J-A14032-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KASHIF M. ROBERTSON 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 232 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered January 29, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0002276-2017

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KASHIF M. ROBERTSON 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 233 MDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 11, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0002276-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: JULY 25, 2022

In these consolidated appeals, Kashif M. Robertson appeals from the 

January 29, 2021 order denying his motion for time-credit, and the February 

11, 2021 order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A14032-22

- 2 -

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we 

affirm.

The factual background of this case is not relevant to our disposition and 

need not be reiterated here. The procedural history of this case, as gleaned 

from the certified record, is as follows: On August 8, 2019, Appellant pled 

guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance1 at docket No. CP22-CR-0002276-2017 and was sentenced that same day to 6 to 23 months’ 

imprisonment, with 6 months’ credit for time-served from January 5 to June 

5, 2017. Appellant did not file a direct appeal to this Court.

The trial court subsequently learned that Appellant had already been 

awarded time credit from January 5 to December 22, 2017 by the Honorable 

Deborah E. Curcillo at a previous docket, No. CP-22-CR-0002526-2012, and 

thus the time credit in the instant matter constituted double credit. 

Following the filing and denial of a litany of pro se motions, Appellant 

filed his first pro se PCRA petition on October 15, 2020, and counsel was 

appointed to represent him. Appellant’s most recent amended PCRA petition 

was filed on December 28, 2020. On January 14, 2021, the PCRA court 

provided Appellant with notice of its intention to dismiss his petition without a 

hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). 

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
J-A14032-22

- 3 -

About the same time, Appellant filed a pro se “Motion to Compel the 

Imposition of Originally Imposed Time Credit,” arguing he was entitled to 

time-credit from January 5 to December 22, 2017. The PCRA court denied 

this motion on January 29, 2021. Thereafter, on February 11, 2021, the PCRA 

court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition and all the 

amendments thereto.

 On February 16, 2021, Appellant filed two timely pro se notices of 

appeal, which were docketed in this Court at Nos. 232 MDA 2021 and 233 

MDA 2021. Appellant’s appeal at No. 232 MDA 2021 is from the PCRA court’s

January 29, 2021 order denying his motion for time-credit; the appeal at No. 

233 MDA 2021 is from the PCRA court’s February 11, 2021 order dismissing 

his PCRA petition. This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte on March 

26, 2021, and counsel entered his appearance on Appellant’s behalf that same 

day.

2

Preliminarily, we note that to the extent Appellant attempts to raise any 

challenges with respect to imposition of time-credit, we find that his claim is 

moot. The record reflects that Appellant was sentenced on August 8, 2019 to 

6 to 23 months imprisonment, with 6 months’ credit for time-served, and has

since completed serving his sentence. 

____________________________________________

2 The record reflects that Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
J-A14032-22

- 4 -

This Court has long recognized that where an appellant has completed 

serving his sentence, he is no longer subject to any direct criminal 

consequences and any challenge to the sentence imposed is moot and 

incapable of review. Commonwealth v. Schmohl, 975 A.2d 1144, 1149 

(Pa.Super. 2009) (stating, “[u]nder Pennsylvania law, if Appellant completed 

the aggregate maximum term of imprisonment while his appeal was pending, 

he would not be subjected to any direct criminal consequences and his 

challenge to the legality of his sentence ... would be moot and incapable of 

review.”); see also Commonwealth v. King, 786 A.2d 993, 996–997 

(Pa.Super. 2001) (holding that a defendant’s challenge to the legality of his 

sentence was moot where the sentence imposed had already been served and 

there were no criminal or civil consequences), appeal denied, 812 A.2d 

1228 (Pa. 2002). As a result, the matter is moot and incapable of review.

We now turn to Appellant’s challenges to the PCRA court’s February 11, 

2021 order dismissing his PCRA petition and various amendments thereto.

Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition 

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s 

findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the 

certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the 
J-A14032-22

- 5 -

PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record 

could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 

136, 140 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted). 

We must first consider the timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition 

because it implicates the authority of this court to grant any relief. 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883, 887 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). If a petitioner fails to invoke a valid exception to the PCRA timebar, courts are without jurisdiction to review the petition or provide relief. 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 729 (Pa. 2017). All PCRA petitions, 

including second and subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of 

when an Appellant’s judgment of sentence becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, 

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

Here, the record reveals that Appellant’s judgment of sentence became 

final on September 9, 2019,

3 30 days after the time period for filing a direct 

____________________________________________

3 We note that, for purposes of this Court’s computation, Appellant would have

needed to file his appeal on or before Monday, September 9, 2019, because 

September 8, 2019 fell on the weekend. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (stating 

that, for computations of time, whenever the last day of any such period shall 

fall on Saturday or Sunday, or a legal holiday, such day shall be omitted from 

the computation).
J-A14032-22

- 6 -

appeal with this Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. Accordingly, Appellant 

had until September 9, 2020 to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s instant petition was filed on October 15, 2020, and 

is thus untimely, unless he can plead and prove that one of the three statutory 

exceptions to the one-year jurisdictional time-bar applies.4

In his brief to this court, Appellant fails to even acknowledge the 

untimeliness of his petition, let alone invoke any of the statutory exceptions 

to the PCRA time-bar set forth in Section § 9545(b)(1). See Appellant’s brief 

at 1-3, 23-29. Accordingly, the PCRA court and this Court are without 

____________________________________________

4 The three statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar are as follows:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials 

with the presentation of the claim in violation of 

the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated 

were unknown to the petitioner and could not 

have been ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that 

was recognized by the Supreme Court of the 

United States or the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to 

apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).
J-A14032-22

- 7 -

judication to entertain any of Appellant’s PCRA claims. See Spotz, 171 A.3d 

at 729.

Furthermore, we note that because Appellant is no longer serving a 

sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime, he is ineligible 

for PCRA relief on this basis as well. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i); see also 

Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 503 (Pa. 2016) (holding the 

petitioner was no longer serving a sentence, so he was ineligible for PCRA 

relief; the petitioner’s ineligibility deprived the court of jurisdiction to entertain 

the petition); Commonwealth v. Williams, 977 A.2d 1174 (Pa.Super. 2009) 

(explaining that once sentence is completed, petitioner is ineligible for PCRA 

relief), appeal denied, 990 A.2d 730 (Pa. 2010). Based on the foregoing, 

we discern no error on the part of the PCRA court in dismissing Appellant’s

petition.

Accordingly, we affirm the January 29 and February 11, 2021 orders of 

the PCRA court. 

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/25/2022