# Recent Reports

Reports News from the GAO

- Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: DHS Has Strengthened the Securing the Cities Program, but Actions Are Needed to Address Key Remaining Challenges What GAO FoundThe Department of Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) has taken multiple steps to strengthen the Securing the Cities (STC) program and is working with regions to address remaining program implementation challenges. CWMD awards funding to support STC regions' program administration. It also funds the procurement and deployment of radiological and nuclear detection equipment and training for the law enforcement officers and other agency partners who use it. To strengthen the program, CWMD has increased outreach and communication activities, developed templates for regional planning and quarterly reporting, and ensured regions' access to long-term federal funding to sustain their STC-related capabilities.As CWMD continues to improve the program, it is also working with STC regions to address challenges that may affect program implementation. Regions identified several key challenges, including staff attrition and turnover; availability and difficulty of scheduling training courses; and keeping partner agencies engaged with the STC program mission among other competing priorities.Photos of Types of Nuclear and Radiological Detection EquipmentCWMD's approach to measuring and tracking regions' performance—outlined in a 2023 revision to its STC program implementation plan—generally follows the key practices and their supporting actions for assessing program effectiveness. For example, CWMD uses weekly or biweekly meetings with the STC regions to provide tailored information that regions need to address specific issues affecting their program implementation. However, it has not clearly communicated to the regions the performance expectations and planned assessment approach adopted in the revised plan. By doing so, CWMD would increase the transparency and accountability for results being achieved through the program.CWMD is collecting and reviewing regional performance data to set targets and benchmarks for assessments that it plans to begin in fiscal year 2025. However, it needs to take additional steps to ensure that information collected from the regions is timely, consistent, complete, and accurate. CWMD officials also stated that they need to complete ongoing and planned efforts to better oversee and hold regions accountable for their performance and timely progress through program phases and toward achieving program goals. By taking these steps, CWMD will be in a better position to use evidence to manage the STC program more effectively, demonstrate regions' progress toward meeting the program goals, and communicate these results to stakeholders.Why GAO Did This StudyThe U.S. faces an enduring threat that terrorists could steal or smuggle nuclear or radiological materials to use in a terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security initiated the STC program as a pilot in 2007 to reduce the risk of such attacks by developing and enhancing sustainable radiological and nuclear detection capabilities of state and local agencies in high-risk urban areas. The program includes 13 regions. CWMD awarded about $300 million to these regions through fiscal year 2023.The CWMD Act of 2018 included a provision for GAO to evaluate the STC program once CWMD completed an assessment of the program, which it did in 2022. This report evaluates (1) CWMD's efforts to strengthen the STC program and address regions' challenges and (2) the extent to which CWMD is measuring and tracking STC regions' performance.GAO reviewed CWMD and STC regions' documents, interviewed officials from CWMD and from each region, and visited two regions carrying out training exercises. GAO compared CWMD's performance assessment approach with key practices for assessing program effectiveness that GAO identified in prior work.
- Intellectual Property: Stronger Fraud Risk Management Could Improve the Integrity of the Trademark System What GAO FoundThe Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (TMA) established two new procedures—expungement and reexamination—that allow individuals and businesses to challenge a registered trademark on the basis that it was not used in commerce, as is normally required. A successful challenge results in the trademark being removed from the register, thus making it available for potential use for the challenger or other applicants.GAO found that from December 2021 through June 2023 the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and attorneys representing trademark owners filed nearly 500 petitions under the new procedures. Collectively, these petitions resulted in the removal of more than 2,500 falsely claimed goods and services from the trademark register. Trademark attorneys told GAO that the new procedures can be cost-effective and low-risk.Existing USPTO programs have also addressed inaccurate or false trademark applications and registrations. The agency's post registration audit program removed trademarked goods and services in about half of its randomly selected audits each year from the start of the program in 2017. This suggests that there may be more than 1 million false and inaccurate registrations out of about 2.8 million overall due to an influx of applications, among other factors.Fraudulent Images of the Same Flashlight with Different Logos Included in Trademark Applications Submitted to USPTOThe USPTO has taken steps to limit fraud risks, such as establishing a culture conducive to fraud risk management. However, the USPTO has not conducted a comprehensive fraud risk assessment of the trademark register or designed a fraud risk strategy. Implementing leading practices from GAO's Fraud Risk Framework would allow the USPTO to comprehensively consider fraud risks, establish more effective controls, and fully articulate a tolerable level of fraud risk while considering the costs and benefits of potential control activities. GAO also found that the USPTO's current data systems do not allow the agency to: (1) assess the effectiveness of current trademark fraud prevention programs and (2) implement new technologies for identifying fraud. Academics told GAO that computational tools such as predictive analytics could help the USPTO identify trademark applications with false or inaccurate information more effectively.Why GAO Did This StudyRegistering a trademark such as a word or symbol is often an essential part of building a business. In recent years there have been a growing number of trademark applications that include false or inaccurate images showing goods that are not actually sold or used in commerce. This has made it more difficult for businesses to find unused trademarks.The TMA includes a provision for GAO to review the USPTO's efforts to address inaccurate and false claims in trademark applications and registrations. This report examines (1) the extent to which the USPTO and third parties used the new TMA procedures; (2) other USPTO initiatives; and (3) the extent to which USPTO used fraud risk principles to address the issue.GAO analyzed USPTO trademark data related to TMA's new procedures and interviewed USPTO officials on other programs and procedures used to protect the integrity of the trademark register. GAO also evaluated the USPTO's current fraud risk practices against key elements of GAO's Fraud Risk Framework and conducted semi-structured interviews with trademark attorneys, top trademark-owning companies, academics, and trademark industry associations to obtain their views on the new procedures.
- Anti-Money Laundering: Better Information Needed on Effectiveness of Federal Efforts What GAO FoundFinancial institution representatives that GAO interviewed identified actions the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) could take to enhance the institutions' ability to identify and report suspicious activity. These include more updates on priority threats and tips to improve suspicious activity reports (SAR), which institutions file if they identify potential criminal activity. FinCEN may cover some of these actions as it implements the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, the aims of which include improving information sharing and technology.GAO identified 31 sections in the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 for which FinCEN is responsible for implementing. For example, FinCEN is to establish standards for financial institutions to test new anti-money laundering-related technology. As of November 2023, GAO found that FinCEN collectively had described its progress in implementing 19 sections through multiple publications and in varying detail. More complete disclosure of FinCEN's progress implementing the act would provide greater transparency and accountability.FinCEN surveys law enforcement agencies about their use of and satisfaction with FinCEN's products and services, such as its database of SARs. However, the surveys may not provide reliable information. FinCEN's 2018–2022 surveys had low response rates (ranging from 2 to 10 percent), raising the risk of biased results that do not represent the views of all agencies. FinCEN also did not analyze and adjust, as needed, results for nonresponse bias. As a result, the surveys may not provide FinCEN with a complete and reliable picture of law enforcement's satisfaction with its products and services.Federal agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, individually track outcomes of their illicit finance investigations (e.g., convictions and forfeitures). Some Justice data track these outcomes across multiple federal agencies (see figure). However, comprehensive, government-wide data do not exist because data collection is fragmented across multiple agencies and data may be incomplete. Developing a consistent methodology to comprehensively track outcomes would better inform federal agencies and Congress about the results and effectiveness of U.S. efforts to combat illicit finance.Outcomes of Defendants Charged under Money Laundering-Related Statutes, Fiscal Years 2018–2022Why GAO Did This StudyCriminal organizations launder illicit proceeds to facilitate and conceal crime. The Bank Secrecy Act, as amended, requires financial institutions to file SARs (which help law enforcement investigate crime) under certain conditions. FinCEN administers the act and maintains these reports in a database.GAO was asked to review U.S. efforts to combat illicit finance. This report examines (1) financial institution suggestions to enhance SAR processes, (2) FinCEN communication of its progress implementing the Anti-Money Laundering Act, (3) FinCEN surveys on law enforcement satisfaction with its products and services, and (4) data collection on efforts to combat illicit finance.GAO reviewed laws, guidance, and investigation data and interviewed FinCEN and federal law enforcement agencies. GAO also interviewed a nongeneralizable selection of 46 representatives of financial institutions and industry associations (such as banks, casinos, money services businesses, and broker-dealers).
- Facial Recognition Technology: Federal Law Enforcement Agency Efforts Related to Civil Rights and Training What GAO FoundSeven law enforcement agencies within the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS), such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Secret Service, reported using facial recognition technology to support criminal investigations. Three of the seven agencies reported owning facial recognition technology. All seven reported using systems owned by other entities, such as state and local entities and nongovernment service providers.In September 2023, GAO found that three of the seven agencies had policies or guidance specific to facial recognition technology that were intended to help protect civil rights and civil liberties. The other four agencies—three in DOJ and one in DHS—did not have such policies or guidance. We also found that DOJ had taken steps to issue a department-wide policy but had faced delays. After our September 2023 report, DHS finalized a department-wide policy, which includes topics such as limiting the use of the technology; protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties; and testing and evaluation of the technology. DOJ also said it has developed an interim policy on facial recognition technology with topics such as the protection of civil rights and civil liberties, and training requirements. However, GAO did not have an opportunity to review and confirm that information.The seven agencies reported using four nongovernment facial recognition services in total from October 2019 through March 2022 to support criminal investigations. All seven agencies had initially used these services without first requiring staff to take training on topics such as how facial recognition technology works, what photos are appropriate to use, and how to interpret results. GAO found that, cumulatively, agencies with available data reported conducting about 60,000 searches using facial recognition services when they did not have training requirements in place. Two of the seven agencies ultimately implemented training requirements as of April 2023. Of the remaining five agencies, two continued to use facial recognition services and three halted their use of the services as of April 2023.Facial Recognition Services Use and Training for Selected Agencies, April 2023Note: The figure shows when agencies used the four services covered by our review (services used from October 2019 through March 2022), and when, if at all, agencies implemented training requirements for facial recognition services. The figure provides use and training information as of April 2023. See figure 2 of the statement for more detail.Why GAO Did This StudyLaw enforcement agencies may use facial recognition technology to help solve crimes. For example, the technology can allow users to quickly search through billions of photos to help identify an unknown suspect in a crime scene photo. Civil rights and civil liberties advocates have cautioned that an overreliance on the technology in criminal investigations could lead to the arrest and prosecution of innocent people, or that its use at certain events (e.g., protests) could have a chilling effect on individuals' exercise of their First Amendment rights.GAO was asked to testify before the United States Commission on Civil Rights on the use of facial recognition technology by DHS and DOJ. This statement discusses GAO's prior work examining the extent to which seven selected law enforcement agencies have (1) owned and used facial recognition technology, (2) developed policies to help protect civil rights and civil liberties related to its use, (3) required staff to take training prior to use, and (4) taken steps to address selected privacy requirements.This statement is based on reports published from 2021 through 2023 related to federal law enforcement agencies' use of facial recognition technology. To conduct that prior work, GAO administered a survey questionnaire to 42 federal agencies that employ law enforcement officers regarding their use of the technology, including the seven agencies that are the focus of this statement. GAO also reviewed relevant documents and interviewed agency officials. GAO selected the seven agencies because they previously reported owning or using facial recognition technology systems.
- Countering Violent Extremism: FBI and DHS Need Strategies and Goals for Sharing Threat Information with Social Media and Gaming Companies What GAO FoundDomestic violent extremists use social media and gaming platforms for several purposes, including to reach wide audiences; to insert their extremist ideas into the mainstream; and to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize others, according to government reports and experts GAO spoke with (see figure). Experts noted that violent extremists generally use a variety of platforms for different purposes, depending on available features, audiences, and content moderation practices.Example of the Viral Nature of Domestic Violent Extremists' Use of Online PlatformsAccording to social media and gaming companies GAO met with, they use various content moderation tools to identify and remove content they determine violates their platforms' policies related to domestic violent extremism on their platforms. For example, they report using machine learning tools to scan for content that violates their policies, as well as reviews by employees. However, companies and experts reported that several factors affect these moderation efforts, such as company financial considerations and diversity in standards of acceptable content. For example, content banned on one platform could be allowed on another.The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have mechanisms to share and receive domestic violent extremism threat-related information with social media and gaming companies. However, neither agency has developed a strategy that articulates how it identifies and selects companies to engage with or the goals and desired outcomes of those engagements. Without a strategy or goals, the agencies may not be fully aware of how effective their communications are with companies, or how effectively their information-sharing mechanisms serve the agencies' overall missions.Why GAO Did This StudyIn recent years, content on social media and gaming platforms that promotes domestic violent extremism has influenced several high-profile attacks, according to experts and agency officials. As a result, some social media and gaming companies, as well as federal agencies, are making an effort to understand and address online content that promotes domestic violent extremism.GAO was asked to review domestic violent extremists' use of social media and gaming platforms. This report (1) describes the purposes for which domestic violent extremists use these platforms; (2) describes how selected companies report mitigating content promoting domestic violent extremism; and (3) assesses the extent to which the FBI and DHS have developed goals and strategies for sharing threat-related information with companies.GAO reviewed FBI and DHS documentation and interviewed officials. GAO obtained views from 16 subject matter experts identified by the National Academies of Sciences and prior work. GAO also interviewed representatives from a non-generalizable sample of five social media and gaming companies.
- DOD Fraud Risk Management: Enhanced Data Analytics Can Help Manage Fraud Risks What GAO FoundThe Department of Defense (DOD) issued an updated fraud risk management strategy in August 2023. Contrary to leading practices, the strategy does not establish data analytics as a method for fraud risk management or provide the direction needed to conduct such data analytics. Data analytics are control activities that can be used to prevent and detect fraud. Data analytics can include a variety of techniques, such as data matching. Data matching can be used to verify key information to determine eligibility to receive federal contracts. For example, if an entity reports that it is a small business in order to receive federal contracts, DOD can use third-party data sources to verify that the entity actually meets requirements to qualify as a small business.DOD's strategy refers generally to data analytics but does not establish it as a specific fraud risk management control activity. Accordingly, the strategy does not identify which DOD entity has the authority to ensure that fraud-related data-analytics activities are planned and implemented. The strategy does not establish clear roles and responsibilities for all entities with data-analytics roles. It also does not provide timelines for designing and implementing data-analytics activities. As a result, DOD is missing an opportunity to provide direction in areas that are critical to achieving its data-analytics goals and managing fraud risks.GAO analyses demonstrate how information from investigative case data on alleged and adjudicated procurement fraud could help inform DOD's fraud risk management consistent with leading practices in GAO's Fraud Risk Framework, despite existing data limitations (see fig.).Examples of Data Collected by the Department of Defense That Could Help Inform Its Fraud Risk ManagementFor example, Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations (DCIO) collect data that describe the extent of detected alleged fraud through the number and types&nbsp;of cases investigated. Using these data, GAO found that the number of alleged and adjudicated procurement fraud cases closed from fiscal years 2015 through 2021 ranged from 444 for the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) to 1,165 for the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, a component of the DOD Office of Inspector General (OIG) (see fig.). Such information could help DOD identify and assess risks as part of its fraud risk profile. Specifically, information on the number and types of cases investigated could help DOD (1) identify procurement fraud risks and the likelihood and impact of those risks and (2) prioritize the fraud risks.Information from Analyses of Investigative Data from Alleged and Adjudicated Procurement Fraud Cases Closed from Fiscal Years 2015 through 2021DCIOs also collect data describing the number and types of investigated offenses and offenses for which remedies were pursued. For example, GAO found that the most prevalent investigated offense in the 444 NCIS cases identified was false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims. GAO also found that this was the most prevalent offense for which remedies were pursued in the NCIS cases. This information could help DOD take actions, such as enhancing its fraud-awareness trainings to provide details on how these frauds were detected, to aid in preventing similar future fraud.Information about adjudicated offenses can help DOD better understand the impact of procurement fraud risks, including the financial and reputation impacts. With this information, DOD would be better able to determine its fraud risk tolerance.GAO's analyses revealed that investigative data on alleged and adjudicated procurement fraud cases were not always complete and could not always be readily analyzed, for various reasons. For example, some investigative data lacked a structured data field identifying cases as involving alleged or adjudicated procurement fraud, requiring analysis of narrative fields. Being able to readily identify such cases would facilitate DOD's fraud risk management.DOD does not have plans to obtain and analyze relevant information from adjudicated procurement fraud cases. Without obtaining such information, DOD may not fully assess its fraud risks or design and implement data-analytics activities to prevent or detect these risks.Why GAO Did This StudyDOD is the largest contracting agency in the federal government—with contract obligations of $414.5 billion in fiscal year 2022 for a wide range of goods and services. In 2021, GAO found that DOD had taken initial steps to combat fraud risks but had not implemented a comprehensive approach.GAO was asked to broadly review DOD's fraud risk management as related to contracting. This report examines (1) if DOD's fraud risk management strategy provides the needed direction for fraud-related data-analytics activities and (2) the extent to which analyses of DOD investigative data on alleged and adjudicated procurement fraud cases can help inform fraud risk management.GAO analyzed DOD's fraud risk management strategy against leading practices. GAO also analyzed investigative data for fiscal years 2015 through 2021 for closed, unsealed, unclassified cases. GAO compared DOD's practices related to the usability of investigative data for fraud risk management and the use of investigative information with federal internal control standards and leading practices for fraud risk management. GAO also selected a nongeneralizable sample of eight cases, two from each DCIO, for illustrative information regarding the cases investigated.
- Ridesharing and Taxi Safety: Information on Assaults against Drivers and Passengers What GAO FoundRidesourcing (also referred to as ridesharing) and taxi services help meet the transportation needs of many people in the U.S.Taxi and Ridesourcing Transportation ServicesThere is no federal requirement to collect data specifically on assaults against drivers and passengers of ridesourcing vehicles and taxis. Some federal and non-federal sources collect data on such assaults, but the available data cannot fully describe the extent of assaults in these industries. Several factors result in the data not being comparable or complete for this purpose. These factors include the varied intended uses of the collected data, the use of different definitions and codes, and underreporting of assaults. More specifically:Six federal databases contain some information on assaults in the ridesourcing and taxi industries. These databases contain more data about assaults against drivers than against passengers. Although limitations exist with these data, a few databases provide some data that can be used to report on assaults against drivers for 2019 and 2020. For example, a census of occupational fatalities reported 19 fatal injuries or illnesses of workers in the ridesourcing and taxi industries in 2019 related to assaults (i.e., intentional injuries by another person). Data for 2020 were not published because they did not meet publication criteria.	Three ridesourcing companies whose representatives GAO interviewed collect data on assaults against their drivers and passengers, and they voluntarily issue reports with information on the extent of the most serious types of assault. The companies report data on fatal physical assaults and use the same definitions to categorize the five most serious types of sexual assault. The three ridesourcing companies reported that about 4,600 incidents of the five most serious types of sexual assault occurred related to trips arranged through their digital applications (app) in 2019, the only year for which all three companies publicly reported data. The five taxi companies whose representatives GAO spoke with collect complaint and incident data, which can include assault data. The five taxi companies' representatives said these data are largely for internal purposes and are not reported publicly. Representatives from the five companies said that they have experienced few or no assaults in 2019 and 2020.Why GAO Did This StudyRidesourcing and taxi companies offer similar transportation services to the public. Ridesourcing companies connect passengers and drivers by offering pre-arranged trips through an app. Taxi companies can conduct either pre-arranged or street-hail trips. Media outlets, advocacy organizations, and others have raised questions about the safety of drivers and passengers of ridesourcing vehicles and taxis.Sami's Law, enacted in January 2023, includes a provision for GAO to conduct a study including the incidence of physical and sexual assaults against ridesourcing and taxi drivers and passengers in calendar years 2019 and 2020. This report describes the extent to which data on such assaults are collected and available.To conduct this work, GAO reviewed federal database documents, such as data dictionaries, and interviewed officials from federal agencies including the Departments of Justice, Labor, and Health and Human Services. GAO also examined laws, regulations, and documents on ridesourcing and taxi oversight for five states and five localities, selected based on whether they collected data and to vary in location, among other factors.In addition, GAO reviewed documents and websites for selected ridesourcing companies and selected taxi companies. GAO also interviewed representatives from three ridesourcing and five taxi companies. GAO selected these companies to ensure variation in size (e.g., revenue, number of trips) and location.For more information, contact Elizabeth Repko at (202) 512-2834 or repkoe@gao.gov&nbsp;and Derrick Collins at (202) 512-8777 or collinsd@gao.gov.
- Online Extremism: More Complete Information Needed about Hate Crimes that Occur on the Internet What GAO FoundThe Department of Justice (DOJ) collects data about hate crimes (i.e., crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, religion, disability, or sexual orientation) using two statistical programs:	The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting Program collects hate crime data, including hate crimes that occur on the internet, from law enforcement agencies.	The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) uses a national annual household survey—the National Crime Victimization Survey—to produce estimates of the prevalence of hate crimes reported and not reported to law enforcement. BJS's survey does not collect data on hate crimes that occur on the internet.The 2022 Better Cybercrime Metrics Act requires BJS to include questions relating to cybercrime victimization in its survey. BJS funded a study that examined one method to measure bias-motivated victimization on the internet. However, the study did not explore other methods, such as an approach similar to how the survey measures in-person hate crimes. Exploring other options to measure bias-related criminal victimization on the internet in the National Crime Victimization Survey or a supplemental survey would complement FBI's data and help DOJ identify and provide assistance to communities affected by hate.GAO found that all six selected companies took some steps to remove content that their policies defined as hate speech or promoting violent extremism against people based on actual or perceived characteristics, such as race or religion. The companies' data show the amount of hateful content removed varied across platforms they operated from 2018 through 2022. This is due in part to the variation of the company definitions of hateful content and their related policies.Hate Speech Occurs on the InternetResearch indicates that up to a third of internet users reported they experienced hate speech on the internet, and users who post hateful or extremist speech on the internet may do so because the internet helps spread hateful ideologies. In addition, research and government reports indicate an association between hate speech on the internet and hate crimes. For example, one peer-reviewed research study found an association between uncivil comments on the internet and hate crimes against Asians in selected U.S. cities. Also, the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI reported that the internet created opportunities for individuals to self-radicalize and conduct lone offender attacks without the support of a larger violent extremist organization.Why GAO Did This StudyA hate crime occurs nearly every hour in the U.S., based on data reported to the FBI. Investigations of recent hate crimes have suggested that exposure to hate speech on the internet may have contributed to the attackers' biases against their victims. In 2021, the FBI placed hate crimes at the same national threat priority level as preventing domestic violent extremism.GAO was asked to review information on hate crimes and hate speech on the internet. This report examines (1) the extent to which DOJ collects data on hate crimes that occur on the internet, (2) what company data indicate about steps selected companies have taken to remove hate speech and violent extremist speech from their internet platforms, and (3) what is known about users' experience with, or expression of, hate speech on the internet, and its relationship to hate crimes and domestic violent extremism.GAO analyzed U.S. hate crime data and interviewed DOJ officials. GAO analyzed data and interviewed officials from six selected companies operating internet platforms with publicly available policies prohibiting hate and violent extremist speech. GAO assessed peer reviewed and nonprofit studies that described hate speech on the internet, hate crimes, and domestic violent extremist incidents.
- Bureau of Prisons: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Restrictive Housing Practices What GAO FoundThe Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has not fully implemented 54 of the 87 recommendations from two prior studies on improving restrictive housing practices. The first study, completed by a BOP contractor in 2014, had 34 recommendations (16 of which are fully implemented.) The other evaluation, completed in 2016 by the Department of Justice (DOJ), had 53 recommendations (17 of those are fully implemented). A May 2022 Executive Order on criminal justice practices directed the Attorney General to ensure full implementation of the January 2016 recommendations. BOP has made slow progress due in part to not assigning responsibility for recommendation implementation to appropriate officials and not establishing associated time frames for completion.Examples of Two Bureau of Prisons' Restrictive Housing Unit Types BOP has two key mechanisms—its program review process and its administrative remedy program—to gather information from facilities about restrictive housing operations. However, it is not fully leveraging either, resulting in missed opportunities to ensure compliance and enhance operations:BOP is not ensuring facilities' timely resolution of deficiencies after routine program reviews because it does not have a process to verify that corrective actions were implemented.	The administrative remedy program allows incarcerated individuals to file grievances about issues such as living conditions. However, BOP does not analyze grievance data to identify trends and improve operations.During the 2014 contracted assessment, reviewers found inconsistencies in the application of subjective criteria used to place individuals in the special management unit (SMU)—one that is designed for individuals with heightened security concerns. GAO's analysis of 2022 data appears to confirm that inconsistencies continued, resulting in equity concerns. Black individuals were 38 percent of the total BOP population but 59 percent of the SMU placements. In comparison, White individuals were 58 percent of the total BOP population and 35 percent of the SMU placements. In response to management challenges, earlier this year BOP closed its remaining SMU and has not yet decided on the future of such units. Analyzing the cause of the substantial racial disparity could inform BOP and DOJ decisions on the future of restricted housing and help ensure consistent and equitable treatment of incarcerated individuals.Why GAO Did This StudyDOJ's BOP is responsible for confining individuals in safe, humane, and appropriately secure conditions. In certain circumstances, such as alleged or substantiated violence, BOP can move individuals to restrictive housing, and generally isolate them in cells for up to 23 hours per day. As of October 2023, BOP continued to house about 8 percent of its population (about 12,000 individuals) in these settings. Strengthening management of federal prisons was added to GAO's high-risk list earlier this year.Among its objectives, GAO was asked to examine the extent to which BOP (1) addressed recommendations from two prior restrictive housing studies; and (2) leveraged facility information to ensure restrictive housing policy compliance and enhance operations.GAO analyzed BOP policies and data; interviewed BOP officials; and conducted non-generalizable interviews with staff and incarcerated individuals at five BOP facilities—selected to cover a range of restrictive housing unit types.
- Forensic Technology: Algorithms Offer Benefits for Criminal Investigations, but a Range of Factors Can Affect Outcomes What GAO FoundGAO's technology assessments in 2020 and 2021 found that federal law enforcement agencies primarily used three types of forensic algorithms to help assess whether evidence may have originated from an individual: probabilistic genotyping, latent print analysis, and facial recognition.Figure. Federal law enforcement primarily uses three types of forensic algorithms. Probabilistic genotyping algorithms compare collected DNA evidence (e.g., from blood, hair) to DNA samples from persons of interest. Such algorithms can assess a wider range of DNA samples than conventional methods but face some challenges. For example, it can be difficult to interpret or explain the results, and some experts told GAO that insufficient scientific studies have been conducted to fully validate their use for samples containing DNA from multiple people.Latent print analysis can search larger databases of fingerprints and palm prints faster and more consistently than an analyst working alone. However, human involvement in using the outputs introduces opportunities for error and cognitive biases.Facial recognition algorithms can also search large databases. They can be more accurate than a human analyst alone, but one study reported that the highest accuracy came from combining algorithms with trained analysts, as is common practice in federal law enforcement. However, human interpretation of algorithm outputs can introduce error or bias, and some law enforcement users may perceive the results as more certain than is warranted.Furthermore, although some algorithms have high accuracy and very low bias, some law enforcement entities may not have enough information or resources to help them select such algorithms.GAO's 2021 report described three options that policymakers could consider to help address key challenges to the use of forensic algorithms. Policymakers could support: increased training to improve consistent and objective use of forensic algorithms, standards and policies on appropriate use of forensic algorithms in investigations, and increased transparency related to algorithm testing.Why GAO Did This StudyFor more than a century, law enforcement agencies have examined physical evidence to help identify persons of interest, solve cold cases, and find missing or exploited people. Forensic experts are now also using algorithms to partially automate the assessment of evidence collected in a criminal investigation, potentially improving the speed and objectivity of their investigations.GAO conducted technology assessments on the use of forensic algorithms in law enforcement (GAO-21-435SP and GAO-20-479SP). This statement addresses the benefits and challenges of three algorithm types—probabilistic genotyping, latent print analysis, and facial recognition—along with options policymakers could consider to help address these challenges.In conducting the prior assessments, GAO interviewed federal officials, select non-federal law enforcement agencies and crime laboratories, algorithm vendors, academic researchers; convened an interdisciplinary meeting of 16 experts; and reviewed relevant agency documentation and literature.GAO presented policy options in the 2021 report supporting this testimony.For more information, contact Karen L. Howard at (202) 512-6888 or HowardK@gao.gov.
- Traveler Inspections: DHS Mechanisms to Help Prevent Discrimination and Address Complaints What GAO FoundU.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has policies, guidance, and training courses to help prevent and address aspects of potential discrimination in its traveler inspection process. For example, consistent with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) nondiscrimination policy, CBP issued a 2014 memorandum prohibiting the consideration of race or ethnicity in law enforcement, investigation, and screening activities in all but the most exceptional circumstances. As of November 2023, DHS is considering updates to its policy. CBP officials noted that the agency has been working with DHS's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) on this effort. It will be important to ensure that CBP's policy continues to be consistent with departmentwide policy, as these policies help to guide CBP officers' activities as part of the inspection process. CBP has issued other guidance documents that include directives on officers' standards of conduct, for example. Further, CBP's training program includes courses on law enforcement professionalism and unconscious bias. CBP evaluates the effectiveness of its trainings by administering course evaluation surveys, according to CBP officials.CBP also has mechanisms for reviewing and monitoring its traveler inspection processes to oversee implementation of the agency's inspection policies and to help prevent discrimination, among other objectives. For example, CBP has developed and implemented processes to review its pre-primary targeting rules used to identify potentially high-risk travelers. These reviews occur as they are developed and on a regular basis thereafter and are conducted to ensure each rule meets its intended purpose, is supported by current law enforcement or intelligence information, and does not impose an unjustifiable impact on legitimate travelers. Moreover, CBP officers and supervisors collect, review, and monitor data and information related to primary and secondary inspections conducted at ports of entry. Supervisors are responsible for monitoring traveler inspections at ports of entry by interacting with officers and travelers to help ensure officers comply with policies and guidance and reviewing inspection records. For example, during a visit to one port of entry, GAO observed a supervisor walking around the secondary baggage inspection area to observe inspections as they were occurring. Further, CBP supervisors GAO spoke with at seven ports of entry said travelers may ask a supervisor why they were selected for secondary inspection. CBP officers and supervisors at those ports of entry stated, and GAO observed at two of the four ports of entry visited, that supervisors answered questions about the inspection process from travelers.Canine Search During Secondary Inspection at a U.S. Land Port of EntryCBP uses various methods at ports of entry and through other communication means to address concerns raised by travelers and share information about complaint mechanisms. At ports of entry, CBP officials stated that if a traveler raises a concern about potential discrimination, generally on-site supervisors first try to address the concern immediately by speaking with the traveler. Officials also stated that travelers may request to speak with a CBP supervisor at any time during the inspection process, and the supervisor can provide the traveler with additional information about the inspection process and answer any questions. Representatives from four of the nine stakeholder organizations GAO interviewed said that some travelers have expressed concerns to them regarding not knowing why they were referred for a secondary inspection. Generally, CBP officials are not permitted to provide specific details regarding reasons a traveler is referred for secondary inspection if that referral is based upon law enforcement and other sensitive information, according to CBP officials.CBP also provides travelers with information on how to submit complaints, including posters and brochures in the inspection areas at ports of entry. GAO observed CBP posters and contact cards in the inspection areas at each of the four ports of entry GAO visited. These posters and brochures encourage travelers to provide comments or compliments via phone, mail, or online forms.Several DHS and CBP offices, such as DHS's CRCL and CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), have varying responsibilities in receiving or investigating complaints about traveler inspections, including potential discrimination. These entities can receive complaints from other DHS entities, employees, travelers, and from stakeholder organizations that submit complaints on behalf of individual or groups of travelers. Representatives from five of the nine stakeholder organizations GAO interviewed said they had filed complaints with CRCL or CBP. For example, representatives noted filing complaints on behalf of travelers with disabilities who experienced issues related to accessibility as well as complaints regarding secondary inspection referrals based solely on nationality or country of birth.From fiscal years 2017 through 2021, CRCL and OPR received and investigated hundreds of complaints related to potential discrimination during traveler inspections. During that time period, CBP inspected over 1.5 billion arriving travelers at land and air ports of entry. CRCL, responsible for addressing civil rights and civil liberties complaints related to DHS activities, received 479 complaints related to potential discrimination in the traveler inspection process. Based on its investigations, CRCL identified findings and issues that it summarized in seven memoranda to CBP. These memoranda included 22 recommendations to CBP to address those findings and issues, such as for it to implement additional training for employees on policies related to nondiscrimination and update guidance on things like personal searches. As of August 2023, CBP had taken action in response to most of those recommendations. In particular, CBP concurred or partially concurred with 17 of the 20 recommendations, and completed planned actions for all but one of those 17 recommendations. These actions included providing training or reminders on CBP's disability access and nondiscrimination policies and updating its Personal Search Handbook. CBP expects to complete action for the remaining recommendation by February 2024. For the three recommendations with which CBP did not concur, it provided CRCL with the rationale for its determination, such as that existing policies addressed identified issues.CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility, responsible for investigating allegations of CBP employee misconduct, received 443 complaints from fiscal year 2017 through 2021 and took action against employees in about 4 percent of the 425 cases in which investigations had been completed at the time of GAO's review. CBP did not take action against employees in most cases (410 cases) due to insufficient evidence of misconduct, according to CBP officials. In cases where CBP took action against employees (15 cases), actions included written or verbal counseling, reprimand, and suspension.Why GAO Did This StudyOn a typical day, CBP officers inspect hundreds of thousands of travelers entering the U.S. CBP is responsible for inspection activities that facilitate the flow of legitimate travel and trade while also keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and contraband, and inadmissible individuals out of the country. Some travelers and stakeholder organizations have raised concerns about CBP inspections, including concerns related to potential discrimination based on race, religion, or other characteristics.GAO was asked to review CBP's efforts to help prevent and address potential discrimination during the traveler inspection process. This report describes (1) CBP's mechanisms to help ensure that its inspection practices at air and land ports of entry do not result in discrimination against travelers based on race, ethnicity, religion, disability, and other characteristics; (2) DHS and CBP mechanisms for receiving complaints related to potential discrimination during traveler inspection process; and (3) mechanisms for investigating complaints related to potential discrimination and the outcomes of those investigations.GAO interviewed DHS and CBP headquarters officials and CBP officials at seven field locations selected based on a mix of criteria including geographic location and volume of travelers. GAO also conducted in-person observations of traveler inspections at four of these locations to gain firsthand knowledge of the traveler inspection process.GAO also interviewed representatives from nine stakeholder organizations, selected based on their work on addressing discrimination or immigration-related issues and prior interaction with CRCL. These organizations included the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the American Civil Liberties Union Texas Border Rights Center, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Disability Rights Education Defense Fund, the National Center for Transgender Equality, the National Disability Rights Network, the National Immigrant Justice Center, the Paralyzed Veterans of America, and the Sikh Coalition.GAO reviewed agency documents, including DHS's and CBP's policy memos on nondiscrimination and CBP's directive on standards of conduct. GAO also reviewed materials from CBP officer training programs and training-related activities that discuss aspects of preventing discrimination during the traveler inspection process. GAO also interviewed CBP officials to obtain information on how CBP assesses the effectiveness of its training.GAO also analyzed documentation on the processes used by DHS and CBP offices that receive and investigate complaints, including DHS's CRCL and CBP's OPR.GAO analyzed CRCL and OPR data on complaints of potential discrimination in CBP's traveler inspection process received in fiscal years 2017 through 2021 (the most recent available). In particular, GAO analyzed the complaints to describe categories of complaints and types of investigations. For the complaints received and retained by CRCL for investigation, GAO interviewed CRCL officials and reviewed agency documentation to describe any outcomes, such as policy recommendations to CBP documented in memoranda, as well as documentation on CBP's responses to those recommendations. For the complaints received and investigated by OPR, GAO analyzed information on outcomes of each investigation, such as whether the complaint resulted in employee discipline.For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or GamblerR@gao.gov.
- Child Trafficking: Addressing Challenges to Public Awareness and Survivor Support What GAO FoundVarious challenges exist to raising public awareness of child trafficking and supporting child survivors, according to GAO's interviews with federal officials and 13 stakeholders. For example, public misperceptions exist about which children are trafficked, how children are trafficked, and what supports child survivors need. Stakeholders reported other challenges as well. For example, children who are detained by law enforcement may not receive the services they need to help address their experience with trafficking. Stakeholders also discussed a lack of services for certain populations (e.g., boys, survivors of labor trafficking, and foreign national children), and limited data and research on child trafficking and programs to combat it.Officials from the Department of Justice's Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) and the Department of Health and Human Services' Office on Trafficking in Persons (OTIP) collaborate to help address human trafficking. However, their collaboration mechanisms broadly focus on individuals of all ages who have experienced trafficking. The offices do not have a collaboration mechanism dedicated to child trafficking; however, officials acknowledged that children have distinct needs. For example, OVC officials said that children's needs are different from adults' needs due to developmental differences, which may require specialized counseling to help address. In addition, OTIP officials told GAO that child trafficking survivors often require more time, attention, and resources than adult trafficking survivors. Establishing a collaboration mechanism focused solely on efforts to combat child trafficking would better enable the offices to overcome challenges specific to children and meet the distinct needs of child trafficking survivors.Both offices have set strategic goals to help measure the success of their anti-trafficking programs for children. OTIP is also developing performance goals, but OVC has no plans to do so. By establishing performance goals, OVC would be better positioned to define what its programs are trying to achieve and its progress in helping combat child trafficking.Why GAO Did This StudyHuman traffickers can target children in the U.S. to exploit them sexually, force them into labor, or both. Children can be targeted due to their age and other factors that make them vulnerable. Children experiencing poverty, homelessness, and juvenile justice or child welfare involvement, along with foreign national children who arrive unaccompanied to the U.S. may be at greater risk of victimization.GAO was asked to review federal efforts to address child trafficking. This report examines challenges related to raising public awareness of child trafficking and supporting survivors, collaboration among federal agencies to address child trafficking, and agencies' efforts to measure the performance and effectiveness of their anti-trafficking programs for children. GAO focused this report on OVC and OTIP, as these are the primary offices administering domestic anti-trafficking grant programs specifically for children. GAO reviewed documents (e.g., grant solicitations) and interviewed officials from the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services. GAO also conducted interviews with 13 nongovernmental organizations with expertise in child trafficking, such as service providers and researchers.
- Legislative Branch: Options for Enhancing Congressional Oversight of Rulemaking and Establishing an Office of Legal Counsel  [Reissued with revisions on Jan. 9, 2024] What GAO FoundGAO identified numerous options for how Congress could enhance oversight of the executive branch rulemaking process. GAO groups the options into three overall themes (see figure). One set of options involves creating a new entity, such as a Congressional Office of Regulatory Review. Other options for additional congressional oversight involve either revising the existing regulatory process or altering existing functions (e.g., altering the responsibilities or duties of entities involved with rulemaking).Congress would have to weigh various tradeoffs if it were to adopt any of these options. While all options could enhance congressional oversight, establishing a new office to conduct research on proposed rules, for example, could entail increased costs for additional staff and potentially duplicate existing congressional services. The extent and scope of the tradeoffs may depend on what Congress determines to be the mission and functions of the new office. Other options, such as requiring agencies to conduct additional analyses, could add complexity or time to the existing rulemaking process.Options also exist for establishing a Congressional Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which Congress has debated for decades. Establishing the OLC would require specifying its function, organizational structure, and legal authority. Potential functions for the office could include advisory, litigation, and coordination with other entities. Organizational structure options include making the OLC a joint or separate entity within or outside of Congress. Authorities by which Congress could establish the OLC include legislation or adopting new chamber rules. Each of these options has tradeoffs. For example, if Congress were to establish a joint OLC, the OLC may speak for Congress as a whole on legal issues, but it could encounter difficulties in obtaining consensus across chambers.Why GAO Did This StudyCongress has broad oversight and investigative authorities, which are essential to its legislative functions under Article I of the U.S. Constitution. In recent years, members of Congress have explored options for enhancing its oversight functions. This includes oversight of federal rulemaking—the process used by federal agencies to formulate, amend, or repeal a rule or regulation. Members of Congress also have shown interest in reforming Congress's legal services.GAO was asked to review congressional oversight of executive branch rulemaking, as well as considerations for establishing a congressional office for legal counsel. This report identifies and describes options for enhancing Congress's role in the oversight of the federal rulemaking process and for establishing a potential Congressional Office of Legal Counsel, as well as potential tradeoffs.GAO analyzed literature from academic, legal, and other sources, as well as GAO's past work. GAO also interviewed selected officials at congressional offices, the Office of Management and Budget, professionals from nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to identify tradeoffs and other considerations. Finally, GAO held group discussions with researchers and other knowledgeable individuals to validate its research.This report contains supplemental material on the options. See http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-24-105870.For more information, contact Yvonne Jones at (202) 512-6806 or jonesy@gao.gov.
- Economic Sanctions: Agency Efforts Help Mitigate Some of the Risks Posed by Digital Assets What GAO FoundDigital assets like Bitcoin and other virtual currencies pose risks to implementing and enforcing U.S. sanctions, but several factors partially mitigate these risks (see table). A key feature of digital assets is that they enable users to rapidly transfer value across countries' borders. Yet many digital assets are recorded on a public ledger, which may enable U.S. agencies and analytics firms to trace transactions and potentially identify illicit actors. However, digital asset owners also may use the anonymizing features of some digital assets or other techniques that obscure their identities in an attempt to evade sanctions.Selected Risks Digital Assets Pose to Sanctions Implementation and Enforcement and Factors that Help Mitigate Risks			Examples of Risks Digital Assets Pose to Sanctions Implementation and Enforcement 									Examples of Factors that Help Mitigate Risks Posed by Digital Assets 								Digital assets provide users some anonymity, and actors may use techniques that obscure their financial transactions.				Actors may take advantage of discrepancies between legal systems and financial reporting requirements in different jurisdictions to avoid consequences of illicit financial activity.				Sanctioned actors may use cybercrime to generate revenue, for example by stealing digital assets.									Agencies may be able to trace transactions on public blockchains and identify illicit actors.				Use of digital assets as a means of payment is limited and the value of digital assets is highly volatile.				The implementation of global standards may lead to increased compliance with Anti-Money Laundering requirements.					Source: GAO. | GAO-24-106178Because digital assets currently have relatively limited use as a payment mechanism, sanctioned entities and other illicit actors may seek to convert digital assets to a more traditional currency in jurisdictions with weak regulations and limited sanctions programs. Efforts to increase compliance with global standards may help to mitigate this risk, but uneven implementation from country to country remains a vulnerability that sanctioned actors may exploit.The risks digital assets pose to sanctions implementation will likely continue to evolve. An increase in the use and acceptance of digital assets could erode the potency of U.S. sanctions and lead to greater sanctions evasion. On the other hand, advancements in capabilities to trace transactions and identify illicit actors could mitigate some sanctions evasion risks.GAO found that agencies have taken various actions to address the risks posed by digital assets to U.S. sanctions implementation. For example, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has sanctioned, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other agencies have taken enforcement actions against, entities and individuals for facilitating sanctions evasion with digital assets. Treasury, the Department of State, DOJ, and other agencies also work with international organizations and foreign partners to build investigative capacity and implement anti-money laundering standards to protect the global financial system from digital assets being used for illicit purposes, including sanctions evasion.Why GAO Did This StudyThe increasing use of digital assets may pose challenges for the implementation and enforcement of U.S. sanctions. As of October 2023, the total market capitalization of all cryptocurrencies was about $1.1 trillion, according to one index. The U.S. maintains dozens of economic sanctions programs to serve a range of foreign policy goals. Sanctions may place economic restrictions on entire countries, sectors of countries' economies, individuals, or entities. Such restrictions can include, for example, denying a designated entity access to the U.S. financial system or freezing an entity's assets under U.S. jurisdiction.GAO was asked to review matters relating to the national security implications of certain types of digital assets. This report describes (1) the risks that digital assets pose to U.S. agencies' ability to implement and enforce U.S. sanctions and factors that may mitigate those risks, and (2) actions U.S. agencies have taken to address the risks that digital assets present with regard to implementing and enforcing U.S. sanctions.GAO interviewed agency officials and reviewed government reports, guidance, and press releases related to sanctions actions and digital assets. GAO also interviewed 15 stakeholders who GAO selected based on their experiences related to digital assets and sanctions. These stakeholders, many of whom had prior government experience, included researchers, representatives of the digital assets industry, and individuals who provide legal or advisory services on sanctions and digital assets issues.For more information, contact Kimberly Gianopoulos at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov.
- COVID-19: Insights from Fraud Schemes and Federal Response Efforts What GAO FoundThe Department of Justice (DOJ) has brought federal fraud-related charges against at least 2,191 individuals or entities in cases involving federal COVID-19 relief programs, consumer scams, and other types of fraud as of June 30, 2023. Based on GAO's analysis of the cases announced in DOJ press releases, at least 1,525 individuals or entities facing fraud-related charges were found guilty or liable. Courts have ordered individuals to pay restitution ranging up to over $60 million and serve prison terms up to 10 years or more. GAO's analysis of fraud schemes highlights the resulting financial losses and impacts on taxpayers, agency reputation, federal program goals, and health and safety. Agencies can use information about schemes to improve their fraud risk management efforts.Examples of Fraud Schemes Involving Federal COVID-19 Relief Programs or Consumer Scams			Key mechanism 									Fraud scheme description 											Conspiracy									A group allegedly conspired to obtain more than $240 million from a federal child nutrition program in a complex fraud scheme. Individuals colluded to open shell companies acting as program sites to claim they were serving thousands of meals a day to underserved children during the pandemic. Instead, these funds were diverted for self-enrichment. Four individuals pleaded guilty but have not been sentenced. Over 40 others are awaiting trial.											Misrepresentation									Two company owners attempted to obtain a total of $5 million by applying for 14 Paycheck Protection Program loans and 12 COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loans. They submitted fabricated tax and other documents inflating the companies' number of employees and payroll. The owners received almost $650,000 in funds they used for personal items, such as a luxury car. Both pleaded guilty, were ordered to pay more than $800,000 in restitution, and were sentenced to 2 to 3 years in prison.											Mislabeling									A company owner sold and mailed pesticide marketed as an air purifier to kill airborne viruses such as COVID-19. The product contained sodium chlorite, a substance declared unmailable under U.S. postal regulations because of its propensity to cause a fire or explosion. The owner was sentenced to 8 months in prison and ordered to pay a total penalty of $556,443 through restitution, fines, and forfeiture.											Health care fraud									A licensed medical practitioner pleaded guilty to selling homeopathic immunizations, falsely claiming they provided immunity to COVID-19. She received over $74,000 for fabricated COVID-19 vaccination and immunization records, knowing this would mislead school officials enforcing the state's vaccination laws. She was sentenced to almost 3 years in prison.					Source: GAO Antifraud Resource and analysis of court documentation (information); Icons-Studio/stock.adobe.com (icons). | GAO-24-106353Various interagency task forces and the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) were established to combat COVID-19 fraud. For example, the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force conducted an enforcement sweep and reported taking law enforcement actions against fraudsters responsible for approximately $836 million in fraud. Similarly, the PRAC estimated its information and resource sharing with investigative agencies supported hundreds of criminal convictions and the recovery of more than $1 billion.Why GAO Did This StudySince March 2020, Congress provided over $4.6 trillion to help the nation respond to and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. The public health crisis, economic instability, and increased flow of federal funds associated with the pandemic increased pressures on federal agency operations and presented opportunities for individuals to commit fraud. The COVID-19 pandemic saw an increase in the number of fraud-related charges, including schemes by individuals and large complex syndicates.The CARES Act of 2020 includes a provision for GAO to report regularly on the federal response to the pandemic.This report describes: (1) the status of federal COVID-19 fraud-related cases announced by DOJ, including examples of fraud schemes and (2) examples of federal efforts that have been taken to combat COVID-19 fraud.GAO reviewed public statements from DOJ from March 2020 through June 2023 to identify federal fraud-related cases. Specifically, GAO identified cases involving COVID-19 relief program fraud; consumer scams; and other types of fraud. GAO then analyzed court documents for details on fraud schemes. GAO also reviewed federal agency documentation and rules, proposed legislation, and proposed antifraud efforts.
- COVID-19: Insights and Actions for Fraud Prevention What GAO FoundChallenges that agencies faced in implementing COVID-19 relief programs provide insights into fraud prevention for normal operations and future emergencies. Specifically, understanding fraud schemes that emerged during the pandemic can provide opportunities for program managers to identify internal controls that had been circumvented and respond to mitigate the related risks. Data and system challenges, such as limited data sharing, highlight the value of data analytics for fraud prevention. Additionally, thoughtful program design choices that consider fraud vulnerabilities can facilitate fraud prevention.Insights from COVID-19 Relief to Inform Fraud PreventionWith strategic fraud risk management, agencies are better positioned to manage fraud during normal operations and emergencies. Sources that provide additional insight for fraud prevention include recommendations GAO has made to agencies, actions GAO identified that Congress can take to strengthen fraud risk management practices across the government, and resources GAO developed to support strategic fraud risk management. Implementing these recommendations and taking these actions, along with leveraging available resources, can enable agencies to carry out their missions and better protect taxpayer dollars from fraud during normal operations and prepare them to face the next emergency.An Insight Based on GAO Resources and Recommendations to Agencies and CongressWhy GAO Did This StudySince March 2020, Congress and the administration have provided trillions of dollars in COVID-19 relief funding to help the nation respond to, and recover from, the pandemic. Agencies across the federal government acted quickly to stand up new programs and greatly scale up existing programs.While COVID-19 relief programs were critical for assuring public health and economic stability, they also created unprecedented opportunities for fraud due to the dollars involved and other risk factors. While the full extent of fraud associated with the COVID-19 relief funds will never be known with certainty, estimates are in the hundreds of billions. In light of what was likely lost to fraud during the pandemic, the importance of fraud prevention cannot be stressed enough.This testimony discusses (1) insights for prevention from COVID-19 fraud; and (2) recommendations, matters, and resources for improving fraud prevention in normal operations and future emergencies.GAO reviewed its prior COVID-19 findings and recommendations on internal controls and fraud risk management practices.
- VA Whistleblowers: Retaliation Claim Investigations and Settlement Agreements  [Reissued with revisions on Oct. 27, 2023] What GAO FoundThe number of whistleblower retaliation cases that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) has received increased since fiscal year 2020. The number of other cases also increased. Specifically, OAWP received 577 whistleblower retaliation cases in fiscal year 2020 and 736 in fiscal year 2023. The non-whistleblower retaliation cases that OAWP received increased from 1,594 in fiscal year 2020 to 1,972 in fiscal year 2023.Office of Special Counsel (OSC) investigations of allegations of whistleblower retaliation from VA employees have decreased in number and have increasingly closed with a favorable action that benefits the complainant (i.e., whistleblower). Most OSC investigations of complaints from VA employees included allegations of whistleblower retaliation. From fiscal years 2018 through 2022, 69 percent of OSC cases involving VA employees included allegations of whistleblower retaliation. Specifically, OSC received 901 whistleblower retaliation cases involving VA in fiscal year 2018 and 515 in fiscal year 2022 (see figure). The percentage of these cases with a favorable action increased from 3 percent to 10 percent.Volume of Office of Special Counsel (OSC) Cases Involving Department of Veterans Affairs Employees, Fiscal Years 2018–2022 According to VA OGC officials, the settlement agreement process involves three distinct phases: initiation, negotiation, and monitoring. VA and a complainant can settle claims of whistleblower retaliation in the office where a dispute arises at any point in the complaint process. The agency has settled 71 whistleblower retaliation cases since it began tracking them in 2022. OAWP tracking information showed that most of the settlements included monetary awards for the whistleblower, ranging from about $1,800 to 525,000. In addition, the settlement may also have included salary adjustments or back-pay. OAWP information also showed that complaints come from program offices across the agency, but most of the settlements originate from complaints out of VA's Veteran's Health Administration, the largest of VA's three administrations.Why GAO Did This StudyWhistleblowers can help protect the public interest by reporting allegations of wrongdoing, such as a violation of law or gross mismanagement. While whistleblowers potentially safeguard the government from fraud, waste, and abuse, they may risk reprisal from their agencies for disclosures, such as demotion, reassignment or termination.VA is one of the largest federal agencies and employs around 400,000 people across hundreds of medical facilities, clinics, and benefits offices. Whistleblowers at the VA can file complaints of retaliation internally, through the agency's OAWP, or externally with other agencies, such as OSC. In some cases, whistleblowers will enter into a settlement agreement with VA to resolve the dispute.This testimony summarizes GAO's May 2023 report on VA whistleblower retaliation claims and settlements, as well as preliminary observations from related ongoing work. Specifically, this testimony examines: 1) the characteristics of OAWP whistleblower retaliation investigations, 2) the characteristics of OSC whistleblower retaliation investigations, and 3) how VA resolves such allegations through settlement agreements.GAO reviewed OSC and VA documents, interviewed agency officials, analyzed OSC case management system data from fiscal years 2018-22, which were the most recent data at the time of the report. In addition, as part of our ongoing work, we collected additional information on whistleblower retaliation claims and settlements from OAWP's Matter Tracking System.For more information, contact Thomas Costa at (202) 512-4769 or costat@gao.gov.
- Federal Law Enforcement Officers: Criminal Sexual Acts while Acting in Official Capacity What GAO FoundThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, enacted a provision of law, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c), making it unlawful for someone, while acting in their capacity as a federal law enforcement officer, to knowingly engage in a sexual act with an individual who is under arrest, under supervision, in detention, or in federal custody. According to an official from the Department of Justice (DOJ), consent is not a defense to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c) and therefore federal law enforcement officers are automatically liable if they engage in the prohibited conduct. Generally, DOJ's Civil Rights Division and/or the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices throughout the country prosecute sexual offenses committed by federal law enforcement officers.According to DOJ data, there were no cases filed by DOJ and no violations (criminal convictions) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c) in fiscal year 2023. Individuals cannot be charged for prohibited conduct that occurred prior to the provision's effective date of October 1, 2022, which may explain why there have been no violations and no cases filed to date. Prior to the new provision, federal law enforcement officers committing criminal sexual acts against these individuals may have been prosecuted under other criminal statutes. An official from DOJ's Office on Violence Against Women noted that there is a high rate of underreporting of sex offenses in general, particularly when it involves victims in custody or detention of law enforcement. Also, it can take several years from the time of an alleged incident to the filing of a criminal case to a disposition of the criminal case.Why GAO Did This StudyThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, includes a provision for GAO to report on violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c) committed between October 1, 2022 and September 30, 2023, and then to report annually thereafter. This report provides information on the number of cases filed by DOJ and the number of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c) during fiscal year 2023. To address our objective, GAO collected information from DOJ officials responsible for maintaining data on charges and convictions pursuant to federal statutes. GAO also interviewed DOJ officials to understand how they report cases filed and violations in their data system, and we assessed the reliability of that data.For more information, contact Derrick Collins at 202-512-8777 or CollinsD@gao.gov.
- COVID-19: Key Elements of Fraud Schemes and Actions to Better Prevent Fraud What GAO FoundMost COVID-19 relief funds went to the intended recipients in the intended amounts. In other instances, significant funds went to those who engaged in fraud schemes. Federal fraud schemes consist of five key elements: (1) affected program, (2)&nbsp;participants, (3) types of fraud activities, (4)&nbsp;mechanisms to execute fraudulent activities, and (5) impacts. These elements represent the highest-level components in GAO's Conceptual Fraud Model. The model provides a common language and structure for describing fraud schemes—including those affecting COVID-19 relief programs—to support agency efforts to combat fraud.Key Elements of an Example of a Fraud Scheme Involving Multiple COVID-19 Relief ProgramsFederal agencies did not strategically manage fraud risks and were not adequately prepared to prevent fraud when the pandemic began. While eliminating all fraud is not a realistic goal, resources and requirements exist to support strategic fraud risk management. For example, GAO's Fraud Risk Framework and Antifraud Resource provide leading practices and interactive tools, respectively, to help agencies combat fraud. GAO's 142 recommendations to agencies to align their efforts with fraud risk management leading practices also provide a roadmap for action. GAO has also suggested actions Congress can take, such as reinstating agencies' reporting on fraud risk management and enhancing data analytic capabilities. These congressional actions and agencies' use of GAO resources to strategically manage fraud risk would position them to better prevent fraud in both normal operations and in emergencies.Why GAO Did This StudySince March 2020, Congress and the Administration have provided trillions of dollars in COVID-19 relief funding to help the nation respond to and recover from the pandemic. Agencies across the federal government acted quickly to stand up new programs and greatly scale up existing programs.The unprecedented demand for benefits and the need to quickly implement or expand programs increased the risk of fraud during the pandemic. There have also been cases of funds paid to those who sought to defraud the government. For example, from March 2020 through June 2023, at least 1,399 individuals or entities were found guilty or liable for fraud-related charges in cases involving federal COVID-19 relief programs.Managing fraud risk is the responsibility of program managers and includes assessing the potential for fraud and implementing strategies to appropriately mitigate related fraud risks. Better understanding the nature of federal fraud schemes and the resources available to combat them can enhance agency efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to fraud risk during normal operations and emergencies.This testimony discusses (1) key elements of federal fraud schemes and examples of schemes involving COVID-19 relief funds and (2) actions agencies and Congress can take to better prevent fraud during normal operations and emergencies.GAO reviewed its prior COVID-19 findings and recommendations on internal controls and fraud risk management practices.For more information, contact Rebecca Shea at (202) 512-6722 or shear@gao.gov.
- Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to Address Workforce Planning and Other Management Challenges What GAO FoundWithin the Department of Justice, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is responsible for conducting immigration proceedings to fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly administer and interpret U.S. immigration laws and regulations. EOIR has taken several steps to improve its management practices since GAO's 2017 report. This includes revising its hiring process and increasing the number of immigration judges from 338 in fiscal year 2017 to 659 as of July 2023. However, EOIR also continues to face several challenges. Specifically:Workforce planning.  In April 2023, GAO reported that EOIR had taken some steps to improve its workforce planning, which is the process of aligning human capital with mission needs and goals. However, GAO found that EOIR's practices did not fully align with key principles for strategic workforce planning.	In 2017, GAO recommended that EOIR develop a strategic workforce plan that addresses the key principles of workforce planning to better position EOIR to address staffing needs. These include identifying critical skills, developing strategies to address skills gaps, and monitoring progress. In 2023, GAO found that EOIR had not yet developed a strategic workforce plan or set workforce planning goals consistent with GAO's prior recommendation. Developing and implementing a strategic workforce plan would better position EOIR to address current and future staffing needs.		In 2023, GAO found that EOIR does not have a governance structure to guide its workforce planning efforts and hold leadership accountable for progress on workforce goals. Specifically, EOIR had not assigned and documented roles and responsibilities for workforce planning and implementation of a strategic workforce plan. Given its longstanding challenges in this area, establishing a documented governance structure for workforce planning would better position EOIR to institutionalize improvements moving forward.		Immigration judge performance appraisal program. In 2023, GAO found that   EOIR evaluated how immigration judges perform their duties but had not evaluated its overall judge performance appraisal program. EOIR revised the criteria against which it evaluates judges but it had not assessed judges' satisfaction with the program's equity, utility, and accuracy. Implementing a process to periodically evaluate its performance appraisal program for judges can better position EOIR to determine the program's effectiveness.	Electronic filing system.  As of November 2021, all immigration courts had access to an electronic filing system and, overall, court staff GAO interviewed expressed positive views of it. However, despite reporting benefits, staff stated they experience outages and delays while using one application within the system—Judicial Tools—that disrupt their work. Judges and court staff use Judicial Tools to access case information and create case orders and decisions. In 2023, GAO found that EOIR did not have a process to regularly assess whether Judicial Tools was meeting users' needs. Developing and implementing a process to regularly reassess whether Judicial Tools is meeting users' needs would help EOIR ensure that the application continues to serve the agency's needs.Why GAO Did This StudyEach year, EOIR issues decisions for hundreds of thousands of cases regarding foreign nationals charged as removable under U.S. immigration law. EOIR is facing a substantial and growing backlog of pending cases. In July 2023, EOIR had nearly 2.2 million pending cases—more than four times the number of pending cases at the start of fiscal year 2017. In 2017 and 2023, GAO reported on EOIR's management practices, including how it oversees workforce planning and IT management.This statement addresses EOIR's (1) workforce planning practices; (2) performance appraisal program for immigration and appellate immigration judges; and (3) implementation of its electronic filing system.This statement is based on GAO's 2017 and 2023 reports on EOIR's management functions (GAO-17-438 and GAO-23-105431). For those reports, GAO analyzed EOIR documents and data and interviewed EOIR officials at headquarters and at immigration courts. As of October 2023, GAO is awaiting updates from EOIR on its efforts to address prior GAO recommendations.
- Native American Priorities: Protection and Repatriation of Human Remains and Other Cultural Items More than 30 years have passed since the enactment of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), which requires federal agencies and specific museums to repatriate certain Native American human remains and other cultural items. Agencies have made some progress implementing NAGPRA, but hundreds of thousands of Native American human remains and other cultural items have yet to be repatriated. Addressing our prior recommendations will help agencies confront challenges they face with implementing and enforcing the act.The Big PictureNative Americans may consider certain cultural items sacred or significant and the damage or theft of these items to be detrimental to preserving their culture and traditions. NAGPRA seeks to repatriate specific Native American cultural items—including human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony—by requiring federal agencies and museums to (1) identify cultural items in their possession or control; (2) identify, where possible, the cultural affiliation between those items and a present-day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization; and (3) generally repatriate culturally affiliated items upon request to lineal descendants, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian organizations under the terms prescribed in the act (see Legal Terms).Since NAGPRA was enacted in 1990, federal agencies and museums have reported being in possession of almost 3 million Native American human remains and associated funerary objects, according to the Department of the Interior's National NAGPRA Program. The program's 2022 report notes that these agencies and museums have not completed the NAGPRA regulatory process for 52 percent of human remains and 29 percent of associated funerary objects. For those cultural items, the process is complete when any necessary tribal consultation for possible cultural and geographical affiliation is concluded and the human remains or associated funerary objects have been listed in a completed inventory published in the Federal Register, according to a program official.&nbsp;Until the&nbsp;process is complete, the items are not available for repatriation (see figure).Status of Certain Native American Cultural Items Reported by Federal Agencies and Museums under NAGPRANAGPRA also prohibits the intentional removal or excavation of Native American cultural items from federal and tribal lands unless certain conditions are met, including consultation with and—in the case of tribal land—consent from the appropriate Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization. Further, NAGPRA criminalizes the knowing sale, purchase, use for profit, and transport for sale or profit of Native American cultural items obtained in violation of the act, among other actions.What GAO’s Work ShowsOur prior work shows that federal agencies have made progress in implementing NAGPRA. However, the progress has taken decades and, as we reported in 2022, challenges remain.NAGPRA Implementation and Tribal ConsultationNAGPRA and its implementing regulations require federal agencies to consult with lineal descendants, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian organizations, as appropriate, in connection with the identification, affiliation, and repatriation of Native American cultural items, as well as when such items are inadvertently discovered on federal lands. Tribes and tribal organizations have expressed concerns about how some agencies are implementing NAGPRA’s consultation requirements. We previously recommended that federal agencies take steps to improve tribal consultation processes in other contexts. Failure to consult with Tribes, or to consult effectively, may result in irrevocable damage to cultural resources.NAGPRA Enforcement and Protections of Native American Cultural ItemsNAGPRA prohibits the removal of Native American cultural items from federal and tribal lands, except in certain circumstances. Federal agencies have taken a number of approaches to prevent and detect theft of and damage to Native American cultural items. But resource constraints, competing priorities, and limitations with data to support decision-making have hampered agencies’ efforts to prevent, investigate, and prosecute incidents of theft and damage.&nbsp;Limitations in the legal prohibitions on theft and trafficking of Native American cultural items have posed another challenge. Congress took steps to address some of those limitations when it passed the Safeguard Tribal Objects of Patrimony Act of 2021 (STOP Act), which became law in 2022 and aims in part to prevent the international export of cultural items prohibited from trafficking under NAGPRA and other laws. Interior is currently developing regulations and taking other actions to implement the STOP Act.Challenges and OpportunitiesWhile federal agencies have made some progress, such as making annual data on the status of federal agencies’ repatriation progress readily available, challenges remain with implementing and enforcing&nbsp;NAGPRA. In particular, more work is needed to repatriate the hundreds of thousands of Native American cultural items that are still in the possession of federal agencies and museums. In October 2022, Interior proposed revisions to its NAGPRA regulations that, according to the agency, are designed to streamline and improve its regulatory process. However, Interior has yet to finalize these regulations. Additionally, the challenges we have identified and our prior recommendations underscore the importance of further examining how federal agencies are implementing and enforcing NAGPRA. We can analyze these and other challenges and opportunities in our future work on cultural protection to support Congressional oversight of NAGPRA implementation and enforcement.In our 2010, 2018, 2019, and 2021 reports, we made a total of 55 recommendations related to the protection of Native American cultural items and tribal consultation. As of September 2023, federal agencies had fully implemented 47 of these recommendations. Implementing the remaining eight could help Interior target efforts to analyze and address risks to Native American cultural resources and improve how federal agencies communicate with Tribes that request assistance with repatriating cultural items from overseas auctions. This could also improve agencies’ efforts to consult with Tribes on certain federal efforts that could affect cultural resources.Legal TermsUnder NAGPRA (Pub. L. No. 101-601, as amended), a museum is any institution or state or local agency that receives federal funds and has possession or control of Native American cultural items, which include human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony. NAGPRA defines other key terms, including federal lands, Indian tribe, Native American, Native Hawaiian organization, and tribal land. 25 U.S.C. § 3001. Our use of terms is in keeping with NAGPRA’s definitions.For more information about this Snapshot, contact: Anna Maria Ortiz, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, (202) 512-3841.
- Human Rights: Agency Actions Needed to Address Harassment of Dissidents and Other Tactics of Transnational Repression in the U.S. What GAO FoundForeign governments may use various tactics—from spyware to assault—to silence U.S.-based dissidents. Agencies have worked to track such incidents, generally known as transnational repression (TNR). Agencies have reported on foreign governments known to engage in TNR worldwide, some of which receive U.S. arms transfers. However, officials said that a lack of common understanding of TNR hinders efforts to fully track incidents against U.S.-based persons.Foreign Governments that Received U.S. Arms Transfers in Fiscal Year 2017-2021 and/or Were Named as Transnational Repression Perpetrators in Reports (Issued 2022–2023)aDid not receive any U.S. arms transfers in fiscal year 2017-2021.Note: For more details, see figures 2 and 4 in GAO-24-106183.U.S. law does not specifically criminalize TNR, but agencies have used existing tools to penalize individuals for TNR against U.S.-based persons. State imposed visa restrictions on 76 Saudis believed to have been engaged in acts of TNR, including the murder of U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi. FBI officials said gaps in U.S. law limit their ability to counter TNR, but DOJ has not developed a DOJ-wide position on the sufficiency of existing laws. Developing such a position may help Congress determine whether new legislation is needed to address TNR.Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)—which prohibits arms transfers to countries that the President determines are engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment against individuals in the U.S.—offers a way to hold some governments accountable for TNR against individuals in the U.S. However, no such determinations have been made, and none of the agencies we spoke with had performed any work related to implementing the statute. Because Section 6 only requires reporting following a positive determination, it is unclear the extent to which the law has ever been considered. Amending its reporting requirement could improve visibility into how, if at all, the law is used.Why GAO Did This StudyRecent high-profile acts of TNR against U.S.-based persons highlight TNR's threat to national security. Some advocates and members of Congress have called for more accountability for foreign governments that benefit from U.S. arms transfers yet engage in TNR against U.S.-based persons.GAO was asked to review federal agency efforts to address TNR using available tools, including Section 6 of the AECA. This report examines the extent to which: (1) agencies have collected and analyzed information about the nature and prevalence of TNR against U.S.-based persons; (2) agencies have used available tools to hold individuals accountable for TNR against U.S.-based persons; and (3) the U.S. government has implemented Section 6 of the AECA.GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from nongovernmental organizations and the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security.
- Pretrial Supervision: Actions Needed to Enhance Management of the Location Monitoring Program What GAO FoundTo implement its location monitoring program, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Administrative Office) contracts with a single provider to supply location monitoring equipment, train officers, and assist with alert response. Further, the Administrative Office reviews each of the 93 district offices with pretrial services every 5 years, in part to ensure they adhere to location monitoring policies.GAO's data analysis showed similar characteristics among individuals with court-ordered location monitoring. Generally, they were male (85 percent) and had zero new criminal charges while under supervision (92 percent). Nevertheless, these individuals faced obstacles. For example, according to federal defenders GAO interviewed, some companies may not hire these individuals because of monitoring-related scheduling restrictions or the visibility of the location monitoring device.Location monitoring poses challenges for officers due to the demands of alert response 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. According to a GAO survey, this includes challenges related to equipment connection errors (see figure). The Administrative Office has initiatives to address some challenges, such as developing an emergency response team to help in the case of natural disasters. However, the Administrative Office does not fully collect and analyze data on the underlying causes of certain location monitoring alerts. In addition, the Administrative Office does not track the length of time it takes officers to respond to and investigate certain alerts. With this data, the Administrative Office could better understand workload demands, potentially reduce them, and use this information when making staffing decisions.Number of Chiefs Reporting that Equipment Related Challenges were Moderately or Extremely Challenging in their Districts within the Past Year aThe survey asked chiefs “In the past year, how challenging, if at all, have each of the following been for location monitoring in your district?”Why GAO Did This StudyFrom calendar years 2018-2022, about 25 percent of individuals released while awaiting trial were required to use a monitoring device as a condition of their release. When an individual fails to adhere to location monitoring restrictions, the monitoring device will signal an alert.GAO was asked to examine the Administrative Office's management of pretrial release location monitoring. This report describes (1) how the Administrative Office manages its location monitoring program and assesses its districts' adherence to policies, (2) characteristics of individuals with court-ordered location monitoring and obstacles they face, and (3) challenges pretrial services officers encounter with alert response and the extent to which the Administrative Office has initiatives to address challenges.Among other methods, GAO analyzed the Administrative Office's pretrial population data and surveyed chiefs in each of 93 district offices—receiving 79 responses. GAO also interviewed officials and a variety of personnel from six districts to obtain perspectives and analyzed the Administrative Office's initiatives to address challenges against its own guidance, internal controls, and human capital standards.
- Unemployment Insurance: Estimated Amount of Fraud During Pandemic Likely Between $100 Billion and $135 Billion What GAO FoundBased on statistical sampling and imputation techniques, GAO estimates that the amount of fraud in unemployment insurance (UI) programs during the COVID-19 pandemic was likely between $100 billion and $135 billion. This is about 11 percent and 15 percent, respectively, of the total amount of UI benefits paid during the pandemic. GAO's estimate is for the period from April 2020 (first full month of payments from all UI programs) to May 2023 (end of the public health emergency). This estimate covers all 53 states that participated in the regular and temporary UI programs. The full extent of UI fraud during the pandemic will likely never be known with certainty. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Labor (DOL) expressed concerns about GAO's fraud estimation methodology and stated that the resulting estimate was likely overstated. GAO disagrees and explains in the report the steps taken to estimate the range of fraud. These steps include using (1) a 95-percent confidence interval to account for sample design and size, and (2) multiple data sources and validity checks to account for uncertainty associated with identifying potential fraud in its sample.During the pandemic, DOL provided states with assistance to improve UI systems and processes. As of July 2023, DOL reported allocating grants totaling about $1.4 billion to states for initiatives including fraud prevention, detection, investigation, and recovery. Officials from selected states confirmed that they used this assistance for fraud detection and prevention, including verification software and improvements in payment timeliness.Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act and American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) Unemployment Insurance (UI) Financial AssistanceAs of May 1, 2023, states reported identifying about $55.8 billion in fraudulent and nonfraudulent UI overpayments and recoveries of about $6.8 billion from March 2020 through March 2023. During this period, states reported identifying fraudulent UI overpayments totaling $5.3 billion and recoveries of $1.2 billion. States use several tools to recover overpayments, including direct repayment and offsets. States can also write off overpayments as uncollectible. Further, states may waive their legal right to collect nonfraudulent overpayments. DOL rules do not allow states to waive fraudulent overpayments.Why GAO Did This StudyThe UI system has faced long-standing challenges with program integrity, which worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to historic pandemic job losses, Congress created new temporary UI programs to provide relief for the unemployed. The unprecedented demand for benefits and need to quickly implement the new programs increased the risk of fraud. Due to this and other challenges, GAO added the UI system to its High Risk List in June 2022.This report (1) provides an estimate of fraud within UI programs during the pandemic; (2) identifies the assistance DOL provided to states; and (3) presents amounts that states reported in UI overpayment recoveries and waivers, among other amounts. GAO used data from multiple sources to produce an estimated range of the extent of fraud during the pandemic. In determining the estimate, GAO reviewed DOL data, selected and reviewed a sample of payments, matched samples to other federal data bases, developed an econometric model on claims and economic conditions, and performed numerous other analyses. GAO also reviewed data on state-reported overpayments, recoveries, and waivers. GAO interviewed officials from 14 states, selected based on fraud risk and other factors.
- Facial Recognition Services: Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Should Take Actions to Implement Training, and Policies for Civil Liberties What GAO FoundSeven law enforcement agencies in the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ) reported using facial recognition services provided by commercial and nonprofit entities. The agencies reported using four services in total from October 2019 through March 2022 to support criminal investigations. All seven agencies initially used these services without requiring staff take facial recognition training. GAO found that six agencies had available data and cumulatively conducted about 60,000 searches when they did not have training requirements in place. As of April 2023, two agencies began to require training.Facial Recognition Services, Use and Training for Selected Agencies, April 2023 Note: The figure shows when agencies used the four services covered by this review (services used from October 2019 through March 2022), and when, if at all, agencies implemented training requirements for facial recognition services. The figure provides use and training information as of April 2023. See figure 6 of the report for more detail.FBI officials told key internal stakeholders that certain staff must take training to use one facial recognition service. However, in practice, FBI has only recommended it as a best practice. GAO found that few of these staff completed the training, and across the FBI, only 10 staff completed facial recognition training of 196 staff that accessed the service. FBI said they intend to implement a training requirement for all staff, but have not yet done so. Such a requirement would help FBI ensure its staff understand how to use these services. Also, clarifying the status of FBI's training requirement would allow stakeholders to fully evaluate use of the service against FBI ethical and privacy standards.GAO also found that three of the seven agencies had policies or guidance specific to facial recognition technology that address civil rights and civil liberties. The other four agencies—three in DOJ and one in DHS—did not have such policies or guidance. DHS has plans to finalize a department-wide policy by December 2023. DOJ has taken steps to issue a department-wide policy, but has faced delays. Developing a plan with time frames and milestones would help DOJ ensure it issues a policy to support staff in safeguarding civil rights and civil liberties.Why GAO Did This StudyLaw enforcement may use facial recognition services provided by commercial and nonprofit entities to help solve crimes. For example, these services allow users to quickly search through billions of photos to help identify an unknown suspect in a crime scene photo.GAO was asked to review federal law enforcement's use of facial recognition technology. This report examines, among other issues, the extent to which selected DHS and DOJ law enforcement agencies used facial recognition services to support criminal investigations; required staff to take training on facial recognition technology to use such services; and developed policies and guidance specific to facial recognition technology to help protect civil rights and civil liberties.GAO selected seven law enforcement agencies within DHS and DOJ based on various factors, including the number of facial recognition technology systems used. GAO reviewed documents, such as training requirements and policies for using facial recognition services. GAO also analyzed training records and interviewed agency officials.
- Defense Contracting: DOD’s Use of Federal Prison Industries What GAO FoundFederal Prison Industries (FPI) is a wholly government-owned corporation that employs federal prison inmates to produce products and services that it sells to federal agencies. The Department of Defense (DOD) was FPI's largest federal customer for fiscal year 2022.Clothing Produced by Federal Prison IndustriesGAO found that DOD obligations averaged about $163 million annually from fiscal years 2018 through 2022 for FPI products and services. The Defense Logistics Agency and the Army accounted for the vast majority—more than 90 percent—of the total. The most prevalent product category that DOD obligated funds for was special purpose clothing, such as cold weather jackets.To decide when and how to contract with FPI, DOD contracting officers told GAO—and our review of contract files confirmed—they primarily consider two factors:Whether FPI has a greater than 5 percent share of DOD's market for the product category containing a particular item. If so, the contracting officer must use competitive procedures to buy the item. If not, they must directly award the contract to FPI, subject to certain criteria.Whether, on the basis of market research (collecting and analyzing data about market capabilities that meet the agency's procurement needs), FPI products are comparable in terms of price, quality and delivery time.	The 12 contracts GAO reviewed generally met the three key acquisition requirements governing contracting with FPI that GAO assessed, such as whether they were to competitively award the contracts or award the contracts directly to FPI.Why GAO Did This StudyFederal agencies, including DOD, are encouraged to purchase FPI products and services to the maximum extent practicable. In fiscal year 2022, DOD represented over 50 percent of FPI's revenue and purchased a range of items, including furniture, apparel, and electronics.The Joint Explanatory Statement for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 included a provision for GAO to assess DOD's contracting with FPI. This report describes (1) the value and various characteristics of DOD contracts awarded to FPI from fiscal years 2018 through 2022 and the factors DOD considers when awarding FPI contracts, and (2) the extent to which DOD complied with selected regulations and policies governing contracting with FPI in awarding 12 fiscal year 2021 contracts that GAO reviewed.GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 fiscal year 2021 contracts based on factors such as product category and total obligations, among other criteria. GAO reviewed federal laws and DOD regulations and guidance. GAO also analyzed contract file documentation to determine whether DOD met three key acquisition requirements, including whether to directly award contracts to FPI. Further, GAO also interviewed DOD and FPI officials.For more information, contact Mona Sehgal at (202) 512-4841 or SehgalM@gao.gov.
- Law Enforcement: DHS Should Strengthen Use of Force Data Collection and Analysis What GAO FoundIn February 2023, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) amended its use of force policy to align with the Department of Justice's (DOJ) policy. For example, DHS's policy introduced restrictions on chokeholds and carotid restraints. DHS officials said U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Federal Protective Service (FPS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) are required to update their use of force policies as needed to be consistent with DHS's policy.DHS law enforcement officers generally receive basic use of force training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers. Officers also receive recurring agency training that covers use of force, firearms, and less lethal devices. DHS agencies use electronic systems to track officers' training.Force ContinuumWhile DHS requires the four agencies GAO reviewed to submit data on uses of force, the data submitted to DHS undercount the frequency that officers used force against subjects. For example, agencies sometimes submitted data to DHS that counted multiple reportable uses of force as a single “incident.” Providing guidance on how agencies should submit data to DHS for the range of scenarios when force was used multiple times would enhance DHS's ability to oversee use of force activities across its agencies.DHS officials stated that analyzing the use of force data would help guide future policy decisions, but DHS has not developed a plan to analyze the data. Developing and implementing a plan, with time frames, for how it will analyze its use of force data will enable DHS management to more effectively assess use of force activities, conduct meaningful trend analysis, and take any appropriate steps to strengthen its oversight activities.The four DHS agencies have review boards to analyze uses of force from the perspective of training, tactics, policy, and equipment; identify trends and lessons learned; and propose any necessary improvements to policies and procedures. Boards that were in operation in fiscal years 2021 and 2022 found that most use of force incidents they reviewed aligned with agency policy. Agencies have applied lessons learned from reviews in various ways, such as revising policy and training.Why GAO Did This StudyOn May 25, 2022, Executive Order 14,074 required the heads of federal law enforcement agencies, including DHS, to ensure their agencies' use of force policies reflect principles of valuing and preserving human life and meet or exceed DOJ's use of force policy.A provision in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, directed GAO to review issues related to DHS law enforcement officers' use of force. GAO was also asked to review DHS's related policies and practices. This report discusses DHS's use of force policies, training, data collection and analysis, and how DHS reviews incidents.To address these topics, GAO selected four DHS agencies with a primary mission related to law enforcement and that employ the highest number of law enforcement officers: CBP, FPS, ICE, and Secret Service. GAO reviewed agency directives and guidance, as well as internal and published use of force incident reports from fiscal years 2021 and 2022. GAO also interviewed agency officials and officials from a nongeneralizable sample of organizations with knowledge of law enforcement use of force.
- Capitol Attack: Federal Agencies Identified Some Threats, but Did Not Fully Process and Share Information Prior to January 6, 2021 [Reissued with revisions on Jul. 21, 2023] What GAO FoundIn the weeks leading up to January 6, 2021, agencies obtained information on potential threats from various sources including investigations, open sources, and social media tips. All 10 federal agencies GAO reviewed identified potential threats of violence, and two—the FBI and the Capitol Police—identified credible threats.However, some agencies did not fully process information or share it, preventing critical information from reaching key federal entities responsible for securing the National Capital Region against threats. For example,The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&amp;A) did not consistently follow agency policies or procedures for processing tips or potential threats because they did not have controls to ensure compliance with policies. Identifying and remediating internal control deficiencies (reasons why staff did not consistently follow policies) will help FBI and DHS I&amp;A ensure policies are consistently followed and help ensure potential threats are developed and investigated, as appropriate.	DHS I&amp;A, Capitol Police, and Park Police did not consistently share all fully developed threat information with relevant stakeholders. For example, DHS I&amp;A did not share threat products based on open sources with certain law enforcement partners. Capitol Police did not share threat products with its frontline officers. GAO found that DHS I&amp;A did not have internal controls, and other agencies did not have policies to enable sharing of threat information.Capitol Police photo above the Capitol Building on January 6, 2021 Most agencies generally used the same methods to identify threats related to January 6 as they did for other demonstrations in D.C., such as the racial justice demonstrations in summer 2020 and the Make America Great Again (MAGA) I and MAGA II demonstrations in fall 2020. DHS I&amp;A officials said they were hesitant to report on January 6 threats due to scrutiny of reporting of other events in 2020.Why GAO Did This StudyPrior to and during the events of January 6, 2021, federal, state, and local entities were responsible for identifying and sharing information on potential threats to inform security measures and ensure the safety of the U.S. Capitol.GAO was asked to review the January 6, 2021 attack. This is the seventh in a series of reports and addresses (1) how federal agencies identified threats related to the events of January 6, 2021; (2) the extent to which federal agencies took steps to process and share threat information prior to the events of January 6, 2021; and (3) how federal agencies identified threat information for the events of January 6, 2021 compared to other large demonstrations in Washington, D.C.To conduct this work, GAO compared agency actions to process and share threat information with policies and procedures for conducting these activities. GAO interviewed officials and reviewed agency threat products. GAO did not review certain threat information that was subject to ongoing investigations or prosecutions. GAO also interviewed officials from the social media platforms Facebook, Parler, and Twitter about information they shared with federal agencies. This report is a public version of a sensitive report issued in January 2023. Information that agencies deemed sensitive has been omitted.
- Venezuela: Illicit Financial Flows and U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Them What GAO FoundIllicit financial flows related to Venezuela include proceeds from the sale of commodities such as oil and gold, among others, as well as drug trafficking.Oil remains a major source of income for Venezuela and has been a mechanism for fraud and corruption, according to Treasury officials. Venezuelan oil continues to be exported to other countries, such as China.Illicitly-mined gold from Venezuela has been refined and its origins otherwise disguised in the Caribbean, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa before entering international markets, according to U.S. government–funded research. Venezuelan gold was subsequently exported to countries in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.Drugs are trafficked through Venezuela, destined for U.S. and European markets. State has described Venezuela as a preferred route for trafficking drugs, predominately cocaine. Individuals in the Maduro regime collaborated with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, known by its Spanish abbreviation ELN) and dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, known as FARC dissidents) to transport cocaine through Venezuela, according to the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command.Venezuelan actors—including criminal organizations, corrupt individuals in the Maduro regime, and others—attempt to export these commodities globally and take steps to cloud their origins. Venezuelan actors use shell companies and familial or business contacts acting as proxies to hide their assets. Venezuelan elites continue to use complex transnational mechanisms to move, store, and trade their wealth abroad, according to State-funded research.U.S. agencies have undertaken efforts to disrupt these flows. State and Treasury have provided assistance to partner countries in the region to build their capacity to disrupt criminal activity in general and, to some extent, financial crimes in particular. However, Treasury officials noted that the volume of illicit financial flows is overwhelming for many partners in the region. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued financial advisories on corruption in Venezuela. Treasury also designated more than 300 individuals and entities related to Venezuela, blocking their assets and generally prohibiting U.S. persons (which include businesses, such as financial institutions) from dealing with them. DOJ and DHS have based criminal investigations on the information they have collected. DOJ has charged at least 35 individuals with money laundering–related crimes connected to Venezuela and secured convictions for some, according to reporting by DOJ’s Fraud Section. DOD monitors drug movements in the region, including those from Venezuela, and has provided money laundering–related intelligence analysis to U.S. law enforcement agencies. Other than these, DOJ, DHS, and DOD do not have any efforts specifically directed at illicit financial activity related to Venezuela.Why GAO Did This StudyMuch of Venezuela is ungoverned, undergoverned, or ill governed, according to the Department of State. In 2019, the U.S. ceased to recognize Nicolás Maduro as Venezuela's president and suspended embassy operations in Venezuela, according to State. U.S. agencies have indicated that the illegitimate Maduro regime allows and tolerates the use of its territory by transnational criminal organizations (TCO), including U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations, for drug trafficking and other criminal enterprises. According to the 2022 Caribbean Border Counternarcotics Strategy, the ongoing political instability in Venezuela provides a permissive smuggling environment for TCOs, and Venezuela’s corrupt political and security infrastructure enables officials to participate in, and profit from, these illicit activities.GAO was asked to review transnational organized crime related to Venezuela. For this report, we analyzed illicit financial flows connected to Venezuela. Specifically, we examined (1) what U.S. agencies know about illicit financial flows connected to Venezuela and (2) U.S. efforts to disrupt those flows. To address our objectives, we analyzed intelligence reports, diplomatic cables, criminal analyses, and U.S. government–funded research. We interviewed officials of the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), State, and the Treasury in Washington, D.C. We also met with U.S. officials at U.S. Southern Command and Joint Interagency Task Force–South in Florida in July 2022.For more information, contact Chelsa Kenney at 202-512-2964 or KenneyC@gao.gov.
- Counterterrorism: Action Needed to Further Develop the Information Sharing Environment What GAO FoundThe Information Sharing Environment (ISE) is a framework to improve terrorism-related information sharing among federal and non-federal partners (i.e., Tribal, state, local, territorial, and private sector partners) through policy guidelines, common standards, and technologies. In 2013, federal officials developed an implementation plan that identified 16 priority objectives (e.g., develop baseline sharing capabilities) needed to implement the framework. As of 2017, federal agencies—including the Office of the Director of the National Intelligence (ODNI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ)—had completed all but three of the 16 priority objectives.The Information Sharing EnvironmentGAO found that agencies have implemented ISE-related projects to complete the three remaining priority objectives since 2017. However, since that time, there has not been a Program Manager to guide and assess those efforts. Assessing agencies' progress with the ISE is a statutory responsibility of the Program Manager. Without someone in this position to assess agency efforts, how much work is needed to complete the ISE Implementation Plan's' remaining objectives remains undetermined.GAO also identified recent amendments to the statute establishing the ISE that, according to White House and ODNI officials, have complicated efforts to name a new ISE Program Manager. Clarifying that the President has full statutory authority to fill the Program Manager position would help ensure that a new Program Manager is named to continue work on the ISE Implementation Plan and broader federal terrorism information sharing goals.Why GAO Did This StudyEvolving terrorist threats, such as those posed by lone offenders and those who are radicalized online, highlight the continued need for effective information sharing between the federal government and its non-federal partners. In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which required the President to establish and develop the ISE. The ISE Implementation Plan has guided federal efforts in this area.GAO was asked to review federal efforts related to the ISE Implementation Plan. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which agencies took action to complete the plan's objectives. GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed ODNI, DHS, DOJ and White House officials about their implementation efforts. GAO assessed these efforts against statutory provisions.