alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          15,639
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           5,222
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     44,170
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                             330
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        377,171
<ALLOWANCE>                                      4,172
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 459,712
<DEPOSITS>                                     313,430
<SHORT-TERM>                                    61,659
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              5,358
<LONG-TERM>                                     50,149
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            34
<OTHER-SE>                                      27,647
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 459,712
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 31,698
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,526
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   496
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                34,720
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              11,689
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              19,091
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           15,629
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    (990)
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 (6)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 13,586
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  5,885
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,721
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    8.46
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                       445
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 4,149
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      278
<RECOVERIES>                                        82
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                   23
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             4,172
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
##### 



EXHIBIT 99.1

Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906


of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


Not Filed Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Friedman Industries,
Incorporated (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the
period ending December 31, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Jack Friedman, Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirement of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

Dated: February 13, 2003



| |                     
| | --------------------
| | By /s/ JACK FRIEDMAN
| |                     
| | Name: Jack Friedman 

| |        |                                                  
| | ------ | -------------------------------------------------
| | Title: | Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
#### DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD et al., Appellants, v. DADE COUNTY CLASSROOM TEACHERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., and Dade Federation of Teachers, Local 1875 AFL/CIO, et al., Appellees.

No. 44131.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 26, 1973.

Thomas G. Spicer, of Bruckner & Greene, and Frank A. Howard, Jr., Miami, for appellants.

Tobias Simon and Elizabeth DuFresne, Miami, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

We have for consideration the motion of appellees, plaintiffs below, to set aside the automatic stay, provided by Rule 5.12, Florida Appellate Rule, 32 F.S.A.

Upon sworn complaint, the trial court entered an order on July 20, 1973, requiring- appellants to return to the collective bargaining table. The trial court denied an oral motion for stay of this order pending appeal. Thereupon, Dade County School Board appealed within a sufficient time to invoke the automatic stay provision of Rule 5.12, Florida Appellate Rule. The motion under consideration was then filed by ap-pellees.

We have heard argument of counsel. The motion to set aside the automatic stay is granted with the condition that appellees may bargain collectively only for those teachers who have designated appellees as their bargaining agent. No rehearing will be allowed.

It is so ordered.

CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 21 - Subsidiaries of Registrant

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
Below is the list of subsidiaries of Rick's Cabaret International, Inc.:

Name:                                    State of.
                                       Incorporation:
<S>                                    <C>
Trumps, Inc.                           Texas
Tantric Enterprises, Inc.              Texas
RCI Holdings, Inc.                     Texas
RCI Entertainment Texas, Inc.          Texas
RCI Entertainment Minnesota, Inc.      Minnesota
RCI Internet Services, Inc.            Texas
RCI Entertainment Houston, Inc.        Texas
RCI Entertainment San Antonio, Inc.    Texas
RCI Internet Holdings, Inc.            Texas
RCI Entertainment Fort Worth, Inc.     Texas
Citation Land LLC                      Texas
XTC Cabaret, Inc.                      Texas
Bobby's Novelty, Inc.                  Texas
Nocturnal Concepts, Inc.               Texas
RCI Ventures, Inc.                     Texas
Broadstreets Cabaret, Inc. - Inactive  Texas
RCI Debit Services, Inc. - Inactive    Texas
Tantra Parking, Inc. - Inactive        Texas
Tantra Dance, Inc. - Inactive          Texas
SRD Vending Company, Inc. - Inactive   Texas
RCI Billing, Inc. - Inactive           Texas
</TABLE>


<PAGE>
Exhibit 32.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss.1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In  connection  with the Annual Report of MDSI Mobile Data  Solutions  Inc. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-K for the year ended  December 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, Erik
Dysthe,  the  President,  Chief  Executive  Officer,  Chairman  of the Board and
Director of the  Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss.1350,  as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


                                      /s/ Erik Dysthe
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                      President, Chief Executive Officer,
                                      Chairman of the Board and Director

                                      March 30, 2004
#### Brian BERG, a minor by his next friend and father Dwayne Berg and Dwayne Berg, Petitioners, v. Joseph FIORITO et al., Respondents.

No. 73-102.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 23, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari dismissed.
#### Charles T. Weimer, Respondent, v Moneca Weimer, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[722 NYS2d 328]

Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs and matter remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: The parties, who have one child together, were divorced in May 1996. The judgment of divorce incorporated but did not merge their separation agreement, executed in January 1995. In April 1999 Moneca Weimer (mother) moved, *inter alia,*to vacate or modify the judgment of divorce (appeal No. 2). She alleged, *inter alia,*that the separation agreement is unfair and unconscionable, and was procured by fraud and overreaching, and that the child support provisions are not in compliance with the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b]). In May 1999 the mother commenced a plenary action against Charles T. Weimer (father) wherein she made the same allegations (appeal No. 1).

The mother’s allegations that the separation agreement is unfair, unconscionable, and the product of fraud and overreaching are not substantiated by proof sufficient to justify setting aside the separation agreement *(see, Christian v Christian,*42 NY2d 63, 71-73). In any event, the mother ratified the separation agreement by complying with its provisions and failing to object to it for more than four years *(see, Skotnicki v Skotnicki,*237 AD2d 974, 975). Furthermore, the mother waited three years before moving to vacate the judgment of divorce on the ground of fraud pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3) and thus that part of her motion based on fraud is untimely *(see, City of Albany Indus. Dev. Agency v Garg,*250 AD2d 991, 993).

We agree with the mother, however, that the child support provisions of both the separation agreement and that part of the judgment of divorce incorporating those provisions fail to satisfy the requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (h) *(see, Brown v Powell,*278 AD2d 846; *Zenz v Zenz,*260 AD2d 474). We therefore modify the order in appeal No. 2 by vacating that part of the judgment of divorce incorporating the child support provisions of the separation agreement, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court to determine the father’s child support obligation in accordance with the CSSA *(see, Zenz v*
      *990
      *Zenz, supra).*Given our determination, we do not reach the remaining issues. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Cattaraugus County, Cosgrove, J. — Vacate Judgment.) Present— Pine, J. P., Wisner, Hurlbutt, Scudder and Kehoe, JJ.
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8212 

To direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to conduct studies on alternative 

work schedules for employees of the Veterans Health Administration, 

and for other matters. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 11, 2020 

Mr. CUNNINGHAM (for himself and Mr. BANKS) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to conduct studies on alternative work schedules for employees of the 

Veterans Health Administration, and for other matters. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘VA Expanded Care 

5 Hours Act’’ or the ‘‘ECHO Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. STUDIES ON ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES FOR 

7 EMPLOYEES OF VETERANS HEALTH ADMINIS8 TRATION. 

9 (a) STUDY OF VETERANS.— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8212 IH

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

2 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec3 retary of Veterans Affairs shall conduct a study on 

4 the attitudes of eligible veterans toward the Depart5 ment of Veterans Affairs offering appointments out6 side the usual operating hours of facilities of the De7 partment, including through the use of telehealth 

8 appointments. 

9 (2) ELIGIBLE VETERAN DEFINED.—In this sub10 section, the term ‘‘eligible veteran’’ means a veteran 

11 who— 

12 (A) is enrolled in the patient enrollment 

13 system of the Department under section 

14 1705(a) of title 38, United States Code; and 

15 (B) received health care from the Depart16 ment at least once during the two-year period 

17 ending on the date of the commencement of the 

18 study under paragraph (1). 

19 (b) DEPARTMENT STUDY.— 

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

21 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec22 retary shall conduct a study on the feasibility and 

23 advisability of offering appointments outside the 

24 usual operating hours of facilities of the Depart25 ment. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 8212 IH

1 (2) STUDY OF EMPLOYEES.—The study re2 quired by paragraph (1) shall include a study of the 

3 opinions of employees of the Veterans Health Ad4 ministration, including clinical, nonclinical, and sup5 port staff, with respect to offering appointments out6 side the usual operating hours of facilities of the De7 partment, including through the use of telehealth 

8 appointments. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 23.2





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS





We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-12923, 333-53017, 333-33636, 333-94169, 333-58754, 333-99421, 333-98635 and 333-98637) of Incara Development, Ltd. of our report dated November 1, 2002 relating to the financial statements, which appears in this
Form 10-K. We also consent to the reference to us under the heading Selected Financial Data.





PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP


Raleigh, North Carolina


December 20, 2002
#### L. K. RUNNELS and Dorothy Rogers, Appellants, v. George BIRD, Appellee.

No. R-500.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 8, 1973.

Rehearing Denied March 20, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Wireless Frontier Internet, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2004 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Kelly E. Simmons, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




Date:  November 22, 2004                     By:  /s/ Kelly E. Simmons
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  Kelly E. Simmons
                                                  Chief Financial Officer
#### The GRAND UNION COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Petitioner, v. Ann PATRICK, Respondent.

No. 71-32.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 20, 1971.

*475West, Goldman & Weisberg, Miami, for petitioner.

Kneale, Roberts, Kneale, Starkweather & Henderson, Miami, for respondent.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ-

CARROLL, Judge.

By certiorari the defendant below seeks review of a discovery order for production. The respondent Ann Patrick filed an action for damages for personal injuries sustained when she fell on the store premises of the petitioner while there as a customer, alleging breach of duty by the defendant to maintain the premises in reasonable safe condition.

Prior to trial the plaintiff filed a motion for an order requiring the defendant to produce “any and all accident reports which were filed by Mr. D. E. Wesgate, general manager, in the normal course of business, and in relation to that certain accident which occurred on February 25, 1969.” The motion contained no reason or ground therefor, and no good cause was shown or attempted to be shown in the motion.

Rule 1.350 F.R.C.P., 30 F.S.A., dealing with motions to produce, requires that such motion shall show good cause, viz: “On motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all parties * * * the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce. * * *.”

It is argued on behalf of the respondent that the failure of the motion to state or show good cause was not material because reference to the pleadings should be sufficient to disclose a need or cause therefor. That argument is unsound. The requirement in the rule that such a motion to produce should show good cause is clear and appears mandatory. The motion in this case failed to conform to the requirement of the rule in that respect.

The record, including certain affidavits filed in the cause, shows that the document which it was sought to have produced was a report by the defendant to its insurer, for investigation by the latter incident to fulfillment of its obligation to defend on behalf of the insured. Such a report is privileged. See Vann v. State, Fla. 1956, 85 So.2d 133. Compare Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Belcher, Fla.App.1962, 144 So.2d 863. The principle under which such reports by an insured to its insurer are privileged is that they are considered relevant to defense of the action and in effect are communications between attorney and client, being information which is to benefit the defense of the cause by counsel, passing through the insurer to counsel. See Annotation 22 A.L.R.2d 659, 660-662.

For the reasons stated certiorari is granted, and the order to produce which is the subject of review in this proceeding is hereby quashed.

It is so ordered.
Please enable JavaScript to use this site.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 9, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 05-50526

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ALEJANDRO RAMIREZ-NAVARRO,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:04-CR-2621-ALL

--------------------

Before REAVLEY, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Alejandro

Ramirez-Navarro raises arguments that are foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998),

which held that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The

Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### Joan Kennington DAY v. Ben William DAY.

Civ. 1491.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

July 12, 1978.

*1031D. C. Martinson of Martinson & Beason, Huntsville, for appellant.

H. Evins Hamm, Huntsville, for appellee.

WRIGHT, Presiding Judge.

This is a divorce case.

Plaintiff and defendant were married originally in 1953. They were divorced in March, 1975. They remarried in November 1975. They separated again in August 1977. The husband filed for divorce in September 1977. The wife answered and counterclaimed seeking a divorce, alimony and attorney fees. After hearing the evidence, the court entered judgment for divorce in February 1978.

The first issue presented is whether the failure to award the wife alimony in gross was an abuse of discretion.

The evidence showed as follows: At the time of the divorce in 1975, the parties entered into an agreement. The court incorporated the agreement into the judgment for divorce. The agreement was for a property settlement of all the real and personal property of the marriage. It was completed by transfer of jointly held title, one to the other and the fulfillment of all mutual obligations. There was no nullification of that agreement when the parties remarried. Neither party had acquired any additional real or personal assets of any material value since the agreement and during the new marriage. The only change had been that the business of the husband had improved in volume if not in profit. He continues to draw the same wages. The income of the wife has increased from $6,900 to $10,000 per year. There are no minor children. The savings account given to the wife in 1975 has slightly increased and is now over $5,000. The wife is age 44 and the husband is age 45. There is no evidence but that she is in good health. The husband has a heart ailment.

We have carefully examined all the evidence. We are unable to find any substantial difference in the situation of the parties at the end of the brief second marriage than when they began it. Each could be said to be slightly better off financially at the end than at the beginning. There is no contention by either party that the rights and titles derived from the first divorce were in any manner affected or nullified by the second marriage. We do not believe the facts and the law would support such contention. *Williams v. Williams,*261 Ala. 328, 74 So.2d 582 (1954). It is the considered opinion of this court that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award to the wife alimony in any form. *Plaskett v. Plaskett,*348 So.2d 784 (Ala.Civ.App.1977).

*1032The second issue presented is whether the court erred in failing to award attorney fees to the wife. The award of attorney fees is controlled by the same principle of law as is the award of alimony. It is a matter for the exercise of the judicial discretion of the trial court. *Novak*v. *Novak,*339 So.2d 77 (Ala.Civ.App.1976). As in the matter of alimony, we find no abuse of discretion under the facts of this case.

AFFIRMED.

BRADLEY and HOLMES, JJ., concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 19
- 0 699 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BRUCE HOWARD HOSEA ,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including July 22 , 20 20 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

June 15 2020

06/15/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0699