J-A28036-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

HUN OH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 825 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 14, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0005108-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 23, 2019

Appellant Hun Oh appeals from the Judgment of Sentence entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County on February 14, 2019, 

following a non-jury trial. We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the facts and procedural history herein as 

follows: 

A. Factual History

On April 20, 2017, at approximately 3:40 pm; [Appellant’s]

twelve year old son ("D.O")[1]returned from school to his home 

located at 500 Susan Circle, North Wales in Montgomery County.2

After about five to ten minutes, [Appellant] came downstairs into 

the living room, visibly angry at the sight of D.O. on his phone.3

[Appellant] angrily interrogated D.O. for a few brief minutes 

before D.O., fearing his father may attack him fled the escalating 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 D.O.’s date of birth is March 29, 2005. 
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situation, and ran up the stairs, with [Appellant] in pursuit, 

ultimately seeking refuge by locking himself in the bathroom.4

[Appellant] unlocked the bathroom door with a key and upon 

entering, caused D.O. to fall back into the tub.5 [Appellant] then 

lunged at D.O., choking his neck with both hands.6 D.O. fought off 

his father by scratching his arm and then ran to his own bedroom.7

[Appellant] followed D.O., cornering him on his bed, where he 

proceeded to punch D.O. repeatedly in the side of his stomach, 

before choking him again.8 D.O. screamed for [Appellant] to get 

off of him, and when [Appellant] let go, D.O. ran downstairs and 

fled for the home of his neighbor, Young Seun Lee ("Ms. Lee").9

Upon answering the door, Ms. Lee immediately saw D.O. was 

crying, seemed to be in shock, and had a scratch mark under his 

right eye.10 When Ms. Lee asked D.O. what was wrong, he 

reported that his father had hit him and asked Ms. Lee to call his 

mother, Jackie Kim ("Ms. Kim").11 Immediately after calling Ms. 

Kim, Ms. Lee drove D.O. to Jaihson Medical Center, D.O.’s 

mother’s place of employment.12 Ms. Kim examined her son and

discovered a mark on his right eye and noted that his face was 

swollen from the assault.13 After Ms. Kim's shift was over, she and 

D.O. waited outside for a while before returning home late that 

night.14 Upon returning home, [Appellant] screamed at D.O. and 

Ms. Kim that he was going to make them leave the house before 

Ms. Kim took D.O. to stay the night in the bedroom with her.15

The next day at school, on April 21, 2017, D.O. shared 

details of the assault with two of his friends. Both of his friends 

and his teacher who overheard the conversation, insisted that 

D.O. report the incident to the school counselor, Toby Sterling 

("Sterling").16 D.O. then reported to Sterling's office and shared a 

detailed account of the attack by his father. Sterling recalled that 

D.O. was visibly upset and experienced pain and difficulty in 

discussing the assault.17 Sterling filed a report with Child Line 

immediately following the conversation with D.O. and took D.O. 

to the school nurse to be examined.18 Marisa Green ("Ms. Green"), 

the school nurse, observed a light bruise on D.O.’s lower cheek 

and noted that D.O. suffered pain when moving his neck, 

swallowing, and speaking.19 Ms. Green immediately called Ms. 

Kim, advising her that D.O. should be taken to the hospital for a 

complete examination, which advice Ms. Kim followed by reporting 

to Grand View Hospital that same day of April 21, 2017.20 On April 

28, 2017, Ms. Kim petitioned for and was granted a temporary 

protection from abuse order on behalf of D.O.21 On April 21,2017, 

Detective Ricardo DeJesus (“Det. DeJesus”) reported to 

Montgomery County Police Department to interview D.O. and 
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afterwards proceeded to schedule a Mission Kids interview for D.O. 

on April 28, 2017.22

B. Procedural History

The Commonwealth ultimately charged [Appellant] with the 

following six (6) counts on Bill of lnformation 5108-17: Count One 

(Strangulation-F2,) Count Two (Simple Assault-M2,) Count Three 

(Recklessly Endangering Another Person ("REAP") -M2,) Count 

Four (Endangering the Welfare of a Child- Ml,) and Count Five 

(Harassment-S).23 On August 29, 2018, the case proceeded to a

two-day bench trial after which the Court found [Appellant] guilty

on the following: Count Two (Simple Assault-M2) and Count Four 

(Endangering the Welfare of a Child-Ml).24

[Appellant] did not file a Post-Sentence Motion.[2] On March 

14, 2019, [Appellant] filed a timely Notice of Appeal challenging 

the imposition of his sentence. On April 9, 2019, [Appellant] filed 

a timely Concise Statement of Matters Complained of On Appeal, 

pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b).

____

2[N.T. 8/29/18, at 42, 46, 125, 167].

3[N.T 8/29/18, at 47-48].

4[N.T. 8/29/18, at 48-49].

5 [N.T. 8/29/18, at 49-50].

6[N.T 8/29/18, at 51-52].

7[N.T. 8/29/18, at 51-52, at Ex. C-4].

8[N.T. 8/29/18, at 55-61].

9[N.T. 8/29/18, at 61-62].

10[N.T. 8/29/18, at 91-92].

11[Id.].

12[N.T. 8/29/18, at 62-63].

13[N.T. 8/29/18, at 105].

14[N.T. 8/29/18, at 107].

15[Id.].

16[N.T. 8/29/18, at 66].

17[N.T. 8/29/18, at 135-36].

18[N.T. 8/29/18, at 137-138, at Ex C-7].

19[N.T. 8/29/18, at 144-145, at Ex C-8].

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2 Appellant was sentenced to five years’ probation and ordered to have no 

contact with D.O. unless permitted by a custody order. Appellant also was 

required to pay the costs of prosecution, attend anger management classes, 

and take part in parenting classes.
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20[N.T. 8/29/18, at 107-109].

21[N.T. 8/29/18, at 110].

22[N.T. 8/29/18, at 156-157, at Ex C-1 I].

2318 Pa. C.S. §§ 2718(a)(I), 2701(a)(l), 2705, 4304(a)(l), 

2709(a)(I).

Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/9/19, at 1-4.

In his brief, Appellant presents the following issues for this Court’s 

review:

A. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in admitting testimony 

from Karen Dougherty, a nurse, whose testimony was based on 

hearsay.

B. Whether the failure of defense counsel at trial to present 

exculpatory evidence constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

Brief for Appellant at 4. 

Preliminarily, we could find Appellant’s claims waived for his failure to 

present them properly in his concise statement. As this Court recently stated: 

[I]ssues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed 

waived for review. An appellant's concise statement must properly

specify the error to be addressed on appeal. In other words, the 

Rule 1925(b) statement must be “specific enough for the trial 

court to identify and address the issue [an appellant] wishe[s] to 

raise on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 

(Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 712, 919 A.2d 956 

(2007). “[A] [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the 

court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional 

equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.” Id. The court's 

review and legal analysis can be fatally impaired when the court 

has to guess at the issues raised. Thus, if a concise statement is 

too vague, the court may find waiver. Commonwealth v. Scott, 

212 A.3d 1094, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Sexton, 2019 WL 5540999 at *4 n. 3 (Pa.Super. Oct. 28, 

2019). 
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Herein, Appellant’s concise statement reads like a narrative wherein he 

mentions the trial court’s allegedly erroneous admission of Ms. Dougherty’s 

testimony and trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. This inarticulate framing 

arguably resulted in a concise statement that is not specific enough for the 

trial court to identify and consider the issues Appellant has raised on appeal. 

However, because this has not fatally impaired the trial court’s legal analysis

in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, we will not deem his issues to be waived for failure 

to preserve them properly in his concise statement. Notwithstanding, 

Appellant has waived his initial claim. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 302 unequivocally provides 

that issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for 

the first time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). This is a fundamental rule of 

appellate practice. Our Supreme Court has stated:

[I]t is axiomatic that issues are preserved when objections are 

made timely to the error or offense. See Commonwealth v. 

May, 584 Pa. 640, 887 A.2d 750, 761 (2005) (holding that an 

“absence of contemporaneous objections renders” an appellant's 

claims waived); and Commonwealth v. Bruce, 207 Pa.Super. 4, 

916 A.2d 657, 671 (2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 

74 (2007) (holding that a “failure to offer a timely and specific 

objection results in waiver of” the claim). Therefore, we shall 

consider any issue waived where Appellant failed to assert a timely

objection.

Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 599 Pa. 1, 23, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (2008).

Herein, after stipulating to Ms. Dougherty’s expertise in forensic and 

emergency nursing on voir dire, Appellant never objected on the record to her

testimony either on hearsay or on any other grounds during direct 
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examination. N.T. 8/29/18, at 20-33. In fact, after Ms. Dougherty was 

subjected to a thorough cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked that

Ms. Dougherty be excused. Id. at 33-39. The trial court questioned whether

defense counsel had any objection, to which he replied “No Objection. Thank

you.” Id. at 39. In light of the foregoing, we find this issue is waived.3

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3 Even if Appellant properly had preserved this issue for our review by 

contemporaneously raising an objection, we note his appellate brief contains 

substantial defects which prevent meaningful review and, therefore, would 

warrant waiver of this claim. For one, the brief is not divided into as many 

parts as there are questions to be decided, nor does it contain separate and 

distinctive headings for each question involved. In addition, Appellant’s 

argument is comprised of bald assertions with no citations to and analysis of 

any relevant legal authority to support them. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-14;

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a),(b)(stating, inter alia, the argument “shall be divided into 

as many parts as there are questions to be argued. . .” and must contain 

“discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); see also

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 889 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa.Super. 2005) (“[A] brief

containing such defective argument that appellate review is precluded has the 

same result as filing no brief at all.”) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. 

Franklin, 823 A.2d 906, 910 (Pa.Super. 2003) (“A brief containing argument 

like this has the same result as filing no brief at all.”). 

Moreover, Appellant’s discussion asserts new claims not presented in his 

concise statement or delineated in the questions presented portion of his brief. 

For example, he asserts his rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated by the 

Commonwealth’s failure to provide an adequate interpreter. See Brief for 

Appellant at 12. Thus, Appellant's patently defective brief deprives us of any 

meaningful basis upon which to review his initial claim. We, therefore, would 

conclude that this first question presented is waived on this basis as well.
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In his second issue, Appellant presents numerous challenges to 

counsel’s effectiveness. In its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court found it 

was precluded from reviewing this claim on direct appeal due to the 

inadequacy of the record before it. Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/9/19, at 6. We 

agree. 

In Commonwealth v. Holmes, 621 Pa. 595, 79 A.3d 562 (2013), the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous holding in 

Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002) that, absent 

certain circumstances, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be 

deferred until collateral review under the Post Conviction Relief Act. Holmes, 

79 A.3d at 576. As the Court later explained:

We recently held in Holmes that claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel litigated after our decision in Grant are not generally a 

proper component of a defendant's direct appeal. In Holmes, this 

Court reaffirmed the general rule of deferral established in Grant, 

and disapproved of expansion of the so-called Bomar[4] exception, 

which allowed for the presentation of ineffectiveness claims on 

direct appeal if the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and 

disposed of the ineffectiveness claims in its opinion. This Court in 

Holmes limited the Bomar exception to its pre-Grant facts. We 

further recognized two exceptions to the Grant deferral rule, both 

falling within the discretion of the trial court. First, we held that 

trial courts retain discretion, in extraordinary circumstances, to 

entertain a discrete claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness if the 

claim is both apparent from the record and meritorious, such that 

immediate consideration best serves the interest of justice. 

Second, we held that trial courts also have discretion to entertain 

prolix claims of ineffectiveness if there is a good cause shown and 

the unitary review thus permitted is accompanied by a knowing 

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4 Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831 (2003), cert. 

denied, 540 U.S. 1115, 124 S.Ct. 1053 (2004). 
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and express waiver by the defendant of the right to pursue a first 

PCRA petition.

Commonwealth v. Arrington, 624 Pa. 506, 86 A.3d 831, 856–57 (2014). 

See also Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 471–72 (Pa.Super. 

2018).

 In the instant case, Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion 

challenging counsel’s ineffectiveness, nor did he execute a PCRA waiver. He 

does not otherwise attempt to show “good cause” in his undeveloped appellate 

brief as to why his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be decided 

on unitary review. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim 

at this time and is permitted to raise any ineffectiveness claims on collateral

review without prejudice.

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/23/19