MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2018 ME 86 Docket: Lin

- 17

- 439 Submitted

On	Briefs: April	25,	2018 Decided: July	3 ,	2018
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER, MEAD , GORMAN ,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

JANICE	M C NUTT

v. JOHN D

. M C NUTT

MEAD ,	J. [ ¶1 ] John	 D.	 McNutt	 (D an ) appeals	 from	 the judgment	 of	 the
District Court	(Wiscasset, Raimondi,	J. ) finding	him	in	contempt	of	the	parties’ earlier	 divorce	 judgment and increasing his	 spousal	 support	 obligation	 to Janice McNutt

. 19

- A M.R.S.	 § 951

- A(4)

- (5)	 (2017) ;	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 66(d) .	 	 Dan contends	 that	 the	 court	 clearly	 erred	 by	 finding	 that	 he	 is	 now	 able	 to	 pay increased	spousal	support	and	abused	its	discretion	by	ordering	a	temporary
increase of that	support	to	$1,750	each	m onth.		He	further	asserts	that	it	was
error	 for	 the	 court	 not	 to address an ambiguit y in	 the	 divorce	 judgment concerning whether	he	has	a	personal	obligation	 to	pay	 Janice	 the	difference
between the net	 proceeds	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 the	 marital	 properties	 and	 the $180,000	value of Janice’s interest s in	the	marital	real	estate as	established	in2 the	divorce	judgment

. He	con tends that because	the court failed	to resolve that ambiguity and imposed	a	lien	in Janice ’s	favor	that	was	not	provided	for	in	the original	 decree , the	 order has	 prevented	 him	 from refinanc ing one	 of	 the properties and	rendered him unable to	purge	his	contempt

. [¶ 2 ] We	conclude that ample	competent	evidence	in	the	record	support s the	 court’s	 finding s that	 Dan	 was	 in	 contempt	 of	 the	 property	 disposition provisions	 of	 the	 divorce	 judgment and that	 he has	 enjoyed	 a	 substantial
increase	in	income	due	to	his disregard of	the	court’s	order	to	sell	or	refinance
the two marital	rental	pro perties. The lien,	as	applied	to	the	proceeds	of	the
sale or	refinancing of the	individual	properties,	is	consistent	with	the	terms	of the	divorce	judgment .		W e affirm the	judgment

. I. BACKGROUND [¶3 ] On	March	31, 2014,	the	court	( Billings,	J. )	issued	a divorce	judgment that	 incorporated	 the	 parties’	 settlement	 agreement	 to	 the	 extent	 not inconsistent	with	the	judgment	and	awarded	Janice	$1,000	in	general	spousal
support payable each	month	until	she	received two lump	sum	payments	for	her
interest s in	 the	 marital	 rental	 properties. The d ivorce j udgment	 specifically3 provided for	 spousal	 support	 until	 the	 rental	 properties were	 refinanced	 or
sold : 4.	 	 Spousal	 Support .	 As	 and	 for	 general	 spousal	 support,	 [Dan] shall	pay	to	[Janice]	the	sum	of	$1,000.0 0	per	month,	commencing with	the	month	of	April,	2014.	The	spousal	support	provision	shall remain	in	place	until	[Dan]	has	paid	all	of	his	obligations	to	[Janice] under	 the	 terms	 of	 this	 Judgment,	 including	 $150 ,000	 for	 the Oak/Howard	 Street	 p roperty,	 $30, 000	 for	 the	 McClintock	 Street and	Townsend	Avenue	properties,	the	debts	and	attorney’s	fees	as set	 forth	 below,	 and	 the	 spousal	 support	 itself.	 Spousal	 support shall	 terminate	 once	 [Dan]	has	paid	 [Janice]	in	 full.	 [Janice]	 shall have	a	lien	against	all	thr ee	parcels	of	marital	real	estate	to	secure the	spousal	support	obligation	of	$1,000	per	month,	and	she	shall be	paid	what	she	is	owed	at	 the	 time	of	 the closing	on	any	given property. [¶4 ] During	their	marriage , the	parties owned two rental	properties (the McClintock	 and	 the	 Oak	 propert ies ) in	 Boothbay	 Harbor

. 1 The divorce judgment set	apart	both of	those properties	to	Dan and ordered that	Janice	was
to	receive two lump	sums ,	as	noted	above, upon	the	sale or	refinancing of the properties .		Throughout the se proceedings,	Dan	has	resided	in	an	owner’s	unit
in	one	o f	the	rental	properties. [¶ 5 ] Pursuant	to Section	3	of the	divorce	judgment ,	which relat es to	real

estate ,	Dan	was	 to	 pay	 Janice	 the first $30,000	 of	 the	 net	 proceeds	 from	 the

1 As	 recited	by	the	court	in	its	 order,	and	noted	in	 the	divorce	judgment ’ s	 reference	 to	 “three parcels	of marital	real	estate,”	the	McClintock	property	consists	of	two	residential	structures .		For	the purposes	of	clarity,	we	will	refer	to	both of	them	together as	the	McClintock	property.4 refinancing	of	th e	McClintock propert y by	December	31,	2015;	if	after	that	date Dan	had	not	refinanced	or	paid	Janice,	he	was	to sell	the propert y to	the	first person	to	make	a “ commercially	reasonable	offer ” and	pay	Janice	the	$30,000 out	of	the	proceeds	from	that	sale. As	for	the	Oak	property, the	court	ordered it	placed	on	the	market	“within	five	days	from	the	date	of	th[e]	judgment	and sold	 for	 the	 first	 commercially	 reasonable	 offer,” at	 which	 time the	 first $150,000	of	the	net	proceeds w as to	go	to	Janice. Eac h	of	t he	two	provisions	in the	 divorce	 j udgment relating	 to the sale	 of the real	 estate concluded	 with virtually	identical language: [ Janice will	or shall] be	paid the	first	[$30,000	or	$150,000]	from the	net	proceeds	of	sale

.	.	. plus	any	amounts	due	her [pursuant	to or	under] her	liens	against	 the	property	 for	 the	debts,	attorney’s fees	and	spousal	support	obligations	as	set	forth	below. [ 2 ] [ ¶6 ] Nearly	 two	 and	 a	 half	 years	 after	 the court	 issued	 the divorce judgment,	Dan	still	had	not	sold	the	Oak	proper ty ; had	failed	to	refinance	the McClintock	propert y by	December	31,	2015 ; and	had	subsequently failed to	list the	latter	propert y for	sale.		On	September	27,	2016,	Janice	filed three motions , asking	 the	 court to (1) increase her monthly spousal	 support	 to	 $3,000; (2) enforce	 the	 divorce	 judgment , see M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 120 ;	 and (3) find	 Dan	 in

2 The	“obligations	as	set	forth	below ” consisted	of	Dan’s	obligation	to pay	$1,000	per	month	as general	spousal	support,	his	obligation	to	pay	certain	specified	marital	debts,	and	the	requirement that	he	pay	Janice’s	attorney	fees.5 contempt	for	failing	to	refinance	or	sell	the	McClintock	propert y ,	allowing	the Oak	property’s	listing	to	lapse,	and	refusing	to	proceed	in	good	faith	wi th	the
sale	of	th e propert ies

. See M.R.	Civ.	P.	66(d)

. 3 [¶7 ] After	a	hearing	 on	 the	motions, t he	court ( Raimondi,	J. ) found	by clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence	 that	 Dan	 was	 in	 contempt	 of	 the	 divorce judgment	because,	despite	his	ability	to	comp ly,	he	allowed	the	Oak	property listing	to	lapse ; refused	to	pay	Janice	$30,000 although	his	attorney	held	that
exact	sum	for	him	in	escrow ; and	had	not	refinanced	or	listed	the	McClintock
propert y for	sale

. The	co urt ’s	order,	dated	July	31,	2017, imposed a	suspended
term	 of incarceration , remedial	 sanctions requiring	 Dan	 to	 comply	 with	 the unfulfilled	divorce	decree	mandates,	and	an	award	of	attorney	fees	to	Janice

. [ ¶8 ] On	Janice’s	motion	to	modify	her	spousal	support,	the	court	found
that her	f inancial circumstances	were	substantially	worse than	at	the	time	of
the	 divorce ,	 in	 large	 part	 because	 she	 had	 received	 none	 of	 the	 lump	 sum compensation	for	her	interests	in	the	rental	properties

. Dan , on	the	other	hand , had	benefitted	from	rental	income generated	from	the	two	properties,	neither of	 which	 he	 had	 refinanced	 or	 sold	 in	 order	 to	 pay	 Janice. Thus,	 the	 court

3 On	September	27,	2016,	Janice personally,	and	not	through	counsel, filed	a	motion	for	contemp t that was	 not	 properly	 served	 on	 Dan.	 	 S he	 then	 filed	 a	 nearly	 identical	 m otion	 for	 contempt	 on April 10, 2017.		Dan	does	not	contest	that	Janice	served	him	with	the	more	recent	contempt	motion.6 ordered	a	temporary	increase in general	spousal	support	to	$1,750	each	month, with	all	support	to	cease after Dan	fully	paid his debts	t o Janice .		The	July	31
order reaffirmed	the	lien s on	the	parties'	real	estate that	were created	in	the divorce	judgment for	the	mont hly	spousal	supp ort,	attorney fees,	and	certain
marital	debts ,	but also	created	a	new	lien	in	Janice’s	favor, something that	the divorce	judgment	had	not	imposed,	“on	[both	parcels	of]	the	formerly	marital real	 estate	 .	 .	 .	 to	 secure	 the	 property	 settlement	 obligations,”	 i.e.,	 the	 first specified	amounts of	the net	proceeds	from each propert y’s refinancing or	sale. [ ¶9 ] On	 August	 7,	 2017 , a	 little	 over	 a	 week	 after	 the	 final	 order	 on Janice’s	motions, the	Oak	property was sold,	netting	$116,867	in	proceeds	that were	paid	to	Janice.		That	same	day,	Dan	released	the	$ 30,000	held	in	escrow	to Janice and	moved	for	the	court	t o	make	further	findings relating	to its	July	31
Order

. See M.R.	Civ.	P.	52( b )

. Two	days	later,	he moved	for	the	court	to	grant
him a	new	trial or amend	the	judgment	to	clarify	his	personal	liability	for	the deficiency	in	the	Oak	property ’s sale proceeds. T he	court	denied the motions, deeming that the	issue	of Dan’s	personal	liability	for	any	shortfall	in	the	total proceeds	 from the rental	properties was	not	properly	before	 the	court .		Dan timely	appealed. See M.R.	App.	P. 2B (c)

.7
II.		DISCUSSION [ ¶1 0 ] Dan does not take	issue	with the	court ’s	judgment finding him in contempt	of	the	property	disposition provisions	of the	divorce	judgm ent or the
court’s f inding that	Janice	had	an	increased	need	for spousal support since the
divorce

. H e assert s , rather, that	the	court	abused	its	discretion	by	ordering	an increase	in	spousal	support	as	a	remedial	contempt	sanction and he contests the	finding	that	he now	has	a	substantially	greater	ability	to pay more	in spousal
support

. He further contends	 that	 it was	 error	 for	 the	 court	 to	 decline	 to address	 the	 divorce	 judgment’s	 apparent	 ambiguity	 regarding	 his	 personal liability	to	Janice	for	any	shortfall	in	the	net	proceeds	from	the	Oak	property’s sale,	and that it	was error for	the	court	to	modify the property	division	terms	of the	 divorce	 judgment	 by	 imposing	 an	 additional	 lien	 against	 both	 marital properties	to	secure	the	individual	lump	sum	payments.
A. Increased	Spousal	Support and the Remedial	Sanctions [ ¶1 1 ] We	 quickly	 dispense	with	Dan’s	 first argument , that	 the	 court’s increase	in	spousal	support	was	somehow	an	impermissible	form	of	remedial contempt	sanction , because	it	is	apparent	from	the	judgment	that	the	increase in	 spousal	 support	 was	 not	 imposed	 as	 a	 sanction

. Maine	 Rule	 of	 Civil
Proced ure	66(d)(3) govern s the remedial	contempt sanctions	imposed in	this8

case
. We	 have	 interpreted	 that	 Rule	 as	 requiring	 an	 alleged	 contemnor	 to

“ comply	to	the	fullest	extent	possible” with a court	judgment	or	order	to	avoid being	 found	 in	 contempt

. Efstathiou	 v.	 Efstathiou ,	 2009	 ME	 107,	 ¶ 13,
982 A.2d 339 (quotation	 marks	 omitted)

. Further,	 as Rule 66(a) (2)(C) provides,	the	function	of remedial	sanction s is “to	coerce	the	termination	of	an ongoing	 contempt	 or	 to	 compensate	 a	 party	 aggrieved by	 conte mpt .”	 	 We
review the factual	findings	underlying the contempt	order	for	clear	error and the	 remedial	 sanctions	 imposed	 for	 an	 abuse	 of	 discretion. See Sullivan	 v. Tardiff ,	2015	ME	121,	¶ ¶ 17, 20,	124	A.3d	652. [ ¶1 2 ] Here ,	 the	 court	 properly	 found	 that the	 divorce	 judgment unambiguous ly required Dan (1) to	 list the	 Oak	 property and	 maintain	 the listing until	 it sold for	 the	 first	 commercially	 reasonable offer ; and (2) to
refinance the	 McClintock	 property by	 December	 31,	 2015 , or immediately
thereafter	list and	sell	it	for	the	first	commercially	reasonable	offer.		As	of	the June	and	July	2017 motion hearings,	it	was	undisputed	that	Dan	had	allowed the	 Oak	 property	 listing	 to	 lapse	 for	 several	 months	 in	 2016	 and	 had	 not
refinanced	 or listed	 th e	 McClintock	 property ; furthermore, the	 court found
Dan’s	 excuses	 for	 his	 non compliance	 unpersuasive

. Accordingly, the	 court’s finding,	 based	 upon clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence,	 that	 Dan	 violated	 the9 provisions	of	the	divorce	judgment	despite	having	the	a bility	to	comply,	is	well supported	 by	 the	 evidentiary	 record. See	 Efstathiou ,	 2009	 ME	 107,	 ¶¶ 11,
13

- 14,	982 A.2d	339. [ ¶1 3 ] The	 court	imposed remedial sanctions giving Dan	 the	 choice	 to either	 (1)	 serve	 a	 sentence	 of	 fifteen	 days’	 incarceration ; or	 (2)	 release	 the $30,000	 held	 by	 his	 attorney	 in	 escrow ; take	 immediate	 steps	 to	 apply	 for refinancing	of	the	McClintock	propert y with	at	least	three	lending	institutions ; actually	 refinance	 them	 by	 March	 1,	 2018,	 or	list	 them	 for	 sale	immediately
after that	 date ; and	 pay	 Janice	 the	 attorney	 fees	incurred in prosecuting	 her contempt	 motion. See M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 66(d)(3)

. T he	 court’s	 order , however,
contains	no indication that	it	intended	the	increased	spousal	support	obligation

to	 serve	 as a	 contempt sanction

. To	 the	 contrary,	 the	 order	 independently analyzed	and	re ached completely	separate	conclusions	regarding	the	contempt and	spousal	support	issues. All of the	sanctions	imposed serve to	ensure	that Janice	 receives	 the lump	 sum settlement	 payments that	 Dan	 had contemptuously	 withheld

. The	 court’s	 imposition	 of sanctions	 did	 not
constitute	an	abuse	 of	discretion

. See Murphy	v.	Bartlett ,	2014	ME	 13,	¶	18,
86 A.3d	610; Efstathiou ,	2009 ME	107,	¶¶ 14

- 15,	982	A.2d	339.10
B. Increase	in	Spousal	Support [ ¶1 4 ] Dan next challenges	the	sufficiency	of	the	evidence	supporting	the court’s	findings	that since	the 2014 divorce judgment he	now	earns	more and can	afford	 to	pay	 Janice	 $1 , 750	each	month	in	 support. We review for	clear error	 a	 court’s	 findings	 regard ing	 a	 payor	 spouse’s	 income, see Efstathiou	 v. Aspinquid,	Inc. , 2008	ME	145,	¶	48 ,	956 A.2d 110,	and	for	an	abuse	of	discretion
a	court’s modification	of	spousal	support, s ee McLeod	v.	Macul ,	2016	ME	76,	¶ 6 , 139	A.3d	920. Title	19

- A	M.R.S.	§	95 1

- A(4 ) grants the	court	authority	to	modify spousal	support	upon	finding	“a	substantial	change	in	circumstances	affecting the	 payor’s	 ability	 to	 pay	 spousal	 support	 and	 the	 payee’s	 need	 for	 spousal support.” McAllister	v.	McAllister ,	2011 ME 69,	¶	12,	21	A.3d 1010 (quotation marks	omitted)

. [ ¶1 5 ] The	court	found	that	a s	of	the	2014	divorce	judgment , Janice	“had
vi rtually	no	debt ”	but had	nearly	depleted	all	of	the	funds left	in	her	checking account.		By	the	time	of	the	motion	hearing, however, Janice	had	accum ulated approximately	$16,000	in	debt, part	of	which was unpaid	taxes on	her	spousal
support, and she had	an	annual	income	of	$15,600 .		S he	qualifies	for	Medicaid and	 food	 stamps. Regarding	 Dan’s	 income	 and	 earning	 potential,	 the	 court
found	 that in	 2016 t he	 rental	 properties	 generated nearly	 $55,000	 more	 in11 gross	rent	than	in 2014 , and Dan	received	all	of that	rent because	he	had	neither
refinanced n or	 sold	 those	properties

. 4 The court	did	 not	 find credible Dan’s
assertion	that	he	finds	himself	with “virtually	no	income”	after	taxes. The	court was	 not	 required	 to accept Dan’s	 asserted	 lack	 of	 income, see Handrahan	 v.
Malenko ,	2011 ME	15,	¶	14,	12 A.3d 79;	instead	it	could	rely	on	the	competent evidence	in	 the	record	supporting	a	 finding	 that	Dan	now has	a	substantially increased	ability	to	pay	spousal	support .		T hus,	the	court	acted	well	within	its discretion	 when	 it	 ordered	 a	 temporary	 increase	 in	 spousal	 support.
See 19

- A M.R.S.	 § 951

- A(4)

- (5); McCarthy	 v.	 Goroshin ,	 2016	 ME	 98,	 ¶ 15,
143 A.3d	138.
C. Ambiguity	in the Divorce	Judgment	and	the	Added	Lien [ ¶1 6 ] Dan finally contends	 that	it	was	error for	 the	court to	decline	 to
address	 the divorce	 judgment’s apparent ambiguity regarding	 any personal liability on	his	part to pay Janice	for the shortfall in the	net	proceeds from	the Oak	property’s	sale

. He	further	contends that	the court erred by impermissibly

4 More	specifically,	the	court	found	that	Dan	had	paid	down nearly	all	of	the	$25,000	of	marital debt	assigned	 to	him	by	 the	divorce	judgment,	save	 for	 $4,000

- $5,000	of	his	son’s	student	loans; invested	$500,000	in	“cash	outlay	and	sweat	equity”	into	 the	rental	properties;	paid	$8,000	of	his post

- judgment	 attorney fees;	 made	 all	 of	 his	 spousal	 support	 payments;	 and	 still	 had	 adequate income	to	avoid	having	to	apply	for	food	stamps.12 modif ying the	divorce	judgment when	it impos ed an additional	lien against the marital	properties to secur e the lump	sum	payment s
. [¶1 7 ] The	original	divorce	judgment	did	not	establish	a	lien	with	respect
to	 the allocation	 of	 the	 proceeds	 from s elling or	 refinancing the	 rental properties

. It	required	Dan	to	pay	Janice's	share	first	out	of	the	net	proceeds
from	the	sale or	refinancing of	the	particular	properties

. E ach	allocation	of a portion	of proceeds is	specifically	designated	to	be	taken from the proceeds	of
one	or	the	other	of	those specific property	transactions,	not	both. The	express language	 of the	 divorce	 judgment	 with	 regard	 to those	 provisions does not
establish lien s upon	 those properties

. See	 Lien , Black’s	 Law	 Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). The divorce court ’s simple allocation	 of the	 sale proceeds
created no legal encumbrance	upon the properties	themselves

— it did	so only with	the	other	three	obligations	(the	spousal	support,	attorney	fees,	and	marital debt)

. The	sole	enforcement	mechanism	for Janice’s	right	to	the	first	share	of proceeds was	 the	 motivation	 provided	 by	 the fact	 that	 the monthly	 spousal support	obligation	would	continue	until all sums	due were	satisfied

. [¶1 8 ] The July	31 o rder confirmed	 the	liens	established	in	 the	divorce judgment	 and created new lien s on	 the	 existing	 property	 settlement obligations :13 [Janice] shall	have	a	lien	on t he	formerly	marital	real	estate as	identified	in	the	Divorce	Judgment	to	secure	the	spousal	support obligation,	the property	settlement	obligations ,	and	liability	for	past and	present	attorney's	fees	or	any	other	obligations owed	by	[Dan] to	[Janice]. (Emphasis	supplied.) [¶1 9 ] The	 lien	 placed	 by	 the	 court in	 its	 order on	 Janice's	 motions	 is explicitly	directed	 to	"the	property	settlement	obligations,"	and thus invokes the	provisions	of	the	divorce	judgment that created	two	separate	obligations: Dan	 was	 to	 pay	 speci fic	 amounts	 to	 Janice	 from	 the net	 proceeds	 of each particular property’s sale or	refinancing

. The terms	of	the	divorce	judgment	do

not explicitly require	Dan	 to	 take	 proceeds	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 one property	 to make	 up	 a	 shortfall	 on	 the	 net	 proceeds	 of	 the	 other ’s sale or	 refinancing

. 5 Accordingly,	 the imposition	 of	 a	 lien	 upon	 a	 particular	 property	 to	 secure Janice’s	 entitlement	 to	 the	 first	 proceeds	 of	 the	 sale or	 refinancing is	 fully
consistent	w ith	the	terms	of	the	divorce	judgment , imposes	no	addit ional	legal

5 Dan	asked	the	court	to	resolve	what	he	characterizes	as	an	ambiguity	in	the	divorce	judgment: whether	 he	is	 personally	 obligated	 to make	 up	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 amount	 designated	 to Janice	 upon	 the	 sale	 of	 either	 of	 the	 properties	and	 the	 actual	 net	proceeds.	 	 The	 answer	 to	 that question	 may	 turn	 on	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 amounts	 of	 proceeds,	 $150,000	 and	 $30,000 respectivel y,	are	deemed	a	form	of	spousal	support	or	property	division. See	McAllister v.	McAllister , 2011	ME	69, ¶¶ 8

- 10,	13,	21	A.3d	1010.		The	court	declined	to	address	that	issue because	no	sale	had taken	place	by	the	date	of	the	hearing	or	decision;	that question	may	properly	be	addressed	in	future proceedings

. The	court	may , at	a	future	proceeding,	also address the	issue	of	Dan’s claimed inability to	purge	his	contempt,	which	purportedly	resulted	from	actions	by	Janice	su bsequent	to	its	contempt order.14 obligation ,	and	does	not other wise	mod if y the	terms	of	the	property	settlement obligations

. Cf

. Wardwell v.	Wardwell , 458 A.2d	75 0 ,	752

- 53 (Me.	1983)

. 6 The	entry	is: The	 July	31,	2017 , o rder	of	 the	District	Court	is affirmed.

Clarke	C.	Hambley,	Esq.,	Miller	Law	and	Mediation,	LLC,	Portland,	for	appellant John	D.	McNutt
Sarah	I rving	Gilbert,	Esq., Camden	Law LLP,	Camden,	for	appellee	Janice	McNutt

Wiscasset	District	Court docket	number	FM

- 2012

- 82 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY

6 “In	the	absence	of	statutory	authorization	to	modify	a	judgment	dividing	marital	property,	the courts	 are	 without	 jurisdiction	 to	 do	 so.” Wardwell	 v.	Wardwell ,	 458	 A.2d	 750,	 752	 (Me. 1983). Although 19

- A M.R.S.	§ 951

- A(4) (2017) authorizes	the	modification	of	a	judgment’s	spousal	support provisions,	there	is	no	similar	statutory	authority	to	modify	the	final	property	disposition	of	a	divorce decree. See	McAllister ,	2011	ME	69,	¶	8,	21	A.3d	1010.		Motions	to	modify	spousal	support “do [ ] not give	 the	 court	 authority	 to	 amend	 or	 modify	 the	 division	 of	 marital	 property	 in	 [the	 divorce] judgment,”	 even	 upon	 finding	 a	 substantial	 change	 in	 circumstances. See Bonner	 v.	 Emerson , 2014 ME 135, ¶ 12,	105	A.3d	1023.