* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JAN 6 2004 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

HAROLD COLBERT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner, Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 03-6128 (D.C. No. 01-CV-1766-R) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before McCONNELL , ANDERSON , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Plaintiff Harold Colbert appeals from the district court ’s affirmance of the decision of the Social Security Administration deny ing disability benefits for his claimed pain in his back, hips, and knees; swelling in his legs; high blood pressure; hearing loss; and nervousness. “Our revi ew is limited to determining whether the agency’s findings are supported by subs tantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Rutledge v. Apfel , 230 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 2000). In light of these standards, andafter a thorough review of the record on appeal, we affirm. In order to determine whether a claimant is disable d under the Social Security Act, the agency applies a five-step process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussingsteps in detail). Here, the administrative law judge (ALJ) reached step five, where the burden is on the agency to show that claimant retai ns the RFC to perform work that exists in the national economy. See Miller v. Chater , 99 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1996). Following a hearing, the ALJ determined that Mr. Colbert was severely impaired by osteoarthritis of the hips and knees an d also by a sensorineural hearing loss, that his conditions do not meet or equal a listed impairment, and that Mr. Colbert could not perform his past relevant work as a warehouseman. Finally, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Colbert retained the residual functional-3-

capacity to perform a limited range of light work, with nonexertional limitations as to concentration, climbing, kneeling, crouching, and working in exposure to heights or noise. Given these limitations, and bas ed on testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Colbe rt could perform several jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Consequently, the ALJ determined that Mr. Colbert was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act and regulations. On appeal, Mr. Colbert’s main contention is that th e ALJ committed legal error in failing to discuss the medical evidence as required by Clifton v. Chater , 79 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 1996). Under Clifton , “[t]he record must demonstrate that the ALJ considered all of the evidence,” and the ALJ must “‘discuss[] the evidence supporting his decision, . . . the uncontr overted evidence he chooses not to rely upon, [and] significantly probative evidence he rejects.” Id. at 1009-10. The ALJ, however, need not discuss every piece of evidence. Id. Contrary to Mr. Colbert’s contentions, the ALJ’s di scussion of the medical evidence is legally sufficient. Though the decisio n is terse, it demonstrates a meaningful analysis of the full medical record and Mr. Colbert’s testimony. In the decision, the ALJ recognizes Mr. Colbert’s medi cally determinable impairments. He notes that Mr. Colbert suffers fro m high blood pressure but finds that this condition does not restrict his abi lity to work. He further-4-

comments that “[t]here is no objective evidence of any medically determinable back condition.” Aplt’s App., Vol. 2 at 17. The decision cites to the exhibits which the ALJ ac corded “significant weight,” as providing the “best evidence of [claimant’s] medical condition,” and states that “there is no substantial evidence . . . contrary” to the listed exhibits. Id. The specified exhibits included the records of tr eating physicians and a consulting physician. See id. at 91-116 (Ex. 1F, medical records from treating ear, nose, and throat specialist Dale B. Smith, D.O .); 117-27 (Ex. 2F, outpatient records from Duncan Regional Hospital); 141-44 (Ex. 4F, medical records from treating orthopedist Thomas J. Eiser, M.D.); and 14 5-150 (Ex. 5F, consultative medical evaluation of internist David Seitsinger, D .O.). Our review of the record bears out the ALJ’s conclu sion that there is no significant conflict in the evidence: the medical records of treating physicians and consultants demonstrate remarkable agreement. Notwithstanding Mr. Colbert’s hyperbole concerning treating physici ans’ statements about his weight, his eventual need for joint replacement sur gery, and the need to avoid running or jogging, the ALJ did not reject any “sig nificantly probative evidence,” Clifton , 79 F.3d at 1010. Accordingly, there was no such evidence to be discussed. Id.-5-

With this consistent evidence as a base, the ALJ ad equately explained his determination that Mr. Colbert’s osteoarthritis doe s not meet the “objective findings or loss of function” required to meet the applicable Listing 1.03, concerning arthritis of a major weight-bearing joint. Aplt.’s App., Vol. 2 at 18. Similarly, the ALJ adequately explained his reasons for not fully crediting Mr. Colbert’s own description of his condition. He stated that Mr. Colbert’s testimony was undercut by a number of consideration s, including his medical history and his account of a daily walk and swim. Id. at 19. Although Mr. Colbert couches his argument as a ques tion of law, he is essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence. Of course, we cannot do this. See Kelley v. Chater , 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995). We conclude that the agency applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision. In light of this conclusion, we need not address Mr. Colbert’s complaints about the district court ’s decision or analysis. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge