alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### A. J., a child, by T. J., her father and next friend, Petitioner, v. John M. PRESLEY, Director of Youth Services, Dade County, Florida, and Walter C. Anders, Superintendent of the Dade County Detention Home at Kendall, Florida, Respondents.

No. 39639.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 22, 1970.

Bruce S. Rogow, Miami, and Rene V. Murai, Perrine, for petitioner.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Melvin Grossman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This cause came on before the Court on petition .for release of a 15 year old minor who was adjudged delinquent by the Juvenile Court of Dade County, Florida, resulting in an order dated March 5, 1970, requiring her to spend not over six months in custody of the Dade County Department of Youth Services at the Kendall Children’s Home. An appeal is now pending in the District Court of Appeal, Third District.

The petitioner seeks to have this Court determine that she is entitled to be released from custody pending appeal despite Section 39.14(5), Florida Statutes 1969, F.S.A., which provides:

> “The taking of an appeal shall not operate as a supersedeas in any case, except that a permanent order of commitment to a licensed child-placing agency or department of public welfare for subsequent adoption shall be suspended while the appeal is pending, but the child shall continue in custody under the order until the appeal is decided.”

Petitioner urges this Court to declare Section 39.14(5), Florida Statutes 1969, F.S.A., unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the law. Petitioner has not requested the trial court or the District Court of Appeal to grant supersedeas. Normally her failure to seek relief below would preclude our consideration of the matter. We have heard argument of the parties, however, and in view of the time element involved, direct that the cause be temporarily remanded to the trial court for evaluation of the matter in the light of our opinion in Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308 (Fla.1956).

It is our view that after a determination of delinquency shall have been made, juvenile court judges may, in their discretion, release children from custody, under reasonable conditions which they may impose, during a valid appeal taken in good faith and if the court finds that such release shall not be detrimental to the child or to society.

*661Accordingly, we relinquish jurisdiction so that the cause may proceed in the trial .court in accordance with the views expressed herein.

It is so ordered.

ERVIN, C. J., and THORNAL, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ„ concur.
263 La. 369

#### George G. VILLERE and the Travelers Indemnity Company v. John MOOK et al.

No. 52944.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 16, 1972.

In re: Aetna Casualty & Surety Company applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 266 So.2d 468.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, the judgment is correct.
California Consumer Products Regulation Pertaining to Automotive Windshield Washer Fluid Products I hereby certifythatthe public comment period in the above-referenced proceeding was closed October 18. 2012, and the rulemaking record was closed March 15, 2013. The rulemaking forthat proceeding and the enclosed copy thereofare complete. I declare under penaltyofperjurythat I am the agency official who compiled the above-referenced rulemaking file and the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 151 h day of March 2013, at Sacramento, California.

Enclosures Trini Balcazar, Regul ·ons Coordinator Board Administration 

### &

Regulatory Coordination Unit
<PAGE>




                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of The First Republic
Corporation of America (the "Company") for the quarter ended September 30, 2003
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Harry
Bergman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

               (3)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                    13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

               (4)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                    all material respects, the financial condition and results
                    of operations of the Company.



By: /s/ Harry Bergman
   ---------------------------------
Name:   Harry Bergman
Chief Financial and Chief Accounting Officer
November 14, 2003
#### SKIP BROWN AUTO SALES, INC., a Florida corporation, and C. R. “Skip” Brown, Individually and as President of Skip Brown Auto Sales, Inc., Appellants, v. Mary Helen COLLIEN, Appellee.

No. S-107.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 10, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Interlocutory appeal dismissed.
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONS OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 Jerome E. Ball, Chief Executive Officer of ForwardIndustries, Inc. ("Forward"), and Douglas W. Sabra, Chief Financial Officer ofForward, do each certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 that, to the best of theirknowledge:

| 1. | Forward'squarterly report on Form 10-QSB for the three months ended December 31, 2005(the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  |
|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2. | the information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of Forward.                                                                                                        |

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, theundersigned have set their hands hereto as of the 2nd day of February 2006.

 

/s/ JEROME E. BALLJerome E. BallChief Executive OfficerPrincipal Executive Officer

/s/ DOUGLAS W. SABRADouglas W. SabraChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas** MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o. 04

- 14

- 00088

- CR Kurt Conrad MILLER , Appellant

v. The STATE of The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 186th Judicial District Court , Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2012CR8700 Honorable Maria Teresa Herr , Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice Delivered and Filed: March 5, 2014
DIS MISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION The trial court imposed sentence in the underlying cause on August 16, 2013. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 5, 2013; however, this court dismissed the appeal because the underlying cause was a plea

- bargain case , and the trial court ’s certification showed the appellant did not have the right to appeal. See Miller v. State , No. 04

- 13

- 00603

- CR, 2013 WL 5575469 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Oct. 9, 2013, no pet.). After this court’s mandate issued on December 11, 2013, the appellant filed a second notice of appeal on January 29, 201 4 , stating an intent to appeal a sentence imposed on January 15, 2014.04

- 14

- 00088

- CR As previously noted, however, sentence was imposed in the underlying cause on August 16, 2013, and appellant’s timely appeal of the trial co urt’s judgment was dismissed. On February 10, 2014, we ordered appellant to show cause in writing why th i s appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

. See Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 51 9, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (court of appeals’ jurisd iction invoked only by timely notice of appeal ). Appellant filed a written response stating his desire to “repeal [his] signing of the plea bargain agreement.” Appellant states he would like his plea bargain agreement changed from two years of community supervision to two years of incarceration. This court has no jurisdiction to consider any issues relating to the trial court’s judgment and sentence in the absence of a timely notice of appeal. Because appellant did not have the right to appeal , his prio r timely appeal was dismissed; and because appellant’s second notice of appeal was not timely filed, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
PER CURIAM
DO NOT PUBLISH

- 2

-
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>      5
<MULTIPLIER>   1,000
       
<S>                                         <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                               YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                                DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                    514
<SECURITIES>                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                           2,351
<ALLOWANCES>                                0  
<INVENTORY>                                 0
<CURRENT-ASSETS><F1>                        0
<PP&E>                                174,392
<DEPRECIATION>                         39,430           
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                        182,521      
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES><F1>                   0
<BONDS>                               122,391      
<COMMON>                                   60 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       0
<PREFERRED>                                 0
<OTHER-SE>                             20,878           
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>          182,521      
<SALES>                                     0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                       29,593     
<CGS>                                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                          26,431     
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                          718
<LOSS-PROVISION>                            0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                     11,928    
<INCOME-PRETAX>                         3,165    
<INCOME-TAX>                                0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                     3,165    
<DISCONTINUED>                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                             0
<CHANGES>                                 612
<NET-INCOME>                            3,777   
<EPS-PRIMARY>                             .61
<EPS-DILUTED>                             .61 
<FN>                                        
<F1> Mid-Atlantic Realty Trust (MART) is in the specialized real estate
<F1> industry for which the current/noncurrent distinction is deemed in
<F1> practice to have little or no relevance.  Therefore, MART prepares
<F1> unclassified balance sheets which do not report current assets or
<F1> current liabilities.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Howard BLANCO v. UNION BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 8688.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Jan. 31, 1972.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1972.

Melvin G. Dupuis, Jr., Morgan City, for appellant.

Donald T. W. Phelps, of Seale, Smith, Baine & Phelps, Baton Rouge, and Bernard E. Boudreaux, Jr., of Bauer, Darnall, Mc-Nulty & Boudreaux, Franklin, for appellee.

Before LOTTINGER, SARTAIN and ELLIS, JJ.

ELLIS, Judge.

This is a companion case to Pearce v. Union Bankers Insurance Company, La.App., 259 So.2d 81, decided by us this date. *84The facts of this case are identical to those in the Pearce case, supra, except that Mrs. Blanco’s sickness was discovered on January 14, 1970, six days before the issuance of the policy to Mr. Blanco. Summary judgment was rendered herein in favor of defendant Union Bankers Insurance Company, dismissing the suit of plaintiff Howard Blanco. He has appealed to this court.

For the reasons given in the Pearce case, supra, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, at plaintiff’s cost.

Affirmed.
#### SOUTH TEXAS LLOYDS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Mrs. Melba Cheatwood HENDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11365.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

Feb. 3, 1970.

*656McKeithen & Mouser, Columbia, by Don C. Burns, Grayson, for appellant.

John Griffin Loftin, Monroe, for appel-lees.

Before BOLIN, DIXON and WILLIAMS, JJ.

DIXON, Judge.

This is a subrogation case arising out of an accident which occurred April 30, 1968 on Highway 80 near Choudrant. There was judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Defendant’s contention in her reconven-tional demand and on appeal is that the plaintiff’s insured had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.

Plaintiff’s insured was Lonnie Cage. The defendant is the daughter of Hogan A. Cheatwood, and his sole heir. She has accepted the succession of Mr. Cheatwood. Mr. Cheatwood was seventy-eight years old at the time of the accident. He was traveling south on Lincoln Parish Highway 4, a dirt road, just prior to the accident. He stopped at a stop sign, looked both ways, then pulled out on Highway 80 in the path of the automobile driven by Cage. Cage attempted to avoid the collision by cutting to his left. Cage’s right front struck the front of the Cheatwood vehicle.

Cage had observed Cheatwood approach the intersection, stop and look, and then pull into Cage’s path. Cage had assumed, as he had a right to do, that Cheatwood would remain in a position of safety until Cage passed.

Cage’s testimony was that he slowed his speed to approximately forty-five or fifty miles an hour when he saw the Cheatwood vehicle. The speed limit at the point of the accident is forty-five miles an hour, but less than two hundred feet away the speed limit on Highway 80 is again sixty miles an hour. The district judge, in his written opinion, stated that he was not convinced that the speed of the Cage vehicle was the cause of the accident, but that the sole cause of the accident was the failure of Mr. Cheatwood to remain stopped in a safe position until the Cage vehicle passed.

We agree with the district court that the evidence does not demonstrate any negligence on the part of plaintiff’s insured, Cage, which contributed to the accident. We cannot agree with appellant in her contention that Cage had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, and should be cast in spite of Mr. Cheatwood’s negligence. The last clear chance doctrine does not apply if a driver does not have a *clear*chance and the *last*chance in the sequence of events to avoid the accident. The evidence in the record does not establish that Cage had either.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed, at the cost of the appellant.
UNITED STATES

                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                             _______________________

                                    FORM 8-K

                                 CURRENT REPORT
                             _______________________

                     PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE
                         SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

                Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported):

                                 August 4, 2008

                       Diamond Hill Investment Group, Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             (Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter)

                                      Ohio
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (State or Other Jurisdiction of Incorporation)

             000-24498                              65-0190407
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      (Commission File Number)         (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.)

      325 John H. McConnell Blvd, Suite 200, Columbus, Ohio         43215
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      (Address of Principal Executive Offices)                    (Zip Code)

Registrant's Telephone Number, Including Area Code:   (614) 255-3333

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (Former Name or Former Address, if Changed Since Last Report)

<PAGE>

Item 8.01.     Other Events
- -------   --------------------------------------------

          As of July 31, 2008, preliminary assets under management totaled
$5.591 billion.  Following is a summary as of July 31, 2008 (in millions):

				         Equity    Fixed Income	    Total
Individually Managed Accounts 	        $ 1,134	      $  110       $ 1,244
Mutual Funds (including sub-advised)      3,790	         135         3,925
Private Investment Funds	   	    422            0           422
                                        -------       ------       -------
Total			       	        $ 5,346       $  245       $ 5,591

Investment Strategy
-------------------
Small and Small-Mid Cap         $    553
Large Cap and Select		   1,331
Long-Short		           3,467
Strategic and Fixed Income     	     240
				--------
Total			           5,591


                                    SIGNATURE
                                    ---------

     Pursuant to the  requirements  of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934,
the registrant  has duly  caused  this  report  to be  signed  on its  behalf
by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

                                        DIAMOND HILL INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.


Date: August 4, 2008	                    By: /s/ James F. Laird
                                            -------------------------------
                                            James F. Laird, Chief Financial
                                            Officer and Secretary
263 La. 368

#### Mrs. Iris BOSCH, wife of and Raul J. VIERA v. KWIK HOME SERVICES, INC., et al.

No. 52939.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 16, 1972.

In re: Mrs. Iris Bosch, wife of and Raul J. Viera applying for Certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 266 So.2d 732.

Writ refused. The present judgment is not final, and we defer our ruling as to the correctness thereof.

BARHAM, J.,

is of the opinion the writ should be granted. There is a conflict between circuits as to whether á reconvention based on libel contained in the main demand is permitted. For that reason and further believing the ruling here is incorrect we should grant the writ.

DIXON, J.,

dissents from the refusal. The judgment of the court of appeal is wrong and the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury in defending a reconven-tional demand which could not stand, even if successful in the trial court.

TATE, J., joins in reasons of BARHAM and DIXON, JJ., for granting a writ.
Exhibit 5.1
                           Law Offices
                          McAfee & Taft
                   A Professional Corporation
                10th Floor, Two Leadership Square
                       211 North Robinson
               Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102-7103
                         (405) 235-9621
                       Fax (405) 235-0439
                    http://www.mcafeetaft.com

                          June 30, 2000

Fleming Companies, Inc.
6301 Waterford Boulevard
Post Office Box 26647
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma  73126


Ladies and Gentlemen:

     Reference is made to your Registration Statement on Form S-3
to  be  filed  with the Securities and Exchange Commission  today
with respect to the proposed offering of 200,000 shares of common
stock, $2.50 par value per share, of Fleming Companies, Inc. (the
"Common  Stock") pursuant to the terms of the Fleming  Companies,
Inc. Dividend Reinvestment and Stock Purchase Plan (the "Plan").

     We  have examined your corporate records and made such other
investigations as we deemed appropriate for the purpose  of  this
opinion.

     Based upon the foregoing, we are of the opinion that:

1.   Fleming  Companies,  Inc.  (the  "Company")  has  been  duly
     incorporated and is validly existing as a corporation in good
     standing under the laws of the State of Oklahoma.

2.   The issuance of the Common Stock has been duly authorized by
     appropriate corporate action on behalf of the Company.

3.   When  issued pursuant to the Plan, the Common Stock will  be
     validly issued, and will be fully paid and non-assessable.

     We  hereby  consent to the inclusion of this opinion  as  an
exhibit to the above mentioned Registration Statement.

                              Very truly yours,

                              MCAFEE & TAFT A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
                              McAfee & Taft A Professional Corporation
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Olympic Entertainment Group, Inc. a
Nevada corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ending December
31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), Dominic Orsatti , Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Olympic Entertainment Group, Inc., and will be retained by Olympic
Entertainment Group, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

/s/ Dominic Orsatti
--------------------------
Dominic Orsatti
Chief Executive Officer
May 6, 2004
#### Dr. I. I. ROSEN v. Nancy Ann STOGNER, Leonard Yokum, Frank M. Edwards, Jr., Joseph H. Simpson, et al.

No. 61984.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 28, 1978.

In re: Dr. I. I. Rosen, applying for writs of certiorari and/or mandamus and for stay order. Parish of Tangipahoa.

Writ denied.
262 La. 315

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Evariste V. WASHINGTON.

No. 52588.

Supremo Court of Louisiana.

June 22, 1972.

In re: Evariste V. Washington applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and habeas corpus.

Application denied; the ruling of the trial judge is correct.
#### David A. SEARS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-319.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Oct. 9, 1973.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and William Bassett and Evelyn R. Flack, Asst. Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Thomas M. Carney and Andrew I. Friedrich, Asst. Attys. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

*400PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.

WALDEN, J., dissents.

WALDEN, Judge

(dissenting) :

I dissent.

Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights were trampled by the police officers when they made their search prior to arrest, without warrant, without probable cause, without plain view, and without any legal justification or right. The very most that can be gleaned as the reason for the police conduct is their naked and altogether in-sufficent subjective reaction of suspicion. See Kraemer v. State, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 615; 29 Fla.Jur., Search and Seizure, § 26.

I would reverse and remand because of the erroneous failure to grant the appellant’s motion to suppress.