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- A14032

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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KASHIF M. ROBERTSON

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 232 MDA 2021 Appeal from the Order Entered January 29, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP

- 22

- CR

- 0002276

- 2017 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KASHIF M. ROBERTSON

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 233 MDA 2021 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 11, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP

- 22

- CR

- 0002276

- 2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: JULY 25, 2022 In these consolidated appeals, Kashif M. Robertson appeals from the January 29, 2021 order denying his motion for time

- credit, and the February 11, 2021 order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.J

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Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541

- 9546. After careful review, we affir m . The factual background of this case is not relevant to our disposition and need not be reiterated here. The procedural history of this case, as gleaned from the certified record, is as follows: On August 8, 2019, Appellant pled guilty to one count of posses sion of a controlled substance 1 at docket N o. CP

22

- CR

- 0002276

- 2017 and was sentenced that same day to 6 to 23 months’ imprisonment, with 6 months’ credit for time

- served from January 5 to June 5, 2017. Appellant did not file a direct appeal to this Court. The trial court subsequently learned that Appellant had already been awarded time credit from January 5 to Decembe r 22, 2017 by the Honorable Deborah E. Curcillo at a previous docket, No. CP

- 22

- CR

- 0002526

- 2012, and thus the time credit in the instan t matter constituted double credit. Following the filing and denial of a litany of pro se motions, Appellant filed his first pro se PCRA petition on O ctober 15, 2020 , and c ounsel was appointed to represent him. Appellant’s most recent amended PCRA petit ion was filed on December 28, 2020

. On January 14, 2021, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice of its intention to dismiss his petition without a hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1)

.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 1 35 P.S. § 7 8 0

- 113(a)(16).J

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A bout the same time, Appellant filed a pro se “Motion to Compel the Imposition of Originally Imposed Time Credi t , ” arguing he was entitled to
time

- credit from January 5 to December 22, 2017

. The PCRA court denied this motion on January 2 9 , 2021

. Thereafter, on February 11, 2021, the PCRA
court ente red an order dismiss ing Appellant’s PCRA petition and all the amendments thereto

. On February 16, 2021, A ppellant filed two timely pro se notice s of appeal , which were docketed in this Court at Nos. 232 MDA 2021 and 2 33 MDA 2021. Appellant’s appeal at N o. 232 MDA 2021 is from the PCRA court’s January 2 9 , 2021 order denying his motion for time

- credit ; the appeal at No. 233 MDA 2021 is from the PCRA court’s February 11, 2021 order dismissing his PCRA petition. T his Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte on March 26, 2021, and c ounsel entered his appearance on Appellant ’s behalf that same da y . 2 Preliminarily, we note that to the extent Appellant attempts to raise any challenges with respect to imposition of ti me - credit, we find that his claim is moot. The record reflects that Appellant was sentenced on August 8, 2019 to 6 to 23 months imprisonment, with 6 months’ credit for time

- served, and has since completed serving his sentence.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 2 The record reflects that Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.J

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This Court has long recog nized that w here an appellant has completed serving his sentence, he is no longer subject to any direct criminal
consequences and any challenge to the sentence imposed is moot and incapable of review. Commonwealth v. Schmohl , 975 A.2d 1144, 1149 (Pa.Super. 2009) (stating, “[u] nder Pennsylvania law, if Appellant completed the aggregate maximum term of imprisonment while his appeal was pending, he would not be subjected to any direct criminal consequences and his challenge to the legality of his sen tence ... would be moot and incapable of review.” ); see also Commonwealth v. King , 786 A.2d 993, 996

– 9 97 (Pa.Super. 2001) ( holding that a defendant ’ s challenge to the legality of his
sentence was moot where the sentence imposed had already been served and there were no criminal or civil consequences) , appeal denied , 812 A.2d
1228 (Pa . 2002). As a result, the matter is moot and incapable of review.
We now turn to Appellant’s challenges to the PCRA court’s February 11, 2021 order dismissing his PCRA petition and various amendments thereto. Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller , 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson , 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of theJ

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PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman , 799 A.2d 136, 140 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted).
We must first consider the timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition because it implicates the authority of this court to grant any relief. Commonwealth v. Davis , 8 6 A.3d 883, 887 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). If a petitioner fails to invoke a valid exception to the PCRA time

bar, courts are without jurisdiction to review the petition or provide relief. Commonwealth v. Spotz , 171 A.3d 675, 729 (Pa. 2017 ). All PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of when an Appellant’s judgment of sentence becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
inc luding discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Here, the record reveals that Appellant’s judgment of sentence b ecame final on September 9, 2019 , 3 30 days after the time period for filing a direct

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 3 We note that, for purposes of this Court ’ s computation, Appellant would have needed to file his appeal on or before Monday, September 9, 2019 , because September 8, 2019 fell on the weekend

. See 1 Pa.C.S .A. § 1908 (stating that, for computations of time, whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or a legal holiday, such day shall be omitted from the computation).J

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appeal with this Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903

. Accordingly , Appellant had until September 9, 2020 to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s instant petition was filed on October 15, 2020 , and
is thu s untimely, unless he can plead and prove that one of the three statutory exceptions to the one

- year jurisdictional time

- bar applies. 4 In his brief to this court, A ppellant fails to even acknowledge the untimeliness of his petition, let alone invoke any of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA time

- bar set forth in Section § 9545(b)(1). See Appellant’s brief
at 1

- 3, 23

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. Accordingly, the PCRA court and thi s Court are without

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 4 The three statutory exceptions to the PCRA time

- bar are as f ollows:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the U nited States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i

- iii).J

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judication to entertain any of Appellant’s PCRA claims. See Spotz , 171 A.3 d
at 729

. Furthermore , we note that because Appellant is no longer serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime, he is ineligible for PC RA relief on this basis as well. 42 Pa.C.S. A. § 9543(a)(1)(i) ; see also Commonwealth v. Descardes , 136 A.3d 493 , 503 ( Pa. 2016) (holding the petitioner was no longer serving a sentence, so he was ineligible for PCRA relief; the petitioner ’ s ineligibility deprived the court of jurisdiction to entertain the petition) ; Commonwealth v. Williams , 977 A.2d 1174 (Pa.Super. 2009) (explaining that once sentence is completed, petitioner is ineligible for PCRA relief), appeal denied , 990 A.2d 730 ( Pa. 2 010)

. Based on the foregoing,

we discern no error on the part of the PCRA court in dismissing Appellant’s petition. Accordingly, we affirm the January 29 and February 11, 2021 orders of the PCRA court. Orders affirme d. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 7/25/2022