[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-14855

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JEFFERY WORTHY, 

a.k.a. Jeffrey Kenneth Worthy, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:04-cr-00217-LMM-CMS-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-14855

Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jeffery Worthy, proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. 

In 2004, a jury convicted Worthy of two counts of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119. The district court sentenced 

him to concurrent sentences of 300 months’ imprisonment for each 

count. In November 2020, Worthy, proceeding pro se, filed a motion for compassionate release in the district court. Worthy asserted that his hypertension, for which he was on medication, together with the attendant increased risks from possibly contracting 

COVID-19, constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons to 

warrant his release. He acknowledged, however, that his illness 

was not terminal. He also requested that he be released so that he 

could care for his elderly, terminally-ill mother. 

The district court denied Worthy’s motion. The court concluded that Worthy had failed to demonstrate extraordinary and 

compelling reasons for relief based on risk to his personal health. 

Worthy had acknowledged that his condition was not terminal. 

And, the court found, Worthy seemed able to manage his hypertension by taking the medications he was prescribed. The court declined to consider on the merits Worthy’s argument about his 

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mother, explaining that Worthy failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies. Worthy has appealed.1

II. 

We review de novo a district court’s determination about 

whether a movant is eligible for a § 3582(c) sentence reduction. 

United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). We 

review the court’s findings of fact regarding the movant’s specific 

circumstances for clear error. See United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 

908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that a district court abuses its 

discretion in denying an eligible movant compassionate release 

when it “makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous”). We 

liberally construe pro se filings. Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 

F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015). And we may affirm for any reason 

supported by the record. United States v. Carter, 969 F.3d 1239, 

1242 (11th Cir. 2020). 

III. 

1 After filing a notice of appeal, Worthy moved the district court for reconsideration of the denial of his motion for compassionate release. The district 

court denied the motion for reconsideration as moot, explaining that the notice of appeal divested the court of jurisdiction. Worthy filed an amended notice of appeal that named the denial of his reconsideration motion as part of 

this appeal, but he has offered no argument on appeal about the reconsideration motion or the mootness ground on which it was denied. He has, therefore, abandoned any argument as to the denial of his motion for reconsideration. See United States v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343, 1344 (11th Cir. 1998). 

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A district court has no inherent authority to modify a defendant’s sentence and “may do so only when authorized by a statute or rule.” United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605–06 (11th 

Cir. 2015); see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section 3582(c) permits a district 

court to reduce a defendant’s sentence in certain circumstances. In 

this case, Worthy sought a sentence reduction based on 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). For a person to be eligible for a sentence reduction 

under this provision, a district court must find, among other things, 

that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant the reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1254.

In Bryant, we held that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” are limited to those reasons listed in the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement found in United States Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262.2 Section 1B1.13 lists four 

extraordinary and compelling reasons: the medical condition of the 

defendant, the age of the defendant, family circumstances, and 

other reasons. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1.3 Worthy’s two stated 

reasons for release, his own health and his mother’s, do not satisfy 

these criteria.

First, Worthy’s medical condition, hypertension, does not 

qualify. Under § 1B1.13, a defendant’s medical condition 

2 Worthy argues that § 1B1.13 is not an applicable policy statement governing 

his motion, but Bryant squarely forecloses this argument. 

3 Worthy has not argued that his age constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.

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constitutes an extraordinary and compelling circumstance only 

when the defendant (1) has a terminal illness or (2) is suffering from 

a physical or mental condition that diminishes his ability to provide 

self-care in prison and from which he is not expected to recover. 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). Worthy has conceded he does not 

have a terminal illness. And the district court’s finding that he was 

able to provide self-care in prison with his prescribed medications 

is not clearly erroneous. See Harris, 989 F.3d at 912 (upholding the 

district court’s determination that hypertension was not an extraordinary and compelling circumstance). Thus, we affirm the district 

court’s denial of relief based on Worthy’s asserted medical condition.4

Second, Worthy’s mother’s terminal illness does not provide an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. A defendant’s 

family circumstances may warrant a reduced sentence following 

“[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s 

minor child or minor children” or after “[t]he incapacitation of the 

defendant’s spouse . . . when the defendant would be the only 

4 Worthy argues on appeal that his cataracts contribute to his medical problems. The only mention of cataracts in Worthy’s district court filings appeared 

in a communication from the prison’s Clinical Director, attached to Worthy’s 

§ 3582(c)(2) motion, indicating that Worthy’s medical conditions did not satisfy the Bureau of Prisons’ compassionate release criteria. Even construing his 

filings liberally, he did not make any argument before the district court that 

his cataracts should be considered in conjunction with his hypertension; thus, 

we do not address his argument made for the first time on appeal. See Access 

Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).

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available caregiver for the spouse.” Id., cmt. n.1(C)(i)-(ii). Based on 

a plain reading of § 1B1.13, caring for one’s parents falls outside the 

purview of reasons warranting relief. Thus, Worthy’s request to 

care for his mother was inconsistent with § 1B1.13 and would not 

provide a basis for relief even if the district court had reached the 

merits of this argument. 

The commentary also contains a catch-all provision for 

“other reasons,” which provides that a prisoner may be eligible for 

a sentence reduction if, “[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary 

and compelling reason other than, or in combination with,” the 

other specific examples listed. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D). But 

we made clear in Bryant that “other reasons” are limited to those 

determined by the Bureau of Prisons, and district courts do not 

have the discretion under the catch-all provision to develop other 

reasons outside of those listed in § 1B1.13 that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1263. The 

Bureau of Prisons has not determined that Worthy’s desire to care 

for his ailing mother qualifies under this catch-all provision; thus, 

he is not entitled to relief under it.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court.

AFFIRMED.

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