J-A19026-14

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

ROBERT WAYNE TAYLOR, II,

 Appellant No. 1723 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 24, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-MD-0000212-2013 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

ROBERT W. TAYLOR, II, 

 Appellant No. 1724 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 24, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-MD-0000197-2013 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014 

 Appellant, Robert Wayne Taylor, II, appeals from the September 24, 

2013 judgment of sentence of 90 days’ incarceration and $300 in fines, 

 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 
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imposed after he was convicted following a non-jury trial of two counts of 

indirect criminal contempt (ICC). After careful review, we reverse. 

 The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows: 

Joy N. Taylor, now Joy N. Kochman [(“Ms. Kochman”)], 

initiated a protection from abuse action against [Appellant] 

on or about September 26, 2011. A final protection from 

abuse order was entered on May 18, 2012 (the “PFA 

Order”). The PFA Order provides that [Appellant] “shall not 

contact [Ms. Kochman], or any other person protected 

under this order, by telephone or by any other means,

including through third persons.” The only exception to the 

communication restriction in the PFA Order is found in

paragraph 5, which provides that “the parties may have text 

message contact for the purposes of custody scheduling 

only, without said contact constituting violation of this 

order. All other terms of this order remain in effect during 

such contact.” On May 22, 2013, the parties entered into a 

separate custody consent order, paragraph 6 of which 

provides that “the parties may have text communication 

with one another for legitimate issues involving the 

children.”

 

On June 21, 2013, [Ms. Kochman] and [Appellant] met at 

the Sheetz convenience store in Kittanning, Pennsylvania 

for a custody exchange of the parties’ two children. The 

children exited Ms. Kochman’s car and walked to 

[Appellant’s] vehicle. The parties were parked 

approximately four vehicle[] widths apart. [Appellant] then 

asked one of the children to ask Ms. Kochman whether she 

had spoken with her lawyer about matters concerning the

sale of the parties’ former marital residence. The child went 

back to Ms. Kochman’s car, spoke with her about the 

matter, then returned to [Appellant’s] vehicle. Ms. 

Kochman then exited her vehicle and began speaking to 

[Appellant] about the house. After the parties’ exchange, 

[Appellant] went into the store with the children. Based on 

his indirect communication with Ms. Kochman, through the 
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child, [Appellant] was charged with [ICC] on or about July 

2, 2013 (No. MD-0000197-2013). 

On or about July 13, 2013, [Appellant] sent Ms. Kochman a 

text message, again with regard to the marital residence. It 

read[] as follows: 

I also sent an email to your lawyer today about the 

house on 4th Avenue. The bank said if you get 

paperwork done I told Cynthia about they will take 

your name off. So if you could please talk to her 

about it, me and the girls can start moving into it. 

Thanks. I will tell them. They said they love you.

Based on the contents of the text message, [Appellant] 

again was charged with [ICC] on or about July 16, 2013 

(No. MD-000212-2013). 

 

The [trial court] conducted a bench trial on both counts of 

indirect criminal contempt on July 29, 2013. At the trial, 

the parties generally did not dispute what occurred at the 

Sheetz store on June 21, 2013 or the contents of the text 

message sent by [Appellant] on July 13, 2013. The [trial 

court] ultimately found that the Commonwealth had proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] had violated the 

PFA Order on both counts. The [trial court] concluded that 

the subject of both communications was not a legitimate 

concern regarding the children but a legal matter regarding 

the disposition of real estate involved in the parties’ divorce 

proceeding. 

[On September 24, 2013, t]he [trial court] sentenced 

[Appellant] to 90 days’ incarceration in the Armstrong 

County Jail, together with a $300.00 fine on both counts, 

the sentences to run concurrently. [Appellant] filed notices 

of appeal and concise statements of [errors] complained of 

on appeal at both case numbers on October 24, 2013 and

November 18, 2013. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/13, at 1-4 (unnecessary capitalization and 

footnote omitted). 

 On appeal, Appellant presents the following two issues for our review: 
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I. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in 

failing to consider the custody modification entered 

May 22, 2013 prior to the filing of the subject indirect 

criminal contempt charge[s] which allowed for text 

communication for any legitimate issue involving the 

children? 

II. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in 

sentencing [Appellant] to a [concurrent] sentence [of] 

three months [of] incarceration and fines of $300.00? 

Appellant’s Brief at viii (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

 In his first issue, Appellant essentially challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to sustain his convictions of ICC. Our standard of review of such 

claims is well-settled: 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the 

evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, as verdict winner, to see whether there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the factfinder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This 

standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence 

is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the 

combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Although a conviction must be 

based on more than mere suspicion or conjecture, the 

Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical 

certainty. Moreover, when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence, this Court may not substitute its judgment for 

that of the fact-finder; if the record contains support for the 

convictions they may not be disturbed. 

Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 649 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

citations, quotations, and brackets omitted). 

 Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6114, 

[w]here the police, sheriff or the plaintiff have filed charges 

of indirect criminal contempt against a defendant for 
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violation of a protection order issued under this chapter, a 

foreign protection order or a court-approved consent 

agreement, the court may hold the defendant in indirect 

criminal contempt and punish the defendant in accordance

with law. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 6114(a). “Where a PFA order is involved, an [ICC] charge is 

designed to seek punishment for violation of the protective order.” 

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 10 A.3d 341, 346 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). To establish ICC, the Commonwealth must prove: 

1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to 

the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct 

prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the 

act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 

4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent. 

Id. (citation omitted). 

 On appeal, Appellant solely challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

to prove the ‘wrongful intent’ element of ICC. Essentially, Appellant 

maintains that his June 21, 2013 communication with Ms. Kochman at the 

Sheetz store, and his July 13, 2013 text message to her, were both for the 

purpose of discussing legitimate issues involving their children’s housing. 

The trial court, however, found that Appellant’s intent “was not to discuss 

matters involving the children’s well-being or custody schedule, but instead 

was to discuss with Ms. Kochman the outstanding issues regarding their 

jointly-held real property and to impress upon her [Appellant’s] desire to 

come to a quick resolution.” TCO at 6. Thus, the court found the ‘wrongful 

intent’ element satisfied.
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Even accepting the court’s interpretation of Appellant’s intent in 

communicating with Ms. Kochman, we disagree with its legal determination 

that his intent was wrongful. In Appellant’s July 13, 2013 text message to 

Ms. Kochman, Appellant stated: “So if you could please talk to [your 

attorney] about it, me and the girls can start moving into [the house].” 

N.T., 7/29/13, at 6 (emphasis added). In describing Appellant’s 

communication with her at the Sheetz store, Ms. Kochman testified that 

Appellant was “asking about what was going on with the other house [the 

parties’ jointly owned] and that [Appellant] wanted to move into it.” Id. at 

10. It was undisputed at trial that the “jointly-held real property” about 

which Appellant was communicating with Ms. Kochman was a home that 

Appellant desired to live in with the couple’s children. Appellant stated at 

trial that he was trying to move into that residence, which was closer to Ms. 

Kochman’s home, so the children would be “closer to their school” and “have 

easier access” to Appellant. Id. at 17. Appellant testified that the bank was 

“going to foreclose on the house” unless Ms. Kochman timely signed 

paperwork permitting Appellant to refinance the mortgage on the home. Id. 

at 16. Appellant attempted to communicate with Ms. Kochman’s attorney to 

obtain Ms. Kochman’s signature, but did not receive a response. Id. 

Considering the context surrounding Appellant’s communications with 

Ms. Kochman, we cannot agree with the court that his intent was wrongful. 

Instead, Appellant’s purpose in contacting with Ms. Kochman was to resolve 

a legitimate issue involving where the couple’s children would be living when 
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in Appellant’s custody. There is also no indication in the record that 

Appellant communicated with Ms. Kochman for the purpose of abusing, 

stalking, harassing, or threatening her, as prohibited by the PFA petition.1

 

Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to prove that Appellant possessed 

wrongful intent in communicating with Ms. Kochman. Thus, we reverse 

Appellant’s convictions for two counts of ICC. In light of this disposition, we 

need not address Appellant’s second issue challenging his sentence.

Judgment of sentence reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Justice Fitzgerald joins in the memorandum. 

Judge Olson files a dissenting memorandum. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/26/2014 

 

1 See Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d 613, 619 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(indicating that to prove ICC of a PFA order that stated the appellant “shall 

not abuse, harass, stalk or threaten any of the above persons,” and 

prohibited the appellant from contacting the petitioner, the Commonwealth 

was required to prove “that he knowingly and willfully made threatening or

harassing statements” to the petitioner); Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 

A.2d 1174, 1177 (Pa. Super. 2005) (reversing ICC conviction based on the 

defendant’s communicating with his wife in violation of a PFA order where, 

inter alia, the defendant “did not believe that he was threatening [his wife], 

and neither she nor any one [sic] else in the courtroom heard [the 

defendant] threaten [his wife] or otherwise make any threatening 

movements or gestures toward her”).