Filed 5/13/21 P. v. Harmon CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GERJUAN DESHON HARMON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B308766

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. LA071371)

THE COURT:

Gerjuan Deshon Harmon (defendant) filed a petition for 

resentencing under Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18)1

seeking to reclassify his 2013 felony conviction for unlawful 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
2

taking or driving of a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. 

(a)) as a misdemeanor. The trial court denied his petition, 

finding that he was ineligible for relief because the $300,000 

Bentley he drove away and crashed into a pole was worth more 

than $950 (before it was crashed into a pole). Defendant 

appealed, and his appointed counsel filed an opening brief 

pursuant to People v. Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496 

(Serrano), indicating that his review of the entire record revealed 

no “arguable issues to raise on appeal.” Because defendant 

availed himself of his right to file a supplemental brief, we will 

review the arguments he raises. (People v. Cole (2020) 52 

Cal.App.5th 1023, 1040 (Cole), review granted Oct. 14, 2020, 

S264278.) As explained below, these arguments are meritless, 

not properly before us, or both. Accordingly, we affirm.

In his supplemental brief, defendant raises four arguments.

His first two arguments are the only arguments properly 

before us, as they are the only ones pertaining to the order he 

appealed that denied him relief under Proposition 47. 

Defendant urges that the trial court erred in not reducing 

his felony Vehicle Code section 10851 conviction to a 

misdemeanor. In People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175, 1187, our 

Supreme Court held that Proposition 47 mandates the reduction 

of a felony conviction for unlawful taking of a vehicle under 

Vehicle Code section 10851 to a misdemeanor if the vehicle taken 

was worth less than $950. This does not aid defendant because 

(1) the jury’s acquittal of the charge of grand theft auto (§ 487) of 

the Bentley necessarily means that its guilty verdict for unlawful 

taking or driving a vehicle rests on driving, and (2) even if we 

ignore the jury’s findings, the sole evidence at trial was that the 

Bentley he took was worth $300,000, which is more than 315 
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times greater than the $950 threshold. In his supplemental brief, 

defendant urges that our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. 

Bullard (2020) 9 Cal.5th 94 (Bullard) aids him. It does not. 

Bullard held that, unlike the general crime of “theft,” Vehicle 

Code section 10851 does not require proof of a defendant’s intent 

to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle; a temporary 

deprivation will suffice. (Id. at pp. 99-100.) Thus, whether 

defendant sought to deprive his victim of her Bentley for a day or 

forever is of no moment; his conviction for felony unlawful driving 

stands.

Defendant also urges that trial court erred in determining 

that the record of conviction foreclosed his ineligibility for 

Proposition 47 relief without first appointing him counsel. 

However, because the court’s determination was based on the 

uncontested evidence in the record of conviction—and, indeed, 

because defendant proffered no contrary evidence in his support 

of his Proposition 47 petition—the court denied defendant’s 

petition at the “eligibility stage” (rather than the later, 

“resentencing” stage) and there is no right to counsel at the 

eligibility stage. (Cf. People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 

299-300.)

Defendant’s remaining two arguments are outside the 

scope of the order reviewed, and we need not consider them. 

They also lack merit.

Defendant contends that all of the convictions he sustained 

after two separate trials in 2013 and in 2014—for first degree 

burglary of an inhabited dwelling house with a person present (§ 

459), for grand theft of personal property (§ 487, subd. (a)), for 

resisting executive officers (§ 69) (two counts), and for evading an 

officer in a vehicle with willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, 
4

subd. (a))—must be vacated because the People had twice

dismissed the charging document and did not obtain his consent 

to a file a third charging document, rendering his convictions 

invalid under section 1387. We have rejected this precise 

contention twice before—in denying two petitions for writs of 

habeas corpus filed in May 2015 (In re Harmon, (May 27, 2015, 

B264086)) and in May 2018 (In re Harmon, (June 14, 2018, 

B290369))—and for good reason: It lacks merit. The record 

reflects that defendant consented to the refiling of the charging 

document following a single dismissal, as authorized by section 

1387.2. Although the court’s minute order initially cited the 

wrong Penal Code provision and had to be corrected, the record is 

clear that there was one dismissal and that defendant consented 

to the People’s refiling of the same charges in the same charging 

document. This complied with section 1387.

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred under the rules 

of evidence in admitting the victim’s testimony regarding the 

value of the items he stole from her. Because this assertion could 

have been raised during the direct appeal of his conviction, he 

may not raise it now. (In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759.) 

This assertion also lacks merit: The victim testified from her 

personal knowledge, and “[i]t is well settled that the owner of 

[personal] property, whether generally familiar with value or not, 

is competent to testify as to the value of [her] property.” (Holt v. 

Ravani (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 213, 215 [so holding, as to a car].)

The trial court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. 
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—————————————————————————————— 

ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J., CHAVEZ, J., HOFFSTADT, J