alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580 

Office ofthe Secretary 

October 25, 2022 

[commenter Anonymous] 

Re: In the Matter ofElectrowarmth Products, LLC, Matter No. 2223096 

Dear [Anonymous]: 

Thank you for commenting on the Federal Trade Commission's proposed consent 

agreement in the above-referenced proceeding. The Commission has considered your comment 

and placed it on the public record pursuant to Rule 4.9(b)(6)(ii) ofthe Commission 's Rules of 

Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 4.9(b)(6)(ii). 

In your comment, you state that a "company that either intentionally misleads or doesn't 

bother to validate the claims on their product should not be in business." You explain that you 

examine labels and packaging for fiber content and origin infonnation, and such infonnation is 

material to you. You fmi her state that false claims "lead to an unfair playing field," and 

violators should be "punished." The Commission shares your concerns. However, you do not 

propose any revisions to the draft complaint or the consent agreement. Therefore, after 

considering your comment, the Commission has determined that the relief set fo1i h in the 

consent agreement is appropriate and sufficient to remedy the violations alleged in the complaint. 

Specifically, the injunctive relief in the Decision and Order will protect consumers by 

preventing the Respondents from engaging in the acts and practices alleged in the Complaint and 

by deteITing other would-be violators. Additionally, the Decision and Order includes 

complementaiy relief, including a monetaiy judgment suspended based on the Respondents' 

inability to pay, a notice provision, and provisions to aid the Commission in monitoring the 

Respondents' compliance. 

At this time, the Commission has determined that the public interest would best be served 

by issuing the Decision and Order in final fo1m without modification. The final Decision and 

Order and other relevant materials ai·e available on the Commission's website at 

http://www.ftc.gov. It helps the Commission 's analysis to hear from a variety ofsources in its 

work, and we thank you again for your comment. 

By direction ofthe Commission. 

April J. Tabor 

Secretaiy
#### Richard BYRD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-125.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 29, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 16, 1971.

*437Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, Edwin T. Mulock, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and P. A. Pacyna, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

PIERCE, Chief Judge.

Appellant Richard Byrd appeals to this Court from an order denying his petition for relief under CrPR 1.850, 33 F.S.A.

Byrd was informed against on July 2, 1969, in the Manatee County Circuit Court in two counts under the Forgery Statute, the first count charging forgery of a bank check and the second count charging the uttering of such check.

On July 29, 1969, he appeared in Court represented by the local Public Defender and pleaded guilty to the two charges. On September 8, 1969, still represented by the Public Defender, he was sentenced to a term in the State Prison.

On November 24, 1969, he filed motion in the trial Court under CrPR 1,850, in which he alleged that “At the sentencing in the instant case, (the defendant being represented by the Office of the Public Defender), said Public Defender was not present at said sentencing, and the defendant respectfully submits that he did not waive his Constitutional Right to the assistance of Counsel at said proceeding”.

The order on the motion was entered on January 13, 1970, and recites that the cause “coming on this day to be heard upon the Motion of the Defendant to Vacate and Set Aside the judgment and sentence heretofore entered pursuant to Rule 1.850, FRCP, and the Court having examined said Motion and Petition filed herein, and the Court finding that such Motion is without merit” the said motion was denied.

On February 7, 1970, Byrd filed his notice of appeal *Pro Se*to this Court.

We have carefully considered the record in this cause. While Byrd in his petition for relief under CrPR 1.850 alleges he was not attended by counsel at the time he was sentenced, the files and records of the cause in the trial Court conclusively refute, such statement. The official minutes of the Court on September 8, 1969, affirmatively attested by the trial Judge, plainly asserts that “on this 8th day of September, A.D. 1969, came the State by its Assistant State Attorney Ralph H. Haben, Jr. and the defendant being present in open Court and being represented by D. Turner Matthews, Assistant Public Defender and having entered a plea of Guilty on a former day of this Court to the offense of FORGERY F.S. 831.01, F.S.A., the Court now adjudges you to be guilty * * * »>. And he was sentenced accordingly.

CrPR 1.850 by its affirmative terms precludes relief to any person where “the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief”. Here the “files and records of the case” conclusively and affirmatively show that Byrd was represented by counsel at the time of his sentencing, his statement in the petition for relief to the contrary notwithstanding.

Affirmed.

LILES and MANN, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

CESAR MUNOZ GONZALEZ, AKA Blanco, AKA "B",

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 23

- 1138

D.C. No. 2:10

- cr

- 00567

- RGK

- 2

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner

, District Judge , Presiding

Submitted February 2 1, 2024 **

Before: FERNANDEZ, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges

.

Cesar Munoz Gonzalez appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying

his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 29 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 23

- 1138

United States v. Aruda , 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021), we affirm.

Gonzale z contends that the district court erred by failing to recognize its

authority to reduce his sentence even if it did not grant him immediate release.

The record demonstrates that the district court adequately responded to the

arguments Gonzalez presented and does not suggest the court mis understood the

scope of its discretion under § 3582 (c) (1)(A) (i)

. See Walton v. Arizona , 497 U.S.

639, 653 (1990) (“Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in

making their decisions.”), overruled o n other grounds by Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S.

584, 609 (2002). Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

concluding that Gon za lez had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling

reasons for relief

. See United States v. Robertson , 895 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.

2018) (a district court abuses its discretion only if its decision is illogical,

implausible, or without support in the record).

AFFIRMED.
---

April 9th, 2007

VIA EDGAR

United States Securities and Exchange Commission

|Re: | Great Basin Gold Ltd. (the
      "Company")
|--- | -------------------------------------------
|    | Annual Report on Form 40-F                 
|    | Consent of Expert                          

This letter is provided in connection with the Company's Form
40-F annual report for the year ended December 31, 2006 (the Annual Report) to
be filed by the Company with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC). The Annual Report incorporates by reference the Annual
Information Form of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2006.

On behalf of Behre Dolbear & Company Ltd. (Behre
Dolbear), I hereby consent to the use of my name and Behre Dolbears name in
connection with reference to my and Behre Dolbears involvement in the
preparation of a technical report entitled Technical Report on the Feasibility
Study for the Burnstone Gold Project (the "Technical Report") and to references
to the Technical Report, or portions thereof, in the Annual Report and to the
inclusion and incorporation by reference of the information derived from the
Technical Report in the Annual Report.

Yours truly,

Behre Dolbear & Company Ltd.

*/s/ Derek C. Rance*

Derek C. Rance

---
263 La. 801

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Roger DOUGET v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 53004.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 5, 1972.

In re: Roger Douget applying for remedial writs and writ of habeas corpus.

Writ denied. According to the judgment of the trial judge, written waivers of counsel and a written plea of guilty are entered in the record. Applicant has failed to make these waivers part of this application.
EXHIBIT A

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 9/2/2015 3:40:17 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
EXHIBIT A
EXHIBIT A
EXHIBIT A
EXHIBIT A
EXHIBIT A
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                         MACKINAC FINANCIAL CORPORATION

                            CERTIFICATION PERSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

This certification is provided pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 18 U.S.C Section 1350, and accompanies the quarterly report on Form
10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2006, (the "Form 10-Q") of Mackinac
Financial Corporation (the "Issuer").

     I, Paul D. Tobias, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Issuer,
certify that:

     (1)  The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a)
          or 78o(d)); and

     (2)  The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of
          the Issuer.


/s/ Paul D. Tobias
------------------------------------
Paul D. Tobias
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
(chief executive officer)
May 12, 2006


                                                                             36.
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-2240

___________

Stacey M. Brown, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. *

 * Appeal from the United States

City of St. Louis Public Safety * District Court for the

Department, * Eastern District of Missouri.

 *

Appellee, * [UNPUBLISHED]

 *

Steven Readye, *

 *

Defendant. *

___________

 Submitted: November 7, 1997

 Filed: December 30, 1997

___________

Before McMILLIAN, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________
The Honorable Lawrence O. Davis, United States Magistrate Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

-2-

PER CURIAM.

Stacey Brown appeals from the district court&s order granting summary

1

judgment to her employer, the City of St. Louis Public Safety Department, in this

hostile environment sexual harassment action brought under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. We affirm. 

In July 1994, Brown, a correctional officer, complained to a supervisor that

Brown&s co-worker, Lieutenant Steven Readye, had on three occasions made

unwelcome sexual comments to her, had once touched her inappropriately, and had

blown kisses at her. A meeting was immediately held at which Readye was

reprimanded and required to apologize to Brown; Brown was told to report any further

incidents. Approximately two weeks later, when Brown reported that Readye had

kissed her on the ear, Readye was immediately transferred to another shift and was

required to enter the next sexual harassment training program; an investigation was

begun that resulted in Readye&s eight-day suspension without pay. No further incidents

of harassment occurred.

As one element of her hostile environment sexual harassment claim, Brown was

required to prove the employer knew or should have known of the harassment, yet

failed to take “proper remedial action.” See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372,

1377 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340,

343-44 (8th Cir. 1992) (upon notice, the employer must take “#prompt remedial action

reasonably calculated to end the harassment&”) (quoted case omitted). Under the

circumstances of this case, we agree with the district court that the employer&s response

to the harassment was sufficient as a matter of law. See Barrett v. Omaha Nat&l Bank,

726 F.2d 424, 426-27 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding district court&s factual finding of
-3-

 appropriate employer response where shortly after complaint, employer investigated,

placed alleged harasser on probation, and threatened termination if there was further

misconduct); cf. Davis, 981 F.2d at 341, 343 (finding requiring harasser to apologize

insufficient response, where alleged harasser apologized twice, and his conduct

worsened after each apology).

Accordingly we affirm. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
EXHIBIT 16


March 22, 2004

Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549

Gentlemen:

We were previously principal accountants for Adams Golf, Inc. and,
under the date of January 28, 2004, we reported on the consolidated
financial statements of Adams Golf, Inc. as of and for the years
ended December 31, 2003 and 2002.  On March 19, 2004, we were
informed our appointment as principal accountants was terminated.
We have read Adams Golf, Inc.'s statements included under Item 4 of
its Form 8-K dated March 15, 2004 and we agree with such statements,
except that we are not in a position to agree or disagree with Adams
Golf, Inc.'s statement that the change was approved by the Audit
Committee of the Board of Directors and the statement that KBA Group
LLP was not engaged regarding the application of accounting
principles to a specified transaction or the type of audit opinion
that might be rendered on Adams Golf, Inc.'s consolidated financial
statements.

Very truly yours,


KPMG LLP
Exhibit 32



STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND THE 
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350



Each of the undersigned hereby certifies in his capacity as an officer of Regions Financial Corporation (the "Company") that this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (this "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



DATE:  May 7, 2004

/s/ Carl E. Jones, Jr.                      Carl E. Jones, Jr.
Chairman of the Board, President
and Chief Executive Officer



DATE:  May 7, 2004

/s/ D. Bryan Jordan                       D. Bryan Jordan
Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Regions Financial Corporation and will be retained by Regions Financial Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. George W. ROTHERMEL.

No. 60139.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 16, 1977.

In re: George W. Rothermel applying for supervisory writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Writ denied: Adequate remedy by review in the event of conviction.
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 23.5


                           Independent Auditors' Consent


     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration 
Statements on Form S-8 (333-01574, 333-12789 and 333-24581); Form S-3 
(333-10383 and 333-14025); Form S-4 (333-13133); and Post-Effective Amendment 
No. 1 to Form S-4 on Form S-8 (333-36463) of our report dated September 23, 
1996, with respect to the financial statements of MTA, Inc. as of December 
31, 1995, and the related consolidated financial statements of income and 
retained earnings and cash flows for the period from January 25, 1995 (date 
of incorporation) to December 31, 1995 (not presented separately herein), 
appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of U.S. Office Products Company.

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP
---------------------------------
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP
July 20, 1998
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10 - 23 - 00234 - CR No. 10 - 23 - 00235 - CR JAMES GAMBRELL, JR. , Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

From the 12th District Court Walker County, Texas Trial Court No s . 30096 & 30238 R E I N S T A T E M E N T A N D B R I E F I N G ORDER A N D

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Th e s e appeal s w ere abated and reman d ed s o the trial court could determine why briefs had not been filed in these cases and whether A ppe llant still desires to proceed with these appeals. The trial cou rt held a hearing and appointed appellat e counsel. T he supplemental clerk's record and supplemental reporter's record of th at hearing have been filed in th is Court.Gambrell v. State Pa ge 2

Accordingly , we REINSTA T E these appeals. The rec ord includes an order dismissing trial court cause number 30096, our cause number 10
- 23
- 00234
- CR. In criminal cases, a party may appeal only from a judgment of convic tion or an interlocutory order as authori zed by st atute. See T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . art. 44.02; T EX . R. A PP . P. 25.2(a)(2); Ragston v. State , 424 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). When this Court lacks jurisdiction, we have no power to act, and we must dismiss the attempted appeal. See State v. Dunbar , 297 S.W.3d 777, 780 (Tex . Crim. App. 2009). Accordingly, we dismiss appellate cause number 10
- 23
- 00234
- CR for lack of jurisdiction
. Appellant's appointed counsel and counsel for the State filed an "Agreed Motion to Transfer Briefs
. " The y assert t hat Appellant 's briefs and the State's briefs were filed in this Court , but erroneously filed in c au se numbers 10
- 23
- 00176
- CR and 10
- 23
- 00181
- CR
. See Ga mbrell v. State , 10
- 23
- 00176
- CR & 10
- 23
- 00181
- CR , 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 1591 (Tex. App.

— Waco March 4, 20 24, no pet. h .) (mem. op., not designate d for publication). They request this Court to transfer the briefs from t hose causes to cause numbers 10
- 23
- 00234
- CR and 10
- 23
- 00235
- CR. Inas much as cause number 10
- 23
- 00234
- CR has been dismissed, we cannot transfe r brie fs into that appeal. Furthermore, Appellant 's briefs were filed pro se, and he is now represented by counsel . He is not entitled to hybrid representation. See Ex parte Taylor ,Gambrell v. State Pa ge 3

36 S.W. 3d 883, 887 (Tex. C ri m. App. 2001) (per curiam)
. Accordingly, w e DENY the Ag reed Motion to Transfer Bri efs. The briefing schedule is reset. Appellant's br ief in 10
- 23
- 00235
- CR is due 30 days from the date of this opinion and order. The State's brief is due 30 days after App ellant's brief is filed.

STEVE S MITH Justice Before Ch ief Justice Gray, Justice Johnson, an d Justice Smith Appeals reinstated Appeal dismissed Opinion and order issued and filed March 7, 2024 Do not publish [RWR] [CR 25 ]
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-4427
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus TONY JAMES BENNETT, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley. David A. Faber, Chief District Judge. (CR-04-158) Submitted: January 31, 2006 Decided: February 15, 2006 Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, Acting United States Attorney, Steven I. Loew, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Tony James Bennett appeals his thirty-month sentence imposed after he pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). He contends on appeal that his sentence is unreasonable in light of United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We affirm. Bennett maintains that his sentence is unreasonable because his possession, while illegal, was harmless to the public. Although the sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory, Booker makes clear that a sentencing court “must consult [the] Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” 125 S. Ct. at 767 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). The court should consider the sentencing range along with the other factors identified in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and then impose a sentence. See United States v. Hughes , 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). The sentence must be “within the statutorily prescribed range and . . . reasonable.” Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted). In sentencing Bennett, the district court considered the properly calculated guideline range and the factors in § 3553(a). Because the court sentenced Bennett within the advisory guideline range and within the ten-year statutory maximum, see18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), we conclude that Bennett’s sentence is reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately- 3 - presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED