counsel, Judge Bernard granted Bar Counsel’s motion and determined that: 

Based on the tardiness in Respondent’s response to discovery (Respondent 

incompletely responded to Petitioner’s discovery request in the afternoon 

on the last business day before trial, Friday, January 24, 2014), this Court 

deemed each Request for Admission “admitted” but deferred ordering any 

relief so that such relief could be addressed if and when an issue arose at 

trial.

During the evidentiary hearings, Bar Counsel presented testimony from 

Gwendelyn Rhett, Teresa Barnes, Arnell Simmons and Winifred Winston, all of whom 

had been complainants included in the first and second petitions, as well as relied on the 

deemed admissions. Bar Counsel introduced various documents, which were admitted 

into evidence, including a Post-Trial Memorandum from the United States Trustee for 

Region 4 (“Trustee Memo”), as well as a Memorandum of Decision from the United 

States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland (“Bankruptcy Court Memo”) to 

which was appended an Order directing Respondent to refund fees in the Winston case. 

Bar Counsel also introduced emails and letters between Respondent and Ms. Rhett, as 

well as the complaints to Bar Counsel from Ms. Rhett, Ms. Barnes, Ms. Simmons and 
9

Ms. Winston, and Barton’s response to Bar Counsel about each complaint, which were 

admitted into evidence. Finally, a letter from Barton to Richard Tolbert, the former office 

manager of the Cardinal Law Firm, as well as an email exchange between the two, were 

admitted into evidence. 

Barton testified on her own behalf; she was precluded from calling Leon Sutton, 

an individual who had served as a paralegal at her Washington D.C. office, as a witness, 

because of her failure to respond to the Request for Admissions. Respondent did 

introduce various documents, which were admitted into evidence, including 

correspondence between Respondent and M&T Bank, a case list from the Cardinal Law 

Firm, two emails between Barton and Mr. Tolbert, an email from Barton to a document 

courier service, the federal Form 1099 for each of her employees from 2011, an 

application for statement of charges and a civil complaint filed by Barton against Mr. 

Tolbert, which were filed in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County 

and the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, respectively, as well as a case 

information document showing pending criminal charges against Mr. Tolbert.15

 

15 Following the issuance of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and proposed 

conclusions of law, Respondent filed a motion to supplement the record to include a 

subpoena for her to appear in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County as a witness 

for theft allegations against Mr. Tolbert as well as her application for statement of 

charges filed with the District Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County. 

Respondent argues that this evidence shows that Mr. Tolbert, not Respondent, is the thief. 

The Application for Statement of Charges had already been admitted at the hearing as 

Exhibit Number Seven; the subpoena directed to her is irrelevant. We deny the motion to 

supplement the record. 
10 

Judge Bernard issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which she 

ultimately determined that Respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 

1.15(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 5.3(a), (b) and (c), 5.4(a) and (b), 5.5(a), 8.4(a), (c) and (d). 

Judge Bernard’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law state:16

In light of the admitted Requests for Admissions, the additional 

evidence submitted by the parties at trial, the trial testimony and the 

arguments of counsel, this Court finds the following facts to have been 

established by clear and convincing evidence: 

1. Respondent graduated from Nova Southeastern University in August 

1998 and was admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on 

December 17, 2002. 

2. In 2010 and 2011, Respondent owned and operated a law firm located at 

5897 Allentown Rd., Camp Springs, Maryland, doing business under the 

name “Cardinal Law Firm”. Respondent owned and operated this firm. 

Respondent also maintained a law office in Washington D.C. 

3. Respondent was the supervising attorney of the Cardinal Law Firm. 

4. Cardinal Law Firm regularly advertised in the local “Pennysaver” 

advertising circular, holding itself out as handling bankruptcy cases. 

5. The Camp Springs office of the Cardinal Law Firm primarily 

represented clients regarding the filing of bankruptcy petitions.

6. Richard Tolbert (hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Tolbert”) owned the 

building at 5897 Allentown Road, Camp Springs, Maryland, at which the 

Cardinal Law Firm was located. 

7. Respondent employed Mr. Tolbert as the office manager for the Camp 

Springs office of the Cardinal Law Firm. Mr. Tolbert worked full-time at 

the Camp Springs office while Respondent primarily worked in her office 

in the District of Columbia. 

 

16 Internal record citations within Judge Bernard’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 

Law have been omitted. 
11 

8. Mr. Tolbert, who is not licensed to practice law, regularly met with 

prospective clients of the Cardinal Law Firm, accepted their cases, and set 

the fee that would be charged by the Cardinal Law Firm. Mr. Tolbert led 

several clients, such as Winifred Winston, to believe he was an attorney and 

regularly met with these prospective clients before they met with 

Respondent. 

9. Respondent permitted Mr. Tolbert to meet with prospective clients, to 

accept cases and set fees, and was aware that Mr. Tolbert was doing so on 

behalf of the Cardinal Law Firm. 

10. At trial, Respondent testified that Mr. Tolbert’s duties were limited to 

taking client names and contact information and immediately forwarding 

this information to her. She indicated that he had no authority to charge 

client fees or to negotiate checks. This Court does not find Respondent’s 

testimony to be credible, however, and it is contradicted by all of the other 

evidence submitted at trial. In a letter to Richard Tolbert (and apparently 

also sent to the U.S. Trustee’s office), Respondent stated “We entered into 

an arrangement around September/October of last year 2010, where you 

would work for me as an accountant, office manager, book[k]eeper, and 

sometimes intake person, you collected money for the firm.” Respondent 

also stated: “I gave you the Maryland rules to read and told you what the 

legal fees for bankruptcy cases in Maryland were supposed to be, 

additionally you worked with other attorneys before, so you knew.” 

Respondent further stated in the letter that she discovered that: “Mr. Tolbert 

spoke to new clients and had them sign retainers without giving me an 

accurate list of names and numbers who these clients are.” Respondent also 

told William Ramsey, an Investigator with the Attorney Grievance 

Commission, that she collected and deposited fees at first, but later Mr. 

Tolbert took over that role, although Respondent asserted that this 

statement only pertained to fees she had previously quoted to clients she 

had already met. Several emails introduced at trial also indicated that Mr. 

Tolbert and the firm were accepting client cases and charging fees 

independent of Respondent’s guidance. Respondent’s trial testimony that 

she had, on several occasions, educated Mr. Tolbert and Ms. Crawford on 

appropriate and reasonable fees in bankruptcy cases only further details 

Respondent’s level of participation and awareness. 

11. Additionally, Arnell Simmons, Winifred Winston, and Gwendelyn 

Rhett, all of whom this Court found to be credible, each testified that Mr. 

Tolbert specifically informed them that Respondent would be the attorney 
12 

handling their case. Each witness also testified that Mr. Tolbert provided 

them with contact information for Respondent during their initial meeting. 

12. Mr. Tolbert frequently advised clients regarding what type of 

bankruptcy petition would be appropriate to be filed in their case, routinely 

accepted retainers and fees from clients, and deposited the funds he 

received from the firm’s clients in an account maintained under the name 

“A. Barton Law Firm”. This account was not an escrow account. 

13. Respondent permitted Mr. Tolbert to deposit funds in her “A. Barton 

Law Firm” operating account. 

14. Respondent was aware that Mr. Tolbert deposited client retainers in the 

“A. Barton Law Firm” operating account. 

15. Respondent gave Mr. Tolbert a limited number of checks to disburse 

funds from the “A. Barton Law Firm” operating account to pay office 

expenses. Notably Respondent testified during trial that she continued to 

provide “blank” checks to Mr. Tolbert for several months after she had 

learned that Mr. Tolbert had stolen money from the firm. 

16. Respondent regularly received bank statements for the “A. Barton Law 

Firm” operating account during 2010 and 2011 but testified that she did not 

review them. 

With respect to the specific allegations of Ms. Winston, the hearing judge found: 

17. Respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of her 

client, Winifred Winston (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Winston”) on or 

about March 10, 2011. 

18. Ms. Winston paid the Cardinal Law Firm a flat fee of $4,000.00, which 

Respondent disclosed on a Disclosure of Compensation filed in the 

Bankruptcy Court. Ms. Winston later paid the Cardinal Law Firm an 

additional fee payment of $526.00, but Respondent did not disclose Ms. 

Winston’s $526.00 payment to the Bankruptcy Court. 

19. Ms. Winston first met Respondent on April 21, 2011, at a 341 hearing 

on her bankruptcy case. Respondent arrived late for the hearing. According 

to Ms. Winston’s testimony, Respondent was unprepared for this hearing 

and unfamiliar with Ms. Winston’s case.
13 

20. After the hearing on April 21, 2011, Ms. Winston discussed her case 

with Respondent and told her that she wanted to sell her condominium and 

to have the second mortgage removed. Respondent told Ms. Winston to 

contact Mr. Tolbert to discuss the issues regarding sale of the condominium 

and removal of the second mortgage. Upon contacting Mr. Tolbert, Ms. 

Winston was told that an additional fee would be required, which Ms. 

Winston paid by a check payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 

21. Respondent failed to appear in court at a confirmation hearing in Ms. 

Winston’s case on May 24, 2011. Ms. Winston testified that she had to 

make several calls to the Cardinal Law Firm in an effort to find Respondent 

to see if she would appear. Ms. Winston was told by office personnel that 

Respondent was on her way to court. 

22. Ultimately, Respondent did not appear, but sent another attorney, 

Donya T. Zimmerman, in her place. Ms. Zimmerman had not met with Ms. 

Winston and was not familiar with her case. 

23. During the representation, Ms. Winston made numerous attempts to 

reach Respondent to discuss her case, but Respondent failed to return her 

calls. 

24. Ms. Winston discharged Respondent as her counsel on October 12, 

2011. 

25. In February 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 

Maryland ordered Respondent to refund $3,776.00 to Ms. Winston within 

60 days. The Bankruptcy Court ordered the refund because it found that 

Respondent improperly failed to appear at the May 24, 2011 hearing, had 

been unresponsive to Ms. Winston’s inquiries, failed to file an amended 

plan, and gave her inaccurate advice. 

26. Respondent confirmed during her testimony at trial that she has not 

refunded any fees to Ms. Winston. 

With respect to the complaints of Brent Ellis, the Chapmans and the Johnsons, the 

hearing judge found: 

27. Respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Brent 

Ellis (hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Ellis”) on or about August 5, 2011. 
14 

28. Respondent filed a Disclosure of Compensation in Mr. Ellis’ case, 

reporting that Mr. Ellis paid a flat fee of $4,500.00. 

29. Respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of her 

clients, Howard and Avon Chapman (hereinafter referred to as “the 

Chapmans”) on or about August 11, 2011.

30. Respondent received a fee of $4,000.00 from the Chapmans. 

31. The Chapmans paid the fee by a check to the A. Barton Law Firm. 

32. Mr. Tolbert set the fee and directed the Chapmans to make their check 

payable to the Cardinal Law Firm. 

33. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland 

ordered Ms. Barton to refund $2,000.00 to the Chapmans, finding that her 

filing of the Chapter 13 petition was a “useless act that could not 

accomplish anything”. 

34. Respondent has not refunded any portion of the Chapmans’ fee. 

35. Respondent filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of Joseph and 

Ernestine Johnson (hereinafter referred to as “the Johnsons”) on August 11, 

2011. 

36. Respondent’s firm received a fee of $4,500.00 from the Johnsons. 

37. The Johnsons initially met with Mr. Tolbert, who advised them that 

they should file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. 

38. Mr. Tolbert informed the Johnsons that the Cardinal Law Firm would 

charge them a $4,500.00 fee for representing them in a Chapter 13 

bankruptcy proceeding and led the Johnsons to believe that he was an 

attorney. 

39. Respondent first met with the Johnsons on November 30, 2011. 

40. At the time the Cardinal Law Firm represented the Johnsons, 

Respondent was the only attorney employed by the Cardinal Law Firm 

licensed to practice law in Maryland or before the United States District 

Court for the District of Maryland. 
15 

41. On March 21, 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 

of Maryland ordered Respondent to refund $3,000.00 to the Johnsons. 

42. Respondent has not refunded any portion of the Johnsons’ fee. 

With respect to the complaint of Ms. Tyner, the hearing judge found: 

43. Rosemary Tyner (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Tyner”) retained the 

Cardinal Law Firm to represent her regarding a bankruptcy matter in 

October 2010. 

44. Ms. Tyner initially met with Mr. Tolbert. 

45. Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Tyner to stop paying her mortgage payments. 

46. Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Tyner to use the money saved from not making 

her mortgage payment to pay her fee to the Cardinal Law Firm. 

47. Ms. Tyner paid the Cardinal Law Firm $4,500.00 as her fee to file a 

Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. 

48. Ms. Tyner met Respondent at her pre-confirmation hearing on February 

19, 2011. 

49. At the pre-confirmation hearing on February 19, 2011, Respondent 

showed Ms. Tyner a copy of a payment plan to be submitted on her behalf. 

Ms. Tyner had not been shown the payment plan prior to the preconfirmation hearing. 

50. Ms. Tyner attempted to communicate with Respondent about the status 

of her case but Respondent failed to keep her informed. 

51. Ms. Tyner’s bankruptcy petition was dismissed after Respondent failed 

to appear in court for a hearing. 

52. In October 2011, Mr. Tolbert contacted Ms. Tyner to say that she was 

late in making a payment on her automobile loan and that she should bring 

in $500.00 to Mr. Tolbert.

53. Pursuant to Mr. Tolbert’s request, Ms. Tyner delivered to Mr. Tolbert 

$300.00. 
16 

54. Ms. Tyner later learned that her automobile loan payment was not late. 

55. Respondent has not accounted for the $300.00 paid by Ms. Tyner and 

has not returned those funds to her. 

With respect to the complaint of Ms. Barnes, the hearing judge found: 

56. The Cardinal Law Firm filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of Teresa 

P. Barnes (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Barnes”) on April 19, 2011.

57. Ms. Barnes paid the Cardinal Law Firm a fee of $4,474.00 by a check 

payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 

58. Ms. Barnes initially met with Mr. Tolbert, who advised her on what 

kind of bankruptcy petition to file. 

59. Mr. Tolbert informed Ms. Barnes of the amount of the fee she would be 

charged by the Cardinal Law Firm. 

60. On February 8, 2012, Ms. Barnes received a summons regarding a suit 

filed against her by Discover Bank. 

61. Ms. Barnes attempted to contact Mr. Tolbert, who did not respond to 

her calls. 

62. Ms. Barnes contacted Respondent by telephone in February 2012. 

63. Respondent informed Ms. Barnes that she had no knowledge of Ms. 

Barnes’s case, and that she was no longer affiliated with the Cardinal Law 

Firm. 

64. Respondent did no work on Ms. Barnes’s bankruptcy case. 

65. Respondent has not refunded any portion of the fee paid by Ms. Barnes.

With respect to the complaint of Ms. Simmons, Judge Bernard found: 

66. Arnell W. Simmons (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Simmons”) 

retained the Cardinal Law Firm in December 2010, to represent her 

regarding a bankruptcy. 
17 

67. Ms. Simmons paid to the Cardinal Law Firm $4,774.00 by checks 

payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 

68. Ms. Simmons initially met with Mr. Tolbert to discuss her case. 

69. Mr. Tolbert accepted her case, informed her of the fee, and advised her 

that she should file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. 

70. Ms. Simmons later met with an associate of Respondent, who is an 

attorney. That attorney advised Ms. Simmons to file a Chapter 13 petition. 

71. The attorney also advised Ms. Simmons to stop paying her mortgage so 

that she could pay her attorney’s fee to the Cardinal Law Firm. 

72. Ms. Simmons stopped making mortgage payments based on the advice 

given to her by the Cardinal Law Firm. 

73. The Cardinal Law Firm filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on 

behalf of Ms. Simmons in February 2011. 

74. Ms. Simmons met with Respondent three times. 

75. Ms. Simmons also met with other lawyers and staff of the Cardinal Law 

Firm. 

76. Respondent failed to keep Ms. Simmons informed of the status of her 

case. 

77. Respondent failed to file required papers on behalf of Ms. Simmons, 

resulting in the Bankruptcy Court issuing a deficiency notice. 

78. Ms. Simmons attempted to contact Respondent about the status of her 

case, but was unable to reach her. 

With respect to the complaint of Ms. Rhett, the hearing judge found: 

79. On March 4, 2011, Gwendelyn Rhett (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. 

Rhett”) met with Mr. Tolbert and retained the Cardinal Law Firm to 

represent her in a bankruptcy matter. 

80. Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Rhett that she should file a Chapter 7 

bankruptcy petition. 
18 

81. Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Rhett that the Cardinal Law Firm would 

charge her attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,000.00 and that the filing fee 

would be $229.00. 

82. By April 4, 2011, Ms. Rhett paid the entire fee to the Cardinal Law 

Firm by checks payable to A. Barton Law Firm. 

83. At Ms. Rhett’s meeting with Mr. Tolbert on March 4, 2011, Mr. Tolbert 

gave Ms. Rhett Respondent’s business card and told Ms. Rhett that she 

could call Respondent any time.

84. Ms. Rhett sent a message by electronic mail to Respondent on April 13, 

2011, asking her questions about the status of her bankruptcy case. 

85. Respondent replied to her e-mail message on May 2, 2011, responding 

to her questions. 

86. In her May 2, 2011 reply to Ms. Rhett, Respondent did not indicate that 

she was no longer connected with the Cardinal Law Firm or Mr. Tolbert. 

87. On May 6, 2011 Ms. Rhett discharged the Cardinal Law Firm and 

requested a refund of her fee.

88. On May 11, 2011 the Cardinal Law Firm responded in writing to Ms. 

Rhett, agreeing to refund the full amount paid. 

89. Thereinafter, Ms. Rhett testified that Mr. Tolbert returned her fee in 

person, by check, along with a gift basket. 

With respect to the complaint of Ms. Miljkovic, the hearing judge found: 

90. In January 2011, Alma Miljkovic (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. 

Miljkovic”) retained the Cardinal Law Firm to represent her in connection 

with a bankruptcy matter.

91. Ms. Miljkovic initially met with Mr. Tolbert. 

92. Mr. Tolbert accepted the case on behalf of the Cardinal Law Firm and 

informed Ms. Miljkovic that the fee would be $2,000.00 plus a filing fee of 

$299.00. 
19 

93. On February 25, 2011, Ms. Miljkovic gave Mr. Tolbert a check for 

$1,299.00, payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 

94. Mr. Tolbert informed Ms. Miljkovic on February 25, 2011, that 

Respondent would be the attorney handling her case. 

95. Mr. Tolbert gave Ms. Miljkovic papers to complete in order to prepare 

the bankruptcy petition. 

96. Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Miljkovic to stop making payments on her 

mortgage loan. 

97. Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Miljkovic to use all of the available credit on 

her credit cards. 

98. On April 13, 2011, Ms. Miljkovic paid $1,000.00 to the Cardinal Law 

Firm by a check payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 

99. Ms. Miljkovic’s payments were not deposited in an attorney escrow 

account. 

100. In the spring and summer of 2011, Ms. Miljkovic called the Cardinal 

Law Firm and Respondent’s Washington office to ascertain the status of 

her case, but could not reach Respondent. 

101. In the summer of 2012, Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Miljkovic that he was 

no longer associated with Respondent, but that Respondent would continue 

to represent her.

102. When Ms. Miljkovic subsequently contacted Respondent in the 

summer of 2012, Respondent refused to handle her case. 

103. Respondent and the Cardinal Law Firm did not provide any legal 

services to Ms. Miljkovic. 

104. Ms. Miljkovic has not received a refund of any portion of her fee paid 

to the Cardinal Law Firm and A. Barton Law Firm. 

With respect to the complaint of Ms. Gray-Knight, Judge Bernard found: 
20 

105. Christine A. Gray-Knight (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. GrayKnight”) retained the Cardinal Law Firm in early 2011 to represent her in 

connection with a bankruptcy matter.

106. Ms. Gray-Knight initially met with Mr. Tolbert on April 14, 2011. 

107. At the April 14, 2011 meeting, Mr. Tolbert accepted Ms. GrayKnight’s case on behalf of the Cardinal Law Firm, and advised her that the 

firm’s fee would be $2,000.00 plus a filing fee of $299.00. 

108. At the April 14, 2011 meeting, Mr. Tolbert advised Ms. Gray-Knight 

to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. 

109. On April 14, 2011, Ms. Gray-Knight gave Mr. Tolbert a check in the 

amount of $500.00, payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 

110. The funds paid by Ms. Gray-Knight to the Cardinal Law Firm were 

not deposited in an escrow account. 

111. Mr. Tolbert explained to Ms. Gray-Knight that the Cardinal Law Firm 

would not begin work on her bankruptcy petition until the fee was paid in 

full. 

112. Mr. Tolbert informed Ms. Gray-Knight that Respondent would contact 

her about preparation of the bankruptcy petition. 

113. In May 2011, the Cardinal Law Firm sent a notice to Ms. GrayKnight, reminding her that a balance of $1,799.00 was owed to the firm and 

that she should make her check payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 

114. In July 2011, the Cardinal Law Firm sent a notice to Ms. Gray-Knight, 

confirming that the firm was retained to represent her in a bankruptcy case. 

115. On August 11, 2011, the Cardinal Law Firm sent another notice to Ms. 

Gray-Knight, reminding her that her bankruptcy petition would not be filed 

until the balance due was paid. 

116. Ms. Gray-Knight attempted to contact Respondent on several 

occasions, without receiving a reply. 

117. Ms. Gray-Knight subsequently spoke to Mr. Tolbert, who promised 

that Respondent would call her. 
21 

118. Ms. Gray-Knight did not receive a call from Respondent after 

speaking to Mr. Tolbert. 

119. Ms. Gray-Knight subsequently discharged the Cardinal Law Firm and 

demanded a return of the unearned fee. 

120. The Cardinal Law Firm provided Ms. Gray-Knight with no legal 

services. 

121. Ms. Gray-Knight made several attempts to contact Respondent to 

request a refund of her retainer.

122. Ms. Gray-Knight has not received a refund of any portion of her 

retainer.

Judge Bernard then proceeded to her Conclusions of Law: 

In the proceedings before the Court, the Petitioner has the burden of 

proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. The Respondent 

has the burden of proving a matter of affirmative defense or mitigation by a 

preponderance of the evidence. In each matter, Petitioner charged 

Respondent with a violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 5.3, 5.5, 

and 8.4 of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 

(hereinafter “MLRPC”).

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 

Respondent violated Rule 1.1 by failing to respond to clients’ repeated 

requests for information, failing to attend hearings on behalf of clients, 

failing to file bankruptcy petitions, and failing to properly further the 

objectives of her clients. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ficker, 349 

Md. 13, 42, 706 A.2d 1045, 1059 (1998), the Court of Appeals stated: 

“[T]he lawyer does have a duty to his or her client to remain diligent”. The 

evidence in this case clearly demonstrated that the Respondent abdicated 

her responsibility to supervise Mr. Tolbert and the other Maryland office 

employees, and provided inadequate representation to her clients despite 

taking a fee in each case. “Compliance with [Rule 1.1] requires more than 

knowing what to do. It requires applying the knowledge to the client’s 

problem.” Attorney Grievance Commission v. McCulloch, 404 Md. 388, 

397-98, 946 A.2d 1009, 1015 (2008). The Court of Appeals has said 

“[e]vidence of a failure to apply the requisite thoroughness and/or 

preparation in representing a client is sufficient alone to support a violation 

of Rule 1.1.” Attorney Grievance Commission v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 54, 
22 

891 A.2d 1085, 1097 (2006). Such acts also demonstrate a lack of 

“diligence and promptness” in violation of Rule 1.3. McCulloch, 404 Md. 

at 398, 946 A.2d at 1015. (“The evidence shows that respondent failed to 

act with ‘diligence and promptness’ as required by Rule 1.3, for the same 

reasons discussed under Rules 1.1 and 1.2.”). As in McCulloch and Guida,

Respondent took a fee in each case but failed to do any cognizable work of 

value to the client. Therefore, Respondent, in each complaint, violated 

Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 8.4(a) and (d) of the MLRPC. See Attorney Grievance 

Commission v. Nelson, 425 Md. 344, 363, 40 A.3d 1039, 1050 (2012). The 

Respondent through her persistent conduct clearly violated Rule 8.4(d), 

which states that it is professional misconduct to “engage in conduct that is 

prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Rule 8.4(a) was also violated 

when Respondent breached the other Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent is also charged in each complaint with a violation of 

Rule 1.4(a) and (b) of the MLRPC. Each and every witness testified to 

having difficulties contacting Respondent, and in some cases, being unable 

to contact Respondent entirely. In Ms. Simmons’ case, Respondent failed to 

adequately communicate with both Ms. Simmons and her creditors. 

Respondent did not keep her clients informed regarding the status of their 

case or respond to their attempts to communicate with her. Moreover, to the 

extent that Respondent had difficulties with her personal health of which 

she testified, or with Mr. Tolbert and the Cardinal Law Firm, Respondent 

failed to inform her clients of these problems and any others that limited 

her ability to represent them. Thus, in each matter, Respondent violated 

Rule 1.4(a) and (b). 

Respondent violated Rules 5.3(a), (b) and (c) by failing to properly 

supervise Mr. Tolbert and the rest of the Cardinal Law Firm. It is 

undisputed that Mr. Tolbert met with clients, quoted fees, provided legal 

advice to clients, and held himself out as an attorney. Mr. Tolbert was able 

to do so because Respondent was not in the office to supervise him and had 

not made any efforts to ensure that his conduct was compatible with 

Respondent’s professional obligations. Mr. Tolbert also mishandled law 

firm and client funds, and deposited unearned funds into a business 

account, not an escrow account. Respondent was not only aware of this 

conduct; Respondent permitted this conduct and instructed both Mr. Tolbert 

and Ms. Crawford[17]

 so that the law office could effectively function 

without Respondent’s presence. More troubling perhaps is Respondent’s 

admission that she provided blank checks to Mr. Tolbert after she learned 

that he had stolen client money from the firm. In fact, Respondent gave Mr. 

 

17 Karen Crawford was Respondent’s paralegal at the Camp Springs office of the 

Cardinal Law Firm. 
23 

Tolbert total control of the firm bank accounts. Respondent testified that 

she did not review the bank statements, even after she had caught him 

stealing. Such conduct can only be seen as enabling and ratification of the 

misconduct. Despite Respondent’s testimony that she knew Mr. Tolbert 

“did not listen” she continued to condone his conduct. The Court did not 

find the Respondent to be at all credible in her denial of Mr. Tolbert’s 

actions. She repeatedly testified that she knew that Mr. Tolbert “did not 

listen,” but did not take any affirmative action to deter or stop his behavior. 

In fact she testified that she continued to pay Mr. Tolbert up until July, 

2011. 

Respondent knowingly permitted Mr. Tolbert to handle client intake, 

which included quoting fees (based upon an evaluation of the prospective 

client’s case) and providing legal advice, and therefore, assisted Mr. Tolbert 

in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Rules 5.5(a) 

and 8.4(d). 

Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d) in the Winston, Miljkovic, GrayKnight, Tyner, Barnes and Bar Counsel complaints for failing to return 

unearned fees paid to Respondent by each client. The fees charged to those 

clients, while the respective fee may not have been unreasonable on its 

face, became unreasonable because Respondent did no work of value, or at 

all, in their case, in violation of Rule 1.5(a). See Guida, 391 Md. at 54, 891 

A.2d at 1096-97. 

Respondent’s failure to disclose the receipt of an additional $526.00 

payment from Winston to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court is a violation of Rule 

8.4(c). 

Respondent’s failure to maintain unearned fees of Cardinal Law 

Firm clients in an attorney trust account, and instead maintaining those fees 

in the A. Barton Law Firm checking account along with firm funds used to 

pay expenses and employees, without written informed consent of the 

clients violated Rule 1.15(a) and (b).

Lastly, Petitioner alleged in its Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial 

Action that Respondent shared fees from cases with Mr. Tolbert in 

violation of Rule 5.4, which Respondent vehemently denied at trial. 

Notwithstanding that denial, this Court again finds Respondent’s testimony 

not credible. The evidence submitted at trial, coupled with Respondent’s 

testimony, demonstrated that Respondent paid Mr. Tolbert $1,000.00 every 

two (2) weeks. On cross-examination, Respondent stated that Mr. Tolbert 

did not receive any additional salary on top of the $1,000.00 and that in 

2011 Respondent was only paid for six months, until the end of June, 2011. 

Yet according to Mr. Tolbert’s 1099 for 2011, submitted into evidence 

during Respondent’s case, Respondent paid Mr. Tolbert $48,000.00 in 

2011. Even if Respondent paid Mr. Tolbert for the entire 2011 year, 
24 

Respondent would have only earned $26,000.00. Since Respondent 

testified that Mr. Tolbert was not paid any additional money, the only 

logical conclusion is that Respondent shared fees with Mr. Tolbert.

Judge Bernard also concluded as to the mitigating factors:

Having determined that Respondent violated the various previously 

referenced Rules, the Court turns now to the mitigation evidence presented 

by Respondent. The Court determines by a preponderance of the evidence, 

pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-757(b) that the following factor mitigates the 

misconduct charged in this case. Respondent testified that she took over 50 

cases pro bono, filing them in Maryland. She indicated that she had to take 

on a second job, in addition to the document reviews that she was doing, in 

order to pay the filing fees and other associated costs. She testified that she 

spoke with creditors, mortgage companies, etc. in order to try to protect the 

interests of the clients that she was handling on a pro bono basis.

The Court did not find that Respondent’s illness in any way would 

mitigate the previously referenced violations. 

“This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney discipline 

proceedings in Maryland.” Attorney Grievance v. O’Leary, 433 Md. 2, 28, 69 A.3d 1121, 

1136 (2013), quoting Attorney Grievance v. Chapman, 430 Md. 238, 273, 60 A.3d 25, 46 

(2013). We conduct an independent review of the record and we accept the hearing 

judge’s findings of fact unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Attorney Grievance v. 

Lara, 418 Md. 355, 14 A.3d 650 (2011). “Under our independent review of the record, 

we must determine whether the findings of the hearing judge are based on clear and 

convincing evidence.” Attorney Grievance v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 73, 753 A.2d 17, 26 

(2000). With respect to exceptions, upon our review of the record, “the hearing judge’s 

findings of fact generally will be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous.” Maryland 

Rule 16-759(b)(2); Attorney Grievance v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 253, 950 A.2d 798, 

806 (2008). “A hearing judge’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous if there is any 
25 

competent material evidence to support it.” Attorney Grievance v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 

16, 85 A.3d 117, 125 (2014) (internal quotation omitted). As to the hearing judge’s 

conclusions of law, such as whether provisions of the MLRPC were violated, our 

consideration is essentially de novo. Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(1). Finally, as to the 

hearing judge’s mitigation findings, Maryland Rule 16-757(b) provides that “A 

respondent who asserts...a matter of mitigation...has the burden of proving the...matter 

by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

 Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions to Judge Bernard’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law and recommends disbarment. Respondent has filed multiple 

exceptions in which she challenges various findings of fact, numerous conclusions of law 

and Judge Bernard’s mitigation findings; at argument Barton’s counsel suggested a 

reprimand, or at worst, a suspension for 90 to 120 days as a sanction. 

 Respondent initially challenges the use of the deemed admissions to establish the 

violations of the Rules alleged. She argues that the deemed admissions should not have 

been relied upon by the hearing judge as bases for the findings of fact and conclusions of 

law and that Bar Counsel was not prejudiced by her failure to answer within 30 days, 

because she eventually did answer the request for admissions, albeit on the eve of the 

hearing. 

We recognize that the hearing judge, generally, “is entrusted with the role of 

administering the discovery rules and, as such, is vested with broad discretion in 

imposing sanctions when a party fails to comply with the rules.” Attorney Grievance v. 
26 

O’Leary, 433 Md. at 28-29, 69 A.3d at 1137, quoting Attorney Grievance v. Kreamer,

404 Md. 282, 342, 946 A.2d 500, 535 (2008). With respect to the sanctions for failing to 

respond to the requests for admissions, Maryland Rule 2-424(b)18 provides that any 

matter for which an admission is requested is deemed admitted if a party fails to respond 

to the request within 30 days. Maryland Rule 2-424(d)19 provides that deemed admissions 

 

18 Maryland Rule 2-424(b) provides: 

(b) Response. Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be 

deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request or within 

15 days after the date on which that party's initial pleading or motion is 

required, whichever is later, the party to whom the request is directed serves 

a response signed by the party or the party's attorney. As to each matter of 

which an admission is requested, the response shall set forth each request for 

admission and shall specify an objection, or shall admit or deny the matter, 

or shall set forth in detail the reason why the respondent cannot truthfully 

admit or deny it. The reasons for any objection shall be stated. A denial shall 

fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith 

requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of the matter of 

which an admission is requested, the party shall specify so much of it as is 

true and deny or qualify the remainder. A respondent may not give lack of 

information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless the 

respondent states that after reasonable inquiry the information known or 

readily obtainable by the respondent is insufficient to enable the respondent 

to admit or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an admission 

is requested presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, 

object to the request but the party may, subject to the provisions of section 

(e) of this Rule, deny the matter or set forth reasons for not being able to 

admit or deny it. 

19 Maryland Rule 2-424(d) provides: 

(d) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this Rule is 

conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or 

amendment. The court may permit withdrawal or amendment if the court 

finds that it would assist the presentation of the merits of the action and the 

party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal 

 (continued...) 
27 

are conclusively established, unless the court permits their withdrawal or amendment, 

which the court may do if it will assist in the presentation of the merits of the action and 

if the party who obtained the admissions fails to satisfy the court that it will be prejudiced 

by the withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. 

Judge Bernard was within her discretion in deeming each Request for Admission 

admitted and not permitting their withdrawal on the eve of the hearing, as she rejected as 

inadequate the proffer by Barton’s counsel that, prior to the hearing, Barton was 

unavailable to him and that he was in another trial. 

Respondent also appears to take broad exception to the hearing judge’s credibility 

findings. In developing her factual findings, Judge Bernard discredited much of 

Respondent’s testimony regarding the authority that she gave Mr. Tolbert in managing 

the Cardinal Law Firm in Camp Springs, as well as his access to the firm’s bank accounts 

and Barton’s recollection of specific interactions she had with clients. 

We, generally, “defer to the credibility findings of the hearing judge.” Attorney 

Grievance v. Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 722, 93 A.3d 262, 277 (2014). “The hearing judge is 

in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to decide which one to 

believe and, as we have said, to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.” Attorney 

Grievance v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 390, 794 A.2d 92, 101 (2002); see also Attorney 

 

(...continued)

or amendment will prejudice that party in maintaining the action or defense 

on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this Rule is for the 

purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission for any other 

purpose, nor may it be used against that party in any other proceeding. 
28 

Grievance v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17, 741 A.2d 1143, 1152 (1999) (stating that the 

hearing judge is “in the best position to assess first hand a witness’s credibility.”). As we 

have stated, a hearing judge is “free to disregard the testimony of respondent if the judge 

believed the evidence was not credible.” Monfried, 368 Md. at 390, 794 A.2d at 101. 

 Respondent excepts to Judge Bernard’s finding that “Respondent permitted Mr. 

Tolbert to meet with prospective clients, to accept cases and set fees, and was aware that 

Mr. Tolbert was doing so on behalf of the Cardinal Law Firm”, based on her own 

testimony during the hearing that she did not leave Mr. Tolbert in charge of the firm and 

he did not have the authority to accept clients, give legal advice, charge client fees or 

negotiate checks because he was not a lawyer; he was only to take the names and contact 

information of potential clients. Respondent also testified that she had no supervisory 

authority over Mr. Tolbert after March, 2011, because she had closed the firm. 

The hearing judge specifically stated that Respondent’s testimony in regard to her 

supervision of and authority over Mr. Tolbert was incredible. In a letter from Barton to 

Mr. Tolbert, which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit R, Barton writes, “we entered 

into an arrangement around September/October of last year 2010, where you would work 

for me as an accountant, office manager, book[k]eeper, and sometimes intake person, you 

collected the money for the firm”, and that, “I gave you the Maryland rules to read and 

told you what the legal fees for bankruptcy cases in Maryland were supposed to be”. 

Respondent also testified that she had told Mr. Tolbert about fee structures in bankruptcy 

cases, after Mr. Tolbert suggested that the firm charge higher fees. In terms of the amount 
29 

of time during which Mr. Tolbert was employed, Judge Bernard had before her Exhibit 

11 – federal Form 1099, which was accepted into evidence at the hearing and, paired with 

Barton’s testimony, shows that Mr. Tolbert was paid by the Cardinal Law Firm up until 

July of 2011. Thus, we overrule this exception. 

 Barton also excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that, “Respondent permitted 

Mr. Tolbert to deposit funds in her ‘A. Barton Law Firm’ operating account”, and, 

“Respondent was aware that Mr. Tolbert deposited client retainers in the ‘A. Barton Law 

Firm’ operating account”, based upon her own testimony that client funds were not 

supposed to be deposited in the A. Barton Law Firm operating account and that Mr. 

Tolbert was not authorized to deposit any client funds into that account. Barton, however, 

during the hearing, testified with reference to the operating account, that “[Mr. Tolbert] 

could only deposit.” Further, Barton testified at a November 30, 2011 hearing before the 

Bankruptcy Trustee, that, “clients were told to pay A. Barton Law Firm because that was 

the name on the IOLTA and business bank accounts”; she further testified that Mr. 

Tolbert “was in total control of the [IOLTA and business] bank accounts”, according to 

the Trustee Memo, admitted into evidence as Exhibit B. We overrule this exception. 

Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that: 

Respondent gave Mr. Tolbert a limited number of checks to 

disburse funds from the “A. Barton Law Firm” operating account to pay 

office expenses. Notably Respondent testified during trial that she 

continued to provide “blank” checks to Mr. Tolbert for several months after 

she had learned that Mr. Tolbert had stolen money from the firm. 
30 

Barton initially testified during the hearing that she gave Mr. Tolbert no authority to write 

checks, but later testified that he was given checks from the A. Barton Law Firm business 

account to pay firm expenses. She further testified that she provided Mr. Tolbert with 

pre-signed blank checks for the A. Barton Law Firm business account, even after she 

caught him stealing money from the firm in February 2011. We overrule this exception. 

Barton also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that: 

In February 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 

District of Maryland ordered Respondent to refund $3,776.00 to Ms. 

Winston within 60 days. The Bankruptcy Court ordered the refund because 

it found that Respondent improperly failed to appear at the May 24, 2011 

hearing, had been unresponsive to Ms. Winston’s inquiries, failed to file an 

amended plan, and gave her inaccurate advice. 

Respondent excepts based on her testimony that she “substantially completed” the work 

in Ms. Winston’s case; that she would have completed Ms. Winston’s bankruptcy were it 

not for her illness and that Ms. Winston’s bankruptcy was eventually approved by the 

United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland (“Bankruptcy Court”). The 

Bankruptcy Court Order undergirding Judge Bernard’s finding, however, had been 

admitted into evidence as Exhibit C and recited, verbatim, what Judge Bernard stated. 

Ms. Winston’s testimony before the Bankruptcy Court, and also during the disciplinary 

hearing, reflects that Barton was unprepared during the bankruptcy hearing, as well as 

that Barton failed to appear at another hearing. Ostensibly, Barton seemingly credits the 

eventual approval of Ms. Winston’s bankruptcy petition as obviating the finding, despite 

the fact that it was Ms. Winston who represented herself ultimately and successfully in 

the Bankruptcy Court. We, as a result, overrule this exception. 
31 

 Respondent also excepts to Judge Bernard’s finding that, “Respondent failed to 

file required papers on behalf of Ms. Simmons, resulting in the Bankruptcy Court issuing 

a deficiency notice.” Barton argues that although Simmons did receive a “routine” 

deficiency notice, “it was corrected” and the case proceeded to confirmation. Respondent 

again, thus, argues no harm, no foul; in reality, however, her client snatched victory from 

the jaws of defeat because Ms. Simmons acted to correct the problem. We, therefore, 

overrule this exception. 

Barton excepts to Judge Bernard’s finding that: 

Ms. Rhett sent a message by electronic mail to Respondent on April 

13, 2011, asking her questions about the status of her bankruptcy case.... 

Respondent replied to her e-mail message on May 2, 2011, responding to 

her questions.... In her May 2, 2011 reply to Ms. Rhett, Respondent did not 

indicate that she was no longer connected with the Cardinal Law Firm or 

Mr. Tolbert.

Respondent testified during the hearing that she was unaware that Ms. Rhett was a client 

and that she never authorized Mr. Tolbert to take any legal fees from Ms. Rhett. 

The emails upon which Judge Bernard relied, however, were admitted into 

evidence at the hearing, as Exhibit I. Exhibit I reflects that, in her email of April 13, 

2011, Ms. Rhett wrote that she had retained Barton’s law firm and asked Barton 

numerous questions pertaining to her representation, including when her bankruptcy 

paperwork would be filed and what she should expect from Barton as her attorney. In 

Barton’s reply, also contained in Exhibit I, three weeks later, Barton confirmed that her 

firm was representing Ms. Rhett, stated that she would file Ms. Rhett’s bankruptcy 

paperwork as soon as possible, and assured Ms. Rhett that she would answer any 
32 

questions by phone, email or in person. At no point in her May 2, 2011 reply did Barton 

state that the Cardinal Law Firm was shuttered, despite Barton’s testimony that she 

closed the firm after March 1, 2011; rather, Respondent confirmed her representation of 

Ms. Rhett, offered that the firm’s paralegals would be working with Ms. Rhett, and 

described what Ms. Rhett should expect during the bankruptcy process. We, therefore, 

overrule this exception. 

Respondent also makes several specific exceptions to Judge Bernard’s findings 

concerning the allegations of individual complainants, specifically the allegations of Ms. 

Winston, Ms. Simmons, Ms. Rhett and Ms. Barnes. 

Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that, “Ms. Winston paid the 

Cardinal Law Firm a flat fee of $4,000.00, which Respondent disclosed on a Disclosure 

of Compensation filed in the Bankruptcy Court.” Barton argues that she did not accept 

payment of Ms. Winston’s $4,000.00 fee. 

The issue is not, however, whether Barton had accepted payment, but whether the 

Cardinal Law Firm had. In making the findings, Judge Bernard relied on the deemed 

admissions as well as the Trustee Memo, which reflected that Barton affirmed, under the 

penalty of perjury, in a Disclosure of Compensation form required by the Bankruptcy 

Court, that Ms. Winston had paid Barton $4,000.00. We, therefore, conclude that Judge 

Bernard’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence and overrule this 

exception.

 Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that: 
33 

After the hearing on April 21, 2011, Ms. Winston discussed her case 

with Respondent and told her that she wanted to sell her condominium and 

to have the second mortgage removed. Respondent told Ms. Winston to 

contact Mr. Tolbert to discuss the issues regarding sale of the condominium 

and removal of the second mortgage. Upon contacting Mr. Tolbert, Ms. 

Winston was told that an additional fee would be required, which Ms. 

Winston paid by a check payable to the A. Barton Law Firm. 

* * * 

Ms. Winston later paid the Cardinal Law Firm an additional fee payment of 

$526.00, but Respondent did not disclose Ms. Winston’s $526.00 payment 

to the Bankruptcy Court.

Respondent excepts, stating that she did not mention “an additional five hundred dollar[]” 

fee to Ms. Winston after the April 21, 2011 bankruptcy hearing. The challenged findings, 

however, do not rest on whether Barton mentioned an amount to Ms. Winston, but 

whether the $526.00 was paid and not disclosed. Judge Bernard relied upon the deemed 

admissions that mirrored her finding, as well as Ms. Winston’s testimony that Barton 

knew that Ms. Winston wanted to remove the second mortgage and directed her to Mr. 

Tolbert, who charged her the additional $526.00. We overrule this exception. 

Respondent excepts to Judge Bernard’s finding that, “Ms. Barnes paid the 

Cardinal Law Firm a fee of $4,474.00 by a check payable to the A. Barton Law Firm.” 

Respondent excepts that Ms. Barnes made payments to the Barton Law Firm and not the 

Cardinal Law Firm. Judge Bernard relied on the deemed admissions in making her 

finding, and, accordingly, we overrule this exception. 

Barton also seems to argue that she did not accept Ms. Simmons’s payments of 

$700.00 and $2,300.00, Mr. Tolbert did. Judge Bernard relied on the deemed admissions 

in making her findings, as well as Ms. Simmons’s testimony that she initially made 
34 

payments to the Cardinal Law Firm by checks payable to the A. Barton Law Firm in the 

amounts of $700.00 and $2,300.00, and that she later was instructed by Mr. Tolbert that 

she needed to pay an additional $1,774.00 to convert her Chapter 7 bankruptcy to a 

Chapter 13, which she paid. Ms. Simmons’s bank statements, additionally, were accepted 

into evidence as Exhibit L, which showed withdrawals totaling $4,774.00, confirming 

Ms. Simmons’s testimony. Judge Bernard’s findings, thus, were supported by clear and 

convincing evidence, and we overrule this exception. 

Barton also excepts to Judge Bernard’s finding that, “Ms. Simmons attempted to 

contact Respondent about the status of her case, but was unable to reach her.” Barton 

argues that despite a delay, she eventually responded to Ms. Simmons and that Ms. 

Simmons was ultimately satisfied with their communication, relying on a letter, accepted 

into evidence at the hearing as Exhibit N, in which Ms. Simmons informed the Attorney 

Grievance Commission that despite a prior “misunderstanding” she was now “satisfied” 

with her communication with Barton. Judge Bernard relied upon the deemed admissions 

in making her findings. Ms. Simmons also testified at the hearing that she attempted to 

contact Barton and that Barton did not respond. Judge Bernard’s finding was based on 

clear and convincing evidence and we, accordingly, overrule this exception. 

Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that, “On May 11, 2011 the 

Cardinal Law Firm responded in writing to Ms. Rhett, agreeing to refund the full amount 

paid.” Respondent argues that she did not respond to Ms. Rhett and that she never 

reimbursed Ms. Rhett. Judge Bernard again relied on the deemed admissions. Ms. Rhett, 
35 

additionally, testified at the hearing that Respondent stated, during a telephone 

conversation, that she would authorize Mr. Tolbert to refund the legal fees, and that Ms. 

Rhett could retrieve a check from the firm’s office. Rhett further testified that Mr. Tolbert 

personally delivered her refund along with a gift basket, as well as also provided Ms. 

Rhett with a receipt, admitted as Exhibit H at the hearing, printed on Cardinal Law Firm 

letterhead in which Barton’s name was featured. Again, there was clear and convincing 

evidence to support Judge Bernard’s finding, and we, therefore, overrule this exception. 

Respondent finally excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to find facts which she 

offered in her post-hearing Proposed Findings of Fact, to include that Mr. Tolbert was 

never a signer on Respondent’s bank accounts; Respondent had to continue working with 

Mr. Tolbert after February 2011, despite being aware that he had stolen from the firm, 

because he owned the office building in which the firm rented space and she had 

approximately 20 active clients remaining; Mr. Tolbert reacted angrily when learning 

Barton was closing the law firm; Mr. Tolbert accepted over 50 clients after March 2011 

and stole their money plus their filing fees; Mr. Tolbert embezzled from the firm by 

somehow using checks that Barton had provided him; Tolbert was criminally charged 

with impersonating a lawyer and theft; Barton has not been criminally charged with 

regard to Mr. Tolbert’s thefts; Barton, as the only attorney in the office who was barred in 

Maryland, had to attend court hearings and could not be in the office at all times; Barton 

only practiced law in jurisdictions in which she was authorized; Respondent’s 
36 

communication with her clients was “adequate[]”; and all the clients’s bankruptcy 

petitions were eventually approved by the Bankruptcy Court. 

A hearing judge, however, is not required to accept any proposed findings 

submitted by Bar Counsel or a Respondent: 

A judge hearing an attorney grievance matter does not need to meld 

together his or her own opinion, taking bits and pieces of each party’s 

proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, but may adopt one 

party’s filing in its entirety, as long as it accurately reflects the judge’s 

independent factual findings, proven by clear and convincing evidence at 

the hearing, and the legal conclusions flowing therefrom.

Attorney Grievance v. Joseph, 422 Md. 670, 696, 31 A.3d 137, 153 (2011). Judge 

Bernard made her own findings, which were established by clear and convincing 

evidence, based upon the deemed admissions and her evaluation of what she heard and 

saw during two days of evidentiary hearings. 

Having overruled all Respondent’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of 

fact and having determined that the findings are supported by clear and convincing 

evidence, we now turn to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. 

The hearing judge determined that Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) 

and (b), 1.16(d), 5.3(a), (b) and (c), 5.4(a) and (b), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a), (c) and (d) were 

violated. Bar Counsel has filed no exceptions. 

Although Barton excepted to the determinations that she violated Rules 1.1 and 

1.3, at oral argument, her counsel conceded the violation of those Rules and we agree that 

those violations are supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
37 

Respondent generally excepts to a lack of evidentiary foundation for the violations 

of Rules 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (b), and 5.4(a) and (b), and takes the same exception, as well 

as other specific exceptions to the determinations that she violated Rules 1.4(a) and (b), 

1.16(d), 5.3(a), (b) and (c), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a), (c) and (d). 

Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rules 

1.4(a) and (b). Judge Bernard concluded: 

Respondent is also charged in each complaint with a violation of 

Rule 1.4(a) and (b) of the MLRPC. Each and every witness testified to 

having difficulties contacting Respondent, and in some cases, being unable 

to contact Respondent entirely. In Ms. Simmons’ case, Respondent failed to 

adequately communicate with both Ms. Simmons and her creditors. 

Respondent did not keep her clients informed regarding the status of their 

case or respond to their attempts to communicate with her. Moreover, to the 

extent that Respondent had difficulties with her personal health of which 

she testified, or with Mr. Tolbert and the Cardinal Law Firm, Respondent 

failed to inform her clients of these problems and any others that limited 

her ability to represent them. Thus, in each matter, Respondent violated 

Rule 1.4(a) and (b). 

Respondent argues there is no evidence of any Rule 1.4 violations. 

Rules 1.4(a) and (b) provide that, a lawyer shall “keep the client reasonably 

informed about the status of the matter”, and that a “lawyer shall explain a matter to the 

extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 

representation.” Rule 1.4(a) requires an attorney to keep a client reasonably informed 

about the status of his or her case. Attorney Grievance v. Gelb, Misc. Docket AG No. 36, 

Sept. Term, 2013, slip op. at 9 (Oct. 22, 2014) (attorney violated 1.4(a) by failing to 

return a client’s telephone calls or respond to another client’s requests for information). 

Rule 1.4(b) requires that an attorney explain matters to the extent necessary to allow the 
38 

client to make informed decisions. Gelb, slip op. at 9 (attorney’s failure to communicate 

violated 1.4(b) when his clients’s cases were dismissed due to lack of prosecution without 

the clients’s knowledge or consent); Attorney Grievance v. Narasimhan, 438 Md. 638, 92 

A.3d 512 (2014) (attorney violated 1.4(b) by failing to provide her client with accurate 

information that was necessary for her client to make informed decisions). 

Here, the hearing judge found that Barton failed to return the phone calls of Ms. 

Winston and failed to keep both Ms. Tyner and Ms. Simmons informed about the status 

of their respective cases in violation of Rule 1.4(a). Barton’s lack of communication with 

Ms. Simmons and the inaccurate advice she gave to Ms. Winston also violated Rule 

1.4(b). Ms. Simmons testified at the disciplinary hearing that she was unable to contact 

Barton after the Bankruptcy Court issued a deficiency notice in her case, due to Barton’s 

failure to file the required papers, and Ms. Simmons eventually had to act on her own to 

correct the problem. The hearing judge also found that Respondent gave Ms. Winston 

inaccurate advice concerning the sale of her condominium, advice concerning a course of 

action which the Bankruptcy Court opined was totally unnecessary. We overrule 

Respondent’s exception and conclude that Barton violated Rules 1.4(a) and (b). 

Respondent excepts to Judge Bernard’s conclusion that: 

The fees charged [in the Winston, Miljkovic, Gray-Knight, Tyner, Barnes 

and Bar Counsel complaints], while the respective fee may not have been 

unreasonable on its face, became unreasonable because Respondent did no 

work of value, or at all, in their case, in violation of Rule 1.5(a). 

Respondent asserts that there was no evidence in that she violated Rule 1.5(a). 
39 

Under Rule 1.5(a), an attorney may not charge an unreasonable fee. An advance 

fee given in anticipation of legal service that is reasonable at the time of the receipt can 

become unreasonable if the attorney does not perform the services expected. Attorney 

Grievance v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 891 A.2d 1085 (2006) (a flat fee to facilitate an 

adoption became unreasonable, in violation of 1.5(a), when the attorney failed to do any 

work); see also Attorney Grievance v. Shakir, 427 Md. 197, 46 A.3d 1162 (2012) 

(attorney violated 1.5(a) when he accepted flat fees to file an asylum application and 

represent a client regarding DUI charges and then failed to perform either task). Here, the 

hearing judge found that Ms. Winston paid Respondent a flat fee which became 

unreasonable when Barton then failed to appear at a bankruptcy hearing, failed to respond 

to Ms. Winston’s inquiries, failed to file an amended bankruptcy petition and 

subsequently gave Ms. Winston inaccurate advice. The hearing judge found that the 

Chapmans and the Johnsons each paid Respondent a flat fee which the Bankruptcy Court 

ordered Barton to refund because of Respondent’s inadequate work product. The hearing 

judge, additionally, found that Respondent accepted fees from Ms. Barnes, Ms. Miljkovic 

and Ms. Gray-Knight, yet Barton “did no work” and provided “no legal services” of any 

kind. We overrule Respondent’s exception and conclude that Barton violated Rule 1.5(a). 

Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rules 

1.15(a) and (b). Judge Bernard concluded: 

Respondent’s failure to maintain unearned fees of Cardinal Law 

Firm clients in an attorney trust account, and instead maintaining those fees 

in the A. Barton Law Firm checking account along with firm funds used to 
40 

pay expenses and employees, without written informed consent of the 

clients violated Rule 1.15(a) and (b). 

Respondent asserts that there was no evidence that she violated Rules 1.15(a) and (b). 

Rule 1.15(a) requires that an attorney deposit advance fees into an attorney trust 

account, and additionally, requires that an attorney keep records of the fees. We have 

noted: 

Funds given in anticipation of future legal services qualify as trust money 

and, accordingly, are to be deposited in trust accounts separate from the 

attorney’s property, to be removed promptly by the attorney as earned. To 

deposit such trust money into the attorney’s personal or operating accounts 

before the fees are earned constitutes a violation of MRPC 1.15(a).

Attorney Grievance v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 463-64, 937 A.2d 161, 170 (2007), quoting 

Guida, 391 Md. at 53, 891 A.2d at 1097 (internal citations omitted); see also Attorney 

Grievance v. Nussbaum, 401 Md. 612, 934 A.2d 1 (2007) (commingling of personal 

funds and client funds violates Rule 1.15(a)). Here, the hearing judge found that 

Respondent permitted Mr. Tolbert to deposit client funds in her law firm’s operating 

account, a practice about which Barton was aware. 

Rule 1.15(b) states: 

(b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer’s own funds in a client trust account 

only as permitted by Rule 16-607 b. 

Maryland Rule 16-607 provides in relevant part: 

a. General prohibition. An attorney or law firm may deposit in an attorney 

trust account only those funds required to be deposited in that account by 

Rule 16-604 or permitted to be so deposited by section b. of this Rule. 

b. Exceptions. 1. An attorney or law firm shall either (A) deposit into an 

attorney trust account funds to pay any fees, service charges, or minimum 
41 

balance required by the financial institution to open or maintain the 

account, including those fees that cannot be charged against interest due to 

the Maryland Legal Services Corporation Fund pursuant to Rule 16-610 b 1 

(D), or (B) enter into an agreement with the financial institution to have any 

fees or charges deducted from an operating account maintained by the 

attorney or law firm. The attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney 

trust account any funds expected to be advanced on behalf of a client and 

expected to be reimbursed to the attorney by the client.

Here, Judge Bernard found that Barton was aware and permitted Mr. Tolbert to deposit 

the funds and retainers received from the firm’s clients into the A. Barton Law Firm 

operating account, which included earned fees and funds from which firm expenses were 

drawn, in violation of Rule 1.15(b). 

Accordingly, we overrule Respondent’s exception and conclude that Barton 

commingled funds in violation of Rules 1.15(a) and (b). 

Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule 

1.16(d). Judge Bernard concluded that, “Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d) in the 

Winston, Miljkovic, Gray-Knight, Tyner, Barnes and Bar Counsel complaints for failing 

to return unearned fees paid to Respondent by each client.” Barton argues that there was 

no evidentiary foundation for the Rule 1.16(d) violation. 

Rule 1.16(d) states that a lawyer shall refund to the client “any advance payment 

of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred.” See Attorney Grievance v. Pinno, 

437 Md. 70, 85 A.3d 159 (2014) (attorney violated 1.16(d) by abandoning a client’s case 

before it was completed and by failing to return the unearned fees); Attorney Grievance v. 

McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 813 A.2d 1145 (2002) (attorney violated 1.16(d) by not 

refunding unearned fees to his clients after performing no legal work). Judge Bernard 
42 

found that: Respondent failed to refund the fees paid to her by Ms. Winston and Ms. 

Gray-Knight after both clients discharged Barton as their counsel; Respondent, 

additionally, did not refund the fees paid to her by Ms. Winston, the Chapmans or the 

Johnsons, despite being ordered to do so by the Bankruptcy Court; Respondent, 

furthermore, did not refund the fees paid to her by Ms. Barnes, Ms. Miljkovic or Ms. 

Gray-Knight after Barton claimed to have no knowledge of those clients’s cases. We 

overrule Barton’s exception and conclude that she violated Rule 1.16(d). 

Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rules 

5.3(a), (b) and (c). Judge Bernard concluded: 

Respondent violated Rules 5.3(a), (b) and (c) by failing to properly 

supervise Mr. Tolbert and the rest of the Cardinal Law Firm. It is 

undisputed that Mr. Tolbert met with clients, quoted fees, provided legal 

advice to clients, and held himself out as an attorney. Mr. Tolbert was able 

to do so because Respondent was not in the office to supervise him and had 

not made any efforts to ensure that his conduct was compatible with 

Respondent’s professional obligations. Mr. Tolbert also mishandled law 

firm and client funds, and deposited unearned funds into a business 

account, not an escrow account. Respondent was not only aware of this 

conduct; Respondent permitted this conduct and instructed both Mr. Tolbert 

and Ms. Crawford so that the law office could effectively function without 

Respondent’s presence. More troubling perhaps is Respondent’s admission 

that she provided blank checks to Mr. Tolbert after she learned that he had 

stolen client money from the firm. In fact, Respondent gave Mr. Tolbert 

total control of the firm bank accounts. Respondent testified that she did not 

review the bank statements, even after she had caught him stealing. Such 

conduct can only be seen as enabling and ratification of the misconduct. 

Despite Respondent’s testimony that she knew Mr. Tolbert “did not listen” 

she continued to condone his conduct. The Court did not find the 

Respondent to be at all credible in her denial of Mr. Tolbert’s actions. She 

repeatedly testified that she knew that Mr. Tolbert “did not listen,” but did 

not take any affirmative action to deter or stop his behavior. In fact she 

testified that she continued to pay Mr. Tolbert up until July, 2011. 
43 

Rules 5.3(a), (b) and (c), “Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants,” 

provide: 

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a 

lawyer: 

(a) a partner...in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the 

firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person’s 

conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; 

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall 

make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible 

with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be 

a violation of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct if 

engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies 

the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the 

law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory 

authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its 

consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable 

remedial action;

Barton argues that she did not violate Rules 5.3(a), (b) and (c). 

“An attorney may not escape responsibility to his clients by blithely saying that 

any shortcomings are solely the fault of his employee.” Mooney, 359 Md. at 90, 753 A.2d 

at 35, quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goldberg, 292 Md. 650, 655, 441 A.2d 

338, 341 (1982). In Attorney Grievance v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 872 A.2d 693 

(2005), an attorney delegated the task of balancing his trust account to a nonlawyer 

employee and then did not follow up to ensure that the delegated task was actually and 

competently performed; the employee did not balance the trust account as requested. 

Zuckerman’s failure to supervise delayed, for a month, his discovery that another 
44 

nonlawyer employee had embezzled funds from his trust account. Zuckerman’s conduct 

violated Rules 5.3(a) and (b). “‘[H]ad the respondent exercised a reasonable degree of 

supervision over [his employee], he might have detected [the employee’s] error before 

any ethical proscriptions had been violated’ under Rule 5.3.” Id. at 374, 872 A.2d at 713, 

quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 481, 671 A.2d 463, 479 

(1996). Rule 5.3(c) is violated when an attorney delegates a task to an employee, the 

unsuccessful or improper completion of which would result in a violation of the Rules. In

Attorney Grievance v. Ward, 394 Md. 1, 904 A.2d 477 (2006), an attorney violated Rule 

5.3(c) when he ordered his assistant to notarize a document without the signer present. 

Attorney Grievance v. Kimmel, 405 Md. 647, 955 A.2d 269 (2008), although 

specifically addressing a violation of Rule 5.1 by two attorneys for failing to supervise an 

inexperienced associate, is helpful in understanding the duty to supervise. In Kimmel, 

Kimmel and Silverman were the managing partners of a Pennsylvania law firm which

operated a high volume practice; neither attorney was a member of the Bar of this State. 

The firm hired Robin Katz, a Maryland-barred attorney, to establish a local office 

wherein Katz was responsible for litigation in Maryland. Kimmel and Silverman stressed 

that Katz meet “a weekly benchmark for complaints to be filed” and regularly 

“emphasized the importance of this objective.” Id. at 656, 955 A.2d at 275. 

Over the course of a year, Katz became increasingly overwhelmed and struggled 

to meet her performance benchmarks; she requested assistance on multiple occasions, but 

none was forthcoming. In one instance, she was reminded by the firm’s office manager 
45 

about the need to file fifteen complaints per week; on another occasion, Katz’s 

supervising attorney emailed, “no excuses, don’t call, no need to talk, just get on it and 

only call me with good positive news of settlements”. Id. at 657, 955 A.2d at 275. Katz 

eventually resigned after becoming “totally overwhelmed”. Id. at 663, 955 A.2d at 279. 

Silverman, shortly thereinafter, visited Katz’s office for the first time, observed “stacks of 

documents in [the] office that were not filed” and noted that Katz, who had yet to depart, 

looked “like a beaten dog.” Id. We emphasized that, “numerous indicators alerted 

[Kimmel and Silverman] to the need for a heightened level of supervision, but [they] 

failed to design and implement policies and procedures that reasonably would ensure 

compliance with the Maryland Rules”, id. at 680, 955 A.2d at 289, and opined that, 

“[w]hether an employee’s ethical breaches are due to the employee’s sub-standard 

performance or the deliberate circumvention of standard procedures, proper supervision 

must include mechanisms to determine whether the delegated tasks are being performed.” 

Id. at 682, 955 A.2d at 290. 

In the present case, Judge Bernard found that Barton was the owner and only 

Maryland-barred attorney in the Cardinal Law Firm at the relevant time, and that she 

employed Mr. Tolbert, who was not licensed to practice law, as her office manager. She 

also not only permitted, but encouraged, Mr. Tolbert to engage in the unlicensed practice 

of law by allowing him to give legal advice to clients of the Cardinal Law Firm. Barton, 

additionally, permitted Mr. Tolbert to deposit client funds in the firm’s operating account 

and provided him with blank checks. After Barton became aware in February of 2011 
46 

that Mr. Tolbert was stealing from the account, she continued to employ him up until July 

of 2011. Accordingly, we overrule Respondent’s exception and conclude that Barton 

violated Rules 5.3(a), (b) and (c). 

Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rules 

5.4(a) and (b). Judge Bernard concluded: 

Lastly, Petitioner alleged in its Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial 

Action that Respondent shared fees from cases with Mr. Tolbert in 

violation of Rule 5.4, which Respondent vehemently denied at trial. 

Notwithstanding that denial, this Court again finds Respondent’s testimony 

not credible. The evidence submitted at trial, coupled with Respondent’s 

testimony, demonstrated that Respondent paid Mr. Tolbert $1,000.00 every 

two (2) weeks. On cross-examination, Respondent stated that Mr. Tolbert 

did not receive any additional salary on top of the $1,000.00 and that in 

2011 Respondent was only paid for six months, until the end of June, 2011. 

Yet according to Mr. Tolbert’s 1099 for 2011, submitted into evidence 

during Respondent’s case, Respondent paid Mr. Tolbert $48,000.00 in 

2011. Even if Respondent paid Mr. Tolbert for the entire 2011 year, 

Respondent would have only earned $26,000.00. Since Respondent 

testified that Mr. Tolbert was not paid any additional money, the only 

logical conclusion is that Respondent shared fees with Mr. Tolbert.

Respondent alleges that there is no evidence of her violation of Rules 5.4(a) and (b). 

Rules 5.4(a) and (b) provide that a “lawyer...shall not share legal fees with a 

nonlawyer” and that a “lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the 

activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.” 

There is insufficient evidence presented in the record to support the hearing 

judge’s determination that Barton shared legal fees with Mr. Tolbert. We, thus, sustain 

Respondent’s exception to the conclusion that she violated Rule 5.4(a). 
47 

Judge Bernard also found that Barton was aware that Mr. Tolbert gave legal 

advice to clients; Respondent also directed Ms. Winston to Mr. Tolbert when Ms. 

Winston raised a legal question regarding her condominium. Clearly, Barton treated Mr. 

Tolbert as a principal in the law firm and thereby violated Rule 5.4(b). We, thus, overrule 

her exception to Rule 5.4(b). 

Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule 

5.5(a). Judge Bernard concluded: 

Respondent knowingly permitted Mr. Tolbert to handle client intake, 

which included quoting fees (based upon an evaluation of the prospective 

client’s case) and providing legal advice, and therefore, assisted Mr. Tolbert 

in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Rules 5.5(a) 

and 8.4(d). 

Respondent argues that there is no proof of her violation of Rule 5.5(a). 

Rule 5.5(a) states that, “[a] lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in 

violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in 

doing so.” Rule 5.5(a) is violated when an attorney permits an employee to operate as a 

lawyer although not barred as one. Attorney Grievance v. Brennan, 350 Md. 489, 714 

A.2d 157 (1998) (an attorney violated Rule 5.5 when he employed a suspended lawyer as 

a paralegal, yet the suspended lawyer provided legal advice to clients). 

What constitutes the practice of law has been defined in Section 10-101(h) of the 

Business Occupations and Professions Article of the Maryland Code as:

(h) Practice law. — (1) “Practice law” means to engage in any of the 

following activities: 

(i) giving legal advice;
48 

(ii) representing another person before a unit of the State government or of 

a political subdivision; or

(iii) performing any other service that the Court of Appeals defines as 

practicing law. 

(2) “Practice law” includes: 

(i) advising in the administration of probate of estates of decedents in an 

orphans’ court of the State; 

(ii) preparing an instrument that affects title to real estate; 

(iii) preparing or helping in the preparation of any form or document that is 

filed in a court or affects a case that is or may be filed in a court; or 

(iv) giving advice about a case that is or may be filed in a court.

Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-101(h) (1989, 2010 Repl. Vol, 2014 Supp.).

We have also opined that: 

To determine whether an individual has engaged in the practice of law, the 

focus of the inquiry should be on whether the activity in question required 

legal knowledge and skill in order to apply legal principles and precedent. 

Where trial work is not involved but the preparation of legal documents, 

their interpretation, the giving of legal advice, or the application of legal 

principles to problems of any complexity, is involved, these activities are 

still the practice of law.

Attorney Grievance v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 176, 821 A.2d 414, 426 (2003) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

Here, Judge Bernard found that Mr. Tolbert, the office manager, led several clients 

to believe that he was an attorney, despite not being licensed to practice law. The hearing 

judge found, additionally, that Barton was aware that Mr. Tolbert gave legal advice to 

clients of the Cardinal Law Firm, including the Johnsons, Ms. Barnes, Ms. Simmons, Ms. 

Rhett and Ms. Gray-Knight, with regard to what type of bankruptcy petitions to file and 

advised Ms. Tyner, Ms. Simmons and Ms. Miljkovic to stop paying their respective 
49 

mortgages. We overrule Respondent’s exception and, therefore, conclude that Barton 

violated Rule 5.5(a). 

Respondent, additionally, excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she 

violated Rules 8.4(a), (c) and (d). Rule 8.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct for 

an attorney to engage in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation. With regard to Rule 8.4(c), Judge Bernard concluded that, 

“Respondent’s failure to disclose the receipt of an additional $526.00 payment from 

Winston to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court is a violation of Rule 8.4(c).” Barton argues that 

there was no evidence adduced to support a violation of Rule 8.4(c). 

An attorney who knowingly makes a false statement to a tribunal necessarily 

engages in misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c). Attorney Grievance v. Dore, 433 

Md. 685, 73 A.3d 161 (2013). Section 329 of Title 11 of the United States Code 

(“Bankruptcy Code”)20 requires all attorneys who represent debtors to disclose the 

 

20 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) provides, in relevant part: 

Debtor’s transactions with attorneys.

(a) Any attorney representing a debtor in a case under this title, or in 

connection with such a case, whether or not such attorney applies for 

compensation under this title, shall file with the court a statement of the 

compensation paid or agreed to be paid, if such payment or agreement was 

made after one year before the date of the filing of the petition, for services 

rendered or to be rendered in contemplation of or in connection with the 

case by such attorney, and the source of such compensation. 

(b) If such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, 

the court may cancel any such agreement, or order the return of any such 

payment, to the extent excessive, to— 

(1) the estate, if the property transferred— 

(A) would have been property of the estate; or 

 (continued...) 
50 

amount of compensation they have received, or will receive, in a bankruptcy case; if the 

compensation exceeds the reasonable value of the legal services received, the Bankruptcy 

Court may order the return of that compensation to the debtor’s estate. Attorneys, 

pursuant to Rule 2016(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,21 must 

supplement the initial disclosure whenever they receive any additional compensation 

from debtors “within 14 days after any payment or agreement not previously disclosed.” 

We have found a Rule 8.4(c) violation when a misrepresentation is overt or based 

upon a concealment of material facts. Attorney Grievance v. Floyd, 400 Md. 236, 929 

A.2d 61 (2007). In Attorney Grievance v. Robaton, 411 Md. 415, 983 A.2d 467 (2009), 

an attorney made an intentional misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c) by failing to 

disclose to the Bankruptcy Court a debtor’s payment to a non-attorney professional who 

had typed the debtor’s bankruptcy petition when the attorney knew that such a payment 

had been made and also failed to disclose the compensation he received from the debtor 

to the Bankruptcy Court. In Robaton, we agreed with the hearing judge’s observation that 

the attorney’s omissions “deprived the court and creditors of the ability to find out how 

much of the debtor’s assets has been paid to the attorney.” Id. at 429, 983 A.2d at 475. 

 

(...continued)

(B) was to be paid by or on behalf of the debtor under a plan under chapter 

11, 12, or 13 of this title; or 

(2) the entity that made such payment.

21 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(b) provides, in relevant part: 

A supplemental statement shall be filed and transmitted to the United States 

trustee within 14 days after any payment or agreement not previously 

disclosed. 
51 

The gravamen of the Rule 8.4(c) violation in the instant case is whether Barton 

intentionally failed to disclose the $526.00 paid by Ms. Winston on Ms. Winston’s 

bankruptcy petition, thereby shielding it from distribution to creditors. Barton asserts that 

she knew nothing about the transaction and so did not intentionally omit the amount from 

the bankruptcy estate. Barton, however, had directed Ms. Winston to speak to Mr. Tolbert 

to handle additional legal issues, and Ms. Winston had paid the additional $526.00 by 

check to the A. Barton Law Firm, an account to which Barton not only had access, but for 

which she had received statements as the responsible party. Barton’s failure to disclose 

the $526.00 payment could only benefit her because, otherwise, the money would revert 

back to the bankruptcy estate. We, therefore, overrule her exception and conclude that 

Barton violated Rule 8.4(c). 

 An attorney violates subsection (d) of Rule 8.4 when he or she “engage[s] in 

conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”. Judge Bernard concluded: 

Respondent took a fee in each case but failed to do any cognizable work of 

value to the client. Therefore, Respondent, in each complaint, violated 

Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 8.4(a) and (d) of the MLRPC. See Attorney Grievance 

Commission v. Nelson, 425 Md. 344, 363, 40 A.3d 1039, 1050 (2012). The 

Respondent through her persistent conduct clearly violated Rule 8.4(d), 

which states that it is professional misconduct to “engage in conduct that is 

prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Rule 8.4 (a) was also violated 

when Respondent breached the other Rules of Professional Conduct.

* * * 

Respondent knowingly permitted Mr. Tolbert to handle client intake, which 

included quoting fees (based upon an evaluation of the prospective client’s 

case) and providing legal advice, and therefore, assisted Mr. Tolbert in 

engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Rules 5.5(a) 

and 8.4(d). 

Respondent urges that there was no evidence of a Rule 8.4(d) violation. 
52 

We previously have held that an attorney violates Rule 8.4(d) when he or she 

willfully fails to attend a hearing on behalf of his or her client. See Shakir, 427 Md. at 

206, 46 A.3d at 1168 (attorney’s “egregious” behavior of failing to appear at a hearing 

and file an asylum application violated 8.4(d)); Attorney Grievance v. Dominguez, 427 

Md. 308, 47 A.3d 975 (2011) (attorney violated 8.4(d) by failing to appear at various 

hearings). An attorney can also violate 8.4(d) by failing to pursue his or her client’s 

objectives, failing to communicate with his or her client, or failing to refund unearned 

fees. See Attorney Grievance v. McCulloch, 404 Md. 388, 946 A.2d 1009 (2008) (an 

attorney violated Rule 8.4(d) when a client’s divorce complaint was dismissed after the 

attorney failed to communicate with the client, abandoned representation and failed to 

return the unearned fee). 

Here, Judge Bernard found that Respondent failed to appear on behalf of Ms. 

Winston and Ms. Tyner at court hearings, and in Ms. Tyner’s case, her bankruptcy 

petition was dismissed as a result. The hearing judge also found that the Bankruptcy 

Court issued Ms. Simmons a deficiency notice after Barton failed to file the required 

papers, and that Ms. Simmons was unable to reach Respondent thereafter. Barton’s 

clients retained her to shepherd them through the bankruptcy process, which she failed to 

do. Judge Bernard also found that Barton failed to both perform any legal services of 

value in exchange for legal fees she charged and failed to return the unearned fees of Ms. 

Winston, the Chapmans, the Johnsons, Ms. Barnes, Ms. Miljkovic and Ms. Gray-Knight. 

We, therefore, overrule her exception and conclude that Barton violated Rule 8.4(d).
53 

 Subsection (a) of Rule 8.4 provides that it is professional misconduct for an 

attorney to “violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 

Conduct”. Rule violations, by themselves, are sufficient to support a violation of Rule 

8.4(a). See Dominguez, 427 Md. at 323-24, 47 A.3d at 985, citing Attorney Grievance v. 

Seltzer, 424 Md. 94, 114, 34 A.3d 498, 510 (2011); see also Attorney Grievance v. 

Nelson, 425 Md. 344, 363, 40 A.3d 1039, 1050 (2012) (“Rule 8.4(a) is violated when 

other Rules of Professional Conduct are breached.”). Barton has violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 

1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 5.3(a), (b) and (c), 5.4(b), 5.5(a), 8.4(c) 

and (d), and therefore, has violated Rule 8.4(a). 

 With respect to sanction, it is well settled that the purpose of attorney discipline is 

for the protection of the public, not punishment of the erring attorney. Attorney 

Grievance v. Coppola, 419 Md. 370, 19 A.3d 431 (2011), citing Attorney Grievance v. 

Goff, 399 Md. 1, 922 A.2d 554 (2007). “Imposing a sanction protects the public interest 

‘because it demonstrates to members of the legal profession the type of conduct which 

will not be tolerated.’” Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 714, 810 A.2d 

996, 1020 (2002), quoting Mooney, 359 Md. at 96, 753 A.2d at 38 (citation omitted). We 

evaluate an attorney grievance matter on its own merits, considering the particular facts 

and circumstances in order to determine an appropriate sanction. Coppola, 419 Md. at 

404, 19 A.3d at 451, citing Attorney Grievance v. Bleeker, 414 Md. 147, 176, 994 A.2d 

928, 945 (2010). We also look to the “presence or absence of mitigating factors and the 

prior disciplinary history of the attorney, particularly as it reveals the presence or absence 
54 

of misconduct of the same, or similar, kind to that being addressed.” McCulloch, 404 Md. 

at 402, 946 A.2d at 1018 (internal citations omitted). 

 In determining the appropriate sanction, we often look to the aggravating factors 

found in Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer 

Sanctions. These include: 

(a) prior disciplinary offenses;

(b) dishonest or selfish motive;

(c) a pattern of misconduct;

(d) multiple offenses; 

(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally 

failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; 

(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 

practices during the disciplinary process; 

(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; 

(h) vulnerability of victim; 

(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;

(j) indifference to making restitution; 

(k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled 

substances. 

Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer 

Sanctions (1992); see Attorney Grievance v. Hodes, Misc. Docket AG No. 61, Sept. 

Term, 2013, slip op. at 66 (Dec. 23, 2014). 

Here, aggravating factors (b), (c), (d), (g) and (j) are implicated, because 

Respondent has embodied a dishonest and selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of 

misconduct, committed multiple offenses, refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 

her conduct and has shown no effort to make restitution, despite a court order to do so. 

 Factor (b), “dishonest or selfish motive”, is present here. Respondent showed a 

dishonest and selfish motive when she retained unearned fees after she failed to do little, 
55 

if any, work of value for her clients. Attorney Grievance v. Stinson, 428 Md. 147, 50 

A.3d 1222 (2012) (applying this factor when an attorney failed to return unearned fees to 

two clients after being discharged). 

 Factor (c), “a pattern of misconduct”, is also present here. Barton failed to 

competently represent nine clients in bankruptcy proceedings, over an almost two year 

period, each of whom was harmed, thereby demonstrating a pattern of misconduct. See 

Dominguez, 427 Md. at 326, 47 A.3d at 985 (applying this factor when an attorney 

neglected the welfare of at least five clients over a period of sixteen months). 

 Factor (d), “multiple offenses”, is also implicated. An attorney commits multiple 

offenses when he or she committed numerous violations of the Rules, particularly against 

different clients. See Stinson, 428 Md. at 194, 50 A.3d at 1250 (applying this factor when 

an attorney committed multiple Rule violations against two clients). Here, Barton 

committed violations of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 

5.3(a), (b) and (c), 5.4(b), 5.5(a), 8.4(a), (c) and (d) against nine clients. 

 Factor (g), “refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct”, is also relevant 

in the instant case. Respondent has consistently refused to admit any wrongdoing and 

instead has repeatedly blamed Mr. Tolbert solely for the bulk of the misconduct here. See 

Hodes, slip op. at 68 (applying this factor when an attorney repeatedly blamed his former 

law firm for his disciplinary proceedings). 

 Factor (j), “indifference to making restitution”, is also present here. Respondent 

was ordered by the Bankruptcy Court to refund the fees of Ms. Winston, the Chapmans 
56 

and the Johnsons, yet has failed to do so. Barton, additionally, has not returned the fees 

paid by Ms. Tyner, Ms. Miljkovic or Ms. Gray-Knight. See Attorney Grievance v. Page, 

430 Md. 602, 62 A.3d 163 (2013) (applying this factor when an attorney failed to refund 

any portion of the advanced fee paid by the client). 

 We also consider mitigating factors in determining the appropriate sanction, 

including: 

Absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish 

motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make 

restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; full and free disclosure 

to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 

inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; physical or 

mental disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim 

rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and 

finally, remoteness of prior offenses. 

O’Leary, 433 Md. at 31, 69 A.3d at 1138, quoting Attorney Grievance v. Brown, 426 Md. 

298, 326, 44 A.3d 344, 361 (2012). 

The hearing judge determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one 

mitigating factor was present in this case—that Barton undertook “interim rehabilitation.” 

Judge Bernard credited Barton’s testimony that she undertook over 50 cases pro bono in 

Maryland, all involving purported victims of Mr. Tolbert; that Barton had to take on a 

second job in order to personally pay the filing fees associated with these cases, and that 

Barton “spoke with creditors, mortgage companies, etc. in order to try to protect the 

interests of the clients that she was handling on a pro bono basis.” We, additionally, note 

that Barton has no prior disciplinary record. 
57 

Barton, however, excepts to Judge Bernard’s finding that, “The Court did not find 

that the Respondent’s illness in any way would mitigate the previously referenced 

violations.” Barton contends that, during the time she operated the Cardinal Law Firm, 

she suffered from a host of health issues, including endometriosis and uterine fibroid 

tumors, for which she eventually underwent surgery. Respondent, however, testified that 

she was still able to handle her cases despite the pain associated with her health issue. We 

have said that, “[w]hile an illness or a traumatic event may serve as a mitigating factor in 

determining sanctions, they may do so only when there is some nexus to the misconduct.” 

O’Leary, 433 Md. at 32, 69 A.3d at 1138-39. Barton argues, on one hand, that her health 

situation mitigates her shortcomings, yet on the other, she argues that she was able to 

competently provide representation to her clients. Barton cannot have it both ways. We

overrule her exception. 

With the aggravating and mitigating factors in mind, we turn to determining the 

appropriate sanction. Bar Counsel recommends disbarment, while, at oral argument, 

Barton’s counsel suggested a reprimand, or at worst, a suspension for 90 to 120 days. 

The instant case presents a bevy of Rule violations that showcases a pattern of 

client neglect and a failure to properly supervise nonlawyer employees and includes an 

instance of misrepresentation before a court. While no other case is on all fours with the 

present case in terms of sanction, several cases are helpful in its fashioning. 

In cases where an attorney exhibits a lack of competence and diligence when 

attending to client affairs, even when more than one client is involved, we have imposed 
58 

an indefinite suspension. For example, in Attorney Grievance v. Mooney, 359 Md. at 97-

98, 753 A.2d at 39, we indefinitely suspended Mooney, who had violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 

1.4, 5.1, 5.3 and 8.4(d) because of his failure to diligently pursue cases, as well as to 

appear at trial, and failure to supervise both another attorney and a nonlawyer assistant. 

He also failed to timely refund a fee and made multiple misrepresentations to the mother 

of a juvenile client. We noted Mooney’s lack of disciplinary history, and stated “that 

while we have generally suspended lawyers who for the first time have been found to 

have violated rules relating to competency; we have disbarred subsequent offenders.” Id. 

at 98, 753 A.2d at 39. 

Client neglect, even when coupled with a finding of misrepresentation in violation 

of Rule 8.4(c), resulted in the imposition of an indefinite suspension in Attorney 

Grievance v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 785 A.2d 1260 (2001). We determined that 

Harrington made numerous ethical violations when he failed to pursue a client matter, 

failed to keep the client reasonably informed regarding the status of his case and 

terminated the client relationship without taking steps to protect the client’s interest. 

Harrington also failed to pursue another client’s claim, and when questioned by the 

client, he falsely led his client to believe that a lawsuit had been filed on her behalf and 

that he was “waiting for a court date” when no suit had actually been filed. Id. at 48, 785 

A.2d at 1267. See also Attorney Grievance v. Cohen, 361 Md. 161, 760 A.2d 706 (2000) 

(attorney violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) and (d) in three client matters 

because he demonstrated incompetence and a lack of diligence, failed to file a client’s tax 
59 

returns with the bankruptcy court despite indicating to the court that it had been done, 

misrepresented to a client and Bar Counsel that he had refunded the client’s fee, and was 

uncooperative with Bar Counsel); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. David, 331 Md. 317, 

628 A.2d 178 (1993) (indefinitely suspending an attorney who, with respect to four 

clients, failed to return an unearned fee for a period of nine months, failed to timely remit 

funds he received on behalf of a client, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to 

respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information and made a misrepresentation to Bar 

Counsel concerning whether a client was already represented when she approached the 

attorney about her case). 

In the instant case, Barton failed to file papers to correct Ms. Simmons’s 

deficiency notice; she failed to appear a bankruptcy hearing which resulted in the 

dismissal of Ms. Tyner’s case; failed to appear at a hearing with respect to Ms. Winston; 

accepted payment from Ms. Barnes, Ms. Miljkovic and Ms. Gray-Knight to file 

bankruptcy petitions, yet never did any work on their cases; and, she failed to refund the 

unearned fees of Ms. Winston, the Chapmans, the Johnsons, Ms. Tyner, Ms. Barnes, Ms. 

Miljkovic and Ms. Gray-Knight. The Respondent, moreover, engaged in a 

misrepresentation to the Bankruptcy Court by failing to disclose the additional 

compensation she received from Ms. Winston. Barton’s failure to supervise Mr. Tolbert 

would also result in her being indefinitely suspended as we did with Kimmel, 405 Md. at 

689, 955 A.2d at 294, and Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 386, 872 A.2d at 716, discussed supra. 
60 

We, therefore, determine that an indefinite suspension in the present case is the 

appropriate sanction, especially in the absence of any finding of misappropriation. See 

Attorney Grievance v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 773 A.2d 463 (2001). Although 

Barton’s counsel recommended a reprimand or a 90-120 day suspension, he cited no case 

law in support, and we have found none. 

 As a result, the Respondent, Sheron A. Barton, is hereby indefinitely suspended 

from the practice of law in the State of Maryland. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 

SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS 

TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS 

COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF 

ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT 

TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, 

FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT 

IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF 

THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 

COMMISSION AGAINST SHERON 

A. BARTON.