### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00640- CV

Ja m e s W . Shr ie ve , A ppe lla nt

v. Texas P arks and Wildl if e De partm ent, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 261ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. GN403181 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N This is an interlocutory

appea l from the district cour t ’s o rd er denying a

ppellant’s
re qu e st f or a te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n to re sto re his e lig ibi lity to o bta in m ana g e d la

nd s dee r p e rm its
. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (West Supp. 2004-05). We will affirm the orde r.
BACK GR OUND This appea l pres e nts is s u es re lating to a landowner ’s ability

to participate in the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department’s manag ed lands de er pe rmit (ML DP) prog ram, throug h which land ow ne rs c an e xpand

de e r h un tin g ri g hts on

the ir pr op e rt

y be y on d that whic h state law g e ne ra lly
a llo ws . So me ba c kg ro un d re g ard ingthe ML DP p ro g ra m is he lpf ul i n p la c ingthe pr e se nt a pp e a l in
c on te xt.The De partment issues about 400,000 de er- hunting lice nses ea ch y ear . 1 2 The MLDP program

The De partment h as the statutory responsibility

of mana g ing the state’s de er population. See Tex. P arks & Wil d. Code Ann. §§ 12.001, 61.002, 61.051, 61.054 (W est 2002). An important aspec t o f d ee r p o pulation manag ement is hunting, which is both a traditional
rec reational pa stime f

or many Texans a

nd a lucr ative commer cial ac tivity for Te x as landowne rs who lease their prope rty

for hunting . Throug h the statutes and r egulations administered by the Depa rtment, Texas endea

vors to strike a balanc e among the g oals of preve nting deer overpopulation, fosteringhunting a s a re cre ational and e conomic ac tivity , and pre venting excessive depletion of the deer population. See id
.

To balanc e these interests, Texas law a llows deer hunting during fix ed seasons e ach y e ar, re qu ir e s e a c h hunte r to a c qu ir e a hunti nglic e ns e fr om t

he De pa rtme nt, and

pla c e s a “ ba g lim it”
on the number of deer eac h hunter may kill ea ch y ear . See id
. § 42.002 (West Supp. 2004-05); 31 1 Tex. Admin. C ode §§ 65.38, 65.42 (2004) . Although ea ch individual hunter is re sponsible for complying with license require ments and bag limi ts, this g ener al re g ime place s no limi tations on the total number of de er that can be killed on a g iven proper ty eac h y ear

or sea son. See id . § 42.002; 31 Tex. Admin. C ode §§ 65.38, .42.

The De partment a lso administers a Wildl ife Man ag ement Plan (“ WMP ”) pr og ram wher eby individual landowners may opt into a differ ent re g ulatory s ch em e g overninghunting on their prope rty

in e x chang e for ag ree ing to mor e compre hensive wildlife and habitat manag ement by the Depa rtment. S

ee31 Tex. Admin. C ode § 65.25 (2003) . Among the manag ement mea sures3

contained in WMP s are harve st quotas for wildlife. Se e id . WMP s are prepa red f ree of cha rg e by Depa rtment biologists based on information the landowne r must supply . I n exchang e for ag ree ing to a WMP, land ow ne rs may

re c e ive pr operty

ta x bre a ks and , w ithre sp e c t to de e r, e lig ibi lity to participate in the ML DP prog ram. Se e id . § § 6 5. 25 -. 26 . A c ur re nt WM P, s pe c if

yinga ha rv e st q uo ta for de er, must be a

pproved a nd on file bef

ore a landowner

is eligible for t he ML DP prog ram. See id . L andowne rs may

participate at var

ying “ l ev el s ” of the ML DP prog ram with diffe rent require ments of manag ement mea sures a nd corr esponding benef

its. To participate at “level thre e” of the ML DP prog ram, for example, a landowne r ag ree s to achieve at least four habitat manag ement
rec ommen d at i o n s within three y ear s. Id . § 65 .2 6. I n e xch ang e , th e land ow ne r r e c e ive s b e ne fi ts inc lud ingan e xten de d s e a so n o n h is o r h e r p ro pe rt y fo r h un tin g de e r w ithgun s. Un de r t he ML DP p ro g ra

m, t he De pa rtme nt i ssu e s a

pa rt ic ipatin g land ow ne r a

c e rt a in number of per

mits t hat ea ch entitle the be are r to kill one deer
. See id . § 65.26(d). L andowne rs have discretion to distribute some or all of the ir annua l ML D per mit s t o t h i rd parties, suc h as per sons paying to hunt on their proper ty
. Id . § 65 .2 6( c ). Th e De pa rtme nt r e pr e se nts that th e ML D p e rm its superse de the standa

rd baglimit s, allowing a bea rer to kill as many

deer as he or she wishes a s long as he or she has unuse d ML D per mits. Moreover, hunter s bear ing ML D perm its can hunt on the pa rt ic ipatin g land ow ne r’ s pr op e rt y duri ng bo th the sta

nd ard de e r s e a so n a

nd , unli ke oth e r l oc a tio ns , during any

extended period. How ever , the total number of ML D permits issued to the landowner
eac h y ear serve s as a c ap on the total annua l number o f deer killed on the proper

ty . Once the landowner ’s annual allotment of ML D permits is ex tinguished, r eg ardle ss of when this occ urs, dee r hunting on the pr operty

must cease for the year . Id
.Ea c h in div idu a l hu nte r m ay sti ll a pp ly fo r a nd recei ve the n or

ma l hu nti nglic e ns e wi th 2 permits that expire at the end of the standar d annual huntingseason.

4 A l a n d o wn e r m a y a p p l y f o r ML D p e rm its by

su bmi tti ngto t

he De pa rtme nt, by Au g us t 1 5 o f e a c h y e ar , d e e r - p o p u lati o n o r d e e r - h ar v e s t da ta. Se e id . § 65 .2 5. A D e pa rtme nt b iol og ist deter mines how many

ML D per

mits t o is s u e (i f any) base d on the ca pacity of the ha bitat and the estimated dee r population. The Department may deny a re quest for ML D per

mits i f the landow ner ha s a llo we d to o ma

ny de e r t o b e kil le d on the pr op e rt y or if the land ow ne r d oe s n ot c omp ly wi th h is or her WMP
. Se e id . § 65.26(g ). De nial of a re q u es t fo r ML D per mits does not affec t the land ow ne r’ s a

bil ity to h un t on his ow n p rop ert y or

to a llo w c omm e rc ia l hu

nti ngon the pr op e rt

y during the s tandar d open sea son. Com pa re31 Tex. Admin. C ode § 65.26 with Tex. Parks & Wil d. 2 Code Ann. § 42.0175 (West 2002).
P roce edings b elow

Appellant James Shrieve is the g ener al or manag ing partner of t he Shrieve L imited Partnership, whic h o wn s a 2 , 900-ac re r anch in Kimble County near J unction. Shrieve uses the proper ty for c ommercia l hunting purpose s. He ha s participate d in the WMP for sever al y ear s and in t he ML DP pr og ra

m sinc e 20 00 . Dur ingthe 20 03 hunti ngse a so n, Shr ie ve ha d a le ve l thre e pe rm it that a uth or ize d hun tin g on his pr op e rt y be tw e e n the Sa tur da

y ne are st Se pte mbe r 3 0 thro ug h th e la st S unday in J anuar

y and duringany

open sea son. See id
. § 6 5
. 2 6 ( b ) ( 3 )
. T h is h a d the ef fec t of extending dee r sea son on Shrieve’s pr operty beyond the s tandar d season by approximately

two-anda-ha lf months, creating c ommercia l hunting opportunities for the ranc h.I f true, the fa ct t h at additional dee r had be en intentionally rele ased to a

trac t that was 3 targ e te d f or po pu latio n r e du c tio n w ou ld b e imp or tant inf or matio n fo r the bio log ist iss uin g pe rm its and det ermini ngho w t o p ro pe rl y a c hie ve re du c tio n g oa ls. Th e De pa rtme nt a lle g e s th a t f

a ilure to no tif y the bio log ist

wo uld c on sti tut e no nc omp lia

nc e wi th t he WMP. No re cord of

the admi n i s t rative a

ppeal pr ocee ding is include d in the rec ord. Ther e wa s 4 testimony at the tempora

ry injunction hearing , howeve r, that the Pane l consisted of t he De partment’s division di rec tor, the direc tor of the bigg ame pr og ram, the whitetail de er prog ram c oordinator, a nd the re g ion director. 5

The pre cise e vents from whic h this a ppeal or iginated ar e somewhat unclear from the
rec ord. On Aug ust 20, 2004, afte r Shrieve’ s most rece nt ML D per mits ex pired, the D epar

tment sent Shr ie ve a le tte r statin g that it ha d de te rm ine d that ac tiv iti e s on his p ro pe rt y we re inc on sis te nt w ith his approved WMP plan, and dec laringhim ineligible to participate i n the ML DP prog ram for the
ne xt thr e e y e ars . Sp e c if

ic a lly , th e De pa

rtme nt a lle g e d th a t Shr ie ve re le a se d a dd iti on a l de e r o n h is land—under

minin g the g oal of re ducing the dee r population set out by Shrieve’s WMP—without notify ing the supervising Depa rtment biologist. Shrieve disputes the De partm e nt’ s a ll e g ations. The 3 letter a lso stated that Shrieve c ould appea l the permit denial, a nd included conta ct information. The De p ar tment admits that no noti ce or opportunity

for he aringwas g iven prior to its issuance of the letter. Appar ently , Shrieve a nd his attor n ey p articipated in an appe al bef ore the Wil dlife Divisions Ap p eals Pane l. On September 15, 2004, the Panel announc ed that it would aff irm the 4 Depa rtment’s dec ision, and decla red Shrieve ineligible to pa rticipate in the ML DP prog ram for a three -y ear period beg inning with the 2004-2005 hunting season. The direc tor of the wildlife division state d th a t th e Pane l

wa s p re se nte d n o n e w a

rgume nts to r e fute the fo llo wi ngpo int s:6

(1) The population g oal of the Wildlife Manag ement Plan (WMP ), ag ree d upon by y ou and F ielding H arw ell [t he De partment biolog ist] , is ‘8-10 ac res pe r dee r’; (2) You and other s in y our par ty acknow ledg ed t h at population reduc tion was ne c e ssa ry to a c hie ve the po pu latio n g oa l; (3) TWP D re cords i n d i cate that over 400 de er w ere added to the pr operty over a three -y ear period a lthough the population reduction g oal had not been a chieve d; (4 ) T h e T P W D b i o l o gi s ti nch ar ge o f t h e W M P wa s n o t n o t i fi ed o f t h es e s t o ck i n gs that w e re in d ir e c t c on tr a dic tio n to the WMP. The pa nel also noted that Shrieve was a lleg edly “re cently convicted on 29 counts of possessingdeer without a valid permit.”

Shrieve a ppeale d the Panel’s de cision to district court, a lleg ing tor t claims and reque sting a temporar

y restra ining order , temporar y injunction, judicial review of the Depa rtment’s administrative dec ision, and decla ratory relief . Following a hea

ring , the district co u rt denied Shrieve’s r equest for

a tempora

ry restra ining or der a

nd temporar

y injunction. This i n t er l o cu t o ry appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N

Shrieve c omplains that the district c ourt abused its discre tion in refusing to issue a temporar y injunction stay ing e nforc ement of the Depa rtment’s dec ision. I n his first issue, Shrieve alleg es that the De partment a cted outside its statutory authority by violating chapter

12 of the pa

rks and wildlife c ode and the Administrative Procedur es Ac t (“APA” ) whe n it sent the Aug ust 2004 letter without first g iving him notice and an opportunity for a hear ing. See Tex. P arks & Wil d. Code7

Ann. § 12.501 (West 2 0 02). In his second issue, Shrieve contends that the D epar tment’s actions violated his due proc ess rig hts. SeeU.S. Const. amend. XI V § 1; Tex. Cons t. art. 1 § 19.
Stand ard of review

A tempora

ry injunction is an extraordinary reme dy and does not issue a s a matter of rig ht. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W .3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). To obtain a tempor ary inj un c tio n, the a

pp lic ant mus t ple a d an d pro ve thr e e e le me nts : ( 1) a c a us e of a c tio n; ( 2) a

pr ob a ble rig ht to the relief soug ht; and (3) a probable , im m i n en t , an d irrepa rable injury

in the interim. Id
. Whether to g rant or deny a temporary injunction is within the trial cour t’s sound discretion. Id . A failure by the trial cour

t to analy ze or apply

the l aw co rr ectly

constitutes an abuse of discre tion. Gonzalez v. Re liant Energy, Inc

. , 4 8 T e x. Su p . Ct
. J. 4 6 2 , 2 0 0 5 T e x. L E X I S 2 12, at *24-25 ( T e x. Marc h 11, 2005).
St at ut or y r igh t t o no ti c e and he ar ing

The De partment must g ive notice and an opportunity for hear ing befor e suspending
or re voking a

n orig inal or re newa l permit or l i cense on cer tain g rounds. See Tex. P arks & Wil d. Code Ann. § 12.501 (West 2002)
. This notice and he aringare g overne d by the re quirements of the contested c ase pr ovisions in s ections 2001.052 and 2001.054 of the g o v ernme nt code. Se e id
. § 1 2. 50 2 ( Wes t 20 02 ); see also Tex. Gov’t C ode Ann. §§ 2001.052, .054 (West 2000). We conclude that these re quirements do not apply here
. By their unambiguous terms, sections 1 2
. 5 0 1 a n d 12.502 only

apply to the suspension
or revoc ation of orig inal or re newa l permits or licenses. See Tex. P ar k s & W i l d
. Code Ann.I n his reply brief, Shrieve m istakenly argues that sec tion 43.603 of the parks a nd wildlife 5 code pr eclude s the conc lusion that his permits ex pired. SeeTex. P arks & Wil d. Code Ann. § 43.603 (West 2002) (“pe rmit is valid for a period presc ribed by the depar tment of not le ss tha

n one y ear ”). Howeve r, section 43.603 relates to de er manag ement permits rathe r than ML D permits. Com pa re 31 Tex. Adm i n . C o d e § § 65.131-138 (2004) , with 31 Tex. Admin. C ode §§ 65.25-.26. The two pr og ra ms a re g ov e rn e d b y

dif fe re nt r ule s. 8 §§ 12.501, .502. By

contra st, the Depa

rtment is not required by statute to give notice or he aring befor e it decide s to “ref

use to issue or transfe r an orig inal or rene wal license, permit, or tag ,” and the contested c ase pro visions of the APA do not apply to such dec isions. Id . § 12.508 (West 2002). Howeve r, a pa

rty may seek judicial revie w of such refusals i n Travis County district court. Se e id
. § 12.506 (West 2002).

We conclude that Shrieve’s c omplaint does not c oncer n a suspension or re vocation of per mits or licenses, but the Depa rtment’s fa ilure to issue them. At the time of the De partment’s actions, Shrive did not have c urre nt ML D per mits; the mos t re ce n t p ermit s expi red at the end of J an u ar y 2004. Shrieve a rgues that eve n if his ML D per mits had ex pired, the D epar tment’s letter 5 sti ll con st it ut e d a

re vo c a tio n o r s us pe ns ion —a re vo c a tio n o r s us pe ns ion of his ri g ht t o p art ic ipate in the ML DP prog ram and rec eive future ML D permits for three y ear s. This argument overlooks the fa ct t h at S h r i e v e h adn o s t at u t o ry ri gh tt o p ar t i ci p at e i nt h e M L DP p ro gra mwi t h o u tp o s s es s i n g a
curr ent WMP plan. Se e id . §§ 65.25, .26 (2004 ). W MP plans are only valid for one y ear , and Shrieve’s had expired befor e the De partment’s Aug ust 2004 letter issued. Se e id .; 31 Tex. Admi n. Code § 65.26(b)( 3) (leve l three permit “is valid from the Saturda y near est September 30 thr oug h the la st Su nd ay in Janu ary

and duri ngan op e n se a so n on the pr op e rt y fo r wh ic h it

is i ssu e d. ” ). I n s um, at the time of the D epar

tment’s decision, Shrieve ha d no active lice nse or pe rmi t t h at could haveWe do not reac h the i s s u e o f wh et h er the Depa rtment failed to g ive prope r notice of the 6 suspension or denial of

a per mit via certified or

reg istered mail bec ause w e find that there wa s no a c tiv e lic e ns e su sp e nd e d o r d e nie d. Mo re ov e r, Shr ie ve a dmi tte d th a t he r e c e ive d a c tua l no tic e via re g ula r m a il. 9 been “re voked” or

“suspende d” by

the Depa

rtment’s dec ision. Se e id . § 12.501 (West 2002). I nstead, the Depa

rtment’s challeng ed action amounts to a dec ision to refuse to issue an or igina l or
rene wal license , permit, or tagpursuant to sec tion 12.508. Id . § 12.508. Under chapte r 12, Shrieve had no rig ht to prior noti ce a nd hear ing; his sole re course is judicial review in district cour t. Se e id
. § 12.506 (West 2002). 6

No r d o es t h e AP A independe ntly g ive rise to a r ight of

Shrieve to prior notice and hear ing be fore the Depa

rtment made its dec ision. I n the absence of express statutory

authority , the APA does not independe ntly provide a rig ht to a conte sted ca se hea ring
. EldercareProps., Inc. v

. Tex. De p’t of Human Serv

s ., 63 S.W .3d 551, 557 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied), reve rsed on other grounds , Texas De p’t of Pr o t ec t i ve & Regulatory Serv s. v. Me ga Child C

are, Inc

. , 145 S.W. 3d 17 0, 19 6 ( Te x. 20 04 ); se e al so Be st &Co. v . Te

x as Sta te Bd

. o f P lum bing E

x am ’r s , 927 S.W
. 2 d 3 0 6 , 3 0 9 ( T e x. A p p . — A u s t i n 1 9 9 6 , w r i t d e n i e d )
. R a t h e r , i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i s l i mit e d to contested c ases r eg ardingthe g rant, de nial, or re newa l of a license that is r equire d to be prec eded by notice and oppor

tunity for he aring . Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.054 (West 2000). Moreove r, in its rules, the Department specifically rese rved “the rig ht to deny further issuance of

ML D per mits” to a landowner

who did not abide by

the WMP . 31 Tex. Admin. Code § 6 5. 26 (g ). Th e pe na lty

fo r e xce e din g the ha

rv e st q uo ta or vio latin g the WMP is in eli gibi li ty to
rec eive ML D per

mits for three y ear s from the date of denia l. Id . We conclude that Shrieve had noShrieve a lso alleg es that the a ppeals pa n el d i d not operate in a fa ir, honest, or unbiase d 7 manner . See Hammac k v. Public Util. Comm’n , 131 S.W. 3d 71 3, 73 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 04 , p e t. filed). Shrieve must overcome t h e pre sumption t hat ag ency decision make rs ar e fa ir, honest, and unbiased. Id . The re cord o f t h e admi nistrative appe al is not before us, and Shrieve’ s mere a lle g a tio ns are ins uf

fi c ie nt t o r e but th a t pr e su mp ti on wi th r e g ard to t he iss ue s p re se nte d in

thi s interlocutory appea l. Se e id .; see also Vandy griff v. First Sav. & Loan Assoc ., 617 S.W .2d 669, 673 (Tex. 1981). 10 curr en t p e r

mi t s u b je c t to s e c ti o n 1 2
. 5 0 1 , th e A PA d id n o t r e qu ir e n o ti c e an d a h e ar in g befor e the Depa rtment issued its letter , and the initial dec ision wa s authorized by Depa rtment rules. The ref

ore, the dis tr ic t court did no t abu se its dis c re tio n in re fu sin g to iss ue the te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n o n th os e g rounds. We overr

ule Shrieve’ s first issue.
Due pr oc e ss I n his second issue, Shrieve alleg es t hat hi s rig ht to due process under the state a nd fede ral c onstitut ions were violated becau s e his “ability to apply for pe rmits amounted to a vested pr op e rt y int e re st. ” Withre sp e c t to pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss c la ims lik e thi s, th e Tex as Su pr e me 7 Court ha s found no meaning ful distinction betwe en Texas’s protec tion of due course of law and the fede ral c onstitut ion’s g uara ntee of due proc ess. University of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than , 901 S.W .2d 92 6, 92 9 (T e x. 19 95 ); see U. S. Co ns t. a me nd . X I V § 1; T e x. Con st. art . 1 § 1 9. Thus , th e su pr e me
c ourt ha s f oll ow e d c on te mpo ra

ry fe de ra l du e pr oc e ss i nte rp re tatio ns of pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss issues. Than , 9 0 1 S
. W
. 2 d at 9 2 9 (c i t i n g Mellinger v. City of Houston , 3 S.W . 249, 252-53 (1887) ); see also Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Stamos , 6 9 5 S
. W
. 2 d 5 5 6 , 5 6 0 -6 1 (T ex . 1 9 8 5 ). Al t h o u gh not bound by

federa l d u e p roce ss jurisprudence , we c onsider fe dera l interpretations of proce dural due proc ess to be per suasiv e au t h o ri t y i n applying our due cour se of law

g uara ntee. Than , 90111

S.W. 2d at 92 9. We t

hu s a pp ly a tw o- pa rt ana ly sis : ( 1) we mus t de te rm ine wh e the r S hr ie ve ha s a pr op e rt y int e re st that is e nti tle d to pro cedu ral du e pr oc e ss p ro te c tio n; a nd (2 ) i f s o, we mus t deter mine what proc ess is due. Id .; see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. , 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982); Colli ns v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n , 94 S.W .3d 876, 883 (Tex. A p p . — Austin 2002, no pet.). To have a prope rty interest in a g overnme ntal benef it, a person must have more than a unilater al expectation of it; there must be a leg itimate claim of entitlement. Se e Bo ar d o f R e ge nts
v . R oth , 4 08 U. S. 5 64 , 5 77 (1 97 2) ; Smith v. Travis County Bail Bond Bd. , 5 5 9 S. W. 2 d 6 9 3 , 6 9 4 ( T e x. Civ. App.—Austin 1977, no writ) (no protec ted prope rty interest in expired license). “[T]he str ic tur e s o f d

ue pr oc e ss a

pp ly on ly to th e th reat ene d d e pr ivatio n o f l ibe rt y and pr op e rt y int e re sts deser ving the protec tion of the fede ral a nd state constitutions.” Trostl e v. Combs , 104 S.W .3d 206, 21 3 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin

20 03 , n o p e t) ; see Spring Branch I .S.D. v. Stamos , 695 S.W .2d 556, 561 (T e x. 19 85 ); see also Ma t h ew s v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Additionally , the claim of entitlement must be cre ated by an indepe ndent source such as state law. Se e id
. An e nti tle me nt m

us t sta nd or fa ll on the a

pp lic a tio n o f r

ule s to fa c ts. Ne lso n v . Cl e me nts , 8 3 1 S. W. 2 d 5 8 7 , 5 9 1 ( T e x. Ap p. — Aus tin

19 92 , w ri t de nie d) . “ To the e xten t a re qu e st a pp e a ls to dis c re tio n r a the r t ha n to ru le s, there is no property .” Id
. (q u o t i n g Scott v. Vill a g e o f K ew a skum , 786 F.2d 338, 339- 40 (7th Cir. 1986)). Shrieve a dmitted that the ML D per mit p ro ce ss involves the discretion of the Depa rtment and it s biologist beca use they deter mine when a

nd how many

permits should be issued. See 31 Tex. Admi n . Co d e A n n . § § 6 5
. 2 5 , . 2 6
. T h e n ar r o w qu e s ti o nb e f

o r e u s is w h e th e r

Sh r ieve p o s s e s s e d a p r o p e rt y i n t e r e s ti na

M LD p e r m i t
. A l t h o u g hS h r i e v e c l e ar l y e x p e c t e d t o r e c e i v e M LDW e n o t e t h at S h ri ev e’ s s u i tfo r j u d i ci al re v i ew o f t h e De p ar t m en t ’s ac t i o nre m ai n s p en d i n g. 8 12 permits for the 2004- 2005 hunting se ason, his was mer ely a unilater al ex p ec t at i o n. Ba sed on the statutes and rules we have examined, w e hold that Shrie ve’s expectation of ML D permits falls short of the ty pe of r ight or

proper ty interest that g ives rise to a due pr ocess inter est. We also observe that courts have char acte rized various other state l icense s as privil eg es, not entitlements. See Tex. P arks & Wild . Co de Ann. § 6 1. 05 5 ( “ the mo st equ ita ble and re a so na ble pr ivi le g e to h

un t g a me anim a ls
or c a tc h aq

uatic anim a l li fe ” ); see also State v. Project Principle, Inc

. , 7 2 4 S. W. 2 d 3 8 7 , 3 9 0 ( T e x. 1 9 8 7 ) ( l i c e n s e t o t e a c h “ c o n f e r s n o v e s t e d

r i g hts ” ); T

exas D ep’t of Pub. Safety v . Schaejbe , 687 S.W .2d 727, 728 (Tex. 1985) (drive r’s lice nse is pr ivilege , not r ight)
. We ove rrule Shrieve’s se cond issue.
CO NC LU SION

Havingfound that the De partment did not ex ceed its statutory authority by issuing the A u g u s t l e t t e r w i t h o u t p r i o r n o t i c e an d h e ar i n g , an d t h a t t h e r e w a s n o d u e p r o c e s s ri g ht t o continued re ceipt of ML D per mits prior to the Depar

tment’s issuance of the l etter, w e hold that the district court di d not abuse its discretion by denying the temporar y injunction. We affir

m the order
. 8

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: May

5, 2005