alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Gertrude K. de Bermingham, Plaintiff, *v.*Ferdinand H. de Bermingham et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Nassau County,

October 8, 1952.

*530
      *John G. Tarrant*and *William B. Pius*for plaintiff.

*Clarence E. Steinberg*for Ferdinand H. de Berminghám and another, defendants.

Hallinan, J.

Motion by plaintiff pursuant to rule 109 of the Rules of Civil Practice for an order dismissing the counterclaim alleged in paragraphs “ Nineteenth ” and “ Twentieth ’ ’ of the defendants ’ answer on the ground that said counterclaim is not one which may be properly interposed in the action.

The action is brought pursuant to article 15 of the Real Property Law to determine claims to real property. The counterclaim under attack is for money loaned. Plaintiff claims that because section 504 of the Real Property Law provides that a defendant may allege facts as a counterclaim *for the same cause of action,*he may not allege any other type of counterclaim. This does not follow. Section 262 of the Civil Practice Act authorizes the interposition of any counterclaim which a defendant may have, subject only to the provisions of section 267 of the Civil Practice Act.

While there seems to be no case directly in point, there is language in *Helterline*v. *People*(295 N. Y. 245, 253) from which it may be inferred that counterclaims, other than those authorized by section 504 of the Real Property Law, may be asserted in actions brought under article 15 of the Real Property Law. There plaintiff brought an action to determine title to land. He appealed from part of the decree which imposed upon him an obligation to pay a portion of the'back taxes. The Court of Appeals held that this was erroneous, saying: “No counterclaim for the recovery of taxes was interposed and the question was not litigated.” The implication is plain that if a counterclaim had been interposed the result might have been different.

The motion is denied. Submit order.
#### AMERICANA OF BAL HARBOUR, INC., etc., Petitioner, v. Mary KIESTER, Respondent.

No. 40974.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 29, 1971.

Certiorari denied. 245 So.2d 121.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002







Securities and Exchange Commission

Washington, DC



The undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Shells Seafood Restaurants, Inc. do hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that Annual Report of Shells Seafood Restaurants, Inc. on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 2, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Shells Seafood Restaurants, Inc.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Shells Seafood Restaurants, Inc. and will be retained by Shells Seafood Restaurants, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





/s/LESLIEJ. CHRISTON

President and Chief Executive Officer

March 10, 2005





/s/WARRENR. NELSON

Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

March 10, 2005
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Herman SMITH, Jr. v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 61448.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 31, 1978.

In re: Herman Smith, Jr., applying for writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Assumption Parish.

*1010Writ granted. Evidentiary hearing ordered to ascertain whether prior convictions were without counsel or with waiver of counsel.
#### Wilma S. JONES et al., Petitioners, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, a municipal corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Respondent.

No. 42943.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 18, 1973.

L. Ralph Smith, Jr., of Smith, Moore & Huey, Tallahassee, for petitioners.

Roy T. Rhodes and W. Ralph Durrance, Jr., of Rhodes, Stephens, Bryant & Dur-rance, Tallahassee, for respondent.

DEKLE, Justice.

The conflict herein for issuance of the writ of certiorari is delineated in the related opinion filed this date of Ball v. City of Tallahassee, 281 So.2d 333 (Fla.1973). There we recite the rule of proof to which we adhere as it appears in our earlier cases of Canal Authority v. Miller, 243 So.2d 131 (Fla.1970); Canal Authority v. Litzel, 243 So.2d 135 (Fla.1970); and Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 123 So. 527 (1929).

Applying the *Canal Authority*rule of proof for a showing of necessity of taking by the condemning authority, to the facts in this particular case, we find that the trial court, as affirmed by the district court of appeal upon the facts, was well within the rule in its determination and judgment which we find to be correct.

The opinion of the district court, 266 So.2d 382, is hereby modified to conform to the rule of proof as set forth in Ball v. City of Tallahassee, *supra,*and the writ of certiorari is otherwise

Denied.

CARLTON, C. J., McCAIN, J., and GALE, Circuit Judge, concur.

ERVIN, J., concurs in the conclusion discharging the writ.
Kyle Lornazow Federal Aviation Administration Enforcement Division, Western Team 1601 Lind Ave., SW Renton, W A 98057 T: (425) 227-1847 F: (425) 227-1007 

### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

## HEARING DOCKET

Inthe Matter of: DocketNo. FAA-2016-4270 FAA Case No. 2015WA910115 AERO TECH, LLC.



### COMPLAINANT'S RESPONSE TO ORDERTO SHOW CAUSE TheCompl<till<j.lltrespectfully apologizes for failing to appear for the scheduled prehearing conference onAugust 16,2016. The undersignedhas never failed to appear for a pre hearing,conference before and did so due to a calendaring error, which shall not be repeated again.

. .

### . While acknowledging that a calendar error is the reason the undersigned failed to appear; the undersigned would like to point outthathe was in fact available for the conference on August 16, but didnotn;ceive 

### 'lphone·c1:1ll fr-om any ofthe interestedparties adv:ising thatthe conft;rencewas underway. Regardless, the May 11, 2016 Procedural Order indicatedthat the prehearing was scheduled for August 16 and the undersigned again apologizes for failing to appear. The undersignedhas discussed dates ofavailabilityto reschedule the prehearing conference with counselfor Respondent. Assuming your honor does not want to· schedule pastNovember we.only discussed availability Septemberthrough November: Dates we are 

### not available: 

### ' • September 1 - 20 •

**Qctober.~-4** • October 18 .-1,9
I 1 ' 'I '• October 31 • November 1-4 • November 15 • November 25

Respectfully submittedthis 26th day ofAugust, 2016.

Response to Order to Show Cause FAA Case No. 2015WA910115 Page 2 of 3 Kyle Lomazow, FAA Attorney T (425) 227-1847 F (425) 227-1007CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certifYthat the foregoing Response to the Orderto Show Cause has been served viafacsimile and First-Class Mail, to the following:

Federal AviationAdministration 800 Independence Avenue SW Washington, D.C. 20591 Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 Wilbur Wright Building- Suite 2W1000 FAX: (202) 267-1293 The Honorable Douglas M. Rawald, Administrative Law Judge Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) Washington, D.C. 20590 TEL: 202-366-5121 FAX: (202)-366-7536 Stephen Doerr, Respondent's Counsel DOERR & KNUDSON, PA 212 West First Street Portales, NM 88130 TEL: (575)-359-1289 Fax: (575) 359-1289

Dated this 26'h day ofAugust, 2016.

Response to Order to Show Cause FAA Case No. 2015WA910115 Page 3 of 3 Kyle Lomazow, FAA Attorney T (425) 227-1847 F (425) 227-1007
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 121 (Friday, June 22, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 29121-29122]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-13503]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services

[CMS-7050-N2]


Medicare & Medicaid Programs, and Other Program Initiatives, and 
Priorities; Meeting of the Advisory Panel on Outreach and Education 
(APOE), June 20, 2018

AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS.

ACTION: Cancellation of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On June 1, 2018, we published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 
25461) announcing a new meeting of the Advisory Panel on Outreach and 
Education (APOE) (the Panel), which was scheduled for Wednesday, June 
20, 2018. This notice announces the cancellation of the June 20, 2018 
meeting.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lynne Johnson, Acting Designated 
Federal Official, Office of Communications, CMS, 7500 Security 
Boulevard, Mail Stop S1-05-06, Baltimore, MD 21244, 410-786-0897, email 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#d599acbbbbb0fb9fbabdbba6babb95b6b8a6fbbdbda6fbb2baa3"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5c102532323972163334322f33321c3f312f7234342f723b332a">[email protected]</span></a>. Additional information about the APOE is 
available on the internet at: http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/FACA/APOE.html. Press inquiries are handled through 
the CMS Press Office at (202) 690-6145.


[[Page 29122]]


    Dated: June 19, 2018.
Seema Verma,
Administrator, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.
[FR Doc. 2018-13503 Filed 6-20-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4120-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### FLORIDA NATIONAL BANK AT LAKELAND v. GULF ASPHALT CORPORATION.

No. 37882.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 1969.

Rehearing Denied April 15, 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 212 So.2d 306.
#### Marzell CLAYTON et al. v. T. H. HARRIS et al.

No. 47399.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 4, 1974.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1974.

A. S. Scott, Jr., Laurel, William A. Stewart, Jr., Jackson, for appellant.

Lampkin Butts, E. R. Alley, Laurel, for appellee.

Before RODGERS, P. J., and PATTERSON, INZER, SMITH and SUGG, JJ-

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jones County; James D. Hester, Judge.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<S>                            <C>
<ARTICLE>          UT
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from FPL
Group's and FPL's condensed consolidated balance sheet as of June 30, 1999
and condensed consolidated statements of income and cash flows for the six
months ended June 30, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
such financial statements.

<CIK>                               0000753308
<NAME>                         FPL Group, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                         1,000,000
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                       JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-TYPE>                            6-MOS
<BOOK-VALUE>                          PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>               $7,958
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>             $3,729
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                  $1,610
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                    $0
<OTHER-ASSETS>                            $899
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         $14,196
<COMMON>                                    $2
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>               $2,891
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                     $2,606
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>          $5,499
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       $0
<PREFERRED>                               $226
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                    $3,479
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                          $0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                   $0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>              $0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>               $0
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                   $0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                 $0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                            $0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>          $4,992
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>          $14,196
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>               $3,138
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                      $159
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>              $2,555
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>              $2,555
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                   $583
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                         $34
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>            $451
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                  $126
<NET-INCOME>                              $325
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                 $7
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>             $325
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                  $183
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                   $0
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                    $748
<EPS-BASIC>                            $1.20
<EPS-DILUTED>                            $1.20



</TABLE>
alaska hawaii guam american samoa virgin islands puerto rico

*

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* Alabama – Online also available. Online only if 

voter requested absentee ballot by email/online 

and voter is located outside the territorial limits 

of the U.S. 

* Alaska - Fax ballot only if voter requested to 

receive ballot by fax or by online delivery.

* Arizona – Online also available. Online 

submission available if a voter receives 

instruction from their local election official.

* California - Fax only if voter is overseas or 

activated within 6 days of the election.

* Colorado - Online also available. 

* Florida - Fax only if the voter is outside the U.S.

* Iowa – Mail, email or fax only for overseas 

Uniformed Service members. All other UOCAVA 

voters must submit ballot by mail. Voters located 

in a hostile fire area may email or fax ballot.

* Missouri – Email or fax only if located in a hostile 

fire area.

* Nebraska – Email and fax available for those 

voters who have the prior approval from their 

local election official.

* Nevada - Online also available. 

* New Jersey – Voters can email or fax their ballot/

FWAB, but they must also still mail their ballot/

FWAB.

* North Carolina – Online available for state ballot 

submission only.

* Oregon – Additional forms are required if voter 

is voting on local offices or ballot measures and 

voter is submitting the ballot by email or fax. 

Forms can be found at www.oregonvotes.gov/

myballot.

* Rhode Island - Fax only if voter requested 

absentee ballot by fax.

* Texas – Fax only if located in a hostile fire area.

alaska hawaii guam american samoa virgin islands puerto rico

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MAIL

MAIL & FAX

MAIL, FAX & EMAIL

HOW VOTERS CAN SUBMIT THEIR 

BALLOT OR FWAB

FEDERAL WRITE-IN ABSENTEE BALLOT

* Last revised 2/14/2024
#### Robert T. WHISNANT and Joey P. Whisnant, Appellants, v. Robert MERHIGE, Jr., Appellee.

No. 72-483.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 15, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                        Ex 10.11

                            FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
                            1999 STOCK OPTION PLAN
                                      OF
                           SFBC INTERNATIONAL, INC.


I.   Section 2 is hereby deleted and replaced with the following:

          2.   Stock. The stock subject to Options shall be authorized but
               -----
     unissued shares of common stock (the "Common Stock"), or shares of Common
     Stock reacquired by the Company in any manner. The aggregate number of
     shares of Common Stock which may be issued pursuant to the Plan is
     1,200,000, subject to adjustment as provided in Section 14. Any such shares
     may be issued as ISOs or Non-Qualified Options so long as the number of
     shares so issued does not exceed the limitations in this Section. If any
     Options granted under the Plan shall expire or terminate for any reason
     without having been exercised in full or shall cease for any reason to be
     exercisable in whole or in part the unexercised shares subject to such
     Options shall again be available for grants of Options under the Plan. The
     Common Stock shall be unregistered unless the Company voluntarily elects to
     file a registration statement.
#### GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Jacob William WOLF, Appellee.

No. 72-625.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 5, 1972.

Gerald Silverman, Miami, for appellant.

Weiner & Rubin, Miami, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed upon authority of the rule stated in North Shore Hospital, Inc. v. Barber, Fla.1962, 143 So.2d 849.
#### Leon DODD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-405.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 29, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### W. A. McMILLIAN v. Luther PATTON, Sheriff and State of Mississippi.

No. 45959.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 1, 1970.

James Sideris, Gulfport, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by John M. Kinard, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Clarence Samuel ESPOSITO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 70-10.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. 16, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 16, 1971.

Thomas W. Garrard, of Edmund, McDaniel & Garrard, Lake Alfred, for appellant.

*452Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael N. Kavouklis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Esposito was convicted by a jury on a charge of possession of stolen property in violation of Section 811.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. He now appeals to this court, assigning as error the trial court’s commenting upon a portion of the testimony within the hearing of the jury.

During the course of the trial, counsel for Esposito was attempting to show through cross-examination that one of the-state’s witnesses had received a meaningless sentence in return for his agreeing to testify against Esposito. The witness testified that he had plead guilty to a charge of “breaking and entering” and a charge of “receiving stolen property” in the Criminal Court of Record of Polk County and that he had received a sentence of four years to run concurrently with a five-year sentence previously imposed in Hillsborough County. Counsel for the appellant then carried on the following colloquy with the witness:

> Q. Was the breaking and entering with the intent to commit a felony ?

> A. I don’t recall.

> Q. It would carry a ten year sentence as a general rule, would it not, that’s the maximum sentence that could be . imposed?

> A. Yes, sir.

> Q. And the possession of stolen property would carry a maximum of five years, is that correct?

> A. Yes, sir.

> Q. And, as a matter of fact, you got nothing.

> Á. I got what the judge gave me.

> Q. You got nothing.

> A. I got four years to run concurrently.

> Q. You got four years running with the sentence already imposed, you were already pulling, right?

> A. Right.

Although the state did not elect to conduct a redirect examination and informed the witness that it had no more questions to ask, the trial court judge indicated that “[t]he statement that he got nothing [was not] correct and shouldn’t be so considered by the jury.” Counsel for appellant immediately requested that the court grant a mistrial on the ground that the court’s commenting upon the testimony of the witness had prejudiced his client’s defense to an extent that made a "fair trial highly unlikely. The motion was denied.

We agree with appellant’s contention. A determination as to the credibility of a witness is uniquely within the realm of the jury’s deliberations and should in no way be infringed upon by the trial court. Stovall v. State, 156 Fla. 832, 24 So.2d 582 (1946). Although there is merit to the court’s statement to the effect that the concurrent sentences were not a mere nullity, it was the duty of the prosecution rather than the court to attempt to rehabilitate its own witnesses.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

HOBSON, C. J., and LILES and Mc-NULTY, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Federal Trade Commission

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

Office of the Chair

Statement of Chair Lina M. Khan

Regarding the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

on the Funeral Industry Practices Rule

Commission File No. P034410

October 20, 2022

People are at their most vulnerable when they’re grieving. That was the insight behind 

the FTC’s Funeral Rule, which first took effect in 1984. The goal was to prevent consumers from 

being taken advantage of during a moment of deep grief and loss. Among other provisions, the 

Rule requires funeral homes to provide a clear list of prices for goods and services offered. This 

helps family members make informed decisions and avoid paying for things they don’t need.

One challenge is that the Funeral Rule was crafted before the internet age, so it only 

applies in person or over the phone. Even though Americans today typically begin their shopping 

online, funeral providers are not required to list prices on their websites. The staff report that the 

Commission is voting on today found that just under 25 percent of funeral home websites 

provided a full list of prices. Over sixty percent provided little to no price information

whatsoever. Stories persist about consumers spending hours trying to answer the most basic 

questions about how much it will cost to bury their loved ones.

1

In the internet era, it’s hard to 

see why anyone should have to physically visit or call multiple funeral homes just to compare 

prices.

Today’s Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks comment on several concrete 

ways to modernize the Funeral Rule. This includes asking whether the Rule should require 

funeral providers to provide pricing information online or via email, which could help consumers

make informed decisions during some of the most difficult moments of their lives. It could also 

better incentivize funeral homes to offer the most competitive prices. This would ultimately 

lower the expensive burden of putting a loved one to rest.2

I am pleased to support this effort, and I look forward to the public comments during our 

rulemaking proceeding. I’d like to thank our staff for their excellent work on this matter.

***

1 Robert Benincasa, Despite Decades-Old Law, Funeral Prices Are Still Unclear, NPR (Feb. 8, 2017), 

https://www.npr.org/2017/02/08/504031472/despite-decades-old-law-funeral-prices-are-still-unclear.

2 See, e.g., Joshua Slocum, Death with Dignity? A Report on SCI/Dignity Memorial High Prices and Refusal to 

Disclose These Prices, FUNERAL CONSUMERS ALLIANCE & CONSUMER FED’N OF AMERICA (Mar. 2017), 

https://funerals.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/3-6-17-Funeral-SCI_Report.pdf; Joshua Slocum & Stephen 

Brobeck, The Relationship Between Funeral Price Disclosures and Funeral Prices: A California Case Study, 

CONSUMER FED’N OF AMERICA (Feb. 2020), https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CaliforniaFuneral-Home-Pricing-Report.pdf.