RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0500-17T3

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN

AND FAMILIES,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

B.S.,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

P.H.,

Respondent.

___________________________________

Submitted September 25, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Children 

and Families, Division of Child Protection and 

Permanency, Case ID No. 16-0604. 

B.S., appellant pro se (Anthony J. Van Zwaren, on the 

brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 15, 2018
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Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Christina A. Duclos, 

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

B.S. appeals from a final agency decision of the Division of Child 

Protection and Permanency (Division), Department of Children and Families 

(DCF), denying his and respondent P.H.'s application to become resource family 

parents.1 We affirm.

B.S. was a family friend of M.B, the biological mother of three children, 

ages twelve, ten and nine, who were in the Division's legal custody but who 

resided with B.S. in his Newark home. The children were deemed presumptively 

eligible to reside in the home conditioned upon B.S. obtaining a resource family 

parent license. 

As part of the application process, the Division inspected the home and 

discovered numerous violations, including plumbing issues and a lack of smoke 

and carbon monoxide detectors. The Division also discovered that P.H. resided 

in the home and was therefore required to apply for a resource family parent 

license and participate in mandatory training for resource parents, which she 

 

1 P.H. has not appealed from the Division's order.
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initially refused to do. Additionally, Josianne Vincent, a Division caseworker, 

observed the children selling water unsupervised on a busy street in Newark. As 

a result of these concerns, the Division removed the children from the home. 

Following the removal, the Division continued to evaluate the home and 

assist B.S. and P.H. with their application. During the investigation, B.S. 

admitted to a Division caseworker that he hit one of the children. In addition, 

M.B. informed the Division that B.S. made persistent and unwanted contact with 

her. 

B.S. and P.H were given psychological evaluations to assess their mental 

status, parenting ability, and treatment needs. Dr. Mark Singer, Ed.D., issued a 

report concluding that while reunification with the children was a viable goal, 

both B.S. and P.H. had significant cognitive and parenting limitations and any 

reunification would have to include services for the family. 

In light of these issues, the Division recommended denying B.S.'s and 

P.H.'s application. DCF's Office of Licensing (OOL) agreed and determined 

B.S. and P.H. failed to meet required licensing standards. B.S. and P.H. 

requested a hearing and the matter was transferred to the Office of 

Administrative Law for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
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ALJ Elissa Mizzone Testa presided over a contested hearing and 

considered testimony from five witnesses and documentary evidence jointly 

introduced by the parties, which included Division contact sheets, a resource 

home inspection report, a psychological report from Dr. Singer, and a letter from 

M.B. 

At the hearing, Vincent testified to the home inspection violations and 

B.S.'s actions in permitting the children to engage in activities that endangered 

their welfare. She also stated that B.S. failed to disclose in his initial application 

that P.H. was living in the home. Vincent considered this omission significant 

because B.S. also told her that P.H. did not want to be a foster parent and initially 

refused to participate in mandatory foster parent training. Vincent also 

described the incident where she witnessed the children selling water without 

any adult supervision and testified that B.S. admitted to hitting one of the 

children. 

Ursula Pollard, a Division quality inspector, stated that B.S. harassed 

M.B. by repeatedly contacting her in an attempt to have the children returned to 

his care. Division resource supervisor Tyronnette Amosu testified that B.S. 

failed to bring the children for scheduled therapeutic services and visits with 

M.B. According to Amosu, B.S. improperly continued to contact the children 
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after they were removed from the home. Amosu also testified to the significant 

issues raised by Dr. Singer's psychological evaluations in which he stated that 

before reunification could occur, B.S. would need to receive services including 

family therapy to allow him "to better understand the needs of the children and 

ways of responding appropriately to the challenge presented by the children."

B.S. testified and denied that he ever hit the children. As to the allegation 

that the children sold water unsupervised, B.S. maintained that a Division 

caseworker previously permitted the children to sell water on the street and they 

were always supervised by him, his sister, or his nephew. B.S.'s nephew 

confirmed his testimony and stated he would occasionally supervise the children 

while they sold water. B.S. also denied that he failed to comply with the 

children's scheduled visits with their biological mother and therapeutic service 

providers. 

The ALJ characterized B.S.'s testimony as "contradictory" and "selfserving with no evidence to support his contentions." She similarly found that 

his nephew's testimony lacked credibility stating that he was "unable to observe, 

remember, or recount dates, times or locations [when] the children [sold] water" 

and noting he gave "inconsistent statements" and was "partial" to B.S. 
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After considering the credible evidence, ALJ Mizzone Testa found that: 

1) the "children sold water unsupervised on a crowded Newark street;" 2) B.S. 

"made persistent, unwanted contact with the biological mother of the children 

and failed to comply with her scheduled visits and with the [recommended]

services for the children;" and 3) B.S. "hit at least one of the children for whom 

he was seeking to be a resource family parent." 

Based on these findings, the ALJ affirmed the OOL's denial of B.S.'s and 

P.H.'s request for a resource family license and concluded that they failed to 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they satisfied the Level I 

supervision requirements detailed in N.J.A.C. 3A:51-5.1(a) and N.J.A.C. 3A:51-

7.1(a)(1). The Division adopted the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of 

law. 

On appeal, B.S. contends that the Division erred in denying his application 

because the ALJ failed to consider and properly assess the evidence and 

incorrectly shifted the burden of proof. We disagree and affirm substantially for 

the reasons detailed in ALJ Mizzone Testa's comprehensive written opinion. 

Appellate review of an administrative agency decision is limited. In re 

Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). We generally defer to final agency actions, 

only "reversing those actions if they are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable 
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or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record 

as a whole.'" N.J. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't 

of Agric., 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 

81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)) (alteration in original). Under the arbitrary, 

capricious, and unreasonable standard, our scope of review is guided by three 

major inquiries: (1) whether the agency's decision conforms with the relevant 

law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in 

the record; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the administrative 

agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 

194 (2011).

When an agency decision satisfies such criteria, we accord substantial 

deference to the agency's fact-finding and legal conclusions, acknowledging the 

agency's "expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field." Circus 

Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009) 

(quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)). 

We will not substitute our judgment for the agency's even though we might have 

reached a different conclusion. Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194; see also In re Taylor,

158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999).
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The OOL is responsible for licensing resource family homes that serve 

children in the custody or supervision of the Division. N.J.A.C. 3A:51-1.1(a). 

The OOL is authorized to deny a resource parent application for good cause,

which includes "conduct, engaged in or permitted, which adversely affects or 

presents a serious hazard to the education, health, safety, general well-being or 

physical, emotional and social development of a child" or if the applicant is not 

"in full compliance with one or more [L]evel I requirements." N.J.A.C. 3A:51-

2.5(b)(8) to (9); N.J.A.C. 3A:51-1.5(a)(1).

The Level I requirements detailed in N.J.A.C. 3A:51-5.1(a) require a 

resource parent to be of "good character" and to possess the "skills, attributes 

and characteristics conducive to . . . caring effectively for a child in placement." 

Further, the resource parent must "[be] in sufficient physical, mental, and 

emotional health to perform his . . . duties satisfactorily," "cooperate with all 

activities in the case plan for the child in placement, such as counseling, therapy, 

court sessions, visits with the child's family", and "be able to provide daily care 

and supervision for each child . . . as appropriate to the child's age and needs." 

Finally, N.J.A.C. 3A:51-7.1(a)(1) requires a resource parent to "ensure that the 

medical, dental, mental/behavioral health, and other health care needs of each 

child in placement are adequately and promptly met . . . ."
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After thoroughly reviewing the record in light of the applicable legal 

principles and the standard of review, we are satisfied that the Division's 

decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and was supported by 

substantial credible evidence in the record. According deference to the ALJ's 

credibility determinations, there is substantial evidence in the record to support 

the ALJ's factual findings. Those findings support the denial of B.S.'s resource 

family license because he failed to meet the Level I requirements detailed in 

N.J.A.C. 3A:51-5.1(a) and N.J.A.C. 3A:51-7.1(a)(1). 

Finally, to the extent we have not addressed any arguments raised by B.S., 

we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.