Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Stacy R. Uliana

Bargersville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tiffany A. McCoy

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Anthony J. Castleman,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

July 9, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2632

Appeal from the Adams Superior 

Court

The Honorable Patrick R. Miller, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

01D01-1907-F6-168

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 2 of 10

[1] Anthony Castleman appeals his convictions for Class A Misdemeanor 

Conversion1 and Class A Misdemeanor Criminal Mischief,2 arguing that (1) his 

two convictions violate Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy; (2) the 

trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial; and (3) the evidence 

was insufficient to support the convictions. Finding no double jeopardy 

violation, no error, and the evidence sufficient, we affirm.

Facts

[2] Sometime in the late evening of June 20 or the early morning of June 21, 2019, 

Enos Gore was driving in his white truck with his friend, Castleman, in the 

passenger’s seat. The truck stalled on a country road that had been flooded with

high waters. At 6 a.m. on the morning of June 21, 2019, Susie Brown was on 

her front porch when she observed a man in a black shirt splashing around in 

the high flood waters in front of her property. According to Brown, the man 

appeared to be “washing his pants,” tr. vol. II p. 141, and proceeded to walk 

onto her property. Brown became nervous as the man approached her house, 

but the man turned to walk onto the farm of her neighbor, Merlie Eicher.

Brown stopped being concerned and went inside. 

[3] Later, Brown heard Eicher’s tractor start up, so she went back onto her porch. 

She looked out and saw the same man in the black shirt driving the tractor into 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3(a).

2

I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a)(1).
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the high flood waters, where it stalled and became almost completely 

submerged. The man crawled out through the tractor’s back window and

walked over to the passenger-side window of the stalled white truck. 

[4] Approximately fifteen minutes later, police arrived, at which point Brown 

observed the man in a black shirt, later identified as Castleman, and another 

man in a gray shirt, later identified as Gore, walk towards the officers.

Lieutenant Dean Amstutz, who was on the scene, noticed that Castleman was 

soaked from the torso down. He also noticed a strong smell of alcohol on 

Castleman’s breath. Lieutenant Amstutz offered to give Castleman a ride to a 

nearby apartment, during which time Castleman broke down in tears and 

“start[ed] to talk to himself about how he’s in so much trouble.” Id. at 172.

[5] Sometime later that day, Eicher returned home and discovered his tractor 

destroyed and submerged in water. He eventually called law enforcement. 

Eicher told Brown’s husband about what had had happened, which prompted 

Brown’s husband to tell Brown. Law enforcement decided to speak with Brown 

because she had witnessed the events from that morning, and the officers 

eventually obtained written statements from both Brown and Eicher. 

[6] On July 3, 2019, the State charged Castleman with Level 6 felony theft and 

Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief. Before his trial, Castleman filed a 

motion in limine, which the trial court granted, that precluded Brown from 

identifying Castleman as the person she had witnessed driving the tractor. 
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[7] During Castleman’s September 16, 2019, jury trial, Castleman’s counsel asked 

Corporal Patrick Piper of the Adams County Sheriff’s Office why law 

enforcement did not request additional evidence from the crime scene. In 

response, Corporal Piper said, “the witness statement from [Brown] identified 

the male subject wearing a black shirt the morning prior. He was identified as . . 

. Anthony Castleman.” Id. at 212. Castleman’s counsel objected, arguing that 

Corporal Piper violated the order in limine.

[8] Then, while outside the jury’s presence, Castleman’s counsel moved for a 

mistrial, contending that Corporal Piper’s comment unduly prejudiced 

Castleman, even though it was Castleman’s counsel who asked the question. 

The trial court concluded that “it’s not a direct violation of the motion in limine 

because the motion in limine was directed directly at [Brown].” Id. at 215

(emphases omitted). Ultimately, the trial court denied Castleman’s motion, but 

to ameliorate any prejudicial effect, went on to admonish the jury as follows: 

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, before we call the next witness, 

the last witness who testified, Officer Piper, in his testimony made 

a statement that they, basically the law enforcement didn’t do 

further investigation to this because [Brown] had identified 

[Castleman] as their suspect. I will point that out to you that that is 

not accurate. That was not testified to by [Brown]. She never made 

a witness identification in this courtroom of anyone. She simply 

described an individual she saw and you are to understand that 

that’s the limits of her testimony at this point [sic] time. Regardless 

of what Officer Piper may have stated in that statement. 

Id. at 216 (emphases omitted).
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[9] At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Castleman guilty of the lesser-included 

offense of Class A misdemeanor conversion and Class A misdemeanor criminal 

mischief. On October 9, 2019, the trial court sentenced Castleman to concurrent 

terms of 300 days in the county jail. Castleman now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Double Jeopardy

[10] First, Castleman argues that his two Class A misdemeanor convictions violate 

Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy. See generally Ind. Const. art. 1 § 

14. We review questions of double jeopardy de novo, giving no consideration to 

the trial court’s decision below. Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 458 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2005).

[11] More specifically, Castleman argues that there is a reasonable probability that 

the jury relied on the same facts to convict him of both conversion and criminal 

mischief. Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind. 2002). Under this “actual 

evidence” test, Castleman must show that there is “a reasonable probability that 

the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of 

one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a 

second challenged offense.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 53 (Ind. 1999). 

There is no double jeopardy violation when the evidentiary facts establishing 

the essential elements of one offense satisfy many, but not all, of the essential 

elements of the second offense. Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. 2013).
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[12] To convict Castleman of Class A misdemeanor conversion, the State was 

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Castleman knowingly or 

intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the property of another person. 

I.C. § 35-43-4-3(a). To convict Castleman of Class A misdemeanor criminal 

mischief, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Castleman recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damaged or defaced another 

person’s property without that person’s consent and that the pecuniary loss is 

between $750 and $50,000. I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a)(1).

[13] Based on the record, the evidentiary facts that the jury probably used to 

establish that Castleman had committed conversion were that he knowingly or 

intentionally entered Eicher’s property and started using the tractor without 

Eicher’s authorization or consent. Then, the evidentiary facts that the jury 

probably used to establish that Castleman had committed criminal mischief 

were that Castleman, without Eicher’s consent, drove off in the tractor and 

plunged it into deep flood waters, where it became submerged and severely 

damaged; it is also undisputed that Eicher’s tractor was valued at 

approximately $28,000 before it was damaged.

[14] Accordingly, Castleman cannot show that there was a reasonable probability 

that the jury relied on the same evidentiary facts to establish the essential 

elements of both offenses. Rather, the record shows that Castleman committed 

two separate acts—unauthorized control of the tractor and unauthorized 

operation/destruction of the tractor—during this timeframe. Therefore, because 

the evidentiary facts establishing the essential elements of one offense establish 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 7 of 10

the essential elements of some, but not all, of the second offense, there is no 

double jeopardy violation. 

II. Mistrial

[15] Next, Castleman argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for 

a mistrial after admitting testimony that potentially prejudiced the jury, despite 

the trial court’s admonishment. 

[16] A mistrial is an “extreme remedy” that should be used only when no other 

curative measure will rectify the situation. Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 57 

(Ind. 1995). Upon review of a denial of a motion for a mistrial, the defendant 

must demonstrate that the conduct complained of was both in error and had a 

probable persuasive effect on the jury’s decision. Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 821, 

825 (Ind. 2002). More specifically: 

[W]hen the trial court admonishes the jury to disregard the 

inadmissible evidence, the prejudicial impact of the evidence may 

be sufficiently mitigated. The question of whether a defendant was 

so prejudiced that the admonishment could not cure the error is 

one that must be determined by examining the facts of the 

particular case. The burden is on the defendant to show that he 

was harmed and placed in grave peril by the denial of the mistrial 

motion. 

Glenn v. State, 796 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations 

omitted). The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion 

of the trial court, and we will reverse only when the trial court’s decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Hall v. State, 

722 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
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[17] Specifically, Castleman contends that Corporal Piper violated the order in 

limine and sufficiently prejudiced his case when Corporal Piper said, “the 

witness statement from [Brown] identified the male subject wearing a black 

shirt the morning prior. He was identified as . . . Anthony Castleman.” Tr. Vol. 

II p. 212. 

[18] We find Castleman’s argument to be unavailing. First, it should be noted that 

the trial court did not find that Corporal Piper’s testimony violated the order in 

limine because the order in limine was directed at Brown herself and 

specifically prohibited only Brown from identifying Castleman. We agree with 

the trial court’s assessment. By speaking about a different witness, Corporal 

Piper did not violate the narrow confines of the order in limine. 

[19] Secondly, even if Corporal Piper’s testimony violated the order in limine, the 

trial court stepped in to rectify the situation by admonishing the jury to 

disregard any testimony by Corporal Piper in which he referenced Brown’s 

direct identification of Castleman as the man driving the tractor. An 

admonishment such as this, we believe, was thorough and effective enough to 

diminish any prejudicial effect that Corporal Piper’s testimony may have had.

[20] Finally, it bears repeating that a mistrial is an “extreme remedy” that should be 

used only when other curative measures cannot rectify a situation. Moore, 652 

N.E.2d at 57. Nothing in the record indicates that Corporal Piper’s testimony 

placed Castleman in grave peril. Given that there were other curative measures 

implemented by the trial court, a mistrial would not have been warranted in this 
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situation. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied 

Castleman’s motion for a mistrial. 

III. Sufficiency of Evidence

[21] Finally, Castleman argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his two 

Class A misdemeanor convictions. When reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting a conviction, we must affirm if the probative evidence and 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom could have allowed a reasonable trier of 

fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. McHenry v. State, 

820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). It is not our job to reweigh the evidence or to 

judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we consider any conflicting evidence 

most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 906 

(Ind. 2005).

[22] As we have already stated, to convict Castleman of Class A misdemeanor 

conversion, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Castleman knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the 

property of another person. I.C. § 35-43-4-3(a). To convict Castleman of Class 

A misdemeanor criminal mischief, the State was required to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Castleman recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally 

damaged or defaced another person’s property without that person’s consent 

and that the pecuniary loss is between $750 and $50,000. I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a)(1).

[23] The only piece of evidence Castleman claims is insufficient is the identification 

of him as the person who committed those crimes. More to the point, he argues 
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that “the State had to present substantial evidence of a probative value from 

which the jury could infer that he was the man who drove Eicher’s tractor into 

the flood waters,” but failed to do so. Appellant’s Br. p. 14-15.

[24] There were only two people in the white truck on the night/morning of the 

incident: Castleman and Gore. While Brown could not and did not directly 

identify Castleman as the one who stumbled across her yard, entered Eicher’s 

property, took off on Eicher’s tractor, and then damaged that tractor in the high 

flood waters, she did describe the individual as someone wearing a black shirt.

Castleman was wearing a black shirt, and we know that Gore was wearing a 

gray shirt. Plus, Lieutenant Amstutz, who was an officer on the scene, observed

that Castleman was wearing a black shirt and was soaked from the torso down. 

Earlier that morning, Brown noticed a man leaving the white truck and 

washing his pants in the high waters. Further, while transporting Castleman to 

a nearby apartment, Lieutenant Amstutz witnessed Castleman crying and 

stating that “he’s in so much trouble.” Tr. Vol. II p. 172.

[25] A reasonable factfinder could have inferred from this evidence that it was 

Castleman who left the white truck, became soaked from the water, and 

committed the two crimes. Thus, the evidence is sufficient. 

[26] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.