In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-3358 

FRANCES L. ROGERS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States Tax Court. 

No. 15306-15 — Kathleen Kerrigan, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 29, 2018 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 19, 2018 

____________________ 

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. A married couple’s choice to file a 

joint federal income tax return results in both individuals assuming full liability for any owed tax. Frances Rogers and her 

husband John did so for 2004. When the Internal Revenue Service subsequently found the return deficient, the Rogerses 

pushed back, ultimately took the IRS to trial, and lost. Frances 

Rogers, a former teacher with an MBA, doctorate, and law degree, attended the trial. Three years later, and facing a substantial tax deficiency and related penalties, Mrs. Rogers 
2 No. 17-3358 

sought so-called innocent spouse relief under the Internal 

Revenue Code. The Tax Court rejected the claim, finding that 

Mrs. Rogers’s meaningful participation in the trial precluded 

her from after-the-fact seeking to avoid responsibility for 

those liabilities. 

The IRS brought its concerns with the 2004 tax return to 

the Rogerses’ attention through the issuance of a notice of deficiency in December 2009. The notice informed them that 

they owed an additional $488,177 in income taxes and underreporting penalties of $138,732. Mrs. Rogers and her husband responded by challenging the Service’s position in Tax 

Court. 

In 2012 a trial ensued to resolve the disputed tax liability. 

John Rogers, a Harvard-educated tax lawyer, represented 

himself and his wife at trial. For her part, and although not 

testifying at trial or otherwise presenting oral argument, 

Frances Rogers attended the entire trial and sat at the table 

reserved for taxpayer petitioners. 

In July 2014 the Tax Court ruled in the IRS’s favor and ordered the Rogerses to pay an income tax deficiency of 

$207,942 and related penalties of $77,868. Congress has made 

that liability joint and several. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013(d). On appeal we affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. See Rogers v. 

Comm’r, No. 15-3678, slip op. (7th Cir. Nov. 3, 2016). At no 

point during the proceedings in the Tax Court did Mrs. Rogers (or her husband as her counsel) raise an innocent spouse 

claim under 26 U.S.C. § 6015. 

In June 2015—three years after the trial that ended with 

the adverse ruling—Mrs. Rogers petitioned the Tax Court for 

innocent spouse relief under 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b) and (f). But 
No.17-3358 3

Congress has chosen to permit such relief only if the petitioner has not “participated meaningfully in [the] prior proceeding”—here the 2012 trial. Id. at § 6015(g)(2). In this way, 

Congress has implemented a variation of res judicata applicable to claims for innocent spouse relief pursued after a prior 

proceeding has reached finality and resolved a taxpayer’s liability. 

While the Internal Revenue Code does not delineate what 

constitutes meaningful participation for purposes of innocent 

spouse relief, courts evaluate the totality of circumstances to 

measure the extent of a taxpayer’s involvement and engagement in the prior proceeding. See Haag v. Shulman, 683 F.3d 

26, 31 (1st Cir. 2012). Whether Mrs. Rogers meaningfully participated in the 2012 trial is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. See Freda v. Comm’r, 656 F.3d 570, 573 (7th 

Cir. 2011). 

The Tax Court held that Mrs. Rogers failed to carry her 

burden of demonstrating she qualified for innocent spouse relief. The bottom line for the Tax Court was that Mrs. Rogers’s 

contention that she lacked knowledge of business and financial matters, including complex tax matters, and otherwise 

did not understand what transpired during the 2012 trial 

lacked credibility. Section 6015(g)(2), the Tax Court reasoned, 

does not afford innocent spouse relief to individuals who 

feign ignorance or choose to remain willfully blind to their 

own tax predicament. Nor, the Tax Court underscored, did 

Congress intend to afford such relief to someone like Mrs. 

Rogers who had every opportunity to raise her claim during 

the 2012 trial. 

On appeal Mrs. Rogers contends that a disclosure violation by the IRS should have precluded the Tax Court from 
4 No. 17-3358 

considering the Commissioner’s argument that she was 

barred from seeking innocent spouse relief. As Mrs. Rogers 

would have it, the IRS was bound under provisions in its Internal Revenue Manual to notify her before the 2012 trial of 

her right to request innocent spouse relief. That it failed to do 

so, she contends, means that the Tax Court should not have 

permitted the Service to invoke the meaningful participation 

bar in § 6015(g)(2). 

We cannot agree. Even assuming that Mrs. Rogers could 

establish that she did not receive a particular disclosure, she 

has identified no authority that a disclosure shortcoming precluded the Service from taking the position that she was not 

entitled to innocent spouse relief. See Matter of Carlson, 126 

F.3d 915, 922 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the “[p]rocedures 

in the Internal Revenue Manual are intended to aid in the internal administration of the IRS; they do not confer rights on 

taxpayers”). This argument need not detain us further. 

Mrs. Rogers’s position on the merits fares no better. In reviewing her petition for innocent spouse relief, the Tax Court 

found substantial portions of her testimony to defy reality 

and lack credibility. The Tax Court did not its mince its words 

on this score: 

 “Despite having an M.B.A. and a J.D. and having completed multiple courses in taxation petitioner contends 

that she has ‘no understanding’ of items and transactions reported on their joint returns, which were the 

subject of the 2004 deficiency case.” 

 “On her Form 8857 and in her testimony petitioner 

portrays herself as having a near complete lack of 

knowledge or sophistication with respect to business 
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and financial matters. For example, she states that before 2009 she ‘was not capable of understanding a 

checking account or credit card statement’ and that she 

still ‘is unable to understand basic financial statements.’” 

 “Petitioner’s testimony about the extent of her ignorance is not credible.” 

 “We do not find it credible that she was unaware of the 

legal implications of being a named party in the 2004 

deficiency case.” 

 “If, as she contends, she truly had ‘no idea’ about the 

matters being considered, then she could and should 

have consulted with her attorney to clarify any misunderstanding.” Instead, “[s]he chose to do nothing.” 

The Tax Court stood on solid ground when rejecting Mrs. 

Rogers’s position. See Frierdich v. Comm’r, 925 F.2d 180, 185 

(7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the Tax Court is not required 

to accept a taxpayer’s testimony as absolute fact). Credibility 

matters. This principle applies with particular force where, as 

here, the taxpayer’s testimony is self-serving and at odds with 

her education and experience. 

The Tax Court also found that Mrs. Rogers’s participation 

through her counsel, an experienced tax attorney, in the prior 

Tax Court proceedings indicated she participated meaningfully. Based on our review of the record, we cannot say any of 

these findings reflect clear error. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.