SECOND DIVISION Opin ion f il ed March 8, 2011 Modif ie d upon deni

al of reheari

ng A pril 5, 2011 No. 1-10- 0880 (consoli

dated with No. 1-10-1707) RILEY A CQUI SITIONS , INC., ) Appe al fro m the ) Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Pl ai ntif f -Ap pel l an t and Cross - ) Coo k C oun ty Appel le e, ) ) v. ) No. 2003 L 11577 ) MARY EL

LEN DREXLER, f/k/a M ary El le n ) Ho no r ab le Brown , ) Su san Mc Dunn, ) Judge Presidin

g. Defendan t-Appellee, Cross- ) Ap pe llan t , an d T hir d- P ar t y ) Plaint iff -Ap pellant ) ) (C.C.S . Ch

i cago R ecre ati on, In

c., )

) Thi rd-Party Def endan t-App el l ee). ) JUS TI CE CON NOR S d elivered t he judg ment o f the co ur t , w ith o pinion. Jus t ices Kar nezis and Har ris co ncur in the ju dgment and o pinion. OPINI ON This ap peal f oll ows a j ury

tria l on cl ai m s rel ated to bre ach

of a guara nty contract. Plai nti f f Ri l ey A cq ui si ti ons , In c., appe als th

e tri al cou rt' s orde r di

recti ng a verd i ct i n f av or of defend ant Mar y Ellen Dre xler aft er t he clo se o f evidence . D efenda nt cr os s-a ppe als o rd er s o f the t r ial c o ur t de nying he rmo t io n fo rsa nc t io ns a ga inst pla int iff un de rI llino is S up r eme Co ur t Ru le 13 7 ( ef f . F eb . 1, 19 94 ), den

y i n g i n pa rt her peti ti on f or c ost s, an

d di sm i ss i n g h er th i rd -p ar ty
co mpla int ag ain st t hir d- pa r t y de fen da nt C. C. S. Ch ica go Re cr ea t io n, I nc . We affir m. I. BACKG

ROUND Durin g the early

1990s, defen

dant Mary

Ell en Drex le r and her then

-husb and, Steven Bro wn, ow ned a nd o per at ed t wo co mpanies, C. C. S. Chicag o R ecr eat ion, Inc . ( CCS ), andNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707) Cus t om Fr ame & Po st er Manu fact ur ing, I nc. (Cu st om Fr ame). In Fe bru ar y 1990 , d efenda nt and Brow n j oi ntl y en tere d i nto a gua ran ty con tract wi th D ev on B an k. U nd er th e c ontr ac t, Devon agree d t o ext end cred it to CCS and Cust om Frame in ex change for d efendant’s and Bro wn’s per so nal gua ra nt y of t he und er lyi ng pr omisso ry no t es. Pu rsu ant t o t his agr eement , o ver t he next
sev eral years Dev on l oane d m oney to CCS an

d Cus tom Fram e throug h a seri es of prom i ssory notes. By

1993, however, defe

ndan t's m arriage wi th Brown unravel

ed, and they

in itiated div orce pro ceedi

ngs an d began dis entangl

in g their b usi ness relationshi

ps. In August 1993, defend ant sent a let t er t o D evo n t hat pur po rt ed t o r evo ke he r p er so nal gua ra nt y on CC S and Cu st o m Fr ame 's d eb t t o De vo n. Abo ut t ha t t ime, CC S a nd Cu st o m Fr ame be ga n t o ha ve t r o ub le meet ing t heir p ayments on t he loa n and d efault ed. Ho weve r, in Sep t ember 1 993 , C CS a nd Cu sto m Fr am e s i gn ed a n ew pr om i ss ory n ote w i th Dev on . Th

e acc oun t wa s l ate r m ade cur re n t, bu t by ea rl y 199 4, C CS an

d Cus tom Fram e h ad ag ai n f al l en be hi nd on p ay men ts a nd De von acc elerated

the l oan. Durin g this sam e tim e, defen dant had taken al

l c ontro l of

Custom Fram

e whi le Brown had assum

ed complete contr ol of CCS. Custo m F rame di ssolved at some point in 1994, but CCS
re mained in exist ence unde r t he co nt ro l of Br ow n. Alt hou gh De von ha d mo ved t o a cce lerat e t he l oan, i t di d not f i l e su i t to collect on th

e deb t from CCS, C ustom Fra me, Brown, or def

endan t. In ste ad , i n 19 94 , D ev

on f ore cl ose d on pr ope rty th at h ad b een pu t upas col l ate ra l i n ord er to secure the note. The forecl osure sale di

d not comple

tely cover the outst andi

ng debt, leavi

ng a def i ciency of s ev eral

thousa nd d oll ars. Brown's obl i gation as guara ntor was l ater term

i na ted duri ng b an kruptcy procee di ngs . W i th th e d i ss ol uti on of Cu sto m Fr am e i n 19 94 , th i s l ef t CC S a s th

e on l y pri n ci pal on th e n oteNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

3 and defen dant as t he sole guarantor . In 2001, CCS in itiated a declarator y j udgment suit again st Devon regardi

ng l ia bi li ty f or pro perty taxes on the f oreclosed property. This

sui t was settled
som eti me i n 20 03 . A s p ar

t of th e s ettl em en t ag re em en t, D ev on re l ea se d C CS f

rom i ts obli gations un

der the note. It is aro und t his time t hat plaint iff beca me involved. Lar ry St ar kman, who ow ns and op er at es p laintiff, wa s a lo ng- t ime friend and business par t ner of Br ow n. At so me po int ar ou nd the ti me of CC S’ settl em

en t agree men t wi th D ev on, Brow n m en ti one d to Sta

rkm an tha t De von sti l l he l d the g

ua ran ty con tract tha t de f en da nt waspa rty to. Brown

tol d Sta rkm an tha t De von ha d r ec en t ly su ffer ed a r ed uc t io n in it s inc o me a nd migh t be int er es t ed in se lling it s int er es t in t he g ua ra nt y at a ba rg ain p ric e. St ar kma n lo o ke d int o t he ma t t er and , t hr o ug h pla int iff, pur chas ed D evo n's inte re st in the g uar ant y cont ra ct . D evo n duly assig ned a ll of its r ight s in the gu ar ant y co nt ra ct t o pla int iff. In lat e 20 03, plaint iff

, in its cap acit y as ass ignee o f Devo n, br ou ght suit aga inst d efenda nt f or brea ch of the gua

ran ty c ontract i

n orde r to coll ect the rem ai ni ng d ef i ciency on the note. In h er answ er to th e c om

pl ai n t, d ef en da n t rai se d s ev

eral af f i rm ati v e def ense s, i n cl udi n g th e statu te of l im itations and di scharge. Def

endan t argued t hat her Augus

t 1993 letter t o Devon that pur po rt ed t o r evo ke he r p er so nal gua ra nt y sta rt ed t he r unning o f the 10- year s t at ut e o f li mitat ions for t he wr itt en gu ar ant y cont ra ct or , a lter nat ively, tha t t he mat ur at ion o f the not e at t he beg inning of S ept ember 1 993 bega n t he limi t at ions p er iod . E ither way, defend ant ar gue d t hat plaint iff 's lawsu it w as u nt imely

beca use it w as filed aft er t he limi t at ions p er iod had r un. Defend ant 's dis charge def

ense was bas ed on the theory that she was not liabl e on the guaranty

contract be caus e Cus

tom Fram e had b een

di ssol ve d an d CC S ha d be en releas ed.No. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

4 In 2004, defe

ndan t file d a third-party c omplai nt agai nst CCS, whi

ch sh e l ater amen

ded aft er t r ial. De fen da nt cla imed t ha t CC S, as pr inc ipa l o n t he no t e, wa s lia ble t o he rfo ran y and all atto rney fees and costs that she i

ncurred whi

le defen din g agai nst the breach

of guaranty

contract act ion. The

cas e proce eded

to a ju ry tria l i n l ate 200 9. A f

ter the c l ose of

evi den ce, the tri al

court dire ct ed a ver dict in favor of d efenda nt on t he bas is of bo t h her st at ut e o f li mitat ions d efense and her dis cha rg e d efe nse . D efe nda nt immedia t ely filed a mo t io n fo r s anc t io ns a ga inst pla int iff
un de rI llino is S up r eme Co ur t Ru le 1 37 ( eff. Fe b. 1, 19 94 ) , as se r t ing t ha t pla int iff kn ew o rsho uld h av e k n own th at i ts c l ai m s w ere b ar

re d a t th e ti me i t f i l ed i ts c om pl ai n t ag ai n st d ef en da n t. Aft er pla int iff filed a mo t io n t o r ec o nsid er , t he t r ial c o ur t affir med t he dir ec t ed ve r dic t in f av or of de f en da n t b ut sua sp onte

modif i ed i ts ord er to ref l ec t onl y the grou nd of the sta tute of li mi tations def

ense. The

trial court la ter sli ghtly modifi ed this order again wh

en def endan t file d
a m ot ion to reconsi der the sua sponte modi f i cation of the ori gi na l order, b ut the trial

court changed on

l y the re ason

i ng u nde rl y i ng i ts j udgm en t bas ed on

the statute of l

i m i tations de f

en se. That same day, the trial court denied defendan t's motion for sanctions. Def endan t fi l ed a p eti tion f or costs un

der section

5-109 of the Code

of C i vi l Procedu re (735 ILCS 5 /5-109 ( West 2008)) , seeking to reco up expenditures on fi li ng fees, subpoena f

ees, courier f ees, photoco pyi

ng, court r eport ers, and legal research costs. The trial

court granted def endan t's p eti tion as to the f i l i ng a nd s ubp oena f ees , but de

ni ed i t as to the re

mai ni ng c osts. Fi n al l y , i n re sp on se to a m oti on b y CC S, th e tr i al cou rt di sm i ss ed de f en da n t' s th i rd -p ar ty
com plai nt un der s ection 2-6 15 of

the C ode of

Ci vi l Procedu re (735 ILCS 5/2-61 5 (West 200 8)). Wi th all is sues i n the case now resolved, plai

ntif f ti me ly fi le d a notice of a

ppeal on the directedNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

5 ver dict issue, and d efenda nt t imely fil ed a not ice o f cro ss ap pea l on t he sa nct ions, co st s, a nd third-part y com

plai nt issues. Thi s case is

now before us. II. AN AL YSIS Thi s appeal

presents f

our issues that we wil

l c onsi der in

turn: (1) whether defen

dant was
en titl ed to a di rected verdict, (2) wh

ethe r plai ntif f shoul d be

san cti oned und er Suprem

e Court Ru l e 1 37 , (3 ) w

h eth er pl ai n ti f f i s e n ti tl ed to co sts , a

n d ( 4) wh eth er de f en da n t’s th i rd -p ar ty compl ai nt agai nst CCS sh

ould ha ve b een dism

is sed. A. Di rected Verdict The pri ma ry issue b efore us on appeal is whether def

endan t was entitled to a directed
ve r dic t fo llo win g t he clo se o f ev ide nc e in t he jur y t r ial. “A mo t io n fo r[ a] dir ec t ed ve r dic t will not be gran ted un l ess al l of the ev i den ce s o overwh

el m i ngl y f avors the movan t that no c ontrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. [Citat ion.] On revi ew, all of the eviden

ce must be construed i

n the l igh t most favorabl

e to t he n onmovi ng party.” Kryw

in v. Chica

go Trans it Authority , 23 8 I ll . 2d

21 5, 2 25 (2 01 0) . We rev i ew an ord er gr an ti n g a di re cte d verdi

ct de novo
. See id. Th e tri

al cou rt' s i ni ti al basis f or th e di rected ve rdi ct w asboth

de f en da nt' s statute

of l i m i tati on s def ense an d h er de f ense of di sch arge . H owev er , the tr i al cou rt sua sp onte

modifi ed its order to refl

ect only the statut e of l

im itations ground because i

t beli eved that the evi

dence sh owe d th at on l y CC S had b een di sch arge d f

rom i ts o b l i ga ti on s on th e n ote, ra th er th an b oth CCS and C ust om. As we will explain, t he t rial co ur t was co rr ect in its initial ru ling on t he di sch arge i ssue. Un de r Il l i noi s l aw , “the l i ab i l i ty of a g ua ran tor i s l i m i ted by an d i s n o gre ater th an

tha t ofNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

6 t he pr incipal debt or and * ** if no re co ver y cou ld be had aga inst t he pr incipal debt or , t he guara ntor woul d also be ab sol ve d of l i ab i l i ty.” (Intern al quotati on m

arks omi tted.) Edens Plaza Bank v. Demos , 277 Ill . App. 3d 201, 209 (1995) (quo ting Hensler v. Busey Bank , 231 Ill . App. 3d 920, 9 27 (1992 )). “Although the language of a guaranty agreemen t ultimatel y determi nes a spe cific guar ant or 's liabil

ity, t he ge ner al ru le is tha t discha rg e, sat isfact ion, or ext inctio n of t he pri nc i pal obl i gation al so en ds the l i ab i l i ty of the g uaran tor.” (Intern

al quotati on m

arks omi tted.) Id . (quot in

g Palen v. Cullom Capital Woodw orking, Inc. , 154 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 68 5, 687 ( 1987) ). A cc ordi ngl y , determ i ni ng whether d

ef en da nt h asbe en ab sol ve d of he r ob l i ga ti ons asgua ran tor
re quir es a t wo -st ep a nalysis. We first must det er mine whet her t he und er lyi ng o bligat ions o f the prin ci pal have been

dis charged or ot herwi se termi nated. If the pri

nci pal 's obl iga tions h ave b een t er minated , t hen we must examine t he gu ar ant y cont ra ct t o d et er mine whet her t he pr incipal's di sch arge a l so f unc tions as a di sch arge of the g uaran tor. There w ere or

i gi n al l y two pri n ci pal de b torson th e n ote u n derl y i n g th e g ua ra n ty con tra ct: CC S a n d Cus tom

Fr am e. The ev i den ce

pr es en ted at tr i al wa s th at C CS wa s rel

ea se d f rom i ts obl i ga ti ons un de r the n ote a s p art of

the settl em en t agree men t wi th D ev on, an d the p arti

esdo n ot dis pute this on appeal . Rather, the key poi nt of contention on appea l f or t hi s i ssue i s whether Custom Fram

e was al so rel eas ed or other

wi se d i sch arged f rom i ts obl i gations. Th

e tri al court
re ver sed itse lf becaus e it be lieved t hat t her e had been no evidenc e pr ese nt ed a t t rial re gar ding Cus t om Fr ame's o bligat ion o n t he no t e. The t rial co ur t re aso ned t hat , be cau se a t least one of t he prin ci pal s was still

li abl e on the note, defenda

nt could not have been

absol ved of l ia bi li ty unde r the g uaran ty c ontract. However, the trial

court was m

is taken on thi s evi

dentia ry poi nt: Brown testifi

ed at tr ia lNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

7 tha t Cu stom Fram e h ad be en di ss ol ve d i n 1 994 . Al

thou gh the re wasno e

vi de nc e that Cus tom Fram e had ev er been form ally released f

rom the note by

Devon, Brown's

testim ony a bout Cu stom Fram e' s d i ss ol ution wasne

ve r con trad i cte d or i m pe ac he d i n a ny wa y . The q ue sti on consequentl

y b ecomes wh

ether Custom Fram

e's dissolution termi

nated i ts li abi li ty as a pri nci pal on the note. Thi s si tuation is covered by

section 12.80 of the B usi ness Corpor ation Act of 1983 (805 ILCS 5/12.80 (West 2002)), whic h i s often cal

le d the Survi

val Stat ute. Under the Surviv al Stat ute, any ac

tion agai nst or on behal

f of a corpor ation that has dissolv ed m ust be comm

enced befo re t he end of a so -c alled su rvival pe rio d, which end s five years aft er t he da t e o f the corp orati on’ s d i ss ol ution. See

805 IL CS 5/1 2.8 0 (W

es t 200 2). Im

porta ntl y , se cti on 1 2.8 0 n

ot only deal s wi th the tim e period f or fi li ng cl ai ms in volv in g dis solv ed corpor ations (see Kleinwort Benson North America, Inc. v. Quantum Financial Services, Inc. , 181 Il l . 2d 214 , 222 (1 998)), but it al so li

mi ts the diss olve d corpo ration's righ ts and lia bi li ties (see Pielet v. Pielet , Nos. 2-09- 0210, 2- 09-0242 cons., slip op. at 28 (Ill. App. Nov. 29, 2010)) . As Pielet sum ma rized:

“ A corp orati on' s debts (a

nd righ ts) e xte nd i nto th e surv i va l pe riod [c itat ion] ; ** * t he po licy f avo ring sa t isfact ion o f a disso lved co rp or at ion's
ou t st anding d ebt s is t he ver y reas on fo r t he Su rvival St at ut e. Thu s, s ince t he
co rp or at ion's d ebt s and obligat ions p er sist into t he su rvival pe rio d, and s ince t he
cor porati on con ti n ue s to ex i st d uri n g th e s ur v i v al period, a c orp ora

ti on or i ts
cr edit or s may asse rt claims reg ar ding t hos e de bt s and obligat ions d ur ing t he
su rvi va l pe riod. H owe ve

r, on cethe su rvi va l pe riod hasen

de d, th e c orporati

on cea ses t o e xist. Since t he co rp or at ion at t hat po int no long er exist s, it can noNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

8 long er be su bject t o a ny claim , a nd any claims no t ra ised a gainst or by the corpo ration becom

e forf ei ted.” Pielet , sli

p op. at 32-33. Ap plying se ct io n 1 2. 80 t o t he fac t s he r e, Cu st o m Fr ame 's o blig at io ns o n t he no t e t er minat ed in 1999, f i ve years af ter i ts di ssol uti on i n 19 94 an d long b ef ore the i nstant action

wasf i l ed i n 20 03. A f ter th at d ate , an

y l i ab i l i ty tha t Cu stom Fram e m ay ha ve ha d on the note ce as ed by ope rati on of l aw un der s ection 12.8 0. CCS and C ust om Fr ame we re t he o nly principal de bt or s o n t he no t e. Cus t om Fr ame's l i ab i l i ty on th e n ote end ed i n 1 999 , an

d C CS ’ l i ab i l i ty en de d w he n i t wa s rel ea se d by De von Bank pursuan

t t o t he settlem

ent agreem

ent. Wi th no prin ci pal s rem ai ni ng l ia ble on the note, defen dant would ordin

aril y b e absol ved of h er li abi li ty as guaran

to r. See Edens Plaza , 27 7 I ll. App. 3d at 209. Thi s ta ke s u s to th

e s ec ond pron g of our a na l y sis. Eve n th ough no pri nc i pal s rem ai n on t he no t e, defend ant may still be li able if the g uar ant y cont ra ct expr essly pr ovid es fo r c ont inuing l i ab i l i ty i n th i s si tuati on. Cf. E dens Plaza , 277 Ill . App. 3d at 211-14 (Greim an, J., dis senti

ng) (di scu ssi ng m odi f i cation of the g eneral

rule by ex pres s languag e of

a gua ran ty c ontract). However, our anal

ysi s must be guided by the wel l-establish ed princi ple that a guarant or “is a fav orite of the l aw. [Citation.] A guaran to r is to be accorded the ben efi t o f an y doubt whi

ch may arise fr om t he langu age of t he co nt ra ct , a nd his liabil ity is not t o be var ied o r e xt ende d by
co nst ruc t io n o rimplic at io n be yo nd it s p r ec ise t er ms. [ Cit at io n. ] T he liabilit y o f a g ua r an t o ris stri ctl y construed i

n h i s f avor and agai nst the pa rty i n w hose f avor the guaran

ty ru ns . [Citation.]” Hensler v. Busey Bank , 23 1 Il l . A pp. 3d 9 20, 926 -27 (19 92) . Ge ne ral rul esof
co nt r ac t co nst ruc t io n a pp ly t o gu ar an t y co nt r ac t s, an d “ [ w] he r e t he lan gu ag e o f a c o nt r ac t isNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

9 unequi vocal , it m

ust be carri ed out acco rdin g to its l anguage.” McLean County Bank v. Brokaw , 119Ill . 2d 405 , 41 2 (1 988 ); se e al so Cohen v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago , 248 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 18 8, 192 ( 1993)(“ Th e m ea ni ng of a g ua ran ty ag ree men t i s a matte r of l aw to b e dete

rm i n ed b y th e c our t. ”). The guaranty

contract here contains an express l ia bi li ty cl ause, whi ch states that de fen da nt “g ua r an t ee [ s] t he full a nd pr o mpt pa yment ** * o f an y and all indebtedne ss, liabil ities, and obligations *** of

[CCS and Cus

tom Fram e] to [Dev

on Ba nk] .” (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Rea ding t his langua ge s t rict ly i n t he gu ar ant or 's favo r, its p lain meaning is tha t defend ant
con tra cte d on

l y to b e l i ab l e a s g ua ra n tor f or C CS ’ a n d Cus tom

Fr am e’ s obl i ga ti on s on th e n ote
an d n othi ng more. Un

de r th e p l ai

n l an gua geof the l i ab i l i ty cl au se , de f en da nt i s on l y l i ab l e on t he gu ar ant y cont ra ct when t he pr incipals have a n obligat ion o n t he no t e, which is co nsist ent with the ge

neral rule of guarantor li abi

li ty. See Edens Plaza , 277 Ill . App. 3d at 209. Yet neithe r Cu st om Fr ame no r CC S has any obligat ions o n t he no t e bec aus e o f the ir re spe ct ive di ss ol ution a nd rel ea se , m ea ni ng tha t the l i ab i l i ty cl au se doe s n ot i m pos e a ny l i ab i l i ty on def endan t as gua ran tor. T he r e a r e n o o t he rcla us es in t he co nt r ac t t ha t ch an ge t his r ea din g. T he o nly p o t en t ially
con tra di ctor y cl au se s a retwo res er

v ati on -of -ri gh ts c l au se s. On

e c l au se sta tes th at “l i ab i l i

ty hereunde r shal l i n no wi se be af

fected or im

pai red by (and [Devon B ank] i s express ly authorized to ma ke from tim e to t im e, without notice to anyone) an y s al e, pledge, surren

der, compromi se, release *** of an

y of said in debtedness , li

abi li ties an d obli gations.” The other clause states that “[i]n case of the deat h, dissol

ution, li quidation, fai

lure *** all

of said i ndebtedness, li

abili ties, and o bligat ions * ** s hall, at t he o pt ion o f [De von B ank] , be co me imm ediat ely due fr om and beNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

10 forthwi th paid b y the undersi gned.” How ev er , w e do n ot re ad

th es e c l au se s to mea

n th at th e g ua ra n tor i s l i ab l e to p ay

th e n ote
ev en wh en t he pr inc ipa l is no t . De fen da nt 's lia bilit y un de rt he gu ar an t y co nt r ac t is e xp r es sly limit ed by t he liabilit y cla us e t o be co ex t en sive wit h t he liabilit y o f t he pr inc ipa ls, an d it is
un rea son ab l e to a ss

um e that a gua ran tor wou l d c ons en t to be l i ab l e w he n th e p ri nc i pal i s n ot without expressl

y s tating so. See Cohen , 248 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 192 (“ A gua ran tor i s n ot l i ab l e f or an y thi ng to wh i ch he did not ag

ree.” ). Mo re o ver , it is u nr ea so nab le t o re ad t he r es er vat io n- o fri gh ts c l au se s to ex

pa n d th e g ua ra n tor' s l i ab i l i ty b ey on d th at ex pr es sl y sta ted i n th e l i ab i l i ty cl ause bec ause they

appear i n a b oilerplate section of the guaranty contract t hat reserves
num erous rights to the bank. See City Na tional Bank o f Hoopston v. Rus

sell , 246 Ill . App. 3d 302, 311 (1993) (“[G] uaran ty a greem en ts are s trictly construed i

n f avor of the gua

ran tor, esp eci al l y wh ere the gua

ran ty i s on a pri nted f orm s uppl i ed b y the credi tor. ”); Cohen , 24 8 I ll. Ap p. 3d a t 192 (“Even wh

ere there are broad statements of guaran to r li abi li ty, an un am bi guous contract must be enf

orced as written .”). No t ably, t he s ec o nd r es er vat io n- o f-r ight s c lau se , w hich r ela t es t o t he d isso lut io n o f a pri n ci pal , a gai n re f er s to a p ri

n ci pal ’s “ i n de b ted n es s, l i ab i l i

ti es an d ob l i ga ti on s” un der the n ote but do es no t acc ou nt for a sit uat ion in which t he pr incipal’s o bligat ions a re ext inguished by opera ti on of l aw un der the S ur

v i v al Sta tute . Readi

n g th i s c l au se i n th e l i gh t m ost f av ora b l e to t he gu ar ant or , t his clause means t hat a gu ar ant or will remain li able o n t he no t e in the event of t he pri nc i pal ’sdi ssol

uti on, b ut onl y so long a s the

pri nc i pal i tself rem ai ns obl i gated on the n ote. W h en th e p ri n ci pal ’s ob l i ga ti on i s exti n gui sh ed at th e en d of th e s ur v i v al period f oll owi n g i ts disso lut ion, t he gu ar ant or ’s o bligat ion is also ext inguished in li ne wit h t he ge ner al ru le. H ad t heNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

11 pa r t ies wis he d t o mo dify t he ge ne r al r ule in o r de rt o en su r e t ha t t he gu ar an t o rr ema ine d lia ble bey ond the survi

val period i n the event of the di ssolution of a pri nci pal , then presum

abl y the y wou l d h av e ex pl i ci tl y sta ted so i n th e g ua ra n ty con tra ct. Un de r th es e c i

rcu m sta nc es , th e re serv ati

on- of -ri gh ts c l au se s do not m

ake the g ua ran tor l i ab l e eve n w he n th e p ri nc i pal i s n ot. Ra the r, w e re ad the se cl au se s to m

ere l y al l ow the c red

i tor la titude to negotiate or ot herwi se deal with the n

ot e i n the ordin

ary course of b

usi ness without
co mpro misi

ng it s ability to hold defend ant liable as gu ar ant or in the e vent of a defau lt o n t he note by the prin ci pal , so long as the pri

nci pal remai ns obl iga ted on the note. In su m, t he unc ont ra dict ed e vidence pr ese nt ed a t t rial est ablished t hat bot h of t he pr inc ipa ls o n t he no t e, CC S a nd Cu st o m Fr ame , we r e n o t liable o n t he no t e. De fen da nt is consequentl

y n ot li abl e under the contract of guaranty an d a di rected verdict in h

er fav or was t her efo re pr op er . Alt hou gh t he t rial co ur t ult imately base d t he dir ect ed ve rd ict o n defend ant 's statut e of l

im itations defen se, we are “

not b oun d to a cc ep t the

rea sons g i

ve n b y a c i rcu i t cou rt f or i ts j udg men t an d the j udg men t may be su stai ne d up on a

ny grou nd wa rra nte d, reg ard

l es s of whet her t he circ uit co ur t re lied upo n suc h gr ou nd and re gar dless o f whet her t he r eas on g iven by the ci rcuit court was corr ect.” Messenger v. Edgar , 15 7 I ll. 2d 16 2, 17 7 ( 19 93 )
. Ac co r di ng ly,
w e affirm the dire ct ed ve rd ict o n t he gr ou nd o f dischar ge a nd do not re ach t he alt er nat ive gr ou nd of the stat ute o f l

im itations. B. Third -P ar t y Complaint We n ext exam in e the di sm

is sal of the thi rd-party compl

ai nt. Defen dant's am ended thirdpa rty com pl ai nt a gai ns t CC S al l eg ed threese pa rate cou nts , onl y two of wh i ch are be f ore u s on appe al . C oun

t I al l eg ed th at, i f de f en da n t we reto b e f oun d l i ab l e on th e g ua ra n ty con tra ct toNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

12 pla in tif f or i f def endan t successf ull y de fen ded agai nst pl ai ntif f' s clai ms but in curred att orney f

ees and costs, th

en CCS i s l i ab l e to def

endan t unde r a the ory of i m pli ed con tractual i nde m ni ty. Cou nt I II al l eg ed

tha t CC S i s l i ab l e f or de f en da nt' s a ttorn ey f ee s a nd cos ts u nd er a the ory of bre ach o f fi

duc iary du t y. Altho ugh d efenda nt 's t hird- par t y complaint did no t des cr ibe the theories of recove

ry b ehi nd he r all egations agai

nst CCS qui

te so co nci sel

y, h er bri efs on appeal spe ci f i cal l y advance those two the orie s i n orde r to support he

r clai m s. The tr i al cou rt di sm i ss ed de f en da n t' s th i rd -p ar ty com pl ai n t i n re sp on se to CC S’ moti on

to di sm i ss u nde r section 2-615 of the Code

of C i vi l Procedu re (735 ILCS 5/2-61 5 (West 200 8)). We rev ie w de novo an order of di sm is sal under section 2-615. See Aguilar v. Safeway Insurance Co. , 2 21 I ll. App. 3d 1 095 , 1 100 -0 1 ( 199 1) . O ur t ask on r eview is t o “d et er mine whet her t he al l egati ons of the c omp l ai

nt, wh en i nterpreted i

n the l i ght m ost fa vorabl e to the pl

ai ntif f , are suf fi ci ent to set forth a cause of action on wh

ic h rel ie f m ay be granted.” Id. “ A

ca us e of ac ti on sho uld no t be dismissed on t he plea dings u nless it clear ly appea rs t hat no s et of fac t s co uld be proved which woul d entitle the pl ai ntif f to recover.” Id. at 11 01
. “ 'We t ak e a s t rue all w ellpled fac t s and re aso nable infere nces t her efro m and co nsider only t hos e fact s in the plead ing and in cl uded i n the attached exh

ibits.' ” University Pr

ofessionals of Illinois v. Stukel , 344 Ill . App. 3d 856, 857 (2003) (quo ting Safeway Insur ance Co. v. Daddono , 334 Ill . App. 3d 215, 218 (2002 )). We f irst consider the im

pli ed cont ractu al i

ndem ni ty count. “Impl

ied i ndem ni ty is ' a con tra ct i m pl i ed i n l aw ari si n g f rom th e l eg al ob l i ga ti on of an i n dem n i tee ** * to s atisf

y l i ab i l i ty
ca us ed by ac ti ons of hi s i nd em ni tor.'[Ci tati on. ] Th e f un da men tal pre m i se un de rl y i ng an ac ti on f or i m pl i ed i n dem n i ty i s th e rec ogn i ti on th at th e l aw may i m pos e l i ab i l i ty up on a b l am el es s p ar tyNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

13 deriv ative ly through another's conduct. [Citation.]” Industrial Color, In c. v. C P Ino rganics, Inc. , 244 Ill . App. 3d 436, 439 (1993). The princi ple beh in d the theory of i

mpl ie d contractual indemnity is tha t , “w her e o ne pa rt y's brea ch o f co nt ra ct cau ses a sec ond par t y to bre ach a separat e contr act with a third part y, the second part y m ay sh if t its co ntract ual l

iab il ity to the first part y. [Ci tat ion.] Indemni

ty is justif ied i n such i nstances because a party who breaches a contract can be hel

d li abl e for dam ages whi ch n aturall y a rise from the breach , provided that such damag es w er e r eas ona bly within the co nt emplat ion o f the par t ies as a pr oba ble res ult of t he breach .” Zielinski v. Miller , 277 Il l . Ap p. 3d 73 5, 740 ( 1995)
. Her e, defend ant alleged t hat she is ent itled t o r eco ver fro m CCS ( 1) any damag es t hat she may be l iab le to plain

tiff for in the even

t t hat plai ntif f prevai led i n i ts guar anty action agai

nst her, or alternativ

el y (2) h er att orney f

ees and c osts in the ev

ent that she succes sf

ull y de fen ds aga inst p laintiff’s act ion. Given t hat defend ant pr evailed a gainst plaint iff at t rial, s he has no cl ai m to i n dem n i f i ca ti on f rom CC S f or th e f i rs t ty pe of re cov er y b ec au se sh e h as n o li ab i l i ty to plai ntif f on the guara nty contract. Moreover, defendan

t is n ot entitled to indem

nifi cation f rom CCS f

or her att orney f

ees an d c o st s, r eg ar dle ss o f wh et he rshe ha d p r ev aile d a ga inst pla int iff in t he gu ar an t y ca se . I llino is law has long been c lear t hat “absent a st at ut e o r a co nt ra ct ual ag re ement 'at t or ney fees a nd t he ordinary expenses an

d burdens of l itigation are not all

owabl e to t he succe ssf

ul pa rty.' ” Kerns v. Engelke , 76 Ill . 2d 154, 166 (1979) (quo ting Ritter v. Ritter , 38 1 I ll. 5 49 , 55 3 ( 19 43 ) )
. T his is true even i

n an in dem nifi cation acti on agai

nst a thi rd party. See Industrial Color , 244 Ill . App. 3d at 43 9-40. Defend ant at t empt s t o a void t he ap plicat ion o f this lo ng- st anding r ule by char act er izingNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

14 h er attor n ey f ee s a n d c ost s a s d

am ag es th at sh e i n cu rre d a s a re su l t of CC S’ b re ach

of i ts obli gations on the n

ot e. Yet t hi s speci

fi c argume nt on si mi la r facts was addres sed and rej ected by the s upr eme co ur t in Kerns . See Kerns , 76 Il l . 2d at 16 6-67 (“

The appe l l ate court dis t ing uis he d t he inst an t ca se fr o m Ritter and t he ge ner al pr op os itio n abo ve in tha t t he at t or ney's fees here were the resul

t o f def endi ng a prior action which gav e ris e to t he i

ndem ni ty cl ai m. *** We are n ot persuaded we sh

ould create an i

ndem ni ty exception to the Ritter holdi ng even un

der the ci rcu m sta nc esof thi s c as e * **. ”). Pur suan

t to Kerns , defen

dant here can

not recover her atto rney fees and costs from

CCS under a theory

of i ndem nifi cation, and c onsequentl

y the trial
cou rt p rop erl y di sm i ss ed th i s c oun t of h er th i rd -p ar ty com pl ai n t. We n ext consider the breach

of f iduc ia ry duty count. In essence, this count all eges that CC S, a s th

e p ri n ci pal on th e n ote, h ad a d uty to de f en da n t, a s th e g ua ra n tor on th e n ote, n ot to defaul t. By CCS’ de faul

t and breach

of thi s duty, the count alle ges, defe ndan t incurred dam

ages in t he fo rm o f at t o rne y fee s a nd co st s be ca us e s he wa s fo r ce d t o de fen d a ga inst pla int iff's law su it on t he gu ar ant y cont ra ct . T he co unt furt her alleges t hat CCS bre ache d so me unsp ecified du t y by enterin g in to the settlem

ent agreem

ent wi th Devon Ban

k and securi

ng a rel ease of i ts own obl i gations u nde r the n ote. We are aware of

no authority that i

mputes a f

iduc ia ry rel ationsh ip as a m atter of law be twe en a p ri nc i pal debtor an d a gua ran tor m ere l y be ca us e of the i r re l ati ve pos i ti ons i n r el ati on to a debt, and def

endan t o ff ers none. But see Schrager v. North Com munity Bank , 328 Ill . App. 3d 696, 707 (2002) (reco gni zi ng that, although there is no f iduc ia ry duty as a m atter of law be twe en a c red i tor and a gua ra nt or , a fiduciar y relat ionship may be fo und d epe nding o n t he f actual ci rcum stan ces ). Ins tead, de f endan t off ers two n ovel theori es to sup port thi s coun

t.No. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

15 Fi rst, defendan

t argues that, because

CCS was owned i

n wh ole b y B rown, who was defend ant 's hus band a t t he t ime, it s omeho w o wed her a fiduciar y dut y. De fendant cite s no au t ho r it y fo rt his h igh ly o r igin al t he o ry o t he rt ha n t he pr o po sit io n t ha t a fid uc iar y re lat io nsh ip
ma y e xi st between spouses, though not based on the s ole f act of the ma

rital relationshi

p. See, e.g. , Nessler v

. Nessler, 3 87 I ll. App. 3d 1 103 , 1 111 (2 008 ). The pr oblem wit h defend ant 's
ar gument is tha t even if we a ssu me tha t suc h a fiduciar y relat ionship be t wee n defend ant and Bro wn exist ed, t hen de fendant wo uld, at best , ha ve a c aus e o f act ion fo r br eac h aga inst B ro wn, not CC S. Moreover, ev

en i f we we re to acce pt for the sa

ke of argum en t that suc h a f i duci ary re latio nship wit h Bro wn co uld su ppo rt a ca use of a ct ion ag ainst CCS , no wher e do es d efenda nt 's
ame nd ed t hir d- pa r t y co mpla int alle ge t ha t de fen da nt an d B r o wn we r e ma rr ied at t he t ime t his alle ged duty arose. Wi

thout such an

alle gation, thi s theory i s f atall y f la wed. See Univer

sity Profess ionals , 344 Ill . App. 3d at 857. Sec ond , de f

en da nt a dvan ce s th e al tern ati ve the ory tha t a f i duc i ary duty aros e b ec au se

of the gua ran ty con tract. How ever, the

ge ne ral rul e of l aw i s th at “ [p] arti esto a c ontr

ac t are not each other's f

iduc ia ries .” Mid-West Energy Consultants, Inc. v. Covenent Home, Inc
. , 35 2 I ll. Ap p. 3d 16 0, 164 ( 2004) . Wh i l e def endan t correctl y poi nts out that i

t is possi bl e f or a f i duci ary relationshi

p to aris e as a m

atter of f act between parties

to a contract ( see Carey

Electric Contra cting, Inc. v. F

irst N ational Bank

of Elgin , 74 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 23 3, 237- 38 (19 79)), n owhe re do es t he t hird- par t y complaint allege t hat t her e wa s a c ont ra ct bet wee n CCS and d efenda nt . T he only co nt ra ct s t hat t he co mplaint allege s ar e t he no t e bet wee n CCS and D evo n Bank , a nd t he gu ar an t y bet we en de fen da nt an d D ev o n B an k. As w it h d efe nd an t 's f irs t t he o ry, t his t he o ry is al so fatally

fl awed and ca

nnot support a cause of a ction agai nst CCS. See Univer

sityNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

16 Profess ionals , 344 Ill . App. 3d at 857-858. Because def

endan t did not state a viab le

cause of action i

n he r third-party com

pla in t, we affirm the c ircu it co ur t 's o rd er dismissing t he t hird- par t y complaint unde r se ct ion 2 -6 15 o f the Code of Ci vi l Procedu re (735 ILCS 5/2-61 5 (West 200 8)).

C. Sanc t ions Defend ant next co nt ends t hat t he t rial co ur t er re d by denying her mot ion fo r sa nct ions
un der Il l i n oi s S up re me C our

t Ru l e 1 37 (e f f . F eb . 1, 19 94 ). R

ul e 1 37 au th ori ze s th e tr i al cou rt to im pose sanctions on at to rneys or parties who file f alse or fri volous pleadi

ngs. See Ill . S. Ct . R. 137 (eff . Feb. 1, 1994). “The deci si on whether to im

pose sancti ons under Rul

e 137 i s comm

itted t o t he so un d d isc r et io n o f t he cir cu it jud ge , an d t ha t de cis io n w ill no t be o ve r t ur ne d u nle ss it represents an a

buse of dis cretion.” Dow

d & Dow d, Ltd. v. Gleason , 181 Il l . 2d 460 , 487 (1 998). “A n ab use of discretion occurs whe n no reasonab le

person would rul

e as the ci rcuit court ruled.” Aguirre v. City of Chicago , 382 Il l . Ap p. 3d 89 , 98 (20 08). The tria l court did not ab

use i ts di scre tion i n de ny i ng d ef endan t's m otion f or san cti ons. Defe ndan t file d her m

ot ion f or sanctions af

ter t he trial

court entered the di

rected verdict in h

er f avor. Her m

otion waspri mari l y ba sed on the argum en t that plai ntif f ei ther was f ull y awar e when it first fil

ed t he laws uit or was late r p ut on no t ice t hat its c aus e o f act ion ag ainst defend ant
wa s b ar re d b y th e statu te of l i m i tati on s a n d def en da n t' s d i sch arge . Th

e tr i al cou rt di sa gr ee d w i th this positi on and, duri

ng an extensi ve di scussi

on that t akes up 13 transcri pt pages in

the record, the tri al cou rt f oun d that the f

ac t tha t de f en da nt' s af f i rm ati ve de f en se s of di scha rge an d s tatute of limita t io ns w er e u lt imat ely su cc es sfu l aft er a ju ry t ria l did no t nec es sa rily mea n t hat pla int iff sh oul d b e s ub j ec t to s an

cti on s f or pur su i n g i ts c l ai m . In pa rti cul ar , s ev eral f ac tual poi n tsNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

17 su rrou nd i ng the de f ense s w ere

un cl ea r an d hea vi l y con tes ted by the pa rti es , an d they were n ot
res ol ve d un ti l the tri al i tse l f . The tri al cou rt ca ref ul l y consi dered al l of the arg um en ts i n f av or of
sanc t ions t hat defend ant ra ised in her mot ion and sup po rt ing memor anda , includ ing t he long and contentious history of thi s case, but ul tim ately declin ed to impose sa

nctions . We can

not say that the tri al cou rt ab us ed i ts d i screti on i n d oi ng so. D. Cos ts Fi na l l y , de f en da nt ass erts tha t the tri al cou rt er red by onl y gra nti ng i n p art h er p eti ti on f or co st s und er sec t ion 5 -1 09 o f the Co de o f Civil Pr oc edu re (7 35 I LCS 5/ 5- 109 (Wes t 200 8) ). We review a trial

court 's order on a petition f or co sts for abuse of

dis cretion. See Myers v. Bash , 334 Il l . Ap p. 3d 36 9, 371 ( 2002)
. Defendan t's petition soug ht reimb

ursement for fi

li ng fees, subpoena f

ees, cou rier fees, pho t oc op ying, co ur t re po rt er s, a nd lega l rese ar ch co st s. T he t rial co ur t gr ant ed d efenda nt 's petition f or t he f il in g and sub poena fe es, but deni

ed i t as to the remai

ni ng i tems. Section 5-109 does n ot def i ne whi ch costs a re rec overa

bl e, but the s

uprem e court has i

nterpreted the sa

me term in se ct io n 5
- 10 8 o f t he Co de o f Civ il Pr o ce du r e ( 73 5 I LC S 5 /5
- 10 8 ( We st 20 08 ) ) , wh ich is
section 5-109 's com pan i on se cti on an

d dea l s wi th rec overy

of c osts by

plai ntif f s, to mean

“c ourt costs” such f

il in g fees , subpoena f

ees, and statuto ry wi

tness f ees. See Vicencio v. Lincoln-Way Builders, Inc. , 2 04 I ll. 2d 2 95, 302 (2 003 ). This d efinition w as a pplied t o s ect ion 5 -1 09 by t he app ellate co ur t in Burmac v. Metal Finishing Co. v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co
. , 35 6 I ll. Ap p. 3d 47 1, 48 5- 86 ( 20 05 )
. T he co st s t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t aw ar de d t o de fen da nt co nse qu en t ly fal l wi thin the category of costs contempl ated by section 5-109. Ho weve r, t her e is so me disag re ement ove r w het her t he r emaining co st s t hat defend antNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

18 so ught fall within sect ion 5 -1 09. Altho ugh Burmac wen t on to addi

tion al l y hol d tha t court report er fees

are recoverabl

e as court co sts under secti on 5-109 ( Burmac , 356 Ill . App. 3d at 486 ), t he co ur t in Kehoe v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon , 387 Ill . App. 3d 454, 471-72 (2 008 ), fou nd t he o ppo site and e xpr essly disag re ed w ith Burmac on tha t poin t. Kehoe rel

i ed on t he su pr eme co ur t 's ad monit ion in Vicen cio : “ T he st at ut es allo win g r ec o ve ry o f co st s a r e in derogation of the comm

on la w. Thus, it ha s long been said that t hey

mus t be narrowly

construed [c i tati on ], a n d th at on l y th ose costs s pe ci f i ca l l y de si gn ate d b y sta tute may b e ta x ed as costs [citation].” Vicen cio , 204 Ill . 2d at 300; see Kehoe , 387 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 471-72. Al though def endan t ci tes se veral cas es i n s upport of her posi tion that copy i ng, c ouri er, and research

fees are recoverabl

e costs under section 5-109, these cas es were ei ther decide d bef ore Vicen cio , deal with recovery of costs under o ther st atut es, or are u np ub l i sh ed ca se s f rom other j uri sdi

cti ons. S ee, e.g. , Johnson v. Thomas , 34 2 Ill. App. 3d 3 82 ( 200 3); Harri s Trus t & Savings Bank v. American National Bank & Trust Co. , 23 0 Ill. App. 3d 5 91 ( 199 2); Goyal v. Gas Technolo gy Institu te , 2 009 U. S. LEX IS 110 869 , a t *27 -2 8 ( N. D. Ill. No v. 2 4, 200 9) (c iting Johnson ), aff ’d in part and vacated i n part , 389 Fed. App’x 539 (7th Cir. 2010). Al

though Johnson wasdeci

ded th ree m onths af ter Vicen cio , it does no t discuss Vicencio or th e d ef i ni ti on of c os t s in this c ont ext
. None of the ca ses

that de f endan t reli es u pon she ds a

ny l i ght on recovery of these typ es of costs un der s ection 5-1 09. Regardl ess, we do not t ake a positi on on whether or not t he rem ai ni ng costs that defendan t so ught are in fact taxable under section 5-109 because the tr ial cour t did not a ssess those costs in this case. The onl y que stion that i s properly bef ore us on this appea

l i s whether t he t rial co ur t abus ed it s discr et ion in denying d efenda nt 's pe t itio n as t o t hos e co st s. G iven theNo. 1-10- 0880 (consoli dated with No. 1-10-1707)

19 dis agreem

ent in our case law ove

r the extent of taxabl

e costs under section 5-109 b ey ond fi li ng, subp oe na, and w itnes s fees, t he circ uit co ur t did no t abus e its discr et ion by lim iting d efenda nt 's
co st s re co ver y to only t hos e ite ms explicitly discu ssed in Vicen cio
. III. CONCLUSION For the reas ons d

i scu sse d ab ove, w e af

f i rm the d i rected verdict i n f avor of de f

endan t. We al so af f i rm the tri al court's orders d en y i ng d ef endan t's m otion f or san cti ons, g ran tin g i n pa rt
an d den y i n g i n pa rt d ef en da n t' s p eti ti on f or c ost s, an

d di sm i ss i n g def en da n t' s th i rd -p ar ty
com pl ai n t. Af fi rmed.