alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 99.2

Certification  Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002  (Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)

Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of SOURCECORP, Incorporated, a Delaware
corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify that:

The
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002 (the "Form 10-K") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|Dated: March 31, 2003 | /s/BARRY EDWARDSBarry Edwards
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|--------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code).

---

QuickLinks
June 27, 1974 

The Honorable Tom Hanna 

Criminal District Attorney 

Jefferson County 

P. 0. Box 2553 

Beaumont, Texas 77704 

Opinion No. H- 336 

Re: Whether Commissioners 

Court may expend funds for 

creation of service pins. 

Dear Mr. Hanna: 

You have asked whether the Commissioners Court of Jefferson 

County can spend county funds to purchase service pins to be awarded 

to employees of the county. The face of the pin is to consist of a replica 

of a seal embedded in the floor of the Jefferson County Courthouse, and 

you also question whether there is any law to prohibit the use of this seal. 

_ Section 18 of Article 5 of the Constitution of Texas creates the 

- -.. 

comtiissioners court and authorizes it to “exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the 

laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed. ” 

It is now well established that commissioners courts can exercise 

only such powers as are conferred upon them either by the Constitution or 

statutes. Canales v. Laughlin, 214 S. W. 2d 451 (Tex. 1948). 

We find no statute specifically authorizing the commissioners court 

to purchase and award pins such as you describe. They are authorized. 

however, to “fix the amount of compensation, office expense, travel expense, 

and all other allowances” for most county officers and employ’ees. Article 

3912k, V. T. C. S. 

In our opinion a pin awarded in recognition of faithful service is 

‘jcompensation” thoygh not “salary” and it falls w$th$n the scope of Art, 

. 

p. 1550 
. 

. 

The Honorable Tom Hanna page 2 (H-336) 

3912k, supra. See Attorney General Letter Advisory No. 71 (1973). 

We are reinforced in this construction by the provision in Sec. 10, 

Article V of the General Appropriation Act for 1974-1975 which specifies 

that service pins might be presented by various state departments and 

agencies “as compensation. ” Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 659, p. 1786, 

at 2203. 

Since your letter indicates that the seal embedded in the floor is not 

an official seal, we do not think it would be desecrated by its inclusion as 

part of the pin. 

In our opinion, therefore, the commissioners court of Jefferson County 

may create a service pin to award to its employees and may include in the face 

of the pin a replica of a seal found in the floor of the county courthouse. : 

SUMMARY 

The commissioners court is authorized to expend - 

7.. county funds to purchase a service pin to be awarded 

to county employees. The pin may include a replica 

of an unofficial county seal. 

/+ry pub yourpt 

AP ED: 

#- 

,,kk. YOR$, F irst Ags H s% 

r w 

DAVID M. KENDAL 

, 

,L, Chairman 

General of Texas 

Opinion Committee 

p. 1551
256 La. 843

#### Mozell C. HATHORN v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 50739.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 25, 1970.

In re: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Emmerick McKay and Earl Dean McKay applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Avoyelles.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, we find no error of law in the judgment complained of.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                        DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                             MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                        10,600
<SECURITIES>                                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  3,186
<ALLOWANCES>                                       0
<INVENTORY>                                    9,103
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              36,214
<PP&E>                                        58,827
<DEPRECIATION>                                37,456
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                98,651
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      3,448,544
<BONDS>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                       49
<COMMON>                                      24,294
<OTHER-SE>                                 2,345,134
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  98,651
<SALES>                                        6,302
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               7,682
<CGS>                                          1,268
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 71,595
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             190,453
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            70,871
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (325,237)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (325,237)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                (325,237)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.015)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.015)


</TABLE>
256 La. 915

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ulysses WALKER v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary et al.

No. 50948.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 9, 1970.

In re: Ulysses Walker applying for writs of certiorari and habeas corpus.

Writ refused. The petitioner’s factual allegations disputing the voluntariness of his plea of guilty are disproved by the transcript of the pre-sentence examination of him conducted by the trial court March 9, 1970.
EXHIBIT 31.2
 Certification of Chief Financial Officer pursuant to Securities Exchange Act Rule
13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) as adopted pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of G&K Services, Inc.;
 2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;
 3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;
 4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
     5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
    By:
    /s/ Jeffrey L. WrightJeffrey L. Wright, Executive Vice President,Chief Financial Officer
and Director
(Principal Financial Officer)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS AND BALANCE SHEETS OF GARAN,
INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARIES ANNEXED HERETO AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE

TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000039917
<NAME> GARAN, INCORPORATED

<S>                           <C>                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                       3-MOS                9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             SEP-30-1999          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                 MAR-1-1999           OCT-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                  JUN-30-1999          JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                          5,412,000            5,412,000
<SECURITIES>                    6,850,000            6,850,000
<RECEIVABLES>                  30,244,000           30,244,000
<ALLOWANCES>                      512,000              512,000
<INVENTORY>                    58,495,000           58,495,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              105,246,000          105,246,000
<PP&E>                         36,779,000           36,779,000
<DEPRECIATION>                 22,778,000           22,778,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                151,709,000          151,709,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>          32,156,000           32,156,000
<BONDS>                         2,033,000            2,033,000
<COMMON>                        2,653,000            2,653,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                   0                    0
<PREFERRED>                             0                    0
<OTHER-SE>                    112,148,000          112,148,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  151,709,000          151,709,000
<SALES>                        45,836,000          143,529,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>               45,836,000          143,529,000
<CGS>                          33,999,000          106,650,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                  33,999,000          106,650,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                        0                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        0                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 21,000               67,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 6,231,000           20,071,000
<INCOME-TAX>                    2,555,000            8,161,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                     0                    0
<DISCONTINUED>                          0                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         0                    0
<CHANGES>                               0                    0
<NET-INCOME>                    3,676,000           11,910,000
<EPS-BASIC>                        0.70                 2.30
<EPS-DILUTED>                        0.69                 2.28



</TABLE>
#### Frank J. McCORMACK and Shirley R. McCormack, Appellants, v. Charles P. WOODBURY, Appellee.

No. Q-289.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 10, 1973.

Robert D. Hart, Jr, Harrell, Wiltshire, Bozeman, Clark & Stone, Pensacola, for appellants.

Gary B. Lane, Beggs, Lane, Daniel, Gaines & Davis, Pensacola, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants seek review of a final judgment rendered by the court sitting as the trier of both the facts and the law. The judgment represents the sum of money to which appellee was found to be entitled as an accommodation endorser on a promissory note given by appellants to a commer- ■ cial bank which appellee was required to pay.

The central issue of this appeal concerns an alleged agreement between the parties hereto by which appellee committed himself to purchase the shares of corporate stock pledged by appellants to the bank as collateral for their loan at a purchase price sufficient to cover the amount of the loan. Implicit in the judgment appealed is the finding by the trial court that either no such agreement was ever reached by the parties or that, if so, it was verbal and not evidenced by any note or memorandum in writing and therefore was void and unenforceable under the statute of frauds which was in effect at that time.1

Our review of the record reveals sufficient competent evidence to sustain either theory which may have been adopted by the trial court as a basis for the judgment here assaulted.2 The judgment appealed is affirmed.

CARROLL, DONALD K, A. C. J, and WIGGINTON, and RAWLS, JJ, concur.

1

. F.S, § 725.02, F.S.A. (repealed by Ch. 65-254, § 1).

2

. Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132, 181 So. 341.
----

|   | 1. | I      have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Benihana,      Inc.; |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | Based      on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a      material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the      statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements      were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this      report. |
|--------|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:      July      26, 2010 |   |   /s/      Gene R. Baldwin             |   |
|-------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                          |   |   Gene      R. Baldwin                 |
|                          |   |   Interim      Chief Financial Officer |
Exhibit
      32.2





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**ADOPTED
      PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




**Certification
      of CFO**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Frequency Electronics, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended July 31, 2007 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Alan L.
      Miller, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
      Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
      of
      2002, that to my knowledge:





(1)
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and




(2)
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.


/s/
                Alan
                Miller
              
              
              September
                14,
                2007Alan L. Miller
                Chief Financial Officer


A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
      Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
      upon request **.**




This
      certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906
      of
      the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required
      by
      such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). Such
      certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing
      under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to
      the
      extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lester HOCKMAN, Jr.

No. 61991.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 14, 1978.

Robert L. Kleinpeter, of Kleinpeter & Kleinpeter, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara B. Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Marilyn C. Castle, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### In the Matter of Tamar Loper, Appellant, v Glenn S. Goord, as Commissioner of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.

[735 NYS2d 828]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Castellino, J.), entered April 19, 2001 in Chemung County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent Superintendent of Southport Correctional Facility finding petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule..

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge a tier II disciplinary determination finding him guilty of intentional flooding. Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s claimed procedural errors and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals primarily asserting that Supreme Court erred in rejecting his claim that the Hearing Officer improperly denied his request that certain witnesses appear and testify at his disciplinary hearing.

We affirm. The record reveals that the witnesses whose testimony was requested by petitioner signed witness refusal forms which adequately explained the reasons for the inmates’ refusal to testify *(see, Matter of Jimenez v Goord,*264 AD2d 918, 919; *Matter of Gold v Bradt,*254 AD2d 674, *lv denied*92 NY2d 819). Moreover, petitioner has waived any claim that the Hearing Officer should have conducted a further inquiry in this regard inasmuch as he failed to render an objection at the hearing to the authenticity of the refusals *(see, Matter of Hidalgo v Senkowski,*283 AD2d 839). Petitioner’s remaining arguments have been examined and found to be without merit.

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Spain, Mugglin and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

,

Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

O ctober 9 , 2019 

# Order

Clerk October 9 , 2019

1 60337 ( 2 7 )

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

SC: 1 60337

v COA: 34 8562

Wayne CC: 12

- 003375

- FC

BRANDON LEWIS CAIN

,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_____________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant

- appellant to ex ceed the page

limitation for his application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The application submitted

on Octo ber 7 , 2019 , is accepted for filing

.
**Exhibit 31.1**
I, Jack Friedman, the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive    Officer of Friedman Industries, Incorporated, a Texas    corporation, certify that:
I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Qof Friedman Industries, Incorporated;
     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect tothe period covered by this report;

     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, result of operations and cash flowsof the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;

     The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;

b) [intentionally omitted per SEC release 33-8238]

c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, asof the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant'sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

     The registrant's other certifying officers(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant's board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions): (a) All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Dated: November 14, 2003 /s/  JACK FRIEDMAN Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 844 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 844

   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a permanent 
                   extension of the research credit.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 4, 1993

  Mrs. Lloyd introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a permanent 
                   extension of the research credit.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF RESEARCH CREDIT.

    (a) General Rule.--Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
is amended by striking subsection (h).
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Paragraph (1) of section 28(b) of such 
Code is amended by striking subparagraph (D).
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years ending after June 30, 1992.

                                 <all>
```