Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, 

Powell, JJ. and Lacy, S.J. 

PKO VENTURES, LLC 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 121534 JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 

 September 12, 2013 

NORFOLK REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AUTHORITY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Louis A. Sherman, Judge 

 In this appeal we consider whether a redevelopment and 

housing authority may acquire by process of eminent domain 

unblighted private property located within a blighted area 

designated for redevelopment subsequent to a statutorily imposed 

limitation on acquisition by condemnation to only those 

properties that are themselves blighted. 

I. Facts and Proceedings 

A. Creation of the Redevelopment Project and Earlier 

Acquisitions 

In January 1998, the Council of the City of Norfolk 

approved the Hampton Boulevard Redevelopment Project ("the 

Redevelopment Project") created by the Norfolk Redevelopment and 

Housing Authority ("NRHA") under the authority of Code §§ 36-49 

and 36-51. Code § 36-49 authorizes a redevelopment and housing 

authority to "adopt a redevelopment plan for a designated 

redevelopment area to address blighted areas." A redevelopment 

and housing authority is "specifically empowered to carry out 
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any work or undertaking in the redevelopment area[,]" including 

"[a]cquir[ing] blighted areas." Code § 36-49(A)(1). 

Code § 36-51(A) authorizes localities to "approve 

redevelopment plans through their governing body or agency 

designated for that purpose." The properties affected by the 

Redevelopment Project included a nine and one-half block area 

bounded by Hampton Boulevard on the west, 48th Street on the 

north, Killam Avenue on the east, and 38th Street on the south, 

all within the City of Norfolk. 

The NRHA's approval of the Redevelopment Project was based 

upon a redevelopment study which determined that the 

Redevelopment Project area was blighted due to incompatible land 

uses, disrepair, environmental risks, demographic changes, and 

high crime rates. Based upon the study, the NRHA concluded 

that, without eliminating these factors, the adverse impact on 

the general welfare would increase. The proposed Redevelopment 

Project's properties were classified as good, fair, or poor. 

The latter classification indicated a structure with extensive 

exterior deterioration and an unlikely economic feasibility of 

rehabilitation. Of all the properties, twenty percent were 

classified as poor. The Redevelopment Project area was selected 

to assist in the orderly expansion of Old Dominion University 

("ODU"), a public university located immediately adjacent to the 

Redevelopment Project. 
3 

Following approval of the Redevelopment Project, two 

decisions of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, in 1999 

and 2009, rejected challenges to the NRHA's condemnation of 

several of the individual properties within the Redevelopment 

Project. In 1999, the circuit court held that the area 

designated for the Redevelopment Project was blighted under Code 

§ 36-49. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. J.A.G. Assocs., 

No. CL99-1100 (Norfolk Cir. Ct. Nov. 16, 1999) (order overruling 

jurisdictional defenses). In 2009, in rejecting a challenge to 

a subsequent petition to condemn other individual properties 

within the Redevelopment Project, the circuit court held that 

the doctrine of stare decisis prevented these landowners from 

relitigating the 1999 determination that the Redevelopment 

Project was blighted and that the NRHA did not act in an 

arbitrary or unreasonable manner. The circuit court, in the 

alternative, confirmed that the area was blighted. Norfolk 

Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Arney, No. CL08-1918 (Norfolk 

Cir. Ct. July 23, 2009)(letter opinion). 

In its 2009 order, the circuit court also addressed a claim 

contesting the propriety of ODU's agreement with the NRHA in 

which ODU agreed to pay the NRHA a commission of four percent of 

the total land assembly costs incurred for the acquisition of 

property within the Redevelopment Project area. According to 

the Cooperation Agreement between the NRHA and ODU, land 
4 

assembly costs included appraisals, the title search, 

environmental studies, title insurance, surveys of individual 

parcels, and the purchase price for properties acquired by deed 

or condemnation. The circuit court held that the NRHA's 

acceptance of a commission of four percent of the total land 

assembly costs from ODU did not create an improper agency 

relationship between the NRHA and ODU. 

B. Acquisition of the Subject Property 

On April 21, 2010, the NRHA, after making an unsuccessful 

offer to purchase, filed a petition to condemn the subject 

property ("the Property") under the authority of Code § 36-49. 

The Property is a parcel of land comprised of approximately 

10,000 square feet located at 1069 West 41st Street in the City 

of Norfolk and improved by a ten-unit residential apartment 

building, then owned by PKO Ventures, LLC ("PKO"). According to 

a stipulation between the parties, the Property was not blighted 

at the time that the NRHA filed its petition. The petition 

indicated that the Redevelopment Project had been approved and 

that the Property was included within the designated 

Redevelopment Project area. The petition requested that the 

circuit court condemn the Property and pass title to the 

Property in fee simple to the NRHA. PKO filed an answer and 

grounds of defense to the NRHA's petition for condemnation. 
5 

The NRHA filed a motion to strike PKO's objections and 

affirmative defenses. It argued that the doctrine of stare 

decisis precluded PKO from challenging the NRHA's acquisition of 

its Property by eminent domain because the court had twice 

upheld challenges to the Redevelopment Project in 1999 and 2009. 

PKO filed a response to the NRHA's motion to strike. 

In response to the NRHA's motion to strike, PKO argued that 

(1) Code § 1-219.1 precluded the NRHA from acquiring PKO's 

unblighted Property after July 1, 2010, (2) stare decisis does 

not apply because the particular objections and defenses raised 

by PKO were not raised in 1999 or 2009, and in part could not 

have been raised because the law then in effect was different, 

and (3) the NRHA violated due process requirements because it 

had a pecuniary interest in the outcome which biased its 

decision to condemn properties constituting the Redevelopment 

Project. 

The Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, after a hearing 

on the matter, denied PKO's objections and defenses to the 

acquisition of the Property, granted the NRHA's motion to strike 

in part, and authorized the NRHA to acquire PKO's Property by 

eminent domain. In its letter opinion, the circuit court 

reasoned that the law that was in effect on the day the petition 

was filed controlled, and that, otherwise, the retroactive 

application of Code § 1-219.1 to discontinue the case would be 
6 

in violation of Code §§ 1-9 and 1-239. The circuit court also 

held that the Redevelopment Plan was lawful, applying the 

results of the 1999 and 2009 cases to the present case by virtue 

of the doctrine of stare decisis. At the conclusion of the 

subsequent July 2012 jury trial to determine just compensation 

for the Property, the NRHA acquired the Property for $550,000. 

PKO filed a timely appeal, and we granted review on all 

assignments of error. 

II. Discussion 

A. Whether the Circuit Court Erred by Permitting the NRHA to 

Acquire the Property at Issue After July 1, 2010 

1. Legislative History of Code § 1-219.1 

The Virginia General Assembly in 2007 enacted Chapters 882, 

901 and 926, all of which are substantively identical 

(collectively "Chapter 882"). Paragraph 1 of Chapter 882 added 

the current § 1-219.1 to the Code of Virginia. As relevant 

here, the legislation provided that property taken for 

condemnation must itself be blighted at the time the petition 

for condemnation is filed: 

 A. The right to private property being a 

fundamental right, the General Assembly 

shall not pass any law whereby private 

property shall be taken or damaged for 

public uses without just compensation. The 

term "public uses" mentioned in Article I, 

Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia 

is hereby defined as to embrace only the 

acquisition of property where: . . . (v) 

the property is taken for the elimination of 
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blight provided that the property itself is 

a blighted property. 

. . . . 

 B. For purposes of this section: "Blighted 

property" means any property that endangers 

the public health or safety in its condition 

at the time of the filing of the petition 

for condemnation and is (i) a public 

nuisance or (ii) an individual commercial, 

industrial, or residential structure or 

improvement that is beyond repair or unfit 

for human occupancy or use. 

Code § 1-219.1(A), (B) (emphasis added). 

Paragraph 3 of Chapter 882 provides: 

until July 1, 2010, the provisions of this 

act shall not affect the ability of a 

redevelopment and housing authority 

organized pursuant to Title 36 of the Code 

of Virginia to acquire property pursuant to 

any redevelopment or conservation plan 

adopted prior to January 1, 2007. However, 

the provisions of this act shall be 

applicable to all redevelopment and 

conservation plans adopted after January 1, 

2007. 

(Emphasis added.) Paragraph 4 of Chapter 882, as amended by 

Acts 2010, ch. 203, provides: 

[n]othing contained in this act shall 

prohibit the Norfolk Redevelopment and 

Housing Authority or the City of Norfolk to 

acquire property located at . . . , both 

located in the City of Norfolk, through the 

use of eminent domain for the location of a 

recreational facility open to the public to 

be owned or operated by a not-for-profit 

entity, provided such acquisitions are 

instituted prior to January 1, 2011. 
8 

(Emphasis added). 

2. Statutory Interpretation of Code § 1-219.1 and Paragraphs 3 

and 4 of Chapter 882 

PKO, in its first assignment of error, contends that the 

circuit court erred in allowing the NRHA to acquire the Property 

after July 1, 2010 by a condemnation action that the NRHA filed 

before July 1, 2010. PKO argues that the circuit court erred 

because: (1) the Property was not blighted at the time the 

petition was filed, as required by Code § 1-219.1, and (2) the 

acquisition of unblighted property was prohibited beginning on 

July 1, 2010, as indicated in Paragraph 3 of Chapter 882. 

PKO's assignment of error presents an issue of statutory 

interpretation of both Code § 1-219.1 and Paragraphs 3 and 4 of 

Chapter 882. This presents a pure question of law which we will 

review de novo. Laws v. McIlroy, 283 Va. 594, 598, 724 S.E.2d 

699, 702 (2012). When evaluating statutory language, the Court 

applies "the plain language of a statute unless the terms are 

ambiguous." Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 

922, 926 (2006). "When an enactment is clear and unequivocal, 

general rules for construction of statutes of doubtful meaning 

do not apply." Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 

84, 87 (1985). 

We have held that "in the construction of statutes 

conferring the power of eminent domain, every reasonable doubt 
9 

is to be [resolved] adversely to th[at] right." School Board v. 

Alexander, 126 Va. 407, 413, 101 S.E. 349, 351 (1919). 

"[U]nless both the spirit and letter of the statute clearly 

confer the power, it cannot be exercised." Id. Statutes 

authorizing the power of eminent domain must, therefore, "be 

strictly construed, and a locality must comply fully with the 

statutory requirements when attempting to exercise this right." 

3232 Page Ave. Condo. Unit Owners Ass'n v. City of Va. Beach, 

284 Va. 639, 645, 735 S.E.2d 672, 675 (2012). 

 The plain meaning of Code § 1-219.1 makes it clear that 

redevelopment and housing authorities no longer have the 

authority to condemn individual properties within a 

redevelopment area determined to be a blighted area when the 

properties are not themselves blighted. The central issue in 

this appeal, however, is whether the NRHA, in its acquisition of 

the Property, is bound by the enactment of Code § 1-219.1. 

3. Effective Date of Code § 1-219.1 

Code § 1-219.1 became effective on July 1, 2007. It 

applied to all governmental entities, including the NRHA. The 

"ability. . . to acquire" property as specified in Paragraph 3 

refers to the completion of an effective taking, and does not 

permit a redevelopment and housing authority acting pursuant to 

a valid redevelopment plan to acquire properties that are not 
10 

themselves blighted after July 1, 2010 merely by filing a 

petition for condemnation. 

We have held that "we have a duty, whenever possible, to 

interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and 

harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal. 

Generally, the Court will look to the whole body of [a statute] 

to determine the true intention of each part." Ford Motor Co. 

v. Gordon, 281 Va. 543, 549, 708 S.E.2d 846, 850 (2011) (quoting 

Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488, 498, 621 S.E.2d 48, 52-53 

(2005)). This includes "the entirety of a single legislative 

enactment as it appears in the Acts of Assembly as a whole." 

Eberhardt v. Fairfax Cnty. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 283 Va. 190, 

194, 721 S.E.2d 524, 536 (2012). Accordingly, we must read the 

text of Chapter 882 as a whole to determine the intended meaning 

of the words "ability . . . to acquire" as used in Paragraph 3. 

 We also assume "[w]hen interpreting and applying a statute, 

. . . that the General Assembly chose, with care, the words it 

used in enacting the statute, and we are bound by those words." 

Kiser v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 285 Va. 12, 19 n.2, 736 S.E.2d 

910, 915 n.2 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because 

we assume that the General Assembly chose the statutory language 

with care, "when the General Assembly has used specific language 

in one instance, but omits that language or uses different 

language when addressing a similar subject elsewhere in the 
11 

Code, we must presume that the difference in the choice of 

language was intentional." Newberry Station Homeowners Ass'n v. 

Board of Supervisors, 285 Va. 604, 616, 740 S.E.2d 548, 554 

(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 We presume that the General Assembly's use of specific 

language in Paragraph 4 of Chapter 882 was intentional and 

consequential. Paragraph 4 establishes an exception to the 

application of the provisions of Code § 1-219.1 specifically for 

the NRHA for one specific recreational project, which is not the 

project at issue here, so long as the petition for acquisition 

by eminent domain was "instituted prior to January 1, 2011." 

Thus, Paragraph 4 clearly sets a deadline for the filing of the 

petition for condemnation and demonstrates that when the General 

Assembly wanted to make an exception to the application of Code 

§ 1-219.1 based on the date a petition for condemnation was 

filed, it did so with clear and unambiguous language. 

In contrast, Paragraph 3 applies to all redevelopment and 

housing authorities operating pursuant to redevelopment plans 

adopted prior to January 1, 2007. It does not refer to either 

the filing of a petition for condemnation or the institution of 

the acquisition of property, but instead places a limitation on 

the "ability of a redevelopment and housing authority . . . to 

acquire property." This language is not comparable to the 

language contained in Paragraph 4 of Chapter 882 and cannot be 
12 

construed to provide an exception to the application of Code 

§ 1-219.1 based on the date the petition for condemnation was 

filed. 

 Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred when it 

allowed the NRHA to acquire the Property subsequent to the 

statutory deadline. The parties stipulated that the Property 

was not blighted. Further, the NRHA did not acquire the 

Property by obtaining title by certificate of take or 

certificate of deposit, or an award pursuant to a petition for 

condemnation prior to the July 1, 2010 deadline established by 

Paragraph 3. The NRHA therefore retained its ability to acquire 

the unblighted property only until July 1, 2010 when the 

limitations of Code § 1-219.1 became applicable. On July 1, 

2010, the terms of Code § 1-219.1 governed the NRHA's attempted 

acquisition and barred its authority to condemn PKO's unblighted 

Property. 

4. Whether the NRHA Had a Substantive Right to Acquire PKO's 

Property under Title 36 of the Code 

The NRHA contends that even if the Court determines that 

Paragraph 3 of Chapter 882 does require it to have completed 

litigation prior to the July 1, 2010 deadline, the circuit court 

did not err. The NRHA argues that Title 36 of the Code 

conferred the NRHA with a substantive right to acquire PKO's 

Property that cannot be impaired by the enactment of a later 
13 

statute. According to the NRHA, the law in effect when its 

right to acquire the Property accrued governs the proceeding.*

 

The NRHA contends that its right to obtain PKO's Property arose 

in 1998 with the adoption of the Redevelopment Project, and that 

the language of Code § 1-219.1 cannot limit that right. We 

disagree. 

We have previously held that "there are no vested rights in 

a potential result in pending litigation." Marriott v. Harris, 

235 Va. 199, 212, 368 S.E.2d 225, 231 (1988) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The NRHA filed a petition for condemnation in 

April 2010 but did not acquire title to the Property until after 

 *

 In making this argument, the NRHA relies, in part, on Code 

§ 1-9. Code § 1-9 states, in relevant part: 

 Nothing in this Code shall operate to 

discontinue any cause or matter, civil or 

criminal, which shall be pending and 

undetermined in any court on the day before 

this Code, or any provision of this Code, 

takes effect. 

The NRHA contends that the terms of Code § 1-9 preclude Code 

§ 1-219.1 from having the effect of discontinuing the 

condemnation proceedings, as they constitute a civil case 

pending in court before Code § 1-219.1 took effect. 

Code § 1-9, however, protected pending "suits and 

proceedings" on grounds not recognized under the new Code from 

being discontinued with the General Assembly's enactment of the 

Code of 1950, and is explicitly inapplicable to acts enacted 

after the Code of 1950 took effect. Commission on Code 

Recodification, Report to the Governor and General Assembly of 

Virginia [Concerning Proposed Code of Virginia] (Dec. 15, 1947), 

House Doc. No. 18 (1948), reprinted in Code of Virginia (1950) 

Vol. 1, at ix-xxiii. Subsequent statutory enactments are 

addressed by Code § 1-239, discussed in Part II.A.4., supra. 
14 

July 1, 2010. As a result, the NRHA's rights to the unblighted 

Property owned by PKO were only prospective at the time that 

Code § 1-219.1 became applicable to redevelopment and housing 

authorities. As in Marriott, the General Assembly only affected 

the potential result of the NRHA's petition for condemnation by 

enacting Code § 1-219.1. The application of Code § 1-219.1 to 

the NRHA therefore could not constitute a denial of vested 

rights. 

The NRHA also contends that Code § 1-239 prohibits the 

retroactive application of new statutes to impair substantive 

rights that accrued before the new statute came into effect. 

Consequently, the NRHA contends that its rights to the Property 

by eminent domain could not be impaired by Code § 1-219.1 

because they accrued prior to the effective date of Code § 1-

219.1. We disagree. 

Code § 1-239 states, in relevant part: 

 No new act of the General Assembly shall 

be construed . . . to affect . . . any 

right accrued, or claim arising before the 

new act of the General Assembly takes 

effect; except that the proceedings 

thereafter held shall conform, so far as 

practicable, to the laws in force at the 

time of such proceedings. 

As aforementioned, the NRHA did not hold any rights to the 

Property when Code § 1-219.1 became applicable to terminate a 
15 

redevelopment and housing authority's power to acquire property 

that is not itself blighted. 

 Code § 1-219.1 did not affect a "claim arising" before it 

took effect. As discussed in Part II.A.2., supra, the Court 

"appl[ies] the plain language of a statute unless the terms are 

ambiguous." Boynton, 271 Va. at 227, 623 S.E.2d at 926. The 

terms of Code § 1-239 are not ambiguous. Code § 1-219.1 became 

effective, in its entirety, on July 1, 2007. When the NRHA 

filed its petition to condemn the Property in April 2010, its 

ability to acquire the Property was unencumbered. The NRHA 

simply failed to acquire the Property, an unblighted individual 

property, before July 1, 2010, when blight became a requirement 

for acquisition of property within the Redevelopment Project 

area. 

 Paragraph 3 of Chapter 882 indicates that, "until July 1, 

2010, the provisions of this act shall not affect the ability of 

a redevelopment and housing authority organized pursuant to 

Title 36 of the Code of Virginia to acquire property pursuant to 

any redevelopment or conservation plan adopted prior to January 

1, 2007." (Emphasis added.) While the terms of Code § 1-219.1 

limit the NRHA's ability to acquire unblighted property within a 

blighted area after July 1, 2010, any claims arising after the 

effective date of Code § 1-219.1 on July 1, 2007 did not arise 
16 

"before the new act of the General Assembly," i.e., Code § 1-

219.1, took effect. Code § 1-239. 

 The NRHA's claim arose in April 2010, when it filed its 

petition for condemnation. Because the petition was filed after 

July 1, 2007, the claim arose after Code § 1-219.1 was enacted 

and was not affected by Code § 1-219.1 in violation of Code § 1-

239. 

B. Other Issues 

 PKO also contends that the circuit court erred when it (1) 

ruled that the subject Property was in a blighted area, (2) 

struck PKO's due process objection, and (3) applied the doctrine 

of stare decisis to hold that the NRHA was permitted to make a 

finding of blight. In light of our decision that the circuit 

court erred by permitting the NRHA to acquire the Property under 

the authority of Code § 36-49 after the July 1, 2010 deadline, 

we will not discuss these remaining assignments of error. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated, we hold that the circuit court 

erred in permitting the NRHA to acquire PKO's Property after the 

effective date of the July 1, 2010 statutory limitation 

prescribed by Code § 1-219.1. We will reverse the judgment of 

the circuit court and enter final judgment in favor of PKO. 

Reversed and final judgment.