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<body><div class="header"><p class="header">APHIS Evaluation: CSF and SVD Status of Estonia

January 2011</p>
<p class="header">______________________________________________________________________________________</p>
</div>
<p><img src="embedded:image6.png" alt="image6.png"></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image7.png" alt="image7.png"><b>APHIS Evaluation of the Status of Estonia Regarding Classical Swine Fever and Swine Vesicular Disease</b></p>
<p><b>Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
</b></p>
<p><b>Veterinary Services
</b></p>
<p><b>January 2011</b></p>
<p><b>TABLE OF CONTENTS</b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>4</b><a href="_Toc183920799"><b><u>Abbreviations</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>5</b><a href="_Toc183920800"><b><u>Index of Figures</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>6</b><a href="_Toc183920801"><b><u>Index of Tables</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>7</b><a href="_Toc183920802"><b><u>1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>9</b><a href="_Toc183920803"><b><u>2. INTRODUCTION</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>10</b><a href="_Toc183920804"><b><u>3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>10</b><a href="_Toc183920805"><b><u>3.1 CSF virus</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>11</b><a href="_Toc183920806"><b><u>3.2 SVD virus</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>13</b><a href="_Toc183920807"><b><u>4. RELEASE ASSESSMENT</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>13</b><a href="_Toc183920808"><b><u>4.1 Authority, organization and infrastructure of the veterinary services</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_3">13<a href="_Toc183920809"><u>4.1.1 Legal authority for animal health activities</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">14<a href="_Toc183920810"><u>4.1.2 Organization and infrastructure of the official veterinary services</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">21<a href="_Toc183920811"><u>4.1.3 Internal and external auditing</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">22<a href="_Toc183920812"><u>4.1.4 Discussion</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>22</b><a href="_Toc183920813"><b><u>4.2 Disease status of the region</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_3">22<a href="_Toc183920814"><u>4.2.1 Overview</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">23<a href="_Toc183920815"><u>4.2.2 Discussion</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>23</b><a href="_Toc183920816"><b><u>4.3 Disease status of adjacent regions</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>24</b><a href="_Toc183920817"><b><u>4.4 Extent of an active disease control program</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>25</b><a href="_Toc183920818"><b><u>4.5 Vaccination status</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_3">25<a href="_Toc183920819"><u>4.5.1 Overview</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">25<a href="_Toc183920820"><u>4.5.2 Discussion</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>25</b><a href="_Toc183920821"><b><u>4.6 Separation from adjacent regions of higher risk</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>26</b><a href="_Toc183920822"><b><u>4.7 Control of animal and animal product movement from higher risk areas</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_3">26<a href="_Toc183920823"><u>4.7.1 Controls on imports from third countries</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">31<a href="_Toc183920824"><u>4.7.2 Transit and transshipment controls</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">32<a href="_Toc183920825"><u>4.7.3 Controls on intra-Community trade</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">33<a href="_Toc183920826"><u>4.7.4 Volume and sources of imports</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">33<a href="_Toc183920827"><u>4.7.5 Discussion</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>35</b><a href="_Toc183920828"><b><u>4.8 Livestock demographics and marketing practices</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_3">35<a href="_Toc183920829"><u>4.8.1 Domestic swine population</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">36<a href="_Toc183920830"><u>4.8.2 Wild boar population</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">37<a href="_Toc183920831"><u>4.8.3 Animal identification and registration system</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">39<a href="_Toc183920832"><u>4.8.4 Artificial insemination centers</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">39<a href="_Toc183920833"><u>4.8.5 Marketing and slaughter practices</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">40<a href="_Toc183920834"><u>4.8.6 Internal movement controls</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">41<a href="_Toc183920835"><u>4.8.7 Rendering plants</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">41<a href="_Toc183920836"><u>4.8.8 Handling of animal waste, animal byproducts and food waste</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">42<a href="_Toc183920837"><u>4.8.9 Discussion</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>43</b><a href="_Toc183920838"><b><u>4.9 Disease surveillance</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_3">43<a href="_Toc183920839"><u>4.9.1 CSF and SVD surveillance in domestic swine</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">43<a href="_Toc183920840"><u>4.9.2 CSF surveillance in wild boar</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">44<a href="_Toc183920841"><u>4.9.3 Discussion</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>46</b><a href="_Toc183920842"><b><u>4.10 Diagnostic laboratory capacity</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_3">46<a href="_Toc183920843"><u>4.10.1 CSF</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">47<a href="_Toc183920844"><u>4.10.2 SVD</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">47<a href="_Toc183920845"><u>4.10.3 Education and training of laboratory personnel</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">47<a href="_Toc183920846"><u>4.10.4 Discussion</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>48</b><a href="_Toc183920847"><b><u>4.11 Emergency response capacity</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_3">48<a href="_Toc183920848"><u>4.11.1 Legislative authority</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">49<a href="_Toc183920849"><u>4.11.2 Notification</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">49<a href="_Toc183920850"><u>4.11.3 Suspicion of disease</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">51<a href="_Toc183920851"><u>4.11.4 Contingency plan</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">52<a href="_Toc183920852"><u>4.11.5 Local infectious animal disease control committee</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">52<a href="_Toc183920853"><u>4.11.6 National infectious animal disease control committee</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">53<a href="_Toc183920854"><u>4.11.7 Quarantine, protection and surveillance zones</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">54<a href="_Toc183920855"><u>4.11.8 Vaccination</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">54<a href="_Toc183920856"><u>4.11.9 Indemnity and compensation</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">54<a href="_Toc183920857"><u>4.11.10 Discussion</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>55</b><a href="_Toc183920858"><b><u>4.12 Release assessment conclusions</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_3">55<a href="_Toc183920859"><u>4.12.1 Likelihood of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">57<a href="_Toc183920860"><u>4.12.2 Likelihood of CSF or SVD virus export from Estonia to the United States</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>59</b><a href="_Toc183920861"><b><u>5. EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>59</b><a href="_Toc183920862"><b><u>5.1 Exposure to infected swine</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>60</b><a href="_Toc183920863"><b><u>5.2 Exposure to contaminated swine semen, ova and embryos</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>60</b><a href="_Toc183920864"><b><u>5.3 Exposure to contaminated swine products</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>62</b><a href="_Toc183920865"><b><u>6. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>62</b><a href="_Toc183920866"><b><u>6.1 Effects on swine health</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>62</b><a href="_Toc183920867"><b><u>6.2 Control and eradication costs</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>63</b><a href="_Toc183920868"><b><u>6.3 Effects on the environment</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>64</b><a href="_Toc183920869"><b><u>6.4 International trade and domestic economic effects</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>65</b><a href="_Toc183920870"><b><u>7. RISK ESTIMATION</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>67</b><a href="_Toc183920871"><b><u>8. APPENDICES</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>67</b><a href="_Toc183920872"><b><u>8.1 Legislative controls on imports from third countries</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_3">67<a href="_Toc183920873"><u>8.1.1 EC controls</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">69<a href="_Toc183920874"><u>8.1.2 Estonian controls</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>70</b><a href="_Toc183920875"><b><u>8.2 Certification requirements for imports from third countries</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_3">70<a href="_Toc183920876"><u>8.2.1 EC requirements</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_3">72<a href="_Toc183920877"><u>8.2.2 Estonian requirements</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>73</b><a href="_Toc183920878"><b><u>8.3 Import data, 1999-2006</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>74</b><a href="_Toc183920879"><b><u>8.4 CSF and SVD surveillance data</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>76</b><a href="_Toc183920880"><b><u>9. REFERENCES</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<h1>
Abbreviations
</h1>
<p class="body_Text">APHIS

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service</p>
<p class="body_Text">ARIB

Agricultural Registers and Information Board</p>
<p class="body_Text">BIP

Border inspection post
</p>
<p class="body_Text">CFR

Code of Federal Regulations
</p>
<p class="body_Text">CSF

Classical swine fever
</p>
<p class="body_Text">CVED

Common veterinary entry document</p>
<p class="body_Text">EC

European Community</p>
<p class="body_Text">ELISA

Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
</p>
<p class="body_Text">EU

European Union
</p>
<p class="body_Text">EU-15

Fifteen EU Member States, specified in 9 CFR 94.0
</p>
<p class="body_Text">FVO

Food and Veterinary Office</p>
<p class="body_Text">OIE

World Organization for Animal Health
</p>
<p class="body_Text">PCR

Polymerase chain reaction</p>
<p class="body_Text">SVD

Swine vesicular disease
</p>
<p class="body_Text">TRACES
Trade Control and Expert System
</p>
<p class="body_Text">USDA

United States Department of Agriculture
</p>
<p class="body_Text">VAFL

Veterinary and Food Laboratory
</p>
<p class="body_Text">VFB

Veterinary and Food Board</p>
<h1>Index of Figures
</h1>
<p class="table_of_Figures">15<a href="_Toc183920881"><u>Figure 1.  Organizational structure of the VFB.</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="table_of_Figures">16<a href="_Toc183920882"><u>Figure 2.  The 15 counties of Estonia (main map), and the location of Estonia in Europe (inset).</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="table_of_Figures">24<a href="_Toc183920883"><u>Figure 3.  Estonia and surrounding regions (main map), and the location of Estonia in Europe (inset).</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="table_of_Figures">36<a href="_Toc183920884"><u>Figure 4.  Geographic distribution of domestic swine in Estonia, by county.</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="table_of_Figures">37<a href="_Toc183920885"><u>Figure 5.  Geographic distribution of wild boar in Estonia, by county.</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="body_Text_Char1">
</p>
<h1>Index of Tables
</h1>
<p class="table_of_Figures">73<a href="_Toc183920886"><u>Table 1.  Volume and source of live swine imports into Estonia, 1999-2006.</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="table_of_Figures">73<a href="_Toc183920887"><u>Table 2.  Volume and source of swine product imports into Estonia, 1999-2006.</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="table_of_Figures">74<a href="_Toc183920888"><u>Table 3.  Number of domestic swine tested for CSF, 2002-2006.</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="table_of_Figures">75<a href="_Toc183920889"><u>Table 4.  Number of domestic swine tested for SVD, 2002-2006.</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="table_of_Figures">75<a href="_Toc183920890"><u>Table 5.  Number of wild boar tested for CSF, 2002-2006.</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="body_Text">
</p>
<h1>1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</h1>
<p class="body_Text">The Republic of Estonia (Estonia) submitted a request to the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA APHIS) in 2005 to be recognized as free of classical swine fever (CSF) and swine vesicular disease (SVD) [1].  In response to this request, APHIS evaluated the CSF and SVD status of Estonia, as part of an import risk analysis to assess the risk of introduction of these diseases into the United States from Estonia.  The risk analysis was conducted in accordance with guidelines for import risk analysis developed by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and is organized into 5 main sections: Hazard identification, Release assessment, Exposure assessment, Consequence assessment and Risk estimation [2].    </p>
<p class="body_Text">CSF and SVD are highly contagious viral diseases of swine.  They are exotic to the United States, and are among the diseases of concern to APHIS in its regulation of animal and animal product importation into the United States [3].  These diseases are also among the OIE-listed diseases of concern for international trade [4].    </p>
<p class="body_Text">As part of this import risk analysis, APHIS qualitatively assessed the likelihood of CSF or SVD virus introduction into the United States from Estonia, in terms of the likelihood of occurrence of the virus in Estonia, and its subsequent export to the United States.  APHIS found no evidence that CSF or SVD virus is present in Estonia.  Potential pathways of its introduction into Estonia include migration of wild boar, trade of swine and swine products, vehicle and human traffic, and importation of swine products for personal consumption.  Several safeguards are in place that mitigate the risk from these pathways.  These include strict Estonian and European Community (EC) animal health regulations, and controls on trade of swine and swine products; and biosecurity procedures in place at ports of entry to Estonia and other European Union (EU) Member States.  The results of this risk assessment suggest that the likelihood of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia through these pathways is low.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The risk of CSF or SVD virus export from Estonia to the United States is further mitigated by systems in place in Estonia to detect and eradicate the virus, should it occur in Estonia, and by United States import controls.  Additional mitigation would be provided by application of the import controls that currently apply to imports of swine, pork, pork products and swine semen from 15 EU Member States (the EU-15; Title 9 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts 94.24 and 98.38), and to imports of pork and pork products from specified SVD-free regions that are subject to additional import restrictions because of their proximity to or trading relationships with SVD-affected regions (9 CFR 94.13).  </p>
<p class="body_Text">APHIS qualitatively assessed the risk of exposure of swine in the United States to CSF or SVD virus in infected or contaminated commodities imported from Estonia.  Potential exposure pathways include direct contact with such commodities, such as through artificial insemination, and contact with waste products derived from such commodities, such as through swill feeding.  The results of the exposure assessment suggest that the likelihood of swine in the United States being exposed to CSF or SVD virus from swine or swine product imports from Estonia is low.  The likelihood of exposure specifically through swill feeding to swine is further limited by licensing, cooking and other regulatory requirements in the United States that are designed to prevent transmission of animal disease agents to and among swine through swill feeding.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Finally, APHIS qualitatively assessed potential consequences of a CSF or SVD outbreak in the United States.  Such an outbreak has the potential to result in large-scale disease and death of swine in the United States, and substantial economic losses to the United States due to the costs of disease control and eradication, and losses due to international trade restrictions.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">In summary, although exposure of swine in the United States to CSF or SVD virus could have severe animal health and economic consequences, the results of this risk analysis suggest that the likelihood of CSF or SVD virus release into the United States from swine and swine product imports from Estonia is low.  
</p>
<h1>2. INTRODUCTION</h1>
<p class="body_Text">APHIS regulates the importation of animals and animal products into the United States to guard against the introduction of animal diseases that are not present or prevalent in this country.  The regulations pertaining to the importation of animals and animal products are set forth in 9 CFR parts 91 through 99 [3].  Among the diseases that are the subject of APHIS import regulations are CSF and SVD (see, for example, 9 CFR 94.9, 94.10, 94.12, 94.13, 94.14, 94.17, 94.24, 94.25 and 98.38) [3].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Estonia submitted a request to APHIS in 2005 to be recognized as free of CSF and SVD [1].  This request was received from the Director General of the Veterinary and Food Board of Estonia (VFB), and was made in accordance with United States regulations regarding requests for recognition of the animal health status of foreign regions (9 CFR 92.2) [3].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">In response to this request, APHIS evaluated the CSF and SVD status of Estonia, as part of a qualitative import risk analysis to assess the risk of introduction of these diseases into the United States from Estonia.  The risk analysis was conducted in accordance with guidelines for import risk analysis developed by the OIE, and is organized into five main sections: Hazard identification, Release assessment, Exposure assessment, Consequence assessment and Risk estimation [2].  The Release assessment section of this risk analysis is structured according to the 11 factors described in 9 CFR 92.2 for evaluation of the animal health status of foreign regions [3].  Information evaluated in this risk analysis includes documentation provided by the VFB, information gathered by APHIS during a site visit to Estonia in November 2005, and data gathered from relevant scientific literature and other public sources.  </p>
<h1>3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION</h1>
<p class="body_Text">The hazard identification step of an import risk analysis, as defined by the OIE, involves identifying the pathogenic agents that might produce adverse consequences associated with the importation of a commodity [2].  In this analysis, the hazards under consideration are CSF virus and SVD virus.  Each causes a disease that is the subject of APHIS regulations regarding importation of animals and animal products into the United States (9 CFR 92.2, 94.9, 94.10, 94.12, 94.13, 94.14, 94.17, 94.24, 94.25 and 98.38) [3].  These diseases are also among the OIE-listed diseases of concern for international trade [4].  </p>
<h2>3.1 CSF virus
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">The CSF virus is an enveloped RNA virus of the genus <i>Pestivirus,</i> family Flaviviridae [5].  It is structurally and antigenically closely related to the bovine viral diarrhea virus and border disease virus of sheep, which can complicate its laboratory identification [6, 7].  Natural hosts of CSF virus are members of the Suidae family of mammals, including domestic and wild swine [5].  In susceptible species, CSF virus infection causes CSF, also known as hog cholera, one of the most economically important viral infectious diseases of domestic swine [5].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The most frequent route of infection is oro-nasal [5].  Transplacental infection of the fetuses of infected sows also occurs [8].  The incubation period in postnatally infected swine is 7-10 days [9].  Infection of sows at about 50-70 days of pregnancy can lead to the birth of persistently viremic piglets that shed large amounts of virus [6].  The virus can be present in all tissues and in most secretions and excretions of infected swine, including the semen of infected boar [10, 11].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Clinical signs of CSF can range from mild to severe, depending on various viral and host factors, including the level of virulence of the virus, and the immune status and age of the animal at infection [6, 7].  Generally, clinical signs are more severe in young animals than in older animals [5].  In older breeding swine, clinical signs are often mild or absent [5].  Acute, chronic, congenital and mild forms of CSF have been described [6, 7].  Infected piglets up to 12 weeks of age often develop acute CSF [6].  Initial signs are anorexia, lethargy, conjunctivitis, enlarged and discolored lymph nodes, respiratory signs and constipation, followed by diarrhea.  Frequently, neurological signs also occur, such as staggering gait, hind-leg weakness, movement incoordination, and convulsions.  Pinpoint hemorrhages are usually observed on the ears, tail, abdomen and inner side of the limbs during the second and third week after infection until death.  The virus is immunosuppressive, which contributes to morbidity from secondary enteric or respiratory infections [6, 11].  The mortality rate in young swine can reach 90%, with death occurring 2-3 weeks after infection [5].  In chronic CSF, initial signs similar to those in acute CSF are followed by non-specific signs, such as intermittent fever, chronic enteritis and wasting [6].  Chronic CSF is always fatal, with death occurring up to 3 months after infection.  Transplacental infection can result in abortion, stillbirth, mummification and malformation, or in the birth of weak or persistently viremic piglets.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The durability of the virus is affected by many physical and chemical variables, including temperature, humidity, pH, presence of organic matter, and exposure to various chemicals [12].  Results of epidemiological studies suggest that the virus is rapidly inactivated in aerosols, but it can survive for longer periods in manure.  It can survive for long periods in favorable environments, i.e., cool, moist and protein-rich environments such as stored meat: survival times of more than 4 years in frozen pork and at least 85 days in chilled fresh pork have been recorded.  The virus is somewhat resistant in meat products to curing and smoking, depending in part on the length of time and temperature of processing; reported survival times in cured or smoked meat range from 17 days to more than a year.  CSF virus is readily inactivated by pasteurization or cooking, although the level of sensitivity to heat can vary among strains of the virus.  It is also readily inactivated by detergents, lipid solvents, proteases and common disinfectants.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">CSF virus can spread through direct contact with infected swine; through ingestion of contaminated food products, such as fresh, frozen and cured meat; and in semen from infected boar [11, 13].  It can also be spread indirectly by contaminated people, animals and equipment [11].  Airborne spread does not appear to be a major feature of CSF virus transmission, at least not over long distances.  Several primary outbreaks of CSF in domestic swine in Germany in the 1990s were attributed to illegal feeding of contaminated swill to swine, and direct or indirect contact with infected wild boar [14].  The first primary outbreak in a severe epidemic of CSF in the Netherlands in 1997 was likely due to spread from an affected region in an adjacent country by a contaminated livestock vehicle [15].  </p>
<h2>3.2 SVD virus
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">The SVD virus is a non-enveloped RNA virus of the genus <i>Enterovirus,</i> family Picornaviridae [16].  Swine are the only known natural hosts of the virus, although the virus has been detected in sheep and cattle [17-19].  In swine, SVD virus infection causes SVD, which can be clinically indistinguishable from foot and mouth disease, vesicular stomatitis and vesicular exanthema of swine [17, 18].  SVD is of major economic importance primarily because of its clinical similarity to foot and mouth disease, and because its eradication is costly and its occurrence can lead to trade restrictions [19].</p>
<p class="body_Text">SVD is highly contagious, and spreads rapidly by direct contact with infected animals and by environmental contamination [16].  The most sensitive route of infection is through damaged skin or ulcerated mucous membranes; infection by ingestion requires larger amounts of virus [17].  After multiplying at the initial site of infection, the virus spreads through the lymphatics and blood.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The incubation period for SVD is generally 2-7 days, but can be longer if the infecting dose is small [17, 20].  Large amounts of the virus can be present in the secretions and excretions of infected swine before the first appearance of clinical signs.  The virus can be detected in the blood as early as two days after initial exposure, and subsequently also in most other tissues and in semen [16, 21].  The highest levels of excretion occur during the first week of infection [17].  In general, the virus is eliminated from infected swine and does not persist in the tissues longer than 28 days, but persistence of some strains in tissue for up to 100 days or longer has been reported [17].  In some cases of persistent infection, the animal can be asymptomatic and seronegative, but continue to shed the virus in its feces for more than 4 months [16].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Clinical signs in SVD can range from absent to mild to severe, depending on virus strain, route and dose of infection, age of the animal, and husbandry conditions [18].  After the initial incubation period, infected swine develop a transient fever, and vesicles on the coronary bands of the feet.  More rarely, infected swine also develop vesicles on the snout, tongue, lips, teats and knees, and in the interdigital spaces of the feet [16, 18].  Younger animals are generally more severely affected than older animals, although severe clinical signs usually occur only in animals housed on abrasive floors in damp conditions [18].  Infected swine usually recover clinically within two to three weeks.  Death from SVD virus infection is rare.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The SVD virus is highly resistant to inactivation by desiccation and freezing, and is stable over a wide range of pH.  It can survive for up to 11 months at 12°C to –20°C, and at pH 2.5 to 12.  It is resistant to inactivation by most common disinfectants, and by fermentation and smoking processes such as used for food product preservation [16].  It can remain in ham for 180 days, dried sausage for more than a year, and processed intestinal casings for more than two years [20].  It can be inactivated by heating at 60°C for 10 minutes [16].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">SVD spreads mainly through contact with infected swine or their excrement, and through feeding of contaminated meat products to swine [17].  Spread through contact with an environment contaminated with SVD virus has been shown to occur as easily as spread through direct inoculation or contact with infected swine.  Airborne spread is not a major feature of SVD virus transmission.  Outbreaks of SVD in Italy in recent years have been associated with spread by contaminated livestock transport vehicles, and persistence of the virus on farms following depopulation.  </p>
<h1>4. RELEASE ASSESSMENT
</h1>
<p class="body_Text">The release assessment of an import risk analysis, as defined by the OIE, consists of a description of the biological pathway(s) through which pathogenic agents can be introduced into an environment, and a qualitative or quantitative estimation of the probability of that introduction occurring [2].  The release assessment component of this risk analysis is structured according to the 11 factors described in 9 CFR 92.2 for evaluation of the animal health status of foreign regions [3].  It consists of a qualitative description and evaluation of the animal health status of Estonia with respect to CSF and SVD; risk factors for the introduction of CSF or SVD virus into Estonia, and into the United States from Estonia; and factors mitigating the risk of CSF and SVD virus introduction into the United States from Estonia.  </p>
<h2>4.1 Authority, organization and infrastructure of the veterinary services</h2>
<h3>4.1.1 Legal authority for animal health activities
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">As a Member State of the EU, Estonia is bound by all applicable EC Regulations, Decisions and Directives, including those related to veterinary activities and control of infectious animal diseases [22, 23].  Regulations and Decisions are binding in their entirety on EU Member States.  Directives are binding in terms of the results to be achieved, but the form and methods of application of Directives are left to the national authorities of the Member States; in general, applicable provisions of Directives are transposed into Member State legislation.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The legislative basis for the organization of veterinary activities in Estonia is provided by the Veterinary Activities Organization Act [24].  This Act defines the organization, main objectives and scope of state veterinary supervision.  It specifies that responsibility for state veterinary supervision lies with the VFB, and mandates cooperation in veterinary supervision between the VFB and the veterinary supervision offices of other EU Member States and the European Commission.  This Act also provides for financing of state and local veterinary supervision through payment of fees, and specifies the services for which such fees can be charged and who is liable for their payment [24].  The responsibilities and organizational structure of the VFB are detailed in two regulations of the Minister of Agriculture: the Statutes of the Veterinary and Food Board, and the Structure and Regular Employees of the Veterinary and Food Board and its Local Authorities [25, 26].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Legislative authority for VFB activities related to the prevention, control and eradication of CSF and SVD is provided by the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act [27].  This Act provides for the establishment of an infectious animal disease control program by the Director General of the VFB, and the development of a contingency plan by the VFB to control infectious animal diseases [28, 29].  It also provides for payment of compensation for losses related to control and prevention of infectious animal diseases [30, 31].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Rules and detailed instructions regarding actions to be taken in cases of suspected or confirmed CSF or SVD occurrence are set forth in the Classical Swine Fever Prevention Instruction, the Swine Vesicular Disease Prevention Instruction, and the Contingency Plan for Control of Infectious Animal Disease [29, 32, 33].  Both CSF and SVD are classified as "especially dangerous infectious diseases," the occurrence of which must be reported immediately to veterinary authorities [1, 27, 34].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Veterinary requirements for trade in animals and animal products with EU Member States and third countries are set forth in the Veterinary Supervision over Trade in, Import and Export of Animals and Animal Products Act, and its bylaws [35-37].  </p>
<h3>4.1.2 Organization and infrastructure of the official veterinary services</h3>
<h4>4.1.2.1 Central competent authority
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">The national animal health authority of Estonia is the VFB.  The VFB is responsible for enforcing and supervising the implementation of legislation governing veterinary medicine, food safety, market organization, animal welfare and farm animal breeding [1, 25].  The VFB reports to the Minister of Agriculture, who supervises, directs and coordinates the activities of the VFB through the chancellor of the Ministry of Agriculture [25].  An organizational chart of the VFB is shown in Figure 1 [1].  </p>
<p class="body_Text"><img src="embedded:image1.png" alt="image1.png"></p>
<p class="caption"><b>Figure 1.  Organizational structure of the VFB.
</b></p>
<p>The VFB is headed by a Director General, who is appointed by the Minister of Agriculture upon recommendation by the chancellor [25].  The VFB is organized into one central office, which coordinates the supervisory activities of the VFB, and 15 local Veterinary Center offices, one in each of the 15 counties of Estonia (Figure 2) [1, 38-40].  Each county is administratively further subdivided into several municipalities [38].  </p>
<p>
<img src="embedded:image2" alt="image2"></p>
<p class="caption"><b>Figure 2.  The 15 counties of Estonia (main map), and the location of Estonia in Europe (inset).
</b></p>
<p class="body_Text">The central office of the VFB includes five departments, each of which is in turn organized administratively into offices.  Animal health related responsibilities of the VFB are delegated to the Animal Health Office of the Animal Health and Welfare Department.  Among these responsibilities are coordinating and supervising state veterinary service activities; organizing infectious animal disease control activities; supervising animal identification and registration programs; organizing animal holding registration; imposing veterinary controls over animal movement; participating in national and international animal health projects; and communicating with officials of other countries and the OIE.  The Animal Health Office also advises and trains local Veterinary Center supervisory officials and authorized veterinarians, and coordinates and supervises their activities [1]. 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The Trade, Import and Export Department of the VFB is responsible for supervising trade and transit through Estonia of goods that are subject to veterinary controls, including trade with other EU Member States [38]. 
</p>
<p>Licenses to engage in veterinary activity (activity licenses) for veterinarians and veterinary laboratories are issued by the Director General of the VFB [24].  The rights and obligations of licensed veterinarians are defined in the Veterinary Activities Organization Act [24].  The obligations of licensed veterinarians include keeping appropriate veterinary records, submitting reports of veterinary activity and animal deaths to the local Veterinary Center office, adhering to professional standards of ethics, and participating in professional development and training activities.</p>
<h4>4.1.2.2 Local veterinary services
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">The 15 local Veterinary Center offices of the VFB are located one each in the 15 counties of Estonia: Harju, Hiiu, Ida-Viru, Järva, Jõgeva, Lääne-Viru, Põlva, Lääne, Rapla, Päarnu, Saare, Tartu, Valga, Viljandi and Võru [1, 38].  These local Veterinary Center offices are responsible for supervising local veterinary activities [1].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Supervisory authority over local veterinary activities is further delegated to authorized veterinarians [24].  Authorized veterinarians are responsible for inspecting at least annually the farms in their jurisdiction, to check for compliance with relevant veterinary legislation [38].  During these inspections, the veterinarian checks the general animal health, animal well-being and hygiene conditions of the farm, and inspects farm records, including animal treatment, movement and feeding records [38].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Authorized veterinarians are selected on a competitive basis by a committee consisting of one representative each from the VFB, the local Veterinary Center office that announced the vacancy, and a registered professional veterinary organization [24, 41].  Authorization is granted for a 5-year term.  The authorized veterinarians are formally under contract, subject to annual renewal, with the local Veterinary Center offices [41] [24].  Authorization can be revoked by the head of the local Veterinary Center office for failure to perform required duties [24].  The number of authorized veterinarians to be selected per county is determined based on the size of the county and its animal population, and on the number of farms in the county [41].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Authorized veterinarians are supervised by the local Veterinary Center offices and audited annually [41].  They bill for their services, and are paid by the Estonian government from the state budget [24, 41].  The scope of authority and the rights and obligations of authorized veterinarians are defined in the Veterinary Activities Organization Act [24].  They are not permitted to exercise veterinary supervisory authority over themselves or members of their families [24].  They are permitted to practice as private veterinarians for the farms in their supervisory jurisdiction, but this practice is discouraged [41].   
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Authorized veterinarians must report monthly to the local Veterinary Center office, and submit monthly reports of their activities, including surveillance and other sampling performed, and farm visits conducted [41].  The reports include descriptions of any violations identified and corrective actions to be taken [41].  Follow up is conducted by VFB officials to determine whether the corrective actions were taken.  
</p>
<h4>4.1.2.3 Border veterinary inspection
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">Veterinary inspections at ports of entry into the EU are carried out at European Commission-approved border inspection posts (BIPs) [1, 42].  Estonia maintains 5 such BIPs.  Each BIP is headed by a VFB veterinary supervisory official, who directs the operations of the BIP [35].  All BIP staff are full-time civil servants [1].  The BIPs are funded from the state budget and from user fees [1, 41].  The locations, operations and biosecurity procedures in place at these BIPs are described in Section 4.7.  </p>
<h4>4.1.2.4 Diagnostic laboratory services
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">The organization and infrastructure of diagnostic laboratory services in Estonia are summarized below.  Details of laboratory capacity for CSF and SVD diagnosis are provided in Section 4.10.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The state veterinary laboratory in Estonia is the Veterinary and Food Laboratory (VAFL), which reports directly to the Ministry of Agriculture [43].  The VAFL consists of the Central VAFL, located in Tartu, and three regional VAFLs, located in Tallinn, Rakvere and Saaremaa.  All are accredited by the Estonian Accreditation Center [1, 41, 43, 44].  The VAFL is responsible for ensuring that the laboratory tests prescribed in the National Infectious Animal Disease Control Program are carried out to the extent and within the terms set out by the VFB [27], and for ensuring that in the event of a suspected or confirmed infectious animal disease occurrence, laboratory tests are carried out as ordered by the VFB [27].  Among the other responsibilities of the VAFL are carrying out state-mandated laboratory testing as part of national animal disease surveillance programs, and testing for animal import and export.  The VAFL also provides laboratory testing services to private veterinarians and farmers for diagnosis and control of animal diseases.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The Central VAFL coordinates the work of the Central and regional VAFLs.  It specializes in diagnosis of OIE-listed diseases of cattle, swine and sheep, and serves as the national reference laboratory for these diseases.  Other areas of expertise are isolation of bacteria, fungi and viruses; antigen detection; diagnostic polymerase chain reaction (PCR) analysis; and serological investigation.  Administratively, the Central VAFL is structured into 5 departments: Bacteriology and Pathology, Virology-Serology, Molecular Analysis, Food Microbiology, and Chemistry.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The Tallinn VAFL specializes in diagnosis of OIE-listed diseases of poultry and horses, and serves as the national reference laboratory for these diseases.  Other areas of expertise are diagnosis of bacterial, fungal and parasitic diseases of cattle, swine, sheep, fish and honeybees; isolation of bacteria, fungi and viruses; antigen detection; and serological investigation.  Administratively, the Tallinn VAFL is structured into 4 departments: Food Microbiology, Diagnostics, Chemistry, and Chromatography.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The areas of expertise of both the Rakvere VAFL and the Saaremaa VAFL include diagnosis of bacterial and parasitic diseases.  Administratively, each of these two laboratories is structured into two departments: Microbiology and Chemistry.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Licenses for laboratory diagnosis of animal diseases (activity licenses) are issued by the Director General of the VFB.  They are valid only for specified analysis methods and in conjunction with documented certification of approval by a reference laboratory [24].  They are issued for a term of up to 5 years, and are renewable [24].  The rights and obligations of licensed veterinary laboratories are defined in the Veterinary Activities Organization Act [24].  These obligations include participating in verification tests organized by reference laboratories, submitting veterinary reports to the VFB, and participating in the laboratory diagnosis of infectious animal diseases in the event of an outbreak.  Scientific study that requires isolation and cultivation of pathogens that cause dangerous infectious animal diseases is allowed only by permit issued as determined by the Minister of Agriculture [27].  </p>
<h4>4.1.2.5 Personnel
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">As of December 31, 2005, the VFB had a staff of 285, of which 103 were employed in the central office and 182 in the local Veterinary Center offices [45].  Approximately 60% of those in the central office, and 70% of those in the local Veterinary Center offices, had served for at least 5 years.  Approximately 20% and 25%, respectively, had served for more than 10 years.  In both the central and the local Veterinary Center offices, approximately 10% were recent hires, having served for less than one year.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In addition to these staff members, 160 individuals were contracted for service as authorized veterinarians with the VFB [1, 45].  A total of 649 veterinarians held activity licenses issued by the VFB in 2005 [45].  In 2006, public and private veterinarians in Estonia numbered 215 and 673, respectively [46].  The Central VAFL has 52 employees [43].  The Tallinn, Rakvere and Saaremaa VAFLs have 41, 16 and 10 employees, respectively.  </p>
<h4>4.1.2.6 Training</h4>
<p class="body_Text">All veterinary officials are required to keep informed of relevant legislation [1].  All current Estonian legislation is publicly available online in an electronic version of the State Gazette [1, 47].  EC legislation is also publicly available online, through the EUR-Lex website [48].  Competence is assessed annually through aptitude testing by direct superiors [1].  Knowledge of relevant legislation is also assessed as part of the selection process for authorized veterinarians [1].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">An annual training program is in place for officials of local Veterinary Center offices [1].  Meetings for training and information sharing are held regularly.  Animal Health and Welfare officials meet once every one to two months, and authorized veterinarians meet at local Veterinary Center offices once every two to three months.  Attendance at local meetings by authorized veterinarians is mandatory; other licensed veterinarians are invited to attend [41].  Lists of participants at these meetings, and meeting agendas, are kept by the central office of the VFB [1].  Electronic presentations and other materials connected with the meetings, including training materials, are emailed to all participants [1].  The central office of the VFB administers a program of training in animal health and welfare-related surveillance for authorized veterinarians.  Topics covered in mandatory training meetings organized by the VFB include EC veterinary legislation [41].  The heads of all BIPs meet once per month [41].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Individuals involved in implementing the national Contingency Plan for Control of Infectious Animal Disease are required to undergo training prescribed in the Plan [29].  The curricula are tailored to the expertise, background and responsibilities of the trainees.  For example, the curricula for laboratory officials and members of the various specialized groups established according to provisions of the Plan (see Section 4.11) cover pathogenesis of OIE-listed infectious animal diseases, clinical and laboratory diagnosis of those diseases, procedures to be followed at outbreak sites and in protection and surveillance zones, and methods of interpreting meteorological and other information related to infectious animal diseases and epidemiological investigation of outbreaks.  Training for these groups is designed to ensure effective decision-making on all levels of organization of the group or organization, and to ensure that the members of these groups and organizations take rapid, effective and appropriate actions in the event of an infectious animal disease outbreak.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The curricula for authorized veterinarians and supervisory officials cover diagnosis of OIE-listed infectious animal diseases, action plans to be implemented at sites of outbreaks or suspected outbreaks, epidemiological investigation, procedures to be followed in protection and surveillance zones, animal welfare at outbreak sites, effective decision-making, record keeping, information flow, and procedures for information reporting.  These trainees must participate in animal disease outbreak simulation exercises at least every two years [1, 29].  The scope of these exercises includes areas of both high and low animal population density, and various species of livestock.  Any deficiencies identified during the training exercises are taken into account in updating of the Contingency Plan [1].  The most recent CSF training exercise was conducted in May 2005 [38].  Training for laboratory personnel is described in Section 4.10.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Professional training in infectious animal disease control for licensed veterinarians is organized by the VFB in cooperation with members of the group of experts formed in accordance with Contingency Plan provisions (see Section 4.11) [29].  The VFB also organizes annual lectures for veterinary students, and other efforts to raise awareness among the public regarding infectious animal disease control [29].  Public education campaigns cover risks and clinical signs of infectious animal diseases, methods of spread of those diseases, the need for immediate notification of appropriate officials, and the mechanisms of compensation for economic losses caused by infectious animal diseases [29].  All of these training efforts are designed to ensure that all institutions and individuals involved in infectious animal disease control are aware of their responsibilities, and to ensure timely reporting of any suspected occurrence of infectious animal diseases [29].  </p>
<h4>4.1.2.7 Electronic systems of information sharing</h4>
<p class="body_Text">Since May 1, 2004, Estonia has participated in the Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES), an electronic system developed and maintained by the European Commission for transmission, storage and management of veterinary information relating to trade in animals and products of animal origin, for both trade that occurs within the Community, and trade that originates in countries outside the customs territory of the EC [1, 49-52].  Information in TRACES includes current statutory reference data, and data derived from common veterinary entry documents and animal health certificates.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Since March 2002, Estonia has participated in the Animal Disease Notification System [1, 53, 54].  This system is used by EU Member States to report information on outbreaks of contagious animal diseases [54].  </p>
<h4>4.1.2.8 Financial resources
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">The 2006 budget of the VFB was 6,691,123 euros [38].  This included approximately 1.5 million euros in accession assistance and surveillance funding from the EC [38].  Veterinary services provided by authorized veterinarians that are financed from the state budget are paid through the budget of the VFB [24].  Expenditures related to implementation of the infectious animal disease control program established by the VFB are covered from the state budget [27], as are the costs of laboratory testing of samples collected in the process of veterinary inspection by supervisory officials and authorized veterinarians [24].  The VAFL receives funding from three sources: the Estonian national government, for basic operational costs; user fees from the VFB for services including surveillance testing; and user fees from food processors, farmers and veterinarians [41].  </p>
<h3>4.1.3 Internal and external auditing
</h3>
<h4>4.1.3.1 Internal auditing
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">The VFB carries out supervisory audits of local Veterinary Center activities once per year in each main sector of activity (meat, milk, fish, animal health and animal welfare) [55].  The local Veterinary Center offices in turn carry out comprehensive inspections at least once per quarter in all meat and milk processing establishments, and each year formally evaluate the performance of authorized veterinarians, and audit their records [1, 41, 55].  The records audited include reports of diagnostic investigations and vaccinations administered, infectious disease reports and records of farm visits and inspections [41].  In addition, the bills submitted by authorized veterinarians for services rendered are checked against the authorized veterinarians' activity reports.  All EU Member States are required by EC regulation to ensure that official controls are carried out regularly to verify compliance with animal health rules [56].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Additional financial and performance auditing of public-sector activities is carried out by the National Audit Office of Estonia, which functions independently of the executive branch of government [57].  Its mission is to assess the use of funds and the performance of institutions of public administration, in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, in support of the goal of ensuring quality and availability of public services.  The scope of its audits includes offices in a broad range of government ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as local and county governments.    </p>
<h4>4.1.3.2 External auditing
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">The veterinary services of all EU Member States, including Estonia, are audited regularly by the European Commission to ensure that applicable EC legislation is properly implemented and enforced [1, 56, 58].  General rules and procedures for veterinary inspections and audits by the European Commission are established by Commission Decision [59].  The audits include on-site inspections by mission teams from the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) of the Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General of the European Commission.  The schedule for these inspections is set annually and reviewed mid-year, to ensure that it remains up to date and relevant [58].  The findings of each inspection are described in an inspection report, together with conclusions and recommendations.  The competent authority of the Member State visited is requested to present an action plan to the FVO on how it intends to address any shortcomings identified in the inspection.  The FVO evaluates this action plan and monitors its implementation through a number of follow-up activities.  Both the inspection schedule and the inspection reports, with any responses from the country visited, are publicly available [58].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Subjects of recent inspections by the FVO in Estonia include BIPs (2004); animal and public health (2004 and 2005); animal byproducts (2005); and import controls and BIPs (2006) [58].  Estonian veterinary authority and competence related to import and transit control of products of animal origin and live animals are scheduled for inspection by the FVO in 2007 [60, 61].  </p>
<h3>4.1.4 Discussion</h3>
<p class="body_Text">The official veterinary services of Estonia are hierarchically organized and appear to have clear lines of command and reporting.  The responsibilities of each supervisory position and the departments and offices of the VFB are well defined.  The official veterinary services in general appear to have sufficient legal authority and resources to carry out animal health activities quickly and efficiently.  Responsibility for control and eradication of CSF and SVD, regulation of animal and animal product movement, and regulation of the import and export of animals and animal products is shared among the EC and Estonian authorities at both the national and the county level (see Sections 4.7, 4.8 and 4.11 for further details).  Auditing systems are thorough and well structured.  Veterinary services at both the county and the national level are audited regularly according to detailed plans, by both internal and external evaluators.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Previously, APHIS identified administrative units within several EU Member States to which APHIS could regionalize those Member States for disease status recognition purposes in the event of an animal disease outbreak [62, 63].  The administrative units were identified as the smallest administrative units of jurisdiction that have effective oversight of normal animal movements into, out of and within the jurisdiction, and that, in association with national authorities, if necessary, have effective control over animal movements and animal diseases locally.  At that time, APHIS proposed to identify an appropriate administrative unit for regionalization of Estonia, in response to an EC request [63].  APHIS considers the appropriate administrative unit for Estonia for disease status recognition purposes in the event of an animal disease outbreak to be the county.  </p>
<h2>4.2 Disease status of the region
</h2>
<h3>4.2.1 Overview
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">The most recent outbreak of CSF in Estonia occurred in January 1994 [1, 46, 64].  The most recent occurrence of CSF in Estonia prior to that was in 1958 [1].  The 1994 outbreak occurred on a domestic swine farm in Viljandi county [1].  This outbreak was controlled and the disease was eradicated from the farm through quarantine and slaughter, followed by cleaning and disinfection.  Of the 738 swine on the farm, 249 were diagnosed clinically with CSF and died, and 489 were slaughtered.  No swine were vaccinated.  The farm was cleaned and disinfected, and 30 days after lifting of quarantine restrictions, repopulation of the farm was permitted.  No cases of official suspicion of CSF have occurred since eradication of the 1994 outbreak [1].  SVD has never been diagnosed in Estonia, and Estonia has never reported the occurrence of SVD in Estonia to the OIE [1, 46].  
</p>
<h3>4.2.2 Discussion
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">The long-term lack of detection of CSF and SVD in Estonia despite surveillance for these diseases (see Section 4.9) suggests that measures to guard against the introduction of these diseases into Estonia have been successful.  These measures are discussed in Section 4.7.  One potential consequence of long-term absence, or lack of diagnosis, of CSF or SVD in any country is lack of experience in the diagnosis, control and eradication of the disease.  Measures in place in Estonia that address this concern include implementation of personnel training programs, and development of emergency response capabilities to control an outbreak and eradicate the disease should it occur (see Sections 4.1.2.6 and 4.11).</p>
<h2>4.3 Disease status of adjacent regions
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">Most of Estonia is surrounded by large bodies of water (Figure 3) [40, 65].  Its only land borders are with EU Member State Latvia to the south, and Russia to the east.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">
<img src="embedded:image3" alt="image3"></p>
<p class="caption"><b>Figure 3.  Estonia and surrounding regions (main map), and the location of Estonia in Europe (inset).</b></p>
<p class="body_Text">In a 2006 evaluation, APHIS determined that the CSF risk profile for Latvia was equivalent to that of 15 EU Member States that APHIS recognizes as a single region of low risk for CSF (the EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Republic of Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man and Northern Ireland; 9 CFR 94.9)) [3, 66, 67].  According to the results of that evaluation and OIE data, the most recent outbreak of CSF in Latvia occurred in domestic swine in 1996, in the western districts of Talsi and Tukums, neither of which shares a land border with Estonia [46, 64].  Based on the results of the 2006 evaluation, APHIS has proposed that Latvia be recognized as free of SVD [66, 67].  Latvia has never reported the occurrence of SVD to the OIE [46, 64].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">APHIS has not formally evaluated the CSF or SVD status of Russia.  According to OIE data, Russia experienced multiple outbreaks of CSF each year from at least 1996 to 2005, and most recently in 2010.  Most of these outbreaks, including the 2010 outbreak, occurred in domestic swine, west of the Ural mountains.  The most recent outbreaks in the two administrative regions of Russia that border Estonia occurred in the province of Leningrad in April 2000, and in the province of Pskov in December 1999, in domestic swine.  These outbreaks were controlled by slaughter and vaccination.  Russia has never reported the occurrence of SVD to the OIE [46, 64].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The occurrence of CSF in Russia is a potential risk factor for its introduction into Estonia.  However, it appears to have remained contained, with adequate measures in place to prevent its spread to Estonia.  Factors that mitigate the risk of CSF and SVD introduction into Estonia are discussed in Section 4.7.  CSF has not occurred since at least 2000 in any of the regions of Russia or Latvia that are adjacent to Estonia, and SVD has never been reported to have occurred in those regions.  The regions adjacent to Estonia do not appear to pose a high risk as potential sources of CSF and SVD introduction into Estonia.  </p>
<h2>4.4 Extent of an active disease control program
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">Due to the absence of CSF and SVD outbreaks in Estonia in recent years, no CSF and SVD control programs are currently active in Estonia.  However, Estonia has a well-developed system in place to limit the risk of introduction of CSF and SVD into the country, and to detect and respond to any introduction rapidly, should it occur.  Components of this system include surveillance for CSF and SVD (see Section 4.9); emergency response planning and capacity development (see Section 4.11); and animal movement controls, animal health certification requirements, and restrictions as to the countries and regions from which trade of swine and swine products to Estonia is permitted (see Section 4.7).  The measures in place in Estonia appear to be sufficient for rapid detection, control and eradication of CSF and SVD in Estonia should they occur.  </p>
<h2>4.5 Vaccination status
</h2>
<h3>4.5.1 Overview
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">General preventive vaccination against CSF and SVD in Estonia is prohibited by both EC and Estonian legislation [1, 32, 33, 68-71].  Emergency vaccination against CSF is permitted only under exceptional circumstances to prevent spread of the disease, and only upon authorization from both the European Commission and the Minister of Agriculture.  No vaccine against SVD is commercially available [18].  The circumstances under which emergency vaccination can be authorized, and the procedures that must be followed for emergency vaccination, are specified in EC and Estonian legislation, in the detailed Estonian CSF and SVD Prevention Instructions, and in the Estonian Contingency Plan for Control of Infectious Animal Disease (see also Section 4.11.8) [29, 70, 71].  Use of live CSF or SVD virus for diagnostic and scientific research, and for the production of vaccine, is prohibited [32, 33].  Production, distribution, sale and acquisition of CSF vaccine is permitted only by authorization from the VFB [70].  </p>
<h3>4.5.2 Discussion
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Awareness of vaccination status is important in the design and evaluation of infectious animal disease detection and control programs, because vaccination can interfere with efforts to detect and control the spread of disease by complicating laboratory testing for the disease [5, 68].  The likelihood of such interference occurring in Estonia due to vaccination against CSF and SVD in Estonia is extremely low: general preventive vaccination against CSF and SVD in Estonia is prohibited; emergency vaccination is permitted only under exceptional circumstances and is subject to strict regulation by both Estonian and EC legislation; no SVD vaccine is commercially available; and production and use of CSF vaccine is strictly regulated by the VFB.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The likelihood of CSF- or SVD-vaccinated swine entering Estonia from other regions also appears to be low.  EC legislation prohibits importation of swine that have been vaccinated for CSF or SVD, and requires that swine imports into the EU originate from regions in which vaccination against CSF and SVD is prohibited [72, 73].  The risk of importing CSF virus-infected swine from Bulgaria and Romania, in which emergency vaccination has been authorized by the EC, is mitigated by the prohibition against dispatch of swine from Bulgaria and Romania to other EU Member States [74, 75].  The risk of migration of vaccinated wild boar into Estonia is mitigated by the lack of vaccination in most nearby regions, and the natural barriers to migration posed by the large bodies of water surrounding most of Estonia.  Overall, the likelihood of entry of CSF- or SVD-vaccinated swine into Estonia appears to be low.  </p>
<h2>4.6 Separation from adjacent regions of higher risk
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">Estonia is separated from most nearby regions by large bodies of water (Figure 3).  It is bordered to the southwest by the Gulf of Riga, to the west by the Baltic Sea, to the north by the Gulf of Finland, and to the east by Lake Peipus, Lake Pskov and the Narva River.  Two of the 15 counties of Estonia, Hiiu and Saare, are islands.  Most of Estonia's border with Russia, to the east, runs through several bodies of water: Lake Peipus, the largest lake in Estonia; Lake Pskov; and the Narva River.  The Narva River, with an average width of 250-400 meters and depth of 4-6 meters, flows northward along the Estonia-Russia border from Lake Peipus to the Gulf of Finland [76].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Estonia shares land borders with only two countries: EU Member State Latvia to the south, and Russia to the east.  Estonia's land border with Latvia extends approximately 150 miles.  Its land border with Russia extends approximately 50 miles to the south of Lake Peipus and Lake Pskov.  The border between Estonia and Russia is patrolled daily by border guards with dogs [41].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">APHIS does not consider Latvia to be a region of high risk for CSF and SVD.  Based on the results of a 2006 evaluation, APHIS considers Latvia to be a region of low risk for CSF, and has proposed that Latvia be recognized as free of SVD (see Section 4.3).  APHIS has not formally evaluated the CSF and SVD status of Russia.  However, CSF has not been reported to have occurred in either of the two administrative regions of Russia that border Estonia in recent years, and SVD has never been reported to have occurred anywhere in Russia (see Section 4.3).  Thus, Estonia is well separated from most nearby regions by large bodies of water, and land regions immediately adjacent to Estonia do not appear to pose a high risk for CSF and SVD.  </p>
<h2>4.7 Control of animal and animal product movement from higher risk areas</h2>
<p class="body_Text">Movement of animals and animal products into Estonia is a potential risk factor for CSF and SVD introduction into Estonia.  As noted above, APHIS does not consider the regions neighboring Estonia to pose a high risk as potential sources of CSF and SVD introduction into Estonia (see Section 4.3).  Residual risk from these regions, and risk from other regions, is mitigated by numerous import controls and biosecurity measures.  These are discussed below in terms of controls on imports from third countries, controls on trade from other EU Member States, and veterinary control of passenger traffic.  Risk from imports of swine and swine products is also discussed in terms of the volumes and countries of origin of such imports.  
</p>
<h3>4.7.1 Controls on imports from third countries
</h3>
<h4>4.7.1.1 Legislative controls
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">Both EC and Estonian legislation governs importation of animals and animal products into Estonia from third countries.  The EC legislation is designed to ensure that animals and animal products imported into EU Member States meet standards at least equivalent to those required for production in, and trade between, EU Member States [77].  Supervisory responsibility for implementation of this legislation lies with the Trade, Import and Export Department of the VFB of Estonia, and with the Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General of the European Commission [1, 38, 77].  Key provisions and the scope of this legislation are summarized below.  Details of legislative controls and certification requirements are provided in Appendices 8.1 and 8.2.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">In general, animals and animal products can be legally imported into the EU only from third countries or parts thereof that are approved for export to the EU by EC legislation, and only through BIPs approved by the European Commission [35, 42, 72, 73].  In most cases, evaluation of a country's application for approval involves an on-site inspection by the FVO, to determine whether the animal health situation and relevant official services, legal provisions, control systems and production standards meet EU requirements [77].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">At the time that this report was being prepared, 4 third countries were authorized to export live swine to EU Member States: Chile, Iceland, New Zealand and Switzerland [72].  Six third countries were authorized to export fresh meat of swine to EU Member States: Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States [72].  Norway was also authorized to export live swine and fresh swine meat to EU Member States, in accordance with provisions of the European Economic Area Agreement [78].  Under the framework of this Agreement, Norway applies EC veterinary provisions sufficient to meet EC requirements for imports of these commodities [78].  APHIS recognizes all of these countries as free of SVD, and all of these except Switzerland as free of CSF (9 CFR 94.9; 9 CFR 94.12) [3].  APHIS has not formally evaluated the CSF status of Switzerland; however, it has initiated such an evaluation.  The most recent outbreaks of CSF and SVD in Switzerland that were reported to the OIE occurred in 1999 and 1975, respectively [46, 64].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Additional EC requirements for live swine exports to the EU include that the swine originate from a region that is free of CSF and SVD, and in which vaccination against CSF and SVD is prohibited [73].  The swine must undergo a veterinary health check both prior to shipment and upon arrival at the BIP of entry, and must not be transported together with animals of a lower health status [72, 73, 79].  Swine products, semen, ova and embryos for export to the EU must also meet region of origin and other animal health requirements [80-84].  Swine products must meet processing or treatment conditions, such as a requirement for heat treatment to a specified temperature or maturation to a specified pH [80, 81].  The details of these requirements vary by country or region of origin of the commodity.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Estonian legislation is harmonized with applicable EC legislation.  The main instrument of Estonian legislative authority for control of animal and animal product imports is the Veterinary Supervision over Trade in, Import and Export of Animals and Animal Products Act [35].  This Act specifies the principles governing the organization of checks for conformity with veterinary requirements for animals and animal products; specifies which animals and animal products are subject to such checks; specifies the procedure, bases and extent of state supervision over compliance with this Act and legislation based on it; and specifies the liabilities for violation of this Act [35].  It provides the VFB with the authority to prohibit importation of animals and animal products from countries or regions in which an epizootic disease occurs, and to prohibit the importation of animals that are infected, or suspected to be infected, with an epizootic disease.  Additional provisions of this Act are described in Appendix 8.1.  </p>
<h4>4.7.1.2 BIPs</h4>
<p class="body_Text">Live swine and swine products for importation into the EU are subject to veterinary checks [85].  These checks are authorized by EC legislation to be performed only at BIPs approved for such checks by the European Commission [42].  The BIPs are inspected regularly by Commission veterinary experts, who review compliance with EC legislation on import controls at the BIPs.  The scope of these inspections includes all aspects of implementation of EC legislation on veterinary import control, including infrastructure, equipment and procedures [42].  The locations, operations and biosecurity procedures in place at the BIPs in Estonia are described below.  Requirements for veterinary checks are described in Section 4.7.1.3.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Of the 5 European Commission-approved BIPs in Estonia, two are located at road border crossings between Estonia and Russia: at Narva in the north and Luhamaa in the south [1, 42].  The other three are located at northern ports: at Paldiski, Muuga and Paljassare.  Each BIP is authorized to accept only EC-specified categories of commodities [42].  Of the BIPs in Estonia, only the BIP at Luhamaa is authorized to accept imports of live animals [42, 86].  All 5 BIPs in Estonia are authorized to accept imports of products of animal origin, with specific category restrictions applying to all BIPs except the one at Luhamaa [42].  For example, the Paldiski BIP is authorized to accept only packed products, and the Paljassare BIP is authorized to accept only packed, frozen products for human consumption.  All authorized BIPs and category restrictions are listed in Commission Decision 2001/881/EC [42].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">BIPs must be notified of incoming veterinary consignments by fax at least 24 hours prior to the arrival of the consignments [35, 41].  The procedures to be used for notification regarding planned importation of animals or animal products are detailed in European Commission Regulations [35, 87, 88].  Incoming consignments and documentation are received by Customs, which notifies VFB personnel of the arrival of any animal or animal product consignments.  Provisions for cooperation between the VFB and the Tax and Customs Board at BIPs are formalized in a general cooperation agreement.  This agreement has been in place since 2001, and was updated in 2004 [1].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Animal products confiscated at BIPs are stored in designated refrigerators or other containers prior to transport to a licensed incinerator or rendering plant [38].  Animal waste materials, including manure and bedding, from BIPs are sent to a rendering plant for processing [38].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Transport vehicles and containers carrying live animals entering Estonia must be certified as having been cleaned and disinfected prior to loading [72].  Routine cleaning and disinfection of transport vehicles entering Estonia is not required.  Customs officials are instructed to prohibit entry of trucks that are dirty or carrying manure [41].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">In the event that a danger of infectious animal disease introduction into Estonia via transport vehicles is identified, such as the occurrence of such a disease in an adjacent country, disinfection barriers are erected at BIPs [38].  Additional vehicle and pedestrian disinfection barriers are erected on roads and at ports as necessary, such as was done in Estonia in 2001 during an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the United Kingdom [38, 41].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">During a site visit to the Narva BIP in November 2005, APHIS noted that live swine were shipped from Estonia through the Narva BIP to a destination in Russia approximately 40 miles from the border, in trucks based in Estonia [41].  For returning trucks not carrying live animals, no documentation of routes or use of the trucks while in Russia is required to be presented at the BIP upon return of the trucks to Estonia [41].  Any returning trucks carrying live animals must return through the Luhamaa BIP [41, 42].  
</p>
<h4>4.7.1.3 Veterinary inspection
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">Rules and procedures for veterinary checks on live animals and animal products for importation into Estonia from third countries are detailed in several instruments of EC and Estonian legislation.  General principles governing the organization of these checks on animals and animal products are provided in Council Directives 91/496/EEC and 97/78/EC, respectively [79, 89].  Provisions of these Directives are incorporated into Estonian legislation in the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act, the Act on Veterinary Checks on Animals and Animal Products in Intra-Community Trade and Trade with Third Countries, and associated regulations [90].  Detailed rules and procedures for implementation of the provisions in these two Directives are provided in Commission Decision 97/794/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 136/2004 [88, 91].  The animals and<b> </b>products that are subject to controls at BIPs under these two Directives are listed in Commission Decision 2007/275/EC [85].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">At each BIP in Estonia, the head of the BIP is responsible for the veterinary checks carried out at the BIP [35].  The veterinary checks, which include document, identity and physical checks, are performed by veterinary supervisory officials [35, 41, 79, 89].  All BIPs in Estonia are required to have a sufficient number of veterinary supervisory officials to perform veterinary checks [35].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In the veterinary checks, veterinary certificates and other documentation accompanying consignments presented for importation are checked for compliance with EC and Estonian requirements [79, 89].  The consignments are inspected to determine whether the items in the consignment match the information provided in the documentation.  Physical checks can include sampling of animals and products for laboratory testing, and checking of product packaging and temperature for compliance with requirements.  Physical checks of animals include clinical examination to assess clinical health status.  Veterinary supervisory officials at BIPs are authorized to conduct additional checks as necessary, such as on means of transport or during quarantine (see below) [35, 79, 89].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Consignments that do not pass the veterinary check are declared nonconforming.  Nonconforming animal products must be returned to the country of origin or destroyed [35].  Nonconforming animals must be returned to the country of origin, sent to quarantine, or in the event neither is possible, sent to slaughter [35].  Veterinary supervisory officials have the authority to have any animals sent to quarantine or slaughter, or animal products destroyed, that are found through veterinary inspection at destination or during transport to be a danger to human or animal health [35].   The VFB must report to the European Commission the species, class, type and origin of consignments that do not pass veterinary checks at BIPs and that present a direct danger to human or animal health, and must increase the efficiency of veterinary checks of consignments that contain animals or animal products of the same species, class, type and origin [35].    </p>
<h4>4.7.1.4 Quarantine
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">The VFB has the authority to require that imported animals be placed in prophylactic quarantine [35].  Quarantine can occur at a European Commission-approved quarantine center in the country of origin; at a quarantine center in the EC; or on the holding of destination [35, 79].  Quarantine centers must be under permanent control and responsibility of an official veterinarian and meet other requirements set out by EC legislation, including having an efficient control system to ensure adequate surveillance of the animals, having sufficient equipment and facilities for cleaning and disinfection, and having appropriate equipment for rapid exchange of information with BIPs and competent veterinary authorities [79].  
</p>
<h4>4.7.1.5 Veterinary control of passenger traffic
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">The main passenger crossing points into Estonia from third countries are Tallinn airport in the north, road and railway crossings at Narva in the northeast, and road crossings at Saatse, Koidula and Luhamaa in the southeast [92].  Estonia shares a land border with only one third country, Russia.  The daily volume of passenger traffic across the Estonia-Russia land border is approximately 6500 passengers at Narva, 700 passengers at Luhamaa and 800 passengers at Koidula, with slightly higher numbers during summer months [38].  Passenger vehicle traffic through the Luhamaa BIP includes vehicles from the Ukraine and Belarus [41].    
</p>
<p class="body_Text">All meat and meat products brought into the EU by travelers, or sent to private persons, are subject to EC import requirements [88, 89, 93, 94].  The meat and meat products can come from only specified third countries that have undergone an EC audit that demonstrates that the competent veterinary authority of that country provides appropriate guarantees as to compliance with EC legislation [93].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">EU Member States are required to implement official controls at points of entry into the EC to detect the presence of illegal consignments of meat and meat products [94].  All personal consignments that are found to be in breach of applicable EC rules must be seized and destroyed [94].  The European Commission has the authority to review animal or public health controls on imports and on passengers' personal luggage at both BIP and non-BIP points of entry [42].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">EU Member States are also required to ensure that at all designated points of entry into the EC, the animal health conditions for importation of products of animal origin are brought to the attention of travelers arriving from third countries [94].  Measures implemented in Estonia to publicize regulations regarding personal imports of meat, and to enhance the enforcement and effectiveness of those regulations, include distribution of informational leaflets to travelers; hanging of informational posters at border crossing points; distribution of press releases; training for Customs officers, Border Guard officers, Customs brokers and Central Post Office staff; and dissemination of information to Customs officers and Customs clients [38, 94].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Luggage checks at border crossings are performed by Customs officials [41].  All incoming cars are opened and inspected, including car trunks, for prohibited food items (any food of animal origin, except baby food).  Ten percent of incoming buses are subject to X-ray inspection of all luggage.  Luggage on the remainder of buses is subject to random checks of several bags.  Luggage of pedestrians is also checked.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">During an APHIS site visit to the Narva BIP in November 2005, BIP officials noted that prohibited food items were not frequently found in luggage, due in part to food prices being lower in Estonia than in Russia, and to the travel distances generally being short [41].  Most of the passenger traffic into Estonia at the Narva BIP consisted of pedestrian traffic, due in part to the proximity to the border of a town in Russia.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">During an APHIS site visit to the Luhamaa BIP in November 2005, BIP officials reported that the BIP experienced a high volume of road traffic from individuals crossing the border to purchase gasoline, tobacco and alcohol in Russia, where these commodities are less expensive than they are in Estonia [41].  Few pedestrians cross the border into Estonia at Luhamaa, due to the absence of any heavily populated towns across the border in Russia.  BIP officials reported that approximately two to three buses, traveling a Kiev to Tallinn route, passed through the BIP per week, and that the weekly number was slightly higher during summer months [41].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Individuals entering Estonia are prohibited from visiting farms within 48 hours after arrival in the country [38].  Local Veterinary Center offices must be informed of visits by individuals from outside Estonia to commercial farms [41].  Records of such visits can be used for traceback purposes in the event of an infectious disease outbreak [41].  </p>
<h3>4.7.2 Transit and transshipment controls
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Transit through Estonia of goods that are subject to veterinary controls is supervised by the Trade, Import and Export Department of the VFB [35, 38].  Transit of animal or animal product consignments is permitted under the following conditions [35, 79, 89]: 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· the consignment originates in a country from which importation of the consignment is permitted; 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· the documents accompanying the consignment indicate that the consignment is for transit; 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· the transit has been approved in advance by the veterinary supervisory official of the BIP of entry; 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· the person responsible for the consignment guarantees that in the event that permission to import the consignment into a third country is denied, the consignment will be handled in accordance with requirements for handling non-conforming animal products, and that animals will not be returned to the country of origin through the EC. 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Animals transiting Estonia to another EU Member State must undergo veterinary checks at the BIP of entry into Estonia, or must undergo documentary and identity checks at the BIP, and physical checks at the establishment of destination [35].  In the latter case, the animals are permitted to leave the BIP of entry only in a sealed vehicle [79].  Consignments transiting the EC must be transported in sealed containers under Customs supervision, and must leave the EC through a BIP within 30 days after departure from the BIP of entry, unless specifically otherwise provided for by EC legislation due to geographical restrictions [89].  </p>
<h3>4.7.3 Controls on intra-Community trade</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Intra-Community trade in goods that are subject to veterinary controls is supervised in Estonia by the Trade, Import and Export Department of the VFB [38].  These goods and the scope of controls are defined by both EC and Estonian legislation [35, 83, 95-97].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The recipient in Estonia of a consignment from another Member State must inform the VFB of the type of consignment, its origin and destination, and its estimated time of arrival, at least 24 hours prior to the estimated time of arrival [35].  Veterinary checks must be carried out on the goods at their origin or their destination in Estonia [35].  Such checks can also be performed during transport, and on means of transport, if violation of veterinary requirements is suspected [35].  Animals and animal products must meet the following requirements for intra-Community trade [35, 95, 96]:  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· they must originate from a holding, center or organization that is under state veterinary control; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· animals must have been identified and registered in the state register of farm animals, and originate from an identifiable holding, center or organization; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· they must be accompanied by appropriate documentation; 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· if part of a shipment intended for transport to several destinations, they  must be grouped in batches by destination.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Additional restrictions apply to animals that are susceptible to epizootic disease, and products derived from such animals [35, 36].  Such animals and products cannot originate from a holding, center, organization or region that is subject to restrictions related to the suspicion, outbreak, prevention or control of an epizootic disease.  Intra-Community trade of animals that are subject to slaughter under an epizootic disease control program, or any products derived from such animals, is also prohibited.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Domestic swine must be identified in accordance with requirements specified in the Infectious Animal Control Disease Act and Council Directive 92/102/EEC; and must have been declared healthy, as determined by clinical inspection performed by a veterinary supervisory official within 24 hours prior to removal of the swine from the herd of origin [27, 35, 36, 98].  The vehicles used to transport the swine must be cleaned and disinfected after or immediately prior to transport of each consignment, at a cleaning and disinfection site officially authorized by the VFB [36].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Additional requirements apply to intra-Community trade in swine for breeding or production [36].  Swine for breeding or production must have remained on the holding of origin for at least the 30 days preceding loading for transport, or must have been born on the holding if the swine are younger than 30 days.  A veterinary supervisory official must certify that based on clinical examination and records checks, the swine meet all veterinary requirements, and the official is convinced that the swine were born in the EU or legally imported into the EU.  Once imported swine have entered a herd, no swine are permitted to be removed from that herd for consignment to another EU Member State for at least 30 days from the day of introduction of the imported swine into the herd.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Swine semen for intra-Community trade must also meet strict animal health conditions set by both EC and Estonian legislation [37, 83].  These conditions include requirements as to the origin, collection, processing, storage and transport of the semen, and requirements for associated documentation.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">To reduce the risk of spread of CSF and SVD from affected EU Member States to other Member States, the EC has developed several legislative measures specific to affected Member States [74, 75, 99].  In general, these measures apply in addition to the animal health control measures applicable to all EU Member States.  The measures, and the Member States and regions of Member States to which they apply, are specified in Commission Decisions that are updated regularly as the CSF and SVD situation in the EU changes.  Among the measures are additional restrictions on movement of swine both to other Member States, and within affected Member States; additional requirements for serological testing and clinical examination for CSF or SVD; and additional animal health certification requirements.  </p>
<h3>4.7.4 Volume and sources of imports</h3>
<p class="body_Text">The volume and sources of swine and swine product imports into Estonia are summarized below.  More detailed data are provided in Appendix 8.3.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">From 1999 through the end of 2006, Estonia imported a total of 473 live swine, all from European countries [100].  From the beginning of 2005, the first full year of Estonia's membership in the EU, through the end of 2006, Estonia imported a total of 58 live swine, all from Finland, Sweden and Norway.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The annual volume of swine product imports into Estonia ranged from approximately 12,000 metric tons to approximately 15,000 metric tons from 1999 through 2004, the year in which Estonia acceded to the EU [100].  All of these imports originated in European countries, except a small percentage prior to 2004 that originated in Canada and the United States.  The volume of swine product imports into Estonia has increased since then, from almost 15,000 metric tons in 2004, to approximately 16,500 metric tons in 2005 and 20,000 metric tons in 2006.  Since 2005, Estonia has imported swine products from only EU Member States.  
</p>
<h3>4.7.5 Discussion
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">In general, import and intra-Community trade control systems are well developed and effectively implemented in Estonia.  The controls are well organized, and supported by extensive legislative authority and infrastructure.  Personnel are well trained regarding relevant legislation and procedures.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Potential routes of CSF or SVD introduction into Estonia through trade and other traffic into the country are trade of swine and swine products, vehicle and human traffic, and importation of swine products for personal consumption.  The risks from these pathways, and means of their mitigation, are summarized below.  </p>
<h4>4.7.5.1 Trade of swine and swine products</h4>
<p class="body_Text">Trade of CSF or SVD virus infected swine or contaminated swine products into Estonia is one possible means of introduction of CSF or SVD into Estonia.  The occurrence of CSF or SVD in countries from which swine and swine product trade into Estonia originates is a potential risk factor for its introduction into Estonia through this pathway.  Potential sources of swine and swine product trade into Estonia are other EU Member States and third countries.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The risk from this pathway is mitigated by EC and Estonian legislation that is designed to limit the likelihood of introduction of CSF and SVD.  These measures include restrictions as to the sources from which such trade is permitted, and requirements for veterinary inspection and veterinary health certification.  Source is restricted in terms of country of origin, and in some cases region and premises or production facility of origin.  Approved sources are subject to inspections to verify compliance with EC animal health requirements.  The risk from CSF- or SVD-affected EU Member States specifically is also mitigated by the enhanced animal health control measures aimed at controlling and eradicating CSF and SVD from those Member States, and preventing their spread into other Member States.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The few countries that are authorized to export swine and fresh swine meat to Estonia do not appear to pose a high risk as potential sources of CSF or SVD virus.  The risk from swine products is also mitigated by the restrictions as to the origin of the swine from which the products are derived, and requirements for processing designed to inactivate viral disease agents.  Overall, the likelihood of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia through trade of swine or swine products appears to be low.  
</p>
<h4>4.7.5.2 Vehicle and human traffic
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">Another potential means of CSF or SVD introduction into Estonia is vehicle or human traffic contaminated with CSF or SVD virus.  The occurrence of CSF or SVD in countries from which vehicle or human traffic into Estonia originates is a potential risk factor for its introduction into Estonia through this pathway.  Although Estonia shares land borders with only two countries, overland and air traffic into Estonia originates from numerous countries.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The vast majority of air travelers do not likely arrive directly from agricultural visits to CSF- or SVD-affected countries, and their clothing and luggage are thus not likely to have been contaminated with CSF or SVD virus immediately prior to arrival in Estonia.  Most air travelers are also not accompanied by personal vehicles, which otherwise might serve as a means of introduction of CSF or SVD virus into the country.  In general, passenger air travel does not appear to pose a high risk of introducing CSF or SVD into Estonia.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Another potential means of CSF or SVD introduction is overland traffic into the country from a CSF- or SVD-affected region.  The risk of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia through this pathway is mitigated by several factors.  First, no reported outbreaks of CSF or SVD have occurred in recent years in Latvia and in the regions of Russia that border Estonia.  This decreases the likelihood of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia directly from these regions.  Second, Customs officials are instructed to prohibit entry of trucks that are dirty or carrying manure.  This increases the likelihood that trucks entering Estonia will have been cleaned prior to entry.  Third, transport vehicles and containers carrying live animals entering Estonia must be certified as having been cleaned and disinfected prior to loading.  Finally, procedures are in place in Estonia to erect disinfection barriers for vehicles and pedestrians at BIPs and other points of entry in the event of heightened risk of introduction of an infectious animal disease.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The risk of exposure of domestic swine in Estonia to CSF or SVD virus from contaminated vehicles, clothing or shoes is mitigated by the prohibition against visiting farms within 48 hours after arrival in the country.  This risk is further mitigated on large production enterprises in particular by implementation of biosecurity measures such as cleaning and disinfection of vehicles prior to entering the premises, and requirements that visitors to the premises wear protective clothing.  Overall, the likelihood of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia, and exposure of domestic swine to the virus, through vehicle or human traffic appears to be low.  </p>
<h4>4.7.5.3 Importation of swine products for personal consumption
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">Another potential means of CSF or SVD introduction into Estonia is importation of CSF or SVD virus-contaminated swine products for personal consumption.  The occurrence of CSF or SVD in the source countries of these products, or the swine from which they are derived, is a potential risk factor for its introduction into Estonia through this pathway.  Swine products contaminated with CSF or SVD virus pose a risk of being the source of infection of swine, for example through consumption by the swine of contaminated food waste.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Several measures in place in Estonia mitigate the risk of CSF or SVD virus introduction through this pathway.  As is the case for trade of swine and swine products into Estonia, agricultural commodities for personal consumption are permitted entry into Estonia only if they originate from European Commission-authorized third countries, or from other EU Member States.  In all cases, bringing of these commodities into Estonia is subject to strict animal health regulation, by both the EC and Estonia.  Other regulatory measures include the requirement for veterinary inspection of most such commodities at ports of entry; the requirement for EU Member States to implement official controls at points of entry into the EC to detect the presence of illegal consignments of meat and meat products; and the requirement that all prohibited commodities be seized and destroyed.  Also mitigating the risk are the efforts in Estonia to increase awareness among the traveling public, and training of Customs, Border Guard and Postal officials, regarding the risks and regulations pertaining to introduction of such commodities into the country.  The risk of exposure of domestic swine to CSF or SVD virus through feeding of contaminated commodities is mitigated by the prohibition against garbage feeding in Estonia.  Overall, the likelihood of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia, and exposure of domestic swine to the virus, through importation of swine products for personal consumption appears to be low.  </p>
<h2>4.8 Livestock demographics and marketing practices </h2>
<h3>4.8.1 Domestic swine population</h3>
<p class="body_Text">The size of the domestic swine population in Estonia remained almost constant at approximately 350,000 swine from 2002 to 2006 [1, 101, 102].  The geographic distribution of domestic swine by county is shown in Figure 4, as percentages of the total domestic swine population [1, 39].  The county with the largest percentage of the domestic swine population is Viljandi, with 27%.  This county is located in central Estonia and shares a land border with Latvia to the south.  The counties with the next largest percentages of the domestic swine population are Lääne-Viru with 12%, Järva with 11%, Rapla with 9%, and Jõgeva and Tartu with 8% each.  None of these counties shares a land border with Latvia or Russia.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">
<img src="embedded:image4" alt="image4"></p>
<p class="caption"><b>Figure 4.  Geographic distribution of domestic swine in Estonia, by county.  
</b></p>
<p class="body_Text">The county with the smallest percentage of the domestic swine population is the island county of Hiiu with 0%.  The three counties that share a land border with Russia are among those with the next smallest percentages of the domestic swine population: Ida-Viru and Põlva with 2% each, and Võru with 1%.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">During each of the years 2002 to 2004, the total number of swine holdings was approximately 3835, and approximately 350,000 swine were slaughtered per year [1].  Approximately 85% of swine in Estonia are reared in production enterprises, with most swine kept by 30 large-scale industrial enterprises in holdings of at least 2000 swine [1].  The distance between production units is usually more than 1 km, and the density of swine farms in Estonia generally is low.  Pasturing of swine, or otherwise keeping them outdoors, is not a common practice in Estonia.  In rare cases, some small backyard farms keep swine in outdoor fenced yards during the summer months (June to August) [1].  </p>
<h3>4.8.2 Wild boar population</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Estimates of the wild boar population size in Estonia are based on data from hunting associations [41].  The number of wild boar in Estonia in 2004 and 2005 was estimated at 17,000 [1, 41].  The geographic distribution of wild boar by county is shown in Figure 5, as percentages of the total wild boar population (due to rounding, the percentages do not total 100) [38, 39].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">
<img src="embedded:image5" alt="image5"></p>
<p class="caption"><b>Figure 5.  Geographic distribution of wild boar in Estonia, by county.  
</b></p>
<p class="body_Text">The counties with the largest percentages of the wild boar population are Pärnu with 12%, and Rapla and Harju with 9% each.  Of these three counties, none shares a land border with Russia, and only Pärnu shares a land border (approximately 40 miles long) with Latvia.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The counties with the smallest percentages of the wild boar population are the island county of Hiiu with 4%, and the eastern counties of Ida-Viru with 4% and Tartu, Põlva and Võru with 5% each.  The three counties that share a land border with Russia (Ida-Viru, Põlva and Võru) are among these counties with the smallest percentages of the domestic swine population.  </p>
<h3>4.8.3 Animal identification and registration system
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Minimum requirements for animal identification and registration in the EC are established by Council Directive 92/102/EEC [98].  Each Member State must ensure that the competent authority has an up-to-date list of holdings in its territory, listing the animal keeper and the species of animals.  Holdings must remain listed in the register for three years after animals are no longer kept on the holding.  The European Commission and competent authority of the Member State must have access to all information collected under this Directive.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Member States must ensure that keepers of swine maintain a register that lists the number of animals present on the holding, and includes an up-to-date record of movements of swine to and from the holding, including origin and destination, dates of the movements, and animal identification information [98].  Animal keepers must supply the competent authority, upon request, with all information regarding the origin, identification and, as appropriate, destination of animals that the keeper has owned, kept, transported, marketed or slaughtered.  All of this information must remain available for at least three years.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Animals must be marked as soon as possible, but before leaving the holding of birth, with an eartag or tattoo that allows identification of the holding of origin and cross-referencing to accompanying documentation [98].  Any animal imported from a third country must, within 30 days, be marked by eartag or tattoo, unless the holding of destination is a slaughterhouse and the animal is slaughtered within the 30-day period [98].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Animal registration data are collected in the Estonian national register of agricultural animals [103].  The main purpose of this register is to support efforts to prevent the spread of zoonoses.  The register data are also used in the administration of agricultural support programs.  The register is maintained by the Animal Register Bureau of the Agricultural Registers and Information Board (ARIB) [104].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">ARIB is a government institution under the administrative and supervisory authority of the Ministry of Agriculture.  It is tasked with maintaining registers of farm animals, agricultural plots and agricultural financial aid; and with managing agricultural, fishery and rural development aid from the state and the EU [105].  It is also responsible for implementing EU agricultural market regulation measures, and is subject to audits by the EU [105].  It has a central office, located in Tartu, and 15 regional offices, one in each county.  In 2005, ARIB had 324 employees, of whom 218 were employed at the central office and 106 in the regional offices.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">As provided for in the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act, keepers of farm animals are required to maintain animal records and register the animals in the state register [27].  This requirement applies not only to large holdings, but also to small holdings of swine for personal consumption [41].  Swine are registered by holding, and breeding sows are also uniquely numbered.  Live animals moved from herd to herd are also tagged with the country symbol for Estonia (EE).    
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Data collected in the register for every animal eartag number are the date of birth, gender and breed of the animal; the eartag numbers of its parents; and owner information [103].  The Animal Register Bureau must be notified of any tagging, selling, buying, slaughter or other animal death, or in the event an animal is missing, within 7 days of the event.  Information regarding official approval of slaughterhouses and enterprises where animal waste is handled must also be entered into the register, within ten working days of the approval [27].  The geographical coordinates of livestock buildings and other structures and animal enclosures, and any enterprises entered into the register, must be submitted to the register by an ARIB official.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Information in the register must be kept up to date [27].  Failure to meet animal identification and registration requirements is punishable by a fine [27].  Agricultural officials estimate the level of compliance with registration requirements to be high, based on assessments through farm visits by agricultural officials [41].  </p>
<h3>4.8.4 Artificial insemination centers
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Two artificial insemination centers are located in Estonia, one for bovines and one for swine.  Both are VFB approved.  Only the bovine center is approved for intra-Community trade [41].  In November 2005, APHIS visited the Kehtna swine artificial insemination center in Rapla county as part of a site visit to Estonia to evaluate the country's veterinary services infrastructure [41].  This center is cooperatively owned by 50 farms, and is licensed to operate by the local Veterinary Center office.  Six farms, all members of the cooperative, were registered with the center to provide boar for semen collection.  Prior to entry into the artificial insemination center, boar are quarantined for 30 days at a quarantine facility located 20 km (12 miles) from the center.  In week three of quarantine, the boar are sampled by an authorized veterinarian for disease testing.  Test results for CSF, SVD and other specified diseases must be negative for the boar to be permitted entry into the artificial insemination center.  Once in the center, the boar are tested annually for CSF, SVD and other specified diseases, in accordance with surveillance requirements for breeding swine.  In accordance with identification requirements for breeding swine, the boar at the center are individually identified.  At the time of the APHIS visit, 40 boar were housed at the center.  The boar were housed in individual stalls, without nose-to-nose contact with other boar.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Records of animal movement and treatment, and records of semen collection dates, activity, quality and destination are kept electronically [41].  Employees are discouraged from owning swine or working at other farms, and from performing inseminations at other farms.  Semen is delivered to customers by courier; it is not picked up at the center by customers.  The center uses its own feed trucks and trucks for movement of boar from quarantine to the center.    </p>
<h3>4.8.5 Marketing and slaughter practices
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">No marketing centers for animals, including swine, exist in Estonia [1].  All farm animal dealer enterprises must be registered and approved as provided for in the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act [27].  Similarly, the livestock buildings and other structures and animal enclosures that are used by animal keepers for dealer activities must be registered and approved.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Animal exhibitions, competitions, fairs and auctions can be held only by operators who hold an operating permit that is approved by the VFB local office in whose territory of supervision the event occurs [27].  These events can be held only at the location and on the dates specified on the permit.  The event organizer is responsible for ensuring verification of compliance with veterinary requirements, including animal health certification requirements.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In general, animals for slaughter must be clinically healthy and come from a herd or area in which no restrictions on animal movement have been established due to the occurrence or suspicion of an infectious animal diseases [27].  An exception to this is the slaughter of clinically diseased animals, or animals suspected of being diseased.  These animals must be slaughtered separately from healthy animals, under supervision of a supervisory official or authorized veterinarian.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Animals for slaughter for production of animal products intended for market can be slaughtered only in slaughterhouses approved pursuant to the Food Act [27].  Animal products can be handled only in enterprises approved pursuant to the Food Act or the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act.  Processing facilities are inspected once per quarter by a local Veterinary Center official together with the chief meat hygiene specialist [41].  Processing facility records must be maintained for at least three years [41].  </p>
<h3>4.8.6 Internal movement controls
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Veterinary requirements for movement of swine from herd to herd and to slaughter are set out by regulation of the Minister of Agriculture [38].  The swine must be identified by eartag or tattoo with the swine holding number, and be examined by an authorized veterinarian.  The swine must also be accompanied by an animal health certificate that attests to the compliance of the swine with the veterinary requirements of the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act, and legislation enacted based on that Act [1, 27, 41, 106].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The animal health certificate is issued by the authorized veterinarian of the area in which the farm of origin is located, after inspection of the animals [1, 106].  For swine moved from one herd to another, the certificate includes identifying information about the farms of origin and destination, and the number, gender, breed, age, and health status of the swine moved.  One copy of the form remains with the veterinarian, one remains with the herd of origin, and one accompanies the swine to the herd of destination.    
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Similarly, a veterinary certificate is issued for swine moved to a slaughterhouse  [1].  One copy of this certificate remains with the veterinarian, one remains with the herd of origin, and one is for the slaughterhouse of destination, from where the movement information is sent to ARIB.  Before movement to the slaughterhouse, the swine are stamped with the number of the herd of origin.   
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Any means of farm animal transport that were used to transport goods that might be harmful to animal health must be cleaned and disinfected after transport, or prior to the next transport [1, 27, 38].  Only disinfectants specified by the VFB or authorized by a supervisory official can be used for this purpose.  The carrier is responsible for ensuring cleaning and disinfection, and for stacking of used litter.  Carriers must maintain records of the time and place of the cleaning and disinfection, as well as the time and place of loading of farm animals, the animals transported, and the consignor and consignee.  These records must be preserved for at least three years.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Cargo for transport to rendering plants is collected from farms and BIPs by trucks under contract with the plants [41].  The trucks are covered and equipped with leak-proof containers, and are cleaned and disinfected prior to departure from the plant.  Fallen stock is collected free of charge from farms within 24 to 48 hours of notification of the plant by the farm.  The trucks collect the stock at the farm perimeter, and do not enter the farm premises.  Detailed information must be recorded regarding all cargo transported to rendering plants.  The information recorded includes cargo collected and date of collection, origin of the cargo, recipient address, truck driver's name and address, reference and approval numbers, and type of processing required.  All fallen stock must be accompanied by a veterinary certificate issued by an authorized veterinarian.  </p>
<h3>4.8.7 Rendering plants
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Rendering plants in Estonia include a Ministry of Agriculture facility in northern Estonia, in Lääne-Viru county, and a privately owned facility at a slaughterhouse in southern Estonia [41].  In November 2005, APHIS visited the Väike-Maarja rendering plant in Lääne-Viru county as part of a site visit to Estonia to evaluate the country's veterinary services infrastructure [41].  This facility had been in operation since January 1, 2005.  It had a staff of 26 employees, and operated 24 hours per day, 6 days per week.  It processed Category 1, 2 and 3 materials (as defined in Regulation (EC) No. 1774/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council), and had a rendering capacity of 10,000 metric tons per year [107].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Materials for processing were collected from throughout Estonia by 4 to 5 trucks under contract with a privately owned company [41].  No materials from other EU Member States were processed at this facility.  The processing consisted of grinding of the materials, followed by heating at 133°C for 20 minutes at 3 bar of pressure [41].  Technical fat produced was used as heating fuel at the plant.  Meat and bone meal, ground to 1.5 mm diameter and with a moisture content of 5% to 6%, was used as a heating fuel at a cement factory and a brick-making facility [41].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Employees showered upon leaving the facility [41].  The facility was fenced, and under security camera surveillance.  Multiple signs stating that entry by unauthorized personnel was prohibited were posted on the premises.  Designated "dirty" and "clean" areas of the facility were clearly separated, as were incoming and outgoing materials.  The facility also had designated areas for cleaning and disinfection of containers and means of conveyance.  Recording equipment was used to monitor processing temperatures.  The facility was informed of EU requirements by the local Veterinary Center office, and had access to EUR-Lex through the internet.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Use of this facility is provided for in the Estonian Contingency Plan for Control of Infectious Animal Disease [41].  Employees of the facility were aware of the plan, and that is was accessible through the VFB home page and from the local Veterinary Center office.  </p>
<h3>4.8.8 Handling of animal waste, animal byproducts and food waste
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Animal waste and animal byproducts (carcasses, animal parts or animal products not intended for human consumption, defined by EC regulations) are permitted to be handled only in approved enterprises in accordance with provisions of the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act and EC regulations [27, 107].  The procedures for approval of enterprises that handle animal waste, the classifications of animal waste, and veterinary requirements for handling animal waste are established by regulation of the Minister of Agriculture [32, 33].  These regulations also specify the conditions under which the VFB can issue permits on the spot for rendering animal waste harmless, such as during disease outbreaks [32, 33].  Animal byproducts sent to rendering plants must be accompanied by a veterinary certificate [41].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Feeding of catering waste to swine is prohibited [1, 70, 71, 107].  Catering waste is defined as waste from food intended for human consumption from restaurants, catering facilities, or kitchens, including industrial kitchens, and households of swine farmers or swine tenders [70, 71].  Catering waste from international passenger traffic must be collected and rendered harmless [1, 70, 71].    </p>
<h3>4.8.9 Discussion </h3>
<p class="body_Text">Several of the characteristics of the domestic swine and wild boar populations in Estonia contribute to prevention, early detection, and limiting the spread of CSF or SVD should it occur.  As noted in Section 4.8.1, most domestic swine in Estonia are kept on 30 large-scale industrial enterprises in holdings of at least 2000 swine [1].  This concentration of swine on large commercial enterprises facilitates veterinary oversight, including animal health monitoring by private and official veterinarians, and official monitoring for compliance with animal health regulations.  This increases the likelihood of early detection and efficient control of disease outbreaks.  Similarly, concentration of the swine on a few large commercial enterprises facilitates official monitoring for compliance with animal identification and holding registration regulations.  This compliance is essential for efficient epidemiological investigation and rapid control of disease outbreaks.  Finally, concentration of the swine on large commercial enterprises also facilitates implementation of biosecurity policies and procedures that are comprehensive and consistent for large populations of animals, contributing to prevention, early detection, and limiting the spread of disease.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The risk of CSF and SVD spread is also limited by the low density of swine farms in Estonia.  This low density limits the risk of spread from farm to farm, through direct contact among animals from various farms, or through human or vehicle traffic.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Wild boar can be a reservoir of CSF virus, and a source of infection of domestic swine [108].  The role of wild boar as an SVD virus reservoir for domestic swine is unknown [108].  In this evaluation, APHIS found no evidence that CSF and SVD are present in wild boar in Estonia.  Should CSF or SVD occur in wild boar in Estonia, the risk of its spread to and through the domestic swine population through exposure to infected wild boar is mitigated by both the low density of swine farms, and the practice of keeping swine indoors instead of outdoors.  The potential for contact between domestic swine and wild boar is also limited by the patterns of geographical distribution of domestic swine and wild boar in Estonia: in general, the counties with the highest percentages of the domestic swine population do not also have large percentages of the wild boar population.  In addition, most domestic swine in Estonia are located in counties that do not border Russia, resulting in a lower likelihood of contact from any wild boar migrating from Russia than if most domestic swine were located along the border with Russia.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The risk of CSF or SVD spread in Estonia is also mitigated by the absence of marketing centers, which eliminates the risk of disease transmission through such centers; and by the strict biosecurity controls and procedures in place regarding internal movement of animals; cleaning and disinfection of animal transport vehicles; and handling of animal byproducts, animal waste and food waste.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In summary, several factors related to swine demographics, marketing and slaughter practices, as well as movement controls and other biosecurity procedures in place in Estonia, contribute to prevention, early detection, and limiting the spread of CSF or SVD should it occur.    </p>
<h2>4.9 Disease surveillance
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">Responsibility for organization of animal disease surveillance activities lies with the VFB [45].   As noted in Section 4.1.1, the frequency of testing and numbers of animals to be tested in surveillance for CSF and SVD are specified in the National Infectious Animal Disease Control Program [1, 28].  All swine samples are tested at the Central VAFL in Tartu [1, 41].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Another component of the CSF and SVD surveillance system in Estonia is vigilance for disease signs by private and official veterinarians, farmers and other members of the public.  Training for authorized veterinarians and other veterinary officials is described in Section 4.1.2.6.  Efforts to raise awareness among the traveling public of disease signs are described in Section 4.7.1.5.  Requirements for reporting of disease signs and suspicion of disease occurrence to veterinary officials are described in Section 4.11.2.  </p>
<h3>4.9.1 CSF and SVD surveillance in domestic swine</h3>
<p class="body_Text">All boar in artificial insemination centers and boar used in natural mating are tested for CSF and SVD serologically once per year [1, 28, 38].  For swine in breeding herds, the numbers of samples to be tested, as specified in the National Infectious Animal Disease Control Program, are based on the number of sows per unit [28].  On farms that have more than one production unit, each unit is sampled separately [38].  According to information provided by the VFB, the sampling plans for breeding swine in the 2005 and 2006 National Infectious Animal Disease Control Programs would enable detection of disease at a prevalence of 5% with 50% confidence [1, 28, 109], or at a prevalence of at least 15% with 95% confidence [38].  The 2005 APHIS site visit team noted that the sampling criteria for 2005 were selected based in part on budget constraints [41].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">At least 1% of slaughter swine are tested for CSF once per year [1, 28, 38].  Sampling is conducted at both large and small slaughter facilities [41].  More sampling occurs in September through December than in the other months of the year, to coincide with the annual peak in size of the population of migrating young wild boar and the resulting peak in estimated level of risk of infectious disease transfer from wild boar to the domestic swine population [41].  According to information provided by the VFB, the sampling plan for slaughter swine is designed to detect disease at a prevalence of at least 0.1% with 95% confidence [38].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Swine that are raised on backyard farms that do not have breeding herds or send swine to slaughter are not routinely tested for CSF and SVD [41].  In general, these swine are raised for their owners' consumption [41].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The numbers of domestic swine tested for CSF or SVD in each county from 2002 through 2005, and the totals for 2006, are provided in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively (Appendix 8.4) [38, 109].  Of these, none were confirmed positive for CSF or SVD, respectively  [38, 109].  </p>
<h3>4.9.2 CSF surveillance in wild boar
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Two percent of hunted wild boar are tested serologically for CSF [28, 41, 109], with more intensive sampling in regions bordering Latvia and Russia than in other regions [1].  Sampling of wild boar for CSF testing is coordinated through hunting associations [41].  Hunting is a well-organized activity in Estonia.  The country is divided geographically into hunting regions, each of which has a designated supervisor.  Hunters must be hunting association members, and pay to obtain a license to hunt wild boar.  Hunting licenses are issued by the Ministry of Environment, which tracks wild boar population data and adjusts the number of hunting licenses it issues based on changes in the estimated wild boar population size.    
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Authorized veterinarians must be notified by hunters of planned hunts [41].  The carcasses of hunted wild boar are clinically inspected and sampled by authorized veterinarians in the field.  The authorized veterinarians then issue veterinary certificates attesting to the inspection and sampling.  Hunters are not permitted to act as certifying veterinarians on their own behalf.  Any carcasses of hunted wild boar that are brought to a processing facility must include all internal organs and be presented together with the veterinary certificate and the hunter's license.  Part of the certificate is then completed by a veterinarian stationed at the facility.    
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The numbers of wild boar tested for CSF in each county from 2002 through 2005, and the total for 2006, are shown in Table 5 (Appendix 8.4) [38, 109].  Of these, none were confirmed positive for CSF.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In general, the home range of wild boar extends across approximately 3 square miles to 7 square miles, depending on population density, landscape structure, cover, and food distribution and availability [110].  During mating season and in search of food, wild boar disperse from their home range territory; the mean dispersal distance is 3 miles for females and 10 miles for males [110].  Migration distances can reach 30 miles or more [111].  </p>
<h3>4.9.3 Discussion
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">The primary method of laboratory analysis of samples collected for routine surveillance for CSF and SVD in Estonia is serological testing.  This method is among the OIE-recommended methods for surveillance testing for CSF [7, 18] [112].  (The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code does not include surveillance guidelines specific for SVD [113].)  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The system of routine collection of samples for surveillance testing for CSF and SVD in Estonia is complemented by efforts to raise awareness of disease signs among veterinary professionals, farmers and the general public, and by requirements for reporting of signs of disease and suspicion of disease occurrence to veterinary officials.  The efforts to raise disease awareness help to counter some of the difficulties in clinical sign recognition that might have developed due to the lack of recent experience in the diagnosis of these diseases in Estonia.  </p>
<h4>4.9.3.1 CSF and SVD surveillance in domestic swine
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">In general, the system in place in Estonia for surveillance testing of domestic swine for CSF and SVD is well organized and well developed.  The swine are tested according to detailed protocols set forth in national plans, which provide for surveillance in both breeding swine and slaughter swine.  The sampling plans are designed to address the seasonal variation in the estimated level of risk of domestic swine infection through exposure to wild boar, and increase the likelihood of detection of CSF or SVD infection of swine through that pathway.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Swine raised in backyard farms are not subject to routine surveillance testing for CSF and SVD.  This might increase the risk of undetected spread of these diseases within and from such holdings, such as through movement of infected swine or contaminated clothing or equipment.  The risk of undetected spread of CSF and SVD within and from such holdings is mitigated by other components of the surveillance system, including vigilance for disease signs by veterinarians and farmers; the requirement that signs and suspicions of disease occurrence be reported to veterinary officials; and swine movement restrictions.  In addition, in general, each such holding has very few swine; and swine on such holdings are generally raised for their owners' consumption and are not likely to be moved to other holdings, and thus likely pose a low risk for infection of swine on other holdings.  As noted in Section 4.8, most domestic swine in Estonia are kept on large production enterprises.  The likelihood of undetected spread of CSF and SVD from backyard farms appears to be low.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The number of domestic swine tested for SVD in Estonia has decreased markedly in recent years, from more than 5000 each year from 2002 through 2004, to almost 4000 in 2005, and 1326 in 2006.  The information provided to APHIS by Estonia for this evaluation does not include a specific explanation for this decrease.  The decrease does not appear to be due to a decrease in the total size of the domestic swine population, which has remained almost constant from at least 2002 to 2006.  The decrease is of note in the context of the report by the 2005 APHIS site visit team that the sampling criteria for 2005 were selected based in part on budget constraints [41].  The sampling criteria for domestic swine for CSF and SVD for 2006 are the same as those for 2005 [28, 109].  These observations raise the question of whether budget considerations might supersede disease risk analysis in surveillance planning.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">However, this adjustment in only one component of the SVD surveillance system in Estonia might simply reflect a shift in focus of veterinary services resources that is appropriate to a low risk of SVD occurrence in Estonia.  According to information provided by Estonian officials and from the OIE, SVD has never been diagnosed or reported to have occurred in Estonia, and CSF was eradicated from Estonia in 1994.  In addition, numerous factors mitigate the risk of CSF and SVD introduction into the country (see, for example, Sections 4.6 and 4.7).  The risk of CSF and SVD occurrence in Estonia appears to be low.  Overall, the level of surveillance for SVD and CSF in domestic swine in Estonia, including all components of the surveillance system, appears to be appropriate to a low level of risk of occurrence of these diseases in Estonia.  </p>
<h4>4.9.3.2 CSF surveillance in wild boar
</h4>
<p class="body_Text">The system for sample collection for surveillance testing of wild boar for CSF in Estonia is well organized and well regulated.  Under the National Infectious Animal Disease Control Program, wild boar in Estonia are tested for CSF but not for SVD.  Not including SVD testing of wild boar in the national surveillance program appears to be appropriate to the low risk of SVD occurring in wild boar in Estonia and adjacent regions (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3).  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Outbreaks of CSF have occurred in wild boar in other regions of Europe in recent years.  These regions are located much farther from Estonia than the distances that wild boar typically roam or migrate (see Section 4.9.2), limiting the risk of CSF-infected wild boar migrating from these regions into Estonia [110, 111].  The regular surveillance testing of hunted wild boar for CSF in Estonia increases the likelihood of detection of CSF in wild boar should it occur.  It also mitigates the risk of CSF spread from wild boar to domestic swine, by increasing the likelihood of detection in wild boar prior to spread to domestic swine, and implementation of appropriate measures to prevent spread to domestic swine.  Overall, the system of surveillance for CSF and SVD in wild boar in Estonia, including efforts to raise public awareness of CSF and SVD signs, and the requirement to report signs and suspicions of CSF and SVD occurrence, appears to be appropriate to the low risk of CSF and SVD occurrence in wild boar in Estonia.   </p>
<h2>4.10 Diagnostic laboratory capacity
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">All diagnostic testing of swine samples for CSF and SVD in Estonia is performed at the Central VAFL, which serves as the national reference laboratory of Estonia [1, 41].  The VFB and the VAFL are authorized to send samples for infectious animal disease diagnosis, confirmation and virus characterization to the EC reference laboratories for CSF and SVD, and other approved laboratories in foreign countries, as provided for in the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act [1, 27].  The EC reference laboratory for CSF is the Institute of Virology in Hannover, Germany [68].  The EC reference laboratory for SVD is the Agricultural and Food Research Council Pirbright Laboratory in Pirbright, Surrey, United Kingdom [69].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The Central VAFL processes approximately 5000 samples per year [41].  All samples are tested for CSF, SVD, transmissible gastroenteritis, porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome, pseudorabies and atrophic rhinitis [41].  The laboratory has a negative-pressure biocontainment unit that meets OIE biosafety containment level Group 3 requirements [1, 41].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The Central VAFL submits a monthly report to the VFB of any detections of disease agents that are subject to reporting requirements, including CSF and SVD virus [41].  The report includes a list of all tests performed, and any positive results reported directly to the farm of origin [41].  The VAFL is audited annually by the EU [41].  CSF and SVD investigations by the VAFL are conducted in accordance with OIE guidelines [32, 33].  </p>
<h3>4.10.1 CSF
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">EC guidelines and minimum requirements for CSF diagnosis are specified in an EC diagnostic manual for CSF [114].  This manual specifies minimum bio-safety requirements and quality standards for CSF diagnostic laboratories; describes procedures for sample collection and transport; describes principles and use of serological and virological tests for CSF diagnosis; specifies which laboratory tests are to be used for CSF diagnosis; and describes criteria for evaluation of laboratory test results.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Methods available at the Central VAFL for CSF testing are antibody and antigen enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA), PCR and virus isolation [1, 41].  Any nucleic acid sequencing for laboratory diagnosis of CSF would be performed at the Institute of Virology in Hannover, Germany.  During an APHIS site visit to the Central VAFL in November 2005, VAFL officials noted that any samples that test positive for CSF by ELISA are retested.  If the sample is from a slaughterhouse, the entire herd of origin is tested.  VAFL officials noted that this occurred once or twice per year.  Procedures for follow-up on CSF suspect samples are testing by antigen ELISA and PCR, and submission to the Institute of Virology in Hannover, Germany for testing.  Samples testing positive for CSF by PCR at the VAFL would be sent to the Institute of Virology in Hannover, Germany for testing, even in the absence of virus isolation by VAFL.  Any samples from which CSF virus is isolated by the VAFL would also be sent to the Institute of Virology in Hannover, Germany for testing.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Samples for CSF surveillance testing are delivered to the Central VAFL within one day of sample collection, and are generally tested in batches once every week or two weeks [41].  In cases of CSF suspicion, the tests are performed immediately upon receipt of the samples by the laboratory [41].  The weekly throughput capacity of the Central VAFL for CSF testing during an outbreak is estimated by the VFB to be 500 antigen detection tests, 100 PCR-based tests, and 20,000 to 40,000 serological tests [41].  </p>
<h3>4.10.2 SVD
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">EC guidelines and minimum requirements for SVD diagnosis are specified in an EC diagnostic manual for SVD [115].  This  manual describes procedures for sample collection and transport; principles and use of serological and virological tests for SVD diagnosis; and criteria for evaluation of laboratory test results.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Methods available at the Central VAFL for SVD testing are antibody ELISA and PCR [1, 41].  The Central VAFL does not perform SVD virus isolation tests [41].  Samples from herds of swine exhibiting vesicle lesions are tested for foot and mouth disease by antigen ELISA if SVD is ruled out [41].  </p>
<h3>4.10.3 Education and training of laboratory personnel
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Diagnostic laboratory personnel attend annual meetings and training provided by EC reference laboratories [1].  Once per year, the VAFL also participates in ring trials organized by EC reference laboratories [1, 41].  These trials include serological, virus isolation and PCR-based tests [41].  Vesicular disease training for VAFL staff is conducted in collaboration with laboratories in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia and Lithuania [41].  Additional training in infectious animal disease diagnosis and control for laboratory officials is described in Section 4.1.2.6.  </p>
<h3>4.10.4 Discussion
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">The system in place in Estonia for laboratory testing for CSF and SVD appears to be well organized, regulated and supervised.  Sampling, testing and follow-up are performed according to established protocols and international standards.  Personnel training includes training from a variety of outside sources.  Laboratory and personnel performance assessments include regular assessments from outside sources.  Internal oversight is provided by the VFB and the Estonian Accreditation Center; external oversight is provided by the EC.  The services of international reference laboratories are readily available for follow-up of VAFL test results. 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The range of tests available at the VAFL, in particular for SVD, is limited, and thus follow-up of initial test results in some cases requires sending of samples to other laboratories, outside of Estonia.  This might delay follow-up testing, and consequently implementation of appropriate emergency response measures, should follow-up confirm the presence of CSF or SVD virus.  The existence of established systems for sending samples to outside laboratories helps to minimize any such delays.  The risk of CSF or SVD spreading during any such delays is mitigated by the procedures in place to implement enhanced animal health control measures in the event of suspicion of CSF or SVD occurrence.  These measures, and the conditions under which they must be implemented, are described in Section 4.11.  </p>
<h2>4.11 Emergency response capacity</h2>
<h3>4.11.1 Legislative authority
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Both EC and Estonian legislation provides for emergency response in the event of suspicion or confirmation of CSF or SVD occurrence.  The main instruments of EC legislation related to control and eradication of CSF are Council Directive 2001/89/EC on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever, and Commission Decision 2002/106/EC approving a diagnostic manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for evaluation of the laboratory tests for the confirmation of classical swine fever [68, 114].  The main instruments of EC legislation for control and eradication of SVD are Council Directive 92/119/EEC introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease, and Commission Decision 2000/428/EC establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for the evaluation of the results of laboratory tests for the confirmation and differential diagnosis of swine vesicular disease [69, 115].  The main instruments of Estonian legislation related to control and eradication of CSF and SVD are the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act and bylaws of that Act, developed in accordance with applicable EC legislation [90].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In the event of a disease outbreak that might endanger human or animal health, the VFB is required to immediately implement the safeguard measures prescribed by the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act, rules established based on that Act, measures prescribed by EC legislation, or internationally recognized control measures [35].  Specific rules and procedures to be followed in the event of suspicion or confirmation of CSF or SVD occurrence are provided in the Classical Swine Fever Prevention Instruction, the Swine Vesicular Disease Prevention Instruction, the Rules on Prevention and Eradication of Classical Swine Fever and African Swine Fever, and the Contingency Plan for Control of Infectious Animal Disease, all of which are established by provision of the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act [27, 29, 32, 33, 70].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The Infectious Animal Disease Control Act also provides for cooperation between the VFB, the Police Board, the Rescue Board, the Border Guard Administration and other state and local government agencies in the implementation of measures to control and eradicate infectious animal diseases [27].  The VFB is responsible for organizing activities related to prevention and control of infectious animal diseases in wild animal populations, in cooperation with the Environmental Inspectorate and hunters [27].  </p>
<h3>4.11.2 Notification
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">EC rules regarding reporting of animal diseases within the EC are described in Council Directive 82/894/EEC [54].  Provisions of this Directive are incorporated into Estonian legislation in the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act and bylaws of that Act [90].  Infectious animal diseases that are subject to notification and registration requirements in Estonia are specified in an official list approved by regulation of the Minister of Agriculture [34].  This list includes CSF and SVD.  Notification and registration requirements that must be met in the event of suspicion or diagnosis of any of these diseases are specified in the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act [1, 27].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Animal keepers are required to inform a licensed veterinarian immediately of suspicion of CSF or SVD [32, 33].  They are also required to notify a veterinarian immediately of any widespread outbreak of an animal disease, or widespread death of animals, and must otherwise comply with all legislative and other requirements established to prevent and control infectious animal diseases [27].  Veterinarians must notify a supervisory official or authorized veterinarian [27].  Veterinarians, veterinary laboratories and supervisory officials must notify a local office of the VFB [27].  The VAFL, authorized reference laboratories, and all other laboratories holding a veterinary laboratory activity license must also notify the Director General of the VFB (or in his absence the Deputy Director General) and the head of the local VFB office in whose area of supervision the tested material originated [27].  Science laboratories that in the course of research diagnose CSF or SVD must notify the VFB [27].  Heads of the local offices of the VFB must notify the Director General of the VFB (or in his absence the Deputy Director General) and the heads of the local VFB offices in neighboring areas [27].  Failure to meet notification requirements is punishable by a fine [27].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">International reporting requirements are set forth in the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act, pursuant to provisions of Council Directive 82/894/EEC and in accordance with OIE guidelines [54].  The VFB must notify international veterinary organizations, the European Commission, EU Member States, and countries neighboring Estonia [1, 27].  In addition, the VFB must immediately inform the European Commission and the competent authorities of other EU Member States [35].    </p>
<h3>4.11.3 Suspicion of disease
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Official suspicion of the occurrence of an infectious animal disease is determined by a veterinarian and confirmed by a supervisory official [27].  It is based on the presence of clinical signs characteristic of the disease, autopsy findings or laboratory test results consistent with disease presence, or contact with an infected animal or herd [27].  Specific definitions of suspicion of CSF and SVD are provided in the CSF Prevention Instruction and the SVD Prevention Instruction, respectively [32, 33].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In the event of suspicion or confirmation of CSF or SVD virus infection, an expert group is formed by the director general of the VFB to advise the national veterinary services in contingency planning [32, 33].  The group consists of veterinarians who have practical experience in the prevention of animal disease; a VAFL virologist who is experienced in collection and testing of samples for dangerous infectious disease diagnosis; an epidemiologist; a meteorologist; and a computer expert.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In the event of CSF or SVD suspicion, a veterinary supervisory official must immediately open an official investigation to confirm or rule out the occurrence of the disease [32, 33].  An authorized veterinarian or supervisory official must be contacted promptly for clinical diagnosis, sampling, epidemiological testing, and implementation of measures necessary to prevent the spread of disease [27].  Veterinarians are required to inform animal keepers, and handlers of animal products, of potential dangers resulting from infectious animal diseases, and to provide them with guidelines for preventing the spread of infectious animal diseases [27].  Supervisory officials or authorized veterinarians who perform ante- or postmortem inspection of animals that are brought to a slaughterhouse upon suspicion of an infectious animal disease must isolate the animals and any products derived from them, and suspend the processing of other animals and animal products.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Upon receiving notice of suspicion of an infectious animal disease, the head of the local office of the VFB imposes restrictions and requirements on the farm or holding at which the animals suspected of being infected are located [27].  The restrictions and requirements for CSF and SVD are described in detail in the CSF and SVD Prevention Instructions.  They include restrictions on movement of people, animals and vehicles to and from the farm or holding; record-keeping requirements; and requirements and restrictions regarding animal slaughter and handling of carcasses and other biological materials [32, 33].  The restrictions remain in force until occurrence of the disease has been officially ruled out [32, 33].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Criteria for ruling out CSF or SVD occurrence, and conditions for lifting of restrictions, are described in the CSF and SVD Prevention Instructions [32, 33].  Slaughter of animals for the purpose of diagnostic follow-up of infectious animal disease suspicion is authorized by the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act [27].  Restrictions established based on disease suspicion can be lifted by the head of the local office of the VFB based on laboratory test results or recommendation from an expert committee appointed by the VFB [27].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">In the event of CSF or SVD suspicion, official diagnosis must be made by the head of the local office of the VFB or a designated supervisory official, or by an expert committee appointed by the VFB, based on clinical signs, autopsy findings, epidemiological data, or laboratory test results [27].  Any diagnosis of CSF or SVD must be registered with the VFB [27, 34].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In clinical diagnosis of infectious animal diseases, and diagnostic sampling and laboratory analysis, the VFB, authorized veterinarians and laboratory personnel must meet requirements provided for in Estonian and EC legislation, or in the absence of such legislation, with OIE principles, guidelines and recommendations [27].  The EU requirements related to diagnosis of CSF and SVD are specified in Commission Decisions 2002/106 and 2000/428, respectively [114, 115].  The presence of CSF or SVD is officially confirmed by the VFB, based on results of serological or virological analysis [32, 33].  </p>
<h3>4.11.4 Contingency plan
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">The Contingency Plan for Control of Infectious Animal Disease is a detailed plan of control measures to be applied upon outbreak of any especially dangerous infectious animal disease, including CSF and SVD, in order to eradicate the disease quickly and efficiently [27].  It is prepared by the VFB, and approved by both the Director General of the VFB and the European Commission [27, 116].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">It is updated at least once per year, and includes the following information [1, 27, 29]: 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· a description of the legal authority for implementing and enforcing the provisions of the Contingency Plan; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· a description of financial provisions for implementing and enforcing the provisions of the Contingency Plan; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· a description of principles of cooperation and the chain of command to be implemented among various institutions and individuals involved in implementing the Contingency Plan, and the obligations of those institutions and individuals; 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· procedures for forming a national infectious animal disease control committee; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· a list of local infectious animal disease control committees; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· the qualifications and obligations of individuals involved in infectious animal disease control; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· means of contacting those individuals by the local infectious animal disease control committees; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· a list of equipment and materials necessary for implementing infectious animal disease control measures; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· detailed instructions regarding actions to be taken in the event of suspicion or confirmation an infectious animal disease occurrence, including methods of carcass disposal; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· a list of training programs aimed at maintaining the practical and administrative skills necessary for effective infectious animal disease control;</p>
<p class="body_Text">· information regarding laboratories involved in infectious animal disease control, including facilities information, measures in place to maintain laboratory skills, and means used for rapid transport of samples for testing; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· for diseases for which emergency vaccination is authorized (including CSF), the quantities of vaccines needed to control the spread of the disease and the supply sources to be used; and </p>
<p class="body_Text">· a description of the principles of cooperation between the various administrative agencies involved in infectious animal disease eradication.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The legal basis for establishing and enforcing the provisions of the Contingency Plan is provided by the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act [27].  This Act specifies that in the event of an outbreak of any especially dangerous infectious animal disease, including CSF and SVD, the outbreak site must be quarantined; a protection zone must be established around the outbreak site; a surveillance zone must be established around the protection zone; epidemiological tests must be carried out to identify potentially affected areas; and local and national infectious animal disease control committees must be formed to direct all activities related to preventing the spread of the disease and eradicating it [27, 32, 33].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The carcasses of slaughtered swine from affected farms or holdings are disposed of by burial or incineration [32, 33].  In exceptional circumstances, as specified in the CSF and SVD Prevention Instructions, slaughter of clinically healthy swine at VFB-approved slaughterhouses is permitted.  The meat can be used for production of high-temperature-treated meat products; the internal organs and blood must be destroyed [32, 33].  </p>
<h3>4.11.5 Local infectious animal disease control committee
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Upon official diagnosis of CSF or SVD, a local infectious animal disease control committee is formed by the county governor, on recommendation from the head of the local Veterinary Center office [27, 32, 33].  This local infectious animal disease control committee consists of the head and other supervisory officials of the local office of the VFB; an authorized veterinarian whose service area includes the outbreak site; and representatives of the local and county governments, the VAFL, the Police Board, and the Rescue Board [27].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">This committee is tasked with carrying out an epidemiological investigation into the outbreak, defining protection and surveillance zones, and coordinating, organizing and monitoring the implementation of infectious animal disease control measures at the local level [27, 32, 33].  The epidemiological investigation is aimed at identifying possible sources and routes of infection, estimating the length of time from infection to detection of the infection, identifying contact herds and animals, and defining the area of potential infection [27, 32, 33].  The investigation includes completion of a detailed questionnaire regarding the case by an authorized veterinarian [38, 117].  In performing its tasks, the local infectious animal disease control committee cooperates with local governments, local offices of the Police Board and the Rescue Board, representatives of the Environmental Inspectorate, local representatives of the Health Protection Service, and other persons and institutions participating in the prevention of the disease [32, 33].  </p>
<h3>4.11.6 National infectious animal disease control committee
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Upon official diagnosis of CSF or SVD, a national infectious animal disease control committee is formed by the Minister of Agriculture, on recommendation from the Director General of the VFB [27].  This national infectious animal disease control committee consists of the Director General and other supervisory officials of the VFB, the head of the local office of the VFB whose service area includes the outbreak site; the head of border inspection for the VFB; and representatives of the VAFL, the Police Board, and the Rescue Board [27, 32, 33].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">This committee is tasked with coordinating the implementation of control measures, and assessing the measures' effectiveness; directing the use of state resources allocated for eradication of infectious animal diseases; cooperating at the international level to prevent further spread of the disease; proposing to the Minister of Agriculture means of resolving outbreak-related issues at the national level; and hearing applications for compensation for outbreak-related damages [27].  In performing its tasks, the national infectious animal disease control committee cooperates with the veterinary services of other countries, the Police Board, the Rescue Board, the Border Guard Board, the Customs Board, the Road Administration, the Health Inspectorate, and other agencies [32, 33].  </p>
<h3>4.11.7 Quarantine, protection and surveillance zones</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Upon official diagnosis of CSF or SVD, quarantine restrictions are imposed, and protection and surveillance zones are established, by written order of the county governor [27].  Quarantine is defined in the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act as prohibition of the removal of animals, animal products, feed, equipment and inventory from an outbreak site, and restriction on movement of people at the outbreak site [27].  A protection zone is defined as an area surrounding an outbreak site that is subject to restrictions on the movement of animals, animal products and people, and is subject to testing of susceptible species for timely detection of any new outbreaks [27].  The protection zone must cover an area of at least 3 km radius around the outbreak site [32, 33].  A surveillance zone is defined as an area surrounding a protection zone that is subject to restrictions on the movement of people and means of transport, and is subject to increased veterinary supervision of livestock [27].  The surveillance zone must cover an area of at least 10 km radius around the outbreak site [32, 33].  The specific requirements and restrictions applicable to quarantines, protection zones and surveillance zones are detailed in the Classical Swine Fever Prevention Instruction, the Swine Vesicular Disease Prevention Instruction, the Rules on Prevention and Eradication of Classical Swine Fever and African Swine Fever, and the Contingency Plan for Control of Infectious Animal Disease [29, 32, 33, 70].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Compliance with quarantine measures is supervised by the local offices of the VFB.  Compliance with restrictions on the movement of animals, people and means of transport at the outbreak site and in the protection and surveillance zones is supervised by the Police Board [27].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Detailed procedures for premises depopulation, disposal of carcasses and contaminated equipment, and cleaning and disinfection are provided in the Classical Swine Fever Prevention Instruction and the Swine Vesicular Disease Prevention Instruction [32, 33].  These Instructions also specify the criteria and procedures to be used for lifting of quarantine restrictions, and restrictions in protection and surveillance zones.  The minimum time period from final cleaning and disinfection (as specified in the Classical Swine Fever Prevention Instruction and the Swine Vesicular Disease Prevention Instruction) until introduction of susceptible animals onto the premises of an outbreak site is 30 days in the case of a CSF outbreak and 28 days in the case of an SVD outbreak [32, 33].  After this time period, all swine herds located in the protection zone must be serologically tested according to specified protocols [32, 33].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Once all criteria for eradication of the infectious animal disease have been met, and on condition of compliance with all applicable rules and requirements set by the VFB for control of the disease, quarantine restrictions are lifted by written order of the county governor, on recommendation from the head of the local office of the VFB [27].  Detailed requirements and conditions for repopulation of premises at outbreak sites after lifting of the quarantine restrictions are provided in the Classical Swine Fever Prevention Instruction and the Swine Vesicular Disease Prevention Instruction [32, 33].    </p>
<h3>4.11.8 Vaccination
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">As noted in Section 4.5, general preventive vaccination against CSF and SVD in Estonia is prohibited [1, 32, 33, 70, 71].  Emergency vaccination against CSF is permitted only under exceptional circumstances to prevent spread of the disease, and only upon authorization from the Minister of Agriculture.  In the event that emergency vaccination is authorized, the VFB organizes the storage, distribution and use of the vaccine [32].  The national infectious animal disease control committee, in cooperation with the appropriate local infectious animal disease control committee, develops a prevention program that defines the vaccination region, and the allowable use of vaccinated swine and meat products and other slaughter products from vaccinated swine [32].  The following conditions apply during any CSF vaccination period and for at least 6 months after the termination of vaccination [32]:   
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· no vaccinated swine are permitted to be transported out of the vaccination area, except for immediate slaughter at a slaughterhouse approved by the VFB and located near the vaccination area; </p>
<p class="body_Text">· all fresh swine meat originating from vaccinated swine must be identified as such by stamp and must not be stored or transported with meat that is not so stamped.  </p>
<h3>4.11.9 Indemnity and compensation
</h3>
<p>Costs related to the prevention and control of CSF and SVD are covered from the state budget [27].  Eligible costs are listed in the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act [27].  Eligible costs include costs related to sampling, diagnostic testing, vaccination, diagnostic slaughter, carcass rendering or other processing of carcasses or animal products, disinfection, and slaughter of diseased or disease-suspect animals.  Also eligible are costs of compensation for animals subject to mandatory slaughter; and for inventory, feed and products contaminated by pathogens and subject to destruction [27].  The procedures for determining the value of farm animals, and the specific conditions and procedures for payment of compensation for damage caused by infectious animal diseases, are set by regulation [30, 31].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The EC provides financial contributions toward the cost of specific veterinary measures, inspection measures, and programs for the eradication and monitoring of animal diseases, including CSF and SVD.  Eligible costs, and the conditions under which such contributions are provided, are specified Council Decision 90/424/EEC [118].  Eligible costs include costs of slaughter, cleaning, disinfection, establishment of protection zones, vaccines and vaccination.  </p>
<h3>4.11.10 Discussion
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Estonia has a well organized system in place to respond to suspicion or confirmation of CSF or SVD occurrence.  Both Estonian and EC legislation provides sufficient authority for a rapid and thorough response by veterinary officials.  Emergency response measures are developed in accordance with EC regulations and international guidelines.  The response system includes a well defined chain of command, with well defined areas of responsibility of the individuals, groups and institutions involved.  Training programs for public officials, and education programs for veterinary professionals, farmers and the general public, are designed to ensure that all relevant parties are aware of their obligations, responsibilities and rights with regard to the control of infectious animal diseases.  Procedures to be followed are detailed and well documented.  The efficiency and effectiveness of the system is evaluated regularly through simulation exercises.  Lessons learned in these exercises and other assessments are used to update and improve the response plan.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Activation of the emergency response system depends on recognition and reporting of disease signs.  This key first step in emergency response can be compromised in any country by long-term absence or lack of diagnosis of the disease, through lack of experience in recognition of disease signs, lack of familiarity with reporting requirements and procedures, and complacency regarding the possibility of CSF or SVD occurring in the country.  These issues are addressed in Estonia through extensive training and public awareness programs.  Similarly, these programs, and in particular the regular disease outbreak simulation exercises, mitigate the risk that veterinary officials and other relevant personnel would not be sufficiently familiar with the emergency response procedures for efficient implementation of the response plan.  </p>
<h2>4.12 Release assessment conclusions
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">Introduction of CSF or SVD virus into the United States from Estonia would require the presence of the virus in Estonia, and its subsequent export to the United States.  In this evaluation, APHIS found no evidence that CSF or SVD virus is present in Estonia.  The risk of CSF or SVD virus release into the United States from Estonia is summarized below as the risk of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia, and the risk of its export to the United States, should it occur in Estonia.  
</p>
<h3>4.12.1 Likelihood of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">In this evaluation, APHIS identified 4 main pathways through which CSF or SVD virus might be introduced into Estonia: migration of wild boar, trade of swine and swine products, vehicle and human traffic, and importation of swine products for personal consumption.  The risk from each of these pathways is summarized below.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The likelihood of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia through migration of infected wild boar into the country from adjacent regions depends on the likelihood of wild boar migration into Estonia from adjacent regions, and the likelihood that any such migrating boar are infected with CSF or SVD virus.  The main factors mitigating the risk from this pathway are that most of Estonia is surrounded by large bodies of water that are excellent natural barriers to wild boar migration; the likelihood of CSF and SVD infection of wild boar in adjacent regions is low; and those regions of Europe in which CSF has been reported to occur in wild boar in recent years are located much farther from Estonia than the distances that wild boar typically roam or migrate [110, 111].  These observations suggest that the likelihood of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia through migration of infected wild boar into the country from adjacent regions is low.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">A second potential pathway of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia is through trade of swine and swine products into the country.  The risk from this pathway is mitigated by the strict EC and Estonian animal health controls on such trade that are designed to limit the risk of introduction of CSF and SVD.  Among these controls are requirements for veterinary inspection and veterinary health certification, and prohibitions on trade in animals and animal products from regions that are subject to restrictions due to a suspected or confirmed outbreak of CSF or SVD (see Section 4.7).  The risk from CSF- or SVD-affected EU Member States specifically is also mitigated by the enhanced animal health control measures aimed at controlling and eradicating CSF and SVD from these countries, and preventing their spread into other Member States.  Overall, the likelihood of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia through trade of swine or swine products appears to be low.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">A third potential pathway of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia is vehicle or human traffic.  One factor limiting the risk from this pathway is that most travelers and non-agricultural vehicles are unlikely to have been exposed to CSF or SVD virus immediately prior to entry into Estonia.  The risk from animal transport vehicles is limited by cleaning and disinfection requirements for vehicles carrying live swine from third countries or other EU Member States; and the policy to prohibit entry of trucks that are dirty or carrying manure, which increases the likelihood that trucks entering Estonia will have been cleaned prior to entry.  The risk from vehicle and human traffic is also mitigated by the procedures in place in Estonia to erect disinfection barriers for vehicles and pedestrians at BIPs and other points of entry in the event of heightened risk of introduction of CSF or SVD.  The risk of exposure of domestic swine in Estonia to CSF or SVD virus from contaminated vehicles, clothing or shoes is mitigated by the prohibition against visiting farms within 48 hours after arrival in the country; and on large production enterprises by additional biosecurity measures such as cleaning and disinfection of vehicles prior to entering the premises, and requirements that visitors to the premises wear protective clothing.  All of these factors help to reduce to low levels the risk of CSF and SVD introduction into Estonia, and the risk of exposure of domestic swine to the virus should it be introduced, through this pathway.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">A fourth pathway through which CSF or SVD virus might be introduced into Estonia is importation of swine products into Estonia for personal consumption.  Any commodities contaminated with CSF or SVD virus pose a risk of being the source of infection of swine, such as through consumption by the swine of contaminated food waste.  Several measures in place in Estonia mitigate the risk of CSF or SVD virus introduction through this pathway.  These include EC and Estonian regulatory measures such as the restrictions as to the countries of origin of agricultural commodities for personal consumption that are permitted entry into Estonia; the requirement for veterinary inspection of most such commodities at ports of entry; the requirement for EU Member States to implement official controls at points of entry into the EC to detect the presence of illegal consignments of meat and meat products; and the requirement that all prohibited commodities be seized  and destroyed.  Also mitigating the risk from this pathway are the efforts in Estonia to increase awareness among the traveling public, and training of Customs, Border Guard and Postal officials, regarding the risks and relevant regulations pertaining to introduction of such commodities into the country.  The risk of exposure of domestic swine to CSF or SVD virus through feeding of contaminated commodities is mitigated by the prohibition against garbage feeding in Estonia.  All of these measures help to reduce to low levels the risk of CSF and SVD virus introduction into Estonia, and the risk of exposure of domestic swine to the virus should it be introduced, through this pathway.  </p>
<h3>4.12.2 Likelihood of CSF or SVD virus export from Estonia to the United States
</h3>
<p class="body_Text">The likelihood of CSF or SVD virus export from Estonia to the United States is influenced not only by the likelihood of its occurrence in Estonia, but also by downstream processes, should it occur in Estonia: the systems in place to detect and respond to detection of the virus in Estonia; and United States import controls.  Risk related to these processes is summarized below.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Rapid detection of CSF or SVD virus, should it occur in Estonia, and effective response to any such detection, are critical to rapid control of any outbreaks and eradication of the disease.  Rapid control and eradication in turn mitigate the risk of export of these viruses to the United States.  In general, the systems in place in Estonia to detect and respond to CSF and SVD occurrence are well organized and well developed.  Surveillance for CSF and SVD in domestic swine is carried out according to detailed protocols set forth in national plans, as is surveillance for CSF in wild boar.  The capacity to detect the virus and limit its spread is further enhanced by efforts to raise awareness of clinical signs of CSF and SVD among veterinary professionals, farmers and the general public; the requirement to report signs and suspicions of CSF and SVD occurrence to veterinary officials; and requirements for veterinary examination prior to movement of swine.  The system in place in Estonia to respond to an outbreak or suspected occurrence of CSF or SVD is well organized, well developed and well documented, and appears to be sufficient for rapid control and eradication.    
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The risk of CSF or SVD virus export from Estonia to the United States is further mitigated by United States import controls.  The main regulatory measure limiting the likelihood of importing CSF or SVD virus is the general prohibition against importing swine, pork and pork products from regions in which CSF or SVD exists (9 CFR 94.9; 9 CFR 94.10; 9 CFR 94.12; 9 CFR 94.14) [3].  Exceptions apply for pork and pork products that meet specified processing conditions designed to inactivate CSF or SVD virus, such as heating or curing and drying (9 CFR 94.9; 9 CFR 94.12; 9 CFR 94.17).  Other conditions for pork and pork products include restrictions as to the premises of origin of the swine from which these commodities are derived; requirements for inspection of the establishments in which they are processed; and certification requirements (9 CFR 94.9; 9 CFR 94.12; 9 CFR 94.17).  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In addition to the general prohibition against importing swine, pork and pork products from regions in which CSF or SVD exists, with the exceptions noted above, other United States import regulations further limit the risk of importing CSF and SVD virus.  The import regulations for live swine include the requirement that the swine be accompanied by an import permit and by certification that the swine were kept in the region of origin for at least 60 days immediately prior to their date of movement from the region (9 CFR 93.504; 9 CFR 93.505).  For domestic swine, the certification must state that the region is free of CSF and SVD (9 CFR 93.505), except for the EU-15, to which additional certification requirements apply (9 CFR 94.24).  Swine are permitted to be imported through only designated ports of entry, and must be quarantined for at least 15 days from the date of arrival at the port of entry (9 CFR 93.503; 9 CFR 93.510).  Swine are inspected at the port of entry, and are permitted entry only if they are found to be free of communicable disease and not to have been exposed to any communicable diseases within 60 days prior to export to the United States (9 CFR 93.507).  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Several import restrictions designed to limit the risk of importing CSF virus apply to only the EU-15 (9 CFR 94.24; 9 CFR 98.38).  The restrictions for swine from the EU-15 include that they be breeding swine; and that they have not been in, or been commingled with swine that were in, any zone under restrictions due to detection of CSF, unless the swine are exported after specified time periods.  This time period extends from the time of detection of CSF until the restricted zone designation is removed by the veterinary authority of an EU Member State, or in the case of detection of CSF in domestic swine, until 6 months after depopulation of the affected premises and the cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises in the zone, whichever is later.  Other restrictions pertain to transit of the swine through restricted zones, and to the equipment used to transport the swine.  The restrictions for pork and pork products and swine semen from the EU-15 are similar, in terms of the swine from which the pork and pork products are derived or the semen was collected.  An official veterinarian of the EU Member State must certify that all applicable export conditions have been met.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Some regions that APHIS considers free of SVD are subject to additional requirements to limit the risk of importing SVD virus (9 CFR 94.13).  These regions, specified in the CFR and including most of the EU-15, are considered by APHIS to pose a higher risk of SVD introduction into the United States than are other SVD-free regions, because they supplement their national pork supply by importing fresh meat from regions where SVD is considered to exist, have a common border with such regions, or have trade practices that are less restrictive than are acceptable to the United States.  Among the additional import controls for pork and pork products from these regions are restrictions as to the method and location of processing or preparation of these commodities; requirements for inspection of the establishments in which these commodities are processed or prepared; and restrictions on transportation and commingling of these commodities or the swine from which they are derived.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Thus, numerous measures in place in both Estonia and the United States limit the risk of CSF and SVD virus export from Estonia to the United States.  The risk would be even further mitigated by application of the import controls that currently apply to only swine, pork, pork products and swine semen from the EU-15 (9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38), and to pork and pork products from specified SVD-free regions that are subject to the additional import restrictions because of their proximity to or trading relationships with SVD-affected regions (9 CFR 94.13).  </p>
<h1>5. EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT
</h1>
<p class="body_Text">The exposure assessment of an import risk analysis, as defined by the OIE, consists of a description of the biological pathway(s) necessary for exposure of animals and humans in the importing country to the hazards released from a given risk source, and a qualitative or quantitative estimation of the probability of the exposure occurring [2].  In line with the limits in scope of APHIS' regulatory authority, and the focus of this import risk analysis, this exposure assessment is focused on exposure of swine to CSF and SVD virus.  Potential risk sources are imported items that might harbor CSF or SVD virus.  The main risk sources considered here are imported swine; swine semen, ova and embryos; and swine products.  The main pathways through which swine in the United States might be exposed to CSF or SVD virus from these risk sources are exposure directly to these sources, and exposure to waste products derived from these sources.  The risks of such exposure, and associated mitigations, are described qualitatively below.  </p>
<h2>5.1 Exposure to infected swine
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">CSF and SVD virus can both be spread by contact with infected swine (see Section 3) [6, 16].  The virus can be present in all tissues of infected swine including blood, and in the secretions and excretions of infected swine.  SVD virus is also present in the epithelium and fluid of the vesicles that are characteristic of SVD.  The main routes of infection are ingestion; contact with the conjunctiva, the mucous membranes or skin abrasions; and percutaneous blood transfer.  Thus, direct and indirect contact with infected swine poses a risk of transmission of the virus.  The likelihood of exposure of swine in the United States to CSF or SVD virus through contact with imported swine depends in part on the likelihood that the imported swine are infected, and the likelihood of contact of swine in the United States with the imported swine.</p>
<p class="body_Text">The results of the release assessment suggest that the likelihood that swine imported from Estonia into the United States would be infected with CSF or SVD virus is low.  The risk would be further limited by application of the swine import controls that currently apply to only the EU-15 (9 CFR 94.24) [3].  Additional exposure risk mitigation would be provided by biosecurity practices at swine holdings of destination in the United States.  Such practices, which can include isolation, testing and clinical examination of swine prior to their introduction into a herd, in general are of high priority in particular at intensive swine production operations, where the potential for disease transmission to large numbers of swine can be high [119].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The likelihood of contact of swine in the United States with imported swine would also depend in part on the purposes of use of those swine.  Limiting imports to only one class of swine would limit the risk of contact with other sectors of the United States swine population.  For example, limiting swine imports to breeding swine only, as in the case of swine imports from the EU-15 (9 CFR 94.24), would target those swine to breeding operations and mitigate even further the risk of exposure of swine in other industry sectors.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The results of this assessment suggest that the likelihood of swine in the United States being exposed to CSF or SVD virus through contact with infected swine imported from Estonia is low.  The risk would be further limited by application of the mitigation measures described in 9 CFR 94.24 [3].  </p>
<h2>5.2 Exposure to contaminated swine semen, ova and embryos
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">Contaminated semen, ova and embryos are potential sources of swine exposure to viral disease agents, such as through artificial insemination and embryo transfer [120].  Factors contributing to the risk of widespread dissemination from these items include the relative ease through which they can be transported worldwide, and the increasingly widespread use of these technologies.  Artificial insemination poses a risk of widespread exposure among swine due to its extensive use in swine production [21].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The results of several experiments have confirmed that CSF virus is shed in semen of infected boar, although the rate of CSF virus isolation from the semen of infected boar can be low [13, 121, 122].  Transmission of CSF through artificial insemination with semen from infected boar has also been demonstrated experimentally [13].  However, findings from these studies suggest that this mode of transmission is inefficient, at least under the experimental conditions in these studies.  SVD virus has also been isolated from semen, suggesting the possibility of transmission through artificial insemination [120].  However, the limited data available suggest that the likelihood is low [120].  Few data are available regarding the potential for ova and embryos to serve as sources of spread of CSF or SVD virus.  In one small study, no SVD virus was detected in ova and embryos collected from SVD virus-infected sows [123].  In another study, CSF virus was detected in the ovaries of experimentally infected sows, but mainly in macrophages and not oocytes [124].  CSF and SVD virus has been detected in swine embryos after experimental exposure of the embryos to the virus, but available data suggest that transmission of the virus through embryo transfer is unlikely [120].  Thus, while contaminated semen, ova and embryos are potential sources of swine exposure to CSF and SVD virus, experimental data suggest that the efficiency of transmission from such sources is low.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The results of the release assessment suggest that the likelihood that semen, ova and embryos imported from Estonia into the United States would be contaminated with CSF or SVD virus is low.  The risk from swine semen from Estonia would be further limited by application of the United States import controls that currently apply to swine semen from the EU-15 (9 CFR 98.38) [3].    </p>
<h2>5.3 Exposure to contaminated swine products
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">One of the main routes of CSF or SVD virus infection of swine is ingestion.  The main sources of ingested virus are contaminated meat scraps and swill derived from infected swine [10, 20].  Potential pathways of swine exposure to CSF and SVD virus from contaminated products include feeding of food waste to swine; contact of swine in production or marketing channels with discarded animal products; and foraging by feral swine at landfills and at outdoor recreation areas littered with food waste [125].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Comprehensive, reliable assessment of the risk of exposure through these pathways is difficult due to lack of sufficient data.  In two previous studies, APHIS conducted limited assessments of exposure risk, focusing on the risk of exposure of domestic swine in the United States to CSF and SVD virus through feeding of uncooked waste to swine by facilities licensed under the United States Swine Health Protection Act to feed waste to swine [126].  In a 1995 study, APHIS found that the exposure risk from legally imported animal products was higher for CSF than for SVD: the median annual likelihood of exposure was estimated to be 1.2 percent for CSF and 0.5 percent for SVD [125].  Almost all of the legal animal product imports in this study originated in countries with a moderate prevalence of CSF.  In a subsequent study, focused on risk from illegally imported animal products, APHIS similarly found that the risk for CSF was higher than that for SVD [127].  This finding was attributed in part to international travel patterns and differences in worldwide distribution between CSF and SVD.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">As noted in Section 4.12, APHIS found no evidence in this evaluation that CSF or SVD virus is present in Estonia, and identified numerous factors that mitigate the risk of its occurrence in Estonia and export to the United States.  All of these factors mitigate the risk of exposure of swine in the United States to CSF and SVD virus from swine and swine product imports from Estonia.  The results of the release assessment suggest that the likelihood that swine and swine products imported from Estonia into the United States would be infected with CSF or SVD virus is low.  The likelihood of exposure to CSF and SVD virus through swill feeding is further mitigated by licensing and cooking requirements for swill feeding in the United States, and other United States regulatory requirements designed to prevent transmission of animal disease agents to and among swine through swill feeding (9 CFR 166) [3, 127].  Available data suggest that the likelihood of exposure of swine in the United States to CSF or SVD virus from contaminated animal products, and products derived from swine, imported from Estonia is low.  </p>
<h1>6. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT
</h1>
<p class="body_Text">The consequence assessment of an import risk analysis, as defined by the OIE, consists of a description of the relationship between specified exposures to a biological agent and the consequences of those exposures [2].  This assessment is focused on primary and secondary consequences of exposure of swine in the United States to CSF or SVD virus.  The primary consequence considered here is infection of swine due to such exposure.  Consequences of infection considered here are effects on swine health; costs of controlling the spread of the virus and eradicating it; environmental consequences; and effects on international trade and associated domestic economic consequences.    </p>
<h2>6.1 Effects on swine health
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">In this assessment, the primary animal health consequence of concern of swine exposure to CSF or SVD virus is infection and development of disease.  Both CSF and SVD are highly contagious [11, 17].  Rates of morbidity and mortality due to CSF infection are high [5, 6].  The severity of clinical signs in CSF depends on the level of virulence of the virus, and on the immune status and age of the animal at infection [6].  Infected piglets up to 12 weeks of age often develop acute CSF, whereas in older breeding swine, clinical signs are often mild or absent [6].  The mortality rate in young swine can reach 90% [5].  Death occurs 2-3 weeks after infection (acute course), or up to 3 months after infection (chronic course) [5].  Chronic CSF is always fatal [6].  Fetal infection from infected sows can occur at any time during gestation, and result in abortion or stillbirth, or birth of persistently viremic piglets that shed large amounts of virus.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In contrast to CSF, SVD is generally a transient disease of low mortality [17].  However, like CSF, it is highly contagious and can spread rapidly.  Usually, infected swine recover within two to three weeks after developing acute signs of the disease [18].  Young swine tend to show more severe clinical signs than older swine.  The morbidity rate varies among swine herds, but can reach 100% in individual pens [17].  Some strains produce only mild or no clinical signs [20].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In summary, the potential animal health effects of exposure to CSF or SVD virus are severe.  Exposure to CSF virus and exposure to SVD virus would both likely be associated with high rates of infection, and high rates of morbidity associated with infection.  CSF virus infection would also likely be associated with high rates of swine death.  </p>
<h2>6.2 Control and eradication costs
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">The total cost of disease control and eradication depends on numerous factors, including the extent of spread and the prevalence of infection prior to detection; the density and types of populations and holdings of susceptible animals in affected regions; and which control and eradication strategies are implemented.  Potential costs include costs of implementing quarantines and other movement controls; slaughtering affected and high-risk herds; indemnity payments; vaccination; surveillance; and laboratory testing.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The most recent outbreak of CSF in the United States occurred in 1976, and SVD has never been reported to have occurred in the United States [46, 64].  Thus, no recent data are available regarding costs of control and eradication of CSF or SVD in the United States.  Below, estimated costs related to more recent outbreaks of CSF in other countries are provided as examples of potential cost ranges and sources.  According to one estimate, the costs resulting from a severe epizootic of CSF in the Netherlands in 1997 totaled 231 billion euros [128].  Half of this cost resulted from slaughter of swine for welfare reasons (overcrowding of swine, or overweight swine).  Smaller proportions of the cost were accounted for by reduced net cash flow for trade and industry (24%), slaughter of infected and high-risk animals (20%), and operational costs (6%).  Approximately one-third of the cost was borne by swine producers, approximately one-third by the EU, 24% by trade and industry, and the rest by the national government. This epizootic lasted 14 months, involved more than 400 outbreaks of CSF and resulted in the slaughter of more than 12 million swine [129].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The estimated total cost of smaller-scale epizootics of CSF in the EU in the 1990s ranges from 10.9 million euros (8 outbreaks, 2 months) to 208.7 million euros (113 outbreaks, 10 months) [128].  In all of these cases, the slaughter of swine, either for welfare reasons or because of infection or high risk, accounted for the vast majority of the estimated costs (87% to 93% of the total).  The direct costs of a control program for a CSF epizootic in the Netherlands in 1983 to 1985 were estimated to total $93 million [15].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Few data are available on the cost of control and eradication of SVD.  The potential for rapid escalation of costs related to a CSF or SVD outbreak is enhanced by the characteristics of these diseases as being highly contagious and spreading rapidly by direct contact with infected animals and through environmental contamination.  In addition, in some cases, CSF and SVD virus infection and spread might not be detected for weeks or even months, due to mildness or absence of clinical signs, allowing ample time for further spread [6, 16].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Lack of sufficient data; the unpredictability of the clinical course and patterns of spread of infections; and the complexity of the factors involved in spread, control and eradication make reliable estimation of the potential costs of control and eradication of CSF or SVD in the United States difficult or impossible.  Results of this qualitative assessment, however, suggest that the costs would be substantial.  </p>
<h2>6.3 Effects on the environment
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">Potential environmental effects of CSF or SVD virus introduction into the United States were reviewed by APHIS in environmental assessments prepared in support of rulemaking regarding importation of swine and swine products from several other EU Member States [130-133].  These assessments were prepared to comply with the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 4321 <i>et seq</i>.) as prescribed in implementing regulations adopted by the Council on Environmental Quality (40 CFR 1500–1508), USDA’s NEPA regulations (7 CFR 1b), and APHIS’ NEPA implementing procedures (7 CFR 372) [3, 134].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Among the potential environmental effects are ones related to disease control and eradication, in particular (1) disposal of animal carcasses, that is, the carcasses of animals that died of CSF or SVD, or were slaughtered as a precautionary measure or for welfare reasons; and (2) cleaning and disinfection of premises and equipment to limit the spread of CSF or SVD.  As noted above, the number of animals slaughtered in disease control and eradication efforts can be several million or more, depending on the extent of the outbreak, resulting in a substantial disposal burden.  Adding to the disposal burden would be the need to dispose of contaminated or potentially contaminated equipment, bedding and manure.  Disposal options include rendering, burial and incineration.  Use of chemicals in cleaning and disinfection is another potential source of environmental impact.  Potential environmental consequences of disposal, cleaning and disinfection include adverse effects on air, water and soil quality.  Among the factors that might influence the type and extent of effects are the methods of disposal used; the volume of the materials disposed of; factors related to the geographic features of the disposal area, such as soil and water resources; and climate-related factors.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Lack of sufficient data; the unpredictability of the clinical course and patterns of spread of infections; and the complexity of the factors involved in spread, control and eradication make reliable estimation of the total potential magnitude of the environmental consequences of CSF or SVD occurrence in the United States difficult or impossible.  The results of this and the environmental assessments mentioned above suggest that the magnitude could range from small to very large, depending in part on the extent of spread and the prevalence of infection prior to detection; and which control and eradication strategies are implemented.    </p>
<h2>6.4 International trade and domestic economic effects
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">Other potential consequences of CSF or SVD virus introduction into the United States are impacts on international trade, and related domestic economic consequences.  Potential export losses due to imposition of trade restrictions by trading partners on swine and swine products from the United States are substantial:  The total value of swine and swine meat exports from the United States in 2006 exceeded $2 billion [100].    </p>
<p class="body_Text">The impact of a foreign animal disease outbreak on the viability of rural and regional economies, including businesses reliant on livestock revenue, could also be substantial.  For example, in one study of the potential revenue impact of an outbreak in the United States of foot and mouth disease, also a contagious, viral disease affecting swine that is exotic to the United States, the potential gross revenue loss was estimated to be 34% for live swine, and 24% for pork [135].  The largest predicted impacts on farm income in this study were from the loss of export markets and reductions in domestic demand arising from consumer fears.    </p>
<h1>7. RISK ESTIMATION
</h1>
<p class="body_Text">Risk estimation in an import risk analysis, as defined by the OIE, consists of integrating the results from the release assessment, exposure assessment, and consequence assessment to produce overall measures of risks associated with the hazards identified at the outset [2].  A qualitative estimate of the risk of importing CSF or SVD virus into the United States from Estonia is provided below.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Importation of CSF or SVD virus into the United States from Estonia would require the presence of the virus in Estonia, and its subsequent export to the United States.  In this evaluation, APHIS found no evidence that CSF or SVD virus is present in Estonia.  Pathways through which it might be introduced into Estonia include migration of wild boar; trade of swine and swine products; vehicle and human traffic; and importation of swine products for personal consumption.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Several factors mitigate the risk of CSF or SVD introduction into Estonia, and thus also its export from Estonia to the United States.  Among these are the strict Estonian and EC controls on trade of swine and swine products; and the separation of much of Estonia from adjacent land masses by large bodies of water, which can act as natural barriers to disease transmission.  The risk of CSF or SVD virus introduction into Estonia via contaminated vehicles is mitigated by cleaning and disinfection requirements for vehicles carrying live swine; and procedures in place in Estonia to erect disinfection barriers at BIPs and other points of entry in the event of heightened risk of introduction via this pathway.  The lack of reported recent outbreaks of CSF and SVD in Latvia, and in the regions of Russia that border Estonia, further mitigates the risk of spread of CSF and SVD into Estonia from these regions.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The risk of CSF or SVD spread to domestic swine in Estonia from contaminated vehicles, clothing or shoes is mitigated by the prohibition against visiting farms within 48 hours after arrival in the country.  This risk is further mitigated on large production enterprises by implementation of biosecurity measures such as cleaning and disinfection of vehicles prior to entering the premises, and requirements that visitors to the premises wear protective clothing.  The risk of infection of domestic swine in Estonia through contact with infected wild boar is mitigated by the low likelihood of occurrence of CSF and SVD in wild boar in Estonia; the low density of swine farms in Estonia; the practice in Estonia of keeping swine indoors instead of outdoors; and the patterns of geographical distribution of domestic and wild boar in Estonia.  The risk of CSF or SVD spread to domestic swine through feeding of contaminated commodities is mitigated by the prohibition against garbage feeding in Estonia.  All of these factors limit the risk of CSF or SVD spread to or within Estonia, and thus also limit the risk of its export to the United States.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The risk of CSF or SVD virus export from Estonia to the United States is further mitigated by systems in place in Estonia to detect and eradicate the virus, should it occur in Estonia.  The system of routine collection of samples for surveillance testing for CSF and SVD in Estonia is complemented by several other surveillance measures, including the requirements for veterinary examination prior to movement of swine; efforts to increase awareness among private and official veterinarians, farmers and other members of the public of clinical signs of CSF and SVD; and the requirement to report signs or suspicions of CSF or SVD occurrence to veterinary officials.  The system in place in Estonia for emergency response to an outbreak or suspected occurrence of CSF or SVD is well organized, well developed and well documented.  All of these measures help to limit the risk of CSF and SVD spread in Estonia, and thus facilitate CSF and SVD eradication, should they occur.  Overall, Estonia's capacity to respond effectively to detection of CSF or SVD appears to be sufficient for rapid control and eradication.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">All of the factors described above that mitigate the risk of occurrence and spread of CSF and SVD virus in Estonia also mitigate the risk of its export from Estonia to the United States.  Residual risk is mitigated by United States import controls.  These include country or region of origin restrictions for swine and swine products; processing and inspection requirements for some swine products; and requirements for quarantine and inspection of live swine at the port of entry into the United States.  The risk would be further mitigated by application of the import controls that currently apply to imports of swine, pork, pork products and swine semen from the EU-15 (9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38), and to the SVD-free regions specified in 9 CFR 94.13 (see Section 4.12.2).  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The main pathways through which swine in the United States might be exposed to CSF or SVD virus from imported swine or swine products are exposure directly to infected or contaminated imported commodities, and exposure to waste products derived from such commodities.  The risk of exposure from swine and swine product imports from Estonia is mitigated primarily by all of the factors that mitigate the risk of occurrence and spread of CSF and SVD virus in Estonia and the risk of its export from Estonia to the United States.  The risk of exposure specifically through swill feeding to swine is further limited by licensing, cooking and other regulatory requirements in the United States that are designed to prevent transmission of animal disease agents to and among swine through swill feeding.  Overall, based on available data, the likelihood of exposure of swine in the United States to CSF or SVD virus from contaminated animal products, or products derived from swine, imported from Estonia appears to be low.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Results of the consequence assessment suggest the potential for severe animal health and economic consequences of a CSF or SVD outbreak in the United States.  Such an outbreak, depending on severity, could result in large-scale disease and death of swine; and substantial economic losses due to the costs of disease control and eradication and trade restrictions.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">In summary, although animal health and economic consequences of CSF or SVD virus exposure of swine in the United States are potentially severe, the likelihood of CSF or SVD virus release into the United States from swine and swine product imports from Estonia appears to be low.  The risk would be further mitigated by application of the import controls that currently apply to imports of swine, pork, pork products and swine semen from the EU-15 (9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38), and to the SVD-free regions specified in 9 CFR 94.13.    </p>
<h1>8. APPENDICES
</h1>
<h2>8.1 Legislative controls on imports from third countries</h2>
<p class="body_Text">Importation of swine and swine products into EU Member States is governed by numerous EC Decisions, Directives and Regulations.  Estonian legislation provides additional authority for regulation of imports into Estonia, and is harmonized with EC legislation.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Key provisions and requirements of EC and Estonian legislation related to importation of swine and swine products, and in particular as related to preventing the introduction and spread of CSF and SVD, are described below.  The full text of EC legislation is publicly available through the EUR-Lex website [48].  The full text of Estonian legislation is publicly available in the online electronic edition of the State Gazette of the Republic of Estonia <i>[Riigi Teataja]</i> [47].  English-language translations of some of the Estonian legislation are publicly available through the Ministry of Agriculture website, the VFB website, and the website of the Estonian Legal Language Center [136-138].  </p>
<h3>8.1.1 EC controls</h3>
<p class="body_Text">Live swine and other ungulates, and their fresh meat, can be imported into and transit through the EC from only European Commission-authorized third countries, or parts of third countries [72, 73].  These countries and parts of countries are listed in Council Decision 79/542/EEC, which is updated regularly as animal health situations and other conditions change [72].  Among the factors that are taken into account in drawing up the list of authorized third countries are the animal health status of the country, the country's history of animal disease reporting to the OIE, results of EC inspections and audits of the country, and animal health and welfare legislation and rules on prevention and control of infectious or contagious animal diseases that are in effect in the country [73].  Council Directive 2004/68/EC provides for inspection and auditing in third countries by Commission experts to verify conformity with, or equivalence to, EC animal health rules [73].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">For importation of live swine, the third country must guarantee that the swine come from a territory that is free of SVD, CSF and other specified diseases; that no vaccination against those diseases has occurred in that territory for at least the time period specified by applicable EC legislation; and that entry into that territory of animals that are vaccinated against those diseases is prohibited [73].  The third country must also guarantee that prior to shipment to the EC, the animals underwent a veterinary health check by an official veterinarian; and that upon arrival in the EU, the animals are checked at a BIP in accordance with the procedures specified in Council Directive 91/496/EEC [73, 79].  Various exceptions to these guarantees are permitted, including for animals for temporary grazing or draft purposes near EC borders; for animals for sporting events, circuses, exhibitions, zoos or experimental animals; and for pets and endangered animals [73].  These exceptions must be established by specific provisions according to procedures specified in Council Directive 2004/68/EC [73].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Council Decision 79/542/EEC specifies that the animals cannot be loaded in a means of transport carrying animals that are not destined for the EC or are of a lower health status, and that during transport to the EC, the animals cannot be unloaded in, or moved through, a third country that is not approved for importation of such animals into the EC [72].  Animals intended for immediate slaughter must be transported without delay to the slaughterhouse of destination, and must be slaughtered within 5 working days [72].  Other animals must be transported without delay to the holding of destination and remain there for at least 30 days, except for transport directly to a slaughterhouse [72].</p>
<p class="body_Text">All consignments of live swine must be accompanied by a veterinary certificate signed by an official veterinarian that attests that all requirements set out in the certificate, and in Council Directive 2004/68/EC and other applicable EC legislation, have been complied with [72, 73].  Additional certification requirements are listed in Appendix 8.2.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Meat products (as defined in Regulation (EC) No. 853/2004), including swine products, can also be imported into, or transit through, the EC from only European Commission-authorized third countries, or parts of third countries [80, 81].  These countries and parts of countries are listed in Commission Decision 2005/432/EC, along with specific animal health conditions for imports of these meat products [81].  Among these conditions are that the meat products meet any processing or treatment requirements specified in the Decision, such as heat treatment to a specified temperature or maturation to a specified pH.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Council Directive 2002/99/EC specifies animal health rules governing the production, processing, distribution and introduction into the EC of products of animal origin for human consumption [93].  Among the provisions of this Directive are that Member States take measures to ensure that products of animal origin for human consumption are introduced into the EC only if they comply with applicable EC requirements, or are accompanied by equivalent animal health guarantees.  These requirements include that the products do not originate from animals that come from a holding, establishment or territory that is subject to animal health restrictions; and that the products do not originate from animals that were slaughtered in an establishment in which animals that were infected, or suspected to be infected, with CSF virus or SVD virus, or other agents of disease specified in the Directive, were present.    
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Commission Decision 2002/613/EC establishes import conditions for semen of domestic swine [82].  It includes a list of countries from which Member States are permitted to authorize importation of swine semen, and a list of approved semen collection centers in those countries.  Swine semen collected at approved collection centers can be imported from Canada, New Zealand, the United States and Switzerland.  The animals from which the semen is collected must have remained in the authorized third country for at least three months immediately prior to collection of the semen [83].  Additional certification requirements established by this Decision are listed in Appendix 8.2.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Factors that are taken into account in establishing the list of European Commission-approved third countries from which semen of domestic swine can be imported are provided in Council Directive 90/429/EEC [83].  They include the animal health status of the country, the country's history of animal disease reporting to the OIE, the country's rules on animal disease prevention and control; the structure and powers of the veterinary services of the country; the organization and implementation of measures to prevent and control contagious animal diseases in the country; and the guarantees that the country can provide with regard to compliance with EC legislation [83].  Council Directive 90/429/EEC also specifies factors related to the semen collection centers that must be taken into account in determining whether importation of semen of domestic swine can be authorized [83].  These include the animal health situation in the area surrounding the collection center; the state of health of the herd in the semen collection center, and of the donor animal; and testing requirements for the herd, and in particular of the donor animal [83].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Member States are prohibited from importing semen of domestic swine that originates in a third country experiencing an outbreak or spread of a contagious animal disease that can be transmitted via semen, or from any third country for any other justifiable reason related to animal health [83].  Council Directive 90/429/EEC provides for inspection in Member States and third countries by Commission veterinary experts to verify compliance with EC legislative requirements [83].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Council Directive 90/429/EEC also includes detailed conditions for approval of semen collection centers; requirements for official supervision and inspection of the centers; conditions for admission of animals to approved semen collection centers; and requirements for routine testing of animals at approved semen collection centers [83].  These conditions and requirements include that the semen collection centers be under permanent supervision of a center veterinarian; that the centers be inspected by an official veterinarian at least twice per year; and that all animals be tested for CSF upon leaving the centers, but not less than 12 months after their arrival at the centers.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Member States are permitted to authorize imports of swine ova and embryos from the same countries from which they are permitted to authorize imports of semen of domestic swine [84].</p>
<h3>8.1.2 Estonian controls</h3>
<p class="body_Text">The main instrument of Estonian legislation for control of animal and animal product imports is the Veterinary Supervision over Trade in, Import and Export of Animals and Animal Products Act.  This Act establishes veterinary requirements for importation of animals and animal products from third countries, including transit through Estonia to a third country; as well as veterinary requirements for export of animals and animal products to third countries and for trade in animals and animal products with EU Member States [35].  All animals, animal products and breeding materials imported into Estonia must meet the veterinary requirements laid down by this Act [35].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">The Act provides the VFB with the authority to prohibit importation of animals or animal products under the following conditions [35]: 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· the consignment does not meet veterinary requirements established by this Act; 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· the animals are infected, or suspected to be infected, with an epizootic disease that has been declared dangerous to human or animal health, or their importation would otherwise pose a danger to human or animal health; 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· importation is prohibited by EC legislation; 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· the state of health of the animals does not allow their transport in accordance with veterinary requirements; 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">· the documents accompanying the consignment do not meet the requirements established by EC legislation.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The Act also provides the VFB with the authority to prohibit importation or restrict further use of animals and animal products from countries or regions in which an epizootic disease subject to international reporting requirements, or any other disease or circumstances that present a threat to human or animal health occurs or spreads [35].  The restrictions must be published on the VFB website, and the competent authority of the country or region concerned must be notified [35].  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">It also provides the VFB with the authority to require the taking of additional safeguard measures in the event of a disease outbreak or other circumstances that might endanger human or animal health, or the VFB has reason to believe that the consignment originates in a danger zone [35].  The Director General of the VFB is required to impose at least temporary safeguard measures until appropriate measures are imposed by the European Commission [35].  The VFB must immediately inform the European Commission and the competent authorities of other Member States of the safeguard measures taken [35].    </p>
<h2>8.2 Certification requirements for imports from third countries
</h2>
<p class="body_Text">Detailed certification requirements for importation of swine and swine products are specified in various instruments of EC and Estonian legislation.  The certification requirements vary by country or region of origin, by commodity, and in some cases by the intended purpose of the commodity, such as swine for breeding or for immediate slaughter [72].  Below is an overview of key EC and Estonian certification requirements for importation of animals and animal products.  </p>
<h3>8.2.1 EC requirements</h3>
<p class="body_Text">General requirements regarding the issuing of certificates required by EC veterinary legislation are specified in Council Directive 96/93/EC [139].  Provisions of this Directive are incorporated into Estonian legislation in the Infectious Animal Disease Control Act [27].  The requirements include that the competent authority ensure that the certifying officers have a satisfactory knowledge of the veterinary legislation regarding the animals or animal products to be certified; are informed as to the rules to be followed in drawing up and issuing the certificates; do not certify data of which they have no personal knowledge or that cannot be ascertained by them; do not sign blank or incomplete certificates; and do not sign certificates relating to animals or products that they have not inspected or that have passed out of their control.  The competent authority must also take all necessary steps to ensure the integrity of certification.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Model veterinary certificates for imports of live animals, semen, embryos, ova and products of animal origin are provided in Commission Decision 2007/240/EC [140].  Information to be included on each certificate includes the name and contact information of consignor and consignee; the country, region and place of origin, and place of loading; the country and region of destination; the means of transport; the BIP of entry into the EU; a description and intended purpose of commodity; and health information as required by applicable EC legislation.  Each certificate must be signed by an official veterinarian.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Certification requirements for live swine include detailed animal health related restrictions as to the country, region and holding of origin of the swine, and the manner in which they are transported to the EU [72].  The swine must be certified as originating from a territory that has been free of CSF and SVD for at least 12 months.  Exceptions are permitted only by special authorization by the European Commission.  The swine must have remained in that territory since birth, or for at least the 3 months (for slaughter animals) or 6 months (for breeding or production animals, or non-domestic Suidae) prior to their dispatch to the EC, without contact with imported cloven-hoofed animals for the past 30 days.  The certification must also attest that the swine have remained in the holding of origin named in the certificate since birth, or for at least 40 days prior to dispatch, and that during that period, no cases or outbreaks of CSF and SVD have occurred in the holding or within a 20 km radius of the holding.  The swine must not have been vaccinated against those diseases, and must not be intended for slaughter under a national program for CSF or SVD eradication.  The swine must have been dispatched from their holding of origin without passing through any market, directly to the EC or through an officially authorized assembly center identified in the certificate.  Any transport vehicles or containers in which the swine were loaded must have been cleaned and disinfected prior to loading, with an officially authorized disinfectant.  The swine also must have been examined by an official veterinarian within 24 hours of loading and shown no clinical signs of disease.  Breeding and production swine, and non-domestic Suidae, from Switzerland, Chile and Iceland must test negative for CSF antibodies and SVD antibodies within 30 days prior to dispatch.  Similar certification must be provided by an official veterinarian for export of fresh swine meat [72].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Certification requirements for swine products (as defined in Regulation (EC) No. 853/2004) include that the products meet specified required treatment or processing conditions, such as heating to a specified temperature or maturation to a specified pH [80, 81].  The treatment or processing requirements vary by country or region of origin of the commodity.  The certification must also attest that the meat from which the products are derived does not originate from a holding that is subject to restrictions for CSF or SVD affecting swine within a 10 km radius of the holding; and that no outbreaks of CSF or SVD have occurred in that area in the past 30 days [81].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">Certification requirements for imports of semen of domestic swine are listed in Commission Decision 2002/613/EC [82].  The requirements include that the country of origin either (1) has been free of CSF, SVD and other specified swine diseases for the past 12 months, and that no vaccination against these diseases has been carried out in that country for the past 12 months; or (2) is free of CSF, SVD and other specified swine diseases in accordance with OIE procedures.  The center at which the semen was collected must be approved for export to the EC by the country of origin; must meet applicable EC legislative requirements; and must be located in an area that for at least 30 days prior to dispatch of the consignment was not subject to restrictions due to an outbreak of CSF, SVD or other specified swine diseases.  Certification requirements related to addition of animals to the semen collection center include that the animals originated from herds or holdings that were not located in an area subject to restrictions under national legislation due to occurrence of CSF, SVD or other specified swine diseases; that the animals were not kept in any herd of a lower health status; that all animals upon admission to the center were quarantined for at least 30 days; and that on admission no animals showed any clinical signs of disease.  The animals from which the semen was collected must have been present in the country of origin for at least three months immediately prior to collection of the semen; showed no clinical signs of disease on the day of collection; and were not allowed to serve naturally.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">An additional certificate required for importation of animals and animal products into the EC is the common veterinary entry document (CVED).  Inspection staff at the BIP of entry must be notified via the CVED of the arrival of animals and animal products from third countries prior to their arrival, at least one working day prior to arrival in the case of consignments of animals [87, 88].  The CVED must be drawn up in accordance with the model CVED provided in Commission Regulation (EC) No. 282/2004 for animals or in Commission Regulation (EC) No. 136/2004 for animal products [87, 88].  Information to be provided on the CVED prior to arrival includes the name and contact information of consignor and consignee; and the country of origin, the means of transport, a description, and the BIP of entry and estimated date and time of arrival of the commodity.  
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Also listed on the CVED is the combined nomenclature (CN) code of the commodity.  The CN is a system of classification of goods and merchandise that was established by the European Commission to meet Customs and trade statistics requirements [141].  The system incorporates and extends the harmonized system of nomenclature that is administered by the World Customs Organization, and thus provides a means of applying an internationally standardized system of classification of goods entering and exiting the EC [142].</p>
<p class="body_Text">Subsequent to completion of all applicable veterinary checks upon arrival at the BIP, the official veterinarian of the BIP is responsible for ensuring that the results of the checks, and the decision as to whether the consignment is acceptable for entry into the EC, are entered on the CVED.  Certification that all applicable veterinary checks have been carried out is provided by signature of the CVED by the official veterinarian.  </p>
<p class="body_Text">If the animals or products are imported into the EC, the original CVED must accompany the animals to the destination specified on that document [87, 88].   One copy of the CVED, and the originals of the veterinary certification and other documents accompanying the consignment, must be retained by the official veterinarian at the BIP for at least three years.</p>
<h3>8.2.2 Estonian requirements</h3>
<p class="body_Text">The main instrument of Estonian legislation related to certification requirements for imports of animals and animal products is the Veterinary Supervision over Trade in, Import and Export of Animals and Animal Products Act.  This Act specifies that each consignment of animals or animal products for importation into Estonia, or transit through Estonia, must be accompanied by an original veterinary certificate specific for that consignment, bearing the name, title, signature and attestation seal of a supervisory official, and issued on the date of dispatch of the consignment [35].  All information in the certificate must be in Estonian and, in case of transit through Estonia, at least one official language of the country of destination [35].  The type and standard format of the certificates are established by the Director General of the VFB for each species and class of animals and animal products, in accordance with requirements set by EC legislation [35].  The VFB publishes the certificates on its website [35].  </p>
<p class="body_Text">At each BIP, a certificate of completion of the required veterinary check is issued by the veterinary supervisory official [35].  These certificates conform to the standards set forth in Commission Regulation 282/2004/EC for animals, and in Commission Regulation 136/2004/EC for animal products [35, 87, 88].  This certificate must accompany the consignment during the time that the consignment is under Customs supervision, and must reference the relevant Customs document [35].  Upon importation for free circulation in Estonia, the certificate must accompany the consignment until the consignment reaches the consignee at destination [35].  A copy of each certificate must be available at the local Veterinary Center office for at least three years after date of issue [35].</p>
<h2>8.3 Import data, 1999-2006
</h2>
<p class="caption"><b>Table 1.  Volume and source of live swine imports into Estonia, 1999-2006.  
</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Live swinea imports into Estonia
</b></p>
<p><b>(head per calendar year)</b><i></i></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>1999</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2000</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2001</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2002</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2003</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2004</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2005</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2006</i></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>Country of origin</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><i>EU-15b</i></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>64</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Finland</p>
</td>	<td><p>39</p>
</td>	<td><p>18</p>
</td>	<td><p>34</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Sweden</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><i>EU-10c</i></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Latvia</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>190</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><i>EFTA Member Statesd</i></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Norway</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>16</p>
</td>	<td><p>11</p>
</td>	<td><p>15</p>
</td>	<td><p>15</p>
</td>	<td><p>19</p>
</td>	<td><p>16</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>Total</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>103</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>20</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>50</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>206</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>18</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>18</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>22</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>36</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>aGlobal Trade Atlas Harmonized System Code 0103, Live Swine [100].</p>
<p>bEU Member States as of April 30, 2004.
</p>
<p>cCountries that joined the EU on May 1, 2004.
</p>
<p>dEuropean Free Trade Association Member States. </p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p class="caption"><b>Table 2.  Volume and source of swine product imports into Estonia, 1999-2006.  </b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Swine producta imports into Estonia
</b></p>
<p><b>(metric tons per calendar year)</b><i></i></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>1999</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2000</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2001</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2002</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2003</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2004</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2005</i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i>2006</i></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>Country of origin</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td>	<td><p><i></i></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><i>EU-15b</i></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>59</p>
</td>	<td><p>214</p>
</td>	<td><p>165</p>
</td>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>298</p>
</td>	<td><p>145</p>
</td>	<td><p>173</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Belgium</p>
</td>	<td><p>107</p>
</td>	<td><p>334</p>
</td>	<td><p>1229</p>
</td>	<td><p>968</p>
</td>	<td><p>1866</p>
</td>	<td><p>1212</p>
</td>	<td><p>963</p>
</td>	<td><p>665</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Denmark</p>
</td>	<td><p>3448</p>
</td>	<td><p>3797</p>
</td>	<td><p>3250</p>
</td>	<td><p>3735</p>
</td>	<td><p>3318</p>
</td>	<td><p>4169</p>
</td>	<td><p>5058</p>
</td>	<td><p>6584</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Finland</p>
</td>	<td><p>1748</p>
</td>	<td><p>2139</p>
</td>	<td><p>2235</p>
</td>	<td><p>4254</p>
</td>	<td><p>5089</p>
</td>	<td><p>5556</p>
</td>	<td><p>6468</p>
</td>	<td><p>7815</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> France</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>48</p>
</td>	<td><p>17</p>
</td>	<td><p>24</p>
</td>	<td><p>69</p>
</td>	<td><p>22</p>
</td>	<td><p>109</p>
</td>	<td><p>125</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>44</p>
</td>	<td><p>21</p>
</td>	<td><p>35</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>161</p>
</td>	<td><p>1715</p>
</td>	<td><p>1486</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Ireland</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>83</p>
</td>	<td><p>24</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Italy</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>44</p>
</td>	<td><p>22</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>24</p>
</td>	<td><p>26</p>
</td>	<td><p>45</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>121</p>
</td>	<td><p>128</p>
</td>	<td><p>156</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Spain</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>87</p>
</td>	<td><p>110</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>192</p>
</td>	<td><p>351</p>
</td>	<td><p>251</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Sweden</p>
</td>	<td><p>3050</p>
</td>	<td><p>1519</p>
</td>	<td><p>1380</p>
</td>	<td><p>1310</p>
</td>	<td><p>1969</p>
</td>	<td><p>2401</p>
</td>	<td><p>530</p>
</td>	<td><p>487</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> United Kingdom</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>49</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>51</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><i>EU-10c</i></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Cyprus</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>22</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>481</p>
</td>	<td><p>575</p>
</td>	<td><p>522</p>
</td>	<td><p>41</p>
</td>	<td><p>118</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>334</p>
</td>	<td><p>172</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>183</p>
</td>	<td><p>190</p>
</td>	<td><p>42</p>
</td>	<td><p>146</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Latvia</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>58</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>94</p>
</td>	<td><p>87</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Lithuania</p>
</td>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>29</p>
</td>	<td><p>50</p>
</td>	<td><p>128</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Malta</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>272</p>
</td>	<td><p>2392</p>
</td>	<td><p>1500</p>
</td>	<td><p>714</p>
</td>	<td><p>1599</p>
</td>	<td><p>370</p>
</td>	<td><p>859</p>
</td>	<td><p>1787</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><i>EFTA Member Statesd</i></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Norway</p>
</td>	<td><p>2853</p>
</td>	<td><p>595</p>
</td>	<td><p>169</p>
</td>	<td><p>56</p>
</td>	<td><p>23</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><i>Other</i></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> Canada</p>
</td>	<td><p>913</p>
</td>	<td><p>361</p>
</td>	<td><p>1086</p>
</td>	<td><p>148</p>
</td>	<td><p>246</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> United States</p>
</td>	<td><p>24</p>
</td>	<td><p>24</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>25</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>Total</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>12858</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>12232</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>11777</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>11872</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>14409</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>14890</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>16639</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>20009</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>aGlobal Trade Atlas Harmonized System Code 0203, Meat of Swine, Fresh, Chilled or Frozen [100].</p>
<p>bEU Member States as of April 30, 2004.
</p>
<p>cCountries that joined the EU on May 1, 2004.
</p>
<p>dEuropean Free Trade Association Member States. </p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<h2>8.4 CSF and SVD surveillance data</h2>
<p class="caption"><b>Table 3.  Number of domestic swine tested for CSF, 2002-2006.  </b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>County</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2002</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2003</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2004</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2006a</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Harju</p>
</td>	<td><p>250</p>
</td>	<td><p>190</p>
</td>	<td><p>145</p>
</td>	<td><p>158</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Hiiu</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td>	<td><p>60</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Ida-Viru</p>
</td>	<td><p>80</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>50</p>
</td>	<td><p>50</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Jõgeva</p>
</td>	<td><p>115</p>
</td>	<td><p>142</p>
</td>	<td><p>130</p>
</td>	<td><p>129</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Järva</p>
</td>	<td><p>372</p>
</td>	<td><p>339</p>
</td>	<td><p>187</p>
</td>	<td><p>333</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Lääne</p>
</td>	<td><p>150</p>
</td>	<td><p>206</p>
</td>	<td><p>160</p>
</td>	<td><p>190</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Lääne-Viru</p>
</td>	<td><p>1089</p>
</td>	<td><p>1003</p>
</td>	<td><p>1000</p>
</td>	<td><p>922</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Põlva</p>
</td>	<td><p>122</p>
</td>	<td><p>250</p>
</td>	<td><p>210</p>
</td>	<td><p>280</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Pärnu</p>
</td>	<td><p>52</p>
</td>	<td><p>70</p>
</td>	<td><p>70</p>
</td>	<td><p>97</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Rapla</p>
</td>	<td><p>514</p>
</td>	<td><p>359</p>
</td>	<td><p>350</p>
</td>	<td><p>246</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Saare</p>
</td>	<td><p>1614</p>
</td>	<td><p>1857</p>
</td>	<td><p>1987</p>
</td>	<td><p>700</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Tartu</p>
</td>	<td><p>349</p>
</td>	<td><p>349</p>
</td>	<td><p>349</p>
</td>	<td><p>354</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Valga</p>
</td>	<td><p>140</p>
</td>	<td><p>150</p>
</td>	<td><p>120</p>
</td>	<td><p>80</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Viljandi</p>
</td>	<td><p>261</p>
</td>	<td><p>272</p>
</td>	<td><p>340</p>
</td>	<td><p>335</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Võru</p>
</td>	<td><p>28</p>
</td>	<td><p>210</p>
</td>	<td><p>116</p>
</td>	<td><p>50</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>Total</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>5136</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>5417</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>5274</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>3924</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>3937</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>aNA: Data not available.<b></b></p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p class="caption"><b>Table 4.  Number of domestic swine tested for SVD, 2002-2006.  
</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>County</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2002</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2003</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2004</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2006a</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Harju</p>
</td>	<td><p>242</p>
</td>	<td><p>190</p>
</td>	<td><p>145</p>
</td>	<td><p>158</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Hiiu</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td>	<td><p>60</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Ida-Viru</p>
</td>	<td><p>80</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>50</p>
</td>	<td><p>50</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Jõgeva</p>
</td>	<td><p>90</p>
</td>	<td><p>142</p>
</td>	<td><p>130</p>
</td>	<td><p>129</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Järva</p>
</td>	<td><p>346</p>
</td>	<td><p>339</p>
</td>	<td><p>187</p>
</td>	<td><p>329</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Lääne</p>
</td>	<td><p>150</p>
</td>	<td><p>206</p>
</td>	<td><p>160</p>
</td>	<td><p>190</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Lääne-Viru</p>
</td>	<td><p>1089</p>
</td>	<td><p>1003</p>
</td>	<td><p>1000</p>
</td>	<td><p>922</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Põlva</p>
</td>	<td><p>122</p>
</td>	<td><p>250</p>
</td>	<td><p>210</p>
</td>	<td><p>280</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Pärnu</p>
</td>	<td><p>52</p>
</td>	<td><p>70</p>
</td>	<td><p>70</p>
</td>	<td><p>97</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Rapla</p>
</td>	<td><p>514</p>
</td>	<td><p>359</p>
</td>	<td><p>350</p>
</td>	<td><p>246</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Saare</p>
</td>	<td><p>1614</p>
</td>	<td><p>1857</p>
</td>	<td><p>1987</p>
</td>	<td><p>700</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Tartu</p>
</td>	<td><p>345</p>
</td>	<td><p>349</p>
</td>	<td><p>349</p>
</td>	<td><p>354</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Valga</p>
</td>	<td><p>140</p>
</td>	<td><p>150</p>
</td>	<td><p>120</p>
</td>	<td><p>80</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Viljandi</p>
</td>	<td><p>295</p>
</td>	<td><p>271</p>
</td>	<td><p>340</p>
</td>	<td><p>354</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Võru</p>
</td>	<td><p>28</p>
</td>	<td><p>210</p>
</td>	<td><p>116</p>
</td>	<td><p>97</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>Total</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>5107</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>5416</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>5274</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>3986</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>1326</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>aNA: Data not available.<b></b></p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p class="caption"><b>Table 5.  Number of wild boar tested for CSF, 2002-2006.  </b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>County</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2002</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2003</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2004</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2006a</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Harju</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Hiiu</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Ida-Viru</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Jõgeva</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Järva</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Lääne</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Lääne-Viru</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Põlva</p>
</td>	<td><p>11</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Pärnu</p>
</td>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Rapla</p>
</td>	<td><p>7</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>7</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Saare</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>12</p>
</td>	<td><p>12</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Tartu</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Valga</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Viljandi</p>
</td>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Võru</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>NA</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>Total</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>67</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>94</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>87</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>85</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>96</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>aNA: Data not available.<b></b></p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<h1>9. REFERENCES</h1>
<p class="body_Text">1.
Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia. June 2, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS for recognition of the classical swine fever and swine vesicular disease free status of the Republic of Estonia. 2005.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">2.
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Risk analysis, in Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 2006. World Organization for Animal Health: Paris.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">3.
Electronic Code of Federal Regulations. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, GPO Access, Available from: <a href="http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/"><u>http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">4.
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Diagnostic tests for international trade purposes, in Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 2006. World Organization for Animal Health: Paris.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">5.
Moennig V. Introduction to classical swine fever: virus, disease and control policy. Vet Microbiol, 2000. <b>73</b>(2-3):93-102.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">6.
Moennig V, Floegel-Niesmann G, and Greiser-Wilke I. Clinical signs and epidemiology of classical swine fever: a review of new knowledge. Vet J, 2003. <b>165</b>(1):11-20.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">7.
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Classical swine fever, in Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. 2004. World Organization for Animal Health: Paris.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">8.
Dewulf J, et al. An experimental infection with classical swine fever virus in pregnant sows: transmission of the virus, course of the disease, antibody response and effect on gestation. J Vet Med B Infect Dis Vet Public Health, 2001. <b>48</b>(8):583-91.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">9.
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Classical swine fever, in Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 2006. World Organization for Animal Health: Paris.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">10.
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Classical swine fever. Technical Disease Cards. 2002. Available from: <a href="http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A130.htm"><u>http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A130.htm</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">11.
Paton DJ and Greiser-Wilke I. Classical swine fever--an update. Res Vet Sci, 2003. <b>75</b>(3):169-78.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">12.
Edwards S. Survival and inactivation of classical swine fever virus. Vet Microbiol, 2000. <b>73</b>(2-3):175-81.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">13.
de Smit AJ, et al. Transmission of classical swine fever virus by artificial insemination. Vet Microbiol, 1999. <b>67</b>(4):239-49.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">14.
Fritzemeier J, et al. Epidemiology of classical swine fever in Germany in the 1990s. Vet Microbiol, 2000. <b>77</b>(1-2):29-41.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">15.
Elbers AR, et al. The classical swine fever epidemic 1997-1998 in The Netherlands: descriptive epidemiology. Prev Vet Med, 1999. <b>42</b>(3-4):157-84.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">16.
Escribano-Romero E, Jimenez-Clavero MA, and Ley V. Swine vesicular disease virus. Pathology of the disease and molecular characteristics of the virion. Anim Health Res Rev, 2000. <b>1</b>(2):119-26.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">17.
Lin F and Kitching RP. Swine vesicular disease: an overview. Vet J, 2000. <b>160</b>(3):192-201.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">18.
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Swine vesicular disease, in Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. 2004. World Organization for Animal Health: Paris.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">19.
Merck & Co. Merck Veterinary Manual, 9th ed., online edition. 2006. Available from: <a href="http://www.merckvetmanual.com/"><u>http://www.merckvetmanual.com/</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">20.
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Swine vesicular disease. Technical Disease Cards. 2002. Available from: <a href="http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A030.htm"><u>http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A030.htm</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">21.
Guerin B and Pozzi N. Viruses in boar semen: detection and clinical as well as epidemiological consequences regarding disease transmission by artificial insemination. Theriogenology, 2005. <b>63</b>(2):556-72.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">22.
 Treaty establishing the European Community (Nice consolidated version), Article 249. Official Journal of the European Communities, 2002. <b>OJ C 325</b>(45):33-184.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">23.
 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, Article 54. Official Journal of the European Union, 2003. <b>OJ L 236</b>(46):33-49.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">24.
Veterinary activities organization act; English translation provided in June 2, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS. Riigi Teataja [State Gazette of the Republic of Estonia], 1999. <b>RT I 1999 58, 608</b>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">25.
Statutes of the Veterinary and Food Board, Regulation No. 28 of the Minister of Agriculture of March 31, 2004; English translation available on VFB website at <a href="http://www.vet.agri.ee/static/body/files/223.Statutes%20of%20the%20Veterinary%20and%20Food%20Board.pdf"><u>http://www.vet.agri.ee/static/body/files/223.Statutes%20of%20the%20Veterinary%20and%20Food%20Board.pdf</u></a>. Riigi Teataja [State Gazette of the Republic of Estonia], 2004. <b>RTL 2004 36, 594</b>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">26.
Structure and regular employees of the Veterinary and Food Board and its local authorities, Regulation No. 29 of the Minister of Agriculture of March 31, 2004; English translation available on VFB website at <a href="http://www.vet.agri.ee/static/body/files/223.Statutes%20of%20the%20Veterinary%20and%20Food%20Board.pdf"><u>http://www.vet.agri.ee/static/body/files/223.Statutes%20of%20the%20Veterinary%20and%20Food%20Board.pdf</u></a>. Riigi Teataja [State Gazette of the Republic of Estonia], 2004. <b>RTL 2004 36, 595</b>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">27.
Infectious animal disease control act; English translation provided in June 2, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS. Riigi Teataja [State Gazette of the Republic of Estonia], 1999. <b>RT I 1999 57, 598</b>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">28.
National infectious animal disease control program (also translated as the State program on monitoring and surveillance of animal infectious diseases); English translations provided in July 26, 2005 and January 24, 2007 submissions of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS. 2005.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">29.
Contingency plan for control of infectious animal disease; English translations provided in June 2, 2005 and July 26, 2005 submissions of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">30.
Conditions and procedure for payment of compensation for costs related to the prevention and control of especially dangerous infectious animal diseases, Regulation No. 260 of the Government of the Republic of Estonia of August 1, 2000; English translation provided in June 2, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS. 2000.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">31.
Procedure for calculation of value of farm animals and conditions and procedure for payment of compensation for damage caused by infectious animal disease, Regulation No. 18 of the Minister of Agriculture of March 1, 2001; English translation provided in June 2, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS. Riigi Teataja [State Gazette of the Republic of Estonia], 2001. <b>RTL 2001 39, 536</b>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">32.
Classical swine fever prevention instruction; English translation provided in June 2, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">33.
Swine vesicular disease prevention instruction; English translation provided in July 26, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">34.
List of infectious animal diseases subject to notification and registration, Regulation No. 34 of the Minister of Agriculture of November 25, 1999; English translation provided in July 26, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS. Riigi Teataja [State Gazette of the Republic of Estonia], 1999. <b>RTL 1999 163, 2360</b>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">35.
Veterinary supervision over trade in, import and export of animals and animal products act; English translation provided in June 2, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS. Riigi Teataja [State Gazette of the Republic of Estonia], 2004. <b>RT I 2004 34, 236</b>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">36.
Veterinary requirements applying to trade in bovine animals and swine, Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture No. 99 of May 25, 2004; English translation provided in July 26, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS. Riigi Teataja [State Gazette of the Republic of Estonia], 2004. <b>RTL 2004 68, 1127</b>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">37.
Veterinary requirements applying to trade in semen of porcine species, Regulation No. 102 of the Minister of Agriculture of June 1, 2004; English translation provided in July 26, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS, in Riigi Teataja [State Gazette of the Republic of Estonia]. 2004.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">38.
Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia. April 25, 2006 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS. 2006.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">39.
Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Estonia. Ministry of Agriculture website, map of administrative divisions. 2007. Available from: <a href="http://www.agri.ee/eng/map/index.html"><u>http://www.agri.ee/eng/map/index.html</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">40.
GraphicMaps.com clip art, outline map of Europe. 2007. Available from: <a href="http://graphicmaps.com/clipart.htm"><u>http://graphicmaps.com/clipart.htm</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">41.
United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. November 2005 site visit to the Republic of Estonia. 2005.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">42.
2001/881/EC Commission Decision of 7 December 2001 drawing up a list of border inspection posts agreed for veterinary checks on animals and animal products from third countries and updating the detailed rules concerning the checks to be carried out by the experts of the Commission. Official Journal of the European Communities, 2001. <b>OJ L 326</b>(44):44-62. Consolidated version 04.05.2007.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">43.
Veterinary and Food Laboratory of the Republic of Estonia. Veterinary and Food Laboratory website. 2007. Available from: <a href="http://www.vetlab.ee/?a=page&page=3ebf7823a3ddb47159e1"><u>http://www.vetlab.ee/?a=page&page=3ebf7823a3ddb47159e1</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">44.
Estonian Accreditation Center. Estonian Accreditation Center website. Available from: <a href="http://www.eak.ee/index_eng.php"><u>http://www.eak.ee/index_eng.php</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">45.
Veterinary and Food Board Yearbook, available on VFB website at <a href="http://www.vet.agri.ee/static/artiklid/211.Yearbook%202005%202006.pdf"><u>http://www.vet.agri.ee/static/artiklid/211.Yearbook%202005%202006.pdf</u></a>. 2006.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">46.
World animal health information database (WAHID). World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), online database of animal health information, Available from: <a href="http://www.oie.int/wahid/"><u>http://www.oie.int/wahid/</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">47.
Republic of Estonia. Elektrooniline Riigi Teataja---eRT [electronic edition of the State Gazette of the Republic of Estonia]. Available from: https://<a href="http://www.riigiteataja.ee/ert/ert.jsp"><u>www.riigiteataja.ee/ert/ert.jsp</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">48.
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. EUR-Lex. Available from: <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/"><u>http://eur-lex.europa.eu/</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">49.
2003/24/EC Commission Decision of 30 December 2002 concerning the development of an integrated computerised veterinary system. Official Journal of the European Communities, 2003. <b>OJ L 8</b>(46):44-45.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">50.
2003/623/EC Commission Decision of 19 August 2003 concerning the development of an integrated computerised veterinary system known as Traces. Official Journal of the European Union, 2003. <b>OJ L 216</b>(46):58-59.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">51.
2004/292/EC Commission Decision of 30 March 2004 on the introduction of the Traces system and amending Decision 92/486/EEC. Official Journal of the European Union, 2004. <b>OJ L 94</b>(47):63-64. Consolidated version 19.07.2005.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">52.
Activities of the European Union, Summaries of legislation, TRACES system. Available from: <a href="http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/f84009.htm"><u>http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/f84009.htm</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">53.
European Commission Directorate General of Health and Consumer Protection. Animal disease notification system. Available from: <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/adns/index_en.htm"><u>http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/adns/index_en.htm</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">54.
82/894/EEC Council Directive 82/894/EEC of 21 December 1982 on the notification of animal diseases within the Community. 1982. <b>OJ L 378</b>:58–62. Consolidated version 25.03.2004.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">55.
European Commission Directorate General of Health and Consumer Protection Directorate F---Food and Veterinary Office. Final report of a mission carried out in Estonia from 7 to 18 November 2005 in order to review the up-grading of certain classes of food processing establishments, controls over certain products of animal origin intended for human consumption, certain live animals controls, and contingency plans for epizootic diseases; DG(SANCO)/7616/2005---MR Final. 2006.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">56.
882/2004 Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules. Official Journal of the European Union, 2004. <b>OJ L 165</b>(47):1-141. Consolidated version 01.01.2007.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">57.
National Audit Office of Estonia. National Audit Office of Estonia website. Available from: <a href="http://www.riigikontroll.ee/?lang=en"><u>http://www.riigikontroll.ee/?lang=en</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">58.
European Commission Directorate General of Health and Consumer Protection Directorate F---Food and Veterinary Office. Food and Veterinary Office website. Available from: <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/index_en.htm"><u>http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/index_en.htm</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">59.
98/139/EC Commission Decision of 4 February 1998 laying down certain detailed rules concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the veterinary field by Commission experts in the Member States. Official Journal of the European Communities, 1998. <b>OJ L 38</b>(41):10-13.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">60.
European Commission Directorate General of Health and Consumer Protection. Program of inspections 2007 by the Food and Veterinary Office, DG(SANCO)660114/2006. 2006. European Communities.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">61.
European Commission Directorate General of Health and Consumer Protection. Program of inspections 2007 by the Food and Veterinary Office, July to December, DG (SANCO) 660062/2007. 2007. European Communities.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">62.
United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. APHIS considerations on the identification of administrative units for certain Member States of the European Union, APHIS-2005-0037-0002, Available from: <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/"><u>http://www.regulations.gov/</u></a>. 2004.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">63.
United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Notice of availability of a document concerning the identification of EU administrative units, Docket No. 04-081-2, Available from: <a href="http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/"><u>http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/</u></a>. Federal Register, 2005. <b>70</b>(145):43838-43839.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">64.
Handistatus II. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), online database of animal health information, Available from: <a href="http://www.oie.int/hs2/report.asp/"><u>http://www.oie.int/hs2/report.asp/</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">65.
Map of Estonia, University of Texas at Austin Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. 2007. Available from: <a href="http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia07/estonia_sm_2007.gif"><u>http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia07/estonia_sm_2007.gif</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">66.
United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. APHIS evaluation of the status of Latvia regarding classical swine fever, swine vesicular disease, and foot and mouth disease, April 2006, APHIS-2006-0106-0003, Available from: <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/"><u>http://www.regulations.gov/</u></a>. 2006.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">67.
United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Proposed rule: Importation of live swine, swine semen, pork, and pork products from the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, APHIS-2006-0106-0001, Available from: <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/"><u>http://www.regulations.gov/</u></a>. Federal Register, 2007. <b>72</b>(28):6490-6499.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">68.
2001/89/EC Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever. Official Journal of the European Communities, 2001. <b>OJ L 316</b>(44):5-35. Consolidated version 01.01.2007.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">69.
92/119/EEC Council Directive 92/119/EEC of 17 December 1992 introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease. 1993. <b>OJ L 62</b>:69–85.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">70.
Rules on prevention and eradication of classical swine fever and African swine fever (also translated as Guidelines for the eradication of classical swine fever and African swine fever), Regulation No. 179 of November 23, 2004; English translation provided in June 2, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">71.
Table of concordance of EC and Estonian legislation; provided in June 2, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">72.
79/542/EEC Council Decision of 21 December 1976 drawing up a list of third countries from which the Member States authorize imports of bovine animals, swine and fresh meat. 1979. <b>OJ L 146</b>:15-17. Consolidated version 01.01.2007.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">73.
2004/68/EC Council Directive 2004/68/EC of 26.4.2004 laying down animal health rules for the importation into and transit through the Community of certain live ungulate animals, amending Directives 90/426/EEC and 92/65/EEC and repealing Directive 72/462/EEC. Official Journal of the European Union, 2004. <b>OJ L 139</b>(47):321–360.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">74.
2006/805/EC Commission Decision of 24 November 2006 concerning animal health control measures relating to classical swine fever in certain Member States. Official Journal of the European Union, 2006. <b>OJ L 329</b>(49):67-73.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">75.
2006/779/EC Commission Decision of 14 November 2006 concerning transitional animal health control measures relating to classical swine fever in Romania. Official Journal of the European Union, 2006. <b>OJ L 314</b>(49):48-49.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">76.
Peipsi.org. Narva river. 2007. Available from: <a href="http://www.peipsi.org/peipsi.org-v2/wiki.phtml?title=Narva_river&frame=body"><u>http://www.peipsi.org/peipsi.org-v2/wiki.phtml?title=Narva_river&frame=body</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">77.
European Commission Directorate General of Health and Consumer Protection Directorate D---Animal Health and Welfare. General guidance on EU import and transit rules for live animals and animal products from third countries; SANCO/10357/2005Rev 6. 2006. European Communities.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">78.
94/453/EC Commission Decision of 29 June 1994 amending or repealing some detailed rules concerning the animal health and public health conditions required for imports of certain live animals and animal products from Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden in application of the European Economic Area Agreement. 1994. <b>OJ L 187</b>:11-13.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">79.
91/496/EEC Council Directive 91/496/EEC of 15 July 1991 laying down the principles governing the organization of veterinary checks on animals entering the Community from third countries and amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC. 1991. <b>OJ L 268 </b>56-68. Consolidated version 01.01.2007.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">80.
853/2004 Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for on the hygiene of foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union, 2004. <b>OJ L 139</b>(47):55-205. Consolidated version 01.01.2007.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">81.
2005/432/EC Commission Decision of 3 June 2005 laying down the animal and public health conditions and model certificates for imports of meat products for human consumption from third countries and repealing Decisions 97/41/EC, 97/221/EC and 97/222/EC. Official Journal of the European Union, 2005. <b>OJ L 151</b>(48):3-18. Consolidated version 01.03.2007.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">82.
2002/613/EC Commission Decision of 19 July 2002 laying down the importation conditions of semen of domestic animals of the porcine species. Official Journal of the European Communities, 2002. <b>OJ L 196</b>(45):45-57. Consolidated version 10.04.2006.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">83.
90/429/EEC Council Directive 90/429/EEC of 26 June 1990 laying down the animal health requirements applicable to intra- Community trade in and imports of semen of domestic animals of the porcine species. 1990. <b>OJ L 224</b>:62-72. Consolidated version 05.06.2003.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">84.
94/63/EC Commission Decision of 31 January 1994 drawing up a provisional list of third countries from which Member States authorize imports of semen, ova and embryos of the ovine, caprine and equine species, ova and embryos of the porcine species. 1994. <b>OJ L 28</b>:47-48. Consolidated version 01.05.2004.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">85.
2007/275/EC Commission Decision of 17 April 2007 concerning lists of animals and products to be subject to controls at border inspection posts under Council Directives 91/496/EEC and 97/78/EC. Official Journal of the European Union, 2007. <b>OJ L 116</b>(50):9-33.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">86.
90/426/EEC Council Directive 90/426/EEC of 26 June 1990 on animal health conditions governing the movement and import from third countries of equidae. 1990. <b>OJ L 224</b>:42–54. Consolidated version 01.01.2007.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">87.
282/2004 Commission Regulation (EC) No 282/2004 of 18 February 2004 introducing a document for the declaration of, and veterinary checks on, animals from third countries entering the Community. Official Journal of the European Union, 2004. <b>OJ L 49</b>(47):11-24. Consolidated version 31.03.2004.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">88.
136/2004 Commission Regulation (EC) No 136/2004 of 22 January 2004 laying down procedures for veterinary checks at Community border inspection posts on products imported from third countries. Official Journal of the European Union, 2004. <b>OJ L 21</b>(47):11-23.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">89.
97/78/EC Council Directive 97/78/EC of 18 December 1997 laying down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on products entering the Community from third countries. Official Journal of the European Communities, 1998. <b>OJ L 24</b>(41):9-30. Consolidated version 01.01.2007.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">90.
Table of transposition of EC into Estonian legislation; provided in June 2, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">91.
97/794/EC Commission Decision of 12 November 1997 laying down certain detailed rules for the application of Council Directive 91/496/EEC as regards veterinary checks on live animals to be imported from third countries. 1997. <b>OJ L 323</b>:31-36.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">92.
Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia. April 25, 2006 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS; Main passenger crossing points from third countries. 2006.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">93.
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</p>
<p class="body_Text">94.
745/2004 Commission Regulation (EC) No 745/2004 of 16 April 2004 laying down measures with regard to imports of products of animal origin for personal consumption. Official Journal of the European Union, 2004. <b>OJ L 122</b>(47):1-9.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">95.
89/662/EEC Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the completion of the internal market. 1989. <b>OJ L 395</b>:13-22. Consolidated version 30.04.2004.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">96.
90/425/EEC Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra- Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market. 1990. <b>OJ L 224</b>:29-41. Consolidated version 19.11.2002.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">97.
64/432/EEC Council Directive 64/432/EEC of 26 June 1964 on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine. 1964. <b>OJ 121</b>:1977-2012. Consolidated version 05.01.2007.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">98.
92/102/EEC Council Directive 92/102/EEC of 27 November 1992 on the identification and registration of animals. 1992. <b>OJ L 355</b>:32-36. Consolidated version 09.07.2005.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">99.
2005/779/EC Commission Decision of 8 November 2005 concerning animal health protection measures against swine vesicular disease in Italy. Official Journal of the European Union, 2005. <b>OJ L 293</b>(48):28-32.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">100.
Global Trade Atlas. 2007. Global Trade Information Services Inc., online database of global trade information, Available from: <a href="http://www.gtis.com/gta/"><u>http://www.gtis.com/gta/</u></a>.
</p>
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European Commission, Eurostat website. Available from: <a href="http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu"><u>http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">102.
AgroWeb Estonia website. 2007. Available from: <a href="http://agroweb.loomakaitse.ee/content.php?content.24"><u>http://agroweb.loomakaitse.ee/content.php?content.24</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">103.
Estonian Agricultural Registers and Information Board. Register of agricultural animals website. Available from: <a href="http://eng.pria.ee/registers/register_of_agricult/"><u>http://eng.pria.ee/registers/register_of_agricult/</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">104.
Estonian Agricultural Registers and Information Board. Estonian Agricultural Registers and Information Board website. Available from: <a href="http://eng.pria.ee/"><u>http://eng.pria.ee/</u></a>.
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Estonian Agricultural Registers and Information Board. Development Plan of ARIB for 2005-2007, Available from: <a href="http://eng.pria.ee/Dev_plan.doc/"><u>http://eng.pria.ee/Dev_plan.doc/</u></a>.
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<p class="body_Text">106.
July 26, 2005 submission of information from the Veterinary and Food Board of the Republic of Estonia to USDA APHIS; Veterinary certificate form 7E.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">107.
1774/2002 Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 October 2002 laying down health rules concerning animal by-products not intended for human consumption. Official Journal of the European Communities, 2002. <b>OJ L 273</b>(45):1-95. Consolidated version 01.01.2007.
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<p class="body_Text">109.
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<p class="body_Text">110.
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European Commission Directorate General of Consumer Policy and Consumer Health Protection---Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare. Classical Swine Fever in Wild Boar, XXIV/B3/R09/1999. 1999. European Commission.
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<p class="body_Text">115.
2000/428/EC Commission Decision of 4 July 2000 establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for the evaluation of the results of laboratory tests for the confirmation and differential diagnosis of swine vesicular disease. Official Journal of the European Communities, 2000. <b>OJ L 167</b>(43):22-32.
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2007/19/EC Commission Decision of 22 December 2006 approving contingency plans for the control of classical swine fever pursuant to Council Directive 2001/89/EC. Official Journal of the European Union, 2007. <b>OJ L 7</b>(50):38–40.
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<p class="body_Text">118.
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<p class="body_Text">119.
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United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Proposed rulemaking for importation of live swine and swine commodities from Poland, environmental assessment, August 2006, APHIS-2006-0106-0009, Available from: <a href="http://www.regulations.gov/"><u>http://www.regulations.gov/</u></a>. 2006.
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<p class="body_Text">134.
United States Code. 2000 edition, supplement 4; GPO Access, Available from: <a href="http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/"><u>http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/</u></a>.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">135.
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<p class="body_Text">136.
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<p class="body_Text">139.
96/93/EC Council Directive 96/93/EC of 17 December 1996 on the certification of animals and animal products. 1997. <b>OJ L 13</b>:28-30.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">140.
2007/240/EC Commission Decision of 16 April 2007 laying down new veterinary certificates for importing live animals, semen, embryos, ova and products of animal origin into the Community pursuant to Decisions 79/542/EEC, 92/260/EEC, 93/195/EEC, 93/196/EEC, 93/197/EEC, 95/328/EC, 96/333/EC, 96/539/EC, 96/540/EC, 2000/572/EC, 2000/585/EC, 2000/666/EC, 2002/613/EC, 2003/56/EC, 2003/779/EC, 2003/804/EC, 2003/858/EC, 2003/863/EC, 2003/881/EC, 2004/407/EC, 2004/438/EC, 2004/595/EC, 2004/639/EC and 2006/168/EC. Official Journal of the European Union, 2007. <b>OJ L 104</b>(50):37-50.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">141.
2658/87 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff. 1987. <b>OJ L 256</b>:1-675. Consolidated version 01.01.2000.
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<p class="body_Text">142.
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</p>
<p class="body_Text">
</p>
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<p>
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<p>(2%)
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<p>(12%)
</p>
<p>
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<p>(11%)
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<p>
</p>
<p>(9%)
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<p>
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<p>(8%)
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<p>
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<p>(8%)
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<p>(7%)
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<p>(6%)
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<p>
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<p>(3%)
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<p>
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<p>(2%)
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<p>
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<p>(2%)
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<p>
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<p>(2%)
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<p>
</p>
<p>(4%)
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<p>
</p>
<p>(5%)
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>(4%)
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>(7%)
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>(7%)
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>(7%)
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>(9%)
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<p>
</p>
<p>(5%)
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>(6%)
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>(9%)
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>(7%)
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<p>
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<p>(7%)
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<p>(12%)
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<p>
</p>
<p>(5%)
</p>
<p>
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</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
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