Docket No . 108133.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PE OP LE O F TH E S TAT E OF I L LIN OI S, Appe llee, v.

CLEO TH ER

TID WEL L, A

pp el l an t.
Opinion filed January 22, 2010.

JUSTICE KA

RMEIER deli

vered t he j udgm

en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Justice Fi tzgerald an

d Justice s Freem

an, Thom as, Ki lb ride, Gar man, a nd Bu rk e co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

At iss ue in t his a pp ea l is whether a m ot ion or request is

required to o bt ain a r ulin g al lowi ng o r d enying leave t o file a su cce ssive pos tcon vi cti on pe ti ti on under se cti on 1 22– 1(f

) of the Pos t-Con vi cti on He ar ing Ac t (A ct ) 7 25 IL CS 5/ 12 2– 1( f) (West 2006)), and whether
a ru ling rend er ed in t he ab se n ce of a m oti on or re qu est i s s

ub j ect to reviewi n th e a pp el l ate cou rt. W e h ol d th at th e c i rc ui t court i s n

ot obli ged to r ule

in the absen ce of a m ot ion or request, but that it may do so wh er e d o cu men t s s ub mit t ed by a de fen da nt su pp ly an adeq ua te basis fo r a ru ling

on t he t hre sho ld cau se- and- pr ejudice que st ion, and when the ci rcuit court has ruled, it s determi nation i s subj ect to review i n th e a pp el l ate cou rt.-2- STATU TE INVOL

VED Sec ti on 12 2– 1( f) of t he Act pr ovid es in pe rt inent part as foll ows: “O nly o ne pe t it io n ma y be f iled by a p et it io ne run de rt his Ar t icle without lea

ve of t he co ur t . Le ave o f co ur t may be granted o nl

y i f a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her f ail ure t o br ing t he cla im in hi s or he r i ni ti al pos t-con vi cti on proceedin gs and prejudice re su l ts from that fai lure.” 725 ILCS 5/122

–1(f ) (We st 2006 ).

BACK GROUND In 1994, foll owing a jury trial in t he cir cu it co ur t o f Co o k C o un t y, de f en da n t, Cle o t he rT idw ell, was convi cted of attempted fi

rst degree murder an d agg ra v ate d b atte

ry wi th a fi rearm. He was

sentence d to an extended ter m of 55 yea rs ’ i m pri son men t. On di rect app eal, defend ant argued that the trial

cou rt er roneou sl y f ai l ed to gi ve a j ury i ns tructi on on re ckles s co nduc t and t hat his sent ence was exce ssive. The appe l l ate cour t rejected those co ntentions. People v. Tidw ell , No. 1–94–2655 (1995 ) (un

pub l i shed order

und er Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 23). On May 6, 1996, defen

dant fi le d a pro se pos tcon

vi cti on pet itio n, alle gin g, i n pa rt, that t rial

counsel had rende

red in eff ective assistance wi th reg ard to a re ckles s co nduc t defens e and instr uct ion t her eo n. T he
a ppe l l ate cou rt af f i rm ed the ci rcu i t cou rt’ s s um mary di sm i ss al of defendant’s pe t it i on a

f ter g ran ti ng the publ i c def

en der’ s m oti on f or leave to withdraw as

counsel pu rsua n t to Pennsylvania v. Finley , 481 U.S. 551, 95 L. Ed. 2 d 539, 10 7 S. Ct. 199 0 (198 7). People v. Tidw ell , No

. 1– 96 –3 10 1 ( 19 97 ) ( un pu blish ed o r de run de rSu pr eme Court Rul e 23). On Decem ber 20, 2006, the successi ve pro se pos tcon

vi cti on pe ti ti on in this ma t t er was re ceived by the c ircu it cler k. The re in, defend ant al

l eged , inter al

ia , that People v. Novak

, 163 Ill . 2d 93, 112-13 (1994), cited on direct appeal to supp or t t he tr ial

cou rt ’s deni al of an i nstruction on reckl

ess conduct under t he char ging instr ument approach, had be en overruled by this cour t ’s de cis io n in People v. Kolton , 219 Ill . 2d 353, 364, 36 7 (200 6). I n t ha t ca se , t his courthel d that an off

ense m ay be considered a lesser-incl uded offense
even i f ev ery ele men t o f t he les se ro ffen se is no t ex plic it ly contain ed in t he ind ict men t as lo ng as t he miss ing ele men t ca n be r ea so na bly-3- in ferred. On t he b as is o f Kolston ’s r eas oning , d efenda nt cl ai me d that
an in struction on reckle ss conduct as a l es ser-i nc l ude d of f ense of at t emp t ed mur de rsho uld ha ve be en t en de r ed at t r ial. Though no m oti on acc omp anied t he pe t itio n, and def endan t made
no express request for leave to file sam e, t he ci rcuit cou rt no netheless considered

the allegations of defendant’s p eti ti on as th ey bor e u pon t he threshol d is sue of caus e and prej udic e, and ul tim at e ly is sued a thoro ugh si x-page order, concludi

ng that defen

dan t had f ai l ed to satisf y the cause-and-prej udic e test. T he ci rcuit court not ed: “In petitioner’ s case, he was charged with att empted fi rst degree murd er for sho ot ing t he vict im with inte nt t o k ill and wi th agg ra vat ed ba t t er y for s hoo t ing her intent ionally and kn o win gl y. Re ck le ss co nd uc t is d efin ed as co nsc io us ly di sr ega rd inga r isk. ‘It is not defined in t he cha rg ing instr ument and thus

und er Novak , defen dant was not entitled to an i nstruction on i

t.’ [Order at 4, quo t ing fro m the appe l l ate court’s 1995 Order.] * * * In peti ti on er ’s ca se , the ch argi

n g i n str um en t d oesnot ex plic it ly defi ne consci ously dis reg ar di ng a ri sk, pe r Novak

. Howev er, tha t men tal sta te c an not b e re as ona

bl y i nf erred f rom t he char ging i

nstrumen t per Kolton , eithe r. The st at e o f mi nd
r equi red for attempted fi

rst degree murder, aggravated battery, and the rem

ai nder of pe t it io ne r ’s ch ar ge d o ffen se s is wi th int en t t o ki ll an d i nt en t io na lly an d k no win gl y. Cons ciousl

y di sreg ardi

ng a ri sk is i na pposi te to thi s. Co nsc io us ly

disreg ardi

n g a ri sk ca n n ot be inferre d by pet itioner’s stal

ki ng hi s g i rlf rien d f ormonths , kidn

appi ng he r f orse ve r al d ays , an d t he n fina lly t hr ea t en ing his girlfriend and her mot her ’s life in a

church a nd then pointi ng an d fi rin g a gun at his girlfriend, who is now par alyzed fr om t he wa ist d ow n. The Kolton ca se

doe s n ot f urth er p eti ti one r’ s p osi ti on on the is sue. The t rial co ur t dec ided, on t he bas is of t he fac t s in pet itioner’s ca se , not t o g ive the re ckles s co nduc t instr uct ion. The appe l l atecou

rt affi rmed t he t r ial c o ur t ’s de cis io n in pet itioner’s direct appeal, and assuc h t he issue is barr ed by res judicata

.-4- * * * It is f urt her apparent t hat the pet itioner has fai le d to demon strate th at a

n y pr ej udi ce

i n ur ed f rom th e f ai l ur e to ass ertt his cla im ea r lier

. Ha d t his claim been pr ese nt ed in t he in itial petition, there i s scan

t pro bab il ity that t he peti

tioner
wo uld have prevai

le d. Thus, petiti oner make s no showi ng that th e absen ce of the cl

ai m n ow presented so inf

ected t he t r ia l that h i s res ul tin g con vi cti on v i ola ted due proces s.” The circu it co ur t co nclude d: “[T ]he co ur t finds t hat petitioner h as fai le d to satisfy the cause and prejudice test set for t h by the le gis la ture. Ac cordi ngl y , l eav e to fi l e the i nstant petiti

on i s hereb

y den i ed.” On app eal, citing ou r d ecisio n in People v. LaPoint

e , 22 7 I ll. 2d 39, 44 (2007), t he appel la te court correct ly

observed that

sect io n 12 2– 1( f) of

the A ct p rohi bi ts th e f i l i ng of a success iv

e petition w

ithout fi rst obt aining lea ve o f co ur t t o do so
. Re fer en cin g o ur o pin io n in LaPointe , 227 Ill . 2dat 44, t he ap pellat e co ur t co nt inued: “Since t he sta tute ex pr es sly c o nd it io ns le av e t o file on de f en da nt’ s s ati sf ac ti on of the cause and prej udic e test, t he court further ruled t hat a su cce ssive pe ti ti on ca n n ot be co nsider ed filed eve n if i t was acc ept ed by t he cl erk’s off

ic e.” From those prem

is es, the appella

te court concl

uded: “Here, the reco rd sh ows , co ntra ry to defendant’s
co nt ent ion, that he did not e xpres sl y se ek l ea ve of cou rt pr i or to fil ing his suc ces sive po st co nvictio n pet itio n, and, thus f ai le d to me et the stat uto ry requi remen t t hat t he re que st pr ece de t he fi li ng. LaPointe , 227 Ill . 2d at 44-5; accord People v. Wyles , 383 Ill. App. 3d 2 71, 275 -76 (20 08) ; Daniel , 379 I ll. App. 3d at 750 -51 ; People v. DeB erry , 372 I l l. A pp. 3d 1056, 1060 (2007 ). Acco rd ingly, we find t hat t he su cce ssive pe ti ti on i s n ot considered

f i l ed , a n d th at th i s c our t m ay n ot c ons ider t he
meri ts of the al

le gations raised ther ein.” No. 1–07–0710 (un pub l i shed order

und er Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 23).

AN AL YSIS The i ssue b ef

ore usi s on

e of statut ory construction, and thus our reviewis de novo

. People v. Davison , 233 Il l . 2d 30, 4 0 (200 9). In
co nst ru inga stat ute, our prim ary obj ective i s t o give effect t o t he in tention of the Gen

eral As se mbly. People v. Greer , 212 Ill . 2d 192,-5- 208 (2004 ). In t hi s ca se , th e evi l s s ough t to be rem edi ed by se cti on 12 2– 1( f ), a n d th e g oal s to be achieve d, ar e no t op en t o q ues t ion. As
our ap pe llat e c o ur t ap t ly o bserv ed in People v. Brockman , 36 3 I ll. App. 3d 679 (2006), section 122–1(f) was cl early in tended by t he Gene ra l Assembly to co dify the c aus e- and- pr ejudice t est ado pt ed by t his courtin People v. Pitsonbarger , 2 05 I ll. 2d 4 44, 459 (2 002 ), and thus evi nces an in ten t t o limit t he fili

ng o f bot h suc ces sive and fri volouspo st co nvi ction petitions . In pursui t o f the l atter obje ctive , t he le gis la ture has al so seen f

it to enact section 22–105 of t he Code of Civil Procedure. See People v. Conick , 232 Ill . 2d 132, 141 (2008) ( pu r po se o f se ct io n 2 2– 10 5 is “ to cu rbthe l arg e n um be r of fri volous coll ateralplead ings filed by priso ner s which a dver sely affect t he efficientad

m i n i strati on of j us ti ce , a n d to co mpensa t e t he co ur t s for t he t ime an d e xp en se inc ur r ed in pr oc essing a nd

dispo sing o f the m”). The que st ions presented i

n thi s case are pur ely p rocedur al : whethe

r a moti on or requ est is req uire d t o o bt ain a ru ling allowing o r d enying leave to fi

l e a s ucce ssi ve postconv

i cti on petiti

on un der se ct io n 122–1 (f ), an d w he the r a r ul i ng ren dered i n th e a bs en ceof a m oti on or request is subject t o r eview in t he ap pellat e co ur t . I t is the legisl atu re’s intent in that

re gar d t hat we mus t disce rn. The bestindicat or of t he legislat ur e’s int ent is the langua ge o f the statut e, which must be ac co rd ed it s plain and ordi na ry mean i ng. King
v. First Capital Financial Se rvices Cor

p. , 215 Il l . 2d 1, 26

(2005 ). Wh eret he l an gua geof the statute i s cl

ear a nd u na m bi guous, th i s court willappl y the sta tute as w ri tten wi thou t resort to aids of

statutory constructi on. In re R.L.S. , 218 Il l . 2d 428 , 433 (2 006). Acco rd ingto t he term s o f sect ion 1 22– 1( f), a de fendant atte mpt in g to in

stitute a successi

ve postconviction proceedi ng, through t he filing o f a

sec ond or subs equ ent po st co nvictio n pet itio n, must fi rst obta i n “ l ea ve of court .” The statut e i

nf orms us that “l

eave”
ma y onl y be gra nte d w he re d ef en da nt “ de mons trate s c au se

f orhi s or her fai lure to bri

ng the cla im in h

i s or he r i ni ti al pos t-con vi cti on proceedin gs an d p r eju dic e r es ult s fr o m that fail ure.” 72 5 ILCS 5/122–1 (f ) (We st 2006 ). No other pr ocedura l requi rem en ts are included in the st at ut e. The re is no men ti on of a p rereq ui si te m oti on seeki ng “ le ave,” n

or even of an

ob l i ga tory re qu est. Wh

il e the parties discuss t he significance of a 200 7 ho use bill t hat wo uld have am

ended t he st at ut e t o sp ec ifica lly

requi re t he fili ng o f a mot ion se eking lea ve-6- (9 5th Ill . Gen. Ass em ., Ho us e B il l 3452) that m easure was n

ever voted o ut o f a s enate comm ittee, and we gi

ve i t no furt he r co nsider at ion. Howev er, it is clea rly defend ant ’s bur den u nd er t he sta tute to ob ta in “ l ea

ve ” of cou rt b ef ore a succ es si ve pos tcon vi cti on p eti ti on ma y be “ fi le d,” so that fur t he rpr o ce ed ing s c an fo llo w. T he r efo r e, it is i n cu m b en t up on de f en da n t, by wh atev er mea n s, to prom

pt t h e cir cu it court to consider whether “ le ave” sh ould be gran

t ed, and
o bt ain a rul

i ng on that que sti on, i.e. , a determ i na ti on as to whet he r defen dant hasdem

onstrated cause and prej udic e. I n mo st ca se s, t his
will req ui re a moti on or

request and an

articulated argumen

t in order to in i tia te court acti

on, b ut that i s n

ot nece ssa

ri l y so. “Leave of court” is def in ed i n Bl ack ’s Law

Dic tionary as “[j ]udici al permissi on t o follow a no n-ro ut ine proced ure. ” Black’s Law Dic tionary 974 (9th ed. 2009) . “L eav e” entai l s an act of the c ourt per mitt ingcertai

n c onduc t or acti on by

a l i tig an t. I t doe s n

ot ne ce ss ar ily

en t ail a re que st . T o illust ra t e t his po intwe note that federal
cou rtsof the T hi

rd Circui t Co urt of Appeals , in ci vil ri ghts cases,
com m on ly, sua sponte gra

nt l ea ve to am en d c om pl ai nts be f or e dismissing

sam e. See Alsto n v. Pa rker , 363 F .3d 229 , 235 (3 d Ci r. 200 4); Witkow

ich v. Gonzales , 541 F. Supp. 2d 572, 590 (S. D.N.Y. 2008) ; Steger v. Delta Airlines, Inc ., 382 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387 (E.D.N .Y. 2005 ) (“e

ve n i f not requested

by the Pl ai ntif f , the C ourt ma y sua sp onte

gr an t lea ve t o ame nd ”)

. Re ce nt ly, without a r equest f rom the p arti es, thiscourtgave the parti es in a pendi ng acti on “l

eave” to f il e supplem

ental briefs addressi ng an is sue we be li

eved to b e dis positi ve, but which t he pa rt ies had no t add re ssed . S ee Ke ener v. Ci ty of Herri n, No. 107658 (June 26, 2009) (o rd er ). Se ct io n 12 2– 1( f) speaksto a required

sho wing o n t he pa rt of a defend ant , a nd t he
ne ce ss it y of ac ti on on

the pa rt of the ci rcu i t cou rt, b ut i t doe s n ot ex plic it ly or

ne ces sari

ly ma ndat e the fili

ng of a m

ot ion as a pre req ui si te to, or the i

m petus f or, court action. Th

us, wh ereas h ere a cou rt i s g i v en th e a uth ori ty to gran t l ea v e, i t may do s o sua sp onte , after finding sat isfact ion o f the st at ed s t at ut or y crit er ia (her e ca use and prej udice); h owev er , i

t is no t required t o ac t in t he a bse nce o f a
moti on or r equ est. Ei

ther way, unti

l such ti me as l eav e i s gra nted , a succ es si ve pe ti ti on, thou gh rec ei ve d or ac ce pt ed by t he cir cu it cl erk, wil l not be considered “f il ed” for purposes of f

urther proceedings-7- under t he Act . T his co nst ru ct ion o f the pr ovisio ns o f se ct io n 12 2– 1( f) is in harmony wit h ou r d ecisio ns in LaPointe and Conick. In LaPointe , the only

is sue b ef

ore this court was whethe

r docke tin g a success iv

e petition f

or second-stage pro ceedi ngs was required wher e t he cir cu it co ur t , wit hin 90 day s af

ter t he peti

tion was “accepted”by

the cl erk’s off

ic e (withouta

motion), f

ai le d to enter an order denying leave t o “file” t he pe t itio n. Fo r p ur po ses o f the 90-day do cke t ing pr ovisio n, we

h el d th at a succ es si ve pos tcon vi cti on p eti ti on willnot be

cons i dered

“f i l ed,” as tha

t term is u se d in t he st at ut e, un t il leave is granted; notwithstandi

n g t he circ uit clerk ’s r ece pt ion and
acc eptan ce of the p eti tion

. LaPointe , 227 Ill . 2d at 44. In Conick , we construed section 122–1(f ) of the Act asit relates to se ct io n 2 2– 10 5 o f t he Co de

. As p r ev io us ly noted, bot h pr ovisio ns ser ve simil a r purpos es, i.e. , t o limit t he fili ng o f succ essive a nd fri volous post convicti on pet itions. In Conick , defen dant fi le d a thi rd requ est f or p ost con

v i cti on re l i ef , s ty l ed “ Pro SePe ti

ti on er Le av e to File Su cc es si

v e P eti ti on Fo r Po st- Con

v i cti on Re l i ef ,”al ong w i th sup po rt ing docum entat ion. The circuit cou rt reviewed defendant ’s fi li ngsand en t er ed t wo o r de r s. I n t he firs t o r de r , t he cir cu it cou rt not only fou nd

t he pr offer ed s ucc essive postcon v i cti on peti ti on f ai l ed to sa t isfy the appli cable cause-and-prejudice requirem ents of se cti

on 122–1 (f ), bu t als o de eme d it s c laims “e nti rel y l acki ng i n m eri t.” The courttherefore deni

ed de fen da nt lea ve t o file his succ essive p et itio n. In th e s ec on d order, th

e c our t as se ss ed “ $9 0 f or f i l i n g a peti t ion t o vacate, modif

y orreconsider fi

nal judgm ent plus $15 i n m ail i ng f ees ,” pur sua nt t o se ct io n 22 –1 05 (a ), bec au se his p ro ffe red thi rd p eti ti on “was fr ivo lo us an d p at en t ly

without meri

t.” See Conick

, 232 Ill . 2dat 135-36. Wh en th e m atte r u l ti mate ly reac hed t his co ur t , w e up held t he
asse ssment under section 22–105(a) again st defen da n t’ s c onte

nti on th at, because

the ci rcuit court had denied hi m l eave to “f

il e” hi s pe ti ti on un der s ec ti on 1 22– 1(f

), there wa s “ no p eti ti on, f ri vol ou s or n ot, *** ‘f

i l ed ’ ” f or pu rpos esof section 22–105. See Conick , 23 2 I ll. 2d at 138. In the course o f our dis cu ss io n in Conick

, we characteriz ed t he do cument “ f

i l ed” b y de f en da nt as a “hy br i d m oti on and s ucc essive petition” a

nd observed, in

a footnot e, “whi

le we agree t hat t he fili

ng of a s ep ara te m oti on f orle ave to fi

le a successi ve peti tion i s prefe

rred,
we fin d t ha t an y t ec hnic al imp er fec t io n in p r o ce du r e in t his c as e d id-8- not hind er t he t r ial c o ur t fr o m pe r fo rming its re view under ei ther
se cti on 122–1(f) of the A

ct or section 22–105 of

the Code.” Conick

, 232 Ill . 2d at 140 n.2. In Conick

, we als o found pertin ent and si

gn if ic ant t he ci rcumstances giv ing r ise t o a c irc uit co ur t o r de rde nying lea ve t o file
a suc ces sive pe t itio n in People v. Smith , 38 3 I ll. App. 3d 1078 (2008 ). In tha t ca se , a s ec ti on 2

–14 01 p eti

ti on was fil ed by de fendant aft er she had un su cc es sfu lly

sought post convi

ction rel ie f i n a prior pro ceedi

ng. T he circu it co ur t re char act er ized t he se ct ion 2 –14 01 p et itio n as a pos tcon vi cti on petition an

d sum mar ily dismissed it as frivo lou s and pa t en t ly without meri

t. The appell

ate court vaca

ted t hat or der and
reman ded wi th i n str uc ti on s to al

l ow def en da n t an opp ortu n i ty to withdraw or am end he r pro se pleadi

ng. On remand, sh

e cho se t he la tt er c ou rse , p ro viding t he co ur t and t he St at e wit h co pies o f he r am ended pet itio n. S he mad e n o r eq ue st fo rlea ve t o file t he pe t itio n. De sp i te t hat omissio n, t he circ uit co ur t ru led up on he r p et itio n, denying her

le ave to fi

le sam e, fi ndi ng, inter al

ia , t hat t he su cce ssive pe ti ti on fa i l ed to s atisf y th e c au se -a

n d- pr ej udi ce

test. Th e a pp el l ate courtnot ed t hat defend ant “ did n ot seek speci

fi c l eave to fi

le her pet itio n” b ut h

el d th at “the t rial co ur t ’s wr itt en o rd er aft er re mand implic it ly ac kn ow ledge d a r equ est for leave a nd t hus fo llowed t he
re qui re men ts of se cti on 12 2– 1( f ) b ef oreden y i n g def en da n t l ea v e to file for fai li ng to satisfy

the cause and prej udic e test.” Basedupon that
as se ss men t, and the “

uni que procedural ci

rcumstances” of the c ase, t he appe l l ate court f

ound th erewa s “ no v i ol ati on of se ct io n 12 2– 1( f) and that t he def

endan t is en titled to a re vi ew of the trial court ’s order denying her leave to fi

le a successi ve postconviction petition.” Smith , 383 Ill . App. 3d at 1084. Wh at e merge s f

rom th es e th re e c as es i s a re cog n i ti on th at a suc ces sive post c onv

i cti on p eti ti on i s n ot con si dered “ f i l ed” f or purposes of

section 122–1(f

), and further proceedi

ngs wi ll not foll ow, unt il l eave is gra nt ed, a de t er minatio n dep ende nt upon a defendant’s
sa ti sf ac ti on of the ca us e-a nd -prej udi cetes t. There

i s a l so a commonsense acknowledgm ent that a defen

dant wh o subm

its a
suc ces sive pos tcon

vi cti on p eti ti on wan ts to “f ile” i t an d i n sti tute proceedin gs t he r eo n. Ho we ve r , it is sti l l de f en da n t’s b urden to o bt ain le ave, and h

e m ust subm it enough i

n th e w ay of docum en tati on to al l owa c irc uit co ur t t o make t hat det er minatio n. C er t ainly, no-9- se pa rate moti on s eeki

ng l ea ve i s m an da ted by se cti on 12 2– 1( f) i

n i ts cur re nt fo rm, no r , as we ha ve de mo n strat ed, is an ex pli cit request
even required if the c i

rc u it co ur t see s fit t o c ons ider t he mat t er and
rule of i ts o wn ac co r d. We find t ha t cir cu it cou rtsh av e th at a uth ori ty under the statut e. The di scretionary exercise o f tha

t au thor i ty to a defendant’s benefit

in this si tuat ion i s consist ent –in log ic and eq ui ty –w i th its exerci se to a defendan t’s detriment

when a pplying t he pr ovisio ns of s ection 22– 105(a ). See Conick

, 23 2 I ll. 2d a t 136 -4 4 ( no se pa ra te moti on or

“ f i l ed” docu

men t i s n ec es sa ry to s uppor

t a cir cu it
cou rt ’s co nsid er at io n o f t he do cu men t r ec eiv ed and t he impos itio n, under sec t ion 2 2–1 05, of fee s and cos ts f orfrivolous pet itions) ; Smith , 383 Ill . App . 3d

at 1 08 4 (n o ex

pl i ci t re qu est re qui

re d to s uppor t a ru ling on le av e an

d the i m posi tion of s ection 22– 105 s ancti ons) ; People v. Willia ms , 39 4 Ill. App. 3d 2 36, 2 43 (2 009) (“defendant’s ‘t ec hnic al’ vi

ol ati on of se cti on 122–1 (f) d id no t pr event t he pos tcon vi cti on cou rt f rom per for ming the re view ca lled for by se cti on 122–1 (f ),” and th e a

pp el l ate cou rt declin

ed t o affirm

the circuit cou rt ’s den i al of l eav e on that ba si s). In light of o ur hold ing re gar ding p er missive cons ider at ion by t he cir cu it co ur t , we ho ld

fur t he r , un de rt he fac t s o f t his cas e, tha t there is no im pedim ent or obstacle to appell ate re view of the rulin

g so ren dere d

. Here, the circui

t cour t entered a thor ough and reasoned order, de nying le ave t o fi let he su cce ssive po st co nvictio n pet itio n, based up on th e c on ten ts of th e petition s

ubm itted. Pursuant to our holdi ng, the re wasno jurisd

i cti ona l ba r to t he ci

rcu it court ’s sua sponte rulin g o n t he mat t er , an d t he r e is , co nse qu en t ly, n o viable rationale for the appel

la te court ’s decl

in ation of rev

ie w. For the reasons stated, the judgm ent of the app ell at e c o ur t is her eby vacated and the c ause i s rem anded to that co urt for review of the me rits of the ci

rcuit court’s ruli

ng on cause a

nd prej udic e. Appellate court judgment vacated;

cause remanded.