# Official Journal C 312/2013

| | ISSN 1977-091X
  doi:10.3000/1977091X.C_2013.312.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 312 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5626 October 2013 |

ISSN 1977-091X

doi:10.3000/1977091X.C_2013.312.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 312

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5626 October 2013

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2013/C 312/01 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6850 — Marine Harvest/Morpol) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2013/C 312/02 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6751 — BayWa/Wilhelm Bonhorst/Bohnhorst Agrarhandel JV) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2013/C 312/01

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6850 — Marine Harvest/Morpol) (
  1
  )

1

1

2013/C 312/02

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6751 — BayWa/Wilhelm Bonhorst/Bohnhorst Agrarhandel JV) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2013/C 312/03 | Euro exchange rates | 2 |
| 2013/C 312/04 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 25 October 2012 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M.6471 — Outokumpu/Inoxum — Rapporteur: Greece | 3 |
| 2013/C 312/05 | Final report of the Hearing Officer — Outokumpu/Inoxum (COMP/M.6471) | 5 |
| 2013/C 312/06 | Summary of Commission Decision of 7 November 2012 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.6471 — Outokumpu/Inoxum) (notified under document C(2012) 7969)
   (
  1
  ) | 11 |
| | NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
| 2013/C 312/07 | Notification of the Lithuania’s national regulatory authority — National Control Commission for Prices and Energy (hereinafter NCC) — pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC regarding the designation of LITGRID AB as transmission system operator in Lithuania | 18 |
| 2013/C 312/08 | Notification of the German Government pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (Gas Directive) concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas regarding the designation of bayernets GmbH, GRTgaz Deutschland GmbH, terranets bw GmbH, Nowega GmbH, jordgasTransport GmbH, Fluxys TENP GmbH, Gastransport Nord GmbH, Gasunie Deutschland Transport Services GmbH, GASCADE Gastransport GmbH, ONTRAS-VNG Gastransport GmbH and Thyssengas GmbH as transmission system operators in Germany | 19 |
| 2013/C 312/09 | Notification of the German Government pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Electricity Directive) concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity regarding the designation of 50 Hertz Transmission GmbH, Amprion GmbH and TransnetBW GmbH as transmission system operators in Germany | 20 |
| 2013/C 312/10 | Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries | 21 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2013/C 312/03

Euro exchange rates

2

2013/C 312/04

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 25 October 2012 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M.6471 — Outokumpu/Inoxum — Rapporteur: Greece

3

2013/C 312/05

Final report of the Hearing Officer — Outokumpu/Inoxum (COMP/M.6471)

5

2013/C 312/06

Summary of Commission Decision of 7 November 2012 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.6471 — Outokumpu/Inoxum) (notified under document C(2012) 7969)
   (
  1
  )

(notified under document C(2012) 7969)

1

11

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

2013/C 312/07

Notification of the Lithuania’s national regulatory authority — National Control Commission for Prices and Energy (hereinafter NCC) — pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC regarding the designation of LITGRID AB as transmission system operator in Lithuania

18

2013/C 312/08

Notification of the German Government pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (Gas Directive) concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas regarding the designation of bayernets GmbH, GRTgaz Deutschland GmbH, terranets bw GmbH, Nowega GmbH, jordgasTransport GmbH, Fluxys TENP GmbH, Gastransport Nord GmbH, Gasunie Deutschland Transport Services GmbH, GASCADE Gastransport GmbH, ONTRAS-VNG Gastransport GmbH and Thyssengas GmbH as transmission system operators in Germany

19

2013/C 312/09

Notification of the German Government pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Electricity Directive) concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity regarding the designation of 50 Hertz Transmission GmbH, Amprion GmbH and TransnetBW GmbH as transmission system operators in Germany

20

2013/C 312/10

Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries

21

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2013/C 312/11 | Notice to economic operators — New round of requests for the suspension of the autonomous Common Customs Tariff duties on certain industrial and agricultural products | 22 |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2013/C 312/12 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.7067 — 3i/Scandferries Holdings) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  ) | 23 |
| 2013/C 312/13 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.7051 — Goldman Sachs/Hastings Insurance Group) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  ) | 24 |
| 2013/C 312/14 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.7031 — EURENCO/MAXAMCHEM/MANUCO) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  ) | 25 |
| | OTHER ACTS |
| | European Commission |
| 2013/C 312/15 | Publication of an application pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs | 26 |

V   Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

European Commission

2013/C 312/11

Notice to economic operators — New round of requests for the suspension of the autonomous Common Customs Tariff duties on certain industrial and agricultural products

22

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

2013/C 312/12

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.7067 — 3i/Scandferries Holdings) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  )

1

23

2013/C 312/13

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.7051 — Goldman Sachs/Hastings Insurance Group) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  )

1

24

2013/C 312/14

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.7031 — EURENCO/MAXAMCHEM/MANUCO) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  )

1

25

OTHER ACTS

European Commission

2013/C 312/15

Publication of an application pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs

26

| | |
| --- | --- |
| 2013/C 312/16 | Note to the reader (see page 3 of the cover) | s3 |

2013/C 312/16

Note to the reader (see page 3 of the cover)

Note to the reader

s3

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/1

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.6850 — Marine Harvest/Morpol)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 312/01

On 30 September 2013, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6850. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6850. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

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| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/1

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.6751 — BayWa/Wilhelm Bonhorst/Bohnhorst Agrarhandel JV)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 312/02

On 6 February 2013, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in German and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6751. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6751. EUR-Lex is the online access to the European law.

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/2

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Euro exchange rates (1)

25 October 2013

2013/C 312/03

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,3777 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 134,15 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4590 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,85190 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 8,7351 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,2348 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 8,1370 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 25,750 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 292,82 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvian lats | 0,7026 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,1858 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,4511 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,7367 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,4369 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,4380 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 10,6820 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,6601 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,7035 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 464,88 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 13,5502 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 8,3814 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,6265 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 15 175,04 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,3488 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 59,243 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 43,8000 |
| THB | Thai baht | 42,842 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 3,0121 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 17,8719 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 84,7680 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,3777

JPY

Japanese yen

134,15

DKK

Danish krone

7,4590

GBP

Pound sterling

0,85190

SEK

Swedish krona

8,7351

CHF

Swiss franc

1,2348

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

8,1370

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

25,750

HUF

Hungarian forint

292,82

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,4528

LVL

Latvian lats

0,7026

PLN

Polish zloty

4,1858

RON

Romanian leu

4,4511

TRY

Turkish lira

2,7367

AUD

Australian dollar

1,4369

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,4380

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

10,6820

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,6601

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,7035

KRW

South Korean won

1 464,88

ZAR

South African rand

13,5502

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

8,3814

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,6265

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

15 175,04

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,3488

PHP

Philippine peso

59,243

RUB

Russian rouble

43,8000

THB

Thai baht

42,842

BRL

Brazilian real

3,0121

MXN

Mexican peso

17,8719

INR

Indian rupee

84,7680

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

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| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/3

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Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 25 October 2012 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M.6471 — Outokumpu/Inoxum

Rapporteur: Greece

2013/C 312/04

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the ‘Merger Regulation’). |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation has an EU dimension within the meaning of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation has an EU dimension within the meaning of the Merger Regulation.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s definitions of the relevant product markets as stated in the draft decision.
  In particular, concerning the product market definition, The Advisory Committee agrees that the impact of the notified transaction must be assessed on the following markets:






  (a) | With regard to the production and supply of stainless steel products:






  (i) | Production of slabs; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s definitions of the relevant product markets as stated in the draft decision.

In particular, concerning the product market definition, The Advisory Committee agrees that the impact of the notified transaction must be assessed on the following markets:

(a)

With regard to the production and supply of stainless steel products:

(i)

Production of slabs;

| (ii) | Hot rolled flat products: while separate markets for Hot Black Band and Hot White Band can be considered, it is not necessary to conclude on the exact product market definition in this case; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

Hot rolled flat products: while separate markets for Hot Black Band and Hot White Band can be considered, it is not necessary to conclude on the exact product market definition in this case;

| (iii) | Cold rolled flat products (excluding precision strip), without distinguishing between commodities vs. specialties, or by grade/family, surface finish or end application; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

Cold rolled flat products (excluding precision strip), without distinguishing between commodities vs. specialties, or by grade/family, surface finish or end application;

| (iv) | Precision strip; |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

Precision strip;

| (b) | Ferrochrome, whereas it is not necessary to conclude on the exact product market definition in this case; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Ferrochrome, whereas it is not necessary to conclude on the exact product market definition in this case;

| (c) | With regard to the distribution of stainless steel flat products: Stockists versus stainless steel service centres, whereas it is not necessary to conclude on the exact product market definition in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

With regard to the distribution of stainless steel flat products: Stockists versus stainless steel service centres, whereas it is not necessary to conclude on the exact product market definition in this case.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s definitions of the relevant geographic markets as stated in the draft decision.
  In particular, concerning the geographic market definition, The Advisory Committee agrees that the impact of the notified transaction must be assessed on the following markets:






  (a) | For the production and supply of stainless steel products: EEA-wide; |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s definitions of the relevant geographic markets as stated in the draft decision.

In particular, concerning the geographic market definition, The Advisory Committee agrees that the impact of the notified transaction must be assessed on the following markets:

(a)

For the production and supply of stainless steel products: EEA-wide;

| (b) | Ferrochrome: EEA-wide, whereas it is not necessary to conclude on the exact geographic market definition in this case; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Ferrochrome: EEA-wide, whereas it is not necessary to conclude on the exact geographic market definition in this case;

| (c) | For distribution of stainless steel flat products: national or at most regional (i.e. wider than national), whereas it is not necessary to conclude on the exact geographic market definition in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

For distribution of stainless steel flat products: national or at most regional (i.e. wider than national), whereas it is not necessary to conclude on the exact geographic market definition in this case.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the proposed concentration does not significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it in the following markets:






  (a) | Production of slabs; |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the proposed concentration does not significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it in the following markets:

(a)

Production of slabs;

| (b) | Production of hot rolled flat products, Hot Black Band and Hot White Band; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Production of hot rolled flat products, Hot Black Band and Hot White Band;

| (c) | Precision strip; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Precision strip;

| (d) | Ferrochrome; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Ferrochrome;

| (e) | Distribution of stainless steel flat products. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

Distribution of stainless steel flat products.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the proposed concentration significantly impedes effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it in the following markets:






  (a) | Production of Cold Rolled flat products in the EEA market. |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the proposed concentration significantly impedes effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it in the following markets:

(a)

Production of Cold Rolled flat products in the EEA market.

| 7. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the final commitments offered by the Notifying Party on 19 October 2012 (the ‘final commitments’) fully address the competition concerns identified by the Commission in the EEA market for the production of Cold Rolled flat products. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the final commitments offered by the Notifying Party on 19 October 2012 (the ‘final commitments’) fully address the competition concerns identified by the Commission in the EEA market for the production of Cold Rolled flat products.

| 8. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's conclusion that, subject to the full compliance with the final commitments, the notified transaction is not likely to significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's conclusion that, subject to the full compliance with the final commitments, the notified transaction is not likely to significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it.

| 9. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified transaction must therefore be declared compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement in accordance with Articles 2(2) and 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified transaction must therefore be declared compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement in accordance with Articles 2(2) and 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.

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| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/5

---

Final report of the Hearing Officer (1)

Outokumpu/Inoxum

(COMP/M.6471)

2013/C 312/05

1.   BACKGROUND

| (1) | On 10 April 2012, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) (‘the Merger Regulation’) by which the undertaking Outokumpu Oyj (‘notifying party’) would acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Inoxum GmbH and Nirosta GmbH (together ‘Inoxum’), the stainless steel division of ThyssenKrupp AG (‘TK’), by way of purchase of shares (the ‘proposed transaction’) (3). The notifying party and Inoxum are designated hereinafter as the ‘parties’. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 10 April 2012, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) (‘the Merger Regulation’) by which the undertaking Outokumpu Oyj (‘notifying party’) would acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Inoxum GmbH and Nirosta GmbH (together ‘Inoxum’), the stainless steel division of ThyssenKrupp AG (‘TK’), by way of purchase of shares (the ‘proposed transaction’) (3). The notifying party and Inoxum are designated hereinafter as the ‘parties’.

2.   WRITTEN PROCEDURE

| (2) | Based on a market investigation, the Commission raised serious doubts as to the compatibility of the transaction with the internal market and adopted a decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation on 21 May 2012 (4). The notifying party submitted its written comments on the Article 6(1)(c) decision on 4 June 2012. During the phase II investigation, informal information exchanges took place on a regular basis between the Directorate-General for Competition (‘DG Competition’) and the parties, as well as weekly status update telephone calls. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Based on a market investigation, the Commission raised serious doubts as to the compatibility of the transaction with the internal market and adopted a decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation on 21 May 2012 (4). The notifying party submitted its written comments on the Article 6(1)(c) decision on 4 June 2012. During the phase II investigation, informal information exchanges took place on a regular basis between the Directorate-General for Competition (‘DG Competition’) and the parties, as well as weekly status update telephone calls.

| (3) | DG Competition also sent several formal requests for information pursuant to Article 11 of the Merger Regulation to the parties. A state-of-play meeting between DG Competition and the parties took place on 8 June 2012. A second state-of-play meeting took place on 6 August 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

DG Competition also sent several formal requests for information pursuant to Article 11 of the Merger Regulation to the parties. A state-of-play meeting between DG Competition and the parties took place on 8 June 2012. A second state-of-play meeting took place on 6 August 2012.

| (4) | A statement of objections was sent to the parties on 9 August 2012 (the ‘SO’). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

A statement of objections was sent to the parties on 9 August 2012 (the ‘SO’).

2.1.   Access to file: redacted answers in certain market questionnaires

| (5) | The notifying party received access to the file via CD-ROM on 10 August 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The notifying party received access to the file via CD-ROM on 10 August 2012.

| (6) | On 13 August 2012, the notifying party requested clarification regarding, and further access to, the redacted answers in certain market questionnaires. In order to address potential confidentiality issues, the notifying party suggested restricted access to its external advisors only. After an exchange of e-mails and telephone calls, DG Competition agreed to grant the notifying party’s external advisors further access subject to a non-disclosure agreement. Access was granted on 21 August 2012. On 28 August 2012, the notifying party complained to me that access to the file had been unjustifiably delayed, and that this had impaired the ability of the notifying party to fully exercise its rights of defence. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 13 August 2012, the notifying party requested clarification regarding, and further access to, the redacted answers in certain market questionnaires. In order to address potential confidentiality issues, the notifying party suggested restricted access to its external advisors only. After an exchange of e-mails and telephone calls, DG Competition agreed to grant the notifying party’s external advisors further access subject to a non-disclosure agreement. Access was granted on 21 August 2012. On 28 August 2012, the notifying party complained to me that access to the file had been unjustifiably delayed, and that this had impaired the ability of the notifying party to fully exercise its rights of defence.

Factual background

| (7) | In the course of its investigation of the case, DG Competition sent a number of questionnaires to competitors, customers and other market players. These questionnaires were sent in two formats, namely as ‘e-questionnaires’ and ‘Word questionnaires’ (i.e. in MS Word format). The procedural dispute concerned only the e-questionnaires. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In the course of its investigation of the case, DG Competition sent a number of questionnaires to competitors, customers and other market players. These questionnaires were sent in two formats, namely as ‘e-questionnaires’ and ‘Word questionnaires’ (i.e. in MS Word format). The procedural dispute concerned only the e-questionnaires.

| (8) | The e-questionnaires contained mainly two types of questions; the first type required a typed answer, whereas the second required a response in table format. The e-questionnaires were accompanied by an explanatory note on how to answer the questions, particularly on how to deal with confidentiality issues. In both question formats, the e-questionnaire would ask the respondents to indicate whether the responses were considered confidential or not and, if the former, to provide a non-confidential version of the response. However, upon receiving the completed e-questionnaires, DG Competition found that they had not been completed properly by many respondents and decided to carry out additional redactions in order to comply with its duty not to disclose party confidential information. DG Competition received responses that can broadly be classified into three categories:






  — | The first category included respondents who replied correctly to the e-questionnaires and provided appropriate non-confidential versions when requested by the forms (category I information). |
| --- | --- | --- |

(8)

The e-questionnaires contained mainly two types of questions; the first type required a typed answer, whereas the second required a response in table format. The e-questionnaires were accompanied by an explanatory note on how to answer the questions, particularly on how to deal with confidentiality issues. In both question formats, the e-questionnaire would ask the respondents to indicate whether the responses were considered confidential or not and, if the former, to provide a non-confidential version of the response. However, upon receiving the completed e-questionnaires, DG Competition found that they had not been completed properly by many respondents and decided to carry out additional redactions in order to comply with its duty not to disclose party confidential information. DG Competition received responses that can broadly be classified into three categories:

—

The first category included respondents who replied correctly to the e-questionnaires and provided appropriate non-confidential versions when requested by the forms (category I information).

| — | The second category included respondents who had indicated that certain responses were confidential, but provided an exact copy of their confidential response as their non-confidential response (i.e. despite indicating that the response was confidential, no redactions were made to the confidential response) (category II information) (5). |
| --- | --- |

—

The second category included respondents who had indicated that certain responses were confidential, but provided an exact copy of their confidential response as their non-confidential response (i.e. despite indicating that the response was confidential, no redactions were made to the confidential response) (category II information) (5).

| — | The third category included respondents who had indicated that certain responses were not confidential, but where DG Competition believed that such responses were, in fact, confidential vis-à-vis the parties (category III information). |
| --- | --- |

—

The third category included respondents who had indicated that certain responses were not confidential, but where DG Competition believed that such responses were, in fact, confidential vis-à-vis the parties (category III information).

| (9) | DG Competition therefore made additional redactions ex officio to category II and III information. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

DG Competition therefore made additional redactions ex officio to category II and III information.

| (10) | At the time of access to the file on 10 August 2012, the parties were not made aware of this unilateral redaction exercise that was carried out by DG Competition. It was only during the course of the e-mail exchanges and telephone conversations that took place after access to the file was granted that it became clear to the parties that DG Competition had redacted information which respondents had not expressly marked as confidential. DG Competition accepted the notifying party’s suggestion of providing access to the external advisors to the unredacted versions of the e-questionnaire responses it had received, viz. the versions that were submitted by the respondents prior to the DG Competition redaction exercise, on condition that the external advisors sign a non-disclosure agreement. Such access was granted on 21 August 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

At the time of access to the file on 10 August 2012, the parties were not made aware of this unilateral redaction exercise that was carried out by DG Competition. It was only during the course of the e-mail exchanges and telephone conversations that took place after access to the file was granted that it became clear to the parties that DG Competition had redacted information which respondents had not expressly marked as confidential. DG Competition accepted the notifying party’s suggestion of providing access to the external advisors to the unredacted versions of the e-questionnaire responses it had received, viz. the versions that were submitted by the respondents prior to the DG Competition redaction exercise, on condition that the external advisors sign a non-disclosure agreement. Such access was granted on 21 August 2012.

Complaint

| (11) | The notifying party’s complaint referred specifically to the category III information described above. The notifying party disputed the ‘Commission’s unilateral decision to redact a large number of responses which were not deemed confidential by the respondents themselves’ and submitted that the Commission should have addressed this issue with the notifying party prior to access to the file being granted. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The notifying party’s complaint referred specifically to the category III information described above. The notifying party disputed the ‘Commission’s unilateral decision to redact a large number of responses which were not deemed confidential by the respondents themselves’ and submitted that the Commission should have addressed this issue with the notifying party prior to access to the file being granted.

| (12) | On the former point, the notifying party submitted that the Commission may only redact information that is marked as non-confidential in situations where it is not possible to obtain the consent of the data provider for the proposed redactions. Furthermore, it argued that the Commission must provide specific reasons for any unilateral redactions. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

On the former point, the notifying party submitted that the Commission may only redact information that is marked as non-confidential in situations where it is not possible to obtain the consent of the data provider for the proposed redactions. Furthermore, it argued that the Commission must provide specific reasons for any unilateral redactions.

Assessment

| (13) | Having investigated the matter, I am convinced that, in this case, there were justified concerns that category II information providers had not properly understood how to prepare the non-confidential versions of the responses they had marked as confidential. In respect of category III information, there were also justified concerns that information providers had failed to identify information that was confidential. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Having investigated the matter, I am convinced that, in this case, there were justified concerns that category II information providers had not properly understood how to prepare the non-confidential versions of the responses they had marked as confidential. In respect of category III information, there were also justified concerns that information providers had failed to identify information that was confidential.

| (14) | Given the Commission's obligation under Article 339 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to protect business secrets and other confidential information, and given the time constraints which made it impossible to contact all of the information providers to clarify the matter with them (6), it was in my view appropriate for DG Competition to make redactions ex officio. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Given the Commission's obligation under Article 339 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to protect business secrets and other confidential information, and given the time constraints which made it impossible to contact all of the information providers to clarify the matter with them (6), it was in my view appropriate for DG Competition to make redactions ex officio.

| (15) | However, DG Competition should have recorded on the accessible file which redactions it had made, and the reasons for doing so, and should have fully informed the parties. Indeed, while the need for speed in merger proceedings can justify ex officio redactions, it cannot justify not informing the parties to the proceedings of such redactions, and the reasons for them (7). If the parties had been informed about the issue before the access to the file, the solution of granting full access only to the notifying party’s external advisors subject to a non-disclosure agreement could have been reached already at that point in time. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

However, DG Competition should have recorded on the accessible file which redactions it had made, and the reasons for doing so, and should have fully informed the parties. Indeed, while the need for speed in merger proceedings can justify ex officio redactions, it cannot justify not informing the parties to the proceedings of such redactions, and the reasons for them (7). If the parties had been informed about the issue before the access to the file, the solution of granting full access only to the notifying party’s external advisors subject to a non-disclosure agreement could have been reached already at that point in time.

| (16) | Whilst it could be said that there has been a procedural irregularity in the conduct of this case, I consider that such procedural irregularity did not actually infringe the parties’ rights of defence in the present case, given that: (i) the parties accepted the restricted access procedure thereby enabling their external advisors to view and comment on the e-questionnaire responses in their original non-confidential form as submitted by the data providers to the Commission; (ii) the parties did not request an extension of time in respect of the additional access; and (iii) there are no indications that the parties have not been able to comment in full on the additional information they were given. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Whilst it could be said that there has been a procedural irregularity in the conduct of this case, I consider that such procedural irregularity did not actually infringe the parties’ rights of defence in the present case, given that: (i) the parties accepted the restricted access procedure thereby enabling their external advisors to view and comment on the e-questionnaire responses in their original non-confidential form as submitted by the data providers to the Commission; (ii) the parties did not request an extension of time in respect of the additional access; and (iii) there are no indications that the parties have not been able to comment in full on the additional information they were given.

2.2.   Letter of facts

| (17) | On 23 August 2012, at 17.39 — less than 24 hours before the expiry of the deadline to reply to the SO — DG Competition sent to the notifying party a document entitled ‘Letter of facts’, the stated purpose of which was to inform the notifying party about pre-existing factual elements which were not expressly relied on in the SO but which, on further analysis of the file, the Commission had concluded were potentially relevant to substantiate its final decision. In addition, the cover letter indicated that the letter of facts also set out a number of corrections to the SO, where errors had been identified in certain paragraphs as well as a clarification of the information contained in the SO, without altering the conclusions drawn therein. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

On 23 August 2012, at 17.39 — less than 24 hours before the expiry of the deadline to reply to the SO — DG Competition sent to the notifying party a document entitled ‘Letter of facts’, the stated purpose of which was to inform the notifying party about pre-existing factual elements which were not expressly relied on in the SO but which, on further analysis of the file, the Commission had concluded were potentially relevant to substantiate its final decision. In addition, the cover letter indicated that the letter of facts also set out a number of corrections to the SO, where errors had been identified in certain paragraphs as well as a clarification of the information contained in the SO, without altering the conclusions drawn therein.

| (18) | The letter of facts indeed contained two parts. The first part of the letter of facts carried the heading ‘New information/evidence that corroborates the objections already set out in the SO’, and contained a list of quotes from documents in the Commission file, grouped under headings such as ‘Paras. 318-328 (BA)’ or ‘Paras. 383-403 (confidential)’, preceded only by the statement that ‘[t]he Commission draws the (notifying party’s) attention on the following additional evidence in relation to the paragraphs of the SO indicated below’. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The letter of facts indeed contained two parts. The first part of the letter of facts carried the heading ‘New information/evidence that corroborates the objections already set out in the SO’, and contained a list of quotes from documents in the Commission file, grouped under headings such as ‘Paras. 318-328 (BA)’ or ‘Paras. 383-403 (confidential)’, preceded only by the statement that ‘[t]he Commission draws the (notifying party’s) attention on the following additional evidence in relation to the paragraphs of the SO indicated below’.

| (19) | The second part of the letter of facts was entitled ‘Clarification of the information contained in the SO without altering the conclusions drawn in the SO’ and was mainly composed of textual replacements for specific paragraphs of the SO which were said to contain errors. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The second part of the letter of facts was entitled ‘Clarification of the information contained in the SO without altering the conclusions drawn in the SO’ and was mainly composed of textual replacements for specific paragraphs of the SO which were said to contain errors.

| (20) | The notifying party was given until 28 August 2012 at noon (that is, one and a half working day beyond the deadline to reply to the SO) to examine the additional factual elements and to provide its views on the facts as well as on the conclusions the case team drew from them. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The notifying party was given until 28 August 2012 at noon (that is, one and a half working day beyond the deadline to reply to the SO) to examine the additional factual elements and to provide its views on the facts as well as on the conclusions the case team drew from them.

Complaint

| (21) | The notifying party responded to the letter of facts on 28 August 2012. In its response, the notifying party raised ‘serious procedural issues’ with the approach followed by the case team. By separate letter dated 28 August 2012, the notifying party complained to me about ‘serious procedural irregularities’ in that: (i) the letter of facts did not introduce ‘new’ evidence, but contained elements already available to the Commission before it compiled its SO; (ii) the letter of facts did not explain the conclusions drawn by the Commission from the ‘new’ evidence; (iii); the clarifications in the second part of the letter of facts altered the conclusions drawn in the SO; and (iv) the replaced new paragraphs of the SO also contained errors (for which the notifying party provided the corrections). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The notifying party responded to the letter of facts on 28 August 2012. In its response, the notifying party raised ‘serious procedural issues’ with the approach followed by the case team. By separate letter dated 28 August 2012, the notifying party complained to me about ‘serious procedural irregularities’ in that: (i) the letter of facts did not introduce ‘new’ evidence, but contained elements already available to the Commission before it compiled its SO; (ii) the letter of facts did not explain the conclusions drawn by the Commission from the ‘new’ evidence; (iii); the clarifications in the second part of the letter of facts altered the conclusions drawn in the SO; and (iv) the replaced new paragraphs of the SO also contained errors (for which the notifying party provided the corrections).

Assessment

| (22) | As regards the second part of the letter of facts (8), I consider that, where the Commission discovers clerical errors or counting or calculation errors in an SO which it has sent, it is normal that it informs the addressees of the SO of these errors and corrects them as soon as possible. Depending on the circumstances, this may create a need to extend the deadline for responding to the SO. In the present case, the notifying party did not request an extension either of the deadline to reply to the SO or of the additional deadline to respond to the letter of facts. As is apparent from the response to the letter of facts, the notifying party was in fact fully able to respond to the corrigendum. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

As regards the second part of the letter of facts (8), I consider that, where the Commission discovers clerical errors or counting or calculation errors in an SO which it has sent, it is normal that it informs the addressees of the SO of these errors and corrects them as soon as possible. Depending on the circumstances, this may create a need to extend the deadline for responding to the SO. In the present case, the notifying party did not request an extension either of the deadline to reply to the SO or of the additional deadline to respond to the letter of facts. As is apparent from the response to the letter of facts, the notifying party was in fact fully able to respond to the corrigendum.

| (23) | As regards the first part of the letter of facts, there are two issues to be considered: (i) the fact that the letter of facts was sent before the parties had responded to the SO and contained information which was already in the Commission's file when the SO was drafted; and (ii) the lack of explanations as to the conclusions which the Commission intended to draw from the pieces of evidence. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

As regards the first part of the letter of facts, there are two issues to be considered: (i) the fact that the letter of facts was sent before the parties had responded to the SO and contained information which was already in the Commission's file when the SO was drafted; and (ii) the lack of explanations as to the conclusions which the Commission intended to draw from the pieces of evidence.

| (24) | First, the EU Courts have recognised that there is no provision which prevents the Commission from sending to the parties after the statement of objections fresh documents which it considers support its argument, subject to giving the undertakings the necessary time to submit their views on the subject (9). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

First, the EU Courts have recognised that there is no provision which prevents the Commission from sending to the parties after the statement of objections fresh documents which it considers support its argument, subject to giving the undertakings the necessary time to submit their views on the subject (9).

| (25) | However, in my view there is a difference between the situation where the Commission identifies and communicates new evidence in reaction to the response to the SO submitted by the parties, and a situation where the Commission does so before the parties have responded to the SO. It also makes a relevant difference whether new evidence has only become available after the sending of the SO for reasons out of the Commission’s control, for instance due to a late response by a third-party information provider, or whether the information was already available at the time of the drafting of the SO. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

However, in my view there is a difference between the situation where the Commission identifies and communicates new evidence in reaction to the response to the SO submitted by the parties, and a situation where the Commission does so before the parties have responded to the SO. It also makes a relevant difference whether new evidence has only become available after the sending of the SO for reasons out of the Commission’s control, for instance due to a late response by a third-party information provider, or whether the information was already available at the time of the drafting of the SO.

| (26) | Sending a letter of facts before the response to the SO, containing information which was already in the file when the SO was drafted, without giving a new time limit for responding to the SO of equal length as the initial time limit, amounts in my view to a circumvention of the normal deadlines for the sending of the SO and the response. Therefore, this should in my view be avoided. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Sending a letter of facts before the response to the SO, containing information which was already in the file when the SO was drafted, without giving a new time limit for responding to the SO of equal length as the initial time limit, amounts in my view to a circumvention of the normal deadlines for the sending of the SO and the response. Therefore, this should in my view be avoided.

| (27) | Second, it is clear that the Commission cannot use in its final decision evidence on which the parties have not been allowed to give their views. According to the relevant case law, ‘the important point is not the documents as such but the conclusions which the Commission has drawn from them’ (10). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Second, it is clear that the Commission cannot use in its final decision evidence on which the parties have not been allowed to give their views. According to the relevant case law, ‘the important point is not the documents as such but the conclusions which the Commission has drawn from them’ (10).

| (28) | In my view, the mere reference in the first part of the letter of facts to paragraph numbers in the SO (see point 18 above) does not suffice as an explanation of what conclusions the Commission intended to draw from the quoted pieces of evidence. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In my view, the mere reference in the first part of the letter of facts to paragraph numbers in the SO (see point 18 above) does not suffice as an explanation of what conclusions the Commission intended to draw from the quoted pieces of evidence.

| (29) | However, the Commission determined in the end that the evidence contained in the first part of the letter of facts was not necessary to support the draft decision. Since this evidence has not been relied upon by the Commission in the draft decision, the parties’ procedural rights, specifically their right to be heard, have thus not been impaired. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

However, the Commission determined in the end that the evidence contained in the first part of the letter of facts was not necessary to support the draft decision. Since this evidence has not been relied upon by the Commission in the draft decision, the parties’ procedural rights, specifically their right to be heard, have thus not been impaired.

3.   ORAL PROCEDURE

| (30) | The formal oral hearing was held on 30 August 2012 and was attended by: the parties and their legal and economic advisors; the relevant Commission services; and representatives from the competent authorities of six Member States, i.e. Germany, France, Hungary, Poland, Finland and Sweden. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The formal oral hearing was held on 30 August 2012 and was attended by: the parties and their legal and economic advisors; the relevant Commission services; and representatives from the competent authorities of six Member States, i.e. Germany, France, Hungary, Poland, Finland and Sweden.

4.   PROCEDURE AFTER THE FORMAL ORAL HEARING

4.1.   Remedies

| (31) | The Commission and the parties started engaging in discussions on possible remedies shortly before the issuance of the SO. On 19 September 2012, the notifying party submitted a formal remedy package consisting in the divestment of a combination of its assets in Sweden, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom and France. The Commission launched a market test on this remedy proposal on 20 September 2012. Upon the Commission's suggestion, the parties also appointed experts to provide an independent analysis of the remedies. On the basis of its assessment, the Commission concluded that the remedies submitted on 19 September 2012 would not solve the competition concerns identified by the Commission, as they raised serious doubts as to whether the assets to be divested would be competitive and viable in the form proposed by the parties, whether a suitable purchaser could be found, and whether such purchaser would have the ability and incentive to compete effectively and on a lasting basis in the EEA CR market. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The Commission and the parties started engaging in discussions on possible remedies shortly before the issuance of the SO. On 19 September 2012, the notifying party submitted a formal remedy package consisting in the divestment of a combination of its assets in Sweden, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom and France. The Commission launched a market test on this remedy proposal on 20 September 2012. Upon the Commission's suggestion, the parties also appointed experts to provide an independent analysis of the remedies. On the basis of its assessment, the Commission concluded that the remedies submitted on 19 September 2012 would not solve the competition concerns identified by the Commission, as they raised serious doubts as to whether the assets to be divested would be competitive and viable in the form proposed by the parties, whether a suitable purchaser could be found, and whether such purchaser would have the ability and incentive to compete effectively and on a lasting basis in the EEA CR market.

| (32) | The parties, therefore, submitted revised remedies to the Commission on, respectively, 1 and 9 October 2012. These revised offers, however, did not alter the Commission's initial assessment. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The parties, therefore, submitted revised remedies to the Commission on, respectively, 1 and 9 October 2012. These revised offers, however, did not alter the Commission's initial assessment.

| (33) | On 19 October 2012, the notifying party submitted further revised remedies, which included a more extended offer of assets for divestment, in particular, as regards certain production lines at Inoxum's production site in Terni, Italy. The Commission concluded that the revised remedies of 19 October 2012 were sufficient to address the concerns which the Commission had raised regarding the compatibility of the proposed transaction with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

On 19 October 2012, the notifying party submitted further revised remedies, which included a more extended offer of assets for divestment, in particular, as regards certain production lines at Inoxum's production site in Terni, Italy. The Commission concluded that the revised remedies of 19 October 2012 were sufficient to address the concerns which the Commission had raised regarding the compatibility of the proposed transaction with the internal market.

5.   THE DRAFT DECISION

| (34) | Pursuant to Article 16(1) of Decision 2011/695/EU, the final report shall consider whether the draft decision deals only with objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Pursuant to Article 16(1) of Decision 2011/695/EU, the final report shall consider whether the draft decision deals only with objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views.

| (35) | Upon review of the draft decision, I conclude that it does not deal with any objection in respect of which the parties have not been afforded the opportunity of making known their views. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Upon review of the draft decision, I conclude that it does not deal with any objection in respect of which the parties have not been afforded the opportunity of making known their views.

6.   CONCLUSION

| (36) | I conclude that the effective exercise of the procedural rights of the parties has been respected in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

I conclude that the effective exercise of the procedural rights of the parties has been respected in this case.

Brussels, 30 October 2012.

Wouter WILS

---

(1)  Pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 275, 20.10.2011, p. 29) (‘Decision 2011/695/EU’).

1

(2)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

2

(3)  OJ C 116, 20.4.2012, p. 4.

3

(4)  OJ C 154, 31.5.2012, p. 2.

4

(5)  The e-questionnaires automatically copy/paste the confidential response into the non-confidential response box when a respondent indicates that its response is confidential, so it is then up to the respondent to redact any information which is confidential. If the respondent does not react to the prompt from the e-questionnaire, the non-confidential version of the response will reflect the confidential version.

5

(6)  As the EU Courts have recognised, the conduct of proceedings in merger cases, including the exercise of the right to be heard, must be adapted to the need for speed, which characterises the general scheme of the Merger Regulation and which requires the Commission to comply with strict time limits for the adoption of the final decision: Judgments of the General Court of 27 November 1997 in Case T-290/94 Kaysersberg v Commission [1997] ECR II-2186, paragraph 113, of 28 April 1999 in Case T-221/95 Endemol Entertainment v Commission [1999] ECR II-1330, paragraph 84, of 22 October 2002 in Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] ECR II-4071, paragraph 100, and of 4 February 2009 in Case T-145/06 Omya v Commission [2009] ECR II-145, paragraph 33, and of the Court of Justice of 10 July 2008 in Case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Commission [2008] ECR I-4951, paragraphs 49 and 90-91.

6

Kaysersberg

Commission

Endemol Entertainment

Commission

Schneider Electric

Commission

Omya

Commission

Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America

Commission

(7)  Compare with Judgment of the General Court of 25 October 2002 in Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR II-4389, paragraph 105.

7

Tetra Laval

Commission

(8)  ‘Letter of facts’ would appear to be a misnomer for what was in reality a corrigendum to the SO.

8

(9)  Case T-334/94 Sarrió v Commission [1998] ECR II-1439, paragraphs 40-41, and Case T-23/99 LR AF 1998 v Commission [2002] ECR II-1705, paragraph 190.

9

Sarrió

Commission

LR AF 1998

Commission

(10)  Case 107/82 AEG-Telefunken v Commission [1983] ECR 3151, paragraph 27.

10

AEG-Telefunken

Commission

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| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/11

---

Summary of Commission Decision

of 7 November 2012

declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement

(Case COMP/M.6471 — Outokumpu/Inoxum)

(notified under document C(2012) 7969)

(Only the English text is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 312/06

On 7 November 2012 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings
   (1), and in particular Article 8(2) of that Regulation. A non-confidential version of the full Decision can be found in the authentic language of the case and in the working languages of the Commission on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address:

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html

I.   THE PARTIES

| (1) | Outokumpu Oyj (‘Outokumpu’, Finland)is a Finnish public company listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Outokumpu is active in the production, sale and distribution of stainless steel products and the production of ferrochrome. It has stainless steel production facilities located in Tornio (Finland), Avesta, Nyby, Degerfors and Kloster (Sweden), Sheffield (United Kingdom), New Castle and Richburg (United States of America, ‘USA’), as well as a ferrochrome mine in Kemi (Finland). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Outokumpu Oyj (‘Outokumpu’, Finland)is a Finnish public company listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Outokumpu is active in the production, sale and distribution of stainless steel products and the production of ferrochrome. It has stainless steel production facilities located in Tornio (Finland), Avesta, Nyby, Degerfors and Kloster (Sweden), Sheffield (United Kingdom), New Castle and Richburg (United States of America, ‘USA’), as well as a ferrochrome mine in Kemi (Finland).

| (2) | Inoxum GmbH and Nirosta GmbH (together, ‘Inoxum’, Germany) are the stainless steel division of ThyssenKrupp AG (‘TK’, Germany). Inoxum is active in the production, sale and distribution of stainless steel products, high performance alloys (‘HPA’) and forging. Inoxum's main stainless steel production facilities are in Krefeld, Bochum and Dillenburg (Germany), Terni (Italy), and outside Europe, in San Luis Potosi (‘Mexinox’) (Mexico), Calvert (USA) and Shanghai (Shanghai Krupp Stainless, ‘SKS’) (China). Inoxum is currently solely controlled by TK. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Inoxum GmbH and Nirosta GmbH (together, ‘Inoxum’, Germany) are the stainless steel division of ThyssenKrupp AG (‘TK’, Germany). Inoxum is active in the production, sale and distribution of stainless steel products, high performance alloys (‘HPA’) and forging. Inoxum's main stainless steel production facilities are in Krefeld, Bochum and Dillenburg (Germany), Terni (Italy), and outside Europe, in San Luis Potosi (‘Mexinox’) (Mexico), Calvert (USA) and Shanghai (Shanghai Krupp Stainless, ‘SKS’) (China). Inoxum is currently solely controlled by TK.

II.   THE OPERATION

| (3) | On 10 April 2012, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation by which Outokumpu acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of Inoxum, by way of purchase of shares (2). Outokumpu and Inoxum are hereinafter referred to as ‘the Parties’. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 10 April 2012, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation by which Outokumpu acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of Inoxum, by way of purchase of shares (2). Outokumpu and Inoxum are hereinafter referred to as ‘the Parties’.

III.   UNION DIMENSION

| (4) | The undertakings concerned had in 2010 a combined aggregate world-wide turnover of more than EUR 5 000 million (3) (Outokumpu: EUR 4 229 million; Inoxum: EUR 6 739 million). The aggregate Union-wide turnover of each of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 250 million (Outokumpu: EUR [...] million; Inoxum: EUR [...] million). Finally, none of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Union-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. The proposed transaction therefore has a Union dimension pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The undertakings concerned had in 2010 a combined aggregate world-wide turnover of more than EUR 5 000 million (3) (Outokumpu: EUR 4 229 million; Inoxum: EUR 6 739 million). The aggregate Union-wide turnover of each of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 250 million (Outokumpu: EUR [...] million; Inoxum: EUR [...] million). Finally, none of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Union-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. The proposed transaction therefore has a Union dimension pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation.

IV.   THE PROCEDURE

| (5) | On 21 May 2012, the Commission adopted an Article 6(1)(c) decision in which the Commission raised serious doubts as to the compatibility of the transaction with the internal market. Outokumpu submitted its written comments to the Article 6(1)(c) decision on 4 June 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 21 May 2012, the Commission adopted an Article 6(1)(c) decision in which the Commission raised serious doubts as to the compatibility of the transaction with the internal market. Outokumpu submitted its written comments to the Article 6(1)(c) decision on 4 June 2012.

| (6) | On 9 August 2012, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections (‘SO’) pursuant to Article 18 of the Merger Regulation. Outokumpu replied to the SO on 24 August 2012. |
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(6)

On 9 August 2012, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections (‘SO’) pursuant to Article 18 of the Merger Regulation. Outokumpu replied to the SO on 24 August 2012.

| (7) | On 30 August 2012, an oral hearing took place. |
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(7)

On 30 August 2012, an oral hearing took place.

| (8) | On 19 September 2012, Outokumpu submitted commitments pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation (‘the Proposed Commitments’). Following the submission of the Proposed Commitments, the Commission launched a market test in order to gather competitors', customers' and other market participants' views on these commitments. |
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(8)

On 19 September 2012, Outokumpu submitted commitments pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation (‘the Proposed Commitments’). Following the submission of the Proposed Commitments, the Commission launched a market test in order to gather competitors', customers' and other market participants' views on these commitments.

| (9) | On 1 October 2012, Outokumpu submitted a revised set of commitments (‘the Revised Commitments’). The Commission launched a market test on the Revised Commitments on the same day. |
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(9)

On 1 October 2012, Outokumpu submitted a revised set of commitments (‘the Revised Commitments’). The Commission launched a market test on the Revised Commitments on the same day.

| (10) | On 9 October 2012, Outokumpu submitted a slightly modified version of the Revised Commitments. |
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(10)

On 9 October 2012, Outokumpu submitted a slightly modified version of the Revised Commitments.

| (11) | On 19 October 2012, Outokumpu submitted a final set of commitments (‘the Final Commitments’). |
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(11)

On 19 October 2012, Outokumpu submitted a final set of commitments (‘the Final Commitments’).

| (12) | The meeting of the Advisory Committee took place on 25 October 2012. The Advisory Committee discussed the draft of this Decision and issued a favourable opinion. |
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(12)

The meeting of the Advisory Committee took place on 25 October 2012. The Advisory Committee discussed the draft of this Decision and issued a favourable opinion.

V.   THE RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS

| (13) | The transaction gives rise to a number of overlaps in the stainless steel market. In particular, the Parties horizontally overlap in the production of (i) slabs (ii) hot rolled products, (iii) cold rolled (‘CR’) products, (iv) precision strip, as well as, (v) in the market for distribution of stainless steel products. In addition, the transaction leads to few vertical relationships between the Parties. |
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(13)

The transaction gives rise to a number of overlaps in the stainless steel market. In particular, the Parties horizontally overlap in the production of (i) slabs (ii) hot rolled products, (iii) cold rolled (‘CR’) products, (iv) precision strip, as well as, (v) in the market for distribution of stainless steel products. In addition, the transaction leads to few vertical relationships between the Parties.

| (14) | In the present decision, the Commission raises competition concerns as to the compatibility of the transaction with the Internal Market with regard to the EEA market for CR products. Accordingly, only this market will be discussed in this summary note. |
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(14)

In the present decision, the Commission raises competition concerns as to the compatibility of the transaction with the Internal Market with regard to the EEA market for CR products. Accordingly, only this market will be discussed in this summary note.

Cold rolled flat products

| (15) | Stainless steel is defined as a steel alloy with a minimum content of 10,5 % chromium and a maximum of 1,2 % carbon. |
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(15)

Stainless steel is defined as a steel alloy with a minimum content of 10,5 % chromium and a maximum of 1,2 % carbon.

| (16) | For certain applications, stainless steel competes with a variety of materials such as aluminium, copper, plastics, ceramics, composites or carbon steel. However, its properties make it uniquely suitable for certain applications in process engineering, automobile, white goods, etc. One of the main properties of stainless steel is its resistance to corrosion. |
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(16)

For certain applications, stainless steel competes with a variety of materials such as aluminium, copper, plastics, ceramics, composites or carbon steel. However, its properties make it uniquely suitable for certain applications in process engineering, automobile, white goods, etc. One of the main properties of stainless steel is its resistance to corrosion.

| (17) | In previous decisions, the Commission has considered that one overall market for CR exists (4). The Commission has not considered appropriate to divide the market according to further segmentations such as by type of surface finish, grades, widths or end application. |
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(17)

In previous decisions, the Commission has considered that one overall market for CR exists (4). The Commission has not considered appropriate to divide the market according to further segmentations such as by type of surface finish, grades, widths or end application.

| (18) | During Phase I and II, the Commission has further investigated whether the market for CR could be further segmented. In particular, the market investigation focused on whether market segmentations by grade, grade family, commodities vs. specialties, surface finish, and end application could be taken into consideration. Each of these potential market divisions will be discussed below. |
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(18)

During Phase I and II, the Commission has further investigated whether the market for CR could be further segmented. In particular, the market investigation focused on whether market segmentations by grade, grade family, commodities vs. specialties, surface finish, and end application could be taken into consideration. Each of these potential market divisions will be discussed below.

Families and grades of stainless steel

| (19) | According to their chemical composition and crystalline structure, four main families of stainless steel can be distinguished: (i) austenitics, (ii) ferritics, (iii) martensitics, and (iv) duplex. Each of the families presents different chemical composition and physical properties. |
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(19)

According to their chemical composition and crystalline structure, four main families of stainless steel can be distinguished: (i) austenitics, (ii) ferritics, (iii) martensitics, and (iv) duplex. Each of the families presents different chemical composition and physical properties.

| (20) | However, given the high degree of supply side substitutability between the different grades and grade families, an overall market for all CR products will be considered for the purpose of this Decision. |
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(20)

However, given the high degree of supply side substitutability between the different grades and grade families, an overall market for all CR products will be considered for the purpose of this Decision.

Commodities vs. specialties

| (21) | Commodity grades usually cover a very wide range of applications (ca. [70-80] % of the market), whereas specialty grades represent [30-40] % of the market. There is no clear-cut and industry-wide definition of which grades can be qualified as specialty grades. |
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(21)

Commodity grades usually cover a very wide range of applications (ca. [70-80] % of the market), whereas specialty grades represent [30-40] % of the market. There is no clear-cut and industry-wide definition of which grades can be qualified as specialty grades.

| (22) | On the basis of the information collected during the market investigation, the Commission confirmed that there is a high degree of supply side substitution between the different grades, regardless of being commodities or specialty grades. Consequently, the Commission considers, in line with the submissions of the Parties, that no separate market by type of grades should be considered in this case. |
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(22)

On the basis of the information collected during the market investigation, the Commission confirmed that there is a high degree of supply side substitution between the different grades, regardless of being commodities or specialty grades. Consequently, the Commission considers, in line with the submissions of the Parties, that no separate market by type of grades should be considered in this case.

Distinction by surface finish

| (23) | While there is a variety of CR surface finishes, the most common ones are 2D, 2B and BA finishes. There also exist other surface finishes which appear to be frequently used in the industry. The market investigation has confirmed that most producers and distributors have the equipment needed to produce the different surface finishes. The only exception is BA finish which requires special and dedicated equipment, as well as an investment of EUR 220 million to acquire a BA line. |
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(23)

While there is a variety of CR surface finishes, the most common ones are 2D, 2B and BA finishes. There also exist other surface finishes which appear to be frequently used in the industry. The market investigation has confirmed that most producers and distributors have the equipment needed to produce the different surface finishes. The only exception is BA finish which requires special and dedicated equipment, as well as an investment of EUR 220 million to acquire a BA line.

| (24) | For the purposes of this decision, the overall market for the production and supply of CR products, independently of their surface finish, will be considered as well as the effects of the transaction on possible BA and non-BA segments. |
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(24)

For the purposes of this decision, the overall market for the production and supply of CR products, independently of their surface finish, will be considered as well as the effects of the transaction on possible BA and non-BA segments.

Distinction by end application

| (25) | Depending on the end use or application, a grade with certain mechanical characteristics is required. In general terms, grade selection for a specific end-use application depends on requirements relating to, inter alia, corrosion resistance, heat resistance, strength, aesthetics and workability. |
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(25)

Depending on the end use or application, a grade with certain mechanical characteristics is required. In general terms, grade selection for a specific end-use application depends on requirements relating to, inter alia, corrosion resistance, heat resistance, strength, aesthetics and workability.

| (26) | The Commission's investigation has confirmed that a variety of grades and grade families are used in the same end application. Moreover, many grades are used in a variety of end applications. Consequently, the Commission considers, in line with the submissions of the Parties, that no market segmentation by end application should be considered in this case. |
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(26)

The Commission's investigation has confirmed that a variety of grades and grade families are used in the same end application. Moreover, many grades are used in a variety of end applications. Consequently, the Commission considers, in line with the submissions of the Parties, that no market segmentation by end application should be considered in this case.

VI.   THE RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS

Market for Cold rolled (CR)

| (27) | In previous decisions, the Commission has considered the possible scope of the market for CR as either not wider than Western Europe or at least Community-wide (5). However, the definition of the relevant geographic market was ultimately left open. |
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(27)

In previous decisions, the Commission has considered the possible scope of the market for CR as either not wider than Western Europe or at least Community-wide (5). However, the definition of the relevant geographic market was ultimately left open.

| (28) | The Parties consider the geographic market for all stainless steel products, including CR, to be at least EEA-wide. |
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(28)

The Parties consider the geographic market for all stainless steel products, including CR, to be at least EEA-wide.

| (29) | In its Phase I investigation, the Commission found evidence that confirmed that the market for CR is not wider than the EEA: (i) there remain significant differences in the price for CR in different areas of the world even for CR of the most common commodity grades, which cannot be justified by transport costs only; (ii) more than half of the customers responding to the Commission’s requests for information during Phase I investigation indicated that they have never purchased CR from a non-European producer, regardless of the grade family or different grades; (iii) the Parties have provided econometric evidence and critical elasticity analysis which does not support a geographic scope of the market wider than the EEA. |
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(29)

In its Phase I investigation, the Commission found evidence that confirmed that the market for CR is not wider than the EEA: (i) there remain significant differences in the price for CR in different areas of the world even for CR of the most common commodity grades, which cannot be justified by transport costs only; (ii) more than half of the customers responding to the Commission’s requests for information during Phase I investigation indicated that they have never purchased CR from a non-European producer, regardless of the grade family or different grades; (iii) the Parties have provided econometric evidence and critical elasticity analysis which does not support a geographic scope of the market wider than the EEA.

| (30) | Furthermore, and according to the responses to the Commission's Phase II market investigation, customers do not regard CR imported from Asia as a full substitute for EEA CR because of (i) longer lead time, (ii) quality related issues, (iii) different payment conditions and (iv) range of products available (certain products are only produced in the EEA). |
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(30)

Furthermore, and according to the responses to the Commission's Phase II market investigation, customers do not regard CR imported from Asia as a full substitute for EEA CR because of (i) longer lead time, (ii) quality related issues, (iii) different payment conditions and (iv) range of products available (certain products are only produced in the EEA).

| (31) | For the purposes of this decision, the Commission concludes that the geographic scope of the market for the production and supply of CR flat products is not wider than the EEA. |
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(31)

For the purposes of this decision, the Commission concludes that the geographic scope of the market for the production and supply of CR flat products is not wider than the EEA.

VII.   ASSESSMENT

EEA Market for CR

(i)   Assessment of the effects of the proposed transaction on market shares and concentration levels

| (32) | The proposed transaction reduces the number of European integrated players from 4 to 3, with number 1 and 2 on the market merging. Inoxum is currently the largest producer and supplier of CR active in the EEA with a market share of [30-40] %. Outokumpu is the second largest player in the same market with a share of [10-20] %. The transaction, thus, will give rise to a combined market share of [50-60] % in the overall market for the production and supply of CR, and even larger combined shares in relation to important segments such as austenitic grades 304 ([50-60] %) and 316 ([60-70] %). Combined capacity shares will also be above 50 %. |
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(32)

The proposed transaction reduces the number of European integrated players from 4 to 3, with number 1 and 2 on the market merging. Inoxum is currently the largest producer and supplier of CR active in the EEA with a market share of [30-40] %. Outokumpu is the second largest player in the same market with a share of [10-20] %. The transaction, thus, will give rise to a combined market share of [50-60] % in the overall market for the production and supply of CR, and even larger combined shares in relation to important segments such as austenitic grades 304 ([50-60] %) and 316 ([60-70] %). Combined capacity shares will also be above 50 %.

| (33) | Furthermore, the combined entity will be three times larger than the next EEA competitors post-merger, i.e. Aperam with [10-20] % and, five times bigger than the third competitor, Acerinox with [10-20] %. All other competitors including Asian producers supplying imports into Europe are small with shares generally well below [0-5] %. |
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(33)

Furthermore, the combined entity will be three times larger than the next EEA competitors post-merger, i.e. Aperam with [10-20] % and, five times bigger than the third competitor, Acerinox with [10-20] %. All other competitors including Asian producers supplying imports into Europe are small with shares generally well below [0-5] %.

| (34) | According to well-established case-law, very large market shares — 50 % or more — may in themselves be evidence of the existence of a dominant position (6). In the present case, the market shares, the increments and the difference between the merged entity and its next competitor are however particularly large. Moreover, the stainless steel industry is a mature sector, where market shares and concentration levels provide an important and strong first indication of market power. The Commission therefore concludes that high market shares in this case constitute a strong first indication that the proposed transaction will result in non-coordinated effects in the EEA market for CR by means of the creation of a dominant position. |
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(34)

According to well-established case-law, very large market shares — 50 % or more — may in themselves be evidence of the existence of a dominant position (6). In the present case, the market shares, the increments and the difference between the merged entity and its next competitor are however particularly large. Moreover, the stainless steel industry is a mature sector, where market shares and concentration levels provide an important and strong first indication of market power. The Commission therefore concludes that high market shares in this case constitute a strong first indication that the proposed transaction will result in non-coordinated effects in the EEA market for CR by means of the creation of a dominant position.

(ii)   Entry in the CR market is unlikely

| (35) | Although there are no legal barriers to entry in the EEA CR market, the investments required to enter the market are very high, given that the industry is a capital intensive business. As such, entry in the future is unlikely. |
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(35)

Although there are no legal barriers to entry in the EEA CR market, the investments required to enter the market are very high, given that the industry is a capital intensive business. As such, entry in the future is unlikely.

(iii)   Theory of harm

| (36) | In the context of the assessment framework set by paragraph 24 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Commission assessed all the factors that are relevant to assess the impact of the proposed transaction on the EEA market for CR and concluded that the proposed transaction is likely to result in a significant impediment to effective competition on the EEA market for CR, in particular through non-coordinated effects by means of the creation of a dominant position. |
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(36)

In the context of the assessment framework set by paragraph 24 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Commission assessed all the factors that are relevant to assess the impact of the proposed transaction on the EEA market for CR and concluded that the proposed transaction is likely to result in a significant impediment to effective competition on the EEA market for CR, in particular through non-coordinated effects by means of the creation of a dominant position.

| (37) | The Parties however submit that the Commission's theory of harm is flawed, as overcapacity implies that the rivals of the merged entity will react to a price increase from the latter, thereby offsetting any anticompetitive effect of the proposed transaction. |
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(37)

The Parties however submit that the Commission's theory of harm is flawed, as overcapacity implies that the rivals of the merged entity will react to a price increase from the latter, thereby offsetting any anticompetitive effect of the proposed transaction.

| (38) | The Commission notes that even in markets which are characterised by excess capacity at the industry level, a merger which leads to a substantial consolidation of production capacities can be expected to entail non-coordinated effects as described in paragraph 24 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. This is because by combining the capacities of the merging parties, a merger eliminates the pre-merger competitive pressure between the merging parties, thereby reducing the competitive pressure on the merged entity compared to the competitive pressure on each of the merging firms pre-merger. |
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(38)

The Commission notes that even in markets which are characterised by excess capacity at the industry level, a merger which leads to a substantial consolidation of production capacities can be expected to entail non-coordinated effects as described in paragraph 24 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. This is because by combining the capacities of the merging parties, a merger eliminates the pre-merger competitive pressure between the merging parties, thereby reducing the competitive pressure on the merged entity compared to the competitive pressure on each of the merging firms pre-merger.

| (39) | The Parties also claim that the Commission's theory of harm is based on the underlying assumption that the market presents pre-merger elements of coordination. According to the Parties, the Commission's conclusion that the competitive constraints from rivals would not be sufficient to defeat a post-merger price increase relies on the existence of coordinated effects. |
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(39)

The Parties also claim that the Commission's theory of harm is based on the underlying assumption that the market presents pre-merger elements of coordination. According to the Parties, the Commission's conclusion that the competitive constraints from rivals would not be sufficient to defeat a post-merger price increase relies on the existence of coordinated effects.

| (40) | The Commission notes that its theory of harm is entirely based on non-coordinated effects both pre- and post-merger, including its assessment of the competitive constraint on the merged entity from its EEA rivals. The Commission’s assessment however observes that competition in the EEA market for CR is not as intense as the Parties' arguments suggest. This may be due to a number of factors, such as a small search or switching costs for customers to switch suppliers; small costs for suppliers to change their production mix; multi-sourcing strategies by customers; and a limited but appreciable degree of geographic differentiation between suppliers. |
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(40)

The Commission notes that its theory of harm is entirely based on non-coordinated effects both pre- and post-merger, including its assessment of the competitive constraint on the merged entity from its EEA rivals. The Commission’s assessment however observes that competition in the EEA market for CR is not as intense as the Parties' arguments suggest. This may be due to a number of factors, such as a small search or switching costs for customers to switch suppliers; small costs for suppliers to change their production mix; multi-sourcing strategies by customers; and a limited but appreciable degree of geographic differentiation between suppliers.

| (41) | In the Commission's view, the pre-merger situation is consistent with non-coordinated competition between EEA producers. Its theory of harm does not rely on the existence of coordinated effects pre-or post-merger. |
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(41)

In the Commission's view, the pre-merger situation is consistent with non-coordinated competition between EEA producers. Its theory of harm does not rely on the existence of coordinated effects pre-or post-merger.

(iv)   Loss of competition between the Parties due to the transaction

| (42) | The transaction gives rise to a significant overlap of actual mutual customers of the Parties. The overlaps between the Parties by grade families, finishes as well as in important customer segments would be very significant. |
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(42)

The transaction gives rise to a significant overlap of actual mutual customers of the Parties. The overlaps between the Parties by grade families, finishes as well as in important customer segments would be very significant.

| (43) | The merged entity will obtain increased power in negotiations with overlapping customers. Furthermore, multi-sourcing strategies by customers imply that the transaction is likely to produce more competitive harm than a 4 to 3 merger in an industry without such multi-sourcing. |
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(43)

The merged entity will obtain increased power in negotiations with overlapping customers. Furthermore, multi-sourcing strategies by customers imply that the transaction is likely to produce more competitive harm than a 4 to 3 merger in an industry without such multi-sourcing.

| (44) | There is also a limited number of customers who can only purchase from the Parties. For these customers, the proposed transaction is likely to have even more detrimental effects. |
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(44)

There is also a limited number of customers who can only purchase from the Parties. For these customers, the proposed transaction is likely to have even more detrimental effects.

| (45) | The planned transaction, therefore, will lead to an important loss of competition between the Parties. |
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(45)

The planned transaction, therefore, will lead to an important loss of competition between the Parties.

(v)   Likely reaction of imports to a CR price increase in the EEA caused by the proposed transaction

| (46) | Imports account for approximately [10-20] % of the EEA market. In 2011, imports were slightly lower than export from the EEA to the rest of the world. The EEA is therefore a net exporter of CR. |
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(46)

Imports account for approximately [10-20] % of the EEA market. In 2011, imports were slightly lower than export from the EEA to the rest of the world. The EEA is therefore a net exporter of CR.

| (47) | Non-European competitors mainly import in the EEA via independent distributors (around [90-100] % of the imports reach the EEA market via distributors). Moreover, imports represent a fringe of players with limited sales and presence in the EEA. |
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(47)

Non-European competitors mainly import in the EEA via independent distributors (around [90-100] % of the imports reach the EEA market via distributors). Moreover, imports represent a fringe of players with limited sales and presence in the EEA.

| (48) | According to the responses to the Commission's market investigation, customers do not regard CR imported from Asia as a full substitute for EEA CR. This is because of lead time, quality issues, payment conditions and range of products available. |
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(48)

According to the responses to the Commission's market investigation, customers do not regard CR imported from Asia as a full substitute for EEA CR. This is because of lead time, quality issues, payment conditions and range of products available.

| (49) | The Commission also found that the price competitiveness of imports depends on a number of variable factors, including fluctuations in the nickel price, currency exchange rates and relative cost-effectiveness of nickel pig iron. |
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(49)

The Commission also found that the price competitiveness of imports depends on a number of variable factors, including fluctuations in the nickel price, currency exchange rates and relative cost-effectiveness of nickel pig iron.

| (50) | The market investigation also revealed that it is not likely that imports from Asia will exercise in the near future a significantly stronger constraint on European producers. First, POSCO, a strong Korean competitor, is building a new CR facility in Turkey which will primarily supply the Turkish market, and will be unlikely to affect the EEA market to any significant extent. Second, the cost competitiveness of Asian players is likely to decrease in the future. Inter alia, the ban on exports of nickel ore from Indonesia is likely to negatively impact Chinese players' competitiveness. Thirdly, the spare capacity of Asian and Chinese players appears to be likely to decrease in the future. |
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(50)

The market investigation also revealed that it is not likely that imports from Asia will exercise in the near future a significantly stronger constraint on European producers. First, POSCO, a strong Korean competitor, is building a new CR facility in Turkey which will primarily supply the Turkish market, and will be unlikely to affect the EEA market to any significant extent. Second, the cost competitiveness of Asian players is likely to decrease in the future. Inter alia, the ban on exports of nickel ore from Indonesia is likely to negatively impact Chinese players' competitiveness. Thirdly, the spare capacity of Asian and Chinese players appears to be likely to decrease in the future.

| (51) | Quantitative evidence also shows that the constraint from imports from Asia is unlikely to be sufficient to prevent a price increase. The Commission acknowledges that imports from Asia represent a certain competitive constraint on EEA producers. However, the quantitative evidence demonstrated that import reactions to a price increase would need to be substantially stronger to eliminate the risk of a price increase. Imports are thus unlikely to be a sufficient constraint to prevent price increases post-merger. |
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(51)

Quantitative evidence also shows that the constraint from imports from Asia is unlikely to be sufficient to prevent a price increase. The Commission acknowledges that imports from Asia represent a certain competitive constraint on EEA producers. However, the quantitative evidence demonstrated that import reactions to a price increase would need to be substantially stronger to eliminate the risk of a price increase. Imports are thus unlikely to be a sufficient constraint to prevent price increases post-merger.

(vi)   Assessment of the competitive constraint on the merged entity from its European competitors (Aperam and Acerinox)

| (52) | The Parties' EEA competitors have substantial levels of spare capacity which, according to the Parties, would award them the ability and incentive to make a post-merger price increase unprofitable for the merged entity. |
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(52)

The Parties' EEA competitors have substantial levels of spare capacity which, according to the Parties, would award them the ability and incentive to make a post-merger price increase unprofitable for the merged entity.

| (53) | As regards ability, the Commission's assessment has shown that nameplate capacity utilisation is likely to overstate the degree of spare capacity held by competitors given that: (i) 100 % nameplate capacity utilisation is not achievable and sustainable in the long run; (ii) actual expansion possibilities by rivals are further reduced by mothballing and capacity suspensions; and (iii) overcapacity is likely to decrease naturally during the next years as a result of growing demand. Nevertheless the Commission concludes that Aperam and Acerinox have a certain degree of spare capacity which would possibly be sufficient to provide these firms with the ability to expand output sufficiently to make a post-merger price increase unprofitable for the merged entity. |
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(53)

As regards ability, the Commission's assessment has shown that nameplate capacity utilisation is likely to overstate the degree of spare capacity held by competitors given that: (i) 100 % nameplate capacity utilisation is not achievable and sustainable in the long run; (ii) actual expansion possibilities by rivals are further reduced by mothballing and capacity suspensions; and (iii) overcapacity is likely to decrease naturally during the next years as a result of growing demand. Nevertheless the Commission concludes that Aperam and Acerinox have a certain degree of spare capacity which would possibly be sufficient to provide these firms with the ability to expand output sufficiently to make a post-merger price increase unprofitable for the merged entity.

| (54) | However, the Commission considers that neither Aperam nor Acerinox will have incentives to aggressively compete with the merged entity after the transaction. |
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(54)

However, the Commission considers that neither Aperam nor Acerinox will have incentives to aggressively compete with the merged entity after the transaction.

| (55) | According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (paragraph 9) and to economic theory in the case of the assessment of non-coordinated effects, the pre-merger situation provides the relevant counterfactual for the assessment of mergers. |
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(55)

According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (paragraph 9) and to economic theory in the case of the assessment of non-coordinated effects, the pre-merger situation provides the relevant counterfactual for the assessment of mergers.

| (56) | In the case at hand, pre-merger price competition between European producers is not very intense as indicated by the coexistence of positive margins and excess capacity. This implies a certain degree of pre-existing market power. Statements from market participants confirm the view that pre-merger competition is not intense. In particular, the Parties' competitors are not competing aggressively to fill their spare capacity. |
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(56)

In the case at hand, pre-merger price competition between European producers is not very intense as indicated by the coexistence of positive margins and excess capacity. This implies a certain degree of pre-existing market power. Statements from market participants confirm the view that pre-merger competition is not intense. In particular, the Parties' competitors are not competing aggressively to fill their spare capacity.

| (57) | Moreover, there is no indication that Aperam and Acerinox will start competing more aggressively post-merger. Aperam and Acerinox have publicly welcomed the transaction, which is consistent with the view that these firms expect price increases post-merger. |
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(57)

Moreover, there is no indication that Aperam and Acerinox will start competing more aggressively post-merger. Aperam and Acerinox have publicly welcomed the transaction, which is consistent with the view that these firms expect price increases post-merger.

| (58) | On the contrary, Aperam and Acerinox may well compete less aggressively post-merger. First, a price increase by the merged entity will reduce the competitive pressure on rivals. Second, the reduction of the number of suppliers means that customers have weaker bargaining positions in negotiations with suppliers. Third, multi-sourcing strategies by customers imply that Aperam and Acerinox will gain some customers and will hence have increased. Fourth, expected demand growth will likely reduce available spare capacity by rivals thereby reducing rival's incentives to compete aggressively. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

On the contrary, Aperam and Acerinox may well compete less aggressively post-merger. First, a price increase by the merged entity will reduce the competitive pressure on rivals. Second, the reduction of the number of suppliers means that customers have weaker bargaining positions in negotiations with suppliers. Third, multi-sourcing strategies by customers imply that Aperam and Acerinox will gain some customers and will hence have increased. Fourth, expected demand growth will likely reduce available spare capacity by rivals thereby reducing rival's incentives to compete aggressively.

| (59) | A detailed assessment of the Parties' competitors’ incentives confirms that Aperam and Acerinox will not find profitable to offset a price increase from the merged entity. This is because the Parties' competitors are not competing aggressively pre-merger and are unlikely to do so post-merger. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

A detailed assessment of the Parties' competitors’ incentives confirms that Aperam and Acerinox will not find profitable to offset a price increase from the merged entity. This is because the Parties' competitors are not competing aggressively pre-merger and are unlikely to do so post-merger.

| (60) | In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that European competitors do not have the incentive to expand output sufficiently to make a post-merger price increase unprofitable for the merged entity. Therefore, such firms do not exert a sufficiently strong competitive constraint liable to prevent post-merger price increases. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that European competitors do not have the incentive to expand output sufficiently to make a post-merger price increase unprofitable for the merged entity. Therefore, such firms do not exert a sufficiently strong competitive constraint liable to prevent post-merger price increases.

(vii)   Assessment on the customers and independent distributors' reactions and buyer power

| (61) | As regards the assessment of the likely reaction of independent distributors to a CR price in the EEA, the Commission considers that independent distributors, contrary to the Parties' arguments, are not a strong competitive constraint on the merged entity. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

As regards the assessment of the likely reaction of independent distributors to a CR price in the EEA, the Commission considers that independent distributors, contrary to the Parties' arguments, are not a strong competitive constraint on the merged entity.

| (62) | Concerning buyer power, the Commission market investigation indicated that the demand side of the stainless steel market is largely atomized. As a consequence, customers do not usually purchase large quantities of stainless steel, or if doing so, they do not represent a significant percentage of the manufacturers' sales. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Concerning buyer power, the Commission market investigation indicated that the demand side of the stainless steel market is largely atomized. As a consequence, customers do not usually purchase large quantities of stainless steel, or if doing so, they do not represent a significant percentage of the manufacturers' sales.

(viii)   Synergies

| (63) | In addition to the above mentioned arguments, the Commission also analysed the impact of the potential synergies generated by the transaction. The Commission concluded that synergies, even if present, would be insufficient as their effect on the merged entity's marginal costs is relatively small. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In addition to the above mentioned arguments, the Commission also analysed the impact of the potential synergies generated by the transaction. The Commission concluded that synergies, even if present, would be insufficient as their effect on the merged entity's marginal costs is relatively small.

(ix)   Joint assessment of the Parties' arguments

| (64) | A joint prima facie assessment of all the Parties' defensive arguments would appear to confirm that these are not sufficient for the transaction not to result in a significant impediment to effective competition. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

A joint prima facie assessment of all the Parties' defensive arguments would appear to confirm that these are not sufficient for the transaction not to result in a significant impediment to effective competition.

| (65) | In addition, the Commission therefore produced a coherent economic assessment framework assessing the Parties main arguments against the inexistence non-coordinated effects. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

In addition, the Commission therefore produced a coherent economic assessment framework assessing the Parties main arguments against the inexistence non-coordinated effects.

| (66) | The model takes the Parties' main arguments and evidence at face value in the most competitive interpretation and also includes a full balancing exercise of marginal cost synergies. The model provides no indication that the Parties' arguments would be jointly sufficient to overturn the conclusions from the assessment above. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The model takes the Parties' main arguments and evidence at face value in the most competitive interpretation and also includes a full balancing exercise of marginal cost synergies. The model provides no indication that the Parties' arguments would be jointly sufficient to overturn the conclusions from the assessment above.

(x)   Conclusion

| (67) | On the basis of the above analysis, the Commission concludes that the elimination of competition between the merging parties will increase the market power of the merged entity. Countervailing factors (i.e. constraint from imports, rival's reactions to a potential price increase post-merger, reactions from independent distributors, marginal cost synergies potentially arising from the transaction, buyer power and entry) are not sufficient to prevent post-merger price increases by the merged entity. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

On the basis of the above analysis, the Commission concludes that the elimination of competition between the merging parties will increase the market power of the merged entity. Countervailing factors (i.e. constraint from imports, rival's reactions to a potential price increase post-merger, reactions from independent distributors, marginal cost synergies potentially arising from the transaction, buyer power and entry) are not sufficient to prevent post-merger price increases by the merged entity.

| (68) | The Commission therefore concludes that the transaction will lead to a significant impediment of effective competition by means of the creation of a dominant position in the EEA market for CR. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Commission therefore concludes that the transaction will lead to a significant impediment of effective competition by means of the creation of a dominant position in the EEA market for CR.

VIII.   COMMITMENTS

| (69) | On 19 October 2012, Outokumpu submitted the Final Commitments, which consist of:






  (a) | Inoxum's production units (comprising all the related sales and marketing activities and personnel) at the Terni stainless steel production site; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(69)

On 19 October 2012, Outokumpu submitted the Final Commitments, which consist of:

(a)

Inoxum's production units (comprising all the related sales and marketing activities and personnel) at the Terni stainless steel production site;

| (b) | Inoxum's Terninox SSC in Ceriano Laghetto (Italy); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Inoxum's Terninox SSC in Ceriano Laghetto (Italy);

| (c) | Outokumpu's SSC in Willich (Germany); |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Outokumpu's SSC in Willich (Germany);

| (d) | At the option of the Purchaser, one or more SSCs located in France (Inoxum's Tours) and/or the UK (Outokumpu's Birmingham) and the Terninox warehouses in Padova, Ancona, Florence and Bologna (Italy); |
| --- | --- |

(d)

At the option of the Purchaser, one or more SSCs located in France (Inoxum's Tours) and/or the UK (Outokumpu's Birmingham) and the Terninox warehouses in Padova, Ancona, Florence and Bologna (Italy);

| (e) | At the option of the Purchaser, the divestiture package will include Terni's forging business (Societa delle Fucine); and |
| --- | --- |

(e)

At the option of the Purchaser, the divestiture package will include Terni's forging business (Societa delle Fucine); and

| (f) | At the option of the purchaser, Outokumpu commits to exclude from the investment Business Terni's bright annealing line LBA2. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

At the option of the purchaser, Outokumpu commits to exclude from the investment Business Terni's bright annealing line LBA2.

| (70) | In addition, at the option of Outokumpu, Outokumpu and the Purchaser will enter into a transitional, arm's length supply agreement for the Purchaser to supply Black Hot Band from Terni to Outokumpu Calvert/Mexinox. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

In addition, at the option of Outokumpu, Outokumpu and the Purchaser will enter into a transitional, arm's length supply agreement for the Purchaser to supply Black Hot Band from Terni to Outokumpu Calvert/Mexinox.

| (71) | The divestiture package does not include Terni's tube-making business at Tubificio di Terni. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The divestiture package does not include Terni's tube-making business at Tubificio di Terni.

| (72) | The Commission considers that the commitments, as submitted on 19 October 2012, are sufficient to ensure the maintaining of the viability of the Divestment business while addressing the competition concerns raised by the proposed transaction. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Commission considers that the commitments, as submitted on 19 October 2012, are sufficient to ensure the maintaining of the viability of the Divestment business while addressing the competition concerns raised by the proposed transaction.

IX.   CONCLUSION

| (73) | The Commission concludes that, subject to full compliance with the undertakings given by the Parties, the proposed concentration will not lead to the creation of a dominant player as a result of which effective competition would significantly be impeded in the Internal Market or in a substantial part of it. Accordingly, the Commission declares the concentration compatible with the internal Market and the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Articles 2(2) and Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Commission concludes that, subject to full compliance with the undertakings given by the Parties, the proposed concentration will not lead to the creation of a dominant player as a result of which effective competition would significantly be impeded in the Internal Market or in a substantial part of it. Accordingly, the Commission declares the concentration compatible with the internal Market and the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Articles 2(2) and Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

(2)  OJ C 116, 20.4.2012, p. 4.

(3)  Turnover calculated in accordance with Article 5(1) of the Merger Regulation and the Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ C 95, 16.4.2008, p. 1).

(4)  Case IV/M.239, Avesta/British Steel/NCC/AGA/Axel Johnson, 4 September 1992; Case IV/M.484, Krupp/Thyssen/Riva/Falck/Tadfin/AST, 21 December 1994.

(5)  Cases COMP/M.5211 — Outokumpu/SoGePar of 25 June 2008; COMP/ECSC.1351 — Usinor/Arbed/Aceralia of 21 November 2011 (concerning carbon steel products).

(6)  See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 17. Footnote 20 clarifies however also that it is a distinct question whether a dominant position is created or strengthened as a result of a merger.

---

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/18

---

Notification of the Lithuania’s national regulatory authority — National Control Commission for Prices and Energy (hereinafter ‘NCC’) — pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC regarding the designation of LITGRID AB as transmission system operator in Lithuania

2013/C 312/07

Following the Lithuania’s regulatory authority’s final decision regarding the certification of LITGRID AB as ownership unbundled transmission system operator (Article 9 of the Electricity Directive) of 27 August 2013 (NCC’s Resolution No O3-325 as of 27 August 2013 on designation of the transmission system operator and issue of electricity transmission licence), Lithuania has notified to the European Commission the official designation of this company as a transmission system operator operating in Lithuania in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Any additional information can be obtained at the following address:

| — | Rimgailė Baliūnaitė, the Chief Specialist of NCC Law Division, tel. +370 52397821, e-mail: rimgaile.baliunaite@regula.lt |
| --- | --- |

—

Rimgailė Baliūnaitė, the Chief Specialist of NCC Law Division, tel. +370 52397821, e-mail: rimgaile.baliunaite@regula.lt

| — | Aistija Zubavičiūtė, the Adviser of NCC Gas and Electricity Department, Electricity Division, tel. +370 52135342, e-mail: aistija.zubaviciute@regula.lt |
| --- | --- |

—

Aistija Zubavičiūtė, the Adviser of NCC Gas and Electricity Department, Electricity Division, tel. +370 52135342, e-mail: aistija.zubaviciute@regula.lt

NCC’s website regarding certification of LITGRID AB:

http://www.regula.lt/lt/naujienos/index.php?full=yes&id=25278

---

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/19

---

Notification of the German Government pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (‘Gas Directive’) concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas regarding the designation of bayernets GmbH, GRTgaz Deutschland GmbH, terranets bw GmbH, Nowega GmbH, jordgasTransport GmbH, Fluxys TENP GmbH, Gastransport Nord GmbH, Gasunie Deutschland Transport Services GmbH, GASCADE Gastransport GmbH, ONTRAS-VNG Gastransport GmbH and Thyssengas GmbH as transmission system operators in Germany

2013/C 312/08

Following the German regulatory authority's final decision of 9 November 2012, 5 February 2013 and 12 March 2013 regarding the certification of bayernets GmbH, GRTgaz Deutschland GmbH, terranets bw GmbH, Nowega GmbH, jordgasTransport GmbH, Gastransport Nord GmbH, GASCADE Gastransport GmbH, ONTRAS-VNG Gastransport GmbH and Thyssengas GmbH as Independent Transmission Operator (Chapter IV of the Gas Directive) and regarding the certification of Fluxys TENP GmbH and Gasunie Deutschland Transport Services GmbH Ownership Unbundled Transmission System Operator (Article 9 of the Gas Directive), Germany has notified to the Commission the official approval and designation of these companies as a Transmission System Operator operating in Germany in accordance with Article 10 of the Gas Directive.

Any additional information can be obtained at the following address:

| Bundesnetzagentur |
| --- |
| Referat 313 — International Coordination Energy |
| Tulpenfeld 4 |
| 53113 Bonn |
| DEUTSCHLAND |
| E-mail: 313-Postfach@bnetza.de |
| http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de |

Bundesnetzagentur

Referat 313 — International Coordination Energy

Tulpenfeld 4

53113 Bonn

DEUTSCHLAND

E-mail: 313-Postfach@bnetza.de

http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de

---

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/20

---

Notification of the German Government pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Electricity Directive’) concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity regarding the designation of 50 Hertz Transmission GmbH, Amprion GmbH and TransnetBW GmbH as transmission system operators in Germany

2013/C 312/09

Following the German regulatory authority's final decision of 9 November 2012 and 11 April 2013 regarding the certification of Amprion GmbH and TransnetBW GmbH as independent transmission operators (Chapter V of the Electricity Directive) and the certification of 50 Hertz Transmission GmbH as ownership unbundled transmission system operator (Article 9 of the Electricity Directive), Germany has notified to the Commission the official approval and designation of these companies as a transmission system operator operating in Germany in accordance with Article 10 of the Electricity Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council.

Any additional information can be obtained at the following address:

| Bundesnetzagentur |
| --- |
| Referat 313 — International Coordination Energy |
| Tulpenfeld 4 |
| 53113 Bonn |
| DEUTSCHLAND |
| E-mail: 313-Postfach@bnetza.de |
| http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de |

Bundesnetzagentur

Referat 313 — International Coordination Energy

Tulpenfeld 4

53113 Bonn

DEUTSCHLAND

E-mail: 313-Postfach@bnetza.de

http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de

---

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/21

---

Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries

2013/C 312/10

In accordance with Article 35(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy (1), a decision has been taken to close the fishery as set down in the following table:

| Date and time of closure | 29.9.2013 |
| --- | --- |
| Duration | 29.9.2013-31.12.2013 |
| Member State | France |
| Stock or group of stocks | LIN/05EI. |
| Species | Ling (Molva molva) |
| Zone | EU and international waters of V |
| Type(s) of fishing vessels | — |
| Reference number | 58/TQ40 |

Date and time of closure

29.9.2013

Duration

29.9.2013-31.12.2013

Member State

France

Stock or group of stocks

LIN/05EI.

Species

Ling (Molva molva)

Zone

EU and international waters of V

Type(s) of fishing vessels

—

Reference number

58/TQ40

---

(1)  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

V Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

European Commission

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/22

---

Notice to economic operators — New round of requests for the suspension of the autonomous Common Customs Tariff duties on certain industrial and agricultural products

2013/C 312/11

Economic operators are informed that the Commission has received requests in accordance with the administrative arrangements foreseen in the Commission communication concerning autonomous tariff suspensions and quotas (2011/C 363/02) (1) for the July round of 2014.

The list of the products for which a duty suspension is requested is now available on the Commission's thematic (Europa) website on the customs union (2).

Economic operators are also informed that the deadline for objections against new requests to reach the Commission, via the national administrations, is 9 December 2013 which is the date of the second scheduled meeting of the Economic Tariff Questions Group.

Interested operators are advised to consult the list regularly in order to be informed on the status of the requests.

More information on the autonomous tariff suspension procedure can be found on the Europa website:

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/tariff_aspects/suspensions/index_en.htm

---

(1)  OJ C 363, 13.12.2011, p. 6.

(2)  http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/susp/susp_home.jsp?Lang=en

---

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/23

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.7067 — 3i/Scandferries Holdings)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 312/12

| 1. | On 18 October 2013, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking 3i Group plc (‘3i Group’, United Kingdom) and investment entities managed by 3i Investments plc (together ‘3i’) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of Scandferries Holding GmBH (‘Scandferries’, Germany) by way of purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 18 October 2013, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking 3i Group plc (‘3i Group’, United Kingdom) and investment entities managed by 3i Investments plc (together ‘3i’) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of Scandferries Holding GmBH (‘Scandferries’, Germany) by way of purchase of shares.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | 3i holds investments in various sectors of industry and services including business and financial services, consumer, healthcare, infrastructure and TMT. 3i Group is a leading international investor focusing on private equity, infrastructure and debt management that makes investments and provides management advice to, and manages investments on behalf of, investment funds, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

3i holds investments in various sectors of industry and services including business and financial services, consumer, healthcare, infrastructure and TMT. 3i Group is a leading international investor focusing on private equity, infrastructure and debt management that makes investments and provides management advice to, and manages investments on behalf of, investment funds,

| — | Scandferries is the top holding company of the Scandlines group, offering ferry services on three routes between Germany, Denmark and Sweden. |
| --- | --- |

—

Scandferries is the top holding company of the Scandlines group, offering ferry services on three routes between Germany, Denmark and Sweden.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the EC Merger Regulation (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the EC Merger Regulation (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.7067 — 3i/Scandferries Holdings, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.7067 — 3i/Scandferries Holdings, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘EC Merger Regulation’).

(2)  OJ C 56, 5.3.2005, p. 32 (‘Notice on a simplified procedure’).

---

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/24

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.7051 — Goldman Sachs/Hastings Insurance Group)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 312/13

| 1. | On 21 October 2013, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (‘Goldman Sachs’, USA) acquires indirectly within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Hastings Insurance Group Limited (‘HIG’, Jersey) by way of purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 21 October 2013, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (‘Goldman Sachs’, USA) acquires indirectly within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Hastings Insurance Group Limited (‘HIG’, Jersey) by way of purchase of shares.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | Goldman Sachs is a global investment banking, securities and investment management firm, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

Goldman Sachs is a global investment banking, securities and investment management firm,

| — | HIG is a non-life insurance provider active in the UK. |
| --- | --- |

—

HIG is a non-life insurance provider active in the UK.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the EC Merger Regulation (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the EC Merger Regulation (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.7051 — Goldman Sachs/Hastings Insurance Group, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.7051 — Goldman Sachs/Hastings Insurance Group, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘EC Merger Regulation’).

(2)  OJ C 56, 5.3.2005, p. 32 (‘Notice on a simplified procedure’).

---

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/25

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.7031 — EURENCO/MAXAMCHEM/MANUCO)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 312/14

| 1. | On 21 October 2013, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which EURENCO SA (‘EURENCO’, France), belonging to SNPE Group and MAXAMCHEM S.L. (‘MAXAMCHEM’, Spain), belonging to the Maxam Group, acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation joint control by way of agreement in a joint venture, MANUCO SA (‘MANUCO’, France), performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 21 October 2013, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which EURENCO SA (‘EURENCO’, France), belonging to SNPE Group and MAXAMCHEM S.L. (‘MAXAMCHEM’, Spain), belonging to the Maxam Group, acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation joint control by way of agreement in a joint venture, MANUCO SA (‘MANUCO’, France), performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | for EURENCO: manufacturing and sales of energetic materials for the production of warheads, ammunition and pyrotechnical devices for military and civil use, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

for EURENCO: manufacturing and sales of energetic materials for the production of warheads, ammunition and pyrotechnical devices for military and civil use,

| — | for MAXAMCHEM: manufacturing, purchasing and sales of chemical products. It belongs to the Maxam Group which is principally active in civil explosives, hunting and sport cartridges, as well as in defence systems, |
| --- | --- |

—

for MAXAMCHEM: manufacturing, purchasing and sales of chemical products. It belongs to the Maxam Group which is principally active in civil explosives, hunting and sport cartridges, as well as in defence systems,

| — | for MANUCO: manufacturing and sale of energetic nitrocellulose. |
| --- | --- |

—

for MANUCO: manufacturing and sale of energetic nitrocellulose.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the EC Merger Regulation (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the EC Merger Regulation (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.7031 — EURENCO/MAXAMCHEM/MANUCO, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.7031 — EURENCO/MAXAMCHEM/MANUCO, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘EC Merger Regulation’).

(2)  OJ C 56, 5.3.2005, p. 32 (‘Notice on a simplified procedure’).

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OTHER ACTS

European Commission

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/26 |
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26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/26

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Publication of an application pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs

2013/C 312/15

This publication confers the right to oppose the application pursuant to Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1).

SINGLE DOCUMENT

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 510/2006

on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs
   (2)

‘REQUEIJÃO DA BEIRA BAIXA’

EC No: PT-PDO-0005-0847-10.01.2011

PGI ( ) PDO ( X )

1.   Name

‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’

2.   Member State or Third Country

Portugal

3.   Description of the agricultural product or foodstuff

3.1.   Product type

| Class 1.4 — | Other products of animal origin (eggs, honey, various dairy products except butter, etc.) |
| --- | --- |

Class 1.4 —

Other products of animal origin (eggs, honey, various dairy products except butter, etc.)

3.2.   Description of the product to which the name in point 1 applies

‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’ is produced through the precipitation or coagulation, by heating, of the lactoalbumin and lactoglobulin in the whey obtained as a by-product of the manufacturing of ‘Queijos da Beira Baixa’ (‘Queijo de Castelo Branco’ PDO, ‘Queijo Amarelo da Beira Baixa’ PDO, ‘Queijo Picante da Beira Baixa’ PDO) and is obtained in the specified geographical area. It is presented as a fresh, unfermented product.

3.2.1.   Chemical characteristics

It is a product of heterogeneous composition in that it results from the milk of two species of ruminants, ovine and caprine, and from different types of cheeses with different manufacturing processes.

Moisture: 60 % to 70 %

Total fat: 14 g to 19 g/100 g of product

Total protein: 10 g to 13 g/100 g of product

Ash: 1,4 g to 1,8 g/100 g of product

3.2.2.   Physical properties

Shape: ‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’ assumes the truncated cone shape and characteristic criss-cross pattern of the traditional wicker or plastic baskets into which the mass is placed for draining. The weight of each unit can vary between 150 g and 400 g.

Texture: the product is presented without a rind. The mass has a soft consistency and a light, grainy texture; it is sliceable or spreadable, cuts smoothly, and is white in colour.

Flavour and aroma: the product has a sweet, milky taste and a pleasant bouquet, melting easily in the mouth.

3.3.   Raw materials (for processed products only)

‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’ is produced from the whey obtained as a by-product of the production of ‘Queijos da Beira Baixa’, to which potable water and raw sheep's or goat's milk from the geographical area defined below are added.

Water and sheep's and goat's milk may constitute up to 10 % of the total volume of the whey used.

3.4.   Feed (for products of animal origin only)

The only possible production system is traditional extensive grazing based on low stocking density — all year round the animals spend most of the day grazing and in the evening are brought back to the stable, where they are milked and spend the night, at least during winter. The animals feed exclusively on natural forage or forage improved with pasture species adapted to the soil and climate characteristics of the region, which thus influences the extensive farming and is supplemented in periods of scarcity with stored fodder (hay and straw), gathered exclusively in the geographical areas of production defined in point 4.

3.5.   Specific steps in production that must take place in the defined geographical area

‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’ is a complementary product obtained from the production of ‘Queijos da Beira Baixa’ DPO, which are made in the same geographical area.

Although ‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’ is produced at high temperatures, its high protein, lactose and water content cause an increase in microorganisms during post-production handling. Such qualitative and quantitative alterations in the microflora result in changes in the product's physical and chemical properties which drastically influence its acceptance by the final consumer.

This presupposes that the entire production process for ‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’ takes place using the same production facilities as for ‘Queijos da Beira Baixa’ DPO, and thus in the same geographical area. Otherwise, a series of different handling operations would result in the deterioration in quality and authenticity that would be detrimental to the interests of producers and consumers.

3.6.   Specific rules concerning slicing, grating, packaging, etc.

Although ‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’ is produced at high temperatures, its high protein, lactose and water content cause an increase in microorganisms during post-production handling. Such qualitative and quantitative alterations in the microflora result in changes in the product's physical and chemical properties which drastically influence its acceptance by the final consumer.

For this reason, the materials used for packaging ‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’ or that come into contact with it must be innocuous and inert as regards their content. Vacuum packaging is permitted as well as any other form of packaging that has been demonstrated to guarantee the necessary conditions for preserving the product and its overall quality.

Furthermore, in order to prevent repeated handling of the product to the possible detriment of its quality, it may be packaged only once it reaches the area defined in point 4.

3.7.   Specific rules on labelling

In addition to compliance with the legal requirements regarding labelling, the following logo must also appear on the product's label:

Image

4.   Concise definition of the geographical area

The geographical area of production of the raw materials, and of processing and packaging is, as for the geographical area of production of ‘Queijos de Beira Baixa’, the municipalities (concelhos) of Belmonte, Castelo Branco, Fundão, Idanha-a-Nova, Mação, Oleiros, Penamacor, Proença-a-Nova, Sertã, Vila de Rei, Vila Velha de Ródão and the parishes (freguesias) of Aldeia de São Francisco, Aldeia do Souto, Barco, Boidobra, Casegas, Conceição, Covilhã, Dominguiso, Ferro, Orjais, Ourondo, Peraboa, Peso, Santa Maria, São Jorge da Beira, São Martinho, São Pedro, Sobral de São Miguel, Teixoso, Tortosendo, Vale Formoso and Vales do Rio of the municipality of Covilhã.

5.   Link with the geographical area

5.1.   Specificity of the geographical area

The traditional extensive grazing systems characteristic of the region are closely connected with the predominant climate and soils, as these heavily influence the development of fodder species. The climate of the region is characterised by high annual mean temperatures, long, hot, dry summers and moderate winters, with relatively low total average precipitation and occasional frost. Dryness is a dominant feature, increasing from north to south or from west to east.

The natural pastures produced by sandy soil are constituted by grasses with greater tillering range and capacity (Agrostias, Poa, etc.) and annual legumes of greater grazing value (Ornitopus, T. Cherleri, T. Arvense, etc.). The local pastures on loose soils of granite origin, composed of slow-growing annual grasses (Vulpia, Periballia) and some low-energy legumes (Trifolium angustifolium and T. Stellatum), are of poor quality and unproductive. On soils of slate origin with good water retention capacity, reasonable quality pastures are found where annual grasses — frequently perennials (Lolium spp.) — predominate. Legumes are generally of good grazing value (Tifolium spp. and Ornithopus).

It is therefore clear that, with such diversity, the reputation of ‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’ is due in part to the wisdom inherited from the good practices of the communities who, faced with the heterogeneity of the raw material available owing to the time of year, milk-producing species, technology used and type of cheeses providing the whey, manage to produce a high-quality product of uniform taste.

5.2.   Specificity of the product

The specificity of the product and its characteristics are the result of the raw materials used and the methods of obtaining them and, as mentioned above, are also due in large part to the good practices of the communities who, using techniques and wisdom handed down from their forebears, have managed to preserve the product.

‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’ is made from the whey obtained as a by-product of the manufacture of ‘Queijos da Beira Baixa’, which is from the same area. The whey is strained to remove the remains of the curd and water is added if salt forms in the milk. The whey is then heated to temperatures varying between 80 °C and 90 °C and is maintained in constant slow movement until coagulation commences, as evidenced by the appearance of flakes which, owing to their low density, float to the surface. The temperature is reduced and movement is interrupted until just before boiling — this operation takes between 15 and 30 minutes. To obtain a larger quantity and thicker mass, a small amount of sheep's or goat's milk is usually added just before boiling. Using a ladle, the mass is then removed from the recipient in which coagulation took place and placed in small wicker or plastic baskets to obtain the desired shape, size and consistency. These processes are the fruit of years of continuous work on the product in the region and it is because of them that the characteristic consistency, shape and size of the product have evolved in a particular way in the region.

5.3.   Causal link between the geographical area and the quality or characteristics of the product (for PDO) or a specific quality, the reputation or other characteristic of the product (for PGI)

Sheep's and goat's milk intended for the production of ‘Queijos da Beira Baixa’, from which the raw materials are obtained for the production of ‘Requeijão da Beira Baixa’, may come only from livestock farms located in the geographical area of production. The production system is traditional extensive grazing based on low stocking density — the animals spend most of the day grazing and in the evening are brought back to the stable, where they are milked and spend the night, at least during winter.

The basis of the feed is thus natural fodder or fodder improved with pasture species adapted to the soil and climate characteristics of the region. The cultivation of fodder plants for the production of hay and the use of second-cut hay for pasturing continues to be a common practice throughout the region. Hence, the milk produced by the ewes and goats grazing in the region has certain attributes that link it to the local environment and to the way in which the ewes and goats are reared.

Because of all of these geographical and human factors the product has taken on particular characteristics which, together with the ancestral techniques and know-how inherited from the wisdom passed down through the generations, have been shaped in such a way that even today the production and packaging processes enable the production of specific products recognised by consumers, who refer to them by the name of the region of origin.

Reference to publication of the specification

(Article 5(7) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 (3))

http://www.dgadr.pt/images/docs/val/dop_igp_etg/Valor/CE_Requeijao_BB.pdf

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(1)  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 93, 31.3.2006, p. 12. Replaced by Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012.

(3)  See footnote 2.

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26.10.2013

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/s3 |
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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/s3

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NOTICE

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