[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 34 (Thursday, February 20, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 7721-7725]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-4219]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 73

RIN 3150-AF53


Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to revise 
its regulations to delete certain security requirements associated with 
an internal threat. This action follows reconsideration by the NRC of 
nuclear power plant physical security requirements to identify those 
requirements that are marginal to safety, redundant, or no longer 
effective. This action would reduce the regulatory burden on licensees 
without compromising physical protection against radiological sabotage 
required for public health and safety.

DATES: Submit comments by May 6, 1997. Comments received after this 
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission 
is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before 
this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be sent to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attention: Docketing and Service 
Branch.
    Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 
between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.
    For information on submitting comments electronically, see the 
discussion under Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information 
Section.
    Certain documents related to this rulemaking, including comments 
received, may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L 
Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents may also 
be viewed and downloaded electronically via the Electronic Bulletin 
Board established by NRC for this rulemaking as discussed under 
Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information Section.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Sandra Frattali, Office of Nuclear 
Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6261, e-mail <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#cfbcaba98fa1bdace1a8a0b9"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="790a1d1f39170b1a571e160f">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    In a memorandum dated September 3, 1991 (COMFR-91-005), the 
Commission requested the NRC staff to re-examine the security 
requirements associated with an internal threat to nuclear power plants 
that are contained in 10 CFR Part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants 
and Materials.'' The NRC staff completed its re-examination and 
recommended some changes in 10 CFR Part 73 to the Commission (SECY-92-
272, August 4, 1992). In a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated November 
5, 1992, the Commission directed the NRC staff to work with the Nuclear 
Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) now known as the Nuclear 
Energy Institute (NEI). Following three public meetings with NUMARC, 
the NRC staff recommended to the Commission (SECY-93-326, December 2, 
1993) additional changes to

[[Page 7722]]

Part 73 that would provide significant relief to licensees without 
compromising the physical security of the plants. In a Staff 
Requirements Memorandum dated February 18, 1994, the Commission 
directed the NRC staff to proceed with a rulemaking.

Discussion

    Seven areas in Part 73 were identified as candidates for 
modification through rulemaking. One of the recommended changes, 
relating to access of personnel and materials into reactor containments 
during periods of high traffic, has been addressed by a separate 
rulemaking. This recommended change was adopted in a final rule 
published on September 7, 1995 (60 FR 46497). Six other changes 
originally considered for this rulemaking were the subject of Generic 
Letter 96-02 issued February 13, 1996. This generic letter identified 
certain areas in which licensees might choose to revise their physical 
security plans without having to wait for issuance of the rule plan. 
One of these (discussed in detail later), an option to leave vital area 
doors unlocked provided certain compensatory measures are taken, has 
been reconsidered in light of recent tampering events. Consequently, 
that change is not being proposed in this rulemaking.
    The five remaining changes being addressed in this proposed 
rulemaking are as follows:
    1. Search requirements for on-duty guards, Sec. 73.55(d)(1);
    2. Requirements for vehicle escort, Sec. 73.55(d)(4);
    3. Control of contractor employee badges, Sec. 73.55(d)(5);
    4. Maintenance of access lists for each vital area, 
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A); and
    5. Key controls for vital areas, Sec. 73.55(d)(8).

1. Search Requirements for On-duty Guards (Sec. 73.55(d)(1)).

    Under current regulations, armed security guards who leave the 
protected area as part of their duties must be searched for firearms, 
explosives, and incendiary devices upon re-entry into the protected 
area. Requiring a guard to go through an explosives detector or 
searching packages carried by the guard protects against the 
introduction of contraband. Because an armed guard carries a weapon on 
site, passage of the guard through the metal detector, the principal 
purpose of which is to detect firearms, serves little purpose. The 
guard has to either remove the weapon while passing through the 
detector or be subject to a hand search. Either approach makes little 
sense for the guard who is authorized to carry a weapon on site. 
Further, removing and handling the guard's weapon could present a 
personnel safety risk.
    This proposed rule would allow armed security guards who are on 
duty and have exited the protected area on official business to reenter 
the protected area without being searched for firearms (by a metal 
detector). Unarmed guards and watchpersons would continue to meet all 
search requirements. All guards would continue to be searched for 
explosives and incendiary devices because they are not permitted to 
carry these devices into the plant.

2. Requirements for Vehicle Escort Sec. (73.55(d)(4)).

    The present requirement for a searched, licensee-owned vehicle 
within the protected area to be escorted by a member of the security 
organization, even when the driver is badged for unescorted access, 
does not contribute significantly to the security of the plant. Under 
the current regulations, all vehicles must be searched prior to entry 
into the protected area except under emergency conditions. Further, all 
vehicles must be escorted by a member of the security organization upon 
entry into the protected area except for ``designated licensee 
vehicles.'' Designated licensee vehicles are those vehicles that are 
limited in their use to onsite plant functions and remain in the 
protected area except for operational, maintenance, repair, security, 
and emergency purposes. Under this requirement, those licensee-owned 
vehicles that are not ``designated licensee vehicles'' must be escorted 
at all times while in the protected area even when they are driven by 
personnel with unescorted access.
    This proposed rule would eliminate the requirement for escort of 
licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area for work-related 
purposes provided that these vehicles are driven by licensee employees 
who have unescorted access. (This amendment would still preclude 
periodic entry of a delivery truck without an escort.) This change 
would provide burden relief to licensees without significantly 
increasing the level of risk to the plant.

3. Control of Contractor Employee Badges (Sec. 73.55(d)(5)).

    Contractor employees with unescorted access are required to return 
their badges when leaving the protected area. Current regulatory 
practice allows licensee employees to leave the protected area with 
their badges if adequate safeguards are in place to ensure that the 
security of the badge is not jeopardized. Because contractors and 
licensees are subject to the same programs required for unescorted 
access, there is no reason to employ more stringent badge control 
requirements for contractor employees.
    This proposed rule would allow contractor employees to take their 
badges offsite under the same conditions that apply to licensee 
employees.

4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vital Area 
(Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A)).

    Maintaining separate access lists for each vital area and 
reapproval of these lists on a monthly basis is of marginal value. At 
many sites, persons granted access to one vital area also have access 
to most or all vital areas. Therefore, licensees presently derive 
little additional benefit from maintaining discrete lists of 
individuals allowed access to each separate vital area in the facility. 
Also, licensee managers or supervisors are required to update the 
access lists at least once every 31 days to add or delete individuals 
from these lists when appropriate. There is also a requirement to 
reapprove the list every 31 days. However, reapproval of all 
individuals on the lists at least every 31 days, to validate that the 
lists have been maintained in an accurate manner is unnecessarily 
burdensome.
    This rulemaking would replace separate access authorization lists 
for each vital area of the facility by a single listing of all persons 
who have access to any vital area.
    The proposed rulemaking would also change the requirement that the 
list must be reapproved at least once every 31 days to quarterly. The 
reapproval consists of a review to ensure that the list is current and 
that only those individuals requiring routine access to a vital area 
are included. Because of the requirement for a manager or supervisor to 
update the list at least every 31 days, conducting this comprehensive 
reapproval every 31 days is of marginal value. Comments from the public 
are requested on the question of the benefits of separating the update 
and reapproval requirements.

5. Key Controls for Vital Areas (Sec. 73.55(d)(8)).

    Under current regulations, licensees change or rotate all keys, 
locks, combinations, and related access control devices at least once 
every twelve months. Because the rule also requires that these be 
changed whenever there is a possibility of their being compromised, 
requiring change at least every 12 months has been determined

[[Page 7723]]

by the NRC to be only marginal to security.
    This proposed rule would remove the requirement for change every 12 
months while retaining the requirement for changing for cause, when an 
access control device has been compromised or there is a suspicion that 
it may be compromised.

Locking of Vital Areas

    As noted earlier, Generic Letter 96-02, described, among other 
things, conditions under which licensees could leave vital areas 
unlocked. Specifically, to leave a vital area unlocked, the licensee 
would have had to ensure that the area is equipped with an alarmed 
access control system that will alarm on unauthorized entry; ensure 
that the doors to the area can be locked remotely; continue to maintain 
a record of personnel access; to examine for explosives, with equipment 
specifically designed for that purpose, all hand-carried packages 
entering any protected area within which there is an unlocked vital 
area; and to demonstrate a capability to protect against an external 
adversary.<SUP>1 This change was considered for inclusion in this 
rulemaking but as a result of recent events, it has been rejected. If 
vital areas are unlocked but alarmed, the response to an entry by an 
unauthorized individual could require a considerable time and level of 
effort to assure that important equipment was not damaged. Maintaining 
VA doors locked limits the number of people who have access to the area 
and ensures that personnel who enter are identified.
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    \1\ Generic Letter 96-02 (February 13, 1996) identified those 
areas in which licensees might choose to revise their security plans 
without having to wait for the issuance of the rule changes. One 
change would have provided the option of not locking the doors to a 
vital area provided that the security of the plant would not be 
compromised.
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    In July and August of this year, tampering events were discovered 
within vital areas of a reactor. The first search missed significant 
tampering with safety-related switches. If vital areas are unlocked but 
alarmed, an entry by an unauthorized individual, deliberate or 
inadvertent, could require a considerable level of effort to assure 
that important equipment was not damaged. It is also uncertain that 
such alarms would always initiate the level of response needed to 
evaluate the safety systems within the impacted vital area. In 
addition, most safety equipment is automatic and rapid access to vital 
areas is generally not required. Thus, this option of leaving a vital 
area unlocked is no longer being considered.

Electronic Access

    Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or 
WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC 
Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The bulletin board may be 
accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the commonly 
available communications software packages, or directly via Internet. 
Background documents on the rulemaking are also available, as 
practical, for downloading and viewing on the bulletin board.
    If using a personal computer and modem, the NRC rulemaking 
subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free 
number (800) 303-9672. Communication software parameters should be set 
as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8, and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1). 
Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem 
can then be accessed by selecting the ``Rules Menu'' option from the 
``NRC Main Menu.'' Users will find the ``FedWorld Online User's 
Guides'' particularly helpful. Many NRC subsystems and data bases also 
have a ``Help/Information Center'' option that is tailored to the 
particular subsystem.
    The NRC subsystem on FedWorld can also be accessed by a direct dial 
phone number for the main FedWorld BBS, (703) 321-3339, or by using 
Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703) 321-3339 to contact 
FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed from the main FedWorld 
menu by selecting the ``Regulatory, Government Administration and State 
Systems,'' then selecting ``Regulatory Information Mall.'' At that 
point, a menu will be displayed that has an option ``U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission'' that will take you to the NRC Online main menu. 
The NRC Online area also can be accessed directly by typing ``/go nrc'' 
at a FedWorld command line. If you access NRC from FedWorld's main 
menu, you may return to FedWorld by selecting the ``Return to 
FedWorld'' option from the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access 
NRC at FedWorld by using NRC's toll-free number, you will have full 
access to all NRC systems but you will not have access to the main 
FedWorld system.
    If you contact FedWorld using Telnet, you will see the NRC area and 
menus, including the Rules Menu. Although you will be able to download 
documents and leave messages, you will not be able to write comments or 
upload files (comments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP, all files 
can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not allowed; all you 
will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look). 
An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with 
descriptions, is available. There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP 
access.
    Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web, 
like FTP, that mode only provides access for downloading files and does 
not display the NRC Rules Menu.
    For more information on NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur Davis, 
Systems Integration and Development Branch, NRC, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ac9fecc2decf82cbc3da"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3b087b554958155c544d">[email protected]</span></a>.

Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion

    The Commission has determined that this proposed rule is the type 
of action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(3)(i). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement 
nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this proposed 
rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This proposed rule amends information collection requirements that 
are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et 
seq.). This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and 
Budget for review and approval of the paperwork requirements.
    Because the rule will reduce existing information collection 
requirements, the public burden for this collection of information is 
expected to be decreased by 102 hours per licensee. This reduction 
includes the time required for reviewing instructions, searching 
existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. The NRC is 
seeking public comment on the potential impact of the collection of 
information contained in the proposed rule and on the following issues:
    1. Is the proposed collection of information necessary for the 
proper performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the 
information will have practical utility?
    2. Is the estimate of burden accurate?
    3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of 
the information to be collected?
    4. How can the burden of the collection of information be 
minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques?
    Send comments on any aspect of this proposed collection of 
information, including suggestions for further reducing the burden, to 
the Information

[[Page 7724]]

and Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail 
at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection" class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="21636b7210616f73620f666e77">[email protected]</a>; and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0002), Office of Management and 
Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
    Comments to OMB on the collections of information or on the above 
issues should be submitted by March 24, 1997. Comments received after 
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance 
of consideration cannot be given to comments received after this date.

Public Protection Notification

    The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently 
valid OMB control number.

Regulatory Analysis

    A discussion of each of the five changes proposed in this rule is 
provided in the supplementary information section. The costs and 
benefits for each of the changes proposed in this rulemaking are as 
follows:

1. Search Requirements for On-duty Guards (Sec. 73.55(d)(1)).

    The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by eliminating 
unnecessary weapon searches of guards who are already allowed to carry 
a weapon, which would result in better utilization of licensee 
resources. There would be no reduction in plant security because the 
potential for reduction in security personnel hours does not impact the 
total size of the security force. Further, the potential safety risk to 
personnel caused by removing and handling a guard's weapon would be 
eliminated.

2. Requirements for Vehicle Escort (73.55(d)(4)).

    The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by requiring 
fewer vehicle escorts which would allow personnel to be utilized more 
effectively. Resources could be redirected to areas in which they would 
be more cost effective. The decrease in security would be marginal 
because unescorted access would be restricted to vehicles owned by the 
licensee and driven by licensee employees with unescorted access.
    Assuming the number of entries by licensee-owned vehicles driven by 
personnel having unescorted access is 10-per-day per-site, the average 
time needed for escort is 3 hours, and the cost per hour for security 
personnel is $30 (loaded), a rough estimate of the potential savings 
per site per year is about $330,000 (10 escorts/day/site  x  365 days/
year  x  3 hrs/escort  x  $30/hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the 
industry per year would be approximately $24,000,000.

3. Control of Contractor Employee Badges (Sec. 73.55(d)(5)).

    The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by more 
effective use of security personnel, who would no longer be needed to 
handle badges for contractor personnel who have unescorted access. 
There would be no reduction in plant security because adequate 
safeguards would be in place to ensure that the security of the badge 
is not jeopardized.
    Assuming that one security person per working day (8 hours) is 
relieved from the duties of controlling contractor employees badges and 
that the cost per hour for security personnel is $30 (loaded), a rough 
estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $88,000 (8 
hours/day  x 365 days/year  x $30 hr). With 75 sites, the savings to 
the industry per year would be approximately $6,600,000.

4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vital Area 
(Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A)).

    The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced because 
licensees would have to keep only one access list for all vital areas 
and reapprove it quarterly, rather than keep individual access lists 
for each vital area that must be reapproved monthly.
    Assuming that the time to reapprove each of the individual lists is 
1 hour per month, that a combined list would take 1.5 hours per month, 
that the average number of vital areas per site is 10, and that the 
cost of a clerk including overhead is $30 per hour (loaded), a rough 
estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $3,420 
[(1 x 10 vital areas/month  x 12 months/yr--1.5  x 1 combined vital 
area/quarter  x 4 quarters/yr)  x $30/hr]. With 75 sites, the savings 
to the industry per year would be approximately $256,500.

5. Key Controls for Vital Areas (Sec. 73.55(d)(8)).

    The regulatory burden on the licensees would be reduced because 
fewer resources would be needed to maintain the system.
    Assuming that of the approximately 60 locks per year, half of them 
had been changed for cause, leaving 30 locks unchanged which would take 
a locksmith one day to change at a cost(including overhead) of $45 per 
hour. A rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is 
about $360 (8 hrs/year  x $45/hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the 
industry per year would be approximately $27,000.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act as amended, 5 U.S.C. 
605(b), the Commission certifies that this proposed rule, if adopted, 
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. This proposed rule would affect only licensees 
authorized to operate nuclear power reactors. These licensees do not 
fall within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set forth 
in the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the Small Business Size Standards 
set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration Act, 
13 CFR Part 121.

Backfit Analysis

    The Commission has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, 
does not apply to this proposed amendment because this amendment would 
not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees. The 
proposed changes to physical security are voluntary and should the 
licensee decide to implement this amendment, will be a reduction in 
burden to the licensee. Therefore, a backfit analysis has not been 
prepared for this amendment.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73

    Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Export, 
Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
    For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC is proposing to 
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.

PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

    1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 
147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as 
amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 sec. 1701, 106 Stat. 
2951, 2952 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f).

    Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 
Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section

[[Page 7725]]

73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 
U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-
399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).
    2. Section 73.55 is amended by revising paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(4), 
(d)(5), (d)(7)(i)(A), and (d)(8) to read as follows:


Sec. 73.55  Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities 
in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle 
access into a protected area. Identification and search of all 
individuals unless otherwise provided herein must be made and 
authorization must be checked at these points. The search function for 
detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be 
accomplished through the use of both firearms and explosive detection 
equipment capable of detecting those devices. The licensee shall 
subject all persons except bona fide Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement personnel on official duty to these equipment searches upon 
entry into a protected area. Armed security guards who are on duty and 
have exited the protected area on official business may reenter the 
protected area without being searched for firearms.
* * * * *
    (4) All vehicles, except under emergency conditions, must be 
searched for items which could be used for sabotage purposes prior to 
entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched must 
include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area. All 
vehicles, except as indicated in this paragraph, requiring entry into 
the protected area must be escorted by a member of the security 
organization while within the protected area and, to the extent 
practicable, must be off loaded in the protected area at a specific 
designated materials receiving area that is not adjacent to a vital 
area. Escort is not required for designated licensee vehicles or 
licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area and driven by 
licensee employees having unescorted access.
    (5) A numbered picture badge identification system must be used for 
all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without 
escort. Badges must be displayed by all individuals while inside the 
protected area. An individual not employed by the licensee but who 
requires frequent and extended access to protected and vital areas may 
be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he or 
she displays a licensee-issued picture badge upon entrance into the 
protected area which indicates:
    (i) Non-employee--no escort required;
    (ii) Areas to which access is authorized; and
    (iii) The period for which access has been authorized.
* * * * *
    (7) * * *
    (i) * * *
    (A) Establish a current authorization access list for all vital 
areas. The access list must be updated by the cognizant licensee 
manager or supervisor at least once every 31 days and must be 
reapproved at least quarterly. The licensee shall include on the access 
list only individuals whose specific duties require access to vital 
areas during nonemergency conditions.
* * * * *
    (d)(8) All keys, locks, combinations, and related access control 
devices used to control access to protected areas and vital areas must 
be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. Whenever there 
is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination, or related 
access control devices may have been compromised, it must be changed or 
rotated. The licensee shall issue keys, locks, combinations and other 
access control devices to protected areas and vital areas only to 
persons granted unescorted facility access. Whenever an individual's 
unescorted access is revoked due to his or her lack of trustworthiness, 
reliability, or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combinations, 
and related access control devices to which that person had access must 
be changed or rotated.
* * * * *
    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of February, 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John C. Hoyle,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 97-4219 Filed 2-19-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


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