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*********************************************** 
KATHLEEN TELMAN v. GARY W. HOYT ET AL.

(AC 41599)

Lavine, Devlin and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter

alia, fraud, in connection with false representations made during the

defendants’ sale of certain real property to the plaintiff. After the defendants were defaulted for failure to plead, a hearing in damages was

held, after which the trial court awarded the plaintiff damages that

included $4000 in attorney’s fees. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion

to set aside the verdict as to damages and for additur, which the court

denied. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed that the court

abused its discretion when it denied her motion for additur as to her

attorney’s fees. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the plaintiff’s motion for additur as to attorney’s fees; our rules

of practice provide for a motion for additur in connection with a jury

trial, not with respect to a hearing in damages to the court, and having

construed the requested additur as a motion for reconsideration, this

court concluded that the trial court could have reasonably decided as

it did and did not abuse its discretion.

Argued September 18—officially released November 19, 2019

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defendants’ alleged fraud, and for other relief, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven,

where the action was withdrawn as to the defendant

Carol Cangiano et al.; thereafter, the defendant Gary

W. Hoyt et al. were defaulted for failure to plead; subsequently, following a hearing in damages, the court, Hon.

Richard E. Burke, judge trial referee, rendered judgment for the plaintiff; thereafter, the court denied the

plaintiff’s motion for additur, and the plaintiff appealed

to this court; subsequently, the court, Hon. Richard E.

Burke, judge trial referee, issued an articulation of its

decision. Affirmed.

Andrew S. Knott, with whom, on the brief, was Robert

J. Santoro, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Kathleen Telman,

appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying her

motion to set aside the verdict as to damages and for

additur. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court

abused its discretion in denying her motion to ‘‘set aside

[the] verdict’’ as to damages and for additur because

the court’s award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff was

so low that it shocks the conscience. We conclude that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the plaintiff’s motion for additur as to attorney’s fees

and, therefore, affirm the judgment.

The following procedural history and facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. The plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendants, Gary

W. Hoyt and Karen A. Hoyt,1 by way of summons and

complaint. The complaint set out nine causes of action

that sounded, inter alia, in fraud. The plaintiff alleged

that on November 20, 2015, she purchased real property

located at 1958 Hartford Turnpike, North Haven (property) from the defendants. In the defendants’ residential

property condition disclosure report (disclosure), they

stated that ‘‘[m]onsoon rains may result in slight water

in [the] garage’’; (internal quotation marks omitted);

and that there were no other water drainage problems

associated with the property. The plaintiff alleged that

the defendants knew that water intrusion occurred in

the garage with normal rainfall and also that there were

other drainage problems associated with the landscaping on the property. Therefore, the plaintiff alleged that

the defendants committed fraud in their sale of the

property by making false representations in the disclosure.

The defendants filed appearances in the present case

but failed to plead in response to the plaintiff’s amended

complaint. Accordingly, the plaintiff filed a motion for

default pursuant to the defendants’ failure to plead,

which was granted by the clerk.

On April 24, 2017, the court held a hearing in damages.

The defendants did not appear at the hearing and, therefore, the plaintiff’s claims were uncontested. The plaintiff presented evidence with respect to the damages

she sustained as a result of the defendants’ fraud. Her

excavation expert testified that it would cost $19,000

to cure the drainage issues associated with the property.

The plaintiff also testified that she spent 197 hours

landscaping the property before she realized that there

were drainage problems that ruined her landscaping

efforts. The plaintiff requested $6,402.05 as compensation for her time spent on her ruined landscaping

efforts, which was calculated on the basis of the hourly

rate she earned from employment.2 The plaintiff sought

punitive damages, including attorney’s fees, on the basis

of the defendants’ fraud. The plaintiff’s counsel pre-
sented evidence of $1,462.35 in court costs and $27,480

in attorney’s fees.3

Soon after the hearing, the court rendered judgment

as to damages. The court awarded the plaintiff damages

in the total amount of $24,462.35, which included

$19,000 in compensatory damages, $1462.35 in taxable

costs, and $4000 for attorney’s fees. The court also

ordered postjudgment interest in the amount of 6 percent per annum. The plaintiff then filed a motion to

‘‘set aside [the] verdict’’ as to damages and for additur

pursuant to Practice Book § 16-35.4

In support of her

motion, the plaintiff argued that the court did not properly apply the law to the facts of the case because it

failed to consider the plaintiff’s lost time and expenses,

and the full amount of her attorney’s fees. The court

denied that motion.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court abused

its discretion when it denied her motion for additur

as to her attorney’s fees. Following oral argument on

appeal, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 60-2, 60-5, and 61-

10, this court ordered the trial court to file a written

articulation of ‘‘the factual and legal basis for the award

of $4000 in attorney’s fees, rather than the amount

requested by counsel.’’ The trial court filed an articulation stating that ‘‘in light of the facts as presented at

the hearing [in damages] and after determining the damages to be awarded, [the court] used its discretion and

awarded a percentage of the requested attorney’s fees

as punitive damages based upon fraud as requested

by counsel.’’ The articulation also highlighted that the

plaintiff’s counsel said at the hearing in damages that

he would ‘‘take whatever . . . .’’5

Our rules provide for a motion for additur in connection with a jury trial, not a hearing in damages to the

court. See footnote 4 of this opinion. Construing the

requested ‘‘additur’’ as a motion for reconsideration,6

we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably

decided as it did and did not abuse its discretion. See

Shore v. Haverson Architecture & Design, P.C., 92

Conn. App. 469, 479, 886 A.2d 837 (2005) (standard of

review regarding challenges to court’s ruling on motion

for reconsideration is abuse of discretion), cert. denied,

277 Conn. 907, 894 A.2d 988 (2006).

The judgment is affirmed.

1 Carol Cangiano, Coldwell Banker Real Estate, LLC, Coldwell Banker

Residential Real Estate, LLC, NRT LLC, NRT New England, LLC, Realogy

Franchise Group, LLC, Realogy Operations, LLC, and CBRE, Inc., were also

named as defendants but are not parties to this appeal. Our references in

this opinion to the defendants are to Gary W. Hoyt and Karen A. Hoyt.

2 There is no evidence in the record that the plaintiff was employed as

a landscaper.

3 The plaintiff’s counsel represented to the court that his legal fee, memorialized in his engagement letter with the plaintiff, was $300 per hour and

that he spent 91.6 hours on the plaintiff’s case.

4 Practice Book § 16-35 is in Chapter 16, which is titled ‘‘Jury Trials.’’

There was no jury trial in the present case, as the uncontested hearing in

damages was tried to the court.

5 The following is counsel’s complete statement: ‘‘So I’ll accept whatever
the court thinks is—.’’

6

‘‘It is the substance of a motion . . . that governs its outcome, rather

than how it is characterized in the title given to it by the movant.’’ State v.

Taylor, 91 Conn. App. 788, 792, 882 A.2d 682, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 928,

889 A.2d 819 (2005).