### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE A pr il 4, 200 5 S es sio n

BE C KY EL LI OT T v
. D ON N A A KE Y , IN D IV ID U A LL Y A N D D /B /A

OWNE R O F P LAZ A R ESTA UR AN T
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Blou nt County No. L-14016 W. Dale Young, Judge

No. E2004-01478-COA- R3-CV - F ILED APR IL 27, 2005

Th is a pp e a l in vo lve s a

dis pu te be tw e e n a

fo rm e r e mpl oy e e a nd he r emplo y e r. B e c ky El lio tt f ile d s uit in B lou nt C ou nty

Cir c uit Co urt all e g ing that D on na Ak e y faile d to pr op e rl y

tr a in andsu pe rv ise
e mpl oy e e s a t he r re staur a nt in L ou do n Cou nty , Te nn e sse e re su lti ng in a n un sa fe wo rk pla c e . B e c a us e the workpla ce w as unsaf

e, Ms. Elliott claims she had to quit her job and wa s damag ed. Ac cording to the complaint, th e P laintiff re sided in Blount County , the Def endant r esided a nd operated the business in L oudon County , and the c ause of action arose in L oudon County . The trial c ourt g rante d the De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to dis mis s f or imp rop er ven ue a nda wa rd e d s a nc tio ns to the De fe nd a nt. Af te r c are fu l r e vie w, we ho ld that 1) the tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y g rante d th e De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to dis mis s f or imp ro pe r v e nu e , 2 ) the tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y de nie d th e P lai ntif

f’ s mo tio n f

or de fa ult judgme nt, and 3) the tria l court er red in a war ding sa nctions to the Defe ndant. Acc ording ly , we aff irm the dec ision of the trial court in part and re versein part.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d in P ar t a nd Reve rsed in Par t; Case Rem anded

S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opin i o n o f the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R

. and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J J ., joined.

Be cky Elliott , pro s e
Rob e rt G. Hi nto n, L e no ir

City , Te nn e sse e , f

or Ap pe lle e Mr s. Do nn a

Ak e y , in div idu a lly

a ndD/B /A
owner of Plaza Restaurant

OP IN ION

Be cky Elliott was formerly

employ ed by

Donna Ake y

at the Plaza Restaura nt in Tellico Vi lla g e , L ou do n Co un ty , T e nn e sse e . O n De c e mbe r 12 , 20 03 , Mr s. El lio t f ile d h e r l a ws uit

a g a ins t Mr s. A k e y , i n d i v i d u a l l y a n d d o i n g b u s i n e s s a s o w n e r o f P l a z a R e s t a u r a n t , c l a i m i n g d a ma g e s a s a result of having quit her job at the Def endant’ s restaur ant bec ause of alleg ed unsaf

e conditions due-2-

to i mpr op e r t

raini ng a ndsu pe rv isi on of c e rt a in e mpl oy e e s. Th e su it, wh ic h wa s f ile d in the Cir c uit Court for B lount County , alleg es that the Plaintiff w as a resident of Blount County , the Def

endant
was a resident of L oudon County , and the lawsuit arose out of an incident cause d by the Def endant’ s failure to properly

train and superv i s e h er employ ees at the Plaza Restaurant loca ted in L oudon County . The Plaintif

f fi l ed a m otion for def

ault judgme nt on J anuary 23, 2004 asserting that the Def endant had failed to file an answe r wit hin 30 day s and seeking a judg ment by default and an orde r requiring the Def

endant to re mit to t he Plaintiff d am age s i n the amount of $60,000 pa y able by cashie rs che ck on or be fore Fe bruary 1, 2004.

Altho u gh t h e rec ord does not re flec t when the De fenda nt was ser ved with proc ess, the Def endant f iled an answ er on F ebrua

ry 9, 2004. The De fenda nt denied any liabilityto the Plaintiff,
asserted that Plaza Restaurant wa s a cor poration and a s such had not bee n proper ly named or serve d, and re quested sanc tions ag ainst the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff obje cted to the a nswer and in a serie s of motions sought to have the trial court set the answe r aside and awa rd a default judgment bec ause the
answe r wa s filed af

ter the e x piration of the “ 30 day period.” Following a hearing on April 2, 2004, the t rial co u r t r

u le d th a t th e D e f

e n d a n t h a d p r o p e r ly

f il e d a n a n s w e r

a n d o v e r ru le d th e Pl a in tif

f’s motions reg arding the an swer and default judgment. The Def endant f iled a motion to dism iss on Ap ri l 19 , 2 00 4, a sse rt ing that ve nu e did no t lie in B lou nt C ou nty be c a us e a c c or din g to the c omp la int , the Plaintiff’s cause of a ction arose in L oudon County , the Def endant resided in L oudon County , and the re staurant wa s headqua rtere d in L oudon County . Following a hearing, the trial court g rante d the motion to di smiss finding that the alleg ations in the complaint indicated that a ll actions complained of took place in L oudon Countyand that the De fendant and her business were situated in L oudon County . The trial court further g rante d the Def endant’ s reque st f

or Rule 11 sanctions and, based on the aff idavit of Def

endant’ s counsel verifying his attorney ’s fee s and expenses, aw arde d sanctions in the amount of $2,805.40 ag ainst the Plaintiff.

Be cky Elliott appea ls, raising the following issues, as re stated, for our re view: 1. Di d th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr in o ve rr uli ng the Pla int if

f’ s mo tio n f

or de fa ult jud g me nt? 2. Did the trial court err in dismissing the c omplaint based on improper venue? 3

. D i d t h e tr i a l c o u r te rr

i n a w ar d i n g t h e D e f

e n d a n ts a n c t i o n s a g a i n s tt h e P l a i n t i f f ?

We note at the outset the Plaintiff in her brief failed to cite any supporting a

uthority for he r arg uments, except for vag ue refer ence s to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12 and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55. Parties ar e requi red by Tenn. R. A pp . P. 27 (a ) ( 7) to c ite a uth ority fo r the ir

po sit ion s. De sp ite thi s noncompl i an ce with the rules, we will, in the interest of justice, conside r the issues ra ised by the Pla int if f i n th is a

pp e a l. In th is n on -j ury

c a se , o ur

re vie w i s de novo upon the re cord of the proce eding s below; but the rec ord co m es t o u s with a presumption of cor rec tness as to the trial
c ou rt ' s f a c tua l de te rm inatio ns wh ic h w e mus t hono r unl e ss the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th os e fi nd ing s. Te nn

. R. A pp . P. 13 (d ); W right v. C ity of Knoxville, 898 S.W .2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995) ; Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) . The trial c ourt' s conclusions of law, howeve r, are acc orded no suc h presumption. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W .2d 26 , 3 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; Pre sle y v . B e nn e tt, 860 S.W .2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1993)

.-3-

Th e Pla int if

f f ir st a rg ue s th a t th e tr ial cou rt sh ou ld h a ve g rante d h e r m oti on fo r d e fa ult jud g me nt b e c a us e the De fe nd a nt f a ile d to fi le he r a ns we r wi thi n 30 da y s of se rv ic e of the c omp la int

. W e d i s a g r e e

. T e n n

. R

. C i v

. P

. 1 2

. 0 1 p r o v i d e s t h a t a d e f e n d a n t“ s h a l l s e r v e a n a n s w e r w i t h i n 3 0 d a ys afte r the service of

the summons and complaint ag ainst him.” The a nswer is not due 30 day s after the filing of t he complaint as t he Defenda nt seems to arg ue, but rathe r 30 day s after the service of the su mmo ns and the complaint. The r ecor d is silent as to when the De fenda nt was served with the
su m mons and complaint, so we do not know whe ther or w hen the a nswer w as filed a fter the expiration of the 30-d ay p er i o d as set forth in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.01. I t also is unclear from the
rec ord if the Plaintiff attached a copy of t he complaint to her summons

. I f t he Plaintiff fa iled to do this, then se rvice mere ly of the summons on the Def endant would not ha ve been suf ficient ser vice to commence the running of the 30 da y s. Howeve r, even assuming that service was prope r and that th e answe r w a s f

ile d late , th e tr ia l c ou rt

ha d th e a uth ority

fo r c a us e sh ow n, a t a ny tim e in i ts discretion, to enlar g e the time for answering , with or without a motion being f iled, if the re quest was
ma de be fo re the e xpir a tio n of the tim e fo r ans we ri ng , o r u po n mo tio n a ft e r the e xpir a tio n o f the tim e for a nswering , wher e the f ailure to a ct was the result of e x cusable neg lect. Te nn. R. Civ. P . 6.02. The de cision to gr ant or deny a motion for default judg ment lies in the sound discretion of the trial court, see Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.01, and we will not disturb such a dec ision on appeal a bsent a showing that th e tr ia l c ou rt

abu se d th a t di sc re tio n. Ap pe llate c ou rt s shou ld pe rm it a dis c re tio na

ry de c isi on to sta ndif re a so na ble jud ic ia l mi nd s c a n d if fe r c on c e rn ing its so un dn e ss . Ove rstreet v. Shoney’s, I nc. , 4 S. W.3 d 6 94 , 7 09 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 9) . We fi ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt did no t c omm it e rr or

a nddid not abuse its discretion by not setting aside t he Defenda nt’s answe r or by allowing an enla

rg ement of time for the filing of

the answe r.

Next t h e p l ai ntiff ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed in dismissi ng her c omplaint based on improper ve nue. I n revie wing this iss ue, we must first determine whe ther this is a l o ca l o r a tr a ns ito ry a c tio n. A l oc a l a c tio n is an ac tio n in whic h the inj ury oc c ur re d to a n im mov able ob

je c t; the classic e x ample is an a ction involving inj ury to rea l property

. A t ransitory action is an ac tion in which the injury

occur red to a subject having a movable loc at i o n an d , t h ere fore , could have
occur red a ny wher e; examples are tort and contra ct ac tions. Curtis v. Garrison , 364 S.W .2d 933 (Tenn. 1963)

. Ms. Elliot t alleg es an injury to the person, r ather than an injury

to rea l estate. Ms. Elliott’s
cause of action could have arisen any wher e, rather than in only one plac e. B eca

use Ms. Elliot allege s a tr a ns ito ry

a c tio n, we turn to Te nn . Co de An n. § 20 -4 -1 01 fo r g uid a nc e . T his statut e pr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p art : (a ) In a ll civ il ac tio ns of a tr a ns ito ry natur e , unle ss ve nu e is o the rw ise

expressly provided for, the action may be broug ht in the county wher e the cause of action arose or in the county wher e the de fendant resides or is found. (b ) I f, ho we ve r, the pl aint if f andde fe nd a nt b othre sid e in the sa me county in this st ate, then suc h action sh al l b e broug ht either in the-4- c ou nty wh e re the c a us e of

a c tio n a ro se or in th e co un ty

of the ir residenc e. Section (a) of this statute applies beca use the parties reside in diff ere nt counties. Ba sed on
a re view of Te nn. Code Ann. § 20-4- 101(a) and the a lleg ations in the complai n t, it is clea r that venue is proper only in L oudon County , Tenne ssee a nd that Blount County , the county wher e the suit was filed, does not have jurisdiction to hea r the c ase. The trial court’ s order ref lects that it relied
on sect io n (b) in d ism iss ing the c a se . A lth ou g h th is w a s a n in c or re c t r e fe re nc e , w e wi ll a ff ir m a trial court’ s decr ee if

corr ect in re sult even thoug h rende red on diff ere nt gr ounds. Hi ll v . La mb e rth , 73 S.W .3d 131, 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) and Hopkins v. H opkins , 572 S.W .2d 639, 641 (Tenn. 19 78 ). Ve nu e fo r this su it d id n ot l ie in B lou nt C ou nty , b ut r a the r i n L ou do n Co un ty . N o r e qu e st fo r t rans fe r wa s ma de by the Pla int if f pu rs ua nt t o T e nn . Co de An n. § 1 6- 1- 11 6. Suc h a tr a ns fe r, if it had been r equeste d, would have be en in the discretion of the trial court. We do not find that the trial court a

bused its discretion or c ommitt ed any err or by not transfe rring the ca s e o n i ts own motion.

We note that the Plaintiff is a pro se litigant and a s such may not hav e b ee n aw ar e o f t he
v e n u e r e q u i r e m e n t s

. C o u r t s s h o u l d a n d d o t ak e i n t o a c c o u n tt h a tm a n y pro se litigants have no leg al training and little familiarity with the judicial sy stem. Ir v in v
. City of C lar

k sv ill e , 767 S.W .2d 649, 65 2 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 8)

. Ho we ve r, we mus t a lso be min df ul o f the bo un da

ry be tw e e n f

a ir ne ss to a pro se litigant and unfairne ss to the pro se litigant’s a dversa ry . Thus, we c annot excuse pr o s e litigants fr om comply ing w ith the same substantive and pr ocedur al rules that r epre sented pa rties ar e expected to observe

. Ed

mu nd so n v . P ra tt , 945 S.W .2d 754, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). We c an neither ove rlook nor ig nore a failure to c omply with the law reg arding a substantive matter such
a s v e nu e . A c c or din g ly , w e ho ld that th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y g rante d th e mot ion to d ism iss

. Next, we turn to the issue of the sa nctions imposed under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11.03
c on ta ins sp e c if

ic pr oc e du ra l r e qu ir e me nts wh ic h p ro vid e in r e le va nt p art a s f oll ow s:

I f, a f te r n o ti c e a n d a

r e a s o n ab le o p p o r tu n it y

to r e s p o n d , th e c ourt d e t e r m i n e s t h a ts u b d i v i s i o n 1 1

. 0 2 h a s b e e n v i o l a t e d , t h e c o u r tm a y, su bje c t to the c on dit ion s st a te d b e low , impo se a n a pp ro pria te sanction upon the attorney s, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision 11.02 or are r esponsible for the violation. (1) How I nitiated. (a) By Motion

. A mot ion fo r sa nc tio ns un de r this ru le sh a ll be mad e se pa

rate ly fr om o the r m oti on s o r r e qu e sts a ndsh a ll d escribe the spec ific conduc t alleg ed to violate subdivision 11.02. I t shall be serve d as provided in Rule 5, but shall not befiled with or prese nted to the court unless, within 21 day s after serviceof the mot i o n (or such other period as the court may presc ribe), the
c ha lle ng e d p ape r, c la im, de fe ns e , c on te nti on , a lle g a tio n, or de nia l is not withdrawn or a

ppropri at el y corr ecte d. I f wa rra nted, the court-5- ma y a wa rd to the pa

rt y pr e va ili ng on the mot ion the re a so na ble expenses and attorney ' s fee s incurre d in prese nting or opposing the mot ion . Abs e nt exc e pti on a l cir c ums ta nc e s, a la w firm sha ll b e he ld joi ntl y re sp on sib le fo r v iol ati on s c omm itt e d b y its pa rt ne rs , a sso c ia te s, a nde mpl oy e e s.
This rule conta ins what is known as the 21-day “saf e har bor” pr o v ision. I t serves the important dual role of

providing parties notice and fa ir warning that an adve rsary is proposing seeking sanctions, and se rving as a de terre n t t o frivolous, unsupported or othe rwise imprope r pleading s being filed in the first plac e.
The recor d indicates that the Defe ndant re quested the imposition of sanctions in her a nswer and re iterate d her r equest in her motion to dismiss

. The re cord doe s not indicate that the De fenda nt filed a motion separ ately from other

motions, o r t h at t he re quest for sa nctions contained a description of t h e s p ecific conduc t alleg ed to violate subdivision 11.02, or that the Plaintiff was
se rv e d w ith the re qu ir e d n oti c e of the Rul e 11 motion prior to it s fi li ng wi th the tr ia l c ou rt

. Furthermore , Rule 11.03(3) re quires that whe n imposing sanc tions, the tria l c ourt must de scribe the conduct de termined to constitute a violation of this rule a nd explain the b as i s for the sa nction imposed. The trial c ourt’s orde r in this case doe s not comply with Rule 11.

This court wa s prese nted with a situatio n simil ar to the pr esent c ase in McG ahey v

. McG ahey , 2 00 3 WL

22 27 23 50 , 2 00 3 T e nn . A pp . L EX I S 71 4, No . W2 00 3- 01 05 1- CO A- R3- CV (Tenn. A pp. W. S . filed Oc tober 1, 2003). T he McG ahey c ou rt ru le d a s f oll ow s:
As cited su

pr a , Ru le 11 .0 3( 3) , T e nn . R. C iv

. P., c le arl y re q u i r e s t h e tr i a l c o u r t t o " d e s c r i b e t h e c o n d u c t d e t e r m ine d to constitute a violation o f [ R u l e 11] and ex plain the basis for the sanction imposed." Her e, the tria l court states that the case " was settled with advice of counse l," and that "the alleg ations in the petition to alter or ame nd are unfounded by proof." Whil e the tria l
c o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e r e w a s n o t s u f f i c i e n t p r o o f t o s h o w t h a t Ms

. Ho ov e r w a s in c omp e te nt, the fa c t that Ms. Sha c ke lf or d los t the c a se does not constitute a basis for Rule 11 sanctions . The trial c ourt faile d to make a

sp e c if ic fi nd ing that Ms . Sha c ke lf or d v iol a te d Ru le 11 by failing to investiga te the fa cts upon which the Motion was
ma de a ndby

faili ng to h a ve e vid e nti ary su pp ort fo r the a lle g a tio ns

. Suc h f a ilu re to expl a in is in dir e c t vi olatio n o f R ule 11 .0 3( 3) , T e nn .R. Civ. P . There fore , we r ever se the Or der of the trial court to the ext ent that it imp os e s Ru le 11 sa nc tio ns up on the Ap pe lla nt an d h e r c ou ns e l.

I n acc ordanc e with our ruling in McG ahey , we f ind it necessary

to reve rse the or der of sanctions ag ainst the Plaintiff.-6-

The Plaintiff ar g ues in her bri ef , an d also arg ued in the trial c ourt, that the trial judg e and
o p p o s in g c o u n s e l a c te d u n f a irly , u n p r o f

e s s io n a ll y a n d in v io lati o n of vario u s e th ic s ru le s

. We disag ree . We find absolutely nothing in the recor d to support the Plaintiff’s contention of a violation of the code of judicial conduct by the trial judg e or a

violation of the code of prof essional conduc t by counsel for

the Def endant. Althoug h we a

re r ever sing the aw ard of sanctions in this matter, nothing he rein should be c o n s t rued to indi cate that we be lieve the tria l judge or counse l for the Def endant wa s dishonorable, a cted in any improper manne r, or violated any rules of c onduct. For the af oreme ntioned rea sons, the judgme nt of the trial court is rever sed as to the a war d of sanc tions, affirmed a s to all other matters, and remanded for collection of costs below. Exercising our discre tion, costs on appeal are assessed to the Appellant, Be cky Elliott and her sur ety , for whic h execution may

issue if nec essary

.

________________________ SHARON G. LEE, J UDGE