IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

VERA MARIE HAMILTON,

Appellant.

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No. 36837-8-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SIDDOWAY, A.C.J. — Vera Hamilton was convicted following a jury trial of 

rendering criminal assistance, making false or misleading statements to a public servant, 

possession of a stolen firearm, and third degree possession of stolen property. She 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support each charge. In a pro se statement 

of additional grounds (SAG), she raises over 20 additional issues. 

Because the evidence was sufficient and her SAG presents no error or abuse of 

discretion, we affirm.

FILED

AUGUST 5, 2021

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

2

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Late in the afternoon of November 20, 2018, Ferry County Deputy Sheriff 

Matthew Kersten was on patrol and responded to a report of a fight in progress at Vera 

Hamilton’s rural property. Deputy Kersten stopped his car outside the property’s gate 

when he saw someone running from the scene whom he believed might have been 

involved in the fight. He briefly gave chase to the fleeing individual, but the individual 

did not stop. The deputy abandoned the chase when he heard people yelling from the 

Hamilton property, “[H]e’s over here and he’s getting in your vehicle.” Report of 

Proceedings (RP) at 299. As Deputy Kersten returned to secure his patrol car, he heard 

gun shots coming from the direction of the individual who fled. 

Deputy Kersten found a beaten, bloodied victim of the fight, Todd Griffith, 

standing by the closed passenger side door of his patrol car. The deputy drew his weapon 

and told Mr. Griffith to show his hands. Mr. Griffith complied, and Deputy Kersten 

handcuffed him and put him in the police car for safety before questioning members of 

Vera Hamilton’s family who were standing nearby. 

Present in the front yard were Ms. Hamilton, her 17-year-old daughter, “Delilah,”

and her 14-year-old son, “Porter.”

1

 By this time, Sergeant Talon Venturo had arrived and

 

1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the teens’ identity, consistent with a general 

order of this court. See Gen. Order of Division III, In re the Use of Initials or 

Pseudonyms for Child Victims or Child Witnesses (Wash. Ct. App. June 18, 2012), 

https//www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/?fa=atc.genorders & div=III.
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

3

he joined as Deputy Kersten questioned them. Deputy Kersten asked the Hamiltons,

“[W]ho did this to this man?” RP at 564. Ms. Hamilton and Delilah told the officers the 

fight had been between Mr. Griffith and his friend. Ms. Hamilton told Deputy Kersten 

that Mr. Griffith had made rude sexual comments to Porter. Delilah told the deputy that 

Mr. Griffith had kicked her. She said she was not injured, and the deputy saw no sign she 

had been injured. Ms. Hamilton told Deputy Kersten that the man who ran away had

“saved [them],” which the deputy understood to mean saved them from Mr. Griffith’s

objectionable statements and kicking. RP at 470-71.

Ms. Hamilton said that before the fight Mr. Griffith and his friend had been 

shooting a firearm. Deputy Kersten asked where the gun was and Ms. Hamilton said, 

“[H]e has it,” pointing in the direction of the individual, now identified as Mr. Griffith’s 

friend, who had fled. RP at 392. When the deputy asked for the identity of the friend, 

Ms. Hamilton said she didn’t know his name. She said she had heard him referred to as 

Shane or Shawn. Porter would later testify that his mother gave the deputy two other 

possible names: Michael, and another, which he was “pretty sure . . . was either Cameron 

or Jesse.” RP at 565.

In fact, the individual who had been shooting with Mr. Griffith and then assaulted 

him, causing his injuries, was Shane Malotte, Delilah’s boyfriend, who Porter would later 

admit had been living with Delilah at Ms. Hamilton’s home for a month. Porter believed 

that the boyfriend might go by Shawn (he thought that was Mr. Malotte’s brother’s or 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

4

dad’s name) but he and everyone else in the family always referred to him as Shane. 

Porter testified that the boyfriend never went by Michael, Cameron or Jesse. 

Porter would also later testify to a brutal beating of Mr. Griffith by Mr. Malotte 

that ended when Deputy Kersten’s patrol car was seen approaching. At that point, Mr. 

Malotte took the gun they had been shooting—an SKS assault rifle that belonged to Mr. 

Griffith’s grandmother—and ran. Porter testified that he and Delilah also told Deputy 

Kersten that the fleeing man was Mr. Griffith’s friend, whose name they did not know. 

Porter admitted that in truth, they all knew Shane’s first name, but did not provide it

“because Shane asked s [sic] not to say anything.” RP at 566. 

Deputy Kersten asked Ms. Hamilton if she knew where Mr. Griffith’s friend lived. 

She said it might be at Mr. Griffith’s home. 

Deputy Kersten spoke to the three Hamilton family members for 20 or 30 minutes. 

He left written statement forms with Ms. Hamilton, telling her that statements would be 

important to his investigation. 

Deputy Kersten and Sergeant Venturo also spoke with Mr. Griffith, trying to get 

an identification of the person who fled the scene, but he was in poor condition and did 

not say. Sergeant Venturo described Mr. Griffith as “out of it” and not wanting to talk 

about anything. RP at 489. Mr. Griffith’s eyes were swollen shut, his lip was lacerated, 

there were multiple contusions on the back of his head, and his face, hands, and shirt 

were covered in blood. 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

5

After leaving Ms. Hamilton’s property, Deputy Kersten, Sergeant Venturo, and 

Deputy Christine Clark, who arrived late and had taken a position of cover outside the 

fence, traveled to the Griffith residence, acting on Ms. Hamilton’s information that the 

man who fled could be there. They decided against approaching the home because it was 

dark and the fleeing man had an assault rifle—circumstances that called for more support. 

Also, Mr. Griffith was still in their custody, and they did not usually expose civilians to 

that kind of risk. 

Mr. Griffith had refused offers to summon or take him for medical care, so the 

officers took him to the county jail to process his arrest for fourth degree assault, for 

allegedly kicking Delilah. Given his injuries, the jail would not accept him, so the 

officers took him to the hospital, “un-arrested him,” and told him they would be in 

contact. RP at 492. 

Thereafter, Deputy Kersten used social media in an effort to find a “Shane” or 

“Shawn” that might be the person who shot at him. On Facebook, he found a “Shane 

Malotte” who was a member of a local Ferry County page and was friends with, or had 

friends in common with, Ms. Hamilton and Delilah. Mr. Malotte had a shaved head and 

his Facebook posts contained Nazi symbolism. After learning that Mr. Malotte had 

previously been arrested, Deputy Kersten obtained a mugshot and included it in a photo 

array that he presented to Mr. Griffith. Mr. Griffith identified Mr. Malotte as the person 

who assaulted him. 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

6

Several days later, on November 25, Ms. Hamilton called 911 to report a trespass: 

that Mr. Griffith had returned to her property to try to get his truck, which had been left 

behind when he was taken to the hospital following the assault. Ms. Hamilton told the 

911 operator that Mr. Griffith was accompanied by a man who “look[ed] exactly like the 

person who had shot at [the deputy].” RP at 325. Deputy Kersten and Sergeant Venturo

responded to the call. Mr. Griffith and his companion had left by the time they arrived. 

They spoke with Ms. Hamilton, who repeated that the man who was with Mr. Griffith 

“matched the exact description” of the shooter. RP at 326. She told the officers she was 

“terrified” on seeing Mr. Griffith and his companion, and believed she had seen the flash 

of a gun out the window as they drove away. Id.

By this time, as Porter would later admit and testify at trial, Mr. Malotte was back 

in the Hamilton home. According to Porter, Mr. Malotte had returned sometime between 

midnight on the night of the assault and 4:00 the next morning. 

During the November 25 contact, Deputy Kersten again asked Ms. Hamilton what 

she knew about the shooter, telling her it was “critical because he had shot at me and 

because he had beat up Todd. I mean he had assaulted Todd in a pretty significant way.” 

RP at 327. Ms. Hamilton again told the officers that all she knew was that the man was 

Mr. Griffith’s friend. That day and the next, Deputy Kersten asked Ms. Hamilton if the 

written statements he had requested were completed, and both times she said they were 

not. 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

7

That same day, Mr. Griffith reported to police that personal property was missing 

from his truck. He traveled to the police station the next day to provide a statement. 

Deputy Kersten relied on Mr. Griffith’s stolen property report to obtain a warrant 

to search Ms. Hamilton’s residence for the missing items. Deputy Kersten and several 

other officers executed the warrant on November 29. Mr. Griffith had reported that 

among property missing from his truck were a snatch block, come-along, some tie straps

and the SKS assault rifle. In executing the warrant at the Hamilton home, Deputy 

Kersten found the SKS rifle “right at the top of the stairs.” RP at 332. He would later 

testify that “[t]here was a little banister and right around the corner of the banister it was 

lying on the ground,” on top of a pile of clothing. RP at 332. The rifle’s stock was 

emblazoned with a swastika and the words “skin head.” RP at 341. 

A double-doored storage area was built into the front of Ms. Hamilton’s house. 

On the day of the search, its doors were open. Inside it officers found a snatch block and 

come-along hung on a water tank. Yellow straps of the type reported stolen were found 

on the ground. According to Deputy Kersten, anyone who walked up to the front side of 

the house could have seen these items. Mr. Griffith later identified the stolen straps, 

snatch block, and come-along as his. He and his grandmother identified the rifle as the 

grandmother’s, although the swastika and “skin head” markings were new. 

No one had been at the Hamilton home when officers arrived to execute the search 

warrant. After completing the search, they learned that a quad (an all-terrain vehicle) that 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

8

Ms. Hamilton and Porter were known to drive was parked near the highway. They 

located the quad at an intersection that serves as a community resources bus stop. While

they were there, a bus stopped as if to let someone off, but then left without anyone 

disembarking. Deputy Kersten stopped the bus, found that Delilah and Mr. Malotte were 

on board, and arrested them. Mr. Malotte, Delilah and Ms. Hamilton all later faced 

charges. 

The State originally charged Ms. Hamilton with first degree assault as principal or 

accomplice, as well as making false or misleading statements to a public servant, first 

degree rendering criminal assistance, possessing a stolen firearm, and third degree 

possessing stolen property. It dropped the assault charge before trial. Its amended 

information stated that the false or misleading statements to a public servant were alleged 

to have been made on November 20. It stated that the rendering criminal assistance was 

alleged to have occurred on or about November 25.

At Ms. Hamilton’s trial, the State offered testimony from Mr. Griffith, Porter, 

Deputy Kersten, Sergeant Venturo, Deputy Clark and a 911 operator. They testified 

consistently with the facts recounted above. 

Mr. Griffith provided detailed testimony about the events of the afternoon of 

November 20. He testified he had been drinking that day and drove to Ms. Hamilton’s 

house midafternoon because he was bored. He took a bottle of alcohol with him. He 

testified that he visited outside with Ms. Hamilton, Delilah, Mr. Malotte and Porter, and 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

9

he and Mr. Malotte had a drink. He testified that he had met Mr. Malotte only once

before, when he and Mr. Malotte accompanied Ms. Hamilton on a drive to a smoke shop 

for cigarettes and “dinked around . . . for a little while” before Mr. Griffith was dropped 

off to walk home. RP at 199. As the group visited outside Ms. Hamilton’s home on 

November 20, Mr. Griffith mentioned that he had his grandmother’s SKS assault rifle in 

his truck. Everyone but Ms. Hamilton took a turn shooting it. 

After shooting, they continued visiting and drinking. Mr. Griffith, who described 

himself as having a “crude sense of humor,” recalls making a joke about kicking Delilah

in the stomach when someone said she might be pregnant, and recalls “nudg[ing] her” 

with his foot. RP at 210, 245. He also joked about Porter “blow[ing]” a man for money

and might have grabbed Porter’s head and shoved it into his crotch. He recalled Ms. 

Hamilton “freaking out” and yelling at him not to talk to people like that. RP at 213-14. 

His recollection of how it went from that to what he referred to as “lights out” was 

poor. RP at 213. He recalls being on the ground and trying to get up and “[t]hey were 

telling me to lay, you know, get down on the ground, you know, kicking me in the face 

and hitting me in the head with the butt of the gun telling me to stay down.” Id. He 

knew they were hitting him with the gun because he could hear the “clinging” of the bolt, 

which made a distinct sound. RP at 215. Mr. Griffith believed Mr. Malotte was the one

kicking him and “[h]e was the one with the gun anyways.” RP at 215. He was pretty 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

10

sure everyone was outside while this was happening. When the police arrived, Mr. 

Griffith remembered thinking “thank God.” RP at 218. 

Porter testified that he and his mother were inside when what he referred to as “the 

actual fight” began between Mr. Malotte and Mr. Griffith. RP at 555. He went outside 

three or four times during their fight. At first, he testified, Mr. Malotte was punching Mr. 

Griffith, “and then he started kicking and when he was kicking he had steel toed boots 

on.” RP at 559. Porter testified he was going out “to make sure like [Mr. Malotte]

wasn’t about to kill him because I was like really scared for T.J.” RP at 558. (Mr. 

Griffith went by “T.J.” as well as “Todd.”) Porter testified that Ms. Hamilton was 

outside for part of the fight and Delilah was outside for most of it. Eventually, Ms. 

Hamilton called the police and Delilah talked to them.

Porter testified that he was not sure whether Mr. Malotte had the Griffith rifle 

when he returned to the house the night he assaulted Mr. Griffith and fled. But he saw 

it in Mr. Malotte’s possession the next day. He testified that Mr. Malotte bought 

ammunition for the rifle and “was always messing with it, upstairs and downstairs.” 

RP at 707. According to Porter, Mr. Malotte mostly kept the rifle upstairs; when he had 

it downstairs, it was in his hands. Porter did not trust Mr. Malotte with the gun and knew 

he should not have it. 

Porter never handled the gun and he had seen Delilah hold only the clip. When 

asked at trial if he had seen his mother holding the gun after November 20, Porter 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

11

answered, “Not that I remember.” RP at 702. Asked if he had told a defense investigator 

that he saw his mother hold the gun, he said he did not recall that either. After listening 

to a recording of his interview by that investigator outside the presence of the jury, 

however, Porter testified that he now recalled that he told the investigator he saw his 

mother hold the gun and hand it to Mr. Malotte sometime after November 20—but he 

could still not recall his mother doing that. 

Porter testified that Mr. Griffith’s truck stayed outside their house for a few days 

and Mr. Malotte went into it; Porter was pretty sure Delilah did too. He testified that Ms. 

Hamilton knew Delilah and Mr. Malotte had gone through the truck. Porter was aware 

straps were missing from Mr. Griffith’s truck and saw some in the house, although he 

was not sure if they were Mr. Griffith’s. 

Porter described the layout of the upstairs of Ms. Hamilton’s home, where 

everyone slept. He and Ms. Hamilton each had a bedroom. Neither bedroom had a door. 

The area outside their rooms was described as a loft, and was where Delilah and Mr. 

Malotte slept. Porter acknowledged that to get to his own room and Ms. Hamilton’s, one 

had to walk through that area.

Porter testified that the clothes the assault rifle was found on during execution of 

the search warrant were his. He was surprised when he saw the officer’s picture of where 

the rifle was found, which he agreed was in the area of the loft near his door. While the 

rifle was often left in the loft, he testified it was usually closer to where Delilah and 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

12

Shane slept. He testified that everyone who lived in the house had access to the entire 

house and no areas were locked or off limits. Porter said they “always went in each 

other’s rooms.” RP at 548.

Porter testified that his mother’s home was located on 10 acres and the family had

chickens, two cows, two goats, two rabbits, and dogs. Everyone helped take care of the 

animals. Water tanks were located in the double-doored storage area. Some were for 

drinking and eating and others were for watering the animals. The animals had to be 

given water every day. 

Ms. Hamilton did not call any witnesses. 

The jury found Ms. Hamilton guilty as charged. A motion to arrest judgment on 

the third and fourth charges on the basis of insufficient evidence was denied. Ms. 

Hamilton appeals. 

ANALYSIS

Ms. Hamilton’s assignments of error challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support her four convictions.

Due process requires the State to prove all elements of a crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. State v. Washington, 135 Wn. App. 42, 48, 143 P.3d 606 (2006). The 

test for sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). All 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

13

reasonable inferences from the evidence are drawn in favor of the State and are 

interpreted most strongly against the defendant. Id. “Credibility determinations are for 

the trier of fact and are not subject to review.” State v. Mines, 163 Wn.2d 387, 391, 179 

P.3d 835 (2008). 

We address Ms. Hamilton’s assignments of error in the order presented.

I. FIRST DEGREE RENDERING CRIMINAL ASSISTANCE

Ms. Hamilton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction 

for first degree rendering criminal assistance on two grounds: first, that the State did not 

present substantial evidence that she knew Mr. Malotte had committed or was being 

sought for first degree assault; and second, that the only evidence of her assistance 

advanced by the State was not evidence of an affirmative act or statement.

A. Substantial evidence supports the essential element that Ms. 

Hamilton knew that Mr. Malotte committed or was being sought for 

the crime of assault

The Washington Criminal Code recognizes three degrees of the crime of rendering 

criminal assistance. As relevant here, it defines “renders criminal assistance” as

comprising six types of assistance rendered “with intent to prevent, hinder, or delay the 

apprehension or prosecution of another person” who the accused “knows has committed 

a crime . . . or is being sought by law enforcement officials for the commission of a 

crime.” RCW 9A.76.050 (emphasis added). By the statute’s plain language, the 

knowledge required to constitute rendering criminal assistance is knowledge of the 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

14

assisted person’s commission of “a crime” or that the assisted person is being sought for 

commission of “a crime.”

The seriousness of the crime the assisted person has committed dictates whether a 

defendant’s assistance is first, second, or third degree rendering criminal assistance. 

RCW 9A.76.070(1) provides that “[a] person is guilty of rendering criminal assistance in 

the first degree if he or she renders criminal assistance to a person who has committed or 

is being sought for murder in the first degree or any class A felony or equivalent juvenile 

offense.” By this statute’s plain language, it does not require the State to prove that the 

defendant knew the person being assisted had committed or was being sought for, e.g., a 

class A felony.

For purposes of instructing the jury in this case on the knowledge element of first 

degree rendering criminal assistance, the State cited State v. Anderson, 63 Wn. App. 257,

818 P.2d 40 (1991), for the proposition that Ms. Hamilton need not know of the degree of 

assault that Mr. Malotte committed or for which he was wanted, but only that it was

assault. Defense counsel persuaded the trial court otherwise. The court instructed the 

jury that to convict, the elements that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt

included:

(1) That on or about November 25, 2018, the defendant rendered 

criminal assistance to a person;

(2) That the person had committed or was being sought for Assault 

in the First Degree; [and]
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

15

(3) That the defendant knew that the person had committed or was 

being sought for Assault in the First Degree.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 148. The State made a timely objection and took exception to the 

instruction. 

In Anderson, the defendant was convicted of first degree rendering criminal 

assistance based on evidence he drove a companion away from the scene of a robbery, 

having been told by the companion that he had just robbed a store. 63 Wn. App. at 258. 

Anderson argued on appeal that while it turned out his companion brandished an apparent 

firearm during the robbery, there was no evidence Anderson knew of the ersatz firearm or 

that it elevated the robbery to a class A felony. He argued that “a person must know that 

a class A felony has been committed before he or she can be guilty of rendering criminal 

assistance in the first degree.” Id. at 259.

This court rejected the argument and held, based on the plain language of RCW 

9A.76.050 and .070, that

a person can be convicted of rendering criminal assistance in the first 

degree if he or she knows at the time of rendering the assistance that the 

one being assisted committed robbery. We further hold that a person 

can be convicted of rendering criminal assistance in the first degree 

notwithstanding a lack of knowledge concerning facts that would disclose 

the degree of the robbery.

Anderson, 63 Wn. App. at 260.

The court analogized rendering criminal assistance to accomplice liability, 

observing, “An accomplice is liable because he or she knowingly aids the criminal 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

16

enterprise of another before the fact,” while “[o]ne who renders criminal assistance is 

liable because he or she knowingly aids the criminal enterprise of another after the fact.” 

Id. at 261. It reasoned that “[b]ecause the goal in both cases is to punish for knowingly 

aiding the criminal enterprise of another, there is no reason to require that the renderer 

have more specific knowledge than the accomplice.” Id. at 261. General knowledge of 

the crime is enough for accomplice liability, the court observed. Id. (citing State v. 

Davis, 101 Wn.2d 654, 658-59, 682 P.2d 883 (1984); and see In re Pers. Restraint of 

Sarausad, 109 Wn. App. 824, 836, 39 P.3d 308 (2001) (accomplice liability attached if 

defendant knew he was facilitating even a simple, misdemeanor-level assault).

Ms. Hamilton does not address Anderson. She takes the position that right or 

wrong, the elements instruction given in her trial is “law of the case” for the purpose of 

our sufficiency analysis. But as stated in State v. Hickman, it is “jury instructions not 

objected to become the law of the case.” 135 Wn.2d 97, 102, 954 P.2d 900 (1998) 

(emphasis added). Hickman did not explain why an objection made in the trial court 

makes a difference, but we can glean why it makes a difference from State v. Johnson, in 

which our Supreme Court considered whether the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 136 S. Ct. 709, 193 L. Ed. 2d 639 

(2016), superseded Washington’s “law of the case” doctrine. 188 Wn.2d 742, 756, 399 

P.3d 507 (2017).
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

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The United States Supreme Court held in Musacchio that when a jury instruction 

adds an element to a charged crime and the government fails to object, “a sufficiency 

challenge should be assessed against the elements of the charged crime, not against the 

erroneously heightened command in the jury instruction.” 577 U.S. at 243. This flows, 

the Court held,

from the nature of a court’s task in evaluating a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

challenge. Sufficiency review essentially addresses whether “the 

government’s case was so lacking that it should not have even been 

submitted to the jury.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16, 98 S. Ct. 

2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978) (emphasis deleted). On sufficiency review, a 

reviewing court makes a limited inquiry tailored to ensure that a defendant 

receives the minimum that due process requires: a “meaningful opportunity 

to defend” against the charge against him and a jury finding of guilt 

“beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314-315, 

99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). The reviewing court considers 

only the “legal” question “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.,

at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (emphasis in original). . . . 

A reviewing court’s limited determination on sufficiency review 

thus does not rest on how the jury was instructed. 

Id.

As Johnson explained, the aspect of Washington’s “law of the case” doctrine 

dealing with unobjected-to jury instructions falls within a category that Musacchio 

observed can constrain an appellate court’s review of a matter: doctrines such as waiver, 

forfeiture, and estoppel. 188 Wn.2d at 761 (citing Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 245).

“Specifically,” Johnson states, “the doctrine is premised on the procedural rule that 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

18

‘“before error can be claimed on the basis of a jury instruction given by the trial court, an 

appellant must first show that an exception was taken to that instruction.”’” Id. 

(emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Salas, 127 Wn.2d 173, 181, 897 P.2d 1246 (1995) 

(quoting, in turn, State v. Bailey, 114 Wn.2d 340, 345, 787 P.2d 1378 (1990))). 

Accordingly, because the State can show in Ms. Hamilton’s case that it took 

exception to the elements instruction, neither due process nor a failure to preserve error 

requires us to assess her sufficiency challenge against the instructions’ erroneously 

heightened charge. We assess it instead against the elements of the charged crime.

Ms. Hamilton acknowledges that Deputy Kersten testified he “told her he was 

looking for the person who assaulted Griffith and the person he alleged shot at him.” Br. 

of Appellant at 16. She contests only the sufficiency of evidence to prove that she knew 

Mr. Malotte committed or was being sought for a class A felony. 

The evidence of first degree rendering criminal assistance was sufficient.

B. There was sufficient evidence of affirmative acts or statements

Ms. Hamilton also contends that for a defendant to be guilty of rendering criminal 

assistance, she or he “must take affirmative acts or make affirmative statements, with the 

intent to conceal or harbor a felony offender from law enforcement.” Supp. Br. of 

Appellant at 4 (citing State v. Pringle, 147 Wash. 555, 266 P. 196 (1928) and State v. 

Budik, 173 Wn.2d 727, 272 P.3d 816 (2012)). Of the six types of assistance that can 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

19

constitute criminally rendering assistance, the jury in Ms. Hamilton’s case was instructed 

on two: that a defendant 

- harbors or conceals such person; or

- prevents or obstructs, by use of deception, anyone from performing an 

act that might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person.

CP at 146.

It is well settled that a defendant cannot be guilty of rendering criminal assistance 

if she does nothing more than falsely disavow information. In Budik, the defendant was 

charged with rendering criminal assistance. The means charged was using deception that 

prevented or obstructed performance of an act that might have aided in discovery or 

apprehension of the wanted person. While our Supreme Court acknowledged that the 

term “deception” used in RCW 9A.76.050 may literally include false disavowals, it was 

properly construed as requiring more: it “requires an affirmative act or statement.”

Budik, 173 Wn.2d at 737. It relied for this construction on the statutory treatment of 

obstructing justice as a whole, other types of assistance criminalized by the statute, the 

statute’s history, and case law from other jurisdictions interpreting the crime of serving as 

an accessory after the fact. Id. at 735-37. The court observed that this construction also 

conformed to its holding in State v. Williams, 171 Wn.2d 474, 483-84, 251 P.3d 877 

(2011), that statutes criminalizing false statements to law enforcement implicate 

constitutional guaranties of speech and privacy and must be narrowly construed. Budik, 

173 Wn.2d at 737.
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

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False disavowals can go hand in hand with affirmatively misleading statements, 

however, as illustrated by State v. Mollet, 181 Wn. App. 701, 707, 326 P.3d 851 (2014). 

Megan Mollet was the front seat passenger in a truck being driven by Joshua Blake when 

a highway patrol trooper stopped the truck just after midnight and was shot and killed by 

Blake. Id. at 703. Officers located Blake’s truck abandoned in a field of tall grass on a 

property and cleared six people from two houses on the property, one being Mollett; 

Blake had arranged to be taken elsewhere. Id. at 704. Mollet told officers she did not 

know Blake and did not know anything about anybody shooting an officer. Id. at 710. 

She told both officers that she had spent most of the prior day helping a friend move; she 

told one officer she didn’t arrive home until 1:00 a.m. and another that she arrived home 

at 11:00 p.m. but went straight to bed. Id. She was charged and convicted of first degree 

rendering criminal assistance by concealing Blake, through false statements to police. 

Id. at 704-05. 

On appeal, she relied on Budik to argue that because she only falsely disavowed 

knowledge, her conviction for rendering criminal assistance could not stand. While this 

court agreed that her statements about not knowing Blake or anything about the crime 

were mere disavowals, 

[her] false statements that she was helping a friend move that night and that 

she did not see Blake at the residence were not mere false denials of 

knowledge. Rather, they were affirmative statements that she had not been 

present at the shooting and that she had had the opportunity to observe but 

did not see anything at the Sidney Road property.
No. 36837-8-III

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Id. at 710-11.

Ms. Hamilton, too, made affirmative misrepresentations. She continually

represented to police that her connection to the man they were looking for was through 

Mr. Griffith and she believed the man lived with Mr. Griffith. On November 25, she 

reported that she was terrified because someone who looked like the friend of Mr. 

Griffith’s who shot at Deputy Kersten had returned with Mr. Griffith to her property, and 

appeared to have a firearm. Jurors could reasonably infer that her false statements were 

calculated to shield Mr. Malotte by deflecting investigation away from her family and 

property. According to Deputy Kersten, it would have “substantially” changed the 

investigation if officers had known Mr. Malotte’s true relationship with the Hamilton 

family. RP at 394. If Ms. Hamilton had denied knowing anything about the person who 

assaulted Mr. Griffith in her fenced yard, it could (indeed, likely would) be perceived as a 

refusal to cooperate and would not have deflected interest from her family and property. 

Ms. Hamilton also argues that the State’s evidence that she harbored or concealed 

Mr. Malotte fails because, as her trial lawyer argued in closing, Mr. Malotte was out in 

public between November 20 and his apprehension on November 29: he rode the 

Hamiltons’ quad to and from the community bus stop and took the bus into town to shop 

and take showers. She relies on the 1928 decision in Pringle, in which our Supreme 

Court construed the statute then in place as requiring the defendant to do some 

affirmative act “toward[ ] hiding or keeping the person he is charged with concealing 
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from the public view,” and found no evidence that the defendant in that case had tried to 

“hide or secrete” the wanted person. 147 Wash. at 558-59. As the State points out, 

however, Pringle was not applying the predecessor statute to RCW 9A.76.050—it was 

applying a different predecessor statute. In holding in Pringle that the “gist of the 

offense” it was applying “is concealment,” the Pringle court distinguished the 

predecessor to the statute we are applying. 147 Wash. at 557. It characterized the 

predecessor to RCW 9A.76.050 as “covering the question of aiding, assisting, harboring, 

or in any way other than by concealment, helping such escaped prisoner.” 147 Wash. at 

557 (emphasis added). 

“Harboring” is defined as “[t]he act of affording lodging, shelter, or refuge to a 

person, esp. a criminal or illegal alien.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 860 (11th ed. 2019). 

The State’s evidence that Ms. Hamilton was harboring Mr. Malotte was sufficient.

II. POSSESSION OF A STOLEN FIREARM

Ms. Hamilton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that she had constructive 

possession of the stolen Griffith rifle. 

“A person is guilty of possessing a stolen firearm if he or she possesses, carries, 

delivers, sells, or is in control of a stolen firearm.” RCW 9A.56.310(1). Possession can 

be actual or constructive. “Actual possession means that the goods are in the personal 

custody of the person charged with possession; whereas, constructive possession means 

that the goods are not in actual, physical possession, but that the person charged with 
No. 36837-8-III

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possession has dominion and control over the goods.” State v. Callahan, 77 Wn.2d 27, 

29, 459 P.2d 400 (1969). 

Whether a defendant had dominion and control over an item turns on the totality 

of the circumstances. State v. Alvarez, 105 Wn. App 215, 221, 19 P.3d 485 (2001). The 

fact that a defendant has dominion and control over premises where an item is found is 

relevant. State v. Echeverria, 85 Wn. App. 777, 783, 934 P.2d 1214 (1997) (possession 

of a firearm). “‘[T]he ability to reduce an object to actual possession’ is an aspect of 

dominion and control, but ‘other aspects such as physical proximity’ should be 

considered as well.” State v. Chouinard, 169 Wn. App. 895, 899, 282 P.3d 117 (2012)

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hagen, 55 Wn. App. 494, 499, 781 P.2d 892 

(1989)). Proximity alone is not sufficient to establish constructive possession, however. 

Id. (citing State v. Raleigh, 157 Wn. App. 728, 737, 238 P.3d 1211 (2010)). “And 

knowledge of the presence of contraband, without more, is insufficient to show dominion 

and control to establish constructive possession.” Id. 

In this case, evidence was presented that Ms. Hamilton possessed the premises and

after being stolen, the rifle was continually kept at her home. Porter testified that Mr. 

Malotte carried the rifle into all areas of the house; when Mr. Malotte wasn’t handling it, 

it would be “laying on the ground,” generally in the loft area where Mr. Malotte and 

Delilah slept. RP at 569. That open area was in close proximity to Ms. Hamilton’s 

bedroom, which had no door. On the day the search warrant was executed, it was even 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

24

closer to her bedroom; it was found next to a banister at the top of the stairs. The trial 

court observed when it denied a motion to arrest judgment on this count that not only was 

the rifle “in open plain view” in the home, but Ms. Hamilton “had to basically trip over it 

every day to get where she was going.” RP at 958.

Ms. Hamilton discounts the importance of her possession of the premises, pointing

to State v. Davis, in which our Supreme Court found that a homeowner, Letrecia Nelson,

did not have possession of a firearm brought into her home. 182 Wn.2d 222, 340 P.3d 

820 (2014) (plurality opinion). The visitor to Nelson’s home was an acquaintance who, 

after being injured in a confrontation with police, demanded entry into her home to get a 

change of clothing and help treating his gunshot wound, and was there for only 15 

minutes. Id. at 225, 228 (lead opinion). Justice Stephens, writing for the majority on this 

issue, observed that having dominion and control over the premises containing an item 

“does not, by itself, prove constructive possession. Id. at 234 (Stephens, J., dissenting) 

(emphasis added). 

Significant to the court’s decision that possession of the premises was not enough 

in Nelson’s case was evidence that her injured, gun-bearing visitor “arrived . . . in an 

atmosphere of chaos . . . making demands for assistance, and admitting to killing four 

armed police officers.” Id. at 235. There was evidence that he had a “tendency to be ‘in 

control of his family members’ and others” and a “reputation of being ‘intimidating.’” 

Id. at 235. Whether Nelson was in a position to exercise dominion and control over her
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

25

visitor’s gun, the court concluded, “must be considered in this context.” Id. Given the 

circumstances, it concluded she had not been in a position during that chaotic 15 minutes 

to exercise dominion and control over his firearm.

Ms. Hamilton was not dealing with a fleeting, chaotic intrusion by someone so 

intimidating that no homeowner would risk acting on their access to the intruder’s 

firearm. The evidence of her constructive possession of the rifle was sufficient.

III. THIRD DEGREE POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY

Under RCW 9A.56.140(1), “[p]ossessing stolen property” means “knowingly to 

receive, retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property knowing that it has been 

stolen and to withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any person other than the true 

owner or person entitled thereto.” Ms. Hamilton argues that with respect to the stolen 

snatch block, come-along, and tie straps, there was insufficient evidence that she 

possessed them or knew they were stolen.

The double-doored storage area, as a part of Ms. Hamilton’s home, was in her 

dominion and control, as, presumptively, were the items in it. Echeverria, 85 Wn. App. 

at 783. The State presented evidence that the storage area was visited regularly by 

members of the household and daily by at least some of them, since that was where water 

needed for personal use and to care for their animals was located. There was also 

evidence that the doors were sometimes left open—they were on the day of the search—

in which case the stolen items could be seen without even entering the storage area. 
No. 36837-8-III

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26

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence supported an inference that 

Ms. Hamilton knew the items were in her home’s storage area.

Porter testified to being present when Delilah and Mr. Malotte talked to Ms. 

Hamilton about the fact that they were going through stuff in Mr. Griffith’s truck. Ms. 

Hamilton was present on the night of the assault and would have seen items strewn

around the truck that were no longer there a few days later. During the same time frame, 

the new items appeared in the storage area. Here, too, the evidence supported the 

inference that she knew the new items were stolen.

IV. MAKING A FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENT

Finally, Ms. Hamilton argues that her statements on November 20 that “[Mr.] 

Malotte might be or could be at Griffith’s home” were not “definitive” and cannot 

support her conviction for making a false or misleading statement to a public servant. 

Br. of Appellant at 25-26. The State responds that Ms. Hamilton made additional false 

and misleading statements, and that all of them support her conviction on this count.

“A person who knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a 

public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. “‘Material statement’ means a written 

or oral statement reasonably likely to be relied upon by a public servant in the discharge 

of his or her official powers or duties.” RCW 9A.76.175. The statute does not require 

actual reliance on the statement by an official. State v. Godsey, 131 Wn. App. 278, 291, 

127 P.3d 11 (2006). While a conviction for rendering criminal assistance stemming from 
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27

deceptive statements to a police officer requires an affirmative act or statement, providing 

a false or misleading statement under RCW 9A.76.175 does not. Mollet, 181 Wn. App. 

at 707. 

Ms. Hamilton first argues that “reluctance” on her part to provide definitive 

information to the deputies does not make her statements false or misleading. Br. of 

Appellant at 26. There is no evidence she was reluctant, but if she was, it would not 

make her statements true or not misleading. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could 

reasonably have found all of the following statements by Ms. Hamilton to be false and 

misleading: that she didn’t know the fleeing man, that he was a friend of Mr. Griffith,

that he might be living with Mr. Griffith,2and that his name was Shane, Shawn, Michael 

or a fourth name (Cameron or Jesse). Telling the deputy that the fleeing man “might” be 

living with Mr. Griffith does not absolve her of guilt; the jury could find the statement 

was knowingly false if she knew Mr. Malotte was not living there. 

As for the required reasonable likelihood that the deputies would rely on Ms. 

Hamilton’s statements, they demonstrably did. Proving their actual reliance was not 

required, but the first step they took after leaving the Hamilton property was to travel to 

 

2 Ms. Hamilton characterizes Deputy Kersten as testifying that she said only that 

the fleeing suspect “might be” at the Griffith house, but the State presented evidence that 

this was in the context of discussing where he was living. See RP at 307.
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

28

the Griffith property and assess whether they could safely approach in search of their 

suspect. And it was foreseeable that they would rely on Ms. Hamilton’s statements by 

focusing their further investigation on Mr. Griffith’s connections. As previously 

observed, had Ms. Hamilton not seemingly cooperated and pointed the deputies in the 

wrong direction, their focus would likely have remained on the Hamilton family 

members and property. 

Here again, the evidence was sufficient.

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS

Ms. Hamilton filed a pro se SAG in which she includes over 20 grounds.

The Rules of Appellate Procedure permit the defendant in a criminal case on direct 

appeal to file a SAG, to identify and discuss matters the defendant believes have not been 

adequately addressed by the brief filed by her or his appellate counsel. RAP 10.10(a). 

We will consider only arguments that were not addressed by counsel’s briefing. 

RAP 10.10(a). Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Ms. Hamilton’s 

convictions were adequately briefed and are rejected for reasons already discussed. Ms. 

Hamilton’s SAG adds nothing of merit on those issues and need not be addressed. 

Issues that turn on facts that are not reflected in the record cannot be resolved in 

the direct appeal and are properly raised through a personal restraint petition (PRP), 

where they must be supported by admissible evidence. State v. Calvin, 176 Wn. App. 1, 

26, 316 P.3d 496 (2013). Almost all of Ms. Hamilton’s claims of ineffective assistance 
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29

of her trial counsel fall into this category. Also falling into this category is her complaint 

that jurors slept during the trial, since the record created by the trial court suggests 

otherwise. Ms. Hamilton is cautioned that to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 

she will need to demonstrate not only deficient representation, but also that she was 

actually prejudiced.

Alleged errors that were not raised in the trial court are unpreserved and generally 

will not be reviewed for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a). Examples are Ms. 

Hamilton’s contention that she should have received a change of venue, since no motion 

for a venue change was made below; her complaint about the exclusion of criminal 

history on the part of Mr. Griffith that the lawyers agreed was inadmissible; a failure to 

redact the identity of her prescribed medications from photographs used to establish her 

dominion and control of areas in the home; and the prosecutor’s questioning of Porter 

about whether some of Mr. Griffith’s behavior was joking. If Ms. Hamilton believes 

these issues resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, she needs to demonstrate the

ineffective assistance in a PRP.

We will not consider a defendant’s SAG for review if it does not inform the court 

of the nature and occurrence of alleged errors. RAP 10.10(c); State v. Bluehorse, 159 

Wn. App. 410, 436, 248 P.3d 537 (2011). An appellate court is not required to search the 

record in support of claims made in the SAG. RAP 10.10(c). Ms. Hamilton speaks of a 

“speedy trial” issue, but she does not identify facts that would raise a rule-based time to 
No. 36837-8-III

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30

trial violation, let alone a constitutional one. Her principal concern is that she wanted a 

pending animal cruelty prosecution to be tried first, but she fails to articulate a legal right 

to trials being conducted in her preferred order.

Complaints about attorney performance cannot be entertained if the attorney's 

conduct “can be characterized as legitimate trial strategy or tactics.” State v. McNeal, 

145 Wn.2d 352, 362, 37 P.3d 280 (2002). Falling into this category are complaints that 

her trial lawyer failed to present evidence that was inadmissible (e.g., an investigator’s 

report, which would have been hearsay; testimony from Delilah and Mr. Malotte, who the 

court was told would refuse to testify, given charges pending against them; evidence of 

Mr. Griffith’s criminal history) or that was irrelevant (signage on her property saying she 

was not liable for lost or stolen property).

We do not review complaints for which no relief can be granted, such as Ms. 

Hamilton’s complaints about the first degree assault charge that the State voluntarily 

dismissed, law enforcement’s alleged failure to procure a no-contact order for her against 

Mr. Griffith, and her receipt of only one offer of a plea deal—an offer she found 

unacceptable.

The only ground raised by Ms. Hamilton that warrants review is her complaint that 

the trial court too summarily rejected her requests for replacement of her court-appointed 

trial lawyer. On three occasions before trial, Ms. Hamilton requested a new attorney. 

The first was at a time when the trial court was ordering an evaluation of her competency 
No. 36837-8-III

State v. Hamilton

31

and she accused her lawyer of being incompetent. The court reasonably ruled that the 

evaluation should be completed first and “if this continues to be a problem in your mind,

. . . we’ll take another look at it.” RP at 8. It did tell Ms. Hamilton that her trial lawyer 

was a “very experienced, well-respected trial attorney.” RP at 7.

The second request was after she had been found competent to stand trial and, 

when returned to court to enter a plea, told the court that she wanted to fire her trial 

lawyer for incompetence, for coercing her, and for talking to the officers involved about 

her case. RP at 16. The trial court again observed that her lawyer was “a very 

experienced defense attorney,” so the court needed to know her reasons more 

specifically. RP at 17. She was told to put her concerns in writing “and we’ll talk about 

it.” Id. 

The third request was at a status hearing presided at by a different judge. Ms. 

Hamilton evidently had not filed a written motion as directed, but the court heard from 

her anyway. She said that she and her lawyer did not “see eye to eye” and

My feeling about it is I haven’t even gone over the case with him. I haven’t 

seen pictures or recordings or anything and he’s having a hard time 

returning my phone calls and I also have him coercing me on a tape too.

RP at 34.

When invited to respond, defense counsel said he had never coerced a client to 

accept a guilty plea and invited the trial court to listen to the tape recording. He told the 

court he had merely told Ms. Hamilton, with respect to a separate, pending prosecution 
No. 36837-8-III

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32

for animal cruelty, that it did not appear that she was guilty of first degree animal cruelty 

but before he could say whether she might be guilty of a separate or lesser included

charge, he needed to see the scene (it was not then possible, due to snow) and do further 

research. 

Ms. Hamilton added that the lawyer had not listened to a tape she wanted him to 

hear or look at a text she wanted him to see. The lawyer responded that the problem with

their communication was that Ms. Hamilton had her own ideas, but did not understand 

the law or court rules and refused to listen to him. The trial judge sought to explain to 

Ms. Hamilton how, in his view, her lawyer was simply doing his job and she should 

listen to him. He, too, reassured her that her lawyer was an “extremely well-respected 

attorney.” RP at 36.

Ms. Hamilton points to no other occasion, in later status conferences or at trial, 

that she renewed her request for replacement counsel.

Defendants do not have an absolute right to the counsel of their choice. When a 

motion for new counsel is made—and we note that Ms. Hamilton never prepared a 

written motion, although directed to do so—courts are required to grant it only “when 

counsel and defendant are so at odds as to prevent presentation of an adequate defense.” 

State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 734, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (Stenson I). A defendant 

“must show good cause to warrant substitution of counsel, such as a conflict of interest, 

an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication between the 
No. 36837-8-III

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33

attorney and the defendant.” Id. Courts consider “(1) the extent of the conflict, (2) the 

adequacy of the inquiry, and (3) the timeliness of the motion.” In re Pers. Restraint of 

Stenson, 142 Wn.2d 710, 724, 16 P.3d 1 (2001) (Stenson II).

Most important here is the nature and the extent of the breakdown in 

communication. Id. at 730. “The general loss of confidence or trust alone is not 

sufficient to substitute new counsel.” Stenson I, 132 Wn.2d at 734. Our Supreme Court 

found no irreconcilable differences where a defendant was: “afraid to proceed with his 

counsel,” his attorney told the lower court that they no longer had an attorney-client 

relationship, and he could not stand the sight of the defendant, because that disagreement 

was short lived and they were able to communicate. Stenson II, 142 Wn.2d at 729-31. 

The court also commented that the disagreement was not comparable to federal cases 

finding irreconcilable differences and “the effects of any breakdown in communication 

on attorney performance seem negligible.” Id. at 729. We review the denial of a motion 

for new counsel for abuse of discretion. Id. at 723. 

Ms. Hamilton did not view the issue as important enough to prepare a written 

motion, as directed. At each appearance in our record, defense counsel was prepared and 

from all appearances was working diligently and competently on Ms. Hamilton’s

defense. Her own exchanges with the court tended to confirm her lawyer’s report that 

she had her own ideas about tactical decisions that were his province, and sometimes 

preferred her ideas over listening to his advice. There was no evidence of a conflict of 
No. 36837-8-III

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interest, nor was there the appearance of irreconcilable differences or a complete 

breakdown in communication. No abuse of discretion is shown in failing to grant or take 

further action on Ms. Hamilton’s informal, undocumented, request for replacement.

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040.

_____________________________

Siddoway, A.C.J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________

Fearing, J.

_____________________________

Staab, J.