alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.49 2013 10K






EXHIBIT 10.49
AMENDMENT TO 
THE WASHINGTON TRUST COMPANY
SUPPLEMENTAL PENSION BENEFIT PLAN
AS AMENDED AND RESTATED EFFECTIVE AS OF JANUARY 1, 2008




		
	A.
	WHEREAS, The Washington Trust Company (the “Company”) maintains The Washington Trust Company Supplemental Pension Benefit Plan, as amended and restated effective January 1, 2008 and subsequently amended (the “Plan”), for the benefit of its eligible employees; and


WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Plan; and


WHEREAS, the Company has reserved the right to amend the Plan by action of its Compensation and Human Resources Committee; and
WHEREAS, the Compensation and Human Resources Committee of the Company has authorized the following amendment to the Plan.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Company hereby amends the Plan as follows:


1.    Article IV is hereby amended by adding the following Section 4.05:


“4.05 Cessation of Accruals.  Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, in no event shall a Participant’s benefit hereunder increase after December 31, 2023.”


B.    The effective date of this Amendment is December 31, 2023.


C.    Except as amended above, the Plan remains in full force and effect and is in all other respects ratified and confirmed.




IN WITNESS THEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be executed by its duly authorized officer this 19th day of September, 2013.


THE WASHINGTON TRUST COMPANY
By:      /S/ Joseph J. MarcAurele    
Joseph J. MarcAurele
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
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<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1996     
<CASH>                                           13294     
<SECURITIES>                                      5737     
<RECEIVABLES>                                    13582     
<ALLOWANCES>                                       500     
<INVENTORY>                                      11225     
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 44826     
<PP&E>                                           23785     
<DEPRECIATION>                                   14925     
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   66764     
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             3191     
<BONDS>                                          11625     
<COMMON>                                          6006     
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0     
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<OTHER-SE>                                       42706     
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     66764     
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   2203     
<INCOME-TAX>                                        63     
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               2140     
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</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 18-2225

___________________________

Patricia Ann Riniker

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Commissioner, Social Security Administration

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Dubuque

 ____________

 Submitted: April 11, 2019

Filed: April 19, 2019 

[Unpublished]

____________

Before COLLOTON, WOLLMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.
Patricia Ann Riniker appeals the district court’s affirmance of a decision 1

denying her disability insurance benefits, which we review de novo. See Combs v.

Berryhill, 878 F.3d 642, 645-46 (8th Cir. 2017) (ensuring that substantial evidence

on record as whole supports decision). We agree with the district court that because

the administrative law judge (ALJ) gave several valid reasons for discounting

Riniker’s subjective complaints, any error based on the ALJ’s failure to mention her

work history in his credibility analysis was harmless. See Bryant v. Colvin, 861 F.3d

779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 2017) (this court defers to ALJ’s credibility determination if it

is supported by good reasons and substantial evidence). As to the remaining issues

Riniker raises on appeal, they are new and she has not shown that manifest injustice

would result if this court declines to consider them. See Gragg v. Astrue, 615 F.3d

932, 938 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to consider issue not raised in district court as

appellant made no showing that manifest injustice would otherwise result). The

judgment is affirmed. 

______________________________

The Honorable Kelly K. E. Mahoney, United States Magistrate Judge for the

1

Northern District of Iowa, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

-2-
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 819 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 819

 To revise the boundaries of the George Washington Birthplace National 
                   Monument, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 4, 1993

 Mr. Bateman introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To revise the boundaries of the George Washington Birthplace National 
                   Monument, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. GEORGE WASHINGTON BIRTHPLACE NATIONAL MONUMENT.

    The Act of January 23, 1930 (46 Stat. 58, chapter 24; 16 U.S.C. 
442) is amended--
            (1) in section 2--
                    (A) by inserting after ``structures thereon'' the 
                following: ``(including lands described in section 
                3)''; and
                    (B) by inserting after ``Secretary of the 
                Interior'' the following ``(referred to in this Act as 
                the `Secretary')'';
            (2) by redesignating section 3 as section 6; and
            (3) by inserting after section 2 the following new 
        sections:

``SEC. 3. BOUNDARIES OF GEORGE WASHINGTON BIRTHPLACE NATIONAL MONUMENT.

    ``The boundaries of the George Washington Birthplace National 
Monument shall include the area comprising approximately 12 acres and 
generally depicted as the `National Monument Boundary' on the map 
entitled `George Washington Birthplace National Monument Boundary Map', 
numbered NPS 332/80,011A, and dated September 1992. The map shall be on 
file and available for public inspection in the Office of the Director 
of the National Park Service, Department of the Interior.

``SEC. 4. ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL MONUMENT.

    ``In administering the George Washington Birthplace National 
Monument, the Secretary shall take such action as is necessary to 
preserve and interpret--
            ``(1) the history and resources associated with George 
        Washington;
            ``(2) the generations of the Washington family who lived in 
        the vicinity and their contemporaries; and
            ``(3) 18th century plantation life and society.

``SEC. 5. ACQUISITION OF LANDS.

    ``The Secretary may acquire lands or interests in lands within the 
boundaries of the George Washington Birthplace National Monument by 
donation, purchase with donated or appropriated funds, or exchange.''.

                                 <all>
```
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-20-00195-CR

IN RE WILLIAM CHARLES WEBB

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator’s original application for writ of mandamus is denied.

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Neill

Application for writ of mandamus denied

Opinion delivered and filed August 19, 2020

[OT06]
Area Code/County,Count603  New Hampshire,14348Belknap New Hampshire,1056Carroll New Hampshire,1369Cheshire New Hampshire,1274Coos New Hampshire,313Grafton New Hampshire,1442Hillsborough New Hampshire,6284Merrimack New Hampshire,2439"No Zip Code Reported, New Hampshire",123Rockingham New Hampshire,5206Strafford New Hampshire,1698Sullivan New Hampshire,849
#### Margaret Frances STEELE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. R-420.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 8, 1973.

Rehearing Denied May 31, 1973.

Henry Clay Mitchell, Jr., Pensacola, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Michael M. Corin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of her judgment of conviction and sentence based upon a jury verdict finding her guilty of second degree murder.

The principal point on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal and find therein competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment. Two eyewitnesses offered testimony in support of the charge made against appellant which, if believed by the jury, supported each element of the offense.1

We have given consideration to appellant’s remaining point on appeal but find it to be without substantial merit. The judgment is accordingly affirmed.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ„ concur.

1

. Darty v. State (Fla.App.1964) 161 So.2d 864.
#### Everett GRAVES v. STATE.

No. 38771.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Aug. 1969.

Habeas Corpus denied without opinion.
#### John J. LEONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-194.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 17, 1970.

*434Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, and D. Turner Matthews, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Morton J. Hanlon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to the last order entered by this Court in this cause on March 25, 1970, (233 So.2d 404) the Public Defender for Lee County made proper inquiry as to the present whereabouts of appellant Leone, and on April 3, 1970, the Superintendent of the State Prison advised the Public Defender in writing that “Leone was released by expiration of sentence, February 5, 1970” and that “we have no way of knowing his present whereabouts”. The letter from the Public Defender to Leone at the State Prison, dated March 26, 1970, enclosing copy of brief as directed by order of March 25, 1970, was returned to the Public Defender marked “released”.

In view of the above, and the apparent impossibility of serving Leone, and also the fact that he has completed serving his sentence, the validity of which he formerly desired this Court to review, we have no alternative but to dismiss this proceeding.

It is so ordered.

HOBSON, C. J., and PIERCE and Mc-NULTY, JJ., concur.
#### Burke GUILLORY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The FIDELITY AND CASUALTY COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 3100.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

June 18, 1970.

Lewis & Lewis, by Seth Lewis, Jr., Ope-lousas, for defendant-appellant.

Frugé & Foret, by Jack C. Frugé, Ville Platte, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before TATE, CULPEPPER, and MILLER, JJ.

TATE, Judge.

The sole issue raised by the defendant’s appeal is: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff $3,500 general damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident ?

The facts are virtually undisputed. The plaintiff, Guillory, was injured in an in-tersectional accident on October 29. His *877automobile was totally demolished in the collision.

Guillory was hospitalized for twenty-four hours, having sustained lacerations of the scalp and arm (which were sutured), bruises and contusions all over his body, and a concussion.

Glass was removed from his scalp on this occasion, and more glass a week later. The residual scars are not disfiguring because beneath the hair.

Guillory’s most serious injury was to his left knee. As a result of a severe contusion and the consequent hemorrhaging, he suffered soft tissue injuries. Further, and persisting longest, the saphenous nerve underneath his kneecap was injured by the accident.

As a result of this knee injury, Guillory was disabled from working for about a month. (He did return to his day-time office job, but his co-workers corroborated his testimony of working only with appreciable pain.) He was forced to hire a replacement to handle his duties at the self-owned grocery he operated outside of office hours.

The evidence reflects that the knee injury caused limping for at least three to four weeks, and pain and discomfort for at least five months after the accident. The orthopedist examined him again for the residual some three months after the accident. This specialist estimated a recovery within the next several months, although he felt that the nerve or scar surrounding it should be excised if the pain persisted longer. Tr. 17.

Additionally as a result of the blow on the head, Guillory suffered a concussion. The headaches residual therefrom persisted for two-three weeks after the accident.

The trial court has great discretion in the award of general damages for personal injuries, which the reviewing court should not disturb in the absence of clear abuse. Civil Code Article 1934; Lo-menick v. Schoeffler, 250 La. 959, 200 So.2d 127. We find no such abuse here in the amount of $3,500 for the painful knee injury causing one month’s disability and an additional four months’ residual pain, considering also the painful and extensive lacerations, contusions, and bruises, and the concussion. See, e. g., Barrois v. Noto, La.App. 4th Cir., 215 So.2d 676; Bates v. Lagars, La.App.2d Cir., 193 So.2d 375.

We therefore affirm the award of the trial court. The defendant-appellant is to pay the costs of this appeal.

Affirmed.
#### Helen McMAHON, Petitioner, v. Robert D. HUNTINGTON and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, Respondents.

No. 40286.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 7, 1971.

Rehearing Denied May 10, 1971.

*744J. J. Goodmark of Goodmark & Good-mark, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Michael B. Davis of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder, Carson & Wahl, West Palm Beach, Patrick H. Mears and J. Franklin Garner, Tallahassee, for respondents.

CARLTON, Acting Chief Justice.

Two substantive issues are presented to us in this workmen’s compensation case: first, did the Judge of Industrial Claims err in finding that claimant had reached maximum medical recovery; second, was the grant of compensation for nursing services proper. The Industrial Relations Commission reversed the Judge’s affirmative rulings on both issues with one member dissenting. In our judgment the reversal was in error and the Compensation Order should have been sustained.

Claimant, a 59-year old woman employed as a chambermaid, fractured her left ankle in a compensable accident. Her injuries healed without serious physical complication to the point of maximum medical recovery, but the accident set off an adverse psychological reaction, known as a chronic anxiety reaction, which lingered on even as her ankle healed. At the hearing on her claim, an examining physician testified that this reaction would suggest further psychiatric treatment, but that the best treatment would be for claimant to begin working again. In his view, employment would alleviate an intense fear of dependency which formed the basis for her anxiety reaction. Considering the testimony that claimant was able to resume work, and that work would be the best remedy for her ills, we believe that the Claims Judge could make a determination of maximum medical recovery based on competent, substantial evidence in accord with logic and reason. The singular interrelationship between claimant’s psychiatric disability and her ability to resume work takes this case out of the situations obtaining in Chastain v. Union News Division of American News Co., 194 So.2d 899 (Fla.1966) [relied upon by the Commission majority], and Moses v. R. H. Wright & Son, Inc., 90 So.2d 330 (Fla.1956).

We also find that an award for practical nursing services rendered by claimant’s sister was properly made. See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Weaver, 226 So.2d 801 (Fla.1969), for a discussion of services which are compensa-ble. In this case, the nature of the injury and the age of the claimant indicated that the services would be necessary; this was confirmed by correspondence from one of the treating physicians in which he stated that claimant “[W]ould need assistance for few weeks after getting out of the hospital.” The services rendered were compen-sable under Fla.Stat. § 440.13(1), F.S.A.

Accordingly, certiorari is granted, the Order of the Industrial Relations Commission is quashed, and the cause is remanded with directions to reinstate the Order of the Judge of Industrial Claims.

Petitioner-claimant’s petition for attorney’s fees is granted in the amount of $500.00.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
#### Cherylann HOBBS et al., Appellants, v. Floyd Michael SAUERS and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation, Appellees.

No. 77-453.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 20, 1978.

Wolfson, Appel & Maram and Anthony J. Brown and Christopher W. Warner, Miami, for appellants.

Talburt, Kubicki & Bradley and Betsy E. Hartley and Robert J. Dickman, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, NATHAN and KE-HOE, JJ.

KEHOE, Judge.

Appellant, plaintiff below, appeals a final judgment entered pursuant to a directed verdict in favor of appellees. We reverse.

Appellant brought the instant action as a result of injuries she allegedly sustained in an automobile accident with appellee Floyd M. Sauers. The gravamen of appellant’s complaint was that, because of the accident, she had sustained permanent injury within reasonable medical probability. § 627.737, Fla.Stat. (1975).

During the course of the trial, the testimony of one of appellant’s witnesses, Jordan Davis, M.D., was excluded from evidence. Doctor Davis’s testimony involved, among other things, the permanency of appellant’s injuries. However, the trial court determined that Dr. Davis was an “examining physician” who was ineligible to testify under the rationale of *Marshall v. Papineau,*132 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961), and its progeny. Thereafter, at the close of appellant’s case, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of appellees. Pursuant to the directed verdict, the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of appel-*915lees. From this final judgment, appellant appeals.

Appellant contends that Dr. Davis’s testimony was improperly excluded because he was not an “examining physician” under the rationale of the *Marshall*case, but rather was a “treating physician” whose testimony in regard to appellant’s complaint was an exception to the hearsay rule.

We agree with appellant’s contention. Our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that Dr. Davis was a “treating physician” whose testimony was improperly excluded from evidence by the trial court. Further, we are of the opinion that if Dr. Davis’s testimony had been admitted, it would have created a justiciable issue of fact which was properly determinable by the jury. See *Parker*v. *Martin,*338 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); *Bill Kelley Chevrolet, Inc. v. Kerr,*258 So.2d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); *Steiger v. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co.,*253 So.2d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); and *City of Hialeah v. Hutchins,*215 So.2d 496 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).

Accordingly, the final judgment entered by the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed.
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EPA Docket Center, Public Reading Room to view or receive 

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Washington, DC. 20004

Telephone:

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docket-customerservice@epa.gov
EXHIBIT 10.3c



AMENDMENT NO. 3

Effective November 17, 2010

to

THE PMI GROUP, INC.

2005 DIRECTORS DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN

(September 20, 2007 Restatement)



THE PMI GROUP, INC., having adopted The PMI Group, Inc. 2005 Directors Deferred Compensation Plan (the Plan) effective as of January 1, 2005, having amended and restated the Plan
effective as of September 20, 2007, and having further amended the restated Plan effective as of February 20, 2008, and having further amended the restated Plan as of November 20, 2008, hereby again amends the restated Plan as
follows:



1. The phrases or as soon as
administratively practicable thereafter and as soon as practicable thereafter are deleted from each place that they appear in the Plan.



2. Section 5.14 is amended in its entirety to read as follows:



Notwithstanding any contrary Plan
provision, any payment that is scheduled to be made to a Participant under the Plan on a Payment Date or anniversary thereof (the Designated Payment Date) shall be treated as made on the Designated Payment Date if such payment is made
either (a) on that date or a later date that is no later than (i) the end of the Participants taxable year that includes the Designated Payment Date, or (ii) if later, the fifteenth (15th) calendar day of the third calendar month immediately following
the Designated Payment Date; or (b) no earlier than 30 calendar days before the Designated Payment Date. In no event shall the Participant be permitted, directly or indirectly, to designate the taxable year of such payment.



3. This Amendment No. 3 to the restated Plan is
effective as of November 17, 2010.



IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, The PMI Group, Inc., by its duly authorized officer, has executed this Amendment No. 3 to the restated Plan as of the date specified below.



|                        |  |  |  |                     |  |                                       
|----------------------- |  |  |  | ------------------- |  | --------------------------------------
|                        |  |  |  | THE PMI GROUP, INC.
|                        |  |  | 
|Date: November 18, 2010 |  |  |  | By:                 |  | /s/ Charles F. Broom                  
|                        |  |  |  |                     |  | Charles Broom                         
|                        |  |  |  |                     |  | Senior Vice President, Human Resources