No. 23-1742

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

and

MARC-PHILLIP FERZAN, 

Receiver-Appellee, 

v. 

ANDRIS PUKKE; PETER BAKER;

and JOHN USHER, 

Defendants-Appellants.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Maryland

No. 18-cv-3309 (Hon. Peter J. Messitte) 

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

PAGE-PROOF BRIEF OF 

THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

ANISHA S. DASGUPTA

General Counsel

Of Counsel:

BENJAMIN J. THEISMAN

Attorney 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20580

MATTHEW M. HOFFMAN

BENJAMIN F. AIKEN

Attorneys 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20580

(202) 326-2151

baiken@ftc.gov

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................iii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1

JURISDICTION .........................................................................................3

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.......................................................................3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................................................3

A. Pukke’s History of Fraudulent Activity.......................................3

B. The Sanctuary Belize Scam .........................................................5

C. Initial District Court Proceedings................................................8

D. This Court’s Decision On Appeal ...............................................11

E. Proceedings on Remand .............................................................13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................................................................16

STANDARD OF REVIEW........................................................................18

ARGUMENT.............................................................................................18

I. Appellants Lack Standing To Bring This Appeal. ....................18

A. Appellants Lack Standing To Challenge the 

Receiver’s Control Over Corporate Assets..........................20

B. Appellants Have Not Shown That They Possess 

Any Assets That Are Subject to the Asset 

Freeze. ..................................................................................24

II. Appellants’ Arguments Are Barred By the Law of 

the Case Doctrine and the Mandate Rule. ................................25

III. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By 

Maintaining the Receivership or the Asset Freeze...................29

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A. The Contempt Sanction Is a Valid Basis for the 

Asset Freeze and Receivership............................................29

B. The District Court Did Not Refuse To Allow 

Appellants To Pay The Contempt Sanction. ......................33

C. The District Court Properly Held That 

Appellants Cannot Be Trusted To Sell the 

Sanctuary Belize Assets Given Their History of 

Deceptive Conduct. ..............................................................37

D. Appellants’ Attacks on the Receiver Lack Merit................39

IV. Appellants’ Request for an 

and Meritless. ....................

“Accounting” Is Forfeited 

.........................................................41

CONCLUSION .........................................................................................41

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iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 

141 S. Ct. 1341 (2021) ..........................................................................12

Doe v. Chao, 

511 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2007)................................................................. 26

FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 

373 F. Supp. 2d 558 (D. Md. 2005)......................................................... 4 

FTC v. On Point Capital Partners, LLC, 

17 F.4th 1066 (11th Cir. 2021) .................................................30, 31, 32

FTC v. Pukke, 

53 F.4th 80 (4th Cir. 2022) ........................................................... passim

FTC v. Ross, 

743 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2014)................................................................... 8 

Fusaro v. Howard, 

19 F.4th 357 (4th Cir. 2021) ...........................................................26, 28

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 

570 U.S. 693 (2013)...............................................................................18

In re Sanctuary Belize Litigation, 

482 F. Supp. 3d 373 (D.Md. 2020)........................................9, 10, 21, 29

McNulta v. Lochridge, 

141 U.S. 327 (1891)...............................................................................37

Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int’l, Inc., 

811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987)...............................................................21

Nat’l Enterprises, Inc. v. Barnes, 

201 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000)................................................................. 35

Padilla v. Troxell, 

850 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2017)................................................................. 41

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Shenzhen Stone

Network Info. Ltd., 

58 F.4th 785 (4th Cir. 2023) ................................................................. 24

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iv

Pukke v. FTC, 

No. 22-958, 2023 WL 6377807 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2023) ..............................13

SEC v. Hickey, 

322 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2003)...............................................................22

Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. S.C. Procurement

Rev. Panel,

20 F.3d 1311 (4th Cir. 1994)................................................................. 23

Solis v. Malkani, 

638 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 2011)................................................................. 18

United States v. Yalincak, 

30 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2022)...................................................................20

Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 

139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) .....................................................................18, 19

STATUTES

15 U.S.C. § 45(a) .........................................................................................8 

15 U.S.C. § 53(b).........................................................................................8 

28 U.S.C. § 1291..........................................................................................3 

28 U.S.C. § 1331..........................................................................................3 

28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) .....................................................................................3 

28 U.S.C. § 1345..........................................................................................3 

REGULATIONS 

Telemarketing Sales Rule

16 C.F.R. Part 310...................................................................................8 

OTHER AUTHORITIES

15A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller,

Fed. Prac. & Proc. (3d ed. 2023)...........................................................21 

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INTRODUCTION 

Appellants Andris Pukke, Peter Baker, and John Usher operated 

a real estate scam that this Court previously described as “dishonest to 

the core.” FTC v. Pukke, 53 F.4th 80, 105 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Pukke I”). 

They induced more than a thousand consumers to purchase lots in a 

purported luxury real estate development in Belize by lying about the 

project’s viability, its finances, and its supposed safety as an 

investment. They also covered up Pukke’s prior conviction for a crime of 

dishonesty by using pseudonyms to conceal his involvement in the 

project. Following a multiweek trial, the district court found Appellants 

liable for deceptive practices in violation of the Federal Trade 

Commission Act (“FTC Act”) and held them in contempt for violating a

prior injunction stemming from Pukke’s operation of an earlier scam. 

The court ordered Appellants to pay $120.2 million in consumer redress

and appointed a receiver to manage the corporate entities involved in 

the scam and liquidate their assets, including the Belizean property. 

In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed the liability findings and 

held that the $120.2 million judgment was proper as a contempt 

sanction. It also affirmed the receivership and a freeze on certain of 

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Appellant’s assets. On remand, the district court entered a new order 

that reaffirmed these provisions. That is the order at issue in this 

appeal. Stripped to its essence, Appellants’ argument is that the district 

court should have terminated the receivership and transferred the 

receivership assets—principally the 14,000-acre Belizean property—to 

Appellants for Appellants to sell. They claim that the Court should 

trust them to use the resulting proceeds to pay the contempt judgment.

Appellants’ arguments must be rejected for multiple reasons. 

First, they lack standing to pursue this appeal because they have no 

direct ownership interest in the Belizean property or the other assets in 

the Receiver’s possession, and they have not shown that they possess 

any personal assets subject to the freeze. Second, their arguments are 

barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine because this Court has already 

affirmed the receivership and the asset freeze. Finally, their arguments 

fail on the merits. Given Appellants’ well-documented history of fraud 

and asset concealment, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

maintaining the receivership and asset freeze, which are critical to 

ensuring that Appellants’ victims receive the monetary redress they 

deserve.

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JURISDICTION

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 

Commission’s claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and 1345. The 

district court orders under review (DE 1446 and 1447 (JA __ and __)) 

were entered on June 15, 2023. Appellants timely appealed on July 12, 

2023. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but 

as discussed below, Appellants lack Article III standing to bring this 

appeal. 

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 

1. Do Appellants have Article III standing to bring this appeal? 

2. Are Appellants’ claims barred by the law of the case doctrine 

and the mandate rule given this Court’s decision in Pukke I? 

3. Did the district court act within the scope of its discretion by

maintaining the asset freeze and receivership provisions that this Court 

affirmed in Pukke I? 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Pukke’s History of Fraudulent Activity

Pukke is a serial fraudster whose history of misdeeds dates back 

at least to 1996, when he pleaded guilty to mail fraud stemming from 

his operation of a loan scam. See United States v. Pukke, No. 2:96-cr-137 

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(W.D. Pa.). Pukke was sentenced to three years probation, fined $5,000, 

and ordered to pay $38,078 in restitution. See id. ECF No. 11. He also 

entered into a consent judgment in a parallel civil case. See United 

States v. Pukke, 2:96-cv-1172 (W.D. Pa.). 

Shortly afterwards, Pukke formed a company called AmeriDebt, 

which ran a credit counseling scam. The FTC sued Pukke over 

AmeriDebt in 2003. See FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 558, 

561 (D. Md. 2005). Pukke eventually resolved that lawsuit by agreeing 

to a consent judgment, which required him to pay $172 million in 

consumer redress, with all but $35 million suspended on the condition 

that Pukke cooperate fully with the FTC. Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 100. The 

consent order also permanently enjoined Pukke from making false 

representations in connection with the telemarketing of any goods or 

services. Id. The AmeriDebt judgment further directed Pukke and 

Baker—“who was also involved with AmeriDebt,” id.—to turn assets 

over to a receiver, but instead of cooperating they conspired to hide 

Pukke’s assets, leading to a contempt finding and six weeks of 

incarceration. Id.

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Meanwhile, in 2011, Pukke pleaded guilty to obstructing justice 

based on the false statements he made about his assets in the 

AmeriDebt case and a separate bankruptcy. Id. at 98; see United States 

v. Pukke, No. 8:10-cr-734 (D. Md.). He was sentenced to 18 months in 

prison plus another three years of supervised release.1

B. The Sanctuary Belize Scam

While the AmeriDebt litigation and Pukke’s obstruction-of-justice 

prosecution were ongoing, Pukke was also engaged in the Sanctuary 

Belize real estate scam with Baker and Usher. The basic facts 

underlying that scam are set forth in this Court’s decision in Pukke I. In 

2003, Pukke and Baker began developing land in Belize; in 2005, with 

Usher’s help, they began selling lots with the purported “intent to 

convert this tropical area into a luxury resort for American 

vacationers.” Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 97. They called this project Sanctuary 

Belize, and the district court referred to the various individuals and 

corporate entities that developed and sold the real estate lots as the

Sanctuary Belize Enterprise (“SBE”). Id. 

1 Pukke is also currently under indictment for alleged wire fraud and 

unlawful monetary transactions in connection with the Sanctuary 

Belize scam. United States v. Pukke, No. 1:23-cr-168 (S.D.N.Y.). 

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Pukke was effectively the CEO of the project and led its sales and 

marketing efforts. Id. Beginning in 2009, he launched “an aggressive 

advertising campaign” on television, websites, and other media to 

persuade consumers to buy lots in Sanctuary Belize. Id. Consumers who 

provided contact information would then be called by telemarketers, 

who were “coached to create a sense of urgency and a fear of loss on the 

part of prospective purchasers, techniques somewhat reminiscent of 

those used by Jordan Belfort, aka the ‘Wolf of Wall Street.’” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

SBE’s sales pitch relied on a mountain of lies. Telemarketers told 

prospective purchasers the development was not risky because it had 

“no debt” and that “every dollar” from the sale of lot purchases would go 

“right into the progress of the development.” Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 98. In 

fact, SBE carried “not insignificant amounts of debt,” was a risky 

investment, and spent “only 14% of sales revenue for development”; 

Pukke diverted about 12.8% of sales revenue—some $18 million—“for 

his own benefit and that of his friends and family.” Id. at 98-99. SBE

also promised that the project would boast luxury amenities, most of 

which “either d[id] not exist, d[id] not exist as promised or ha[d] never 

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been seriously contemplated to exist.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Consumers were told that the development would be done in 

two to five years, even though SBE lacked sufficient funds and had no 

realistic prospect of finishing the project in that time. Id. Additionally, 

salespersons falsely told prospective purchasers there was a “strong 

resale market” for Sanctuary Belize lots, even as they were actively 

working to undermine and impede resales by preventing owners from 

reselling lots before SBE sold all the lots. Id.

Finally, as part of an “overarching falsehood,” SBE’s salespersons 

represented to consumers that Pukke had no meaningful involvement 

in the development. Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 99. They knew that disclosure 

of his felony convictions for deception of trusting consumers would 

“scare away purchasers.” Id. To keep consumers in the dark, they 

disguised Pukke’s identity behind various aliases. Id. at 98. 

All told, Appellants sold more than 1,000 Sanctuary Belize lots—

some of them more than once—swindling consumers out of $120.2 

million. Id. at 98-99.

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C. Initial District Court Proceedings

The FTC sued Pukke, Baker, Usher, and various SBE entities in 

2018, seeking to shut down the Sanctuary Belize scam and secure 

redress for its victims. The FTC’s complaint alleged violations of the 

FTC Act’s prohibition on deceptive acts or practices, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), 

and the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule (“TSR”), 16 C.F.R. Part 310.

The FTC brought its claim under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 53(b), which authorizes the FTC to sue in district court for a 

permanent injunction against violations of the laws under its purview. 

At the time, courts of appeals had unanimously held that Section 13(b) 

authorized the FTC to obtain both equitable monetary relief to redress 

consumer harm and prospective injunctive relief. See, e.g., FTC v. Ross, 

743 F.3d 886, 890-92 (4th Cir. 2014).

In addition to filing the complaint, the FTC filed several motions 

to hold Pukke, Baker, and Usher in civil contempt for violating previous 

court orders. Most relevant here, the FTC alleged that Pukke, Baker, 

and Usher’s operation of the Sanctuary Belize scam violated the

AmeriDebt consent order’s prohibition on deceptive telemarketing 

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practices.2 The district court consolidated the existing AmeriDebt case 

with the new Sanctuary Belize case. DE 261 at 1 (JA __). Though they 

were properly served, Usher and several SBE-affiliated corporations 

never appeared, and the district court entered default judgments 

against them. DE 1112 (JA __).

The district court entered a temporary restraining order, which 

was later superseded by two preliminary injunction orders. See In re 

Sanctuary Belize Litigation, 482 F. Supp. 3d 373 (D.Md. 2020) 

(“Sanctuary Belize”); see also DE 615 (JA __). Among other things, those

orders appointed a receiver to take control of the corporate defendants’ 

related business entities—including Sittee River Wildlife Reserve

(“SRWR”), a corporation that owned SBE’s property in Belize. DE 615

at 7, 9, 25-31 (JA __, __, __-__). Pukke, Baker, and Usher were ordered 

to turn assets over to the Receiver. DE 615 at 31-33 (JA __-__). The 

orders also froze any assets the defendants had as of the date the TRO 

was entered (November 5, 2018) and assets obtained afterwards derived 

from the Sanctuary Belize scam. DE 615 at 12-14 (JA __-__). 

2 Although Usher was not a party in AmeriDebt, the consent order also 

bound Pukke’s business associates. Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 100.

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Following a lengthy bench trial, the district court issued a detailed 

opinion finding that Pukke, Baker, Usher, and the various SBE entities 

violated the FTC Act and TSR. See Sanctuary Belize, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 

429-59. It also held Pukke, Baker, and Usher in contempt for violating 

the AmeriDebt injunction. Id. at 476-77. The district court found that 

the scam caused $120.2 million of consumer harm. Id. at 475.

The district court issued three remedial orders: the “De Novo 

Order” (DE 1194), the “Default Order” (DE 1112), and the “Contempt 

Order” (DE 1113). The relevant provisions of the De Novo and Default 

Orders are similar. In addition to permanent injunctive relief, the 

orders imposed a $120.2 million equitable monetary judgment against 

the defendants, to be paid to the FTC and used for consumer redress. 

DE 1194 at 8, 11-12 (JA __, __-__); DE 1112 at 9, 14 (JA __, __). The 

orders also required Pukke, Baker, and Usher to transfer assets in 

excess of a nominal amount to either the FTC or the Receiver and 

stripped them of any rights in assets previously transferred to the 

Receiver. DE 1194 at 8-10 (JA __-__); DE 1112 at 9-12 (JA __-__). The 

orders modified the asset freeze to permit these transfers and provided 

that the freeze would be dissolved upon full satisfaction of the monetary 

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judgment. DE 1194 at 12 (JA __); DE 1112 at 15 (JA __). Finally, the

orders restated the Receiver’s authority to control, manage, and 

liquidate the receivership assets. DE 1194 at 13-16 (JA __-__); DE 1112 

at 16-19 (JA __-__).

As relevant here, the Contempt Order required Pukke, Baker, and 

Usher to pay the FTC the same $120.2 million imposed in the other 

orders: an amount representing the total amount of consumer loss. DE 

1113 at 3 (JA __).3 Appellants were ordered to transfer assets sufficient 

to pay the judgment to the FTC within 30 days. Id.

D. This Court’s Decision On Appeal

Pukke, Baker, Usher, and some of the corporations appealed to 

this Court, which substantially affirmed the district court’s judgment.

The Court affirmed the contempt finding as “supported by an 

abundance of evidence and show[ing] no hint of an abuse of discretion.” 

Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 101-02. The Court also found it “clear that Pukke 

and SBE violated the FTC Act and TSR” through their brazen lies, 

concluding that “Pukke’s Belizean business venture was dishonest to 

3 The district court also ordered Pukke to pay the full $172 million 

judgment in AmeriDebt. DE 1113 at 2-3 (JA __-__). 

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the core” and that “this sort of deception lies at the heart of what the 

FTC is empowered to seek out and stop.” Id. at 105. 

The Court vacated the monetary judgment against Pukke and 

Baker to the extent it relied on Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, which the 

Supreme Court had recently concluded did not authorize monetary 

relief.

4 Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 105; AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141

S. Ct. 1341 (2021). But that did not “change the bottom line” because

Pukke, Baker, and Usher were still liable for the same $120.2 million as 

a contempt sanction for violating the AmeriDebt consent order. Id. at 

105-06. The Court held that AMG did not affect the validity of the 

district court’s injunctive relief or invalidate the appointment of the 

Receiver. Id. at 106-08. It also rejected Pukke’s challenge to the asset 

freeze, finding the freeze “an appropriate use of the court’s discretion, 

especially given the risk of Pukke diverting funds to his personal 

accounts.” Id. at 109. 

4 The parties have disputed whether the Court also vacated the 

Section 13(b) monetary judgment against Usher, who defaulted, see 

Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 106-07, but that does not matter for present 

purposes because Usher is plainly subject to the monetary contempt 

sanction.

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Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment in part and vacated 

and remanded for further proceedings in part.5

E. Proceedings on Remand

On remand, the FTC filed a motion to reform and reaffirm the 

district court’s prior relief orders in accordance with this Court’s 

mandate. DE 1404 (JA __). Pukke, Baker, and Usher, joined by several 

of the corporate defendants, opposed (DE 1405 (JA __)), and filed a 

separate motion for return of property (DE 1435 (JA __)). They argued 

that the district court should lift the asset freeze and order the return of 

the assets held by the Receiver, contending there was no longer any 

basis for the receivership in light of AMG and this Court’s vacatur of 

the Section 13(b) monetary relief. DE 1405 at 8 (JA __); DE 1435-1, at 1-

2 (JA __-__). 

The district court largely granted the FTC’s motion and denied the 

motion for return of property. DE 1441; DE 1447 (JA __, __). The court 

explained that “[t]he Contempt Order stands in full force and effect” 

because “[t]he Fourth Circuit clearly upheld the $120.2 million 

5 The Supreme Court denied Appellants’ petition for a writ of 

certiorari on October 2, 2023. See Pukke v. FTC, No. 22-958, 2023 WL 

6377807 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2023). 

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judgment against Baker, Pukke, and Usher as set forth in the 

Contempt Order and separately confirmed the validity of the 

Receivership and the injunctive relief ordered pursuant to Section 

13(b).” DE 1441 at 2 (JA __). That relief, the court explained, “plainly 

include[d] freezing Defendants[’] assets and requiring that they be 

turned over to the Receiver.” Id.

The district court rejected the defendants’ argument that they 

were entitled to a return of the assets held by the Receiver. DE 1441 at 

5 (JA __). It noted that “[i]n the course of these proceedings many of 

these assets were in fact long hidden by Defendants” and that they 

should not now be “rewarded.” Id. It further noted that this Court had 

“loudly and clearly” affirmed the Receiver’s authority to “manage and 

liquidate these assets,” and that the turnover of assets was appropriate 

given the “overall conspiratorial scam.” Id.

The accompanying order—the “Reaffirmation Order” from which 

Appellants now appeal—confirmed that “[t]he Contempt Order ... 

stands in full force and effect and requires that the Defendants’ assets 

be frozen and otherwise turned over to the Receiver.” DE 1447 at 2 (JA 

__). The Reaffirmation Order also explained that the contempt 

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judgment “supports all the monetary relief and related provisions

directed at or related to the Individual Defendants” in the De Novo and 

Default Orders. DE 1447 at 3 (JA __-__). The Reaffirmation Order 

further confirmed that “[t]he injunctive relief and receivership 

provisions of the De Novo Order ... and the Default Order ... stand in 

full force and effect.” Id. at 2 (JA __). The court reiterated that Pukke, 

Baker, Usher, and the defaulting corporate defendants remained 

“obligated to relinquish, transfer, and turn over all assets that they 

directly or indirectly own or control ... until the judgments against them 

are satisfied in full.”6 Id. at 4 (JA __).

Pukke, Baker, and Usher now appeal from the Reaffirmation 

Order. The corporate defendants who joined the briefing on remand in 

the district court have not joined the appeal. Although the Receiver has 

taken possession of the corporate defendants and their assets (including 

the Sanctuary Belize property), Pukke, Baker, and Usher have never 

6 The district court also issued a separate order implementing the next 

phase of a consumer redress plan. DE 1446 (JA __). Although 

Appellants reference this order in their Brief’s Statement of the Case

(Br. 12, 13), they do not discuss it in the argument section of their brief 

and it is not relevant to the issues they raise on appeal.

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paid a penny of the judgment against them or turned over any 

individual assets to the Receiver. See DE 1217-2 at 4, 9 (JA __, __). 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

For starters, Appellants lack standing to bring this appeal. Article 

III’s standing requirements—injury, traceability, and redressability—

must be met by anyone seeking appellate review, just as they must be 

met by anyone filing a complaint. Here, Appellants are complaining 

about the maintenance of the receivership and asset freeze. But 

Appellants are not injured by the maintenance of the receivership 

because they do not directly own the Sanctuary Belize property or any 

of the other underlying assets they seek to have “returned.” Those 

assets belong to various corporate entities that did not join this appeal. 

Appellants’ status as shareholders or as principals who control (or 

formerly controlled) those corporate entities does not give them 

standing to assert injuries on the corporate entities’ behalf. To the 

extent that Appellants are challenging the freeze on their personal 

assets, they have not shown that they currently possess or control any 

assets that are subject to the freeze. Accordingly, the appeal should be 

dismissed.

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If the appeal is not dismissed for lack of standing, the Court 

should affirm because Appellants’ arguments are barred by law of the 

case. This Court already upheld both the asset freeze and the 

receivership in the prior appeal. This Court also upheld the contempt 

judgment and explained that the district court’s previous “bottom line” 

had not changed because the contempt judgment justified both the asset 

freeze and receivership. Appellants offer no explanation for why this

Court’s decision does not dictate the outcome of the present appeal; they 

simply ignore it. 

Even if the Court had not already resolved these issues, 

Appellants’ arguments would fail on the merits. As the district court 

explained, the receivership and asset freeze remain necessary to secure 

consumer redress for the harm associated with Appellants’ violation of 

the AmeriDebt injunction. That determination was not an abuse of 

discretion. Nor was any other aspect of the district court’s decision. The 

court did not prevent Appellants from paying their contempt judgment; 

its factual findings provide a thorough explanation for the necessity of 

the receivership; Appellants cannot be trusted to sell the receivership 

assets themselves; and there is no merit to Appellants’ attacks on the 

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trustworthiness and qualifications of the Receiver. Appellants forfeited 

any request for an accounting by failing to make such a request until 

now, but regardless the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

failing to order an accounting on top of the regular reports the Receiver 

already files. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a district court’s decision to award equitable 

relief, such as an asset freeze or an accounting, for abuse of discretion. 

Solis v. Malkani, 638 F.3d 269, 274 (4th Cir. 2011). 

ARGUMENT 

I. APPELLANTS LACK STANDING TO BRING THIS APPEAL. 

This appeal should be dismissed for lack of standing because 

Appellants have not shown that they suffered any injury from the 

portions of the Reaffirmation Order they are challenging. 

Article III of the Constitution requires that “any person invoking 

the power of a federal court must demonstrate standing to do so.” 

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013). The standing 

requirement “must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as

it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.” Va. 

House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2019) 

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19

(internal quotation omitted). To establish standing, the party invoking 

the appellate court’s jurisdiction must “do more than simply allege a 

nonobvious harm”; it must “explain how the elements essential to 

standing are met.” Id. Those elements are “(1) a concrete and 

particularized injury, that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged 

conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 

1950. “As the part[ies] invoking this Court’s jurisdiction,” Appellants 

“bear[] the burden” of establishing these elements. Id. at 1955. 

Appellants have not met this burden. All of their arguments are 

directed toward what Appellants describe as an “asset freeze and 

seizure” order.7 Br. 15, 16, 19-22, 24, 26. As relief, they request that the 

Sanctuary Belize property and other assets currently under the 

Receiver’s control should be “returned” to them. Br. 13, 14, 20, 24-26. 

But Appellants have not established that they directly own any of the 

assets in the Receiver’s control, and they fail to identify any personal 

assets they are seeking to have unfrozen. Accordingly, Appellants have 

7

 The Reaffirmation Order maintains an asset freeze, but the district 

court never issued any “seizure order.” That label appears to refer to the 

portion of the Reaffirmation Order that keeps the receivership “in full 

force and effect.” DE 1447 at 2 (JA __).

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20

not demonstrated standing to challenge the receivership or the asset 

freeze.

A. Appellants Lack Standing To Challenge the 

Receiver’s Control Over Corporate Assets.

Appellants lack standing to challenge the portion of the 

Reaffirmation Order that maintains the receivership because 

Appellants do not own the Sanctuary Belize property or any other 

assets that they seek to have “returned.” Those assets are owned by 

corporate entities that are legally distinct from Appellants and that did 

not join this appeal. Appellants themselves have never turned over any 

personal assets to the Receiver. And because they do not own the assets 

in the receivership, Appellants are not directly injured by the Receiver’s 

continued control over those assets. Moreover, those assets cannot be 

“returned” to Appellants because Appellants did not own them in the 

first place.

It is well settled that a party lacks standing to appeal portions of a 

district court’s orders that relate solely to another party. See United

States v. Yalincak, 30 F.4th 115, 132 (2d Cir. 2022) (dismissing appeal 

challenging codefendant’s restitution order because the outcome of the 

appeal would have “no effect” on appellant’s restitution obligations and 

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21

he had therefore “suffered no cognizable injury as a result of” the 

challenged order); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int’l, Inc., 811 F.2d 

1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987) (“It is hornbook law that a party may only 

appeal to protect its own interests, and not those of a coparty.” (internal 

quotation omitted)). Just as there is a “general standing doctrine that a 

litigant may not advance the rights of others,” there is a corollary “that 

a party may not appeal to protect the rights of others.” 15A Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3902 (3d ed. 2023). 

That rule forecloses any argument from Appellants about the assets in 

the receivership estate.

None of the Appellants have any direct ownership interest in any 

assets in the receivership estate. The most significant of those assets—

and the focus of Appellants’ brief—is the Sanctuary Belize property. 

See, e.g., Br. 20. None of the Appellants have any direct ownership 

interest in that land. A company called Sittee River Wildlife Reserve 

(“SRWR”) “became the sole owner of the entire Sanctuary Belize 

development” in 2007. Sanctuary Belize, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 390. 

Although SRWR was a party to the proceedings on remand below and 

expressly named in the Reaffirmation Order, see DE 1447 at 1 & n.1 (JA 

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22

__ & n.1), neither SRWR nor any other corporate defendant appealed.

The only parties to this appeal are the individual Appellants, who have 

never contributed any assets to the receivership. See DE 1217-2 at 4, 9 

(JA __, __) (declaration from Receiver discussing source of the assets in 

the receivership).

A recent claim by SRWR and several other corporate defendants

likewise indicates that the individual Appellants have no

constitutionally cognizable interest in the receivership assets. Following

the Reaffirmation Order, those companies sued in the United States

Court of Federal Claims seeking redress for the “millions of dollars of

assets and properties” they claim were “wrongfully seized” in this

action—i.e., the receivership assets.8 Complaint at 1, Buy Belize et al. v. 

United States of America, No. 1:23-cv-1025 (U.S. Ct. Claims July 3,

2023), ECF No. 1. Their theory is that the “seized assets and property”

constitute “an illegal exaction” because those belonged to the

corporations, who “are separate from Pukke, Baker, and Usher.” Id. at

2. Each of the entities—represented by the same counsel who represent

Appellants here—emphasizes that “[i]t is a separate legal entity from

8 The estate of Pukke’s father is also a party to that action.

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23

its stockholders and members.” Id. at 3. The corporate entities thus

view themselves as both legally distinct from Appellants and as the

direct owners of the receivership assets. 

To be sure, Appellants did have practical control over the

Sanctuary Belize property and other receivership assets through their

ownership or control of the various corporate entities that are now

managed by the Receiver. That is why those entities and their assets

are properly part of the receivership estate. See, e.g., SEC v. Hickey, 322 

F.3d 1123, 1125, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2003) (district court’s “broad 

equitable powers” authorized it to freeze assets of corporate entity that 

was “dominated and controlled” by contemnor).9 But neither ownership 

nor control over the corporate entities confers Article III standing to

assert those entities’ property rights in litigation. “It is considered a 

fundamental rule that a shareholder—even the sole shareholder—does 

not have standing to assert claims alleging wrongs to the corporation.”

Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. S.C. Procurement Rev. Panel, 20 F.3d 1311,

9 Appellants have not disputed, either here or below (see DE 1405 (JA

__)), that they controlled the corporate entities and that this control 

requires that those entities and the entities’ assets be used to satisfy 

the contempt judgment. See DE 1408 at 2 (JA __) (summarizing 

evidence of Appellants’ control of the corporate entities).

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24

1317 (4th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). Similarly, “[c]orporate officers ... 

generally lack standing to defend their corporation’s property interests.” 

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Shenzhen Stone Network Info. Ltd., 58 

F.4th 785, 792 (4th Cir. 2023). That Pukke, Baker, and Usher may be 

shareholders or principals of the corporate defendants or otherwise 

exercised control over them is thus insufficient to confer standing.

Since Pukke, Baker, and Usher have no direct ownership interest 

in the assets owned by the corporate entities, they suffer no Article III 

injury from the Receiver’s continued control over those assets. And 

since Appellants have never turned over any personal assets to the 

Receiver, an order requiring the “return” of the receivership assets 

would not directly benefit them. Appellants thus lack standing to 

challenge the maintenance of the receivership. 

B. Appellants Have Not Shown That They Possess 

Any Assets That Are Subject to the Asset Freeze.

To the extent that Appellants are challenging the portion of the

Reaffirmation Order that freezes their personal assets, they have not

met their burden to demonstrate standing because they have not

identified any assets they possess that are subject to the freeze. The

freeze applies only to “assets that predate the filing of this case [on 

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25

November 6, 2018] or are derived from actions or assets that predate 

the filing of this case,” DE 1447 at 2-3 (JA __-__)”); see also DE 615 at 

12-14 (JA __-__). It does not apply to assets acquired later on, such as 

money that Appellants may earn through employment or other 

legitimate activity. 

Appellants’ brief focuses on “the Sanctuary Belize assets,” i.e., the 

assets in the receivership. E.g. Br. 19, 20. As discussed above, these 

assets do not belong to Appellants, and the assets under the Receiver’s 

control are not subject to the freeze. Appellants do not identify any 

assets that they personally own that are still in their possession or 

control and hence subject to the freeze. Absent such a showing, 

Appellants have failed to demonstrate that any of them has standing to 

challenge the asset freeze.

II. APPELLANTS’ ARGUMENTS ARE BARRED BY THE LAW OF THE

CASE DOCTRINE AND THE MANDATE RULE. 

Even if Appellants have standing, their arguments are barred by 

the law of the case doctrine and the mandate rule. Appellants argue 

that in light of AMG and this Court’s vacatur of the Section 13(b) 

monetary judgment, the district court was also required to lift the asset 

freeze and “seizure order”—i.e., the receivership provisions of the prior 

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26

orders—and transfer the receivership assets to them. Br. 15, 19. But 

this Court specifically affirmed both the receivership and the asset 

freeze in its prior decision. Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 107-09. Under the 

mandate rule, the district court had no authority to reconsider those 

issues, and under the more general law of the case doctrine, this Court 

is bound by its rulings in the prior appeal.

Under the law of the case doctrine, “when a court decides upon a 

rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in 

subsequent stages in the same case,” including “a subsequent appeal in 

the same litigation.” Fusaro v. Howard, 19 F.4th 357, 367 (4th Cir. 

2021) (internal quotation omitted). The mandate rule is a “more 

powerful version of the law of the case doctrine” that “prohibits lower 

courts, with limited exceptions, from considering questions that the 

mandate of a higher court has laid to rest.” Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d 461, 

465 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). Under this rule, “any 

issue conclusively decided by this court on the first appeal is not 

remanded,” and a district court has no authority to reconsider it. Id.

Here, Pukke argued in a prior appeal that AMG required 

nullification of the receivership as well as the Section 13(b) monetary 

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27

award. This Court squarely rejected that claim, holding that “AMG does 

nothing of the sort.” Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 107. The Court explained that 

“the appointment of a receiver has long been considered an ancillary 

power that a court can deploy to effectuate its injunctive relief” and that 

a receivership was appropriate here to “ensur[e] further FTC Act and 

TSR violations would not occur and that Pukke would not continue to 

profit from these deceptions.” Id. at 107-08. The Court likewise rejected 

Pukke’s challenge to the asset freeze, holding that the freeze was “an 

appropriate use of the court’s discretion” to secure payment of a civil 

contempt sanction, “especially given the risk of Pukke diverting funds 

to his personal accounts.” Id. at 109. This Court thus held that the asset 

freeze was appropriate even though AMG rendered monetary relief 

under Section 13(b) unavailable.

Because this Court affirmed the receivership and the asset freeze 

provisions of the district court’s prior orders, the mandate rule barred 

the district court from reconsidering those provisions on remand. 

Indeed, the Court’s order constituted only a partial remand. See Pukke 

I, 53 F.4th at 110 (“The judgment is affirmed in part and vacated and 

remanded in part for such further proceedings as are consistent with 

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28

this decision.”). Thus, the district court plainly did not err by 

reaffirming the receivership and asset freeze; it had no authority to do 

anything else.

Similarly, the law of the case doctrine precludes this Court from 

revisiting its prior decision affirming the receivership and the asset 

freeze. There are only three exceptions to the law of the case doctrine: 

“(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially different evidence, 

(2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law 

applicable to the issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous 

and would work manifest injustice.” Fusaro 19 F.4th at 367. The first 

two exceptions plainly do not apply. For the third exception to apply, 

the prior decision “cannot be just maybe or probably wrong; it must 

strike [the Court] as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, 

unrefrigerated dead fish.” Id. (cleaned up). Here, Appellants have not 

even alleged that the prior decision was wrong, much less shown the 

kind of extraordinary circumstances that would allow this Court to 

reconsider it. 

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29

III. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By 

Maintaining the Receivership or the Asset Freeze. 

Even if the district court had discretion to revisit the receivership 

and asset freeze provisions this Court had previously affirmed, it did 

not abuse its discretion by maintaining those provisions in the 

Reaffirmation Order. The district court made extensive findings about 

Appellants’ history of fraud, diversion of assets for personal and familial 

gain, failure to follow court orders, and concealment of assets. 

Sanctuary Belize, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 393-96, 409-10.10 It cited some of 

this history in the Reaffirmation Order. DE 1441 at 5 (JA __). These 

findings, which this Court affirmed, are more than sufficient to support 

the continuation of both the asset freeze and the receivership. None of 

Appellants’ arguments to the contrary holds water.

A. The Contempt Sanction Is a Valid Basis for the 

Asset Freeze and Receivership.

There is no merit to Appellants’ argument that the asset freeze 

should be lifted because there is “no longer any nexus” between the 

relief the FTC sought and the assets (if any) subject to the freeze. Br. 

10 For this reason, there is no merit to Appellants’ suggestion that “the 

district court made no ... fact findings” that would support an asset 

freeze and receivership. Br. 21-22.

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30

16. As this Court held in an earlier appeal, vacating the Section 13(b) 

award “does not in fact change the bottom line” because Appellants are 

liable for the same amount as a contempt sanction. Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 

106. Put another way, “the harm from Defendants’ contumacious 

conduct is ... the same as the harm caused by their FTC Act violations.” 

DE 1109 at 1 (JA __). Thus, Appellants are still subject to a contempt 

sanction in the amount of $120.2 million: the “consumer loss caused by 

their violation of the [AmeriDebt] Telemarketing Order.” See DE 1113 

at 3 (JA __). And because that contempt sanction addresses the same 

harm as the FTC Act violations, the court properly maintained both the 

receivership and the freeze on Appellants’ personal assets.

Appellants misplace their reliance (Br. 16-19) on FTC v. On Point 

Capital Partners, LLC, 17 F.4th 1066 (11th Cir. 2021). On Point does 

not help Appellants because, unlike this case, it did not involve a 

Section 13(b) case and contempt proceeding consolidated into a single 

proceeding with a single docket number and caption. See DE 261 at 1 

(JA ___); see also Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 104 (AmeriDebt contempt motions 

consolidated with the Sanctuary Belize case). In On Point, the district 

court had entered an asset freeze and receivership order in place to 

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31

secure a monetary judgment under Section 13(b). 17 F.4th at 1075-76.

Separately, the defendants there were subject to a contempt sanction—

and associated asset freeze and receivership order—for their violation of 

a consent decree in an earlier case (Acquinity). Id. at 1076. Following 

AMG, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the On Point order asset freeze and 

receivership, reasoning that with monetary relief off the table, “there is 

no need to preserve resources for a future judgment” in On Point. Id. at 

1078. 

Appellants’ suggestion that they should be entitled to the same 

relief now that the Section 13(b) monetary award against them has 

been vacated (Br. 18-19) misunderstands the Eleventh Circuit’s 

analysis. Here, the Contempt Order, De Novo Order, and Default Order 

were all entered on the same docket and are part of the same case. 

Thus, even though there is no longer any basis for monetary relief 

under Section 13(b), the Contempt Order remains as a basis for the 

asset freeze and receivership. Nothing in On Point undermines that 

conclusion. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized in On Point that 

“nothing in this opinion should be construed as commenting on or 

having a legal effect on the separate asset freeze in Acquinity,” id. at 

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32

1078, which was entered to facilitate the payment of the contempt 

sanction there. 

Appellants also miss the mark in suggesting that the asset freeze 

and receivership should be deemed invalid because those provisions 

were set forth in orders other than the Contempt Order and not 

expressly incorporated in the Contempt Order. See Br. 6-7, 18-19. As 

discussed above (at 25-28), this Court specifically affirmed the 

receivership as an appropriate component of the relief ordered by the 

district court under Section 13(b). Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 109. Regardless, 

Appellants cite no authority requiring that a receivership and asset 

freeze appear in the same order as the judgment they protect—and the 

FTC is aware of none. The relevant question is whether there is a legal 

basis for a receivership and asset freeze, and here there plainly is. As 

the district court explained, the Contempt Order “stands in full force 

and effect” and the contempt relief affirmed by this Court “plainly 

includes freezing Defendants[’] assets and requiring that they be turned 

over to the Receiver.” DE 1441 at 2 (JA __); see also DE 1447 at 2 (JA 

__) (same). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

maintaining the asset freeze and receivership on remand.

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33

B. The District Court Did Not Refuse To Allow 

Appellants To Pay The Contempt Sanction.

Appellants misstate the facts in arguing that the district court 

“abused its discretion by refusing to permit ... Appellants to pay the 

$120.2 million contempt sanction.” Br. 19. Nothing prevents Appellants 

from paying the contempt sanction with any assets that they own or

control. Indeed, the district court’s orders obligate them to turn over

such assets to the FTC or the Receiver to satisfy the contempt sanction. 

See, e.g., DE 1447 at 2-3 (JA __-__). Furthermore, nothing in the district 

court’s order forbids Appellants from seeking employment or otherwise 

earning money through legitimate means and using their earnings to 

pay down the judgment.

Appellants’ core complaint is that the district court declined to 

transfer the receivership assets to them so that they could sell the 

Belizean property and pay off the judgment. But as the district court 

explained, “many of these assets were in fact long hidden by 

Defendants,” such that the turnover of assets was necessary to address

Appellants’ “overall conspiratorial scam.” DE 1441 at 5 (JA __). Given 

Appellants’ long and well-documented history of fraud and concealment 

of assets, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 

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34

that Appellants could not be trusted to manage and sell the receivership 

assets.

The declaration submitted by Appellant Baker in the remand 

proceeding does not undermine this conclusion.11 Baker’s declaration 

asserts, without any supporting evidence, that the assets in the 

receivership estate are more than sufficient to pay the $120.2 million 

consent judgment in this case.12 DE 1405-1 (JA __). In particular, he 

asserts his “belie[f]” that “the funds generated by a sale of the 

Sanctuary Belize property would far exceed the $120.2 million needed 

to transfer to the FTC under the Contempt Order.” DE 1405-1 at 3. (JA 

__). The district court considered the Baker declaration, DE 1441 at 4 

(JA __), but concluded that Appellants “are not entitled to any return of 

assets.” Id. at 5 (JA __).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to credit

the Baker declaration. First of all, Baker’s assertions are pure hearsay 

laced with a dollop of speculation. Baker hedges nearly all his claims by 

11 Some of the figures that Appellants cite in their brief (Br. 20) do not 

actually appear in Baker’s declaration. 

12 Baker ignores that Pukke is liable for an additional $172 million 

under the AmeriDebt injunction. See DE 1113 at 2-3 (JA __-__).

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stating they are what he “believes” or “understands” based on 

unspecified “reports filed by the Receiver and other information.” DE 

1405-1 at 2 (JA __). Yet he does not include the Receiver’s reports or the 

“other information” he claims to rely upon. Id. Similarly, Baker claims 

that a “conservative estimate” of the value of the Belize property is $104 

million, but he does not provide any actual data to support that claim; 

instead, he asserts that the property was previously appraised at $87 

million at some unspecified time and he arbitrarily increases that figure 

by 20%. Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to 

accept these unsupported claims. See, e.g., Nat’l Enterprises, Inc. v. 

Barnes, 201 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000) (appellant’s “self-serving 

affidavit describing the content of” certain agreements could not defeat 

summary judgment, especially because appellant failed to produce the 

agreements in question).

In fact, there is no reliable evidence that the seized assets exceed 

the value of the contempt judgment. The value of the Belizean property 

will not be known until the Receiver actually sells the still undeveloped 

land. If the value of the assets ends up exceeding Appellants’ 

obligations—including both the $120.2 million contempt sanction and 

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36

the $172 million plus interest that Pukke owes from AmeriDebt—then 

Appellants will be entitled to receive the excess, “as would be the case 

in any collections matter.” DE 1441 at 4 n.2 (JA __). None of that means 

that the assets should be turned over to Appellants to sell. Given 

Appellants’ history of deceptive conduct, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion by assigning that task to the Receiver.

Some of Baker’s other claims are, in the district court’s words, 

“pure blather.” DE 1441 at 4 (JA __). For example, he claims that

Sanctuary Belize consumers have been credited with “$50 million in 

monthly payments due and owing by them but not collected” and counts 

as receivership assets another $157 million in “current receivables from 

lot purchasers at Sanctuary Belize.” DE 1405-1 at 1, 2 (JA __, __). In 

other words, Baker is counting as a receivership asset money that 

consumers would be required to pay under the terms of their purchase 

contracts if those contracts were valid. But in fact, consumers do not 

owe any of this money because the purchase contracts were induced by 

Appellants’ fraud and are void. The $120.2 million represents money 

that Appellants actually took from consumers. If consumers had paid 

more, Appellants would owe more.

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Nor were Appellants entitled to “credits” for the roughly $21 

million the Receiver has spent “managing Sanctuary Belize during the 

five years of this litigation.” Br. 21. A receiver “stands in place of the 

corporation.” McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 331 (1891). The 

owners of Sanctuary Belize would have incurred the same costs these 

last five years to maintain the property that the Receiver has incurred. 

None of that has contributed to making Appellants’ victims whole.

On top of these shortcomings of proof, there is also Baker’s lack of 

credibility. Given Baker’s active participation in a scam that swindled 

consumers out of $120.2 million and his prior actions to conceal assets 

in AmeriDebt, the district court was not required to credit his selfserving testimony. 

C. The District Court Properly Held That Appellants 

Cannot Be Trusted To Sell the Sanctuary Belize 

Assets Given Their History of Deceptive Conduct.

Appellants miss the point in arguing that their “histories of 

deceptive conduct” cannot serve as a legitimate reason for maintaining 

the asset freeze and receivership because they “have already been 

punished for this ‘deceptive conduct’—to the tune of 120.2 million 

dollars.” Br. 23. Asset freezes and receiverships exist to secure the 

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38

payment of judgments. As of today, Appellants have not paid a cent of 

the $120.2 million they owe to their victims, and their history of 

deceptive conduct shows that they cannot be trusted to manage the 

Sanctuary Belize assets or repay injured consumers. The district court 

did not abuse its discretion by leaving the asset freeze and receivership 

in place to secure consumer redress.

Appellants’ argument that they are in a better position than the 

Receiver to obtain “top dollar” for the Sanctuary Belize property (Br. 23) 

is wrong for at least two reasons. First, as the district court pointed out, 

Appellants “remain subject to a full ban on real estate activity and, 

more specifically, bans preventing any further involvement with, or 

presence in, Sanctuary Belize.” DE 1441 at 3 (JA __); see also DE 1194

at 6 (JA __); DE 1112 at 7 (JA __). The terms of that injunction were 

affirmed on appeal. In light of this prohibition, Appellants cannot

legally sell the Sanctuary Belize property. 

Second, Appellants’ claim that “the only thing they could do (and 

would do) with the Sanctuary Belize assets is sell” those assets and pay 

the judgment, Br. 22, carries no weight given their extensive history of 

engaging in consumer scams, enriching themselves and associates, and 

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39

hiding assets. Appellants insist they would certainly sell the assets 

because they “remain subject to the district court’s pervasive injunctive 

decrees,” Br. 22, but as this Court noted, “Pukke has repeatedly harmed 

and deceived people despite direct injunctions forbidding these very 

acts. Had Pukke obeyed the injunctions, he never would have swindled 

Sanctuary Belize consumers out of millions of dollars.” Pukke I, 53 

F.4th at 103. Given this history, it is vital that Appellants have no

further involvement with the Sanctuary Belize assets. The district court 

did not abuse its discretion by appointing a neutral third-party receiver 

to manage and dispose of those assets.

D. Appellants’ Attacks on the Receiver Lack Merit.

Appellants’ attacks on the Receiver’s expertise are unwarranted.

They say that their superior knowledge of the Belize market makes 

them a better option to sell the property than the Receiver, who “has no 

familiarity with that market,” Br. 23. But the Receiver will not 

personally sell the property. Instead, the district court charged the 

Receiver with “engag[ing] a reputable international real estate 

brokerage firm, at commercially reasonable rates and terms” to handle 

the process. DE 1446 at 3 (JA __). The Receiver fulfilled that obligation 

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40

by “select[ing] CBRE, Inc.—one of the largest commercial real estate 

services and investment firms in the world, with clients in more than 

100 countries” following a thorough vetting process. DE 1455 at 17-18

(JA __-__). CBRE will now “serve as the broker for the Belize real estate 

assets for an initial period of 18 months and help support any and all 

Court-approved sale(s).” Id. 

Nor is there any reason to doubt the Receiver’s competence to 

oversee the sale of the Sanctuary Belize assets. Appellants suggest 

otherwise by quoting, out-of-context, FTC filings focused on a narrow 

dispute between the Receiver and the FTC concerning “consumer 

survey materials.” DE 1463 at 3 (JA __); see Br. 23. Specifically, the 

FTC was arguing that it should have oversight of these materials, and 

that the process for surveying consumers should move forward 

expeditiously to minimize the Receiver’s costs and preserve money for 

consumers. DE 1463 at 3-4 (JA __-__). That has nothing to do with the 

Receiver’s qualifications or capability to sell the Sanctuary Belize 

property. The FTC remains confident in the Receiver’s ability to 

complete that task and is satisfied with the Receiver’s selection of 

CBRE to handle the process.

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41

IV. APPELLANTS’ REQUEST FOR AN “ACCOUNTING” IS 

FORFEITED AND MERITLESS. 

Appellants forfeited their alternative request for an “accounting,” 

Br. 24, by failing to make that argument in the district court. See 

Padilla v. Troxell, 850 F.3d 168, 178 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Petitioner did not 

raise this argument below, and we similarly consider it forfeited on 

appeal.”). None of their filings below use the word “accounting” or 

propose that it would be an appropriate alternative remedy. See DE 

1405, 1417, 1435. 

The argument is also meritless. The Receiver in this case files 

regular reports with the district court, and those reports include 

“accounting and financial statements.” DE 1455 at 20 (JA ___) (title 

case removed). The district court did not abuse its discretion by 

declining to order an accounting on top of these reports.

CONCLUSION 

The Court should dismiss the appeal for lack of standing, or in the 

alternative, affirm the district court’s judgment.

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1742 Doc: 22 Filed: 11/17/2023 Pg: 46 of 48
42

Respectfully submitted,

ANISHA S. DASGUPTA

General Counsel

MATTHEW M. HOFFMAN

Attorney 

November 17, 2023 /s/ Benjamin F. Aiken

BENJAMIN F. AIKEN

Attorney 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20580

(202) 326-2151

baiken@ftc.gov

Of Counsel:

BENJAMIN J. THEISMAN

Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20580

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1742 Doc: 22 Filed: 11/17/2023 Pg: 47 of 48
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that the foregoing brief complies with the volume 

limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 8278

words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 

32(a)(7)(B)(iii), and that it complies with the typeface requirements 

of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. 

R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it was prepared using Microsoft Word 

for Microsoft 365 MSO in 14-point Century Schoolbook type.

November 17, 2023 /s/ Benjamin F. Aiken 

Benjamin F. Aiken

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1742 Doc: 22 Filed: 11/17/2023 Pg: 48 of 48