Opinion filed February 9 , 20 2 3



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ No. 1 1

- 21

- 00 243

- C R

__________ WILLIAM DAVID CRUTHIRD, III , Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 50th District Court Baylor County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. 5784

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellant, William David Cruthird, III, was indicted for the offense of arson,

a second

- degree felony , enhanced with a prior felony conviction

. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 2 8 .02(a) (2)(A) (West 2019 ). The jury found Appellant guilty of the charged offense , found the enhancement allegation to be true, and assessed his punishment at 40 years ’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly.2 On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sup port his
conviction. We affirm.
I. Factual Background During the early morning hours of January 12, 2021, Appellant and his girlfriend got into an argument while they were at the residence of Kristen Logan, Appellant’s girlfriend’s sister. Appellant’s girlfriend and son were living with Logan in Seymour , and Appellant had stayed there over night. Following the argument, Appellant requested the keys to a maroon 2005 Chrysler Sebring ; his request was refused. Appellant then went outside and b egan yelling and strik ing multiple vehicles that were parked at Logan’s residence. Logan looked outside through the window to determine the cause of the disturbance and observed Appellant “dropping the gas can and lighting the car

. ” She then saw Appellant pour gasoline on another vehicle. Logan the reafter called 9

- 1

- 1 to report the disturbance. Logan testified that she saw Appellant use a cigarette lighter to ignite the gasoline
that he had poured on the vehicles , which resul ted in a medium

- sized flame appearing o n the maroon vehicle that quickly burned out

. William Cruthird IV, Appellant’s son, also observed the incident. William testified that he saw Appellant pour “ something ” on the vehicle s that were parked
outside and use a lighter to cause a “spark” that became more than a spark. William then ran outside the house to stop Appellant and heard Appellant yelling : “I’m going to light this on fire” and “I’m going to burn it.” The chief of police of th e City of Seymour , John Michael Griffin , arrived shortly thereafter

. Chief Griffin testified that when he arrived at Logan’s residence, he observed Appellant walking around the vehicles that were parked in front of the
house , and he smelled the odor of gasoline on Appellant’s person

. Chief Griffin’s body camera footage revealed that App ellant told Chief Griffin that he was “fixin’
to burn” the vehicle that Appellant’s girlfriend would not let him use. Appellant also3 told Chief Griffin that he had poured gasoline on th at vehicle

. Chief Griffin then
arrested Appellant for arson

. II. Standard of Review We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of whether it is denominated as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the
standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v.
State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State , 337 S.W.3d 286,
288

– 89 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State , 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial and defer to the factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Winfrey v. State , 393 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton v.
State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to
draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson , 4 43 U.S. at 319; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v.
State , 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record sup ports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 326;
Merritt v. State , 368 S.W.3d 516, 525

– 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton , 235
S.W.3d at 778.4 Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally. Isassi , 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Circumstantial evidence is as proba tive as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be sufficient to establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State , 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper , 214 S.W.3d at 13). A guilty verdict does not requir e that every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant’s guilt. Hooper , 214 S.W.3d at 13. Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances may be sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in evaluating the su fficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of
the evidence. Villa v. State , 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State , 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
III. Analysis In a single issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the evidence presented at trial does not establish that he started a fire or caused an ignition because (1) t here was no evidence of a fire, (2) absent some evidence of damage to the vehicle, his conduct cannot amount to more than attempted arson, and ( 3 ) the
absence of a definition for the term “ ignition ” results in an ambiguous statute that
leads to absurd results. A person commits the offense of a rson “ if the person starts a fire, regardless of whether the fire continues after ignition, or causes an explosion ” with the intent to destroy or damage any vehicle and while knowing t hat the vehicle is located within the limits of an incorporated city or town

. P ENAL § 28.02 (a)(2)(A). The offense of arson is complete when the actor starts a fire with the requisite culpable mental state, even if no damage flows from the prohibited act

. Romo v. State , 593 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) , overruled on other grounds5 by Wagner v. State , 687 S.W.2d 303, 313 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1984);
Beltran v. State , 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)

. First, Appellant argues that there i s no evidence that a fire occurred

. However, both Logan and William testified that they saw Appellant start a fire

. Logan saw Appellant po u r gasoline on to the maroon vehicle and then use a cigarette lighter to ignite the gasoline, which result ed in a medium

- sized fire

. During one of her
conversation s with the 9

- 1

- 1 dispatcher, Logan stated that Appellant was trying to
catch the vehicle on fire ; she also reported that “it ’s [the car] already lit

. ” In a subsequent call to 9

- 1

- 1, Logan explain ed that the car was not currently on fire and
that she believed the cold weather had prevent ed the fire from burning for a longer period of time. Similarly, William saw Appellant pou r “ something ” on the vehicle s and then use a lighter to cause a spark

. When asked whether the vehicle caught on fire,
William stated that “it definitely did

. ” Further, Appellant confirmed that he poured gasoline on the vehicles and threatened to burn the m

. Appellant testified that the lighter sparked but that no flame ever appeared on the vehicle.
The actus reus of the offense of arson , as recited in the arson statute , i s that “the person starts a fire, regardless of whether the fire continues after ignition .”
P ENAL § 28.02(a) (emphasis added)

. Logan and William tes tified t hat they observed Appellant start a fire on the vehicle by holding a lighter to the gasoline that he had poured onto to the vehicle; however, the fire did not continue after its original ignition. While Appellant testified that only the lighter ignited , not the gasoline, the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is
to be afforded. See Winfrey , 393 S.W.3d at 768 ; Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899

. Appellant’s inconsistent testimony does not cause the jury’s verdict to be lacking in sufficiency ; the 9

- 1

- 1 recordings and the testimony provided by Logan and William
are sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. Because the jury was free to believe6 or disbelieve all, some, or none of the testimony presented, we may presume that the jury resolved any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778. Second, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction because , absent some evidence of damage to the vehicle, his conduct cannot amount to more than attempted arson. In this regard, Appellant contends that
without some level o f “ burning

- damage

- combustion ” to the vehicle , Appellant’s conduct is indistinguishable from an attempt to commit arson

. However, to satisfy
the statutory elements of the charged offense , damage to the vehicle is not required ; it is only the actor’s intent to damage the vehicle that is of significance

. As we have said, t he offense of arson is complete when a person “starts a fire.” Romo , 593 S.W.2d at 693; Beltran , 593 S.W.2d at 689. Starting a fire requires an ignition and nothing more. P ENAL § 28.02(a) (“regardless of whether the fire continues after ignition”). As such, w e decline to expand the scope of the arson statute , as Appellant suggests, to include evidence of damage to the vehicle as a r equired element of the
offense

. See Boykin v. State , 818 S.W.2d 782, 78 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“ Where the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add or subtract from such a

statute

. ” (quotin g C o it v. State , 808 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)) )

. Importantly, Appellant’s conduct is distinguish able from an attempt to commit arson , because he ignited the gasoline. Furthermore, and al though not

requ ired to support Appellant’s conviction , evidence of damage to the vehicle i s supported by the record. Chief Griffin testified that he observed scorch marks on
the hood of the vehicle that Appellant ignited

. Logan testified that there were markings on the vehicle after the incident that were not present the day before. Thus, there is sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could have inferred and found that Appellant’s conduct constitut ed arson, rather th an attempted arson.7 Finally , A ppellant argues that the term “ ignition , ” at least in the manner used to convict him in this case, is unclear or ambiguous and lead s to absurd results

. Appellant contends that a reasonable interpretation of the term “ignition” within the context of Section 28.02(a) requires that the object of the inten ded burning must have been affected in some way

. S tatutory interpretation is necessary when th e sufficiency

- of

- the

- evidence turns on the meaning of the statute under which the defendant has been prosecuted

. Pruett v. State , 510 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)

. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.
Pruett , 5 10 S.W.3d at 927 ; Cortez v. State , 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)

. “We interpret a statute according to the plain meaning of its language unless the statute is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the Legislature could n ot possibly have intended.” Pruett , 510 S.W.3d at 927. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, we conclude that t he term “ignition” as

u sed in Section 28.02(a) is un ambiguous. I gnition , while not statutorily defined , is not reasonably susceptible to more than one plain meaning or understanding in this

context. See Cortez , 469 S.W.3d at 598 (statutory language was ambiguous because a key word was not statutorily defined and reasonably susceptible to more than on e meaning and understanding in the context). T he prohibited act under Section 28.02
is to “start a fire.” The phrase “regardless of whether the fire continues after ignition” clarifies the legislature’s intent that the prohibited act is complete
whenever t he actor starts a fire, irrespective of whether damage of any kind result s therefr o m

. P ENAL § 28.02(a); see Romo , 593 S.W.2d at 693. Therefore, because the statute only requir es that the actor must start a fire and intend for it to either cause damage or destruction , the combination of these events forecloses the possibility of

any absurd result. Moreover, t he plain meaning of “ ignition ” in Section 28.02(a) when read in

proper context does not lead to absurd results. Thus, w e may not go beyond the text8 of the statute in our interpretation and application of it

. See Boykin , 818 S.W.2d at
786

. We hold, therefore, that the term “ignition” within the context of
Section 28.02(a) means to start a fire ; there is no requirement that the object of the
fire must have been damaged

. In this regard, t he only relevant culpable mental state
is the actor’s intent to cause damage . It follows, then, that the evidence adduced by
the State is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction under Section 28.02(a). We have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict
and conclude that the record contains suff icient evidence from which a rational jury could have inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of the offense of arson as charged in the indictment. Accordingly, w e overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruli ng We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

February 9 , 20 2 3 Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey , C.J., Trotter , J

. , a nd Williams , J.