THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William Jon McCormick, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1443 C.D. 2018

: Submitted: May 31, 2019

Dunkard Valley Joint Municipal :

Authority :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION 

BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: September 24, 2019

William Jon McCormick (McCormick), pro se, appeals an order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court) that granted Dunkard Valley 

Joint Municipal Authority’s (Water Authority) petition to strike a default judgment 

entered against it and to quash McCormick’s local agency appeal. At issue is how 

to effect service of a local agency appeal under the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. 

§§551-555, 751-754, and whether a default judgment can be entered against a local 

agency that does not file a response to an appeal of its decision. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part. 

McCormick owns a bed and breakfast named “The Captain’s Watch

Inn” in Greensboro, Pennsylvania. The Water Authority supplies water to the 

property. McCormick’s account with the Water Authority became delinquent and 

on October 20, 2017, the Water Authority issued a shut-off notice, which 

McCormick disputed in a letter. The Water Authority treated McCormick’s letter as 

an appeal and appointed a Hearing Officer to conduct a hearing on December 19, 

2017. 
2

At the hearing, McCormick asserted that in March of 2016 there had 

been an accord and satisfaction of his obligation to the Water Authority. Rejecting 

this assertion, the Hearing Officer recommended that McCormick’s appeal be denied 

and that the Water Authority proceed with its collection of McCormick’s delinquent 

debt and shut off his water service. On January 3, 2018, the Water Authority adopted 

the Hearing Officer’s decision as its own. The Water Authority’s counsel, Ernest P. 

DeHaas, III, sent a copy of the Water Authority’s decision to McCormick with a 

letter stating as follows: 

Enclosed is a copy of the Findings, Conclusions and Decision 

which the [Water] Authority received from the hearing officer 

today and has adopted. ... Although you should make your own 

determination regarding the time within which an appeal must be 

taken to this decision, it is my understanding that it would be 

within 30 days from the date of this letter. 

Supplemental Reproduced Record at 39b (S.R.R.__). 

On January 19, 2018, McCormick appealed the Water Authority’s 

decision to the trial court. On January 29, 2018, the trial court entered an order

noting that the record did not reveal “service upon the [Water Authority]” and stating 

that the “Court will take no further action in this matter until [McCormick] is in 

compliance with Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 400-430.” Trial Court Order, 1/29/2018; 

Reproduced Record at 4 (R.R.__). In response, on February 1, 2018, McCormick 

filed a certificate of service with the trial court stating that on January 20, 2018, he 

had mailed a true and correct copy of his appeal to the Water Authority’s counsel, 

DeHaas, at 2 West Main Street, Uniontown, Pennsylvania 15401, which was the 

address that appeared in DeHaas’s letter to McCormick enclosing the Water 

Authority’s decision. 
3

On May 9, 2018, McCormick filed a praecipe for default judgment 

based on the Water Authority’s failure to file a timely responsive pleading to his 

appeal. The Greene County Prothonotary entered a default judgment against the 

Water Authority on the same day. 

On May 21, 2018, DeHaas entered his appearance on behalf of the 

Water Authority that listed his address as 51 East South Street, Uniontown, 

Pennsylvania 15401. The Water Authority then filed a petition to strike the default 

judgment and to quash McCormick’s appeal. It also sought attorney fees. The Water 

Authority asserted that McCormick’s appeal was governed by the Local Agency 

Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §§551-555, 751-754, and that a statutory appeal must be served on 

the local agency by certified mail, return receipt requested. It argued that 

McCormick did not properly serve notice of his appeal upon the Water Authority.

The Water Authority asserted that the default judgment should be 

stricken because (1) McCormick had not properly served the Water Authority with

notice of his appeal; (2) the Water Authority was not required under the Local 

Agency Law to file a responsive pleading to the notice of appeal; and (3) McCormick 

failed to notify the Water Authority of his intention to file a praecipe for default 

judgment, as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The Water 

Authority requested the trial court to quash McCormick’s appeal. It argued that 

although McCormick filed a certificate of service in response to the trial court’s 

January 29, 2018, order, he did not serve a copy of that certificate on the Water 

Authority or its counsel. Lastly, the Water Authority requested payment of its 

attorney fees because McCormick’s conduct in the matter was “obdurate and 

vexatious.” Petition, 5/21/2018, at 4; Original Record (O.R.) Item No. 16. The trial 
4

court scheduled oral argument on the Water Authority’s petition for July 11, 2018, 

and the parties submitted additional briefs.

On October 10, 2018, the trial court granted the Water Authority’s 

petition to strike the default judgment and motion to quash McCormick’s appeal of 

the Water Authority’s decision of January 3, 2018. The trial court denied the Water 

Authority’s petition for attorney fees. McCormick appealed to this Court. 

On appeal,1 McCormick argues that the trial court erred in striking the 

default judgment against the Water Authority and in quashing his statutory appeal.

In making these assignments of error, McCormick argues that his statutory appeal 

was a civil action governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure; therefore, 

a default judgment was a remedy available to him when the Water Authority did not 

respond to his appeal. 

We begin with a review of the nature of the proceeding before the trial 

court. The Water Authority is organized pursuant to the Municipality Authorities 

Act, 53 Pa. C.S. §§5601-5623. Its authority to shut off the supply of water to a 

delinquent customer is found in Section 502(a) of the Water Services Act,2 53 P.S.

§3102.502(a).

3

 In general, where the right to appeal is statutory, an appellant must 

 

1 Our scope of review determines whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of 

law was committed or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial competent 

evidence. Johnson v. Lansdale Borough, 180 A.3d 791, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

2 Act of April 14, 2006, P.L. 85, 53 P.S. §§3102.101 – 3102.507. 

3

It states, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (c), all of the following apply:

(1) If the owner or occupant of a premises served by a water utility neglects 

or fails to pay, for a period of 30 days from the due date, a rental, rate or 

charge for sewer, sewerage or sewage treatment service imposed by a 

municipality or municipal authority, the water utility shall, at the request 

and direction of the municipality, the authority or a city, borough or 

township to which the authority has assigned its claim or lien, shut off the 
5

comply with the procedures identified in the governing statute. Southern Chester 

County Concerned Citizens Organization v. Zoning Board of Lower Oxford 

Township, 937 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Where the statute is silent on 

appeal rights and procedures, as is the case with the Water Services Act, the Local 

Agency Law applies. 2 Pa. C.S. §752.4 Accordingly, McCormick’s appeal of the 

Water Authority’s decision on a shut-off notice was governed by the Local Agency 

Law. 

Section 933(a)(2) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §933(a)(2),5 vests 

each court of common pleas with jurisdiction over local agency appeals. Some

counties, by local rule, have made the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 

 

supply of water to the premises until all overdue rentals, rates, charges and 

associated penalties and interest are paid.

(2) If the authority, city, borough or township also supplies water to 

premises, the authority, city, borough or township is authorized to shut off 

the supply of water to the premises.

53 P.S. §3102.502(a). 

4

It provides: “Any person aggrieved by an adjudication of a local agency who has a direct interest 

in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the court vested with jurisdiction 

of such appeals by or pursuant to Title 42 (relating to judiciary and judicial procedure).” 2 Pa. 

C.S. §752. See also 36 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE §166:306 (2019 ed.) (“The Local 

Agency Law establishes a uniform and comprehensive method of appeal from local agency 

adjudications, which applies even if the local enabling legislation makes no provision for appeal 

from such adjudications.”).

5 Section 933(a)(2) provides:

(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise prescribed by any general rule adopted 

pursuant to section 503 (relating to reassignment of matters), each court of common 

pleas shall have jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of government agencies in 

the following cases:

* * *

(2) Appeals from government agencies, except Commonwealth 

agencies, under Subchapter B of Chapter 7 of Title 2 (relating to 

judicial review of local agency action) or otherwise.

42 Pa. C.S. §933(a)(2). 
6

applicable to local agency appeals. See, e.g., Appeal of Sgro, 447 A.2d 325, 327 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1982). In the absence of such a local court rule, the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Civil Procedure do not apply to a local agency appeal. Terminal Freight Handling 

Corporation v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 790 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2001) (explaining that because tax assessment appeals are not civil actions but 

statutory appeals, the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply). Here, the Greene

County Court of Common Pleas has not made the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 

Procedure applicable to local agency appeals. Accordingly, we reject McCormick’s 

contention that the Rules of Civil Procedure were generally applicable to his 

statutory appeal of the Water Authority’s determination of January 3, 2018. 

Further, because the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply here, the 

Water Authority, as the non-moving party, did not have to file a response to

McCormick’s statutory appeal. Indeed, even the moving party in a statutory appeal 

“has nothing more to do to move the case forward once it has perfected its appeal 

other than wait for the trial court to schedule the matter.” Koller v. Department of 

Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 682 A.2d 82, 84 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1996). Therefore, the trial court did not err in striking the default judgment, which 

was improperly entered. 

We next address whether the trial court properly quashed McCormick’s 

appeal. After McCormick appealed the Water Authority’s determination, the trial 

court entered an order on January 29, 2018, stating: 

Whereas proper service is a prerequisite to a Court acquiring 

personal jurisdiction over a Defendant and a review of the record 

reveals that no service upon the Defendant was effectuated, this 

Court will take no further action in this matter until the Plaintiff 

is in compliance with Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 400-430. Fraisar v. Gillis, 

892 A.2d 74 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). 
7

Trial Court Order, 1/29/2018; O.R., Item No. 21.6 McCormick responded to the 

court’s directive by filing a certificate of service, stating that the notice of appeal had 

been served by mail upon the Water Authority at the office of its representative, 

DeHaas. The question is whether this was effective service of a statutory appeal.

To perfect a statutory appeal, the appellant must serve notice of the 

appeal upon the appellee. Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 590 A.2d 1369, 1371 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1991). As explained above, the Local Agency Law governs, not the Water 

Service Act. 2 Pa. C.S. §752. Although the Local Agency Law does not specify the 

manner of service of a statutory appeal, this Court has determined that certified mail, 

return receipt requested is an appropriate manner of service in Local Agency Law 

appeals. Airo Die Casting, Inc. v. Westmoreland County Board of Assessment 

Appeals, 706 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). However, “other methods of 

service of a notice of appeal [are] acceptable if they achieve the purpose of providing 

an effective record. Other acceptable methods of perfecting service include personal 

service by hand and acceptance of service by the defendant.” Id. (citing Gilmore, 

590 A.2d at 1372). See also McNeilis v. Department of Transportation, 546 A.2d 

1339 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (holding that service could be effected upon state agency 

by certified mail, return receipt requested).

 

6 The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure Nos. 400-430 cited by the trial court govern service 

of original process to ensure notice and address service generally, in particular actions, upon 

particular parties and pursuant to special order of court. Relevant here, Rule No. 403 provides for 

service by mail, and states, in part: “If a rule of civil procedure authorizes original process to be 

served by mail, a copy of the process shall be mailed to the defendant by any form of mail requiring 

a receipt signed by the defendant or his authorized agent. Service is complete upon delivery of the 

mail.” PA. R.C.P. NO. 403. Rule 405(b) requires a return of service to set forth “the date, time, 

place and manner of service, the identity of the person served and any other facts necessary for the 

court to determine whether proper service has been made.” PA. R.C.P. NO. 405(b). Rule No. 

405(c) requires that proof of service by mail include “a return receipt signed by the defendant.” 

PA. R.C.P. NO. 405(c). 
8

This Court has observed that the methods of service sanctioned in 

McNeilis and Gilmore “are practical because, unlike an original process, a 

petitioner’s action is an appeal where all parties are known and the parties are aware 

of the pending legal issues.” Airo Die Casting, 706 A.2d at 1283. Stated otherwise, 

those methods of service do not prejudice the government agency. In the trial court’s 

January 29, 2018, order, it referred to Fraisar, 892 A.2d at 78. There, a pro se

inmate’s civil complaint against Department of Corrections employees was 

dismissed for lack of service. This Court reversed, noting that the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has counseled a “flexible approach” on service where the plaintiff 

has made a “good faith effort at notice [and] the defendant had actual notice of the 

litigation and was not otherwise prejudiced.” Id. Stated otherwise, where service 

has been attempted in good faith and the recipient has actual notice of the filing,

service that does not conform to the applicable requirements will suffice. Here, the 

service requirements for a local agency appeal have not been established.

Here, in response to the trial court’s January 29, 2018, order, 

McCormick made a record of service by filing a certificate stating that on January 

20, 2018, he mailed a copy of his appeal of the Water Authority’s decision to 

DeHaas. At no point has the Water Authority alleged that it did not receive this copy 

of McCormick’s appeal. Instead, it has insisted that McCormick failed to serve a 

copy of the certificate of service on the Water Authority or its counsel, and “[a]s a 

result neither the [Water] Authority or its counsel was aware of whether McCormick

had taken any action in response to the [trial] court’s order.” Water Authority Brief 

at 18. However, the trial court’s directive did not require McCormick to send a copy 

of the certificate of service to the Water Authority or its counsel. Nor did it order 

McCormick to make personal service upon the Water Authority. The order required, 
9

in somewhat vague terms, that McCormick confirm that he effected service of his 

notice of appeal on the Water Authority so as to vest the trial court with personal 

jurisdiction over the Water Authority. Without any evidence to the contrary, there 

is no indication that the Water Authority did not receive the appeal or that service 

was not effected. 

McCormick made a “good faith effort” to serve notice of his appeal.

Fraisar, 892 A.2d at 78. He timely mailed his appeal to the address provided to him 

by DeHaas’s letter announcing the Water Authority’s decision.7 The letter 

accompanying the Water Authority’s decision provided no instructions on how to 

effect an appeal thereof. To the contrary, it advised McCormick that he was on his 

own with respect to when and how to file his appeal to the trial court. The better 

course is for a local agency to give direction on how to appeal lest it face a due 

process challenge. Moreover, the trial court’s January 29, 2018, order gave the 

Water Authority actual notice that McCormick had filed an appeal. See Trial Court 

Order, 1/29/2018; O.R., Item No. 21. 

The Water Authority makes the bold assertion that service by regular 

mail is not sufficient, but it has not cited to any supporting case law. In the relevant 

cases, this Court has observed that the Local Agency Law does not require “certified 

mail, return receipt requested, as the exclusive mode of service with respect to [] 

 

7 The Water Authority argues that McCormick mailed his notice of appeal to the wrong address. 

The letter notifying McCormick of the Hearing Officer’s decision used DeHaas’s address at 2 

West Main Street, Uniontown, Pennsylvania 15401. This is the address to which McCormick 

mailed his notice of appeal. The Water Authority’s brief in support of its petition to strike the 

default judgment states that DeHaas did not begin practicing at a different address until February 

22. Brief in Support of Defendant’s Petition to Strike Judgment, Quash Appeal and Award 

Counsel Fees at 2; O.R. Item No. 13. Because McCormick mailed his notice of appeal on January 

20, 2018, it does not appear that he used the wrong address. 
10

statutory appeals.” Gilmore, 590 A.2d at 1372 (emphasis in original).

8

 Without 

knowing whether DeHaas received a copy of McCormick’s appeal, we cannot 

determine whether McCormick’s service by regular mail was an appropriate manner 

of service. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order quashing McCormick’s 

appeal and remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. 

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s decision to 

strike the default judgment entered against the Water Authority. We vacate the trial 

court’s order insofar as it quashed McCormick’s appeal and remand the matter to 

the trial court to determine if DeHaas received notice of McCormick’s appeal.

 

 ______________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

 

8 Nor has our precedent rejected the use of first class mail as a mode of service. Litigants electing 

to use first class mail do so at their own peril, however, given the challenge of proving that the 

intended recipient actually received the mail. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William Jon McCormick, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1443 C.D. 2018

:

Dunkard Valley Joint Municipal :

Authority :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 24th day of September, 2019, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court) dated October 10, 2018, is 

AFFIRMED insofar as it granted the petition of the Dunkard Valley Joint Municipal

Authority to strike the default judgment entered against it. The trial court’s order is 

VACATED insofar as it quashed William Jon McCormick’s statutory appeal and 

this matter is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with the attached opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

 ______________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge