[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11459

____________________

ROBERT SHAWN INGRAM, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

WARDEN, HOLMAN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, 

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-01464-LSC

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11459

Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

When Robert Shawn Ingram was charged in Alabama with 

the 1993 capital murder of Gregory Huguley, he immediately began cooperating. Acting without an attorney, he secured a plea 

agreement with the state. He agreed to plead guilty to a lesser 

charge of murder and receive a parole-eligible sentence of life imprisonment. In exchange, he would testify against his three co-defendants. 

After Mr. Ingram obtained counsel, one of the co-defendants convinced him that they would all be acquitted if they remained silent: “Nobody talks, everybody walks.” Against the advice of his attorneys, Mr. Ingram refused to perform his part of the 

plea agreement and testify at the trial of one of his co-defendants. 

The state then declared the agreement void and tried him for capital murder. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court—following the jury’s recommendation—sentenced him to death. 

After his conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, Mr. Ingram sought state post-conviction relief. As relevant 

here, he asserted that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance 

by failing to properly advise him about the risks of not following 

through with his plea agreement and by not doing enough to persuade him to testify against his co-defendant. The Alabama courts 

rejected this ineffectiveness claim, ruling in part that Mr. Ingram 

could not show prejudice resulting from his attorneys’ conduct. 

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The district court denied Mr. Ingram’s federal habeas corpus 

petition, concluding that the decision of the Alabama courts was 

not an unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court precedent and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2). Following our review of the 

record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we agree and affirm. 

I

On July 31, 1993, Mr. Ingram and three others—Anthony 

Boyd, Moneek Ackles, and Dwinaune Quintay Cox—kidnapped 

Mr. Huguley at gunpoint from a public street in Anniston, Alabama 

because he had failed to pay $200 for crack cocaine that they had 

sold to him. See Ingram v. State, 779 So. 2d 1225, 1238 (Ala. Crim. 

App. 1999). Mr. Ingram and his co-defendants took Mr. Huguley 

to a baseball field in a rural area and, while he was pleading for his 

life, they “taped him to a bench, doused him with gasoline, set him 

on fire, and burned him to death.” Id. Mr. Ingram was a principal 

actor in the murder—he wielded the gun, used force to effect the 

kidnapping, poured the gasoline, and lit it with a match. See id. 

After Mr. Huguley had been set on fire, Mr. Ingram and his co-defendants stood around for approximately 20 minutes and watched 

him burn to death. See id.

Mr. Huguley’s body was found the next morning. Shortly 

thereafter, Mr. Ingram and his three co-defendants were identified 

as having been involved in the murder. Mr. Ingram immediately 

began cooperating with the authorities and gave a number of statements admitting his involvement in the murder. Mr. Ingram was 

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then charged with the capital murder of Mr. Huguley during a kidnapping. 

A

Before his trial, Mr. Ingram entered into a self-negotiated 

plea agreement with the state. Pursuant to the agreement, Mr. Ingram would plead guilty to a lesser-included offense of murder and 

receive a parole-eligible life sentence. In exchange, he would cooperate with the state’s investigation and testify against his co-defendants. 

The plea agreement provided that it would become “null 

and void” if Mr. Ingram did not testify against his co-defendants or

failed to cooperate with the state’s investigation. Given what later 

transpired, that language in the agreement proved to have significant consequences. 

Mr. Ingram and his co-defendants were incarcerated together at the county jail. During jailhouse conversations, one of 

the co-defendants, Mr. Ackles—who had not given a statement to 

the police—convinced the others, including Mr. Ingram, that the 

state’s case against them was weak, and that if they did not testify, 

none of them would be convicted. Mr. Ackles’ advice was simple: 

“Nobody talks, everybody walks.” 

Mr. Boyd’s trial was the first to go forward. When the time 

came for Mr. Ingram to fulfill his plea agreement by testifying

against Mr. Boyd, he refused. At that time, Mr. Ingram was represented by Jeb Fannin and Mark Nelson, who did not learn of his

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decision to not testify until he took the stand on the second day of 

Mr. Boyd’s trial.1

Once Mr. Ingram announced his refusal to testify, the trial 

court gave him the opportunity to meet with his attorneys to discuss his decision to renege on his plea agreement. Mr. Ingram told 

his attorneys that Mr. Ackles had come up with a plan—if they all 

remained quiet they would “all go home.” He also explained that 

he did not want to testify against Mr. Boyd because he did not want 

to be labeled a “snitch”—“you don’t last in the penitentiary when 

you get a label like that.” The attorneys advised and urged Mr. 

Ingram to honor the plea agreement and “explained to him what 

could happen to him if he did not testify against [Mr.] Boyd—i.e., 

that he could receive the death penalty.” The attorneys also 

“warned him that one of his [co-defendants] would take the 

[s]tate’s offer if he did not want to take it[.]” 

Mr. Ingram, however, was “adamant in his decision” and 

Mr. Fannin explained that he and Mr. Nelson could not “twist his 

arm and make him testify.” The attorneys told Mr. Ingram that it 

was his decision whether to follow through with his plea agreement and testify against Mr. Boyd. 

1 At the state post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Mr. Ingram testified that he 

had informed his attorneys ahead of time about his decision to not testify 

against Mr. Boyd. The state post-conviction court, however, credited the testimony of Mr. Fannin that he and Mr. Nelson first learned of Mr. Ingram’s 

decision at Mr. Boyd’s trial. 

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After Mr. Ingram had an opportunity to meet with his attorneys, everyone appeared before the trial court. One of the prosecutors told the trial court that the state was viewing Mr. Ingram’s 

failure to testify against Mr. Boyd as a breach of the plea agreement. 

The prosecutor also informed the trial court that the state would 

try Mr. Ingram for capital murder, that Mr. Ingram had given a 

“confession” admitting his involvement in the crime, and that the 

prosecution intended to use his statements against him at trial. Mr. 

Nelson told the trial court that he and Mr. Fannin had met with 

Mr. Ingram and had gone “over all the options and all the possible 

punishments,” and that Mr. Ingram said he understood but “did 

not wish to testify.”

The trial court then engaged in a colloquy with Mr. Ingram 

to ensure that he knew what he was doing and understood the consequences of his decision. The trial court asked him whether he 

understood that murder carried with it a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, while capital murder carried

with it either a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of 

parole or a sentence of death. The trial court also explained that 

the state was going to view his decision to not testify as a breach of 

the plea agreement and was going to prosecute him for capital 

murder. 

Mr. Ingram repeatedly said that he understood and maintained that he wanted to exercise his right to remain silent. The 

trial court specifically cautioned him that he was “deciding [his] fate 

. . . to some extent” by breaching the plea agreement, and gave him 

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a final chance to change his mind, but he continued to refuse to 

testify against Mr. Boyd. The trial court determined that he understood what he was doing and what he was giving up. 

At the end of the day, Mr. Ingram did not testify against Mr. 

Boyd. As a result, the state rescinded the plea agreement.2 

The state subsequently tried Mr. Ingram for capital murder. 

See Ingram, 779 So. 2d at 1237. The state presented overwhelming 

evidence of his guilt at trial, and the jury found him guilty. The 

jury recommended a sentence of death, and the trial court followed 

that recommendation. 

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 

affirmed Mr. Ingram’s conviction and death sentence. See id. at 

1282–83. So did the Alabama Supreme Court. See Ex parte Ingram, 

779 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Ala. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1193 (2001). 

B

After his direct appeal concluded, Mr. Ingram filed a petition 

for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. He alleged, in part, that his attorneys had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and its progeny by failing to properly 

2 Mr. Ingram’s attorneys proved to be prophetic. Mr. Cox, one of Mr. Ingram’s 

co-defendants, agreed to testify on behalf of the state and did so at Mr. Boyd’s 

trial. A jury convicted Mr. Boyd of capital murder and the trial court sentenced him to death. See Boyd v. Commissioner, 697 F.3d 1320, 1325–26 (11th 

Cir. 2012). Mr. Cox received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole, 

and he is no longer in prison. 

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advise him about the risks of not following through with his plea 

agreement and by not doing enough to persuade him to testify 

against Mr. Boyd. 

Following a series of appeals and remands, the state postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing. With respect to the 

ineffectiveness claim, it heard testimony from Mr. Fannin (one of 

Mr. Ingram’s former attorneys), Mr. Ingram, and several of Mr. Ingram’s family members.

Mr. Fannin testified that, leading up to Mr. Boyd’s trial, he 

had hoped that Mr. Ingram would uphold his plea agreement. He 

explained that he had conversations with Mr. Ingram about testifying against Mr. Boyd. Although he could not specifically remember those conversations from 29 years ago, he said that he “would 

have made [Mr. Ingram] aware of the evidence and his chances so 

to speak.” 

In addition, Mr. Fannin testified that he and Mr. Nelson 

were not aware that Mr. Ingram was going to renege on his plea 

agreement until he took the stand at Mr. Boyd’s trial. He described 

how he and Mr. Nelson then met with Mr. Ingram, explained the 

consequences of his decision, and tried to persuade him to honor 

the plea agreement. For example, they told him that if he chose 

not to testify against Mr. Boyd one of his co-defendants would accept the state’s plea offer. They also told him he could receive the 

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death penalty. But they could not “twist his arm and make him 

testify.”3 

Mr. Ingram admitted that his attorneys had encouraged him 

to testify against Mr. Boyd, and that they had told him that if he did 

not, then one of his co-defendants would accept the state’s plea offer. But he explained that he refused to testify against Mr. Boyd for 

two reasons. First, he and his co-defendants had devised a plan to 

stay silent because they believed that if “everybody be quiet, we all 

go home.” He did not listen to his attorneys because he thought 

they were “bluffing.” Second, he chose not to testify because he 

did not want to be labeled a “snitch.” As he put it, “you don’t last 

in the penitentiary when you get a label like that.” 

According to Mr. Ingram, if his attorneys had sought out his 

sister or his aunt to talk to him, he would have listened to them 

and honored his plea agreement. This testimony was echoed by 

Mr. Ingram’s relatives. Mr. Ingram’s aunt testified that the attorneys never asked her for help in persuading him to testify against 

Mr. Boyd. Had they done so, she would have gone to him and said:

“Shawn, listen, and I want you to listen to me good . . . for the sake 

of your mother and for the sake of yourself, I want you to tell them 

the truth about what happened.” She explained that she believed 

he would have listened to her because “he’s scared of [her]” and 

because “[h]e’s scared he going to get a whooping.” Mr. Ingram’s 

older sister similarly testified that she “would have popped him on 

3 Mr. Fannin explained that if he thought anyone could have persuaded Mr. 

Ingram to change his mind he would have sought out that person. 

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the head, and then . . . told him he needed to do whatever it was to 

spare his life and to tell the truth.” 

After the evidentiary hearing, the state post-conviction court 

issued an order denying Mr. Ingram relief. With respect to the ineffectiveness claim at issue here, the court ruled that Mr. Ingram’s 

attorneys “did all that was constitutionally required of them when 

they attempted to persuade [Mr. Ingram] to honor his [plea] agreement[.]” The court concluded that Mr. Ingram’s attorneys did not 

render deficient performance because their actions were reasonable—when Mr. Ingram insisted he would not testify against Mr. 

Boyd, they met with him, advised him of the consequences of his 

decision, warned him that one of his co-defendants would take the 

deal offered by the state, and urged him to honor his plea agreement. The court further found that it was not “convinced that 

there was anything [the attorneys] could have done to persuade 

[Mr. Ingram] to change his mind.” Mr. Ingram was “adamant” that 

he would not testify against Mr. Boyd because he believed everyone would be acquitted if they all remained silent and because he 

did not want to be labeled a “snitch.” Even when the trial court 

informed him of the consequences of his decision, Mr. Ingram “insisted that he would not testify.” 

The state post-conviction court also concluded that Mr. Ingram had failed to prove that his attorneys had failed to enlist his 

family members to persuade him to honor the plea agreement: 

“[Mr.] Ingram presented no evidence that, given that his decision 

to not testify against [Mr.] Boyd occurred in the middle of [Mr.] 

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Boyd’s trial, his family members could have arrived at the courthouse in the short amount of time that [the attorneys] had to meet 

with [him] to persuade [him] to honor his agreement. . . . Additionally, there was nothing offered at the evidentiary hearing to 

demonstrate that the trial court would have waited for [Mr.] Ingram’s family to arrive to attempt to persuade him to testify against 

[Mr.] Boyd.” 

In an unpublished opinion, the Alabama Court of Criminal 

Appeals affirmed the state post-conviction court’s order on the 

ground that Mr. Ingram had failed to establish prejudice resulting 

from his attorneys’ allegedly deficient performance: “[T]he [state 

post-conviction] court found that [Mr.] Ingram failed to prove that 

any of the actions he asserted [the] trial [attorneys] should have undertaken would have made any difference in the outcome.” Ingram 

v. State, No. CR-17-0774, slip op. at 13 (Ala. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 

2019). Mr. Ingram did not want to be labeled a snitch, and because 

“serving time in prison was inevitable” it “was reasonable for the 

[post-conviction] court to conclude that [he] would not have honored his plea agreement regardless of [the attorneys’] actions.” Id.

C

Mr. Ingram sought federal habeas corpus relief, but the district court rejected his ineffectiveness claim. It concluded that the 

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals made a reasonable determination of the facts when it held that Mr. Ingram could not demonstrate Strickland prejudice. Mr. Ingram’s contention that his attorneys should have done more to persuade him to testify against Mr. 

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Boyd failed because it was “based on the pure speculation that, had 

his [attorneys] more persuasively warned him that he would already be labeled a ‘snitch’ in prison . . . [he] would have heeded 

their advice. . . . The [Alabama] courts were entirely reasonable in 

finding that, because [Mr.] Ingram testified that he ‘never’ wanted 

to be labeled a ‘snitch’ in prison, nothing his [attorneys] could have 

done would have changed his mind.” In other words, the prejudice 

ruling of the Alabama courts was not an unreasonable application 

of applicable Supreme Court precedent and was not based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 

We granted Mr. Ingram a certificate of appealability on 

whether his attorneys “rendered ineffective assistance when they 

failed to properly advise him on the risks of failing to follow 

through with his plea agreement and the cooperation it required.” 

II

“[B]oth the performance and prejudice components of the 

ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. “Although a district court’s ultimate conclusions as to deficient performance and prejudice are subject to plenary review, we subject underlying findings of fact only to clear 

error review.” Cade v. Haley, 222 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2000).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 

which governs this case, provides a further limitation on the availability of habeas relief. It establishes a “highly deferential standard 

for evaluating state-court rulings, [and] demands that state-court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 

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U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam)). When a state court has adjudicated a claim 

on the merits, habeas relief is available only if the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court precedent, or was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-

(2). This standard is “intentionally difficult to meet.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).4

III

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a habeas petitioner must show both that his counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Unless a petitioner demonstrates both 

deficient performance and prejudice, “it cannot be said that the 

conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Id. Generally 

speaking, to establish prejudice a petitioner must demonstrate “a 

4 In some cases, such as those where AEDPA deference is unclear, we can apply traditional standards of appellate review if the result is the denial of relief. 

This is because “‘a habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of habeas 

corpus if his or her claim is rejected on de novo review.’” Reese v. Sec’y, Florida 

Dep’t of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010)). See also Conner v. GDCP Warden, 784 F.3d 752, 

767 n.16 (11th Cir. 2015) (“This Court has previously affirmed the denial of § 

2254 relief after conducting de novo review without resolving whether AEDPA 

deference applies.”) (citing cases).

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reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

We may resolve the performance and prejudice prongs “in 

either order and need not address both when denying a[n] [ineffectiveness] claim.” Clark v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 988 F.3d 

1326, 1331 (11th Cir. 2021). Our analysis here begins and ends with 

the prejudice prong, as Mr. Ingram has failed to establish that he 

was harmed by his attorneys’ allegedly deficient performance. 

A

In order to prove prejudice, a petitioner who claims that he 

did not plead guilty and proceeded to trial due to his counsel’s deficient performance must establish a reasonable probability that 

“the outcome of the plea process would have been different with 

competent advice.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012). 

Where, as here, “[h]aving to stand trial . . . is the prejudice alleged,” 

the petitioner must show that “but for the ineffective advice of 

counsel there is a reasonable probability that” he would have accepted the plea offered, that the trial court would have accepted 

the plea, and that the conviction or sentence (or both) would have 

been less severe than what ultimately resulted after trial. See id. at 

163–64. 

The ineffectiveness claim in Lafler was admittedly somewhat 

different than Mr. Ingram’s—the petitioner there claimed that he 

had rejected a favorable plea offer due to his counsel’s deficient advice that he could not be convicted at trial of assault with intent to 

murder, while Mr. Ingram contends that he breached the plea 

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agreement he had signed due to his attorneys’ allegedly deficient 

efforts to persuade him to testify against Mr. Boyd. Despite this

difference, we agree with Mr. Ingram that Lafler provides the basic 

framework for evaluating the prejudice prong of his ineffectiveness 

claim. In both Lafler and here the essential contention is that the 

petitioner did not accept or follow through on a favorable plea offer 

due to ineffective assistance of counsel and received a more severe 

sentence after being convicted at trial. The critical question then, 

adapted from Lafler, is whether Mr. Ingram has shown a reasonable 

probability that he would have honored his plea agreement and 

testified against Mr. Boyd if his attorneys had done more (i.e., pressured him more effectively to testify, told him in no uncertain 

terms that he would be convicted of capital murder at trial, and 

enlisted the help of his family members to convince him to honor 

his plea agreement). 

B

Our sister circuits have generally held that a determination 

that a habeas petitioner or a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 movant would (or 

would not) have accepted a plea offer or would (or would not) have 

gone to trial but for counsel’s deficient advice and performance 

constitutes a finding of fact. See, e.g., Feliciano-Rodriguez v. United 

States, 986 F.3d 30, 36–37 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Gonzalez, 

943 F.3d 979, 982–83 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Peleti, 576 F.3d 

377, 382–85 (7th Cir. 2009); Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 405 

(2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Thompson, 27 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 

1994). We have said the same thing in an unpublished opinion, see 

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Millan v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 663 F. App’x 753, 755 (11th Cir. 

2016), and now expressly come to the same conclusion. 

As the Second Circuit has persuasively explained, “the determination of the likelihood that [the petitioner] would have accepted the plea bargain if he had been fully informed of its terms 

and accurately advised of the likely sentencing ranges under the 

plea bargain and upon conviction after trial [is], like all predictions 

of what might have been, a factual issue, albeit a hypothetical one.” 

Cullen, 194 F.3d at 405. See also Gonzalez, 943 F.3d at 982–83 (“Because of conflicting evidence, whether there [is] a reasonable probability that [the petitioner] would have pleaded guilty but for his 

constitutionally deficient counsel is ultimately a question of fact.”). 

So the determination by the Alabama courts that Mr. Ingram 

would not have testified against Mr. Boyd no matter what his attorneys did is a factual one. 

C

In our criminal justice system, the decision as to “whether 

to plead guilty” or “insist on maintaining . . . innocence” belongs to 

the defendant. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018). 

The state post-conviction court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that there wasn’t anything that the attorneys 

could have done to make Mr. Ingram change his mind, honor his 

plea agreement, and testify against Mr. Boyd. In other words, they 

found that, regardless of what more the attorneys might have 

done, Mr. Ingram would not have testified against Mr. Boyd. This 

is a factual finding, and even if we were only applying traditional 

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standards of appellate review it would not be clearly erroneous. See 

Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 293 (2017) (“A finding that is ‘plausible’ 

in light of the full record—even if another is equally or more so—

must govern.”).

At the state evidentiary hearing, Mr. Fannin testified about

the discussion that he and Mr. Nelson had with Mr. Ingram after he 

announced he would not testify against Mr. Boyd. Mr. Ingram told 

them that “he felt like nobody was going to testify against anybody 

else.” Additionally, Mr. Ingram explained that he was reluctant to 

testify because he did not want to be labeled a “snitch.” Mr. Fannin 

and Mr. Nelson advised Mr. Ingram that he should honor his plea 

agreement, but he was “so adamant in his decision” that they could 

not just “twist his arm and make him testify.” Mr. Fannin and Mr. 

Nelson told Mr. Ingram that if he did not follow through on his 

plea agreement one of his co-defendants would accept the state’s 

offer and testify. They also warned him that he could receive the 

death penalty. But Mr. Ingram thought they were “bluffing” and 

did not follow their advice. This evidence makes the factual finding 

of the Alabama courts plausible. 

Mr. Ingram, of course, testified that he would have honored 

his plea agreement and testified against Mr. Boyd if only his attorneys had told him that he would undoubtedly be convicted of capital murder at trial and enlisted his family members to get him to 

change his mind. And his relatives testified that they could have 

gotten him to honor his plea agreement if only they had been able 

to speak to him. 

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Contrary to Mr. Ingram’s assertion, see Br. for Appellant at 

29, the Alabama courts did not fail to consider that evidence. Instead, they did not credit it. For example, as the Alabama Court of 

Criminal Appeals explained, “[t]he [state post-conviction] court, as 

the finder of fact, was free to reject [Mr.] Ingram’s self-serving testimony[.]” Ingram, slip op. at 13. See Williams v. Smith, 591 F.2d 

169, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1979) (a finding that the defendant would have 

pled guilty even if he had “been given accurate sentencing information” was a factual one subject to clear error review because it 

“relate[s] to such intangibles as motivation and intent [and] depend[s] especially upon . . . credibility assessments”) (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

As noted, AEDPA places an even higher hurdle for Mr. Ingram when it comes to challenging factual findings made by the 

Alabama courts. It provides that a “determination of a factual issue 

made by a [s]tate court shall be presumed to be correct” and that 

the petitioner has the “burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

As we have explained in a habeas case governed by AEDPA, clear 

and convincing evidence consists of proof that a claim is “highly 

probable.” Fults v. GDCP Warden, 764 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 

2014) (alterations adopted). And “[t]he credibility of a witness is a 

question of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness under 

AEDPA.” Jenkins v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 963 F.3d 1248, 

1272 (11th Cir. 2020).

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On this record, the Alabama courts’ factual finding that Mr. 

Ingram would not have changed his mind no matter what more his 

attorneys might have done is entitled to a presumption of correctness. And that presumption has not been overcome by clear and 

convincing evidence. First, the concern that he would be labeled a 

“snitch” provided a firm reason for Mr. Ingram refusing to testify 

against Mr. Boyd, and that concern would not have gone away 

even if the attorneys tried to exert more pressure. Second, this is 

not a case in which the attorneys gave Mr. Ingram false hope of an 

acquittal if he went to trial. They told him that if he did not testify 

against Mr. Boyd one of his co-defendants would accept the state’s

plea offer. And they told him that he could receive the death penalty if he proceeded to trial. Nevertheless, Mr. Ingram thought his 

attorneys were “bluffing” and was convinced that if no one talked, 

he and his co-defendants would get off “scot-free.” Third, even if 

his attorneys did not sufficiently convey the likely consequences to 

Mr. Ingram, the trial court told him that if he breached his plea 

agreement the state would try him for capital murder and use his 

confession against him. The trial court also told him that he was 

“deciding [his] fate . . . to some extent” by refusing to testify. Despite these warnings, Mr. Ingram stuck to his decision and refused 

to testify against Mr. Boyd.

As for the attorneys’ alleged failure to seek the help of Mr. 

Ingram’s relatives, the state post-conviction court explained that 

“[Mr.] Ingram presented no evidence that, given that his decision 

to not testify against [Mr.] Boyd occurred in the middle of [Mr.] 

Boyd’s trial, his family members could have arrived at the 

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-11459

courthouse in the short amount of time that [the attorneys] had to 

meet with [him] to persuade [him] to honor his agreement. . . . Additionally, there was nothing offered at the evidentiary hearing to 

demonstrate that the trial court would have waited for [Mr.] Ingram’s family to arrive to attempt to persuade him to testify against 

[Mr.] Boyd.” Mr. Ingram does not offer anything in his brief to 

challenge these determinations. 

In sum, the Alabama courts’ factual finding that Mr. Ingram 

would have refused to testify against Mr. Boyd, no matter what 

more his attorneys did, stands. And based on that finding, their 

ultimate conclusion that Mr. Ingram was not prejudiced by his attorneys’ allegedly deficient performance—which constitutes a ruling on a mixed question of law and fact—is not unreasonable under 

§ 2254(d)(2). See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (a 

state court decision is unreasonable under AEDPA if it is “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”).

IV

We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Ingram’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to establish prejudice.

AFFIRMED.

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