J-S25005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.A., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: E.A., MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1755 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-JV-000654-2021

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2023

Appellant E.A., a minor, appeals from the order following his 

adjudication of delinquency for possession of a controlled substance. On 

appeal, Appellant claims that the suppression court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress. After careful review, we affirm.

The suppression court summarized the underlying facts of this matter 

as follows:

On June 2, 2021 at approximately 7:08 [P.M.], [Philadelphia] 

Police Officer Gerard Gaydosh was on foot patrol at Lippincott and 

F Streets, which is in the 24th Police District in Philadelphia. At 

the suppression hearing on February 18, 2022, Officer Gaydosh 

testified as to his experience as a police officer. He has been a 

police officer since March of 2020. He worked in the 24th District 

for fifteen months prior to February of 2022. During those fifteen 

months, he worked five days a week plus overtime. In his time 

on the police force he has observed more than ten hand-to-hand 

drug transactions per day. He made forty stops resulting in drug 

arrests. Of the forty stops, fifteen to twenty were within a threeblock radius of Lippincott and F Streets. At the Police Academy 
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he was trained in narcotics distribution and exchanges in 

Philadelphia.

While Officer Gaydosh was on F Street approaching Lippincott, he 

heard a female say “walkers, walkers.” Officer Gaydosh was 

familiar with the term “walkers” because in his experience, it is 

used to “warn drug dealers that the cops are coming.” Upon 

hearing the female say walkers, Officer Gaydosh’s attention was 

drawn to his right where he observed [Appellant] handing small 

objects to an unidentified male. [Appellant] handed [the 

unidentified male] the objects with an open hand and closed palm. 

The unidentified male then handed [Appellant] an unknown 

amount of United States currency. Officer Gaydosh, based on his 

experience, believed he had just witnessed a drug transaction. 

After the transaction, both [Appellant and the unidentified male]

began to flee, first toward Officer Gaydosh who was in full uniform. 

Upon seeing him, [Appellant] then turned and fled in the opposite 

direction. Officer Gaydosh pursued him. He gave [Appellant] a 

verbal command to stop. Officer Gaydosh eventually was close 

enough to grab [Appellant,] who went to the ground. As 

[Appellant] went to the ground, “items consistent with crack 

cocaine and powder cocaine packaging fell out of his front hood 

pocket.” Officer Gaydosh then placed [Appellant] under arrest. 

Thirty-two clear Ziplock packets contained a fine white powdery 

substance, alleged powder cocaine; ten pink flip-top containers 

containing a white chunky substance, alleged crack cocaine; five 

clear Ziplock packets with blue glassine inserts stamped bitcoin 

containing a white powder substance, alleged heroin/fentanyl and 

eighty-five dollars in United States currency were recovered from 

the person of [Appellant] and highway.

Suppression Ct. Op., 10/20/22, at 2-3 (citations omitted and some formatting 

altered).1

The Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition alleging possession of a 

controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to 

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1 Hon. Jonathan Q. Irvine presided over the suppression hearing and authored 

the suppression court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion.
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deliver (PWID).

2

 On September 14, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to suppress 

physical evidence and statements made to the police on the basis that 

Appellant’s arrest was not based on probable cause. Following a hearing, the 

suppression court denied Appellant’s motion.

On June 15, 2022, the trial court held an adjudication hearing. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court adjudicated Appellant delinquent as 

to the possession charge, but acquitted Appellant for PWID. 

On July 13, 2022, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. Appellant 

subsequently filed a court-ordered concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) 

opinion addressing Appellant’s claim.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Was not Appellant arrested without probable cause where a police 

officer observed Appellant engage in an innocuous exchange of 

money for unknown items on a street in broad daylight, and then 

immediately charged at and chased Appellant and pulled him to 

the ground?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Appellant argues that Officer Gaydosh’s interaction with Appellant 

constituted an arrest, which was not supported by probable cause. Appellant’s 

Brief at 9-19. Specifically, Appellant argues that because Officer Gaydosh ran 

upon observing Appellant, rather than initially approaching him at a walking 

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2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) and (30), respectively.
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pace, Officer Gaydosh’s interaction with Appellant was no longer an 

investigative detention and instead constituted an arrest. Id. at 11. 

The Commonwealth responds that Officer Gaydosh’s interaction with 

Appellant initially began as an investigative detention. Commonwealth’s Brief 

at 9. The Commonwealth further argues that Officer Gaydosh placed 

Appellant under arrest after observing several packets of white powder fall out 

of Appellant’s sweatshirt pocket. Id. at 11. 

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, our standard of review,

is limited to determining whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression 

court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by the 

record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo. 

Where, . . . the defendant is appealing the ruling of the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression 

rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes 

evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709, 715 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations

omitted), appeal granted on other grounds, --- A.3d ---, 2023 WL 6416182

(Pa. filed Oct. 3, 2023).

It is well settled that that “Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution both 

protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Jurisprudence 

arising under both charters has led to the development of three categories of 
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interactions between citizens and police.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 

298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for 

information) which need not be supported by any level of 

suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. 

The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a 

reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period 

of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to 

constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest 

or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 987 (Pa. 2006) (citations 

omitted).

[T]o establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must 

articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with 

reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him 

reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal 

activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in 

that activity. The question of whether reasonable suspicion 

existed at the time [the officer conducted the stop] must be 

answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to 

determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual 

stopped. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court 

must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to 

the officer at the moment of the [stop] warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 

appropriate.

Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 125 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(citations omitted and some formatting altered).

We find this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Smith, 172 A.3d 26 

(Pa. Super. 2017), to be instructive. In Smith, a Pennsylvania State Police 

trooper was engaged in covert surveillance with the State Police Narcotics 
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Unit. Smith, 172 A.3d at 28. Specifically, the trooper, who had twenty-four 

years’ experience with the Pennsylvania State Police with extensive training 

and experience in narcotics, was conducting an “aggressive patrol” of an area 

where “a lot of drug activity was being reported by civilians.” Id. at 28-29

(citation omitted). Prior to going on patrol, the trooper was provided with a 

surveillance photograph of an individual suspected to have participated in at 

least five different drug transactions in the area of the patrol. Id. at 29.

During his patrol, the trooper observed the individual from the 

photograph exit his vehicle start quickly walking away. Id. The trooper, who 

was dressed in uniform, made eye contact with the individual, and the 

individual began walking away faster. Id. The trooper began jogging after 

the individual, and called for the individual to stop multiple times. Id. 

The Smith Court determined that the trooper had reasonable suspicion 

to conduct an investigatory detention, explaining:

[The trooper was provided] with at least one surveillance photo of 

a person [who was observed] engaging in hand-to-hand narcotics 

sales. [The trooper] was permitted to use this information to 

determine whether he had reasonable suspicion to detain [the 

individual]. Not only did [the individual] match the description 

and the photo [provided], but [the individual] was detained in 

close proximity to the location where the suspect had been 

observed making hand-to-hand drug transactions, which was an 

area known for a high volume of narcotics sales. Further, after 

[the trooper] asked [the individual] to stop, [the individual] 

attempted to flee by walking at a faster pace than when [he] 

exited the car. Under these circumstances, we conclude that [the 

trooper] had reasonable suspicion to detain [the individual].

Id. at 34 (citations and footnotes omitted and some formatting altered).
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Here, the suppression court did not make a determination as to whether 

Appellant was first subjected to an investigative detention or a custodial 

detention. However, the suppression court concluded that Officer Gaydosh’s 

interaction with Appellant was supported by probable cause. Specifically, the 

court explained:

[T]he evidence at the suppression hearing established that 

sufficient relevant factors existed to determine probable cause. 

Initially, Officer Gaydosh was alerted to the exchange by a woman 

shouting “walkers.” He testified that he relied on his experience 

in the district where he served for fifteen months to know that 

“walkers” was a warning to participants in a drug transaction that 

the police were approaching. The moment he heard “walkers,” 

Officer Gaydosh immediately turned and observed [Appellant] in 

what he knew to be a drug transaction. The 24th Police District 

where Officer Gaydosh served, clearly, had a very high incidence 

of drug transactions. Officer Gaydosh was personally familiar with 

hand-to-hand drug transactions. Forty to fifty percent of the 

arrests made by Officer Gaydosh for drug transactions occurred 

within a three-block radius of the incident in the current case. 

Officer Gaydosh’s testimony drew a nexus between his experience

and the observations he made. Probable cause exists in this case 

because the knowledge Officer Gaydosh possessed was based on 

trustworthy information and is sufficient to warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect had committed 

or is committing a crime.

The [suppression court] found that based upon the evidence 

presented and the totality of the circumstances the motion to 

suppress was denied. Additionally, the [suppression court] found 

that the testimony of [Officer Gaydosh] was credible. Video 

evidence was presented to [the suppression court] by the defense. 

[The suppression court] found that the video affirms the officer’s 

testimony.

Suppression Ct. Op. at 5 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).
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Following our review of the record, and in viewing the evidence 

presented at the suppression hearing by the Commonwealth, we discern no 

error by the suppression court in rejecting Appellant’s claims. See Lear, 290 

A.3d at 715. At the suppression hearing, Officer Gaydosh testified that he 

initially approached Appellant after he observed what appeared to be a handto-hand drug transaction. Officer Gaydosh explained that he reached this

conclusion based on his training and experience, which included police 

academy training, his job in the 24th Police District in the City of Philadelphia 

and having witnessing in excess of ten drug transactions per day and 

conducting at least forty arrests for narcotics offenses. See N.T. Suppression 

Hr’g, 2/18/22, at 8, 12. Based on the totality of these circumstances, we find 

that Officer Gaydosh had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting 

that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity. See Basinger, 982 A.2d at 

125. Therefore, on this record, we find that Officer Gaydosh had reasonable 

suspicion to conduct an investigative detention. See id.

Moreover, the suppression hearing reveals that Appellant fled upon 

seeing Officer Gaydosh. N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 2/18/22, at 10. Officer 

Gaydosh testified that he got close to Appellant, grabbed him, and as 

Appellant went to the ground, “items consistent with crack cocaine and powder 

cocaine packaging fell out of his front hood pocket.” Id. at 10-11. Officer 

Gaydosh placed Appellant under arrest after the alleged crack cocaine and 

powder cocaine packaging fell out of his pocket. Id. at 13. 
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We reiterate that a police officer must establish probable cause before 

placing an individual under arrest. See Pakacki, 901 A.2d at 987. With 

respect to probable cause, this Court has explained:

Probable cause does not involve certainties, but rather the factual 

and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 

and prudent men act. It is only the probability and not a prima 

facie showing of criminal activity that is a standard of probable 

cause. To this point on the quanta of evidence necessary to 

establish probable cause, the United States Supreme Court 

recently noted that, “[f]inely tuned standards such as proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, 

useful in formal trials, have no place in the probable-cause 

decision.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) 

(citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 528 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some 

citations omitted and formatting altered). This Court has determined that the 

police had sufficient probable cause to place an individual under arrest when 

a police officer observed the defendant remove suspected packaged narcotics 

from his pocket. Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 548 (Pa. Super. 

2019). 

Here, the suppression court concluded that Officer Gaydosh was 

credible. See Suppression Ct. Op. at 5. We, therefore, decline to revisit the 

suppression court’s credibility determinations or re-weigh the evidence 

presented at the suppression hearing, as we are bound by the suppression 

court’s factual findings, instantly, as they are supported by the record. See 

Lear, 290 A.3d at 715; see also Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 A.3d 

697, 711 (Pa. 2015) (reiterating that, as an appellate court, we will not upset 
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the credibility determinations of a suppression court, “within whose sole 

province it is to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 

their testimony”).

Based on our review of the record, we find that the trial court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record and that the trial court’s legal conclusions 

are free from legal error. See Lear, 290 A.3d at 715. The trial court credited 

Officer Gaydosh’s testimony that after he got close to Appellant and grabbed 

him, Officer Gaydosh observed “items consistent with crack cocaine and 

powder cocaine packaging [fall] out of [Appellant’s] front hood pocket.” N.T. 

Suppression Hr’g, 2/18/22, at 10-11. After Officer Gaydosh observed the 

alleged crack cocaine and powder cocaine fall out of Appellant’s pocket, Officer 

Gaydosh had probable cause to place Appellant under arrest. See Luczki, 

212 A.3d at 548; Jones, 121 A.3d at 528 n.5. 

For these reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief. For these reasons,

we affirm.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 11/13/2023