Interim..Decision *1429 

MATKAR OP YOUNG 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-418967S 

Decided by Board. January 99, 1985 

Applicant's voluntary departure from the United States following the institution of, and pursuant to, deportation proceedings did not break the continuity of his residence within the purview of section 249, Immigration and 

Nationality Act, as amended. 

Oxon.:use: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (2) (8 U.S.O. 1251(a) (2) ]—Remained_ 

longer—Nonimmigrant. 

Lodged: Act of 1952--Section 241(a) (2) (S U.S.O. 1251(a) (2)]—Entered 

without inspection. 

The case conies forward on appeal by the trial attorney from a 

decisiOn of the special inquiry officer dated September 15, 1981 granting the application for adjustment of status under section 249 of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

The record relates to a native and citizen of China, 65 years old s 

arrived in the United States at the port of male, widower, who last 

New York on or about July 4, 1947 on the S.S. Paralos and was 

ordered detained and refused a landing permit. Ere thereafter 

entered the United States without inspection as an alien. Deportability solely on the lodged charge is, conceded. 

The respondent has applied for an adjustment of immigrant status 

under section 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The 

only requirement with which we are concerned is that the alien must 

have resided continuously in the United States since prior to June 

28, 1940. In his Application for Adjustment of Status as a. Permanent Resident (Form 1-485), executed in connection with the deportation proceedings, and in his Alien Registration Form (Form 

AR .2) executed November 2, 1940, the respondent indicated that 

he had resided in the United States since 1925. The respondent has 

38 

o. 
Interim Decision *1429 

established, on the basis of testimony and documents presented, the 

requisite continuous residence in the United States since prior to 

June 28, 1940. However the Service contends that the respondent 

interrupted the continuity of his residence by his voluntary departure on-March 15, 1947 because this voluntary departure occurred 

after the institution of deportation proceedings; that any departure 

from the United States after deportation .proceedings have beeninstituted breaks the continuity of residence for the purpose of section 24.9 relief. 

The term "residence" means the place of general abode, the 'place 

of general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling 

place in fact without regard to intent? The Service has commingled 

the definitions of "entry" and "residence" to result in the conclusion 

that a person whose departure is occasioned by deportation proceedings could not claim that he had not made a new "entry" into the 

United. States. It is conceded that the respondent made a new 

"entry" into the United States when he entered without inspection 

on or about July 4, 1947 after his voluntary departure. Since section 

249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act requires continuous 

residence in the United. States since prior to June 28, 1940, it is. 

apparent that the significant term is "residence" and that the question to be determined is whether such residence was continuous or 

was broken by a voluntary departure pursuant to deportation procedings in March 1947. The respondent testified that he reshipped 

in France to another vessel owned by the same line at the direction 

of the owner of the line. He claims that when he departed in March 

1947 he maintained his residence in the United States as indicated 

by his retention. of his living quarters in the United States where 

he left much of his personal effects. 

There appear to be no court cases directly in point: Those court 

cases which held that residence for the purpose of section 249 of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act was broken involve a departure 

under an order of deportation, such departure being regarded as 

having executed the order and warrant of deportation. 2 

There have been some administrative- decisions which have dealt 

indirectly with the problem: In Matter .of P—, 8 L & N. Dec. 167, 

the alien alleged entry in the United States in 1920 and continuous 

2Sebtlea 101(a) (33) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, S U.S.C. 1101 

(a) t33). 

Mrvica v. Beverly, 376 U.S. 560, 11 Led. 2d .911:.Chong v. Beverly, 191 F. 

Sung. 935 (8.D.N.Y., 1981) ; Sit Jag Sing v. Nice, 182 F: Supp. 292 (D.C., Cal. 

1960) afrd. 287 -F.2d 561. 

89 
Interim Decision *1429 

residence since that time. Evidence was presented to establish that 

claim and also establish that he had been absent from the- United 

States for brief periods on two occasions, in August 1922 and. again 

in 1940. The departure in 1922 was as the result of exclusion proceedings. It was held that an alien who has bean absent from the 

United States at any time since the entry upon which his application 

is based may be found to have resided continuously in the United 

States since the date of his original entry if his absence was temporary and his principal actual dwelling place in fact remained in the 

United States during the entire period of his absence. It was further 

held that a departure from the -United States cre a result of emoktsion 

or eepuZsion proceedings breaks the continuity of residence for the 

purpose of section 249, regardless of the period of time the alien is 

outside the United States after such departure. The underlined portion must be read in conjunction with the next sentence which indicates that the applicant's continuous residence in the United States• 

was broken on August 24, 1922 when be .was excluded and deported. 

Thus the holding in this case is consistent with the holding of the 

Supreme Court in. dirvicay.Espordy, 376 U.S. 560.3 

Although the residence since the critical date must be continuous,. 

the statute does not require actual physical presence in the United_ 

States during the entire period. -Temporary absence, without abandoiament of residence in the United States, will not preclude establishment of the required residence. All the statute requires is that 

the applicant "has had his residence in the United States continuously since such entry." "Residence" is- defined as "the place of 

general abode; the place of general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent." 4 

The Service suggests that the record-does not•clearly show whetheror not the respondent was accorded the privilege of voluntary departure or left under an outstanding deportation order. A reading of 

the evidence clearly shows that it is conceded that he left under an 

order of volUntary departure. In any event, if the respondent had 

in fact been deported, the Service would have introduced evidence. 

of such deportation into the record and if they should' discover such, 

evi.dence,.it may properly be made the, subject of a motion to reopen 

or reconsider. ' 

It is Conchnled that the respondent' has established continuous 

residence in the United. States since prior to June 28, 1940. gis de- 

'matter of P—, 8 X. & N. Ded. 187, was cited with approval In Matter of R—. 

8 L & N. Dec. 598,. 599. - 

‘.00cdon and Rosenfield, Znanigratrozi ZU417 and Procedure Tat 

40: 
Interim Decision #1429 

parture in 1947 was not the result of exclusion or expulsion proceedings but was voluntary. We are unable to distinguish between a 

voluntary departure prior to the institution of deportation proceedings and a voluntary departure subsequent to the institution of 

deportation proceedings. The legal effect remains the same. The 

respondent has established that his absence was temporary. He is 

not a member of the excludable classes enumerated in section 249, is 

not ineligible to citizenship and is a person of good moral character. 

He has established eligibility for the discretionary relief available 

under section 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The 

order of the special inquiry officer will be affirmed. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the order of the special inquiry officer 

dated September .15, 1964 granting the application for adjustment 

of status under section 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

be affirmed. 

It is further ordered that the appeal by the trial attorney from 

such decision of the special inquiry officer be and the same is hereby 

dismissed. 

41