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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TERRANCE L. RICE

(AC 37407)

Beach, Sheldon and Mullins, Js.

Argued April 7—officially released August 16, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven, B. Fischer, J.)
James R. Vicario, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Jennifer Stevens, certified legal intern, with whom

were Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney,

and, on the brief, Michael Dearington, state’s attorney,

and Jennifer Lindale, assistant state’s attorney, for the

appellee (state).
Opinion

BEACH, J. The defendant, Terrance L. Rice, appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury

trial, of unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-95 and breach of peace in the

second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a181 (a)(1). He claims that(1)the state presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and (2) the

court violated his right to confrontation by improperly

limiting his cross-examination of a state’s witness. We

disagree, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as reasonably could have been

found by the jury, and procedural history are relevant.

On January 3, 2013, at approximately 11 p.m., Gina

Phillips-Jackson was waiting for a train at Union Station

in New Haven with her husband. She left her belongings

with her husband and walked to the women’s restroom.

As she approached the restroom, she passed by the

defendant, who was drinking from a nearby water fountain. The women’s restroom contained several stalls,

including a stall in the back for disabled persons. Phillips-Jackson initially proceeded to the stall in the back,

but changed her mind. Turning around to exit the stall,

she saw the defendant standing approximately two to

three feet away from her. Phillips-Jackson informed the

defendant that he was inside the women’s restroom.

The defendant responded, in a calm, quiet voice with

a flat affect, ‘‘Come here,’’ and he made a corresponding

hand gesture.1 The defendant then repeated the phrase

to her more than once. Phillips-Jackson testified that

in that moment she felt ‘‘nervous’’ and looked to the

front entrance to the restroom for a way to ‘‘get out.’’

Without her consent, the defendant ‘‘grabbed’’ Phillips-Jackson’s right hand, though not in a forceful manner, for approximately a second. Immediately she said

‘‘get off me’’; then recoiled and ‘‘sprung around him.’’

In doing so, she lost her balance and fell on her back.

The defendant continued to stand near Phillips-Jackson

and repeated the phrase ‘‘come here.’’ At one point

the defendant tried to quiet Phillips-Jackson by saying,

‘‘Shhh.’’ Phillips-Jackson was in pain, and, screaming

loudly, she began to crawl toward the exit using her

elbows. Her screams prompted a security guard to come

to her assistance.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted

of unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of

§ 53a-95, and breach of peace in the second degree in

violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1). The court imposed a total

effective sentence of five years incarceration. This

appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction for unlawful

restraint. Specifically, he claims there was insufficient
evidence as to the elements of (a) specific intent and

(b) actual restraint.2 We are not persuaded.

‘‘In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we

apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.

Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom

the [trier of fact] reasonably could have concluded that

the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is not required to accept as

dispositive those inferences that are consistent with

the defendant’s innocence. . . . The trier may draw

whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and

logical. . . . This does not require that each subordinate conclusion established by or inferred from the

evidence, or even from other inferences, be proved

beyond a reasonable doubt . . . because this court has

held that a [trier’s] factual inferences that support a

guilty verdict need only be reasonable.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morelli, 293 Conn. 147,

151–52, 976 A.2d 678 (2009).

Section 53a-95 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of

unlawful restraint in the first degree when he restrains

another person under circumstances which expose

such other person to a substantial risk of physical

injury.’’ ‘‘[T]he hallmark of an unlawful restraint . . .

is a restraint.’’ State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 530,

949 A.2d 1092 (2008). ‘‘ ‘Restrain’ means to restrict a

person’s movements intentionally and unlawfully in

such a manner as to interfere substantially with his

liberty . . . by confining him . . . in the place where

the restriction commences . . . without consent. . . .

.’’ General Statutes § 53a-91 (1).

A

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient

evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

had the requisite specific intent to restrain the victim.3

We are not persuaded.

‘‘[T]he question of intent is purely a question of fact.

. . . The state of mind of one accused of a crime is

often the most significant and, at the same time, the

most elusive element of the crime charged. . . .

Because it is practically impossible to know what someone is thinking orintending at any given moment, absent

an outright declaration of intent, a person’s state of

mind is usually proven by circumstantial evidence. . . .

Intent may be and usually is inferred from conduct.

. . . [I]t is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of

a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case

involving circumstantial evidence.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams,

110 Conn. App. 778, 791–92, 956 A.2d 1176, cert. denied,
289 Conn. 957, 961 A.2d 424 (2008).

‘‘[U]nlawful restraint in the first degree is a specific

intent crime . . . .’’ State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn.

570. ‘‘[Specific intent] is an intent to bring about a certain result.’’ Id., 572. ‘‘[U]nlawful restraint in the first

degree requires that a person have the specific intent

to restrain the victim.’’ State v. Youngs, 97 Conn. App.

348, 363, 904 A.2d 1240, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 930,

909 A.2d 959 (2006). Thus, to prove unlawful restraint,

the ‘‘state was required to establish that the defendant

had restricted the victim’s movements intentionally and

unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially

with her liberty by confining her without her consent.’’

(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Salamon, supra, 573.

‘‘Because direct evidence of an accused’s state of

mind typically is not available, his intent often must be

inferred from his conduct, other circumstantial evidence and rational inferences that may be drawn therefrom. . . . . For example, intent may be inferred from

the events leading up to, and immediately following,

the conduct in question . . . the accused’s physical

acts and the general surrounding circumstances. . . .

An accused’s own words, however, constitute particularly compelling, direct evidence of his intent. . . .

Finally, when a jury evaluates evidence of a defendant’s

intent, it properly rel[ies] on its common sense, experience and knowledge of human nature in drawing inferences and reaching conclusions of fact.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Winot, 294 Conn. 753, 768, 988 A.2d 188 (2010).

The defendant’s testimony itself provided evidence

of intent to restrain. The defendant testified that after

having a cigarette outside on the platform, he picked

up two of his bags, but forgot the third. He testified that

he noticed the third bag was missing after he stopped at

a drinking fountain near the women’s restroom. He

thought that Phillips-Jackson had taken his bag. He

testified that, acting on that belief, he followed her into

the restroom ‘‘[b]ecause somebody grabbed my bag and

I’ve been robbed before. The first thing that came into

my head, somebody got my bag and I want justice . . . .

I want to find out . . . who got my bag.’’ He further

testified that he did not want the person who took his

bag ‘‘to get away,’’ but, rather, he wanted that person

arrested. He testified that ‘‘[i]f anybody was running or

trying to leave . . . . I wanted justice, I didn’t want

them to run, I wanted a cop to be around.’’

The jury additionally could have inferred from the

defendant’s conduct that he intended to cause the confinement of Phillips-Jackson. There was evidence that

he briefly held Phillips-Jackson, that he blocked her

egress from the restroom, and that he discouraged her

from calling for help; this activity, moreover, occurred

in a confined place out of public view.
The jury reasonably could have determined that the

defendant’s reportedly mistaken assumption that Phillips-Jackson had stolen his bag, coupled with his intention to locate the person who had stolen the bag and

his desire not to let that person ‘‘get away,’’ combined

with actions consistent with an intent to restrain, demonstrated his intention to prevent Phillips-Jackson’s liberation. The jury reasonably could have determined that

he intentionally prevented Phillips-Jackson from exiting

the restroom.

The defendant also argues that his only intention

when he entered the restroom was to find his missing

bag. Because of a speech impediment and an episode

of diabetic shock, he claims that he had difficulty

explaining his intent to Phillips-Jackson. Even if the

jury credited his testimony regarding the speech impediment and diabetic shock, the jury nonetheless reasonably could have concluded that the defendant intended

to prevent Phillips-Jackson’s liberation, as these concepts are not inconsistent. He further contends that

Phillips-Jackson never testified that she believed his

intent was to restrain her from exiting the restroom

and that holding Phillips-Jackson’s hand for a moment

is not inconsistent with an intent to find his missing

bag. That Phillips-Jackson perhaps may have been

unaware of the defendant’s intent is immaterial; the

defendant testified quite clearly as to his intent and the

jury was free to credit that testimony.4 See State v.

Goriss, 108 Conn. App. 264, 269, 947 A.2d 1041 (noting

jury’s right to accept some, none or all of evidence

presented), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 904, 957 A.2d 873

(2008).

B

The defendant contends that it was unreasonable for

the jury to conclude that his brief grasping of PhillipsJackson’s hand satisfied the element of actualrestraint.5

In the context ofthis case, we need not decide whether a

brief grasp is sufficient to constitute ‘‘restraint.’’6 During

the encounter, the defendant briefly grasped PhillipsJackson’s hand, but there was also more evidence that

the jury could have considered.

Phillips-Jackson testified that when she turned

around to leave the stall in the back of the restroom,

the defendant was standing between her and the exit.

She further testified that she informed the defendant

that he was in the incorrect restroom. Instead of leaving

upon being informed that he was in the women’s

restroom, the defendant stood between Phillips-Jackson and the exit and instructed herthree times to ‘‘come

here.’’ During this encounter, the defendant was standing two to three feet from her, an arm’s distance away.

The jury reasonably could have concluded that the

defendant effectively was blocking Phillips-Jackson

from exiting the restroom, thereby constraining her lib-
erty of movement. Once Phillips-Jackson fell backwards and began screaming, the defendant’s response

was to whisper, ‘‘Shhhh.’’

In addition to the defendant’s actions, there was evidence of the requisite intent, as set forth in part IA of

this opinion. The duration of the confinement at issue

is not in itself determinative of whether an unlawful

restraint has occurred. Rather, the question is whether

an actual restraint or confinement was accomplished

with the requisite intent to prevent liberation. See State

v. Winot, supra, 294 Conn. 762 (using definition of

restraint under § 53a-91 [1] in the context of kidnapping). Evidence of the defendant’s actions, coupled with

evidence of intent to restrain, satisfies the element of

‘‘restraint.’’

II

The defendant next claims that the court violated his

right to confrontation by limiting his cross-examination

of a state’s witness. We disagree.

The defendant argues that the court improperly limited his cross-examination of Phillips-Jackson regarding

a conversation she had with police concerning the

charges brought against the defendant. Phillips-Jackson

testified on cross-examination that she returned to

Union Station shortly afterthe incident and, afterinquiring, discovered what crimes the defendant had been

charged with committing. Defense counsel further

inquired, ‘‘[W]hen you went down there did you inquire

as to what the charges were that were lodged against

[the defendant]?’’ The state objected and the court sustained the objection on the basis that it was ‘‘not relevant to what this jury has to decide.’’ After defense

counsel asked to make a record, the court excused the

jury. Defense counsel proceeded with his offer of proof

by asking Phillips-Jackson what charges the police officer had told her had been brought against the defendant.

She said she had been told ‘‘breach of peace.’’ Defense

counsel asked, ‘‘Did you indicate to him that you didn’t

believe those are the appropriate charges? Did you ask

them to charge him with assault or anything like that?’’

Phillips-Jackson responded, ‘‘No, sir.’’ Defense counsel

argued that Phillips-Jackson’s interest in the prosecution of the defendant and dissatisfaction with the minor

nature of the charges were relevant to motive and bias

and were appropriate subjects of cross-examination.

The court sustained the state’s objection.

‘‘[T]he sixth amendment to the [United States] constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal

prosecution to confront the witnesses against him. . . .

The primary interest secured by confrontation is the

right to cross-examination . . . and an important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’

motivation in testifying. . . . Cross-examination to

elicit facts tending to show motive, interest, bias and
prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly

restricted. . . The constitutional standard is met when

defense counsel is permitted to expose to the jury the

facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact

and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences

relating to the reliability of the witness. . . .

‘‘However, [t]he [c]onfrontation [c]lause guarantees

only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not

cross-examination that is effective in whatever way,

and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. . . .

We have emphasized in numerous decisions . . . that

the confrontation clause does not give the defendant

the right to engage in unrestricted cross-examination.

. . . [For example, a] defendant may elicit only relevant

evidence through cross-examination. . . . The court

determines whether the evidence sought on crossexamination is relevant by determining whether that

evidence renders the existence of [other facts] either

certain or more probable. . . . The trial court has wide

discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and

the scope of cross examination. Every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness

of the [trial] court’s ruling . . . .

‘‘The proffering party bears the burden of establishing

the relevance of the offered testimony. Unless a proper

foundation is established, the evidence is irrelevant.

. . . Relevance may be established in one of three ways.

First, the proffering party can make an offer of proof.

. . . Second, the record can itself be adequate to establish the relevance of the proffered testimony. . . .

Third, the proffering party can establish a proper foundation for the testimony by stating a good faith belief

that there is an adequate factual basis for his or her

inquiry.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Benedict, 313 Conn. 494, 510–11, 98

A.3d 42 (2014).

The defendant argues that the line of questioning

regarding whether Phillips-Jackson inquired as to the

charges brought against the defendant was relevant. He

contends that Phillips-Jackson’s return to Union Station

days after the incident to learn of the charges brought

against the defendant shows bias, in that the witness,

rather than being objectively disinterested, wished to

see the defendant punished rather severely. Further

inquiry would have revealed, according to the defendant, that Phillips-Jackson was dissatisfied with the

misdemeanor charges that originally were brought

against the defendant.

Phillips-Jackson did testify on cross-examination in

the presence of the jury and without objection that she

returned to Union Station after the incident to find out

what charges had been brought against the defendant.

The defendant, however, was not permitted to question

Phillips-Jackson regarding her satisfaction with the

charges initially brought. The defendant’s argument that
the court improperly limited cross-examination into

Phillips-Jackson’s dissatisfaction with the charges initially brought7 against the defendant is negated by the

fact that Phillips-Jackson did not testify during the offer

of proof that she was, in fact, dissatisfied. Rather, during

the proffer no facts were elicited that were probative

of motive or bias. She testified in the course of the offer

of proof that she did not indicate to officers at Union

Station that she was dissatisfied with the charges initially brought and that she did not ask the officers to

charge the defendant with assault or a similar felony.

Accordingly, the defendant’s right to confrontation was

not violated and the court acted within its discretion

in limiting this line of questioning. The questions themselves, of course, were not evidence. State v. Bonsu,

54 Conn. App. 229, 235, 734 A.2d 596 (‘‘questions are

not evidence’’), cert. denied, 251 Conn. 909, 739 A.2d

1249 (1999).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant testified that he had a speech impediment which caused

him to stutter, and his stuttering worsened when he was stressed. He also

testified that he was diabetic and, at the time, had low blood sugar and was

in shock.

2 On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only

as to the elements of intent and physical restraint; thus, we confine our

review to those elements.

3 The defendant also argues that he did not intend harm; thus, there was

insufficient evidence that he had the requisite intent. He cannot prevail on

this argument because unlawful restraint requires proof of an intent to

restrain, not proof of an intent to harm. See State v. Youngs, 97 Conn. App.

348, 363–65, 904 A.2d 1240, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 930, 909 A.2d 959 (2006).

4 An intention to find a missing bag certainly can exist simultaneously

with an intent to restrain.

5 The defendant also argues that his actions did not constitute a restraint

because he did not harm Phillips-Jackson. The defendant cannot prevail on

this argument because the definition of ‘‘restrain’’ contains no requirement

of harm. See General Statutes § 53a-91 (1).

6

It is well established that there is no minimum period of time necessary

to establish a restraint. State v. Winot, supra, 294 Conn. 761 (using definition

of ‘‘restrain’’ under § 53a-91 [1] in context of kidnapping). Our Supreme

Court in State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. 532 n.21, however, noted that

‘‘there are conceivable factual situations in which charging a defendant with

kidnapping based [on] the most minuscule . . . [duration of confinement]

would result in an absurd and unconscionable result . . . . A challenge

. . . predicated on such miniscule . . . duration of confinement remains

viable on constitutional grounds under the vagueness doctrine.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Unlawful restraint requires a

‘‘restraint’’ as defined by § 53a-91 (1). See State v. Salamon, supra, 530;

General Statutes § 53a-91 (1). Kidnapping requires an abduction; State v.

Salamon, supra, 533–36; which, according to § 53a-91 (2) requires a

‘‘restraint.’’ This case does not involve a minuscule confinement, nor does

the defendant claim constitutionally suspect vagueness.

7 There was testimony at trial that the defendant was initially cited with

breach of peace and criminal trespass.