F OR P UB LIC AT ION



### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

K EV I N C OOPER , Plaintif f-Appellant ,

v.

M I CH A EL A. RAMOS , District Attorney for the County

of San B e rn ard ino ; S TEVE N M Y ERS , Senior Cr imi na lis t w iththe Ca lif or nia Depa rtment of Just ice DN A L a bo ra tor y ; D A N I EL G R E G O N IS , Cr imi na lis t at th e SB CSD ; F RE D E CK L EY ; K EN S CH RE CKE N G O ST , SB CSD De puty ; W I L L I AM B A I RD , SB CSD De puty ; I R VI N S H A RP , SB CSD De puty ; H ECT O R O CAMPO , SB CSD De te c tiv e ; G AL E D U FFY , SB CSD De puty ; D A V ID S T O CKW ELL , Defendants-A ppellees

. No. 11-57144

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-03942- SVW-OP

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ce ntr a l D istri c t of

Ca lif or nia Stephen V. Wilson, Dist rict Judge, Pre siding

Argued and Submitted Aug ust 20, 2012—Seattle, WashingtonC O O PER V

. RAMOS

2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. Filed De cembe r 27, 2012

Be fore : M. Marg are t McKeown, Ronald M. Gould,
a nd Ric ha rd C. T a llm an, Cir c uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e McK eown

SUMMAR

Y *

Civil Rights The pa nel af firmed the distr i ct court’s dismi ssal of a complaint broug ht by

Kevin Cooper, who was c onvicted of
mur de r an d

s e n t e n c e d

t o d e a t hi n1 9 8 5 , c h a l l e n g i n g a s t a te court’s de nial of his reque st to obtain additional DNA testing pursuant to a state statute. Cooper a l l eged that he was the targ et of a long- running
c on sp ir a c y , invo lvi ngme mbe rs of the San B e rn ard ino C o u

nty Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment and other s, to manipulate evidenc e and preve nt him from proving that he was fra med. The dist rict court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, to the e x tent th at C ooper w as able to plead viable c laims that were not barr ed by the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine.

The panel first deter

mined that the district court intended its order to b e fi n al and appeala ble and ther efor e the pa

nel ha d ju ri sd ic tio n to c on sid e r t

he ru lin g . T he pa

ne l th en hel d that the district c ourt proper ly dismiss ed the c omplaint underC O O PER V

. RAMOS 3

the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine be c a us e the fe de ra l c ourt s la c ke d su bje c t matte r jur isd ic tio n ov e r Coo pe r’ s first cla im, whi c hs o u g h t f

e d e r a l r e li e f

f r o m t h e s tate c o u rt’s de te r mi n a ti o n in th e D N A p r o c e e d in g , an d o v e r h is second
an d t h i r d c l a i m s , w h i c h w e r e i n e xtr i c a b l y i n t e rt w i n e d w ith the fi rs t. T he pa

ne l f ur the r h e ld t hat th e dis tr ic t di d no t e rr

in imp lic itl y de nyingCoo pe r’ s re qu e st to ame nd the c omp la int

.

CO UN SEL

L . D avid Rus se ll a nd Ke nn e th K . L e e , Jenne r & B loc k L L P, L os An g e le s, Ca lif

or nia , f or Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt.
Sh annon L . Gustafson, Ly nberg& Watkins, Ora ng e, Ca lif or nia fo r D e fe nd ants -A

pp e lle es Mi c ha e l A . Ra mos , Daniel Gr eg onis, Fre d Eckley , Ken Schr ecke ng ost, W illiam B a ir d, I rv in S ha

rp , H e c tor

Oc ampo , G a le Du ffy , a

nd Da vid Sto c kw e ll; Kr ist in G. Ho g ue , Of fi c e of the Attor ne y Ge ne ra l, S an D iego, Ca li forni a, fo r Defe nd ant -Ap pel lee Ste ve n M ye rs

.

OP IN ION
McKEOWN, Circuit J udg e:
Kevi n Cooper wa s convicted of

four c ounts of first-degree mur de r a nd se nte nc e d to de a th i n 19 85

. Sin c e the n h is c a se ha s tr ave le d u

p, do wn and aro un d th e fe de ra l and state judiciaries. Most rec ently , Cooper filed suit in fede ral district
c ourt in C a lif or nia c ha lle ng inga

state c ourt ’s de nia l of

his
re qu e st t o o bta in a dd iti on a l D NAte sti ngpurs ua nt t o a stat e statute. I n the complaint, Cooper alleg es that he is the tar g et of a long -running conspirac y , involving members of the SanC O O PER V

. RAMOS

4

B e rn ard ino County She ri ff ’s De pa rtme nt and oth e rs , to manipulate evide nce a

nd preve nt him from pro v i n g t hat he was fr amed. The district court d i smissed without prejudice on the basis that it lacked subjec t matter jurisdiction under the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine be c a us e Coo pe r’ s f

e de ra l su it
c o n s ti tute d

a d e f a c to a p p e a l o f th e s tate c o u rt j u d g me n t. We ag ree that his comp l ai nt was prope rly dismiss ed. Unde r the Rooke r -F el dman doctrine, the fede ral c ourts lack subjec t matter jurisdi ction over his first c laim, which soug ht fede ral relief from the state court’s de termin at ion in the DNA proce eding , and over

his second and third c laims, which are in ex tricably

intertwined with the fir st. W e fur ther hold that the dis tr ic t di d n ot e rr in i mpl ic itl y de nyingCoo pe r’ s r e qu e st to a me nd the c omp la int

.

B ACKG ROUND Coop er has vigor ously

pursued his postconviction op tio ns . H e ha s a

pp e are d b e fo re mul tip le thr e e -j ud g e pa ne ls and an e n banc pa

nel of this c ourt, as we ll as various fe dera l district and state c ourts. Whil e his eff o rt s have que stioned the cr edibility

of the police work an d the fore nsic evidenc e, they have failed to re sult in a rever sal of his conviction. The br uta l f a c ts a nd prol on ged

pr oc e dura l hi sto ry

are de ta ile d in
our previous opinion a

nd are not r epeated her e. See Coope r v . B ro wn , 510 F.3d 870 ( 9th Cir. 2007).

I n 2010, sever al y ear s after denial of his fe der al habeas petition, Cooper filed a moti on in San Dieg o Superior Court under California Penal Code § 1405. Sec tion 1405, entitled Mo tio n f or DN A T e sti ng , pro vid e s c on vic te d f e lon s a ri g ht t o fil e a motion for post-conviction DNA testing , and sets out
e ig ht de ta ile d f

a c t- ba se d c ri te ri a

fo r gra nti ngthe mot ion . Ca l. Pena l C o d e § 1 4 0 5

. Co o p e r s o u g h t f u rth e r p o s t- c o n v ic tionC O O PER V

. RAMOS 5

DNA testingof three p i ece s of evidenc e, all of which had be e n e xten siv e ly

te ste d a nd un su c c e ssf

ull y c ha lle ng e d in pr e vio us pr oc e e din g s.

I n reje cting Cooper’s r equest for testing, the Superior Court review ed in de tail the tests that had bee n conducte d on
eac h piece of evide nce, c onsidered the re quirements for fu rt he r te sti ng un de r § 14 05 , and re je c te d Coo pe r’s c la ims that the pr os e c uti on and oth e r pu bli c of fi c ia ls t ampe re d w ith the evidenc e of the crime. The court labeled a s “spec ulation” Coo pe r’ s “ un sp eci fie d ta mpe ri ngthe or

y .” Th e c ourt

a lso found that Cooper ha d failed to show that use of a diff ere nt testing me thod, the M iniFiler kit , “would provide results that
are rea sonably

mo re discriminatory

and probative of the ide nti ty of the pe rp e tr a tor

or a c c omp lic e or

have a re a so na ble probability

of contra dicting prior test results” a s require d by § 1405. Ultimately the court conclude d that Cooper “ha s not demonstrated the re is a rea sonable probability he would have ha d a mor e fa vo ra ble outc ome if

the reque ste d D NAre su lts had bee n available .”

Rathe r t ha n f ili nga pe tit ion

fo r r e vie w w iththe Ca lif

or nia Supreme Court, Cooper f iled a complaint in fe dera l court ag ainst a host of public officia ls— Micha el A. Ramos, Daniel Gre g onis, Fre d Eckley , Wil liam Ba ird, Hec tor O’Campo, Gail Duff y , David Stockwell, and Steve n My ers—a lleg ing violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cooper a lleg ed that he is the targ et of a

long- running conspi ra cy to manipulate evidenc e and pre vent him f

ro m proving that he wa s framed. He
a dv anc e d thre e c la ims : ( 1) de nia l of pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss in t he t ri al court

ba se d o n th e § 1 40 5 p ro c e e din g s ( a g a ins t San Be rnar dino D istrict A ttorney Michae l Ramos and Steven My ers, se nior criminalist ); (2 ) civil conspira cy to deny pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss b a se d o n h is § 14 05 re qu e st ( a g a ins tC O O PER V

. RAMOS

6 Ramos and My ers) ; and (3) civil conspirac y to deny substa n t i v e due proce ss based on tampe ring with and falsifying e vidence (ag ainst all defe ndants). C hara cter izi ng Coo pe r’ s su it a s a

de fa c to ap pe a l of the state c ourt jud g me nt, the d is tr ic t c o u rt d is mi s s e d th e c o mp la int w it

h o u t p r e ju dice for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction under the Ro ok e rFeldman doctrine.

A N A L Y SIS

I. A V A ILA BILITY O F A PP ELLATE REVIEW
The th re s h o ld issue on appea l is whether we have j u r i s d i c t i o nt o c o n s i d e r

t h e d i s tr i c tc o u rt ’ s r

u l i n g

. T his question arises be cause the d i s trict court dismissed the
c omp la int “ wi tho ut p re

jud ic e , to the e xten t th a t Pla int if f i s a b l e t o p l e a d

v i a b l e c l a i m s t h a tar e n o t b a r r e d b y Ro ok e rFeldman ,” but the cour

t ne ither g rante d nor denie d Cooper’s reque st for leave to amend. See W MX Tech., In c. v. Miller , 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 ( 9th Cir. 1997) (en ba nc) ( noting the difficulty of dete rmining the finality of a district court’s orde r “whe n a complaint is simply dismiss ed without prejudice ”).

This c ase stands in c ontrast to W MX Technologies , wher e a dismissal was no t fi nal for pur poses of a

ppeal be cause the dis tr ic t c ourt

e xplic itl y

g ra nted t he r e qu e st f

or le ave to amend. He re, where there is no order w ith resp ec t to the reque st for leave to amend, ou r pre cede nt require s an evaluation of the district court’s intent: “Or dinarily an orde r dis mis sin g the c omp la int

rathe r t ha n d ism iss ingthe a c tio n is
no t a fi na l or de r a

nd thu s n ot app eal a

ble . H ow e ve r, if

it
a pp e ars that th e dis tr ic t c ourt int e nd e d th e dis mis sa l to dispose of the a ction , i t m ay be conside red f

inal and
a p p e a la ble.” Kneve lbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc. ,C O O PER V

. RAMOS 7

232 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2000) (a lteration, interna l quotation ma rk s , and citation omitted). In Kne v e lba ar d Dairies, fo r e xamp le , t

h e pla int if f o pp os e d mo tio ns to d ism iss its complaint and, alternati v el y , asked f or leave to amend. We hel d th a t th e c ourt ’s or de r gra nti ngthe mot ion s to dis mis s, wi tho ut m e nti on of le ave to a

me nd , “ ne c e ssa

ri ly entailed a denial of the alternative reque st for leave to amend
and a de te rm inatio n .

. . tha

t th e ple a din g c ou ld n ot p os sib ly be cur ed by

the alleg ation of other f acts.” Id. (i nterna l citation and quotation marks omitted). Although he re the d istrict court adde d that it dism issed

“ wi tho ut p re

jud ic e ” and

“ to t he ex tent ” that Co op e r c ou ld plead non- barr ed cla ims, these qualifiers do not ove rcome the inf e re nc e that the dis tr ic t c ourt imp lic itl y de nie d the req ue st to amend a

nd intended to finally

dispose of the a ction. See Gerritsen v. dela Madrid Hurtado , 819 F .2 d 1 51 1, 15 14 (9 th Cir. 1987) (“F ailure to a llow leave t o am en d supports an infere nce that the district court intended to ma k e t h e order fi na l.” ). Un lik e the Rul e 12 (b )( 6) dis mis sa l for fa ilure to s tate a cla im in Kneve lbaard Dairies , the di s t ri ct court dismi ssed this case unde r Rule 12(b)( 1) for lack of subject m atter jurisdi ction. I t is not uncommon for courts to fra me a jur isd ic tio na l di smi ssa l a s bei ng“ wi tho ut p re jud ic e ” be c a

us e the merits have not been considered. See Frigard v. United States , 8 62 F .2 d 20 1, 20 4 (9 th Cir

. 19 88 ) ( “ Or din ari ly , a c a se dismiss ed for

lack o f subject matter jur isdiction should be di s missed without prejudice so that a pla intiff may rea ssert his claims in a competent c ourt.”).

Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re fe rence to p ote nti a l “ via ble c la ims t h a t ar e n o tb ar

r e d b y Rooke r-Feldman ” do e s n ot n e c e ssa ri ly
r e f le c t th a t th e c o u rt w a s inv it in g ame n dme n t r a th e r than
me re ly le avin g op e n th e po ssi bil ity that Coop e r mig ht b e a bleC O O PER V

. RAMOS

8

to b ri nga se pa rate , me ri tor iou s su it. Th e ratio na le se t out in the or de r s tr on g ly

su g g e sts that th e c ourt

re je c te d th e via

bil ity of any amendments

. The c ourt specif ically considere d Coo pe r’ s argume nt t

hat, a lthoug h n ot p le d a s su c h, his su it posed an inde pende n t, g ener al cha lleng e to the constitutionalit y

of § 1 4 0 5. I t rea soned that, eve n if the complaint could be c onstru ed t o encompa ss that claim, the claim “must fail” be cause no California sta te cour t had construed the statute to fore close a cc es s to DNA testing for prisoners who all eg ed they wer e fr amed. See Kne v e lba ar d Dairies , 232 F.3d at 983 (finding “infe renc e that finality was intended . . . espe cially strong ” whe re “ [n] o one has sug g ested a

n amendment that c ould c h ang e the district cour t’s ruling ”).

That the court considere d the case closed is also evinced by the c le rk ’s de fi nit ive te rm ination of the c a se . A s in Kneve lbaard Dairies , “[t] he cle rk’s docket entry descr ibe[d] the dismiss al order as ‘terminatingcase .’” Id. a t 983. A “ JS6” code , indicating case termination, ap p ea rs on both the order and the doc ket entry . Clerk entries, a lbeit “ministerial acts” distinct from the “the judicia l act of r ender ing j u d g ment,” Lockwood v. W olf Corp. , 6 2 9 F

. 2 d 6 0 3 , 6 08 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980), may

be instructive. Se e Kne v e lba ar d Dairies , 232 F.3d at 983. Thoug h a docke t entry alone is not dispositi ve, the ter

m i n at i o n of the c ase, c ombined with the infere nce of

finality arisingfrom the c ourt’s fai l ure to g rant le ave to ame nd

and the c ourt ’s re

je c tio n o f a

po te nti a l, alternative claim, lead us to c onclude that the court intende d its order to be final and appe alable. A ccor dingly , we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.C O O PER V

. RAMOS 9

II. J U R I SDI C TI ON A L B AR T O C OO PE R ’ S C L A I MS
The Rooke r-Feldman doctrine instruc ts that feder al dis tr ic t c ourt s are wi tho ut j ur isd ic tio n to he ar direct a pp e a ls fr om t he jud g me nts of

state cou rt s. Con g re ss, in 2 8 U .S. C. § 1257, vests the United States Supreme Court, not the lower fede ral c ourts, with appellate jur isdiction ove r st ate c ourt judgme nts. Lan c e v . D e nn is , 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (pe r curiam). Acc ording ly , “[r]e view of suc h judgme nts may be h ad only in [ the Supreme] Court.” D i s tr i c t o f C o l u mb ia Court of Appeals v. Fe ldman , 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). The doctrine ba

rs a district cour

t from exercisingjurisdiction not only over a n action explicitly

sty l ed as a

direc t appea l, but also over the “de f

acto e quivalent” of

such an a

ppeal. Noel
v . H all , 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 ( 9th Cir. 2003).

To de te rm ine wh e the r a

n a c tio n f unc tio ns a s a

de fa c to appea l, we “pa

y close attention to the r e l i e f s oug ht by

the fede ral-c ourt plaintiff.” Bianchi v. Ry l a arsdam , 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). “I t is a forbidden d e fa cto appe al under Rooke r-Feldman when the pla intiff i n fede ral district cour t
c omp la ins of

a le g a l wr on g a lle g e dly

c omm itt e d b y

the state court, a nd seeks r elief f

rom the judg ment o f t hat cour t.” Noel , 34 1 F .3 d a t 11 63 ; see also Skinne r v. Switzer , 1 31 S. Ct

. 1289, 1297 (2011) ( emphasizing that the Ro oker-Feldman doctrine is limited to case s “broug ht by state-c ourt losers . . . inviting district court revie w and re jection of the state court’s judgme nts”) (inter

nal quota ti o n ma r k s , a lt eration, and citation omitted).

We rec og nize that the Supreme C o u rt has bee n very sparingin its i nvocation o f t h e doctr ine, se e Ex x on Mo bil Corp. v. Saudi B asic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)C O O PER V

. RAMOS

10 (empha siz ing t h e “n arr ow g round occ upied by Rooke r–Feldman ”), so we are car ef u l not to sweep too broadly . The doc trine d o es n ot prec lude a plaintiff f rom bring ing a

n “indepe ndent claim” that, though simil ar or eve n identical to issues aire d in state court, was not the subjec t of a pre vious judgment by the state cour t. Skinner , 131 S. Ct . at 1297. The Court h as found claims barre d under Ro ok e rFeldman only in the two flag ship c ases that g ave the doctrine its name. See R ooker v . Fidel i t y Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (192 3) ; Feldman , 4 6 0 U

. S. 4 6 2

. I nb o th c a s e s th e Cour

t
re a so ne d th a t th e pla int if fs , havin g los t in

state c ourt , “esse ntially

invited federa l courts of fir st instance to re view and re verse unfavor able state -cour t judgments.” Exx on Mo bil , 54 4 U.S. at 283. A re view of the Feldman c a se provides an instruc tive framework f or eva luating Coope r’s
c la ims

.
I n Feldman , tw o g ra du a te s of un a c c re dit e d law s chools petitioned a local court for a waiver to permit them to sit for the bar

. When the ir antitrust, F ifth Amendment and g ener al fairne ss/due proce ss c laims w ere reje cted by that court, they filed suit in feder al cour

t. The Su p re m e C ourt dee med the action a de fac to appea l to the ext ent that it sought re view of the l ocal court’s denial of t he petiti ons. On t he other hand, as
we r ecounte d in Noel , the Supreme Court a llowed the “cha lleng e to the loca l c ourt’s leg islative act of pr omulgating its rule” prohibiting the g raduates from sitting f or the bar,
rea soning that it “was a c halleng e to the v al id ity of the ru le rathe r than a

challeng e to an appli ca tion of the rule .” Noel , 341 F.3d at 1157 (emphasis adde d). The Court fu rther
rea soned that, “[i] f the c onsti t utional claims prese nted to a United States District Court are inextricably intertwined wi th the state c ourt’s denia l in a judicial proce edingof a pa rticular plaintiff’s application for admission to the s tate bar, then theC O O PER V

. RAMOS 11

District Court is i n essenc e beingcalled upon to r eview the state court decision,” which “the District Court may not do.” Feldman , 460 U.S. at 482 n.16 (empha sis added and c itation omitted). I n Fe ldman’s ca se, howeve r, the Court found that the cha lleng e to the validi ty of t he rule constituted “a g ener al attack on [its] constitutionalit y ” that wa s independe nt of, not intertwined with, the loca l court’s de cision. Id. at 487.

Our c ir c uit

ha s emp hasi zed

that “ [o]nl y

wh e n th e re is alre ady a for bidden de f

acto a ppeal in fe dera l court does the ‘inextricably

intertwined’ te st come into play .” Noe l, 34 1 F .3 d a t 11 58 . In id e nti fy ingwh a t is su e s are ine xtri c a bly i n t ertwine d with a forbidde n appea l, the following succinc t g uid anc e fr om Jus tic e Mars ha ll i s u se fu l:

Whil e the que stion whether a federa l
c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e is i n e xtr i c ably intertwined with the mer its of a state-court jud g me nt m ay

sometim e s b e dif

fi c ult to
answe r, it is appare nt, as a fi rst step, that the fe de ra l c la im is ine xtri c a

bly int e rt wi ne d w ith the state -c ourt

judg me nt i f t

he fe de ra l c la im
succe eds onl y to the ex tent that the state c ourt wrong ly decide d the issues b efor e it. Where fede ral rel ief c an only

be pre dicated upon a
c on vic tio n th a t th e state c ourt wa s w ro ng , it is dif fi c ult to c on c e ive the fe de ra l pr oc e e din g a s, in substance, any

thing other

than a pr ohibited
a pp e a l of the state -c ourt

jud g me nt.
Pennzoil Co. v. Texac o, Inc. , 4 81 U. S. 1, 25 (1 98 7) (M ars ha ll, J., c on c ur ri ng ). Thus , w e have fo un d c la ims ine xtri cab ly intertwined wher e “‘ the re lief re quested in the fe dera l action
wo uld e ff e c tiv e ly re ve rs e the state c ourt

de c isi on or vo id itsC O O PER V

. RAMOS

12

r u li n g .’” F

o n tana Empire Ctr., LL C v. City of Fontana , 3 0 7 F. 3 d 9 8 7 , 9 9 2 (9 t hC i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g C h a r ch enko v

. City of Sti llwat er , 47 F.3d 981, 983 ( 8th Cir. 1995)).

Wit h these princ iples in mind, we now conside r whe ther Rooke r-Feldman ba

rs Coo pe r’ s f

e de ra l c la ims

. A. Claim One – Challenge to state c ourt decision on § 1405 m otion Cooper’s f

irst claim is a pure hor izont al appe al of the state c ourt ’s de c isi on . Co op e r’s c omp la int fu nd ame nta lly mis c ha ra c te ri zes the state c ourt ’s ho ldi ng , att e mpt ing to c a st the claim as a

n attack on the state cour t’s statutory construction of § 1405. A re v i ew of Cooper’ s g rieva nces make s c le ar, ho we ve r, tha t h is c omp la int

in a c tua lity challeng es the fa ct-spec ific dete rmination in his case.

Th e fi rs t c la im s tate s: [B]y finding that alleg ations o f t amper ing “ca nnot serve a s a basis for satisfying the specific statutory

require ments” of § 1405, and by holding that the potential to identify the minor contributor(s) to the DNA samples is of no “pra ctical sig nificanc e” a nd cannot satisfy t h e condition of § 1405(f)(6) (B ), the Superior Court of the State of C al i fo rnia ha s ma d e it imp o s s ib le f

o r Pl a inti f f to u ti li ze § 1 40 5 to pr ove that he wa s f ra me d. Th is int e rp re tatio n d e pr ive s P la int if f o f h is l ibe rt

y and prope rty

interests in § 1405 without due proce ss of law.C O O PER V

. RAMOS 13

The state court, howeve r, did not rende r a c ateg orica l holding that tamperingalleg at i o n s can ne ver se rve a s a basis for § 1405 relief

. Cooper’s complaint omits crucial par ts of the qu o ted dec ision. After c are fully addre ssing Cooper ’s alleg ations of tamper ing the Superior Court held:

De fe nd ant has not p roduced any evide nce to
s u p p o rth i s u n s p e c i f

i e d t a m p e r i n g t h e o r

y. Merespeculation that evidenc e tampering has
occurre d is not a suff

icient basis for g ood
cause discov er y . I t also cannot ser ve as the basis for satisfy ing the specific statutory require me n ts f

o r post-conviction DNA t es t i n g. The Superior

Court firmly

reste d its decision on the inadequa cy

of Cooper’ s evidenc e. In his § 1983 suit, Cooper

“ e sse nti a lly

inv ite [s] [ a] fe de ra l c ourt [] of fi rs t in sta

nc e to revie w and r ever se [his] unfavor able state -cour t judgment[].” Ex x on Mo bil , 544 U.S. at 283. This invitation i s laid bare by other a lleg ations in the first claim. C ooper a lleg es that he

“ me t a ll of the fa c tor s e nume rate d in § 1 40 5, ” and he re qu e sts
re lie f t hat in c lud e s “ [a] d e c lar ato ry jud g me nt t

hat [he ] is entitled to a cce ss a

nd to perfor

m DNA testing on the evidenc e reque sted in his 2010 § 1405 moti on.” Perhaps r ealizing that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine square ly bars th e re view he se eks, Cooper trie s in briefing befor e thi s court to re cast his complaint as a g ener al constitutional attack on the DN A testing statute. He a rgues that he is not attackingthe sp ec ific interpr etation that the Superior Court applied to his ca se, but rather that “Sec tion 1405, as writ ten by th e Californi a legislature and as inte rp re te d b

ytheCa liforn ia c ou rts , constitutes anC O O PER V

. RAMOS

14

Sp eci f

i cal l y , Skinner argued t hat th e s t at e co urt s had “ co nst rued t he 1

s t at u t e t o com pl et el

y f ore cl ose a n y pr i s o n e r w h o c o u l d h a v e s o u g h t DNA t es t i ng p r i or t o t r i al , b ut d i d not , f r om s eek i ng t es t i ng post convi ct i on. ” I d.

a t 1 2 9 6 (in te rn a l q u o ta tio n m a r k s a n d a lter a tio n s o m itt e d ; em p h a sis ad d ed ). unconstitutional denial of due pr ocess.” Cooper re lies heavily on Sk inn e r v . S witz e r to support his posit ion.

The facts of Skinner bear some rese mblance to Cooper ’s
c a se . Sk inn e r w a s c on vic te d o f m ur de r a nd fa ile d to ob ta in state or f eder al postconvi ct i o n relief . He moved f

or DNA te sti ngun de r a

Te xas s tatut e a llo wi ngpr iso ne rs to o bta in
su c h tes tin g in l imi te d c ir c ums tanc e s. Th e Te xas c ourt s denied his motions, finding no re asonable probabil i ty that Skinner would not have be en convic ted if DNAtests w ere exculpatory

and findingfault on Skinner’s pa rt in not reque sting the testing ea

rlier. Skinner the n broug ht a § 1983 action ag ainst the District Attorney seeking an inj unction entitling him to the t esting he sought. Skinner , 131 S. Ct. at 12 95 . T he Sup re me Court re je c te d th e argume nt t

hat Ro ok e rFeldman barr ed S kinner’s suit. The Court’s re asoning hinge d on the fa ct that Skinner did “not cha lleng e the pr osecutor ’s conduct or

the dec isions reac hed by the [stat e court],” but
ra the r “ c ha lle ng e [d], as de nyinghim pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss, Texas’ postconviction DNA statute ‘ as construe d ’ b y the Texas courts.” Id. at 1296. I n e sse nc e , Sk inn e r’ s § 19 83 su it 1 launche d a g ener al cha lleng e to the adequa cy of the state-la w pr oc e ss a va ila ble to h im.
Cooper urg es us to rea d Skinner as “approv[ing] the exact ty pe o f cla im at issue here .” Cooper’ s first claim, howeve r, dif fe rs in s e ve ra l c ri tic a l r e sp e c ts f ro m Sk inne r’ s su it. Throug hout his complaint, Cooper expl icitly attacks both theC O O PER V

. RAMOS 15

prosec utor’s conduc t in his specific ca se and the state cour t’s application in his sp ecif ic ca se of the statutory fac tors g overningentitlement to DNA testing . Cooper alleg es at leng th that Ramos and My ers wi thheld exculpatory information duringhis trial an d t h at the prose cution planted and tampere d with e vidence . Cooper alleg es that the District Attor ne y c on sp ir e d w iththe stat e c ri min a lis t to de ny him
a c c e ss t o te sti ngun de r § 14 05 , s pe c if ic a ll y “ [b]y kn ow ing ly and/or intentionally

submitt ing materially

misleading and fac tually err oneous information to the Superior Court.” Cooper ac cording ly

maintains that the Superior C o u rt err ed in r e je c tin g the se a lle g a tio ns of tampe ri ng . As se t f

or th above, the complaint asser ts that, c ontrary to the state cour t’s own assessment of the § 1405 fac tors, Cooper mee ts eac h of the eig ht require ments. I n alleg ing that the Superior Court’s f in d in g s h av e “ ma d e it

im p o s s ib le f

o r Pl a inti f f to u ti li ze § 1405 to prove that he was fr amed,” the emphasis is on thi s plaintiff. I t simpl y

cannot be said that, here , Cooper “doe s not challeng e the a dverse [st ate c ourt] decision[ ] [ it s el f] .” Skinner , 131 S. Ct . at 1298. He attacks t h e Superior Court ju d g me n t e xp li c it ly , an d

s o e n c o u n te r s the Rooke r-Feldman obstacle that Skinner avoided.

I n contra st to Skinner , wher e the pr isoner asse rted that the Texas statute was const itutionally inadequate as to any prisoner who failed to seek DNA testing befor e trial, Cooper does not ac tually

launch a

broad side ag ainst the constitutionalit y of § 1405. In Skinner , the Court made c lear that, unlike a st ate court decision, “a statute or rule g overning th e d e c is io n ma

y b e c h a ll e n g e d in a f

e d e r a l a c ti o n

. ” Id. at 1298. But Cooper

articulates no g ener al cha lleng e t o the statute. As the district cour t noted:C O O PER V

. RAMOS

16 [T] he only

arg ument r e g ar d in g the constitutionalit y

of Section 1405 that even arguably could be g leane d from the Complaint is that “Section 1 4 0 5 violates due proc ess by fore closing acc es s to DNA testing for convicted c riminals who alleg e that they wer e framed throug h planted DNAevidenc e.” Although Coope r maintains that this contention contemplates a g ener al constituti o n al att ack on the statute, nothing in the text of § 1405 pre vents victim s o f fr aming from obtaining DNA testing , and the Superior Court’s decision esche wed a ny cate g orica l h o lding r eg ardingthe ade quacy of tamper ing
a lle g a tio ns

. Notably , the state c ourt dec lined t o rea d the text of the DN A t e sti ngstatut e —s pe c if ic a lly , it s r e qu ir e me nt t hat a defe ndant demonstrate that the evidenc e he seeks to te st was
su bje c t to a su ff

ic ie nt c ha in of c us tody , § 14 05 (f )( 2) —to cate g orica lly

bar r elief pr emised upon evide nce tampering claims. The g overnme nt argued that it was a contra diction for Cooper

“to alleg e an unspecified tamperingtheory relating to items of evidenc e that he is also contendingmeet the nec essar

y chain of custody requ i reme nt for purpose s of his post-conviction DNA testingmotion.” Th e state cour t fo un d n o in c on g ru ity

and fo un d th a t Co op e r h a d me t hi s statutory burden on the require ment: Cooper’s “a lleg ations of tamperingdo not pr eclude [C ooper] from meeting his burden unde r s u b d iv is io n ( f

) ( 2 )

. ” I n a d d it io n , a s n o te d a b o v e , the Sup e ri or Cou rt den ie d Co op e r’ s § 14 05 mot ion no t be c a us e a tampering theory was cate g orica lly insufficient fo r t he statutory req u i rements, but because Cooper “ha[d] not produced any

evide nce to s up po rt his unspecifie d tampering theory

. ” No C alifornia c ourt has interpr eted § 1405 a sC O O PER V

. RAMOS 17

I n a ddi t i on t o c h al l en g i n g t h e Su per i or Cour t ’ s a ppl i ca t i on of § 1405, 2 C oo per’ s f

i r s t cl ai m al l ege s t hat M y er s an d R amo s vi ol at ed pro ce d ural d ue p roce ss by “ i nt ent io n a ll y s ub m i t t [i ng] mater i al l y m i sl ead i ng and f ac t u al l y e r r on eou s i n f

or mat i on ” t o t h e Su per i or Cour t du r i n g t h e § 1405 binding the Super ior Court to p rec lude re lief base d on tampering

. Cf. Skinner , 131 S. Ct

. at 1297 (chara cter izi ng Skinner’s complaint as “ assailing the Texas statute as authoritatively

construed [by

Texas courts]”).

B e c a us e Coo pe r i n fa c t cha lle ng e s the pa rt ic ula r o utc ome in h is s tate c a se , “ [i]t is imm a te ri a l th a t [Coo pe r] f ra me s h is fe de ra l c omp la int

a s a c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e to t he state
c ourt [’s ] de c isi on [], r a the r t han as a dir e c t a pp e a l of th[at] decision[] .” Bianchi , 3 34 F .3 d at 900 n .4 . Co op e r “ bo th
ass e rts a s [h is ] i n

ju r y le g a l e r r o r o r e r r o r s b y th e s tate c o u rt and seeks as [hi s] re medy relief from the st at e c o urt judgme nt.” Kougasian v. T MSL, Inc. , 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). The Rooke r-Feldman doctrine theref ore ba rs the c la im

. H av in g e s ta

b li s h e d th a t t h e e s s e n c e o f

Co oper’ s first claim is “at least in pa rt a forbidden de fa cto appe al of a st a t e c o u rt j u d g m e n t , ” w e n e xt c o n s i d e r w h e th e r his additional claims reg arding the ac tions of Ramos, My ers, a nd the other de fenda

nts are “ ‘inextricably

intertwi n ed ’ with an issue resolved by

the state court judicial decision from which th e f o r b id d e n d e f

a c to a p p e a l is ta

ken.” Noel , 341 F.3d at 1165.

B. Cl aimTwo –

Co nspi r ac y t o de ny due proce ss i n § 1 40 5 pr oc e e ding Cooper’s se cond cla im for re lief—that R amos and My ers conspired to den y h i m a fair § 1405 proc eedingin violation of pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss— is a va ri a tio n on his fi rs t c la im. 2C O O PER V

. RAMOS

18

p ro c e e d ing s. T h is a lleg a tio n o v e rla p s w ith C la im T w o , d isc u sse d in this

se c tio n , an d w e d isp o se o f it o n th e sa m e gr o u n d s w e a rtic u la te w ith

r eg ar d t o Cl ai m T wo. Cooper alleg es that Ramos and My ers c onspired “to pr event him from obtaining DNA testing,” citing to the history of the DNA testingin his case and his cha lleng es to the validity of the e vid e nc e the g ov e rnme nt pr e se nte d to the Sup e ri or Court

. Specifica lly , Cooper fa

ults Ramos for “obtain[ing] a n expert de c laratio n fr om De fe nd ant My e rs

. . . and re l[ying ] heavily on the My ers decla

ration in opposingPlaintiff’s motion] ” and alleg es that “the decla

ration conta ined st atements that were either f alse o r m isleading .” He claims this conduct denied him “ a f a ir § 1 4 0 5 p r o c e d

u r e

. ” O f c o u r s e , th e Su

p e rior Court ’s de c isi on to de ny § 14 05 te sti ng wa s dir e c tly tie d to its decision to cre dit My er s ’s decla ration and its deter

mination that there was no e vi d en ce of tamper ing w ith or planting evidenc e. The Superior Court dismissed the claims as “unsupported spe culation,” “vague and unsubstantiated” and with “no merit.”

Coo pe r’ s p re se nt atte mpt

to h old Ramos and

My e rs lia ble for conspi ra c y

in t he state c ourt

pr oc e e din g that he los t is a claim “inextricably

intertwined” with the Superior Court’s order denying his re quest for D NA testing

. Cooper’s pr ay er fo r r e lie f i n th e fo rm

of mon e tary

and punit ive dama g e s, althoug h distinct from his p ra y er f or a de clar atory

judgme nt th a t h e is e n ti tl e d to D N A te s ti n g , is c o n ti n g e n t u p o n a finding that the state c ourt dec ision wa s in e rror

. The a lleg ed conspirac y

is a fig leaf for taking aim at t he st ate court’s own alleg ed errors. I t is precise ly this sort of horizont al re view of state cour t decisions that the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine ba rs

. Be cause the sec ond claim “succee ds only to the extent that the state c ourt wrong ly

decide d the issues befor e i t ” andC O O PER V

. RAMOS 19

“fe dera l relief can only be predicate d upon a conviction that the state c ourt was wr ong ,” Pennzoil Co. , 48 1 U. S. at 25 (M ars hall , J ., c on c ur

ri ng ), Coo pe r c ann ot e sc a pe the re a lity that hi s se c on d c la im is in e xtri c a bly int e rt wi ne d w ith

the state court de cision, no matter what label he puts on it. Fe der al adjudication of this claim would im permissibly “under cut the state ruling ” on the same issues. Bianchi , 334 F.3d at 898.

C. Cl aimThr e e – C ons pir ac y t o denyfair investigation an d conviction Cooper’s third a

nd final cla im ex pands o n t h e sec ond cla im to a lle g e a

br oa d c on sp ir a c y

amon g a ll the de fe nd ants not only during the § 1405 proc eed ing but a lso during the
mur de r inv e sti g a tio n a

nd a t tr ia l. C oo pe r a lle g e s th a t Mye rs , Ramos , a nd a ho st o f o the r p ubli c off ic ia ls c on sp ir e d to tampe r w ithand

fa lsi fy e vid e nc e in v iol atio n o f h is
s u b s tantive due pr ocess to “a fair a nd unadulterated investigation and conviction.”

To the extent the claim enc ompasses a challeng e to My ers and Ramos’s conduc t during § 140 5 p roce eding s, the
c ha lle ng e is “ ine xtri c a

bly int e rt wi ne d” with the d e fa c to appea l of the state c ourt j u d gm en t for the same re asons set forth above . A re view of the broade r alleg ations of
c on sp ir a c y

sh ow s th a t th e y , to o, are “ ine x tric a bly intertwined” and ther efor e bar red. Cooper base s his § 1983 c onspiracy claim on alleg ations that the state court considere d in denying f urther D NA te sti ng , n ame ly , th a t th e def e nd ants manip ulate d th e c ri me scene ; destroy ed blood-spla t tere d cover alls belong ing to a differ ent potential suspect and withheld evidenc e of a bloodstained shirt; planted i n cr i minating shoe prints, a hatche tC O O PER V

. RAMOS

20

In reachi ng t hese co ncl usi o ns, t he Sup eri o r C o urt d rew on evidenti ary 3 d et erm i nat i o ns m ad e i n t he m ulti p le p revi o us p o st

- co nvi ct i o n s t at e and f ed eral pro ceed i ngs t hat C o o p er has i ni t i at ed

. Fo r exam p le , t he co urt i nco rpo rat ed b y ref

erence t he f

act s set f o rt h i n P eopl e v

. Co op er , 5 3 C a l. 3 d 77 1 , 7 9 5

– 8 0 2 (C al

. 1 9 9 1 ) (app eal of co nvi ct i o n and de at h s ent ence), and i n Coo

pe r v

. Br own , 510 F. 3d 870, 874–76, 887–1004 ( 9t h Ci r

. 2007) (a p p e a ls c o u rt d e c isio n o n su c c e ssiv e fe d e ra l ha b e a s p e tit io n w ith ap p end i x s et t i ng f

o rt h dis t ri ct co urt de ci si o n). sheath , a b u tt o n , an d

c ig ar e tt e s ; a

n d ma n ip u late d the t es t i m o n y o f th e su rv i v i n g v i ct i m

. I nt h e § 1 4 0 5 p ro ce ed i n g, the Sup e ri or

Court fo un d th a t si mil ar a

nd , in so me ins tanc e s, identical alleg ations were insufficien t to establish Cooper’s
en t i t l em en tt o fu rt h er

DN A t es t i n g. F ro m e xpre ssl y 3 char acte rizing as “unsupported speculation” Cooper’s theor y that law enf

orce ment planted his blood on evidenc e to finding that Co op e r m a de “ no sh ow ing o f ba d f a ith ” wi th r e g ard

to the alleg ed withholding of the shirt, the state cour t considere d these issues as pa

rt and pa rce l of the § 1405 application. The state cour t acc epted pr evious state cour t findings r eg arding the e v idence of the shoepr ints, the hatchet sheath, and the
c ig are tte s. F ina lly , th e state c ourt dis mis se d Coo pe r’ s c la ims th a ts t a t e m e n t s m a d e b y

t h e e i g h t

- y e ar
- o l d

s u r v i v i n g v i c tim raised a ny probability that Cooper would have enjoy ed a more fa vorable outcome at trial with the benefit of the reque sted DNA te sting. In g ener al, the state c ourt found that Coo pe r h a d “ no t pr od

uc e d a ny e vid e nc e ” to s uppo rt

his the or y re g ard ingtampe ri ngwi th t he e vid e nc e a g a ins t hi m. Cooper ca

n only establish his § 1983 conspirac y by proving an agree ment to eng ag e in tamper ing of evidenc e, wher eas the Superior Court alre ady deter mined that Cooper’s alleg ations of tamper ing w ere specu lative and unsupporte d. To cr ed it Cooper’s third claim is just another wa y of decla ring that “the state court w ro n gly decide d the issuesC O O PER V

. RAMOS 21

befor e it.” Pennzoil Co. , 481 U.S. at 25 (Mar shall, J ., c on c ur ri ng ). Ac c or din g ly , Co op er’ s th ir d c la im i s inext rica bly intertwined with the mer its of t h e s t ate c ourt’s decision and is effec tively “a pr ohibited appea l of the statecourt judg ment.” Id.

III

. D I SM I SS A L W I THO U T L E AVE T O A M E ND
Coo pe r’ s f

ina l argume nt i s that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in dismiss ing his c omplaint without leave to amend. Dismissal of a c ompla int

wi tho ut l e ave to a

me nd is p ro pe r whe re it i s c le ar t hat th e c omp la int

c ou ld no t be sa

ve d b y ame ndme nt. Thinket Ink I

n f o

. Res., Inc . v. Sun Mic rosystems, Inc

. , 368 F.3d 1053, 106 1 (9 t h Cir. 2004). Cooper off ers two bases f or ame ndment, eac h of which is futile.

A. Am endm ent to focus on actions of ad verse parties Cooper propose s to amend his complaint to focus on the actions of My ers, Ramos, and the ot her public officia ls, rather tha n th e state c ourt ’s de c isi on . H e arg ue s th a t, notwithstanding c erta in alleg ations assailing the re asoning and re sult of the state cour t,“it is indisputable that the crux of this case involves d efe ndants’ ac tions in t he conspira cy

. . . no t t h e c o r

r e c t n e s s o f

t h e S u p e r i o r C o u rt ’ s h o l d i n g

. ” In support, Cooper asse rts the following : he sued the individual defe ndants, not the court; he seeks relief ba sed on the a lleg ed conspirac y

that resulted in the state cour t decision, not based on the state c ourt dec ision i t self; and throug hout the district
cou rt p roce eding s on the motion to di smiss, C ooper repr esente d that he wa s not challeng ing the state cour t’s d e c i s i o n

. C o o p e rar g u e s t h a th e c anc u r e an y Ro ok e rFeldman problems by

simply removinghis claim for decla ratory relief

and “g ently

editing” the par ag raphs of theC O O PER V

. RAMOS

22

c omp la int that r e fe r t o h is s a tis fy

ingthe § 14 05 fa c tor s a

nd to the Superior Court’s unc onstitut ional interpre tation of the statut e . Abs e nt t

he se all egatio ns , h e po sit s th a t th e re wo uld no longe r be a

forbidden de fac to appea l of the state c ourt judgme nt to serve a s a hook for barringclaims that are “inextricably

intertwined.” See N

oel , 341 F.3d at 1166 (noting that “[b] eca

use [pl aintiff] ha s not broug ht a forbidde n de fa c to a pp e a l fr om any of the e arl ie r s tate c ourt jud g me nts , the ‘inextricably

intertwined’ a

naly sis . . . does not app l y ”). Nonethele ss, even if Cooper’s sugg ested e ditorial flourishes
are c re dit e d a

nd the fi rs t c la im c ou ld b e e xci se d, his
rema ining second and third claims eac h co n front ins ur mou nta ble ob sta c le s. Collateral estoppe l, commonl y k n o wn a s is s ue pre clusion, pr ov ide s an in de pe nd e nt b ar to Co op e r’ s se c on d c la im. Under California law, which is a pplicable he re, the following
r e qu i r e m e n t s m u s tb e m e tf o r c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l t o a

p p l y: First, the issue soug ht to be prec luded from
re lit ig a tio n must

be ide nti c a l to that de c ide d in
a fo rm e r p ro c e e din g . Se c on d, thi s iss ue mus t have be en ac tual ly

litigated in the f

ormer proce eding . Third, it must have be en n ec es s ar i l y

d ec i d ed i n t h e fo rm er

p ro ce ed i n g. Four th, the decision i n the former proc eeding must be f in a l a n d o nth e me r it s

. F in a ll y , the pa rt y a g a ins t wh om pr e c lus ion is so ug ht m us t be the same a s, or

in pr ivi ty wi th, the pa

rt y to t h e f o rm er p ro ce ed i n g.

In reCan tre ll , 329 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (interna l citation omitted). I n his se cond claim, Cooper ac cuses My ers of misleadingthe cour

t and submitti ng a fa lse dec laration,C O O PER V

. RAMOS 23

and a c cus es Ra

mos of op po sin g Coo pe r’ s § 14 05 mot ion in relianc e on a decla

ration he kne w was mistaken. Coope r ma int a ine d th a t f

ur the r t e sti ng us in g a

Min iF ile r k it w ou ld
rea sonably contra dict prior test results for which My ers vouched. T he state c ourt square ly reje cted that ve ry argument and, relying on the My ers decla ration, found that “ther e is no prac tical signific ance to a dditional nuc lear DNA testing w ith the MiniFiler kit.”

Un d e r is s u e p r e c lu s io nr

u le s , th e s e s ame f

a ctual alleg ations now prese nted i n fede ral court cannot be cre dited. B e c a us e Coo pe r a lr e a dy li tig a te d a nd los t th is p re c ise c la im in state court, the f

irst and sec on d p ro n gs of the collate ral estoppel test ar e met. As Cooper ad m its, the state court de c isi on a do pte d “ ve rb a tim mu ch of the langua g e in Def endant My ers’ s decla

ratio n ,” thus reje cting Cooper’s alleg ations that the dec laration was false . The state c ourt

“ ne c e ssari ly

deci ded ” th ese i ss ues —t he t hi rd pro ng —n ot o nly beca use i t was ex plicit in doing so, but also because My ers’ s explanation of previous test re sults and likely outcomes fr om further test results was c entra l to the state court’s d en ial of Cooper’s § 1405 motion. Cooper does n o t contest either of the final two prong s of California’ s collatera l est o p p el require ments: that the decision i n the forme r proc eedingwas f i n a l an d o n t h e m e r i t s , an d

t h a tt h e p art i e s ar e i np r i v i t y. F ur the r, “ pr e se rv a tio n o f t

he int e g ri ty

of the jud ic ia l sy ste m, pr omo tio n o f j ud ic ia l e c on omy , an d prot e c tio n o f l iti g ants from har assment by

vexatious l itigation” a

re public policie s war rantingprec lusion of relitigation of the issues here

. Luc ido v . S

up e rio r Co ur t , 51 Cal. 3d 335, 343 (Cal. 1990). Acc ording ly , Cooper’s se cond claim is collatera lly estopped. Cooper’s third c laim, alleg ing not only false te stimony duri ngthe § 14 05 pr oc e e din g , but a lso a br oa d c on sp ir a c y

toC O O PER V

. RAMOS

24

Cooper doe s n ot c on t es t t h i s c on cl us i on

. T h e def en dan t s a r g u ed on 4

a p p e a l t h a t H eck

b a rr e d the c o n sp ira c y c la im a g a ins t all the d e fe n d a n ts (C la im T h re e ), a n d C o o p e r’s o n ly re sp o n se w a s tha t H eck posed no obs t ac l e t o h i s pu r por t ed ch al l en g e t o t h e con s t i t u t i on al i t y of § 1405. ob ta in C oo pe r’ s c on vic tio n a nd ke e p h im incarc e ra

te d, is p r e c l u d e d b y Hec k v. H

umphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1 9 9 4 ). The hear t of the third claim is an e ffor t t o at t ac k t he integ rity

of the investigation and trial. Succe ssfully litigatingCooper’s
c l a i m s o f

ane v i d e n c e t amp e r i n g c o n s p i r a c y w ou ld
n ec es sarily

implicate the validity

of his state cr iminal conviction. These claims are not cog nizable unless Cooper’s conviction is vacated, overturned, or inva lidated. Hec k, 51 2 U. S. at 486 –8 7; see also Gue rrero v. Gate s , 442 F.3d 69 7, 70 5 (9 th Cir

. 20 06 ) (h old ing a § 1 98 3 c on sp ir a c y

c la im in connec tion with a plaintiff’s ar rest and prosec ution barre d b y Hec k ). We a lso no te that man y of Coo pe r’ s mu lti ple 4 alleg ations of tamper ing w ith evidence are barr ed by collater al estoppel unde r th e s ame r ationale a s to his second
c la im. Thus Coo pe r’ s e ff or t to ame nd the thi rd

c la im w ou ld be futile a lso.

B. Am endm ent to c hallenge construction of § 1405 Finally , Cooper asks that “[t] o the extent it i s unclea r that [he ] is atta c kin g Se c tio n 140 5 as co ns tr ue d b y the Ca lif or nia
c ourt s a nd no t a sp e c if ic Sup e ri or

Court de c isi on , [he ] sho uld be g rante d leave to amend his complaint to clarify this point .” The Superior

Court made a fac t-specif

ic deter mination based on Cooper’s own c ase a

nd did not re l y o n a “r

ule g overning the dec ision [ that] m ay b e challeng ed in a f eder al ac tion.” Skinner , 1 31 S. Ct . at 12 98 . T he “ c on str uc tio n” of the statut e that Co op e r s e eks to c on te st i s in a c tua lity on ly the fa c tspecific application of the statute to his own case , and he hasC O O PER V

. RAMOS 25

no t c ited any

c on tr oll ingstate law that he c on te nd s is
un so un d. Am e nd

me nt i s f uti le on thi s p oint a s w e ll.

Be cause amen d ment will not save any of Cooper’ s claims, the district court did not er r in implicitl y

denying Cooper leave to amend.

AF F IRMED.