alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### MIAMI AUTO AUCTION, INC., Appellant, v. FRIENDLY ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a World of Cars and Interstate Fire Insurance Co., Appellees.

No. 71-706.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 25, 1972.

Bretan, Marks, Attias & Raskin, Miami, for appellant.

Blackwell, Walker & Gray, and James E. Tribble, Miami, for appellees.

Before SWANN, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.

SWANN, Chief Judge.

Miami Auto Auction, Inc. sued the defendants Friendly Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a World of Cars, and Interstate Fire Insurance Co. A default was entered against Friendly but Interstate filed a motion to dismiss that was granted. By a written order on March 12, 1971, plaintiff’s motion for rehearing to the order of dismissal was denied, however the same order granted *70plaintiff’s oral motion for leave to file an amended pleading within ten days.

Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint within 10 days of March 12, 1971. Interstate moved, on May 6, 1971, for an order of dismissal because of plaintiff’s failure to comply with the March 12 order. On May 26, 1971, an order of dismissal was signed and rendered reciting that “plaintiff has as of the date of this order taken no further steps to file an amended complaint” and the cause was thereupon dismissed with prejudice as to Interstate. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 26, 1971. Apparently the amended complaint was filed after the dismissal order of May 26 had been signed in view of the language contained therein.

Plaintiff appeals from the order of May 26 which dismissed its complaint with prejudice. It assigns as error the order of May 26; the original order which granted Interstate’s motion to dismiss and the order which denied plaintiff’s motion for rehearing.

We first determine that plaintiff could properly appeal from the order of May 26, 1971 which dismissed the cause with prejudice and assign as error the entry of that order and also the entry of the first order of dismissal and the order which denied its petition for rehearing.

Assuming error, arguendo, in the original order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint and in the order denying its motion for rehearing, it is our view that plaintiff is estopped, or has waived its right to assert such error by its conduct in orally requesting and receiving written leave to file an amended complaint within ten days from March 12, 1971; or that such error, if any, was cured by the trial court granting plaintiff’s oral request to file an amended complaint within ten days of March 12, 1971. 2 Fla.Jur. Appeals §§ 311 and 312.

Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint on March 22, 1971, as required, but filed it on May 26, 1971 or approximately 65 days late. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the cause with prejudice under these circumstances. E & E Electric Contractors, Inc. v. Singer, Fla.App.1970, 236 So.2d 195.

The final order of dismissal with prejudice is

Affirmed.

CARROLL, J., concuss in the judgment.
#### HARDWARE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Howard ROTH, individually and as next friend of his son, Neal Allen Roth, a minor, et al., Appellees.

No. 68-1000.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

May 20, 1969.

*769Rose & Marlow, Miami, for appellant.

Horton & Schwartz, Sams, Anderson, Alper & Spencer, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, a compensation carrier, seeks review of an order of equitable distribution entered by the trial court pursuant to § 440.39(3) (a), Fla.Stat., F.S.A. The original third party tort action was settled. The amount of the compromise settlement was $200,000.00 to the injured minor employee and $50,000.00 to the father of the minor, who had the responsibility for medical expenses.

The appellant urges that the trial court erred in permitting it to recover only $2,000.00 when it had medical expenses in excess of $34,000.00, urging that this court should adopt as a guideline the philosophy that a compensation carrier can recover the full amount of its medical expense against any liability settlement that covers this item, if necessary up to 100% of the settlement less a proportionate amount for costs and attorney’s fees. We reject this argument, in light of the statute vesting the discretion for equitable division in a trial court.

If guidelines are to be set to aid a trial court in this distribution, they should be affixed by the Legislature. This is particularly so in light of the fact that ordinarily a compensation carrier cannot receive any reimbursement from a claimant. This only happens when a third party action is commenced.

Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the order here under review be and the same is hereby affirmed upon the authority of Arex Indemnity Company v. Radin, Fla.1954, 72 So.2d 393; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Harb, Fla.App.1964, 170 So.2d 54; Security Mutual Casualty Company v. Grice, Fla.App.1965, 172 So.2d 834; Luby Chevrolet, Inc. v. Foster, Fla.App.1965, 177 So.2d 510.

Affirmed.
#### AUTOMATIC CARBONIC CORPORATION, Jack E. Trost and Walter Kellin, Appellants, v. Harvey R. MORRIS, Bar Boy of Delaware Valley, Inc., a Florida corporation, and David H. Reilly, Appellees.

No. 69-212.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 22, 1970.

Rehearing Denied May 25, 1970.

Roger H. Harper, Boca Raton, for appellants.

Robert L. Parks, of Quinton, Leib, Parks & Aurell, Miami, for Harvey R. Morris and Bar Boy of Delaware Valley, Inc.

PER CURIAM.

We have reviewed the briefs and record on appeal. On the basis thereof, we are of the opinion that no harmful error has been demonstrated. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed.

Affirmed.

WALDEN, McCAIN, and REED, JJ., concur.
POWER OF ATTORNEY

     WHEREAS, the undersigned officers and directors of Vital Signs, Inc. desire
to authorize Terence D. Wall, Anthony J. Dimun and Barry Wicker, to act as their
attorneys-in-fact  and  agents,  for the  purpose  of  executing  and filing the
Corporation's  Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 1996,
including all amendments thereto,

     NOW, THEREFORE,

     KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS,  that each person whose  signature  appears
below  constitutes  and  appoints  Terence D.  Wall,  Anthony J. Dimun and Barry
Wicker and each of them, his true and lawful  attorney-in-fact  and agent,  with
full power of substitution and resubstitution,  to sign the Corporation's Annual
Report on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 1996, including any and all
amendments thereto,  and to file the same, with all exhibits thereto,  and other
documents in connection therewith,  with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
granting unto said  attorneys-in-fact  and agents,  and each of them, full power
and  authority  to do and  perform  each and every act and thing  requisite  and
necessary to be done in and about the premises,  as fully and to all intents and
purposes as he might or could do in person,  hereby ratifying and confirming all
that  said  attorneys-in-fact  and  agents,  or any of  them,  or  their  or his
substitute or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this power of attorney in
the following capacities on this 23rd day of December, 1996.

SIGNATURE                                               TITLE


/s/Terence D. Wall
_____________________            President, Chief Executive Officer and Director
Terence D. Wall


/s/David J. Bershad
_____________________            Director
David J. Bershad


/s/Anthony J. Dimun
_____________________            Executive  Vice   President,  Chief  Financial
Anthony J. Dimun                 Officer, Treasurer  and Director  (Chief
                                 Financial  and  Accounting Officer)


/s/Joseph J. Thomas
_____________________             Director
Joseph J. Thomas


/s/John Toedtman
_____________________              Director
John Toedtman


/s/ Barry Wicker
_____________________              Executive Vice President and Director
Barry Wicker
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

June 25, 2013

p0617 

# Order

Clerk June 25, 2013

146902

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 146902

COA: 304322

Wayne CC: 10

- 013293

- FC

KEVIN CORTEZ HOWELL,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 31, 2013

j udgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
# Official Journal L 377/2006

| | ISSN 1725-2555 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 377 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 4927 December 2006 |

ISSN 1725-2555

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 377

English edition

Legislation

Volume 4927 December 2006

---

| Contents | | I   Acts whose publication is obligatory | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | * | Regulation (EC) No 1899/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 on the harmonisation of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation (1) | 1 |
| | * | Regulation (EC) No 1900/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 on the harmonisation of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation | 176 |

Contents

I   Acts whose publication is obligatory

page

*

Regulation (EC) No 1899/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 on the harmonisation of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation (1)

1

*

Regulation (EC) No 1900/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 on the harmonisation of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation

176

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.
1 Terry Gray TAG Resources Call with Industrial Economics August 10, 2009

• Terry has been working on TDF issues sin ce the 1970s and has consulted for the U.S. federal government and state, provi ncial, and foreign governments.

• The market for whole tires is dependent on the market for TDF in that cement kilns take tires for which there is no demand as TDF. That is, with a few exceptions, whole tires are sent to cement kilns only if they can’t be sold as shredded TDF to other facilities.

• Cement kilns often will not accept contamin ated tires that contain a lot of mud.

• There are a limited number of cement kilns that cannot use tires, but Terry does not have data on them.

• The market for civil engineering applications for scrap tires has diminished recently. It’s possible that it could rec over if scrap tires are consider ed a solid waste, but it’s not clear that it would necessarily recover.

• He is open to working with IEc as a consultant on the project.
#### WILD KINGDOM, INCORPORATED et al., Appellants, v. George S. HARKINS and Robert T. Coughlan as Trustees of HNC Mortgage and Realty Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, Appellees.

No. 73-412.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 4, 1974.

Appeal dismissed.
# Official Journal C 265A/11 J

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 265A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6511 July 2022 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 265A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6511 July 2022

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | V   Announcements |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | European Parliament |
| 2022/C 265 A/01 | Recruitment Notice PE/273/S – Director-General (Function group AD, grade 15) – Directorate-General for Parliamentary Democracy Partnerships | 1 |

Contents

page

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Parliament

2022/C 265 A/01

Recruitment Notice PE/273/S – Director-General (Function group AD, grade 15) – Directorate-General for Parliamentary Democracy Partnerships

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
261 La. 1047

#### Smith ALPHA v. AIR SIFTERS, INCORPORATED.

No. 52445.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 18, 1972.

In re: Air Sifters, Inc. applying for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Mary. 260 So.2d 101.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, we find no error of law in its judgment.
**Exhibit 99.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,As adopted pursuant toSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of General Binding Corporation (the"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2003 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on May 15, 2003, (the "Report"), I, DonCivgin, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:
(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

By:

/s/ Don      Civgin                                 
 
Don Civgin
 
Senior Vice President and Chief      Financial Officer
 
May 15, 2003
#### Percy J. FONTENOT v. Walter LAFLEUR and Hilda G. Lafleur.

No. 54043.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 26, 1973.

In re: Walter Lafleur and Hilda G. Lafleur applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Evangeline. 281 So.2d 868.

Not considered. Not timely filed.
<PAGE>


                                                               Exhibit 32.2

                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

           Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of P-Com, Inc. (the
"Company"), hereby certifies, to the best of his knowledge, that the Company's
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the "Report")
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable,
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.


Date: March 30, 2004            By: /s/ Daniel W. Rumsey
                                    --------------------
                                Daniel W. Rumsey
                                Chief Financial Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure
document.




                                       96
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR
ENDED  DECEMBER  31, 1999 AND IS  QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FORM 10-K.
</LEGEND>

<CIK>                                         0000935802
<NAME>                                       ANICOM, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                       1,000
<CURRENCY>                                       dollars

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                               JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                 DEC-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                    1.000
<CASH>                                             1,928
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    116,432
<ALLOWANCES>                                       2,703
<INVENTORY>                                      105,488
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 244,062
<PP&E>                                            17,775
<DEPRECIATION>                                     6,770
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   383,697
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             77,840
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                             20,000
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                              17
<OTHER-SE>                                       156,832
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     383,697
<SALES>                                          536,721
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 536,721
<CGS>                                            428,347
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    428,347
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 117,949
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 6,720
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (16,295)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (6,475)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (9,820)
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (9,820)
<EPS-BASIC>                                         (.41)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (.41)




</TABLE>
#### Stem *v.*Bethlehem Borough, Appellant.

*Election law*— Ballots—Municipalities—Increase *of debt*— Constitu*tional law*— Act *of April 29,1903, P. L. 338.*

The ballots to be used at an election under the Act of April 29, 1903, P. L. 338, to ascertain whether the indebtedness of a borough shall be increased must be in the form prescribed by the act, and if the question submitted is printed on the ballot, but is not followed by the words “yes” and “no,” the election will be invalid.

Argued March 7, 1911.

Appeal, No. 164, Jan. T., 1910, by defendant, from decree of C. P. Northampton Co., June T., 1909, No. 3, on bill in equity in case of Leo A. *462Stem et al. v. Bethlehem Borough.

April 24, 1911:

Before Pell, C. J., Brown, Mestbezat, Potter and Stewart, J J.

Affirmed,

Bill in equity for an injunction to restrain the issue of borough bonds, and to declare void an election to increase borough indebtedness. Before Stewart, J.

The only question involved was the validity of an election to increase the indebtedness of the borough of Bethlehem.

*Error assigned*was decree declaring the election void and enjoining the issue of the bonds.

*George R. Booth*and *John G. Johnson,*for appellant.

*Harry C. Cope,*for appellees.

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Mestrezat,

This is a taxpayer’s bill, and the appeal to this court raises the question of the validity of the municipal election held to determine whether the indebtedness of the borough should be increased for the purpose of constructing a water system to supply the defendant borough with water. The appeal, as we understood at the argument, is abandoned. The form of the ballot used at the election did not comply with the requirements of sec. 2 of the Act of April 29,1903, P. L. 338, 2 Purd. 1350, and for this reason the election was vitiated. We have quite recently held in McLaughlin v. Summit Hill Borough, 224 Pa. 425, this act to be constitutional, and that the ballots to be used at an election to ascertain whether the indebtedness of a borough shall be increased must be in the form prescribed by the act. This is decisive of the present case. The question submitted was printed on the ballot, but it was not followed by the words “yes” and “no,” as required by the statute. Section 4 of the act provides that “no ballot without the official endorsement shall be allowed to be deposited in the ballot box and none but ballots provided in accordance with the provisions of this act shall be counted.”

The decree is affirmed. -
#### Sarah BELFLOWER and Carl Belflower Sr., her husband, Appellants, v. Leon RISHER and Geraldine M. Risher, his wife, Appellees.

No. 69-28.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Oct. 29, 1969.

Earle C. Moss, Jr., Jacksonville, for appellants.

James W. Dawson, of Howell, Kirby, Montgomery & D’Aiuto, Rockledge, for ap-pellees.

OWEN, Judge.

The plaintiffs in this negligence suit appeal from final judgment entered in favor of the defendants. The case was previously before this court on plaintiffs’ appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants which we reversed because the affidavits submitted by the opposing parties disclosed factual issues. Belflower v. Risher, Fla.App.1968, 206 So.2d 256.

On the present appeal appellants contend that the sole point involved is whether the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law the status which plaintiff Sarah Belflower occupied while on the defendants’ property, and in subsequently directing a verdict in favor of the defendants.

The record on appeal contains none of the trial proceedings except the testimony of the plaintiff Sarah Belflower and one witness called on behalf of plaintiffs. Although appellants state in their brief that the trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendants at the close of all of the evidence, based upon a determination by the trial court that the plaintiff, Sarah Bel-flower occupied the status of a licensee, the transcript of trial proceedings does not disclose any of this. Appellants’ brief discloses that the partial transcript of proceedings furnished to us also omits the testimony of other witnesses.

 Since the appellants have not included in the record all of the evidence that was adduced in the trial court, we cannot properly review the action of the trial court in directing a verdict for defendants. The judgment arrived here with a presumption of correctness and in the absence of a proper record demonstrating reversible error, the judgment must be affirmed. Gulf Coast Title Company v. Walters, 1937, 126 Fla. 739, 171 So. 763; Warriner v. Doug Tower, Inc., Fla.App. *7031965, 180 So.2d 384; Wilder v. Altman, Fla.App.1965, 179 So.2d 250; Brown v. Householder, Fla.App.1961, 134 So.2d 801.

Affirmed.

CROSS, C. J., and WALDEN, J., concur.