This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 4 ). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16
- 0487 In re the Matter of: M. J. E. B., petitioner,

Respondent,

vs. A. L. n/k/a A. T., Respondent, E. G., Appellant, C. L., Respondent Below, Ramsey County, intervenor, Respondent. Filed November 28, 2016 Affirmed Hooten , Judge Ramsey County District Court File No. 62

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- 3483 Karen A. Cooper, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent M

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. ) Lateesa T. Ward, Ward & Ward, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant) John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Sara Lauthen, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent county)
A

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. , Oakdale, Minnesota (pro se respondent)2

Considered and decided by Bratvold , Presiding Judge; Peterson , Judge; and Hooten , Judge

. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N HOOTEN , Judge In this paternity action, appellant challenges the district court’s amended order, which adjudicated petitioner

- respondent biological father as the child’s legal father. Appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding that the weightier considerations of policy and logic favor adjudication of the biological father as the child’s father because the district court elevated the weight of genetic testing results over c ompeting paternity presumptions and t he child’s best interests

. We affirm. FACTS Respondent A.T. ( the mother) gave birth to E.D.G. (the child) i n January 201 3. When the child was conceived , the mother was involved in romantic relationships with appellant E

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. and petition er - respondent M .B. In the early stages of the mother’s
pregnancy, E.G. and M.B. each believed that he was the child’s biological father. During this time, the mother was marrie d to respondent C .L. T he mother and E.G. signed a

r ecognition of p arentage (“ ROP”) in which they both acknowledged that they were the parents of the child. Even though the mother was still married to C.L. at the time of the child’s birth, C.L. renounc ed that he was the child’s father in the ROP

. T he mother and E.G. remained in an intimate relationship , which allowed E.G. to have regular contact with the child. E.G. also paid court

- ordered child support to the mother for the child’s benefit. But, the mother also allowed M.B. to h ave contact with the3

child on an int ermittent basis with visits at various different locations, including visits at the homes of the mother and M.B’s relatives , a church , a Burger Kin g, a church camp, and

a Walmart. These visits, however, eventually ended in January 2015

. M.B. and E.G. eac h portrayed himself as the child’s father in his community and each introduced the child to his own family members, who accepted the child as part of their family.
M.B. filed a paternity action against the mother in March 2014, seeking to establish hims elf as the child’s legal father. The district court joined E. G ., C.L. , and Ramsey County as parties to the proceeding and directed the mother, the child, and M.B. to undergo genetic testing to determine whether M.B. was the child’s biological father. The test results indicated a 99.99% probability that M.B. was the child’s biological father. Due to the genetic testing results, the district court vacated the ROP and E.G.’s child support obligation. M.B. and E.G. , but not C.L. , so ught to be a djudicated as the child’s father. C.L., who was divorced from the mother in March 2015 and had no relationship with the child, did not participate in the proceeding

. T he matter was set for a court trial , and the genetic test results were admi tted into evidence. In an order issued on September 9, 2015, the district court adjudicated M.B. as the father of the child. The district court found that (1) M.B. was the biological father; (2) M.B. desire d a relationship with the child ; (3) M.B. was willing and financially able to support the child ; (4) M.B. introduced the child to his extended family , and his family accepted her; (5) the child w ould likely want to know the identity of her biological father; and (6) because of her young age, the child would be able to develop a relationsh ip with M.B.4

The district court indicated that it chose n ot to review and apply the best interests of the child factors, as set forth in Minnesota Statutes s ection 518.17 , subdivision 1 (2014) 1 , due

to the child’s young age and because the factors would favor E.G. only for having more

access to the child.
E.G. moved the district court to amend its findings or , alternatively , set a new trial, arguing that the district court ignored relevant evidence, failed to con sider the child’s best interests, failed to properly evaluate M.B.’s testimony, and improperly weighed the genetic testing results over compet ing presumptions of paternity. T he district court denied E.G. ’s motion for a new trial but amended its findings t o include an analysis of the best interests factors under s ection 518.17. The district court found that two of the factors favored E.G. , specifically that the mother preferred that E.G. be named the child’s legal father and that there was no evidence of E

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. , unlike M.B., having any mental health or physical issues that m ight adverse ly affect his ability to parent the child or the child’s well

- being

. The district court found that the remaining factors were either neutral or inap plicable to E.G. and M.B. Though the district court concluded that the best interests factors weighed slightly in favor of E.G. , it determined that the considerations of policy and logic still supported adjudicating M.B. as the child’s father. The district court noted that neither the

1 The legislature revised the applicable statutory factors in between this case’s court trial and the district court’s initial order. 2015 Minn. Laws ch. 30, art. 1, § 3, at 271

– 73 (current version at Minn. Stat. § 518.17 , subd. 1 (Supp. 2015)). The “law of the case” doctrine, which an appellate court must follow, generally yields to an intervening change of controlling law unless doing so would alter rights that ha ve matured or have become unconditional. McClelland v. McClelland , 393 N.W.2d 224, 226

– 27 (Minn. App. 1986). Because neither party contends that the revised version of the sta tute must apply and due to the significant rights at stake, we apply the pre

- August 1, 2015 version of the statute.5

best interests factors favoring E.G. nor the biological connection between M.B. and the child wer e dispositive in its decision. The district court also emphasized its concern that adjudication of E.G. as the father could significantly limit M.B.’ s ability to play a role in the child’s life. E.G. appeal ed. D E C I S I O N E.G. argues that the district court erred in determining that the considerations of policy and logic weigh in favor of adjudica ting M.B. as the child’s father. The Minnesota
Pa rentage Act ( the Act) governs determinations of paternity by providing a variety of circumstance s in which a man is legally presumed to be the father of a child. Minn. Stat. §§ 257.51

– .85 (2014); Turner v. Suggs , 653 N.W.2d 458, 463 (Minn. App. 2002)

. A case that involves analyzing competing presumptions under the Act presents a question of law
that we review de novo. See In re Welfare of C.M.G. , 516 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Minn. App. 1994) . W e will uphold the district court’s findings of fact unless such find ings are clearly

erroneous. In re Paternity of B.J.H. , 573 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Minn. App. 1998) . In a case where there are conflicting paternity presumptions, we will affirm the district court’s paternity adjudicati on if the court’s adjudication is based on the facts and supported by policy and logic. See id. at 103

– 04. Under the Act, both M.B. and E.G. are presumed fathers of the child. M.B. is a presumptive father based on genetic testing that indicated a 99.99% likelihood that he is the child’s biologic al father. See Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(b) (2014)

. E.G. is presumed to be the father because (1) he and the mother signed and filed a ROP for the child, and (2)6

he has openly held the child out as his own child. See Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d), (e) (Supp. 2015)

. In a case in which there are multiple competing presumptions, the Act and relevant precedent provide us with direction on how to resolve an issue of paternity. The Act states that a presumption may be rebutted only by clear and c onvincing evidence. Id. , subd. 2 (2014)

. It is well established that one particular presumption does not automatica lly trump another. B.J.H. , 573 N.W.2d at 103 . Rather, “[i]f two or more presumptions arise which conflict with each other, the presumptio n which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.” Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 2. When weighing the considerations of policy and logic, we examine the particular facts of the case and take into account the chil d’s blood relationships, the child’s existing relationships, and the child’s best interests pursuant to the factors in s ection 518.17. B.J.H. , 573 N.W.2d at
102

– 04; C.M.G. , 516 N.W.2d at 560

– 61 ; Kelly v. Cataldo , 488 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Minn. App. 1992) , rev iew denied (Minn. Sept. 15, 1992)

. The Child’s Biological Relationships E.G. argues that the district court improperly elevated the weight of M.B.’s genetic testing results over the presumptions that favored adjudicati ng E.G. as the child’s father.

“ [ T ] he determination of paternity is no longer solely an issue of biological fact.” C.M.G. , 516 N.W.2d at 560. But, th is court must acknowledge the importance of not impairing blood relationships. State v. Thomas , 584 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Minn. App. 1998) , re view denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1998). Here , the district court stated that one of the considerations supporting M.B.’s adjudication as the child’s father was the fact that he is her biological7

father. But, the district court also noted twice that the fact t hat M.B. i s the child’s biological father was not dispositive in determining paternity in a cas e with competing presumptions. The district court also found that, based on the testimony at trial, it is like ly that the child will want to know the identity o f her biological father when she is older. Despite E.G.’s assertions to the contrary , there is evidence that suggests M.B. ’s relationship with the child would be severely impaired if he was not adjudicated as her father. M.B. testified that he was only permitted to visit with the child on a sporadic, inconsistent basis and only after the mother had given him permission. The mother testified that she intentionally limited M.B. ’s contact with the child, even after she learned that M.B.

was the child’s biological father. Given these circumstances , the district court emphasized its concern that M.B. ’s ability to play a role in the child ’s life would be significantly limited
if E.G. was adjudicated as the father. However, the district court also found t hat if M.B. was adjudicated as the father, E.G. would still be involved in the child’s life. This is supported by the fact that E.G. is engaged to the child’s mother and they share a joint child

. T he district court appropriately balanced the significance of M.B. ’s biological relation to
the child without treating it as the determinative factor in deciding paternity. The Child’s Existing Relationships E.G. next argues that the district court failed to carefully weigh the child ’s existing relationships or consider the fact that E.G. and the mother have a joint child together. Stability in maintaining a child’s existing relationships is another consideration that the district court should examine in a case with competing paterni ty presumptions. See B.J.H. , 573 N.W. 2d at 103 n. 1. T he district court recognized that E. G

. and the mother are the8

parents of a joint child born in August 2014. The district court also acknowledged that the mother is the biological mother of five other children , and that all but two of the children have different biological fathers. Some, but not all, of the mother’s other children have parenting time with their biological fathers outside of the mother’s home. T he mother’s household consists of a “blen ded” family in which many of the child’s siblings do not share the same biological father . The child in this case is only three years old and she has an existing relationship with bo th presumed fathers. Under these circumstances, the district

court did n ot err in determining that the child’s environment would not be disrupted by adjudicating M.B. as the father. The Child’s Best Interests E.G. also contends that the district court improperly analyzed and weighed the best interests factors against other consi derations of policy and logic. “ [ A ] child’s best interests is a valid policy factor in resolving a conflict between competing paternity presumptions.”
C.M.G. , 516 N. W.2d at 560. I n its amended order, the district court evaluate d each best interest s factor and determined that the factors, under the pre

- August 1, 2015 version of section 518.17 , weighed slightly in favor of E.G

. T he district court concluded that only two of the best interests factors favored E.G. over M.B. , the rest being neutral or inapplicable.
E.G. argues that the district court erred in its application of the fourth factor: the intimacy of the relationship bet ween each party and the child. See Minn . Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(4)

. Though the district court found that E.G. had more time and opportunit y than M.B. to bond with the child , it decided that this factor did not favor either E. G . or9

M.B. The district court found that there was ample evidence demonstrating E.G. ’s love
and affection for the chi ld. But, the district court also found that M.B. had ongoing contact with the child, whenever the mother permitted it, and the evidence suggested that the child enjoy ed M.B’s company during his visits. E.G.’s assertion that M.B. showed interest in the c hild only to rebuild his relationship with the mother is not consistent with the evidence. M.B. testified that he was willing to do anything to be in the child ’s life and that he wanted to be in her life fully, not only as a “weekend father.” He also tes tified that the child wo uld be his main focus. His testimony is supported by the fact that he enrolled in a parenting program through the Father’s Resource Project and would be willing to participate in parenting classes. T he evidence demonstrates that , while E.G. may be more bonded with the child due to his opportunity to have more contact with her, both M.B. and E.G. deeply care for the child, and thus it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to find that this factor favored neither M.B. nor E.G.
E.G. also argues that the record does not support the di strict court’s finding that the desired maintenance of continuity for the child was a neutral factor, noting that M.B. has been homeless, has moved several times, and has a spotty employment record. The district court found, however, that M.B. is presentl y employed and, like E.G., lives in in his own apartment. There was no evidence presented that either apartment of M.B. or E.G. would be an inadequate place to exercise parenting time. M.B. also has the support of several family members who consider the child as part of their family. For these reasons, the10

district court did not err in finding that this factor did not favor one presumed father over the other. M.B.’s Ability to Parent Finally, E.G. contends that the district court ignored relevant fact s concerning M.B.’ s ability to parent the child , including M.B. ’s anger management issues and violent tendencies. 2 But, the district court acknowledged that M. B. had trouble controlling his emotions , referencing an August 2013 incident that occurred at a church camp attended by the mother and the child when M.B. lost his temper and caused some property damage

. He was subsequently charged and pleaded guilty to misdemeanor criminal property damage. The district court noted, however, that M.B. has taken ste ps to address his anger issues, which include enrolling in the Father’s Resource Project and expressing a willingness to participate in family therapy and counseling.
E.G. also argues that M.B. ’s volatile temper would seriously impair M.B.’ s ability

to c o - parent with the mother or communicate with E.G., who will likely play a role in the child’s upbringing

. The mother did testify that M.B. threatened to take the child away from her. 3 But M.B. testified, and the district court found , that he wanted to ha ve a healthy co

parenting relationship with the mother. Although the evidence in the record suggests that M.B. and E.G. had some conflicts, including arguments on Facebook and a minor incident

2 E.G. asserts that M.B. did not testify credibly regarding his efforts to address his anger and mental health issues. But, we defer to t he district court’s determinations on credibility

. B.J.H. , 573 N.W.2d at 104. 3 M.B. testified that he may have threatened to take the mother to court because of his limited and sporadic parenting time with the child

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involving M.B. visiting with one of the mother’s other children, the district court determined that both presumed fathers understood that they need ed to communicate effectively and cooperate in raising the child. It is evident that the district court did not ignore evidence of M.B. ’s prior conduct or a nger issues, but rather weighed this evidence in light of other policy considerations. We recognize the difficulty in having to decide a child’s paternity between two presumed fathers, both of whom are emotionally invested in th e child and willing to ca re for th e child. But we cannot conclude , based on this record, that the district court’s fin dings are clearly erroneous or that the district court failed to properly weigh the child’s best
interests and considerations of policy and logic in adjudicating M.B. as the child’s father. Affirmed.