alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000037637
<NAME> FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                        3,632
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                        364
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                             606
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                             0
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                     448
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   5,050
<COMMON>                                         1,004
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                            0
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                                915
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                   1,919
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         33
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                             1,473
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                       0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                      152
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                   1,473
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                    5,050
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                        2,037
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                               142
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                       1,562
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                       1,704
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                            333
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                                   7
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                     340
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            90
<NET-INCOME>                                       250
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                          1
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                      249
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                           150
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                            0
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                             494
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.00


</TABLE>
#### B & B CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF OHIO, INC., and the Continental Insurance Company, Appellants, v. AIRLITE PROCESSING CORPORATION OF FLORIDA, a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 73-598.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 11, 1973.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County.

Appeal dismissed.
<PAGE>   1

                                  EXHIBIT 24.4

                                POWER OF ATTORNEY
                                 DANIEL B. WARD


        KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned, Daniel B. Ward
constitutes and appoints Steven H. Moger or William D. St. John his true and
lawful attorney-in-fact and agent, for him and his name, place and stead, in any
and all capacities, to sign the Form 10-KSB of Nutraceutix, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1999, and any amendments or
supplements thereto, and to file this Power of Attorney and the Form 10-KSB with
all exhibits thereto, and to the documents in connection therewith, with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the NASDAQ National Market System,
granting unto said attorney-in-fact and agent full power and authority to do and
perform each requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as
fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do in person, hereby
ratifying and confirming all that said attorney-in-fact and agent, may do or
cause to be done by virtue hereof.

        Dated this 27th day of March, 2000.

Signature:



/s/ Daniel B. Ward
-----------------------------------
Daniel B. Ward
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION of CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT to SECTION 1350 of CHAPTER 63 of TITLE 18 of the UNITED
STATES CODE,

as ADOPTED PURSUANT to

SECTION 906 of THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Quarterly Report
of Frischs Restaurants, Inc. (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 12, 2006 (the Report), the undersigned officer of the Registrant certifies, pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of
Title 18 of the United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                 |  |     |  |                           
|---------------- |  | --- |  | --------------------------
|January 15, 2007 |  | By: |  | /s/ Donald H. Walker      
|                 |  |     |  | Donald H. Walker          
|                 |  |     |  | Vice President-Finance and
|                 |  |     |  | Chief Financial Officer   

This certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a  14(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or otherwise subject to the liability of that
Section. This certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act, except as other otherwise stated in such filing.
Jun, 25, 2010 11:21AM No, 8943 P. 2 

John Anderson 

President 

NOYAC HILLS ESTATES ASSOCIATION 

168 Wildwood Road l^fPl OFWi^l 

Sag Harbor, New York 11963 ^ 

Docket Operations M 30 

U.S. Dept, of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE 

RoomW12-U0 

West Building Ground Floor 

Washington D.C, 20590-0001 

RE: Docket Number FAA-2010-0302 

June 23,2010 

To Whom It May Concern; 

I am writing as the President of the Noyac Hills Estates Association. Our members are 8? home 

owners who have been enduring noise and disturbance to their enjoyment of their homes and 

properties as a consequence of numerous helicopters flying overhead. 

We appreciate and applaud the FAA for proposing mandatoiy flight rules for helicopters over 

long Island. The following amendments are offered in an effort to strengthen the proposed rules: 

• That helicopters using the North Shore route be required to use Orient Point as a 

waypoint to proceed over water to the maximum extent possible when arriving/departing 

East Hampton Airport (HTO) or points east of HTO. And, fiirther, that they comply with 

local (HTO) rules concerning flight paths and minimum altitudes. 

• That the FAA establish similar mandatory flight rules for the South Shore route and 

establish procedures to equalize the volume of helicopter traffic using the North and 

South Shore routes. 

• That the minimum flight altitude be increased to 3000 feet from 2500 feet. 

In addition, we strongly encourage the FAA to establish procedures in cooperation with local 

airports to monitor and enforce compliance with the proposed rules. 

The data demonstrates that the vast majority of helicopter traffic over Long Island operates 

beteen East Hampton Airport (HTO) and New York City. Accordingly, we think it is appropriate 

to empower HTO management to establish and enforce certain local rules designed to mitigate 

and reduce the noise impact of helicopter traffic on Long Island residents. 

Thank you. 

Yours truly. 

John Anderson, President 

Noyac Hills Estates Association 

cc: Nancy Graboski, Tim Bishop, Chuck Schumer
#### Julia V. DUFFY, Appellant, v. George A. DUFFY, Appellee.

No. 70-689.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 5, 1971.

William L. Penrose, of Harris, Barrett & Dew, St. Petersburg, for appellant.

E. Ronald Bradley, of Ellis, Logan, Reynolds & Bradley, St. Petersburg, for ap-pellee.

MANN, Judge.

In custody cases it is often impossible to do the right thing because there is no right thing. Here is a case in which both mother *494and father are less than ideal parents, and after hearing the testimony the trial judge awarded to the father custody of two boys, the older of whom is a stepson adopted by him. The pronouncement of this ruling sent the mother into a highly emotional state. The attorneys and parties then conferred and stipulated that the custody of the older child should be awarded to the mother and of the younger child to the father. She appeals, urging Arons v. Arons, Fla.1957, 94 So.2d 849, as authority for the proposition that custody of several children should not be split.

What might have been in the trial judge’s mind is that the appellee’s mother would be available, as she has been, to care for the children, and that they would be better cared for with legal custody in the father under actual supervision of his mother. Or it may be that the chancellor thought the children’s mother needed to straighten herself out emotionally before assuming the burden of rearing these children. We are in either case reluctant to interfere with the sound judgment of a judge who has seen the parties and heard the evidence. The initial award of custody to the father is supported by the record, although we might have decided differently had any of us been the trial judge. Additionally, the appellant cannot now complain that split custody is unlawful when she herself stipulated to the judgment appealed from. Shenk v. Shenk, Fla.App.3d 1961, 126 So.2d 286.

This case seems to us much like Lindgren v. Lindgren, Fla.App.2d 1969, 220 So.2d 440, in which we affirmed a judgment awarding custody several days each week to each parent. There we pointed out that the mother had some personal problems to overcome before she would be entitled to full custody, and that the judgment is open to modification upon a proper showing.

We do not depart here from the rule that the mother is normally to be preferred as custodian of young children. Kelly v. Kelly, Fla.App.2d 1964, 163 So.2d 498. But this case was heard by a judge whose opportunity to evaluate these parents is better than our own. If since the entry of this final judgment the mother has become emotionally stable and can provide a loving environment for these children she may so indicate in a petition for modification. We cannot say that the judgment entered was the right one. There is no right one where neither parent is adequate to the challenge of parenthood. But it was agreed to in open court and is not legally erroneous.

Affirmed.

PIERCE, C. J., and LILES, J., concur.
----

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated this 29th of September, 2011.                     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                         |   |
| /s/ Kyle Ross                                                |   |
| Kyle Ross                                                    |
| Executive Vice President and Interim Chief Financial Officer |

----
#### A. Jay CRISTOL et al., Petitioners, v. The CITY OF MIAMI BEACH et al., Respondents.

No. 41152.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 10, 1971.

Rehearing Denied July 12, 1971.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Lemon HOWARD v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 53056.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 1, 1973.

In re: Lemon Howard applying for remedial writs and writ of habeas corpus.

Writ granted. Evidentiary hearing ordered (to determine whether applicant’s mental condition rendered his plea of guilty involuntary and un-knowing.)
#### Geraldine THOMPSON, Appellant, v. Larry Neal THOMPSON, Appellee.

No. 72-724.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 22, 1973.

Appeal dismissed.
#### WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Richard J. NAFE, individually and as father and next friend of Frances Martha Nafe, a minor, Appellees.

No. 68-664.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

Jan. 28, 1969.

*766Dixon, Bradford, Williams, McKay & Kimbrell, and Joseph W. Womack, Miami, for appellant.

Colson & Hicks, Podhurst & Orseck, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, defendant in the trial court, seeks review of a final judgment subsequent to an adverse jury verdict in a slip and fall case. The only point preserved for review is the correctness of the following jury charge, taken from the standard jury charges:1

> * * * * * *

> “You may take into consideration any aggravation of an existing disease, or physical defect, resulting from such injury.

> “If you find that there was such an aggravation, you should determine, if you can, what portion of Frances Nafe’s condition resulted from the aggravation, and make allowance in your verdict only for the aggravation.

> “However, if you cannot make that determination, or if it cannot be said that the condition would have existed apart from the injury, you should consider and make allowance in your verdict for the entire condition.”

> **** * **** *

It is apparent from the record on appeal, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, that the charge was proper. There was evidence which indicated that the trauma experienced by the minor plaintiff, as a result of the slip and fall in the defendant’s premises, incited or aggravated a serious blood disease which had not theretofore been apparent in her. It was within the province of the jury, pursuant to the charge, to apportion the damage if it could but if not, as the charge indicated, it was justified in assessing all the damage against the tort feasor, in accordance with C. F. Hamblen, Inc. v. Owens, 127 Fla. 91, 172 So. 694; Wise v. Carter, Fla.App.1960, 119 So.2d 40; Byrd v. Felder, Fla.App.1967, 197 So.2d 554; Hollie v. Radcliffe, Fla.App.1967, 200 So.2d 616.

Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the final judgment here under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

1

. Florida Standard Jury Instructions—became effective April 19, 1967.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDG MENT

No. 04

- 18

- 00368

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF B .J.B

. , et al., Children

From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas

Trial Court No. 13

- 311

- CCL Honorable Michael P. Peden, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE MARTINEZ

, JUSTICE ALVAREZ , AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. Costs of the appeal are taxed against appellant Crystal Caldwell

Bays.

SIGNED December 12, 2018.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez , Justice
#### Shirley Leary WARE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Webster WARE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13411.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

Sept. 12, 1977.

*934Love, Rigby, Dehan & Love by Samuel P. Love, Jr., Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellant, Shirley Leary Ware.

Ike F. Hawkins, Jr., Shreveport, for defendant-appellant, Webster Ware.

Before BOLIN, C. J., and PRICE, HALL, MARVIN and JONES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment awarding custody of and support for a minor child of a marriage was signed April 19, 1977. A new trial was denied on April 25, 1977. Both parties — divorced parents of the minor — appealed. Neither appeal was sought before June 24, 1977, and neither appeal bond was filed before July 7, 1977.

We noticed that the appeals were not timely sought or perfected and notified counsel for each litigant to show cause why the appeals should not be dismissed. La.C. C.P. Art. 3943. Neither counsel responded.

Accordingly, the appeals are hereby dismissed at the cost of appellants.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.18


                           HORIZON HEALTH CORPORATION

                            BONUS PLAN -- FISCAL 2001




James W. McAtee:     Shall earn a bonus for fiscal 2001 from zero
                     (0%) to one hundred (100%) of fiscal 2001 base salary
                     pro-rata based upon the company's audited net income
                     results.


Ronald C. Drabik:    Shall earn a bonus for fiscal 2001 from zero
                     (0%) to forty (40%) of fiscal 2001 base salary pro-rata
                     based upon the company's audited net income results.


The following bonuses will be earned starting at 80% of target achievement with
pro-rata amounts due up to 100% of the target. The two contract management
operators may have up to 50% of their bonus upon the achievement of specific
contracts retained as set by the President and CEO of the Company.

Linda Laitner:       Up to fifty-five percent (55%) of average base
                     salary for fiscal year 2001 based upon the achievement of
                     operating cash flow targets consistent with fiscal 2001
                     budgets.

David Tingue:        Up to fifty percent (50%) of average base salary
                     for fiscal year 2001 based upon the achievement of
                     operating cash flow targets consistent with fiscal 2001
                     budgets.

Frank Baumann:       Up to sixty percent (60%) of average base salary
                     for fiscal year 2001 based upon achieving a combination of
                     operating cash flow targets and contract retention.

Dave White:          Up to sixty percent (60%) of average base salary for
                     fiscal year 2001 based upon achieving a combination of
                     operating cash flow targets and contract retention.
#### Barbara C. BAGGETT v. Charles C. BAGGETT, Jr.

Civ. 1447.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

July 12, 1978.

*1023Horace N. Lynn, Montgomery, for appellant.

George H. Wakefield, Jr., Montgomery, for appellee.

HOLMES, Judge.

This is a divorce ease.

The wife appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in the division of property.

It is clear to this court that the trial court entered its decree after an *ore tenus*hearing. It is equally as clear that there is no transcript of the evidence before this court. This court has no alternative but to affirm the decree of the trial court. See 2 Ala. Digest *Appeal & Error*@=>671(2), and 2A Ala. Digest *Appeal & Error*@=>1008.1(6).

We deem it appropriate to quote from *Adams*v. *Adams,*Ala.App., 385 So.2d 174, 177 (1976), where Judge Bradley, speaking for this court, stated:

> “The argument urged on appeal is directed exclusively to the proposition that the trial judge’s decree, based on evidence heard ore tenus, was plainly and palpably erroneous. Reversal on such ground must be solidly based on the appellate court’s conclusion that the evidence virtually compels a result inconsistent with the trial judge’s findings, *Sparkman v. Williams,*260 Ala. 472, 71 So.2d 274. It is impossible for an appellate court to make such a determination where none of the oral testimony is communicated to it.

> “Under ARAP it is not necessary to submit the entire transcript; however, there is a minimum below which an appellant who bases his argument on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence may not fall and still present a reviewable issue. The complete absence of any transcript or 10(d) statement of oral testimony falls below such a minimum.”

> The case is due to be affirmed.

> AFFIRMED.

WRIGHT, P. J., and BRADLEY, J., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                      19,673,252
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  691,157
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            20,224,362
<PP&E>                                       3,167,856
<DEPRECIATION>                             (1,248,895)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              23,584,921
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,703,128
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        13,405
<OTHER-SE>                                  15,926,692
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                23,584,921
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,396,941
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               30,941,776
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             737,708
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (30,282,543)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (30,282,543)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (30,282,543)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (9.82)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (9.82)
        

</TABLE>