alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FHLB Pit ex10.10.2 10K 2013


 


2012-2013 Key Employee
Transition Incentive Compensation Plan (“Transition Plan” or “Plan”)


		
	I.
	Purpose and Administration




The purpose of this Transition Plan effective January 1, 2012 is to assist in the transition of the Bank’s key employee plan from a plan without a deferred component to one with a deferred component.  The Transition Plan shall be administered consistent with the terms of the Bank’s 2012 Key Employee Incentive Compensation Plan (“2012 Plan”), excluding those provisions governing deferred awards.  Capitalized terms used in this Transition Plan but not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them under the 2012 Plan and the definitions of “disability,” “involuntary termination,” and “retirement” shall also have the meanings ascribed to them under the 2012 Plan.  Unless expressly set forth otherwise in this Transition Plan, payments under the Plan are intended to satisfy the “short-term deferral” exception under Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”).  


		
	II.
	Goals




The annual goals under the 2012 Plan shall serve as the 2012 goals under this Transition Plan.  The annual goals established under any 2013 key employee incentive compensation plan shall serve as the 2013 goals under this Transition Plan.   


		
	III.
	Transition Plan Award Levels




The award levels under this Transition Plan for each of 2012 and 2013 are set forth below, expressed as a percentage of the participant’s base salary:


	
				
	Participant Level
	 Threshold
Incentive Award Opportunity
	 Target
Incentive Award Opportunity
	 Maximum
Incentive Award Opportunity

	Managing Director and Senior Director
	(2012)    3.08%
(2013)    2.32%
	(2012)   4.70%
(2013)   3.55%
	(2012) 6.33%
(2013) 4.77%

	Director
	(2012)     2.74%  
(2013)     2.06% 
	(2012)   3.76%
(2013)   2.84%
	(2012) 4.8%
(2013) 3.6%






		
	IV.
	Transition Plan Award Determinations and Payouts




The 2012 Transition Plan Award payments shall be made by March 15, 2013, at the same time as the Bank makes payment of the 2012 Current Incentive Award payment under the 2012 Plan.  The 2013 Transition Award payments shall be made by March 15, 2014 at the same time as the Bank makes payment of the current amount of any 2013 incentive awards.
-I

6wo-q.*9F\).. 6wo-D.. g:fgq -t\,.

6WO-E............. 6WO-P

6WO-S

PuebIo

P.O. Box 1846'Taos. New Mexico'87571

0t t06/t I

Miguel I. Flores

Director, Water Quality Protection Division USEPA, Region 6 (6WQ)

1445 Ross Avenue. Suite 1200

Dallas, Texas 75202

RE: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permit for Point Source

Discharges from Application of Pesticides (PGP)

To Whom it May Concem:

The Pueblo ofTaos has examined the proposed National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(NPDES) General Permit for Point Source Discharges from Application ofPesticides (PGP). Since 2006,

Taos Pueblo has had U.S. E.P.A. approved Water Qualif Standards, which apply to all surface waters in

and around the exterior boundaries of Taos Pueblo. Pursuant to section 404 and 5 l8 ofthe Clean Water

Act, Taos Pueblo is the certifying agency for all such activities that occur on Taos Pueblo Lands. As

Taos Pueblo includes lands at the bottom ofthe Rio Pueblo de Taos Watershed, where the riverjoins the

Rio Grande, Taos Pueblo Water Quality Standardshould be considered in the development and

promulgation for any NPDES Permit in the Rio Pueblo de Taos Watershed. In the case of this National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permit for Point Source Discharges from

Application of Pesticides (PGP), Taos Pueblo is submitting the following comments for inclusion in the

final draft permit.

o Copies ofall Notifications, associated analy'tical data, and written reports for actions covered

under this permit occurring on Taos Pueblo lands shall be provided to the Taos Pueblo

Governor's Office as well as the Taos Pueblo Environmental Office at the same time they are

provided to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Any correspondence between applicant

and EPA related to conective action, enforcement, monitoring, or adverse incident written r€ports

should likewise be routed to Taos Pueblo. All requested materials shall be sent to: Governor,

Taos Pueblo, P.O. Box 1846, Taos, NM, 87571 and Program Manager, Taos Pueblo

Environmental Office Program Manager, same address.

The Pueblo ofTaos reserves the right to certifo this permit pending a final draft. Ifyou need further

information please feel free to contacthe Pueblo ofTaos Environmental Program Manager Robert

Gomez or Environmental Scientist, Jeff Ogburn at (575) 751-4601 .

Sincerely,

Nelson J. Cord

Govemor - Ta

Mr. Brent Larsen, USEPA, Region 6 (6WQ-PP)

Mr. Randy Gee, OEJTA, USEPA Region 6

EPA-t5f$lv'if

II JAII -6 PH

RTCEIVE O

OFcEPA-6!VC-lilX 0FC

Taos
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

Order 

March 9, 2012 

142320 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 142320 

 COA: 298964 

Macomb CC: 1998-003105-FH 

WAMIDH BUTIRUS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 1, 2010 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

 MARKMAN, J. (concurring). 

 I concur in the Court’s order denying leave to appeal. In 1998, defendant, a 

noncitizen, pleaded no contest to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. Subsequently, 

the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defense attorney must “advise a 

noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 

consequences.” Padilla v Kentucky, 559 US ___; 130 S Ct 1473, 1483; 176 L Ed 2d 284 

(2010). Later, in May 2010, defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment, alleging 

that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise 

him of the immigration consequences of his no-contest plea. The trial court denied this 

motion, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. In order to obtain relief, 

defendant must establish that he was actually prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to advise 

him concerning the risk of adverse immigration consequences. MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b); 

Padilla, 130 S Ct at 1483. Even assuming that Padilla applies retroactively to this case, 

as the trial court explained, “defendant has not proffered any evidence (i.e., an affidavit) 

establishing that his trial counsel failed to discuss the immigration ramifications of a 

guilty plea.” Defendant also failed to present any evidence that he was actually 

prejudiced by such a failure. Defendant has since filed an affidavit with this Court in 

which he avers that his attorney failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of 
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

March 9, 2012 

h0306 

 

2

his plea and that he would not have pleaded no contest had he known that he would be 

deported. He also avers that he has been ordered deported to Iraq, but because of the war 

in that country, the Department of Homeland Security has placed him under an order of 

supervision until it is safe to physically deport him. However, even assuming that this 

affidavit would be a sufficient offer of proof, it was never submitted to the trial court. 

Therefore, I cannot conclude that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for 

relief from judgment.
#### Norris *v.*Breakwater Company, Appellant.

*Appeals*— Failure *of court below to write opinion*— Remitting *record.*

Where the court below fails to file an opinion, in making absolute a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, and merely enters an order “rule absolute,” the record will be remitted so that the court below may indicate its reasons for its action.

Argued March. 23, 1911.

March 27, 1911:

Appeal and certiorari, No. 3, Jan. T., 1911, by defendant, from order of C. P. No. 4, Phila. Co., March T., 1910, No. 8, making absolute rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense in case of Edward W. Norris v. The Breakwater Company.

Before Brown, Mestrezat, Potter, Elkin and Stewart, JJ.

Record remitted.

Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

*Error assigned*was order making absolute rule for judgment.

*John Kent Kane,*with him *Emanuel J. Myers,*for appellant.

*F. S. Laws,*of *Lewis, Adler & Laws,*for appellee.

Per Curiam,

The affidavit of defense in this case covers seventeen pages of printed matter in appellant’s paper-book. Judgment was entered against the defendant for its alleged insufficiency. The court below must have had reasons for deeming it insufficient, but what they were we do not know. No specifications of insufficiency were filed by the appellee, and all that we have from the court below is “Rule absolute.” In such a case the reason or reasons *164entertained by the court for holding the affidavit of defense insufficient should be given, and the record is remitted that we may be informed why this affidavit was deemed so. The duty is not ours in the first instance of saying why an affidavit of defense is insufficient. Upon return of the record leave will be granted to move to advance the hearing of the appeal.
#### Michael PAULE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-418.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Jan. 31, 1973.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Brevard County; Joe A. Cowart, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

September 23, 2022

No. 04

- 22

- 00407

- CR

Michae l HORNADAY, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 11

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 637583

Honorable Michael Keasler , Judge Presiding



### ORDER

On August 1, 2022, the court reporter responsible for preparing the reporter’s record in this appeal filed a notification of late record, stating that appellant ha d failed to pay or make arrangements to pay the fee for preparing the reporter’s record. O n August 5, 2022, we ordered appellant to provide written proof to this court no later than August 15, 2022

, that the reporter’s fee had been paid or arrangements had been made to pay the reporter’s fee. We further ordered that if appellant failed to file written proof regarding the reporter’s fee within the time provided, appellant’s brief would be due on or before September 6, 2022. Despite our August 5, 2022 order, a ppellant has failed to file any written proof regarding the reporter’s fee or appellant’s

brief.

On September 13 , 2022, appellant’s attorney informed the clerk of this court that he planned to file a motion to dismiss this appeal on appellant’s behalf

. H owever, as of this date, no such motion has been filed.

We , therefore, ORDER appellant’s attorney to file appellant’s brief or an appropriate

response on or before October 7, 2022 . If appellant’s attorney fails to file a brief or a response by that date, we will abate this appeal to the trial court for an abandonment hearing. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.8(b)(2)._________________________________ Liz a A. Rodriguez , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 23rd day of September, 2022

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
#### Alfred Porter ROLLE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 71-987.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 26, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal quashed.
#### George W. BROWN, Jr., Petitioner, v. VAUGHN & WRIGHT et al., Respondents.

No. 39675.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 16, 1970.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and DREW, THORNAL, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
#### Allen J. SHACKETT, Appellant, v. SEACREST MANOR HOTEL, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 71-43.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 28, 1971.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; Stephen R. Booher, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
```

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 241 (Thursday, December 15, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 77990-77991]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-32160]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Ultra-Deepwater Advisory Committee

AGENCY: Office of Fossil Energy, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of open meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice announces a meeting of the Ultra-Deepwater 
Advisory Committee. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 
86 Stat. 770) requires that public notice of this meeting be announced 
in the Federal Register.

DATES: Thursday, January 19, 2012, 8 a.m.-5 p.m. (CST).

ADDRESSES: Hilton Houston North, 12400 Greenspoint Drive, Houston, 
Texas 77060.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elena Melchert, U.S. Department of 
Energy, Office of Oil and Natural Gas, Washington, DC 20585. Phone: 
(202) 586-5600.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    Purpose of the Committee: The purpose of the Ultra-Deepwater 
Advisory Committee is to provide advice to the Secretary of Energy on 
development and implementation of programs related to ultra-deepwater 
natural gas and other petroleum resources; and to provide comments for 
the Department of Energy Annual Plan per requirements of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, Title IX, Subtitle J, Section 999D.

Tentative Agenda

January 19, 2012

7:30 a.m.-8 a.m.: Registration.
8 a.m.-noon: Call to Order, Welcome, Introductions, Opening Remarks, 
Overview of the Section 999 Research Portfolio (Ultra-Deepwater and 
NETL Complementary Research).
1 p.m.-4:45 p.m.: Overview of Draft 2012 Annual Plan.
4:45 p.m.-5 p.m.: Public Comments.
5 p.m.: Adjourn.
    Public Participation: The meeting is open to the public. The 
Designated Federal Officer and the Chairman of the Committee will lead 
the meeting for the orderly conduct of business. If you would like to 
file a written statement with the Committee, you may do so either 
before or after the meeting. If you

[[Page 77991]]

would like to make oral statements regarding any of the items on the 
agenda, you should contact Elena Melchert at the telephone number 
listed above. You must make your request for an oral statement at least 
three business days prior to the meeting, and reasonable provisions 
will be made to include all who wish to speak. Public comment will 
follow the three minute rule.
    Minutes: The minutes of this meeting will be available for public 
review and copying within 60 days at: http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/advisorycommittees/UltraDeepwater.html.

    Issued at Washington, DC, on December 7, 2011.
LaTanya Butler,
Acting Deputy Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 2011-32160 Filed 12-14-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
```
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

JUDGMENT

Henry Taylor, Jr., Appellant

No. 06

- 13

- 00078

- CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee Appeal from the 124th District Court of Gregg County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 40623

- B ). Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley,

Chief Justice Morriss and Justice Carter participating. Dissenting Opinion by

Justice Carter.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court

below

. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We further order that the appellant, Henry Taylor, Jr., pay all costs of this appeal.

RENDERED DECEMBER 13 , 2013

BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
EXHIBIT 23.1

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We consent
to the incorporation by reference in the following Registration Statements of our reports dated March 5, 2010, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedules of The PMI Group, Inc., and the effectiveness of internal control
over financial reporting of The PMI Group, Inc. included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2009.



|                              |  |        
|----------------------------- |  | -------
|Registration Statement Number |  | On Form
|333-123049                    |  | S-8    
|333-32190                     |  | S-8    
|333-47473                     |  | S-8    
|333-63122                     |  | S-8    
|333-66829                     |  | S-8    
|333-76742                     |  | S-8    
|333-81679                     |  | S-8    
|033-99378                     |  | S-8    
|333-48035                     |  | S-3    
|333-67125                     |  | S-3    
|333-29777                     |  | S-4    
|333-102761                    |  | S-8    
|333-107747                    |  | S-3    
|333-110044                    |  | S-3    
|333-130103                    |  | S-8    
|333-130102                    |  | S-8    
|033-92636                     |  | S-8    
|333-133095                    |  | S-3    
|333-136727                    |  | S-8    
|333-152675                    |  | S-8    
|333-156955                    |  | S-3    

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP

San Francisco, California

March 5,
2010
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

 

PASCUAL BURCIAGA, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D15-5538

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

) 

Opinion filed February 9, 2018.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for 

Hendry County; James D. Sloan, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, 

and Matthew J. Salvia, Assistant Public 

Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Susan M. Shanahan, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee. 

 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CRENSHAW, MORRIS, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 7954 

To reauthorize the Tropical Forest and Coral Reef Conservation Act of 

1998. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

AUGUST 7, 2020 

Mr. CHABOT (for himself and Mr. SHERMAN) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To reauthorize the Tropical Forest and Coral Reef 

Conservation Act of 1998. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Tropical Forest and 

5 Coral Reef Conservation Reauthorization Act of 2020’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION. 

7 Section 806(d) of the Tropical Forest and Coral Reef 

8 Conservation Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 2431d(d)) is amend9 ed by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: 

10 ‘‘(9) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2021. 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 7954 IH

1 ‘‘(10) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022. 

2 ‘‘(11) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2023. 

3 ‘‘(12) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2024. 

4 ‘‘(13) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2025.’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
#### William Edward VAN POYCK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-403.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 29, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> BD
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-27-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-30-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-29-1995
<CASH>                                       2,604,189
<RECEIVABLES>                               87,351,808
<SECURITIES-RESALE>                                  0
<SECURITIES-BORROWED>                       11,199,204
<INSTRUMENTS-OWNED>                         13,419,381
<PP&E>                                       3,221,294
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             125,997,799
<SHORT-TERM>                                49,500,000
<PAYABLES>                                  29,665,880
<REPOS-SOLD>                                         0
<SECURITIES-LOANED>                          4,780,120
<INSTRUMENTS-SOLD>                             320,384
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       289,156
<OTHER-SE>                                  28,752,157
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               125,997,799
<TRADING-REVENUE>                            1,015,766
<INTEREST-DIVIDENDS>                         1,875,801
<COMMISSIONS>                                9,719,951
<INVESTMENT-BANKING-REVENUES>                2,301,881
<FEE-REVENUE>                                1,453,871
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             857,043
<COMPENSATION>                               9,378,206
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                636,331
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     416,331
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   416,331
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.15
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.15
        

</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued October 2, 2019

Decided October 16, 2019

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐3164

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JOMO K. HILL,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:18‐CR‐101‐1‐JPS

J. P. Stadtmueller,

Judge.

O R D E R

Jomo K. Hill pleaded guilty to robbery and brandishing a firearm. Before his

sentencing hearing, the district court circulated a list of proposed conditions of

supervision. At the hearing, the district court pronounced his sentence and

incorporated those conditions by reference. On appeal, Hill initially argued that the

district court procedurally erred by incorporating the circulated list of conditions

without adding it to the record. After his opening brief, however, the district court

supplemented the record with that list, curing any procedural defect. This appeal is

therefore moot. We decline the defendant’s invitation to issue an advisory order to

clarify the proper procedure for incorporating conditions.

DISMISSED

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1