UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

JOHN GERALD TRUJILLO, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. PAMELA PLOUGHE, Warden, CTCF; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents - Appellees. No. 11-1436 (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-01712-REB) (D. Colo.)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

Before BRISCOE , Chief Judge, MURPHY and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.
John Gerald Trujillo, a stat e prisoner appe aring pro se, 1 seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application for habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (p roviding no appeal may

* This order is not binding precedent, ex cept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. A pp. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Mr. Trujillo is proceeding pro se , we construe his pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also United States v. Pinson , 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Ci r. 2009) (“[W]e must construe [a pro se litigant’s] arguments liberally; this rule of liberal construction st ops, however, at the point at which we begin to serve as his advocate.”). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court-2- be taken from a final orde r disposing of a § 2254 pe tition unless the petitioner first obtains a COA). We deny Mr. Trujillo’s request and dismiss this matter.
I. BACKGROUND Mr. Trujillo was charged in three separa te Colorado state cases with multiple crimes involving the rape an d kidnapping of three different women occurring on January 6, 1999, September 30, 1999, and July 30, 2000. After a Colorado state trial court consolidated the three cases, a jury convicted Mr. Trujillo of second-degree kidnapping, attempted first-degree sexual assault, third- degree sexual assault, two counts of seconddegree kidnapping of a victim of sexual assault, two counts of first-degree sexual assault, attempted second-degr ee murder, attempted sexual assault, and sexual assault by unwanted sexual contact by the actual application of physical force or violence. The state court sentenced Mr. Trujillo to a term of 120 years to life in prison. The Colorado Court of Appeals (“CCA”) a ffirmed the judgment, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review. M r. Trujillo filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c), asserting numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The state trial cour t denied Mr. Trujillo’s motion, and the CCA affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Co urt denied certiorari review. Mr. Trujillo filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court on July 20, 2009. Four days later, a magist rate judge ordered Mr. Trujillo to file an amended application because Mr. Trujillo had no t identified specific cl aims for relief. The magistrate judge also found that Mr. Tru jillo’s application did no t comply with Fed.-3- R. Civ. P. 8(a) because it did not contain “shor t and plain statements.” ROA, vol. 1 at 75. Mr. Trujillo filed a written objection to th e magistrate judge’s order, claiming he needed additional pages to present his clai ms and that amending his application would present a financial burden. The district cour t denied Mr. Trujillo’s objection, noting that Mr. Trujillo’s application was 68 pages an d that his claims were “repetitive and unnecessarily verbose and confusing.” Id. at 84. Mr. Trujillo filed an amended ap plication on September 14, 2009. 2 He alleged two claims—(1) a violation of his right to de cide whether to testify or remain silent, a claim arising from the consolidation of the thre e cases, and (2) a violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel. His ineffective assistance of counsel claim included ten subclaims: (a) failure to de pose Detective Vince Berrera to obtain exculpatory evidence about the connection between th e three victims and the drug dealers whom Mr. Trujillo had implicated while working as a conf idential informant; (b ) failure to obtain exculpatory DNA evidence from one of the victims that would have proven that she lied to the police about being raped; (c) failure to interview prosecutio n witnesses and obtain their criminal histories; (d) failure to employ a medical forensic expert to testify about the

2 As a threshold matter, Mr. Trujillo argue s that he was prejudiced by having to amend his § 2254 application. When it denied this amended application, the district court stated that many of his claims were vague an d lacking in specificity. Mr. Trujillo argues that the district court would not have denied his claims if it had co nsidered his original application. But, after review ing Mr. Trujillo’s filings, we c onclude that he was afforded full opportunity to allege and argue each of his ineffective a ssistance of counsel subclaims and was thus not prejudiced by having to file an amended application.-4- nature and age of the victims’ injuries; (e) failure to call Mr. Trujillo’s counselor as a witness to testify about Mr. Trujillo’s fear of being home alone; (f) conceding to the prosecution’s motion in limine to exclude evid ence of the stabbing of one of the victims a few days before she met Mr. Trujillo; (g) fa ilure to impeach the testimony of certain prosecution witnesses; (h) failu re to make a closing argumen t; (i) failure to object to the all-white jury consisting of 12 women and two men (two alternates); and (j) failure to call two important rebuttal witnesses to testify. On January 13, 2010, the dist rict court dismissed three of Mr. Trujillo’s subclaims for ineffective assistance of co unsel—(d), (e), and (g)—as proc edurally barred. On June 16, 2011, the district court denied Mr. Tru jillo’s application for writ of habeas corpus with prejudice and found that there was “no basis on which to issue a certificate of appealability.” ROA, Vol. 2 at 496. Mr. Trujillo filed an application for a CO A limited to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. DISCUSSION To receive a COA, Mr. Trujillo must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S. C. § 2253(c)(2). To make th at showing, a petitioner must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could deba te whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manne r or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encour agement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (quota tions omitted). When a distri ct court dismisses a § 2254-5- petition on procedural grounds without reaching the underl ying constitutional claim, a petitioner is entitled to a COA only if he show s both that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether he had stated a valid co nstitutional claim and debatable whether the district court’s procedural ruling was correct. Id. at 484. In evaluating whether Mr. Trujillo has carried his burden, we undertake “a preliminary, though not definitive, considera tion of the [legal] fram ework” applicable to each of his claims. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) . Mr. Trujillo is not required to demonstrate that his appeal will su cceed, but he must “prove something more than the absence of fri volity or the existence of mere good faith.” Id. (quotations omitted). To prevail on a § 2254 petition in the district court, a petitioner must show that the state court’s decision on the merits “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal la w, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . was based on an unreasonable determ ination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254( d)(1), (d)(2). A state court’s decision is contrary to clearly established federal law when “the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] . . . on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone , 535 U.S. 685, 6 94 (2002). A state court’s decision is an unreasonable applicati on of clearly established federal law when it “identifies the correct governing legal princi ple from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but-6- unreasonably applies it to the facts of the . . . case.” Id. A. Subclaims (d), (e), and (g) as Procedurally Barred The district court found that three of M r. Trujillo’s subclaims were procedurally barred. These subclaims were: (d) failing to employ a medical forensic witness to testify that the victims’ injuries were days rather th an hours old, (e) faili ng to present the expert testimony of Mr. Trujillo’s counselor, and (g) failing to impeach the credibility of certain prosecution witnesses during cross-examination. A state prisoner generally may not raise a claim for federal habeas corpus relief unless he “has exhausted the remedies availabl e in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also Magar v. Parker , 490 F.3d 816, 818 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Congress has emphatically directed us that habeas petitioners seeking relief in federal court must first exhaust all available state cour t remedies . . . .”). A claim is exhausted when it has been “fairly presen ted” to the state court. Wilson v. Workman , 577 F.3d 1284, 1294 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quotations omitted). To be “fairly presented,” the substance of the claim must be raised in state court and the alle gations and supporting evidence must offer the state courts a fair opportunity to apply the controlling legal principles to the facts beari ng upon the constitutional claim. Id. In addition, in 28 U. S.C. § 2254 proceedings, federal courts “do not address issues that have been defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate state procedural ground, unless the petitioner can demonstrat e cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Cummings v. Sirmons , 506 F.3d 1211, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007)-7- (quotations omitted). To show cause, a pe titioner must demonstrate that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded [h is] efforts to comply ” with state law. Murray v.
Carrier , 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that he suffered “actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). A fu ndamental miscarriage of justice provides only “a narrow exception to the cause requirement where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the convicti on of one who is actually innocent of the substantive offense.” Dretke v. Haley , 541 U.S. 386, 393 (200 4) (quotations omitted). We note that, in Colorado, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally considered in post-conviction collateral proc eedings rather than on direct appeal. See Ardolino v. People , 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003) (“ In light of the considerations potentially involved in determin ing ineffective assistance, de fendants have regularly been discouraged from attempting to litigate their counse ls’ effectiveness on direct appeal.”); People v. Thomas , 867 P.2d 880, 886 (Colo. 1994 ) (“[T]his court has expressed a preference for having ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought in Crim. P. 35(c) proceedings.”). Mr. Trujillo raised his ineffec tive assistance claims in state court through post-conviction collateral attack. 1. Subclaim (d) The only mention that Mr. Trujillo made of subclaim (d) in his brief to the CCA challenging the trial court’s denial of post -conviction relief was his attorney’s “[f]ailure to call ‘expert’ witnesses (medical ) to testify.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 266. The CCA held that-8- “because [Mr. Trujillo] merely lists [this] argument[] without f acts, argument, or authority, we do not address [it] here.” Id. at 322. The district court decided that Mr. Trujillo’s failure to articulate an argum ent before the CCA re ndered subclaim (d) procedurally defaulted. The district c ourt further found that Mr. Trujillo had not established cause and prejudice or that a failu re to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Mr. Trujillo appears to argu e that there was cause for the procedural default because he was limited by Colo. App. R. 28 (g)’s 30-page limit a nd was thus unable to present his argument to the CCA. But “pro se parties [must] follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Nielsen v. Price , 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted); see also Indiana v. Edwards , 554 U.S. 164, 185 (2008) (“A

pro se defendant may not . . . fail to comply with relevant rules of procedural . . . law.”) (quotations omitted); United States v. Ceballos-Martinez , 387 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have never interpreted [our precedent] to give litigants—even pro se litigants— carte blanche to disregard congressionally estab lished procedural rules.”). The page limit does not constitute cause for Mr. Trujillo’s procedural default. Further, Mr. Trujillo has not shown that ou r refusal to consider this claim would result in a fundamental miscarriag e of justice. Our review of the record fails to show that Mr. Trujillo could succeed on a claim of actual innocence. We conclude that reasonable jurists coul d not debate with the district court’s holding that subclaim (d) was procedurally barred.-9- 2. Subclaim (e) Mr. Trujillo mentioned his attorney’s fa ilure to introduce testimony from his counselor in his post-conviction motion to the Colorado trial c ourt under the heading “Conduct of Counsel Resulting in a Sham Defe nse.” Tr. Vol. 2, at 560. As with subclaim (d), Mr. Trujillo simply listed this issue in his brief to the CCA challenging the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relie f and did not provide a supporting argument. The CCA refused to address Mr. Trujillo’s “sham defense” argument for the same reasons that it refused to consider his argumen t on subclaim (d). Thus, the district court found that subclaim (e) wa s procedurally defaulted. Mr. Trujillo makes the same arguments he re on subclaim (e) as to cause and prejudice as he does for subclaim (d). For th e same reasons we articulated for subclaim (d), we conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate that this issue was procedurally barred. 3. Subclaim (g) In subclaim (g), Mr. Trujillo argues that his attorney was ine ffective because he did not impeach the credibility of prosecution witnesses at trial. The district court held that he did not exhaust this claim in the stat e courts. In his brief to the CCA challenging the state trial court’s denial of his motion for post-conviction relie f, Mr. Trujillo argued that his attorney failed to inte rview prosecution witnesses and obtain criminal histories. He also briefly added that his attorney’s fa ilure to investigate prevented effective crossexamination of prosecution witn esses. This latter point be came subclaim (g) in Mr.-10- Trujillo’s § 2254 petition. The CCA did not specifically address the cr oss-examination issue. It did address the failure to investigate issue and held that Mr. Trujillo failed to demonstrate that his attorney provided ineffectiv e assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed Mr. Trujillo ’s subclaim (g) becau se the ineffective cross-examination issue was not exhausted in the state courts. The court explained that Mr. Trujillo presented this § 2 254 claim in a different manner than he did in his brief to the CCA. Although Mr. Trujillo ’s limited reference to the cr oss-examination issue before the CCA raises concern about exhaustion, we c onclude it is debatable whether the district court’s exhaustion conclusion is correct. 3 Nonetheless, when a district court di smisses a § 2254 pe tition on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying co nstitutional claim, to receive a COA the petitioner must also show that reasonable ju rists would find it deba table whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484. “In reaching this determination, we will not delv e into the merits of the clai m, but instead will determine only whether the petitioner has facially allege d the denial of a constitutional right.”

3 The district court also found that subclaim (g) was procedurally defaulted because Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI) and (VII) ge nerally prohibit successive post-conviction Rule 35 motions and two such motions were filed. Although two Rule 35 motions from Mr. Trujillo appear in the reco rd with different date stamps , these motions are identical, and both have the same date listed next to Mr. Trujillo ’s signature. Further, the CCA appears to have considered only one Rule 35 motion. Therefore, whether this issue was procedurally defaulted al so is debatable.-11- Fleming v. Evans , 481 F.3d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). Mr. Trujillo has failed to allege a cons titutional violation. His allegation of ineffective cross-examination is concluso ry and unsupported by sufficient facts or argument showing that, but for his counsel ’s alleged ineffective interrogation of witnesses at trial, there is a reasonable prob ability he would not have been convicted, one of the critical requirements of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Cummings v. Sirmons , 506 F.3d 1211, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 2007) (conclusory a llegations are not sufficient to satisfy Strickland ). Therefore, we de ny COA on subclaim (g).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To establish a claim of ineffective assist ance of counsel, a petitioner must show both (1) constitutionally deficient perfo rmance and (2) resulting prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the case would be different. See Strickland , 466 U.S.at 687. If the applicant is unable to show either “deficient performance” or “sufficient prejudice,” the ineffective assistance claim necessarily fails. Hooks v. Workman , 606 F.3d 715, 724 (10th Cir. 2010). “[O]ur review of counsel’s perfo rmance under the first prong of Strickland is a highly deferential one.” Byrd v. Workman , 645 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted), cert. denied , 132 S. Ct. 763 (2011). “[W]e indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls with in the wide range of reasonable professional-12- assistance” and presume that counse l’s conduct is sound strategy. Welch v. Workman , 639 F.3d 980, 1010 (10th Ci r. 2011) (quotations omitted), cert denied , 132 S. Ct. 292 (2011). “To be deficient, the performanc e must be outside the wide range of professionally competent assistan ce. . . . [I]t must have be en completely unreasonable, not merely wrong.” Hooks , 606 F.3d at 723 (citation omitted) (quotations omitted). To show prejudice, the applicant must es tablish that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive him of a fair tr ial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 724 (quotations omitted). “Establishing a reason able probability of a different outcome requires something less than a showing counsel ’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. Instead, a reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citation omitted) (quotations omitted). “[M]ere speculation is not sufficien t to satisfy this burden.” Byrd , 645 F.3d at 1168. 1. Subclaim (a): Failure to Depose or Call Detective Berrera to Testify Mr. Trujillo argues that hi s attorney failed to provid e effective assistance of counsel because he did not depose or call Dete ctive Berrera to testify. He claims that Detective Berrera would have explained the connection between the three victims and certain drug dealers whom Mr. Trujillo im plicated while working as a confidential informant. This testimony, he asserts, would have proved to the jury that the victims had a motive to set him up and st age the charged assaults. The record indicates that Mr. Trujillo’s attorney investigated this connection between the drug dealers and the victims and pres ented some of this information at trial.-13- Mr. Trujillo’s attorney subpoenaed Detec tive Berrera and attemp ted to obtain the confidential informant reports relating to Mr. Trujillo’s work. Further, Mr. Trujillo testified as to the connec tion between the victims and the drug dealers. Because Mr. Trujillo’s attorney investig ated the connection between the victims and the drug dealers, and because Mr. Tru jillo has failed to prove that, but for his attorney’s failure to depose and call Detective Berrera to testify, the result of his trial would have been different, we conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate whether the district court properly re jected this claim under the Strickland standards. 2. Subclaim (b): Failure to Obtain Exculpatory DNA Evidence from the Seat of Mr. Trujillo’s Truck Mr. Trujillo claims that his attorney sh ould have obtained and presented DNA evidence from Mr. Trujillo’s pers onal truck. One of the victims testified at trial that Mr. Trujillo offered her a ride in his red or blue work truck, drove her to a secluded area, and, after a struggle, raped her. Mr. Trujillo, on the other hand, testified that he had consensual sex with the victim in his white, personal pickup truck. Mr. Trujillo argues that there was DNA ev idence from one of the victims on the seat of his personal white pick up truck and that this evidence would have proved that the victim was lying when she said that Mr. Trujillo gave her a ride in a red or blue work truck. This evidence, he contends, would al so prove that the vic tims framed him for the attacks. Mr. Trujillo explained this theory at trial when he testified that he and the victim had consensual sex, after which the victim saved the condom, spread Mr. Trujillo’s DNA-14- on her pants and body, and then roughed hers elf up, all in an attempt to frame Mr. Trujillo. As the Supreme Court explained in Strickland , “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a r easonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffec tiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reas onableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgm ent.” 466 U.S. at 691. “An attorney is not required to investigate all leads as long as the decision not to purs ue a particular lead is reasonable under the circumstances.” Smith v. Workman , 550 F.3d 1258, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). As the district court and the CCA noted, counsel’s failure to test Mr. Trujillo’s personal pickup truck for DNA evidence was not unreasonable. Apart from Mr. Trujillo’s contention, there is no indication th at this DNA evidence existed. Moreover, even if this evidence did exist, it would not prove that Mr. Trujillo and the victim had consensual sex or that the incident in th e secluded area did not occur. Further, the overwhelming weight of the tria l evidence goes against Mr. Tr ujillo’s theory that he was framed. For these reasons, we conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate that the district court properly rejected this ineffectiveness claim based on the Strickland standards. 3. Subclaim (c): Failure to Interview Pros ecution Witnesses and Obtain Criminal Histories-15- Mr. Trujillo argues that hi s attorney should have in terviewed the prosecution’s witnesses and obtained their cr iminal histories to impeach their credibility. He claims that all the victims were drug addicts and th at his attorney should have presented this information at trial. The record, however, reflects that Mr. Tr ujillo’s attorney atte mpted to interview the victims and requested criminal historie s from the prosecution. The record also reflects that one of the victims testified th at she had a prior felony conviction for drug possession and that she ingested cocaine with Mr. Trujillo on the night of the assault. Mr. Trujillo fails to provide an y evidence that the other vic tims had criminal records or used drugs in the past. The foregoing undermines any claim that either Strickland factor was met. Accordingly, we conclude that reasonable juri sts could not debate that the district court properly rejected this claim. 4. Subclaim (f): Conceding a Pretrial Motion Regarding the Stabbing of One of the Victims a Few Days Before the Se ptember 30, 1999 Incident with Mr. Trujillo Mr. Trujillo argues that hi s attorney should not have conceded the prosecution’s motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence that one of the victims had been stabbed a few days before she was allegedly raped by Mr. Trujillo. He claims that had this evidence been introd uced, it would have proved that the vi ctim’s injuries were days old at the time of the alleged rape and that M r. Trujillo could not have caused them. Mr. Trujillo does not state what injuries the victim sustained from the stabbing,-16- nor does he explain how they would have been the same as the injuries that medical personnel observed on the ni ght of the alleged rape. The testimony of the medical personnel who treated the victim on the night of the alleged ra pe strongly suggested that the victim’s injuries were immediate. The emergency room doctor who treated her testified that she was transported to the hosp ital on a backboard with pain in her head, neck, and forearm, and that she was frightened and anxious. He also testified that he observed the victim’s injuries: She had several small contusions . . . [t hat] were an inch to two inches in diameter. That her neck was tender along the midline . . . . She had some redness to the side of her cheek and a bunch of scratches to her back. She had a small cut on her right elbow and then a two-by-four abrasion on her forearm . . . . Tr. Vol. 14 at 10. Additionally, the paramedi c who first examined the victim testified that she was having some tonic/colonic activ ities, which the doctor later testified were mild seizures. Because there was ample testimony at trial regarding the victim’s immediate injuries sustained the night of the assault, we conclude that reas onable jurists could not debate that the district court properly di smissed this ineffec tive assistance claim. 5. Subclaim (h): Failure to Make a Closing Argument Mr. Trujillo argues that he was deprived of effective as sistance of counsel because his attorney waived hi s opportunity to present a closing argument. He contends that his attorney should have used this opportuni ty to point out inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. He also claims that by failing to make a closing statement, his-17- attorney essentially conceded that M r. Trujillo was guilty. The Supreme Court has never considered whether failure to give a closing argument constitutes ineffective assistance. See Allen v. Lawhorn , 131 S. Ct. 562, 564 (2010) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J. and Alito, J., diss enting from denial of certiorari) (“[N]one of our cases has ever considered wh ether the failure to give a closing argument can be considered prejudicial under Strickland .”). But we have stated that “it is wellsettled that the decision to wa ive an opening or closing st atement is a commonly adopted strategy, and without more, does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Fox v. Ward , 200 F.3d 1286, 1296 (10t h Cir. 2000). The record shows that Mr. Trujillo’s attorney actively defended Mr. Trujillo throughou t the trial and never conceded Mr. Trujillo’s guilt. Even if we were to question Mr. Trujillo ’s attorney’s decision to waive closing argument, Mr. Trujillo has not established that he was prejudiced by this decision. Based on the overwhelming weight of the evidence at trial, such an argument would likely not have changed the outcome of the trial. For these reasons, we conclude that reas onable jurists could not debate that the district court properly rejected this claim based on the Strickland standards. 6. Subclaim (i): Failure to Challe nge the Composition of the Jury Mr. Trujillo argues that his attorney should have challe nged the composition of the jury, which, including alternat es, consisted of twelve wome n and two men, all of whom were white. He claims that the large nu mber of women on the jury made it biased-18- because this was a sexu al assault case. The Sixth Amendment guarantee s a defendant the right to a jury pool consisting of a fair cross section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana , 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). But “[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular compos ition” and the actual jury need not mirro r the community. Id. at 538. A defendant also does not have a constitutional right to a “jury composed in whol e or in part of persons of his own race.” Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (quotations omitted). We are not aware of contrary authority regarding a jury consisting primarily of women. Mr. Trujillo appears to be making a Batson claim, but he never argues that his attorney or the prosecution improperly used th eir peremptory challenges. Nor does Mr. Trujillo challenge the compositi on of the jury pool. He do es not present a cognizable issue relating to the co mposition of the jury. For these reasons, we conclude that reas onable jurists could not debate that the district court properly rejected this claim based on the Strickland standards.
7. Subclaim (h): Failure to Call Tw o Important Rebuttal Witnesses Mr. Trujillo argues that his attorney should have calle d Agent Susan Stephens and Agent James Greer to testify at trial that he did not have visible in juries during the days after one of the incidents ev en though the vic tim testified that she had kicked and scratched him. Three prosecution witnesses testified that M r. Trujillo had visible injuries after the incident. The mother of his child testified that he had large scratches on his face and-19- arms. Additionally, two of Mr. Trujillo’s coworkers tes tified of his injuries—one testified that he had scratches on his face, and th e other testified that he had a black eye. Conversely, Mr. Trujillo’s girlfriend and his r oommate both testified th at he did not have scratches on his face or arms after the alleged incident. Mr. Trujillo argues that Agents Greer and Stephens would have presented unbiased testimony that he did not have visible injuries after the alleged incident. He states that Agents Greer and Stephens resp onded to a domestic violence call at his girlfriend’s home less than a week after th e incident and prepared a police report indicating that “John [Trujillo] stated that he had no injuri es and there was no damage done to his truck.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 40, 65. Acco rding to Mr. Trujillo, if he had scratches on his face or a black eye, the agents would have included th at information in their police report. But this police report appears to be limit ed to the discrete domestic violence incident and refers only to what Mr. Trujillo himself reported about his injuries, not the officers’ observations about any prior injuries that Mr. Trujillo might have had. Thus, there is no indication that Agent Greer or Ag ent Stephens would have testified that Mr. Trujillo did not have visible injuries. Furthermore, Mr. Trujillo’s attorney did elicit testimony from two witnesses that Mr. Tr ujillo did not have visible injuries. For these reasons, we conclude that reas onable jurists could not debate whether the district court properly rejected this claim. 8. Other Ineffectiveness Claims-20- In his application for COA, Mr. Trujillo mentions other ineffective assistance arguments, such as inconsistencies in testim ony that his attorney should have highlighted or testimony that he should have elicited. Bu t Mr. Trujillo does not fully articulate these arguments, nor does it appear that he fully exha usted them in state court. In any event, even if Mr. Trujillo had exhausted these ar guments, after reviewing the record, we conclude that none of these arguments su pports a debatable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard. 9. Cumulative Effect Mr. Trujillo argues that the cumulative effect of his a ttorney’s errors constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and that the di strict court erred in considering each of his claims in isolation. We disagree. We ha ve not found Supreme Court precedent holding that the cumulative effect of a counsel’s none rrors may constitute ine ffective assistance. We explained in United States v. Cox , 83 F.3d 973, 990 (10th Cir. 2010), that “[c]umulative error analysis evaluates the effe ct only of errors, not the cumulative effect of nonerrorrs.”; see also Bunton v. Atherton , 613 F.3d 973, 990 (10th Cir. 2010) (“In any event, the cumulative error doc trine does not apply here because we have not found the existence of two or more actual errors.”). Because we reject all of Mr. Trujillo’s individual claims for ineffective assistan ce of counsel, we cannot hold that the cumulative effect of his attorney’s conduct was nonetheless ineffective. We conclude that this argument does not support Mr. Trujillo’s application for a COA.
III. CONCLUSION-21- After reviewing Mr. Trujillo’s application for a COA, the district court’s orders, and the entire record, we conclude that Mr. Trujillo is not entitled to a COA. We deny his request for a COA and dismis s this matter. We grant Mr. Trujillo’s request to proceed in forma pauperis

. ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge