COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

M. GARZA ENTERPRISES, INC. and 

EVERETT HOLDINGS, LLC, 

 Appellants, 

v. 

JULIA PEREZ, 

Appellee.

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No. 08-23-00354-CV

Appeal from 

131st Judicial District Court

of Bexar County, Texas 

(TC# 2022CI00753) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Back for another round, M. Garza Enterprises, Inc. and Everett Holdings, LLC 

(collectively, Garza Enterprises) attempt to appeal the trial court’s default judgment order in Julia 

Perez’s premises liability suit.

1 We again conclude the trial court did not render a final, appealable 

judgment, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

We refer to our first opinion in this case for its background. See M. Garza Enters., Inc. v. 

Perez, No. 08-23-00110-CV, 2023 WL 8587637, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 11, 2023, no 

pet.) (mem. op.). There, Garza Enterprises attempted to appeal the trial court’s default judgment 

1 This case was transferred pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. 

§ 73.001. We follow the precedent of the Fourth Court of Appeals to the extent it might conflict with our own. See

Tex. R. App. P. 41.3. 
2

order, which we concluded was not final and appealable because it did not dispose of Perez’s gross 

negligence claim. Id. at *3.

Here, Garza Enterprises contends the trial court has finally disposed of all pending claims 

and parties through its order titled “Order Denying Plaintiff’s and Receiver’s Motions for 

Reconsideration, Defendant’s Verified Plea in Abatement, Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Contempt/Sanctions & Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions and Restitution”2 and dated September 

5, 2023 (the September 5 order). The September 5 order states in its entirety:

On June 29, 2023, the Court heard the above referenced matters. Having considered 

all filings on the above matter, arguments of counsel, and the law, the Court hereby 

ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES:

1. Plaintiff’s and receiver’s motions for reconsideration are DENIED;

2. Defendant’s verified plea in abatement is DENIED without prejudice;

3. Plaintiff’s request for contempt/sanctions is DENIED;

4. Defendants’ request for sanctions is DENIED; and

5. Defendants’ restitution claim is hereby DENIED.

The order is signed by the presiding judge.

Among other things, Perez claims the September 5 order does not dispose of all Garza 

Enterprises’ counterclaims. Garza Enterprises disagrees, maintaining that it disposed of all 

remaining claims between the parties such that it can now challenge the trial court’s default 

judgment order through this appeal.

ANALYSIS

Whether we have jurisdiction is a legal question, which we review de novo. Bonsmara Nat. 

Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020). In general, 

2 Capitalization omitted.
3

a party can appeal only a final judgment, unless an exception applies to allow appellate review

before final judgment, none of which are applicable here. Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche 

Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 730 (Tex. 2019); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 

195 (Tex. 2001). While a judgment following a trial on the merits is presumed to be final, “there 

is no such presumption of finality following a . . . default judgment.” In re Burlington Coat Factory 

Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 829 (Tex. 2005). A judgment is final when it 

“actually disposes of every pending claim and party or . . . it clearly unequivocally states that it 

finally disposes of all claims and parties, even if it does not actually do so.” In re Guardianship of 

Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021) (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205). “If the judgment 

clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and parties, the assessment is 

resolved in favor of finding finality, and the reviewing court cannot review the record.” Patel v. 

Nations Renovations, LLC, 661 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Tex. 2023). Thus, we begin by determining 

whether the challenged order is clearly and unequivocally final on its face. Id.

While “no magic language is required” to satisfy the clear-and-unequivocal standard, 

merely stating that the order is “final” or “appealable,” including a Mother Hubbard clause,

3 or 

awarding costs are not sufficient when standing alone. Id. Instead, “a trial court may express its 

intent to render a final judgment by describing its action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims 

and parties, and (3) appealable.” Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020)

(citing In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535, 543 (Tex. 2019)). Here, the September 5 order contains no 

indication of finality on its face—it does not state the order is final or appealable, include a Mother 

Hubbard clause, or state that it disposes of all claims and parties. Id.

3 A Mother Hubbard clause is “a recitation that all relief not expressly granted is denied.” Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 

39 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tex. 2001). 
4

We therefore turn to the record to determine whether the judgment “actually disposes of 

every pending claim and party.” Id. at 801–02. In sum, Perez asserted two claims against Garza 

Enterprises: premises liability and gross negligence. As we previously determined, the trial court’s 

default judgment order disposed of the former but not the latter. M. Garza, 2023 WL 8587637, at 

*3. Perez later nonsuited her gross negligence claim. Perez also apparently filed a motion for 

sanctions and contempt, though it does not appear in the record before us. 

As to Garza Enterprises, in its original answer, it asserted a restitution counterclaim and 

counterclaim against Perez for sanctions under Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and 

Remedies Code. Garza Enterprises specifically sought sanctions for Perez’s gross negligence 

claim as well as sanctions for Perez’s premises liability claim:

Alternatively and additionally, the premises liability claim is not supported by

sufficient allegations, evidence, or a good faith belief that the claim is likely to have

evidentiary support after reasonable opportunity for further investigation.

But Garza Enterprises’ motion for sanctions and restitution did not request judgment on its 

claim for sanctions based on Perez’s premises liability claim, nor did it include any allegations or 

argument in support of that claim. Instead, Garza Enterprises’ motion for sanctions addressed only 

its restitution counterclaim and counterclaim for sanctions based on Perez’s gross negligence 

claim. And a review of the reporter’s record from the hearing on the motion confirms that Garza 

Enterprises did not raise its sanctions counterclaim based on the premises liability claim during 

argument.

4

While the September 5 order states “Defendants’ request for sanctions is DENIED,” we 

presume it did not deny relief that Garza Enterprises had not requested. Ins. Co. of State of Pa. v. 

4 For example, counsel for Garza Enterprises argued “the reason why this litigation has ballooned so much is because 

. . . Ms. Perez’s pleadings includes [sic] a frivolous claim of gross negligence for exemplary damages in a premises 

liability suit against the landlord. So that is the basis of the sanctions motion.” 
5

Orosco, 170 S.W.3d 129, 134 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (“We presume the 

regularity of a judgment absent controverting evidence.” (quoting Casillas v. State Office of Risk 

Mgmt., 146 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.)). That is, the September 5 order 

did not deny Garza Enterprises’ claim for sanctions based on the premises liability claim. Because 

a party’s request for sanctions is considered a claim for finality-analysis purposes, the trial court’s 

September 5 order did not dispose of all pending claims. See Crites v. Collins, 284 S.W.3d 839, 

841 (Tex. 2009). 

Thus, considering the record and the September 5 order’s plain language, we conclude the 

September 5 order is not a final, appealable judgment. See Burlington, 167 S.W.3d at 830. 

CONCLUSION

As the trial court’s September 5 order is not a final, appealable judgment, and no 

constitutional or statutory grant of jurisdiction otherwise permits our review of the default 

judgment order, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd., 567 

S.W.3d at 730. We deny Perez’s request for Rule 45 sanctions against Garza Enterprises for filing 

a frivolous appeal.

LISA J. SOTO, Justice

June 26, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.