COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ARNOLD DORSEY ANDERSON 

v. Record No. 2148-93-2 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MAY 16, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NOTTOWAY COUNTY 

Thomas V. Warren, Judge 

 Denis J. McCarthy for appellant. 

 Robert B. Beasley, Jr., Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; 

 Janet F. Rosser, Assistant Attorney General, 

 on brief), for appellee. 

 This appeal is from a trial court's order that revoked 

twenty years of Arnold Dorsey Anderson's suspended penitentiary 

sentences of fifty-two years. The sole issue is whether the 

trial court erred at the revocation hearing by allowing the 

Commonwealth to introduce evidence that Anderson possessed 

cocaine, which evidence had been suppressed at an earlier 

criminal prosecution against Anderson because the judge ruled 

that the cocaine had been illegally seized in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. 

 In 1989, Anderson was convicted of five felony counts of 

distributing and possessing cocaine. He was sentenced to a total 

of eighty years imprisonment with sixty-four years suspended. 

 In 1993, Anderson was charged and prosecuted for possessing 

cocaine. However, at trial, the court found that the cocaine had 
 -2- 

been seized in violation of Anderson's Fourth Amendment 

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Based 

upon that finding, the court suppressed the cocaine as evidence, 

and because that evidence was indispensable to the prosecution, 

the court dismissed the indictment charging that Anderson 

possessed cocaine. The Commonwealth's attorney then requested 

that a capias be issued to show cause why Anderson's suspended 

sentence should not be revoked. At the revocation hearing, the 

Commonwealth introduced as evidence the cocaine that had been 

suppressed at Anderson's earlier trial. The judge found that 

Anderson possessed the cocaine and revoked twenty years of 

Anderson's suspended sentences. 

 The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable 

searches and seizures. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 

n.9 (1967). Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution for a charged 

criminal violation pertaining to the seized evidence. Mapp v. 

Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). By adopting an exclusionary 

rule, the Supreme Court sought to curb illegal police conduct in 

making unwarranted and unreasonable searches and seizures in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment where no other meaningful 

sanction against such police misconduct had proven effective. 

Id. at 651-53. However, the exclusionary rule is not to be 

"'interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized 

evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.'" United 
 -3- 

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting Stone v. 

Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)) (emphasis added). 

 Application of the exclusionary rule has been "restricted to 

those instances where its remedial objectives are thought to be 

most efficaciously served." Arizona v. Evans, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 

115 S. Ct. 1185, 1191 (1995). In determining whether to extend 

the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than the immediate 

criminal prosecution which resulted from the illegal search or 

seizure, the inquiry must be whether to do so effectively or in a 

meaningful way furthers the primary purpose of the rule, that is 

to "deter future unlawful police conduct." United States v. 

Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); see also Reynolds v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 435, 388 S.E.2d 659, 662 (1990). 

Many state and federal courts which have considered whether the 

purpose of the rule is served by excluding illegally seized 

evidence in secondary proceedings have refused to extend the 

exclusionary rule to proceedings for the revocation of probation, 

parole, or a suspended sentence. See Chase v. State, 522 A.2d 

1348 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987); Thompson v. United States, 444 

A.2d 972 (D.C. 1982); see also Annot. 77 ALR 3d 636 (1977 and 

1994 Supp.) (discussing the exclusionary rule in both state and 

federal revocation proceedings). 

 Anderson urges us to follow the holding of the United States 

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Workman, 585 

F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978), which applied the exclusionary rule in 
 -4- 

probation revocation hearings. The Workman decision has been 

strongly criticized by other courts that have considered it. See

United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 833 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1983) 

(stating that Workman "greatly overstates" the deterrent effect 

of the rule), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984). We decline the 

invitation to adopt the Workman holding. 

 Although a probation, parole, or suspended sentence 

revocation proceeding is not criminal in nature, the outcome of 

such a proceeding may result in the loss of one's liberty. See

Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 84, 402 S.E.2d 684, 686 

(1991). Nevertheless, unless the evidence shows that the police 

officers who illegally seized the evidence also acted in bad 

faith, the exclusionary rule should not be used to prevent the 

evidence from being admitted into evidence in a secondary 

proceeding, such as a probation revocation hearing. See State v. 

Turner, ___ P.2d ___, 1995 WL 81615 (Kan.); Chase, 522 A.2d at 

1362-64. Unlike the situation in Leon, where evidence seized 

under a defective warrant is excluded unless the state proves 

that the police acted in good faith, we hold that illegally 

seized evidence may be admitted in a secondary proceeding unless 

the defendant shows that the officer's conduct was so egregious 

that it constituted bad faith. Only when an officer acts in bad 

faith do we need to extend the exclusionary rule of Mapp to 

secondary proceedings in order to curb improper police conduct. 

 Conduct which may constitute bad faith on behalf of a police 
 -5- 

officer, over and above the illegal search itself, may take many 

forms. See People v. Stewart, 610 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. App. 1993) 

(evidence obtained in illegal warrantless search can be excluded 

if police know defendant is a probationer); State v. Proctor, 559 

P.2d 1363 (Wash. App. 1977) (police conducting illegal 

warrantless search of known probationer can amount to bad faith 

justifying excluding evidence). However, we find nothing in the 

record which proved that the police officer knew or thought 

Anderson was on probation or parole, expected that the evidence 

could be used against Anderson for a secondary purpose, or 

conducted the search or seizure with a purpose of harassing or 

annoying Anderson. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling. 

Affirmed.