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FILED

JUL 03 2017

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-16-1343-LTaKu

)

BRUCE DWAIN COPELAND, DBA ) Bk. No. 2:05-bk-11844-ER

Copeland & Company, DBA )

Copeland Enterprises, DBA )

West American Construction, )

)

Debtor. )

______________________________)

)

BRUCE DWAIN COPELAND, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) M E M O R A N D U M*

)

LEVENE, NEALE, BENDER, YOO & )

BRILL, LLP; DAVID B. )

GOLUBCHIK, Esq.; TODD M. )

ARNOLD, Esq.; TIMOTHY J. YOO, )

Chapter 7 Trustee, )

)

Appellees. )

______________________________)

Submitted Without Argument on June 22, 2017

Filed - July 3, 2017

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Ernest M. Robles, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

_________________________

Appearances: Appellant Bruce D. Copeland, pro se on brief;

Edith R. Matthai and Marta A. Alcumbrac of Robie &

Matthai on brief for Appellees.

_________________________

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication.

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
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Before: LAFFERTY, TAYLOR, and KURTZ, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 71 debtor Bruce Copeland appeals the bankruptcy

court’s denial of his motion to reopen his bankruptcy case; he

sought reopening to pursue litigation against his former counsel

for allegedly forging Copeland’s signature on a declaration in

support of a fee application. Copeland’s claims based on the

alleged forgery, however, had previously been dismissed by a

state court, two federal district courts, and the bankruptcy

court. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court denied the motion to

reopen as futile. We AFFIRM.

FACTS

Copeland filed a chapter 11 petition in January 2005; the

case was converted to chapter 7. Copeland received a discharge,

and the case was closed in February 2011. 

During the chapter 11, Copeland was represented by Appellees

David Golubchik and Todd Arnold and their law firm, Appellee

Levene, Neale, Bender, Yoo & Brill, LLP (“LNBYB”).2 On

October 27, 2006, shortly after the case was converted, LNBYB

filed its first and final application for compensation. Among

the documents filed in support of the fee application was the

declaration of Bruce Copeland filed November 17, 2006 (the

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532.

2 At the time the case was converted, Appellee Timothy Yoo

was an attorney with Robinson, Diamant & Wolkowitz (“RDW”) and

was appointed as chapter 7 trustee. RDW merged with LNBYB on

January 1, 2010.

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“11/17/06 Declaration”).3 Copeland did not object to the fee

application, and the bankruptcy court approved it on August 17,

2007.

In October 2011, Copeland filed a cross-complaint against

LNBYB, Golubchik, and others in a state court lawsuit that had

been filed by a creditor against Copeland and others. That

cross-complaint included an allegation that LNBYB had forged

Copeland’s signature on the 11/17/06 Declaration and sought

relief for that conduct under various theories, including

forgery. In May 2012 the state court entered judgment in favor

of LNBYB and Golubchik on Copeland’s cross-claims; Copeland did

not appeal. 

Thereafter, in 2012, Copeland sued LNBYB and others in the

United States District Court for the District of Oklahoma, again

alleging that LNBYB had forged Copeland’s signature on the

11/17/06 Declaration. That complaint was dismissed on LNBYB’s

motion. Copeland did not appeal. 

In 2014, Copeland again sued LNBYB and others, this time in

the United States District Court for the Central District of

California, again alleging that LNBYB had forged his signature on

the 11/17/06 Declaration. In October 2014, that complaint was

dismissed on LNBYB’s motion, and again, Copeland did not appeal.

On July 1, 2015, Copeland filed an adversary proceeding in

3 By order of December 27, 2016, a BAP motions judge waived

the requirement for Appellant to file excerpts of the record. We

have therefore exercised our discretion to examine the bankruptcy

court’s docket and imaged papers in Case No. 05-11844-ER and

related adversary proceedings. Woods & Erickson, LLP v. Leonard

(In re AVI, Inc.), 389 B.R. 721, 725 n.2 (9th Cir. BAP 2008).

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the bankruptcy court against Appellees and others seeking relief

under various state law theories, including forgery, based in

part on the same forgery allegations against LNBYB and Golubchik

that were asserted in the prior lawsuits.4 The bankruptcy court

dismissed Copeland’s claims against Appellees with prejudice on

the grounds that Copeland’s claims were barred by the statute of

limitations and claim preclusion. The bankruptcy court also

denied Copeland’s motion for reconsideration. Again, Copeland

did not appeal.

On September 15, 2016, Copeland filed a second motion to

reopen, again alleging that his former counsel had forged

Copeland’s signature to the 11/17/06 Declaration. Copeland did

not specify what action he intended to take if the case was

reopened. The motion stated in relevant part:

Copeland discovered David Golubchik and the Law Office

Levine, Neale, Bender, Rankin & Brill forged his

signature to an affidavit to obtain payment from the

Bankruptcy Court.

Copeland believes the forgery committed by his attorney

on the affidavit submitted to the court is “good cause”

to re-open the bankruptcy proceedings [sic] that was

previously closed.

(emphasis in original). Appellees filed an opposition. The

bankruptcy court found the matter suitable for submission without

oral argument and denied the motion to reopen without a hearing

4 At the time Copeland filed this adversary proceeding, the

bankruptcy case was closed, but a motion to reopen was pending. 

Copeland filed that motion in February 2013 for purposes of

avoiding a judgment lien that he contended was procured by fraud,

i.e., for reasons that appeared to be unrelated to the forgery

allegation. For reasons that are not clear from the record,

approximately three years passed before the bankruptcy court

denied Copeland’s first motion to reopen in February 2016.

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on October 13, 2016. The bankruptcy court found that because it

had dismissed with prejudice Copeland’s claims based on his

forgery allegations, there was no legal basis upon which the

court could grant relief to Copeland. As a result, reopening the

case to allow Copeland to pursue those claims would be futile. 

Copeland timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 158.

ISSUE

Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in denying

Copeland’s motion to reopen?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The denial of a motion to reopen a bankruptcy case is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Staffer v. Predovich

(In re Staffer), 306 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2002). A bankruptcy

court abused its discretion if it applied the wrong legal

standard or its findings were illogical, implausible or without

support in the record. TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc.,

653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Matter: Appellant’s “Objection to the Altering

of the Record and the Removal of Exhibits attached to be

Reviewed by the Appellate Court”

On June 2, 2017, Copeland filed the above-referenced

document with the BAP Clerk. Copeland alleges in the objection

that an “exhibit of his signature being forged” was attached to

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his “original” notice of appeal but thereafter completely removed

from the record. The notice of appeal appearing on the BAP

docket, however, is identical to the notice of appeal filed in

the bankruptcy court; thus, there is no indication that the

notice of appeal was altered. In any event, the Panel has access

to the referenced document (the 11/17/06 Declaration) from the

bankruptcy court docket.

Next, Copeland contends that an exhibit attached to his

reply brief was altered. That exhibit is a copy of a document

filed in the bankruptcy court on September 2, 2015, Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Defendant Levene, Arnold[,] Golubchik, and Yoo’s

Motion [to] Dismiss (the “Opposition”), which, as originally

filed, included 13 supporting exhibits. The Opposition, as

attached to Copeland’s reply brief as Exhibit 2, includes only

its first two exhibits. Based on the omission of 11 exhibits,

Copeland alleges that someone in the BAP Clerk’s office tampered

with his filings. 

There is no evidence of any tampering; rather, it appears

that Copeland inadvertently omitted the 11 exhibits. The

confusion may stem from the fact that Copeland attached the

Opposition (including the first two exhibits) as Exhibit 2 to his

reply brief. He then attached a copy of his “Request for

Electronic Notice” filed in the bankruptcy court on September 24,

2015 as Exhibit 3 to the reply brief. Exhibit 3 to the original

Opposition is the case docket for adversary proceeding

no. 15-01505. Thus, at first glance it appears that Exhibit 3

has been replaced, but the issue seems to be the result of an

inadvertent error by the filer.

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Copeland also notes that he is unable to retrieve most of

the purportedly missing documents from the bankruptcy court

dockets. Those documents were filed before the advent of

electronic filing in the Bankruptcy Court for the Central

District of California. At that time most documents were not

scanned, so they are not now available from the bankruptcy court

dockets, but those documents would likely be available upon

request to the Federal Records Center.

However, to the extent necessary for its review, the Panel

has accessed the original Opposition and its exhibits directly

from the docket in adversary proceeding no. 15-01351. Therefore,

Copeland is not prejudiced by any omission in the exhibits filed

with the BAP. To the extent Copeland requests relief in his

objection, that relief is DENIED.

B. Merits

A bankruptcy court may reopen a closed bankruptcy case “to

administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other

cause.” § 350. Reopening a closed bankruptcy case “is a

ministerial act that functions primarily to enable the file to be

managed by the [bankruptcy court] clerk as an active matter and

that, by itself, lacks independent legal significance and

determines nothing with respect to the merits of the case.” Menk

v. LaPaglia (In Re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 913 (9th Cir. BAP 1999).

Ordinarily, it is inappropriate to consider the merits of an

underlying claim when ruling on a motion to reopen. See id. at

915. A “motion to reopen legitimately presents only a narrow

range of issues: whether further administration appears to be

warranted; whether a trustee should be appointed; and whether the

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circumstances of reopening necessitate payment of another filing

fee. Extraneous issues should be excluded.” Id. at 916-17. See

also In re Staffer, 306 F.3d at 972 (holding that whether the

potential defendant has an affirmative defense is an extraneous

issue in the context of a motion to reopen for purposes of filing

a nondischargeability action, citing Menk). 

Here, the bankruptcy court denied the motion to reopen on

grounds of futility because it had previously found the forgery

claim was barred under the applicable statute of limitations and

claim preclusion. The bankruptcy court’s ruling thus initially

appears to be contrary to the rule articulated in Menk and

Staffer. However, when the undisputed facts in the record

unequivocally establish that reopening the case would be a

“pointless exercise,” the bankruptcy court may deny the motion to

reopen on that basis. See, e.g., Beezley v. Cal. Land Title Co.

(In re Beezley), 994 F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993).

Based on our review of the record, we find no abuse of

discretion in the bankruptcy court’s denial of the motion to

reopen. Copeland’s claims based on his allegation that the

11/17/06 Declaration was forged were dismissed by every tribunal

that considered them – one state court, two federal district

courts, and the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court dismissed

those claims with prejudice. As such, it would have been

pointless for the bankruptcy court to grant Copeland’s motion to

reopen to pursue those claims yet again.

On appeal, Copeland fails to acknowledge that his claims

based on his forgery allegations against LNBYB have been

dismissed with prejudice and are thus forever barred. Instead,

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Copeland argues that the bankruptcy court invoked “a subtle form

of nepotism to protect the misdeeds of Appellant’s former

bankruptcy attorneys”; that the alleged forgery violated

Copeland’s Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel; that LNBYB

committed fraud upon the court in forging Copeland’s signature;

that Copeland has been denied the right to an impartial tribunal

in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights; and that the

bankruptcy court erred in rejecting all of the evidence Copeland

presented to it in support of the forgery allegations. None of

these arguments acknowledges the fact that Copeland’s claims

against LNBYB have been dismissed with prejudice and that the

expiration of the appeal period for those rulings is long past.

In short, the undisputed facts presented here establish that

reopening Copeland’s bankruptcy case would have been a pointless

exercise; the bankruptcy court could not have afforded any relief

to Copeland even if it had granted the motion. As such, the

bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motion to reopen. See In re Beezley, 994 F.2d at 1437 (holding

that bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying

motion to reopen to permit a debtor in a no-asset chapter 7 case

to add an omitted debt to his schedules because scheduling would

not affect dischargeability of the debt).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM.

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