Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

STEPHEN T. OWENS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

J. MICHAEL SAUER MICHAEL GENE WORDEN

Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ARTHUR JOHN BRYANT, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 31A04-1109-PC-542

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE HARRISON SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Roger D. Davis, Judge

Cause No. 31D01-0506-PC-2

December 31, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON REHEARING - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge
In his petition for rehearing, Bryant seeks reconsideration of his argument that his 

attorneys were ineffective due to their failure to object to testimony about the conversation he 

had with his mother during their meaningful consultation at the police station. We grant 

Bryant’s petition for the limited purpose of clarifying our opinion.

Two officers eavesdropped on Bryant’s meaningful consultation with his mother at the 

police station. Bryant’s pre-trial motion to suppress the testimony was denied and at trial, 

Detective Bauman was allowed to testify over objection about the conversation that was 

overheard. Officer Whelan testified next about what was overheard, but defense counsel did 

not object. On direct appeal, we found that the error in admitting Detective Bauman’s 

testimony was harmless because it was cumulative of Officer Whelan’s testimony, to which 

no objection was lodged. On appeal from the denial of Bryant’s petition from post-conviction 

relief, Bryant argued that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to Officer 

Whelan’s testimony about the same matter.

Counsel for Bryant testified that in general one strategy at trial is not to object too 

frequently for fear of leaving the jury with the impression that the defendant has something to 

hide. Counsel also testified that an objection should have been lodged to Officer Whelan’s 

testimony because the error would have been preserved for purposes of appeal. To prove 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object, however, a petitioner must establish 

that an objection would have been sustained, and that he was prejudiced by the failure to 

object. Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1997). Given the trial court’s prior ruling 

on the testimony of Detective Bauman, an objection likely would not have been sustained. 

Bryant has failed to meet his burden.
Moreover, Bryant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object because there 

was substantial independent evidence of his guilt such that it is unlikely the erroneously 

admitted evidence played a role in his conviction. See Sundling v. State, 679 N.E.2d 988 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (erroneous admission of evidence is harmless where there was 

substantial independent evidence of guilt such that erroneously admitted evidence likely 

played no role in the conviction). Here, jeans were found in the trunk of the vehicle where 

Bryant’s step-mother’s body was found. DNA tests of the jeans revealed that they were 

stained with Bryant’s step-mother’s bodily fluids and that Bryant had worn them. Bryant 

gave away some of his step-mother’s jewelry and pawned some of her property. He showed 

the car to his friends, while his step-mother’s body remained in the trunk, and drove around 

in that car for a number of days. In short, the erroneously admitted evidence likely had no 

impact on Bryant’s conviction given the strength of the State’s case against him.

Judgment affirmed.

BROWN, J., and PYLE, J., concur.