Mrs. Ger stacke r appa rently has filed two differ ent orig inal petitions for divorce , the pre sent 1 case , filed in 2003, trial court cause number D-1-F M-03-001171, and one filed in 2006 in trial cour t cau s e n u mb e r D
- 1

- F M
- 0 6

- 0 0 3 6 2 9
. T h e 2 0 0 6 p e ti ti o n a p p a r e n tl y w a s f

il e d a f te r s h e lea rned that Mr. Ger stacke r had not fulf illed his promise to file an ag reed fi n al divorce decr ee sig ned by the pa rt ie s. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 09 -00 022 -CV

St uar t T hom as G e r st ac ke r , A ppe lla nt

v. Kim berly Ann Ger stacker , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 261S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- F M- 03- 0011 71 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Stuart Thomas Ge rstacke r filed a notice of a

ppeal c omplaining of

the trial court’ s divorce de cre e, s i gn ed Dec ember 1, 2008. I n our re view of the cler k’s re cord, w e discovere d that the di vorce proce eding , which was initially filed in 2003, was dismiss ed for want 1 of pr os e c uti on on July 19 , 200 7, a nd that the c a us e wa s nev e r r e ins ta te d o n th e tr ia l c ourt ’s do c ke t. The divorc e dec ree was sig ned more than a y ear later, w ell bey ond the date on which the tria l court lo s t p le n a r

y p o w e r o v e r th e c a

u s e . T h e d iv o r c e d e c r e e , th e r e f o r e , is a v o id order. See I n r e Brookshire Groc ery Co. , 2 5 0 S
. W
. 3 d 6 6 , 7 2 (T ex . 2 0 0 8 ) (“ T h e Feb ru ar y 1 , 2 0 0 5 o rd er gra n t i n g a new tria l was sig ned af

t er the court’s plena

ry power period e x pired, a

nd, there fore , that orderWe c ou ld f ind no su c h p oli c y

re fl e c te d in

loc a l rul e s of the Tr a vis County Di str ic t Co ur

ts. 2 2 wa s v oid .” ); State ex. rel Latt y v. O wens , 907 S.W .2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) (“Judicial action take n afte r the c ourt’s jurisdiction over a cause has expired is a nullity .”). I n r e s p o n s e t o o u r i n qu i r y r e g a r d i n g o u r j u r i s d i c t i o n t o c o n s i d e r t h e a pp e a l, Ruth S tepher son, Mrs. Ger stacke r’s attorney , filed a response explaining t hat i n J uly 2008, when she beg an her repr esenta tion of Mrs. Ger stacke r, she contac ted the trial court to a sk why Mrs. Ger stacke r had not re ceive d notice of the J uly 2007 dismiss al. Ms. Stephe rson was informed that there had bee n
an er ror a nd that the ca

use should not have been dism issed beca use “the re w ere Tempora

ry Orde rs issued and by dismiss ing the cause there wer e no protec tions for the minor child.” She was told that if she filed a

Motion for Enforc ement of Child Support, “the ca se would be r ea ct ivated.” Ms. Stepherson followed this advice , filing a motion to enforce on Aug ust 1, 2008, which was se t for a hear ing at the end of Aug ust 2008, and the ca se proc eede d from ther e, culminating in the final hear ing in De cembe r 2008. Ms. Stepherson a sserts that there was g ood cause to r etain the c ase on the trial cour

t’s docket a

nd that “jurisdiction was invoked” when Mrs. Ger stacke r filed he r motion to enforc e on Aug ust 1, 2008.

Acc ording to Ms. St epher son’s response , the trial co u rt agr ees tha t the J uly 2007 dis mis sa l w a s d on e in e rr or a nd the re se e ms t o b e a n unwrit ten po li cy in T ra vis Cou nty no t to dismiss for wa

nt of prosec ution in cases involving te mporary order s relate d to children. Fur ther, 2 Ms. Ste ph e rson state s th a t Mr s. Ge rs ta c ke r “ ha d n ot r e c e ive d n oti c e of the dis mis sa l.” F ina lly , it appea rs from the c onduct of this case that the trial cour t believed the c ase could be “r eac tivated” by Mrs. Ger stacke r’s motion to e nforc e. Howeve r, having revie wed the case law and rules of proc edure3

and althoug h we rec og nize the difficult position in which this place s Mrs. Ger stacke r, we conclude that w e have no c ho ic e bu t to de c lare the div or c e de c re e vo id a nd dis mis s th e a

pp e a l. A tri a l c ou rt

ma y no t di smi ss f

or wa nt o f p ro se c uti on

un le ss n oti c e of th e in tent to dismiss is sent to each r epre sented party ’s attorney and to e ach pro se party
. Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(1)
. Notice of a dismissal must be mailed to t h e p ar t ies immediately
. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 165a(1), 306a(3) . Unless a party files a tim ely motion that ex tends the trial cour t’s plenar y power , the cour

t’s plenar y power expir es t h i rt y d ay s afte r a judg ment is signed. T ex. R . Civ. P . 329b(d). Af ter the court’s ple nary

power expires, the “judg ment cannot be set aside by the trial cour

t except by

bill of revie w for suf

ficient c ause, f

iled within the time a llowed by law,” a lthough the c ourt may rende r a judgme nt nunc pro tunc to c orre ct a cler ical err or and may sign an order decla ring an ea rlier or der void beca use i t was signed a fter the court’s ple nary power had expired. Tex. R. Ci v. P. 329b(f). A judgme nt rende red in violation of rule or st atute but s igne d by a cour t with proper jurisdiction over the ca use is voidable, not void. Re iss v . R e iss , 1 1 8 S
. W
. 3 d 4 3 9 , 4 4 3 (T ex . 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Mapco, In c . v . F orre st , 795 S.W .2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990)) (“ Error s other than lac k of jurisdiction, such as ‘a c ou rt ’s a c tio n c on tr a ry to a statut e or statut or y e qu iva le nt, ’ m e re ly

re nd e r t he jud g me nt v oid a

ble
so that it may be ‘cor

rec ted throug h the ordinary appellate proce ss or other prope r proc eeding s.’”)
. On J uly 1 9 , 2 0 0 7 , th e tr ia l c o u rt s ig n e d th e o r d e r d is mi s s in g th e c a u s e f o r wa nt of prosec ution. Rega

rdless of whe ther notice was provide d befor e or after the dismissal, the trial court had jurisdiction at the time it signed t h e o rd er , an d the dismissal is m ere ly voidable. See id. The trial court lost plenar

y power thirty day s later a

nd thus was without jurisdiction to proceed a ny further as of August 20, 2007. Ms. S tepher son’s inquiries and the trial court’s instructions related4

to the motion to enforce occur red a y ear later. The trial court ha d no jurisdiction over the c ase at the time it heard Mrs. Ge rstacke r’s motion to enforc e and sig ned the f inal divorce decr ee. A par ty may file a bill of review to overturn an i mproper judg ment within four y ear s of the judg ment’s sig ning. Caldwell v. Barnes , 975 S.W. 2d 53 5, 53 8 ( Te x. 19 98 ); se e Go ld v . G old , 14 5 S. W.3 d 2 12 , 2 14 (T e x. 20 04 ) ( wh e n p la int if f d id n ot r e c e iv e no ti ce of tr ia l c ourt ’s int e nt t o dismiss for wa

nt of prosec ution, dism issal is errone ous and plaintiff is entit l ed to pursue
re ins ta te me nt thr ou g h b ill of re vie w) ; see also Ginn v. F orrester , 282 S.W .3d 430, 432 (Tex. 2009) (“When e x trinsic evidenc e is nece ssary to challeng e a judg ment, the appr opriate r emedy is by motion fo r n e w tri a l or by bil l of re vie w fil e d in the tr ia l court so that th e tr ia l c ourt ha s th e op po rt

un ity to consider a

nd weig h fac tual evidenc e.”)
. A b i l l -of-review petitioner who did not rec eive notice of a trial c ourt’s intent to dismis s for wa nt of prosec ution must show she wa s not ne g lige nt in f ailing to seek to re tain the ca se on the trial c ourt’s docke t. See Caldwell v. Barnes , 1 5 4 S .W .3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (bill of revie w petitioner g ener ally must prove (1) me ritorious defe nse (2) that she wa s p re v en t ed fr om making by opposing pa

rty or off icial mistake, (3) unmix ed with her own fa ult or neg lige nce, but pe titioner claiming non-ser vice is re lieved of f

irst two elements). The motion to enforc e filed by Mrs. Ger stacke r is not a bil l of review and does not alleg e any of the re quired e lements of a bill of re view. See id. The motion see ks only to enforc e a prior orde r re lated to child support and does not re fer to the dismiss al in any

form. The J uly

2007 dismiss al orde r was a final, appea lable order enter ed in this case , and beca use there was no notice of a pp e a l f ile d w ith in t

hir ty da y s o f t ha t or de r, we a re wi tho ut j ur isdicti on to c on sid e r t

he a pp e a l.5

Se e Sta te e

x . r e l La tty , 907 S.W .2d at 486. We there fore have no c hoice but to dec lare the divorce decr ee void a

nd dismiss the appe al for w ant of jurisdiction.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: September

4, 2009