alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Elmer E. SHEFFIELD and Essie F. Sheffield, his wife, Appellants, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, a municipal corporation, Appellee.

No. S-98.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 17, 1973.

W. Dexter Douglass, of Douglass & Mi-chaels,, Tallahassee, for appellants.

Roy T. Rhodes, and W. Ralph Durrance, Jr., of Rhodes, Stephens, Bryant & Dur-rance, Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

By complaint, appellants-plaintiffs alleged they were the owners of certain land in Leon County, Florida, and that appellee-defendant, without any right, had constructed a large electric power transmission line across their land. After taking extensive testimony, the trial court found that for a period in excess of 20 years the City and its predecessor utility company, as to the power line, had:

> “. . . maintained [it] openly, adversely, continuously, uninterruptedly and with the knowledge of the servient owner for a period *in*excess of twenty years. The City, therefore, has an easement of way to continue the operation and maintenance of this power line across plaintiffs’ [appellants’] property. The easement is limited, however, to the right to continue the line over the same width of space occupied by the line during the period. The City does not have the right to occupy additional space with wires or guy wires not present during the period or to prohibit construction or planting by the owner that does not interfere with the space occupied by such wires, guy wires, or poles.”

After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the evidence supports the foregoing judgment of the trial court.

*461By caveat, the trial court made the following observation in its final judgment:

> “(It does not appear that there are poles on plaintiffs’ [appellants’] property at present; but *if necessary*to the maintenance of the line, they would have the right to place poles within the space under the line but could not require the removal of a structure by plaintiffs [appellants] for that purpose.)” [Emphasis not supplied.]

The record before us is devoid of any evidence which supports the foregoing gratuitous finding by the trial court, and appellants are correct in urging this Court to strike same from the final judgment. Upon remand the trial judge is directed to strike the above sentence from the final judgment; otherwise, the judgment appealed is affirmed.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

RAWLS, C. J., and JOHNSON and CARROLL, DONALD K., JJ., concur.
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<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             1,520
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
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#### James FUSSELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 42326.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 21, 1973.

Jerome M. Novey of Novey & Blanton, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

*247PER CURIAM.

The appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death in the Circuit Court in and for Leon County, Florida. Subsequently, under authority of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33. L.Ed. 346 (1972), the Supreme Court of Florida in Anderson v. State, 267 So.2d 8 (1972), reduced the appellant’s sentence from death to life imprisonment.

The appellant has raised two points in his appeal. His first argument concerns an oral confession given by the appellant to Captain Terry of the Leon County Sheriff’s Department and William Camper of the State Attorney’s office while the appellant was an inmate at Sing-Sing Prison in Ossining, New York. After a careful examination of the record it appears that the appellant was advised of his right to counsel and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Witnesses Terry and Camper testified that the incriminating statements which the appellant made at that time were freely given in conformity with the guidelines presented in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). While a room within the walls of a state prison would not appear to provide the most ideal atmosphere within which to conduct an interrogation, there is nothing in the record to indicate that procedural safeguards were ignored or that the confession should have been suppressed.

Appellant’s second point concerns the competency and sufficiency of evidence admitted at trial to prove a felony-murder charge. In addition to the evidence discussed above, there was eye-witness identification and circumstantial evidence presented which identified the appellant as a participant in the felony-murder. This competent and substantial evidence tended to support a verdict of guilt. Accordingly, the conviction, as previously modified by reduction of sentence, is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN, ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### Mack BROWN v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 50096.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Jan. 11, 1978.

Houghton F. EKas, Jr., Cleveland, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Karen Gil-foy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Bolivar County; J. C. Feduccia, Judge.

Before PATTERSON, C. J., and BROOM and BOWLING, JJ.

AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Paul Stephen, Appellant.

[725 NYS2d 205]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Erlbaum, J.), rendered February 18, 1997, convicting him of burglary in the second degree and attempted rape in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The showup identification of the defendant, which was conducted in close temporal and spatial proximity to the crime, was not impermissibly suggestive *(see, People v Duuvon,*77 NY2d 541; *People v Bunker,*259 AD2d 757).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (s*ee, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPU 470.15 [5]). Altman, J. P., McGinity, Luciano and H. Miller, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE                                     EXHIBIT 27
AG-CHEM EQUIPMENT CO., INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)
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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
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<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   18,922
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (874)
<INVENTORY>                                    109,463
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               138,622
<PP&E>                                          42,470
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<CGS>                                          214,688
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                70,259
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   404
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,713
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<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,625
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<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.35
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</TABLE>
#### Horace WINGARD, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Adult Corrections, Respondent.

No. 70-466.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 18, 1970.

Habeas corpus denied.
**Exhibit 31.2**
I, Ben Harper, certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Qof Friedman Industries, Incorporated;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect tothe period covered by this report;

     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flowsof the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;

     4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:

          a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;

          b) [intentionally omitted per SEC release 33-8238]

          c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, asof the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

          d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant'sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

     5. The registrant's other certifying officers(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant's board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):

          a) All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and

          b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

Dated: August 14, 2007 /s/  BEN HARPER Senior Vice President-Finance and Secretary/Treasurer
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Francis THERIOT.

No. 62822.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 14, 1978.

In re: Francis Theriot, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Cameron.

*1207Writ granted. The sentence heretofore imposed in this case is set aside and the case is remanded for resentencing in a manner consistent with law. See *State v. Segers,*357 So.2d 1 (La.1978); *State v. Bosworth,*No. 61,492, 360 So.2d 173 (La.1978).

SANDERS, C. J.,

concurs in the granting of the Writ, being of the opinion that the case is controlled by *State v. Bosworth,*No. 61,492, La., 360 So.2d 173, handed down June 19, 1978, from which he dissented.

SUMMERS, J., dissents.

MARCUS, J., concurs for reasons assigned by Chief Justice Sanders.
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

Docket Number: FAA- 2015-0933

Directorate Identifier: 2014NM098AD

PROFORMA SB SBF27-28-071, R1 --- 3/6/14

AOM AOF27.043#03 --- 3/6/14

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
Exhibit 4.5

                                  AMENDMENT TO
                               M.S. CARRIERS, INC.
                           INCENTIVE STOCK OPTION PLAN

     WHEREAS, the Incentive Stock Option Plan (the "Plan") of M.S. Carriers,
Inc., a Tennessee corporation, under which options may be granted from time to
time eligible employees of the Company, was adopted on February 28, 1986;

     WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Plan in order that the provisions
of the Plan will comply with the Tax Reform Act of 1986.

     NOW, THEREFORE, the Incentive Stock Option Plan of M.S. Carriers, Inc. is
hereby amended, effective January 1, 1987, in the following manner:

     1. Section 7(i) is hereby deleted in its entirety and the following is
substituted in its place:

          (i) AMOUNT OF OPTIONS. The aggregate fair market value of stock
(determined as of the date on which an Option is granted) for which Options are
exercisable for the first time under the terms of this Plan by any employee
during any calendar year cannot exceed $100,000.

     2. Section 7(j) is hereby deleted in its entirety.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment has been executed this 19 day of
February, 1987.

                                        M.S. CARRIERS, INC.


                                        By: /s/ M.J. Barrow
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            M.J. Barrow, Secretary
----

            COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 86/2005

of 20 January 2005         

fixing the representative prices and the additional import duties for molasses in the sugar sector applicable from 21 January 2005         

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the market in sugar (1), and in particular Article 24(4) thereof,

Whereas:

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The representative prices and the additional duties applying to imports of the products referred to in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1422/95 are fixed in the Annex hereto.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 21 January 2005.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 20 January 2005.

For the Commission

J. M. SILVA RODRÍGUEZ            

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

----

(1)OJ L 178, 30.6.2001, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 39/2004 (OJ L 6, 10.1.2004, p. 16).

(2)OJ L 141, 24.6.1995, p. 12. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 79/2003 (OJ L 13, 18.1.2003, p. 4).

(3)OJ 145, 27.6.1968, p. 12. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1422/95.

----

ANNEX

Representative prices and additional duties for imports of molasses in the sugar sector applicable from 21 January 2005

----

(1)  This amount replaces, in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1422/95, the rate of the Common Customs Tariff duty fixed for these products.

(2)  For the standard quality as defined in Article 1 of amended Regulation (EEC) No 785/68.

----
#### Ray W. JOHNSON and Reta L. Johnson, his wife, Appellants, v. HERLONG AVIATION, INC., Appellee.

No. 71-763.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. 6, 1972.

Rehearing- Denied Jan. 26, 1973.

Ronald H. Schnell, St. Petersburg, for appellants.

*227Robert B. Laseter, Jr., Marks, Gray, Conroy & Gibbs, and Smith, Hulsey, Schwalbe, Spraker & Nichols, Jacksonville, for appellee.

LILES, Judge.

Appellant, Ray Johnson, purchased a Cessna airplane from Herlong Aviation, Inc., appellee. Subsequently, he and his wife, Reta L. Johnson, took a trip to Free-port, Grand Bahamas. On their return trip, the airplane developed severe vibrations and other difficulties. After landing in St. Petersburg, appellant had the airplane repaired. A long list of difficulties were alleged to have been present and the costs of repairs were $2,029.88. Appellants then brought suit against Herlong Aviation, Inc. in a four count complaint. Summary judgment was granted on counts three and four, leaving counts one and two to be adjudicated. The trial judge transferred the cause to the appropriate court, the civil and criminal court of record, on the basis that the jurisdictional amounts were below the circuit court’s jurisdiction.

Appellants assign as error the trial judge’s dismissal of counts three and four and maintain that there was a genuine issue of material fact alleged in both counts three and four. We believe the trial judge was correct in dismissing count four in that there was no evidence to be adduced which would constitute punitive damages.

We believe, however, that the trial judge erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for damages for mental pain and anguish resulting from her fright during the return trip from the Grand Bahamas. We do not rule as a matter of law that she is entitled to damages. We simply say that she is entitled to a trial on the amended count three of the complaint.

Count three presents the question of compensable damages in the absence of impact. This court recently in Way v. Tampa Coca Cola Bottling Company, Fla.App.1972, 260 So.2d 288, abolished the necessity for impact in food and beverage cases and followed the rule laid down in Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., Me.1970, 269 A .2d 117.

We have reviewed the trend in Florida as well as in other jurisdictions and believe the time has come when the impact doctrine serves no useful purpose. See Hollie v. Radcliffe, Fla.App.1967, 200 So.2d 616. We recognize that this holding is in conflict with case law of Florida and that appellee would be in a position to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida by conflict certiorari. Therefore, we hereby certify to the Supreme Court of Florida, as a question of great public interest, the following:

> CAN A PLAINTIFF RECOVER FOR MENTAL PAIN AND ANGUISH IN THE ABSENCE OF IMPACT?

For the foregoing reasons the cause is reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate plaintiffs’ amended count three and proceed to trial in the circuit court on all issues of damages in counts one, two and three.

PIERCE, C. J., and MANN, J., concur.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-86,132-01

IN RE CLARENCE RAY RANDOLPH, Relator

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CAUSE NO. 1116419-A IN THE 177 DISTRICT COURT TH

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam. NEWELL, J., not participating.

O R D E R

Relator has filed a motion for leave to file an application for a writ of mandamus pursuant

to the original jurisdiction of this Court. In it, he contends that he filed an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in the 177 District Court of Harris County, that more than 180 days have elapsed, th

and that the application has not yet been forwarded to this Court. TEX. R. APP. P. 73.5. Relator

contends that the district court entered an order designating issues on March 4, 2010.

Respondent, the Judge of the 177 District Court of Harris County, shall file a response with th

this Court by having the District Clerk submit the record on such habeas corpus application. In the

alternative, Respondent may resolve the issues set out in the order designating issues and then have
2

the District Clerk submit the record on such application. In either case, Respondent’s answer shall

be submitted within 30 days of the date of this order. This application for leave to file a writ of

mandamus will be held in abeyance until Respondent has submitted his response.

Filed: January 25, 2017

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