alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 22

- 60153 Summary Calendar

**Island Operating Company, Incorporated; Louisiana Workers’**  **Compensation Corporation,**

Petitioners

— Appellant s **,**

versus

**Donna Sanchez,** Widow of Allen D. Sanchez **; Director,** Office of Workers ’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor **,** Respondents

— Appellee s

**.**

Appeal from the United States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board BRB No. 21

- 0092

Before **Stewart, Duncan,** and **Wilson ,**  Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** *

Claimant Donna Sanchez sought benefits pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et

seq. , as extended by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331

* Pursuant to **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED September 14, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 22-60153 Document: 00516471138 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/14/2022No. 22

- 60153

2 et seq

. She alleged that her husband Allen ’s death was causally rel ated to his work for the Island Operating Company, Incorporated (“ Island ”)

. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held that Allen’s heart attack and death arose out of and in the course of his employment with Island

. Accordingly, the ALJ awarded Sanchez benefits under Section 9 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 909, based on Allen’s average weekly wage, id. § 910(c)

. Island appealed to the Benefits Review Board (“the Board”) , challenging the finding that Allen’s work activities contributed to his death and , alternatively, the calculation of Allen’s average weekly wage. The Board
affirmed the ALJ’s decision and order awarding benefits. Island then appealed to this court.

We review decisions of the Board under a highly deferential standard, assessing “ whether it has adhered to its proper scope of review

— i.e. , whether the ALJ ’ s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence
and are consistent with the law.” Gulf Best Elec., Inc. v. Methe , 396 F.3d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 2004). After review of the briefs and record, we conclude that
the Board thoroughly considered the case brought by Sanchez , fairly
considered Island ’s defenses to her claims, and committed no reversible error in its decision. Accordingly, w e **AFFIRM** the Board’s decision essentially for the reasons stated in its thorough, well

- reasoned opinion. Case: 22-60153 Document: 00516471138 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/14/2022
#### Ex parte Curtis Leon LOMAX.

77-501.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 23, 1978.

EMBRY, Justice.

WRIT DENIED.

TORBERT, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER and ALMON, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                            9
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         28,236
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               6,038
<TRADING-ASSETS>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    203,266
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         6,997
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           6,975
<LOANS>                                        4,668,579
<ALLOWANCE>                                    30,094
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 5,198,157
<DEPOSITS>                                     4,173,102
<SHORT-TERM>                                   510,180
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            38,139
<LONG-TERM>                                    85,165
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       255
<OTHER-SE>                                     391,316
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 5,198,157
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                329,746
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              16,614
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               346,360
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             184,402
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             27,363
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          134,595
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  9,137
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                             4,473
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                114,203
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                36,454
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     20,704
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   20,704
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0.81
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                 7.61
<LOANS-NON>                                    45,021
<LOANS-PAST>                                   0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                               0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                4,138
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               27,943
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  7,660
<RECOVERIES>                                   674
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              30,094
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           30,094
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                            0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                        2,800
        



</TABLE>
# THE STATE OF TEXAS

M A N D A T E

*********************************************

TO THE 124TH DISTRIC T COURT OF GREGG COU NTY, GREETING:

Before our Court of Appeals for the 12th Court of Appeals District of Texas, on the 20th day of
May , 2015 , the cause upo n appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between

ROBERT DARRELL TOLAR , Appellant

NO. 12

- 14

- 00228

- CV; Trial Court No. 2010

- 1235

- B

Opinion by Brian Hoyle , Justice.

DARBIE D. TOLAR, SEA GRID ANN HOWE

AND TIA JO VANSCHOYC K, Appellee s

was determined; and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

“ THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the court

below be in all things affirmed , and that all costs of this appeal are hereby adjudged against appellant, ROBERT DARRELL TOLAR , for which execution may issue, and that this

decision be certified to the court below for observance. ”

WHEREAS, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Court of Appeals District of Texas in this behalf, and in all things have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

WITNESS, THE HONORABLE JAMES T. WORTHEN , Chief Justice of our Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Court of Appeals District, with the Seal thereof affixed, at the City of Tyler, this the 31 st day of July , 2015.

CATHY S. LUSK, CLERK

By:

_______________________________ Chief Deputy Clerk
Do you want to vote absentee?
Here’s how to get started.

CONTACT YOUR
VOTING ASSISTANCE OFFICER
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Forest Laboratories, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Francis
I. Perier, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:





1.           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








/s/ Francis I. Perier,
Jr.


Francis
I. Perier, Jr.


Senior
Vice President - Finance and


Chief
Financial Officer


February
6, 2009
United States


Securities and Exchange Commission


Washington, D.C. 20549





FORM 8-K








CURRENT REPORT


Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the


Securities Exchange Act of 1934





Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported): May 2, 2017














DIAMOND HILL INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.


(Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter)





Ohio000-2449865-0190407(State or other jurisdiction ofincorporation)(Commission File Number)(I.R.S. EmployerIdentification No.)


325 John H. McConnell Blvd., Suite 200, Columbus, Ohio43215(Address of Principal Executive Offices)(Zip Code)





Registrant's Telephone Number, Including Area Code:   (614) 255-3333








Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions:





 ̈ Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)





 ̈ Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)





 ̈ Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))





 ̈ Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))


Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is an emerging growth company as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act of 1933 (§230.405 of this chapter) or Rule 12b-2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (§240.12b-2 of this chapter).


Emerging growth company ☐





If an emerging growth company, indicate by check mark if the registrant has elected not to use the extended transition period for complying with any new or revised financial accounting standards provided pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. ☐








---







Item 8.01   Other Events





The following is a summary of assets under management as of April 30, 2017 of Diamond Hill Capital Management, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Diamond Hill Investment Group, Inc. (in millions):





By Investment VehicleProprietary funds$14,477Sub-advised funds1,444Institutional accounts4,503Total$20,424





By Investment StrategySmall Cap$1,729Small-Mid Cap3,445Mid Cap97Large Cap9,105All Cap Select423Long-Short4,895Corporate bonds637Core fixed income293(Less: Investments in affiliated funds)(200)Total$20,424








SIGNATURES





Pursuant to the  requirements  of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant  has duly  caused  this  report  to be  signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.





DIAMOND HILL INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.Date:May 2, 2017By:/s/ Thomas E. LineThomas E. Line, Chief Financial Officer
261 La. 215

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Andrew James ROBINSON.

No. 52062.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 8, 1972.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leonard E. Yokum, Dist. Atty., William M. Quin, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Robert W. Tillery, Hammond, for defendant-appellant.

*70PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Andrew James Robinson, appeals from a conviction of attempted manslaughter (La. 14:27 and 31), for which he was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. He relies on two bills of exceptions.

The first bill was reserved when the trial judge allowed the introduction of an acknowledgment signed by the defendant that he had been advised of his constitutional rights. The basis for the objection does not appear in the bill of exceptions. The evidence showing the circumstances of the introduction of the document is not before us, not having been made a part of the bill of exceptions. We cannot determine the basis of the objection. The per curiam of the trial court attached to Bill of Exceptions No. 1 suggests no reason why the document was inadmissible. There is no merit to Bill of Exception No. 1.

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 complains of the introduction of an oral confession as not having been given freely and voluntarily. Again, the evidence showing the circumstances of the introduction of the confession and the ruling upon which the bill of exceptions is based are not in the record, and is not attached to the bill of exceptions, and does not form a part of it. The bill of exceptions itself indicates that it was taken to the overruling of a motion for a new trial. The motion for a new trial alleges that a bill of exceptions was reserved to the erroneous introduction of the confession. The per curiam of the trial judge points out that the defense did *not*reserve a bill of exceptions to the introduction of the oral culpatory statements of the defendant when they were introduced into evidence.

Failure to reserve a bill of exceptions at the time of an adverse ruling operates as a waiver of the objection and as an acquiesence in the ruling. C.Cr.P. art. 841.

At any rate, the per curiam of the trial court stands uncontradicted in the record; it shows that the court found the oral confession to have been made freely and voluntarily. There is no merit in Bill of Exceptions No. 2.

For these reasons, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED
SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000037637
<NAME> FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-19-2000
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                        3,566
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                        419
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                             694
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                           308
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                      52
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   5,039
<COMMON>                                         1,004
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                            0
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                                992
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                   1,996
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         34
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                             1,398
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                     201
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                       82
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                   1,328
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                    5,039
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                        2,238
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                               153
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                       1,728
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                       1,881
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                            357
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                                   5
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                     362
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            96
<NET-INCOME>                                       266
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                          1
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                      265
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                           154
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                            0
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                             386
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.00


</TABLE>
No. 00-811.

#### Allegheny County et al. *v.*Berg et al.

C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
<PAGE>

                                                                 Exhibit 10.8(b)

                         American Woodmark Corporation

                               Fiscal Year 2000
             Annual Incentive Plan for Senior Vice Presidents and
                       Vice President of Human Resources


I.  The objectives of the Annual Incentive Plan are threefold:

     A.   Provide an incentive which will encourage and reward outstanding
          individual performance;

     B.   Help align the personal goals of the individual with the overall goals
          of and objectives of American Woodmark and the stockholders of
          American Woodmark; and

     C.   Together with base pay and long term incentive programs, provide a
          compensation package, in both form and total value, which is equal to
          or better than opportunities offered in the competitive marketplace
          for similar performance in similar positions.


II.  Eligibility for Participation in the Annual Incentive Program

     A.   Senior Vice Presidents of the Company. Eligible participants must be
          employed by the Company on April 30, 2001. All calculations will be
          reduced on a pro-rated basis for eligible participants not employed as
          of May 1, 2000.


III. Determination of Annual Incentive Payout

     A.   Determination of the payout will be based on one component:

          1.   Zero to 100% of base salary on April 30, 2001 as determined by
               the attached schedule for net income. No payment will be made on
               net income below $16.0 million. Net income will be the audited
               amount as listed in the Company's annual report for Fiscal 2001.
#### George LANDRY v. NATIONAL GYPSUM COMPANY and Kemper Insurance Company.

No. 61817.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 31, 1978.

In re: National Gypsum Company and American Motorist Insurance Company applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 354 So.2d 739.

Denied.
EXHIBIT 23.2
                                                ------------
                                                            
                              
                              
                              
                              
             CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
             ----------------------------------
                              
                              
                              
We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the
Registration Statement on Form S-8 of our report dated March
7, 1997 appearing in BRC Holdings, Inc.'s Annual Report on
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1996.



/s/ PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP

PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP

Dallas, Texas
January 9, 1998
#### Angelo D’Apice, Plaintiff, *v.*Standard Oil Company (N. J.), Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County,

September 18, 1952.

*Harry I. Stein*for plaintiff.

*Walter X. Connor*for defendant.

Keogh, J.

Plaintiff seeks to vacate defendant’s notice to examine plaintiff before trial. Prior to July 1, 1952, when rule 121-a of the Rules of Civil Practice became effective, the defendant was denied the right to examine plaintiff on two items by order of this court dated July 31, 1951. Because of the amendment to the above-mentioned rule of the Rules of Civil Practice the defendant now seeks the examination of the plaintiff on the same two items.

Plaintiff opposes defendant’s asserted right to avail itself of the new rule not only on the ground, as stated, that an examination already has been had, but on the further ground *528that the ruling of the court under the outstanding order constitutes the law of the case; also that, in waiting more than a year, defendant has been guilty of laches.

In *People ex rel. Central New England Ry. Co.*v. *State Tax Comm.*(261 App. Div. 416, 418) the court said: “ It is unquestionably true that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and proceedings unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation. However, something more than the application of that proposition is involved here. This rule has been generally understood to refer only to those pending actions in which the procedural step changed by the new law has not yet been taken. The respondent contends, however, that the rule is so extensive that it may be used to validate a proceeding unauthorized by the prior statute. Such a construction, we think, is contrary to the necessity for consistent practice and has no support in authoritative decisions. Unless procedure is to be involved in chaos it must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises. *(Southwick*v. Southwick, 49 N. Y. 510; *Lazarus*v. *Metropolitan Elevated Railway Co.,*145 id. 581; *Matter of Reynolds,*202 id. 430.) ”

Motion to vacate, accordingly, is granted.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7914 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7914

  To specify that no person shall be required to comply with the CECL 
             Rule under any Federal statute or regulation.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 31, 2020

 Mr. Luetkemeyer introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                  the Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To specify that no person shall be required to comply with the CECL 
             Rule under any Federal statute or regulation.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Eliminating CECL Accounting Standard 
Act''.

SEC. 2. REMOVING ANY REQUIREMENT TO COMPLY WITH THE CECL RULE.

    (a) In General.--No person shall be required to comply with the 
CECL Rule under any Federal statute or regulation.
    (b) CECL Rule Defined.--In this section, the term ``CECL Rule'' 
means the accounting standard contained in the Accounting Standards 
Update No. 2016-13 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, titled 
``Financial Instruments-Credit Losses (Topic 326): Measurement of 
Credit Losses on Financial Instruments'' issued June 2016.
                                 <all>
```
#### Rudolph KNIGHT v. EDGAR MURRAY SUPPLY CO., INC. and American Employers’ Insurance Co.

No. 61845.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 31, 1978.

In re: Edgar Murray Supply Co., Inc. and American Employers’ Insurance Co. applying for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans.

Denied.