NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA

, Appellee

,

v.

RICK EUGENE MALIN

, Appellant

.

No. 1 CA

- CR 16

- 0189

Appeal from the Superior Court in La Paz County

No. S1500CR201400171 The Honorable Samuel E. Vederman

, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office , Phoenix By Joseph T. Maziarz Counsel for Appellee

David Goldberg

, Ft. Collins, CO C ounsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined.STATE v. MALIN
Decision of the Court

2 G O U L D
, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Rick Malin appeals from his convictions for DUI, arguing the superior court erred by denying his motion to suppress

. For the following reasons, w e aff irm

.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1

¶2 On the Fourth of July weekend of 2014, Deputy R. was assigned to a special detail in Parker, Arizona

, that was tasked with traffic enforcement, “with emphasis on alcohol enforcement and seat belt

restr aint [ s ]

. ”

¶3 On Saturday, July 5, Deputy R. was monitoring traffic on Highway 95 in Parker

. Around midnight , h e saw Malin’s car make a “wide sweeping turn” no rthbound onto Highway 95 from Lakeside Boulevard, passing from the curb lane to the inside lane without using his turn signal. After driving past Deputy R., Malin moved into the left turn lane at Riverside Drive, again without using his turn signal.

¶4 B ased on his training and experience , Deputy R. recognized that Malin’s “wide sweeping turn” and fail ure to signal lane changes were signs of driving while impaired

. As a result, Deputy R. followed Malin and pulled him over

. When Deputy R. spoke to Malin

, he admitted that he had an interlock device restriction on his license, and that he had consumed 21⁄2 rum and cokes earlier that day. After Malin perform ed poorly on several field sobriety tests , Deputy R. arrested him for driving under the influence

. Malin’s breath samples later showed a BAC of 0.15 and 0.147

, and his blood samples revealed a BAC of between .144 to .159.

¶5 Malin was charged with two counts of aggravated driving under the influence pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.” )
sections 28

- 1383(A)(4) and 28

- 1381(A)(1). Before trial

, Malin filed a motion to suppress on the grounds there was no reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. Following a n evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied Malin’s motion to suppress

.

1 “ In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding its ruling.” State v. Moreno

, 236 Ariz. 347, 349, ¶ 2 (App. 2014)

.STATE v. MALIN
Decision of the Court

3 ¶6 In denying Malin’s motion, the court determined there was reasonable suspicion to stop Malin’s vehicle on multiple grounds. First, by failing to signal his turns and lane changes, Malin violated A.R.S. §§ 28

- 754(A), (B) . The court further found that Malin’ s violation of A.R.S. § 28

- 754 “may have affected other traffic.” Second, Malin’s wide turn onto Highway 95 violated A.R.S. § 28

- 751(1). Third, the court found that Malin’s failure to signal and his wide turn provided reasonable suspicion to stop him for driving while impaired in violation of A.R.S. § 28

- 1381(A).

¶7 The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Malin guilty

on both counts. Malin timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶8 On appeal, Malin challenges the court’s determination there

was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop based on his alleged violat ion of A.R.S. §§ 28

- 754(A), (B) . Malin does not challenge the court’s other findings supporting reasonable suspicion

.
¶9 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Peterson , 228 Ariz. 405, 40 7 , ¶ 6 (App. 2011) (citations omitted). We consider only the evidence before the trial court at the suppression hearing, and defer to the cou rt’s factual findings that are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. State v. Estrada , 209 Ariz. 287, 288, ¶ 2 (App. 2004) . However, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo, including whether there was a Fourth Amendment vi olation

. Id.

¶10 An officer may conduct a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion the defendant has violated the law

. See State v. Evans , 237 Ariz. 231, 234, ¶ 7 (2015) (citations omitted). R easonable suspicion for a traffic stop consists of “some minimal level of objective justification” under the totality of the circumstances, including specific reasonable inferences an officer is warranted in making i n light of his training and experience. Id. at 234, ¶¶ 7

- 8

. (citations omitted).

¶11 Because Malin has not challenge d the court’s finding the stop was justified based on a reasonable suspicion he was driving while impaired , he has abandoned this argument on appeal. ARCAP 13(a)(6) ; DeElena v. S. Pac. Co., 121 Ariz. 563, 572 (1979) (issues not argued on appeal

are deemed abandoned ). However, we have discretion to address this issue, and cho o se to do so, because it provides an undisputed basis to resolve this appeal. C

f. State v. Payne, 223 Ariz. 555, 568 n. 8 , ¶ 47 (App. 2009) (“‘I f application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would disposeSTATE v. MALIN
Decision of the Court

4 of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.’”) (internal citations omitted) ; State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 75, 79, ¶ 12 (2002) (appellate court may address argument otherwise waived)

.
¶12 Here, t he record shows there was r easonable suspicion to stop Malin for driving while impaired in violation of A.R.S. § 28

- 1381(A)

. Deputy R. observed Malin make a wide turn and repeatedly fail to signal his lane changes ; both of these observations indicated to Deputy R., based on his training and experience, that Malin may have been driving while impaired by alcohol

. 2 Accordingly, we find no error.

CONCLUSION

¶13 For the above reasons, we af f irm the superior court’s denial of Malin’s motion to suppress.

2 Because we conclude the stop was justified based on reasonable suspicion of DUI, we need not reach the issue of whether the stop was justified based on a violation of A.R.S. § 28

- 751(1).