IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter of the Guardianship of: ELLA NORA DENNY, an incapacitated person. RICHARD DENNY and THOMAS ANDERSON, Appellants,

OHANA FIDUCIARY CORPORATION, FULL GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE AND LIMITED GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON OF ELLA NORA DENNY, Respondent. DIVISION ONE CTNo. 70312-9-1 ^ (consol. with No. 70610-1-1) L

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: August 1,2016 Dwyer, J. — This is the second appeal from proceedings in the management ofthe limited guardianship ofElla Nora Denny. The appellants,
one purporting to act as Mrs. Denny's "next friend," raise several issues related to the guardianship court's approval ofthe guardian'sthird annualreport and related orders. Finding no error in the superior court's continued management of Mrs. Denny's guardianship or its supervision of the appointed guardian, we
affirm.No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/2

I The circumstances supporting the establishment of Mrs. Denny's limited guardianship in 2009 and what transpired in the guardianship prior to the events underlying this appeal are known to the parties and, additionally, are set forth in
ouropinion from the first appeal in this matter. See In re Guardianship ofDenny, No. 69117-1 (consolidated with No. 69610-6-1) (Denny I). This appeal concerns three orders entered by the superior court. The April 1, 2013 orderapproved the third annualreport ofthe guardian, Ohana 

### Fiduciary Corporation. The May 23, 2013 orderdenied Richard Denny's1 motion for reconsideration of the April 1, 2013 order and awarded attorney fees to the 

### guardianship estate, payment ofwhich was assessed as Richard's responsibility. The June 26, 2013 orderapproved the amount ofattorney fees requested by 

### Ohana and granted Ohana's requestto restrict Richard from filing new pleadings until hepaid outstanding attorney feejudgments heowed the guardianship

estate. The Guardian's Third Annual Report is Approved 

### On April 1, 2013, the superior court convened a hearing toconsider Ohana'sthird annual report, which covered the period January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012. The superior court considered over 300 pages of documentary evidence and competing arguments from three attorneys—one each for Richard, Marianne Zak (Mrs. Denny's daughter), and Ohana. The issues addressed at the April 1, 2013 hearing included:
1Richard Denny is referred to by his first name to avoid confusion. He is Mrs. Denny's

son.No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1 -l)/3
1. Guardianship Court's Authority. Richard orally objected to the superior court's ruling on the third annual report when issues relating to the second annual report were on appeal. The superior court overruled Richard's objection, ruling that it had ongoing authority over Mrs. Denny's guardianship and that approval of the third annual report did not affect the issues on appeal. 2. CaregiverBudget. Richard objected to a live-in companion caregiver forMrs. Denny being paid for by the guardianship estate. The superior court overruled Richard's objectionbased on Mrs. Denny's documented needs. 3. $100,000.00 Bond. Richard requested that the superior court consider whether Ohana's $100,000 bond was adequate in light of the fact it managed the checking account for Denny Resources LLC (DR LLC) and madeaggregate distributions from the LLC to Mrs. Dennytotaling approximately $333,000 in 

### 2012, as reflected in the guardian's annual report. The superior court approved 

### Ohana's management ofDR LLC and distribution ofLLC income in 2012. The superior court found that the $100,000 bond was adequate. 

### 4. Estate PlanningAttorney Fees. Richard objected to the fees requested 

### by attorney Timothy Austin for estate planning services rendered to Mrs. Denny. The superior court approved the fees. 

### 5. Accusations Against Marianne. Richard objected to Ohana's decision 

### not to pursue a protection order against his sister, Marianne, after Mrs. Denny 

### tested positive for cocaine in December 2012. The superiorcourt concluded that Ohana's response was appropriate and that the guardian properly addressed the risk to Mrs. Denny byhiring a 24-hourlive-in caregiver.No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/4

6. Marianne's Request to Sanction Richard. Marianne requested that the superior court sanction Richard for accusing her of wrongdoing without an evidentiary basis. The superior court declined to impose sanctions but warned Richard's attorney not to file pleadings without conducting a reasonable investigation. 7. Request forDiscovery. Richard's attorney asked permission to conduct discovery. The superior court denied the request, finding "[tjhereis nothing here
that warrants a trial." 8. Conflict ofInterest. Richard requested that the superior court remove 

### Ohana's attorney, Thomas Keller, becauseofan alleged conflict ofinterest.2 The superior court denied this request, finding there to be no conflict ofinterest. 9. Counselfor Mrs. Denny. Richard objected to the superior court ruling on the third annual reportwithout appointing counsel for Mrs. Denny. The 

### superior court overruled this objection and noted thatthis was oneofthe issues

on appeal. After considering the documentary evidence and competing arguments at 

### the April 1, 2013 hearing, thesuperior court entered the"OrderApproving Third Annual Report ofLimited Guardian ofthe Person and Full Guardian oftheEstate and Authorizing Payment ofFees, Costs and Other Expenses."3 Richard moved for reconsideration ofthe April 1, 2013 order, asserting thatthe superior court lacked authority under RAP 7.2 to rule on Ohana'sthird 2Richard had previously made the same allegation only to withdraw it. On June 6, 2012, Richard represented to the superior courtthrough his attorney: "Richard withdraws the objection that Mr. Keller or [Ohana] have a conflictof interest." 3The superior court incorporated its oral ruling into the written order entered April 1, 2013.No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/5 annual report due to the pendency of the firstappeal (Denny I). Ohana filed a response at the request of the superior court. Marianne responded separately that Richard's "delays and multiple appeals are not in the best interest ofElla Nora Denny" and expressed "grave concerns about the extent to which he may be manipulating and influencing their mother." The superior court denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered Richard to reimburse the guardianship estate for the attorney fees incurred responding to his motion. The superior court made 17additional unchallenged findings of fact in support of its ruling, including that [tjhere was a lack of candor to the Court in the failure to disclose the Court of Appeals Notation Ruling.'4' There was a lack of diligence in arguing that theApril 1, 2013 Order changed the March 29, 2012 Order. The Motion to Reconsider review of the Guardian's Third Annual Report was not in Mrs. Denny's best interests, as the role of the Superior Court is to oversee the Guardian's conduct. 

### The Superior Court Ordered Richard to Stop Filing New Pleadings Until He PaidAttorney FeeJudgments Owed to the Guardianship Estate On June 26, 2013, the superior court conducted a hearing to consider 

### Ohana's petition to approve the amount ofits fees and toprohibit Richard from filing additional pleadings in theguardianship until hepaid theoutstanding attorney fee judgments he owed the guardianship estate. After considering theevidence andcompeting arguments, the superior court awarded the guardianship estate ajudgment of$10,355.98 against Richard, and prohibited Richard from filing anymore pleadings until the new
4The Notation Ruling referred toin the superior court order wasour commissioner's notation ruling ofMarch 6, 2013, which stated, in pertinent part: "The guardianship ofMs. Denny isongoing, and thetrial courtwill continue toenterorders."

-5-No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/6 judgment of $10,355.98 and priorjudgment of $9,338.44 were paid.

II Apreliminary matter in this appeal is what to make ofbriefs filed in Mrs. Denny's name by Thomas Anderson, whopurports to be acting as Mrs. Denny's
"next friend." Anderson is the son ofMrs. Denny's brother, Martin Anderson, from whom Mrs. Denny wished to keep information about herguardianship. Anderson first attempted to involve himselfin the ongoing management ofMrs. Denny's 

### guardianship in April 2012. Atthat time, hefiled with the guardianship court, inter alia, a motion to modify Mrs. Denny's guardianship and replace Ohana as 

### guardian. The guardianship court dismissed Anderson's motion without a 

### hearing and awarded Ohana reasonable attorney fees (assessed against Anderson) for its related efforts. Thecourt alsoordered Anderson to posta nonresident security bond. Anderson never posted a security bond but, nevertheless, continued for sometime tofile pleadings in the guardianship case. However, Anderson was not a party to any ofthe ordersherein on appeal. In thefirst appeal in this case, we concluded thatAnderson's motion to 

### modify the guardianship, which was the only potential basis for his involvement in the ongoing guardianship proceedings, was properly dismissed. Having so concluded, andwithout any separate argument from Anderson as towhy he should nevertheless have been permitted to act as Mrs. Denny's next friend on 

### appeal, we declined to address the other issues thatAnderson attempted to raise in that case as Mrs. Denny's "next friend."

6-No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/7 As in Denny I. Anderson offers us no argument regarding why he is entitled to act as Mrs. Denny's "nextfriend" on appeal. Rather, he simply declares himselfto be acting in that position in briefs that he filed in her name. 

### We, once again, reject Anderson's unsolicited and improper attempttoinvolve himselfin theongoing guardianship ofMrs. Denny and decline to address the issues that he attempts to raise herein.
Ill 

### In his second assignment oferror,5 Richard contends that "[t]he superior 

### courterred by entering the April 1, 2013 ordercontrary to RAP 7.2(a)." This is 

### so, he asserts, because his appeal in Denny Idivested the guardianship court of authority to enter further orders. We disagree. 

### RAP 7.2(a) provides, in pertinent part, that after review is accepted, "the 

### trial court has authority to act in acase only to the extent provided in this rule." Subsections (c)-(l) ofthe same rule identify circumstances in which atrial court 

### may enterrulings afterappellate review has been accepted. At leastone of these subsections authorizes each ofthe superior court's challenged rulings. 

### First, pursuantto RAP 7.2(e), the superiorcourt has authorityto hearand determine "postjudgmentmotions authorized bythe civil rules, the criminal rules,
or statutes." Herein, consideration ofthe petition to approve Ohana's third 

### annual report was authorized by RAP 7.2(e) because Ohana's petition was a 

### postjudgmentmotion required—notsimply authorized—by statute, specifically the mandatory annual review process for guardianships. See RCW 11.92.040(2)

5Richard's first assignment oferror is addressed below.

-7-No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/8 (review for guardianships ofthe estate); RCW 11.92.043(2) (review for guardianships ofthe person). While the cited rule requires the permission ofthe appellate courtprior to the entry of a trial courtdecision thatwill change a decision being reviewed by the appellate court, not even Richard argues that the April 1, 2013 order changed any ofthe orders thatwere onappeal at thetime. Second, pursuant to RAP 7.2(i), "[t]he trial court has authority to act on claims for attorney fees, costs and litigation expenses." Theportion oftheApril 1, 2013 order that approved Ohana's attorney fees, costs, and litigation expenses fell within RAP 7.2(i). 

### Third, pursuanttoRAP 7.2(1), "the trial court retains full authority to actin 

### the portion ofthe casethat is not being reviewed by the appellate court." The 

### April 1, 2013 orderwas permissible under RAP 7.2(1) because it concerned the latest annual reports required by RCW 11.92.040(2) and .043(2), notthe prior 

### annual reports thatwere subjectto appeal. Accord Town ofRuston v. Wingard, 70 Wn.2d 388, 390, 423 P.2d 543 (1967) (appeal from orderfinding defendant in 

### contemptfor violating apermanent injunction did not divesttrial court ofauthority to enter later order to show cause aftersubsequent act ofcontempt). 

### In short, for thevarious reasons setforth above, thesuperior court's order
did not violate RAP 7.2. 

### Indeed, the superior courtwasacting as required. By statute, guardians
are "at all times

. . . under thegeneral direction and control ofthecourt making 

### the appointment." RCW 11.92.010. The Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act, chapter 11.90 RCW, provides that "a

-8No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/9

court that has appointed a guardian or issued a protective order consistent with this chapter has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the proceeding until it is terminated by the court or the appointment or order expires by its own terms." RCW 11.90.240: accord In re Guardianship of Gaddis, 12Wn.2d 114, 125, 120 P.2d 849 (1942) ("[A] superior courtwhich has once properly acquiredjurisdiction over the administration of an incompetent's estate cannot divest itself of that jurisdiction until suchtime as theconditions requiring the guardianship have ceased."). This is consistent with the constitutional role of the superior court to act as 

### the "superior guardian" and protect theperson and estate ofincapacitated 

### persons. In re Guardianship ofLamb, 173 Wn.2d 173, 184, 190, 265 P.3d 876 (2011); In re Guardianship ofDecker, 188 Wn. App. 429, 451, 353 P.3d 669, review denied, 184Wn.2d 1015 (2015). By contrast, the Court ofAppeals' constitutional role is to review the decisions made by the lower courts, not to 

### replace them asfactfinders. SeeWash. Const, art. IV §30(3); RCW 2.06.030;
RAP 1.1(a). 

### Contrary toRichard's contention, it was properfor thesuperior court to 

### continue managing Mrs. Denny's guardianship even after Richard initiated an appeal from several of its earlier orders.
IV 

### Richard's first assignment oferror assertsthat "[t]he superior court erred 

### in ruling concerning the rights retained by Ms. Denny in its 2009 orderwithout

9No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/10 allowing her to retain counsel to advocate on herbehalf."6 We disagree. Washington's guardianship statutes, which are designed to comply with the requirements of due process, guarantee counselfor persons who are alleged to be incapacitated andfor persons already subject to a guardianship when "the rights and interests of..

. [the] adjudicated incapacitated person cannot otherwise be adequatelyprotected and represented." RCW 11.88.045(1 )(a). Theright to counsel afteran adjudication ofincapacity also existswhere fundamental liberty interests are at stake such as commitment to an institution, electroshock therapy, psychosurgery, orpsychiatric procedures thatrestrict freedom ofmovement. See RCW 11.92.043(5).7 

### The April 1, 2013 order did not involve any issues that implicated the right 

### to appointed counsel. The order pertained to a routine annual report under RCW 11.92.040(2) and .043(2). NeitherWashington's guardianship statutes nor due 

### process require the appointment ofcounsel for such an occasion. The superior court's approval ofthe third annual report did not deprive Mrs. Denny of constitutionally-protected liberty orproperty interests. Ohana did not request or 

### receive any expansion ofits authority or any restriction ofMrs. Denny's retained 

### rights, and the order maintained the status quo in the guardianship that had been
established in 2009.
6Richard asserted essentially the sameclaim in Denny I. It is, therefore, addressed in a somewhat abridged manner herein. 7See also In reGuardianship ofHaves. 93Wn.2d 228, 234, 608P.2d 635 (1980) (requiring independent guardian ad litem before superiorcourt may grant apetition for sterilization based on the "fundamental rightto procreate"); In re Guardianship ofK.M., 62 Wn. 

### App. 811, 817, 816 P.2d 71 (1991) (independentcounsel required because ofthe "gravity and finality ofan authorization to sterilize"); and In re Guardianship ofIngram, 102Wn.2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363 (1984) (independentcounsel appointed where the guardian sought authority to remove the ward's larynx).

-10-No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/11 Nevertheless, Richard contends that, because Mrs. Denny was permitted to engage Austin for matters related to the distribution of her estate, she should have been given independent counsel in the guardianship. However, the exception permitting Mrs. Dennyto retain court-approved counsel forestate planning services was included in the orderestablishing herguardianship in
2009. When the guardianship was established, the superior courtlimited Mrs. 

### Denny's right to engagecounsel. Among therestrictions imposed on Mrs. Denny in the 2009 order was termination of her right to enter into a contract and "to sue or be sued other than through a guardian." Notwithstanding the general 

### prohibition on her rightto contract, the 2009 order expressly preserved Mrs. 

### Denny's right to engage in estate planning with Austin, her longtime attorney for such matters. In 2012, Mrs. Denny's cognitive functioning was reevaluated, and she wasfound to be more impaired than when the guardianship was established. 

### Thereafter, thesuperior court reaffirmed thatMrs. Denny did not have the 

### capacity to engage counsel, exceptfor the previously authorized estate planning purposes. To change this provision ofthe guardianship order, Richard was required to file a petition to modify the guardianship under RCW 11.88.120, which he did not do, in anticipation of the third annual report. 

### The superior court did not errby approving thethird annual report without appointing counsel for Mrs. Denny.
V 

### In his third assignment oferror, Richard contends that"[t]he superior court

11No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/12 erred byruling that Denny Resources LLC is not a guardianship asset." He also contends that the superior court should have considered that Ohana manages the DR LLC checking account in reviewing the adequacy of the $100,000bond. We disagree on both accounts. Facts specific to this issue: Guardianship Bond and UnblockedAccounts Ohana maintains several unblocked accounts related to Mrs. Denny's 

### guardianship. In August 2012, Ohana petitioned to transferthe balance oftwo blocked accounts into an unblocked account for the payment oftaxes, attorney fees, and otherexpenses. The superior court approved this requestwithout 

### opposition after notice to Richard. As ofDecember 31, 2012, Ohana held $73,686.85 in unblocked accounts forMrs. Denny. Ohana's bond has been $100,000since the guardianship was established

in 2009. DRLLC 

### Priorto the guardianship, Mrs. Denny owned three apartment buildings that she transferred into three separate limited liability companies, LLC A, LLC B 

### and LLC C, one LLC for each property. These three LLCs areowned by afourth 

### LLC, DR LLC, which was also created by Mrs. Denny priorto the guardianship. DR LLC has 14 million membership units, composed of 140,000"A" units 

### that have voting rights, and 13,860,000 "B" units that have no voting rights. Mrs. 

### Denny once owned all 14 million units but, priorto the guardianship, shegave 500,000 "B" units to the Ella Nora Denny Family Trust (the Trust). Also priorto

-12No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/13 the guardianship, Mrs. Denny sold another 4,500,000 "B" units to the Trust in exchange for a $4,500,000 promissory note. The Trust is an irrevocable trust, and Mrs. Denny's children, Richard and Marianne, are the co-trustees. The order that appointed Ohana guardian in 2009 expressly stated that assets ofthe trusts are not part ofthe guardianship estate. On January 4, 2012, Mrs. Denny executed an assignment wherebythe DR LLC promissory note was gifted back to theTrust. Mrs. Denny's ownership share ofthe DR LLC units was and remained at the time ofthe third annual 

### report 64.29 percent. The Trust owned theother 35.71 percent oftheDR LLC units, which were outside the scope ofMrs. Denny's guardianship. DRLLC Income Reported to the Superior Court From the date ofits appointment through 2011, Ohana collected all ofthe 

### income from DR LLC and reported that income to thesuperior court.8 These 

### reports were approved by the superior court after notice to Mrs. Denny's children, 

### including Richard. With the express approval ofthe superior court, all ofthe LLC income was paid to the guardianship estate, even though Mrs. Denny owned 

### only 64.29 percent ofthe units, in lieu ofinterest payments on the promissory 

### note. Beginning in January 2012, when the promissory note was gifted back to theTrust, theTrust's share ofthe DR LLC income was distributed to the trustees 

### ofthe Trust (Richard and Marianne), ratherthan to Mrs. Denny's guardianship

estate.

### Ohana, as full guardian ofMrs. Denny's estate, which owned 64.29
8These reports included the initial inventory report, the interim report, the first annual report, and the second annual report.

-13-No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/14 percent ofthe outstanding units ofDR LLC, appointed itselfto manage DR LLC. Contrary to Richard's assertion that his "written objections and his counsel's arguments . . . alerted the superiorcourt that [Ohana] had appointed itself manager ofDenny Resources LLC," Br. ofAppellant (Richard Denny) at 15, Ohana reported this election, along with the functions performed by Ohana as LLC manager, to the superior court in 2012 and again in thethird annual report filed in 2013. Ohana's management of the DR LLC and distribution of the DR LLC income were expressly approved by the superior courtin the order approving the second annual report (which was onappeal in Denny I). As manager ofthe DR LLC, Ohanamaintains an LLC bankaccount, receives the rent distributions from the property management company, pays LLC administrative fees, and makes distributions from the LLC bank account to theTrust and to Mrs. Denny's guardianship account. Because Mrs. Denny 

### continues to own 64.29 percent ofDR LLC, Ohana transfers that percentage of the cash out ofthe DR LLC account to the guardianship operating account each month. BecausetheTrust (managed by Richard andMarianne outside the 

### guardianship) owns the other 35.71 percent ofDR LLC, Ohanatakes the Trust's 35.71 percent share ofthe DR LLC cash and divides itevenly between Richard and Marianne, payable to them as the co-trustees. The total funds distributed in this manner from the DR LLC to the 

### guardianship estate between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2012 was $333,330.96. This total was reported to the superior court in the third annual 

### report, aswell asanticipated distributions for 2013. Distributions from the DR

14No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/15
LLC were used alongwith Mrs. Denny's other monthly income to pay her substantial expenses. At the end of 2012, there was approximately $51,000 in undistributed income in the DR LLC account, of which 64.29 percent, or approximately $32,788, was Mrs. Denny's share. The other35.71 percentofthe undistributed income, totaling approximately $18,212, belonged to theTrust, was notsubjectto the superior court's oversight or the guardianship bond, and was subjectto the 

### control and protection oftheco-trustees, Richard and Marianne. The total ofthe 

### unblocked guardianship accounts totaled $73,686.85 as ofDecember 31, 2012. Thus, thetotal ofthe unblocked guardianship accounts, combined with Mrs. 

### Denny's share ofthe DR LLC account, was approximately $106,475.85. The 

### superior courtfound thatthe guardian's $100,000 bond was adequate to protect against the guardian's defalcation with regard to thesefunds.
A Richard first contends that the superior courterred byruling that DR LLC is not a guardianship asset. 

### "A limited liability company is a statutory business structure that is like a 

### corporation in that members ofthe company are generally not personally liable for the debts or obligations ofthe company and like a partnership in that it can be classified as a partnership for tax purposes and therefore avoid double taxation." Chadwick Farms Owners Ass'nv. FHC, LLC. 166Wn.2d 178, 186-87, 207 P.3d 

### 1251 (2009) (internal quotations marks omitted). Limited liability companies are "entirely creatures ofstatute." Chadwick, 166 Wn.2d at 187. The Washington

15No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/16
Limited Liability Company Act defines members' ownership interests as follows: The only interest of a member that is transferable is the member's transferable interest. A transferable interest is personal property. A memberhas no interest in specific limitedliability company property. RCW 25.15.246(1) (emphasis added). TheAct defines "transferable interest" as "a member's or transferee's right to receive distributions of the limited liability company's assets." RCW 25.15.006(19). Mrs. Denny's ownership of64.29 percent ofthe DR LLC units gives her a transferable interestin the company—namely, a right to receive 64.29 percent of DR LLC distributions. However, Mrs. Denny's ownership of units and associated rights did not convert thecorporation into a guardianship asset. 

### The superior court correctly ruled thatthe DR LLC is not a guardianship

asset. B 

### Richard also argues that the superior court erred by failing to considerthe funds Ohana distributed as manager ofthe DR LLC, including the funds distributed to thetrust administered by Richard andMarianne, in setting Ohana's bond amount. We disagree. 

### The guardianship bond operates as collateral security for the proper discharge ofthe duties imposed on the guardian by statute. Dickman v. Strobach, 26Wash. 558, 560, 67 P. 224 (1901). RCW 11.88.100 provides, in
relevant part: 

### Before letters ofguardianship areissued, each guardian orlimited 

### guardian shall. . . , unless dispensed with by order ofthe court as provided in RCW 11.88.105, file abond

... in such sum as the

16-No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/17 court may fix, taking into account the characterof the assets on hand oranticipated and the income to be received and disbursements to be made. (Emphasis added.) The guardianship bond may be dispensed with, orreduced, to the extent that liquid assets and securities are in blocked accounts, RCW 11.88.105, or ifthe assets of the guardianship estate are valued at less than $3,000. RCW 11.88.100: accord In re Estate ofTreadwell v. Wright, 115Wn. App. 238, 249, 61 P.3d 1214 (2003). Ohana's guardianship bond was originally set at $100,000. It was not 

### reduced despite thefact that income distributions toMrs. Denny declined with the 

### court-approved gift ofthe LLC promissory note to her children's Trust. In support 

### ofprior annual reports, Ohana presented substantial information about DR LLC and Ohana's role as manager, which alsonever resulted in any change to the 

### original $100,000 bond. In 2013, atthe request ofRichard, the superior court 

### again reviewed the adequacy ofthe $100,000 bond. After considering and evaluating Richard's concerns about Ohana serving as LLC manager, the 

### superior courtfound thatthe $100,000 bond remained adequate to protect Mrs. Denny's interests. Richard did not assign errorto this finding, which was, in any event, supported by substantial evidence. 

### As explained above, the nature ofMrs. Denny's interest in the DR LLC is the rightto receive 64.29 percent ofthe DR LLC distributions, not a64.29 

### percent ownership interest in the real property assets ofthe LLC. Richard improperly conflates the two when he argues that "Ms. Denny's 64% has a marketvalue ofnearly $6.5 million." Br. ofAppellant (Richard Denny) at 15.

-17No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/18
Mrs. Denny's share of the undistributed DR LLC account, coupled with the unblocked guardianship accounts, represents the unblocked "assets on hand." These totaled $106,475.85. Under these facts, the superior court did not err in finding the $100,000 bond adequate, "taking into accountthe characterofthe assets on hand or anticipated and the income to be received and disbursements

to be made." RCW 11.88.100.
VI Richard's fourth assignment oferrorstates that"[t]he superior court erred 

### in approving [Ohana]'s failure to report to the court material events concerning Ms. Denny's welfare." Br. ofAppellant (Richard Denny) at2. Richard's complaints are not properly before this court because hefails toassign errorto 

### any ofthe superior court's findings offact, contrary to RAP 10.3(g), fails to 

### provide a "separate concise statement" ofeach claimed errorby the trial court, 

### contrary to RAP 10.3(a)(4), and fails to provide this courtwith any legal authority to support his arguments, contrary to RAP 10.3(a)(6). "'Where no authorities are cited in support ofa proposition, the court is not required to search out 

### authorities, but may assume that counsel, afterdiligent search, has found none.'" State v. Logan. 102 Wn. App. 907, 911 n.1, 10 P.3d 504 (2000) (quoting DeHeer
v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962)). We decline to further address this claim of error.
VII 

### In his fifth assignment oferror, Richard contends that "[t]he superiorcourt erred in admonishing and threatening Richard's counsel with sanctions for

18-No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/19 inquiring about alleged incidents that relate to Ms. Denny's welfare." Br. of Appellant (Richard Denny) at 3. Under the same assignment, he also contends that the court improperly denied his oral request to conduct discovery. We disagree on both accounts. Atrialjudge has the authority and the responsibility to control litigants who threaten to impede the orderly conduct oflegal proceedings. See CR 11; Yurtis v, Phipps, 143 Wn. App. 680, 693, 181 P.3d 849 (2008); RCW 2.28.010(3). Herein, Richard asked for authorityto conduct discovery in his written 

### objections to Ohana's third annual report. He repeated his request atthe April 1, 2013 hearing after, in response toMarianne's motion requesting that he be sanctioned, the court cautioned him aboutfiling materials without conducting 

### reasonable investigation.9 The superior court denied therequest for discovery, 

### finding that "[t]here is nothing here thatwarrants atrial." When Richard nevertheless repeated the request, the superior court responded: 

### This guardianship isproceeding apace as it should, with the 

### exception oftheintermeddling ofMr. Denny. And theCourt sees absolutely no problem with the progress ofthe guardianship. 

### This finding was incorporated into the superior court's written order. 

### The superior court did not sanction Richard's attorney but, instead, cautioned him not to make further unfounded allegations. Richard does not 

### explain why such aremark is appealable but, in any case, the trial court's admonishment is amply supported by the record.
9In response to Ohana's petition regarding the drug overdose, Richard filed pleadings accusing his sisterofdrugging their mother, abusing drugs, cheating on her husband, and 

### wanting their motherto die, which provoked Marianne to requestthe sanctions againstRichard that the superior court denied.

-19-No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/20
The superior court also did not err infinding that Richard had not established good cause to conductdiscovery. Discovery in guardianship cases is governed by RCW 11.96A.115, which provides as follows: In all matters governed by this title, discovery shall be permitted only in the following matters: (1) Ajudicial proceeding that places one or more specific issues in controversy that has been commenced under RCW 11.96A.100, in which case discovery shall be conducted in accordance with the superior court civil rules and applicable local rules; or (2) A matterin which the court orders that discovery be permitted on a showing of good cause, in which case discovery shall be conducted in accordance with the superior court civil rules andapplicable local rules unless otherwise limited by the orderof the court. 

### There is no right to discovery in matters governed by TEDRA10 unless ajudicial proceeding has been filed placing oneormore specific issues in controversy. 

### Otherwise, parties must establish good cause to engage in discovery. Seeln_re Estate ofFitzgerald, 172Wn. App. 437, 447, 294 P.3d 720 (2012) (deferring to 

### trial court's refusal to grant a continuance to conduct discovery in aTEDRA matter). 

### Substantial evidence supports thetrial court's findings thatRichard did not 

### establish good cause to conductdiscovery. No evidence in the record supported Richard's requestto "investigate Ohana's accounts and Ms. Denny's living and
care situation." With regard tothe LLC's finances, as co-trustee, Richard 

### received monthly reports from the property manager relating to the DR LLC income anddistributions. Furthermore, the superior courtfound no deficiencies 

### with Ohana's annual reports, which were timely filed pursuant toRCW
10 Trust and EstateDispute Resolution Act, chapter 11.96A RCW

-20-No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-1)721 11.92.040(2) and .043(3), and included information about Mrs. Denny'sliving and

care situation. Moreover, from the record in this case, it is reasonable to infer that, if Richard were authorized to conduct discovery, the cost to Mrs. Denny would be substantial, the superior court and appellate courts would become mired in discovery disputes, and therewould be nodiscernible benefit to Mrs. Denny or her estate. Richard fails to demonstrate that the superior court erred either by 

### cautioning his attorney orby denying the oral request toconduct discovery. No appellate relief is warranted.
VIII Richard's sixth assignment oferror states his contention that"[t]he 

### superior court erred by ordering Richard to file no further pleadings with the court 

### until he paysjudgments that he has appealed." Br. ofAppellant (Richard Denny) at 3. Again, we disagree. 

### As noted above, superior courts have the "inherent power tocontrol the 

### conduct oflitigants who impede the orderly conduct ofproceedings." Yurtis, 143 

### Wn. App. at 693; seealso RCW 2.28.010(3). Acourt, therefore, has discretion to 

### place reasonable restrictions on any party who abuses thejudicial process. In_re Marriage ofGiordano, 57Wn. App. 74, 78, 787 P.2d 51 (1990) (approving 

### moratorium upon party filing any motions pending resolution oftrial).1 11

11 The court in Shutt v. Moore articulated thepublic policyjustification ofthis authority: 

### "'[Judicial resources arefinite. Timetaken to considerfrivolous claims is time notavailableto legitimate litigants. Baseless litigation furthermore burdens thejudicial support services.... Responsible litigants should not be prejudiced by delays socaused, nor should public treasury bearthe costs.'" 26 Wn. App. 450, 456, 613 P.2d 1188 (1980) (quoting Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp. 853, 857 (W.D. Wash. 1977)).

21No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1-l)/22
"The welfare of incompetent persons and the care oftheir property are objects ofparticular care and attention on the part of the courts.'" Shelleyv. Elfstrom, 13 Wn. App. 887, 889, 538 P.2d 149 (1975) (quoting In re Guardianship ofMignerev, 11 Wn.2d 42, 49, 118 P.2d 440 (1941): Pottery. Potter, 35 Wn.2d 788, 215 P.2d 704 (1950)). TEDRA codifies the court's broad powers in guardianship matters to make"any and all manner and kinds oforders . . . that might be considered proper or necessary in the exercise ofthejurisdiction or powers given orintended to be given by this title." RCW 11.96A.060. Herein, the unchallenged findings offact establish that the guardianship court had ordered Richard to reimburse the guardianship estate $9,338.44 for 

### attorney fees incurred responding to his motion for revision, and that, despite 

### having the ability to pay it, Richard had not paid thisjudgment atthe time the superior court considered the guardian's petition to limit Richard's new court 

### filings. The unchallenged factual findings also establish that Richard's failure to 

### pay the attorney feejudgmentharmed Mrs. Dennyfinancially, that Richard's "pleadings ha[d] not raised meritorious issues, and ha[d] not benefitted [Mrs.] 

### Denny." In addition to these findings, the superiorcourt had previouslyfound "a lack of candor to the Court" and a "lack ofdiligence" byRichard. The superior 

### court also had received multiple requests by Marianne to sanction Richard for 

### false statements in pleadings filed without evidentiary support, and had before it


### a record showing that Mrs. Denny's guardianship estate had paid more than 

### $71,000 in 2012 for litigation-related attorney fees in response to pleadings filed by Richard and Anderson.

-22No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1 -l)/23
On this record, the superior court ordered as follows: This Court has a duty to guard against waste of the ward's assets. Under this Court's plenary authority, as well as RCW 11.96A.020, .040, and .060, the Court concludes that Richard Denny should be prohibited from filing new pleadingsin this guardianship until he pays alljudgments, plus accrued interest, entered againsthim in this guardianship, except forpleadings relating to anymotion for revision of or appeal of this Order or any pending appeal. Thesuperior court had before it a "specific anddetailed showing ofa 

### pattern ofabusive and frivolous litigation." Whatcom County v. Kane, 31 Wn. 

### App. 250, 253, 640 P.2d 1075 (1981). The superior courtdid not deny Richard all access to the courts, butconditioned new pleadings on his payment of 

### previously ordered attorney fees and costs.12 The superior court also expressly exempted motions for revision and appellate pleadings. The superiorcourtdid not abuse its discretion in limiting Richard's new pleadings until he paid outstanding attorney fee judgments.
IX Richard's final contention is that he should be awarded reasonable 

### attorney fees on appeal. Ohana, in turn, contends that it should be awarded reasonable attorney fees relative to both Richard's and Anderson's appeals. RAP 18.1 permits attorney fees to be awarded on appeal ifapplicable law 

### grants the partythe rightto recoverreasonable attorneyfees. RCW 11.96A.150 permits the appellate courts in guardianship, probate, and trust matters to award attorney fees from any party to any party "in such amount and in such manner as thecourt determines to beequitable." RCW 11.96A. 150(1). In determining
12 This is the same remedy authorized by the Rules ofAppellate Procedure when aparty fails to paycourt-ordered fees. RAP 18.9(a).

-23-No. 70312-9-1 (consol. with No. 70610-1 -l)/24
whether to award fees under RCW 11.96A.150, we "may consider any and all factors . . . deem[ed] to be relevant and appropriate, such as whether the litigation benefits the estate." Decker, 188Wn. App. at 451 (awarding guardian attorney fees on appeal against ward's former attorney who sought to "vindicate" her due process rights). As demonstrated above, the arguments made on appeal by both Richard and Anderson were contrary to established law and, in part, were advanced in a manner that violated the rules of appellate procedure. Furthermore, the ongoing 

### litigation is contrary to Mrs. Denny's bestinterests and acts as a drain on her estate's resources. Thus, the equitiesweigh heavily in favor of Ohana's request and against Richard's. 

### Accordingly, Richard's request for an award reasonable attorney fees is denied. Ohana's request is granted. An award in favor ofOhana and against 

### Richard is appropriate with regard to Ohana's efforts to respond to Richard's 

### briefing. An award in favor ofOhana and againstAnderson is appropriate with 

### regard to Ohana's efforts to respond to Anderson's briefing asMrs. Denny's "next friend". Upon compliance with RAP 18.1, a commissionerofthis courtwill enter appropriate orders. Affirmed. .—_ a

We concur:

24-