### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 15, 200 4

JEFF ERY LEE MILLE R v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Montgom ery C ounty No. 40000723 John H. Gasaw ay, III, Jud ge

No. M2003- 02841-CCA -R3-P C -F iled April 19, 2005

The petiti oner, J eff

ery L ee Mill er, was convicted by a jury in the M ontgome ry CountyCircuit Court of pre meditated first deg ree murder. The petiti oner rece ived a sentenc e of life imprisonment in the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ection without the possibilit y of parole . Subsequently , the petitioner filed a pe tit i o n fo r post -convic tion relief, a lleg ing that he re ceive d the ineff ective a ssistance of

c ou ns e l. A ft e r a

he ari ng , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt de nie d the pe tit ion

. Th e pe tit ion e r no w a pp e a ls. Upon our revie w of the rec ord and the parties’ briefs, we aff irm the judgme nt of the post-convic tion court.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J

. , d elivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Wil liam F. Kr oeg er, Spring field, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, J eff

ery L ee Miller.

Paul G. Sum me rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; J o h n W es l eyC ar n ey , J r. , Di s tri ctAt t o rn eyGe n er al ; an d He l en O. Yo u n g, As s i s t an tDi s tri ctAt t o rney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
The pe titioner was cha

rg ed with one count of preme ditated first deg ree murder, and a tria l

wa s h e ld o n A pril 28, 19 97

. At the c on c lus ion of the tria l, the jury

wa s u na ble to a g re e on a

ve rd ic t, and a mistrial wa s decla

red. Asecond tria l beg an on Augus t 25, 1997, and the pe titioner was convicted of

the cha rg ed off ense. This c ourt aff

irmed the c onviction on direct a ppeal, a nd, in doing

so , o utl ine d th e fa c ts u nd e rl y ing thec on vic tio n a s f oll ow s:-2- The e vidence at trial established th at on S eptember 1, 1996, the [petiti oner] shot and killed the victim, J osh Kelley . The e vidence indicated that e arli er that evening , three y oung ladies, Tennille, Ca ssi e , a nd He a the r, we re drivi ng “ up a nd do wn ” Riv e rs ide Drivein Cla rk sv ill e , T e nn e sse e . T he y vis ite d a

mot e l w her e [Mic ha e l] Powers, Cassie’s boy friend, w as throwing a party

. Whil e in t he motel room, Tennille saw the [petiti oner] prepa ring to leave the room , at which point someone ha nded a gun to him. The [petitioner] then left t h e p ar t y

. S h o rt l y

t h er ea ft er , t h e t h re e y o u n g l ad i e s d ec i d ed t o go cruising on Riverside Drive ag ain. They pulled in the parking lot of Pag e and T ay lor’s Sporting G oods Store to c hang e drivers. As they

we re c h a n g i n g s e a t s , a y o u n g m a n i n t h e p ark i n g l o t t o l d the m to “suck [ h is ] d ic k

o r le a v e

. ” T h e th r e e y o u n g la d ie s le f t th e ar e a a nd

re turne d to thepa

rty a t th e mot e l.
When they

arrived at the motel, the ladie s told M r. Powers about the y oung man’s comment. At this point, Mr. P ower s and the [pe tit ion e r], wh o ha d re turne d to the mot e l, w e nt t o th e [pe tit ion e r’ s]

ca r, an d t h e [ p et i t i o n er ] fo l l o we d t h e l ad i es t o t h e p ar k i n g l o to f P age
a ndTay lor ’s Spo rt ing Go od s Sto re . A c c or din g to the [pet iti on e r’ s] second state ment to the police, upon arri v al at t he par king lot, the [petit ioner] told Mr. P ower s to “g et the g un from under the passeng er seat.” Acc ording to at least one w itness, when Mr. Power s exi ted the vehicle, he had a g un in his waistband. The [petitioner] a n d Mr. Powers then a

pproac hed a g roup of tee nag ers standing in the parking lot. The evidence at t rial indicate d that Mr. Powers a sked which of the m h a d to ld

h is g irlf r ie n d to “ s u c k

[h is ] d ic k

. ” I n r e s p o n s e , the vic ti m s te p p e d f

o r w ar d a n d s a id
, “ We d o n ’ t kn o w y o u

. We d on’t know y our g irlfriend. We didn’t s ay anything to any body .” Mr. Powers then pulled the g un from his waistband and pointed it at the vic tim

. Ac c or din g to on e wi tne ss, the [pe tit ion e r] t oldMr . Po we rs to “ca p [t he victim].” Mr. Powers lowered the g un to his side, at which point the [ petit i o n er] took the g un out of Mr. Powers’ hand. The [petit ioner] cocke d the g un, pulled the slide bac k, pointed the g un at the g round in front of the v i ct i m’s fee t, and fire d. The [petitioner] then ra ised the g un, pointed it at the victim’s c hest, and fired. A fter the shooting, the [petit ioner] and Mr. Power s left the sce ne.

State v. J eff

ery Miller, No. 01C01-9801-CC-00029, 1999 W L 398188, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 18, 1999). Our supre me court denied permission t o appea l.

There afte r, the pe titioner filed a pe tition for post- co n v i ction relief , alleg ing that his trial counsel wa s i n ef

fe cti ve in fa iling to ca ll his co-defe ndant, Michae l Powers, as a witness in theP o w e rs w a s c o n v ic te d un d e r th e the o ry o f cr im ina l re sp o n sib ili ty. 1

-3- second tria l, when Power s testified at the fir st trial which re sulted in a hung jury . Additionally , the petitioner alleg ed that trial c ounsel was ineffe ctive in f ailing to r equest the trial court to instruc t the jury on all lesser- included off enses of preme ditated first deg ree murder.
The pe titioner testified at the post-c onviction hearing that Powers was c alled as a State’s wi tne ss at th e fi rs t tria l. A g a ins t th e pe tit ioner’s wi sh es, tr ia l c ou ns e l f a ile d to c a ll Po we rs a s a witness at the petitioner’ s second tria l. The petitioner a cknowledg ed that he and t ri al counse l discussed ca lling Power s as a witness. Trial counsel informed the pe titioner that he did not believe calling Powers as a

witness would be in the petitioner’ s best interest.
The pe titioner stated that he a sked trial counse l to call Powers as a witness at the sec ond trial beca use Powers’ version of e vents was subst antially the s ame as the account given by the petitioner. The pe titioner maintained that the testimony of other witnesses at both his first and sec ond trials left the imp re ssi on that the pe tit ion e r g ot the g un fr om P ow e rs , f ir e d in to the g ro un d at th e vic tim ’s fe e t,
a ime d f or thevic tim ’s c he st, the n fi re d. Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd e d th a t he g ot the g un fr om P ow e rs , fired into the gr ound at the victim’s fe et, and a s he turned to r un, and the g un acc identally fired. T he petitioner conc eded that at t he first trial, Powers testi fied that the petit ioner shot the ground then shot the victim, but failed to mention that the second shot w as acc idental. The pe titioner also conce ded that sever al witnesses at the second trial testified t h at t h e p eti tioner shot the g round then shot the vic tim . T his te sti mon y

wa s su bs ta nti a lly

sim ila r t o Po we rs ’ te sti mon y a t th e pe tit ion e r’ s f ir st t ri a l.

Th e pe tit ion e r f

urthe r c omp la ine d th a t a t t he sec on d tria l, t ri a l c ou ns e l f

a ile d to re qu e st instructions on any

lesser- included off

enses.

Michae l Powers testified at the po s t -conviction hearing that he wa s serving sentenc es for

rec kless homicide and a g g ravated assault base d upon the same f acts unde rly ing the petitioner’s conviction for f

irst deg ree murder. P o wers was orig inally convicted of

second de g ree murder; 1 howeve r, his c onviction w as re verse d on appea l due to the trial court’s failure to char g e all lesser

included off

enses.

Powers stated that he was available to te stify at the petitioner’s second trial, but he was not called a s a witness. Powers asse rted that the pe titioner shot at the g round nea r the victim’s fe et, then, “[a]s he was turning to run he stumbled back and the g un went off .” Power s acknow ledg ed that he did not testify

at his own trial. He conce ded that at the petitioner’s first trial he did not mention that the petitioner stumbled and acc identally discharg ed the fata l r ound. Further, Power s conce ded that he neve r told police that the fatal shot was accidental. In fac t, Powers admitted that the first time he

ev erm en t i o n ed t h att h e s ec o n d s h o t wa s ac ci d en t al wa s att h e p et i t i o n er ’s p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n h ea ri n g. The pe titioner’s trial counse l testified that he re prese nted the petitioner at both his first and second tria ls. Trial counsel r eca lled having sever al conver sations w ith the petitioner reg arding the wi tne sse s th e y

wo uldc a ll f

or the se c on d tri a l. Cou ns e l outl ine d the “ pr os a ndc on s” of e a c h w itn e ss.-4-

Counsel co u l d not specifica lly rec all discussing the possibili ty of Powers te stify ing on the petitioner’s be half. How ever , he surmised that he likely told the petitioner that he would not

rec ommend subpoenaing Powers

. Counsel did not reca ll the petitioner asking for Power s to be a witness at his second tria l. Tri al co u n s el asserted that if the pe titioner had re quested that Power s testify at t he second trial, counsel would have subpoenae d Powers. Trial counse l admitted that he did not interview Powers prior to the second trial.

Trial counsel noted t hat t he S tate called P ower s to testify at the petitioner’ s first trial. Trial counsel opined that the State was surprised by Powers testimony that he, not the petitioner, br oug ht the g un to the sc e ne of the c ri me

. Ho we ve r, the re ma ind e r of Pow e rs ’ t e sti mon y wa s su bs ta nti a lly the sa me a s th a t of

oth e r w itn e sse s at bo th t

ri a ls, makin g his te sti mon y c umu la tiv e . Wh e n th e State g ave trial counsel its witness list for the second trial, trial couns el noticed that Power s’ name w as
no t onthe lis t. C ou ns e l maint a ine d th a t

it wa s m y

b e l i e f t h a tt h e y h a d m o d i f

i e d t h e i r q u e s t i o n i n g a n d t h e ir testimonyand other – might have had re buttal witnesses which they didn’t bring forwa

rd to ne g ate his te stimony

. I thought he would be – they wer e laying – the y might have been lay ing a trap, so to speak, ho pin g I wo uldc a ll M r. Pow e rs

.
At th e c on c lus ionof

thepr oo f, the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt de nie d th e pe tit ionfo r p os tconviction re lief. The c ourt found that the pe titioner failed to prove by clea r and c onvincing

e vid e nc e that he re c e ive d th e ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l. T he pe tit ion e r n ow app e a ls this

ru l i n g.

II. Ana lys is

To be succe ssful in his claim for post-conviction relief
, the petitioner must prove all fa ctual alleg ations contained in his post-conviction petition by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f) (2003). “ ‘Clear and convincing evidence means evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the cor rec tness of the co n cl usions drawn fr om the

e vid e nc e .’ ” State v. Ho lde r, 15 S.W. 3d 90 5, 91 1 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 99 ) ( qu oti ng Ho dg e s v . S. C. To of & Co. , 833 S.W. 2d 89 6, 90 1 n.2 (T e nn . 199 2) ). I ssu e s re g ard ing the c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s, the weig ht and value to be ac corde d their testimony , and the f actua l questions raised by the evidenc e adduce d at trial ar e to be r esolved by the post-convicti o n co u rt as the trier of fac t. See Henle y

v. S t at e, 9 6 0 S

. W

. 2 d 5 7 2 , 5 7 9 (T en n

. 1 9 9 7 ). T h er ef o re , we af fo rd th e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs of fac t the weig ht of a jury verdic t, with such findings be ing c onclusive on appe al abse nt a showing that the evidenc e in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst those finding s. I d. at 578.

A c la im o f ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l is a mixe d que sti on of la w an d fa c t. S e e State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . We will review the post-c onviction court’s finding s of fac t de novo with a pre sumption t hat those finding s are corr ect. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450,-5-

45 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) . H ow e ve r, we wi ll r e vie w the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion s o f l a w p ur e ly de novo. I d.

“To e stabli s h ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, the petitioner be ars the bur den of pr oving both that counsel’s perf

ormanc e was defic ient and that the defic iency prejudice d the defe nse.” G oad v. State, 938 S.W .2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S

. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct . 2052, 2064 (1984))

. I n evaluating whether the petitioner has met this burden, this court must determine whe ther c ouns el ’s perf ormanc e wa s within the rang e of c ompetencerequire d of attorney s in criminal case s. See B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Moreove r,

[b] eca use a pe titioner must establish both prongs of the test, a failure to p ro ve e ith e r d e fi c ie nc y or pr e jud ic e pr ov ide s a

su ff ic ie nt b a sis to deny relief on the i neff

ective assistance claim. I ndeed, a court need

no t a d d r e s s t h e c o m p o n e n t s i n a n y p ar t i c u l ar

o r d e r o r e v e n a d d re ss both if t h e [ p etitioner] makes an insuffic ient showing of one

c omp on e nt.
Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069).

As we ha ve no te d, thepe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t tria l c ou ns e l sh ou ld have c a lle d Po we rs to testify at his second trial. Powers testified at the post-conviction hea ring that the fatal shot occurr ed when the pe titioner stumbled as he turned to r un from the victim. Howeve r, Powers a dmitted that prior to the post-convic tio n h ea ri n g, he had ne ver told any one that the f atal shot was f

ired

acc identally , even thoug h the information would have been important to the petitioner’s def ense and to Power’s own defe nse. Additionally
, trial counsel testified that Powers’ testimonyat the first trial

wa s la rg e ly c umu la tiv e to that of

theoth e r w itn e sse s. F urthe r, e ve n th ou g h th e State cho se no t to utiliz e Power s in the second tria l, counsel fe are d that having Powers testify as a w itness for the defe nse could ultimately damag e the petitioner’s case. There fore , he dete rmined that having Powers te sti fy was no t in the p e tit ion e r’ s b e st i nte re st. I t is app are nt that c ou ns e l’ s d e c isi on no t to c a ll Pow e rs wa s a

str a te g ic c ho ic e . O n a

pp e a l, this c ou rt

ma y no t sec on d- g ue ss the ta c tic a l or str a te g ic choice s of counse l unless those choice s are based upon inadequate prepa ration, nor may

we mea sure counsel’s be havior by

“20-20 hindsig ht.” See State v. Hellar d, 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). The petitioner has f

ailed to prove trial counsel’ s ineffe ctiveness in this reg ard.
As his final complaint of inef fec tive assistance , the petitioner a sse r ts th at c o u n s e l s h o u ld ha ve
re qu e ste d th a t th e tr ial c ou rt ins truc t th e jury

on a ll l e sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e s o f p re me dit a te d f

ir st deg ree murder. A t the petitioner’s sec ond trial, the trial court instructed the jury on first deg ree murder and second de g ree murd er

. T h e t ri al court did not ins truct the jury on voluntary manslaug hter, c riminally

neg lige nt homicide, or re ckless homicide.
Reg arding lesser- included off ense instruc tions, our supreme c ourt has noted that “[t ]he trial court’s duty to char g e juries as t o the l aw of eac h offe nse i ncluded in an indictment a pplies whether or not a de fendant reque sts such an i nstruction.” State v. Wil son, 92 S.W .3d 391, 394 (Tenn. 2002) ;W e no t e t hat t he p et i t i o ner r ai sed t hi s i ss ue as t he i ne ff e c tive as si st ance o f t ri al co unsel
, not as t he 2
ine ff e c tive n e ss o f ap p e llate c o u n se l.

-6- see a lso Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18- 110(a) (1997); Yasmond Fe nderson v. State, No. E2001-01088- CCA -R 3- PC, 2 00 2 WL

8322 05 , a t *5 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. a t K no xvill e , M a y 2, 20 02 ), pe rm . to appea l denied, (Te nn. 2002). B ased upon the trial court’ s du t y t o i n s truct the jury reg ardle ss of counsel’s r equest, this court ha s previously declined to f

ind that counsel was ineffe ctive for f ailing to pursue lesser -included of fense instructions at trial. See Te rra nce L . Turner v. State, No. M2002- 02 42 9- CCA -R 3- PC, 2 00 4 WL 58 76 36 , at *5 (T e nn . Crim . App . at N a sh vil le , M ar. 25 , 2 00 4) , p e rm

. to a pp e a l de nie d, (T e nn . 2 00 4) ; T e rry Da vidS tep hen s v . St a te , N o. M2 00 1- 01 03 6- CCA -R 3- PC, 2002 WL 31890860, at *7 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, De c. 30, 2002), pe rm. to appea l denied, (Tenn. 2003) . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the pe titioner also failed to e stablish the ineffe ctive assistance of counse l in this reg ard. 2

III. Conclusi on

F ind ing no e rr or , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE