IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 

COMPANY, as Trustee for Long Beach No. 73833-0-I 

Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4, 

DIVISION ONE 

Respondent, 

UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

V. 

JOHN E. ERICKSON AND SHELLEY A. 

ERICKSON, individuals residing in 

Washington; 

Appellants, 

BOEING EMPLOYEES' CREDIT UNION, 

a Washington corporation; AMERICAN 

GENERAL SERVICES, INC., a Delaware 

corporation; TBF FINANCIAL, LLC, an 

Illinois limited liability corporation; JUSTIN 

PARK & ROMERO PARK & WIGGINS, 

PS, a Washington Professional Services 

Corporation; RANDAL EBBERSON, an 

individual residing in Washington; THE 

LAW FIRM OF KEATING BUCKLIN & 

McCORMACK, INC., PS, a Washington 

professional services corporation; CITY 

OF AUBURN, WASHINGTON, a 

Washington municipality; CHARLES 

JOINER, an individual residing in 

Washington; PAUL KRAUSS, an individual 

residing in Washington; DAN HEID, an 

individual residing in Washington; 

SHELLEY COLEMAN, an individual 

residing in Washington; BRENDA 

HEINEMAN, an individual residing in 

FILED: February 13, 2017 
73833-0-1/ 2 

Washington; and THE WASHINGTON ) 

CITIES INSURANCE AUTHORITY, a ) 

municipal organization of Washington ) 

public entities, ) 

) 

Defendants, ) 

) 

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., a ) 

national banking association; LONG ) 

BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, ) 

2006-4; JOHN DOES 1-99, ) 

) 

Third Party Defendants. ) 

) 

 ) 

APPELWICK, J. — Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (DBNTC) filed suit to 

foreclose on the Ericksons' home. The Ericksons argue that DBNTC has failed 

to show that it possesses the original note, and therefore it has no standing to 

foreclose. DBNTC argues that it is entitled to foreclosure because it produced 

the original note, and that the Ericksons are collaterally estopped from arguing 

otherwise. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DBNTC. We 

affirm. 

FACTS 

John and Shelly Erickson purchased a house in 2006 with a loan from 

Long Beach Mortgage Company. The Ericksons and Long Beach executed a 

deed of trust with Old Republic Title Ltd. as trustee. Long Beach was a part of 

Washington Mutual Inc. Washington Mutual failed and JPMorgan Chase Bank 

National Association purchased its assets. Shortly after executing the loan, Long 

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Beach sold the loan into Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4 (LBMLT). 

DBNTC was the trustee of the LBMLT. 

The Ericksons defaulted on their payments in 2009. In 2010, the 

Ericksons filed suit against Long Beach, JP Morgan Chase, and Deutsche Bank, 

seeking various forms of relief. Erickson v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., No. 10-1423 

MJP, 2011 WL 830727 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 2, 2011), affd 473 F. App'x 746 (9th 

Cir. 2012). After removal to federal court, that lawsuit was dismissed on 

summary judgment. Id. at *2. The court held that the defendants provided 

sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of the 2006 note. Id. at *3. 

Later, on January 31, 2013, JP Morgan assigned all beneficial interest 

under the deed of trust to DBNTC. DBNTC filed this lawsuit seeking foreclosure 

on the Ericksons' property in January 2014. DBNTC moved for summary 

judgment, arguing that it was entitled to foreclosure, because it possessed the 

note. DBNTC presented the original note with an endorsed in blank stamp at the 

summary judgment hearing. It also attached a copy of this original note to its 

attorney's declaration. The trial court granted DBNTC's motion for summary 

judgment and denied the Ericksons' motion for reconsideration. The Ericksons 

appeal. 

ANALYSIS 

First, DBNTC argues that collateral estoppel bars the Ericksons from 

contesting DBNTC's claim that it possesses the original note. Second, the 

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Ericksons argue that DBNTC has not shown that it possesses the note and 

therefore is not entitled to foreclosure. 

We review summary judgment orders de novo, taking all facts and 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Estate of 

Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice Arena, Inc., 166 Wn.2d 489, 497, 210 P.3d 308 

(2009). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ranger 

Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). A party 

resisting summary judgment cannot satisfy his or her burden of production 

merely by relying on conclusory allegations, speculative statements, or 

argumentative assertions. Bopuch v. Landover Corp., 153 Wn. App. 595, 610, 

224 P.3d 795 (2009). Rather, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts 

demonstrating a genuine issue of fact. Id. 

I. Collateral Estoppel 

The Ericksons argue that DBNTC has not shown that it holds the original 

note. DBNTC responds that the 2010 federal lawsuit collaterally estops the 

Ericksons' argument that Deutsche Bank has not shown that it possesses the 

note. In that suit, the Ericksons argued that the defendants did not provide 

evidence that they held the note. The federal court's entire analysis of this 

argument was as follows: 

Plaintiffs' argument rests on the contention that Defendants lack 

standing to foreclose because they are not the original creditors, 

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and cannot produce the original note. Courts "have routinely held 

that [this] so-called 'show me the note' argument lacks merit." 

Freeston v. Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S., No. C09-5560BHS, 

2010 WL 1186276 (W.D.[ ]Wash. Mar.[ ]24, 2010) (quoting 

Diessner v. Mortq. Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F.Supp.2d 1184, 

1187 (D. Ariz. 2009) (collecting cases)[, aff'd, 384 Fed. App'x 609 

(9th Cir. 2009)]). The Court agrees with these cases. More 

importantly, Defendants provide evidence demonstrating their 

ownership of the note, which the Ericksons do not credibly 

challenge. The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion and DENIES 

Plaintiffs' motion with respect to claims for a declaration or an 

injunction against foreclosure. The Court DISMISSES this claim. 

Erickson, 2011 WL 830727, at *3 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added). 

The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of an issue after 

the party estopped has had a full and fair opportunity to present its case. 

Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wn.2d 552, 561, 852 P.2d 295 (1993). The 

party seeking collateral estoppel must establish four elements: (1) identical 

issues; (2) a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the 

argument is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the 

prior adjudication; and (4) application of the doctrine must not work an injustice 

on the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied. Hadley v. Maxwell, 144 

Wn.2d 306, 311-12, 27 P.3d 600 (2001). Although the doctrine is usually 

characterized as an affirmative defense, it is equally available to plaintiffs and 

may be applied "offensively" to bar a defendant from relitigating issues in a 

second proceeding. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 186 Wn. 

App. 715, 722, 346 P.3d 771 (2015). 
73833-0-1/ 6 

All four collateral estoppel elements are satisfied here. First, the issues 

are identical. Hadley, 144 Wn.2d at 311-12. In the federal case, the Ericksons 

alleged that the defendants lacked standing to foreclose because they were not 

the original creditor and could not produce the original note. Erickson, 2011 WL 

830727, at *3. The Ericksons' main argument in this appeal is that DBNTC has 

failed to show that it possesses the original note. The Ericksons make the same 

argument in both cases: that DBNTC has not produced enough evidence to 

prove ownership of the original note and therefore cannot foreclose. These 

issues are identical. 

The "final judgment on the merits" element is also met. Id. A final 

judgment includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is 

determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect. In re 

Dependency of H.S., 188 Wn. App. 654, 661, 356 P.3d 202 (2015). The federal 

court entered summary judgment against the Ericksons on all issues, including 

their claim on possession of the note, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

affirmed. Erickson, 2011 WL 830727, at *7; Erickson, 473 F. App'x at 746. The 

resolution of the 2010 suit constitutes a final judgment on the merits. 

The Ericksons argue that the identity of party element is not satisfied, 

because in this case Deutsche Bank is appearing as "Deutsche Bank National 

Trust Company, a Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4," while in 

the federal case it appeared only as "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company." 

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73833-0-1 /7 

(Emphasis added.) But, the standard requires that only the party against whom 

collateral estoppel is being asserted was a party to the prior case. Hadley, 144 

Wn.2d at 311-12. The Ericksons were a party to the federal case. Erickson, 

2011 WL 830727, at *1. And, even if the standard required DBNTC to be a party 

to the prior case, it was. Id. Regardless of whether DBNTC appeared on its own 

behalf or as a trustee in the federal case, it was clearly "a party to or in privity 

with a party to the prior adjudication." Hadley, 144 Wn.2d at 311-12. The 

identical party element is satisfied. 

Finally, applying collateral estoppel will not work an injustice against the 

Ericksons. The Ericksons make no substantive argument on this element. 

Applying collateral estoppel may seem unjust because the Ericksons were not 

represented by counsel in the federal case. But, they made the conscious choice 

to pursue those claims pro se. See Edwards v. LaDuc, 157 Wn. App. 455, 464, 

238 P.3d 1187 (2010) ("[T]he trial court must treat pro se parties in the same 

manner it treats lawyers."). Enforcing collateral estoppel here would not amount 

to an injustice. 

We hold that collateral estoppel bars the Ericksons' arguments that 

Deutsche Bank does not hold the original note. 

II. Possession of the Note 

Even if the Ericksons were not collaterally estopped from their substantive 

arguments, a holder of a note endorsed in blank is entitled to enforce that note. 

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73833-0-1/ 8 

Brown v. Dep't of Commerce, 184 Wn.2d 509, 536, 359 P.3d 771 (2015). 

Presentation of the original note at a summary judgment hearing is sufficient to 

prove a party's status as holder of the note. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust. Co. v. 

Slotke, 192 Wn. App. 166, 175, 367 P.3d 600, review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1037, 

377 P.3d 746 (2016). 

DBNTC attached a copy of the note to its attorney's summary judgment 

declaration. That copy included an endorsement in blank.1 The summary 

judgment hearing transcript also shows that DBNTC presented an original copy 

of the note at the summary judgment hearing. Because DBNTC presented an 

original, signed, endorsed in blank note at the summary judgment hearing, it was 

entitled to summary judgment and to enforce the note against the Ericksons. 

The Ericksons make a number of counterarguments. First, the Ericksons 

argue that DBNTC should not be entitled to foreclosure because it has failed to 

explain how it came into possession of the note. The Ericksons do not provide 

any legal support for their argument that, despite possessing the note, DBNTC 

1 The copy of the note attached to the complaint did not include the 

endorsed in blank stamp. DBNTC attached a copy of the note with the endorsed 

in blank stamp in support of its summary judgment motion. The Ericksons argue 

that DBNTC's failure to originally include the endorsement in blank stamp is 

evidence that DBNTC is actually not the proper holder of the note. But, this 

argument is merely speculative. See Boquch, 153 Wn. App. at 610 ("[A] party 

resisting summary judgment cannot satisfy his or her burden of production 

merely by relying on conclusory allegations, speculative statements, or 

argumentative assertions. Rather, the nonmoving party 'must set forth' specific 

facts demonstrating a genuine issue of fact." (citation omitted) (quoting Las v. 

Yellow Front Stores, Inc., 66 Wn. App. 196 198, 831 P.2d 744 (1992)). 

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73833-0-1 / 9 

cannot enforce the note if it cannot explain all previous transfers of the note. 

DBNTC produced the original note endorsed in blank. That alone allows DBNTC 

to enforce it. RCW 62A.1-201(21)(A) (defining "holder" as "[t]he person in 

possession of a negotiable instrument."); RCW 62A.3-205(b) ("When [e]ndorsed 

in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by 

transfer of possession alone until specially [e]ndorsed."); see also Brown, 184 

Wn.2d at 536 ("As the holder of the note [endorsed in blank], M & T Bank is 

entitled to enforce the note."); Deutsche Bank, 192 Wn. App. at 173 ("[1]t is the 

holder of the note who is entitled to enforce it. It is not necessary for the holder 

to establish that it is also the owner of the note secured by the deed of trust."). 

Second, the Ericksons argue that the note was not properly authenticated. 

DBNTC's attorney submitted the note as an exhibit to his declaration. The note 

is commercial paper. See United States v. Varner, 13 F.3d 1503, 1508 n.5 (11th 

Cir. 1994). Under ER 902(i), commercial paper qualifies as a self-authenticating 

document. See, e.g., Varner, 13 F.3d 1508-09 ("Mere production of a note 

establishes prima facie authenticity and is sufficient to make a promissory note 

admissible.") (emphasis added)). 

Third, the Ericksons argue that the note constitutes inadmissible hearsay. 

Statements that have "operative legal effect" are not subject to the prohibition on 

hearsay. ARONSON & HOWARD, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN WASHINGTON § 10.05[2][f] 

(5th ed. 2016). The note is a legally enforceable promise to pay and it therefore 
73833-0-1 / 10 

has independent legal significance. See Kepner-Treqoe, Inc. v. Leadership 

Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 1994) (" 'Signed instruments such as 

wills, contracts, and promissory notes are writings that have independent legal 

significance and are not hearsay.'" (quoting THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF 

TRIAL TECHNIQUES 180 (1988)). The promissory note was self-authenticating and 

not subject to the prohibition on hearsay. 

Fourth, the Ericksons argue without citation to authority that notes are 

tantamount to a conveyance of real property, and therefore should be subject to 

the statute of frauds'2protections. Washington cases involving enforcement of 

notes have not identified the statute of frauds as an impediment to foreclosure. 

See, e.g., Slotke, 192 Wn. App. at 173 ("Mt is the holder of a note who is entitled 

to enforce it."); Brown, 184 Wn.2d at 535-36 ("M & T Bank is the holder of 

Brown's note because M & T Bank possesses the note and because the note, 

having been indorsed in blank, is payable to the bearer."). The statute of frauds 

does not bar DBNTC's enforcement of the note. 

III. Amount of Judgment 

The Ericksons also argue that, besides the note itself, DBNTC submitted 

no evidence to support the monetary judgment entered against them. But, the 

note is evidence of the debt. The trial court entered a judgment and decree of 

foreclosure against the Ericksons for the $465,047.67 loan principal and 

2 RCW 64.04.020. 

10 
WE CONCUR: 

?e l73833-0-1/ 11 

$253,354.11 in interest. The Ericksons do not challenge the mathematical 

calculation of the amount due under the note, but stress the fact that no 

additional evidence of the amount was offered. Payment is an affirmative 

defense under Washington law. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Whitney, 119 Wn. App. 

339, 347, 81 P.3d 135 (2003). The Ericksons did not assert any payment 

defense in their answer. Thus, they cannot now challenge the principal and 

interest owed under the note. 

IV. Attorney Fees 

The Ericksons have requested attorney fees. Because we affirm 

summary judgment against the Ericksons, we deny their request for attorney 

fees. 

We affirm. 

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