alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-20261 Conference Calendar

DANNY HENRY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus K. COBBS, Officer; T. FITCH, Officer, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-97-CV-1164

-------------------- August 27, 1999 Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Danny Henry, Texas prisoner # 688114, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). He renews his claim that the defendant prison guards verbally threatened and intimidated him, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He additionally asserts, for the first time on appeal, that he is entitled to relief under the Texas Tort Claims Act.No. 98-20261 -2- Henry’s claims are not actionable under § 1983. Verbal threats and name-calling by prison guards do not amount to a constitutional violation. See Bender v. Brumley , 1 F.3d 271, 274 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993)(pretrial detainee case); Lynch v. Cannatella , 810 F.3d 1363, 1376 (5th Cir. 1987). Section 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for Henry’s newly-raised state-law tort claim. See Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. , 38 F.3d 198, 200 (5th Cir. 1994). Because Henry did not assert a claim of a constitutional violation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint as frivolous. See Siglar v. Hightower , 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). Henry’s appeal is without arguable merit and is thus frivolous. Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the appeal is frivolous, it is dismissed. 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
FI FTH DI VI SI ON DI LLA R D, C. J. , REESE, J. , and B ETHEL, J.

N O T IC E : M otions for r e c ons i de r a tion m us t be ph y sic a l ly r e ce iv ed i n our c le r k ’s offic e w ithin te n da y s of the da te of de c is ion to be de e m ed tim e ly file d.

http://w w w .ga a ppe a l s .us /r ule s Jul y 25, 2018



# I n th e Co u r t o f

A p p eals o f

G eo r g ia

A1 6 A1 65 0 . DAVIS v . THE STATE.

D I LLA R D , Ch i ef J u d g e.
I n S t a t e v. Da vi s , 1 th e Su p rem e Co u rt o f Geo rg i a co n cl u d ed t h at we l a c k e d ju ri s d i ct i o n t o co n s id er t h i s cas e b ecau s e i t ad d res s es a co n s t i t u t i o n al q u es t i on o f fi rs t
i m p res s i o n , an d , t h erefo re, o u r d eci s i o n i n Da vi s v. S t a te 2 i s a n ul l i t y
. Acco rd i n g l y ,
t h e Su p rem e Co urt v a c a t e d t h a t d eci s i on ; d eci d ed t h e m eri t s o f t h e ap p eal as i f t h e

cas e h ad b een p ro p erl y t ran s ferred ; an d rem an ded t h e cas e t o t h i s Co u rt w it h d i rect i o n

t h at t h e ju d g m en t o f t h e t ri al co u rt b e rev ers ed an d t h e rem i t ti t ur be tran s m it t ed wi th

t h e Su prem e Co u rt ’ s o p i n io n
. Ju d g men t r ever sed . Rees e a n d

Bet h el , JJ., co n cu r
.

1

_ _ _ Ga.

__ _ , Sl i p
. Op

. at 8 (1 ) (Cas e No

. S1 7 G1 3 33 ; d eci d ed M ay 2 1 , 2 0 1 8 ).

2 3 4 0 Ga. Ap p . 6 5 2 (7 9 8 SE2 d 4 7 4 ) (2 0 1 7 ).
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 4267

_____________________________ C HARLES P EARCE , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for D uval County

. Steven B. Whittington , Judge

. November 6, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
R OWE , B ILBREY , and W INSOR , JJ., concur.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.3 31

.

_____________________________2 Charles Pearce, pro se
, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
263 La. 362

#### Daniel DEVER v. EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LTD., et al.

No. 52933.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 16, 1972.

In re: Daniel Dever applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 266 So.2d 455.

Application denied. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error in the judgment complained of.

BARHAM, J.

is of the opinion the writ should be granted, believing there was a statutory violation by defendants of R.S. 40:1672 & 40:1682 which was a cause in fact of the injury. Defendants owed a duty to plaintiff which encompassed the risk which gave rise to the injury. They are liable under Civil Code Art. 2315.

TATE, J., concurs in BARHAM, J.’s reasons for granting the writ.
#### Geneva DAVIS v. VISKO’S, INC. and U. S. F. & G.

No. 61930.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 28, 1978.

In re: Geneva Davis, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Orleans.

Writ denied.
---



##### 



Section 1. Principal Office.
 Section 2. Registered Office.
 Section 3. Other Offices.
 
 Section 1. Place of Meetings.
 Section 2. Annual Meetings.
 Section 3. Substitute Annual Meeting.
 2




---



##### 



Section 4. Special Meetings.
 Section 5. Notice of Meetings.
   Section 6. Waiver of Notice.
 Section 7. Shareholders List.
 3




---



##### 



Section 8. Voting Group.
 Section 9. Quorum.
   Section 10. Proxies.
 4




---



##### 



Section 11. Voting of Shares.
   Section 12. Informal Action by Shareholders.
  Section 13. Actions to be Taken at an Annual Meeting of Shareholders.
 5




---



##### 



Section 14. Conduct of Meeting and Order of Business
 
 Section 1. General Powers.
 Section 2. Number, Term of Office and Qualification.
 Section 3. [Repealed]
 6




---



##### 



Section 4. Removal.
 Section 5. Vacancies.
 Section 6. Compensation.
 Section 7. Nominations for Election of Directors.
 7




---



##### 



Section 8. Chairman of the Board.
 
 Section 1. Regular Meetings.
 Section 2. Special Meetings.
 Section 3. Notice of Meetings.
 Section 4. Waiver of Notice.
 8




---



##### 



Section 5. Quorum.
 Section 6. Manner of Acting.
 Section 7. Presumption of Assent.
 Section 8. Action without Meeting.
 Section 9. Committees of the Board.
 
 Section 1. Number of Officers.
 9




---



##### 



Section 2. Election, Term of Office and Qualification.
 Section 3. Subordinate Officers.
 Section 4. Officers Acting as Assistant Secretary.
 Section 5. Removal.
 Section 6. Resignations.
 Section 7. Vacancies.
 10




---



##### 



Section 8.
 Section 9. Duties of Officers.
  Section 10. Salaries of Officers.
 
 Section 1. Contracts.
 Section 2. Loans.
 Section 3. Checks and Drafts.
 11




---



##### 



Section 4. Deposits.
 
 Section 1. Certificates for Shares.
 Section 2. Stock Transfer Books.
 Section 3. Lost, Stolen or Destroyed Certificates.
 12




---



##### 



Section 4. Fixing Record Date.
   Section 5. Holder of Record.
 
 Section 1. Distributions.
 Section 2. Seal.
 Section 3. Fiscal Year.
 13




---



##### 



Section 4. Amendments.
 Section 5. Definitions.
 Section 6. Inapplicability of The North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act.
 Section 7. Inapplicability of The North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act.
 Section 8. Execution of Instruments.
 14




---



##### 



Section 1. Right to Indemnification  Executive Officers, Directors of the
Corporation or of Designated Subsidiaries, and Requested Representatives.
 Section 2. Right to Advancement of Expenses  Executive Officers, Directors of
the Corporation or of Designated Subsidiaries, and Requested Representatives.
 Section 3. Board Determinations.
 15




---



##### 



Section 4. Actions to Enforce Rights to Indemnification or Advancement of
Expenses.
 Section 5. Discretionary Indemnification and Advancement of Expenses.
 16




---



##### 



Section 6. Insurance.
 Section 7. Miscellaneous Matters.
   17




---



##### 



18




---



##### 



19




---



##### 



20




---



##### 



21
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
         THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
BALANCE SHEET OF KLEVER MARKETING,  INC. AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND THE RELATED
STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND CASH FLOWS FOR THE YEAR THEN ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         203
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               238
<PP&E>                                         523
<DEPRECIATION>                                 57
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1651
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1311
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       113
<OTHER-SE>                                     227
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1651
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               1705
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             31
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1735)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1735)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.15)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.15)


</TABLE>
ORIGINAL 

UNITED STATES OF AMRICA 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMSSION
 

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUGES
 

) 

In the Matter of ) 

) 

POLYPORE INTERNATIONAL, INC., ) Docket No. 9327 

Respondent. ) 

) 

ORDER ON NON-PARTY THE MOORE COMPANY'S SECOND 

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO SEEK IN CAMERA TREATMENT 

I. 

On April 
 24, 2009, non-pary The Moore Company submitted a motion seeking an 

extension of time until May 6, 2009 to seek in camera treatment ("Motion"). The Moore 

Company represents that Complaint Counsel does not object to the requested extension of time 

and that Respondent does not object to an extension of time, but has not indicated a position as 

to the requested date of May 6,2009. As set fort below, the Motion is GRANED in par. 

II. 

By Order dated April 14, 2009, a previous motion for extension of 
 time by The Moore 

Company was granted and Respondent was directed to inorm The Moore Company, by April 

17,2009, with specificity, which documents Respondent intended to introduce at triaL. The 

Moore Company was directed to file its motion for in camera treatment for such documents, not 

including affidavits, by April 
 24, 2009. 

The Moore Company states that, on April 17, 2009, Respondent identified over 160 

individual Bates ranges of documents, consisting of approximately 1566 pages of evidence. The 

Moore Company argues that the sheer volume of documents designated by Respondent rendered 

it impossible for The Moore Company to comply with the one week deadline for seeking in 

camera treatment, in par due to the strict standards governing in camera applications and the 

level of detail and specificity required to support such applications. The Moore Company also 

states that, on April 23, 2009, Respondent informed The Moore Company that it had fuer
 

narowed its proposed trial designations. 

III. 

Upon consideration of the arguments raised in The Moore Company's motion for an 

extension of time to file its motion for in camera treatment, it is GRANTED in par. The Moore 
Company shall file its motion for in camera treatment by May 1,2009. Any oppositions to The 

Moore Company's motion for in camera treatment shall be filed by May 7,2009. 

ORDERED: J) m c4".,¡ 

D. Michael Chappell 

Administrative Law Judge 

Date: April 28, 2009 

2
4. I. Economic and Fiscal Impact Statement.
#### Margaret J. EARLY, Appellant, v. John J. EARLY, Jr., Appellee.

No. 70-884.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 8, 1971.

Harold S. Wilson, Clearwater, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

MANN, Judge.

Appellee’s effort to try the propriety of appellant’s possession of property not involved in the divorce proceedings is out of place in these proceedings. The judgment was final. Appellee’s motion for reconsideration was filed after the time allowed by Fla.R.C.P. 1.530, 31 F.S.A. and was dismissed as inadequate under Rule 1.540. An order requiring appellant to surrender certain of appellee’s property may be appropriate in subsequent proceedings, but we find no warrant in this record for determining questions not properly before the Court.

Reversed and remanded.

PIERCE, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
#### THE FLORIDA BAR, Petitioner, v. Edward G. RICCARDI, Respondent.

No. 42154.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 21, 1972.

*6Norman A. Faulkner, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Edward G. Riccardi, in pro. per.

PER CURIAM.

This is a Bar discipline matter. On January 27, 1972, Edward G. Riccardi, a member of The Florida Bar, was adjudged guilty of a violation of Title 18, Section 201(f), U.S.Code, which provides in pertinent part:

> “(f) Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official; Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.”

This offense constitutes a felony under the laws of the United States. The time for appeal has expired.

Noting that Article XI, Rule 11.07(4) of the Integration Rule, 32 F.S.A., provides that final judgments shall be considered as conclusive proof of guilt of the offense charged, The Florida Bar on March 6, 1972, petitioned for a Notice to Show Cause why appropriate disciplinary action should not be entered against respondent. This Court granted the petition and gave respondent leave to answer on or before April 24, 1972. We have received no response from the attorney within the time allotted.

In determining appropriate disciplinary action, we must be primarily guided by the welfare of the public and the legal profession. A study of the indictment lodged against respondent reveals that he was charged with bribery of an Internal Revenue Agent with intent to influence the Agent’s determination of the current tax liability of Robert Rosenbloom, respondent’s co-defendant under the indictment. Respondent pleaded guilty to the indictment, and was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of eighteen months, with six months to be spent in actual confinement, and the remainder suspended.

In our view bribery is a particularly noxious ethical failure under the Code of Professional Responsibility, because it not only involves a breach of the individual attorney’s public trust as a member of the legal profession, but also represents an attempt by the offending lawyer to induce a third party to engage in fraudulent and corrupt practices. Such conduct strikes at the very heart of the attorney’s responsibility to the public and profession. We are, therefore, not inclined to leniency in bribery matters, absent mitigating factors in the individual case. See The Florida Bar v. Craig, 238 So.2d 78 (Fla.1970). No such mitigating factors have been brought to our attention in the instant case.

Accordingly, it is the judgment of this Court that respondent, Edward G. Riccar-di, should be, and is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in the State of Florida.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 31.01

Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant To Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) As Adopted Pursuant To Section 302 of The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I,
Jochen Witte, President and Chief Executive Officer of Versant Corporation, certify that:

|                       |  |                                                       |  | 
|---------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|Date: January 14, 2009 |  |                                                      
|By                     |  | /s/ Jochen Witte Jochen Witte
Chief Executive Officer |  | 

---



QuickLinks
INDEX TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS



                                                            Page
                                                            ----
Bradley Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Subsidiaries

  Report of Independent Certified Public Accountants         F-2

  Consolidated Balance Sheets at December 31, 1998
    and 1997                                                 F-3

  Consolidated Statements of Income for the Years
    Ended December 31, 1998 and 1997                         F-5

  Consolidated Statement of Shareholders' Equity
    for the Years Ended December 31, 1998 and 1997           F-6

  Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows for the
    Years Ended December 31, 1998 and 1997                   F-7

  Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements               F-8 - F-24
































                                 F-1








                     REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED
                           PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS



Board of Directors and Shareholders
Bradley Pharmaceuticals, Inc.



We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of Bradley
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Subsidiaries as of December 31, 1998 and 1997, and the
related consolidated statements of income, shareholders' equity and cash flows
for each of the two years in the period ended December 31, 1998.  These
financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's management.  Our
responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on
our audits.

We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement.  An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting
the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements.  An audit also includes
assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by
management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.
We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in
all material respects, the consolidated financial position of Bradley
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Subsidiaries as of December 31, 1998 and 1997, and
the consolidated results of their operations, and their consolidated share-
holders' equity and their consolidated cash flows for each of the two years in
the period ended December 31, 1998, in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles.





GRANT THORNTON LLP

Parsippany, New Jersey
March 9, 1999
















                                F-2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           2,361
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,900
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    105,581
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                           1,892
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 124,551
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                         76,504
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,270
<OTHER-SE>                                      15,187
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   124,551
<SALES>                                         69,967
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                71,119
<CGS>                                           59,814
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   70,465
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   296
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 516
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    654
<INCOME-TAX>                                       248
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       406
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .00
        

</TABLE>
#### W. D. KING et al. v. ALLSTATE INS. CO. et al. Frank A. URBANIC et al. v. COMMERCIAL UNION INS. CO. FLORIST MUTUAL INS. CO. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. et al.

No. 60875.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 11, 1977.

In re: James L. Rogers, Charlotte 0. Rogers and Commercial Union Ins. Co. applying for certiorari, or writ or review to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Caddo. 349 So.2d 998.

Writ denied.
**EXHIBIT32.01**

 

**Section 1350Certification of Chief Executive OfficerFurnished Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Versant Corporation (the “Company”)on Form 10-K for the year ended October 31, 2004 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, NICKORDON, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

 

1.                    The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934; and

 

2.                    The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresult of operations of the Company for the annual period covered by theReport.

 

 
| /s/ Nick Ordon                        |   |
|---------------------------------------|--------|
| Nick Ordon                            |
| President and Chief Executive Officer |
| February 28, 2005                |

 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by section 906has been provided to Versant Corporation and will be retained by VersantCorporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

 

----