Office of Commissioner 

Rebecca Kelly Slaughter 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Federal Trade Commission 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580 

Statement of Commissioner Slaughter 

Joined by Commissioner Alvaro M. Bedoya 

On the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Non-Compete Clauses 

Commission File No. P201200 

January 5, 2023 

One of the great privileges of working at the Federal Trade Commission is the 

opportunity—and responsibility—we have to help real people in their everyday lives. We offer 

that help not only when we challenge massive mergers but also when we tackle the myriad 

smaller ways in which people are denied agency and autonomy. When we fight fraud, 

manipulative business opportunities, anticompetitive schemes, and bogus fees, we help restore 

meaningful choice and dignity to consumers and workers. These principles are the bedrock of a 

democratic society, but too often they are denied to Americans who are not rich and powerful. 

Addressing the scourge of noncompete clauses that restrict the job mobility of workers advances 

our mission by ensuring that workers have the chance to compete to earn a fair wage and familysupporting benefits. 

I am therefore pleased to support the Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(“NPRM”) on the Noncompete Clause Rule under Sections 5 and 6(g) of the Federal Trade 

Commission Act. I am grateful to the cross-agency team who worked on this NPRM and thank 

them for their hard work and collaborative drafting process. 

I also want to thank the civil-society organizations and academics who filed a petition 

with the FTC in 2019 calling for a rulemaking to address noncompetes in employment 

contracts.0F

1 This petition increased the awareness of and knowledge about the issue not only 

within the agency but also with the public more broadly. That heightened focus was on display in 

the FTC’s noncompete workshop in January 2020.1F

2 As I did at that workshop, I again thank the 

labor community for engaging with the competition community to tackle the pocketbook issues 

that sit at the intersection of labor and antitrust law and that have profound effects on workers.2F

3 

Several years of activity by the Commission related to noncompete clauses in employment 

1 Open Markets Inst. et al., Petition for Rulemaking to Prohibit Worker Non-Compete Clauses (March 20, 2019), 

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e449c8c3ef68d752f3e70dc/t/5eaa04862ff52116d1dd04c1/1588200595775/Pe 

tition-for-Rulemaking-to-Prohibit-Worker-Non-Compete-Clauses.pdf. 2 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Non-Competes in the Workplace: Examining Antitrust and Consumer Protection Issues, 

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events/2020/01/non-compete clauses-workplace-examining-antitrust-consumerprotection-issues. 3 Remarks of FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, New Decade, New Resolve to Protect and Promote 

Competitive Markets for Workers, FTC Workshop on Non-Compete Clauses in the Workplace (Jan. 9, 2020), 

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1561475/slaughter_-

_noncompete_clauses_workshop_remarks_1-9-20.pdf . 

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contracts have culminated in this NPRM, which is another milestone in our effort to more 

thoroughly incorporate labor competition and effects on workers into our antitrust law analyses. 

I write separately to emphasize two points. 

First, noncompete clauses, and the restrictions they place on workers regarding their 

future employment or business creation, are deeply troubling. Based on the research discussed in 

the NPRM, they have serious ramifications for individual workers and labor competition 

broadly, as well as for consumers. Although sometimes referred to as noncompete “agreements,” 

they rarely represent actual agreements. Instead, they are often imposed on workers with no 

ability to bargain as a condition of employment. Even when noncompetes have been ruled 

unenforceable by courts or outlawed by legislation, firms continue to use them, as was alleged in 

a recent case the FTC settled over noncompetes imposed on minimum wage–earning security 

guards.3F

4 

Workers restrained by noncompetes are unable to pursue certain job opportunities and are 

therefore deprived of higher wages and more favorable working conditions and benefits. 

Similarly, businesses that need to hire workers are inhibited from attracting and hiring 

noncompete-restrained workers through better working conditions, pay, and benefits.4F

5

 Even 

more alarming is the evidence that shows noncompetes reduce earnings for workers not 

individually bound by them.5F

6

 Studies also show reduced entrepreneurship, new-business 

formation, or both when workers are inhibited by noncompetes.6F

7 Finally, American consumers 

can suffer from noncompete clauses through paying higher prices for lower-quality goods and 

services.7F

8 For all these reasons, it is clear that it is more than appropriate for the FTC to use our 

rulemaking authority under Sections 5 and 6(g) to address noncompete clauses in employment 

contracts. 

Second, I strongly encourage the public to share their lived experiences and perspectives 

with the Commission. I have heard personally about how noncompete clauses can strike fear into 

workers and make them anxious about their livelihoods. These stories come from a variety of 

2 

 

 

 

 

4 In the Matter of Prudential Security, Inc., a corporation; Prudential Command Inc., a corporation; Greg Wier, a 

natural person; and Matthew Keywell, FTC Matter/File Number 2210026 (January 4, 2023), Complaint ¶22, 

https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cases-proceedings/2210026-prudential-security-et-al-matter; Statement of 

Chair Lina M. Khan Joined by Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Commissioner Alvaro M. Bedoya In the 

Matters of Prudential Security, O-I Glass Inc., and Ardagh Group S.A, January 4, 2023, https://www.ftc.gov/legallibrary/browse/cases-proceedings/public-statements/statement-chair-lina-m-khan-joined-commissioners-slaughterbedoya-matters-prudential-security-o-i. 5 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Non-Compete Clause Rule, Part II.B.1. 6 See Matthew S. Johnson, Kurt Lavetti, & Michael Lipsitz, The Labor Market Effects of Legal Restrictions on 

Worker Mobility 2 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3455381; Evan Starr, Justin Frake, 

& Rajshree Agarwal, Mobility Constraint Externalities, 30 Org. Sci. 961, 6 (2019). 7 See Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 

57 Mgmt. Sci. 425, 432 (2011); Jessica Jeffers, The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on Corporate Investment 

and Entrepreneurship 22 (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3040393; Evan Starr, 

Natarajan Balasubramanian, & Mariko Sakakibara, Screening Spinouts? How Noncompete Enforceability Affects 

the Creation, Growth, and Survival of New Firms, 64 Mgmt. Sci. 552, 561 (2018). 

8 See Naomi Hausman & Kurt Lavetti, Physician Practice Organization and Negotiated Prices: Evidence from State 

Law Changes, 13 Am. Econ. J. Applied Econ. 258, 284 (2021); Michael Lipsitz & Mark Tremblay, Noncompete 

Agreements and the Welfare of Consumers 6 (2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3975864. 
 

different industries and professions, from fast-food workers to family physicians.8F

9

 Public input 

from individuals who are or who have been bound by noncompetes and from firms that use them 

is a critically important step in the rulemaking process, and it will help the Commission weigh 

the proposed broad ban on noncompete clauses as well as the alternative approaches discussed in 

the NPRM. I look forward to working with my fellow Commissioners to achieve a just outcome 

that promotes fair competition. 

9 See People of the State of Ill. v. Jimmy John’s Enters., LLC, No. 2016-CH-07746 (Cook County Cir. Ct. filed June 

8, 2016); See also Kurt Lavetti, Carol Simon, & William D. White, The Impacts of Restricting Mobility of Skilled 

Service Workers Evidence from Physicians, 55 J. Hum. Res. 1025, 1042 (2020). 

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