J-S67004-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee :

:

 v. :

:

TOM HAL CORNELISON, III, :

:

 Appellant : No. 1913 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 19, 2012,

Court of Common Pleas, Cambria County, 

Criminal Division at No. CP-11-CR-0000769-2011 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY and FITZGERALD*, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2014 

 Appellant, Tom Hal Cornelison, III (“Cornelison”), appeals from the 

judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas, Cambria County, 

following his convictions of burglary, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a), criminal 

trespass, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii), and criminal mischief, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3304(a)(4). After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of 

sentence. 

 A summary of the relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. 

Cornelison was involved in an on-and-off relationship with Dora Vetter 

(“Vetter”). On March 26, 2011, Cornelison called Vetter and asked her if she 

would give him a ride to do a few errands. During this time, Cornelison and 

Vetter got into an argument. As a result of the argument, Vetter dropped 

Cornelison off at an establishment. Throughout the course of the day, 
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Cornelison called Vetter numerous times. Vetter took some of the calls but 

ignored others. That evening, Vetter returned to her home to find her 

front door broken open and the door frame damaged. Every room of her 

house was in disarray and damaged. Vetter immediately called the police. 

 While the police were at her house, Vetter found a wallet on the floor. 

The police opened the wallet and found Cornelison’s driver’s license inside. 

The police went to Vetter’s neighbors’ homes to ask if anyone had seen 

anything. One neighbor, Judith Litko (“Litko”) told police that Cornelison 

knocked on her door and asked to use her phone. Litko allowed Cornelison 

to use her phone. After Cornelison put the phone down, Litko watched him 

walk across the street to Vetter’s home, slam into the door with his 

shoulder, fall into the apartment, and then close the door. When the police 

hit the redial button on Litko’s phone, Vetter’s phone rang. 

 Cornelison was charged with the aforementioned crimes. A jury trial 

commenced on February 29, 2012. At trial, Cornelison did not dispute that 

he broke down the door to Vetter’s home and destroyed the house, but 

argued that he had permission to be at Vetter’s home. At the conclusion of 

testimony, the jury found Cornelison guilty of all charges. 

On July 12, 2012, Cornelison filed a motion for new trial, challenging 

the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion for new trial 

on July 17, 2012. On July 19, 2012, the trial court sentenced Cornelison to 

20 to 40 months of incarceration. Cornelison filed a post-sentence motion 
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on July 30, 2012. Oral arguments on the post-sentence motion were held 

on October 5, 2012. In a written opinion on November 1, 2012, the trial 

court denied Cornelison’s post-sentence motion. Cornelison did not file a 

direct appeal at that time. 

On June 7, 2013, Cornelison filed a petition for relief pursuant to the 

Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et. seq. On 

September 5, 2013, the PCRA court reinstated Cornelison’s direct appeal 

rights and right to file post-sentence motions within 10 days. The PCRA 

court deferred ruling on Cornelison’s remaining claims pending the 

conclusion of direct review. On September 13, 2013, Cornelison filed postsentence motions requesting a judgment of acquittal, a new trial, and a 

modification of his sentence. On November 7, 2013, the trial court denied 

Cornelison’s motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, as well as 

Cornelison’s motion to modify his sentence based on excessiveness. The 

court deferred ruling on Cornelison’s motion to modify his sentence based on 

the court’s alleged failure to credit Cornelison with a certain amount of time 

served. It finally disposed of Cornelison’s post-sentence motions on 

November 18, 2013. 

 On November 21, 2013, Cornelison timely filed a notice of appeal to 

this Court. He raises the following issue for our review: 

Whether the verdict reached by the jury to convict 

[Cornelison] of burglary and criminal trespass, and

which was sustained by the trial court on post-
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sentence motions, was against the weight of the 

evidence presented by the Commonwealth? 

Cornelison’s Brief at 4. 

 Cornelison argues that “the Commonwealth utilized largely 

circumstantial, self-serving, and unreliable evidence against [him,]” and 

failed to produce eye-witness testimony of the crimes for which he was 

convicted. Id. at 8. Cornelison further argues that “[t]he majority of the 

witnesses with knowledge of the situation in this case gave interesting 

testimony that strongly suggested that [he] lived at the victim’s 

residence[,]” and that the only witness to testify any differently was the 

victim. Id. at 8-9. 

In its written opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court 

noted that “the [c]ourt twice denied [Cornelison’s] post-sentence motions 

for a new trial challenging the weight of the evidence presented at trial.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/15/14, at 3. The trial court concluded that it did not 

abuse its discretion by denying Cornelison’s motion for a new trial as it 

“presided over the trial and the evidence.” Id. Furthermore, the trial court 

found that “it cannot be said that the jury rendered a verdict that was so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Id. 

 Our standard of review is well settled: 

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence is 

addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new 

trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict 
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in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion.

Rather, ‘the role of the trial judge is to determine 

that ‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are 

so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to 

give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny 

justice.’’ It has often been stated that ‘a new trial 

should be awarded when the jury's verdict is so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of

justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so 

that right may be given another opportunity to 

prevail.’ 

* * * 

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of 

the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge 

has had the opportunity to hear and see the 

evidence presented, an appellate court will give the 

gravest consideration to the findings and reasons 

advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial 

court's determination that the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable

reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the 

lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was 

not against the weight of the evidence and that a 

new trial should be granted in the interest of justice. 

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by 

the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a 

new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the

evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a 

trial court's discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he 

term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment,

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate 

conclusion within the framework of the law, and is 

not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the 

will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the 

foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, 

personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.

Discretion is abused where the course pursued 
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represents not merely an error of judgment, but 

where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or 

where the law is not applied or where the record 

shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will. 

Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 285-86 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis in 

original) (citations omitted)). 

In this case, although Cornelison frames the issue as an abuse of 

discretion claim, he does not present any argument as to how he believes 

the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a new trial. 

Instead, he directs his entire argument to the underlying question of 

whether his convictions are against the weight of the evidence. See

Cornelison’s Brief at 8-9. As stated above, this is not the question before us 

for review, as our review is limited to determining whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in ruling upon his weight claim, not the underlying 

question of whether the verdict was in fact against the weight of the 

evidence. See Horne, 89 A.3d at 285. 

Ignoring this failing, our review of the record reveals that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the verdicts in this case 

were not against the weight of the evidence. At trial, Cornelison testified 

that he lived with Vetter, stayed at her apartment when she left for work, 

and had a key that she authorized him to purchase. N.T., 2/29/12, at 137-

40. Cornelison stated that he would occasionally stay with his friend, Bert 
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Wissinger (“Wissinger”), on 12th Street, but slept at Vetter’s apartment 

“[n]inety-nine percent of the time.” Id. at 139. 

Cornelison also presented the testimony of his mother, Linda 

Spangenberg (“Spangenberg”), and Wissinger in support of his testimony. 

Spangenberg testified that up until the date of the incident, she contacted 

Cornelison through Vetter’s cell phone and forwarded mail to him at Vetter’s 

apartment “[b]ecause as far as [she] knew, that’s where [he] was living.” 

Id. at 118. Spangenberg further testified that she picked up Cornelison’s 

belongings from Vetter’s apartment. Id. Cornelison never told her that he 

had personal belongings elsewhere. Id. at 121. 

Wissinger testified that Cornelison stayed at Vetter’s apartment most 

of the time but lived with him on 12th Street on the other days. Id. at 130-

31. Wissinger also testified that Cornelison had dishes, clothing, bedroom 

items, large containers that had his belongings in them, knives, and jewelry 

at his home. Id. at 130. 

In contrast, Vetter testified that only her name was on the lease of the 

apartment and that Cornelison lived with Wissinger on 12th Street. Id. at 

37-38. Although Cornelison had personal belongings at her apartment and 

stayed over at the apartment three to four times a week, Vetter testified 

that Cornelison did not have a key to the apartment. Id. at 38-39. Vetter 

would give Cornelison a key at times but he did not have his own key to 

enter when he wanted to because she “didn’t want him to have a key all the 
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time” and did not want him in the apartment when she had not given him 

the key. Id. at 39-40. 

The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Litko, Vetter’s 

neighbor, who testified that she witnessed Cornelison break down Vetter’s 

door on the night in question. Id. at 27. Litko testified that Cornelison 

knocked on her door and asked if he could use her phone. Id. at 26. Litko 

stated that she had never seen Cornelison before that day. Id. After 

Cornelison used the phone, Litko testified that Cornelison ran through her 

yard, “[a]nd when he hit the curb he started at full gait, and he smashed his 

shoulder into [Vetter’s] door and broke the door down.” Id. at 27. 

Cornelison fell onto the steps on the inside of the apartment and slammed 

the door shut. Id. 

The jury heard the conflicting testimony and made its credibility 

determinations, apparently choosing to believe Vetter that Cornelison did not 

live at her apartment and was not permitted to be there on the evening in 

question. As we are mindful of “our obligation to respect the fact finder’s 

credibility determinations and the weight it accords the evidence,” we find 

no fault with the trial court’s conclusion that the verdict is so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. See Renna v. Schadt, 64 A.3d 

658, 670 (Pa. Super. 2013). Finding no abuse of discretion, Cornelison is 

not entitled to relief on his weight claim. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/17/2014