### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON JU N E 9, 200 5 S es sio n GAR Y W. BA KERv. JOSE PH SMITH & D EBOR AH SMITH In t he M at te r of : T. M . S. , A C hi ld U nd er18 Y ea rs of A ge

Direc t Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Shelb y County

No. L8793 Herber t J. Lane, Judge

No. W2004-02867-C OA-R3-JV - F iled Augu st 5, 2005

I n th is a pp e a l w e ar e c a lle d u po n to e va luate a juv e nil e c ou rt ’s de c isi on re g ard ing a pe tit ionto mod if y a pr e vio us c us tod y

or de r. Th e orig ina l c us tod y or de r a wa rd e d c us tod y

of themin or

c hil d to the maternal g randpa

rents over the obj ection of the natural fathe r. At the conclusion of the he aring on th e fat her ’s pe tit ionto m od if y c us tod y , th e juv e nil e c ou rt fo un d th a t a

mate ri a l c ha ng e in circ umstances wa

rranted a chang e in custody from the mate rnal g randpa rents to the natur al father. The juvenile court also awa rded the g randpa

rents libera l visit ation. The g randpa rents filed an appea l to this Cou rt . We va c a te thede c isi on of the juv e nil e c ou rt a ndho ld that th e su pe ri or pa re nta l r ig hts doctrine, not a

materia l chang e in circ umstances, is the standa rd which the juvenile court should have ap p l i e d t o t h e f

a t h e r ’ s p e t i t i o n f

o r a c h a n g e o f

c u s t o d y.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Juv e nileCo ur t V ac at e d and Rem anded A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined. Stu art B . B re aks ton e , K a thy

D. B ake r, Me mph is, TN , f or Ap pe llants Wil liam T. Wi ncheste r, Memphis, TN, for AppelleeT he reco rd f i l ed wi t h t hi s C o urt on ap p eal do es not co nt ai n a t rans cri p t of t hi s heari ng. 1 OP IN ION I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

J oseph Smith (“Gra ndfathe r”) an d Debor ah Smith (“Grandmother”) are the maternal g rand pa re nts (h e re ina ft e r c oll ect iv ely re fe rr e d to a s “ Gr a nd pa re nts ” or “ Ap pe llants ” ) o f T .M .S. (dob: 0 4 / 0 1 / 1999). Virg inia Smit h (“Mother ”) and Gary Ba ker ( “F ather ” or “ Appellee ”) a re the bio log ic a l pa

re nts of T. M. S. F a the r w a s se ve nte e n ( 17 ) y e ars of a g e a t th e tim e Mo the r g a ve birth to T .M .S. OnSe pte mbe r 5 , 2 00 0, Gr a nd pa re nts fi le d a pet iti on in the Juve nil e Cou rt of She lby Cou nty a lle g ing tha

t Moth er, th e ir

daug hte r, “ faile d to pr ov idepr op e r c are , s up po rt , o r s up e rv isi on ” to T.M.S. resulting in T.M.S. becoming depende nt and negle cted. Father subsequently

filed a pe tition to in te r v e n e a s s e rti n g th a t h e s h o u ld r e c e iv e c u s to d y o f T

. M

. S. A f te r c o n d u c ti n g a h e ar ing , the 1 juvenile court refe ree submitt ed her Finding s and Recommendations to t he juvenile court stating that T.M.S. should be found to be depe ndent and ne g lected, F ather’s p et ition shoul d be denie d, Gr a nd pa re nts sh ou ld re c e ive c us tod y of T. M. S., a nd F a the r sho uld re c e ive vis itatio n. Th e juv e nil e court subs eq u ently

enter ed an or der c onfirming the re fer ee’ s findings. The rea fter, F ather filed a reque s t f o r a r e h e ar in g b e f

o r e th e ju v e n il e c o u rt ju d g e . T h e ju v e n il e c o u rt ju d g e e n te r e d an orde r dismiss ing F ather ’s petition and re aff irmed its orig inal order . Neither party appea led this order. On J anuary

13, 2004, Father filed a petition in t h e j u venile court seeking to modify the custody arran gem en t p reviously

set by the court. I n his petition, Father a sserted that a material c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s wa rr a nte d a c ha ng e d in c us tod y . Af te r c on du c tin g a

he ari ng , th e juv e nil e c ou rt re fe re e su bmi tte d h e r w ri tte n Fi nd ing s andRe c omm e nd a tio ns statin g that c us tod y of T. M. S. should be remove d from Gr andpar ents and a war ded to Father, a nd Gra ndpare nts should rece ive visitation. The refe ree rec ommended that F ather should rece ive custody of T.M.S

. for a period of tw e lve(1 2) mon th s u nd e r the pr ote c tiv e su pe rv isi on of theMe mph is andShe lby

Cou nty Com mun ity Service Ag ency

(“CSA”) . The juvenile c ourt subsequently enter ed an order confirming the re fer ee’ s finding s. There afte r, Grandpare nts filed their re quest for a re hearing be fore the juvenile court judge

. On Octobe r 14, 2 0 0 4 , t h e j u v enil e court conducted a rehe aring in the matter. At the outset of the hearing, c ounsel for F ather noted t hat, i n the i nitial custody order , the juvenile court never enter ed a fi nd ing that F a the r w a s a n u nf it pare nt. Af

te r list e nin g to the pr e lim ina ry arg ume nts of

c ou ns e l, the juvenile court stated that, in examini ng Father’s pe tition t o modify cust ody , “ther e has to be shown a mate rial chang e in circ umstances a s it relates to the c hild.” At the time of the he aring , Father wa s twenty -two (22) y ear s of ag e, mar ried, possesse d a high sc hool diploma, and both heand his wife ha d stable employment. At the hea ring , he pre sented the re sults of voluntary

drug scre ens, indicating that he and his wife were not t aking drug s. Fatherand his wife te stified that they do not smoke. Father presented the court with certificates showing that he and his wife completed parenting classes. The evidence also demonstrated that Grandmother is a second g rade teac her, and Gra ndfathe r is an instructor at the Univer sityof Memphis. T.M.S., who was f ive y ear s old at the time of the hearing , had essentially been living wit h Gra ndpare nts since birth. Father’s de cision to seek a modific ation of custody primarily cente red around his discover y o f t w o c i g a r e t t e b u r n s a n d b ru i s e s i n f l i c t e d u p o n T

. M

. S

. w h i l e i n G r a n d p ar e n t s ’ c u s t o d y. Gra ndpare nts testified at the hea ring and ac knowledg ed that, since obtaining c ustody of T.M.S. from Mo ther , the y

ha ve a llo we d M oth e r andhe r p re se nt b oy frie ndto h a ve un su pe rv ise d v isi ts w ithT. M. S. Whil e Gr andpar ents do not smoke, Gra ndfathe r t estified that Mother does, but she does not smoke ins idehe r h ou se wi th T .M .S. presen t. T he fi rs t c ig are tte bu rnoc c ur re d w he n T .M .S. app are ntl y walked into a c iga

rette he ld by

Mother d u ri n g a visit, resulting in a burn to his hand. The second cig are tte burn occ urre d approximately two to three y ear s later during a visit t o Gra ndmother’s pare nts’ house. Grandmother testified that, during this visit, T.M.S., who was not wea ring a shirt at the time, ran into a c iga

rette held by her fathe r, resulting in a burn to his chest. F ather documented both burns by

taking photogr aphs during his visit ation. Th e pa rt ie s a lso te sti fi e d r e g ard ing br uis e s su staine d b y

T. M. S. d uring un su pe rv ise d v isi ts with Mothe r. Gra ndmother testified that Mother called he r at wor k one day to inform her that she and boy friend spanked T.M.S. with a be lt the previous nig ht. Grandpa rents proc eede d to T.M.S.’s school wher e they

discovere d bruises on his buttocks. Du ri n g the cour se of e x amining T .M.S., Gra ndmother testified that she thoug ht he had a feve r, and he reported having a stomach ac he. As a re su lt, Gr a nd pa

re nts re mov e d T .M .S. fr om s c ho ol and to ok him to the ir ho me . A c c or din g to Gr a nd mothe r, sh e te le ph on e d F a the r a nd re sc he du le d a n u pc omi ng vis itatio n c iti ng T. M. S.’ s il lne ss. Gra ndmother did not inform Father of the spanking or the bruise s at that time. During a subsequent visit, F ather and T.M.S. we re play ing when T.M.S. sat down ha rd and ind ic a te d th a t hi s b utt oc ks hu rt
. Ac c or din g to F a the r, wh e n h e inq uir e d a bo ut the state me nt, T. M. S. stated that he w as not su p p o s ed to s how Father. When F ather examined T.M.S., he noticed the br uis ing a nd do c ume nte d it wi th ph oto g ra ph s. Up on fu rthe r inq uiry , F a the r te sti fi e d th at T .M .S. stated that Mother and her boyfriend spanked him for not eating his spinach. A fter F ather returne d T. M. S. t o G rand pa

re nts , T

. M

. S

. t o l d G rand pa re nts that F a the r h a d ta

ke n p ho tog ra

ph s o f h is b utt oc ks

. Soo n th e re a ft e r, F a the r r e c e ive d a ph on e c a ll f

ro m G rand fathe r i nf

ormin g hi m of

theinc ide nt. Gr a nd fathe r su bs e qu e ntl y se nt a le tte r to Mo the r’ s b oy frie ndinf ormin g him

that heha d n o auth ority to discipline T.M.S. Lisa Coleman (“ Ms. Coleman”), the CSA ca se mana g er a ssigne d to the case , testified that T

. M

. S

. d i d we l l i n Gr an d p ar en t s ’ cu s t o d y , an d s h e co n cl u d ed t h at t h er e wa s n o ta m at er i al ch an ge i n ci rc u m s t an ce s warr an t i n g a ch an ge in cu s t o d y . M s . C o l em an ad m i t t ed s h e h ad n o p ri o r k n o wl ed ge of any cig are tte burns bef

ore the hearing, but she stated that knowledg e of the se i ncidents would not chang e her

conclusion bec ause they wer e is olated events. Ms. Coleman also admitted that she had not personally

investigated Father, and she had never been to his home. Howe ver, she testified that her pr edec essor did investig ate F ather and found nothing improper.The juvenile c ourt enter ed an or der on O ctober 21, 2004, provid i n g, i n re l evant part, as fo llo ws : It appea

rs to the Court that there has bee n a material chang e of c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u f

f i c i e n tt o w arr a n ta

m o d i f i c a t i o n o f c u s t o d y . It further appea rs that it is in the minor child’s best interests to place the child in the custo d y , car e, and c ontrol of Father, with libera l visitation t o the maternal Grandpare nts. . . . No oth e r f

ind ing s of fa c t or

c on c lus ion s o f l a w w e rec on ta ine d intheor de r. Gr a nd pa re nts subsequently

filed a timely

notice of a

ppeal to this Court presenting , as we perc eive them, the following issues for our r eview: (1) Whether the ju v en i l e court err ed by apply ing an incorre ct leg al standar d when it awa rded custody of the minor child to Appellee ; and (2) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in finding that a material chang e in circ umstances wa rranted a modification of custody

when the pr eponder anceof the e vidence proves otherwise. For the re asons set forth more fully here in, we vac ate the trial court’s or der.

II. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW

I n revie wing the dec ision of the j u v en i l e co u rton appea l, we ar e g uided by the following standard of

revie w: We review the trial court’s conclusions of law “unde r a pur e de novo standard of revie w, acc ording no defe renc e to the conc lusions of law made by the lower courts.” S. Const

ruc tor s, Inc . v. Lo udo n Cou nty Bd. of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 7 0 6 , 710 (Tenn. 2001) . Furthermore , our re vie w of thetria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t is de novo upon the re cord, ac c o mp a n ie d b y

a p r e s u mp ti o n o f

c o rr e c tn e s s , u n le s s the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is othe rwise. Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13(d); Hass v. Kni

ghton , 6 76 S.W. 2d 55 4, 55 5 ( Te nn . 1 98 4) ; se e als o N i c h o l s v . N i c h o ls , 792 S.W .2d 713, 716 (Tenn. 1990) . When the tria l c ourt makes no sp e c if ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t, h ow e ve r, we mus t revie w the re cord to de termine whe re the pre p o n d erance of the evidenc e lies. Ga nze v oo rt v . Rus se ll , 949 S.W .2d 293, 2 9 6 (Tenn. 1997). Kendrick v. Shoem ake , 90 S.W .3d 566, 569-70 (Te nn. 2002). III . A N A L Y SISI n their first issue pre sented to this Court for revie w, Gra ndpare nts c ontend that, althoug h the

juvenile court’s order

states that it fou n d a material cha ng e in circ umstances to exist, t he court imp ro pe rl y

c on sid e re d F a the r’ s su pe ri or pa re nta l ri g hts in re a c hin g its de c isi on . I n s up po rt of thi s position, Grandpar ents point to severa l statements made by the j uvenile court during the cour se of the proc eeding s below:

THE C OURT: Ma’am, do y ou ever think there’s g oing to be a time when the fathe r should be allowed to be a father to the c hild?

. . . . THE COURT: Don’t y ou think it g ets harde r on the boy every

y ear though? I mean, he’s five y ear s old now. And the long er he stay s with y ou and y our husband, the more intringe d [si c] he bec omes t h er e an d t h e h ar d eri tb ec o m es fo r h i mt o go live with his father.

. . . . T H E CO U RT : . . . So th is g o e s b a c k to th e s a me question I

asked the g randmother

. When do they become g randpa

rents and a llow the fathe r an opportunity

to be a f ather to this child? Citi ng to our supreme court’s de cision in Blair v. Badenh ope , 77 S

. W

. 3 d 137 (Tenn. 2002)

. Gra ndpare nts arg ue that a biolog ical par ent’s superior pare ntal rig hts can n o t b e consi dere d when evaluating a

petition to modi fy

a pre vious custody

order

. Conversely , Fa t her a sserts that the juvenile c ourt could prope rly consider his superior pare ntal rig hts w hen evaluating his petition to modify the pre vious custody

order . He too re lies on the Bla ir de c isi on in s up po rt

of his po si tion, a ndhe c on te nd s th a t th e orig ina l c us tod y or de r i s invalid because the juvenile c ourt ig nored the superior pa renta l rig hts doctrine in the orig inal proce eding and neve r adjudicated him an unfit pare nt. At theou tse t, w e mus t a dd re ss Grand pa re nts ’ c on te nti on that th e tria l c ou rt inc or re c tly applied the supe rio r p ar en t al rig hts doctrine whe n evaluating F ather ’s petition to modify . As previously noted, Gra ndpare nts r ely upon the statements by the court contained in the transcript of thehe ari ng . I n the fi na l or de r, ho we ve r, the c ou rt make s no me nti on of the su pe ri or pa re nta l rig hts doctrine. In fac t, the juvenile court’s order states that “[i] t appea

rs t o the C ourt that there has bee n a material change of c ircumstances su ff ic ie nt t o w arr a nt a mo di fi cat ionof c us tod y .” (e mph a sis added)

. This is consistent with the trial court’s statement to c ounsel for the parties at the outset of the hea ring to the eff

ect that “there has t o be shown a material c hang e in circ umstances a s it relates to the child.” In any

event, wecannot look to t he st atements by the juvenile court at the hea ring and make the inf

ere nce Grandpa

rents urg e upon this Court. It is a well established rule in this state that a court speaks only throug h its written j udg ments, there fore , any oral pronounc ements by a trial c ourt are of no eff

ect unless made a part of the writt en judg ment. Elmore v . El more , No. E2004-00301- C OA -R 3 -C V, 2 0 0 4 T en n . Ap p . LE X IS 8 7 3 , a t * 7 (T en n . C t
. Ap p . De c. 2 9 , 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g State v.Bough , 15 2 S.W. 3d 45 3, 46 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) ); se e als o I n re Ado ption o f Fe male Chil

d , 42 S.W .3d 26, 31 (Tenn. 2001) (“Mor eover , the court s p ea k s throug h its order, not throug h the transc ript.”). We fi nd no thi ng in the or de r ind ic a tin g that the juv e nil e c ou rt a do pte d a ny

of its prior state me nts int o theor de r. Ac c or din g ly , w e mus t c on c lud e that th e tria l c ou rt app lied th e mat eri a l c ha ng e in circ umstances standa

rd to Father’s pe tition t o modify the o ri gi n al custodyorder . Howeve r, our analy sis of this is sue cannot end at this point. Father, rely ing on the Gra ndpare nts’ contention that the juv e nil e c ou rt app lie d the su pe ri or pa re nta l rig hts do c trine , h a s a sse rt e d th a t th e do c trinesh ou ld app ly to an e xami natio n o f h is p e tit ionto m od if y thec us tod y

arr a ng e me nt. Both the U nited States and Tenne ssee Constitutions rec og nize the pare nts’ fundame n ta l rig ht to raise their

children a s they

see f it. Haw k v . Ha wk , 855 S.W .2d 573, 578-79 (Te nn. 1993). In an initial custodyproce eding involving a pare nt and a non-par ent, our supre me court has direc ted that the following two-prong standard must be a pplied: I n a contest betwee n a parent and non-par ent, a parent c annot b e d ep ri v ed o f t h e c u s t o d y o f ach i l d u n l es s t h er e h as b ee n a f i n d i n g, afte r notice r equire d by

due process, of substantial harm to t he child. Only then may

a court eng ag e in a g ener al “be st interest of the c hild” evaluation in making a de termination of custody

. I n re Askew , 9 9 3 S

. W .2d 1, 4 (Tenn. 1999) . “[D]ue to the constitut ional protec tion affor ded the biologica l pare nts, the non-biolog ical pare nt ha s the burden of establishing by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that the child will be ex posed t o substantial harm if place d in the custodyof the biolog ical pare nts.” Hal

l v. B oo ko ut , 87 S.W .3d 80, 86 (Tenn. 2002) (citations omitted). The a pplication of the “supe rior par ental rig h t s doctrine” to an initial custody decision involving a

pare nt and a nonpare nt is well established in this st ate:

The la w is n o w w e ll

- s e tt le d th a t th e T e n n e s s e e Co n s ti tu tion protec ts the fundamenta l rig ht of natura l pare nts to ha ve the c are and custody of their c hildren. See Nale v . Robertson , 87 1 S.W .2d 674, 68 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) ; Haw k v . Ha wk , 855 S.W .2 d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993). Throug h Article I , section 8 and its implicit recog n i t i o n of pare ntal privac y

rig hts, our Constit ution requires that courts dec iding initial custodydispute s g ive natura l pare nts a presumption of “superior pare ntal rig hts” reg arding the custody of their c hildren. See In re Askew , 99 3 S. W.2 d 1 , 4 (T e nn . 1 99 9) . Si mpl y state d, thi s pr e su mpt ion re c og nize s tha t “pa re nta l rig hts aresu pe ri or

to the ri g hts of others and continue without interruption unless a biolog ical par ent c on se nts to r e lin qu ishthe m, a ba nd on s his or he r ch ild , or f or fe its his or her p ar e n ta l rig h ts b y

s o mec o n d u c t th a t s u b s tan ti a ll y h ar ms the ch i ld.” See O'Daniel v. Me ssier , 9 05 S.W. 2d18 2, 18 6 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1995). Blair v. Badenh ope , 77 S.W. 3d13 7, 14 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; see also Doles v . Doles , 848 S.W .2d 656, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) ( “the right of the par ent is superior in a c ustody dispute betwee n a par entand a third pa rty ”). I n Blair v. Badenhope , ou r su pr e me c ou rt a dd re sse d the stand ard to b e app lie d to a re qu e st to modify a pre vious order a war ding c ustody to a non-pa

rent. Bla ir , 77 S.W .3d at 139. Following the death of the child’s mother, the child’s g randmother filed a petition seeking custody of the c hild. Id

. Th e c hil d’ s bio log ic a l fathe r ini tia lly c on te ste d the g rand mothe r’ s pe tit ion , but h e eventua lly ag ree d to a consent order placing custody of the c hild with the gr andmother. Id . Shortlythere afte r, t h e f at h erfi l ed a p et i t i o n s ee k i n g t o m o d i fyt h e p re v i o u s cu s t o d y o rd eral l egi n g a m at er i al ch an ge in circumstanc es. Id . at 140. He a lso asserted that, as the child’s pa rent, he enjoy ed a pr esumption of sup er i o r p ar en tal rig hts over the g randmother

. Id . The trial c ourt determined that no materia l chang e in circ umstances e x isted to warr ant a c hang e in custody

. Id

. On ap p e a l , t h e f

a t h e r a r g u e d t h a t “ t h e d o c tr i n e o f s u p e r i o r r i g h t s m u s t b e a pp lie d in modification ca ses, just as it is t o be applied in origina l ac t i o n s for c ustody .” Id . at 141. Our s u p re m e c o u rtd i s agr ee d , s t at i n g:

[A] natur a l pa

re nt e njo y s th e pr e su mpt ionof su pe ri or ri g hts under f our circ umstances: (1) when no or der ex i s t s that transfe rs custody from the natural paren t ; (2) when the orde r transf erring custody from the natural par ent is acc omplished by fraud or without notice to the par ent; (3) whe n the order transfe rring custody from the natur al pare nt is invalid on i ts face ; and (4) w hen the natural par ent c e d e s o n l y

t e m p o r ar y

a n d i n f o r m a l c u s t o d y

t o t h e n o n - p ar e nts
. Consequently , when any

of t hese circumstanc es are present i n a g iven case , th en p ro t ection of the rig ht of natura l pare nts to have the c are and cus t o dy

of their c hildren dema nds that they be ac corde d a presumption of superior pare ntal rig hts ag ainst claims of custodyby no n- pa re nts
.

. . . . [P ] ar en t s in the initial custodyproce eding s enjoy a strong pr e su m p t i o n t h a tt h e y

ar e e n t i t l e d t o t h e p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y o f th e ir children

. However, ha ving onc e prote cted the rights of natural pare nts to the care a nd custody of their c hildren, no constitutional principle de mands that natura l pare nts ag ain be a ffor ded a presumption o f superior rights in a subse quent modification pr oc e e din g . O f c ou rs e , w he rea n in iti a l or de r d oe s not e xist, or is otherwise inva lid, then the Constit ution requires a court to apply

the superior rights doc trine.

. . . . Ac c or din g ly , w e ho ld that a natur a l pa

re nt is no t g e ne ra lly e nti tle d to inv ok e thedo c trineof su pe ri or ri g hts to mod ify

a va lid custody order awa rding custody

to a non-pa

rent. Instead, in the absenc e of e x traordina

ry circ umstances—f

or i nstance , the natura l pare nt was n o t aff

orded an opportunity

to assert superior pare ntalN at ural l y t he juveni l e co urt was not requi red t o de t erm i ne t hat t he f at her i n B la ir w as u n f i t or pos ed a 2 subst ant i al ri sk o f

harm t o t he chi l d be cause t he f at her vol unt ari l y agreed t o rel i nq ui sh cust o d y of t he chi l d t o t he g ra n d p a re n t. B la ir , 77 S. W

. 3d a t 146.

rig hts in the init ial custody proce eding ; the custody

order is invalid on its face ; the order i s the result of fraud or proce dural illeg ality ; or the order g rants only temporary custody to the non-par ents— a trial c ourt should apply

the standar d typically

applied in par ent-vs-pa rent modification ca ses: that a material ch an g e in circ umstances ha s oc c ur re d, wh ic h ma

ke s a c ha ng e in c us tod y

in the c hil d' s b e st interests. Se e

, e .g ., Nic hol

s v . N ic hol s , 7 9 2 S

. W .2d 713, 715-16 (T e nn . 1 99 0) . A s ina ll o the r c a se s, thebu rd e n o f e sta bli sh ing the se fac tors rests upon the pa rty seeking the chang e in custody

. See Rog e ro v . P

itt , 759 S.W .2d 109, 112 (Tenn. 1988)

. Id . at 14 3–48 ; see also Kendrick v. Shoem ake , 9 0 S.W .3d 566, 575 (Tenn. 2002) (applying the materia l chang e in circu m s tance s standard to a petition to modi fy

custody from one pa

rent to the other pa rent). F inding the in i t i al custody order to be valid, the supre me court determined that the fathe r could not avail hims elf of the superior pare ntal rig hts doc trine in the subseque nt modification proce eding

. Bla ir , 77 S.W.3 d at 14 6; see also Means v. Ashby , 130 S.W .3d 48,57 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (r eiterating the differ encebetwee n the standar d applicable to an initial custody determination as opposed to a pe tition t o modify when a non-par ent is involved). I n the ins ta nt c a se , F a the r a tte mpt s to dis tin g uis h the pr e se nt c a se fr om Bl air by no tin g that, u n li k e th e f

a th e r in Bl air , he did not voluntarily relinquish custody

to Grandpa

rents. In Bl air , the fathe r ar g ued on appe al that he c ould assert his super i o r p ar en t al rig hts in the modification pr oc e e din g be c aus e he wa s ne ve r fo un d to b e a n u nf it p are nt b y

thelow e r c ou rt
. Bla ir , 77 S.W .3d 2 a t 14 6. Th e su pr e me c ou rt a dd re sse d th e e ff

e c t of thefathe r’ s d e c isi on to v olu nta ri ly rel in qu ish cu s t o d y t o t h e gr an d m o t h er

i n t h e i n i t i al p ro ce ed i n g, s t at i n g: [A] pa re nt’ s v olu nta

ry c on se nt t o c e de c us tod y

to a no n- pa re nt d e fe a ts the ability

of that par ent to later c lai m s u p er i or par ental rig hts in a subse q u e n t p r o c e e d in g to mo d if y c u s to d y . Pr e s u mi n g th a t a p ar e nt is affor ded the opportunityto assert superior pare ntal rig hts in the initial cu s t ody

proce eding , then the par ent’s voluntary transfe r of custody to a non-pa

rent, with knowledg e of the conseque nces of that t ra n s fe r, ef

fec tively operates as a w aiver

of these f

undamental pare ntal rig hts. Under these circ umstances, ther efor e, the Constit ution does not ag ain entitle the natur al par ent to assert sup erior pare ntal rig hts to mod i fy

a valid custody

order , even if

no court ha s pr e vio us ly

fo un d th e natur a l pa

re nt t o b e un fi t. Id . at 14 7–48

. F a the r is c or re c t in no tin g that, sin c e vo lun tary re lin qu ish me nt is no t a n is su e in this c a se , it c a nn ot be us e d as a jus tif

ic a tio n for

pr e ve nti ng him

fr om a sse rt ing his su pe ri or pa re nta l rig hts i n t h e m o d i fi ca t i o n p ro ce ed i n g.T hi s order cons i s t ed of t he r ef er ee’ s f i ndi ng s wh i ch wer e c onf i r med by t he j uv eni l e c our t
. Af t er 3
co nsi d eri ng Father ’ s p et i t i o n fo r a r eheari ng, t he juveni l e co urt dis m i ss ed Father ’ s p et i t i o n and reconfi rme d t he p re v io u s o rd e r.

W e ar e mi n df

u l t h at w e do n ot h av e a copy of t h e t r an s cr i pt of

t h e h ea r i n g h el d i n 2000 t o r ev i ew on 4
a p p e a l. H o w e v e r, a s p re v io u sly no te d , t h e trial c o u rt is d e e m e d to sp e a k o n ly t h ro u g h it s w ritten ju d g m e n t. E lm o re v. E lm o re , N o. E2004- 00301- CO A- R3- CV , 2004 T en n . App. LEX I S 873, a t * 7 ( T en n . Ct

. App. D ec . 29, 2004) (ci t i ng Stat e v. Bough , 15 2 S.W

. 3 d 45 3 , 46 2 (T enn. 20 0 4 ))

. Father also arg ues that this c ase prese nts one of the “extraordinary circ umstances” alluded to in Bl air which war

rants the application of the superior pa renta l rig hts doctrine in the modification proce eding

. Id . at 148. Specific ally , Father c ontends that the juvenile court, when issuing the initial custody order in 2000, ignor ed his superior parenta l rig hts by dismiss ing his petition, and the c ourt ne ver adj ud ica ted him an u nf it p are nt o r c on c lud e d th a t hepo se d a su bs ta nti a l risk

of ha rm to h is c hil d. Th us , it

is a pp are nt t o th is C ou rt

that Fath er, wi tho ut c iti ng a ny auth ority in s up po rt

of his position on appe al, is arg uing, in e ssence , that the juvenile court’s orig inal order awa rding custody to Grandpa

rents is invalid. I f dee med invalid, then the juvenile c ourt err ed by not ap p l y i ng the superior pa

renta l rig hts doctrine to the F ather ’s petition f or a modification of custody

. See id. We fi ndF a the r’ s a

rg ume nt i n th is r e g ardto b e me ri toriou s. I n response to the position take n by Father on a

ppeal, Gr andpar ents arg ue that, since Father rec eived a p re s u m p t i o n that his parenta l rig hts were superior to Gr andpar ents’ rig hts in the init ial proce eding pursuant to the supre me court’s decision in Bl air , his rights a s a biolog ical par ent wer e adequately

protec ted, there fore , the initial custody order is valid. W e cann o t agr ee . The orig inal c us tod y or de r e nte re d in20 00 me re ly pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s: 3 1. The [ Gra ndpare nts’] petition filed on S eptember 28, 2000 be sustained. 2. Said child(ren) is (are ) depe ndent and ne g lected c hild(re n) wi thi n th e me a nin g of

thela w of th e S tate of

Te nn e sse e in that said child(re n)’s mother has failed to provide prope r ca re, support or supervision.

. . . . 1. That the I nterve ning Petiti on filed [ by fathe r] in thi s Court on September 28, 2000 be dismiss ed. No a dd iti on a l f

ind ing s o f f

a c t or c on c lus ion s o f l a w w e rema de by thejuv e nil e c ou rt
. 4 As previously

noted, an initial child custody dispute involving a biolog ical par ent and anonpare nt r equire s the courts of this state to e ng ag e in a two- part inquiry

. In re Askew , 993 S.W .2d 1, 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; see also Nolen v. N olen , N o . M 2 0 0 2

- 0 0 1 3 8

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 2 0 0 3 T e n n . A p p . LE X IS 546, at *6-7 (T enn. Ct. App. Aug

. 5, 2003). First, “[t]he magnitude of a par ent’s constitutional rig ht to rea r and ha ve custody of his or her children would nece ssitate a clear finding of su bs ta nti a l ha

rm ” by the trial court. Id. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . O nc e thetria l c ou rt ha s ma de thi s in iti a l f

ind ing , it mus t g o further to de termine that placing custody of the child with a particular individual is in the child’s best interest. Id.Si nce t he ori gi nal pet i t i on for c us t od y f i l ed by G r andpar ent s was i n t he nat ur e of a depen dency an d neg l ect 5 p ro c e e d ing , t h e ju v e n ile c o u rt h a d e x c lus ive ju risd ic tio n . See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 7

- 1

- 1 0 3 (a)( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 3 ). “ [A ]ny appe al f r om a n y f

i n al or der or j u dg men t i n [ a]

. . . de pen den t a n d n eg l ec t pr oce edi n g , f i l ed u n der t h i s c h apt er , ma y be mad e t o t he ci r cui t cour t wh i ch s hal l he ar t he t es t i mo ny of wi t nes s es an d t r y t he cas e de no vo . T h e appe al s h al l be per fec t ed wi t h i n t en ( 10) da y s , e x cl u di n g n on j u di ci al da y s , fol l owi n g t h e j u v en i l e cou r t ’ s di s pos i t i on . ” T en n . Code A nn. § 3 7

- 1

- 1 5 9 (a) (20 0 3 ); s e e al s o In r e M . J. B. , 14 0 S.W

. 3 d 64 3 , 65 1 (T enn. C t
. A p p . 20 0 4 ) ( o ut l i ni ng t he p ro c e d u re fo r a p p e a ling fi n a l o rd e rs in d e p e n d e n c y a n d ne g le c t ca se s) . “A p p e a ls fro m a n o rd e r o f t h e . . . circ u it cou r t pu r s u an t t o t h i s s u bs ec t i on ma y be c ar r i ed t o t h e cou r t of a ppea l s a s pr ov i ded by l aw . ” T en n . Code An n . § 37- 1

- 1 5 9 (c) (20 0 3 ). We are mindful that Fathe r neve r appe aled the juve nile court’s initial custody order

. 5 Howe v er , we f

ind the supreme c ourt’s dec ision in In re Askew a ndsu bs e qu e nt d e c isi on s b y thi s Court interpreting that decision to be controlling in this case. The supreme c ourt’s dec ision in In re Askew involved unique fa cts similar to those present in this case . The c hild’s biologica l mother e xpe ri e nc e d f

inanc ia l pr ob le ms s ho rt ly a ft e r the birth o f h e r c hil d, and sh e pe rm itt e d a thi rdpa rty to car e for

her c hild. Id. a t 1. I n 19 94 , the thi rd pa rty fi le d a pe tit ionse e kin g c us tod y

of thec hil d and simply

alleg ed, as a

justification for custody , that the child had been l iving with her since 1991. Id. at 1-2. The juvenile court subsequently awa rded custody to the third party in a “p er fu n ct ory order ” which did not contain any finding s as to the biologica l pa rent’s unfitness or depe ndency and neg lect. Id. at 2. Shortly thereaf t er, the biologica l mother filed a pe tition i n the juvenile court re q u es t i n g t h att h e e ar l i ero rd erb e s etas i d e s i n ce s h e d i d n o tre ce i v e p ro p ern o t i ce o f t h e h ea ri n g. Id. She also asserted that a mate rial chang e in circ umstances wa rrant ed a re turn of the c hild’s custody to the mother. Id. T h e juvenile court conc luded that the mother did not re ceive proper notice, and the court a war ded the third pa rty temporary

custody of the daug hter until such time as the biologic al par ents could demonstrate they wer e able to car e for

the child. Id. On appe al, this Court noted that the mother did not appea l the orig inal order , and we cited its re s ju dic ata eff

ect. Id. a t 4. Th e su pr e me c ou rt dis a g re e d a nd no te d the abs e nc e of a n impli c it or explicit finding of su b s t an t i al h ar m or depe ndency and neg lect in the orig inal order

. Id. The supreme court, relying on the temporary nature of the lang uag e used in the orig inal order , held that the orig inal order

did not constitut e a f

inal order

. Id. As a

re su lt, thec ou rt

he ld a s f oll ow s: It appea rs that no valid initial determination was e ver ma de that [g ranti ng the th ir d party ] cu sto dy of [the c hil d] w ou ld r e su lt i n “substantial harm” to the child. Absent such a f inding, weconclude that the deprivation o f t h e cust ody of her child has re sulted in an abridg ment of [the moth er ’s ] fundamental rig ht to privacy

. Bond , 89 6 S. W.2 d at 54 8; Na le , 87 1 S.W. 2da t 68 0; Haw k , 855 S.W .2d at 577. I n light of the unique circ umstances of this case, webelieve that the Cou rtof Appe als has misapplied modification of c ustody principles whe n no valid initial orde r depriving the natural mother of custody exis ted. I n the absen ce o f such a va lid init ial order , we believe that it would be unconstit utional for the natural mother to bea r the burden of proving the absenc e of substantia l h ar m. Bec ause the re c or d d oe s n ot sh ow tha t a fin din g o f su bs tan tia l ha rm was ma de in this case, constitutional pri nciples compe l us to rev erse the de cisionsT h is c o u rt h a s p re v io u sly sta te d tha t a find ing o f sub sta n tial h a rm to a c h ild m a y i n c lud e a fi n d ing tha t a 6 p a re n t i s u n fit o r th a t t h e c h ild is d e p e n d e n t an d ne g le c te d

. See N ol en v. N ol en , No

. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 0 1 3 8

- C OA

- R 3

- C V, 2 0 0 3 T enn. A p p . LE X IS 5 4 6 , at * 8 (T enn. C t
. A p p . A ug. 5, 20 0 3 ) ( ci t i ng I n r e Askew , 9 9 3 S .W .2 d a t 4 ); El l i ngt on v. M addox , N o. W 2000- 00948- CO A- R3- CV , 2001 T en n . App. LEX I S 159, a t * 17 ( T en n . Ct

. App. M ar . 12, 2001) (ci t i ng I n r e Askew , 99 3 S.W

. 2 d at 4). A ny argument by G randp arent s i n t hi s regard wo ul d not b e m eri t o ri o us. T he i ni t i al order s t at es t hat T

. M

. S. i s depended and n egl ect ed s i nce “ m ot her has f ai l ed t o pro vi d e p rop er care, s up p o rt an d s u per v i s i on . ” ( emph as i s a dded)

. N o f i n di n g w as ma de, e i t h er i mpl i ci t l y or e x pl i ci t l y , r eg ar di n g t h e ade qu ac y of F a the r’s c a re fo r T .M .S

. M o re o v e r, w h ile th e ju v e n ile c o u rt’s failur e to m a k e a fi n d ing o f sub sta n tial h a rm is d isp o sitive o f t h e issu e s p re se n te d fo r o u r re so lutio n , w e a lso no te tha t co n sp ic u o u sly a b se n t f ro m the initial o rd e r is a fi n d ing tha t p la c ing c u sto d y o f T .M .S . w ith G ra n d p a re n ts is i n the c h ild ’s b e st inte re st. See I n r e Askew , 993 S .W .2 d a t 4 ; N ol en , 20 0 3 T enn. A p p . LE X IS 5 4 6 , at * 6

- 7

. T hus, t he i ni t i al ord er of cust o d y hand ed do wn b y t he ju v e n ile c o u rt is d e fec tive in this r e g a rd a s w e ll.

of t he low e r c ou rts
. Id. at 5 (e mphasis added)

. Ad mitte dly , n oth ing in the ini tia l or de r r e nd e re d b y thejuv e nil e c ou rt

in this c a se su g g e sts that it was intended to be te mporary in nature or

that the trial court intended to ret u rn cu s t o d yof T.M.S. t o Fa t h er at some later time. Howe ver, subse quent dec isions rendere d by this Court have relied on the analy sis by

the supreme court in In re Askew to hold that, if an orig inal custody order does not include the r equisite finding of substantial harm, it amounts to an invalid order and is not enfor cea ble. Se e Wil

lia ms v. Thr

ail kil l , N o . W 1 9 9 9

- 0 1 0 3 2

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 2 0 0 0 T e n n . A p p . LE X IS 718, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2000) (r ely ing on In re Askew to hold that an order which does not contain a finding of subs tantial harm to the c hild constitut ed an inva lid order whic h cannot be e nf or c e d) ; Heathm an-Wood v. Wood , N o . M 1 9 9 9

- 0 0 3 4 1

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 2 0 0 0 T e n n . A p p . LE X IS 541, at *15-16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug

. 16, 2000) (re asoning that, even though the initial orde r was not temporary

as in In re Askew , it did not c onstitut e a valid order since it f ailed to c ontain a finding that su bs ta nti a l ha

rm to the c hil d wou ld re su lt if pla c e d inthec us tod y of thefathe r) ; Enge l v . Young , No. M2001-00734-COA- R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. L EXI S 216, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar . 14, 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g In re Askew fo r the pr op os it io n that a n o rd e r w hic h d oe s n ot i nc lud e there qu isi te finding of substantial harm is an inva lid order)

. Since the orig inal custody order handed dow n by

the juvenile court does not contain a c lear fi nd ing that a wa

rd ing c us tod y of T. M. S. to Fathe r wo uld re su lt in subs ta nti a l harm to thec hil d, it 6 amounts to an invalid order based on the afor ementioned authorities. Since this case r epre sents one o f th e “ e xtr a o r d in ar y

c ir c u ms tan c e s ” s e t f

o rthin Bl air , the juvenile court errone ously applied the materia l chang e in circ umstances standard to Father’ s petition to m odify the orig inal custody

order

. See Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 137, 148 (Tenn. 2002) . I nstead, the juve nile court should have applied the pr esumption of superior pa rental ri gh t s whi ch re quires the Gr andpar ents to prove, by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, that T.M.S. will be exposed to substantial harm if he is place d in the custody of F ather

. See In re Askew , 9 93 S.W. 2da t 4; Hal l v . Bo ok out , 87 S.W .3d 80, 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Whil e trial c ourts nece ssarily have br oad dis cr etion when f ashioning a custody arr ang ement base d on the unique circ umstances prese nt in an individual c ase, w e must reve rse suc h decisions when the lower c ourt applies an inc orre ct leg al standar d. S e e E n g e l v . Young , No. M2001-00734-COA- R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXI S 216, at *19 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar . 14, 2003) (c i t i n g Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) ).A ltho u g h the ju v e n ile c o u rt a w a rd e d c u sto d y to the F a the r fo r a n inc o rr e c t re a so n , t h e c o u rt’s d e c isio n to 7
r et ur n c us t od y of

T

. M

. S. t o Fat her f

ur t her demo ns t r at es t he t ot al abs enc e of ev i dence i ndi cat i ng t hat Fat her i s an u n fit p a re n t. Although w e havedetermined that the juvenile court employ ed an inc orre ct leg al standar d in this ca se, a rema nd of this c ase to the juve nile court for further proce eding s reg arding the custody of T.M.S. is not warranted. Our de novo revie w of the rec ord reve als that it is completely devoid of evi den ce w hic h w ou ld i nd ic a te that F a the r i s a n u nf it p are nt o r that hi s h a vin g c us tod y of T. M. S. poses a substantial risk of ha rm to the child. I n fac t, the testimonyof Grandpare nts solidifies our 7 fi n d i n g i n t h i s re gar d

. Gr an d fa th ero ff er ed t h e f o l l o wi n g t es t i m o n y

att h e h ea ri n g: Q. Okay . Now, what conce rns do y ou have w ith [ Father] reg arding him having c ustody with his son? A. I think [ T.M.S.] is being denied the bonding and the loving c area ndsta

bleho me e nv ir on me nt that we we reableto pr ov idehim

. Q. So y ou ’r e say ing that [F a the r] doesn’ t ha ve a sta bleho me e nv ir on me nt? A. No, I ’m saying that when he has custody , it’s to the exclusion of the other

half of [ T.M.S.’s] family that [T.M.S .] has been wi th e ve r s inc e he ’s be e n b orn f or ov e r f ivey e ars . Gr a nd mothe r o ff

e re d th e fo llo wi ng op ini on re g ard ing a de c isi on to re turn c us tod y of T. M. S. t o Father: THE C OURT: Ma’am, do y ou ever think there’s g oing to be a time when the fathe r shoul d be allowed to be a father to the c hild? THE WI TNESS: Yes, sir, one day

. I just don’t think right now in h is l if e it’ s th e be st thin g fo r h im.

. . . . THE COURT: W h en d o y o u t h i nk that would be? A y ear

f r o mn o w , t w o y e ar s f

r o mn o w , f

i v e y e ar s ? THE WI TNESS: I ’m not sure. I ’m n o t s u re. I just don’t think

ri g ht n ow in h is l if

e it’ s th e be st thin g fo r h im. Such testimonydoes not constitute the foundation u p o n wh i ch the juvenile court could build a de c isi on that r e turnin g c us tod y of T. M. S. t o F a th e r w ou ld p os e a su bs ta nti a l risk

of ha rm to this child. Acc ord in g ly , w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e ju v e n il e c o u rt r e a c h e d th e c o rr e c t r e s u lt b y r e tu r n ing custody of T.M.S. to Fathe r, albe it for an e rrone ous rea son. We vacate t he juvenile court’s order at issue on appea l, a n d w e r e man d th is c a s e to th e ju v e n il e c o u rt f o r th e e n try o f a n o r d e r r e tu r ning custody of T.M.S

. to Father for the reasons set forth herein. As a result of our decision in this case, it i s n ot n e c e ssa

ry that w e a dd re ss the a lte rn a tiv e iss ue raise d b y Gr a nd pa re nts on app e a l.T he T en ne ssee R ules o f A p p ell ate P ro ce d ure p ro vid e a s fo l l o w s: 8

R evi ew general l y wi l l ext end only t o t ho se i ss ues present ed fo r r evi ew. T he ap p el l at e co urt s hal l al so co nsi d er whet her t he t ri al and ap p el l at e co urt have juri sdi ct i o n ove r t he subject m at t er, whet her or not p res ent ed fo r r evi ew, and m a y i n i t s di s cr et i on c o n sid e r o the r issu e s in o rd e r, a m o n g o the r re a so n s: (1 ) to p revent need l ess l i t i gat i o n, (2) t o prevent i njury t o t he i nt erest s o f t he p ub l i c, and (3 ) t o p rev en t p rej ud i ce t o t he jud i cial p ro ce ss. T enn. R

. A p p . P

. 13 (b) (20 0 4 ) ( em p hasi s ad d ed ).

A t t he concl us i on of

t he hea r i ng i n t hi s mat t er , t he j uv eni l e c our t i ns t r uct ed t he part i es t o cr af t a pr op ose d 9 vi si t at i o n s ched ul e fo r G randp arent s. T he vi si t at i o n s ched ul e set fo rt h i n t he juveni l e co urt ’ s o rder represent s t he c o u rt’s a d o p tio n o f F a the r’s p ro p o se d visita tio n sc h e d u le a s m o d ifi e d b y the c o u rt. I n light of our

decision in this case, it is nece ssary that we a l s o ad d re s s t h e issue of Gra ndpare nts’ visitation as set forth in t h e o rder

. After determining that F ather

should rece ive 8 custody of T.M.S., the juvenile court also stated that Grandpare nts should re c e iv e“ li b e r al v isitation.” Th e juv e nil e c ou rt inc lud e d in the or de r a de ta ile d v isi tatio n s c he du le to a c c omp lis h th is g oa l. Th is 9 Cou rt ha s p re vio us ly

state d a s f

oll ow s: A court may

not awar d a non-pa

rent visitation unless the non-par ent can show that denial of visitation prese nted a substantial risk of ha rm to the child. Se e Simm ons v . Si mm ons , 900 S.W .2d 682, 685 (Tenn. 1995). I f an order g ranting visitation does not inc lude a fi n d i n g on the i ssue of substantial harm, that order is invalid. See In re Askew , 993 S.W .2d at 4. Engel v. Engel , N o. M2 00 1- 00 73 4- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 3 T e nn . A pp . LEX I S 21 6, a t *1 4 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Mar. 14, 2003) . Nowher e in th e juvenile c ourt’s orde r is there a finding that denying G r a n d p ar e n t s v i s i t a t i o n w i t h T

. M

. S

. w o u l d p o s e a s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k

o f h ar mt o t h e c h i l d

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we mus t va c a te theor de r f or thi s r e a so n a s w e ll. On rema nd, the juvenile court may conduct a new hearing to a ddress this iss u e c o n s i s t ent with statutory and case law g overning the g rant of visitation to a non-pa rent. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 6- 30 2, -3 06 (2 00 3) ; Simm ons v . Si mm ons , 9 00 S.W. 2d68 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; Haw k v . Ha wk , 855 S.W. 2d57 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; Ottinger v. Ottin ger , No. E2003-02893- COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEX I S 45 9 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . July 21 , 2 00 4) ; Hale v. Culpepper , No. M2002-01955-COA- R3-CV, 20 03 Te nn . Ap p. LEX I S 89 9 (T e nn . Ct. Ap p. De c . 2 2, 20 03 ); Ellison v. Ellison , 994 S.W .2d 623 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 8) ; Hil lia rd v . Hi lli

ar d , N o . 0 2 A 0 1

- 9 6 0 9

- C H

- 0 0 2 3 0 , 1 9 9 7 T e n n . A p p . LE X IS 10 5 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . F e b. 12 , 1 99 7) ; Flo y d v . M c Ne e ly , No. 02A01 -9 4 0 8 -C H- 0 0187, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXI S 443 (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 5, 1995). Should the juvenile court determine that gr anting vis itatio n to Gr a ndpar e nts is c on sis te nt w ithsu c h auth ority , th e juv e nil e c ou rt ma y inc lud e thi s finding in the new or der. IV.C ONCL US I ON

For the fore g oing rea sons, w e vacate the juvenile c ourt’s orde r and r emand this ca se to the juvenile court for entry

of an or der c onsistent with the findings in this opinion. Costs of thi s appea l are taxed to the Appellants, J oseph Smith and Deborah Smit h, and their surety , for which execution may issue if nec essary .

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE