1

Filed 8/31/17 (unmodified opn. attached)

Order modifying published opinion filed 8/25/17 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re CHARLES G., a Person coming under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

___________________________________

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHARLES G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 No. A149593

 (Contra Costa County 

Super. Ct. No. J1501141)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the published opinion filed herein on August 25, 2017, be 

modified as follows: 

Beginning on the first line of page 3, the phrase, “We reject Charles’s claim for a 

simple reason passed over by the parties:” is modified to delete “passed over by the 

parties.” The phrase shall read, “We reject Charles’s claim for a simple reason:”.

There is no change in the judgment.

Dated: ________________________, P.J.
2

Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. John T. Laettner

Counsel: 

Jamie M. Weyand, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, 

Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, Joan Killeen and Amit Kurlekar, Deputy Attorneys General for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
1

Filed 8/25/17 (unmodified version)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re CHARLES G., a Person coming under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

___________________________________

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHARLES G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 No. A149593

 (Contra Costa County 

Super. Ct. No. J1501141)

Charles G. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order in a Welfare and 

Institutions section 602 proceeding. Charles argues that we should reverse the court’s 

finding that he carried a concealed firearm in violation of Penal Code section 254001as 

unlawful because that statute is preempted by a more specific statute that targets minors, 

section 29610, which the court also found he violated. Charles also argues there was 

insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that he willfully resisted, 

delayed, or obstructed a peace officer in that officer’s discharge of his duties in violation 

of section 148.

We disagree that section 29610 preempts section 25400. We conclude the statutes 

prohibit different conduct and affirm the juvenile court’s findings that Charles violated 

both statutes. We agree with Charles that there was insufficient evidence that he violated 

section 148 and therefore reverse this part of the court’s ruling.

 

1

 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
2

BACKGROUND

In December 2015, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a petition 

alleging Charles committed a felony violation of section 29610 for possession of a 

firearm by a minor; a felony violation of section 25400, subdivision (a)(2) for having a 

concealed firearm on his person; and a misdemeanor violation of section 148, 

subdivision (a)(1) for resisting, obstructing or delaying a peace officer in that officer’s 

performance of his duties.

In August 2016, the juvenile court commenced a hearing regarding Charles’s 

motion to suppress evidence under Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1 and 

regarding jurisdiction. The court denied the section 700.1 motion and sustained all three 

counts, but subsequently granted Charles’s motion to reduce the two firearm felony 

violations to misdemeanors. At a subsequent disposition hearing, the court committed 

Charles to Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility for a six-month regular program. 

Charles subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I.

Section 29610 Does Not Preempt Section 25400, Subdivision (a)(2).

Charles first argues the juvenile court improperly found he violated both 

section 25400, subdivision (a)(2), which prohibits a person from carrying a concealed 

firearm, and section 29610, which prohibits a minor from possessing a firearm capable of 

concealment on his or her person. He contends the juvenile court should have found he 

violated section 29610 only because it is the more specific statute and, therefore, 

preempts section 25400, subdivision (a)(2).2The People agree with Charles that the 

statutes involve the same conduct, but argue that section 29610 does not preempt 

section 25400 because it does not prescribe lesser punishment. We do not further 

 

2

 Charles did not first present this argument in the juvenile court. Nonetheless, 

we consider it here because it is of a purely legal nature. Charles may “raise for the first 

time on appeal a pure question of law which is presented by undisputed facts.” (Hale v. 

Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394.) 
3

consider the parties’ debate on this issue. We reject Charles’s claim for a simple reason 

passed over by the parties: a violation of section 29610 is not necessarily or commonly a 

violation of section 25400, subdivision (a)(2) and, therefore, section 29610 does not 

preempt section 25400, subdivision (a)(2). 

A. General Legal Standards

“ ‘Questions of statutory interpretation are, of course, pure matters of law upon 

which we may exercise our independent judgment.’ ” (In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 

46 Cal.4th 298, 311.) “[I]f a general statute includes the same conduct as a special 

statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted 

exclusively under the special statute.” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 

(Murphy).) This “Williamson rule,” first formulated in In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 

651, 654 (Williamson), is a rule of judicial interpretation that is designed to “ ‘ascertain 

and carry out legislative intent. The fact that the Legislature has enacted a specific statute 

covering much the same ground as a more general law is a powerful indication that the 

Legislature intended the specific provision alone to apply.’ ” (Murphy, at p. 86.)

The Williamson rule is triggered “when ‘it appears from the statutory context that 

a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the 

general statute.’ ” (Murphy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 86.) On the other hand, we do not 

assume the Legislature intended to preclude prosecution under the general statute if it 

“contains an element that is not contained in the special statute, and that element would 

not commonly occur in the context of a violation of the special statute.” (Id. at p. 87.) 

B. Analysis

Charles argues that “[l]ike the Murphy defendant, [he] was prosecuted under two 

statutes prohibiting similar conduct—the carrying of concealed firearms.” This is 

patently untrue; the plain language of the two statutes makes clear they prohibit distinctly 

different conduct. Section 29610, states: “A minor shall not possess a pistol, revolver, or 

other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.” (Italics added.) In other 

words, section 29610 only prohibits a minor’s possession of a firearm, and the firearm

need not be actually concealed. 
4

On the other hand, section 25400, subdivision (a)(2), states in relevant part: “A 

person is guilty of carrying a concealed firearm when the person . . . [c]arries concealed

upon the person any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon 

the person.” (Italics added.) Thus, while section 29610 involves a minor’s possession of 

a firearm that is capable of being concealed, section 25400, subdivision (a)(2) requires 

that a person carry and conceal the firearm.3

The different conduct prohibited by the two statutes distinguishes the present 

circumstances from those discussed in Murphy. There, the defendant caused a stolen 

vehicle report to be filed with law enforcement based on her false report that her car had 

been stolen. (Murphy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 85.) She was later convicted of a felony 

violation of section 115, which prohibits the filing of a false “instrument” with the State. 

(Murphy, at p. 85.) On appeal, she argued her prosecution under section 115 was 

precluded by two more specific statutes, including Vehicle Code section 10501, 

subdivision (a), which prohibits the filing of a false vehicle theft report with law 

enforcement. (Murphy, at p. 85.) 

The appellate court concluded that section 115 was a more general statute, as it 

applied “to a broader range of documents that may be filed in any public office” than did 

Vehicle Code section 10501. (Murphy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 88.) The main issue was 

whether a violation of Vehicle Code section 10501, the more specific statute, which 

prohibited the filing of a false “report,” would necessarily or commonly violate section 

115, the more general statute, which prohibited the filing of a false “instrument.” 

(Murphy, at p. 89.) The court concluded that regardless of the precise definition and 

formality of an “instrument,” the filing of a false vehicle theft report in violation of 

Vehicle Code section 10501 would commonly result in a violation of Penal Code 

section 115. Accordingly, the court, applying the Williamson rule, inferred that “the 

 

3 Consistent with this additional concealment requirement, another subdivision of 

section 25400, subdivision (b), states that a person’s carrying of a firearm openly in a belt 

holster is not a violation of section 25400’s prohibition against carrying a concealed 

firearm. 
5

Legislature, in specifying that such conduct constitutes a misdemeanor, intended to create 

an exception to the felony punishment specified in the more general statute.” (Murphy, at 

pp. 94–95.)

Here, it is not necessarily the case that section 29610 is the specific statute and 

section 25400, subdivision (a) the general one. Each addresses specific subject matter, as 

indicated by the headings under which it is placed in the Penal Code.

4

 Section 29610 is 

contained in a Penal Code article and chapter about a specific subject, i.e., minors’

possession of handguns. It is within Division 9, entitled “Special Firearm Rules Relating 

to Particular Persons,” which is within Title 4 (“Firearms”) of Part 6 (“Control of Deadly 

Weapons”) of the Penal Code. Title 4 also contains section 25400. Section 25400 also is 

in a division devoted to a more specific subject, “Carrying Firearms,” and within a 

chapter and article that are about carrying a concealed firearm. 

Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that, as Charles argues,

section 29610 is the more specific statute, the conduct prohibited by that statute and the 

conduct prohibited by section 25400 are not the same. The “possession” of a firearm by 

a minor that is prohibited by section 29610 could result in a violation of the prohibition 

against a person carrying a concealed firearm contained in section 25400, 

subdivision (a)(2), but we cannot say it would commonly do so. This is in part because

possession is far broader than carrying. To “possess” a firearm means “having ‘ “ ‘actual 

control, care and management of’ ” ’ ” the firearm. (People v. Hurtado (1996) 

47 Cal.App.4th 805, 810, fn. 4, quoting approvingly People v. Mijares (1971) 6 Cal.3d 

415, 420; see also People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1186 [quoting Mijares].) 

Possession may be actual or constructive. (People v. Peña (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1078, 

1083–1084.) It does not require that a person be armed or that the weapon to be within a 

person’s immediate vicinity. (Id. at p. 1084 [possession “does not mean the weapon must 

 

4

 “ ‘The policy sought to be implemented [by a statute] should be respected 

[citation], and to this end, titles of acts, headnotes, and chapter and section headings may 

properly be considered in determining legislative intent.’ ” (People v. Romanowski 

(2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 912, quoting Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 

489.) 
6

be carried on the defendant’s person”]; People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, 

1030 [“firearm can be under a person’s dominion and control without it being available 

for use”; “possessing a firearm does not necessarily constitute being armed with a 

firearm”].) Rather, it encompasses having a weapon in one’s bedroom or home or 

another location under his or her control, even when the individual is not present at the 

location. (See, e.g., In re Carleisha P. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 912, 915, 918 [weapon 

and ammunition found in juvenile’s bedroom]; In re Ricardo A. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 

1190, 1192 [same]; In re Jeremy G. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 553, 554–555 [weapons and 

ammunition found at minor’s residence]; In re Arcenio V. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 613, 

615 [guns found inside utility cabinet]; In re Christopher K. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 853, 

855 [pistol in nightstand drawer in motel room].) To “carry,” on the other hand, as 

required by section 25400, requires something more specific. As noted by one court, it 

means “ ‘to convey, or transport . . . ;’ and ‘to transfer from one place . . . to another.’ ” 

(People v. Overturf (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 6, quoting Webster’s New Internat. 

Dict., Second Edition, p. 412.)5 Notably, the Overturf court compared “carrying” to 

“having,” the latter relating to “an ‘act or state of possessing,’ ” and concluded that there 

was “a distinct difference in the two concepts.” (Ibid., italics added.) 

Another important difference in the conduct required by the two statutes concerns 

concealment. Possession under section 29610 does not require concealment, whereas 

carrying under section 25400 does. To be sure, possession charges may be based on an 

act that would also constitute carrying, but the crime of possession reaches a considerably

broader range of conduct than that of carrying a concealed weapon.

Not only do sections 29610 and 25400 address different conduct, subdivision (a) 

address different purposes. In People v. Harrison (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 115 (Harrison), 

the court considered whether, under section 654, an individual could be punished both for 

 

5

 More recently, “carry” has been defined as “to take or support from one place to 

another; convey; transport,” “to wear, hold, or have around one,” or “to contain or be 

capable of containing; hold.” (<http://www.dictionary.com/browse/carry [as of August 

24, 2017>].) 
7

violating a statute that prohibited ex-felons from “possessing” a firearm and for 

simultaneously violating a statute that prohibited “carrying” a loaded firearm in a vehicle 

or on a public street. (Harrison, at pp. 121–122.) In analyzing that issue, the court 

focused on the difference in the conduct proscribed by the two statutes and the different

purposes served by them. Former section 12021 applied to “a person previously 

convicted of a felony and who own[ed] or ha[d] custody, control or possession of a 

concealable firearm, loaded or unloaded and whether in a vehicle or not.”6 (Harrison, at 

p. 122.) Former section 12031 applied “to any person and to any firearm, concealable or 

not, but only if it [was] loaded and he carrie[d] it either on his person or in a vehicle. 

Neither ownership, possession, custody or control is a statutory element in the unlawful 

carrying of a loaded firearm in a vehicle.” (Ibid.) Regarding the purposes of the two 

statutes, the Harrison court observed: “[Former sections 12021 and 12031] strike at 

different things. One is the hazard of permitting ex-felons to have concealable firearms, 

loaded or unloaded; the risk to public safety derives from the type of person involved. 

The other strikes at the hazard arising when any person carries a loaded firearm in public. 

Here, the mere fact the weapon is loaded is hazardous, irrespective of the person (except 

those persons specifically exempted) carrying it.” (Ibid.)7 

 

6

 A successor statute to section 12021, section 29800, which similarly prohibits a 

person convicted of a felony from owning, purchasing, receiving or possessing a firearm, 

is in Division 9 of Title 4 of Part 6 of the Penal Code, the same division as section 29610, 

which division is entitled, “Special Firearm Rules Relating to Particular Persons.” 

7

See also People v. Blakely (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1057, distinguishing 

“mere possession” of a firearm from being armed or using a firearm for purposes of 

eligibility for resentencing under Proposition 36, noting: “ ‘[T]he threat presented by a 

firearm increases in direct proportion to its accessibility. Obviously, a firearm that is 

available for use as a weapon creates the very real danger it will be used.’ [Citation.] 

The same cannot necessarily be said about a firearm that is merely under the dominion 

and control of a person previously convicted of a felony. For instance, a firearm passed 

down through family members and currently kept in a safe deposit box by a convicted 

felon would be under his or her dominion and control, but would present little or no real 

danger.”
8

Our Supreme Court later disapproved of Harrison’s holding that section 654 did 

not preclude punishments under both of two statutes the defendant violated by the same 

act. (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 360 (Jones); see Harrison, supra, 

1 Cal.App.3d at pp. 118–119 [indicating the punishments in that case were based on one 

act, defendant’s having a revolver in a vehicle that police found protruding from a seat 

during a traffic stop].) However, the Supreme Court did not reject the Harrison court’s 

conclusion that carrying and possessing a firearm are two distinct crimes. Specifically, in 

weighing the arguments for and against prohibiting double punishment under section 654,

the Supreme Court stated, “Additionally, former section 12021 criminalized possessing 

the firearm, while former section[] . . . 12031 criminalized carrying it. But under the 

facts of this case, the possession and the carrying were the same act, not two separate 

acts.” (Jones, at p. 359.) Notably, in both Jones and Harrison, the defendants were 

convicted of both crimes of possession and crimes of carrying, and in neither did the

court imply the conviction on both counts posed a conflict in the statutes or any other 

problem. (See Jones, at pp. 352, 353–360; Harrison, at pp. 117–118, 121–122.) 

Moreover, it appears fairly common for defendants to be convicted of both carrying and 

possession charges in other contexts. (See, e.g., People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 

1230 [approving multiple convictions of defendant on three separate weapons offenses 

arising out of same conduct: “possessing a firearm by a felon, carrying a concealed 

firearm, and carrying a loaded firearm in a public space”]; People v. Padilla (2002) 

98 Cal.App.4th 127, 131, 137–139 [affirming convictions of possession of firearm by 

convicted felon and carrying concealed firearm in vehicle].) 

These cases reflect that possession under section 29610 and carrying under 

section 25400, subdivision (a)(2) are separate offenses, that the two sections serve 

different purposes and that where an adult defendant violates both statutes even by the 

same act or course of conduct, he may be convicted of both violations.

8

 Under these 

 

8

 Charles also argues that the reasoning of another “special statute preemption” 

case involving sections 29610 and 25400, In re M.G. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1268, 

“squarely applies here.” The case is inapposite and does not merit further discussion for 
9

circumstances, we cannot conclude that the Legislature necessarily or even likely 

intended by enacting section 29610 to preclude prosecution of a juvenile under 

section 25400, subdivision (a)(2). (See Murphy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 87.) 

Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in finding Charles violated both statutes. 

In light of this conclusion, we do not address the other arguments by the parties regarding 

whether section 29610 is a special statute that preempts section 25400.

II.

There Is Not Substantial Evidence That Charles Violated Section 148.

Charles also argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that he violated 

section 148 by willfully resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer in the officer’s 

performance of his duties. Specifically, Charles contends there is not substantial

evidence that he “clearly knew that [Officer] Berkley sought to detain him.” We agree.

A. The Proceedings Below

We summarize the pertinent evidence presented, and the juvenile court’s ruling

made, in the course of the August 2016 contested jurisdictional hearing.

1. Officer England’s Account

Michael England, a police officer with the City of Oakley, testified that he was on 

duty in full uniform at approximately 3:22 p.m. on August 4, 2015, in the area of the 

parking lot of the Oakley Main Street police station. There, a man named Guillermo 

flagged him down and told him that a woman had approached him and said her home had 

just been burglarized. Guillermo drove her up the street so she could retrieve her 

property. When Guillermo approached an intersection on Main Street, the woman got 

out of the car, pointed to two individuals in the city park and said they had burglarized 

her. Guillermo then drove to the Main Street police station. Guillermo, as he was talking 

to England, pointed out two individuals walking on a Main Street sidewalk and said they 

 

a simple reason: it resolved a sentencing issue regarding the application of sections 

29610 and 25400, subdivision (c)(4), both of which dealt with “possession” (and not 

subdivision (a)(2), the provision at issue here). (In re M.G., at pp. 1275–1278.) The 

difference between a person carrying a concealed weapon and a minor possessing a 

firearm was not at issue in the case. (Ibid.) 
10

were the individuals the woman had pointed out. The two individuals were wearing gray 

shirts, dark-colored jeans and backpacks, and were not doing anything out of the 

ordinary. England identified Charles as one of them. 

England further testified that he radioed to other Oakley police officers about the 

incident. He then drove to within 30 yards of the two individuals in a marked patrol car, 

at which time the two ran into a restaurant. England then heard on his radio that another 

officer had apprehended one of the individuals near the restaurant. England drove across 

Main Street to the restaurant, where Oakley Police Officer Logan Cartwright handed him 

a green backpack with a revolver in it. 

England also testified that the Main Street police station had a large parking lot in 

front of it and was located across the street from a shopping center that contained the 

restaurant, a grocery store, and various other stores and restaurants. There was a parking 

lot area for customers around these stores.

2. Officer Berkley’s Account

When England made his radio call, Oakley Police Officer Curtis Berkley was on 

duty, in uniform, inside the Main Street police station. Berkley looked out the window 

and saw two individuals slowly jog across Main Street, one of whom he identified at the 

hearing as Charles. The other individual had on a blue backpack. Berkley drove his 

police car across the street towards the restaurant there. He saw the other individual was 

detained, but Charles was not. Berkley drove around to the rear of the grocery store next 

to the restaurant. He saw Charles, without his backpack, look at him and jump over a 

fence. Other officers later detained Charles. 

3. Officer Cartwright’s Account

Oakley Police Officer Logan Cartwright testified that he was on duty on August 4, 

2015. He was dispatched to the shopping center across from the Main Street police 

station to assist in a residential burglary investigation, where he observed that Charles

and another individual were detained. Based on what officers told him, he searched the 

parking lot area for a green backpack with cartoon characters on it. He found a green 

backpack with Ninja Turtles on it in bushes by a dumpster in the parking lot area behind 
11

the restaurant. A .22-caliber revolver, some paperwork and clothing were in the 

backpack. Cartwright gave the backpack and its contents to England.

4. The Juvenile Court’s Ruling

The juvenile court found the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Charles had committed the acts alleged in all three petition counts—he had been in 

possession of a firearm as a minor, carried a concealed firearm on his person, and 

willfully resisted, delayed or obstructed a peace officer in the performance of the officer’s 

duties. Regarding the last count, the court found that Charles did not flee from England, 

but did knowingly flee from Berkley because he turned, saw Berkley and then jumped 

over the fence by the grocery store.

9

B. Relevant Legal Standards

To establish a person has willfully resisted, delayed or obstructed a peace officer 

in the performance of the officer’s duties, the People must prove (1) the person willfully 

resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer; (2) when the officer was engaged in the 

performance of his or her duties; and (3) the person knew or reasonably should have 

known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her 

duties. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329 

(Muhammed C.).) Physical resistance, hiding, or running away from a police officer, as 

well as refusing an officer’s repeated requests, can constitute a violation of section 148. 

(Muhammed C., at pp. 1329–1330.) 

We review the juvenile court’s decision for substantial evidence of evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Charles violated section 148. (See People v. Jennings 

(2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638.) “Reasonable doubt is . . . ‘ . . . is not a mere possible doubt; 

 

9

 The court also rejected Charles’s contention that he was unlawfully detained, 

ruling that Guillermo’s information, Charles’s fleeing and his discarding of the backpack 

provided sufficient reason to detain him. Charles argues the court erred, and that his 

flight from Berkley was not a basis for arresting him under section 148 because Berkley 

lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him at the time. We do not further address this 

argument in light of our conclusion that there was not substantial evidence that Charles 

violated section 148. 
12

because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. 

It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the 

evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an 

abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.’ ” (§ 1096.)

“Substantial evidence” means “ ‘evidence that “reasonably inspires confidence 

and is of ‘solid value.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34.) “In reviewing 

a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. We 

review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine 

whether it discloses sufficient evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, 

and of solid value—supporting the decision, and not whether the evidence proves guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate 

the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] We presume in support of the judgment the 

existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] 

If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of 

the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be 

reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 638–

639.)

C. Analysis

The parties appropriately focus their attention on whether there is sufficient 

evidence to establish the first element of a section 148 violation—that Charles willfully 

resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer in the performance of that officer’s duties

and, specifically, whether, as the juvenile court found, Charles resisted Berkley’s effort to 

detain him. The inquiry centers on Berkley’s testimony. He testified that he drove his 

police car past where the other individual was being detained by a restaurant to the 

parking lot behind the grocery store next door, where he saw Charles look at him and 

jump over a fence. There was other testimony that Charles was seen earlier wearing a 
13

green backpack and that a green backpack was recovered from a dumpster in the parking 

lot area behind the restaurant, inside of which was a .22-caliber revolver. 

The parties interpret this evidence very differently. Charles asserts that Berkley’s 

testimony is devoid of substantial evidence of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Charles had reason to believe Berkley sought to detain him. 

The People argue that Charles’s claim has no merit because “[n]umerous officers 

responded to Officer England’s report regarding the burglary suspects,” and Charles’s 

“flight from the officers and abandonment of his backpack demonstrates his knowledge 

that they sought to detain him,” as does his climbing over a fence when Berkley, dressed

in a police uniform, spotted him. According to the People, Charles’s “actions clearly 

demonstrate his awareness that the officer sought to detain him. Officer Berkley was not 

required to issue verbal commands to [Charles] in the course of the pursuit. In these 

circumstances, [Charles’s] conduct evidenced defiance in the face of the officers’ readily 

apparent desire to talk to him. The record thus establishes that [Charles] knew or should 

have known that Officer Berkley was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his 

duties. (Muhammed C., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1329–1330.) Because a rational 

factfinder could conclude that each of the elements of section 148 had been met here, 

[Charles’s] adjudication should be affirmed.” 

We agree with Charles. Although the People contend that Berkley was “chasing” 

Charles in the parking lot and that Charles jumped over the fence “to escape 

apprehension,” they cite no evidence to support these specific contentions, and we have 

not found any in the record. Nothing in the record suggests that Berkley “chased” 

Charles, said anything to Charles, such as ordering Charles to stop, or flashed his lights, 

sounded a horn or siren, drove particularly fast or close to Charles or otherwise acted so 

as to indicate he wanted to detain Charles. 

It can be reasonably inferred from the record that Charles abandoned a green 

backpack with a loaded firearm in it behind a dumpster by the restaurant and sometime 

later jumped over a fence behind the grocery store when he saw Berkley in his police car. 

This evidence is not substantial evidence of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that 
14

Charles willfully resisted Berkley’s efforts to stop him. A person who seeks to evade 

police detection does not violate section 148 unless he or she also “willfully resist[ed], 

delay[ed], or obstruct[ed] a peace officer.” (§ 148, subd. (a)(1).) Though Charles’s 

actions may have been suspicious in nature, the juvenile court could not reasonably infer

from Charles’s abandonment of his backpack that he knew the police were after him. His 

conduct is just as consistent with a general desire to avoid detection. Individuals in the 

vicinity of police, including those in possession of potentially incriminating items on 

their person, are free to go about their business until they understand police are intending 

to stop them. Charles did not violate section 148 by jogging across the street, abandoning

his backpack or jumping a fence to avoid the police unless he knew, or reasonably should 

have known, the police were pursuing him. The burden was on the People to establish 

this was the case in the juvenile court below. It did not do so. 

There is evidence that Charles’s companion was detained outside the restaurant. 

However, there is no evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that Charles was 

with that individual when detention occurred, knew about it or knew police were in the 

vicinity of the restaurant for the purpose of detaining Charles. Charles and his 

companion were seen together going into the restaurant; they could have just as easily 

split up as stayed together after that point and it is speculation to suggest they did one or 

the other. 

There is other evidence to consider in determining whether substantial evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s ruling. Specifically, earlier in the incident, another officer, 

England, drove his police car within 30 yards of Charles and his companion when they 

either ran (England’s account) or slowly jogged (Berkley’s account) into the restaurant. 

The juvenile court correctly concluded this was insufficient evidence to support a 

section 148 violation. We conclude that no rational fact finder could conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt from this evidence that Charles knew England wanted to stop him, 

particularly when all were in the vicinity of a police station, where one would expect to 

see police cars. 
15

Under these circumstances, the paucity of evidence that Berkley took direct action 

to stop Charles by the fence behind the grocery store is fatal. This is far different from 

the evidence offered in Muhammed C., relied on by the People. There, the police arrested 

defendant for willfully delaying the officers’ performance of their duties when defendant 

continued to speak to a suspect in the back seat of a police car after police ordered him 

away. (Muhammed C., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) Such direct police action is 

lacking in the present case.

In short, there is not substantial evidence of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt

that Charles knew police wanted to stop him and therefore, we must reverse the court’s 

sustaining of the petition allegation that Charles violated section 148, subdivision (a)(1).

DISPOSITION

We reverse the juvenile court’s ruling that Charles violated section 148, 

subdivision (a)(1). The court’s jurisdictional ruling is otherwise affirmed. The court’s 

disposition order is vacated and this matter remanded to the juvenile court for a new 

disposition order that is consistent with this opinion.

STEWART, J.

We concur.

KLINE, P.J.

RICHMAN, J.

In re Charles G. (A149593)
16

Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. John T. Laettner

Counsel: 

Jamie M. Weyand, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, 

Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, Joan Killeen and Amit Kurlekar, Deputy Attorneys General for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.